Contributions To Phenomenology 80

Tziovanis Georgakis
Paul J. Ennis *Editors*

Heidegger in the Twenty-First Century

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Nicosia, Cyprus — Tziovanis Georgakis
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Martin Heidegger Abbreviations

BH	'Brief über den "Humanismus."' In *Wegmarken*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 9*, 313–364. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.
BW	'Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft.' In *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*: *Band 1*, edited by Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto Pöggeler, 5–27. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
BWD	'Bauen Wohnen Denken.' In *Vörtrage und Aufsätze*, 139–156. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004.
DD	'Das Ding.' In *Vörtrage und Aufsätze*, 157–179. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004.
DS	'Nur noch ein Gott "kann uns retten"' *Der Spiegel*, 21st March 1966, 280–287.
FD	*Die Frage nach dem Ding*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1987.
FNT	'Die Frage Nach der Technik.' In *Vörtrage und Aufsätze*, 9–40. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004.
GA 1	*Frühe Schriften*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 1*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.
GA 2	*Sein und Zeit*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 2*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.
GA 3	*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 3*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
GA 6.1	*Nietzsche I*, edited by Brigitte Schillbach. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 6.1*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996.
GA 6.2	*Nietzsche II*, edited by Brigitte Schillbach. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 6.2*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997.

GA 7 *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 7*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000.

GA 8 *Was heißt Denken?*, edited by Paola-Ludovika Coriando. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 8*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.

GA 11 *Identität und Differenz*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 11*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006.

GA 12 *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 12*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985.

GA 14 *Zur Sache des Denkens*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 14*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007.

GA 20 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, edited by Petra Jaeger. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 20*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979.

GA 24 *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 24*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975.

GA 26 *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, edited by Klaus Held. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 26*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.

GA 27 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, edited by Otto Saame and Ina Saame-Speidel. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 27*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996.

GA 28 *Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*, edited by Claudius Strube. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 28*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997.

GA 29/30 *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 29/30*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.

GA 32 *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, edited by Ingtraud Görland. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 32*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980.

GA 33 *Aristoteles, Metaphysik IX, 1–3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*, edited by Heinrich Hüni. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 33*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981.

GA 38 *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, edited by Günter Seubold. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 38*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998.

GA 39 *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein,'* edited by Susanne Ziegler. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 39*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980.

GA 40 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, edited by Petra Jaeger. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 40*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.

GA 46 *Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemäßer Betrachtung 'Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben,'* edited by Hans-Joachim Friedrich. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 46*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2003.

GA 50 *Nietzsches Metaphysik / Einleitung in die Philosophie—Denken und Dichten*, edited by Petra Jaeger. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 50*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990.

GA 51 *Grundbegriffe*, edited by Petra Jaeger. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 51*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981.

GA 54 *Parmenides*, edited by Manfred S. Frings. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 54*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982.

GA 55 *Heraklit*, edited by Manfred S. Frings. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 55*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979.

GA 60 *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*, edited by Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly, and Claudius Strube. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 60*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995.

GA 61 *Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, edited by Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 61*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985.

GA 62 *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik*, edited by Günther Neumann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 62*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005.

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GA 66 *Besinnung*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 66*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997.

GA 79 *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*, edited by Petra Jaeger. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 79*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994.

GA 94	*Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*, edited by Peter Trawny. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 94*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014.
GA 95	*Überlegungen VII-XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938/39)*, edited by Peter Trawny. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 95*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014.
GA 96	*Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*, edited by Peter Trawny. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 96*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014.
KE	'Die Kehre.' In *Die Technik und die Kehre*, 37–47. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007.
MWP	'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie.' In *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 81–90. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969.
NWGT	'Nietzsches Wort "Gott ist tot."' In *Holzwege*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 5*, 209–267. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.
SDUR	*Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität / Das Rectorat 1933/34*, edited by Hermann Heidegger. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990.
SG	*Der Satz vom Grund*. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1965.
SZ	*Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006.
UK	'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes.' In *Holzwege*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 5*, 1–74. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.
ÜM	'Überwindung der Metaphysik.' In *Vörtrage und Aufsätze*, 67–95. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004.
VWG	'Von Wesen des Grundes.' In *Wegmarken*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 9*, 123–175. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.
VWW	'Von Wesen der Wahrheit.' In *Wegmarken*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 9*, 177–202. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.
VWBP	'Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1.' In *Wegmarken*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 9*, 239–302. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.
WB	'Wissenschaft und Besinnung.' In *Vörtrage und Aufsätze*, 41–66. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004.
WHD	*Was Heißt Denken?* Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1997.
WM	'Was ist Metaphysik?' In *Wegmarken*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 9*, 103–122. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.
ZS	'Zeit und Sein.' In *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 1–25. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969.

ZSEM *Zollikoner Seminare: Protokolle—Gespräche—Briefe*, edited by Medard Boss. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987.

ZW 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes.' In *Holzwege*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe: Band 5*, 75–113. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.

Chapter 1
Prolegomena to a Twenty-First Century Heidegger

Tziovanis Georgakis and Paul J. Ennis

In his last lecture course given at the University of Freiburg in 1944, right before he was drafted to the German army, Martin Heidegger introduces philosophy as a guide to authentic thinking through the works of Nietzsche and Hölderlin. Right at the very beginning of the lecture, in a paragraph entitled 'The Impossibility of an Intro-duction [Ein-leitung] to Philosophy,' Heidegger bluntly states that 'strictly thought, there is no "intro-duction" to philosophy' (GA 50, p. 90). For Heidegger, whoever plans an introduction to philosophy presupposes that one could possibly stand initially outside it. But such a task is impossible because a human being is a historical being who always already, and essentially, stands within philosophy. Historical humans are philosophical in their essence not because they make use of philosophical knowledge as it has been handed down to them from their intellectual tradition. Rather, as Heidegger notes, 'historical humans reflect [denkt an] the origin and future' out of philosophy, and, 'from the horizon [Gesichtskreis] of such reflection,' they 'think what has been, what comes, and what is present' (GA 50, p. 90). Human beings are philosophical because they have been thinking in accordance to the ways of being which are strictly reflective: poetic and philosophical. Necessarily then, as reflective historical beings, humans always and already philosophize and no longer have the need to be introduced to philosophy.

Nonetheless, the reassurance that humans have always been philosophizing is in no way comforting for us specific humans who have been dealing with philosophical issues for many years. For anyone who wishes to philosophize, the nature,

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history and practice of philosophy are accompanied with a certain level of anxiety. If anything else, the act of philosophizing arouses uneasiness and apprehension resulting from an uncertain anticipation that philosophy as a proper subject matter with certain attributes can be understood and discerned clearly in a pronounced manner. In fact, Heidegger is ready to admit that 'philosophy is not, however, what it widely and continually appears to be: the remote or the beyond of "genuine" life' (GA 50, p. 92). In philosophy, anticipation and apprehension arrive together and consummate an open field of ambiguity and uncertainty, a difficult discourse that is impossible to be condensed and mastered. Heidegger concludes:

> Rather, philosophy as genuine thinking is the continually unknown region in which habitual thinking constantly sojourns without becoming versed or at home in it as the property [Eigentum] that has been allocated to the essence of humans insofar as they are the thinking ones. (GA 50, p. 92)

In any case, thinking in the direction of the question of the meaning of being is that which solely constitutes thinking for Heidegger, and the current volume wishes to provide a rather 'difficult' reflection on what thinking might become after Heidegger's philosophy. The chief significance of this volume for contemporary Heideggerian research is that it navigates its tangled paths and maps out new routes that remain susceptible to hidden bends and twists. At the same time, this volume plays out the diverse and often unpredictable expressions that the question of being can obtain after Heidegger's advent. In a way, then, the presented volume stands in a crucial juncture where Heidegger's perplexing thinking is summoned from many different locations but is also splintered to many other surprising directions.

Hence, the aim of the current volume is to critically expand the current field of research by presenting unfamiliar and unchartered avenues that will guide and carry the Heidegger scholarship into the twenty-first century. Some of the essays—such as the ones by Glazebrook and Story, Tonner and Babich—are intended for a broader audience that might not be well-versed in Heidegger's philosophy. Some other essays—such as those by Haas, Keane and Haase and Sinclair—are more suitable for specialists in Heidegger's thinking. Finally, some essays—including those of Moran, Raffoul and Hogan—are of keen interest to those who are concerned with the intricate relationship between Heidegger and other thinkers such as Husserl and Derrida.

Section I, 'On Methodology: Ambiguity, Transcendence, and Ground,' sets the stage for the volume with three articles emphasizing the importance of methodology for the future of Heidegger studies. In 'The Ambiguity of Being,' Andrew Haas sketches Heidegger's reading of the concept of being in Parmenides and insists on staying true to the question of the meaning of being regardless of its ambiguous nature. In Haas' impassioned plea for faithfulness to Heidegger's original project, we are tasked with learning to think aporetically: to think being by not thinking it. Haas here suggests that readers of Heidegger should adopt a Socratic approach and accept in an ironic way that the act of thinking presupposes that one does not yet think. This ambiguous withdrawal towards the unthinkable that precedes the thinkable remains for Haas the departure for Heideggerian scholarship in the twenty-first century.

Dermot Moran's 'Dasein as Transcendence in Heidegger and the Critique of Husserl' investigates Heidegger's development of the concept of transcendence from the late 1920s to the eventual abandonment of the term in the early 1930s. Moran firstly examines Heidegger's articulation of finite transcendence in terms of his critique of Husserl's notion of the transcendence of the Ego, and he secondly points out the way in which Heidegger offers a re-thinking of the nature of intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. Moran argues that Heidegger does not offer a radical alternative to Husserl's notion of transcendence and concludes that the difference in their conceptions of the notion of worldhood remains to be explored as an important project for the twenty-first century Heidegger studies. He also insists that phenomenology as transcendental philosophy remains in the sphere of correlationism, so recent speculative realist readings of Heidegger could only be viewed with suspicion in the future.

In his 'The Self that Belongs to an Abyssal Ground: Reading Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie*,' Niall Keane explores the complicated relation between self and ground as it is unfolded in Heidegger's work of the late 1920s and 1930s. He argues that Heidegger's philosophical thinking eventually turns to an abysmal ground as the hidden foundation [*fundamentum ab-sconditus*] which claims and responds to the question of the meaning of being and provides an understanding of what it means to be a self. For Keane, the future of Heidegger studies involves the recognition of an essential need for questioning which suspends all seductions of philosophy without necessarily leaving them behind. The real significance of Heidegger's analysis of ground and selfhood is its appeal for a groundless terrain of philosophical deliberation which extends itself in the unknown future.

Section II is entitled 'History, Responsibility and Voice.' It examines the historical, ethical and vocal-poetical in Heidegger's thought and draws conclusions and lessons relevant to the Heidegger scholar of today. In 'History and the Meaning of Life: On Heidegger's Interpretations of Nietzsche's *2nd Untimely Meditation*,' Ullrich Haase and Mark Sinclair investigate Heidegger's recently published seminars on Nietzsche's *2nd Untimely Mediation*, given in 1938 and entitled *On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life* (1874). According to the two authors, the Heidegger of the late 1930s returns to Nietzsche, whom he had earlier appropriated in terms of *Being and Time*, and reworks a different notion of the concept of 'life' that has remained unexplored within his earlier Nietzsche's texts. A careful re-examination of Heidegger's intricate relationship with Nietzsche, according to Haase and Sinclair, has a double significance for anyone who wishes to foresee the advent of Heideggerian scholarship in the twenty-first century. On the one hand, it is still necessary to go through Nietzsche in order to understand Heidegger's transition towards another thinking, which still remains unthought today, since Heidegger's confrontation with philosophy involves Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche. On the other hand, Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche involves Nietzsche's confrontation with philosophy that goes beyond the philosophy of life as it emerges in his *2nd Untimely Mediation*. In effect, as one could infer from this chapter, Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche leaves the philosophical concept of confrontation as such, the confrontation of philosophy with philosophy, open to a transition towards another thinking that is historical and, thus, futural.

In 'The Ex-Appropriation of Responsibility,' François Raffoul argues that both Heidegger and Derrida reverse that metaphysical concept of responsibility in terms of an exposure to the inappropriable: 'inappropriable thrownness and finitude' for Heidegger and 'experience of the im-possible' for Derrida. For Raffoul, a new concept of ethical responsibility can be thought from the inappropriable, an experience that Derrida called 'ex-appropriation.' This ethical responsibility, however, is not a derivative concept of the inappropriable but rather its profound expression or its perplexing event, which remains inexpressible and unforeseeable. As Raffoul claims, responsibility is the invention of the impossible order of the other which constitutes subjectivity as such. Undoubtedly, Raffoul's argument does not merely engage Heidegger's reception in the twenty-first century by highlighting the ethical significance of his thought. It also exposes the way in which ethics itself was given another foundation in Heidegger's writing at the very limits of its aporetic nature, a foundation which necessarily remains inappropriable, surprising and, thus, open to a future response.

Correspondingly, in 'Hearing Heidegger: *Proximities* and *Readings*,' Sinéad Hogan re-interprets Heidegger in view of *téléiopoièse*. This Derridian term responds to a deconstructive reading of Heidegger's thought and provides a spatial and temporal caesura from which Da-sein's *différance* might emerge. Hogan proposes that *téléiopoièse* disrupts Heidegger's analytic of Da-sein insofar as it is an effect encountered in the 'voice of the friend' that brings to an end every relational determination. She finally considers how the ethos of the non-relational positionality of voice in Heidegger's *Being and Time* relates to his critique of the essence of technology. Overall, Hogan does not simply apply deconstruction to reinterpret Heidegger's philosophy and its import in the twenty-first century. She additionally lays bare Heidegger's thinking to a technique and a poetics that are not only future-oriented but also future-producing, i.e., constitutively undecidable. Basically, the space and time of the creative aporia that Hogan locates in Heidegger's thinking keeps open a risky and incalculable hearing of the other and preserves philosophical thinking in its futural dimension.

The last section of this volume is entitled 'Heidegger Applied' and demonstrates Heidegger's appeal to a variety of other discourses besides philosophy and the way his thinking could be creatively approached, utilized and implemented in our century. 'Heidegger and International Development' by Trish Glazebrook and Matt Story is an application of Heidegger's thought in relation to international developmental studies. The authors argue that Heidegger's notion of truth gives sense not only to the historical destining of being but also to cultural difference. By exploring Heidegger's critique of modern thinking and tracing the birth of modern technology in terms of the history of science, they claim that the hermeneutic violence of the mathematical projection of nature carries through the global attack of capital as an inevitable effect of the realization of the essence of technology. Moreover, Glazebrook and Story argue that Heidegger's indeterministic thought helps locate not only the danger but also the saving power of the essence of technology since it offers an alternative human dwelling and a different destining of being that are not so environmentally and politically calamitous to the global South. Finally, the two

authors suggest that a positive research program in the twenty-first century Heidegger scholarship, which their chapter invites, could inaugurate a tangible change in philosophical thinking and public policy, a new beginning that could make possible a progress on pending world crises.

In 'Did *Homo erectus* Dwell? Heidegger, Archaeology and the Future of Phenomenology,' Philip Tonner investigates how modern archaeologists have engaged the thinking of Martin Heidegger. He outlines several crucial appropriations of Heidegger's work and the ways it critically informs archaeology in general and human origins research in particular. Specifically, Toner argues that evidence in the human prehistory gives way for an interpretation of a kind of engagement that begins to 'face up to mortality,' an engagement that prefigures a human dwelling as it is described by Heidegger's phenomenological thinking. This kind of human dwelling—which is not only a mode of engagement but also an interpretive approach—opens up a space for evolutionary and non-anthropocentric approaches that could innovate, diversify and advance archaeology and relevant sciences in the twenty-first century.

The last essay in the volume is written by Babette E. Babich, and it is entitled 'The "New" Heidegger.' She notes that recent discussions on Heidegger's writings on scientific and technological thinking claim that the philosopher has been comprehensively and exhaustively examined and that his phenomenology has little to contribute to philosophy of science and technoscience. Contrary to contemporary criticisms, Babich engages current and crucial issues of transhumanism, technoscience, time and death and argues that Heidegger's thinking still remains to be properly engaged insofar as it remains critical to the way that research schemes—and academic scholarship in general—set up themselves as fully manageable and business-integrated enterprises. For Babich, the current practice of appraising the viability of future research projects based on calculations about their past history is short-sighted since, as Heidegger teaches us, what seems possible to become calculable becomes precisely, through the power of calculation, incalculable. It is a cautious view for the incalculable that calls for thinking and reflection, a sight that keeps the character of genuine questioning and protects against the ephemeral fascination for novelty and progress. In a way, then, a twenty-first century delve into Heidegger's philosophy gives an important prospect not only for the future of philosophical studies but also for the research vistas of humanities and sciences in general.

Let us raise one final question: where is Heidegger scholarship heading for now? If there is a lesson to be learned from the collection of essays that is presented here, an attempt to tackle this question could never hope to be prescriptive about its future direction. We, as editors, rather wish to suggest that contained in this volume is a specimen of the living philosophical tradition itself. It is continuation that prioritizes questioning over answers; it is dissemination that primarily prepares philosophy for philosophy proper. For Heidegger, philosophy proper is 'the questioning of being,' and this characterization of philosophy has a twofold interpretation: (a) the questioning of the beingness of being which gives a priority to the presentation of beings over the truth of being, so it effects the forgetfulness of being and the collapse

of the ontological difference; (b) the questioning of the truth of being which rehabilitates the precedence of being over beings, so it consummates the remembrance of being and the reconstitution of the ontological difference. However, 'both interpretations contain in their unity what is essential to previous and future philosophy and, thus, contains the directive for crossing from the one to the other' (GA 65, p. 424). Thus, with this volume, we admit that we stand in a living, fleeting and forgetful moment whereby the meaning of Heidegger's philosophy of being is presented/represented, appropriated/expropriated in the depths of the twenty-first century. These two contradictory but also complementary acts do not merely repeat and modify Heidegger's thinking but instead unseal it critically to its past and future which remain unconditionally—or, rather, impossibly—open. It is in this sense that this volume is propaedeutic since it simply prepares the Heidegger of the past to presently become the Heidegger of the future.

Nonetheless, each interpretation presented here is a decision. Once a decision is made, we remain at the mercy of its sway. The more we dissect, organize, categorize and rationalize Heidegger's thought, the more difficult it is to remain faithful to its open directive. And yet, paradoxically so, to get back to this unconditional fissure created by Heidegger's thinking, we must, in some sense, be engaged in Heidegger's thinking. In other words, we must make a wager in blind conviction. Our wager here is to walk Heidegger's path in a direction that remains guideless and mysterious. Indeed, Heidegger states the following: 'If phenomenology is thus experienced and retained, it can disappear as a designation in favour of the matter of thinking whose manifestation remains a mystery [Geheimnis]' (MWP, p. 90).

In a sense, then, the wager we make by interpreting Heidegger is to take Heidegger's word as an intriguing enigma. It is an admission that a Heidegger of the past could guide us now into a philosophical future, but this futural terrain of philosophical engagement would not be our habitual lot since it is a well-guarded secret. It is embroiled in this mystery that we dare to sojourn towards the Heidegger of the twenty-first century.

Part I
On Methodology: Ambiguity, Transcendence and Ground

Chapter 2
The Ambiguity of Being

Andrew Haas

> After you had discovered me, it was no trick to find me: the difficulty is now to lose me [nachdem Du mich entdeckt hast, war es kein Kunststück mich zu finden: die Schwierigkeit ist jetzt die, mich zu verlieren].[1]

2.1 Introduction

Each thinker, according to Heidegger, essentially thinks one thought. Plato thinks the idea. Descartes thinks the *cogito*. Spinoza thinks substance. Nietzsche thinks the will to power. If a thinker does not think a thought, then he or she is not a thinker. He or she may be a scholar or a professor, a producer or a consumer, a fan or a fake, but he or she would not be a thinker. Thus, if Heidegger is a thinker, he essentially thinks one thought.

What is Heidegger's one thought? It is neither life nor death, neither me nor you. It is neither technology nor art. It is neither spirit nor language. Heidegger's one thought is being—or more precisely, the question of the meaning of being.

And what is being? It is what calls us to thinking. Is that an answer? Not at all.

Still, we know that this is the question that occupies Heidegger throughout his work; it is the question that poses itself again and again, in everything that he writes, every talk he gives, every text he teaches; it is the question away from which there is no turn. From the *Habilitationsschrift* (GA 1) through his (only) two books, *Being and Time* (SZ) and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (GA 3), from the *Beiträge*

[1] Friedrich Nietzsche signed the above as 'The Crucified' in a letter to G. Brandes, dated 4 January 1889. It is quoted by Heidegger in GA 8, p. 56.

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zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65) to the *Spiegel* interview, Heidegger thinks one thought: being. As he writes in *Being and Time*—in spite of all the talk of *Dasein*, of the world and the worldliness of the world, of the They and being-with, of fear and Angst, idle talk and falling prey, thrownness and care, being-towards-death as the '*possibility of the impossibility of existence in general*' (SZ, p. 262), of authenticity and anticipatory resoluteness, of history and historicity, time and temporality—in spite of all of the aforementioned, we must not forget that 'the actual theme is being [im eigentlichen Thema steht das Sein]' (SZ, p. 67).

And it is this question that is posed again, 25 years later in *What is Called Thinking?* But here, if 'the most-in-need-of-thought, in our most-in-need-of-thought time, is that we are still not thinking [das Bedenklichste in unserer bedenklichen Zeit ist, daß wir noch nicht denken]' (GA 8, pp. 7–8), it is neither simply because of human neglect or indifference, lack of will or lack of means, nor merely because of stupidity or sloth; rather, it is just as much because the '*thing-to-be-thought turns away from humans* [*zu-Denkende selbst sich von Menschen abwendet*]' (GA 6.2, p. 397). It is not because we are too dumb but because we have not yet thought that we have not yet thought; we have not thought because that which is to be thought cannot be thought, or rather only thought as *das Undenkbare,* the unthinkable.[2] And this is the task that Heidegger sets for himself: not a science of being, but a thinking of being—a thinking of being as unthought, as it turns away from us. Then, if we too hope to think this being, we will have to unlearn our normal way of thinking in order to give up our scientific-technological habits—for 'science itself does not think, and cannot think [die Wissenschaft ihrerseits nicht denkt und nicht denken kann]' (GA 8, p. 9) or 'science does not think in the sense of the thinking of the thinker [die Wissenschaft denkt nicht im Sinne des Denkens der Denker]' (GA 8, p. 138). But this is how we must learn to think, if we are to think what calls for thinking, namely, being.

So, what is being? For Heidegger, it is the being of beings—not a being, but *zuvor*, prior (in essence, not simply in time) to beings; it is the origin of beings, that which allows them to be. And we humans, if we are like everything that is, we are related to being, 'determined by being [vom Sein her bestimmt]' (GA 8, p. 13), although our species difference consists in our way of being open to being, called by it to always think it before, *jeweils zuvor*, all else, in everything, *bei allem*, that essentially is (GA 8, pp. 96, 102). Which is why—to answer Leibniz's question—there is something rather than nothing: because of being; being lets it be so. And it does so by giving being to beings, which is why being needs us—for as Kojève writes (albeit with respect to Hegel): 'Without Man, Being would be mute: it would

[2] Heidegger cites Nietzsche: 'Something un-fixed with respect to power, something un-dulant, is *totally unthinkable for us* [Etwas Un-festes von Kraft, etwas Un-dulatorisches ist *uns ganz undenkbar*]' (GA 6.2, p. 286). Metaphysics is nihilism insofar as it throws up its hands and remains caught in resignation and passivity, immobility and indifference when faced with the unthinkable. See also (GA 6.2, pp. 384, 397).

be there, but it would not be true.'[3] Or, to paraphrase Schelling: in us, being opens its eyes and first notices that it is.

But what does this say about being? How does being let beings be? For the being of beings is no answer to the question of the meaning of being; it far more indicates that the question remains. So, what is being?

2.2 The Meaning of Being in Parmenides

In fact, Heidegger answers the question, 'What is being?,' in *What is Called Thinking?* through a translation of Parmenides' fragment: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι. But if 'every translation is already interpretation [jede Ubersetzung ist aber schon Auslegung],' (GA 8, p. 176),[4] we might not be surprised to find Heidegger's thinking of being put into Parmenides' mouth, for (to paraphrase what Heidegger says about his own reading of Kant), 'it may be very bad Parmenides, but it is very good Heidegger.'[5]

Regardless, as we know, Parmenides' text corresponds to Diels Fr. 6, 1–2 (1897, 1903), and this is exactly the text that Heidegger cites. The traditional English translation reads: 'That which can be spoken and thought needs must be,' or 'What can be spoken and thought of must exist.'[6] Is being, then, that which must be? For (in spite of Russell), there obviously seem to be things that can be spoken of, and thought of, which do not necessarily exist; or, alternatively, it is the case that what can be, must be—not to mention the fact that, if the hyperbaton between τὸ and ἐὸν

[3] Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. James H. Nichols (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 188.

[4] As Kojève comments: 'Parmenides' assertion: "Being and Thought are the same thing," can at best be applied only to *true* thought, but certainly not to *false* thought. The false is certainly *something other* than Being. And yet, one cannot say that the false "is nothing," that "there is no" error. Error "exists" in its way: *ideally*, so to speak.' ibid., 187. For Heidegger's interpretive translation of Parmenides' Fr. 3 (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι), see GA 11; for Fr. 8, 34–41, see Heidegger's essay, 'Moira,' in GA 7. For the consideration of ἀλήθεια as *Entbergung* in Parmenides, see *Parmenides* in which Heidegger also considers the essential ambiguity of the Greek tragic word (GA 54, pp. 104–23). For a reflection on Parmenides' ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι [Es ist nämlich Sein], see Heidegger's first published document after 1945, 'Brief über den "Humanismus"' in GA 9.

[5] Bernd Magnus quotes Löwith who notes with respect to *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*: 'Many decades after its publication, after all of its deficiencies had been discussed to death, Heidegger told a friend of mine: "It may not be good Kant, but it is awfully good Heidegger." I feel the same thing can be said of Heidegger's Nietzsche studies: They may not be good Nietzsche, but they are first-rate Heidegger.' See Karl Löwith, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. J. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), xvii.

[6] See G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); G. L. E. Owen, 'Eleatic Questions,' *Classical Quarterly* 10, no. 1–2 (1960): 84–120.

stands, 'the grammar is horrid.'[7] And the text is corrupt and emended since it should read: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τὸ νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι.[8] Kranz therefore revises the German: 'Nötig ist zu sagen und zu denken, daß nur das Seiende ist.'[9] The English should be (something like): 'It is necessary to say and to think that what is is' or 'To say and to think that what is, is, is necessary.'[10]

Heidegger however, attempts to step-back from the 'violence and crudity' of the traditional translations—whether based on the corrupted text or not—in order to hear what each word signifies, before attempting the task of thinking the sense of the fragment as a whole. He writes:

> χρή, needful [useful, given, called, summoned, demanded by the thing that is there, *es gibt,* that we respond to what we use, come into an essential-belonging-together with, *Wesenszugehörigkeit*, admit What and How it properly is, and kept it as it shows itself]: λέγειν to carefully let lie before us [to lay out, glean and gather-together, what was already lying there, present, having appeared, come forward of itself, unfolded of its own accord, and revealed itself as it is] and νοεῖν, to take to heart [*in-Acht-nehmen,* perceiving and receiving, seeing and focusing, keeping and guarding, preserving and continuing, leaving that which is there, what already lies before us, exactly as it is, *gerade so, wie es ist*, by remembering and retelling that it is not thanks to us, but to the thing that is there] that ἐὸν, being [the older Lesbian form of τό ὄν, that to which letting-lie and taking-to-heart refer, namely, What is and the act of being that which is]; ἔμμεναι, is [the infinitive, to be, that which haunts all philosophical discourse and writing, that which calls us mortal beings in all our finitude to thinking]. (GA 8, pp. 196, 199, 206, 208.)[11]

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[7] See Jonathan Barnes, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (New York: Routledge, 1982), 611n.5.; Leonardo Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).; Nestor-Luis Cordero, *Les deux chémins de Parménide dans les fragments 6 et 7* (Paris: Editions Critique, 1984).

[8] This is in accordance with Karsten's 1835 correction in the light of Simplicius' interpretation of Aristotle's *Physics*. See Pierre Aubenque, 'Syntaxe et sémantique de l'être dans le Poème de Parménide,' in *Etudes sur Parménide II* (Paris: Vrin, 1987). See also Jürgen Wiesner, *Parmenides: Der Beginn der Aletheia, Untersuchungen zu B-2, B-3, B-6* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), 10–1.

[9] Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Erster Band*, ed. Walther Kranz, 9th ed. (Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960), 232. Tarán points out that the 'nur' is clearly an embellishment. See Tarán, *Parmenides*: 55.

[10] See John A. Palmer, *Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 110 ff.

[11] I will not here deal with the issue of Heidegger's etymologies. It is clear however, that this strategy is already well-known by Aristotle—which is no wonder, considering that Heidegger advises students to read Aristotle for 15 years before opening Nietzsche (whether he took on this pedagogical strategy himself or not). Aristotle writes: 'you may devise a line of attack by reinterpreting a term in its literal meaning, with the implication that it is most fitting so to take it rather than in its established meaning: e.g. the expression "strong at heart" will suggest not the courageous man, according to the use now established, but the man the state of whose heart is strong; just as also the expression "of a good hope" may be taken to mean the man who hopes for good things. Likewise also "well-starred" may be taken to mean the man whose star is good, as Xenocrates says "well-starred is he who has a noble soul." For a man's star is his soul.' See Aristotle, *Topica*, trans. E. S. Forster, *Posterior Analytics, Topica* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960b), Bk. 2, Ch. 6. So, τοὔνομα ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, ibid., 112a32, is a way of reinterpreting a word by going back to its etymological or literal meaning, translating it back into its own language; and for this reason, all of Heidegger's (oft contested) etymologies are perfectly legitimate *qua* ways of thinking that,

So what then, is thinking? It is the conjunction or sameness, αὐτό (not ὅμοιον) of λέγειν and νοεῖν, of the give-and-take or *Gefüge*, jointure, of *Vorliegenlassen*, letting-lie-before-us and *In-die-Acht-nehmen,* taking-to-heart: 'thinking steps-beyond every being, transcends it in the direction of its being, not in order to leave behind and abandon beings, but so that by this step-beyond, this transcendence, it may represent, what it, *as* a being, is.'[12] Thinking is neither grasping nor attacking, manipulating nor apprehending, conceptualizing nor systematizing; rather, it is going-beyond, μετὰ, in order to (appropriately and befittingly) let that which is thought remain *eine immerwährende Frage,* an everlasting question, a keeping the question questionable. Thinking is, therefore, not answering a question, not deciding upon the indecidable or becoming certain about uncertainty but holding open—and ourselves open to—that which is worth asking, the questionability of the question. And the decisive question is that of the essential nature of being (GA 8, pp. 215–16).

How, then, do we think in this questioning way? Once again, Heidegger is quite clear: by listening to language, to that which language says about being, we hear the being of beings. By thinking about being, giving it the gift of our thoughts, we pay it heed—for 'it is not we who play with words, but the nature of language plays with us [spielen nicht wir mit Wörten, sondern das Wesen der Sprache spielt mit uns] (GA 8, p. 122). In this way, we do not create any concepts, as Deleuze might claim; rather, by turning our attention to the question of being, we discover what was always already there to be found. And with thinking as the step-beyond beings towards being, as the jointure of letting-lie and taking-to-heart, with the leap from our language into Greek, 'we imagine that we have the answer to precisely what is still in question [halten wir genau das für ausgemacht, wonach erst zu fragen ist]' (GA 8, p. 229). For we know that ἐὸν ἔμμεναι means 'being is'—but what does that mean?

In fact, with this question, we touch on the τέλος of thinking, and this is 'the question we stay with [die Frage, bei der wir halten]' (GA 8, p. 234). But this does not mean that we cannot unfold the question's questionability or that we cannot raise questions that look like statements or assertions (what Nietzsche calls 'barbs and arrows'),[13] at least as long as we remember that the question cannot be answered. And thus, we find ourselves in perhaps an embarrassing position: we do not know the meaning of being because we cannot know, although we know that we do not know, and can maintain ourselves in ignorance, which is a kind of knowing of the unknowable.

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under the pretense of returning words to their original or literal sense, seek to illuminate something about the way in which they are spoken.

[12] 'Übersteigt das Denken jeweils das Seiende, transzendiert es in der Richtung auf dessen Sein, nicht um das Seiende hinter sich zu lassen und es preiszugeben, sondern um das Seiende durch diesen Überstieg, die Transzendenz, in dem vorzustellen, was es als das Seiende ist' (GA 8, p. 226).

[13] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1869–1874*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 7* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 29 [222]. The specific fragment can be found on pages 718–19.

Nevertheless, if thinking is listening by leaping into Greek, have we not thought being insofar as we think ἐὸν? On the contrary, we may have said the word, but we have not thought the thought. And the question remains: What is being? What is it that speaks *in jedem Wort*, in every word and *vor allem,* before all else? What is it that maintains the possibility of speaking, the horizon of every statement? What speaks even in that which cannot be spoken? What being is known even if it is unknowable? And thought even as unthinkable?

In fact, whatever it is, we can be sure that being is not a universal genus. As *Being and Time* (§ 7) reminds us, particulars and universals are; so if being is a generic universal, it is not universal enough, and it could not be predicated of beings. As Aristotle writes:

> But it is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of beings; for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentia; so that if unity or being is a genus, no differentia will either have being or be one.[14]

So being is not simply a genus—neither is it merely a predicate, nor a concept like beingness (whether universal, indefinable or self-evident), nor an object, thing or being—although this does not mean that it is not a universal at all. On the contrary, as Heidegger writes: the universality of being is 'beyond every generic universality [übersteigt alle gattungsmäßige Allgemeinheit]'; it is so universal, more universal than any universal, that it is the one and only, *the* absolute *transcendens*, *das transcendens schlechthin* (participle of *transcendere*), the absolute transcending (SZ, § 1). Being is so universal that 'it stands before us before all others, only we do not see it because we stand within it [es steht vor allem anderen vor uns, wir sehen es nur nicht, weil wir darinnen stehen]' (GA 8, p. 102). For 'just as it is with bat's eyes in respect of daylight, so is it with our mental intelligence in respect of those things which are by nature most obvious.'[15] And 'the being of beings is the most apparent; and yet, we usually do not see it at all—and if we do, only with difficulty [das Sein des Seienden ist das Scheinendste; und doch sehen wir es gewöhnlich überhaupt nicht—und wenn, dann nur mit Mühe]' (GA 8, p. 113). As Heidegger writes in the Nietzsche lectures: being *as such*, being itself, being *as* being, being as a whole, as the ἀρχή of being, all being, being insofar as it is being—this being is *more* than any being, *more* than the sum of beings—for 'what is meant is the whole, being taken as a whole from the outset, being taken *as* such unity' (See GA 6.1, pp. 401–15; GA 6.2, pp. 301–61).

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[14] οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἓν εἶναι γένος οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὄν: ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ τὰς διαφορὰς ἑκάστου γένους καὶ εἶναι καὶ μίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην, ἀδύνατον δὲ κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ εἴδη τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκείων διαφορῶν ἢ τὸ γένος ἄνευ τῶν αὐτοῦ εἰδῶν, ὥστ' εἴπερ τὸ ἓν γένος ἢ τὸ ὄν, οὐδεμία διαφορὰ οὔτε ὄν οὔτε ἓν ἔσται. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics: Books 1–9*, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 998b22-27. Cf. also, ibid., 991a. and Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*: 92b13, 1960a.

[15] ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics: Books 1–9*: 993b9-11.

But how is that possible? How can being be more universal than any universal or particular? And then, how can this being be both not a being and in beings, the being *of* beings, especially if it is not simply a universality, merely ideal, and not just beyond beings in some other place, ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας,[16] but rather real and concrete—and so not just a being, although always the being of beings? As Brentano asks: If being is spoken in many ways, τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς (being a thing and being present, being true or untrue, being possible or actual, being necessary or accidental, being with regards to the four causes, being in the mode of the multiple categories), how can it still be being?[17] Or, if 'ever since ancient times being is one (ἕν) [das Sein von altersher das Eine ist (ἕν)],' if 'oneness belongs to the essence of being in general [zum Wesens des Seins uberhaupt gehört Einheit],' how can it be both multiple and a whole (GA 33, pp. 22, 27, 30)?

Aristotle's answer is that being is *like* a category but not identical to one; it is *like* a genus but not one. This does not mean, however, that being is simply equivocal, ὁμώνυμος, for its sameness is not nominalistic; it is not just that the word sounds (or is) the same in different propositions. Nor does it mean that being is merely univocal, for there is then, from Duns Scotus to Spinoza, no way to account for its multiplicity; and this is 'the night in which all cows are black' (Hegel). But nor does this mean that being is (in accordance with Thomas' interpretation) simply analogous, ἀναλογικός, to beings but not a being—for if God as *summum ens* is supposed to be a being, although completely different and separate from beings, unlike any being, but beyond all beings, then God cannot be like us in anyway whatsoever, much less with respect to being (*finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio*—Thomas). If we and God both are beings, if *ens finitum* and *ens infinitum*, *ens creatum* and *ens creans*, are all *ens*, then the essential difference between us is erased. There is supposed to be an analogy between being and beings, but if they are alike, then how to explain their difference? As Heidegger notes, Meister Eckhart sought to resolve this aporia by arguing that 'God "is" not at all, because "being" is a finite predicate and absolutely cannot be said of God [Gott "ist" überhaupt nicht, weil "Sein" ein endliches Prädikat ist und von Gott gar nicht gesagt werden kann]' (GA 33, p. 46). But, for Aristotle, the answer to the question of the meaning of being is that beings are with reference to being, πρὸς ἕν. As Cajetan notes (*De nominum analogia*, 1498), Aristotle only uses ἀναλογία in the mathematical sense of proportion, and he distinguishes focal unity (unity of origin, ἀφ' ἑνὸς) from analogical unity.[18] Being is universal because it is the ἀρχή of beings; it is the answer to the questions: What is? How is being possible? Why is there something rather than nothing?

[16] Plato, *The Republic: Books 6–10*, trans. Paul Shorey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 509b9.

[17] See Franz Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, trans. Rolf George (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975).

[18] GA 33, p. 46. Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), 1096b27-28. For an argument against the traditional interpretation that Aristotle thinks being as analogical, see Pierre Aubenque, 'Les origines de la doctrine de l'analogie de l'être: Sur l'histoire d'un contresens,' *Les Etudes philosophiques* 1 (Janvier-Mars 1978): 3–12. Cajetan is quoted in this article.

For Heidegger, however, the originality of being is not the solution to the questions surrounding being. It is itself *die harteste Aporie*, the toughest aporia. Being is the origin of beings—but what is that? And how do beings originate in being? Heidegger's response is swift:

> Thus, it is necessary to surpass Aristotle, not in a forward direction in the sense of a progression, but rather backwards in the direction of a more original unveiling of that which he grasped. With this we are saying that what is at issue here is not an improvement of the definition, not a free-floating brooding over individual lifeless concepts; rather, this backward-going-beyond is simultaneously in itself the striving through which we bring ourselves again before the actuality that secretly prevails in the dead concepts of the tradition. Whether we succeed here, in this monstrous task or not, is a later care.[19]

Heidegger, then, thinks beyond Aristotle, μετὰ: being is an origin because it is a participle (although not simply a verbal adjective); it is an origin because it participates (μέθεξις, μετάληψις) in two simultaneously (ἅμα) inter-related meanings, substantive and verb, *Nomen* and *Zeitwort*, or rather, verbal noun and nominal verb. Origin means, as Heidegger writes in 'The Origin of the Work of Art,' that from and by which, *woher* and *wodurch*, beings are (GA 5, p. 7). In this way, if being is participial, it is because it is two-fold, *zwiefaltig*, ambiguous, and this is the origin of being's unfolding (becoming, creation, genesis, motion, change). The ontological difference, the oldest difference, the one between being and beings, is grounded on the essential ambiguity of being itself. As Heidegger writes, the difference, *Verschiedenheit*, of being and beings, is only possible on the basis of the difference, *Unterschied,* of ambiguity, *Zwiefalt* (GA 8, p. 232).[20] Heidegger's one thought—if he has one—may, in fact, not be that being is one, a unity, *Einheit* but rather two, double, *zwiefalt*. Indeed, he writes: 'Unity can always only remain the reflection of

[19] 'Es gilt…Aristoteles zu überholen; nicht in der Richtung nach vorwarts, im Sinne eines Fortschritts, sondern rückwarts in Richtung einer ursprünglicheren Enthüllung des von ihm Gefaßten. Damit ist weiter gesagt: Es handelt sich nicht um eine Verbesserung der Definition, um ein freischwebendes Grübeln über einzelne leblose Begriffe, sondern dieses Nachrückwärtsüberholen ist zugleich in sich die Anstrengung, durch die wir uns wieder vor die Wirklichkeit bringen, die in den für die Überlieferung abgestorbenen Begriffen im geheimen waltet. Ob uns hier diese ungeheure Aufgabe gelingt oder nicht, is eine spätere Sorge' (GA 33, p. 82).

[20] Already in 1922, in *Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (GA 61), Heidegger thinks Aristotelian being and φύσις as twofold and ἀρχή as *Auslegung/Verfügung*, that out of which something emerges/that which governs and preserves something's ordering. The oneness of being is, therefore, understood as the unity through which the many are originally gathered by virtue of which they essentially belong-together, a πόλεμος of λόγος. See Walter Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 14, 34, 37. For an interpretation of the original Greek insight that being and non-being (nothing) simultaneously (ἅμα) are—but are not the same, see Jacques Derrida, 'Ousia et grammè: note sur une note de *Sein und Zeit*,' in *Marges de la philosophie* (Paris: Minuit, 1972), 31–78. For Levinas' argument that truth is paradoxical, amphibological, essentially ambiguous, see Emmanuel Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 65, 75, 79.; Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2005), 25; Emmanuel Levinas, *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1974), 149n.

difference and never lead to the origin, out of which this difference can be seen as no longer original.'[21] The essence of the origin is participation, and the essence of participation is ambiguity. And the essence of ambiguity? The aporia of ambiguity? If both meanings of being are always in play, the uncertainty of both is irreducible. Ambiguity is maintained, just as they belong-together and both remain possible.[22] Thus, the essence of ambiguity is uncertainty.

And this is what is to be thought—for the origin of thinking is not thinking; it is being, the being thanks to which all beings are (through their ontological difference), and the being that is itself twofold, ambiguous: that which is must be thought as *what* is (substantive, noun, *that* which is) and what *is* (verb, *Zeitwort*, act of being, that which *is*). And thinking is paying heed to the uncertainty characterizing being's ambiguity, discovering the original twofold meaning of being *qua* twofold. It is perhaps no surprise then, as Heidegger says in the *Rektorratesrede,* that thinking means '*questioning, unguarded standing-of-one's-ground in-the-midst of the uncertainty of beings as a whole* [*fragenden, ungedeckten Standhaltens inmitten der Ungewißheit des Seienden im Ganzen*]' (SDUR, p. 14).[23] A reduction of uncertainty

[21] 'Einheit kann immer nur der Widerschein des Unterschiedes bleiben und niemals in den Ursprung führen, von dem aus diese Unterscheidung als nicht mehr ursprüngliche ersehen werden kann' (GA 65, § 132).

[22] Although I do not have the space to take up the relationship between Hegel and Heidegger, it is clear that Hegel is assumed here to belong to the history of philosophy of metaphysics since Hegel is taken to have resolved the aporia of being: being and nothing are the same, namely, moments of the movement of the concept of becoming and every concept is said to follow the logic of supersession, sublation, *Aufhebung*, through which contradiction is overcome. For Hegel, however, *aufheben* is ambiguous: 'to give, like to supersede, two-meanings: (a) to give *up*—to view it as lost, destroyed; (b) [to *give*]—but even therewith *simultaneously*, to make it into a problem, whose content is not destroy; but which is saved and whose distortion is a difficulty to be solved [Aufgeben, wie Aufheben, doppelsinnig: (a) Aufgeben—es als verloren, vernichtet betrachten; (b) [Aufgeben]—eben damit aber zugleich es zum Problem machen, dessen Gehalt nicht vernichtet ist, sondern der gerettet und dessen Verkümmerung, Schwierigkeit zu lösen ist],' See G. W. F. Hegel, *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831 (Werke 11)* (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986a), Aphorism 52, 574. In order to fulfill his own *Abgrenzungsbedurfnis*, his need to differentiate himself over and against another, Heidegger interprets Hegel as one-sided philosophy of (absolute) consciousness and (absolute) subjectivity, as the logical conclusion of Cartesianism, and as incapable of maintaining aporia. But, for Hegel, 'all things are contradictory in themselves, and in fact, in the sense that this sentence, as opposed to all others, much more expresses the truth and essence of things [alle Dinge sind an sich selbst widersprechend, und zwar in dem Sinne, daß dieser Satz gegen die übrigen vielmehr die Wahrheit und das Wesen der Dinge ausdrücke].' See G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik 2 (Werke 6)* (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986b). See particularly, *Lehre des Wesens*, Kapital Zwei, C. Der Widerspruch, Dritte Anmerkungen. Nevertheless, the debt to Hegel is clear; the last line of Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift* points towards a 'Philosophie des lebendigen Geistes, der tatvollen Liebe der verehrenen Gottinnigkeit' (GA 1, p. 410; cf. GA 8, p. 141). I have tried to think through some of these issues in Andrew Haas, 'Being and Implication: On Hegel and the Greeks,' *Cosmos and History* 3, no. 3 (2007a): 192–210.

[23] See also Günter Figal, *Martin Heidegger zur Einführung* (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1992). I have taken up the task of addressing these issues in Andrew Haas, *The Irony of Heidegger* (London: Continuum Books, 2007b). See particularly Chaps. 2 and 5. In many ways, it seems that Heidegger is thinking that which Keats notes in a letter to his brothers George and Thomas, dated December 21, 27 (?), 1817: 'I mean Negative Capability, that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties,

to certainty, even to a certain uncertainty, like the disambiguation of ambiguity, means that we fail to think being *qua* being, being as participial, both substantive and verb. A *double-entendre* limited to a single *entendu* no longer functions; but the event that holds both senses of being together is the λόγος of their πόλεμος, the truth of being's original ambiguity, and that which Heraclitus simply called 'beauty,' καλόν.[24]

2.3 The Irony of Thinking

The ambiguity of being, then, is to be thought as the origin, and thinking is taking the essential uncertainty of ambiguity to heart. But if being is ambiguous, how can it show itself to us as that which allows what-is-present to come to presence? Will we be able to think it as that which has been forgotten, that which remains unnoticed and unthought? For how can we think ambiguity *qua* ambiguous, or the uncertainty of uncertainty? Is it possible to take being to heart without translating it into the language of metaphysics? Without transforming possibility into actuality, or interpreting every question as an answer? Without telling the secret? Without solving the riddle? Without making the trust needed for promising superfluously, by forcing it into the *Gestell* of a contract, thereby turning the gift into exchange? Without determining the indeterminable or deciding upon the indecidable?

In fact, according to Heidegger, the history of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche, thinks not—and like Bartleby, it prefers not to—for it is the history of the disambiguation of the ambiguity of being, or the bringing-to-presence of the unambiguous determination of ambiguity as ambiguous, deciding on indecidability, determining indeterminacy, being certain of certainty and uncertainty. For Heidegger, however, this way-of-thinking is a lack-of-thinking that serves to conceal the possibility of thinking the original ambiguity of being; it is the demystified mystery, the solved puzzle or resolved enigma, the fulfilled promise, the answered question.[25] As soon as being is announced as twofold, metaphysics restricts it to a single meaning: the question of the meaning of being is answered with presence, *Anwesenheit*. Beings are immediately given the dominant interpretation of present-beings, that which endures in the encounter with what comes to presence, manifests itself as a being, as being here; so, what waits to be encountered by us [uns Gegenwärtiges], prevailing in the presence of what is present, is the unconcealment of beings.[26] The history of philosophy as metaphysics, that is, the philosophy of

Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.' See Grant F. Scott, ed. *Selected Letters of John Keats* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 60. I have most recently taken up this question in Andrew Haas, "Truth Beauty," *Cordite*, Vol. 47, 2014.

[24] See GA 40, p. 140.

[25] See GA 6.2, p. 369.

[26] See GA 8, pp. 236–37. In the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger also refers to the indeterminacy and Janus-head, *Doppelgesicht*, of 'being' and 'is' (GA 6.2, p. 224). With respect to the understanding

presence, therefore, calls for destruction. The γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας, the battle of the giants concerning being, is essentially a duplicitous battle concerning duplicity. The fight over being is really over ambiguity: its possibility or impossibility, its truth or non-truth, its good or evil (ethics), its beauty or ugliness (aesthetics), its presentability or representability, its knowability or not (epistemology), or its acceptability or not—or not.

So what does Heidegger think? Is it possible to think the hardest aporia, the aporia of being in all its ambiguity and uncertainty? He is quite clear: it remains undecided, *nicht entschieden* (GA 8, pp. 162, 239). And this is why *What is Called Thinking?* ends with a question—which is to say, it never ends, but far more continues on the way towards an unattainable τέλος (an infinite goal/end—like the Hegelian end of art). Heidegger writes: 'Can thinking take this gift into its hands, that is, take it to heart, in order to entrust it in λέγειν, in the telling statement, to the original speech of language?'[27] The question remains. The question of thinking continues to be questionable; the question of the meaning of being is still a question. For the essential ambiguity of being is escaping thought, always withdrawing from our grasp, and the indecidability of the undecided remains to be thought. And this is why 'we are still not thinking; none of us, including me who speaks to you, me first of all [wir noch nicht denken; wir alle noch nicht, der Sprecher mit einbegriffen, er sogar zuerst]' (GA 8, p. 17).[28]

And yet, if we are still not thinking, only underway to thinking, then are we not thinking? Thinking that we are still not thinking? In this way, Heidegger is perfectly Socratic: he thinks That and How he cannot think, just as Socrates (ironically) knows that and how he does not know—and this may be the only advantage he has over his interlocutors who just think they know. As Heidegger insists: thinking thinks the 'unthinkable' (GA 6.2, p. 360). And this may be why Socrates, 'the purest thinker of the West [der reinste Denker des Abendlandes],' wrote nothing but rather placed himself in the withdrawal of that which exceeds any thinking whatsoever (GA 8, p. 20). Instead of submitting to the violence of disambiguation, translation, decision, objectification, subjectification, presentation, representation, writing—even speaking or remembering, thinking or thanking, indicating or pointing, showing or signing, standing or placing—the thinker of the question of the meaning of being withdraws into ambiguity, leaps into non-translation, steps into uncertainty, refuses to simply say Yes or No, to be For or Against. For if being remains con-

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of truth, see not only *Being and Time* (in which *Dasein* is always in the truth and the untruth), but also GA 54, p. 241.

[27] 'Vermag das Denken diese Gabe in seinen Empfang und d.h. in die Acht zu nehmen, urn es im legein, in einem Sagen dem ursprünglichen Sprechen der Sprache anzuvertrauen?' (GA 8, p. 247).

[28] Levinas writes: 'There is, according to Heidegger, a circuit which leads each moment of our existence to the task of existing; thus in turning the handle of our door we open up the totality of existence.' See Levinas, *Existence and Existents*: 36. Levinas' argument with Heidegger however, is that, although being is the being of beings, it is not always the being of beings; on the contrary, being *qua* being, being itself, is the other of the being of beings. If being is not a being, then the ontological difference means that being arises from a hypostasis, and being and nothing are phases of a more general *es gibt, il y a,* there is. See ibid., 5.

cealed, remains obscure—precisely insofar as beings appear, come to presence and make themselves presentable, or rise into unconcealment—then the only way to do justice to it, to the truth of its ambiguity, would be to let it remain as it is, withdrawn.[29]

But what is the origin of being's withdrawal? What makes it withdraw? What makes it show itself as beings? What makes it the presence of what is present? From and through what does that happen? What drives the withdrawal of being, if it is neither lack nor desire (like Plato's lovers in *The Symposium*, like Aristotle's divine thought-thinking-thought that we want to imitate, or like our nature to know, as described in the opening line of *Metaphysics*), neither goodness nor love (like the Judeo-Christian God), neither doubt nor the lust to become masters and possessors of nature (Descartes), neither brutishness nor the horror at the state of nature in which all is nasty and short (Hobbes), neither need or negation (Schelling or Hegel), neither the will to self-expression (Spinoza) nor the will-to-power (Nietzsche)?

In fact, for Heidegger, withdrawal is the being of being and belongs to the aporia of being. For ambiguity to remain ambiguous, it must withdraw from us at the very moment we try to disambiguate it. The ambiguity of being, therefore, does not withdraw because it wants to, but because it must, because it can only be that which it is insofar as it withdraws. The withdrawal of being, however, does not originate in a being and is not its self-evidence; it does not come out of the fact that its abyssal infinity is greater than any universal, not because it is larger or wider or deeper than any being (like some kind of little Sileni in the ἀγορά, or the *persona* behind the *persona*), not simply because it is beyond all thinking—for being is thought as unthinkable, that is, thought and not thought. And this is the clue to being's withdrawal: it is the ambiguity that belongs to the essence of being that is the cause, αἰτία, of its withdrawal, that is responsible for its withdrawal from us, from beings, even from itself. In other words, ambiguity is the being of being. And it is perhaps, therefore, no surprise that the twofold or Janus-headed structure of being is the sign of every 'inexhaustible creativeness [das unausschöpfbare Schöpferische].' But this means that at the moment it presents itself as itself, it is no longer itself; and if it does not withdraw, it cannot be what it is. As Heidegger admits: 'The *un*-thought is, in each case, only as the un-*thought* [das *Un*-Gedachte ist je nur als das Un-*gedachte*]' (GA 8, p. 82). So, if being is being, it is not being—although this is not nothing, just as being in *withdrawal* is *being* in withdrawal. Still *not* thinking is still not *thinking*; remaining undecided is still remaining. Continuing to *question* is *continuing* to question; standing one's ground—whether in certainty or uncertainty—is still standing, at least as much as placing oneself in a draft is still placing. And if Heidegger is suggesting that thinking the aporia of being *qua* aporia must endure

[29] See GA 8, pp. 240, 246. Withdrawal is the essence of being's ambiguity, but also of a series of other phenomena (e.g., uncertainty in the *Rektoratsrede*). Thus, the forgetting of being [Seinsvergessenheit] of *Being and Time* is never simply a criticism of Western metaphysics, nor of us, and it is neither just good nor bad, neither merely positive nor negative. As Heidegger says in the *Parmenides* lectures: 'What is happening here proceeds from the very essence of forgetting, which withdraws itself and hides' (GA 54, § 2).

this ambiguity [dieses Zwiespältige aushalten], he must also endure the irony that enduring ambiguity is still enduring.[30]

What can we do, then, when faced with the problem of metaphysics? What can we do when confronted with a promise that only remains promising insofar as it is not fulfilled, when encountering the challenge of recalling the essential ambiguity of being? How can we preserve the unthinkable while still not translating it into the language of the thinkable, the infinite without hypostasizing it into the finite? How can we maintain their contradiction without resolving it? How can we experience uncertainty without impoverishing it in the name of certainty, the negative without reducing it to the positive, or the inexhaustible without exhausting it? How can we experience that which is beyond all possible experience? How can we describe what is essentially indescribable, but not describe it; and determine us as the as-yet-undetermined-animal, without determining us? How can we not decide—even that things are undecided? How can we stand in the withdrawal of being and still not bring it to a stand-still? How can we remember that the question of the meaning of being, and the question itself, has today been forgotten, but still not remember it? How can we notice the unnoticed while still not noticing it? How can we conceal without revealing? How can we prepare for thinking the most thought-provoking thought without having already thought? Is it not maybe by still not thinking?

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[30] See GA 65, §§ 132, 185, 256.

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Chapter 3
Dasein as Transcendence in Heidegger and the Critique of Husserl

Dermot Moran

'*The transcendence of knowledge is what perplexes me*.'[1]

There is a long debate as to whether and to what extent Heidegger may be termed a transcendental philosopher, following in the tradition of Kant and of Husserl (after 1905). Indeed, in one sense, the answer is straightforward. Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* is, by his own admission, an essay in transcendental phenomenology. He writes: 'Every disclosure of being as the *transcendens* is transcendental knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of* being*)* is *veritas transcendentalis* (SZ, § 7, p. 38). Of course, here Heidegger is invoking both the concept of the transcendentals (*ens, verum, bonum, unum*), i.e. the most universal categories that apply to anything, as found in medieval Scholasticism and referring to the transcendental conditions for the possibility of knowledge as in Kant. Heidegger very often speaks of the transcendental conditions of knowledge with an implied reference to subjectivity. At the same time, *Being and Time* presents itself as an anti-subjectivist manifesto, and Heidegger more and more emphasises this anti-subjectivism in his later writings, most notably in the 'Letter on "Humanism"' (GA 9, 1976b). This is puzzling as usually the transcendental turn is understood as a turn towards the subjective grounding of knowledge. How does Heidegger reinterpret the transcendental and especially transcendental subjectivity? What then is his relation to Husserl and transcendental phenomenology?

[1] Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in der Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07*, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 24* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), 398. For the English translation, see Edmund Husserl, *Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge. Lectures 1906/07*, trans. C. Ortiz Hill, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Collected Works, Volume 13* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 398.

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3.1 Between German Idealism and Life-Philosophy

When Heidegger returned from Marburg to Freiburg to take up the Chair vacated by Edmund Husserl on his retirement, he was regarded by the students as someone who had a high regard for German Idealism, specifically Hegel and Schelling, as is evident from his first Freiburg lecture course.[2] Indeed, in a 1927 letter to Heidegger's Marburg colleague Rudolf Bultmann, Heidegger proclaimed:

> The fundament of [my work] is developed by starting from the 'subject,' properly understood as the human Dasein, so that with the radicalization of this approach the true motives of German idealism may likewise come into their own …[3]

In his correspondence with Bultmann, Jaspers and others, Heidegger makes clear that he is seeking to rethink the mode of being of the transcendental subject (opposing all typically Hegelian formulations which he took to be mere dogmas). This rethinking of the subject is informed by his independent reading of life-philosophy [Lebensphilosophie] as he had found in it in the works of Wilhelm Dilthey—it is not clear how much he knew of Simmel. He is drawn especially to Dilthey's account of human being 'as he exists as a person, a person acting in history' [als Person, alshandelnde Person in der Geschichte existiert] (GA 20, p. 163), as Heidegger puts it in his 1925 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* lectures, essentially a first draft that eventually became *Being and Time*. Heidegger was also beginning to confront Kant on whom he had begun to lecture in Marburg in 1925. Indeed, Heidegger writes to Jaspers on 10th December 1925: 'I am beginning to really love Kant.'[4] His relationship with Kant grew in the late 1920s but remained critical. In this regard, he considered that Kant had not properly interrogated the being of the subject. As he wrote in *Being and Time*, '[Kant] failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analysis of the subjectivity of the subject' (SZ, § 6, p. 24). Heidegger had planned to include the 'destruction' of Kant's philosophy in *Being and Time* (as we know from SZ, § 6), but this project had to be postponed to his 1929 *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (GA 3), as he was under pressure to publish *Being and Time* in order to be promoted at Marburg. A decade later, in his 1938 *Beiträge zür Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, Heidegger will speak of 'using force' (GA 65, p. 253) against Kant in order to break open his concept of transcendental subjectivity and its relation to being. Sometime in the 1930s, however, Heidegger came to realize that even his efforts to articulate Dasein as transcendence

[2] See GA 28. Heidegger lectured also on Schelling (1930) and Hegel (1930/1931). See Heidegger GA 32.

[3] Landmesser Christof and Andreas Großmann, eds., *Rudolf Bultmann/Martin Heidegger: Briefwechsel 1925–1975* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 48. See also Otto Pöggeler, *Philosophie und hermeneutische Theologie: Heidegger, Bultmann und die Folgen* (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2009).

[4] See letter of Heidegger to Jaspers, 10 December 1925, in Walter Biemel and Hans Saner, eds., *The Heidegger-Jaspers Correspondence (1920–1963)* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003), 61.

(and as an open projecting) ended up caught in a kind of Platonism and that the whole language of transcendental philosophy is seen as hopeless. He then explicitly abandons the language of transcendental philosophy as is evident in the 'Letter on "Humanism."'

Inspired by Wilhelm Dilthey and, of course, by his reading of Kierkegaard, Eckhart, Jaspers and other more 'existential' thinkers, Heidegger in the 1920s wants to reinterpret subjectivity in a way that conveys its sense of living, temporal historical existence, living a *life* (*Leben*, a term with particular resonance for Dilthey) with all its connotations of immediate insertion into thrownness and absorption in the world and also to gain some kind of authentic stance towards one's temporal existence such that one can, in the Pauline sense, 'seize the time.' As Heidegger had earlier proclaimed in a 1921–1922 lecture course given while he was still at Freiburg, 'the phenomenological category "world" immediately names—and this is crucial—*what* is lived, the content aimed at in living, that which life holds to' (GA 61, p. 86). Indeed, already in 1925, Heidegger had been reading Hegel (in order to lecture on him in his courses) and wrote to Karl Jaspers complaining that Hegel's abstract conception of being, nothingness and becoming showed no true understanding of 'life—existence—process and the like.' He explains:

> He [Hegel] didn't see that the traditional stock of categories from the logic of things and the world is fundamentally insufficient, and that we must question more radically, not only about becoming and motion, happening and *history*—but about being.[5]

The inquiry into being is supposed to revisit the underlying issue that was obscured in traditional ontologies—thinking the uniqueness of human existence and its way of being in time. Heidegger had been seeking a proper way of accessing the specifically human mode of being-in-the-world and a new way of articulating his radical conception of 'concrete [konkret]' human existence. The remarkable result of these interrogations is the ontological analytic of Dasein from the standpoint of temporality in *Being and Time* and specifically its conception of Dasein and its 'thrown-projection' (SZ, § 31).

As is almost too well known and hence its significance has been covered up, in introducing Dasein, Heidegger wants to avoid many of the pitfalls associated with traditional metaphysical concepts of human being—both the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of human being as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον (SZ, § 6) and the traditional Biblical understanding of human being made *in imaginem et similitudinem dei* (SZ, § 10), since they both treat human beings as present-at-hand entities. He also rejects not just a purely biological account of human life but even the attempt by personalism to give a new conception. In this regard, Scheler's conception of the human being as a person is given acknowledgement, even if in the end it is regarded as unclear and not penetrating through to an ontological conception. Heidegger regards the current interest in 'personalism' as shallow. The being of the person has not been interrogated in positive terms, and the phenomenologists have been content to remain with negative characterizations: 'The person is not a thing, not a substance, not an object

[5] See Heidegger letter to Jaspers, 16 December 1925. Ibid., 62.

[Die Person ist kein Ding, keine Substanz, kein Gegenstand]' (SZ, § 10, p. 48). Here Heidegger links Scheler's account of the person to Husserl's meditations on the person in the then unpublished *Ideas* II where the person is not to be understood as an entity in nature but as a subject who engages in personal and social acts involving mutual recognition of other persons in the 'personalistic attitude [die personalistische Einstellung].' Heidegger, although he acknowledged the influence of Husserl's analyses in *Ideas* II, is not happy that Husserl continues to talk of human being in terms of the layering of body, soul and spirit, which he sees as continuing a stale Cartesian ontology (or set of regional categories—consciousness and nature).

Most especially, however, Heidegger is deliberately targeting and rejecting in these opening chapters his mentor Husserl's interpretation of human being in terms of the stream of consciousness [Bewusstseinsstrom] (which he sees as bedevilling modern psychology) and of intentionality. He does take over Husserl's conception of human being as being in an 'environing world [Umwelt],' but he reinterprets intentionality in terms of transcendence towards this world. As Heidegger will state in his essay 'Vom Wesen des Grundes' ('On The Essence of Ground', VWG),[6]

> We name *world* that *towards which* Dasein as such transcends, and shall now determine transcendence as *being-in-the-world*. World co-constitutes the unitary structure of transcendence; as belonging to this structure, the concept of world may be called *transcendental*.[7] (GA 9, p. 139)

Furthermore, in offering a re-interpretation of Kant's conception of world (as unconditioned totality), Heidegger suggests that Dasein comes to be itself *from out* of the world. It is first out there in the world and then comes to grasp itself. This relation of Dasein to world inevitably leads to the misconstrual of the world as something subjective. Heidegger writes:

> . . . the task is to gain, through an illumination of transcendence, one possibility for what is meant by 'subject' and 'subjective.' In the end, the concept of world must indeed be conceived in such a way that world is indeed subjective, i.e., belongs to Dasein, but precisely on this account does not fall, as a being, into the inner sphere of a 'subjective' subject. (VWG, p. 158 GA 9)

Transcendence has to be thought as a new way of thinking human Dasein in a non-subjectivist manner. Dasein is 'always already [immer schon]' out there, available, public, caught in the network of social practices.

In *Being and Time*, as is well known, Heidegger more or less abandons or even suppresses the Brentanian/Husserlian concept of intentionality and replaces it with his existential analytic of Dasein in the course of which he emphasizes Dasein's finite transcendence, attempting to wrest the thinking of transcendence away from the associated notion of attaining of a timeless Platonic realm. In fact, despite the emphasis placed on it by his mentor Husserl, the text of *Being and Time* contains

[6] The essay written in 1928 and contributed to Husserl's seventieth-birthday *Festschrift*, published as a supplementary volume to the *Jahrbuchfür Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* in 1929 and reprinted in *Wegmarken* (GA 9, pp. 123–75).

[7] 'Wir nennen das, *woraufhin* das Dasein als solches transzendiert, die Welt und bestimmen jetzt die Transzendenzals *In-der-Welt-sein.*' (GA 9, p. 139)

only two brief references to intentionality: a critical remark regarding the inadequacy of Max Scheler's analysis of the person as the 'performer of intentional acts [Vollzieher intentionaler Akte]' (SZ, § 10, p. 48); and a single—important but dense—footnote on intentionality as 'grounded in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein' (SZ, § 69 (b), p. 363), a remark to which we shall return later in this chapter.

Heidegger, of course, did have plenty to say about intentionality elsewhere, especially in his Marburg lectures leading up to *Being and Time*. In general, and among many other criticisms, in his lectures from 1925 to 1929, Heidegger persistently portrays Husserlian phenomenology—not entirely unjustly given the 'Cartesian way' that Husserl seemed to emphasize in his public pronouncements—as in the grips of an un-interrogated Cartesian metaphysics (which is also Heidegger main complaint about Kant). To overcome this supposed defect, Heidegger proposes instead to address the ontological 'question of the being of the intentional [die Frage nach dem Sein des Intentionalen] (GA 20, § 12, p. 148),' as he puts it in his 1925 lectures on *The History of the Concept of Time*. The suggestion seems to be that Husserl—who he acknowledges has played a key role in the revival of ontology in the twentieth century, overcoming its neglect in Neo-Kantianism—lacks a 'concrete' (a heavily loaded term for Heidegger) ontological understanding of consciousness and of intentional life in its dynamic lived capacity, something he finds better articulated in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, for instance, or in St. Paul. Heidegger does not want to reject intentionality entirely. He states that it is not so much intentionality itself that is problematic but rather what is presumed within its structure:

> It is not intentionality as such that it is metaphysically dogmatic but what is built under its structure [Struktur], or is left at this level because of a traditional tendency not to question that of which it is presumably the structure, and what this sense of structure itself means. (GA 20, p. 63)

According to Heidegger, the *relation* of the act of intending to its object have been left completely obscure, and, in phenomenological investigation, the word 'intentionality' is the very last one that should be used as a phenomenological slogan (GA 20, § 5). In other words, Heidegger is criticising Husserl and his phenomenological followers for not really offering an analysis of the nature of the transcendental 'correlation' between noesis and noema in the intentional relation. Heidegger wants to make the correlation itself thematic. He is not, pace Quentin Meillassoux and his followers, rejecting correlationism per se. In fact, the choice of the term Dasein is precisely the highlight the 'place' where the correlation between being and its manifestation comes to light.

In his Marburg lecture courses from 1925 onwards, Heidegger had been carefully preparing the way for this shift from Brentanian and Husserlian intentionality to what he calls in 1925 'the being of the concrete entity called man' (GA 20, p. 148). He now explicitly proclaims that the intentionality of consciousness (and indeed the noetic-noematic structure as proposed by Husserl) has to be rethought in terms of the very peculiar transcendence of Dasein which is not simply that a present-at-hand entity has some special quality that raises it above other entities in the world. Dasein is never a present-at-hand object. Heidegger further claims that

the manner in which beings have been revealed in the 'natural attitude' (Husserl's 'die natürliche Einstellung') has been understood naturalistically—the human being has been interpreted as experiencing itself zoologically as a 'ζῷον,' a living being that is part of the world (GA 20, § 12). This itself, for Heidegger, is a tremendous distortion and indeed reduction of the truly radical character of human existence as disclosive of truth, of human existence in its phenomenality.

Furthermore, only an inquiry into the manner in which human beings live in their 'everydayness' can begin to disclose a right way of interpreting human existence and its temporality. One cannot simply start to understand human beings by fastening upon some trait, e.g. rationality. Humans live their lives out and make their lives meaningful. Everydayness [Alltäglichkeit] itself, of course, is just the proximal point for beginning the investigation into Dasein. As Heidegger will clarify in the 'Letter on "Humanism,"' everydayness is not some sociological way of portraying human existence (such as one will find in Henri Lefebvre) nor is it any kind of moral or normative category ('normal' life); rather, it is a way of articulating phenomenality, disclosure and the truth of being (GA 9, p. 332).

In his Marburg lectures, Heidegger is especially critical of Husserl's allegedly Cartesian construal of the traditional concepts of 'transcendence' and 'immanence,' terms upon which Husserl relies heavily in *Ideas* I. At this time (and well into the 1930s), Heidegger himself, somewhat ironically, also makes considerable use of the concept of transcendence. Indeed, throughout *Being and Time*, there are strong hints that the meaning of being should be thought in terms of transcendence.[8] Being is simply transcendence, Heidegger remarks—although it is not clear from the context if he is really endorsing this statement or simply summarising a typical view from the tradition that 'Being is the *transcendens* pure and simple [Sein ist das transzendens schlechthin]' (SZ, § 7, p. 38).[9] In his 'Letter on "Humanism"' (1947), Heidegger returns to gloss this phrase as it appeared in *Being and Time* and, this time, construes it in terms of his own 'correlationist' approach:

> The introductory definition, 'Being is the *transcendens* pure and simple,' articulates in one simple sentence the way the essence of being hitherto has been cleared for the human being. This retrospective definition of the essence of the being of beings from the clearing of beings as such remains indispensable for the prospective approach of thinking toward the question concerning the truth of being. (GA 9, p. 337)[10]

[8] At the outset of *Being and Time*, Heidegger refers to being [*Sein*] as that which, according to Aristotelian philosophy, 'transcends' the categories. In this regard, the Scholastics referred to being as '*transcendens*' (SZ, § 1, p. 3). The transcendentals are those characteristics of being that lie beyond every genus (SZ, § 4, p. 14).

[9] Heidegger seems to say this more as a kind of statement that is in one sense obviously true and, in another sense, has never been interrogated as to its deeper meaning. It is, as it were, a truism, what Aristotle calls a commonly held opinion.

[10] Heidegger's 'Letter on "Humanism"' was originally written to the French philosopher Jean Beaufret in 1946 as a response to certain questions put to Heidegger regarding his relations to Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism. In his letter, Heidegger believes 'humanism' is an essentially metaphysical position deriving from Roman philosophy that fails to capture what is essential to human existence. He writes: 'Humanism is opposed because it does not set the *humanitas* of the human being high enough' (GA 9, p. 330).

The point is that being has been understood as 'transcendence' in one way or another by the philosophical tradition. That is the way being has revealed itself, but the manner—or even more importantly the *site*—of this revealing has not been articulated. As we shall see, Heidegger offers a number of interpretations of what 'transcendence' means in the philosophical tradition and attempts a new account while still retaining in the language of the tradition (later he abandons this attempt as mistaken). But, at least in the 1920s, he is also insistent, in many different places in his lectures, in interpreting what Husserl calls 'intentionality [Intentionalität]' in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. What remains puzzling is that, although Heidegger is critical of Husserl's retention of and interpretation of the terms transcendence and immanence, he himself continues to work within the same contrast of immanence/transcendence, albeit offering new connotations to these terms and ignoring the fact that Husserl too claimed to be investing these terms with entirely new—and phenomenologically grounded—meanings. We shall have to examine Husserl's new conception of 'transcendence in immanence' or 'immanent transcendence' to see if Heidegger is right to criticize him for Cartesianism and to see whether Heidegger can offer a new way of thinking the relation between immanence and transcendence.

Although intentionality appears rarely in *Being and Time*, Heidegger offers extensive discussion of the concept in his lecture courses both in Marburg (especially 1925) and again when he returned to Freiburg (at least until around 1931). Thus, in his 1928 *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* lecture course at Marburg, he writes that 'the intentional relation must be founded on the 'being-with [Sein-bei],' or 'being-by,' of Dasein (GA 26, p. 168). He goes on to characterize intentionality as a form of 'ontic' transcendence that can only be understood if Dasein's more basic 'ontological' transcendence is understood (GA 26, p. 170). Heidegger is trying to understand how Dasein ontologically transcends: how his mode of being is already 'beyond' beings and actually functions to display or disclose being. In invoking this peculiar conception of transcendence, Heidegger appears to be striking out on a path quite different from Husserl's eidetic phenomenology of consciousness and its intentional 'achievements [Leistungen].'

Heidegger's relationship to the concept of 'transcendence' is most complicated and clearly evolves in the course of his thinking. He struggles to articulate the centrality of the designation of transcendence in relation to Dasein without repeating the old conceptions of 'transcendence.' His new approach is to link transcendence to both the questions of grounding and of truth. In the late 1920s, he often describes Dasein as itself transcendence, by which he means that it essentially involve or even is a 'stepping over,' a 'passage across,' a 'surpassing.' He uses both nominal and verbal forms: *Transzendenz*, *transzendieren* [to transcend] as well as equivalent terms, in particular *übersteigen* [to climb over, surmount, exceed, transcend] and *überschreiten* [to cross, exceed, and also to overstep, to transgress]. As he puts it in his last Marburg lecture course of 1928, 'Dasein is itself the passage across [Das Dasein selbst ist der Überschritt]' (GA 26, p. 211). In general, as in '*Vom Wesen des Grundes*' (1928), he interprets the meaning of transcendence quite traditionally: 'transcendence means surpassing [Transzendenz bedeutet Überstieg]' (VWG, p. 137.) But he also links transcendence to the individuation of Dasein and its

becoming a *self*: 'Transcendence constitutes selfhood,' he proclaims in the same essay (VWG, p. 137). He asserts that transcendence is something that belongs uniquely to Dasein as what fundamentally constitutes its being (VWG, pp. 136–37), but he seems not to be able to incorporate a clear account of the manner in which Dasein's ecstatic existence of thrownness and projection somehow are also to involve the notions of inauthentic and authentic selfhood.

In his 'Letter on "Humanism"' (1947), Heidegger—and this reiterates remarks he had already made in the late 1920s—explains one traditional meaning of transcendence as found within Christianity: God is *beyond* the world. The transcendent means that which is *beyond the sensible*—beyond the flesh:

> The reference to 'being-in-the-world' as the basic trait of the *humanitas* of *homo humanus* does not assert that the human being in merely a 'worldly' creature understood in a Christian sense, thus a creature turned away from God and so cut loose from 'Transcendence.' What is really meant by this word would more clearly be called 'the transcendent.' The transcendent is a supersensible being. That is considered the highest being in the sense of the first cause of all beings. (GA 9, pp. 349–50)

The later Heidegger, under the influence of Nietzsche, never wants his conception of Dasein to be mistaken for some kind of anthropology derived from Christian theology that locates human uniqueness in its orientation towards a transcendent infinite being. Human finitude is intimately connected with its disclosive alethic character.

3.2 Heidegger and Jaspers' Conception of Transcendence

In relation to his own understanding of transcendence, Heidegger is quite clearly influenced by his personal contact with Karl Jaspers for whom transcendence is a central concept in his existential account of human existence, a concept found right across his voluminous writings. But one should also not ignore the influence on Heidegger of Max Scheler, who had recently died, and especially his extraordinary *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*,[11] originally delivered as a lecture and then published in 1928. Scheler's work offers a critique of traditional understandings of human nature and a new multi-layered account that in many ways parallels what Heidegger is saying in *Being and Time*.

For Jaspers, as for Heidegger and Scheler, transcendence names something essential about the human condition. For Jaspers, transcendence means first and foremost that which is permanently non-objective. Thus, in *Volume 2* of his three-volume *Philosophy* (1932), Jaspers writes:

> Just as I do not exist without the world, I am not myself without transcendence . . . I stand before transcendence, which does not occur to me as existing in the world of phenomenal things but speaks to me as possible—speaks to me in the voice of whatever

[11] Max Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (Darmstadt: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1928). For the English translation, see Max Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, trans. M Frings (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009).

> exists, and most decidedly in that of my self-being. The transcendence before which I stand is the measure of my own depth.[12]

According to this enigmatic formulation, I primarily experience transcendence in experiencing my own existence as possessing a depth and a range of unactualised possibilities that surpass me and yet make me who I am. Furthermore, Jaspers explicitly relates transcendence to his unique conception of human 'existence [Existenz]'—a term also invoked by Heidegger (SZ, § 3, p. 12). Jaspers writes: 'Existence is the self-being that relates to itself and thereby also to transcendence from which it knows that it has been given to itself and upon which it is grounded.'[13] And again, he notes that 'existence is not a self-contained unity. If there is unity it only is in transcendence.'[14] This is a way of stating that existence is somehow as it were 'outside' itself, displaced into its possibilities rather than situated in the self as a stable entity with fixed properties.

Jaspers is a man of bold pronouncements, of enigmatic and provocative insights, rather than arguments, but he was deeply influential on Heidegger and more so than is often appreciated. Indeed, Heidegger had written to Jaspers on 24 May 1926 (just as *Being and Time* was going to its initial proof stage) that only *he* will understand the true intentions of the work. Heidegger's letter continues:

> From the fact that Husserl finds the whole thing to be off-putting and can no longer find it fit under phenomenology in the usual sense, I conclude that I have *de facto* already gone much further than I believe and see myself.[15]

Indeed, it is precisely as a result of his discussions with Jaspers that Heidegger decided to hold back on printing Part Three of Division One. Jaspers emphasises the historicity (and finitude) of human existence as precisely revealing this transcendence. Thus, Jaspers notes in his *Philosophy of Existence* (1938) that transcendence is revealed through human historicity (a thought Heidegger will develop in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*). He writes: 'Only through historicity do I become aware of the authentic being of transcendence—and only through transcendence does our ephemeral existence acquire historical substance.'[16] I am both inside and outside history. I experience myself historically, but this allows me to see myself in some sense as beyond history.

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[12] Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy, Volume 2*, trans. E. B. Ashton, *Philosophy: 3 Volumes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 45. For the original German collection, see Karl Jaspers, *Philosophie. 3 Bände (I. Philosophische Weltorientierung; II. Existenzerhellung; III. Metaphysik)* (Berlin: Springer, 1932).

[13] Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy of Existence*, trans. R. F. Grabau (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 21. For the original German text, see Karl Jaspers, *Existenzphilosophie* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1938). Although strictly speaking, these written remarks of Jaspers were published after the period we are discussing, Jaspers himself was exploring these issues much earlier than they appear in published form.

[14] Jaspers, *Philosophy of Existence*: 76.

[15] Heidegger letter to Jaspers, 24 May 1926. See Biemel and Saner, *The Heidegger-Jaspers Correspondence (1920–1963)*, 67. See also, Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 483.

[16] Jaspers, *Philosophy of Existence*: 74.

3.3 Transcendence as a Theme in Heidegger's Writings of the Twenties and Thirties

The term 'transcendence' is relatively uncommon in *Being and Time*, but it appears more frequently in Heidegger's writings in the late 1920s and very early 1930s,[17] especially in '*Vom Wesen des Grundes*' (VWG) (1929), '*Was ist Metaphysik*?' (WM) (1929), and *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (GA 3) (1929), all writings that Heidegger himself associates with the overall project of *Being and Time*. The term is discussed critically in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (GA 65) and other writings of the late 1930s. But it reappears in writings such as the 'Letter on "Humanism"' (BH) only to disappear again in the Heidegger of the 1950s. In these 1928 to 1930 writings, Heidegger explicitly ties transcendence to the essence of Dasein but also insists, following Jaspers, that transcendence is an indicator of Dasein's finitude. Thus, he makes statements such as 'transcendence means the being in itself accessible to a finite creature,' 'transcendence is ecstatic-horizontal' (GA 3, p. 114) and that 'ontological knowledge forms transcendence' (GA 3, § 25). It is noteworthy too in this context that Eugen Fink (1905–1975) and Oskar Becker (1889–1964), two of Heidegger's most original and most capable students, also take up the problem of 'transcendence' in their writings in the thirties and make it a central theme.

Indeed, in a somewhat pompous and obscure paper entitled 'Transcendence and Paratranscendence,' delivered at the Ninth International Conference of Philosophy in Paris in 1937 (the so called 'Descartes conference' where National Socialists officially represented German philosophy), Becker, an ardent follower of National Socialism, who was banned from teaching for a time after the war for his anti-Semitic writings, seeks to make a distinction between 'transcendence' and what he calls 'paratranscendence [Paratranszendenz]' and also suggests there is a difference between 'Dasein' and (his own neologism) 'Dawesen' and between the 'ontological difference' and his own 'parontological difference.'[18] Becker's paper did not go unnoticed and was singled out for criticism by Husserl's student Marvin Farber (who had escaped Nazi Germany by moving to the USA) who wrote:

> The linguistic extravagances of Heidegger may be said to have culminated in the vapid straining after unprobed depths which Oskar Becker of Bonn illustrated under the heading of 'Transcendence and Paratranscendence' in the 1937 meeting of the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris.[19]

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[17] For an excellent discussion, see Daniel O. Dahlstrom, 'Heidegger's Transcendentalism,' *Research in Phenomenology* 35(2005): 29–54.

[18] See Oskar Becker, 'Transcendenz und Paratranszendenz,' in *Travaux du IXe congrés international de philosophie. Volume 8. Analyse réflexive et transcendance*, ed. Raymond Bayer (Paris: Hermann, 1937), 97–104. See also Oskar Becker, 'Para-Existenz: Menschliches Dasein und Dawesen,' *Blätterfür Deutsche Philosophie* 17 (1943): 62–95.

[19] See Marvin Farber, 'Experience and Transcendence,' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 12, no. 1 (1951): 20.

Following Heidegger's discussions in '*Vom Wesen des Grundes*' (VWG, pp. 160–62) and elsewhere, Becker distinguishes between the traditional conception of transcendence to be found in Plato (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας)[20] and a new sense of transcendence ('paratranscendence') which ought to give rise to a new science called 'parontology.' Becker asks whether Kant really introduced a double meaning into transcendence or whether something like that distinction already permeated the tradition prior to Kant. The first sense of transcendence he finds in Plato's concept of the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) *beyond* being and in Aristotle's distinction of the difference between being (τὸ ὄν) and beings (τὰ ὄντα). There is a second sense of transcendence in Aristotle, according to Becker, when one says that God transcends things. Becker explains his terms in a way that echoes Heidegger: transcendence means 'stepping-over [Überschreitung]' or 'passing beyond [Überstieg]' or whereas paratranscendence means a kind of 'insurmountability [Unentstiegenheit].'[21] Farber points out that, for Becker,

> 'Unentstiegenheit' is taken to signify something positive because the prefix 'un' suspends the syllable 'ent.' Thus, that which 'gets away' (*entsteigende*) from the existent is to a certain extent caught and held back before it completely 'gets away,' so that 'Unentstiegenheit' is a 'dialectical' term.[22]

Becker equates this kind of 'paratranscendence' with φύσις, with the idea of nature both as supporting and holding back. He attributes this kind of paratranscendence to human existence, now articulated as 'Dawesen.' Becker writes:

> Its mode of living is neither genuine [eigentliche] nor non-genuine (fallen) existence, neither a gaining itself nor a losing itself. It is rather the absence of every kind of self-being, but not in the sense of a total negation, or, rather, of an antithetical, equal position.[23]

Here Becker is changing the emphasis from that found in Heidegger. For Heidegger, it belongs to the transcendence of Dasein to live in a temporal manner and also to live either authentically or inauthentically. Becker seems to be taking Heidegger's anti-subjectivism much further than Heidegger himself would have wanted to go.

3.4 Husserl's Conception of Immanent Transcendence

In his late 1920s writings, Heidegger does not attempt to articulate transcendence in the speculative terms that one finds in his later writings. Rather, his main focus is to criticise Husserl's phenomenology. As is well known, after his discovery of the

[20] Plato, *The Republic: Books 1–5*, trans. Paul Shorey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 509b9.

[21] Becker, 'Transcendenz und Paratranszendenz,' 100.

[22] Farber, 'Experience and Transcendence,' 20.

[23] See Becker, 'Transcendenz und Paratranszendenz,' 104. It is translated in Farber, 'Experience and Transcendence,' 21.

epochē and reduction in 1905, Husserl consistently describes his phenomenology in transcendental terms and explicitly records his debt to Kant and even more to Descartes, the true founder of transcendental philosophy by his recognition that the entire sense and being (*Sinn und Sein*) of the world is the outcome or achievement of the constituting subjectivity of the 'I think.' In *Ideas* I, for instance, Husserl insists that phenomenology is possible only *as transcendental philosophy* and that the correct understanding of the *epochē* and the reduction is essential for understanding the move to the transcendental required by any genuine, ultimately grounded 'first philosophy'.[24] Late works such as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* even present phenomenology not just as transcendental but as the 'final form [Endform]' of transcendental philosophy.[25] In describing the phenomenological domain, Husserl also speaks very often of 'transcendence' and 'immanence,' and, indeed, he even seems to have almost as a slogan the idea that phenomenology is concerned with transcendence-in-immanence. This conception of 'transcendence in immanence' or 'immanent transcendence' makes its appearance probably for the first time in his *The Idea of Phenomenology* lectures of 1907,[26] but it continues to play a central role from *Ideas* I[27] to the *Cartesian Meditations*[28] and then seems to disappear in the later discussions of the 'life-world' in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. In the First Cartesian Meditation, for instance, Husserl speaks of 'immanent

[24] Husserl adopted from Descartes (and of course originally from Aristotle) the idea of an ultimate grounding science which is called *prima philosophia* or 'first philosophy.' Husserl insists that fully clarified transcendental phenomenology (which includes even the 'phenomenology of phenomenology') is the ultimate first philosophy.

[25] Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie*, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 6* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1976a), § 14. For the English translation, see Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), § 14.

[26] Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen*, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 2* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1973a). For the English translation, Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. L. Hardy, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Collected Works, Volume 8* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).

[27] Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die Reine Phänomenologie*, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 3–1* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995). For the English translation, see Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. F. Kersten, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Collected Works, Volume 2* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982).

[28] Edmund Husserl, *Méditations cartésiennes: introduction à la phénoménologie*, trans. Emmanuel Levinas and Gabrielle Peiffer (Paris: Almand Colin, 1931). The German text was not published until 1950. See Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 1* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1950). For the English translation, see Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960).

transcendence.'[29] Phenomenology, using the method of radical bracketing and suspension of all commitments to actuality and being, proceeds in immanence and uncovers the hidden structures of intentional life. At the same time, phenomenology uncovers how transcendence happens, as it were, how a transcendent world comes to be constituted within immanence.

Initially, as in his 1906/1907 lectures on logic and epistemology, Husserl interprets the transcendental problematic in terms of epistemology and a radicalisation of the Cartesian and Kantian problematic of the justification of knowledge as an attainment of objectivity. He speaks of the 'sphinx of knowledge [Die Sphinx der Erkenntnis]'[30]—when we reflect on knowledge, it becomes something mysterious. He goes on to say that 'the transcendence of knowledge is what perplexes me.'[31] In this regard, he asks the question: 'what is immanence and what is "transcendence"?'[32] He asks, adapting Kant's question in his letter to Marcus Herz: 'How can knowledge, through the particular act, the particular series of acts, "reach beyond" and grasp, posit, know something that is valid independently of the individual act.'[33] There is no doubt that Husserl is thinking of Kant and the problem of 'representation.' How does mind transcend its own 'immanence'—its internal relation to its own mental states and their contents (representations)—to reach the thing or object which is defined as that which is outside of or transcendent to the mental state and its content? In fact, in his 1907 *Ding und Raum* lectures,[34] Husserl explicitly invokes Kant's famous 1772 letter to Marcus Herz.[35] He believes that this question of the *Triftigkeit* of knowledge can only be understood if the phenomenological reduction is effected.[36] This reduction brackets nature and all naturalistic understanding of the mind-object relation. We have to explore the essence of knowledge in itself—without reference to nature, in just the same way as we can explore the essence of perception in imagination. The problem is that natural and philosophical 'position-takings' have become mixed up.[37]

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[29] Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*: 134.; Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*: § 47.

[30] Husserl, *Einleitung in der Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07*: 396.

[31] Ibid., 398.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.; Husserl, *Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge. Lectures 1906/07*: 398.

[34] Edmund Husserl, *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907*, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 16* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1973b). For the English translation, see Edmund Husserl, *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Collected Works, Volume 7* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998).

[35] Especially in various writings from the period 1906/1907, Husserl frequently invokes Kant's Letter to Herz. See for example, Husserl, *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907*: 139. He often alludes to Kant's formulation in this letter in his mature works. See, for instance, Edmund Husserl, 'Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie (1917),' in *Aufsätze und Vorträge 1911–1921*, ed. H. R. Sepp and Thomas Nenon, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 25* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), 143.

[36] Husserl, *Einleitung in der Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07*: 400.

[37] Ibid., 402.

More than 20 years later, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl speaks of the problem expressed in Kant's letter to Marcus Herz as being a false problem for phenomenology. It simply formulates the question incorrectly. He asks:

> What does phenomenology's transcendental self-investigation have to say about this? Nothing less than that the whole problem is inconsistent. It involves an inconsistency into which Descartes necessarily fell, because he missed the genuine sense of his reduction to the indubitable we were about to say: his transcendental *epoché* and reduction to the pure ego. But, precisely because of its complete disregard of the Cartesian *epochē*, the usual post-Cartesian way of thinking is much cruder. We ask: Who then is the Ego who can rightly ask such 'transcendental' questions? As a natural man, can I rightly ask them? As a natural man, can I ask—seriously and transcendentally—how I get outside my island of consciousness and how what presents itself in my consciousness as a subjective evidence-process can acquire Objective significance? When I apperceive myself as a natural man, I have already apperceived the spatial world and construed myself as in space, where I already have an Outside Me.[38]

For Husserl, natural life cannot even pose the problem of transcendence; we are always out there in the world. It is only a peculiar (and essentially modern) epistemological approach that can raise this question, and it misses the whole point.

In *Ideas I*, Husserl includes a number of sections where he explains how phenomenology proceeds in immanence and that various forms of transcendence or transcendent entities ('transcendencies [Tranzendenzen]') have to be excluded. These include God, the ego, and the object understood as a real part of the experience. In this sense, what is transcendent is the physical thing which is not a real part of any *Erlebnis* and which has a horizon of profiles other than the one that presents itself to me now in perception. For example, he notes that 'the physical thing is said to be, in itself, unqualifiedly transcendent.'[39] He furthermore elaborates in detail:

> Our considerations have established that the physical thing is transcendent to the perception of it and consequently to any consciousness whatever related to it; it is transcendent not merely in the sense that the physical thing cannot be found in fact as a really inherent component of consciousness; rather the whole situation is an object of eidetic insight: *With an absolutely unconditional* universality and necessity it is the case that a physical thing cannot be given in any possible perception, in any possible consciousness, as something really inherently immanent.[40]

According to Husserl, the physical thing is essentially adumbrated in profiles in all forms of perception, and this eidetic truth holds true even for God. Even God cannot contemplate all dimensions and adumbrations of a physical object at once. The *Erlebnis*, on the other hand, is always given as it is, and this is what allows phenomenological reflection to lay hold of something absolute and be given once and for all. In the application of the reduction, according to Husserl, various kinds

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[38] Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*: 116. Husserl; Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*: § 41, 83.

[39] Husserl, *Ideen I*: 77.; Husserl, *Ideas I*: § 42, 90.

[40] Husserl, *Ideen I*: 77.; Husserl, *Ideas I*: § 42, 89.

of 'trancendencies' have to be excluded, including both God and ego. As he writes, 'The transcendency God excluded [Die Transzendenz Gottes ausgeschaltet].'[41] At the same time, the ego is to be reconceived as a 'transcendency within immanence [eine Transzendenz in der Immanenz]'[42] since it not only seems to be present in every experience but also goes beyond that specific experience as it is present in the entire stream of experiences. Even after excluding these elements, Husserl goes on to exclude essences from the experience:

> Having excluded individual realities in every sense of the word, we now attempt to exclude all other sorts of 'transcendencies.' This attempt concerns the set of 'universal objects,' of essences. They are also 'transcendent' to pure consciousness in a certain manner; they are not found as really inherent within it. Nevertheless, we cannot go on excluding transcendencies without limit; transcendental purification cannot mean an exclusion of *all* transcendencies since otherwise even though a pure consciousness would indeed remain, there would not remain, however, any possibility of a science of pure consciousness.[43]

These processes of methodical exclusion continue to be found in Husserl's later writings, especially *Cartesian Meditations*. But Husserl does not have any further way of articulating precisely what he means by the manner in which various kinds of intentional object 'transcend' the intentional lived experiences which are directed at them. They simply exceed the viewing act.

3.5 Husserl's Interpretation of Immanent Consciousness as Absolute Being in *Ideas I*

The procedure of phenomenological and transcendental reduction is meant to exclude objects that are really transcendent in the old sense and bring in a new way of considering things that asks how they can be constituted in their transcendent features from within consciousness. This seems to be dangerously close to reformulating Herz's problem within phenomenology. Husserl conceives of the phenomenological reduction as in some sense a reduction to immanence, and, furthermore, within this phenomenologically reduced immanent sphere, we somehow discover the roots of the transcendent world. Husserl writes that 'w*ithin*

[41] Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu Einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die Reine Phänomenologie, 2. Halbband: Ergänzende Texte (1912–1929), Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 3–2* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1976b), § 58, 124.; Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*: § 58, 133.

[42] Husserl, *Ideen I*: § 57, 124.; Husserl, *Ideas I*: § 57, 133.

[43] Husserl, *Ideen I*: § 59, 111–12.; Husserl, *Ideas I*: § 59, 135.

this "*original sphere*" (the sphere of original self-explication) we find also a "transcendent world."'[44]

In the *Cartesian Meditations* and elsewhere, Husserl claims phenomenology operates within an entirely new framing of the contrast between the immanent and the transcendent—a new formulation that owes nothing to the metaphysical tradition. In this regard, both Husserl and Heidegger are seeking a new way of understanding the transcendent. Husserl writes in *Cartesian Meditations*:

> This concept of the transcendental and its correlate, the concept of the transcendent, must be derived exclusively from our philosophically meditative situation . . . Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life as a really inherent part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts. This 'transcendence' is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly, despite the fact that anything worldly necessarily acquires all the sense determining it, along with its existential status, exclusively from my experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, valuing, or doing, at particular times notably the status of an evidently valid being is one it can acquire only from my own evidences, my grounding acts. If this 'transcendence,' which consists in being non-really included, is part of the intrinsic sense of the world, then, by way of contrast, the Ego himself, who bears within him the world as an accepted sense and who, in turn, is necessarily presupposed by this sense, is legitimately called transcendental, in the phenomenological sense. Accordingly the philosophical problems arising from this correlation are called transcendental-philosophical.[45]

Transcendence is an intrinsic part of anything worldly. That seems to mean, at least for Husserl, that anything other than conscious processes themselves are given in profiles, are essentially incomplete and are encountered within a horizon of intentional (and hence 'non-real') implication. Husserl goes on to distinguish between different forms of transcendence—in particular, distinguishing between the 'first' transcendence of physical things and the 'second' transcendence of persons. He explicates the phenomenological concept of transcendence in terms of intentional constitution and being somehow generated 'within the ego':

> Transcendence in every form is a within-the-ego self-constituting being-sense. Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being.[46]

Husserl insists on this point: there is no being or sense possible outside of the domain constituted by transcendental subjectivity. He notes:

> Transcendency in every form is an immanent existential characteristic, constituted within the ego. Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being. The attempt to conceive the universe of true

[44] Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*: 135.; Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*: § 47, 104–05.

[45] Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*: 65.; Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*: § 11, 26.

[46] Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*: 117.; Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*: § 41, 83–4. Translation modified.

> being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely nonsense.[47]

Transcendental subjectivity is the 'universe of possible sense.' It is impossible to postulate something beyond it. Every objectivity is what it is precisely through the constitution of transcendental subjectivity. Husserl is clearly interpreting the transcendental in terms of transcendental idealism.

Heidegger was uneasy with these blatantly idealist formulations, which seemed to fall back into the very subjectivist trap from which phenomenology had been trying to escape. Heidegger is also—and this is very evident in the 'Letter on "Humanism"'—trying to combat the impression that somehow Dasein makes things appear and controls the manner of their appearing. Constitution is not to be construed as creation, Heidegger says elsewhere. For Heidegger, Husserl is offering too subjectivist a construal of the peculiar transcendence of Dasein. Heidegger also criticizes Husserl for not having thought through a proper notion of the grounding relation. In '*Vom Wesen des Grundes*,' Heidegger discusses the problem of 'ground' by situating it within the problem of truth or disclosure, and then goes on to say that to understand truth is to raise the question of transcendence: 'the question about the essence of ground becomes *the problem of transcendence*' (VWG, p. 135). But Husserl did attempt to give a new transcendental account of groundedness and of the factical grounding of the world. Thus, in *Erste Philosophie (1923/24)*, in an essay entitled 'Kant's Copernican Revolution and the Sense of such a Copernican Turn in General,' he writes the following:

> The question on the part of the human being living in the natural attitude concerning the ground of the fact of this world becomes, in the transcendental internal attitude, the question as to the ground of the being of these factical subjectivities and the constitution of the world taking place in them factically, including that of all factically fulfilled conditions of the possibility of such constitutions. What meaning the concept of 'ground' at stake here can have and what it can be which does not let us rest in peace with this fact, that is a new question, which points to a higher level of transcendental research.[48]

Just as disclosure involves closure and revealing is always accompanied by a concealing, so too Heidegger's way of conceiving of 'ground' always connects it with the notion of the 'abyss [Abgrund]' (VWG, p. 174). Furthermore, the manner of apprehending Dasein's temporal transcendence has to vary depending on whether we are approaching its mode of being from the standpoint of everydayness [das Man] or the standpoint of authentic selfhood.

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[47] Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*: 117.; Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*: § 41, 83–4.

[48] Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte*, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 7* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1956), 220.

3.6 Heidegger's Critique of Husserl on Transcendence

In his Marburg lectures in the 1920s, Heidegger already criticizes Husserl's understanding of immanence and transcendence. Thus, in his discussion of Husserl's *Ideas* I in his 1925 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* lectures, Heidegger writes critically of Husserl's four determinations of consciousness (GA 20, § 11), which he sees to continue to harbour metaphysical prejudices despite Husserl's official pronouncements. These four determinations of consciousness are:

1. Consciousness is immanent being.
2. Consciousness is absolute being in the sense of absolute givenness.
3. Consciousness is absolutely given in the sense of lacking nothing for its existence ('*nulla re indigent ad existendum*').
4. Consciousness is pure being.

Heidegger finds that all these determinations can be traced back to Descartes. He states critically:

> The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomenologically by going back [Rückgang] to the matters themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy. (GA 20, p. 147)

In these 1925 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* lectures, Heidegger is particularly critical of Husserl's conception of immanence. He interprets immanence as meaning being-in-something else: 'immanence implies . . . to be in another [in einemanderensein]' (GA 20, p. 142). For Husserl, furthermore, immanence is understood as a relation that is possible between lived experiences themselves, between the reflecting act and the reflected (GA 20, § 11a, pp. 142–43). The problem is the following: what kind of relationship is involved here? The concept of the 'immanent' is really the concept of something being related to, but the nature of this relation has not been clarified.

Heidegger then offers his solution: intentionality must be understood not as an inner-outer relation (which retains all the problems of the Cartesian way and also of Brentano's notion of *Inexistenz*) but based on Dasein's transcendence. Dasein already transcends towards the world. In his 1925 lectures, Heidegger makes interesting remarks about the nature of 'being-in' and 'being-with [Sein-bei].' He speaks of the manner in which the snail is in its shell. When the snail sticks its head out of the shell, it is not now entering the world, as if it did not belong to the world before. Even in its shell, it is out in the world (GA 20, p. 223).

The 1925 discussion in *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* sets the stage for the bold pronouncements to be found in *Being and Time*, § 69, entitled 'The temporality of being-in-the-world and the problem of the transcendence of the world [Transzendenz der Welt].' Heidegger interprets intentionality in terms of transcendence but then sees transcendence as deeply implicated in the individuality of Dasein. This individuality has to be generated through the manner in which each Dasein lives out its temporal existence. It is worth recording the later enigmatic note that Heidegger wrote in his copy and which the editors inserted into the

Gesamtausgabe edition of *Being and Time*: 'Transcendence as the ecstatic—timeliness—temporality, but 'horizon'! Being covered up as being. Transcendence, however, of the truth of Being: the Event of appropriation' (GA 2, p. 5na).[49] Heidegger recasts the problem of transcendence as a problem about how Dasein both belongs to the world in a very special sense and also lives out its individual existence:

> The 'problem of transcendence' cannot be brought round to the question of how a subject comes out to an object, where the aggregate of objects is identified with the idea of the world. Rather we must ask: what makes it ontologically possible for entities to be encountered within-the-world and objectified as so encountered? This can be answered with recourse to the transcendence of the world—a transcendence with an ecstatico-horizonal foundation. (SZ, § 69c, pp. 417–18, 366)

It cannot be said that Heidegger answers the question of the individuality of Dasein in a satisfactory manner in *Being and Time*. Heidegger's effort to relate intentionality, subjectivity and transcendence continues immediately after *Being and Time*. Thus, in his '*Vom Wesen des Grundes*,' he states unequivocally that 'to *be* a subject means to be in and as transcendence' (VWG, p. 138). Here, he is more or less repeating the stance that he had already taken in his *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* where he writes that 'intentionality is the *ratio cognoscendi* of transcendence. Transcendence is the *ratio essendi* of intentionality in its diverse modes' (GA 24, § 9, p. 91). And in his 1928 lectures *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger also proclaims that 'to be a subject means to transcend' (GA 26, § 11, p. 211).

But again, we should be clear—and perhaps this slowly dawned on Heidegger—that this interpretation of intentionality in terms of transcendence remains close to Husserl's own formulations. In his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929),[50] from exactly the same period as Heidegger's writings on the topic, Husserl also speaks of intentionality as involving transcendence:

> It is the *universal ideality of all intentional unities* over against the *multiplicities* constituting them. In it consists the *'transcendence' belonging to all species of objectivities over against the consciousness of them* (and in an appropriately altered but corresponding manner, the transcendence belonging to this or that ego of a consciousness, understood as the subject-pole of the consciousness.) If, in spite of this, we still *separate immanent from transcendent objects*, that can only involve a distinction *within* this broadest concept of transcendence. In no respect does it alter the fact that likewise the transcendence belonging to the real (the objective in a pre-eminent sense) is constituted in respect of its being and sense exclusively in the immanent sphere, the sphere of the multiplicities of consciousness, and that the *transcendence belonging to the real as such, is a particular form of 'ideality'* or better, of a *psychic irreality*; the irreality of something that itself, with all that belongs to it in its own essence, actually or possibly *makes its appearance* in the purely phenomeno-

[49] The whole note reads: 'transcendens freilich nicht—trotz alles metaphysischen Anklangs—scholastisch und griechisch-platonisch *koinon*, sondern Transzendenz alsdas Ekstatische—Zeitlichkeit—Temporalität; aber "Horizont"! Seyn hat Seyendes "überdacht." Transzendenz aber von Wahrheit des Seyns her: das Ereignis.'

[50] Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl—Gesammelte Werke, Band 17* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1974). For the English translation, see Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1969).

> logical sphere of consciousness *and yet* in such a manner that it is evidently *no real part of moment of consciousness*, no real psychic datum.[51]

But—as Becker will recognize in his 1937 paper—Heidegger begins to associate the transcendence of Dasein more and more with 'nothingness' and with grounding understood as the abyss. Thus, in his 1929 '*Was ist Metaphysik?*' lecture, he declares:

> Da-sein means: being held out into the nothing [Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts]. Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call *transcendence* [Dieses Hinaussein über das Seiende nennen wir*Transzendenz*]. If in the ground of its essence Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even toward itself. Without the original manifestation of the nothing, no self-being [Selbstsein] and no freedom. (WM, p. 115)

Dasein's transcendence means that it is holding itself out in the 'nothing'—its grounding comes in being released for grounding. The kind of transcendence which Dasein possesses is precisely its 'freedom for ground' (VWG, p. 165). In terms close to Jaspers, if humans did not have this relation to nothing, they could not have 'self-being.' Something can only be itself if it is open to its ground, which is really transcendent nothingness. Heidegger connects that releasement towards grounding with freedom.

In '*Vom Wesen des Grundes*,' Heidegger is critical of Husserl's understanding of the groundedness of human subjectivity. Here, he connects 'transcendence' with intentionality:

> If one characterizes all *comportment* towards beings as intentional, then *intentionality* is possible only *on the grounds of transcendence*. Intentionality, however, is neither identical with transcendence nor, conversely, does it itself make transcendence possible. (VWG, p. 135)

Dasein transcends towards the 'world.' Transcendence essentially characterizes Dasein as being-in-the-world. How does worldhood manifest itself? Transcendence has a temporal 'ecstatic' character: 'The ecstatic unity of temporality—that is the unity of the "outside-of-itself" [in future, past, present] is the condition for the possibility that there can be an entity which exists as its "there"' (SZ, § 69, p. 350). For Heidegger, transcendence is always towards *the world*, but the world is never an object, or even something that can be said to exist. 'The world,' in Heidegger's notorious phrase, 'worlds' [Welt *ist* nie, sondem *weltet*] (VWG, p. 164).

Another constant theme is that transcendence cannot be understood in any religious-Christian-Platonic sense as towards another non-sensory realm or involving any denial of or renunciation of the world. All transcendence is what he calls 'finite transcendence.' Heidegger also wants to express this finite transcendence in terms of 'thrownness [Geworfenheit]' and 'projection [Entwurf].' Dasein exists as 'thrown' (SZ, § 29, p. 134–40). In his later years, especially in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, the concept of transcendence recedes into the

[51] Husserl, *Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*: § 62, 148.; Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*: § 62, 165–66.

background. Heidegger continues to articulate (now more inspired by Nietzsche) a rejection of the two-world theory of Platonized Christianity. Thus, he writes:

> Even when 'transcendence' is grasped differently than up to now, namely as *surpassing* and not as the *super-sensible* as a being, even then this determination all too easily dissembles what is ownmost to Dasein. For, even in this way, transcendence still presupposes an *under and this-side* [*Unten und Diesseits*] and is in danger of still being misinterpreted after all as the action of an 'I' and subject. And finally even this concept of transcendence continues to be stuck in Platonism. (GA 65, § 199, p. 322)

In *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, Heidegger also acknowledges that his speaking of 'human Dasein' in *Being and Time* and elsewhere had been misleading since it suggested there might be another kind of Dasein e.g. animal or plant Dasein. In fact, only human beings can be Dasein: 'Da-sein—the being that distinguishes human being *in its possibility; thus Dasein then no longer needs the addition "human"*' (GA 65, § 176, p. 301). He also tries to re-interpret his talk in *Being and Time* of the 'understanding of being' in a way that does not make being in some way 'subjective':

> Indeed it [understanding of being] overcomes all 'subjectivity' and shifts man into the openness of being, poses him as the one who is exposed to beings (and before that, to the truth of be-ing). (GA 65, p. 303)

In later years, Heidegger sought to eradicate the 'subjectivism' that he felt continued to haunt *Being and Time*. His *Kehre* or 'turning' is also a reversal, from beings to being, from human wilfulness to the 'sending of being.' Dasein is now said to 'unfold in the throw of being' (BH, p. 327). Its selfhood is now something that seems to come from elsewhere and absolutely not from some kind of self-constitution of the ego, as in Husserl, or from the self-knowing of absolute subjectivity, as in Hegel. The problem remains, however, that Heidegger gives us no new language with which to articulate this new conception of subjectivity that he is supposed to be advocating. In the later Heidegger, as in the earlier, there is a strong sense that language—and not just the language of metaphysics but the language of thinking—has failed him.[52]

3.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, we can recognize that Heidegger does see himself as offering a radical re-thinking of the nature of intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. He tries to articulate this notion of 'transcendence' in various ways but eventually abandons this language. In fact, as we have shown, Heidegger is not

[52] In his 'Letter on "Humanism,"' Heidegger explains that the third division of Part One of *Being and Time* was held back because 'thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics' (GA 9, pp. 327–28). However, the 'other thinking' of the later Heidegger does not appear to have any adequate way of expressing the meaning of Dasein's self-being either.

radically going beyond Husserl's own understanding of the kind of 'immanent transcendence' that characterizes the nature of the intentional relation. Both recognize that intentionality is possible only against a backdrop of a world which always is presumed but which is never presented as an object of experience. The relations between Heidegger's and Husserl's conceptions of worldhood remain to be explored, and this would be an important project for twenty-first century Heidegger studies. Finally, it is important to recognise that Heidegger, as much as Husserl, sought to think through the relation that Husserl calls the 'noetic-noematic correlation.' Heidegger as a phenomenologist and as a transcendental philosopher (although he eventually abandons the language of transcendental philosophy) remains committed to the essential a priori correlation between Dasein and Sein. Phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy remains correlationism. This needs to be understood in light of the new speculative realist readings of Heidegger.

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Chapter 4
The Self that Belongs to an Abyssal Ground: Reading Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*

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4.1 Sketching the Problem

The necessity and intractable difficulty of establishing a transcendental ground, that is, a ground in the categorial framework or formal *a priori* structures of the constitutive subject, have marked phenomenology in its diverse, and often subversive, attempts to explain how human beings are able to give an account of themselves and the world as free rational agents. Yet, where does Heidegger, both early and late, stand in relation to the questions of phenomenological ground? Well, one can easily locate a quasi-Kantian strategy in *Being and Time* and in the subsequent *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, which emphasizes the being of Dasein's understanding as '*a priori perfect*,' or even more noticeably when Heidegger writes, 'the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical *individuation*. Every disclosure of Being as *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological truth … is veritas transcendentalis*' (SZ, p. 38). In a word, the analytic of Dasein has as its task the disclosure of the conditions of the possibility of the understanding of being. Thus, when it comes to addressing the problematic of the meaning of being as such, the problem of Dasein's existential care-structure is crucial in explicating 'the subjectivity of the subject' itself as ground (SZ, p. 24). Basically, a refashioned understanding of subjectivity and ground are the motivating issues that guide Heidegger's work until the early 1930s. For example, in 'The Essence of Truth' from 1929, again intentionally utilizing a Kantian idiom, Heidegger even goes so far as to speak of 'condition of possibility' when talking about the grounding nature of freedom as transcendence, writing that 'the openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness is grounded in freedom' (VWW, p. 186).

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Yet, at a certain point in Heidegger's thinking, and the 1936 text *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* is pivotal here, the transcendental method is found wanting and is thereafter interpreted as having well and truly buried the question of the truth of being. Examining Heidegger's critique of the centrality of horizon and constitution in Husserlian phenomenology, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann stresses how 'the turn' in Heidegger's philosophy is 'a crossing from the transcendental-horizonal perspective into the historically-appropriating perspective.'[1] Yet, what exactly are we to make of von Herrmann's undoubtedly correct observation? How are we to make this understandable to ourselves in a broadly phenomenological register? And is it even possible to explain the philosophical transition announced in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* without resorting to Heidegger's encoded and often tortured language? This paper is an attempt to trace and make sense of this transition by looking at the issue of 'phenomenological ground' as a self-retracting or self-retreating ontological ground that nonetheless grounds genuine selfhood. In a word, it is a ground that has grounds for not showing its ground.

So, having touched upon some of the more revealing transcendental commitments in Heidegger's early lectures with an eye to the radically transitional and transformative character of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, one can quickly see that the Heidegger of the mid-1930s appears to have reformulated, or at least refined, the phenomenological task which he had set out a decade earlier in *Being and Time*, insofar as he endeavours to challenge and transform the transcendental method in order to prepare the way for what he ambitiously (although not naively) terms 'another beginning,' that is, his attempt to confront and appropriate philosophy's first beginning more radically. In the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, Heidegger even speaks of retracing 'Kant's main steps' in order to 'overcome the "transcendental" departure point through Da-sein' (GA 65, p. 176). In the same section, Heidegger adds that this is but one path for showing that being, in order to prevail, requires the grounding of its truth, a grounding necessarily accomplished as Da-sein, and by means of which all idealism and metaphysics in general are overcome. Even more startling, however, is that Heidegger goes on to write that even the most nuanced sense of Dasein's transcendence, as outlined by Heidegger just a few years earlier, is misleading since transcendence is likely to be misunderstood as the intentional directedness of a willfully driven ego or curiously subjective I can. Thus, Heidegger concludes that as far as Da-sein is concerned, 'the notion of "transcendence" in *every* sense must *disappear*,' which implies a subsequent transformation of the project of fundamental-ontology (GA 65, p. 217).

Thus, the Heidegger of 1936 is attempting to identify the various models of philosophical transcendence and to situate his own previously championed fundamental-ontology among them as a means of radicalizing his earlier position and the transcendence and transcendentalism he associates with it. To clarify his

[1] Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 'Contributions to Philosophy and Enowning Historical Thinking,' in *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, ed. Charles E. Scott (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 111.

point, he writes, 'It was necessary to free oneself from the [language of] "condition of the possibility" as a merely "mathematical" regression and to grasp the truth of being from within its *own* essential prevailing' (GA 65, p. 250). Emphasizing his struggle to radicalize the relationship between self and ground, he strikes out against Husserlian phenomenology, declaring that 'the enactment of self-mindfulness has nothing in common with a curious ego-addicted lostness in the brooding over 'one's own' *Erlebnisse*' (GA 65, p. 51) and that 'self-mindfulness has left all "subjectivity" behind' (GA 65, p. 52).

The above declaration notwithstanding, I would argue that Heidegger is still unable to free himself from a certain fidelity to transcendental method, when writing, 'Be-ing needs the human in order to prevail; and the human belongs to being so that he can establish his most extreme vocation as Da-sein' (GA 65, p. 251). The human being, then, which lies between Da-sein and the so-called event of appropriation, are not merely knowers who may or may not grasp the truth of being, but are co-constituters, or better, participant-recipients in the truth process itself. Hence, the grounding in which be-ing and Da-sein are doubly implicated is an event that is also the appropriation of Da-sein by being. The truth of being is the event in which being prevails precisely by making Da-sein its own. As he writes: 'Belongingness to be-ing prevails only because being in its uniqueness needs Dasein and, grounding it, needs man. No truth prevails otherwise' (GA 65, p. 317).

Between 1936 and 1938, Heidegger indefatigably attempts to give voice to this intimate co-belonging, and the result is a way of 'thinking being historically' that is allegedly neither transcendent in the Platonic sense nor transcendental in the Kantian or Husserlian sense. Far from descriptively hovering over entities in a pure or extramundane manner, being is taken as the historical event of their presencing and absencing, and the human being's belonging to this historical event becomes central to Heidegger's thought.

Even after acknowledging that a suitable understanding of Da-sein can be characterized as transcendence, Heidegger is still resolute that all talk of transcendence must be abandoned insofar as it is insufficiently radical. The reason, he tells us, is that Da-sein is originally the opening of concealment. In other words, insofar as Da-sein is the opening of being's self-concealment, any talk of Da-sein overstepping or surpassing itself is misleading. Nonetheless, in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, we find Heidegger repeatedly designating Da-sein as the 'overcoming of all subjectivity' and insisting that be-ing only prevails as the appropriating event, insofar as it appropriates Da-sein, that is, makes Dasein its own, while simultaneously granting Da-sein its selfhood. Thus, in the language of *Being and Time*, one can say that the self does not emerge as an object of understanding but rather understanding, existing understandingly, constitutes the being of the self. This testifies to the fact that while the Heidegger of the mid-1930s is even more vehemently against a philosophy of the subject than he was in *Being and Time*, specifically a notion of the subject which is either transcendentally or transcendently grounded, he nonetheless holds fast to a remnant of the earlier existential-ontological self, the 'how' and 'who' of the human being which grounds the truth of being in its self-refusal. Or, as he puts it in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, 'The

question [of the truth of be-ing] has to be asked for the sake of the essential prevailing of being*, which needs us* […] Hence all mindfulness is necessarily self-mindfulness' (GA 65, p. 44). In a word, what Heidegger terms the dogma of the *subjectum* is radically called into question for the sake of a forgotten or abandoned self that has, in turn, been abandoned by the necessary withdrawal of a disjunctive ground. Let us now take a closer look at this ground.

4.2 Ground

It might appear odd that the after having stated that the principle of '*Grund*' must be left behind in favour of a new form of thinking that the Heidegger of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* take ups the issue of ground once again. But here, however, Heidegger's language is, as usual, willfully ambiguous. Ground in this particular text is intended as giving ground or as *Ergründung*, in the sense of 'letting the ground be, so that the human being can again come to *itself* and recover self-being' (GA 65, p. 31). Thus, grounding here does not appear to signify the laying of new foundations but rather a leaping-in, an excavation towards the ground of the truth of be-ing, the 'more-than-human', which is also a getting back to the Da-sein from which genuine selfhood emerges. We already know that the site of such grounding is Da-sein. The event of which the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* speaks is the event '*of the* grounding of the t/here *Da* … intended as a *genitivus objectivus:* the t/here [*Da*]*,* the essential prevailing [*Wesung*] of truth in its grounding (what is more originary of Da-*sein*) is appropriated…' (GA 65, p. 247)

This grounding also participates in the essential 'counter-resonance [*Gegenschwung*]' of *Ereignis*: Da-sein founds the truth of being, while the truth of being, simultaneously, claims this site as the site of its proper unfolding. As Heidegger puts it:

> The truth of be-ing and thus be-ing itself essentially prevails [*west*] only where and when there is Da-sein. Da-sein 'is' only when and where there is the being of truth. [That is] a turning or rather *the* turning, which points out precisely the essential prevailing of being itself as the counter-resonating event of appropriation. The event of appropriation grounds Da-sein in itself (I). Dasein grounds the event of appropriation (II). (GA 65, p. 261)

In a word, what we have is Da-sein's needful grounding of *Sein* and *Sein's* needful grounding of Da-sein. The 'turning [*Kehre*]' or reciprocal 'counter-resonance [*Gegenschwung*]' here becomes the movement that ensures the reciprocity of grounding and the co-belonging of the human and being. Thus, it is no longer a case of thinking the meaning of being starting from the modality of being of the human being but rather the human being's intimate and mutual rapport with being and, specifically, in function of its appeal and hiddenness. However, Heidegger avers that the grounding of the truth of being has nothing to do with transcendental subjectivity or with the binary opposition of subject and object. Grounding does not mean creating, constituting, causing or bestowing meaning upon beings, nor does it imply

that Da-sein is simply disclosive. Instead, it means 'letting the ground be' (GA 65, p. 31) by assuming a non-subjectivistic style of thinking which can preserve the inverse horizon of the manifestation of beings, and it is the grounding attunement of reticence or restraint (*Verhaltenheit*) that Heidegger proposes as this style of being.

On the side of reticence or restraint, then, there is the refusal to speak on the part of being itself, i.e. its remaining silent, and, for this reason, the thinking of the other beginning, according to § 37 of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, is essentially a sigetic task to which we are called and by which we are claimed. Or, as Heidegger puts it, 'Bearing silence is the 'logic' of philosophy inasmuch as philosophy asks the basic question out of the other beginning. Philosophy seeks the truth of the essential occurrence of being, and this truth is the intimating-resonating concealment (the mystery) of the event (the hesitant withholding)' (GA 65, p. 78).

Yet, what does this mean? Well, let us be clear, reticence, as a form of historical-phenomenological questioning-back [*Rückfrage*], is not a flight into the mystical; it is not an opting for irrationality. Instead, it is a singular way of thinking which accords with what Heidegger sees as the hesitating and silent self-refusal of being itself. In a word, it is a becoming silent in and for a language that responds to the silence of being. With this, we come to the point at which the possibility of the other beginning—the other beginning that must always relate itself to that decisive first beginning—comes into play.

4.3 Language

On the one hand, being is always given in or bounded by language, always brought to articulation in a historical language, and, on the other, the human being speaks insofar as he/she responds to a historical language by way of listening. Precisely because of this, language can be seen as grounding being. It is evident that there is a sort of circularity at work here: originating, as the word of being, language allows human beings to speak, yet it is subsequently through human language that being comes to be given in the word. In a word, then, being both founds and is founded by the expressivity of human language. So, being is always partially brought to articulation in language thanks to the disclosive power of the word, but being also makes a claim on language prior to its disclosive activity. Moreover, language, taken together with the self-refusal of the unsaid that carries the human being into linguisticality, is a resonating silence, and by dint of this language itself has its origin in silence. More simply put, the essence of language is silence, but its expressive power has its origin in a silence that goes together with the unsaid and the unsayable. Therefore, the silence with which language is run through is not a mere emptiness but rather a resonating silence. What all this amounts to is that silence grounds the expressivity of language and that 'silence is the most sheltered holder of measure. It holds the measure in that it first sets the measure' (GA 65, p. 510). The issue of silence as measure is one that must be understood as the delimiting horizon of verbalized expression, not merely its causal ground but rather its nurturing

historical horizon. Thus, thinking, as Merleau-Ponty puts it so beautifully in *The Prose of the World*, 'should be sensitive to the thread of silence from which the tissue of speech is woven.'[2] Much like Merleau-Ponty's analysis, silence, for Heidegger, echoes or murmurs in human speech.

> Corresponding [ent-sprechen], or better co-responding, to this silence, the human being must in some way resist what has been traditionally understood to constitute its very essence, namely, its ability to speak. That is, the human being can only become a 'who' that speaks by listening in on the silence. Or, more precisely, the human being must first remain reticent or restrained because speaking is an essential possibility. This paradox goes well beyond the recognition of the ambivalence that characterizes language. Therefore, language is both that which institutes being and, simultaneously, through the denigration or 'defrocking'[3] of its essence by way of a tranquilizing chatter, is that which remains oblivious to being. Let me try to explain this more clearly.

One of the key distinctions that Heidegger is trying to get to grips with is that between human speech (the ability to assert, objectify and represent) and the speaking or saying of language itself, which is intimately bound up with the language of be-ing [*die Sprache des Seyns*] (GA 65, p. 78). This *distinctio phaenomenologica* implies that the originary saying of language is nascent in the spoken word [*das Gesprochene*] and, consequently, a trace of this saying resonates in human speech. In effect, this distinction is what gathers them into an intimate unity which Heidegger, inspired by and borrowing from Hölderlin's *The Death of Empedocles*, terms '*Innigkeit*' (GA 39, pp. 249–50).[4] Human speech is understood as a breaking with the saying of language, a breaking of the silence; yet, in this breaking, this carrying apart, there is simultaneously a drawing together into a unity of reciprocal co-dependency. This breaking of the silence, this carrying apart, is thus a movement out of indistinct distinctness and into an intimate distinctness. What makes poetry so unique then is that it allows this intimate distinctness to unfold itself and allows it to resonate in the word which is both part of human speech and yet not simply reducible to human speech. According to Heidegger, then, essential thinking and saying enacts itself by means of responding to the essence of language, to the silent claim of language, and hence thought comes into its own only insofar as it thinks language out of the essence of language.

The question of language, bearing the double genitive in mind, is thus both an interrogation of language and an interrogation by language. What is noteworthy

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[2] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *La Prose du monde* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 64.; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 46.

[3] Wilhelm S. Wurzer, 'Heidegger's Turn to Germanien—a Sigetic Venture,' in *Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s*, ed. James Risser (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 188. See also Daniel Panis, ‚La Sigétique,' *Heidegger Studies* 14(1998): 111–127.

[4] See Peter Warnek, 'Translating Innigkeit: The Belonging Together of the Strange,' in *Heidegger and the Greeks*, ed. Drew Hyland and John Manoussakis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 57–82. See also David Farrell Krell, *Lunar Voices: Of Tragedy, Poetry, Fiction, and Thought* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 40–45.

here is that Heidegger stresses the importance of recognizing the reciprocal co-belonging, or the participant-recipient structure, of the saying of language and that of human speech: the saying of language needs human speech as much as human speech needs the saying of language. Thus, one could say that language only gives itself by way of human speech and that language is needy of speech. However, one must not forget that human speech is appropriated by language insofar as humans, who can speak only because they can listen, offer a rejoinder to the silent and needy saying of language. This is the reason behind Heidegger's attempt to discern a more appropriate manner of listening, which holds itself back from all determinate speaking, all in the name of offering a silent rejoinder to the silent saying of language itself. What we can take from Heidegger's analysis then is that the essence of language as saying both needs the continuously fractured silence of human beings in order to let its own stillness resonate. What this amounts to is that human speech shatters the stillness of language and becomes thoughtful only insofar as it realizes that its speaking is a response to that which delimits it, needs it and grounds it.

I submit, then, that what is at stake here is the impossibility of a perfect silence, insofar as the uncanny immediacy of silence is not given unless it is mediated through or woven into the fabric of speech as such. We find Heidegger making the same basic point about the experience of death and its own inimitable speechlessness. If the human being were to arrive at a perfect silence, this very silence would be annulled in its very arrival mainly because the human being is a speaker and the silence we are concerned with is in no way perfect but rather demanding in its noiselessness. In an analogous way, and going back to the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit*, the human being is by its essence mortal, and yet death will annul this very mortality in its no longer being-there. Yet, if this is the case, inauthenticity or irresoluteness, as the constitutive hollowing out of the human being, is not only a possibility of Da-sein but rather its singular effective possibility.

4.4 Going to Ground

Coming back to the question of ground, then, if for the various epochs of metaphysics *Grund* means 'cause' or 'reason' [*das Woher als Ursache*], for Heidegger, the thinker of the other beginning, *Grund* is intended as the 'in which [*das Worin*],' that is, the ground or soil wherein or from which being is given. Moreover, it should be noted that even if the Heidegger after the so-called turn is even more allergic to the transcendentalism and anthropologism that shadow his early work, selfhood still plays a key role in relation to the history of being. Echoing *Being and Time*, Heidegger again states: 'The truth of be-ing and thus be-ing itself prevails only where and when there is Da-sein' (GA 65, p. 261). However, even if the grounding is intimately reciprocal and hesitatingly oscillating, the fact remains that being nonetheless appears to exert an affective pull over the human being. This notwithstanding, Da-sein is in some way the condition of being, insofar as this

un-representable origin could not make itself felt without a respondent or a recipient. Nonetheless, between 1936 and 1938, Heidegger distinguishes between Da-sein and the human and defines Da-sein as '*das Zwischen*,' that open site which lies 'between' the human being and the truth of being.

In *Being and Time*, the distinction between Da-sein and human being remains somewhat peripheral, insofar as Da-sein refers to the 'who' and the 'how' of the human being's having to be in its phenomenological neutrality, while human being belongs to the tradition which thinks man as rational animal. Starting from the *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* of 1929, more precisely when the finitude of the human is taken to be more primordial than the human being, Da-sein is understood as a grounding structure within the human being, and Da-sein is the Da-sein of historical human existence. In *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, this transformation becomes even more pronounced, and what is certain is that Da-sein is not a property characterizing the human but is rather the possibility of the human being as such, a task with which the human being is charged. Moreover, this task passes directly through the recognition of our mortality, which consists in dedicating or devoting our Da-sein to the truth of being and thus providing truth with what Heidegger calls 'a site for the moment' of its occurrence (GA 65, p. 323). This dedication is precisely an institution of being, or what Heidegger terms the '*Erdenkung des Da-seins*,' the thoughtful transformation of the human being which will lead to the institution of being (GA 65, p. 230). In this sense, Da-sein, as the future possibility of humans to come, as Heidegger puts it, is a excavating movement towards ground, towards an origin which is always yet to come and withdrawn. Thus, the precise *topic* of ground or grounding, that is, the institution of ground, corresponds to the precise topology of ground as the opening of the *Da-* of *Da*-sein as the *topos* of the truth of being.

4.5 The Task of Being a Self

From the perspective of the other beginning, Heidegger warns us against understanding the self in terms of an enduring I, the self as a possible object of consciousness, or an I-oriented self-consciousness, if you will, opting instead for the fiendishly difficult achievement of proper selfhood, which is possible only by taking up the task of grounding to which be-ing, as *appropriating event* [*Ereignis*], calls the human being. Accordingly, selfhood is essentially given only in its belonging to being as abyssal ground and, at the same time, in being's necessitating selfhood, namely, the dynamic of what Heidegger terms *Zu-eignung* and *Über-eignung* (GA 65, pp. 320–321). As such, the play of *Ereignis* is one that carries us towards selfhood, a proper selfhood that is not merely within ourselves, not something that is given and to which we must return. Much like in *Being and Time* and the fundamental analysis of Dasein's ec-static modality of being, proper selfhood is beyond

the self, in the 'more-than-human,' as a task to which I must respond and to which I must respond in my singularity and reticence. As Heidegger puts it:

> coming-to-oneself is also never a prior, detached I representation. It is rather taking over the belongingness to the truth of being, leaping into the t/here [*Da*]. Ownhood as ground of selfhood grounds Da-sein. But ownhood itself is in turn the steadfastness of the turning in enowning. (GA 65, p. 320)

It is clear that certain ideas from *Being and Time* are still operative here; the call of conscience, as a retro-relation, comes to mind. And yet, this being beyond myself is no longer allied to ecstatic transcendence as it was up until the early 1930s but rather to the co-belonging of be-ing and Da-sein, the co-belong of the two finite groundless grounds mentioned in the introduction to this article. Hence, it is through the so-called event of appropriation that being and Da-sein are thought in terms of a reciprocal co-belonging, in which one has sense only in relation to the other. However, is the relationship between Da-sein and the truth of being founded on an asymmetric reciprocity? Despite what appears to be an imperfect symmetry, the co-belonging of the human and being should not be thought in terms of a simple privileging of the truth of being over the human but rather in terms of their mutual neediness. This is borne out by the fact that the human being cannot rest content with a previously determined essence but instead has to arrive at its essence by means of dis-location. In a sense, then, Heidegger would perhaps have endorsed Freud's well-known claim that the self 'is not master in its own house.'[5] Yet, the centrality of the human being, the centrality of self as agent or ground, is not simply put out of play but rather deferred; it is neither past nor present but always yet to come as potentially transformed and transformative.

The manner in which being is thought against the horizon of finitude should convince us that the human, for Heidegger, is not merely deferential to the truth of being. To be consistent with Heidegger's own thought, being must not be understood as a pole of radical difference, but rather as intimate difference in its self-refusal. For example, a formula which defines man as the 'shepherd of being' (GA 9, p. 323) remains altogether incomprehensible if one fails to understand that being is not something that one can be the custodian of, if being the custodian means to take custody of. Instead, Heidegger claims that being is to be safeguarded or treasured like a secret, and yet it is precisely the safeguarding or treasuring of what is noble and rare which both underwrites and confers on me my selfhood. If being is interpreted in this weaker sense, then the criticism of the human being's alleged acquiescence to being, the human being as simply in the service of the truth of being, as Michel Haar argued many years ago,[6] loses much of its critical force. Thus, my contribution to reading Heidegger today is to stress, against Michel Haar's hugely influential reading, that we are not dealing with the human being or subject as the privileged entity who nonetheless submits itself and subsequently loses itself

[5] Sigmund Freud, 'A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis,' in *An Infantile Neurosis. Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works (Volume 17)* (London: Hogarth, 1974), 143.

[6] Michel Haar, *Heidegger et l'essence de l'homme* (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1990), 103–108. On this very issue, see François Raffoul, 'Rethinking Selfhood: From Enowning,' *Research in Phenomenology* 37, no. 1 (2007): 75–94.

to an external force that simply needs to be safeguarded. More simply and more correctly, the human being is the one charged with taking charge of its own selfhood as a possibility that belongs to the truth of be-ing as the 'more-than-human.' I am, however, aware that Heidegger's language could very well be understood as having a reverential theological flavour to it, words like 'falling,' 'guilt,' 'call,' 'conscience,' 'shepherd,' 'preserver' and 'devotion' all lend weight to such an interpretation. Nonetheless, we must ask ourselves if this is due to Heidegger's unwitting inability to disengage himself from his own formation, if such a thing is possible, or, on the contrary, whether this language is motivated by a deeper need which is tied to his struggle to find a non- or pre-metaphysical language, the language of 'reticence,' more capable of expressing the theme of event and appropriation. It is precisely on this very issue that the possibility of the other beginning, that is, the legitimacy of the language of ibid., hinges.

4.6 Time-Space

At the precise moment that Da-sein offers a site and an instant for the truth of being, it is, for Heidegger, constituted as 'time-space [*Zeit-Raum*].' Here, another key figure in the thought of the other beginning is brought into play, and it is a grounding figure which is polysemic. In its appearance, it seems to allude to two distinct dimensions: the temporalization of being as *Abgrund*, as abyssal ground, and the originary temporality of Da-sein which is the clearing of being. However, in reality, the essential connection between these two levels can be traced back to the dynamic of this very ground. Obviously, Heidegger is attempting to take leave of, although not simply reject, the traditional representations of space and time, the *subject* of and in space and time, in the hope of interrogating their source, namely originary time-space. Hence, it is not only necessary to move beyond the ordinary and everyday understanding of space and time but also beyond the classical philosophical understanding of space and time, which makes time a category or a subjective experience. Instead, Heidegger argues that it is necessary to break with the petrified illusion that time is rooted in the subjective structures of experience and space in the objective domain. Consequently, for Heidegger, their rapport needs to be rethought at the level of an intimate and profound co-belonging, at the level of the truth of being, i.e. the event of their grounding. As Heidegger puts it, 'truth and with that the essential prevailing of ground become dis-jointed temporally-spatially. Thereby, however, time and space are grasped originarily from truth and are essentially related to the grounding' (GA 65, p. 308). Here, too, one is faced with a reciprocal rapport: the ground has a place or a site in time-space, and yet time-space is only thinkable in terms of the former. Or rather, time-space is in a certain way *Abgrund* itself, the abyssal ground in which ground has or is granted a place. The modality of the originary appearing of ground is granted, for Heidegger, from an abyss not understood as a lack of ground, i.e. the negation of all ground, but rather in terms of a retraction or remaining-away of ground, a ground that grounds only in its

self-refusal. In other words, only by remaining-away does the ground disclose the space and instant of an opening, allowing that which is capable of manifestation to bring itself into the open and for the remaining away of ground to resonate or presence in its own absence. Or, in Heidegger's own words:

> … ab-ground is also beforehand the originary essential sway of ground, of its grounding, of *what is ownmost to truth* … Ab-ground is the staying-away of ground … Ab-ground, staying-away, as ground in self-sheltering concealing, is a self-sheltering-concealing in the manner of non-granting the ground. However, not granting is not nothing but rather an outstanding originary manner of letting *be* unfulfilled, of letting *be* empty—thus an outstanding manner of enopening. However, as essential swaying of ground, ab-ground is not a mere self-refusing as simply pulling back and going away. *Ab*-ground is ab-*ground*. By refusing itself, ground brings into the open in an outstanding manner, namely into the initial openness of *that* emptiness, which is thus already a definite one … Ab-ground is the hesitating refusal of ground. In refusal, originary emptiness opens, originary *clearing* occurs; but the clearing is at the same time such that the hesitating manifests in it. (GA 65, p. 379)

The necessity of this abyssal contraction, then, for want of a better phrase, stems from the fact that it is impossible to maintain, from the perspective of the other beginning, the simple causal connotation of ground and grounded—the founding and founded distinction. Put otherwise, Heidegger is attempting to distance himself from the logic of production and creation that characterizes metaphysics and its seeking after explanatory causes. For Heidegger, the unfolding of ground has a site and an instant only insofar as it is abyssal, that is, from its being the non-causal ground of something, bottomless in the sense of never touching bottom, although leaving a trace of this bottomless in what is grounded. Thus, the self-refusal of ground should not be understood as a total refusal, an absolute no, for if that were the case nothing would be permitted to show itself from the source. Rather, ground reluctantly hesitates [*Zögert*], and it is in this reluctant hesitation that a space is opened for its own distinct illumination or clearing [*Lichtung*] and for the illumination or clearing of beings. This most modest of roles is nonetheless decisive in grounding all that is. With this hesitating refusal, it institutes space and time as the possibility of something manifesting itself. In a word, or to rephrase Heidegger's own position, it grounds by spatializing [*Räumung*] and temporalizing [*Zeitigung*] (GA 65, p. 384).

The *Lichtung*, the opening or clearing, opened by the reluctant hesitation of abyssal ground, is precisely Da-sein. The hesitating refusal is in fact 'the hint by which Da-*sein* – that is the steadfastness [*Beständnis*] of the sheltering that lights up – is beckoned; and that is the resonance of the turning [Kehre] between 'the call' and belongingness, as en-*ownment* [*Er-eignung*], be-ing itself' (GA 65, p. 380).

According to Heidegger, the 'emptiness' instituted or established by the self-refusal is neither indeterminate nor indefinite but instead coincides with the *Da* of being. He writes, '"Emptiness" is also not the mere not-satisfying of an expectation and a wish. It *is* only as Da-*sein*, i.e., as reservedness … as holding back in the face of hesitating refusal, whereby time-space grounds itself as the site for the moment of deciding' (GA 65, p. 382). It is precisely here that the temporality of the event is brought together with that of Da-sein. The self-refusal of abyssal ground

corresponds to the reticent self-reservedness of Da-sein; the hesitation of ground corresponds to the moment of decision.

The temporalization of Da-sein is hence structured in parallel with the dynamic of granting and refusing, openness and hiddenness, which characterizes ground. On the one hand, we find here the movement of retraction or removal [*Entrückung*], while on the other, one finds a drawing close, an enchanting, or an alluring [*Berückung*]. These two movements, we are told, coincide in Da-sein within the nexus of remembering and expecting, what Heidegger terms '*das erinnernde Erharren*' (GA 65, p. 384). Thus, the 'empty' opening through the *Da* is far from a simple absence or lack, but it is precisely what promises the future, originating in the having-been and granting the present as a point of equilibrium between the two movements. Heidegger writes:

> Self-refusal creates not only the *emptiness* of deprivation and awaiting but also, along with these, the emptiness as an emptiness that is in itself removing-unto, removing-unto futurality and thus at the same time breaking open what has been, which bounces back from what is to come and makes up the present as moving into abandonment, but as remembering-awaiting. (GA 65, p. 383)

Hence, being, which is given through the clearing, albeit only under the form of this two-fold manner, is both oriented towards having-been and towards the future. According to Heidegger, and this is perhaps where he remains most faithful to the insights of *Being and Time*, the abandoning of being is what constitutes the remembrance of the appearance of being and the attentive awaiting on its appeal.

The identification of an originary time-space, then, in the sense of what grants time and space, brings with it two difficulties with which Heidegger is altogether mindful. On the one hand, there is the clear impression that in his attempt to get to a non- or pre-metaphysical origin, an origin that refuses to give itself as something determinate, he ends up bringing time and space together in a sort of mythical or pre-metaphysical limbo; the other danger, notwithstanding all his precautions, is that it could be argued he is assisting in the further subjectivization of time and space, insofar as the spatiality of Da-sein tends to determine the essential movement that defines temporality as such.

With regard to the first difficulty, Heidegger again states that the pre-metaphysical provenience of notions such as time and space did not have a chronological connection, and, hence, they do not coincide with a possible mythical space that precedes the rise of philosophy proper. The mythical representations are hence not truly originary, insofar as they are *vor-anfänglich* and not *anfänglich*. Instead, the thinking of the inception rests for Heidegger on the task of a thinking to come. However, Heidegger also finds a solution to the second difficulty. The development of an originary time-space starting from Da-sein does not mean a return to or the privileging of the subject. On the contrary, the ipseity of Da-sein is precisely that which allows for the overcoming of binary relation between subject and object, and with that a rethinking of the ontological difference. Heidegger notes:

> *Understanding of being* does not make be-ing either 'subjective' or 'objective.' Indeed it overcomes all 'subjectivity' and shift man into the openness of being, poses him as the one

> who is exposed to beings (and before that, to the truth of be-ing) … 'Be-ing' is not the making of the subject. Rather Da-sein as overcoming of all subjectivity arises from the essential swaying of being. (GA 65, p. 303)

What, in the final reckoning, is demonstrated in the analysis of time-space in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*? I would say nothing other than the necessity of rethinking ground as an interlocking relation, as a constant return to the interwoven question of ground and grounded. The origin, namely *Ereignis*, being in and as *Ereignis*, is by necessity temporal, insofar as its occurrence as shaking, shuddering, hesitating, retracting, and opening has nothing to do with eternity as *nunc stans* or with the sempiternal. The question of eternity from the perspective of a thinking otherwise, from the perspective of a thinking the other beginning, is rethought in terms of the instant or the moment. Heidegger writes, 'The eternal is not what ceaselessly lasts [*Fort-währende*] but rather that which can withdraw in the moment, in order to return once again' (GA 65, p. 371). On the other hand, it is the event itself that seems to generate or make possible time and space in the hesitating refusal and as abyssal ground. It is here that one finds delineated the *Kehre* of time and being in the *Ereignis*, which Heidegger returns to in the 1962 *Time and Being* (see GA 14, p. 16).

Finally, there is one last issue that needs to be underlined here: the notion of time-space marks in Heidegger the definitive bringing together of space and time in the constitution of the origin. If time, from the perspective of his earlier fundamental ontology, is configured as the exclusive horizon for interpreting and understanding the question of the meaning of being, here space is significantly recovered and rethought. The very notion of the *Kehre* as a 'curvature' or *Ereignis* as a 'field' of hesitation points to the refashioned place of space in Heidegger's thought, which is again taken up in his explicit reference to the new or futural project of a topology of being.

4.7 Conclusion

In general, between 1927 and 1930, 'self' for Heidegger comes to mean something like that which gathers into a cohesive whole. However, by the time of *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, it could be argued that the word has lost much of its reference to humans beings and has come to mean something like that which gathers 'I, you, we, a people' as historical context; it gathers the promise of the future into a whole about which it makes sense to say that it makes sense.

Yet, there are still intimations of something-more-than-human that contributes to what we understand when we understand what it means to be human being or selves. References to the gods, the holy ones, and even the word 'Being' itself, no matter how it is spelled, all suggest that everything is not just a relativistic hodgepodge where anything goes and no epochal formation is better than any other. That it is impossible to say anything about this something-more-than-human makes the text

called *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* a transitional and experimental text, a noble failure. Or, to quote the late Franco Volpi, this experimental text is 'the logbook of a shipwreck. In an attempt to push further and further out onto the sea of being, Heidegger's thought founders. Nonetheless, as with the foundering of all great vessels, it offers us a breathtaking and sublime vista.[7]

Yet, it is precisely in being claimed by this something-more-than-human that Heidegger reinterprets the human being's need to attend to the nature of selfhood and ground not as *fundamentum absolutum* but rather as a singularly mute, yet operative, *fundamentum ab-sconditus* to which the human being, as a necessary and mutual co-respondent, essentially belongs. More importantly, however, this is not a mere absence of ground but rather a grounding that makes itself felt in its indeterminate (yet determining) remaining away.

In a word, then, I would say that Heidegger is continually attempting to respond to his transcendental heritage by taking a step back into what is most unthought in that heritage, examining the unsaid of that heritage, and forward into what he terms 'the highest possibility of the being of the human' (GA 4, p. 40). Essential to this thinking is the attempt to learn how to dwell in the event of language as the free gift of silence. This thinking-otherwise is an attempt to abide with that event through which the meaningfulness of the 'things themselves' is always already mediated or given. Accordingly, it is a challenge to think the enigmatic inception of all meaning that necessarily exceeds meaningfulness, to think 'what cannot be exhausted by meaning,'[8] yet to think it together with meaning.

It is clear that Heidegger's middle and later thought demands a different logic than that of transcendental philosophy. Yet, how would one know when one has located such a different logic, this logic of the other beginning? How could one speak, suffer, or articulate this pre-metaphysical saying or listening? What would it feel like to succeed or fail in this repeated attempt? And what are the 'grounds' upon which one raises this to the level of a phenomenological problem?

In large measure, Heidegger himself is not inattentive to these questions or problems, although his answers often simply pose the questions anew. Ultimately, for Heidegger, there is no way of being certain of one's movement along these paths of thinking-otherwise, insofar as they are paths that must be risked for the sake of 'something more' or 'something other.' Consequently, within Heidegger's thought, there is no principle of verification in terms of which recourse to 'reality' can be made for his thought is a thinking that seeks the retracting and retracted grounds of the manifestation of what is taken to 'be.' Nevertheless, this recognition makes Heidegger's thinking no less rigorous but rather renders it more exigent.

I would say that the future of Heidegger scholarship involves recognizing that the matter of Heidegger's thinking emerges only when we allow the essence of questioning to come upon us, that is, when we are seized by an essential need for

[7] Franco Volpi, *La selvaggia chiarezza. Scritti su Heidegger* (Milano: Adelphi Edizioni, 2011), 211. Translation is mine.

[8] Richard Polt, 'Meaning, Excess, and Event,' *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 1(2011): 34.

questioning: being both open to the question and simultaneously opened by it. As such, Heidegger's uniquely phenomenological style of thinking, his admittedly ambiguous transitional thinking, is continually at the service of suspending the seductions of philosophy, yet without ever leaving those seductions behind. It is an attempt to formulate a transitional vocabulary that could aid in a recovery that will always remain incomplete and forgetful of itself. In the end, the real significance of Heidegger's analysis of thinking the retracted ground and reticent selfhood is its demand for an attentive response to the ungovernable ground of our philosophical convictions and seemingly well-vetted arguments. If one gets nothing else from Heidegger, then perhaps this is enough.

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Part II
History, Responsibility and Voice

Chapter 5
History and the Meaning of Life: On Heidegger's Interpretations of Nietzsche's *2nd Untimely Meditation*

Ullrich Haase and Mark Sinclair

5.1 Introduction

Volume 46 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, entitled *Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemäßer Betrachtung*, scheduled to appear in translation as *Interpretation of Nietzsche's 2nd Untimely Meditation* with Indiana University Press, is based on notes with which Heidegger led what were officially seminar exercises in the Winter Semester of 1938/39. As a result of the large number of participants, however, the seminars took the form of lectures. Heidegger, consequently, placed the notes relating to the lectures in Division II of the *Gesamtausgabe* or collected works, which contains records of the lecture courses, rather than in Division IV, which contains records of the seminars.

In 'promoting' them in this way, Heidegger seems to have considered these notes important. Indeed, they contain his most extensive reflection on the question of animality after the lectures of 1929/30, *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (GA 29/30). They also contain an extended version of the phenomenological analysis of memory and forgetting that will reappear in the Zollikon Seminars (ZSEM) of the mid-1960s. The volume is of interest above all, however, because it presents an element of the *Auseinandersetzung*, the 'confrontation' or 'setting apart' that Heidegger attempts, beginning in 1936, in relation to Nietzsche's thinking. Certainly, Heidegger did not choose to incorporate any substantial sections of these seminars of 1938 in the two volumes of his *Nietzsche* (GA 6.1; GA 6.2), which are based on other lecture courses in the years 1936–1941. This implies that he saw these seminars as a self-standing reflection on Nietzsche's work, and as

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Otto Pöggeler reports, Heidegger excluded these seminars from his *Nietzsche* with the remark that 'they follow another and earlier thematic than the other Nietzsche lectures.'[1]

The seminars follow another and earlier thematic than the other Nietzsche lectures precisely in that within them Heidegger returns to Nietzsche's *2nd Untimely Meditation*, *On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life*—a text which Heidegger had read penetratingly and cited extensively in *Being and Time*. In 1938, however, the reading contrasts sharply with the positive interpretation and appropriation advanced in 1927. Belonging wholly neither to the positive appropriation of the 1920s nor to the *Auseinandersetzung* of the 1930s, the seminars form, in fact, a bridge between the two moments of Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche in these decades. The seminars consequently allow us to bring into relation Heidegger's interpretative strategy in the late 1930s with his earlier approach to Nietzsche's thought, and, therefore, to understand Heidegger's general method, which, as we will see, is characterized by the relation of a 'destruction' to a subsequent 'setting apart' or *Auseinandersetzung*.[2] More generally, it allows us to understand how the destruction of the history of metaphysics operative in *Being and Time* is internally and inherently bound to the later period of Heidegger's thought formed by the turning [die Kehre].

Since the *2nd Untimely Meditation* deals with the notion of history rather than with narrowly or recognizably 'Nietzschean' concepts, studying the text in the present context will allow us to investigate not only the way in which Heidegger presents his explicit interpretations of Nietzsche but also the Nietzschean ground of Heidegger's thinking as such. In this sense, we aim to develop much of the secondary literature concerning Heidegger's relation to Nietzsche, which focuses on the former's engagement with the latter in the 1930s and 1940s, without noting adequately the influence that Nietzsche had on the early Heidegger. Even so, those studies that have focused on the presence of Nietzsche in *Being and Time* have limited their reflections to the few explicit occurrences of his name in Heidegger's *magnum opus*, thereby covering over the true presence of Nietzsche in that work.[3]

Between 1927 and 1938, in any event, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's 1874 text undergoes a significant transformation, and the aim of this essay is to ascertain the sense and legitimacy of this transformation and to show that it does not separate independent periods of Heidegger's work but is rather a matter of an internally related development of his thinking. To this end, the first two sections of the essay examine how the young Heidegger positively appropriates the young Nietzsche's reflections on history. The third section, however, will show how Heidegger's approach in 1938 turns on an interpretation of the idea of life itself, not only in this short text of the young Nietzsche but also within Nietzsche's work as

[1] Otto Pöggeler, *Friedrich Nietzsche und Martin Heidegger* (Bonn: Bouvier, 2002), 9.

[2] For the relation between '*Destruktion*' and '*Auseinandersetzung*,' compare especially GA 65, § 90f. and GA 66, § 14f.

[3] For such an approach, see, for example, Jacques Taminiaux, 'La présence de Nietzsche dans *Sein und Zeit*,' in *Lectures de l'ontologie fondamentale* (Grenoble: Millon, 1995), 231–252.

a whole. This question of life, we contend, is a question that has not yet been sufficiently addressed in Heidegger and Nietzsche scholarship; insofar as these seminars of 1938 help us to address it, it is no exaggeration to claim that they will determine the shape of studies of the Nietzsche-Heidegger relationship for years to come.

5.2 Nietzsche's Problem of History as Background to *Being and Time*

At the beginning of the 1920s, prior to the formulation of his project of fundamental ontology, one of Heidegger's early attempts to articulate and address history as a problem clearly indicates a knowledge of Nietzsche's *2nd Untimely Meditation*. In the opening sections of the lecture course of the Winter Semester 1920/21 entitled *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, Heidegger seeks to clarify the nature of 'the historical [das Historische]' as a 'core phenomenon' within 'factical life experience [faktischer Lebenserfahrung].' He notes:

> The historical is felt today as a burden. It inhibits our naïveté in creating. Historical consciousness incessantly accompanies, like a shadow, each attempt at a new creation. Immediately, consciousness of transitoriness stirs and takes from us enthusiasm for the absolute. Insofar as a new spiritual culture is insisted upon, historical consciousness, in this sense of being a burden, must be eradicated, and thus the self-assertion [das Sich-behaupten] against the historical is a more or less open struggle against history [die Geschichte]. (GA 60, p. 38)

Increased historical awareness, in other words, leads to the de-motivating idea that we are but epigones or latecomers with little original power to create. Consequently, new and lasting achievements, a new spiritual culture, will require a struggle against this burden of historical awareness. Heidegger goes on to survey different possible modes of such a philosophical struggle against history, including Platonism and Spengler's historicism as limit positions, and this occurs without Heidegger explicitly referring to Nietzsche. Nevertheless, the problem of historical awareness that Heidegger describes here in the *Phenomenology of Religion* implies the diagnosis of a 'historical malady' in the first section of the *2nd Untimely Meditation*: 'there is a degree of insomnia, of rumination, of the historical sense, through which something living comes to harm and finally perishes, whether it be a person, a people or a culture.'[4] This deleterious degree of historical sense arises in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche argues, as a result of the 'demand that history be a science.'[5]

[4] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 1* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), 250. For the English translation, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 62.

[5] Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*: 271.; Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*: 77.

According to the idea that knowledge of the past can be gained with the same kind of objectivity and truth as that claimed by the natural sciences, historical knowledge becomes an end in itself, something pursued for its own sake and not for the sake of the knowing being and of the prior ground of knowledge itself, namely *life*. Nietzsche writes:

> Now life is no longer the sole ruler and master of knowledge of the past: rather all boundary markers are overthrown and everything which once was rushes in upon man … A boundless spectacle such as history, the science of universal becoming, now displays what no generation has ever seen; of course, she displays it with the dangerous boldness of her motto: *fiat veritas pereat vita*.[6]

The demand that history be a science promotes the value of objective truth over and above any actual concern for our lives, and thus it can be characterized by the dictum: *let there be truth and may life perish*.[7]

Heidegger's approach to the problem of history in his 1920/21 lectures is somewhat limited in that the problem seems to be merely one of an excess of historical knowledge. Nietzsche, in contrast, in Section II of his text, had already argued that the human being requires knowledge of history in three respects:

> It belongs to him as an active and striving person; it belongs to him as a person who preserves and reveres; it belongs to him as a suffering person in need of emancipation. This trinity of relationships corresponds to a trinity of methods for history, to the extent that one may make the distinctions, a monumental method, an antiquarian method, and a critical method.[8]

The human being requires history in order to act or 'create,' to revere and to achieve freedom from the past. Each of these needs produces a method or mode of historical study with, as Nietzsche goes on to show at length, its own advantages and disadvantages: (1) the monumental mode of history provides models for the great deeds of the future but can degenerate into the belief that greatness belongs not only to the past but also to the sheer falsification of historical events; (2) the antiquarian mode enables one to feel bound to a tradition, and yet it can hinder the appreciation of creative novelty in the present and also falsify the past by focusing only on what within it explicitly prefigures the present; (3) the critical mode expresses our need for liberation in the present, and it brings the past to judgment, distancing itself from the latter. However, this distance can be a form of alienation when carried out to excess. As Nietzsche clarifies, the problem consists in that from the perspective of critical history everything appears worthy of destruction.

It is, then, the possible harmony or unity of these three modes of history that is undermined by the demand that history be a science. Yet, this demand is not simply

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[6] Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*: 272.; Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*: 78.

[7] On the unacknowledged presence of Nietzsche's text in Heidegger's lecture course of 1920–1921, see also Jeffrey Andrew Barash, *Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 121.

[8] Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*: 258.; Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*: 67.

external to the three modes, for it derives from a predominance of one mode at the expense of the others. Kant had said that our age is one of critique, and Nietzsche ultimately argues that what has occurred in the advent of this age is that 'critical history' has taken precedence over 'monumental history' and 'antiquarian history'; this imbalance between the three forms of history is the basis of the 'historical malady,' which will later be called by a more familiar term: 'nihilism.' 'Science,' then, is not a method independent of history to which the latter is to be bent; on the contrary, the sciences themselves are shown by Nietzsche to be properly historical phenomena. This is to say, as Nietzsche puts it in the second preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, and as Heidegger will more famously claim in his critique of technology, 'the problem of science cannot be recognized within the territory of science.'[9]

It is thus not only that in the *2nd Untimely Meditation* Nietzsche stakes out the very possibility of his own thought, but, after him, Heidegger takes the questions of science and history as they appear within this period of Nietzsche's thought as the measure for any future philosophy as such. It is in this sense that an interpretation of the *2nd Untimely Meditation* can serve as a yardstick in any attempt to understand Heidegger's thought in the 1920s and in the following pivotal texts of the 1930s: his *Nietzsche I & Nietzsche II* (GA 6.1 & 6.2), *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* (GA 65) and *Meditation* (GA 66).

If we are to grasp the fundamental importance of the *2nd Untimely Meditation* for *Being and Time*, we should therefore not restrict ourselves to the few places in the work where Nietzsche is mentioned explicitly. Instead, we have to look at the method and the motivation of *Being and Time* as a whole. In the literature, the following points have certainly been recognised: (1) *Being and Time* stands as a meditation on Nietzsche's dictum that there are no truths but only interpretations and interpretations of interpretations; (2) Heidegger's claim according to which 'the idea of Eternal Truth is the last remnant of Christian theology within philosophical thinking' (SZ p. 229) derives from Nietzsche; (3) the ideas of authenticity and resoluteness are indebted to the ethical imperative 'to become the one who one is.' Yet, in order to understand fully the importance of Nietzsche's thinking for Heidegger in the 1920s, we need to look at the very idea of history as it is developed in the *2nd Untimely Meditation*. In order to begin to do so, it is necessary to differentiate Nietzsche's understanding of history from other forms of essentially historical philosophy. Here, we try to do this; however, we do so schematically by differentiating Heidegger and Nietzsche's approach from those of Hegel and Spengler.

In all these four essentially historical [geschichtliche] thinkers, the present can be understood only on the ground of history itself. They, thus, all reject any form of positivism. It can be said, nonetheless, that in Hegel the end of history brings out the truth of the beginning, whereas in Nietzsche the truth of the end becomes clear only by bringing it back to its beginning. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger, in other words, try to understand our time as derived from and 'falling' away from 'the beginning.' The step back into this beginning motivates Nietzsche's claim, which Heidegger

[9] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5.

will repeat, that the greatness of German philosophizing will be measured by how far it can bring us back to the Greek soil.[10] To express this in a form of shorthand: what is teleological in Hegel's idea of the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history becomes *amor fati* in Nietzsche and *Geschick* instead of *Geschehen* in Heidegger.

To make sense of this transformation in the idea of history, however, we have to underline another development in Nietzsche's thought that distinguishes it from the ideas of both Hegel and Spengler. On account of an essentially historical thinking, we might ask what Heidegger meant by saying that 'the essence of technology is nothing technological' and what Nietzsche meant when saying that 'the problem of culture cannot be recognized within the territory of culture'? Whereas the Spenglerian idea of culture is close to that of a Leibnizian monad in that it is conceived as an individual substance underlying its manifold phenomena and including the development of philosophical thought itself, and while on Hegel's account the Owl of Minerva takes flight only at dusk, for Nietzsche, and even more so for Heidegger, philosophy is synonymous with European history. There is no stronger image of this idea of an omnipotent philosophy than Nietzsche's likening of world history to a theatre play whereby the philosopher is seen to be the author of the play.[11] And already in the *2nd Untimely Meditation*, the demand that the Will to Knowledge has to turn its sting against itself[12] leads to the recognition of the 'infinite importance of our knowledge for all that is to come.'[13] Without such a pre-eminence of philosophy, or at least of that which Heidegger later calls 'thinking,' the whole 'question of the meaning of being' and later the 'question of the history of being' would be, in the end, without import. It is therefore only this type of thinking that can be understood as a historical power, as opposed to the sciences which themselves 'do not think.'

According to Heidegger, as he argues in 1930, the originality of Nietzsche's treatment of history, in opposition to the derivative accounts offered by Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages, Max Scheler and Leopold Ziegler, is grounded on the fundamental account of the difference between the Dionysian and the Apollonian in *The Birth of Tragedy*.[14] In the *2nd Untimely Meditation*, this difference reappears in the difference between life as 'an unhistorical power' and the idea of a thoroughly

[10] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente, 1884–1885*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 11* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), 679.

[11] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 3* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), § 301, 539. For the English translation, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 241f.

[12] Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*: 302.

[13] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1880–1882*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 9* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 494.

[14] See GA 29/30, pp. 105ff; see also Marion Heinz, '"Schaffen." Die Revolution von Philosophie. Zu Heideggers Nietzsche-Interpretation (1936/37),' *Heidegger Jahrbuch* 2(2005): 174–192. Heinz sees clearly that for Heidegger Nietzsche's work becomes the measure for all contemporary

integrated *Gestalt* of the three modes of history, each harmonised with the others. In such an 'ideal' mode of historical existence, it is 'life that speaks with the voice of history and history that speaks with the voice of life,' to adapt a phrase from *The Birth of Tragedy*.[15] It follows from here that the equilibrium of the three modes of history, or the right balance in each of them alone, is not accessible by or available to calculative thinking; it cannot become the object of an *ego cogito*. Not being able to become the voluntary exercise of a subject, this equilibrium is much more a function of historical destiny. To invoke an idea of destiny in this connection is to think truth as derived from a necessary forgetting. In other words, perhaps the most essential idea that Heidegger draws from the *2nd Untimely Meditation* is that of truth as ἀ-λήθεια.

5.3 The *2nd Untimely Meditation* in *Being and Time*

In § 6 of *Being and Time*, which outlines the task of destroying the history of ontology, Heidegger returns to the historical malady that Nietzsche diagnoses in the *2nd Untimely Meditation* in relation to the history of philosophy itself. Dasein—as Heidegger writes whilst really targeting contemporary philosophers—has become so alienated from an authentic relation to history that,

> it confines its interest to the multiformity of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophical activity in the most exotic and alien of cultures; and by this very interest it seeks to veil the fact that it has no ground of its own to stand on. Consequently, despite all its historiological interests and all its zeal for an Interpretation which is philologically 'objective', Dasein no longer understands the most elementary conditions which would alone enable it to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own. (SZ, p. 21)

The claim that contemporary historians of ideas and of philosophy have, in reality, 'no grounds to stand on' is not simply to be taken as a statement that historians come to busy themselves with the past to the point where they have no genuine concern for the meaning and possibility of philosophy for us in the here and now. 'No grounds to stand on' is to be understood in a related but much more ontological sense: the very idea of historical objectivity presupposes that the course of history as the object of historical studies is an object arrayed before an a-historical gaze. In other words, it presupposes that the human being, insofar as it thinks, is independent of history, outside of time, or, as Nietzsche puts it, 'an eternal non-subjectivity.'[16]

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philosophizing, but, due to the limits of her essay, she does not explicitly bring into question what this would mean for our understanding of *Being and Time*.

[15] Nietzsche writes: 'Thus the difficult relationship of the Apolline and the Dionysiac in tragedy truly could be symbolized by a bond of brotherhood between the two deities: Dionysos speaks the language of Apollo, but finally it is Apollo who speaks that of Dionysos.' See Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*: § 21, 104.

[16] Heidegger would say an eternal 'subjectivity,' but the point, i.e. the critique of the idea of an a-historical, self-grounding principle proper to human being remains, in essence, the same.

According to this presupposition, the historian has, indeed, and necessarily, no *historical ground* of her own to stand on. Strictly speaking, however, it is not adequate to say, reading Nietzsche's text, that the pursuit of objective historical studies is presupposed by such a conception of an a-historical human being, for the latter is just as much conditioned by the former. Unable to realize itself in deeds and present-day 'culture,' historical knowledge 'stays hidden in a certain chaotic inner world, which that modern man describes with a strange pride as an "Inwardness" peculiar to him.'[17] An excess of history thus leads to a Cartesian division of an 'inside' from an 'outside,' but this division only reinforces the pursuit of useless historical knowledge. At a more fundamental level, however, this division between an inside and an outside belongs to the (Roman) 'culture' that is subject to critique by Hegel as much as by Nietzsche.[18]

Of course, the modern historian may well explicitly claim an extra-historical standpoint as a particular virtue of the age: it is because we have attained an ultimate, timeless truth, it may be argued, that we can look back to the history of philosophy and finally judge it as a series, however interesting, of errors. Yet, Nietzsche devotes a whole section of his text to bringing to light the naivety, abstractions and remnants of Christian theology involved in such a claim.[19] To be sure, Heidegger echoes Nietzsche's concerns in § 44 of *Being and Time* when he writes that the ideas of eternal truths and of an a-historical subject are the last vestiges of Christian theology in philosophy.[20]

Heidegger's remarks in § 6 of *Being and Time*, then, point back to the *Untimely Meditations*, but it is not until much later in the text of 1927, within the fifth chapter of the second division concerned with temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and historicity [Geschichtlichkeit], that Heidegger explicitly addresses both Nietzsche's text and the conditions enabling us 'to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively' our own. Within this chapter (§ 72 – § 77), § 76 concerns the existential origin or genesis of *Historie*—historiology, i.e. the study of history—in the *Geschichtlichkeit*, the historical being or 'historicity' of Dasein. Dasein can study history only because and insofar as it is always already *geschichtlich* or historical in its essence: 'the historiological thematising of history is possible only if, in general, the "past" has in each case already been disclosed' (SZ, p. 393)—only if I already have access to and understand the past itself. According to the preceding analyses of temporality in *Being and Time*, however, the past—at least when it is taken up authentically—is a function of my being stretched out beyond myself into

[17] Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*: 272.; Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*: 78.

[18] For the Hegelian background to Nietzsche's critique, compare especially the section on 'Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture' in G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 294–328.

[19] See, in particular, section V of Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*.

[20] See SZ, p. 229.

the future. In this way, the past is lived not as a reservoir of dead, immutable necessity but rather as a source of possibility for the present and future.

It is this temporality or historicality, then, which Heidegger posits as the ground of historiology. This is not to say that *Being and Time* attempts a deduction of the conditions of possibility of a particular form of historiology. On the contrary, as Heidegger states, 'the idea of historiology must be projected ontologically in terms of Dasein's historicality' (SZ, p. 393). In expanding on this idea, Heidegger turns to the *2nd Untimely Meditation*:

> the possibility that historiology in general can either be 'used' 'for one's life' or 'abused' in it, is grounded on the fact that one's life is historical in the roots of its Being, and that therefore, as factically existing, one has in each case made one's decision for authentic or inauthentic historicality. (SZ, p. 396)

Historiology can be advantageous or disadvantageous for Dasein to the extent that one either has or has not taken up one's own historicity authentically. In other words, if there are different ways of conducting historical inquiry, then these ways are different existential possibilities of and for Dasein, expressions of different ways in which it can exist as a being that is intrinsically bound to the movement of time or history itself.

Heidegger claims that Nietzsche says 'what was essential as to the "advantages" and "disadvantages" of historiology for life … and said it unequivocally and penetratingly' (SZ, p. 396). Now, as Jacques Taminiaux has noted in relation to the other readings of the canonical philosophers of the tradition in *Being and Time*, this is high praise indeed: Heidegger seems to say that Nietzsche's critique of historiology as an objective science and his more general evaluation of historiology in relation to life contains essential insights.[21] And yet, this positive remark is followed by one that is more critical: Nietzsche 'distinguished three kinds of historiology—the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical—without explicitly pointing out the necessity of this triad or the ground of its unity' (SZ, p. 396).

Nietzsche's analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of three forms of history is for Heidegger, then, of great importance, but he nevertheless claims that Nietzsche does not point out the necessity of the modes of history or the ground of their unity. Why, Heidegger encourages us to ask, are there three modes and three modes only? Why does the human being need history only in the three respects that Nietzsche delineates? It has been argued that Nietzsche's triad—rather than being 'a purely theoretical construction,' as one commentator has put it[22]—has been influenced by nineteenth century practices and controversies concerning history as an ontic discipline. The distinction, for example, between the critical and the antiquarian can be traced back to the schools of nineteenth century *Altertumswissenschaft* that were

[21] Taminiaux, 'La présence de Nietzsche dans *Sein und Zeit*,' 243.

[22] Anthony Jensen, 'Geschichte or Historie? Nietzsche's 2nd *Untimely Meditation* in the Context of 19th Century Philological Studies,' in *Nietzsche on Time and History*, ed. Manuel Dries (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 214.

opposed under the headings of *Wortphilologie* and *Sachphilologie*. Concerning the monumental mode of history, it has even been argued that Nietzsche's description of its disadvantages is an expression of his negative reaction to 'the establishment of specific historical foundation myths for a new German nation state.'[23]

Nietzsche's triad may well be influenced by the historiology of his time, even if opinions differ on the nature of that influence. Yet, Heidegger aims to show that the triad has a more profound or more philosophical origin, which Nietzsche does not make explicit in what is, after all, a short essay rather than a systematic treatise: '*the threefold character of historiology is vorgezeichnet*'—prefigured or 'adumbrated', as Macquarrie and Robinson have it—'in the historicity of Dasein' (SZ, p. 396). The idea of prefiguration or adumbration is important, and we should note that Heidegger does not say that Nietzsche's forms of history are grounded in Dasein's historicity—only their possible unity is. It is not the case, in other words, that Nietzsche's triad can be adopted without modification as an analysis of the meaning and possibility of historiology. Heidegger aims to show how 'authentic historiology is the factically concrete unity' (SZ, p. 396) of what Nietzsche seems to consider as separable modes of historical inquiry. As elaborated in the 2nd *Untimely Meditation*, in accordance with its goals, energies and needs, life requires 'a certain kind of knowledge of the past, now in the form of monumental, now of antiquarian, now of critical history.'[24] For Heidegger, in contrast, authentic historiology is not to be carried out according to any particular one of the three modes, as if the choice of mode depended on one's mood and the needs of the moment, but it instead has to be *all three at one and the same time*. Authentic historiology is *monumental* insofar as it interprets great acts of the past as a source of possibilities for the future. But this repetition at once reverently preserves the past and thus is *antiquarian*, and such monumental-antiquarian historiology is at one and the same time critical, insofar as it carries a critique of the present and thus 'becomes a way of painfully detaching oneself from the falling publicness of "today"' (SZ, p. 397).

What Nietzsche seems to analyse as three apparently separable modes of historiology constitute *together*—and that is to say, *all at once*—the necessary, authentic form in which authentic historiology is to be carried out. Authentic historiology necessarily consists of this unity because Dasein, as Heidegger has already shown in *Being and Time*, exists as a temporal or historical being 'according to the unity of future and having-been [Gewesenheit] as presence [Gegenwart]' (SZ, p. 397). All three of the modes of history correspond to one of the ecstases of temporality: from the perspective of present day inquiries into the past, the monumental in a certain sense privileges the future, the antiquarian the past, and the critical the present. Of course, Nietzsche had already more or less explicitly seen the relation of the modes

[23] See Christian J. Emden, 'Toward a Critical Historicism: History and Politics in Nietzsche's Second *Untimely Meditation*,' *Modern Intellectual History* 3, no. 3 (2006): 1–31.

[24] Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*: 271.; Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*: 77.

of history to the particular aspects of time. As Jacques Taminiaux has argued, the needs on which Nietzsche grounds the three modes of historiology—striving, preserving and liberation—can be understood to correspond to the three aspects or moments of time itself.[25] Yet, what Nietzsche does not explicitly grasp is that these 'moments' of time are in fact *ecstases* of temporality and that such *ecstases* are mutually implicated and cannot—at least when lived authentically—exist each independently of the other.

Nietzsche's three modes of historiology point towards but, nevertheless, do not explicitly enable one to grasp Dasein's temporality or historicity. Again, to what extent Nietzsche remains unable to see this, and thus remains imprisoned within a vulgar conception of time, is open to question. His critique of the ontological presuppositions of the nineteenth century ideal of historiological objectivity, together with his recognition of the hermeneutic instantiation of the historian in history, can be understood at least to imply the sort of destruction of the linear, vulgar conception of time that Heidegger effects within his fundamental ontology. Heidegger himself seems to want us to think in this direction, to see in Nietzsche's *2nd Untimely Meditation* an ontological precursor of *Being and Time*.[26] For as he notes enigmatically, 'the beginning of his [Nietzsche's] "meditation" allows us to suppose that he understood more than he has made known to us' (SZ, p. 396). The 'beginning of Nietzsche's text' can be understood to include Nietzsche's description of the three needs of the human being in the second section, but it seems to refer more directly to the comparison of animal and man in the first paragraphs of the text. Posited as a limit case, the animal—in this case, a cow—exists in a permanent state of forgetting. It lives *unhistorisch,* unhistorically, and is 'contained in the present,'[27] whereas man is forever burdened by the past. In this comparison of man and animal, there lies at least the possibility, as Heidegger seems to say, of a conception of man as not simply being contained in the present, a conception prior to any question of historiology or of remembering in the widest sense of explicit cognition of the past. In the titular idea of life that Nietzsche never adequately clarifies in the text, there is hidden, perhaps, the possibility of an ontology of Dasein.

[25] Taminiaux, 'La présence de Nietzsche dans *Sein und Zeit*,' 247.

[26] As Alain Boutot notes in his introduction to the French translation of GA 46, 'tout se passe donc comme si Nietzsche avait en quelque sorte entrevu, dans sa *Considération*, le phénomène de la temporalisation.' See Martin Heidegger, *Interprétation de la Deuxième considération intempestive de Nietzsche*, trans. Alain Boutot (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), 9–10.

[27] Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*: 249.; Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*: 61.

5.4 GA 46: The Negative Repetition

The *Turning* in Heidegger's thought involves two mutually dependent elements of philosophical methodology, both related to each other temporally: one looks back and is critical, the other looks forward and is creative. They thus relate to each other as the critical mode of history relates to the monumental mode in Nietzsche's text. Heidegger writes:

> What was presented in *Being and Time* as 'destruction' does not mean dismantling as demolition but *purification* with a view to bringing to light the fundamental metaphysical position. But all this is … only a prelude. (GA 65, p. 221)

In the *2nd Untimely Meditation* and other texts of the period—principally *The Birth of Tragedy* and 'On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense'[28]—Heidegger discovers the fundamental theme or aim of Nietzsche's philosophy that still lies at the root of the later interpretation of being as Will to Power: 'to look at science from the perspective of art, and at art from the perspective of life.'[29] From this genealogical perspective, Nietzsche says that as soon as the roots of morality have been unearthed, then that morality will have lost its power. In *Being and Time*, we find a similar project in that Heidegger seeks to demonstrate that the genealogical roots of the scientific world picture lie in the art of interpretation and to understand this art from the perspective of the average everydayness of life. And yet, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger treats the idea of 'life' tentatively. The reason for this, as he explains in *Interpretation of Nietzsche's 2nd Untimely Meditation* (GA 46), is that the idea of life will restrict our understanding of human existence by comparing it to an unspecified, vague idea of animality.

As the repetition of metaphysics with the aim of its destruction, *Being and Time* attempts to ground our understanding of the world in terms of a step back into the historical ground of being. Subsequently, the work of the 1930s—the *Auseinandersetzung* not only with Nietzsche, but also with other philosophers and, in the end, with philosophy itself—investigates the possibility of overcoming this past. As a result, the fundamental question that Heidegger poses to the *2nd Untimely Meditation* in GA 46 is whether Nietzsche's conception of life facilitates this overcoming. Heidegger's evaluations of Nietzsche's thought in *Being and Time* and then in GA 46 are thus distinct in a manner that could be described according to Reiner Schürmann's differentiation of retrospective and transitional concepts.[30] The question can, consequently, be rephrased in the following way: can 'life' be more than a retrospective concept allowing us to understand the essentially metaphysical understanding of the human being as 'half animal, half divine', as the strange hybrid of which Nietzsche speaks?

What was Heidegger looking for exactly with this question? Nothing less than an overcoming of the current historical situation of the human being and a 'leap into

[28] See Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*: 139–153.

[29] Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*: 14.

[30] See Rainer Schürmann, *Le principe d'anarchie* (Paris: Seuil, 1982), 222ff.

Dasein'—'der Einsprung in das Dasein' as he comes to call it from the mid-1930s onwards.[31] There is, however, no doubt that overcoming the human being is also, and equally, Nietzsche's aim. When he speaks about the Eternal Return of the Same as a historical decision about 'either animal or Overhuman,' Nietzsche is trying to sever the interpretative links between the ideas of animality and humanity. The Overhuman will no longer be the strange hybrid existence that has characterised humanity for the last near 2,400 years since Plato. And yet, if that is the case, what can we do with the concept of life? Can we move with the notion of 'life' beyond the human being to what Nietzsche calls the Overhuman and Heidegger names Dasein—that is, to an interpretation of our being as absolutely independent from the idea of animality?

This question transcends Heidegger's approach to the *2nd Untimely Meditation* in *Being and Time*, but the principal elements of his earlier reading nevertheless remain: Heidegger still affirms that Nietzsche's threefold conception of history derives from the temporality, the *Geschichtlichkeit* of Dasein, even if the question of whether or not the three forms *necessarily* derive from temporality is one that he leaves open (GA 46, p. 92). It is this problem that had led Heidegger to assert, as noted above, that the three forms are adumbrated—but not simply grounded—in Dasein's historicity. Yet, now Heidegger seeks to underline that Nietzsche does not adequately grasp historiality or *Geschichtlichkeit* as such. The idea of life as an 'unhistorical power' remains opaque throughout the *2nd Untimely Meditation*, and this might explain why Nietzsche is not able to distinguish essentially the notions of *Geschichte* and *Historie* (GA 46, p. 100). On this basis, and within the context of his *Auseinandersetzung*, Heidegger now emphasises all that prevents Nietzsche from gaining an essential insight into historicity and temporality and into the fundamental metaphysical position proper to his thinking as a whole.

Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche in the 1930s and 1940s operates within this horizon. On the concept of life, as Heidegger often claims, Nietzsche makes the mistake of importing biology into philosophy, even though he had already established that 'the sciences do not think.' Nietzsche's conception of life would therefore be biological, even if for him biology is not able to determine what life is, since life is a concept more fundamental than those available to and accessible by any ontic science. We are, however, compelled to ask: where do we ever see Nietzsche 'borrowing from biology'? He does not often refer to results or statements from the science that, since the early nineteenth century, bears the name 'biology,' and even when he does—when he engages with Darwin, for example—he does so merely negatively. Yet, Heidegger's critique of biologism targets more than the reading of biological treatises and their use to understand, for example, the dividing line between animality and human being. He notes:

> It is no mere extension or carrying over of 'biology' as a science onto the understanding of the whole of the world, but the carrying over of the projection, on which biology as such rests, onto the whole of 'beings.' This is no mere 'biologism,' to be sure, in the crude and almost impossible sense of an extension of present biology to all domains of what can be known and evaluated, but is still biologism in an essential sense of the adoption of the foundations

[31] Compare amongst many other places in Heidegger's works of the late 30s: GA 65, § 91, p. 184.

> of biology as the fundamental determination of beings as a whole. We have not overcome biologism in explaining that the positing of life is not an extension of biology as a 'science'; it is still more essentially biological because it takes over its fundamental position. (GA 46, p. 215)

Any comparison presupposes an identity, a *tertium comparationis*, that is, a quality that the two things have in common such that they can be compared. The *tertium comparationis* in the comparison of animal and human being consists in the idea of 'life' in general. In this way, in fact, Nietzsche determines man on the basis of 'animality,' already on the basis of a traditionally vague idea of life in relation to the *animus* and, consequently, through a restriction of what he presents as the essential characteristic of animality, namely forgetting or being-unhistorical (GA 46, p. 275). This account is certainly 'historically correct,' given the long history of understanding the human being as a *ζῷον* or *animal* plus something extra. Here man is the being who is not able, or at least not always able, to forget; the differential defining the species human being is here not immediately reason or rationality but rather not-being-able-to-forget. In focusing on forgetting in this way, Nietzsche veers away from a positive account of the historial existence that is prior to any explicit act of recognition of the past, any historiology—and he thus seems to be caught up in the traditional, occidental determination of man as *ζῷον λόγον ἔχον*, as the rational animal. Philosophy has determined the human being as a type of animal, and Nietzsche will later say that it is the 'not yet determined animal.'[32] Even Nietzsche's Overhuman, while seemingly severing the connection with animality, is still characterized with respect to a general idea of life as *Will to Power*.

Nietzsche's 'comparative study [vergleichende Betrachtung]' (GA 46, p. 16) thus serves to animalise the human being and to humanise our understanding of animality. The phenomenon of forgetting, as it is given in our own experience, can exist only as a privation, that is to say, as a particular mode of retaining or remembering. When he ascribes forgetting to the animal, Nietzsche imposes an essentially human characteristic on it. As Heidegger argues,

> *the animal does not forget* because it cannot retain [behalten], and it cannot remember or retain in the sense of making something present to itself [Vergegenwärtigung] because it never needs to forget anything present that could be represented. (GA 46, p. 49)

Certainly, Nietzsche points to something essential when he posits the limit case of the animal as being bound to the present, but if, as he writes, 'the animal does not know what today is, what yesterday is,'[33] then it is improper, or at least imprecise, to say that it forgets anything at all. Within what Heidegger had already termed in 1929/30 the 'environmental captivation [Benommenheit]' (GA 29/30, pp. 347f.) of the animal, what the animal is concerned with arises and sinks away for it; nonetheless, this sinking away is not a forgetting (GA 46, p. 49). Of course, animals, in all

[32] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 5* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 81.

[33] Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II (Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben)*: 248.; Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*: 60.

kinds of ways, can be understood to have a certain kind of memory, but this, Heidegger suggests, is to be understood in terms of an unspecified principle of habituation (GA 46, p. 49).

In response to these arguments, one might claim that Heidegger takes the *2nd Untimely Meditation* much too seriously. Nietzsche does not really pretend to give an accurate account of animal life when speaking about the encounter of a human being with a cow, and the description obviously does humanize the cow in question. Yet, none of this affects the point that Nietzsche accounts for human life from the perspective of life as such and, therefore, in relation to some idea of animality. For the Heidegger of 1938, Nietzsche's 'comparative consideration' is precisely what stops him from drawing any further consequences for the essential definition of human life from his account of the threefold relation of history to life (GA 46, p. 299), from his account of the three needs of the human being to which the three forms of history correspond. Hence, if we were tempted, following Jacques Taminiaux, to perceive in Nietzsche's delineation of these needs at least the echo of an original thinking of temporality, the Heidegger of 1938 urges us to recognise instead that an original grasp of temporality or historicity precludes any comparative consideration of man and animal and that such a thinking of temporality will shake life-philosophy to its very foundations by recognising the abyss that separates man and animal. It is here that we can identify one of the most contentious points of the reception of Heidegger's work. Whoever, for example, complains about Heidegger's famous statement that 'the sciences do not think' overlooks this historical dimension of his thinking.

What, then, to make of this thesis or these theses? In the end, the idea of not-being-able-to-forget as a determination of human being is indeed superficial, and it facilitates the nascent, generalised philosophy of life that he presents, however inchoately, in the text—a philosophy of life as an 'unhistorical power.' For Nietzsche, the human being is one with needs, hunger and desires. In attempting to respond to these needs with an account of the advantages and disadvantages of history for life, and in attempting thus to respond to the greatest urgency that is the advancing nihilism of the modern techno-scientific age, Nietzsche only begins to bring to completion, as Heidegger seeks to underline, the most extreme *Seinsverlassenheit*, the most extreme abandonment of beings by being. In passing over the question of temporality here, after having encountered it obliquely, Nietzsche passes over the question of being and passes on, via manifold philosophical twists and turns, to the later philosophy of the Will to Power as the metaphysical determination of life.

As Heidegger argues in GA 46, 'life' cannot escape the horizon of metaphysics when it is essentially determined in a comparison of human being and animal (*ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, ζῷον πολιτικόν*, *animal rationale*, etc.), and it is incapable of grounding another conception of history. This new conception of history is one that transcends an old, originally Greek conception, as Heidegger argues in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*:

> roughly speaking, the fact that the normative delimitation of place and of time for all metaphysics is to be found in a 'physics' … entails that place and time are not conceived in terms of their relation to history or to human beings as historical but rather are thought with

> respect to mere processes of movement in general. As such, the places and sequences of events in human history also fall into 'dimensions,' that is, into those realms in which space and time can be measured numerically. The representations of space and time that have held reign for almost two and a half thousand years are of the metaphysical kind. (GA 65, p. 53)

5.5 Conclusion

It is against this yardstick of a new history that Nietzsche's philosophy of life fails. Even though in the *2nd Untimely Meditation* Nietzsche begins to understand life from the position of justice, and even though this idea of justice[34] will draw the understanding of our being further and further away from a comparative analysis of human being and animal, as much as from the idea of life as an 'unhistorical power', Heidegger still concludes in the *Interpretation of Nietzsche's 2nd Untimely Meditation*:

> Being is 'becoming,' and even though justice is brought into an essential relation to 'life,' from out of itself 'justice' as such never suffices for the determination of beingness in its essence, let alone for the destruction of the metaphysical determination of beings and for the sublation of our fundamental experience of 'life,' in order to draw us into an essentially *different* experience. (GA 46, p. 176)

Nietzsche, Heidegger argues, will not be able to overcome the limitations of metaphysical ontology as long as he remains tied to a conception of life. It should be underlined that life-philosophy as such is either empty in the sense of tautologous—in *Being and Time*, 'philosophy of life' is take to mean 'as much as "the botany of plants"' (SZ, p. 46)—or else hopelessly vague. In this latter sense, one attempts to escape the problems of thinking after Hegel by means of an idea that can mean just about anything, idealism as much as realism or positivism, an idea that commands approval only because we mistakenly think that it takes us to the core of philosophical thinking.

But where does this leave us, in the early twenty-first-century and in our attempts to understand Nietzsche, Heidegger and their interrelation? Does this mean that there is nothing else positive to be gained from reading Nietzsche, the Nietzsche who now has been situated on *this side* of the transition towards another thinking? And if this were the case, why is Heidegger quite unable, many years later, to answer the question 'What is Called Thinking?' without a long recourse to Nietzsche? The answer Heidegger gives to this question is twofold. On the one hand, it is still necessary to go through Nietzsche in order to reach the transition—this is why the *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche is integral to the *Auseinandersetzung* with philosophy as such—while, on the other hand, the truth of Nietzsche's philosophy goes further than the philosophy of life that seems to arise in the *2nd Untimely Meditation*.

[34] As we have not enough space here to develop the idea of justice with respect to the interpretation of life, we refer the reader to Ullrich M. Haase, 'Nietzsche on Truth and Justice,' *New Nietzsche Studies* 8, no. 1/2 (2009): 79–97.

'Whoever has moved,' as Heidegger writes, 'through *that knowledge* within which Nietzsche sustained himself and went under, will judge the account of his thought as "life-philosophy" to be perfectly thoughtless' (GA 6.1, p. 581).

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Chapter 6
The Ex-appropriation of Responsibility

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Para Mélida

6.1 Introduction

Responsibility has traditionally been associated with a project of appropriation, understood as the securing of a sphere of mastery for a willful subject, a model one finds unfolded from Aristotle's discussion of the voluntary and responsible decision in Book III of *The Nichomachean Ethics* to Kant's discussion of transcendental freedom in the third antinomy and his understanding of enlightenment as self-determination, and culminating, although not without some paradoxes and reversals, with Sartre's philosophy of hyperbolic responsibility.[1] Indeed, the concept of responsibility has traditionally been identified with accountability, that is, conceived of in terms of will, causality, freedom or free-will and subjectivity. In that tradition, responsibility is understood in terms of the *subjectum* that lies at the basis of the act, as ground of imputation, and opens onto the project of a self-legislation and self-appropriation of the subject. It thus belongs to a semantics of power and appropriation, as it is about owning one's actions and owning oneself, as well as establishing an area of mastery and control for a willful and powerful subject: to be responsible in this context designates the capacity by a sovereign subject to appropriate itself entirely in an ideal of self-legislation and transparency. As Derrida put it, 'all the fundamental axiomatic of responsibility or decision (ethical, juridical,

[1] On this history of responsibility, I take the liberty of referring to my own study. See François Raffoul, *The Origins of Responsibility* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

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political), are grounded on the sovereignty of the subject, that is, the intentional auto-determination of the conscious self (which is free, autonomous, active, etc).'[2]

However, one finds in Heidegger and Derrida the reversal—indeed, the deconstruction—of such a tradition and responsibility understood instead as an exposure to an inappropriable: 'experience of the im-possible' for Derrida, assumption of an inappropriable thrownness and finitude in an original *Schuldigsein* or being-guilty for Heidegger. I will suggest in the following pages that for both Heidegger and Derrida, responsibility cannot be conceived of as the imputation or ascription of an act to a subject-cause. As Derrida puts it, responsibility 'is in no way that of the tradition anymore, that tradition implying intentionality, subjectivity, will, conscious ego, freedom, autonomy, meaning, etc.'[3] Rather, responsibility has to do with the encounter and exposition to an event as inappropriable. One notes the presence of such inappropriable in all the characterizations of responsibility in Heidegger's thought: in the 'ruinance' of factical life in the early writings and lecture courses; in the *Uneigentlichkeit* of existence and the being-guilty of conscience in *Being and Time*; in the thrownness felt in moods and in the weight of a responsibility assigned to an inappropriable finitude; in the withdrawal as origin of the call and in the presence of *Enteignis* within *Ereignis* in the later writings. Each time and throughout, one finds that responsibility in Heidegger is described as the exposure to an inappropriable. That such inappropriable is not opposed to appropriation, but 'plays' in it and as it were lets it be, is what Derrida attempts to describe with the neologism of 'exappropriation' in one word. One is then invited to reflect on this peculiar play between appropriation and expropriation in Heidegger and Derrida's thinking of responsibility. I will begin by identifying instances of inappropriability in Heidegger's existential analytic, before engaging Derrida's thought of the impossible as site of an aporetic responsibility. In the process, I will engage the very complex and tortuous relation of Derrida to Heidegger. In this way, I hope to engage Heidegger's reception in the twenty-first century by emphasizing the ethical import of his thought and how indeed ethics itself was given another foundation in his writing at the very limits of its aporetic nature.

6.2 The Inappropriability of Responsibility

It is not stressed enough that Heidegger has an important thought of responsibility, developed in the early works as well as in the later writings. However, responsibility for Heidegger is not, and cannot be, accountability in the classical sense. Indeed, as a concept, accountability assumes the position of a subject-cause, an agent or an

[2] Jacques Derrida, *Without Alibi*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), xix.

[3] Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy, 'Responsabilité—Du sens à venir,' in *Sens en tous sens: autour des travaux de Jean-Luc Nancy*, ed. Francis Guibal and Jean-Clet Martin (Paris: Galilée, 2004), 178–179.

author who can be displayed as a *subjectum* for its actions. Accountability, a notion that has defined (but not exhausted) the traditional concept of responsibility rests upon the motifs of agency, causality, free will, and subjectivity. As one knows, Heidegger's thinking of Dasein breaks decisively with the tradition of subjectivity, as well as that of free will; as for causality, it is said to be foreign to the eventfulness of being. The basis for an identification of responsibility with accountability thus disappears in Heidegger's thinking, which does not necessarily exclude another thought of responsibility. Indeed, at the same time that the concept of accountability is phenomenologically deconstructed, Heidegger renews the philosophy of responsibility, of what *to be responsible* means, no longer associated with the accountability of the sovereign subject but with a certain *responsiveness*. For instance, playing on the proximity between *Verantwortung* and *Antwort*, Heidegger explains in the 1934 summer semester course on *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache* that responsibility should not be understood in its moral or religious sense but 'is to be understood philosophically as a distinctive kind of answering' (GA 38, p. 121). In the *Zollikon Seminars*, Heidegger interpreted this answering as a kind of correspondence: 'The expression "to correspond" means to answer the claim, to comport oneself in response to it. *Re*-spond [Ent-*sprechen*] → to answer *to* [Ant-*worten*]' (ZSEM, p. 206).

Responsibility will thus have to find another origin than that of the free autonomous subject. This was indeed the sense of the choice of the term Dasein: it was a matter for Heidegger of approaching the human being no longer as a subject but in terms of the openness of being as such. The question of responsibility is hence situated outside of egology, arising instead out of the very openness of being where the human being dwells as Dasein. In fact, responsibility defines the very concept of Dasein, which, as care, means to be a responsibility of and for oneself. Heidegger states that Dasein is distinctive in the sense that it does not 'simply occur among other beings' but rather 'is concerned *about* its very being' (SZ, p. 12). Being is given in such a way that I have to take it over and be responsible for it. Being is a task, a weight I have to carry and be responsible for. This original non-indifference to being, and to one's own being, defines Dasein as care and as primordial responsibility. Terms such as care, concern, solicitude, anxiety, authenticity and being-guilty designate such primordial responsibility in *Being and Time*. In later texts, responsibility would be thought in terms of the human's response and correspondence to the address of being. Responsibility then names the correspondence between humans and being, humans' belonging to being, as well as their essence as humans. Responsibility thus designates no less than the co-belonging of being and Dasein, a co-belonging that is *the* question of Heidegger's thought and its very heart.

Yet, this co-belonging remains affected by a certain expropriation: when the question of responsibility is investigated most closely in *Being and Time*, namely in the sections on conscience, one notes that Dasein's responsibility is assigned to an inappropriable. Indeed, one finds in *Being and Time* what one might call instances of inappropriability at the heart of the analytic of Dasein that would seem to threaten the very possibility of responsible agency, if it is the case that these instances

represent not only what I am not responsible for but what I could never appropriate, what will always evade my power. Heidegger writes that existence arises out of a perfectly opaque ground (or rather, non-ground!), which can only constitute a limit for responsible appropriation. Such limits can be found in the very notions of facticity, thrownness and being-guilty. Let us first investigate such thrownness when it is first discussed at length, in the discussion of moods in sections 29–30 of *Being and Time*.

Heidegger describes moods [Stimmungen] by emphasizing the element of opacity and withdrawal in them that seems to interrupt and foreclose any possibility of cognitive or practical appropriation. Heidegger thus explains that moods are beyond the reach of both will and cognition. In moods, which are a mode of disclosure, the being of Dasein is said to be able to 'burst forth as a naked "that it is and has to be"' (SZ, p. 134). Having a mood brings Dasein to its 'there,' that is, leads Dasein before the pure 'that' of its There, which as such, Heidegger writes in a striking formulation, 'stares directly at it with the inexorability of an enigma' (SZ, p. 136). Heidegger states that in being-in-a-mood, the being of the there 'becomes manifest as a burden [Last]'; he then adds, 'One does not *know* why.' In fact, Dasein 'cannot know why' (SZ, p. 134). Any rational enlightenment finds here an impassable limit, for 'cognition falls far short' of the original disclosure of the there in a mood. This phenomenon is not due to some weakness of our cognitive powers, which somehow could be improved; rather, it has to do with the peculiar phenomenon of moods as they exhibit the facticity of Dasein. And what is peculiar to this phenomenon is that the 'that' of our being is given in such a way that 'the whence and whither remain obscure' (SZ, p. 134). This is why cognition falls short: in the phenomenon of moods, there is a 'remaining obscure' which is irreducible. It is, Heidegger says, a characteristic of Dasein's being, which he names thrownness: 'We shall call this character of being of Dasein which is veiled in its whence and whither, but in itself all the more openly disclosed, this "that it is," the *thrownness* [*Geworfenheit*] of this being into its there' (SZ, p. 135). The thrownness revealed in moods thus reveals the inappropriability of our existence and, more precisely, of our coming into being, of our origins. In a 1928–1929 course, entitled *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Heidegger evokes the 'darkness of Dasein's origins' and contrasts it with the 'relative brightness of its potentiality-for Being,' to then state the following: 'Dasein exists always in an essential exposure to the darkness and impotence of its origin, even if only in the prevailing form of a habitual deep forgetting in the face of this essential determination of its facticity' (GA 27, p. 340).

There is, therefore, a dimension in our being that resists appropriation, whether practical or theoretical. That dimension is nothing other than our very coming into being and the sheer inappropriability of it. This, of course, mobilizes the question of birth. It is often said that Heidegger neglected the phenomenon of birth and that he privileged being-towards-death. Yet, one must insist that birth and death cannot be separated in Heidegger's thought of Dasein. For Heidegger, it is through a same throw (the throw of thrownness) that I am born … into death. I am born towards death, and as mortal, I exist natally. I am natally exposed to death, towards which I exist as born each time anew. Further, Dasein is said to exist *between* birth and

death, not in the sense that Dasein would occupy an actual place between two external limits but as stretching itself between birth and death: Dasein *is* the between of birth and death. Being that between, Dasein exists towards each of its ends: Dasein exists towards death, *and Dasein exists towards birth*. In this sense, Heidegger speaks of a 'being-toward-the-beginning [Sein zum Anfang]' (SZ, p. 373). Thus, it is simply not accurate to say that Heidegger ignored the dimension of birth, which is an integral part of the existential analytic. Ironically, in light of these charges, it was Heidegger who warned that his analysis would indeed be 'one-sided' (SZ, p. 373) if it ignored the beginning, or birth! We thus exist both in a 'natal' way and in a 'mortal' way, in the sense that we relate to both ends, 'our' ends. But are they really 'ours'? In fact, they remain for Heidegger inappropriable: I can no more go back behind my coming into being than I can appropriate death by making it somehow actual. Here, responsibility as a project of appropriation (being properly oneself) seems to encounter an impassable twofold limit. I seem to be expropriated from my whole being (birth and death) and, thus, expropriated from my 'own' being. Does any meaningful sense of responsibility not collapse in such an expropriation?

6.3 Responsibility as Appropriation of the Inappropriable

It is at this juncture, at this very *aporetic* moment, that Heidegger paradoxically situates the responsibility of Dasein, a responsibility arising as it were from its own impossibility, a paradoxical phenomenon that Derrida attempts to approach in terms of a logic of aporia, of what he calls the possibility of the impossible, in a word, *ex-appropriation*. In fact, Derrida stresses that, in principle, responsibility is situated in paradox: 'the concepts of responsibility, of decision, or of duty, are condemned a priori to paradox, scandal, and aporia.'[4] As such, responsibility can only be, as he puts it, an *experience of the impossible* (for Derrida, experience itself means to be in the impossible, in the aporia, in the contradiction). How does such a paradox of responsibility appear in Heidegger's text? On the one hand, Heidegger explains that Dasein 'exists as thrown,' that is, 'brought into its there *not* of its own accord' (SZ, p. 284). Certainly, as a potentiality for being, Dasein 'belongs to itself'; nevertheless, Dasein 'has *not* given itself to itself' (SZ, 284), such a 'not' designating the phenomenon of thrownness. The 'not,' Heidegger explains, 'is constitutive for this *Being* of Dasein—its thrownness' (SZ, p. 284). Thrownness means that existence can never get back behind its coming into being and can never appropriate its origins. Dasein can never 'gain power over one's ownmost being from the ground up' (SZ, p. 284). At the same time, existence means being called to appropriate one's own being, *from the ground up*. Hence the paradox of responsibility: 'The self,

[4] Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, trans. David Wills (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 68.

which as such has to lay the ground of itself, can *never* gain power over that ground, and yet it has to take over being the ground in existing' (SZ, p. 284).

This is why it is this very impossibility that Dasein must make its own and possibilize; it is that very inappropriable that Dasein must appropriate. In the course previously cited, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Heidegger explains that it is precisely that over which Dasein is not master that must be worked through and survived:

> [What] … does not arise of one's own express decision, as most things for Dasein, must be in such or such a way retrievingly appropriated, even if only in the modes of putting up with or shirking something; that which for us is entirely not under the control of freedom in the narrow sense … is something that is in such or such a manner taken up or rejected in the How of Dasein. (GA 27, p. 337)

Indeed, Dasein is not thrown only once and for all. Rather, 'as long as it is, Dasein is constantly its "that" as care' (SZ, p. 284). I am thrown into existing, that is, into a possibility to be, a 'having-to-be.' Dasein exists only in such a way that it projects itself toward possibilities in which it is thrown; each time, it *has to be* this being-thrown, this 'not.' One is thrown each time *into a responsibility*, which, in turn, is for such a thrownness. Heidegger uses the expression 'Faktizität der Überantwortung [facticity of responsibility]' (SZ, p. 135) to indicate this thrownness of responsibility, which also means a thrownness into responsibility.

Responsibility signifies taking on thrownness, the very inappropriability of existence, presenting the paradox or aporia of having to appropriate the inappropriable in what Derrida calls an experience of the impossible. The expropriation that comes to light in the incapacity for Dasein to make itself the author of existence is precisely what existence must take on. Responsibility is hence the 'carrying' of what remains inappropriable in existence.

6.4 The Weight of Responsibility

This is indeed why one speaks of the *weight* of responsibility. What weighs is what remains inappropriable in existence. The call of conscience calls Dasein back from the disburdened (deresponsibilized) existence in the everyday back to its 'own' being-guilty. As we saw, what Dasein has to be, what it has to assume and be responsible for, is precisely its being-thrown as such. Dasein has to be not being itself the ground for its being. Heidegger writes, 'Even though it has *not* laid the ground *itself*, it rests in the weight of it, which mood reveals to it as a burden' (SZ, p. 284). This is the very weight of responsibility, as it registers this incommensurability of being a thrown origin. Let us thus dwell on this motif of weight, as it seems to harbour both the expropriation of facticity and the appropriation of ethical responsibility.

Ordinary language does speak of the connection between ethics, responsibility and weight: one speaks of responsibility in the sense of carrying a weight, of 'shouldering' a burden. Heidegger speaks of the human being as burdened or heavy with

a weight, in a situation of care and concern, in contrast to the lightness or care-lessness of inauthentic or irresponsible being. Heidegger, thus, evokes the fundamental 'burdensome character of Dasein even when it alleviates that burden' (SZ, p. 134). So-called 'moods of elation,' which do lighten the burden, are said to be possible only on the basis of this burdensome character of Dasein's being. Indeed, being as 'having to be' is a task, a weight Dasein has to carry. In his early lecture courses, Heidegger stated that factical life (later renamed Dasein) is a fundamental caring, marked by the difficult weightiness of a task and affected by an irreducible problematicity and questionableness. That weight, Heidegger claims in a 1921–1922 Winter semester course, 'does not accrue to life from the outside, from something that lacks the character of life, but is instead present in and with life itself' (GA 61, pp. 100–01). Precisely because of this burdensome character of factical life, Heidegger adds, 'factical life is always seeking the easy way' (GA 61, p. 108). Responsibility, as the carrying of the weight of existence, is the originary phenomenon, and irresponsibility—making things easy—is derivative. Irresponsibility is to make things easy; authentic responsible being is to make things hard. One verifies this in the phenomenon of the so-called 'difficulty of life.' With respect to such difficulty, Heidegger stresses the following in 1922:

> A characteristic of the being of factical life is that it finds itself hard to bear. The most unmistakable manifestation of this is the fact that factical life has the tendency to make itself easy for itself. In finding itself hard to bear, life *is* difficult in accord with the basic sense of its being, not in the sense of a contingent feature. If it is the case that factical life authentically is what it is in this being-hard and being-difficult, then the genuinely fitting way of gaining access to it and truly safekeeping it can only consist in making itself hard for itself. ("Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation," in Supplements, ed. John Van Buren (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 113.)

The weight is here the weight of existence itself, an existence which, as Heidegger puts it, is 'worrying about itself' (Ibid, 118).

It is no accident that when he analyses the disclosedness of existence into a there, that is, into an affective disposition, Heidegger speaks of a 'burden.' As we saw, in moods, the being of the there 'becomes manifest as a burden [Last]' (SZ, p. 134). Interestingly, the very concept of weight and burden reintroduces, as it were, the problematic of responsibility. In a marginal note added to this passage, Heidegger later clarified:

> 'Burden': what weighs [das Zu-tragende]; human being is charged with the responsibility [überantwortet] of Dasein, appropriated by it [übereignet]. To bear [tragen]: to take over something from out of belonging to being itself. (SZ, p. 134, p. 442)

The burden is 'what weighs,' what has to be carried. The weight of facticity, i.e., the burden, is to be carried; responsibility carries this weight, takes on the weight of an inappropriable facticity.

The motifs of weight, Being-guilty, being-a-ground and thrownness, and the taking on of the inappropriable, point to expropriation as the paradoxical site of responsibility—or, more precisely, to the *exappropriation of responsibility*. Indeed, for

Heidegger, responsibility now means, as the taking on of facticity, the appropriation of expropriation. This is why authentic existence is nothing but the taking on of the inauthentic. 'Resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically [Sie eignet sich die Unwahrheit eigentlich zu]' (SZ, pp. 298–99), and authenticity consists in 'projecting oneself upon one's *ownmost* authentic potentiality for becoming guilty' (SZ, p. 287). In this sense, the original sense of responsibility is the appropriation of the inappropriable *as* inappropriable. It is in relation to such inappropriable that one encounters Derrida. Indeed, as we saw, for Derrida responsibility is an experience of the impossible. In Heidegger, we see how the responsibility of Dasein arises out of the aporia of being a thrown ground, a thrownness and an expropriation felt in a mood and carried as a weight.

6.5 Derrida: From the Inappropriable to the Im-possible

It is in fact around this motif of weight that Derrida breaks with Heidegger, in addition to the notion of appropriation that, according to him, still governs Heidegger's thought of existence and responsibility. For weight, according to Derrida, indicates the impossibility of appropriation and the primacy of expropriation.[5] In *On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy*, Derrida returns to the motif of weight, while discussing several texts from Jean-Luc Nancy, and cites a passage from *The Gravity of Thought* where Nancy writes that existence '*is* the appropriation of the inappropriable.'[6] Derrida reads that expression by insisting on the 'ex-scription' revealed in it, that is, on what remains inappropriable in the appropriation: 'it thus inscribes the uninscribable in inscription itself, it *exscribes*.'[7] Derrida reverses Heidegger's 'appropriation of the inappropriable' into an 'expropriation of the proper,' which he also calls 'exappropriation.' For instance, in 'Politics and Friendship,' found in *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews*, Derrida describes a 'paradoxical ex-appropriation' as 'that movement of the proper expropriating itself through the very process of appropriation.'[8] Ex-appropriation refers to that 'interminable appropriation of an

[5] This is also Agamben's reading, who considers that the originary facticity of Dasein signifies that Dasein's opening is marked by an original *impropriety.* Such is the 'passion of facticity,' a passion 'in which man bears this nonbelonging and darkness.' See Giorgio Agamben, 'The Passion of Facticity,' in *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 107. This will allow Agamben to claim a 'primacy of the improper' in Heidegger's thought of being. As he puts it, on Heidegger's account of facticity, 'Dasein cannot ever appropriate the being it is, the being to which it is irreparably consigned.' See, ibid., 100.

[6] Jacques Derrida, *On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy*, trans. Christine Irizzary (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 299. See also Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Gravity of Thought*, trans. François Raffoul and Gregory Recco (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997).

[7] Derrida, *On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy*: 298.

[8] Jacques Derrida, *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971–2001*, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 171.

irreducible nonproper' that limits 'every and any appropriation process at the same time.'[9] Thus, the most proper sense of existence is such 'on the condition of remaining inappropriable, and of remaining inappropriable *in* its appropriation.' On the condition, then, as Nancy put it, of existence '*having weight* [faire poids] at the heart of thought and in spite of thought.'[10] This 'in spite of thought' indicates the *outside* to which thought is assigned and how existence weighs on thought from the outside. Such is, precisely, 'the weight of a thought': '*The weight of a thought* is quite exactly the inappropriability of appropriation, or the impropriety of the proper (proper to the proper, absolutely).'[11] From this thinking of weight as mark of the inappropriable in existence, Derrida introduces the motif of the impossible: 'Another way of saying that "existence," "is," "Being," "is quite exactly," *are all names of the impossible* and of self-incompatibility.'[12]

Seeking to collapse the proper into the improper, the possible into the impossible—indeed, attempting to show how the possible *becomes* im-possible—Derrida states that the Heideggerian thought of being as event, as *Ereignis*, involves a certain expropriation. In 2001, by going against the grain, one must admit, of many of his previous interpretations, in which he tended to stress a privilege of the proper in Heidegger's work,[13] Derrida claims on the contrary that 'the thought of *Ereignis* in Heidegger would be turned not only toward the *appropriation* of the proper [*eigen*] but toward a certain *expropriation* that Heidegger himself names [*Enteignis*].'[14] He then adds, explicitly linking the Heideggerian thought of the event to the inappropriable and the impossible: 'The undergoing [l'épreuve] of the event, that which in the undergoing or in the ordeal at once opens itself up to and resists experience, is, it seems to me, a certain *unappropriability* of what comes or happens [ce qui arrive].'[15] Even if Derrida recognizes that any event necessarily calls for a certain appropriative reception, he insists on the fact that 'there is no event worthy of its name except insofar as this appropriation falters at some border or frontier.'[16] For Derrida, the event manifests an irreducible inappropriability and is unforeseeable, unpredictable, without horizon and incalculable. This is manifest in the surprise of the event, which forecloses understanding or comprehension: 'The event is what comes and, in coming comes to surprise me to surprise comprehension: The event is first of all *that which* I do not first of all comprehend. Better, the event is first of all *that* I do not comprehend.'[17] Derrida finds here access to his own thinking of the impossible, in

[9] Derrida, *On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy*: 181–182.

[10] Cited in ibid., 299.

[11] Cited in ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] And still on Jacques Derrida, *Aporias*, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 56.

[14] Giovanna Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 90.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

particular in an interpretive reading of the expression 'possibility of the impossible,' borrowed, as we will see, from Heidegger. In fact, in *Aporias*, Derrida claimed that the expression 'possibility of the impossible' should be read as the indication of the presence of an *Enteignis* within *Eigentlichkeit*.'[18] Everything for Derrida is at stake in this expression that he seeks to *reverse* towards the impossible. It is a matter, he tells us, 'of knowing in which sense (in the sense of direction and trajectory) one reads the expression the possibility of impossibility,'[19] reminding the reader, following the polysemy of *sens* in French, that the term should also be heard as 'direction.' Hence, reversing the direction, the expression 'the possibility of the impossible' becomes 'the impossibility of the possible,' although ultimately Derrida seeks to grasp possibility *as* impossibility.

Now, the expression, 'possibility of the impossible' appears in *Being and Time* to designate the existential meaning of death, which is defined by Heidegger '*as the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general*' (SZ, p. 262).[20] The very structure of the Derridean thought of the impossible is thus marked by this Heideggerian heritage. Derrida discusses this expression at length in *Aporias*, an expression he seeks to preserve—and complicate—in his thinking of the eventfulness of the event, of its arrival/happening (l'arrivée). Derrida begins by clarifying that for Heidegger death is grasped as a possibility and not as impossibility: 'this is indeed the possibility of a being-able-not-to or of a no-longer-being-able-to, but by no means the impossibility of a being-able-to.'[21] I *can* die; death is a possibility for Dasein, that is, the possibility of the impossible, but not the mere impossibility of existence. This is a crucial precision, as Derrida explains, 'The nuance is thin, but its very fragility is what seems to me both decisive and significant, and it probably is most essential in Heidegger's view.'[22]

Now, Derrida seeks to complicate matters and understand the expression 'the possibility of the impossible' as an aporia. 'Is this an aporia? Where do we situate it? In the impossibility or in the possibility of an impossibility (which is not necessarily the same thing)? What can the possibility of an impossibility be?'[23] For Heidegger, as we know, death is *the most proper possibility* of Dasein; for Derrida, *on the contrary*, it will be an issue of leaning towards the impossible, that is, the

[18] Derrida, *Aporias*: 77.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Already in paragraph 50, Heidegger states that 'Death is the possibility of the pure and simple impossibility of Dasein' (SZ, p. 250).

[21] Derrida, *Aporias*: 68.

[22] Ibid. Derrida identifies two senses of the possible in *Being and Time*: first, 'the sense of the virtuality or of the imminence of the future'; second, the sense 'of the possible as that of which I am capable, that for which I have the power, the ability, or the potentiality.' He then concludes that 'these two meanings of possibility co-exist in *die Möglichkeit*.' See ibid., 62. One might suggest a third sense here, which is precisely the opposite of the second sense (possibility as power): for the 'I can' in 'I can die' designates more a vulnerability or exposure than a power. The possible here takes the sense of a being-exposed (passivity) to the possibility of death. I can die (i.e., am mortal) because I am exposed to death.

[23] Ibid., 68.

improper and expropriation. For, as Derrida argues, if the most extreme and most proper possibility turns out to be the possibility *of the impossible*, then we will have to say that expropriation always already inhabits the proper and that death becomes *the least proper* possibility. He writes:

> If death, the most proper possibility of Dasein, is the possibility of its impossibility, death becomes the most improper possibility and the most ex-propriating, the most inauthenticating one. From the most originary inside of its possibility, the proper of Dasein becomes from then one contaminated, parasited, and divided by the most improper.[24]

When Heidegger speaks of the possibility of death '*as that of the impossibility of existence in general* [*als die der Unmöglichkeit der Existenz überhaupt*],' Derrida understands this 'as' as revealing that possibility is approached *as* impossibility, for this is 'not only the paradoxical possibility of a possibility of impossibility: it is possibility *as* impossibility.'[25] Now, to my knowledge, Heidegger never speaks of possibility *as* impossibility. Rather, he speaks of death *as* the possibility *of* the impossibility of existence in general. How does one slide from the possibility *of* an impossibility into possibility *as* impossibility, except through some interpretive violence? For Heidegger always stressed, as if to prevent possible misunderstandings, that death is a possibility that 'must not be weakened' and that 'it must be understood *as possibility*, cultivated *as possibility*, and endured *as possibility* in our relation to it' (SZ, p. 261).[26] Yet, Derrida evokes a *disappearance* of the possible in the impossible, explaining that, for Dasein, death 'is both its *most proper* possibility and this same (most proper) possibility as impossibility' and is 'hence, the *least proper*, I would say'—although he immediately concedes that 'but Heidegger never says it like that.'[27]

What can be seen in this interpretation is Derrida's renewed thinking with respect to the possible and the impossible. In 'A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event,' Derrida challenges the traditional opposition between the possible and the impossible, seeking to 'upset' the distinction and attempting to grasp the impossible no longer as the opposite of the possible but, on the contrary, as what 'haunts the possible.'[28] As he writes: 'Even when something comes to pass as possible, when an event occurs as possible, the fact that it will have been impossible, that the possible invention will have been impossible, this impossibility continues to haunt the possibility.'[29] Everything takes place as if the impossible is what truly enables or possibilizes the possible, as if the possible could only be possible *as impossible*. To such an extent, the impossible, Derrida claims, *is* possible, not in the sense that it would become possible, but in a more radical sense in which the impossible, *as impossible*,

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[24] Ibid., 77.

[25] Ibid., 70.

[26] Further, in our coming near death in its anticipation, one does not come near the actuality of death, but its possibility, a 'possibility of the possible [that] only becomes "greater"' (SZ, p. 262).

[27] Derrida, *Aporias*: 70.

[28] Jacques Derrida, 'A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event,' *Critical Inquiry* 33, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 452.

[29] Ibid.

is possible. It is thus a question of converting or 'turning' the possible into the impossible[30] and recognizing that if the impossible is possible (as impossible), the possible in a certain way *is* impossible (arising out of an aporia). Derrida writes:

> I'll say, I'll try to show in what way the impossibility, a certain impossibility of saying the event or a certain impossible possibility of saying the event, forces us to rethink not only what 'saying' or what 'event' means, but what *possible* means in the history of philosophy. To put it otherwise, I will try to explain how I understand the word 'possible' in this sentence in a way that this 'possible' is not simply 'different from' or 'the opposite of' impossible, and why, in this case, 'possible' and 'impossible' say the same thing.[31]

Such thinking radically transforms our understanding of the possible and the impossible. The possible is no longer the opposite of the impossible but what is possibilized by it; the impossible is no longer what cannot be but the possibility of the possible. For that reason, Derrida rewrites impossible as 'im-possible':

> We should speak here of the im-possible event, an im-possible that is not merely impossible, that is not merely the opposite of possible, that is also the condition or chance of the possible. An im-possible that is the very experience of the possible.[32]

Derrida thus gestures towards the im-possible, towards the aporetic. In turn, aporia will appear as the condition of possibility (or impossibility![33]) of what it affects. For Derrida, an aporia, far from indicating a closure, instead represents an opening, the site of an experience. This is why it is a matter of neither 'stopping at it nor overcoming it'[34] but rather 'of thinking according to the aporia.'[35] Has not deconstruction, as Derrida conceived of it and practiced, aimed at revealing the aporias inherent in philosophical systems, aporias that are constitutive of what they limit and to that extent are positive phenomena?—hence, the 'positive' or 'affirmative' sense that Derrida has always conferred to deconstruction, which must nonetheless always be associated with the privilege granted to aporetic thought, as he stressed in *Rogues*.[36] Responsibility thus becomes approached as an experience of the impossible; each time, responsibility can only happen as impossible: as a decision without norms, as a law that is itself lawless, as the undergoing of the undecidable, as a decision without or beyond knowledge, as the unconditional—and thus impossible—welcome of the other, finally as a responsibility for an incalculable and unpredictable event. Let us briefly, in closing, draw the features of this im-possible responsibility.

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[30] Ibid., 445.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., 454. In *Rogues,* Derrida insists that 'what is at issue is precisely another thought of the possible (of power, of the masterly and sovereign "I can," of ipseity itself) and of an im-possible that would not be simply negative.' See Jacques Derrida, *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 143.

[33] The expression 'condition of impossibility' can be found, among other places, in Jacques Derrida, *Paper Machine*, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 79, 84, 90, 91.

[34] Derrida, *Aporias*: 32.

[35] Ibid., 13.

[36] Derrida, *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*: 174.

6.6 Of an Im-possible Responsibility

Indeed, for Derrida responsibility is wed to the impossible, to the aporia. Responsible decision is only possible *as impossible*. A first aporia marks the excess of responsibility with respect to any norm or rule in relation to duty itself. One typically understands responsibility in terms of a conformity to a rule or a law, in terms of an act done in conformity with or out of duty. For Derrida, this conception would be the height of irresponsibility, as it reduces responsibility to the application of a rule and the unfolding of a program. Ethical responsibility cannot consist in applying a rule: the 'ought' of ethics cannot and 'must not even take the form of a rule.'[37] One needs to seize responsibility instead as an event, as a risk, as a *taking* of responsibility, which can only take place beyond norms and rules: 'the ethical event, is there is such a thing, must take place beyond duty and debt.'[38] The event of responsibility takes us beyond the law, beyond the language of duty, beyond the categorical imperative itself! Ethical responsibility would be here a duty beyond duty, and Derrida breaks at this point with the Kantian formulation of duty: 'Would there thus be a duty not to act *according to duty:* neither *in conformity to duty,* as Kant would say (*pflichtmässig*), nor even *out of duty* (*aus Pflicht*)?'[39] A counter-duty or, rather, a duty beyond duty, a hyperbolic duty or a hyper-duty, a responsible decision must judge without rules; it is a decision 'that *cuts,* that divides,'[40] infinitely exceeding duty and norm. The aporia of the rule (the fact that 'as in all normative concepts … it involves both rules and invention without rule', writes Derrida, giving the example of politeness), in which 'one knows the rule but is never bound by it,' leads the responsible decision to the undecidable.[41]

For Derrida, there is no decision and no responsibility without the confrontation with the aporia of undecidability, that is to say, with the impossible. 'Undecidable' does not mean the impossibility of decision but its paradoxical condition, i.e., its condition of possibility and/or impossibility. A decision must decide without rules to follow, apply, or conform to, as it is each time, the event of a singular decision. The undecidable designates the event-character of decision, as Derrida supports by evoking 'the event of a decision without rules and without will in the course of a new experience of the undecidable.'[42] Happening outside of prior conditions of possibility, and therefore 'im-possible,' a decision is an absolute risk that can rely on nothing (no rules) but its own absence of foundation: 'there is no politics, right, ethics, without the responsibility of a decision which, to be just, must not be content

[37] Jacques Derrida, 'Passions: "An Oblique Offering",' in *On the Name*, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 8.

[38] Derrida and Nancy, 'Responsabilité—Du sens à venir,' 175.

[39] Derrida, 'Passions: "An Oblique Offering",' 7.

[40] Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority',' in *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), 24.

[41] Derrida, 'Passions: "An Oblique Offering",' 9.

[42] Ibid., 17. Translation modified.

with simply applying existing norms or rules but take the absolute risk, in each singular situation, to justify itself again, alone, as if for the first time, even if it is inscribed in a tradition.'[43] Ethical responsibility is thus a matter of *invention*, an invention of the impossible, as it were, and not the application of a rule. The undecidable is the horizon of ethical responsibility. A decision made does not suppress the undecidable. Derrida is quite clear on this point: *a decision does not end some aporetic phase*; the undecidable as impossible haunts any decision, including when a decision is made. Decision *remains* confronted with the undecidable that makes it possible *as decision*.

A not-knowing is thus a condition of responsible decision, marking another appearance of the impossible. Derrida explains in a 2004 interview with *l'Humanité*:

> If I know what I must do, I do not take a decision, I apply a knowledge, I unfold a program. *For there to be a decision, I must not know what to do* … The moment of decision, the ethical moment, if you will, is independent from knowledge. It is when 'I do not know the right rule' that the ethical question arises.[44]

Of course, Derrida recognizes that 'one must know as much as possible and as well as possible before deciding,'[45] but there will always remain a gap between decision and knowledge. The moment of decision, the moment of responsibility, thus supposes a rupture with the order of knowledge and with calculative rationality, if it is the case that 'a decision always takes place beyond calculation.'[46] To that extent, there is what Derrida calls a 'madness of the impossible'[47] as opening to the incalculable.[48] It is a matter of deciding without knowing, without seeing [*voir*] or foreseeing [*prévoir*], thus from a certain invisible or unforeseeable, without being able to calculate all the consequences of the decision, by entering, as Derrida says, into 'the night of the unintelligible.'[49] To that extent, Derrida will go so far as to speak of an 'unconscious decision'! '*In sum, a decision is unconscious*—insane as that may seem, it involves the unconscious and nevertheless remains responsible.'[50]

If the decision takes place as a leap into the unknown, then it can never be 'my' decision. Derrida explains:

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[43] Jacques Derrida, *Papier machine* (Paris: Galilée, 2001), 358. Translation is mine.

[44] Jacques Derrida, 'Jacques Derrida, penseur de l'évènement,' *l'Humanite.fr*, 28 January 2004. Interviewed by Jérôme-Alexandre Nielsberg. Translation and emphasis are mine. Accessed at: http://www.humanite.fr/2004-01-28_Tribune-libre_-Jacques-Derrida-penseur-de-levenement

[45] Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, *De quoi demain … Dialogue* (Paris: Galilée/Fayard, 2001), 92.

[46] Derrida, *The Gift of Death*: 95.

[47] Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 45.

[48] In Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris, *A Taste for the Secret*, trans. Giacomo Donis (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2001), 61., Derrida writes that, 'the moment of decision, and thus the moment of responsibility, supposes a rupture with knowledge, and therefore an opening to the incalculable.'

[49] Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*: 49.

[50] Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London: Verso Books, 1997), 69.

> Just as we say 'I give' and 'I forgive' too easily, we also easily say, 'I decide' or 'I take responsibility' or 'I'm responsible.' These statements are all equally inadmissible. To say 'I decide,' to say 'you know that I decide, I know that I decide,' means that I am capable of deciding and master of my decision, that I have a criterion that allows me to say that I'm the one who decides. If this is true, the decision is a sort of expression of my power, of my possibility.[51]

Derrida seeks to imagine an alterity of decision, a decision that would be *of the other*, marking a hiatus within the subject. A decision worthy of this name should mark the splitting open of the self in its identity or self-sameness. He continues:

> A decision should tear—that's what a *decision* means; it should interrupt the fabric of the possible [which Derrida understands here as the 'I can' of the ego, as power and will of an ipseity]. Whenever I say 'my decision' or 'I decide,' you can be sure that I'm mistaken. Decision should always be … the other's decision. My decision is, in fact, the other's decision.[52]

That decision of the other is nonetheless a decision of the other *in me*, for at the same time, it engages me: just 'as no one can die in my place, no one can make a decision, what we call "a decision," in my place.'[53]

Decision is now assigned to a 'secret,' one that makes the I 'tremble,' a secret of myself that nonetheless is not *my* secret, and that in fact belongs to no-one.[54] I tremble 'at what exceeds my seeing and my knowing [*mon voir et mon savoir*] although it concerns the innermost parts of me, right down to my soul, down to my bone, as we say.'[55] This decision of the other affects my self intimately but,

> not in the sense of a (Kantian) autonomy by means of which I see myself acting in total liberty or according to a law that I make for myself, rather in the heteronomy … [of] whatever is commanding me to make decisions, decisions that will nevertheless be mine and which I alone will have to answer for.[56]

Hence, the paradox of a passive decision, 'the paradox without paradox to which I am trying to submit: a responsible decision must be that im-possible possibility of a 'passive' decision, a decision by the other in me that does not exonerate me from any freedom or any responsibility.[57] With such a 'passive decision,' it is a matter of designating an alterity at the heart of responsible decision, an alterity or heteronomy from which and in which alone a decision can be made. 'That is what I meant … by heteronomy, by a law come from the other, by a responsibility and decision of the other—of the other in me, an other greater and older than I am.'[58]

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[51] Derrida, 'A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event,' 455.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Derrida, *The Gift of Death*: 60.

[54] Ibid., 92.

[55] Ibid., 54.

[56] Ibid., 91.

[57] Derrida, *Paper Machine*: 87.

[58] Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*: 134.

With this motif of the other, one is brought back to the question of the inappropriable, the inappropriable event of the other, and the responsibility that arises from it. Responsibility is to 'the event of the other, the coming of the other, or as other: non-reappropriable.'[59] Responsibility is to a secret, the secret of the other. Ultimately for Derrida, the experience of responsibility is tied to the impossible, the aporetic and the unpredictable event of the other—that is, the event of who or what happens and arrives, the *absolute arrivant* [*l'arrivant absolu*]. As such, as a responsibility to the event, responsibility *itself* is an event, itself unpredictable, a matter of invention, an invention *of the impossible*: 'The responsibility to be taken is and must remain incalculable, unpredictable, unforeseeable, non-programmable. Each one, each time—and this is where there is responsibility—must invent.'[60] Certainly, as Derrida concedes, what unpredictably happens/arrives 'exceeds my responsibility;' yet, from such an excess, I am called to responsibility. Responsibility thus becomes the response to such an absolute arrival, an arrival that remains inappropriable and yet to which I cannot not respond: the event is 'an arriving event [*une arrivance*] that surprises me absolutely and to which and to whom I cannot, I must not, *not answer and respond*—in a way that is as responsible as possible.'[61]

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[59] Derrida and Nancy, 'Responsabilité—Du sens à venir,' 178.

[60] Ibid., 179.

[61] Derrida and Roudinesco, *De quoi demain … Dialogue*: 90–91.

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Chapter 7
Hearing Heidegger: *Proximities* and *Readings*

Sinéad Hogan

7.1 Resistance and Dis-sociation: The '*voice of the friend*'

> L'ami se tait […] bien entendu […] *À bon entendeur, salut*.[1]
> O mes amis, il n'y a nul amy.[2]
> Das Hören konstituiert sogar die primäre und eigentliche Offenheit des Daseins für sein eigenstes Seinkönnen, als Hören der Stimme des Freundes, den jedes Dasein bei sich trägt. (SZ, p. 163)

In this paper, I will engage with Derrida's reading of the phenomenon of the 'voice of the friend' in *Sein und Zeit*. I will consider how the affect of a resistance and dissociation of the 'voice of the friend' from every determined relational and directional distinction may become paramount for any future reading of Heidegger's thinking. Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* set himself a specific task, that is, to 'reawaken an understanding,' through concrete description, of the 'question of the sense [Sinn] of Being' (SZ, p. 1). I propose that in response to this, Derrida's notion of *friendship,* which he developed in relation to politics, and his notion of *différance*, which structures his critique of presence, are both constituted as an echo of the *unheimliche* spacing outlined by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* as Da-sein's 'call-structure.' I will also propose that the sense of spatial and temporal peculiarity, described in that text by Heidegger, produces an essential differentiation in terms of the aesthetics of

[1] Jacques Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié suivi de l'orielle de Heidegger* (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1994), 348, 419. Cf. 'The friend is silent […] of course […] let the hearer beware.' Jacques Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993a), 163–218.

[2] Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié suivi de l'orielle de Heidegger*: 14. Also see other various voices including Montaigne, quoting a remark attributed to Aristotle: 'O my friends, there is no friend.' Cf. Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London: Verso Books, 1997). This phrase structures various forms of Derrida's seminars between 1988 and 1989.

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responsivity and *ethos* between what is called Da-sein and *das Man*. In this way the *destruktion* of 'conscience' performed by Heidegger can be considered in relation to the *Unheimlichkeit* of any future politics of friendship.

In a footnote introducing his essay 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),[3] Derrida points out how Heidegger's momentary phrase 'als Hören der Stimme des Freundes, den jedes Dasein bei sich trägt' (SZ, § 34, p. 163) resists an easy listening, understanding, hearing and translation.[4] One of the key moves in Derrida's critique of the privileging of presence, operating in philosophy as ontotheology, was the deconstruction of the according of 'voice' with the phenomenon of an absolute-proximity as self-presence. In the essay 'The Voice that Keeps Silence' in *Speech and Phenomena*, in relation to his critique of Husserl's theory of signs and the privileging of speech, Derrida proposed that in so-called direct speech, the presumption that 'hearing oneself speak' operates as pure auto-affection and indicates a sense of self-proximity that is nothing less than the complete 'reduction of space in general.'[5] In turn, he proposes that 'this proximity is broken when, instead of hearing myself speak, I see myself write or gesture.'[6] I propose that this is also disrupted by Heidegger's analysis of Da-sein's spatiality as *Ent-fernung* and the phenomenology of 'voices' in *Sein und Zeit.*

To consider how a voice may be heard, yet be silent, and how such a two-fold phenomenon is not necessarily in contradiction, we can performatively engage the 'voice of authorship' that appears to take place in a text. Through the operations of what Derrida called 'the flexions and reflections of personal pronouns,'[7] the Da-sein of writing is an operation of *différance.* That is, it is a 'play that makes

[3] See Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV).' It is not clear if these should be treated as one or two texts. This essay is published in the Galilée edition of *Politics de l'amitié* as a 'following' section to the main text with a separate title of 'L'orielle de Heidegger, Philopolémologie (Geschlecht IV),' but it does not appear in the English translations of the book *The Politics of Friendship*. It originally appeared as a paper given by Derrida at a conference commemorating the 100th anniversary of Heidegger's birth at Loyola University Chicago in September 1989. The papers were then published in John Sallis, ed. *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). In the French publication, the essay on Heidegger acts by adding a supplement to the main title of *Politiques de l'amitié* with '*suivi de l'oreille de Heidegger*,' and, in addition, each section of the essay (only numbered in the English publications) is given a separate title in the French edition: 1. '*Portées de voix. Rhetorique de l'amitié*'; 2. '*L'avoir, l'être et l'autre: tender l'oreille, accorder ce qu'on n'a pas*'; 3. '*Quelques-uns (Le marriage du ciel et de l'enfer)*'; 4. '*Tautologie, monologie, otologie. Le sacrifice de Heidegger*.' I include this information as an additional problem of the situational phenomenologies of reading, translation and the shift of positions and contexts for hearings. See Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié suivi de l'orielle de Heidegger*: 341–419.

[4] 'Cette phrase résiste à l'écoute, elle n'est pas facile à entendre.' Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié suivi de l'orielle de Heidegger*: 341.

[5] Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 79.

[6] Ibid., 80.

[7] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 39.

possible nominal effects,'[8] such as the aesthetic effect of interpellation, summoning and differentiation:

> … In performing 'my' authorial 'I,' *I* can amplify, within the intimacy of this apostrophe, the accentuated artificialities of 'our' commonality by focusing on the sense of interpellation as an effect of writing. In the face-to-face of writing, 'I' do not inhabit a presence in front of you, even if I appear to address you. Or perhaps 'you' are just listening in, presuming I am addressing some one other. I do not even necessarily accord with 'myself.' 'I' may be a constructed author, is there any other kind? Who is to say *I* as author of the text have not invited or allowed without invitation another author into my voicing, or perhaps I perform ventriloquism through an other's style. Maybe I am being dictated to? *I* therefore (as singular voice/as plural?) can ask *you* (singular/plural?), as unspecified, unidentified 'reader(s)' listener(s), what sense do *we hear*, at work *here now* in the phenomenon of a text, of a writing, of a reading? Who's *we,* where's *now*? Phenomenologically, what kind of proximity of voice is embodied or carried as an intimate relation traced in this hearing-in-reading? Is it in discourse-with-another, or with-self? Is there any determined addressee presumed by this communication? Is 'my' or 'your' or 'our' split vocality echoing, as we read, in a private or privative infinite regress? Does this *I* speak in affirmation or negation, as friend or opposer? How or who is it heard or judged by, friend or opposer? Who or what, and where, ontologically speaking, *is* the spatially and temporally unlocatable impropriety of voice that you *now*, *here* perhaps feel in some kind of proximity to or alienation from? Who is addressed and where is this address occurring?
>
> What is heard when *I write*? Is this repetition of a narcissistic, auto-affective paragraphing of the *'I',* a 'text-in-itself,' something like the apostrophe of 'O my friends, there is no friend'? Does its correspondence effect have an enforced restriction to its form that operates as an echo-chamber? What does its authorial allocution and the spectralities of its interpellation evoke, carry or activate? What voice lives on after the death of the author, of that very moment, as persistence of authorial voice, in writing? What or who is carried here that may not *exist*? A friendship, *perhaps*, a sense of understanding that comes prior to the ideality of 'the absolute self-present friend' or prior to the limitations of 'friend' determined by our tastes, our regional particularities, the identifications that 'we' understand and accord *with*? What is heard in the phenomenon of a silent voice whenever an *I* may be tending 'in response' to the uncanny phenomena that is an attunement (without an accord) to the difference between *thinking* and *knowing*?

Therefore, to engage with the phenomenology of 'hearing' and 'voice' in *Sein und Zeit* as part of the analytic of Da-sein*,* I propose it is necessary to reflect on how the phenomenology of thinking and reading appears to refer to some kind of sonority. This gives rise to the epiphenomena of multiple voices that cannot be accommodated by a simple notion of 'proximity' that would rely on the oppositional spatial positioning of 'interiority vs. exteriority.' This, I propose, can be considered in relation to what Heidegger and Derrida respectively call 'language' or 'writing,' as an expanded sense of what is at work at the heart of the critique of presence. Therefore, I will propose that what is described through such critique necessarily resists determining 'voice' as something identifiable or available as present-to-hand or in relation to any 'real, ideal or transcendent object.' This will then be shown to accord with what may resist the 'positionality' [Ge-Stell] that Heidegger identified as the modus operandi and *danger* in technological thinking.

[8] Jacques Derrida, 'Différance,' in *Margins of Philosophy* (The Harvester Press Limited: Brighton, 1982a), 26.

7.2 Hearing as Necessary Mishearing

As examples of the everyday tensions in language between tonality and sense that takes place, for example, within translation, Derrida points to the subtle differences, resistances and iterative capacities between three French translations of Heidegger's phrase 'als Hören der Stimme des Freundes, den jedes Dasein bei sich trägt' (SZ, § 34, p. 163): (1.) 'ouïr de la voix amie, que tout être-là porte en lui-même'[9]; (2.) 'écoute qui s'ouvre à la voix de l'ami que tout *Dasein* porte auprès de lui'[10]; (3.) 'en tant qu'entente de la voix de l'ami que tout *Dasein* porte avec soi'.[11] This inevitable play between idiomatics and possible-impossible translatability itself requires a hearing of non-accordances—for example, between the 'openness' evoked by the 'écoute qui s'ouvre' and the sense of a hearing-understanding play that 'qu'entente' and the French verb *entendre* can evoke between 'listening, understanding and/or agreement.' The act of translation also requires precision of attunement to the phenomenon of 'false friends' where apparent according tonalities, or an 'appearing to be the same' of some words, works in fact to misdirect or disguise key differences in sense when heard by an ear not intimately familiar with the different language worlds. 'Voice,' of course, to further complicate the situation, could always have the extended tonality of a cry, a call or song. It may even be related to a non-phenomenological *sense of appeal* as much as to any recognizable sense of intelligible 'human' rational language as speech [*Logos*]. To further problematize this, the English 'as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Da-sein carries with it'[12] is also difficult to make sense of and pin down, in terms of who, what or where this reference to 'des Freundes' and 'bei sich trägt' refers to? In Heidegger's phenomenological description, 'friend' appears just once in this form, nominating an undecidable quasi-phenomenon that is part of, distinct from, yet in proximity to Da-sein. It is as if this singular evocation of 'the friend' grounds the analytic of Da-sein's *eigentliche openness* in such a fundamental way, that it can only give itself (to an analytic questioning of 'the sense of Being'), through *both* resisting and referring to sense and sonority. It is as if such a voice must not offer any transparency of explication, *to be what it is*—undetermined. Derrida starts his deconstruction, therefore, with the statement 'the friend is silent [*l'ami se tait*].'[13]

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[9] See Martin Heidegger, *L'Être et le temps*, trans. Rudolf Boehm and Alphonse de Waelhens (Paris: Gallimard Mayenne, 1964), § 34.

[10] See Martin Heidegger, *L'Être et le temps*, trans. François Vezin (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1986), § 34.

[11] See Martin Heidegger, *Être et Temps*, trans. Emmanuel Martineau (Paris: Authentica, 1985), § 34.

[12] See both Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1962), § 34. and Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), § 34.

[13] Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' 163. This may be heard as an echo or citation of Nietzsche's, 'Oh my friend, human being is something that must be overcome. The friend should be a master of guessing and keeping silent [*Im Errathen und Stillschweigen soll*

Yet, before interpretation, there is the possibility that this could also be (mis) heard when spoken—as *l'âme y se tait* or even *l'âme y c'était*—in such a way the disseminatory possibilities of a co-relation between *l'ami* [friend] and *l'âme* [soul], between *se tait* and *c'était*, etc., could be evoked through mis-reading and mis-hearing. Any reading or hearing must then ask the question, 'are mis-translations and mis-hearings appropriate responses for a philosophical hearing and reading?' Can any hearing and reading answer that question in the negative without closing itself off from the performance of the speculative conjecture necessary for an undetermined hearing and reading?

7.3 Hearing and Reading as *Destruktion* …

What would be the opposite of a hearing that closes itself off from the indeterminacies of voice? For Heidegger, the momentary evocation of friendship in *Sein und Zeit* indicates an originary 'enthrallment' that constitutes Da-sein's 'Being-open as Being-with for Others' (SZ, p. 163). Derrida's reading focuses on the aporetic moments that are located around the semantics of the *bei sich trägt*. There is a peculiar spacing in such a notion of a *beside*, 'this *auprès de* whose vicinity is neither very close nor the infinitely distant.'[14] This opens up for us a question of the phenomenology of 'proximity' and its shared role in Heidegger's analysis of Da-sein and Derrida's notion of *différance*. There are resonances between the phenomenology of the carrying of the 'voice of the friend,' hearing and the critical *destruktion* of the 'singular spacing of the call' in *Sein und Zeit*. The principle of *destruction*, according to Heidegger in *Was ist das—die Philosophie?*, is that 'destruktion does not mean destroying [zerstören] but dismantling [Abbauen]' or 'removing/carrying off [Abtragen]' (GA 11, p. 20). *Destruktion* evokes critique in the positive sense of a *sonorous attunement,*[15] an allowing or a 'to let hear' which is '—to open our ears, to make ourselves free for what speaks to us in tradition as the Being of being. By listening to this interpellation [Zuspruch hören], we attain the correspondence [Entsprechung]' (GA 11, p. 20).

Heidegger structures the *destruktion* of Da-sein using a phrase that acts as a motif occurring over fifty times, as such, in the text. That is the phrase, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as, 'proximally and for the most part

der Freund Meister sein]: you must not want to see everything.' See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 41. Derrida's deconstruction of proximity will further invoke Nietzsche's 'higher than love of the neighbor is love of the farthest and the future.' See ibid., 44.

[14] Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' 178.

[15] Along with *harmonia* [ἁρμονία], *ethos* [ἦθος] is a Greek term originally having an association between music and morality and, therefore, between hearing and ethics, as well as indicating disposition and custom.

[zunächst und zumeist].'[16] Heidegger uses this motif to sound out the distinctions that show themselves between Da-sein's co-constitution in both *eigentlichkeit* and *uneigentlichkeit*.[17] That Da-sein is, proximally and for the most part, *uneigentlichkeit* is part of its potentiality as *eigentlichkeit* and contributes to explaining Da-sein's apparent closeness to the 'man of metaphysical humanism.' However, this structural closeness is not an absolute proximity as self-presence but one that is spatially constituted by *difference and deferral.* This is evidenced in Heidegger's phenomenological identification of the sense of this situation through its aesthetics of *Unheimlichkeit.* The necessity of analyzing the concrete phenomenological effect of uncanniness allows Heidegger to differentiate Da-sein from what it may appear in proximity to, i.e. from *das Man.* In response to this, Derrida throughout his writings expands this analysis of the phenomenological effect of uncanniness through differentiating between absolute-proximity, auto-affection and the aporias of *différance*. Da-sein then becomes thought of, through Heideggerian *destruktion* and Derridian deconstruction, in terms of the *Unter-Scheid* or *différance* that precisely *is not* generic 'man' but perhaps 'that on which the basis of the humanity of man is thought … "at this locus where it *experiences the aporia*".[18]

What might be the relation between this 'aporetic locus' and the point where Heidegger essentialises Da-sein's *unheimliche* spatial difference in terms of a 'hearing the voice of the friend'? It is this characteristic of the aporetic and the *unheimliche* in the phenomenon of *proximity*, where being is neither considered as organized around a notion of 'the same' nor as a '*distant from*,' that I think will have a crucial conceptual-aesthetic import for any future reading of Heidegger's thinking. Proximity is both a disruptive and constituting situation when described and evoked through an aesthetics of *Unheimlichkeit*. After the critique of presence, it may be what allows Da-sein, as a thought and description of who or what it is *to be*, to resist or side-step the *relève* or *Aufhebung* of the notion of 'belonging' and 'man' that constantly reasserts the 'magnetic attraction' of 'humanism' and, by doing so, reintroduces reified and pre-determined senses of subject and object. I propose that this complex aesthetic relation between 'voice,' 'proximity' and 'spacing' [Ent-fernung] is what gives Heidegger's *destruktion* of Da-sein a relation to the thought of Derrida's *différance*.

At the end of *Sein und Zeit*, in section 71, Heidegger specifies the key significance of the phrase 'zunächst und zumeist' for his methodology, explaining 'Zunächst' as a covered over kind of openness in the everydayness of 'the "with-one-another" of publicness' (SZ, p. 370), a journalistic clarity, transparency or 'manifestness.' And the 'Zumeist' signifies a kind of 'rule' bound showing of itself to an '*ontically* familiar,' 'Jedermann,' a generic everyone. Heidegger specifically

[16] See, for example, SZ, pp. 16, 21, 35, 36, 43, 63, 85, 105, 113, 116, etc.

[17] I propose the terms as untranslatables since to translate them as 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity'—without having a way to emphasise the relation to the 'eigen-' of such a crucial terms as *Ereignis*, for example, in Heidegger's terminology—performs too great a loss; they also bring with them a tonality of 'genuine versus inauthentic' that is inappropriate and more than misleading.

[18] Jacques Derrida, *Aporias*, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993b), 32.

distinguishes there the 'Miteinander der Öffentlichkeit', as a way of being, from Da-sein's 'existentiell' as a *Mit-da-sein*. In reading this, we must discern the difference (in proximity) between the sharedness and co-constitution in the 'call of conscience,' as a response-ability that produces the singularity of the *-da-* in every *Mit-da-sein*, and a different intention or identification in relation to the '*das Man*,' i.e. the giving over responsibility to an anonymous 'One.' Here is another proximity to be heard, between a singular opening as according in the *diffèrance* of the '*da*,' operating as a spacing in the *Mit-da-sein,* and a reduced con-sensus of 'harmonising' with the 'one' or a 'they' of '*das Man*.' When Derrida writes on 'friendship,' it will be the effect of the neutralizing and excluding consensus of 'fraternity' in democratic politics that will be under deconstruction.

In addition to the phrase 'der Stimme des Freundes,' there are three other references to the phenomenon of 'voice' in *Sein und Zeit*. What is notable is that the 'call of care' as *conscience* [*Gewissen*] has, in its root evocation of *wissen*, a relation to an *uncanny knowing* that is different from an assured knowledge. For Heidegger, that uncanny relation gives evidence or testimony [Bezeugung] that is not itself vocal but silent. This puts the *destruktion* of what is non-phenomenological in the 'call of conscience,' in a relation to the 'voice of the friend,' as Derrida points out in *Politics of Friendship.*[19] At the same time, as Heidegger differentiates the specifics of the phenomenon of the 'it calls me' [es ruft mich'] (SZ 277), its analysis is also what explains the other forms of voicing that Da-sein appears subjected to: (1.) 'the voice of conscience as an alien power by which Dasein is dominated' (SZ, p. 275); (2.) the effect of the 'caller,' the 'who' that accords with 'Dasein in its uncanniness' and is 'unfamiliar [unvertraut]' to the 'they-self'. This is heard as 'something like an *alien* voice' [eine *fremde* Stimme] (SZ, p. 277). Then, also, in further differentiation, there is (3.) the 'voice of the they [die Stimme des Man]' (SZ, p. 278). The latter, as Heidegger proposes, is a kind of avoidance by Da-sein of Da-sein's essential *Unheimlichkeit* through an assured interpretation of responsibility in accordance with the voice of a universal 'public conscience' (SZ, p. 278). In describing the 'voice of the friend' as undetermined and carried, *bei sich*, rather than listened to as a positional point away from Da-sein, we could infer, without any further analytic development by Heidegger, an evocation of an aesthetic relation between the phenomenology of the 'voice of the friend' and the 'call of conscience.' The phenomenology of both evocations, in its spacing and aesthetics of silence, is different from the traditional thought of conscience as an alienating, negating, resentful or restrictive 'super-ego.' Friendship, instead, implies affirmation and trust.

Here, through what Derrida called the 'the effects or indices of the magnetic attraction under the general concept of proximity,'[20] the necessity for the thought of *différance* between Da-sein and *das Man* can be considered to have emerged. This occurs, I propose, because of the distinction/dif-ference, the *Unter-Scheid*, which is required to be made between a deconstructed thought of proximity and the aesthetics

[19] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 241.

[20] Jacques Derrida, 'The Ends of Man,' in *Margins of Philosophy* (The Harvester Press Limited: Brighton, 1982b), 124.

and logic of *the same*. The different 'voices' in the *destruktion* of Da-sein attest to a *différance* evoked by responding to the *same* and call for a *techné* and aesthetics of *différance* to recognize the nuances of those distinctions. If a logic of 'the same' as equivalence was underpinning Heidegger's thought of proximity or responsibility, then that would equate Da-sein and *Mit-da-sein* with '*das Man*'; however, a logic and (phenomeno)logic of proximity and responsibility is precisely what keeps them distinct. This is because in appearing so close they can never co-incide. If they could, they would never *appear to be similar*. It is therefore *différance*, neither differences nor sameness, which in proximity becomes manifest and calls to be thought.

This is a question of the spatial complexity of 'nearness' and 'farness' in Heidegger's analysis of Da-sein. This is particularly audible if we pay attention to Heidegger's *destruktion* of Da-sein's transcendent spatiality as *Ent-fernung* (SZ, § 23). As Derrida points out in *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*:

> One is forced to appeal … to the Heideggerian use of the word *Entfernung*: at once divergence, distance and the distantiation of distance, the deferment of the distant, the de-ferment … the [*destruction*] (*Ent-*) which constitutes the distant itself, the veiled enigma of proximity.[21]

Heidegger's analytic firmly differentiates Da-sein's kind of spatiality from the measurability and calculability of the world. This allows *for* a hearing-understanding in the peculiar mode of distanciating of a 'nearness that preserves farness,' requiring, thus, the de-ferment as a spatialising-temporalising movement of Da-sein's *différance*. Heidegger goes as far as to say that this spacing of an essential distance or 'de-severence [Ent-fernung] … is something that Dasein can *never cross over*' (SZ, p. 108). Therefore, this kind of distance 'proper' to Da-sein can neither be crossed nor measured. It is not-of-the-world of measure and cannot therefore be thought of based on any logic of presence-at-hand. This distance prevents the reduction of space that would occur in an absolute self-proximity and allows for Da-sein's 'Being-open' which allows for an other 'voice to be carried' as a 'Being-with.'

The *Ent-fernung* of Da-sein is most evidently a split [*écartement*] in any experience of absolute proximity of voice to source, and it is the spacing that opens up or 'echoes' as the 'singular spacing of the call structure.'[22] The phenomenology is described by Heidegger as how, 'the call comes from me, from beyond and over me [Der Ruf kommt *aus* mir und doch *über* mich]' (SZ, p. 275).

7.4 Language and the *Aesthetic* Affect of Proximity

Is there a shared aesthetics between Heidegger's sense of spacing and Derrida's discourse on friendship? The *Ent-fernung*, this 'veiled enigma of proximity'[23] in the call structure constitutes the taking place of Da-sein's *individualised ek-static spatiality*

[21] Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 50–51.

[22] Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' 167.

[23] Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*: 50–51.

or transcendence. *Ent-fernung* translates also variously as *distance*, *remoteness*, *removal* and *ablation* [*abtragung*]. It is similarly considered by Heidegger to constitute that structure of *language* that *Entsprechung co-responds*. If we consider how Heidegger also describes language as a called-structure, we can hear other echoes of his phenomenological description of Da-sein's constitutive 'finding itself' through the *Unheimlichkeit* of the call. In reference to a poem by Trakl, in the essay 'Die Sprache' in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (GA 12, p. 7–30), Heidegger writes the following: 'who the author is remains unimportant here, as with every other masterful poem. The mastery consists precisely in this, that the poem can deny the poet's person and name' (GA 12, p. 15). In this sense, 'the poem' has its own voice. This performative and descriptive displacement of 'vocation and agency' from author to work echoes the uncanniness of the 'singular spacing of the *call*' with the effect of authorial voice and attendant subjectivities coming '*from … beyond … and over …*'

What kind of responsivity does such a singular call structure evoke? In 'Was is das—die Philosophie?', Heidegger proposes the following: 'the answer is not a reply; the answer is rather the co-respondence which responds to the Being of being.' (GA 11, p. 19) The co-responding is, therefore, not a reply in the form of reciprocation but is a constitutive *accord* or echo to the 'appeal of Being/*zuspruch des Seins*' which 'speaks/spricht.' Heidegger directly relates '*Stimme*/voice' to the *Stimmung* of 'tuning and attunement'—not to an *Einklang/harmony* which we might read as more predominant in his writings on Hölderlin but to θαυμάζειν (GA 11, p. 22). In this, we can hear that in co-responding to the appeal/*Zuspruch* the aesthetic phenomenology is both *pathos* and *ethos* as wonder, astonishment and enthrallment, which puts any reduced sense of understanding (as a harmonious consensus) under erasure. Further identifying or nominating the source of 'voice' in this way, even as 'other,' would start the closing-down mechanisms of representation.

In *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge* (GA 79), Heidegger specifically draws on the figure of echo in relation to the *pathos* of the response to the appeal[24] when he writes the following: 'What the thinker says of being is not his opinion. What is said is the echo speaking through him of the claim that essences as being itself in that it brings itself to language … To be an echo is the suffering of thinking.' This type of voice requires, according to Heidegger, a 'carefulness with language' that is fundamentally different from a 'technical-terminological style' (GA 79, pp. 65–66). We could also propose here that it requires a carefulness of hearing. In the same section of *Sein und Zeit* in which the phrase 'voice of the friend' is evoked, Heidegger differentiates between the existential possibility of a sense of *hearkening* [*Horchen*] and an understanding based only on a sensory psychological *hearing* (SZ, p. 163); In addition, as Heidegger continues in the same section, 'the person who "cannot hear and "must feel" may perhaps [veilleicht] be one who is able to hearken very well, and precisely because of this' (SZ, p. 164).[25] Therefore, 'hearing,' in this sense,

[24] In relation to Nietzsche and the nihilism of the will to power, cf. GA 79, p. 62.

[25] The quotation is a reference to the German proverb, 'Wer nicht hören kann, muss fühlen [he who cannot heed, must suffer].' See Heidegger, *Being and Time*: (translated by Macquarrie and

becomes de-anthropologised and de-psychologised—but not, I propose, de-aestheticised—to coincide with Heidegger's later expanded thought that 'language speaks' rather than that 'man speaks': 'Die *Sprache* spricht. Die Sprache? Und nicht der Mench?' (SG, p. 161).

Heidegger says that the disposition [Gestimmtheit]—a term in which a relation to 'voice', *Stimme*, can be heard—that is given/endured in θαυμάζειν is not an initiating of thought like the start of a procedure, but it is a *burden and a freeing*, an enslavement and an enablement, an 'astonishment [that] *carries* and pervades philosophy [Das Erstaunen *trägt* und durchherrscht die Philosophie]' (GA 11, p. 22, my emphasis). Here, we can hear a link to that mode of 'carrying' again, and it could be considered that it is the originating passion or *pathos* and *ethos* as undergoing and endurance, a bearing and freeing, a non-psychologised disposition/attunement of θαυμάζειν that 'carries' the friend. This carrying in θαυμάζειν has the aesthetic/phenomenology of a 'restraint.' There is an '*être en arrêt*,' a 'step-back' in θαυμάζειν where we hold ourselves back from determining what being *is* and let it be. And yet, we are *held into* the attachment to what withdraws/ *zurücktreten* (GA 11, p. 23). Like 'the friend,' which is also mentioned once in *Sein und Zeit*, θαυμάζειν is translated as 'to be amazed to the point of not understanding' (SZ, p. 172). In such a movement, θαυμάζειν is reinstated as the *ethos* of thinking in differentiation from understanding.

The short reference to the friend in *Sein und Zeit* is prefaced by a phrase that uses an ellipsis: 'Listening to … is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others' (SZ, p. 163).[26] In that undetermined locus of a 'listening to …' and in the *veilleicht* of 'hearkening' lies the singular spacing of the logic of *perhaps*. Derrida's discourse on friendship is formulated by accentuating the aesthetics of these kinds of *perhaps* [*peut-être*]. [27] Along with the figure of the ellipsis, this marks the risk of any spacing as what 'arrives to undecide meaning at each decisive moment.'[28]

Derrida ends his essay on Heidegger with the phrase '*à bon entendeur, salut*.'[29] This is an idiomatic warning in French, translated in the English text as 'let the hearer beware,' often alternatively translated as 'a word to the wise', that can of course, *bien entendu*, also be read otherwise. The idiomatic term *salut* can be a greeting on either arrival or as a 'farewell' and has a relation to the 'take care' and 'keep safe' of 'salvation.' Before anything else, with the signing off of his essay on

Robinson), translators' note 1. The above is not a dissimilar saying in some ways to the French '*à bon entendeur, salut*.'

[26] This 'openness' for and with Others, that is Dasein's 'ownmost potentiality-for Being,' includes the privative modes of not-listening of hearing, of resistance to what is said, of turning away, of disavowal, etc. (See SZ, p. 163).

[27] A term Derrida points out with reference to Rodolphe Gasché's reading of Heidegger is often treated with distain (as distasteful) in classical philosophy in its lack of assurity. Cf. note 5, Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 45–46. See also Rodolphe Gasché, 'Perhaps—a Modality? On the Way with Heidegger to Language,' *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 16, no. 2 (1993): 469.

[28] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 40.

[29] Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' 216.

Heidegger's polemics and *philia*, Derrida issues a warning to those who may consider they hear with an assured interpretation or conscience.

7.5 *aimance/différance*, An Intimate Striving

Derrida considers that the friend who is carried as voice 'by every Dasein' is only 'evoked' by Heidegger or, more specifically, is 'what can permit evocation in general.'[30] The aporetic and enigmatic possibility of an undetermined vocative is what is carried, prior to determining friendship or enmity. Derrida points out that for Heidegger πόλεμος and φιλεῖν are not terms themselves in exclusion or opposition. This brings into deconstructive critique models of friendship that are based on structures of relational inclusion or exclusion, or sets of mutual identification, self-reflection and familiarity. Indeed, the purity and structuring metaphorics of φιλία—such as in canonic 'democratic' examples that may de-eroticise, exclude or sublimate relations of the 'other' and the 'friend' under an exemplary model of 'fraternity'—are under deconstruction.[31] This is in line with *Sein und Zeit*, where Heidegger relates *eigentliche* 'Being-their-selves in resoluteness' and *eigentliche* being 'with-one-another,'[32] contrasting this to 'jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing [Verbrüderungen] in the 'they' and what the 'they' want to undertake' (SZ, p. 298). Derrida reads the interpretation by Heidegger of 'destruction' as a 'hearing-dialogue [Entsprechen]' (GA 11, pp. 3–26), as evidence of how πόλεμος is co-constitutive of what produces the difference between φιλεῖν and φιλία—a difference which Heidegger calls '*das Leiben*' and Derrida calls '*aimance*.'[33] This is a term in Derrida's oeuvre that literally resonates with *différance* and is defined as 'loving, before any distinction between the loving of love and the loving of friendship.'[34] Derrida proposes that we hear and understand [*entendre*] this as a dimension of 'experience without limit' which *philo*sophy as the love of knowledge has 'no authority to question' since *aimance* is of the order of something unexpected. This in itself evokes the phenomenology of the called-structure in *Sein und Zeit* where '"It calls [Es ruft]," against our expectations and even against our will' (SZ, p. 275). This is therefore an *undergoing* that is prior to understanding and agreement

[30] Ibid., 171.

[31] Ibid., 192.

[32] Heidegger writes: 'dem eigentlichen Selbstsein der Entschlossenheit entspringt allererst das eigentliche Miteinander' (SZ, p. 298).

[33] Cf. Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' 179.

[34] Ibid., 180. Cf. the following: 'Le *phileîn,* dont il parle beaucoup, il le traduit par *das Lieben,* l'aimer, avant toute distinction entre l'aimer d'amour et l'aimer d'amitié, ce qu'en français, dans un séminaire que j'avais consacré à ces questions, j'appelle l'aimance.' See Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié suivi de l'orielle de Heidegger*: 369.

[*entente*], prior to intentionality, 'something like an event.'[35] Derrida terms this a *teleiopoetic* 'event'.[36]

How then does this phenomenology relate to how 'we' may perhaps read Heidegger in the 21st century, as the future of friendship and *différance*? Who is this 'we'? If the phenomenology of *Unter-Scheid*/dif-ference *is* the called-spacing of Da-sein—as outlined by Heidegger in the 1950 essay 'Die Sprache' in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (GA 12, pp. 7–30) as an 'intimacy of the difference [die Innigkeit des Unter-Scheids]' (GA 12, p. 24)[37]—we could ask what type of openness would this type of intimacy allow 'take place [ereignen sich]'? This phenomenology is of an 'openness' as intimate-striving. It can be discerned throughout Heidegger's thinking as a distinction between an essential constituting dif-ference [Unter-Scheid] that 'carries out world in its worlding' (GA 12, p. 22) and any differentialism that requires a subject-object structure of representation. It also disrupts any idea of subjectivity as absolute-proximity because 'the intimacy of world and thing is not a fusion' (GA 12, p. 22).

This 'event [Ereignis]' of Unter-Scheid as intimacy-in-difference is the site of πόλεμος. In his reading of Heidegger's seminar on Heraclitus (GA 55), Derrida points out that φιλία is the 'grace [die Gunst]' that accords to the other what is essential to 'freedom proper [eigene Freiheit],' a 'friendship that leaves the other, lets it be, gives it what it has and what it already is.'[38] In Heidegger's phenomenology, this πόλεμος between φιλεῖν and φιλία offers a notion of φιλεῖν-φιλία that 'is older than subjectivity'[39]; for example, it precedes, yet makes possible, the notion of substitution as 'testimony for friendship.'[40] As the constitutive Mit-da-sein, it requires no evidence, reciprocity or proof of friendship. This is a gift 'to the other of what is to the other its very own proper or properness.'[41] This proposes an example of an economy of the gift that may escape the logic of reciprocity, of the return of a debt or duty, for it is the other that 'owns' its own freedom 'given' to it by each Da-sein in *eigentliche Offenheit* as it 'bears the voice of the friend.' The gift of a 'giving what it doesn't have,' the other's alterity, is for Derrida both an impossible and the only gift possible. This would invoke a possibilising of the impossible, as any 'hearing the other' would also be impossible, since the other is never given as a phenomenological presence. Here what Derrida provocatively proposed in the essay

[35] Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' 181.

[36] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 40.

[37] Also quoted in Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' 169. Derrida observes how this gets the brevity of its name by Heidegger delinking the elements of the title of the chapter of *Sein und Zeit* that contains the reference to the 'voice of the friend.' See SZ, § 34, pp. 160–67. The chapter is entitled, 'Being-there and Discourse. Language.'

[38] Ibid., 194.

[39] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 251.

[40] This reading of Heidegger most evidently calls for a re-reading of substitution and proximity in Levinas. We can perhaps propose here that the future of both Heidegger and Levinas in the 21st century would be to read one *with* the other.

[41] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 195.

'Différance' as 'Heideggerian *hope*' or expectancy, *l'espérance*,[42] would become one of the resonances in a series of substitutable terms such as *l'espérance*, *aimance*, *différance*.

In Heidegger's later writings, the held-open structure of Unter-Scheid as intimacy-in-difference is consistently referred back to the role of *resoluteness* [*Entschlossenheit*] operating as the *unheimliche aesthetic* of the call-structure. Hearing *Entschlossenheit* with Derrida's reading would be to propose a resoluteness and aesthetic risk of *hope* as Da-sein's disposition. This would explicitly propose Heidegger as a thinker of a future, delinked from the privileging of presence, assured positionality and calculation. As an example of Dasein's peculiar futurity we can hear in the 1935–36 essay 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,' how Heidegger notes 'the resoluteness intended in *Sein und Zeit* is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up … out of its captivity in that which is, to the openness of Being' (UK, p. 55).

7.6 The Artificiality of *téléiopoièse*

Is there an ethical art, *techné* or technique *of* distance and nearness brought together by the kind of thinking Heidegger and Derrida were trying to evoke? Derrida coined the terms *téléiopoièse*, *philopolémologie* and *aimance* as part of his hearing of Heidegger. Derrida's term *téléiopoièse* was explicitly coined in relation to his readings on the politics and futurity of the 'perhaps [*vielleicht/peut-être*]' of friendship or a friendship *with* the *teleiopoetic* politics of *futurity*.[43] While contemporaneous with his discussion on Heidegger and 'the voice of the friend,' it was specifically introduced in his readings of Nietzsche's vocative and exclamatory phrase from *Beyond Good and Evil*, '-Alas! If only you knew how soon, how very soon, things will be—different! [-Ach! Wenn ihr wüßtet, wie es bald, so bald schon—anders kommt!].'[44] That the term *téléiopoièse* appears contemporaneously with the lecture 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV)' specifically relates it to deconstruction's peculiar messianic structure of re-reading. In this, there is an affirmation of Nietzsche's thought *with* Heidegger's deconstruction of Nietzsche, of a reading 'to come' of what 'begins at the end [and] is initiated with the signature of the other.'[45] At the end of his 1943 essay 'Nietzsches Wort "Gott ist tot,"' Heidegger proposes that another tonality to the essence of nihilism can be heard by the 'ear of our thinking' and that what is to be thought is not a deep hidden tonality but 'something lying close by; it is something that is lying most closely, which we, because that is all it is, have therefore continually already passed over' (NWGT, p. 266).

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[42] Derrida, 'Différance,' 27.

[43] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 32.

[44] Ibid., 31. See also Friedrich Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 5* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 152.

[45] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 32.

What this evokes for us, then, is the situation of rethinking what is called 'proximity' and 'what is close by' for Da-sein that are otherwise than any kind of present-to-hand entities. Along with the thought of a dif-ference [Unter-Scheid] that cannot be thought on the basis of a relational distinction, an *aesthetics of proximity* and the strange *unheimliche* spatiality of *nearness* then emerges to be deconstructed. Derrida thereby added another tonality to the term *téléiopoièse* which supplements the sense of 'tele,' contra or contrapunctually, to a teleology to allow us to also hear the sense of a communicating or a correspondence at a distance, what he calls 'the poetics of distance *at one remove*.'[46] What kind of measure is an '*at one remove*'? We could ask, with and after Derrida reading Heidegger, the following: If *Da-sein* is 'the carrying,' then what does 'carry' evoke in this 'hosting,' housing or lodging *bei sich trägt*?[47] What kind of distance, spacing or *nearness* is an '*at one remove*'?

As Derrida developed in the essay 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' the *destruktion* of spacing is a 'call to come [that] calls to a proximity.' He paraphrases Heidegger's 'the calling here calls into a nearness. But even so the call does not wrest what it calls away from the remoteness, in which it is kept by the calling there. The calling calls into itself and therefore always here and there—here into presence, there into absence' (GA 12, p. 18).

In introducing what we might call a techné of *téléiopoièse*, Derrida introduces an 'economic' image of an arrow[48] that we could hear as indirectly in dialogue with Heidegger's discussion of Ἔρως *and* φιλεῖν in '*What is Philosophy?*' (GA 11, pp. 3–26).[49] This arrow performs a manoeuvre Derrida terms the 'absolute economy of the feint.'[50] It withdraws back to the bow, never reaching its destination, yet, in that imperceptible performance of withdrawal (which in its undecidability may be an imperceptible return, performative and reportive at the same time as it changes the order of how things *are*), it allows for the *futurity of event*. This is what he calls the *téléiopoièse* of *perhaps*. In his economic use of the *téléiopoièse technique*, Derrida stresses, there must also be heard the 'auto-tele-affection,' rendering it necessary to 'speak of *auto-teleiopoetics*.' And in the consequent dropping of the '*auto*,' Derrida himself evokes the phenomenology *evoked by* the line carrying the friend from *Sein und Zeit* when he says,

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[46] Ibid.

[47] We could continue by asking of the many examples of such an experience of and towards the friend, or other, i.e. contained in the phenomenon of a 'lodging in my throat … that makes it impossible to speak …' and all the inadequacies of being lost for words as signs of our θαυμάζειν, our stunned familiarities and unfamiliarities, our everyday sometimes disastrous, sometimes mournful, sometimes joyful and sometimes wonderful, failures and impossibilities *of* communicating.

[48] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 32.

[49] The particular text is a lecture doubly titled '*Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? Was ist das—die Philosophie?*,' given as part of the conference *Einleitung eines Gespräches* in Cérisy-la-Salle, Normandy in August 1955.

[50] Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié suivi de l'orielle de Heidegger*: 48. This can also be heard in reference to (Nietzsche) Zarathustra's discourse '*of the friend*' where '[…] you should be his arrow and longing for the overman.' See Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: 41.

> We shall say *teleiopoetics* for short, but not without immediately suggesting that friendship is implied **in advance therein**: friendship for oneself, for the friend and for the enemy. We all the more easily authorise ourselves to leave the self of the *autos* in the wings, since it appears here in the **split effect** rather than as the simple origin of teleiopoesis [*téléiopoièse*]. The inversion of repulsion into attraction is, in a way, engaged, analytically included, in the movement of *philein*.[51]

7.7 A Techné of Risk, *perhaps*

The 'originary sharing [*partage*] and belonging' of Da-sein's *bei sich Tragen* therefore *hears* a voice that is silent and, according to Derrida's reading, 'no more represents friendship in general than it is necessarily friendly … but [is] a belonging … [as] the possibility of speech or discourse' … an 'affective' belonging.[52] Therefore, any 'who' addressed or not addressed *as* friend must always be a non-assured risk for thinking. Instead of a determined destination, 'it is really a matter of the voice of the other.'[53]As such, as something not of the order of phenomenology, it cannot be located, conscripted or positioned.

This relates the *ethos* of the non-positionality of voice in *Sein und Zeit* to the role of *risk* [Gefahr] and positionality [Ge-Stell] in Heidegger's critique of the essence of technology. In the essay 'The Danger' (GA 79, pp. 45–67), Heidegger writes that 'positionality' [Ge-Stell][54] essences in a way that excludes and 'prohibits nearness' (GA 79, p. 46). This brings his critique of technological thinking, as the reduction of everything to a 'standing reserve [Bestand],' to bear essentially on the question concerning proximity. Nearness [Nähe] as the 'arrival of the worlding of the world' is withheld in the 'distanceless' where every single thing, regardless of *différance*, can be reduced to the same and utilized as of 'equal value' (GA 79, p. 46). In this reduction of everything, the production of a resource occurs that can be 'challenged forth' (GA 79, p. 28–30). Instead of a 'calling that calls into a nearness without wresting what it calls away from the remoteness,' instead of a 'poetics of distance *at one remove*,' the danger [Gefahr] or risk [Gefahr] would be that the openness of Da-sein that hears the voice of the friend, of the other, of conscience, would be completed, reduced and instrumentalised by technological thinking as nihilism. This would manifest itself as the totalisation of presence and reduction of all spacing. In technological thinking, the danger is that ethics could finally be reduced to being called upon merely as a resource, a potential kept in reserve, to be capitalized on, and the 'voice of the friend,' of conscience, would be merely tapped into when useful.

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[51] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 32. My emphasis in bold.

[52] Derrida, 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV),' 174–75.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Andrew J. Mitchell translates 'Ge-stell' as 'positionality.' See Martin Heidegger, *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012). In previous Heidegger scholarship, the term is usually translated as 'en-framimg.'

Derrida's notion of *téléiopoièse* as 'a poetics of distance *at one remove*' may be read as putting a focus on how any future-producing-*techné* or '*poièse*' must be constitutively undecidable. And this would apply and relate to Heidegger's proposal of *Dichten-Denken* as a different future for thought. The technique of *téléiopoièse* operates to preserve the called-uncanniness of any spacing and, therefore, to keep open a hearing of the aporia, promise and necessity of taking a risk in any 'future producing' of what Da-sein, proximity, aesthetics and *Dichten-Denken* may be. How can a future (for thinking) be produced, predicted, or corresponded with? If it is calculated, pre-meditated or pre-styled, a 'possible that would only be possible (non-impossible) … a futureless possible,'[55] thinking would not be *futural* and an open to what would surprise. All that is secured and held as 'standing reserve,' as resource, could never surprise. It would merely be a calculating and measuring process 'without an event.' To *hear* Da-sein's 'eventuality' as *openness*, 'die primäre und eigentliche Offenheit des Daseins' (SZ, p. 163) is, therefore, to think response-ability as *risk*. In relation to the 'voice of conscience,' then, the risk would be a technique of *friendship* based on the aesthetics of a *perhaps* … to trust and respond to the *Unheimlichkeit* of the called-structure *and* its silences—without the assurity of knowing, without the positionality of this being a resource—so that there can be a future …

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[55] Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*: 29.

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Part III
Heidegger Applied

Chapter 8
Heidegger and International Development

Trish Glazebrook and Matt Story

8.1 Introduction

Heidegger scholarship in the twentieth century was largely aimed, in conversation with Heidegger himself until his death in 1976, at understanding and digesting Heidegger's work through textual analysis. It was therefore preoccupied in large part with arguments about accuracy and authenticity of interpretation. Yet, scholars began in the latter part of the twentieth century to play out and develop the implications of Heidegger's thinking. The philosophy of technology is an early example that emerged during his lifetime.[1] His thought was a (if not *the*) foundational contribution to this philosophical sub-discipline that has far exceeded his critique, even yet where debate and discussion of his work continue.

His thinking was further brought to bear in new contexts as disparate as, for example, environmental philosophy and the phenomenology of nursing.[2] Many

[1] On Heidegger's philosophy of technology, its impact and influence, See Don Ihde, *Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).

[2] For an overview of Heideggerian environmental philosophy, see Trish Glazebrook, 'Heidegger and Environmental Philosophy,' in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (London: Continuum, 2013), 433–440. On Heidegger and nursing, see Patricia Benner, 'Quality of Life: a Phenomenological Perspective on Explanation, Prediction, and Understanding in Nursing Science,' *Advances in Nursing Science* 8, no. 1 (1985): 1–14.; Patricia L. Munhall, *Revisioning Phenomenology: Nursing and Health Science Research* (New York: National League for Nursing, 1994).; and Tina Koch, 'Interpretive Approaches in Nursing Research: The Influence of Husserl and Heidegger,' *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 21, no. 5 (1995): 827–836. Paley argues that applications of Heidegger to nursing are 'thoroughly Cartesian in spirit,' so they are a betrayal rather than realization of Heidegger's phenomenology. See John

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such themes emerged in Heidegger's thinking that can be similarly applied or otherwise pushed toward their further implications and insights. Yet, one thought—keeping in mind his comment in 1952 that 'Every thinker thinks one only thought' (WHD, p. 20)—expresses the culmination of his lifetime of *Denken* and *Besinnung*: a prayer for new beginning in the face of the global threat of modernity.

'Prayer' is a tendentious word to introduce to philosophical debate. It is not intended here to indicate or elicit religious commitment but as an interpretation of Heidegger's well-known suggestion in the *Der Spiegel* interview that 'Only a god can save us,' as acknowledgement that any new beginning, i.e. *Ereignis*, to succeed modernity is beyond human control and intention. Our contribution to twenty-first century Heidegger scholarship is to extend his thinking into issues in international development and argue that an alternative (i.e. alternative to the *Gestell* of technology) possibility for revealing [Entbergung] is already given in women's subsistence agricultural practices in the global South. Accordingly, we show not only that Heidegger provides intellectual resources in the twenty-first century for new ways of understanding globalization and international development but also that those resources can uncover an alternative to modernity.

Already in the twenty-first century, Heidegger's thinking has been applied to issues in economics. For example, Asvoll argues that the nothing as interpreted by Heidegger 'can be a condition for an entrepreneurial decision-making paradigm.'[3] Shionoya uses Heidegger more theoretically to develop an ontology of economics that aligns Heidegger with Schumpeter whose evolutionary economics explains economic and social change through concepts of innovation and creation in contrast to tradition and routine. Shionoya argues that Heidegger's hermeneutics similarly show how innovation is possible. Like Asvoll, he is attempting a theoretical framework to explain entrepreneurial innovation.[4] Critical rather than explanatory, Nadal uses Heidegger's analysis of technology in the economics of international development to argue that the Philippines (and Filipinos themselves) become 'standing-reserves … a precious resource, whose value can be maximized through capital investments … a subsidiary appendage to the global economy as a regional zone of outsourced labour and service industry.'[5] The time is thus ripe for a Heideggerian assessment of international development that questions the assumptions of modernity.

Paley, 'Misinterpretive Phenomenology: Heidegger, Ontology and Nursing Research,' *Journal of Advance Nursing* 27, no. 4 (1998): 817–824. Paley's argument is made despite Leonard's insistence that Heideggerian phenomenology permits conceptions of self in nursing to escape a reductive Cartesianism. See Victoria W. Leonard, 'A Heideggerian Phenomenological Perspective on the Concept of Person,' in *Interpretive Phenomenology: Embodiment, Caring and Ethics in Health and Illness*, ed. Patricia Benner (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 43–64.

[3] See Håvard Åsvoll, 'On Heidegger, 'Theory of Nothing' and Entrepreneurship: A Prologue to an Entrepreneurial Philosophy of Nothing,' *Academy of Entrepreneurship Journal* 18, no. 1 (2012): 55–75.

[4] See Yuichi Shionoya, 'Hermeneutics and the Heidegger = Schumpeter Theses,' *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 69, no. 1 (2010): 188–202.

[5] See Paul Nadal, 'Heidegger's Critique of Modern Technology: On 'The Question Concerning Technology',' in *Be Late, A Blog by Paul Nadal* (2010).

We make our argument in four sections. The first section argues that modernity is not the destiny of the global South. The second claims that the intellectual history of the West is for Heidegger the history of conceptions of nature that culminates in scientific objectivity. The third section argues that the mathematization of nature in modern science makes possible ontological reduction of all that is encountered with economic value. The final section argues that women's subsistence agriculture in the global South is invisible to the essence of technology and thus is an alternative dwelling, a saving power that grows within the postcolonial imperialism of the essence of technology.

8.2 Modernity as Destiny and the Global South

This section argues that Heidegger's understanding of truth applies equally well to culture as to historical epoch. Accordingly, modernity is a cultural project. We show how cultural location is a destiny of being and that cross-cultural discussion is possible but does not just reduce the global South to the terms of modernity. Thus, we conclude that modernity is not the destiny of the global South.

Heidegger's 1930 'On the Essence of Truth' essay closes with the enigmatic, if not downright obfuscatory, claim that 'the essence of truth is the truth of essence' (VWW, p. 202). This statement is comfortably interpreted, however, if one has paid close attention to the essay. Heidegger has argued, in what Rebecca Comay once referred to as his 'once-upon-a-time,' that the history of European thought can be divided into epochs. Elsewhere, throughout the Heideggerian corpus, one can see that the epochs are ancient, medieval and modern and that these epochs are differentiated by their ontological commitment, that is, by how things are revealed during that epoch. This is the apophantic character of beings in § 7 of *Sein und Zeit* and the sense in which beings stand in the open and lit clearing insofar as they are accessible to human cognition and in human experience. Quite straight-forwardly, the medieval epoch is determined by the revelation of things as divine artifacts; likewise, the modern epoch is determined by the revelation of things as objects. The ancient epoch—which means the epoch of 'the Greeks,' so often referred to by Heidegger with a handwave, despite his close readings and clear understanding of distinctions between a number of them—is a bit unruly and hard to pin down. Οὐσία, λόγος and φύσις are all candidates for naming how things appear to 'the Greeks' at different points in Heidegger's thinking. Yet, clearly enough, φύσις has a particular role. He says in *Einführung in die Metaphysik* that from the standpoint of φύσις, what always already lies before is the a priori (GA 40, p. 202; cf. GA 65, § 111). Some few years later, in his 'Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1.' (VWBP), he reads Aristotle as a pivotal figure in the sequence of transformations in the interpretation of nature that is the history of the West. Heideggerians prefer to talk of essences in English in terms of how things 'hold sway,' following William Lovitt's helpful footnote on 'essence' and 'epoch' in his translation of 'Die Frage nach der

Technik.'[6] Hence the essence of truth is the truth of essence insofar as 'what truth is' is historically determined by the interpretation of being that holds sway in any particular epoch. Truth is essentially a matter of ontological commitment.

The idea that truth is historically situated should come as a shock to philosophers steeped in 2,500 years of footnotes to Plato's eternal ἰδέα, that is, that truth is eternal and unchanging. Heidegger has taken much criticism for the ways in which he is German, but what of the way in which he is here philosophically not bound by anything especially German so much as European? Does Heidegger think that only Europe (whatever that is) has history, thus epochs, and so truth(s)? There is nothing in *Sein und Zeit* to suggest that Dasein is only possible in the European tradition. Heidegger has already distanced himself from the notion of 'worldview' (GA 3), but if 'world' can have ontological force indicating a 'realm that encompasses a multiplicity of entities' (SZ, pp. 64–5), or can designate the 'ontologico-existential concept of worldhood' (SZ, p. 65) such that only Dasein is 'worldly,' why can there not be 'the world of the African,' (whatever 'Africa' is) or better, the 'world of the Ewe,' 'the world of the Hausa,' 'the world of the Frafra,' and so on—each culture distinguished by its unique revealing of beings experienced as an a priori structural whole? Culture is thus the world-opening a priori project that structures experience—in short, truth. Heidegger's account of truth is accordingly readily intelligible in terms of cultural location.

Indeed, modernity is for Heidegger as much a cultural project as it is historical. The critique he levels throughout his work at the Western intellectual tradition of the global North[7] is only a critique of technology because it is first a critique of science. In 'Die Frage nach der Technik,' the essence of technology is for Heidegger 'a way of revealing' (FNT, p. 16), a truth by which world is opened through ontological projection. So the essence of technology is *Ge-stell:* projection of an interpretive framework that structures experience. Beings reveal themselves in modernity (if there is such a thing) as *Bestand*—translated as 'standing-reserve,' but perhaps more clearly understood as 'resource.' The truth of modernity is the praxical interpretation of beings as nothing more than resources available for human use. So, a forest is reduced to so many board-feet of lumber, or even an aesthetic resource for the tourist industry.

Heidegger attaches no necessity to this technological interpretation of beings. Glazebrook shows how in his account this interpretation, which is detailed and assessed in the next section, arises historically.[8] Here, there is good reason to believe that, by the end of his life, Heidegger does not hold that the historical sequence of epochs that define 'the West' has any kind of necessity driving it. Indeed, he is

[6] See Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row 1977).

[7] The question whether Heidegger's discussion of 'the West' (das Abendland, literally, the Eveningland) must now take place in terms of 'the global North' arises not just from a confusion of geography on his part. It is only possible in post-colonial contexts.

[8] See Trish Glazebrook, 'From Φύσις to Nature, Τέχνη to Technology: Heidegger on Aristotle, Galileo and Newton,' *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 38, no. 1 (2000): 95–118.

assertedly anti-Hegelian about history insofar as he rejects Hegel's grand teleology. Likewise, he does not accept the necessity attached to Marx's dialectical materialism.[9] He certainly speaks of destiny well into the 1950s, but by 1962, being is simply given—'*Es gibt*,' as he says in *Zeit und Sein*. And by the time he gives the *Der Spiegel* interview, Heidegger's answer to the question of a new beginning is simply, '*nur ein Gott* "*kann uns retten*"'—'only a God "can save us"' (DS). This is not a new found religiosity but an assertion of the gratuitous non-necessity of any interpretation of being, coupled with simple resignation that a new beginning, i.e. a new interpretation of being and thus beings, is outside human control and intent.

The 'destiny [das Schicken]' of 1962 is translated by Stambaugh as 'sending' (ZS, p. 8).[10] In *Sein und Zeit*, some 25 years earlier, Heidegger spoke instead of 'fate [das Schicksal]' and a different kind of 'destiny [der Geschick]' (SZ, p. 384). He described fate as 'a possibility which [Dasein] has inherited and yet has chosen' (SZ, p. 384). This possibility can only become 'authentic historicality,' Heidegger says, if Dasein can 'take over its thrownness and be in the moment of vision for "its time."' (SZ, p. 385). Given the historical, and also Heidegger's biographical, events between 1927 and 1962, one has to ask if his view of destiny has changed.

Certainly, Heidegger has ceased talking in terms of *Geschick* and *Shicksal* and instead focuses on the root of these words in '*schicken*'—sending. The history of being is a sending that is lived and not directed, that is, an event, *Ereignis*, or series of events, not driven by human intention. (But this is not to say that it is not constituted essentially by human understanding, as we show later.) The notion of 'authentic historicality' has lost its promise of interventive power. So, Hitler, to take one extremely problematic example, did not drive history with any intention. Rather, his intentions were caught up in complex contexts of meaning and action that made the outcomes unpredictable for him, even if his plans had not failed. As a less controversial example, Descartes' impact was formative for modernity, and hence he, in a sense, began a new epoch. Yet, there was no intent on his part to begin a process that would culminate in global climate change. The actualities of historical existence are not planned outcomes but can only be expressed in the 'there is,' that is, '*Es gibt*.'

This helplessness in the face of being does not mean, however, that a story cannot be told to make sense of how epochal transition comes about in the way Heidegger himself recounts the 'once-upon-a-time' detailed in the next section. Epochs are incommensurable because projections of being are irreducibly differentiated and cannot be simultaneously projected. Heidegger notes that transition in the projection of being is not limited to the historical. When he describes transition from the

[9] A debate about Heidegger and Marx took place several decades ago (see for example, Valentino Gerratana, 'Heidegger and Marx,' *New Left Review* 106(1977): 51–58.), and it has continued though Derrida. See Jacques Derrida, *Spectres of Marx*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994). More recently, Vattimo and Zabala call for leaving behind the ideal dialectic of development maintained by many contemporary Marxist theorists, on the basis of its 'implicit danger of those politics' and their 'violence.' See Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, *Hermeneutic Communism: From Heidegger to Marx* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

[10] See Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 8.

natural to the theoretical attitude in *Sein und Zeit* § 69(b), he says that 'the understanding of being has changed over' (SZ, p. 361) so that things are no longer encountered according to ontological projection of their handiness and instrumental value (equipmentality, readiness-to-hand in concernful dealings) but rather through projection of their spatio-temporal being, stripped of its use-value (objectivity, presence-at-hand) that reduces them to objects of science.

Drawing, then, from philosophers of science, Kuhn is right that paradigms are incommensurable.[11] But Lakatos is also right that, nonetheless, rational reconstruction can make sense of how paradigm shifts happen.[12] In quantum physics, additionally, Bohr notes that scientists can measure any axis of spin they wish but only that specific one at hand, since equipment cannot be oriented along multiple axes simultaneously.[13] Incommensurability does not entail unintelligibility. Heidegger, who knew and conversed with Heisenberg,[14] appears to accept complementarity, of which the uncertainty principle is one example. Complementarity simply says, in an example from the quotidian, 'you can't have your cake and eat it too.' But that doesn't mean that eating cake is unintelligible if one decides to save it for later. In fact, no one would save anything for later if consuming it thereby became impossible. Through training and practice, people can change paradigms at will and move between them smoothly—no more, thereby, disrupted than when the physicist stops work to have lunch.

If essential determinations of being underwrite historical epochs, they can just as easily determine cultural situation. And if the projections of being that define culture are irreducible but intelligible, then Heidegger's account of truth contains the possibility of good faith cross-cultural discussion, exchange and mutual engagement rather than supporting or conducing cultural arrogance and notions of the 'primitive.' For no ontology (and thus no epistemology) has inherent priority.

Accordingly, Heidegger provides a basis for rejecting modernity theory (or, modernization theory) as a conceptual basis for international development policy and practice. Modernity theory is, in a nutshell, the belief that development happens along a single trajectory such that so-called 'developed' countries are simply ahead

[11] See Thomas S. Kuhn, 'Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability,' *Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 1982* Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers(1982): 669–688.

[12] Imre Lakatos, 'History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions,' *Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 1970* (1970): 91–136.

[13] Neils Bohr, 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Reality be Considered Complete?,' *Physical Review* 48(1935): 696–702. Reprinted in Neils Bohr, 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Reality be Considered Complete?,' in *Quantum Theory and Measurement*, ed. John Archibald Wheeler and Wojciech Hubert Zurek (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 145–151.

[14] See C.F. v. Weizäcker, 'Begegnugen in vier Jarhzehnten,' in *Erinnerugn an Martin Heidegger* (Stuttgart: Verlag Günther Neske, 1977), 239–248. For the story on the meeting between Heidegger and Heisenberg, see 239–240.

of 'developing,' or 'under-developed' countries.[15] Where modernity theory is at work, 'development' means catching up with the global North. In practice, 'catching up' often means industrialization—and it always means economic development thorough the adoption and promotion of consumer culture. This is the sense in which developing countries are discussed as 'emerging economies.' When the path of development that emerged in colonial and post-colonial imperialism is examined, Heidegger's critique of modernity, as an account how modern technology is a global assault, is especially relevant. For both human beings and ecosystems are abused in the essential globalization of technology that is modernity.

8.3 The Truth of Modernity

By explicating Heidegger's analysis of the intellectual history of the West as the history of conceptions of nature that culminate in the scientific paradigm of objectivity, this section addresses the question of how modernity became such a destructive truth. We show that modern science is already inherently technological, i.e. technoscience, because its logic is that of representational thinking. The representational thinking that lies at the essence of technology reduces beings to their instrumental value in a way that modernity becomes an assault on all it encounters.

Heidegger's critique of modernity is in large part a critique of technology. For Heidegger, technology emerged as a distinctive truth, i.e. unconcealment of being. As noted above, the history of the West consists in epochs determined essentially by their understanding of nature. In the ancient—Aristotelian, in Heidegger's account—understanding of nature, beings move, i.e. develop, of their own accord, in the way for example that acorns become oak trees and puppies become dogs. In contrast, τέχνη (production) is defined for Aristotle by the conception of the artifact in the mind of the artist prior to production. In the subsequent medieval interpretation, nature is a special case of production, i.e. a divinely-crafted artifact. Thus, nature remains—as it was for Aristotle—teleological; but the end is now determined by God, the divine craftsperson. Heidegger distinguishes modernity from the medieval epoch in that Bacon, Galileo and Newton understand nature in terms of efficient causes and locomotion rather than teleology and growth. That is to say, the explanatory function of the divine no longer appears. As Laplace famously told Napoleon, God is an unnecessary hypothesis.[16]

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[15] For critical introductions to modernist development paradigms and the subsequent 'dependency theory,' see Kate Manzo, 'Modernist Discourse and the Crisis of Development Theory,' *Studies in Comparative International Development* 26, no. 2 (1991): 3–36.; See also Frans J. Schuurman, 'Paradigms lost, paradigms regained? Development studies in the twenty-first century,' *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (2000): 7–20.

[16] Most famously recounted by Rouse Ball, Laplace answered Napoleon, who had objected that he did not see God in Laplace's equations, 'Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là [I did not need that hypothesis].' See W. W. Rouse Ball, *A Short Account of the History of Mathematics*, 4th ed.

The conceptual changes the transition to modernity entails are detailed more thoroughly in one of Glazebrook's aforementioned works[17]; suffice it to say here that, in modernity, things are reductively interpreted as objects in the scientific sense: they are spatio-temporally extended bodies that move according to efficient causality, i.e. when acted upon by forces (in contrast to Aristotle's teleological conception of nature in which 'cause' primarily means the final cause that drives growth and development and not locomotion). Efficient and final causes are thus quite different: efficient causes are like billiard balls that move things through impacts that force them to change their place, while the final cause (τέλος, *telos*) is the end, purpose or goal. Teleology includes human purposes, intents and goals for Aristotle, but it is not limited to human motivation. Rather, teleology includes more broadly what drives and governs a thing's growth, development and maturation. In the paradigm shift to the medieval epoch, teleology is displaced from natural entities (Aristotle's τά φυσικά) to a divine craftsperson, and then the divine craftsperson is made redundant in modern science such that the sense in which bodies can be living organisms in pursuit of their own end is lost. Thus, in 1954, when Heidegger argues that modern physics sets nature up as 'a coherence of forces calculable in advance' (FNT, p. 25), he talks about what Horkheimer, Adorno and others have called the disenchantment of nature.[18] What does this scientific ontology of objectivity, however, have to do with technology?

Heidegger argues that though the modern scientific practice predates the rise of machine-technology, 'modern technology … is, from the point of view of the essence holding sway within it, historically earlier.' (FNT, p. 26) At about the same time, in *Was Heißt Denken?*, he argues that 'modern science is grounded in the nature [Wesen] of technology' (WHD, p. 155).[19] Heidegger has made clear in the technology essay that the essence of technology is *Gestell*, i.e. its projective nature, which is reminiscent of Aristotle's claim that definitive of τέχνη is the conception of the work in the mind of the artist prior to production. In this sense, understanding is always projective, as Heidegger argued in § 32 of *Sein und Zeit*. What is distinctive of the modern understanding is that it projects an understanding of being as *Bestand*, which is to say, it comes to all it encounters with a prior conception that reduces everything to instrumental value as resource. This is, of course, exactly what the deep ecologists react against by arguing, instead, for the intrinsic value of nature; abolitionists and other human rights advocates react against slavery in a similar manner by arguing that people are not to be reduced in this way since they

(New York: Dover Publications, 1960), 343. See also Isaac Newton, *Principia. Vol. II: The System of the World*, trans. Florian Cajori and Andrew Motte (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 677.

[17] See Glazebrook, 'From Φύσις to Nature, Τέχνη to Technology: Heidegger on Aristotle, Galileo and Newton.'

[18] See Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (New York: Social Studies Association, Inc., 1944). For the English translation, see Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972).

[19] J. Glenn Gray translates 'Wesen' as 'nature' rather than 'essence.' See Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968).

are autonomous ends-in-themselves. The understanding that grounds the modern epoch reduces all that is encountered, even people—Heidegger warns in 1954—to object (See FNT, p. 30). Modernity is thus neither determined by technology, insofar as the modern experience is replete with technology, nor science, insofar as scientific knowledge is (perhaps) broader and scientific practice more successful than ever previously known. Rather, modernity is determined essentially by technoscience, that is, the way of opening a world (a truth, unconcealment of being) in which science and technology are mutually penetrating and interdependent because of their projection of beings as objects appropriable into resources.

So, scientific objectivity comes to the fore in the mid-seventeenth century, well before machine-powered technology that was only developed in the second half of the eighteenth century. But the *essence* of technology, its unconcealment of being through projection, is already present in the modern scientific projection of objectivity. The self-assertion of the modern subject in the Cartesian *ego cogito*, i.e. the idealism of the metaphysics of subjectivity, thus grounds a global assault on the environment and people alike. That is to say, modernity, as a world-opening truth, is a violent imposition of human understanding onto beings as objects that can bear no value beyond the instrumental. Hence, Heidegger has an ongoing aversion to efficient causality and to the demand that thinking produces results, which he begins to rail against as early as 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes' (ZW) in 1938.

Yet, violence has always held a central place in human experience. At stake here is what is unique to modern violence: how does this violence stand in relation to violence in the much more the usual sense of hurting, destroying and treating unjustly in the struggle to reproduce the material conditions of daily living or beyond, to the accumulation of power and wealth for their own sake? Heidegger accounts for the violence of modernity by examining another kind of violence, the hermeneutic violence of the modern scientific displacement of experience by the empirical. The next section shows how this violence is essential to the logic of capital.

8.4 Experiment, Violence and Capital

This section argues that the mathematization of nature is the foundational projection onto nature by human understanding that makes experimental methodology necessary to modern science. Moreover, mathematization makes possible the reduction of beings, i.e. anything that can appear in modernist ontology, to economic value. Modernity is thus driven by a logic of capital at work in technoscience in that the instrumentality at the essence of technology is inseparable from the calculability essential to modern science.

Heidegger first indicates how he thinks modern science is violent in his 1935–1936 lectures when he is contrasting Aristotelian science against Newtonian in *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (FD). He cites Aristotle on violence (βία). For Aristotle, motion is violent when it goes against a thing's τέλος, its final cause and fulfilling

activity. Rocks, for example, are teleologically drawn to the centre in Aristotle's account, so a rock thrown upwards is subject to violent motion.[20] Newtonian science cannot make this distinction between violent and non-violent motion. This is because, as noted above, there is no room for Aristotelian teleology in Newton's mechanistic universe where motion is reduced to locomotion driven by efficient causes. Thus, experiments commit hermeneutic violence by forcing natural entities to behave in ways they would not left to themselves.[21] That is why experiments are done in labs: nature is messy and things behave not as predicted when other influences are present. The point of the lab is precisely to remove beings from everyday, ordinary experience to ideal conditions that can be controlled.[22] Accordingly, the experiment produces more reliable data than ordinary experience, but this data is not empirical in the Aristotelian sense of ἐμπειρία, experience, i.e. what is encountered 'without one's having to *do* anything' (GA 65, p. 160).[23] That lab science is violent in this way cannot be seen without the conceptual tool necessary to see it, i.e. Aristotle's βία.

Τέχνη, i.e. production of artifacts, is violent in Aristotle's sense because it appropriates entities by reducing them to material upon which to impose form. The artisan indeed works where natural processes are inadequate to satisfy human intention. Incipient in the 1935–1936 lectures is the *Gestell* of technology—the assault that reduces nature to a stockpile of resources. Indeed, in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, soon after the aforementioned lectures, Heidegger identifies experiment as 'a *necessary* and prime *component* of knowledge' only once it is a 'setting up of nature [Ansetzung der Natur]' (GA 65, p. 163).

The idea that scientific understanding requires projection has been with Heidegger since his 1916 argument distinguishing science from history through projection of its time concept (cf. GA 1, pp. 413–33), and appeared again in § 69 of *Sein und Zeit* as already discussed above. Emerging in the mid-1930s, for the first time in the discussion of Aristotle, is this further idea that modern science is violent. In the early 1950s, Heidegger argues in *Was Heißt Denken?* that science is grounded in the

[20] Aristotle, *Physics: Books 5–8*, trans. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 230a32.

[21] Cf. Trish Glazebrook, 'Violence Against Nature: A Philosophical Perspective,' *Journal of Power and Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Review* 2, no. 4 (2001): 322–343.; Trish Glazebrook, 'Heidegger on the Experiment,' *Philosophy Today* 42, no. 3 (1998): 250–261.

[22] The contemporary practice of clinical trials is a more complex way of controlling experiment when the subjects cannot be confined to a lab for ethical reasons. Such is the case of control groups that do not receive treatment whereby double-blinding attempts to remove or at least replicate evenly the placebo effect are used. Heidegger's point that experimental design is intended to control remains valid, and the issue of how such trials are experiential in their production of empirical data is an open question, given that point that drug therapy is intervention rather than mere observation.

[23] Bacon argues that 'the office of the sense shall be only to judge the experiment, and that the experiment itself shall be the judge of the thing,' because the experiment is more reliable than experience in that 'sense fails in two ways' that can be rectified in the experiment. See Francis Bacon, *The Great Instauration and New Atlantis* (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1980), 24.

essence of technology, and, in the technology essay, he claims that the essence of technology is an assault upon nature. That is, modern science 'pursues and entraps nature,' while technology reduces nature to 'the chief storehouse of the standing energy reserve' (FNT, p. 25). Science is thus for Heidegger conceptually violent in that it 'sets upon [stellt] nature' (FNT, p. 18) in what Heidegger was above cited as calling 'the organized global conquest of the earth' (GA 6.2, p. 358).

In *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, Heidegger addresses 'the mathematical projection of nature.'[24] He argues that when Descartes makes the *ego cogito* the foundation of knowledge, 'the mathematical as the axiomatic project posits itself as the authoritative principle of knowledge' (FD, p. 83). In Descartes' method, the *ego cogito* is an axiom from which other truths can subsequently be deduced. Newton likewise begins with 'axiomata,' which he also calls 'leges,' (laws) of motion.[25] Heidegger's description of science as mathematical echoes Newton's own phrase for his work, the 'mathematical principles of philosophy,'[26] and Heidegger is reading the *Principia* at the time (FD, pp. 66–8; pp. 286–88). But Heidegger finds more to 'the mathematical' here than simply the claim that modern science is axiomatic, like geometry. Rather, 'the mathematical' is '[the] fundamental position we take toward things by which we take up things as already given to us … the fundamental presupposition of the knowledge of things.' (FD, pp. 58; pp. 277–78). The mathematical can be learned because it is built into assumptions—the a priori found in experience because it is projected there. Hence modern science knows 'objects' as it projects objectivity.

Shortly thereafter, however, in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, Heidegger argues that because modern 'science' (physics) is mathematical (not empirical), so it is necessarily *experimental* in the sense of the *measuring experiment* (GA 65, p. 163). He subsequently refers to the representational thinking of the sciences as calculative (ZW, pp. 78–9) and world as 'what can seemingly be calculated completely' (ZW, p. 88), while nature is what can be reckoned (WB, p. 54) and thus stockpiled (FNT, p. 19). In his 1955 Memorial Address in honour of Conradin Kreutzer, Heidegger still holds that for the scientist, the world 'appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought.' (GL, pp. 17–8). For Heidegger, modern science underwrites capitalist exploitation because mathematization prepares nature for economic reduction by setting it up as objectively reckonable. The scientific projection of objectivity renders invisible all values beyond the calculable, which

[24] The phrase 'mathematical projection of nature' first appears in Heidegger's work in § 69(b) of *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger returns to the word Grundbegriffe, basic concepts, in a lecture course in 1941 (GA 51) wherein he considers basic concepts determinative not just of regional ontologies but also of the history of Western metaphysics. He begins with a saying from Periander that criticizes as unwise those who concern themselves with only a part instead of the whole. This text is thus the beginning of his criticism of the regional ontologies of the sciences that will culminate in 'Wissenschaft und Besinnung' (WB) in the claim that the sciences as sciences cannot be self-reflective.

[25] Isaac Newton, *Newton's Philosophy of Nature: Selections from his Writings* (New York: Hafner Press, 1953), 25.

[26] Ibid., 10.

capitalists and their accountants readily reckon as expense and revenue. Women's unpaid labour, for example, or the value of a tree to the diverse species active in the healthy functioning of the forest ecosystem have no point of entry into the cost-benefit analyses of economic reckoning, and they remain ontologically persistent only as so-called 'externalities.'

Babette Babich, in her reading of Heidegger's 'Überwindung der Metaphysik,' thus notes that, for Heidegger, modern consumption uses things, and 'the using is a using up.'[27] That is to say, modern consumption cannot be sustained; it is environmentally destructive. Moreover, she further cites Heidegger that 'Man is the "most important raw material" because he remains the subject of all consumption' (ÜM, p. 88). Babich then raises the question of Heidegger and Marx by noting that, 'Whatever Marxian reading of Heidegger may be worked out, it would have, it should, begin with … the "circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption."' And she notes Heidegger's prescience 'well in advance of the discourse of globalization' in that he understood that 'the distinction between "national" and "international" has also collapsed.'[28] Indeed, cultural imperialism in post-colonial global contexts is aimed precisely at expanding the consumer base. Human being is reduced to means rather than end-in-itself, not just as exploited labour but also as wage-earning consumer.

Heidegger's analysis of the mathematical in modern science shows how Galileo's claim that 'the universe is a book written in the language of mathematics'[29] lays nature bare in mathematical projection such that it is ripe for capitalist exploitation. For without the mathematical projection of nature in modern science, technological exploitation would have no basis for its reckoning of nature as exploitable resource. Accordingly, there is embedded in Heidegger an account of the function of science and technology in capitalist exploitation of global peoples and resources. We argued, however, in the first section above, that the destiny of the West is not the destiny of cultures in the global South. In the next section, we assess what does not appear in the logic of technoscientific capital and argue that it is one possibility of the saving power that is found growing where the danger of the essence of technology also grows.

8.5 Technological Determinism and the Saving Power

In this final section, we argue against technological determinism. The danger of the essence of technology may be in that it consumes all it encounters, but, as we argued in the first section, technology is not the destiny of the global South but of

[27] Babich directly cites Heidegger in ÜM, p. 88. See Babette Babich, 'Politics and Heidegger: Aristotle, Superman, Žižek,' *Telos* 161, no. 4 (2012): 160.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Galilei Galileo, *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo*, trans. Stillman Drake (London: Anchor Books, 1957), 238.

modernity. Because it is unpaid and unsold, and because it does not reckon, assume or imply a mastery of the earth, women's subsistence agriculture is irreducible to the technoscientific logic of modernity. It cannot be encountered because it is invisible to the technoscientific logic of capital. It is an alternative dwelling, a different destiny than the destiny of modernity.

We do not read Heidegger as a technological determinist; rather, he thinks the essence of technology 'is in a lofty sense ambiguous' (FNT, p. 37). One the one hand, it 'challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view,' and, on the other, 'it comes to pass for its part in the granting that lets man endure—as yet unexperienced, but perhaps more experienced in the future—that he may be the one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth' (FNT, p. 37).

When taken together as a critique of technoscience, especially as we have read them, Heidegger's critiques of science and technology are, indeed, extremely bleak—though no more so than the reality of the impacts of so-called 'development' on lived experience in the global South where many critics note the exacerbation of poverty (especially for marginalized groups) caused by investment in industrial agriculture and 'structural adjustment' programs. In contexts of development, examples abound of the 'organized global conquest of the earth' (GA 6.2, p. 238), predicted by Heidegger through destructive practices of resource exploitation and of human injustices like slavery, which is still evident globally in human trafficking as well as child and sweatshop labour. These evidences seem to support the many critical readings of Heidegger as a technological determinist, as if the essence of technology is an inevitable, dystopic fate.

In 'Die Frage nach der Technik,' Heidegger argues that the threat of technology is that 'it drives out every other possible way of revealing' (FNT, p. 37). Reading this text with earlier texts shows that it drives alternatives out by distracting, deferring and dazzling. In the *Rektoratsrede*, Heidegger argues against the 'mere progress of information' (SDUR, p. 13) In 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes,' he says that science becomes 'mere busyness' when it ceases questioning what he called in *Sein und Zeit* 'basic concepts,' (SZ, p. 9) and instead 'simply chases after such results and calculations' (ZW, p. 97). In 1937, he continues this attack on what has become known, thanks to Thomas Kuhn, as 'normal science' by criticizing the preoccupation with the superficial and a blind reckoning and frenzy of explanations in the German university (BW, p. 16). In *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, he argues against 'an indiscriminate gathering up of observations solely on the basis of their unsurveyable manifoldness and conspicuousness,' (GA 65, p. 161) and, in 'Die Kehre,' the 'mere wanting to know' (KE, p. 41) into which the human being can sink. At the same time, in 'Die Frage nach der Technik,' he claims that the human being risks 'merely staring at the technological' (FNT, p. 36). This analysis began as early as in the 1930 'Von Wesen der Wahrheit' essay where Heidegger identified *das Irren* and *die Irre* (translated as 'erring' and 'errancy'), leading astray from the question (there called 'mystery') of being. Rather, Dasein in-sists (*insistiert*), i.e. 'holds fast to what is offered by beings' because it 'is turned toward the most readily available beings' (VWW, pp. 196–8).

The threat of technoscience is, then, that human being drives out other ways of revealing by ceasing to see its destiny as a gift of being and rather asserts its ontology and epistemology as superior because inevitable and true. This is identical to the problem of modernist approaches to development, as noted above: Eurocentrism disrespects, denigrates and ultimately displaces the world-opening truths of other cultures, and because of this rampaging through them, eventually destroys them.

Heidegger has shown that the mobilization of technoscience in international development is not accidental to the cultural disruption of globalization but rather is its driving force. We have argued above that the crucial moment in modernity is mathematization, which actualizes this technological essence of science in capitalist economies of exploitation. Moreover, in the face of preoccupation with beings, being withdraws. That is, the self-assertion of technoscience precludes understanding by making invisible not only the truth of other cultures but also the truth of technoscience itself. Accordingly, the insight that other ways of world-opening are possible is covered over and obscured in the European worldview gone global.

Yet, we have already argued that Heidegger does not hold to that notion of inescapable fate subsequent to his critique of technology. In the texts noted above, the 'indiscriminate gathering' of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* is contrasted against 'a gathering with the intention toward an order' (GA 65, p. 161). The mere wanting to know of 'Die Kehre' stands in contrast to thinking, and mere staring at the technological in the technology essay is viewed against 'catching sight of what come to presence in technology' (KE, p. 43). The 'destiny' Heidegger analyses in 'Zeit und Sein'—that which we read above in terms of the 'authentic historicality' of *Sein und Zeit* and that in which Dasein can 'take over its thrownness and be in the moment of vision for 'its time' (SZ, p. 385)—can further be read in terms of the alternative possibility to insistence and erring found in the 'Von Wesen der Wahrheit' essay: ek-sistence. Definitive of Dasein (whether human or not, and regardless of its location in the geographies of differences that map its immanence if human) is its status as inquirer (SZ, p. 7). As Aristotle put it, opening his *Metaphysics*, 'all human beings by nature desire to know [πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει].'[30] In Heidegger's account, any thinker at any time can break the monotonous bedazzlement and seduction of the technological and ask the question of being instead—that is, anyone can put into question their own being in the hermeneutic circle Heidegger describes in § 7C of *Sein und Zeit*. This is the moment of vision that provides order, that is thinking, and that allows sight to be caught of what comes to presence in technology. In this moment of vision, Dasein comes to know its own assumptions, its interpretive stance toward beings that underwrites its experience as being-in-a-world.

This is to say, following Heidegger following Hölderlin, 'but where danger is, grows / The saving power also' (FNT, p. 32). If technology boxes in, then it is a Pandora's box—eventually from within its very heart emerges this enigmatic

[30] Aristotle, *Metaphysics: Books 1–9*, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 980a22.

'saving power.' This power is the capacity of thinking to question its own assumptions about being and knowledge, the ontologies and epistemologies buried deep in the very structures of thinking but still accessible through the house of being, language. It seems, however, that philosophical analyses and political critiques are insufficient to swerve the current rush of destruction that is immense species extinction, habitat loss, global poverty, and resource depletion. Indeed, Heidegger's late-term conclusion that destiny is outside human intent and control may be his most accurate insight of all.

And if the essence of technology has played itself out, but yet still holds sway in globalization, what is revealed from within international development studies (that Heidegger seems himself not to have reached) is that this critical insight is historically present in globalization through the encounter with the Other. That is, as Eurocentric thinking globalized itself through the imperialist assault that is the essence of technology, the 'Other' (in fact othered by this patronizing term) became an insider.

To date, this question of the Other is read in Heidegger scholarship in Hegelian terms, i.e. the Other is reduced to the subjectivity of the self that it mediates. That is, the Other is not seen as a self but as other-to-me, and thus witnessing the Other uncovers the limits of—and thereby the totality and wholeness—the self. This is the way in which, for example, McNeill assesses in his analysis of the glance of the eye (der Augenblick) that 'the *looking* [of the other human being] is itself nothing human.' He is clear that he does not mean here the dehumanizing of the other as if the other is not human but rather that the other 'belongs to "being itself," to an event of presencing that exceeds it.'[31] The other is here experienced in Heideggerian terms as an event of being. Likewise, elsewhere, in an analysis of guest-friendship, McNeill reads love as 'the desire that the beloved remain the one that it is.'[32] The other is welcomed in guest-friendship, according to this text, and McNeill is providing an argument against exclusions and intolerance.

But as Lugones and Spelman note, successful dialogue means 'coming to our communities in friendship' rather than the other needing always to come to the hegemon's community and speak in the hegemon's language.[33] In the hegemon's world, the marginalized can never be met on their own terms. Since, as Heidegger says, 'Language is the house of being' (BH, p. 313), we must join then with Wade Davis in his regret at the rapid (two per week) loss of languages throughout the planet.[34] Loss of culture is always tragic, and a world-opening, a saving power, a

[31] William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 308.

[32] William McNeill, 'Heimat: Heidegger on the Threshold,' in *Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s*, ed. James Risser (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 344.

[33] Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman, 'Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for "The Woman's Voice",' in *Women and Values*, ed. Marilyn Pearsall (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999), 29.

[34] See Wade Davis, *The Wayfinders: Why Ancient Wisdom Matters in the Modern World* (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2009).

possibility for a new beginning, is no more every time a language lost. Hegemonic terms of discourse are, as Irigaray (1974) shows, logics of the same, wherein the other is reduced to the terms of the self and therefore can never measure up.[35] Globalization changes these terms of hegemony in two ways.

First, globalization is a colonization of culture in that it exports not just goods but desire for them in the form of consumerism; thus, the subject is used as a medium for the using, as noted in Babich cited above.[36] Yet desire is not monological, as people in the global South have always appropriated technology. Idhe (1999) uses this as evidence of technology's 'multistability,' i.e. the idea that technology can be appropriated for uses never intended by its producer.[37] More often than not, however, people just use technology that is transferred to their context. For example, the rise of cell phones, just used as cell phones in the global South, has radically changed experiences, capacities and self-determination in myriad ways. Family members in the diaspora send money back home more often when they stay in closer touch. But also, as early as Tiananmen Square, cell phones figured in political resistance in ways that, more recently, made the Arab Spring possible. Heidegger's account of the ambiguous nature of the essence of technology does not imply inevitable dystopia—technology is inherently neither good nor bad but is never neutral. Technology transfer to the global South is replete with problems, most of which can be traced easily back to the logic of capital as essentially a project of reckoning profit. But this transfer, even as a phase of colonization, places technology in local hands and so creates opportunity for autonomy and self-determination.

Secondly, given that cultural difference is essentially different world-opening, as we have argued above, technology transfer does not necessarily mean only passive reception of its essence. Rather, technology is subject to cultural appropriation. If the essence of technology is inherently modern in Heidegger's account (such that Greek production and use of artifacts is essentially different, as Heidegger argues 'Die Frage nach der Technik'), then exposure through globalization of non-European cultures to the Eurocentric logic of domination that lies at the heart of technology makes possible a new beginning—an event of being in which it is possible 'to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself' (ZS, p. 25). That is, globalization exposes the homelessness of modernity to other ways of dwelling, for the human condition is not necessarily in every case the homelessness that Heidegger's analysis in *Sein und Zeit* suggests. There, he uses *Unheimlichkeit* to explain anxiety as a basic kind of being-in-the-world (SZ, pp. 188–90). *Unheimlichkeit* is literally, un-home-ish-ness, though translated there as 'uncanniness.' Later writing suggests that homelessness belongs rather to the modern experience of the West. Human being can be at home in nature.

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[35] Luce Irigaray, *Speculum de l'Autre Femme* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1974). For the English translation, see Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

[36] See Babich, 'Politics and Heidegger: Aristotle, Superman, Žižek,' 160.

[37] See Don Ihde, 'Technology and Prognostic Predicaments,' *AI and Society* 1, no. 13 (1999): 44–51.

Reading Hölderlin, Heidegger calls *Heimat* 'the power of the earth' (GA 39, p. 88). He says elsewhere that the earth is 'the building bearer, nourishing with its fruits, tending water and rock, plant and animal,' (DD, p. 170) and 'the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal' (BWD, p. 143). Dwelling is 'cultivating and caring [Pflegen und Hegen],' (BWD, p. 185), and he describes it in terms of peace, preservation, sparing and safeguarding. It is 'the manner in which mortals are on earth' (BWD, p. 142). Human beings 'dwell in that they save the earth … To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation. (BWD, p. 144) As McNeill puts it, dwelling 'means protecting the fourfold, saving the earth and heavens in letting them be.'[38]

There are many accounts of how non-Western ideologies offer alternative paradigms to heal the challenges of modernity, from Buddhism, to adivasi practice in India, to Native American tradition in the United States. And there are equally many accusations of idealization of the peasant experience, including no shortage of such criticisms against Heidegger. Our argument is not that every non-Western paradigm is free of challenges and problems, not least among which would be gender. Rather, we are suggesting that these alternatives to the hegemony of modern technoscience offer possibilities for a new beginning, a different relation to nature than the modern technoscientific reduction of nature, a different destining of being that is not so environmentally and politically destructive.

The issue that troubles us instead is a certain discomfort at intending to charge peoples who have been the victims of the global conquest that is technology with the task of solving problems largely engineered by the global North. But this very question overlooks that the destiny of being is not in human control. The peoples of the global South, which include marginalized indigenous cultures in the global North, have suffered environmental and other injustices, but the point at issue in this paper is that, from a Heideggerian perspective, they are not just victims. Rather, they inhabit world-openings.

No one could, however, even if one wished, orchestrate the displacement of modern technoscience for a new beginning. Yet, Heideggerian analysis suggests that a new beginning can just as much not be stopped. The abrupt introduction of gender, with strong focus on the global South, as it took place at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Annual Conference of Parties (COP) in Warsaw in 2013, may prove to be the change in thinking which makes possible a progress on this crisis issue. The next COPs will witness the confrontation of global capital with what could be described as logics of care. This is one thread of the positive research program in twenty-first century Heidegger scholarship that this paper invites, just as it invites a new beginning. Women's subsistence agriculture in the global South promises a saving power that also grows alongside the technoscientific, global conquest of the logic of capital.

[38] McNeill, 'Heimat: Heidegger on the Threshold,' 326.

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Chapter 9
Did *Homo erectus* Dwell? Heidegger, Archaeology and the Future of Phenomenology

Philip Tonner

9.1 Introduction

Heidegger scholarship is changing and its future is exciting. In the twenty-first century, a new task has begun to be elaborated for Heidegger scholars from what at first might seem an unlikely source, namely, archaeology. In fact, since the 1980s, archaeologists have increasingly referred to phenomenological thinkers in general and to Heidegger in particular in an effort to elucidate the ways in which human agents created meaningful worlds in the past. Phenomenology, after all, is a method of enquiry that attempts to reconnect 'us' with the world as 'we' experience it, and perhaps it should come as no surprise that the step toward understanding how past peoples might have experienced their world would be taken once the promise of specifically Heideggerian phenomenology was recognised by anthropological and archaeological thinkers.

In fact, a distinct 'dwelling perspective' has now found its place in the anthropological and archaeological literature.[1] For Heidegger, dwelling is 'the manner in which we humans *are* on the earth' (BWD, p. 141). Nonetheless, Heidegger uses the term 'dwelling' in at least two senses. First, it designates the human essence: essential dwelling, the fundamental, perpetual and universally defining characteristic of

[1] See Christopher Gosden, *Anthropology and Archaeology: A Changing Perspective* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).; Tim Ingold, 'Building, Dwelling, Living: How Animals and People Make Themselves at Home in the World,' in *Shifting Contexts: Transformations in Anthropological Knowledge*, ed. Marilyn Strathern (London: Routledge, 1995), 57–80.; Tim Ingold, 'Epilogue: Technology, Language, Intelligence: A Reconsideration of Basic Concepts,' in *Tools, Language and Cognition in Human Evolution*, ed. Kathleen R. Gibson and Tim Ingold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 449–472.; Tim Ingold, 'The Temporality of the Landscape,' in *Interpretive Archaeology: a Reader*, ed. Julian Thomas (London: Leicester University Press, 2000), 510–530.

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human beings. Second, it names existential dwelling: that state wherein Dasein (the human agent taken as being-there-here-now) has gained an authentic understanding of its essence (essential dwelling) and so lives in accordance with this understanding.[2]

The significance of the term 'dwelling' derives from the Old High German and Old English word 'bauen.' As Heidegger reports, while this word is usually understood as the verb 'to build,' the Old High German word for building, 'buan' actually meant 'to dwell.' Despite being lost to us, a trace of this sense of 'bauen' can be detected in the German word for neighbour, 'Nachbar.' A 'Nachbar' is a 'Nachgebur' or 'Nachgebauer,' a near-dweller. Heidegger further argues that from 'bauen' stem 'Ich bin (I am)' and 'du bist (you are)' and that these mean 'I dwell' and 'you dwell' (BWD, pp. 140–41). A human being 'is' in so far it dwells.

The word 'bauen' has another meaning: to cherish and to protect, to care for and to preserve, especially with regard to agricultural cultivation. 'Bauen' in this sense does not 'make' anything; cultivation contrasts with construction, but both take place within dwelling. Dwelling is that prior state that must be reached in order for both agricultural cultivation and architectural construction to occur. Dwelling is 'being on the earth' that is, from the very outset, 'habitual.' Human agents 'inhabit' their dwelling on the earth.[3] For this reason, dwelling as a constitutive state of Dasein (being-there-here-now) fades into the background of the more prominent human accomplishments of cultivation and construction. These activities become the bearers of dwelling while the original sense of 'bauen' 'falls into oblivion' (BWD, p. 142). The dwelling perspective in archaeology and anthropology resists this fading away and instead focuses on the vibrancy of life-worlds and the agency that occurred within them in the past in order to bring Heidegger's insights to bear—*mutatis mutandis*—on archaeological questions.

What I would like to do in this chapter is first to place this appropriation of Heidegger's thought of dwelling by archaeological thinkers in context by focusing on how Heidegger became a point of reference for contemporary archaeological theorists in the first place. This will involve a foray into archaeological theory. From there, I will be able to explore the dwelling perspective in archaeology while suggesting a particular area—that is, the study of mortuary practice in the past—that Heidegger's thought might be directly relevant to.

Indeed, following the interpretive turn in the 1980s, archaeologists have increasingly found inspiration in Heidegger's thought. What has emerged is a form of anthropological and archaeological thinking that is deeply influenced by Heidegger but that operates in its own field. A significant amount of what follows in this chapter is dedicated to outlining this field. What I would like to suggest here is that Heidegger scholarship would be enriched by coming to know these thinkers, the context of their thinking and the kind of questions that they are posing. Doing so will bring to light certain questions that, while posed out/with Heidegger scholarship, could in fact become posed within that scholarship by commentators on Heidegger. The result

[2] See Michael Watts, *The Philosophy of Heidegger* (Durham: Acumen Publishing, 2011), 212.

[3] Cf. with the German 'gewohnte,' which means habitual, customary or routine.

would be a new area, emerging within Heidegger studies, unfolding in the twenty-first century, which would engage with the wider concerns of both anthropology and archaeology in such a way that would see his thought not as a form of anthropology but as a form of philosophy that can be brought to bear on archaeological questions.

9.2 Archaeology and Dwelling

Bruce Trigger has identified a strain in post-processual archaeology that draws significantly on the phenomenological tradition in general. This strain has been dubbed 'intuitive,' 'constructivist' and 'humanist,' and it places emphasis on the nature of human experience in archaeological enquiry.[4] Introduced in the mid-1990s, and including key exponents such as Christopher Tilley,[5] Christopher Gosden[6] and Julian Thomas,[7] although John Barrett,[8] Cornelius Holtorf and Håkan Karlsson[9] also deserve mention, this variety of interpretive archaeology can be characterised by its sustained engagement with phenomenological philosophers, including Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and, perhaps most centrally, Heidegger.

Heidegger and other phenomenological thinkers became attractive to archaeologists because their work promised access to the fundamental manner in which practically engaged agents 'dwell' on this earth, and it is in this context that what archaeologists now call the 'dwelling perspective' arose. Heidegger, along with other phenomenological philosophers and thinkers share a concern with the nature of human experience, but the notion of dwelling has its ultimate origins in Heidegger's thought.[10]

The notion of dwelling was first brought into the archaeological and anthropological literature by social anthropologist Tim Ingold in two papers in 1993. Interestingly, in the first of these papers, Ingold specifically links dwelling to theoretical reflexivity. He says: 'the *practice of archaeology is itself a form of dwelling*.'[11] In the other paper, he invokes dwelling in terms of the agent who 'dwells in the

[4] Bruce G. Trigger, *A History of Archaeological Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 472.

[5] Christopher Tilley, *A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments* (Oxford, Providence: Berg Publishers, 1994).

[6] Christopher Gosden, *Social Being and Time* (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1994).

[7] Julian Thomas, *Time, Culture and Identity: An Interpretative Archaeology* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).

[8] John Barrett, *Fragments from Antiquity: An Archaeology of Social Life in Britain, 2900–1200 B.C.* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

[9] Cornelius Holtorf and Håkan Karlsson, *Philosophy and Archaeological Practice: Perspectives for the 21st Century* (Göteberg: Bricoleur Press, 2000).

[10] Gosden, *Anthropology and Archaeology: A Changing Perspective*. The classic elaboration of the notion of dwelling is in Heidegger's 'Bauen Wohnen Denken' (BWD).

[11] Ingold, 'The Temporality of the Landscape,' 510. For a discussion on thinking as dwelling, see Gail Stenstad, *Transformations: Thinking after Heidegger* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

world.' He says the following: 'A being who … is wholly immersed, from the start, in the relational context of dwelling in a world. For such a being, this world is already laden with significance: meaning inheres in the relations between the dweller and the constituents of the dwelt-in-world.'[12] In both of these statements, the echo of engagement with Heidegger is unmistakable, right down to the hyphenation of 'dwelt-in-world' in Ingold's text. Instead of referring to an 'ego,' 'self' or 'I' when characterising the human, Heidegger instead uses the term Dasein (being there, here, now) to invoke the characteristic manner in which human beings exist or 'dwell' in the world as interpreting and acting agents. Specifically, in *Being and Time*, he writes that Dasein 'is *in each case mine*' (SZ, p. 42). 'Mineness [Jemeinigkeit]' dictates that one must always use a personal pronoun when addressing a Dasein (SZ, p. 42). For any Dasein, its own being is an 'issue for it'; the essence [Wesen] of Dasein lies in its 'to be [Zu-sein]' or its existence [Existenz].

As Dasein, our primary mode of engagement within the world is non-cognitive. Dasein is an agent who is situated within a context: Dasein's being is being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein], and the basic character of this mode of existence is non-cognitive dwelling. As Dasein, we are not spectators on a world that is somehow separate to us. Thus, Ingold's statement that archaeology is a form of dwelling is intelligible in the sense that being archaeologists is a manner in which practically engaged agents can be in touch with their world; their project of 'being archaeologists' gives shape to their worldly concerns.

Heidegger restricts the term 'Dasein' to what palaeoanthropologists and archaeologists call 'anatomically modern humans.'[13] Dasein is being-in-the-world, and an essential existential dimension of this is being-with. Dasein is fundamentally social, so it always experiences its existence in relation to other Daseins. As Watts writes, Dasein's world is a 'with-world.'[14] Death is the end of Dasein's possibilities, and no other can take any particular Dasein's place in the face of death. Death comes to individuals: it is the condition of their singularity. The function of death is to individuate Dasein. Death is non-relational, and, while it is certain that Dasein will die, it is uncertain when any Dasein will die. Death is the existential state that opens up the communal space in one's being that enables other agents in one's locale to become compatriots. Heidegger explains:

> The very death, which each individual man must die for himself, which reduces each individual to his own uttermost individuality, this very death and readiness for the sacrifice it demands creates first of all the preliminary communal space from which comradeship springs. (GA 39, p. 73)[15]

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[12] Ingold, 'Epilogue: Technology, Language, Intelligence: A Reconsideration of Basic Concepts,' 453.

[13] The concept of an 'anatomically modern human' was introduced into palaeonanthropology around 40 years ago. For a discussion of this issue, see Chapters 2 and 3 of Clive Gamble, *Origins and Revolutions: Human Identity in Earliest Prehistory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Gamble argues that all human beings alive today are anatomically modern and are characterised by a gracile skeleton, a large cranium and so. See ibid., 36–37. It is in this context that I refer to Heidegger's restriction of the term 'Dasein' to anatomically modern humans. It is anatomically modern human beings *qua* Dasein who 'are in each case mine.'

[14] Watts, *The Philosophy of Heidegger*: 265.

[15] The same passage is quoted by Inwood for his 'death and dying' entry. See Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 45.

The dwelling perspective, as it has been developed by archaeologists, stresses the 'full sensuous experience of living in the world.'[16] This perspective is now a central point of reference in contemporary interpretive archaeology. But what is 'interpretive archaeology?'

9.3 'New Archaeology'

To put the interpretive turn in archaeology in context, we must go back to the 1960s because it was then that a new orthodoxy in archaeological theory emerged which intended to guide and unite approaches to the material past. This orthodoxy claimed for itself the title 'new archaeology.'[17] The rise of theory in archaeology coincides with the advance of new archaeology in the 1960s and 1970s. In contradistinction to previous culture-historical approaches to the archaeological record, 'new archaeology' modelled itself on anthropological science and aimed to explain rather than describe the past. This approach is also known as 'processual' archaeology since it favoured cross-cultural generalizations and inferred from particular cases that explain phenomena by reference to both natural and social processes.

'New archaeologists' were concerned with both theory and method. Ultimately, their aim was to gain more and more positive knowledge about the past where such knowledge is considered neutral and timeless. Processual archaeology was anthropological: it was concerned with the reconstruction of past social realities. Society is taken to be composed of sets of patterned behaviours, including the production of material culture, and it is essentially an expression of human adaptation to social and natural environments. Explaining social processes entails directing attention to the aspects of the society in question that are most central to environmental adaptation.[18] So, the aim of archaeology under processualism was the 'generation of law-like statements covering human social and cultural development.'[19]

Processual archaeologists were not theoretically un-reflexive. The scientifically minded archaeologist David Clarke noted that a loss of innocence will occur in archaeology inevitably as a consequence of an 'expanding consciousness.' This expanded consciousness was the result of a continuous process that began to unfold after the initial naming of a discipline. He explains:

> Theory exists, in however unsatisfactory a form, in everything that an archaeologist does regardless of region, material, period and culture … It is this pervasive, central and international

[16] Gosden, *Anthropology and Archaeology: A Changing Perspective*: 127.

[17] See Michael Shanks and Ian Hodder, 'Processual, Postprocessual and Interpretive Archaeologies,' in *Museums in the Material World*, ed. Simon J. Knell (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 144–165.

[18] Ibid., 144–145.

[19] Julian Thomas, 'Introduction: The Polarities of Post-Processual Archaeology,' in *Interpretive Archaeology: A Reader*, ed. Julian Thomas (London: Leicester University Press, 2000), 2.

> aspect of archaeological theory, multiplied by its current weakness, which makes the whole issue of major importance in the further development of the discipline.[20]

Subsequently, 'postprocessual archaeologists' have taken this incipient theoretical reflexivity or 'critical self-consciousness' further, and it is Hodder's view that their various criticisms of processualists have been more to do with theory rather than method.[21] The result of the new archaeologists' stress on science and anthropological theory was the opening up of contemporary archaeology to a wide range of different perspectives including phenomenology, post-structuralism and evolutionary psychology. Mithen, who draws on evolutionary psychology, sums up this new enthusiasm: '[a]rchaeologists should always be seeking to extend the domain of their discipline.'[22] For Hodder, this 'maturity and confidence' amongst contemporary archaeologists derives from their expertise on the 'long-term view' and materiality of human life, which amounts to contemporary archaeologists' belief that they have something to say about the nature of human existence in itself.[23]

9.4 Current Archaeology

The phenomenological movement and the growing field of interpretive archaeology are broad and heterogeneous. Not only did the interpretive or hermeneutic turn in anthropology and archaeology involve phenomenology, but it also involved an engagement with the philosophy of Wittgenstein.[24] While phenomenology awakened an interest amongst anthropologists and archaeologists in the 'subjective,' a reading of Wittgenstein emphasised the social use of language and encouraged enquiry into the socio-cultural and historically negotiated nature of meaning.

Interpretation is linked to meaning. Regarding artifacts, and so the archaeological record, meaning admits two levels: a functional meaning level and a symbolic meaning level. On the functional level, object 'a' is for task 'b,' such that a knife *means* a thing for cutting. On the symbolic level, object 'a' connotes meaning 'b,' such that the knife 'is' a symbol of relations of exchange and gender identity.[25]

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[20] See David Clarke, 'Archaeology: The Loss of Innocence,' *Antiquity* 47(1973): 6–18. Since this article is reproduced online (See http://antiquity.ac.uk/Listing/lossclarke.html), conventional page numbers do not apply.

[21] Ian Hodder, *Archaeological Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 1. See also Kevin Greene and Tom Moore, *Archaeology: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 249.

[22] Steven Mithen, 'Archaeological Theory and Theories of Cognitive Evolution,' in *Archaeological Theory Today*, ed. Ian Hodder (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 98.

[23] Hodder, *Archaeological Theory Today*: 11.

[24] Ernest Gellner, 'Interpretive Anthropology,' in *Interpreting Archaeology: Finding Meaning in the Past*, ed. Alexandra Alexandri, et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 49.

[25] Thomas, 'Introduction: The Polarities of Post-Processual Archaeology,' 9.

In Thomas's reading, it is the latter sense of meaning that is typically employed in archaeology: his example is of a throne connoting royalty and state power.[26]

Thomas suggests these two distinct senses of meaning would break down if we approach a 'thing' in terms of its significance to a historically situated agent. Seeing a throne as a thing to sit on has no priority over seeing it as a symbol for state power since what any object 'is' is a matter of how it reveals itself to an agent.[27] Both senses of meaning are not separable, so either sense of meaning could be primary in so far as they are connected to the comportment of an agent at any point in time. Viewing things in this way upholds the phenomenological thesis that what something 'is' is how it reveals itself to agents' understanding and interest in terms of their projects and tasks. Meaning is use, and it is this sense of 'use' that is central to accounting for the archaeological record from the point of view of dwelling.

9.5 Heidegger, Three Phenomenological Archaeologists and One Phenomenological Anthropologist

Writing in what he considered to be a 'blurred genre,' Tilley draws on phenomenological texts in philosophy alongside works in cultural anthropology, human geography and interpretive archaeology in the service of understanding prehistoric landscapes.[28] Without reducing one thinker's position to the other's, Tilley lets Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty outline the phenomenological perspective: phenomenology involves description and interpretation of 'things' from a first-person perspective.[29] Regarding space, it is by virtue of 'the *dwelling* of humanity' within the world that spaces open up for description by phenomenologists in the first place before they can be approached in quasi-mathematical or theoretical terms.[30] Spaces are first inhabited by agents—Daseins—who dwell. For this reason, prior to theoretical

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] See Tilley, *A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments*. See also Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006).; Jeff Malpas, *Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).; Stuart Elden, *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History* (London and New York: Continuum, 2001).; Julian. Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).; Julian Young, 'Heidegger's Heimat,' *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19, no. 2 (2011): 285–293.; Stuart Cooke, 'Echo-Coherence: Moving on from Dwelling,' *Cultural Studies Review* 17, no. 1 (2011): 230–246.; Michael Peters and Ruth Irwin, 'Earthsongs: Ecopoetics, Heidegger and Dwelling,' *Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 18, no. 1 (2002): 1–17.; William McNeill, *The Time of Life: Heidegger and Ēthos* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).; Felix Ó Murchadha, 'Being as Ruination: Heidegger, Simmel, and the Phenomenology of Ruins,' *Philosophy Today* 46, no. SPEP Supplement (2002): 10–18.

[29] Tilley, *A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments*: 11–14.

[30] Ibid., 13.

abstraction, such spaces can be meaningfully appropriated and interpreted by agents in terms of their projects. The primordial nature of dwelling means that the body must also be considered since it is that point from which the world is experienced by situated agents. Merleau-Ponty's work is 'grounded in the physicality and material existence of the human body in the world.'[31]

Tilley's starting point is the proposition that knowledge of landscapes, past or present, is attained through perceptual experience from the point of view of a subject.[32] Phenomenologists describe these experiences so as to outline as richly as possible a description of the landscape so that other subjects may come to understand this landscape in its full complexity. These other subjects may partake of the original set of experiences outlined by the phenomenologist by virtue of their metaphorical textual mediation.

Acknowledging that phenomenological approaches to landscape are in their infancy, Tilley does offer a number of conclusions. Landscapes have a profound significance/meaning for individuals and groups. Such meanings may be variable and contested but are related to the interests and practices of these individuals and groups. Landscapes 'do' things to individuals; they have experiential effects on agents that can be articulated phenomenologically. As constructed, landscapes will have had more or less specific sets of meanings attached to them that researchers in the present can try to semiotically decode.[33]

Archaeologists Gosden and Thomas develop archaeological questions regarding time. Gosden's work is explicitly 'about time.'[34] His engagement with Heidegger, Husserl, Hegel and Bourdieu is mediated by his interest in this question. Bourdieu is important for Gosden since, as he states, a 'stress on dwelling is an antidote to what Bourdieu calls the outsider's perspective in anthropology.'[35] Gosden's view derives from recent variations of cultural anthropology.[36] Restricting 'relationships' to just the human, in abstraction from the 'things' that surround them in their world, does not capture the rich complexity of life as it is lived by agents in their pre-reflective immersion in their world. Human relations always incorporate things: they are always material and social, and material culture is at the heart of human social life.[37]

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[31] Christopher Tilley, *The Materiality of Stone: Explorations in Landscape Phenomenology* (Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 2004), 2.

[32] Christopher Tilley, 'Phenomenological Approaches to Landscape Archaeology,' in *Handbook of Landscape Archaeology*, ed. Bruno David and Julian Thomas (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2008), 271.

[33] Martin discusses the notion of semiotic decoding in his article, Wayne M. Martin, 'Bubbles and Skulls: The Phenomenology of Self-Consciousness in Dutch Still-Life Painting,' in *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 559–584.

[34] Gosden, *Social Being and Time*: 1.

[35] Gosden, *Anthropology and Archaeology: A Changing Perspective*: 127.

[36] Ibid., 120.

[37] Ibid.

Cultural anthropology and archaeology overlap in subject matter and timescale, and they exploit similar theoretical structures. Gosden highlights two viewpoints that he considers to be promising, although both stand in need of further elaboration. These are the dwelling perspective and the 'relational view' associated with Strathern and Wagner's deconstructionist anthropology of Melanesia.[38]

The relational view allows the analyst to isolate particular contexts of action and change while acknowledging broader perspectives concerned with period and place. On the relational view, people and things have no essential natures or properties: their natures emerge out of the relationships that they are bound up with. The nature of any particular thing, artifact or human, will depend upon and derive from various sets of material and social relations that together constitute the situation. Gender, for example, is not an inherent or invariable property of an individual. Rather, gender is produced by the relations that make up an agent's context. Gender is relational: it may unfold differently in different relational contexts. Life as a whole is 'a series of transformations' unfolding as the relations that compose people and things change.[39]

This analytic relational perspective allows the analyst to focus in on specific contexts. Thus, it may be complementary to the dwelling perspective. Dwelling keeps firmly in mind the first person perspective of life as it is lived through by an agent. So, perhaps inevitably, the dwelling perspective is place-specific and tends towards the synchronic.[40] Dwelling derives from Heidegger, and it is this term that Ingold deploys to name his position.[41] Both theories of practice and the dwelling perspective share a phenomenological heritage.[42]

Gosden broadly accepts Ingold's view that to dwell is to be immersed in the 'flow of life composed of both social relations and practical actions.'[43] Dwelling adds a spatial dimension to Ingold's earlier notion of the taskscape: the assortment of related activities distributed across the physical landscape. Gosden has developed a complementary view that stresses activities forming systems of reference: an activity that is carried out at one place refers either implicitly or explicitly to a myriad of other activities to be carried out at other places. Gosden's view resonates with Heidegger's: the activity of fashioning a handaxe, for example, is embedded within a system of references and purposes that will affect its manufacture and relate to other possibilities at other times and places. The ideas of taskscape and systems of reference help to account for both space and time: activities that are spatially distinct must also be temporally distinct. Each taskscape has its own temporality, rhythms of action and rest.[44]

Although dwelling humanizes time by contextualising it within a taskscape, dwelling retains a synchronic dimension: its roots are in the 'here and now' or,

[38] Ibid., 121.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., 128.

[42] See Gosden, *Social Being and Time*.

[43] Gosden, *Anthropology and Archaeology: A Changing Perspective*: 128.

[44] Ibid.

archaeologically speaking, the 'then and there.' The dwelling perspective does not address longer sequences of change. Gosden reminds us that we must remain attentive to questions about how intelligible human worlds were created in the first place and how humans are then shaped by their creations. Dwelling, while centrally important, is not the whole story for Gosden.[45]

Thomas' discussion of time occurs alongside a discussion of identity and materiality, together with case studies that seek to place these discussions within the context of prehistoric archaeology.[46] His central argument is that while these phenomena remain implicit concepts in archaeology their 'character' remains only rarely questioned. While archaeologists have dating methods and chronologies, they might not ask the (philosophical) question, 'what is time?' Archaeologists have produced accounts of peoples, communities and groups in the past, but they have not asked how such entities have emerged in the first place and how they might have come to self-recognition.[47] Of course, exactly these questions have been posed by phenomenological thinkers. Heidegger, for example, was interested in how it happens that the meanings of any particular entities, any particular 'X' or 'Y,' together with their possible relations, becomes established in the first place.[48]

For Thomas, archaeologists study 'material culture' without being overly troubled by the recent division of culture from material nature that is often implied by the term.[49] It is Thomas' view that the issues of time, culture and identity are deeply connected, and, in a Heideggerian move, it is due to their fundamental importance to archaeology that they can be taken for granted. This is in no small part due to archaeology being embedded in the standard categories of thinking characteristic of Western modernity. As a discipline, archaeology emerged in tandem with modernity as an investigation into the 'origins and depths of human historical achievement' by means of the material record that this achievement left behind.[50] It is for this reason that Thomas suggests that it is difficult to puzzle out archaeology's fundamental assumptions without questioning the very foundations of modernist thought.

Thomas is clear, and the argument he makes about archaeology's genealogy runs in parallel to Heidegger's argument about the 'category of "Being."'[51] Heidegger's argument about the notion of being extends to a critique of the entire tradition of Western metaphysics, and it is Thomas's view that it is Heidegger's challenge to the run of the mill categories employed in contemporary Western thought, along with

[45] Ibid., 129.

[46] Thomas, *Time, Culture and Identity: An Interpretative Archaeology*: ix.

[47] Gosden might stand as an exception.

[48] See SZ, pp. 35–39 and ZS, p. 20. See also, Bret W. Davis, ed. *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts* (Durham: Acumen, 2010), 5. Finally, see Philip Tonner, *Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being* (London and New York: Continuum, 2010).

[49] Thomas, *Time, Culture and Identity: An Interpretative Archaeology*: ix.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., x.

his discussions of time, materiality, art and so on, that make his ideas important to contemporary archaeology.[52]

After all, past peoples may not have constructed their worlds out of the 'concepts and habits of mind' that we might now employ unthinkingly in order to understand them, and so a thinker who places these concepts in question would seem to be required reading for the theoretically reflexive archaeologist. In no small measure, Heidegger's importance lies in his critique of the detached theoretical perspective that has been adopted in Western philosophy and in much archaeological theory hitherto.[53] Thomas's aim is to consider what a Heideggerian archaeology might look like.

Thomas argues that experiential analysis of landscape must be situated within a different conception of landscape to the one traditionally employed by archaeologists. The phenomenological approach to landscape must not ignore more traditional methods, but it is the case that post-processual landscape archaeology and traditional landscape archaeology are not complementary alternative manners of investigating the same phenomenon. Further, the phenomenologically inspired post-processual approach 'necessarily connects with what Ingold characterizes as "the dwelling perspective."'[54]

Ingold turns to Heidegger's 'Bauen Wohnen Denken' in order to elucidate the dwelling perspective. Here, Heidegger states what Ingold considers to be the 'founding statement' of that perspective:

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[52] For Heidegger, the question of the meaning of being [die Seinsfrage] has been forgotten by the tradition of Western metaphysics. This happened in antiquity as a result of Greek substance ontology. There, being is understood as οὐσία, which signifies 'presence' or the 'present.' Being and time are related, but their natures and interconnectedness remain mysterious. Further, the tradition of Western metaphysics, *qua* substance ontology, did not problematize Dasein, that being who has an ontological understanding of being. Dasein has an understanding of being by virtue of its temporality, and so any proper inquiry into being will raise the interrelated problems of being, time and Dasein. It is just these problems that Western metaphysics fails to address and to which Heidegger directs his attention. Heidegger's introduction to *Sein und Zeit* is the place to start with regard to these problems. These themes are elaborated in most commentaries, including Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, eds., *A Companion to Heidegger* (Oxford Blackwell, 2005).

[53] Heidegger regarded the theoretical perspective to be derivative of the more basic state of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Taken at this level, Dasein may be characterized in terms of pragmatic coping [Sorge]. Dasein is pre-reflectively engaged in projects and tasks prior to theoretical abstraction. Indeed, theoretical abstraction tends to take place after a 'breakdown' at the practical level of coping. So, if enquiry begins at the theoretical level, it will either miss entirely or distort this prior level of practical coping that Dasein is 'in' most of the time. For a general introduction to Heidegger that includes elaboration of these points, see the editors' introduction to ibid., 1–15.

[54] Ingold, 'Building, Dwelling, Living: How Animals and People Make Themselves at Home in the World,' 75. See also Julian Thomas, 'Archaeology, Landscape, and Dwelling,' in *Handbook of Landscape Archaeology*, ed. Bruno David and Julian Thomas (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2008), 301.

> To build is in itself already to dwell (BWD, p. 140) … We do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is because we are *dwellers* (BWD, p. 143) … *Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build* (BWD, p. 155).[55]

For Ingold, Heidegger's statement amounts to the view that the forms constructed by individuals and groups, whether in their imaginations or in their environs, arise from within their actively engaged and involved agency within their relational contexts of environmental praxis.[56] As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the world is the homeland of our thoughts; it is only because dwelling is already occurring that the agents who dwell can think the thoughts that they do.[57]

As Thomas reconstructs it, dwelling for Heidegger is that condition which human beings experience when they are at home in the world; it is a relationship characterised by equanimity with the world wherein individual agents care for and preserve their surroundings without imposing their will onto them; individuals let beings 'be.' Dwelling is at once a 'caring for' and 'being cared for' by one's environs; it is a relationship of reciprocity between agent and world.[58]

9.6 Phenomenology, Archaeology and Gamble's Palaeolithic Societies of Europe

Most recently, and partly thanks to the thinkers we have discussed above, post-processual archaeology has started to influence studies of the Palaeolithic, an area that had hitherto been characterised by studies influenced by the 'hard sciences.'[59] Perhaps, the central figure in this regard is Clive Gamble who adopts a phenomenological definition of culture where emphasis is placed on the active engagement of

[55] The above statements are assembled and cited in Ingold, 'Building, Dwelling, Living: How Animals and People Make Themselves at Home in the World,' 76.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 24.

[58] Thomas, 'Archaeology, Landscape, and Dwelling,' 302.

[59] The Palaeolithic (Old Stone Age) spans the period from the beginning of the archaeological record, around 2.5 million years ago, until the end of the last Ice Age, around 10,000 years ago. It can be subdivided (based on the European archaeological record) into Lower (c.2.5 million to 300,000 year ago), Middle (c.300,000–40,000 years ago) and Upper (c.40,000–10,000 years ago) periods. The Neolithic (New Stone Age) begins around 9–10,000 years ago. This later period is marked by the origins of agriculture and the rise of a settled life style amongst human communities. By contrast, the Palaeolithic represents the archaeology of human evolution and is marked by a hunter-gatherer lifestyle amongst human communities and our hominin ancestors. See Brian M. Fagan, *People of the Earth: An Introduction to World Prehistory*, 13th ed. (Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2010). For an up to date overview, see Christopher Stringer and Peter Andrews, *The Complete World of Human Evolution*, Revised ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 2011), 210.

individuals within their environments.[60] Effectively, Gamble brings interpretation of the period in human prehistory between around 2,500,000–10,000 years ago into the purview of the post-processual or interpretive agenda in contemporary archaeological theory.

Gamble sets out to show that V. G. Childe's view that reconstruction of social life in the Palaeolithic is 'doomed' is incorrect. Childe's view is that, due to the deficiency in the archaeological record of the Lower Palaeolithic, when it came to indications of social organisation or of its lack, from the 'scraps [that are] available [to us] no generalizations are permissible.'[61] Gamble challenges this view, which was still widely accepted during the 1990s. While it is true that data representative of the Palaeolithic are not as helpful to social archaeologists (archaeologists concerned to understand social life in all its forms) as the later pyramids and granaries have been to reconstruction of social relations in later periods, it is the case that Palaeolithic data is well-dated and of high-quality.[62] Both intra- and inter-regional variation is available to archaeological analysis. Further, Gamble has shown that, within the timeframe of 500,000–21,000 years ago, it has been the way in which archaeologists have approached the data from the Palaeolithic that has 'doomed' the social archaeological programme.

An analysis that approaches a study paradigm for later periods becomes possible. Amongst the reasons for this is the fact that, after 21,000 years ago, there is an abundance of cave and mobiliary art and that there are burials that begin to pave the way for the cemeteries of the later Mesolithic.[63] Generally, it becomes easier to study the transition from ecological adaptation to the reconstruction of social relations.[64] The dwelling perspective, of course, will place emphasis on past worlds as vibrant 'life-worlds' wherein agents engaged with themselves and others.

Gamble argues that because it is necessary to recast our approach to the reconstruction and understanding of society in the Palaeolithic it becomes essential to rethink our underlying assumptions and our approach to social archaeology itself, as this has been done in a number of post-processual critiques.[65] As such, interpretation of the Palaeolithic becomes an aspect of the broad post-processual agenda that disbars any return to the 'good old days' of social-typology and/or evolutionist approaches.[66] The result of bringing the Palaeolithic into the post-processual

[60] Clive Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 420.

[61] V. Gordon Childe, *Social Evolution* (London: Watts, 1951), 85. Square brackets are my addition.

[62] Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*: 4–7, 417.

[63] See ibid., 417–418.

[64] Ibid., 418.

[65] See the following: Ian Hodder, *The Domestication of Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).; Julian Thomas, *Rethinking the Neolithic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).; Christopher Tilley, *An Ethnography of the Neolithic: Early Prehistoric Societies in Southern Scandinavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).; Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*.

[66] Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*: 418.

purview will be to enable the debate to move beyond discussions of 'calories and tool maintenance' as well as to move beyond social reconstruction as 'merely an assertion of what must have gone on during rituals around open graves, against cave walls and in our ancestors' heads.'[67]

That is, the post-processual purview prompts a move toward capturing social life as a whole and not just as it unfolded in the time between meals. In order to move beyond the two models which Gamble sees as governing the analysis of the Palaeolithic—the 'stomach led' and the 'brain dead' models (the first focusing on early hominids as hunters and which emphasises the importance of calories and the latter that attributes change to gradual awakening of hominid's brains from their prehistoric slumbers)—both of which dogmatically and fallaciously seek a 'prime mover' as cause of change in the archaeological record, Gamble argues that it is necessary to adopt a social perspective that will ultimately champion the individual as a unit of analysis while focusing on the importance of interaction in the performance of social life.[68]

On this basis, Gamble outlines a framework for new research that includes a précis of the issues that he takes to now be available for investigation to the archaeologist of the Palaeolithic. Gamble returns to the individual rather than the group. Stressing both involvement with the world and with others through the concept of agency, he seeks to examine the acts that arise when the body is taken to be the prime 'form of social communication and power' of individuals in a group.[69]

For Gamble, interpretation of the Palaeolithic focuses on the individual, the creation of networks and the role of performance in social life.[70] Because of this, social archaeology cannot begin with the rich Upper Palaeolithic record but must instead extend its reach throughout the entire hominin record, that is, from at least 5 million years ago right down to the present. It is in this context that social archaeologists are required to explain the 'release from proximity,' which is our primate social heritage; this is the moment when social relations became stretched across space and time.[71] Lower Palaeolithic excavations such as Boxgrove in Sussex represent precious moments in time: snapshots of ancient events that when investigated do bring us closer to the actions of individuals from the distant past.[72]

Gamble deploys a broadly phenomenological definition of culture: emphasis is placed on individuals' and groups' active engagement with their environments rather than on any enhanced linkage in a modular mind as proposed by Mithen.[73]

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[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid., xx.

[69] Ibid., 419.

[70] Ibid., 67.

[71] Ibid., 67–68.

[72] The site of Boxgrove, dating to around 500,000 years ago, yielded a number of stone tools and fossil bones. These bones included human teeth and a human shinbone. It is thought that this site represents the behaviour (hunting and butchering a horse) and remains of *Homo heidelbergensis*, the same species of hominin found at the Sima de los Huesos.

[73] See Steven Mithen, *The Prehistory of the Mind* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1996).

Underlying this methodological drive on Gamble's part is the view that, in order to understand the changes and selection that brains underwent, it is necessary to place them within their context of action. This is garnered by the more general creation of social life where the brain is 'part of the whole organism and its surrounding environment.'[74] This insight is important since Gamble, in collaboration with Coward, has noted that enquiries into human evolution 'remain committed to a Cartesian model of cognition and consciousness' wherein cognition is 'abstracted from its real-world context.'[75] The problem facing human evolutionary studies is to understand 'how "the mind"' is grounded in real-world contexts.'[76]

Archaeologists are now arguing that meaning is 'always already' lived 'in the material world by embodied beings,' prior to any theoretical abstraction.[77] Thus, within the context of post-processual archaeology, theorists have made this existential-phenomenological move and have recognised pre-theoretical dwelling as central to human existence. Gamble employs a network approach to define the social in the Palaeolithic where the notion of 'structure' has a dual nature: (social) action both enables and constrains (individuals). Structure and interaction is a 'two-way process.'[78]

Key to understanding Gamble's concern with the social in the Palaeolithic is the following proposition: 'social life in the Palaeolithic involved hominids in the continuous and different construction of their surrounding environment.'[79] In order to investigate this, Gamble sets out a conceptual scheme employing spatial scales of locales and regions. Such locales and regions are linked by rhythms: the paths and tracks trod by prehistoric hominids. Such rhythms also include the operational sequences immanent in tool manufacture together with the overall 'taskscape' wherein individuals attended to one another. These terms are used in place of the more familiar terms of 'campsites, home bases and satellite camps' and in place of Binford's distinctions between 'residential camp, location, caches and field stations.'[80] Since these older terms have become attached to a dichotomous approach to the study of foragers, they have become theory-laden and are best restricted to specific analytical approaches.[81] Gamble's point in applying a new vocabulary is to

[74] Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*: 420.

[75] Fiona Coward and Clive Gamble, 'Big Brains, Small Worlds: Material Culture and the Evolution of the Mind,' in *The Sapient Mind: Archaeology meets Neuroscience*, ed. Colin Renfrew, Chris Frith, and Lambros Malafouris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 52.

[76] Ibid., 63.

[77] Hodder, *Archaeological Theory Today*: 7.

[78] Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*: 64.

[79] Ibid., 96.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Some of the dichotomies applied to foragers (hunters and gatherers past and present) include the following: social organization, territorial versus non-territorial; kinship system, complex (e.g. Eskimo) versus elementary (e.g. Australian); interaction pattern, closed, exclusive and inegalitarian versus open, inclusive and egalitarian. See ibid., 14, (Table 1.3).

declare that a new agenda is being explored: the study of Palaeolithic society rather than Palaeolithic settlement.

Important for Gamble's project is Leroi-Gourhan's stress on the social nature of technical acts.[82] The *chaîne opératoire* is an operational sequence that is an example of social production: social productions develop their specific rhythms and form as the body is engaged in material action [*le geste*]. On the basis of this perspective, a social approach to the Palaeolithic takes in all aspects of 'mobility, production, consumption and discard,' and it is the repetition and persistence of such material action in time and space that produces archaeological cultures.[83] Archaeological cultures are the result of the repetition of learned 'technical gestures' by individuals.[84]

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[82] The philosopher Bernard Stiegler deserves mention in this regard. Stiegler is receiving more and more attention all the time, as witness by the following collection: Christina Howells and Gerald Moore, eds., *Stiegler and Technics* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). Stiegler approaches Heidegger's philosophy of technology through Simondon and Leroi-Gourhan. For Heidegger, 'the essence of modern technology is by no means anything technological' (FNT, p. 9). That is, the essence of technology cannot be gleaned from the totality of technological artefacts considered in isolation. Rather, the essence of technology can only be reached by way of a consideration of Dasein and being. Howells and Moore put the point this way: 'For Heidegger, technology is significant not because of what it tells us about technology, but because of what it tells us about *ourselves*, our 'ontological' way of being in the world.' See ibid., 2. The problem about the way that we relate to the world in modernity for Heidegger is that it conceals our mortality and overstates our ability to dominate nature. This domination of nature is expressed by Heidegger as 'enframing [Gestell].' See FNT, p. 23. In this regard, note Howells and Moore, technology has become a way of immortalising humanity that at one and the same time undermines that which human survival depends, namely, planet Earth. By contrast to modern nihilistic technology, Heidegger invokes the ancient Greek concept of *tekhnē* (art or poetic craft). It is in *technē* that Heidegger finds 'the fullest affirmation of our mortality. 'Technics' as 'unveiling,' paradigmatically expressed in poetic renditions of the refusal of nature to submit to human ordering or framing, is a recognition of 'human finitude that, according to Heidegger, modern technology attempts to deny.' See Howells and Moore, *Stiegler and Technics,* 3. Stiegler builds upon Heidegger's insight in the first volume of *Technics and Time*, returning to ancient Greek mythology in order to find an alternative way to think about technics. See Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). For Stiegler, Heidegger's account falls short: Heidegger does not recognise that human being, or Dasein, is in fact enabled by technics, so Heidegger's claim that the essence of technology is found in Dasein misses the prior and enabling condition of humanity that technics is. In short, Stiegler calls into 'question Heidegger's claim that "the essence of technics is nothing technical."' See ibid., 18. Human beings exist only through technics. In fact, Stiegler argues that it is through technology that time enters the world: human beings invent their futures by way of the inherited experience and 'horizons of expectation' of their ancestors. Human beings are constituted through culture, which is a form of externalised memory of a past that has not been lived in the present and that is made up of technical objects which embody our ancestors' knowledge. Fire, the first technics, is conceived by Steigler as an externalised organ or artificial, technical prosthesis, that is at once the enabling but also condemning of humans: through technics 'man' is condemned to 'life outside of himself.' Technics is *pharmakon*: both cure and poison, salvation and ruin, what sets humans apart from animals but yet symbolises their mortality. See Howells and Moore, *Stiegler and Technics*, 4.

[83] See Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*: 96.

[84] Ibid.

Culture is an expression of active engagement structuring the social processing of 'information' received through activities, which involve rhythms and gestures that take in other agents and materials. Such processing is not necessarily linguistic, and it is not solely recorded in the style of the artefacts produced. Rather, culture is produced by 'attention, perception and movement' without which social life would not exist.[85] Gamble's view is that his approach highlights two areas that have yet to be studied in depth in the Palaeolithic: learning and memory. Both terms involve the 'cultural transmission of information' about how one should act and about how one should control one's body during the performance of social life.[86] The approach to these questions that Gamble would support would depart from the hitherto dominant tradition of accounting [analytically] for change in the Palaeolithic in terms that emphasise training the mind. Such a one-sided approach is rejected by the dwelling perspective since 'all aspects of a life are captured in "the body."'[87]

While Binford, in his discussion of the differences in organisation between Neanderthals (*Homo sapiens neanderthalensis*) and Crô-Magnons (*Homo sapiens sapiens*; anatomically modern humans), places emphasis on 'planning depth' in accounting for the differences in complexity and variety of tools present in Crô-Magnon assemblages, Gamble departs from this emphasis because, as he sees it, the notion of planning depth and anticipation are concepts that are constructed upon the basis of an agent's detachment from its world. Further, on this kind of approach, 'life' becomes 'compartmentalised' in order to study specific behaviours that emerge as a result of this reduction. The result is that the individual fades away in favour of an 'imposed institutional-like framework.'[88] On the terms developed by Gamble, agents are engaged with their world and evolve within social networks they create. Utilizing Ingold's notion of the 'taskscape,' the dichotomy of agents who engage with a more or less hostile environment 'out there' is challenged. The concept of the taskscape, on Gamble's estimation, allows for selection on action and an understanding of, as Wilson put it, 'that creature of immense but inchoate promise and potential,' hat *Homo erectus* was.[89]

Gamble's hope is that employing a social perspective will 'raise the curtain on a much more interesting past,' and his work provides the framework for the archaeologist to investigate the multifaceted products of social interaction over the *longue durée* of at least 500,000 years.[90] Moreover, Gamble's efforts fully open the door to utilizing the dwelling perspective in studies of the Palaeolithic.

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[85] Ibid., 420.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Bernard Cullen, 'Philosophy of Existence 3: Merleau-Ponty,' in *Continental Philosophy in the 20th Century: Routledge History of Philosophy Volume 8*, ed. Richard Kearney (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 91.

[88] Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*: 421.

[89] Peter J. Wilson, *Man, the Promising Primate: the Conditions of Human Evolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 41. Cited in Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*: 418.

[90] Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*: 426.

9.7 Current Research Questions

The emphasis on dwelling as a perspective that seeks to capture a lived human reality forms part of the more general interpretive turn that has been occurring in archaeology since about the 1980s. Interpretive archaeologies are tasked with understanding the meaning of material culture and social practices in the past, and the impact that this turn has had on Palaeolithic archaeology and human evolutionary studies generally has been to pose deep questions about the status of *Homo sapiens sapiens* as a species of animal and its evolutionary history and development.[91] While we can now speak of dwelling in archaeology as a method of inquiry, can we also speak of 'prehistoric dwelling' as a feature of prehistoric life, when the agents in question were not anatomically modern humans?

Shanks and Hodder pose a number of questions that can now be asked in human evolutionary studies from an interpretive point of view.[92] What I would like to do here is to attach a Heideggerian inflection to these questions. Posing these questions within Heidegger scholarship will form a new task for scholars. Heidegger's concerns and commitments are consonant with the concerns of interpretive archaeologists interested in the Palaeolithic. Such questions ask after the origins of self-consciousness, symbolic behaviour and, ultimately, the 'modern human beings' who dwelt on this earth in the Upper Palaeolithic. In the concluding section of this chapter, I will suggest that evidence for mortuary practice deep in the human past—what Heidegger grouped together as 'funeral rites, interment and the cult of graves'—is evidence for the advent of a form of engagement that we might take to be the beginning of facing 'up to mortality' (SZ, p. 238) in Heidegger's sense of the term. Facing up to mortality is essential to Heidegger's account of dwelling. Such behaviour, which might be discernible in archaeology, records the advent of that form of engagement that became dwelling in Heidegger's sense. Thus, the 'dwelling perspective' in both of its related senses (as an approach and as a mode of engagement) can be extended into Palaeolithic research.

The questions that can now be posed in human evolutionary studies are the following:

1. 'To what extent were humans more "animal" in the remote past?' ('Are we moderns separated by a "gulf of essence" from our predecessors?')
2. 'Are there radical differences between the conceptual abilities of humans and animals?' ('What is the difference between poverty in the world and world formation?')
3. 'To what extent are interpretation, understanding and intentionality present in animal behaviour?' ('How are animals in the world?')

[91] Michael Shanks and Ian Hodder, 'Interpretive Archaeologies: Some Themes and Questions,' in *Interpreting Archaeology: Finding Meaning in the Past*, ed. Alexandra Alexandri, et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 31.

[92] Ibid.

4. 'If [interpretation, understanding and intentionality] are [present in animal behaviour], what are the implications for early hominid development, the development of language, tool-use and symbolic behaviour (for example…mortuary practice)?'
5. 'What generally is the evolutionary significance of the development of symbolising abilities and linguistic communication?'
6. 'Is the interpretation of the earliest phases of prehistory going to be different from that of later phases?' 'If so, how?'[93]

Running these questions together, we might well ask: '*Did Homo erectus dwell?*'[94]

9.8 Prehistoric Dwelling

As indicated, I would like to pick up on the fourth research question here, regarding mortuary practice in the remote past, and I will suggest that Heidegger's analysis of the death of a compatriot in *Sein und Zeit* could be deployed in coming to understand such practice in a way that is phenomenologically informed.[95]

Heidegger notes that 'the ways in which death is taken amongst primitive peoples and their ways of comporting themselves towards it in magic and cult' illuminates their understanding as situated agents within a culture. Nevertheless, 'an existential analytic and a corresponding conception of death' (See SZ, pp. 246–49) must still be reached in order to account for their situated understanding. That is, their understanding must be accounted for from an ontological point of view.

Heidegger had in mind modern human 'primitives,' or 'primitive Dasein,' as he calls it, who are scientifically described as anatomically modern humans, members of the species *Homo sapiens sapiens* and not any of their fossil ancestors. In fact, Heidegger has quite a lot to say about such a manner of 'being-there' and of its significance for existential analysis. Analysis of Dasein directed toward the 'life of

[93] Ibid., 31. The square bracket is my addition. I have added a Heideggerian inflection to some of the questions raised by Shanks and Hodder in brackets after the quoted question.

[94] In this context, *Homo erectus* is a stand-in for a variety of fossil hominins, *including Homo heidelbergensis* and the Neanderthals,

[95] For an overview of prehistoric mortuary practice see Paul Pettitt, *The Palaeolithic Origins of Human Burial* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). See also, Michael Parker Pearson, *The Archaeology of Death and Burial* (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 1999), 153. See also, Henry De Lumley, 'The Emergence of Symbolic Thought: The Principal Steps of Hominisation Leading towards Greater Complexity,' in *Becoming Human: Innovation in Prehistoric Material and Spiritual Culture*, ed. Colin Renfrew and Iain Morley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 17. On de Lumley's broadly cognitivist account, symbolic thought is one essential dimension of human cognition, and it amounts to our ability to transcend the material world and to integrate our cogitations into a universe that is richer than the one revealed to us by our senses. Such thought involves combining concepts or abstract notions into systems of relations that are complex. Evidence for the sophisticated symbolic activity that issues from such thought follows the appearance of *Homo sapiens sapiens* in the archaeological and fossil record.

primitive peoples' (SZ, pp. 50–2) can be methodologically positive since 'primitive phenomena' can be less 'concealed' and 'complicated' by the kind of 'extensive self-interpretation' on the part of Dasein in more complex societies. Heidegger writes:

> Primitive Dasein often speaks to us more directly in terms of a primordial absorption in 'phenomena' (taken in a pre-phenomenological sense). A way of conceiving things which seems, perhaps, rather clumsy and crude from our standpoint, can be positively helpful in bringing out the ontological structures of phenomena in a genuine way. (SZ, p. 51)

On one level, Heidegger might be read here as a man of his time: *primitive cultures are simply less complicated than advanced Western ones*, and, because of this, they can be easier to read ontologically. While, no doubt, revealing a theoretical pre-judgment on Heidegger's part to leave the discussion at this recognition would be to miss the deeper point that he is making. Precisely because there is, in one sense, less to make of a particular case or example of behaviour in 'primitive' societies (an assumption that can be challenged), there is much more to make of it in ontological terms because of its simple or structural clarity. The existential analytic of primitive Dasein (primitive 'being-there, here, now') will yield an ontological understanding of the structure of Dasein's being as possibility. This will include the existential-ontological understanding of death. Such an understanding of death is logically prior to any ontical understanding of it, including any particular cultures 'other-worldly speculation' (SZ, p. 248), as to its meaning and to the practices surrounding it.

An ontological analysis of death will be 'formal and empty,' but it will reveal death to be central to the existential nature of Dasein as possibility and of Dasein's being-toward-its-end (SZ, p. 248). Death is Dasein's 'basic certainty'; it is the 'possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein' (SZ, p. 250). As he puts it later, 'only man dies.' Only man dies because it is only man who 'dwells poetically upon this earth,' and it is only such dwellers that are capable of death *as* death (BWD, p. 144). Dasein is a 'mortal,' and it is mortals who dwell in terms that allow them to come to regard themselves as safe in their world *as* their dwelling place, their 'place' or 'home.' Such mortals are 'taken care of' or 'provided for' by this dwelling place and 'take care of' and 'care for' the things they encounter there.[96]

To dwell is to be in that 'free place' where, *qua* mortal, one is secure and enabled to face up to mortality in terms of a releasement [Gelassenheit] that is not an evasion: 'Mortals dwell in that they initiate their own nature—their being capable of death as death—into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death' (BWD, p. 145).[97] The existential analysis of death is 'superordinate' to the analysis of death in 'biology, psychology, theodicy or theology' and, we might

[96] See also Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*: 64.

[97] See also ibid., 64–65.

add, to its analysis in archaeology and anthropology because it reveals these aspects of human dwelling in their ontological dimension (SZ, p. 248).

Heidegger notes that the information that is available for analysis about modern primitives has been provided by ethnology, which tends to refer to 'the observable aspects of a society encountered by the anthropologist in the field.'[98] The trouble with this is that, like other ontic enquiries, ethnology proceeds with an implicit but definite preliminary conception and interpretation of what 'human Dasein in general' is: 'ethnology itself already presupposes as its clue an inadequate analytic of Dasein' (SZ, p. 51).

Despite this, positive science cannot and should not await the completion of philosophy *qua* ontology. Rather, what must occur is that what has 'already been ontically discovered' must be subjected to ontological purification in order to render such ontological structures transparent. The many cultures described by anthropologists and archaeologists amount to various 'forms of Dasein' (SZ, p. 52), and each of these should and could be subjected to such ontological purification. To get a 'genuine knowledge of essences,' the kind of knowledge Heidegger is interested in, it is necessary to go beyond cultural comparison and classification and toward the existential analytic (SZ, p. 52). Doing this will reveal the categories of factical life that are transcendental, formal and ontologically neutral—universal structures of factical life that are logically prior to any ontic cultural constellation.[99]

It is exactly this manner of inquiry that might prove illuminating to archaeological thinkers working from within the dwelling perspective when accounting for ancient mortuary practice since it gives them a phenomenologically informed starting point in the present from which to approach past action within worlds of pragmatic concern. In fact, evidence for the advent of a form of engagement that begins to 'face up to mortality'—however that 'facing up' was taken ontically—might be forthcoming when the archaeological record is approached from this fresh perspective. If so, then Heidegger's restriction of dwelling to just anatomically modern humans may need augmenting.

From Heidegger's point of view, looking at 'simpler cases' of primitive Dasein should enable us to elicit ontological knowledge of the structures of being-there in a more direct way than when dealing with more 'advanced cultures.' 'Prehistoric Dasein' might be a form of being-there that is not yet Heidegger's primitive Dasein but is nevertheless a form of being-there that, from an ontological point of view, shows the first signs of the kind of engagement that we moderns enjoy.

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[98] Gosden, *Anthropology and Archaeology: A Changing Perspective*: 3.

[99] The categories that Heidegger has in mind here characterise Dasein in its being. For example, the category 'care [Sorge]' is characteristic of all Daseins. In other words, to be Dasein is to be-in-the-world, and this is unified by the structure of practical coping or care. The category of care (amongst other categories, such as temporality, or historicity) *qua* practical coping is the same wherever it is found. The category of care enables Daseins to cope practically in a number of ways, hence its transcendental, formal and ontological status. See Tonner, *Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being*: 79–80.

The "archaeophenomenological" challenge is to develop an understanding of our ancestors, of these creatures 'of immense but inchoate promise and potential' that are represented in the archaeological record of human mortuary practice.[100]

For modern human beings, whether primitive or not, *qua* Dasein, a deceased person amongst us remains a compatriot to those who 'have remained behind (SZ, p. 238),' as Heidegger puts it in his phenomenology of the death of the other. In remaining a compatriot, the dead person is no mere lifeless material thing but can be the 'object of "concern" in the ways of funeral rites, interment, and the cult of graves' (SZ, p. 238). As encountered in concernful being-in-the-world, the deceased is 'still more' than mere equipment for use to those who have 'remained behind.' In mourning and commemoration, those who are left behind remain with the deceased in 'respectful solicitude' (SZ, p. 238). Their mourning and commemoration is a mark of solidarity with and concern for their dead compatriot *as* a dead compatriot; finitude opens up in Dasein that space of sensitivity to the meaningfulness of things. While the deceased has left the living agents' world, the same world that they shared with those who mourn their passing, 'those who remain [behind] can still *be with*' their deceased compatriot (SZ, p. 238).[101]

The point of comparison with any human ancestor must turn on mortuary practice. Universally modern Dasein, including Heidegger's primitive Dasein, ritually disposes of the dead by some means. The question is, when, given the evidence of mortuary practice in the remote past, did our ancestor's engagement with their dead start to resemble our own engagement with our dead in the present?

9.9 Conclusion

Our remote ancestors were not yet us: they were *becoming* us. We have to wonder when their worlds became meaningful to them in a way that approaches the way our world is meaningful to us. One marker of this 'meaningfulness' is the concernful taking care of the dead. In this chapter, I hope that I have begun the task of extending the 'dwelling perspective' into the Palaeolithic, along with showing some ways in which Heidegger and phenomenological philosophy have influenced modern archaeological thought. I also hope that I have contributed to opening a space for evolutionary and non-anthropocentric considerations to be heard in connection with Heidegger's account of dwelling. Finally, I hope that you, like me, believe that Heidegger's thought is relevant to archaeology and to human origins research.

[100] Wilson, *Man, the Promising Primate: the Conditions of Human Evolution*: 41. Quoted in Gamble, *The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe*: 418.

[101] The square brackets are my addition.

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Chapter 10
The 'New' Heidegger

Babette Babich

10.1 Calculating Heidegger: From the Old to the New

The 'new' Heidegger corresponds less to what would or could be the Heidegger of the moment on some imagined 'cutting edge' than it corresponds to what some wish they had in Heidegger and above all in philosophical discussions of Heidegger's thought. We have moved, we suppose, beyond grappling with the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. And we also tend to suppose a fairly regular recurrence of scandal—the current instantiation inflamed by the recent publication of Heidegger's private, philosophical, *Tagebücher*, invokes what the editor of these recently published 'black notebooks' attempts to distinguish as Heidegger's 'historial antisemitism' — 'historial' here serving to identify Heidegger's references to World Jewry in one of the volumes.[1] We have hardly come to terms with the question of Heidegger and Nazism. To say this does not mean that some scholars do not read Heidegger as if one might bracket such historical associations or that others, conversely, think only of his all-too official Nazi affiliation as university rector in 1933–1934 and refuse, categorically, to read him at all. Indeed, the force of the most recent scandal threatens a new scholarly imperative towards just such non-engagement in the wake of what the popular press calls, following Trawny,

[1] The 'Black Notebooks,' as these are called, correspond to the three (at the date of this writing) most recent editions of *Gesamtausgabe, IV Abteilung, Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen*, Vols. 94–96 (See GA 94, GA 95, GA 96), edited by Peter Trawny. A fourth volume, (GA 97), until now in the hands of Silvio Vietta, is scheduled to be published in March 2015. As editor, Trawny has also issued a commentary highlighting the third of the notebooks (GA 96). See Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014).

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Heidegger's Nazi 'contamination,' a term that itself echoes Habermas's language with respect to Nietzsche.[2]

At the same time, Tom Sheehan, who has already earned his anti-Heidegger stripes in earlier scandals on this same theme, is today insisting that all Heidegger studies convert to what Sheehan names a 'new paradigm,' reducing being to meaning, a call that Sheehan already published as such more than a decade ago.[3] Don Ihde—who years ago also stopped engaging Heidegger in his own work in technology studies—has similarly issued a call for a post-phenomenological move, which would bracket Heidegger even more than Husserl.[4] So what is stopping Sheehan's 'new paradigm' or Ihde's post-phenomenology? Perhaps only the trivial or ontic detail that we continue to lack what might count as a genuinely 'new' Heidegger, assuming indeed that what we mean by the rubric of the 'new' is not merely a desire to shift a paradigm from the concerns of others to the concerns of a single scholar (no matter whether Sheehan or Ihde). Any talk of the 'new' should hold at least to the standard set in continental philosophical convention not with respect to Heidegger but Nietzsche, the thinker Heidegger claimed the most decisive for his thinking, in David B. Allison's collection, *The New Nietzsche*.[5] What made Allison's Nietzsche 'new' was nothing other than the same Heidegger who influenced every other author in Allison's collection: Derrida, Deleuze, Klossowski, Blanchot, Lingis, etc. To date, there is no comparable programme of reflections on Heidegger.[6]

This particular point is one that can be made without adverting to the important differences between readings that one once upon a time might have counted as 'analytic'—here taking the term, *pars pro toto*—to stand for today's 'mainstream' readings, those of Dreyfus and Blattner and Guignon, Kelly and Haugeland and Okrent and Brandom, to name some American readings, along with Lafont and Philipse among many others, along with more traditional, or so-called 'continental,' readings such as those of Dastur and Janicaud and Schürmann but also like Kockelmans and Kisiel and certainly the present author.[7]

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[2] See Joshua Rothman, 'Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism,' *The New Yorker*, April 28 2014. Rothman's essay describes the audience and the atmosphere at the April 8, 2014 interview with Peter Trawny, the editor of the notebooks, with Roger Berkowitz and later featuring a panel discussion adding Babette Babich, sponsored by the Goethe-Institut in New York.

[3] Thomas J. Sheehan, 'A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger's Research,' *Continental Philosophy Review* 34(2001): 183–202.

[4] Don Ihde, *Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

[5] David B. Allison, ed. *The New Nietzsche* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).

[6] For further on this, see the several contributions in Keith Ansell-Pearson, ed. *The Fate of the New Nietzsche* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993). See also the broad range of contributions in the journal explicitly founded in 1996 to foreground the new spirit of Allison's *New Nietzsche Studies*.

[7] The tradition of analytic scholarship also includes its own distinctions and differences and, detailing this further, one can add the contributions to Christopher Macann, ed. *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments (4 Volumes)* (London: Routledge, 1992), in addition to the tool-philosophers who reduce Heidegger to what is called object-oriented philosophy among other new bids to avoid engaging other readings of Heidegger.

In the interim, virtually everything written on Heidegger seems, more or less dissonantly, to advocate a restart. Thus, we are urged to start again, to return to the early Heidegger, the later Heidegger, to reflect after Heidegger and thus, post Heidegger, to think beyond him. Such recommencements include the habit of genealogizing Heidegger as well as efforts dedicated to re-thematizations of his work from the standpoint of political scandal.[8]

Perhaps, a better question would be to ask why we continue to refer to Heidegger at all? Given Heidegger's 'contaminated' thought or given that Heidegger might have been talking not about being but meaning, surely we are better off with a return to Frege or Wittgenstein, if not Searle or Austin or even Cavell? If Heidegger is outdated or has misled us as, for example, certain readings of his work on ontology are unified in suggesting, why not simply take up with another thinker, say, Lefebvre or Simondon or Laruelle or Latour or Sloterdijk or, just to go all rock star on the matter, Žižek himself? Indeed, why not do something else altogether? Of course, this tactic too is old hat: re-baptised under the rubric of Heidegger's contamination with historial anti-Semitism and resuscitated under the new non-engagement mentioned at the start. Omit Heidegger and move on. Has Heidegger not already been too well represented to require either analysis or discussion? 'Been there, done that,' says popular culture, and today's new scholar 'speculates' accordingly.

Indeed, our all-too modern desire for the new together with our tired postmodernity, that is, our sense of the already post-datedness of almost everything, may be the most persistent remnant of metaphysics, counted in millennia, as we date everything from a particular last god ('Nearly 2000 years and not a single new God,' as Nietzsche complained in all seriousness in his *The Antichrist*).[9] In this spirit, we seek our redemption from Heidegger by way of a 'new Heidegger,' post-Heidegger.[10]

There is a fated impossibility to any 'new' undertaking of this kind—quite apart from the arbitrary assumption that is built into our chronological convictions that we ourselves count as newer, better, more advanced. Certainly, we have not tired of

[8] This politicizing goes, as one says in a certain American parlance, *way back* and has never been altogether neutral, thus we may note Tom Sheehan's review of the *Gesammtausgabe* itself in his well-titled, Thomas J. Sheehan, 'Caveat Lector: The New Heidegger,' *New York Review of Books* (December 4, 1980). See for example, Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger* (London: Continuum Press, 2005).; Theodore Kisiel and John Van Buren, eds., *Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).; Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). The scandals themselves also go way back, indeed, to just after the war, arguably also during the war and, as noted in the text, seemingly resurface from time to time, such as the very plainly titled, Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*, trans. Michael B. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

[9] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Der Antichrist*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 6* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), § 19, 185.

[10] The term dates from the very conflicted notion of the postmodern for Ihde and for other scholars who use the term in this sense. See, to begin with, Don Ihde, *Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).

the 'siren twitterings' of those Nietzsche named the 'old metaphysical bird catchers, who have all too long been piping' at us: '"you are more! you are higher! you have a different genesis!"'[11]

And we are quite sure that the 'metaphysical bird catchers' are right about us: all of us are secret Harry Potters, scions of lost wizards, with secret powers. In the same way, many of us are quite happy to designate ourselves posthuman (this would be Donna Haraway's cyborg) or transhuman (whether alluding thereby to Nick Bostrom or Ray Kurzweil), while, and at the same time, others exercise themselves in bootless worries about the fate of being post-anything: from the now well and truly dated *postmodern condition* to post-analytic philosophy, and, of course, we eagerly add post-continental philosophy to boot. Beyond the merely posthuman, if we today opt to call ourselves transhuman, for which achievement we need do nothing at all, all performative work done by the trans-, and the achievement sheerly one of designation or 'branding.' Thus, ignoring the implications of the anthropo-obscenity of our self-absorption and our destructiveness, we declare ourselves *Humanity 2.0*[12] and the parallel with consumer product updates and capitalist speculation does not seem to be a coincidence.

Add update and stir, *et voila!*—and as if life were a television screenplay—we have *Humanity: The New Generation*. Thus, we debate the ethical implications of deploying technologies barely extant and become a *new old* vision of ourselves, packaged and marketed for a profit margin that does not, as it turns out, include most of us, no matter our efforts to buy every latest gadget, as illustrated by the (now failed) worldwide movement known as Occupy Wall Street. There is no one who doesn't want to buy the latest thing, live the advertised good life. But the jobs are lacking, the houses too costly to buy, the rents obscenely high, and all this calls more than ever for a reflection on building, dwelling, thinking. The point of profit is also political. And we should ask about the politics of it all, but we do not: there is no god but capital—another meaning of speculation. And the Heideggerian programme of asking questions is itself complicated these days inasmuch as political control is increasingly a matter of media i.e., what is disseminated and what is not. What we do not see does not exist. Social protest movements are not given media time any more than their more or less brutal police suppression, unless there is a political reason to make it public. Nor is this limited to the social. We talk about climate change while ignoring weather modification technologies, fracking, mining, farming, fishing. And, above all, we ignore the spills and disasters consequent upon our activities. Nor do we think about what we do not see. All the oil seeping from the seabed, so we are confident, has vanished, been 'cleaned up' in the Gulf of

[11] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 5* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), § 230.

[12] In the interval between the time I first wrote this, Steve Fuller has obligingly published an invaluable overview of the traditional working notion of the human throughout the sciences, especially the human, social and political sciences. See Steve Fuller, *Humanity 2.0: What it Means to be Human Past, Present and Future* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Mexico after the BP seabed rupture and undersea volcano. All gone. (Hardly, to be sure, but that would be the theme of another essay.)

Heidegger writes, almost in Theodor Adorno's Frankfurt School voice, almost in Günther Anders' voice, of the relation between thinking and media, reflecting that 'we do not yet hear, we whose hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and film under the rule of technology' (KE, p. 46).

The collusion between capital and supposed 'democratic' representation is unremarked upon, although everything that happens on the political world stage reflects this collusion. And today, a theoretical and even more importantly, a technical, data-rife, book appears on the stage, Thomas Piketty's *Capital* as if to tell us, bristling with statistics for the scientistically minded among us—and we are all, as Tzvetan Todorov underscores the point, *more* rather than less scientistic—that this collusion and the disparity between classes, rich and poor, enfranchised and not, has not changed over time and cannot change.

If we take this point to another limit, that would be the Twitter or Facebook or, more patently still, the LinkedIn extreme of self-marketing, we thereby set aside the whole array of questions needed to consider such a self-assessment as the residuum of a by-now superseded, outmoded, 'humanist' worldview.[13] But the ontic details remain, and, like the faded Arab spring, the Wall Street occupy movement is over—protesters systematically brought to order by prosecution and imprisonment, adjudged in the interim as legal felons, under which title they will now live their lives.

And who wants to talk about Heidegger and capitalism anyway? Certainly, and after Nietzsche, and given Adorno's failures, one would think one would know better.

Out with the old, in with the new. Let's just talk about 'objects' and pretend to be 'things.' As the Heidegger of *Being and Time* says, this modern passion for the new is the 'curiosity' that seeks newness 'but only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty' (SZ, p. 172). The insight persists throughout his work if it has gotten him little more than a reputation for being a rustic or black forest thug: critical of what he calls 'idle talk.' Everywhere and nowhere, 'curiosity is concern with the constant possibility of distraction,' but not in the sense of 'observing entities and marvelling at them,' as Heidegger remarks, and as distinguished from philosophical wonder, 'to be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest' (SZ, p. 172). As Heidegger goes on to add, both 'idle talk and curiosity take care in their ambiguity to ensure that what is genuinely and newly created is out of date as soon as it emerges before the public' (SZ, p. 174).

[13] See, for example, of an overview of such concerns, Julian Savulescu and Nicklas Bostrom, eds., *Human Enhancement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)., which takes the notion of the 'post-human' condition about as literally as one might wish. For one overview of transhumanism as a concept, see Nicholas Agar, 'Whereto Transhumanism? The Literature Reaches a Critical Mass,' *Hastings Center Report* 37, no. 3 (2007): 12–17. There are any number of essays and books on the theme of the post- and transhuman, as what Heidegger called the rush to overreach ourselves as the rage to think about and to write and to publish on nothing but the latest topics shows no sign of abating.

But as we thus attend only to what we anticipate as the latest thing, we are also well able to suppose that *that* fascist, eugenicist worldview was what was (Nazism), and that what we are promised in our new humanity 2.0 is somehow different. Indeed, more than the fantasy of the embedded gills that would permit one to swim underwater or the wings that might permit us to soar through the air, or any of the other things that might have been supposed, the new humanity 2.0 when it is not about prosthetic limbs turns out to be little more than having the virtual equivalent of prosthetic limbs, namely internet access, wireless access. Jean-François Lyotard would have been delighted, as he praised efficiency, above 'the true, the just, or the beautiful … a technical move is good when it does better and/or expends less energy than another.'[14] Be it with Google or a Twitter or Facebook account, and above all with a certain dedication to life 'online,' our transhumanity is always mediated, a matter of attention; focus on a conversation, a game, a film, and automatically transcend our here and now.

Does the newly transhuman condition really reflect the 'latest thing'? Perhaps but then everything old is new again. Well in advance of Steve Fuller or Jean-François Lyotard or Marshall McLuhan, Heidegger's student, the phenomenological media theorist of radio and television, music and sound, Günther Anders had challenged us to reflect in Heidegger's spirit on the mediating of media. For Anders, in a phenomenological reflection on radio *and* television *and* film, contending that 'no medium is only a medium,'[15] what matters is our devotion to having the 'event' come to us rather than the other way around.[16] Rather than being oneself involved, messily, bodily, in real time, real world events, we voluntarily, using our own free or "leisure time," as Anders emphasizes this in 1956, enslave ourselves to fabricating the very mass media selves—we used once to call them logins, avatars, screen names, and such; but the mindmeld is complete, and we no longer do that—and today we live and flourish in the image of networked media, from radio to television to the so-called cloud. Thus, our trans-humanity is negotiated digitally, we 'act,' like other 'actants' via network connections, no matter whether the network is meant literally, digitally or metaphorically, speculatively, in terms of capital investment. And the literal net (be it of networked things or selves) does not work on us without its own just as literally or all-too embodied connection to us. Today, we remain 'connected' via a changing proliferation of gadgets to which (this is key) we pay no attention (this is how mediation works in the case of media). Intentional beings as we are, intent on what we now simply, as if we ourselves were programmers, call 'content,' we relate to the computers on our desks while attending to neither our

[14] Jean-François Lyotard, *Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 44. I discuss this in Babette Babich, 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra, or Nietzsche and Hermeneutics in Gadamer, Lyotard, and Vattimo,' in *Consequences of Hermeneutics: 50 Years After Gadamer's Truth and Method*, ed. Jeff Malpas and Santiago Zabala (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 218–243.

[15] Günther Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, Band 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution* (München: Beck, 1987), 99.

[16] He writes: 'Die Ereignisse kommen zu uns, nicht wir zu ihnen.' See ibid., 110.

computers nor our desks, unless, and as Heidegger reminds us, *something goes wrong*; and when I say this, of course, I include tablets of whatever networked kind, like iPads, but I am also including as omnipresent cell phones, smart televisions, traffic and street cameras for surveillance, in the pocket networking, all ready to hand. These constitute and thus effect the current *commercium* to use Heidegger's 1927 terminology. Both Heidegger and Anders emphasize that mediation, that is to say, the means by means of which our communication is mediated, always makes a difference even as it withdraws from our awareness inasmuch as or because *our attention is*—and this is the way intentionality always works—*elsewhere*. To this extent, we *are* our multitouch gestures, we *are* our keyboards, real or virtual, we *are* our screens or displays—because what we touch and what we see mediates our interaction—tablets/iPads, smart phones, taking 'smart' television or cable or cell service for granted as we do, along with the entirety of what we call media in all its monotony, the lot of it mediated via an internet connection, mostly wireless, and to hell with the bees (and we are sure that cell phones can't possibly harm bees or any living thing) and to hell with our health.[17]

10.2 Technology and Transhumanism

Impatient to be done with Heidegger's warnings regarding what he named 'calculating representation' (KE, p. 45), both in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, especially now that it is clear that the same terminology also appears in connection with Heidegger's Black Notebooks, but also and to be sure in Heidegger's reflections on science and his questionings concerning technology, we remain quite certain, contra Heidegger, that we will indeed be able to calculate as we must and thereby 'save' our technological cake and eat it too.

[17] Ved Parkash Sharma and Neelima R. Kumar, 'Changes in Honeybee Behaviour and Biology under the Influence of Cellphone Radiations,' *Current Science* 98, no. 10 (25 May, 2010): 1376–1378. To this day, research on the damage done by cell phones to bees continues to be disputed; likewise, the effects of cell phone use on human health are also disputed. Nevertheless, it has long been known that cell phones present in measurable fact a danger to human health, but this fact, and this is so even when acknowledged and it should be said that the industry *continues* to 'dispute' it, has had little practical influence on regulation and even less on cell phone use. But see the World Health organization's 'Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health: Mobile Phones, Fact sheet N°193,' (Geneva: World Health Organization, June 2011). I discuss the limitations of scientific publishing in the circular context of mutual censoring characteristic of peer review, esp. pp. 360–361, in Babette Babich, 'Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears,' *International Journal of the Philosophy of Science* 24, no. 4 (2010): 343–391. For a discussion of the bees themselves, see one study that records the bees' screams (which the scientist 'objectively' describes and so diminishes as 'piping'), see Daniel Favre, 'Mobile Phone-Induced Honeybee Worker Piping,' *Apidologie* 42, no. 3 (2011): 270–279., as well as the study by the medical epidemiologist, Devra Davis, *Disconnect: The Truth About Cell Phone Radiation, What the Industry has Done to Hide It, and How to Protect Your Family* (New York: Dutton Adult, 2010).

Long past our post-war technological anxieties, we embrace the salvific promise of technology: the more, the better. And far less turns out to be needed for salvation than anyone ever seemed to have imagined in the 1930s dreams of technological Molochs. In fact, as Horlkheimer tells us, as Baudrillard tells us, all we need is the iconic, the imaginary: the image suffices. The idea of genetic engineering, the notion of software engineering, the concept of digital technology repackaging, like reality TV make-overs are seemingly all we need to ensure our confidence in a corporate vision or advertisement of what we take to be 'the promise' of the future. Thus, we expect the technological singularity as a rapture to be had for everyone. And if we listen to Ray Kurzweil and his marketing planners, pitched for new investment opportunities, all of it is already coming, any day now, at more and more affordable prices … .[18]

Apart from the all-too modern obsession with the 'future,' as Heidegger himself, writing as he wrote in the space and time of two post-war Germanys, taking over this engagement with time (and mortality) from the Stoics, our age is the very everyday concern with gossip.[19] Thus, in his *What is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger writes:

> Today every newspaper, every illustrated magazine, and every radio program offers all things in the identical way to uniform views … The one-sided view … has puffed itself up into an all-sidedness which in turn is masked so as to look harmless and natural. But this all-sided view which deals in all and everything with equal uniformity and mindlessness … reduces everything to a univocity of concepts and specifications the precision of which not only corresponds to, but has the same essential origin as, the precision of technological process. (GA 8, p. 36)

And what makes these uniform views more captivating than ever is that our interest is purely disembodied. We are, closed in our world, not seen seeing, or so we imagine. This, too, Günther Anders emphasizes. For what is crucial for industry is precisely that consumption *not* be public but standardized, just as Adorno says, just as Marcuse says, universal or ubiquitous but above all atomized, autistic absorption, perfectly private. The programming, the 'conditioning' (Anders uses both terms and here he uses the English term in scare quotes in his German text) of the individual takes place individually, in one's home, separately and, this is the key for Anders, quite individualistically, for everyone.[20] All of the aforementioned kinds of 'mediation,' in Anders' sense of the term, were and remain ways of connecting, without having ourselves to be present: no connection, no actual contact, no fuss, no muss. It is also true that we thereby mean to catch what 'comes to us' privately—thus our

[18] See Ray Kurzweil and Terry Grosmman, *Transcend: Nine Steps to Living Well Forever* (Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press, 2009).; Ray Kurzweil, *The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology* (New York: Viking, 2005).

[19] See my first chapter on 'branding' and Facebook in Babette Babich, *The Hallelujah Effect: Philosophical Reflections on Music, Performance Practice and Technology* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013).

[20] Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, Band 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution*: 105. It is significant that Don Ihde himself would oppose the proposed English translation of Anders' 1956 book when it was recommended in the decades to follow as 'too negative.'

unquenchable appetite for the 'news,' be it for reports of war, riots, scandal, sports scores, all to anticipate what we suppose is coming, largely because of the conviction we have concerning the future, construed as we construe it as the only thing that matters.

Like those clamouring emigrants at port, in Nietzsche's quasi-psychoanalytic aphorism in *The Gay Science,* entitled 'The Thought of Death,' an uncannily Heideggerian or Lacanian sort of aphorism, we too comprise, as Nietzsche articulates it, nothing less than 'a brotherhood of death,' hell-bent on the future and inspired in this by our 'conviction' (this term, which can also be translated as 'prejudice', is an importantly Nietzschean hermeneutic terminus) 'that what has been were little or nothing while the near future is everything.'[21] Indeed, as Nietzsche reminds us in black, satirical humour, '*everyone* wants to be the first in this future.'[22] Hermes, who carries messages between divinities and mortals, also accompanies the souls of the dead to their passage to the underworld, with Charon, the ferryman of Hades, emblematic as Charon is for the (Christian) Michelangelo and for the Stoics as he was always in evidence in archaic philosophical traditions, particularly Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in addition to Nietzsche's nearly contradictory example of Epicurus.[23] Nietzsche's '*The Thought of Death*' is accordingly thematically aligned to Heidegger's own reflections in his *Being and Time* on that which comes, *Zu-kunft*: the future is an unknown sea.[24]

It would be the Stoics who remind us that although meditation on future calamities may serve one well, time as such, regarded from the perspective that rules everything that comes to be, that is to say, *aeon* beyond Chronos, is also the fond image of time, as Eugen Fink also takes up this image in his analysis of the playing of Nietzsche's world child as this play conveys the cosmic legacy of Heraclitus and Empedocles, now broken into three parts.[25] Thus, too Nietzsche's gate, *Augenblick*, adds a third moment to the two collision courses of time, each into, each against itself.

Here we note what all philosophers know: time may be separated out into various moments only one of which approaches the momentary, that is the present (which does not stay), the past (which cannot be altered), and the future (which cannot be

[21] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die fröliche Wissenschaft*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 3* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), § 278, 523.

[22] Ibid. My emphasis, to be sure.

[23] On Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius as well as Epicurus, see the several studies by Pierre Hadot, particularly Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995). On Nietzsche and Epicurus, see Howard Caygill, 'The Consolation of Philosophy: Neither Dionysos nor the Crucified,' *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 7(1994): 131–151., as well as Fritz Bornmann, 'Nietzsches Epikur,' *Nietzsche-Studien* 13(1984): 177–188.

[24] Cf. the beginning of the fifth book, added 5 years later in 1887, where Nietzsche speaks of a 'new cheerfulness' and a sea open, like never before. See Nietzsche, *Die fröliche Wissenschaft*: § 342.

[25] See Eugen Fink, *Nietzsches Philosophie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960), 187. The ancients, as we recall Caesar's word on the division of Gaul, were fond of tripartite scissions, old gods too, as Nietzsche counts Christianity as a superannuated tradition.

known with certainty).[26] Clamour for the future, as we may, the strange point for Nietzsche (as the concluding section of his *Human, All-too-Human*, entitled *The Wanderer and his Shadow*, had already made clear enough) is the uncanny as such: 'the shadow stands now behind everyone, as his dark fellow traveller', thus 'death and deathly silence alone are certain and common to all in this future.'[27]

It is exactly this death, and we hardly need to say this when it comes to Heidegger, that we do not anticipate. This is the 'one death' singularized as the German convention singularizes the death that one has to die, as it is the culmination of the existence that *Dasein has* to live, as one's own death: *einen Tod muss man sterben*, that is, as we say, sardonically, ironically, resignedly: *you've got to die somehow*. The jokes that go along with various odd ways that people die speak to us, as Freud tells about the relationship between what jokes tells us about our own truths, an all-too-intimate or personal death that every one of us must, that is to say, that every one of us has to die, and it is exactly this that we do not think in the mode of telling ourselves that of course, of course, it is so.

One dies. Thinking of the future, we remain disinclined to prepare for death, let alone to contemplate death. Like those emigrants at Nietzsche's Italian portside and then as now, 'nothing' could be 'further from their minds [our minds] than' the 'thought of death.'[28]

More important perhaps than these neatly proto-existential parallels is a particular boredom. I began by noting our scholarly impatience for a 'new Heidegger' to say new things to us just to the extent that it can seem that we need new things to read, especially as it transpires, distracted as we are in a way that the Heidegger who wrote on idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity could never have imagined distraction, that *we read less and less*, even as we live our lives more mediatedly than ever through the text, texting, email, online posts. Without reading what has already been written on Heidegger, hard to do as many commentators point out, because so very much has already been written on his work, we are impatient for the 'new.'

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[26] Marcus Aurelius famously writes at the conclusion of his *Meditations*: 'The things are three of which thou art composed, a little body, a little breath (life), intelligence.' And we may read his account of his spirit or intelligence in Heideggerian terms: 'Of these the first two are thine, so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is, from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee because they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee or in the breath (life), which is by nature associated with the body, is attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached to it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and of time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles' sphere, "All round, and in its joyous rest reposing;" and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is, the present—then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which remains for thee up to the time of thy death, free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon (to the god that is within thee).' Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, *The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius*, trans. George Long (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1914), 12.3.

[27] Nietzsche, *Die fröliche Wissenschaft*: § 278, 523.

[28] Ibid.

And seemingly predicting the psycho-cognitive effects of Googling and emailing and downloading (this is the real Levinasian efficacy of Facebook), and above all the effects of the interactive effects of social networks on our memories and our capacity for innovative thought, Heidegger might well appear to have assessed the results of the same before any of it came to pass to the degree that we today simply take for granted:

> The scholar disappears. He is succeeded by the 'research man' who is engaged in research projects. These, rather than the cultivating of erudition, lend his work its atmosphere of incisiveness. The research man no longer needs a library at home. Moreover, he is constantly on the move [ständig unterwegs]. (ZW, p. 85)

Heidegger thus writes 'The Age of Worldview [Die Zeit des Weltbildes]' for scholars across the nationalistic board, as relevant to research in Nazi Germany as indeed in the UK, as in America and Russia, not only in 1938 but today as well. Here, Heidegger highlights what is inherent in the nature of the mathematical projection of the world, that is qua knowable, whereby Heidegger writes that 'all events,' (and this has been hugely significant for Jean Baudrillard's analysis of the event), 'if they are to enter at all into representation as events of nature, must be defined beforehand as spatio-temporal magnitudes of motion, accomplished through measuring, with the help of number and calculation' (ZW, p. 79). And we know this, we fans of correctness, as Heidegger explains exactly unremarkably, the point of precision is effected through advance stipulation, as what is 'already known,' and with this 'already known' Heidegger only repeats the heart of Nietzsche's own epistemological, scientific insight: thus, we moderns, we scientifically-minded people explore the unknown in every case by reducing it in every case to what is already known. And we succeed in this, as Heidegger reminds us: 'The rigor of mathematical physical science is exactitude,' which works owing to stipulation. 'The plan or projection of that which must henceforth, for the knowing of nature that is sought after, be nature: the self-contained system of motion of units of mass related spatio-temporally' (ZW, p. 79). Here, the point for Heidegger is all about what stipulation, as this is the foundation of scientific exactitude, is secured to begin with. Natural science, he reminds us, 'is not exact because it calculates with precision; rather it must calculate in this way because its adherence to its object sphere has the character of exactitude' (ZW, p. 79). In other words, what matters is method: natural or mathematical science to be science 'becomes research through the projected plan and through the securing of that plan in the rigor of procedure' (ZW, p. 79). Heidegger would always emphasize that we have yet to begin to think, and he does this again and again, with particular injury (as if he needed to be particularly injurious) to the sciences along that way, reflecting that we are 'still' not thinking in *What is Called Thinking?* (1951/1952)—indeed, as he emphasized particularly with respect to Nietzsche, as he also maintained that we have yet to begin to understand even those 'easy' thinkers who serve us as our formative guides, this is Plato, as Whitehead famously tells us (and this is especially true if we speak English), but for German authors, this will also include Aristotle, Augustine, and this is also Kant and even if we are not French (but especially if we are), this is Descartes as well. To the list we can add Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger himself, etc.

The problem is our conviction not only that we need a *new* Heidegger but a *new* everybody and everything else in philosophy. We suppose ourselves to know all this past philosophy. Thus, analytic philosophy, following the model or exemplar of the *philosophy of science*, which early on separated itself and its prospects from what it called the *history of science*,[29] names the entirety of the concern with Heidegger as well as Nietzsche or Kant or Plato and so on, as so much *history of philosophy*. Here this mainstream or 'analytic' terminus is only deployed to differentiate such 'historical' studies from what is to be counted as philosophy proper. For such properly mainstream philosophy, all we need is what analytic scholars tell us is to be acquired via the sciences (philosophy says what science says or it is not philosophy) or else via survey on the model of the social sciences (i.e., what is called 'experimental' philosophy, on the model of Brian Leiter's web polls). Both reference points raise the ticklish question of the academic redundancy of mainstream or 'analytic' philosophy on its own terms but these same terms dictate the importance of the contemporary or the 'new.'

And yet reading Heidegger, Nietzsche, Kant, Plato, etc., should correct the conviction that we already know what they are saying. Once we begin to read an author we *think we know*, even when we do know this author, *perhaps especially when we do know the author*, we find ourselves in the realm of the unexplored: finding nuances, sometimes whole ranges of riches missed the first time, contexts we failed to see and points we realize may be vanishing from our grasp even as we notice them now for the very first time. We know a text, we know an author, only in our vain conviction that we know.

In this sense, we have yet to begin to read Heidegger. We do not 'know' Heidegger, any more than we 'know' Nietzsche, any more than Heidegger knew Nietzsche, a realization that was anything but an empty one in the human, all-too-human progression of Heidegger's own life. All wisdom consists in this.

I mean to emphasize this in more than an esoteric sense, in terms of some secret Heidegger specific to the 1930s or even the 1950s. I am not talking about Heidegger's unpublished works, be it the *Contributions* (GA 65) or his *Mindfullness* (GA 66) or even the still undigested (untranslated, incomplete) *Black Notebooks* (GA 94, GA 95, GA 96, etc.). My point is much rather that we literally do not understand Heidegger's most well-known texts. Nor is this deficit a corrigible one. (I am not saying that I have the secret reading, or that one should prefer *my* new paradigm to any others on offer.) As Nietzsche points out, knowing the limitations of knowledge, knowing that we are in error, is not to abrogate those same limitations, that same error.[30] This is the hermeneutic phenomenological point Heidegger seeks to make in his teaching of Hölderlin and of Nietzsche, as of Aristotle and Plato, as Gadamer remarks upon this, a teaching that Gadamer took up for his own part, and that the later Heidegger argues as the need for thinking, for retrieve, reprise.

[29] See Babich, 'Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears,' 356f.

[30] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1880–1882*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 9* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 504.

Hence, if one posed the question of the 'new' whomever, two long centuries ago in 1810 or 1815, for example, say, in an academic reflection on Kant, it is likely that one would not exactly have pointed to or even identified the profile of neo-Kantianism as we have known it historically. And we know this just to think of Schopenhauer, as of Kierkegaard, as of Goethe, and so on. In the early years of the nineteenth century, one's sense of one's own very philosophical future would have been based, as are all of our futures, on one's own past, precisely as one's past only comes to one, 'temporalizes' as we say, out of the future *as we see it coming*. To be sure, the scholars in question can be defined as proto neo-Kantians, but that is precisely because our own classifications tend to work that way.[31] But then, there would still be what *becomes* Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson, James and Pierce, just to name a few philosophical names.[32]

10.3 Thinking the End of Philosophy and the Death of the Scholar

Heidegger scholarship has long been fraught by interpretations bent on articulating and defending/attacking one, usually limited, version of Heidegger's work and scope but also by those who take seriously Heidegger's own reflections on interpretive rigor to apply these reflections to Heidegger's thought.

Heidegger himself, and despite his well-known lack of (explicit) engagement with contemporaneous scholarly literature, was nearly always engaged reflectively with his own claims, par for the course for a thinker schooled in the critical style of neo-Kantianism, together with theological hermeneutics, as in the kind of medieval logic and method that would serve him in reading both Kant and Descartes, but also

[31] Thus, we can think of a text that appeared in 1810 and happened to have been inspired by a call from Berlin from Johann Christoph Hoffbauer (1766–1827), someone duly named a Kantian but who could also be aligned as a Fichtean and who also stood in the broader Wolfian, Lambertian, and Baumgartian traditions. See Johann Christoph Hoffbauer, *Ueber die Analyse in Philosophie, ein grossten Teils analytischer Versuch, veranlasst durch die erste, diesen Gegenstand betreffende, Preisfrage der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin philosophischen Wissenschaften* (Halle: Hemmerde und Schwerke, 1810). The essay was dedicated to the philologist Friedrich August Wolf whose 1795 *Prolegomena ad Homerum* pretty well inaugurated what remains known as the Homer question, if scholars today tend to assume this question a fully answered or closed issue and which was itself, precisely as a question, the theme for Nietzsche's own inaugural lecture at Basel, in addition to the physicist Georg Simon Klügel.

[32] And, so too, if we skip ahead to 1910, a famous year all around, even there, it is still the case that predicting the future of 20th century philosophy would have been a tough call, and the disputes among various claimants to be the heirs to an unsettled throne continues today. For an account of the philosophy of science and related issues, including the invention of moving sidewalks (1893), not to be sure solely in 1910 but from 1890, and a bit prior to that and 1930 and a bit after that, see Babette Babich, 'Early Continental Philosophy of Science,' in *The New Century: Bergsonism, Phenomenology and Responses to Modern Science*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson and Alan Schrift, *The History of Continental Philosophy* (Chesham: Acumen Press, 2010), 263–286.

with history as a discipline and including the study of art (perhaps most significantly as Heidegger himself opts to mention it as part of his formation).[33]

When we look to our own future, claiming the twenty-first century as our legacy, we are either, as Nietzsche would say, pregnant with the future or simply full of ourselves: *nur Narr, nur Dichter*. What is certain, so history teaches us, is that mainstream scholars in any generation are sure that their pet projects constitute the future while marginalized scholars have no such confidence, and not least for this reason Nietzsche would have taught Heidegger to attend to the 'few and the rare' (although the terminus is also part of the second century AD Lucian's *Philosophies for Sale* and so widely disseminated in translations by Erasmus and St. Thomas More and echoed by Jonathan Swift who variously teach us about mainstream wisdom and its attendant and oblique follies), just by contrast with the 'few and the rare.'

By thinking of ourselves as so many variants on Nietzsche's idea of the posthumous, qua philosophers of the future, one lays claim to the mainstream *by other means*. This way of thinking goes together with our all-too-Hegelian and non-hermeneutic supposition that we are the first properly or rightly to read a thinker other generations misunderstood or overlooked in their own time. This confidence, conviction, or prejudice is widespread in the history of philosophy. Certainly, Husserl, in the middle of his career working with the Hilbert school in Göttingen, was persuaded of this virtuosity in 1910, as was, on the analytic side, Bertrand Russell who had at the time just published the *Principia Mathematica* with Alfred North Whitehead, a year innocent of Wittgenstein (who had likewise in 1910 patented an aerodynamic propeller), an innocence even more marked for Kurt Gödel who was all of 4 years old in the same year. Mathematicians reach their peak in their twenties, and, two decades later, Gödel would prove formal incompletability in answer to Hilbert's call for mathematical foundations in 1900.

To our earlier citation of Heidegger's reflection on time, 'Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future' (SZ, p. 331), what is noteworthy here is that the past thereby becomes what we *count* as 'having been' (SZ, p. 338). Here, all of Heidegger's ecstatic reflections on time catch us up. Thus he writes, 'The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" releases from itself the present' (SZ, p. 326). Now we all know that this crystallization of the past, in its character as 'having been,' thus in the whatness of what has been, together with its relatedness to the future and the present is the very temporal precondition of the possibility of authenticity as such: 'Authentically futural, *Dasein* is authentically having been' (SZ, p. 326).

This point has been captivating for Tom Sheehan and his focus on *Das Gewesen*, even if Sheehan also borrows (without, alas, mentioning it) a bit of Magda King's thunder in his fascination. Sheehan outlines the distinction and the philosophical advantage for a reflection on time and being in simply having the linguistic wherewithal that permits one to say: *Ich bin gewesen*, 'I am been,' as opposed to what

[33] Note that if Heidegger did not learn critical thinking from Rickert or indeed from Jaspers, he certainly learnt it from Nietzsche. See discussion and references in Babich, 'Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears.'

King calls the round-about and confusing English transliteration, using hyphens to make the temporal point : 'I am-(as)-having-been.'[34] But this means that *Dasein* qua futural, with all its anticipatory dimensionality, that is, ahead of itself as it is, also always finds itself attuned 'as the being that it still is and already was, that it constantly is as having been' (SZ, p. 328). It is indeed for this reason, as Heidegger from the start of *Being and Time* develops this point, that one *can* become what one is, as Pindar says to the benefit of Nietzsche's *amor fati*. 'We call authentic having-been "retrieve"' (SZ, p. 339).

In *What is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger observes that the project of thinking about what is most thought-worthy eludes academic interventions, writing papers, writing books, teaching, giving lectures at scholarly conferences. Instead, Heidegger calls for action more in the spirit of a Marx than a Dilthey or a James:

> The state of the world is becoming constantly more thought-provoking. True, this course of events seems to demand rather that the human being should act without delay, instead of giving speeches at conferences and international conventions and never getting beyond proposing ideas on what ought to be, and how it ought to be done. (GA 8, p. 6)

Heidegger observes in 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,' a text that is often more reacted to than read (egad! how can one say that philosophy is at an end? Does one not see that the professors are still in possession of their chairs and the students yet in eager pursuit of degrees to ignore those professors and lay claim to chairs of their own?), the kind of thinking he intends as 'preparatory thinking' differs from the anticipation of projects for techno-scientific reflection. By contrast, for Heidegger,

> The preparatory thinking in question does not wish and is not able to predict the future. It only attempts to say something to the present which was already said a long time ago precisely at the beginning of philosophy and from that beginning, but has not been explicitly thought. (GA 14, p. 75)

Here Heidegger invokes Parmenides, the 'father' of logic, the first thinker of being, observing that Parmenides' 'thoughtful poem … as far as we know, was the first to reflect explicitly upon the being of beings, which still today, although unheard, speaks in the sciences into which philosophy dissolves' (GA 14, p. 83). This is the 'end' of philosophy, this is what comes 'after' metaphysics, here regarded 'in the pure sphere of the circle in which beginning and end are everywhere the same' (GA 14, p. 83). Heidegger argues that the 'contemplative human being is to experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment,'[35] which Heidegger goes on to call the 'place of stillness which gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin with … the opening of what is open' (GA 14, p. 83). Thus, Heidegger suggests that we must 'think Ἀλήθεια, unconcealment, as the opening which first grants

[34] Magda King, *A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 219.

[35] I discuss this translation of ἀτρεμὲς as 'untrembling' (rather than the more conventional 'unshaken') in an essay dedicated to Joan Stambaugh and her translations, in Babette Babich, 'Truth Untrembling Heart,' in *Being Shaken: Ontology and the Event*, ed. Michael Marder and Santiago Zabala (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 154–176.

being and thinking and their presencing to and for each other' (GA 14, p. 83). The argument thus continues that we also need to consider that 'self-concealing, concealment, Λήθη, belongs to Ἀ-λήθεια, not just as an addition, not as shadow to light, but rather as the heart of Ἀλήθεια' (GA 14, p. 88).

The thinker who could think the needed paradox that here calls for thinking is set upon already by the changing character of the intellectual world. There may be that which calls for thinking, but the problem is that we who should heed this call are increasingly unable to do so. It is not merely the case that we are 'still not thinking' as if we might somehow snap out of it: a scholar's apprentice waking up from the dream of reason. As we have seen, in an age of science as machination and business-integrated enterprise, what matters is 'impact', economic and intellectual productivity and in such a celebration of 'progress', 'the scholar disappears' (ZW, p. 85). Rather than 'erudition,' the research scholar strives in Heidegger's estimation at the time of his writing—a condition that as we noted above has not changed at all in the interim—to attain and maintain at the so-called cutting edge: 'The research worker necessarily presses forward of himself into the sphere characteristic of the technologist in the most essential sense' (ZW, p. 85).

Heidegger continues here in 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes' to write that 'knowing, as research, calls whatever is to account with regard to the way in which and the extent to which it lets itself be put at the disposal of representation' (ZW, p. 86). Far from empty theory or thought, science, now transformed into 'research' (ZW, p. 86), serves the common, productive, industrial or corporate good. Thus, as Heidegger goes on to observe in 'Wissenschaft und Besinnung,' however much it appears that physics has moved away from the determinism of the Newtonian world view, wherein 'every state of motion of bodies that occupy space is at any time simultaneously determinable—i.e., is precisely calculable in advance, predictable—both as to position and as to velocity' (GA 7, pp. 53–4), it nonetheless holds that in modern atomic physics—and here Heidegger is speaking of complementarity—'a state of motion may on principle be determined either as to position or as to velocity' (GA 7, pp. 53–4). The 'or' is logical or exclusive in this context. And yet, as Heidegger quotes Heisenberg, the point of quantum mechanics always remains calculation: 'being able to write one single fundamental equation from which the properties of all elementary particles, and therewith the behaviour of all matter whatever, follow.'[36] Here too, one has to do both with the objectification and calculation of nature as well as precisely because one has to do with nature as such, the same nature that as Heraclitus tells us, 'likes' to hide, and does so, as the late Pierre Hadot carefully reminded us, as from a wholly other temperament did Jacques Lacan, *in plain sight*, *without veils*.[37] Thus, Heidegger writes:

[36] Cited in GA 7, p. 54. For Heisenberg's text, see Werner Heisenberg, 'Die gegenwärtigen Grundprobleme der Atomphysik,' in *Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaften* (Zurich: S. Hirzel, 1949), 89–101.

[37] Pierre Hadot, 'Isis Has No Veils,' *Common Knowledge* 12, no. 3 (2006): 349–353. See further, Pierre Hadot, *The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

> Scientific representation is never able to encompass the coming to presence of nature; for the objectness of nature is, antecedently, only one way in which nature exhibits itself. Nature thus remains for the science of physics that which cannot be gotten around. (GA 7, p. 56)

And that 'which cannot be gotten around' is where we find ourselves as we speculate on how it goes not with being but with Heidegger, on his impact prospects and his liabilities as a research thematic in the twenty-first century in which we find ourselves. That this is a suitable topic for research is already patent in our undertaking as a very explicit kind of intellectual *Machenschaft*, as Heidegger here explains that: 'Research has disposal over anything that is when it can either calculate it in its future course in advance or verify a calculation about its past' (ZW, pp. 86–7). In this way, speculators all, we continue to seek to get a bead on the state of Heidegger studies, the current stand of viable, respectable, worthwhile research (and the whole point will be about sorting the 'good' from the 'bad').

And yet, as with technology, precisely here in our effort to find which ways might be best encouraged and which might not, we find ourselves (Heidegger uses the nicely mathematical example of atomic physics and the gigantic) defined as 'a continual not-ever-having-been-here-yet.' Heidegger argues that this condition 'originates only in a blind mania for exaggerating and excelling' and notes that 'what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes precisely through this, incalculable' (ZW, p. 95).

It is with the incalculable that Heidegger calls for thinking, for reflection.[38] 'Reflection transports the futural human being into that "between" in which he belongs to being and yet remains a stranger amid that which is'(ZW, p. 96)—and, of course, as Heidegger adds:

> Reflection is needed as a responding that forgets itself in the clarity of ceaseless questioning away at the inexhaustibleness of That which is worthy of questioning—of that from out of which in the moment properly its own, responding loses the character of a questioning and becomes simply saying. (GA 7, p. 65)

In this fashion, we are set to thinking the 'new' Heidegger, in Heidegger's wake.[39] Nor will anyone be surprised to learn that we are well able to think any number of 'new' thoughts, like the countless swells of laughter (as Nietzsche quotes Aeschylus at the start of his *The Gay Science*), to wonder as he does about the future of philosophy (the teachers of the 'meaning of life'), as of the future of wisdom, or the future of laugher.

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[38] So we read 'that the human being will know, i.e., carefully safeguard into is truth, that which is incalculable, only in creative questioning an shaping out of the power of genuine reflection' (ZW, p. 96).

[39] See David Wood, *Thinking after Heidegger* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).; Gail Stenstad, *Transformations: Thinking after Heidegger* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).; Hubert L. Dreyfus, ed. *Heidegger Reexamined: Art, Poetry, and Technology, Volume 3* (New York: Routledge, 2002). And see too John Sallis, *Echoes: After Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). Of course, Adorno had long ago sounded a call to go beyond Heidegger as had Carnap and the latter's heirs have been busy doing just that.

To say, as Heidegger says, that a thinker thinks one thought is also to say that that same thinker has yet to come into his or her own. Thinking is a project and one has to *become* what one is. As the Heidegger of *Being and Time* alludes to Nietzsche and through Nietzsche to Pindar:

> Only because the being of the 'there' receives its Constitution through understanding and through the character of understanding as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or alternately does not become), can it say to itself 'Become what you are.' (SZ, p. 145)

The imperative form of this 'projective' 'potentiality-for-Being' as Heidegger speaks of it remains to be worked out in the form of ethics.[40] From Nietzsche, we may remember that the reason this imperative urgency remains 'needful' is because we have no idea who we are and not least because, essentially because, we never think about this, we never think about what we are. Thus, we are always and already late-comers in coming to realize that we have for Nietzsche 'never sought ourselves.'[41]

If we like our novelty dated, we can add Lacan for an edge or take a critical line from Adorno but most of all, because we mean to be *à la mode* or trendy or at least (and this is the inauthentic anxiety of our desire not to be disincluded among the 'they') not to be 'out of it,' we can add Agamben or Sloterdijk or Žižek just to cite a few names from the old new guard or else we can cite an array of younger/older 'new' theorists—i.e., *your name here*—be these 'new' theorists in France, in Germany or Scandinavia, borrowed perhaps via the analytic default of philosophy,[42] or from the new fields of media theory of one sort or another, etc., provided they have not yet been too, too read, or too, too cited (by the wrong people), provided they are sufficiently 'fresh' to be counted as the right kind of 'new.'

Heidegger: this is why we convict him as did my own teacher, Jacques Taminiaux, of a critically important 'nostalgia,'[43] promises little in the way of either novelty or progress. How, again to ask his own question, can his thinking get us anywhere? And how then is a 'new' Heidegger even possible?

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[40] See my discussion, via Heidegger, of Nietzsche's imperative in Babette Babich, 'Become the One You Are: On Commandments and Praise—Among Friends,' in *Nietzsche, Culture, and Education*, ed. Thomas E. Hart (London: Ashgate, 2009), 13–38.

[41] See Preface of Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals : A Polemic. By way of Clarification and Supplement to my Last Book Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[42] See the author's earlier analyses of the analytic-continental divide, especially, Babette Babich, 'On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy,' in *A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, ed. C. G. Prado (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003), 63–103. and for a recent discussion of this same default, see Babette Babich, *La fin de la pensée? Philosophie analytique contre philosophie continentale* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012). For my dialogue with interviewers Dennis Erwin and Matt Storey, see Babette Babich, 'An Improverishment of Philosophy,' *Purlieu: A Philosophical Journal* 1, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 37–72.

[43] See Jacques Taminiaux, *La Nostalgie de la Grèce à l'aube de l'idéalisme allemand: Kant et les Grecs dans l'itinéraire de Schiller, de Hölderlin et de Hegel* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1967).

And after the challenge of logical positivism posed almost from its inception if we read Heidegger's 1920 inaugural address 'What is Metaphysics?', the question of the bootlessness of his thought is one of the oldest questions raised against his thinking. Heidegger tells us that science is concerned with facts and for this reason wants to know 'nothing about nothing' (WM, p. 106). Science is concerned 'with what-is—and nothing else; only what-is—and nothing more; simply and solely what-is—and beyond that, nothing' (WM, p. 105). For Heidegger, alluding to Carnap's objection in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*: 'He who speaks of nothing does not know what he is doing' (GA 40, p. 25). Heidegger goes on detailing the argument from Parmenides through to the injunction articulated in the spirit of logical positivism and intellectual cleanliness, that is, vis-à-vis what logicians call a performative contradiction:

> In speaking of nothing he makes it into a something. In speaking he speaks against what he intended. He contradicts himself. But discourse that contradicts itself offends against the fundamental rule of discourse (*logos*), against 'logic.' To speak of nothing is illogical. He who speaks and thinks illogically is unscientific …. Such a speaking about nothing moreover consists entirely of meaningless propositions. (GA 40, p. 25)

QED: Dr. Carnap. Demonstration points: Prof. Dr. Heidegger.

Later on, in a lecture in Bühlerhöhe in 1950, given in memory of Max Kommerell, Heidegger returns to the same problem, invoking meaningless utterances in terms of tautology as opposed to the incipient nihilism threatening empty pronouncements about nothing but nothing. Writing that 'Language itself is language,' Heidegger repeats: the 'understanding that is schooled in logic, thinking of everything in terms of calculation and hence usually overbearing, calls this proposition an empty tautology' (GA 12, p. 10). Here, Heidegger again does his critics the service of asking their questions for them, posed in and on their own terms, 'overbearing' or not, contra Heidegger's own point, as the point would seem to need to be made: 'Merely to say the identical thing twice—how is that supposed to get us anywhere?' (GA 12, p. 10).

Again and again, I reflect on Heidegger's contra: 'But we do not want to get anywhere. We would like only for once, to get to just where we are already' (GA 12, p. 10).

This would of course be the point of Da-Sein. What is key is openness, thinking.

The movement here is one that for Heidegger invites us 'to be ready and willing to listen' (GA 8, p. 15).

For this, in our doing that is constantly more than what we will, is still and always what calls for thinking.

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