EDITED BY
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DIVERSITY AND LOCAL CONTEXTS

URBAN SPACE, BORDERS, AND MIGRATION



PALGRAVE STUDIES IN URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY

Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology

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Half of humanity lives in towns and cities and that proportion is expected to increase in the coming decades. Society, both Western and non-Western, is fast becoming urban and mega-urban as existing cities and a growing number of smaller towns are set on a path of demographic and spatial expansion. Given the disciplinary commitment to an empirically-based analysis, anthropology has a unique contribution to make to our understanding of our evolving urban world. It is in such a belief that we have established the Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology series. In the awareness of the unique contribution that ethnography offers for a better theoretical and practical grasp of our rapidly changing and increasingly complex cities, the series will seek high-quality contributions from anthropologists and other social scientists, such as geographers, political scientists, sociologists and others, engaged in empirical research in diverse ethnographic settings. Proposed topics should set the agenda concerning new debates and chart new theoretical directions, encouraging reflection on the significance of the anthropological paradigm in urban research and its centrality to mainstream academic debates and to society more broadly. The series aims to promote critical scholarship in international anthropology. Volumes published in the series should address theoretical and methodological issues, showing the relevance of ethnographic research in understanding the socio-cultural, demographic, economic and geo-political changes of contemporary society.

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Diversity and Local Contexts

Urban Space, Borders, and Migration

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Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology
ISBN 978-3-319-53951-5 ISBN 978-3-319-53952-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017951204

Cover design by Jenny Vong

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

The Editors wish to thank the Commission on Urban Anthropology of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, the Institute of Ethnology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Management of Social Transformation (MOST) Program for their support of the "Diversity and Local Contexts: Urban Space, Borders and Migration" conference held in Prague May 2012 from which many of these contributions emerged. We also wish to thank the members of the Feliks Gross Seminar in Urban and Visual Ethnography of the City University of New York (CUNY) for their advice regarding this collection.

Contents

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Jerome Krase and Zdeněk Uherek

One can easily argue that some of the greatest impacts of globalization on cities in the twenty-first century have been the effects of migration-induced transnationalism and multiculturalism engendered at the local level. In anthropology, much of this had been presaged by the work of Appadurai (1996), Hannerz (1996), Kearney (2004) and Friedman (1994) as they discussed the interfaces between global processes and their impacts on local cultures and social structures. These issues have been theoretically examined from every angle; from world systems theory to postmodernism. This volume provides a contemporary "worm's eye" and "ground level," i.e., "ethnographic" look at the interdependence of world markets and local cultures. This is what Robertson called "glocalization" (1995); how the homogenizing and universalizing forces of globalization interact with the heterogeneity and particularity of local forces to create hybrid cultures. As noted by Prato, multi-ethnic environments marked by cultural heterogeneity, once associated exclusively with

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_1

societies such as the United States of America, have now become commonplace across the world (2009). In sociology, for example, there have been parallel treatments of the contradictions engendered by the globalization of capital and migration, especially by Sassen (1998) and Portes (1995). Although some of the cities represented in this volume are not of "global" scale or import, their terrains are nevertheless actually and symbolically "contested" by global forces such as immigrant communities and their informal economies (Hutchison and Krase 2007).

This broad, but highly selective, collection of original essays maps out "glocal" developments on culturally and socially diversified city territories that have been highly influenced by migration flows and cultural exchanges. The stimulus to collect and edit these essays emerged from the conference "Diversity and Local Contexts: Urban Space, Borders and Migration" that was held in Prague in May 2012. The deliberations were organized by the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences' Commission on Urban Anthropology and the Institute of Ethnology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic as well as consultations with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's Management of Social Transformation Program. The contributors addressed many often-neglected questions about these issues and in the process made a significant contribution to the literature in the field of urban social science. In addition to papers read at the conference, other contributions are included due to their closeness to the conference topics or in recognition of the richness and topicality of their arguments.

The texts presented here are to a greater or lesser degree ethnographies based on observation and direct contact with the participants in the described events as well as interpretation of secondary data. These data are provided as representations of the observed events or their as Geertz might suggest as "translations" into the language of science or a language comprehensible to a wider than the local context (1973, 1988). From the perspective of contemporary anthropology (Prato and Pardo 2013), they can also be considered as observer's evocations as they are discussed by Stephen Tyler (1986: 129, 131) or Marilyn Strathern (2004: 7–8). The researcher's positioning within the described events usually exceeds the insights of a "mere" observer. Most of our contributors spent considerably long periods of time conducting their field work. Some also taught or worked on other projects while on site. Reflexivity plays an important role in qualitative research (Marcus 1986) and is also influenced by the personality of the researcher. The work presented here provides many

perspectives both of the authors and the subjects upon which they report. Their work might be called "anthropology at home" (Prato and Pardo 2013: 89–90). Therefore, the term "diversity," which is the first key term at the title of this book, relates not only to the varied social settings themselves, but also to the different perspectives applied in the research.

We agree with Selma van Londen and Arie de Ruijter that "Diversity has been and will always be a fundamental characteristic of the human condition…In the sense living together is a series of processes in which a distinction is constantly made, consciously or unconsciously, between within and without, between us and them, between self and other" (Londen and Ruijter 2010: 13). Social diversity resides in the originality and uniqueness of each human individual. It is created in the context of the social milieu found in specific local situations. Social diversity is as necessary and natural as is orderliness, and contributes to the structural tendencies that create bordered functional wholes that are capable of internal cooperation.

Discovering the principles and laws of cooperation between diverse groups has been a continual topic in a range of social scientific disciplines, especially sociology, which was constituted as a science with this specific goal. Discovering the principles of the orderliness amid diversity is a critical and practical contemporary concern. According to Phil Wood and Charles Landry, the current period can be characterized as "the age of diversity" (2008: 7), not in the sense that diversity is new, but that current interest in it is great and growing.

Diversified elements of society become components of one cooperating whole within a framework of dynamic processes, which we understand as "social change." The chapters presented in this volume describe much in the way of social changes, while bringing attention to their contradictory and, in some cases, adversarial natures. They describe a world undergoing neoliberal transformations, which affect interpersonal relations, the relationship of the citizen to the state and the relationship of people to the things which surround them (Tylor 2003; Lipman 2011; Sassen 2014). These experiences are seen through the lens of neoliberalism that anthropologists and sociologists adopted in the 1990s. It suggests that neoliberal policies applied in different settings result in different effects and which are difficult to predict (Buyandelgeriyn 2008).

"Local contexts," which is the second key term in the title of this work, emphasizes that social diversity always manifests itself in a specific, local milieu, which in turn allows it to be materialized, described and

categorized. Understanding these local contexts is important for our descriptions precisely because they provide the settings for diversity. Each particular milieu can fundamentally change universal meanings and even reshape them into opposites. As to this point, we build on the work of Katherine Verdery and Michael Burawoy, who by using the example of post-socialist economic transformations showed that the neoliberal market economy is not a direct path from socialism to Western capitalism, but instead leads to changes that activate a number of contradictory mechanisms. As a consequence, people utilize their previous local experience, skills, contacts, moral values and judgements to navigate the new economic arena (Verdery 1996; Burawoy and Verdery 1999).

The question of the degree to which the lessons learned from one social transformation can be transferred from one society to another is often discussed. In connection with the collapse of the Socialist system, it has been thoroughly addressed by Chris Hann in *Socialism: Ideas, Ideologies and Local Practice*, in which contributors Ernest Gellner and Ladislav Holý found themselves in different conceptual fields. Gellner saw the collapse of communism as a logical consequence of the pre-industrial method of the redistribution of social wealth created by the means of industrial society (1993). On the other hand, Holý saw it as the consequence of local social situations (1993). More than 20 years later, we can see that the events can best be interpreted with a synthesis of both concepts. Systemic changes can be interpreted as Gellner's contribution, inspired by the work of his teacher Karl Polanyi. Holý's contribution is the conceptualization that merges cultural relativism with interpretive anthropology.

The historical experience of individualistic and liberal economic societies demonstrates that while the rules of the redistribution of wealth play an important role in their development, they are not sufficient for societal-wide social transformations. On the contrary, the consequences of the economic changes evoke different effects in various local contexts. As Sassen wrote: "Economic globalization, then, needs to be understood also in its multiple localizations, rather than only in terms of the broad, overarching macro level processes that dominate the mainstream account" (2000: 86). As to the importance of the local milieu as a catalyst for social change, Sassen's work is invaluable. The idea of globalization as activities of supra-regional importance, as well as micro-processes with limited local impact, better reflects the reality of globalization (Sassen 2008: 3).

"Urban space" is another key term here as it concentrates diversity, accelerates social movement and gives social space its specific characteristics.

Urban sociologists in particular characterize urban society as a dynamic one. During the first half of the twentieth century, the Chicago School of Sociology inspired the study of the city on a global scale. Robert E. Park and Louis Wirth for example worked from the assumption that the heterogeneous milieu of the city creates a specific type of urban personality, as well as diverse districts with local characteristics (Park 1924, Wirth 1938). It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that a wider variety of research methods and theoretical approaches were implemented based on the understanding that individual cities and their constituent parts have different developmental dynamics (Krase 2011).

The work in this volume focuses on the urban context even while understanding that the contemporary, postmodern, world is not anchored exclusively in urban models. Also, even though urban culture is not the exclusive domain of cities (Jameson and Speaks 1992, Garreau 1991, Sorkin 1992, Dehaene and De Cauter 2008), the urban milieu continues to a substantial degree to shape the linkage between local and global worlds. These conjunctures generally appear in the form of nodal points in a "network of networks" (Hannerz 1992) of global culture or macro-processes. For Setha Low: "The city is not the only place where these linkages can be studied, but the intensification of these processes – as well as their human outcomes – occurs and can be understood best in cities" (2005: 2). However, as noted by Sassen, the focus on (large) cities: "allows us to specify a geography of strategic places at the global scale, places bound to each other by the dynamics of economic globalization" (2000: 80). The role of large cities is even more distinctive today in "developed countries" where the process of urbanization is not entirely completed. Of equal interest are countries that are more recent members of the global world. For example, those that joined the club, so to speak, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and particularly their capital cities, have become "gateways" of globalization tendencies (Dostál 2008: 15).

"Borders and Migration" are the terms, which close the list of the key phrases in the title of this collection. Borders and divisions are critical as they are intrinsic to the concept of migration. For the past 50 years, social scientists have intensively studied the increases in urban social diversity. Topics such as ethnic identity and self-definition of groups were introduced to anthropologists particularly through the ideas of Edmund Leach (1954) and Fredrik Barth (1969). The study of the metamorphoses and the variety of borders and divisions is a methodological challenge to this day (e.g. Wilson and Donnan 2012). Borders, just like migrations, are

phenomena that change over time, and both can cause social separation, as well as integration. Their ambiguity and temporality have been studied for instance by Sarah Green, who speaks of borders as "tidemarks", whose presence is often almost intangible (Green 2009). The study of the forms and the quality of borders in relation to the structuring of diversity makes it is possible to consider further developmental tendencies to which diversified systems are exposed.

Movement across borders is typically classified as migration. Migratory movements, just as any complex milieu, have at the same time characteristics of both the geophysical and cultural worlds. These flows of people are central to the genesis of glocalization, and in the same way that we can label the present as "the age of diversity," it might also be called "the age of migrations" (Castles and Miller 1993). As significant geopolitical change factors, migrations are regularly mapped. For example, findings of studies regarding economic and asylum migrations between the Third World and developed nations have been incorporated into national and international migration laws (Massey 1998). However, it must be noted that the majority of such human flows occur directly between individual Third World states, and not, as often assumed, between them and advanced Western countries (Massey 1998). Besides the vast migrations on the African continent, there have been extensive migratory movements, especially in the last 20 years, within the territory of the Russian Federation (Heleniak 2001). These have played an important role in the development of the current geopolitical problems there as well as in other successor states of the former Soviet Union.

These local migratory movements are seldom studied, and one of the aims of this volume is to make a scholarly contribution in this important area. Another value of the following chapters is that they systemically address the issues of social transformation and migration. They also demonstrate that globalization trends do not affect every group in the same way, and the differential impacts of changes on individual groups, localities and regions. As argued by Hannerz, cultures are connected with place when people travel between them (1996). For example, Albania was a country of emigration, but since the collapse of Communism, major cities there have experienced large-scale "immigration." This has occurred on two levels; internal migration from rural, mountain areas to the urban peripheries, and immigration of many foreigners to major cities.

Hannerz' thesis on the place representing the local specificity more distinctly than the people who are in it captures very well the character of a number of Central European cities. In these cities, knowledgeable

actors or anthropologists are able to recognize the specificity of the place, its history and social representations much more easily than many locals. Locals, for example, often do not know or would like to forget many of the meanings of certain places because they are dangerous or painful for them: forced displacement, escapes, occupation and holocaust. The shifts of borders and extensive out and return migrations often do not allow for a clear definition of who is "domestic" and who is not; who is the victor and who is the defeated; and who is the victim and who is the perpetrator. The following brief overview of the chapters included in this volume gives a good sense of these issues that go well beyond the confines of Central Europe.

Giuliana Prato's "Changing Urban Landscape in Albania" examines the consequences of the rapid transformation of Tirana's urban landscape. Besides demographic movement, she also analyses public access to areas of the city previously restricted to The Communist Party's leadership, as well as investment in infrastructures necessary for European Union (EU) programmes. These factors are part of the overall scheme to promote democratization and the general public welfare but instead reflects foreign interests. She focused on the transformation of the urban landscape in the Tirana–Durrës region in order to offer an historically contextualized analysis of the impact of post-communist policies and European programmes on the development of this area. The chapter addresses three major factors. First, ordinary people's access to the city's public space and to previously restricted residential areas. Second, the impact of internal and external demographic movement and informal urbanization. Third, the role of the international community for the accomplishment of EU programmes, such as the construction of Corridor VIII and sustainable cities planning. The author suggests that the resulting outcome may well serve the interests of international political agendas but has problematic ramifications in terms of democratic citizenship rights and good governance.

Giovanni Picker's bi-focal ethnographic discussion notes that the "Post-Socialist Europe label has been criticized for its inability to fully capture the post-1989–91 social and cultural processes in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia." The term can be faulted for simplifying and lumping together different political, economic and social experiences. Also by supporting "allochronism" and denying contemporaneousness, the agency of the people of the region(s) is not recognized. Rather than asking what was Socialist Europe? The questions today are "What is "non-post-Socialist Europe?" and perhaps "Does a present-day non-post-Socialist

Europe exist?" Moving from these standpoints, this chapter examines both resemblances and disjunctures between Eastern and Western Europe and contextualizes them within their Socialist antecedents. By focusing on the local governance of marginalized Romani families in Cluj-Napoca (Romania) and Florence (Italy), the author shows that during both temporal regimes (pre- and post-1989), the two cities display ethnographic resemblances. However, rather than creating disparities and hierarchies, the ethnography compares the margins of the "West" and the "East" in order to de-dichotomize and refine our knowledge.

In "The Containment of Memory in the 'Meeting Place:' City Marketing and Contemporary Memory Politics in Central Europe," Hana Cervinkova and Juliet Golden focus on the Polish city of Wroclaw and address issues of contemporary memory politics in urban Central Europe. In 1945, this German city of Breslau was transferred to Polish administration whose national heritage policy drew a thick line between its German past and its Polish present. After the watershed year of 1989, Wroclaw seems to have taken an alternative approach, marketing itself as the multicultural "meeting place" or a "city of encounters." It became a European metropolis with ambitions to build on its multicultural heritage. Červinková and Golden argue, however, that the city's self-labeling, which serves as a marker of distinction on the global market, is a form of neoliberal containment rather than a serious change in how the past of the city informs current policy. Following a decade that began in the early 1980s, both scholars and local citizens began delving into what Jan Assmann terms "cultural memory." This vast archive greatly exceeds the instrumentalized horizons of collective memory, and current policies are narrowing the scope of collective memory. They conclude that this narrowing helps exclude the diverse cultural memories of "the other" from the discourse and practices of contemporary identity building. In this way, Wroclaw's multicultural past, a lure for investors and tourists, becomes mainly as a trademark.

It is an open question whether efforts to cope with the past via institutionalized control of memory will spread in Europe. In any case, there is tension between the local sights of memory and the external demand also in Prague. Prague can also be labelled as multicultural. The city with extensive German- and Czech-speaking communities contained Czech, German and Jewish residents. After WWII in the period 1945–1989, it became an almost exclusively Czech city. Today, Prague presents itself as a city of many cultures and, for example, markets its German-Jewish cultural

heritage such as in the work of Franz Kafka. This development, full of paradoxes, is captured by Zdeněk Uherek's text "Discourse on Public Spaces: Praguers in the Process of Globalization Changes and the Neoliberal Economy." Uherek examines the discourse on public space in Prague during the period 2010–2014 and identifies its main actors, themes and the motivations of different groups. The data come from an investigation initiated by a nongovernmental not-for-profit institution Open City which was joined by the Institute of Ethnology. The multi-level study documented the ways that the public as well as authorities utilize and talk about public space. Analysis of this discourse uncovers the powerful role of the neoliberal economy in transforming post-socialist cities and their institutions.

Karolina Koziura discusses the "Hidden Colonial Factors in the Transformation of the Post-Socialist City: Chernivtsi and its Complicated Cosmopolitan Story." She notes that the 1990s not only changed Europe's geopolitical map but also gave impetus to movements towards democracy and market economies in the former Soviet bloc. It also let to the rediscovery of "lost" memory and "white holes" in Central and East European history. Chernivtsi, a city in Western Ukraine, continues to undergo a complex socio-economic transition in almost every aspect of urban life. During socialist times, it was a highly-industrialized centre with many state-owned factories, entrepreneurships and Soviet-style suburbs. The collapse of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) resulted in the new state of Ukraine, and Chernivtsi became a frontier on the intersection of Ukrainian, Romanian and Moldovan interests. Koziura analyses the impacts of nationalization and heterogeneity on city centre revitalization in 2008. She shows how the revitalization highlights tensions between local political interest, as well as strategies for creating urban memory and identity by both dominant and subordinate cultures.

Ivana Bašić and Petrija Jovičić's "The Dispersed City: The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan by Borislav Pekić in Light of the Urban Revolution" is discussed from the standpoint of literary anthropology and urban theory. Using an innovative technique, the complex novel is analysed in the context of the metaphor of "The Dispersed City," used by Henri Lefebvre to describe the process of the dilution of the city as a human construct because of its encounter with urban society. The obsession of the main character, Arsenije Njegovan, a property owner and developer who is described in detail, are buildings he owns actually as well as symbolically in the city of Belgrade. In this multidisciplinary, and theoretically rich,

essay, Bašić and Jovičić reveal how the distinctive philosophical transformation between a perfect city, urban development and property ownership is confronted not only by the prevailing reality of industrial society, but also by urban tendencies within the consciousness of the main character. Njegovan's reasoning and actions ultimately reflect the "pulse" of the era towards which he displays resistance on conscious and theoretical planes, despite the impression that he is rather quietly hospitable to it.

Like Uherek, Marianna Mészárosová's "The Perception of Language (dis)similarity. [On the example of Slovak and Hungarian Ethnic Minorities in Prague]" also focused on the city of Prague. However, her perspective is that of a foreigner from a Hungarian-speaking section of South Slovakia. Most Hungarians in Slovakia are also fluent in Slovak. In this chapter, she examines the similarity between the Slovak and Czech languages from the position of the Slovak minority in Prague. On the whole, taking language similarity into account helps explain contemporary attitudes of Slovaks towards their own position within Prague's multicultural spaces. Perception of this similarity requires one to examine the whole context in which people's sense-making practices develop. The data for her study were gathered from semi-structured interviews, participant observations and direct participation with Slovak and Hungarian ethnic minorities. Mészárosová's findings regarding the concrete language situation and attitudes towards language reflect the wider social climate so typical for Central Europe. She concludes that the main problem of relations between nations and ethnic groups is not language understanding or different conceptual perception of the world. Rather, it is socially constructed differences in which language plays more of a role in symbolic division than as an obstacle to understanding.

Italo Pardo's contribution on "On Imperiled Democracy: Contested and Negotiated Urban Space among Native Neapolitans and Immigrants" is also focused on newcomers. It argues that urban Europe is a testing ground for key dynamics of negotiation of citizenship reflected in dichotomies such as integration versus exclusion, and tolerance versus toleration. His well-argued chapter draws upon his long-term fieldwork in Naples in which he has investigated how contested and negotiated urban spaces are divided and used by different social groups. His carefully gathered ethnographic evidence shows the complex and varied relations between immigrants and native entrepreneurs in a context where Neapolitans have long been treated as second-class citizens. Pardo concludes that this situation must be understood in light of the erroneous view held by many that

Southerners are deeply corrupt in their personal and public lives and that Southern society is undermined by a cultural sympathy with criminality.

Although this volume concentrates on Europe, it also addresses the same problem areas which appear outside of it. One of the universal global themes is migration and the issue of the spatial integration of migration groups. Henk Paw, Carla Collins and Stephanie Gouws write on "European expatriates and African migrants in Port Elizabeth, South Africa." As in the case of Europe, they draw attention to the increasing influx of immigrants from the surrounding countries as a consequence of globalization and less strict controls of the borders, which occurred with the democratization process after the first free elections in 1994. They point out that not even in South Africa has it been possible to create optimal conditions for the integration of migrants into the new everydayness. They openly speak of "neo-racism", where the same people who were discriminated against in the apartheid era are now expressing xenophobic attitudes towards foreign African migrants. Globalization has made cross-border migration a normal part of life in many countries. Some migrants are expatriates being sent by their "mother" companies to South African subsidiaries, while others migrate to achieve what is regarded as a "better life." Based on studies of domestic partners of German expatriates, and African migrants in Port Elizabeth, they address the reception of migrants, their experiences and relationships with locals and the extent to which they are able to maintain their own cultures in their daily lives.

The final chapter, by Jerome Krase, "Italian Americans and Others in New York City: Interethnic Relations from the Field," discusses relations between Italian Americans and other ethnic groups in New York City in response to mass media coverage of several notoriously violent interracial incidents. He suggests that in order to better understand the problems engendered by ethnic changes in urban neighborhoods, facile media accounts should be corrected to provide an objective context for understanding Italian Americans' reactions that are partially explained by their territorially centred culture. As their "defended" neighborhoods (Suttles 1968) slowly changed during the 1970s and 1980s, despite local resistance, individual activists and citywide Italian American organizations worked positively, but mostly unnoticed, with other ethnic groups. All this took place during a turbulent era in New York City punctuated with other many instances of intergroup violence, urban riots, as well as hotly contested municipal elections that exploited racial, ethnic and religious

divisions. In essence, this chapter, in combination with the others from a wide variety of urban locales, demonstrates the common problems and prospects of diversity within urban spaces engendered by various historical and contemporary movements of human populations.

The collection in this volume looked at issues such as migration, post-migration behaviour, intergroup relations, memory and multiculturalism from a wide variety of social science disciplines, theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches. Although our scope is global and focused on a wide variety of cities, the largest number obviously are Central and Southern European cities that share a relatively recent Socialist and post-Socialist history. For younger generation European anthropologists like Marianna Mésároszová and Giovanni Picker, the concept of post-Communism is something they received from the previous generation of scholars. The producers of this ideological discourse spent most of their lives in a divided Europe and today dichotomize it not as Capitalist versus Socialist but as Western versus post-Socialist.

An aspect seldom addressed is the way that residents of post-socialist cities, actually experience local life as compared to their simplistic stereotypes, presented in western media. Their behaviour, identities and even the creativity of city dwellers are influenced by specific economic and political situations; some accidental, others planned. For example, some cities draw their images from their cultural past while others, from their changing present; and these in turn inform practices such as tourism projects. This volume also provides a unique "glocal" perspective, in that migration of different ethnic, religious and racial groups to these cities is a recent phenomenon and presents opportunities for new thinking about diversity in urban contexts. The selections for this volume cover cities on three continents Europe, Africa and North America, and therefore provide ample opportunity for planned and serendipitous contrasts. Urban diversity is created by both locals and foreigners. In this sense, cities exceed their own borders as they are impacted by multiculturalism, tourism and their consequent effects on intergroup relations. For example, although all migrants, and other minorities, create their own territories, these can be met locally by different integration or segregation strategies. When new groups are stigmatized and marginalized by xenophobic reactions, local governance and inclusive notions of citizenship itself can also suffer.

Although it easily understood that migrants and minority groups, in effect, produce the diversity of urban life, seldom is the second-order effects of that urban diversity considered. This volume looks closely at

not only the impact of diversity itself and the past and present processes that contribute to it, but also the effects on the cities as a whole by the residence of people from different cultural backgrounds. It has been argued here that the city and its changing functions cannot be understood without taking into account the relevant local contexts of diversity. The influx of new groups has a different effect in historically homogenous cities, for example, than those in which heterogeneity has been an integral part of their historical experiences. In this and other regards, the editors emphasize the important of understanding the specific economic, social, spatial, political and cultural contexts that endow all cities with their unique characteristics.

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CHAPTER 2

Changing Urban Landscape in Albania

Giuliana B. Prato

This chapter focuses on the rapid transformation of the urban landscape in the Tirana–Durrës metropolitan region to offer a historically contextualized analysis of the impact of post-communist policies and European programmes on the development of this area. I shall look at three factors that have influenced such a transformation. First, ordinary people's access to the city's public space and to areas previously restricted to the Party's leadership (such as the *Blloku* in Tirana). Second, the impact of internal and external demographic movement—which includes internal rural–urban migration and foreigners who reside in the country (more or less permanently) as Embassy personnel, NGOs activists or consultants to the Albanian government and other key public institutions. Significantly, when I began my research in 1999, there were almost as many foreigners in Albania as native Albanians. Third, the role of the international community who, since the collapse of the communist regime, has supported (financially and politically) the creation of the infrastructure necessary for the accomplishment of EU programmes, such as the construction of Corridor VIII (one of the major European Ten–T Corridors) and, more recently, the accomplishment of urban planning towards green, sustainable cities. These EU programmes are part of an overall scheme to promote exchange and stability in the Balkan area and bring social and

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_2

economic welfare to the local population. However, in Albania the result is a cultural, social and economic diversity which may well serve the interests of international political agendas but, as we shall see, often has problematic ramifications in terms of citizens' democratic entitlement, making a significant part of the population feel as outsiders in their own country. I argue that post-communist Albania may well have a democratic government, supported by a written Constitution that should guarantee fundamental rights and people's sovereignty but, as it has happened in other late-twentieth-century democracies, declarations of rights on paper does not guarantee good governance and the accomplishment of the common good, which appears to have become particularly problematic in urban areas.

Tirana: A Capital City between 'Urban Sprawl' and 'Compact City'

In a recent article published in a special issue of the journal *Diogène* (Prato 2015), I have discussed the relevance of addressing urban contemporary dynamics from a perspective that encompasses the meanings of *urbs*, *civitas* and *polis*. There I examined *civitas* and *polis* as sociological concepts, drawing on Weber's analysis of the western city ideal-type. Weber describes such ideal-type as a social body of citizens (*polites* and *cives*) united by law that demands the fulfilment of their civic responsibility for the accomplishment of the common good, but also, and fundamentally, grants them rights. It is significant to note here that Weber referred to the *polis* in the Aristotelian sense; that is as a political community that bridges the gap between the private sphere (represented by the household economy) and the public sphere (the common good). At the same time, the ideal-typical *civitas* is intended as an urban community of free (a historically contextualized freedom, of course) and self-determining citizens who participate, through the election of their representatives, to the decision-making process. Thus, Weber's ideal-typical urban community would have: a certain degree of political autonomy—that is, an autonomous elected administration and a partially autonomous court of law; a flourishing market—with the attendant trade and commerce relations; and sufficient military power to protect its citizens (in contemporary society, this would be represented by different forms of policing institutions). To sum up, the ideal-typical *polis* and *civitas* would both favour the establishment of forms of association or organization that promote political and civic participation.

These two ideal-types exist within a given territory, which is reflected in the structure of the *urbs*. The *urbs*, intended as built environment, is more than a mere infrastructure that provides shelter. It is an environment that should be functional to the performance of good government, intended as government that serves the community of citizens—a government that serves the *res publica* intended as common good, not just as a body of public institutions.

Having addressed these three interconnected analytical categories in relation to my Brindisi ethnography (Prato 2015), I have asked to what extent they would help to shed light on post-communist urban development in Albania. I suggest that, taken together, these three analytical categories bring out the complexity of contemporary cities without being caught in such categorizations as those proposed by the New Urbanism approach, which casts the future development of cities in terms of either 'compact city' or 'urban sprawl'. As Pllumbi (2013) points out, contemporary Tirana could fit both categorizations.[1] On a parallel line of analysis, Felstehausen (1999) argues that up to the 1990s Tirana presented the characteristics of a 'compact city'; that is, a dense and mixed-use city of 225,000 inhabitants within a limited geographic extension. By mid-1999 the urban population had grown to more than 600,000 and the metropolitan area had expanded fivefold. The expansion of the 1990s took the form of an informal 'urban sprawl' mainly linked to the internal migration from mountain areas to the urban periphery. As we shall see, throughout the following decades, local administrators have argued that the chaos created by the collapse of communism and the ongoing reforms made it impossible to control the modes and rhythms of urbanization, thus justifying a convenient, and often electorally instrumental, *laissez-faire* approach.

An outline of Tirana's development, focusing on significant historical moments, will help to understand the present situation. It shows that spontaneity and planning have alternated in the development of this city, ultimately leading to the first major urban plan in the early twentieth century, when Tirana became the capital city of independent Albania.

Until the seventeenth century, Tirana was no more than a small hamlet at the cross-roads of the east–west and north–south commercial routes. The three major hypotheses about the city's foundation, none of which appears to be irrefutably documented, are not mutually exclusive, instead they seem to complement each other. As Tirana developed at a time when most of central Albania was under Ottoman rule, a now fashionable theory links the foundation of Tirana to the establishment of an *imaret*, built on

the initiative of Sulejman Pasha Barggjin Mulleti in 1641, which included a public bath, an inn, a mosque and a bakery. However, it should be pointed out that, given its original nature as a public soup kitchen, an *imaret* would have made sense only if its services were needed by a significant number of existing residents. On the other hand, it should also be noted that, although the *imaret* was not invented by the Ottomans, during their empire it developed as highly structured group of buildings.[2] Another theory links the development of the city to an agricultural and animal fair organized in the fields around the Tiranë River, an area that apparently also included an organized system of fortifications. Still another theory argues for the existence of a small village from which a larger town developed as a consequence of the increasing trading flow. All these apparently diverging hypotheses seem to share the view that Tirana grew around a bazar—an Ottoman open-air, market place—initially dedicated mainly to the trading of agricultural produce. Over the centuries, this bazar expanded to include permanent shops, several inns and taverns and the businesses of craftsmen organized in guilds (among them, silversmith, coppersmiths, bricklayers and curriers). The expansion and diversification of these trading and commercial activities stimulated the construction of residential housing and places of worship and attracted the interest of some feudal families from the nearby medieval city of Krujë, who began to settle in Tirana.[3] The population steadily increased and, having become the centre of the Krujë–Tirana sub-prefecture, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the city counted 12,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, until the beginning of the twentieth century Tirana continued to be a small provincial town and did not seem to be playing any relevant role in the country, always secondary to larger and more important cities like the ancient maritime city of Durrës.

Tirana acquired political relevance when, in 1920, it was proclaimed capital of independent Albania.[4] Tirana's newly acquired status (and political relevance) and the aspiration of independent Albania to become a liberal democracy on a par with West European nation states demanded a 'rationally organized' urban planning in order to accommodate the necessary political institutions.

Apart from the Austrian regulatory master plan of 1923, throughout the following two decades, Tirana's urban development was the outcome of a cooperation programme between King Zog and the Italian government. In particular, the master plans conceived by the Italian architects Brasini and Bosio, respectively in 1925 and in 1940, constituted the

almost unchallenged blueprints, even under Communism, for the city's urban planning. Brasini's 'boulevards axis' and arrangement of the ministerial buildings and Bosio's pedestrian friendly city plan are evident in the urban structure of contemporary Tirana. Both architects, especially Bosio, were influenced by the concept of 'garden city' developed in the late nineteenth century by Ebenezer Howard (Howard 1965).[5] Bosio's 'garden city' plan led to the creation of a pedestrian friendly urban set up, with radial roads converging to the centre—which could be reached within 30 minutes from any direction—and circular roads at the outskirts (Prato 2016).[6] As Pllumbi (2013: 79) points out, Bosio's aim was to create a modern urban environment that would give Tirana the image of a western capital city, while at the same time preserving existing elements that reflected its tradition, such as the mosque of Et'hem Bej, with the adjacent Old Clock Tower and the Old Bazar.

The Communist Anti-urban Policy and Its Legacy

Under communism, Tirana's urban centre was conceived as a monumental space that would reflect the ideal of 'Socialist City'. Thus, old buildings, including traditional houses, were demolished and new architectonical symbols were erected. Among the most notable casualties, there were the Old Bazar, the Orthodox cathedral and the municipal building; they were replaced by soviet-style buildings, such as the Palace of Culture and the National Historical Museum, whose façade is dominated by a huge socialist mural and holds centre-stage in Skanderberg Square. These new buildings were meant to be a triumph of communist architecture together with the massive, colourless apartment complexes that flanked broad roads that were mostly empty of cars.[7] The only historical buildings that survived were the mosque of Et'hem Bey and the Clock Tower in Skanderberg Square and the surrounding complex of ministerial buildings. Other structures that were reminiscent of the past political system were turned to a communist-friendly use; for example, the building that had housed the Albanian Parliament until the end of the WWII was turned into a theatre for children. Most important, the communist period, especially after the 1960s, was characterized by a strict anti-urbanization policy that had a threefold aim: to foster the development of rural areas and of the suburban industrial districts; to control urban growth; and to control demographic mobility (Prato 2016). The ideal demographic distribution was supposed to be one-third in urban areas and two-thirds in rural areas.

Paradoxically influenced by the 1940s plans and the 'garden city' model, this anti-urbanization drive was justified as a planning strategy aimed at achieving an optimum city size (Pllumbi 2013). Accordingly, urban areas were delimited by the so-called 'Yellow Lines'; once a city's expansion reached the Yellow Line, the excess population was forced to move to other, less populated cities or to newly created towns (see Aliaj 2003). It must also be noted that under the communist totalitarian regime, Albanians were not allowed to move freely from one city or village to another; a person who wanted to move elsewhere would have to obtain a special permission from a state's representative, which would usually be granted only if a 'proof of job' was provided. In Albania, the communist strategy of the 1960s was meant to emulate the project of self-sustaining urban settlements that had been implemented in some East European countries and in some regions of the Soviet Union.

The establishment of the Yellow Line not only allowed the state to control population movements but also enforced a distinction between the rural and the urban. In line with the concept of self-sustaining urban settlements, land outside the Yellow Line was organized in state-owned farms and publicly managed cooperatives whose priority was to supply the urban population (Prato 2016). Urban areas were generally defined in terms of *urban administrative areas*. Aliaj summarizes the three main criteria adopted in the communist period to grant the status of 'town' to a human settlement. They were: (1) *Activity*—specifically the prevalence of industrial labour and the presence of local administrative authorities; (2) *Number of inhabitants*—although no lower limit was fixed, an ideal town was supposed to have between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants; and (3) *Impact*—which refereed to the 'social dimension' in terms of urban life-style and to the relationship with the surroundings labour market (Aliaj 2003: 27). There were, however, distinctions between relatively large urban areas and small settlements. Cities like Tirana, Durrës and Shkodër would have a larger population. For example, in 1955 Tirana had reached a population of 108,200 inhabitants.

After the collapse of the communist regime in 1990, Albania has been transformed from one of the most rural societies in Europe to an urban society. Almost 60% of the country's population now lives in urban areas. According to the 2015 census, the city of Tirana counts 610,070 inhabitants, while the greater municipality of Tirana has a population of 800,986 inhabitants.[8] It is not clear, however, how accurate is the census regarding the residents of the informal areas, which I shall discuss later. As I mentioned

earlier, internal migration and the increasing number of foreign residents were major causes of demographic growth and the rapid urban expansion. More generally, the urban changes that also affected the city centre could be seen as the outcome of the newly acquired freedom of movement and rights to private property and private business. While migrants from rural areas settled in the urban periphery, many of the city's residents began to extend their properties illegally. Some occupied public spaces and erected informal structures to set up equally informal businesses, especially in central places like the Rinia Park. Not surprisingly, in a country that had experienced one of the harshest communist regimes, were people had been kept isolated from the outside world for decades and had been denied any form of freedom, the newly acquired rights translated into a distorted interpretation of the free market and, as Abitz notes, into a 'lack of respect for public property' (2006: 67). Abitz goes on to argue that the early years after the collapse of communism were certainly not a golden period for urban planning, as they saw different actors contesting the city development. Interestingly, from a social anthropological perspective, Bardhoshi (2011a, 2011b) shows that in the 'legal vacuum' that characterized post-socialist Albania land market and the circulation of property as capital have been possible 'through adaptations of the local tradition of customary law.' He describes this process as a 'kanunization of the free market' in contrast with national processes that appear to be more in line with a neoliberal approach (Bardhoshi 2011a: 11). The following two sections will look at the relationship between local practices, new urban planning and the impact of European programmes like the construction of Corridor VIII.

Overcoming Dividing Lines: Access to the *Blloku* and to Urban Public Space

Perhaps the most symbolic aspect of people's free movement in Tirana is having gained access to the *Blloku* (blocked area). During the communist dictatorship, the *Blloku* was an exclusive residential area inhabited by the party's leadership and was absolutely forbidden to 'ordinary' citizens. This secluded area was constantly patrolled by armed guards to prevent trespassing. The *Blloku* is now an upmarket neighbourhood with luxurious apartments, elegant shops, trendy bars and restaurants. However, in spite of being physically accessible to all, very few can actually enjoy the services and entertainment that this area has to offer. The *Blloku* has become the

'playground' of the young Albanian élite and is very attractive to foreigners, who enjoy the many local bars, restaurants, nightclubs and casinos. The centrally located Rinia Park has been transformed into a green commercial area with renovated buildings, including some illegal constructions that have survived the cleansing order during the programme of 'Urban Renaissance' (*Rilindja e Qytetit*) promoted in 2000 by the then mayor, Edi Rama, who has now become Albania's Prime Minister.[9] The complex known as the Taiwan Centre has become the most popular gathering place in Rinia Park, with its expensive restaurants and bars, outdoor terraces facing the new fountain, a bowling alley, a club and a casino.

Elsewhere (Prato 2016) I have discussed in detail the urban renaissance of Tirana's inner city that has been promoted since the 2000. Here, it should be pointed out that before the implementation of this scheme, the inner city was subjected to a wild building speculation which, apart from the aforementioned illegal housing extensions and appropriation of public space, saw unplanned new high-rise complexes, mainly residential condominiums, mushrooming totally out of control. The absence of urban planning generated what some urbanists have called a 'collage city' (Pllumbi 2013). By the mid-1990s, Tirana had become a construction site dotted with countless new or renovated buildings that rose next to rundown neighbourhoods. The renovation promoted under the 'Urban Renaissance' scheme also addressed the problems of the crumbling soviet-style residential buildings. The solution proposed by the mayor, who was an artist, was to paint in bright colours the grey apartment blocks inherited from the communist era. Some tower blocks were painted with horizontal orange and red stripes; others with concentric pink and purple circles. His political opponents argued that this was just a facelift because while the façades of these buildings looked better the internal poor conditions remained mostly unchanged. Although in 2004 the internet community elected Rama as 'World Mayor' for the improvement of Tirana's inner city, his home critics claimed that he focused too much on cosmetic changes, but was unable to address major problems such as shortages of drinking water and erratic electricity supply. His political opponents also accused him of mismanagement of funds and corruption, including corruption in granting some building permissions.[10] However, when in 2014 I met some informants who in the past had criticized his work as mayor of Tirana, I found that they were now full of praise for his approach as Prime Minister. From my recent conversations with these informants it

has emerged that people's changing attitude towards their rulers should be contextualized historically in relation to broader processes. It appears that in Albania these changing attitudes are in part explained by people's opposition to emerging ideologies that are perceived as hindering the country's efforts to redefine and finally affirm its image as a liberal and democratic European society.

Albania's effort to be regarded as a modern, democratic and efficient country is reflected in the various attempts to implement a sustainable urban planning for its major cities, including Tirana. Since 1994, at least half a dozen urban plans have been outlined for Tirana with the help of foreign consultants from a variety of countries, such as the United States of America, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and France, and local NGOs and experts. These plans have mainly targeted inner-city development, though in some cases they have addressed the whole metropolitan area, including the informal zones that have grown at the periphery, beyond the Yellow Line. The continuously changing political situation that has characterized the post-communist decades, has considerably delayed the formal approval of these plans. Many of them were the outcome of 'informal' agreements between the élite in power at the time and consulting firms. Because of the frequent political changes, most of these plans did not undergo the established approval procedure; therefore, as their legal status was unclear, their implementation could potentially lead to accusation of corruption from political opponents. An example of how changes in the political sphere have influenced the implementation of these plans is provided by the project to build the multifunctional 'Toptani Plaza complex', which has replaced the previous plan for the 'Toptani shopping centre' approved by Edi Rama when he was mayor of Tirana. Those in favour of the multifunctional complex argue that this project is more in line with the idea of a sustainable city because it is conceived as an indoor, pedestrianized extension of modern Tirana.

In spite of political fights and bureaucratic delays, positive changes did occur in Tirana's inner-city. For example, the area around the Lana River—a stream that crosses the city centre—has been cleaned and landscaped; the old rundown houses along the riverbanks have been demolished (although it took 10 year to empty a building occupied by squatter families) and the Tanner Bridge has been restored and is now part of Tirana's pedestrian network. Pedestrian areas are most welcome in Tirana for, regardless of age, the city residents enjoy socializing outdoors; it is not unusual to see the older generation playing cards or simply chatting in the

city's parks, whereas younger people love to engage in long promenades, locally known as the *xhiro*, through car-free boulevards and pedestrian paths. The promenade is a typical aspect of outdoors socialization in many north Mediterranean countries. This is another aspect of life that could not be enjoyed under communism and has been eagerly rediscovered or, in the case of the younger generation, discovered anew.

Pedestrian routes and bike lanes are a new aspect of Tirana's aim of being in tune with the EU programmes on smart, green, sustainable cities. Many of these projects have been part of the Central Axis Masterplan, which has focused on Skanderberg Square and its surrounding boulevards and the relocation of the central station. The latter project is still a long way from being accomplished and, today, Tirana is perhaps the only European capital without a train station. This master plan envisages the construction of ten 85-meter-tall towers around Skanderberg Square. Two of them have been completed—the TID Business Centre and the 4–Ever Green Tower—and now dominate the urban landscape with their multifunctional 25 floors that include residential apartments, shopping facilities, office space and luxurious hotels with panoramic views.

Significantly, as some of the proposals included in these plans have obtained international funds, including funds from the World Bank, the international community has pressured Albania's decision makers to speed up the necessary reforms that would allow the implementation of the most relevant projects. As we shall see, this is necessary for the improvement of Tirana and essential for the completion of the European projects involving Albania. In order to accomplish these projects, since the early 2000s, the new urban development plans have gradually radiated outwards, first towards areas within the official boundaries of the city (the Yellow Line), then towards the informal areas, addressing the development of the Tirana–Durrës region through which the infrastructure of Corridor VIII would be located.

Many of these projects are about the construction of modern, multi-functional centres along the highway connecting Tirana to the port city of Durrës, along the axis connecting Tirana to the airport and in the direction of the developing residential areas at the urban outskirt. Typical examples are the Mall of Albania and the City Park to the northwest, which include shops, cinemas, casinos, spa centres, luxurious hotels with high-tech conference facilities and the Tirana East Gate to the southeast, which is described as Albania's largest covered retail and entertainment centre. All these new developments are supposed to be easily accessible to

everybody either by private car, through renovated or new main roads, or by public transport. In practice, going to these extra-urban facilities has become a status symbol because they are accessible mainly by car. There are free shuttles running from various points in the city centre, but they are not easily reachable by people who, for example, live in the informal areas at the urban periphery. Furthermore, it should be noted that, on the one hand, the use of public transport, or walking (out of necessity, as opposed to walking for pleasure as in the case of the *xhiro*) are associated to low socio-economic status; on the other hand, the informal areas are poorly connected to the city centre by public transport. Some observers have argued that this aspect of urban transformation has generated a 'dual city' (Pojani 2010b); that is, a city—within the Yellow Line—for well-off residents, and a city—made up of the informal areas—for the poorer Albanians, mainly immigrants from rural areas. In order to understand why and how this dual reality has developed, it is relevant to examine the processes that spurred the unplanned, unauthorized urbanization at the periphery of Tirana and of other major Albanian cities.

In Search of a Better Life: Informal Urbanization in the Tirana–Durrës Region

In a separate comparative work on European migration, I have analysed in depth the phenomenon of internal migration that led to the development of the urban informal areas in Albania (Prato 2016). Here, I will summarize the aspects of this process which are relevant to the present discussion, including the significance of their location along the route of Corridor VIII.

Since the early 1990s, the closure of cooperatives, state industries and state farms led to a sudden collapse of the country's economy, leaving many people unemployed, especially in the countryside. The rural north was particularly affected by the economic crisis and the consequent deterioration of the infrastructure. The combination of these negative events triggered the exodus of the working-age population from the mountain areas. Those who could not emigrate abroad moved to the country's urbanized areas, especially in the central coastal region (mainly in the Tirana–Durrës area), in the hope of making a better life in the city. As most of them could not afford to pay rent in the city, they occupied illegally the land of former agricultural cooperatives and state industries outside the official boundaries marked by

the Yellow Line. In the metropolitan area of Tirana, the informal zones amount to 40% of the urban expansion. The initial squatter settlements grew in four specific peri-urban areas; they are: Kamza to the northwest, Babruja to the north, Sauk to the south and Yzberish to the southwest. Morphological reasons apart, this is explained by the fact that these areas were well located—they were near transport routes and could be easily connected to electricity and water supply lines and, many families hoped, given their proximity to new planned transport routes, children could easily go to school. Significantly, the strongest expansion occurred towards the northwest, along the planned EU transportation Corridor VIII. The pressure to acquire land for development produced widespread speculation, rampant unauthorized building and, not surprisingly, an increase in the (informal) market value of the land. Felstehausen (1999) has documented the development in the commercial use of highway space and the rapid increase in the number of shops and businesses. We have seen, for example, that the fashionable City Park is located along this Corridor.

As I have indicated, the construction of new houses and business premises in these areas have taken place in the absence of public planning, street layout and infrastructure. Water and electricity supply was obtained by illegally tapping into the public grid. As these areas have become more urbanized, these services have fallen under the control of illegal ward bosses who have charged each household a hook-up fee. As we shall see, over the past decade, several plans have been made to improve living conditions in these areas. Pressured by the international community, in 2006 the Albanian government established the 'Agency for the Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Areas/Constructions' (ALUIZNI).[11] This Agency was a special body of the Ministry of Urban Development and was meant to cooperate with international investors, NGOs and private stakeholders in the implementation of various projects that targeted informal areas across the country. However, given the strategic and economic and demographic relevance of the Tirana–Durrës region, special attention has been paid to address the problem swiftly there. It is worth noting that the Tirana–Durrës region is the fastest growing region in Europe; it covers two counties (*qarku*) and includes the country's capital city, its main port, more than a quarter of its population and almost two-fifths of its economy.[12]

As I mentioned earlier, Durrës – the ancient Dyrrachium – has witnessed a process of informal urbanization similar to Tirana. This maritime city has played a key role in many significant moments in the history of the

country. Today, its port constitutes Albania's most important node of maritime transport, the starting point of Corridor VIII and the terminal on the eastern shore of the Adriatic of the oil and gas pipelines of the Adriatic-Black Sea itinerary. Noteworthy, the contemporary itinerary of Corridor VIII follows the route of the ancient *Via Egnatia*, the road that linked Rome to the Eastern provinces of the Empire. Not surprisingly, now Durrës is playing again an important strategic role in several international programmes.[13] Equally unsurprisingly, the urban development of the city and its municipal territory are the object of constant monitoring, especially by those international organizations that have invested considerable resources in the accomplishment of infrastructural projects and are pressing the Albanian government to find efficient solutions to the problems associated with the informal urban sprawl.

Apart from the informal constructions that have mushroomed in the city centre (e.g. multi-storey condominiums and commercial buildings), the three peripheral areas that have been affected by a significant degree of informal urbanization are Këneta, Spitalla and Porto-Romano, all located to the north of the city and had been sites of major industrial development. The largest informal urbanization has occurred in the former marshes of Këneta.

Emulating the Italian projects of reclamation of marshlands in the Fascist era, the Këneta marshes (*kënetë* means reeds bed) were drained in the 1950s to expand the agricultural farmland around the city of Durrës; later, the land was designated as a green area (regulatory plan of 1987). In the post-communist period, this area began to be populated through a process of allocation of land similar to that that occurred at the periphery of Tirana. In both cases, the previously state-owned farmland and business buildings were leased to private individuals.[14] As I explain in a separate work (Prato 2016), initially this partial privatization benefitted mainly the former communist *nomenklatura* who had timely access to the right information. Parcels of land were also allocated to workers families on condition that they would work the land and become independent farmers.

The Këneta area began to be populated in 1992. By 1996, around 170 families (almost 10,000 inhabitants) were settled on 400 acres of land. Over the years, urbanization has grown considerably, now extending to a territory of 350 hectares. The number of residents has increased considerably, reaching about 7,000 families (about 40,000 inhabitants), which accounts for 18.3% of the population of Durrës. This is one of the largest, densely populated informal developments in Albania, though the area

lacks basic infrastructure, schools and social services. In most of the Këneta area there is no solid waste collection; waste is either transported by the local residents to collection sites outside the immediate neighbourhood, or is burned, buried or thrown into the drainage canals.

The rural migrants who first arrived in the area 'purchased' their land from the people who were already settled there. There were no laws regulating the land market. However, although the acquisition of land took place informally, the buyers felt assured that they had obtain full legal ownership. Problems with ownership seem to affect mainly potential formal developers, who would have to buy the land from the owners of onsite houses that had been built informally. These informal practices have affected both the land market in the informal areas and the land market that developed following the restitution of property prescribed by the law of 1993.

The social and cultural dynamics, and the economic and political implications of this kind of informal market have been studied from different disciplinary perspectives. From an anthropological perspective, I have analysed these informal transactions in relation to the restitution of property in Durrës (Prato 2011) and Bardhoshi has provided a detailed analysis of the land market in the informal areas of Tirana, describing these informal areas as sites of '*fluid uncertainties*' (Bardhoshi 2011a). Bardhoshi refers to Pardo's analysis on trust (Pardo 2000b) to suggest that the informal practices 'appear to be a product of people's distrust and mistrust of the state law . . . a result of the state's failure to implement the law' (Bardhoshi 2011a: 18). The informal zones emerge as 'self-regulating systems' where, again borrowing from Pardo (2000a), different legitimizing moralities seem to exist that allow people to operate and to make a living; in particular, by adapting norms and values incorporated in the traditional customary law. However, as I have argued in relation to the Durrës ethnography (Prato 2011), the reference to the rediscovered appeal to traditional norms should not be seen as evidence of a historical continuity. Contrary to deterministic approaches, I asserted that what may appear as a cultural legacy, has turned out to be a new development of 'familiar patterns that assume new meanings and are used to new ends' (Prato 2011: 136). Most important, following Pardo's analysis on exchange of favours in Naples (Pardo 1996), I suggested that in Albania, faced by continuously changing laws and bureaucratic delays, people have engaged in informal transactions that have become part of a system of exchange based on broadly defined social and moral norms that

cannot be address solely in relation to a set of legal rules (Pardo 2004). Both my own and Bardhoshi's analyses indicate that, paradoxically, politicians across the political spectrum have initially encouraged this system in order to secure political support and legitimize their power in urban areas.

New Paths Towards Legalization, Urbanization and Integration

Today, the future of cities like Durrës and Tirana is linked to the legalization and the sustainable development of the informal areas. In the case of Durrës, projects that address the integration of the informal areas into an expanded city context focus on three central development axes: urban planning (with the World Bank's financial assistance), the port (funded through EU programmes) and tourism (involving private-public partnerships). Këneta seems to have good potentialities for both tourism and 'legal' real estate development; intervention in the bay of Porto-Romano is instead directed towards the development of a new port (mainly for industrial purposes) through the restructuring of the existing LGP and oil facilities, which would lighten the pressure on the overcrowded main port of Durrës.

Although the situation in the informal areas has remained virtually unchanged for more than 20 years, recently formal services have begun to be provided. The electricity network has been upgraded and extended; meters for domestic consumption are being installed and households have begun to pay regularly their bills.

Albania's current Prime Minister, Edi Rama, is translating his approach to *Rilindja e Qytetit*—which he had applied as mayor of Tirana—into a scheme of 'Renaissance of Cities' for the whole country. This scheme is meant finally to bring about a 'Europeanizing transformation' of major Albanian cities. An example of this scheme is represented by his government's projects for Durrës. In 2014, during his official visit to the city, Rama promised to invest 13 million US dollars for the 'urbanization of the new Durrës', which would include the requalification of large neglected areas of the city, such as the Poplars underpass and the Dajlani Bridge (both filled with waste) and the creation of a landscaped, seven-kilometre-long bike lane by the sea.

Once again, the Albanian government's waking up and new approach to the solution of informal areas are in part due to pressure from the

international community. Having signed a new Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2006, Albania is formally committed to pursue the path towards European integration. However, full membership of the EU is conditional to demonstrating that the country will bring into the Union a democratic society and an economically strong and politically stable state.

Since 2009, the adoption of a new planning system has become a priority for the national government (see, for example, Republic of Albania 2009; 2013). Fully implemented in 2011 in an amended form, it includes the socio-spatial integration of the informal areas in the city as a whole, thus eliminating the 'dual city' phenomenon that makes people feel, with good reason, second class citizens and outsiders in their own country.

In line with Krase (2012b), it could be argued that the transformation of the urban landscape produced by migration has introduced a new ordering of city life. In contemporary Albania, while rural migrants have changed the suburban landscape, the inner cities have been changed by urban planners to satisfy what local administrators perceive to be the needs of the international community; in the process, transforming the country's urban realities into 'world-class cities' that would hopefully attract new investors. As a consequence, for a long time the built environment and the separation of the informal areas from the wider urban society have, as Krase would say (Krase 2012a), symbolically marked people's position and the ordering of the urban inhabitants in terms of spatial location.

Several NGOs are now involved in programmes of integration of the informal areas in the city life (Vitorovič 2009b). In particular, by advocating 'participatory planning', their intervention is facilitating the participation of the local communities in schemes of private–public partnership (PPP) and the relationship between local residents and the municipal authorities. In a sense, mirroring processes of urban development and gentrification in other world cities, these NGOs are crucial to providing a 'view from the street' that is often missing from abstract urban planning and politicians' approach. As Krase and DeSena show with reference to gentrification in Brooklyn, 'most policy–makers . . . employ wide–angle lens to describe what is going on at that very street level' (2015: 3), thus failing to see both the particular—for example, people's needs and expectations— and the broader picture —such as, the benefits for the whole society that the social, political and economic integration of these areas and their inhabitants would bring about.

Crucially, the new planning system also recognizes that making municipalities responsible for the implementation of territorial programmes is essential to the successful accomplishments of this strategy of integration. Making local administrations responsible for the process of territorial governance might be a recent phenomenon in the Albanian scenario, but it certainly is an essential aspect of democracy as it helps (or should help) to facilitate the participation of citizens in decision making. Most important, it should be recognized that the establishment of this level or responsibility in running local affairs is essential to the concept that 'a key task of governance is to establish and nurture the connection with citizens' values, needs and expectations, the strength of which depends upon the observable quality of the link between political responsibility and trust and authority in the exercise of power' (Pardo and Prato 2011: 1).

Conclusions: Good Governance, Cities and Urban Life

The integration of informal settlers into the city life is progressing—very slowly. In the past, this was due to lack of a comprehensive strategy, which widened the gap between the informal settlers and the rest of the city. Now, major problems that remain poorly addressed and that are hindering this process are high level of unemployment, illiteracy, poor health, low-income jobs (often in informal activities) and poverty.[15] And yet, it should go without saying that it is the task of governments to recognize and solve society's problems.

At the beginning of this chapter I referred to the cities ideal-types encapsulated by the concepts of *urbs, polis* and *civitas*. I suggested that, taken together, these ideal-types would promote political and civic participation and provide an environment functional to good government. The historical and ethnographic material that I have analysed here indicates a slow unwinding progress in post-communist Albania towards the accomplishment of 'good government'—a government that, as I said, is at the service of the community of citizens and of the common good.

There is of course a difference between governance and government. Undeniably, post-communist Albania does have democratic institutions of government. However, as I have argued, a democratic constitution on paper does not guarantee citizens' rights and their full participation in society (Prato 2011). Most important, rulers should value the rights of society and act to the benefit of its citizens by managing and allocating resources to address collective problems. Good governance is ultimately based on

responsibility, accountability, transparency, participation, democratic decision making and effectiveness. Of course, good governance is much more than ticking the right boxes according to statistical standards; it is about how public functions at political/administrative level are carried out; it is about economic democracy and how resources are distributed in society and whether people have actually access to them; it is about prioritizing the rights and needs of citizens at all times. It is not simply about exercising power; more fundamentally, as Pardo argues (Pardo 2000b), it is about authority and the socially recognized legitimacy of such authority. In a nutshell, it is reflected in shared values and the accomplishment of the common good.

Notes

1. The material analysed in this chapter suggests that such description would also apply to other major Albanian cities, like Durrës.
2. Ottoman *imarets* could include mosques, inns, public baths and, if located along trading routes, caravanserais—the latter were more usually found along the "silk road".
3. Notably among them, the Toptani family, who became one of the most prominent and influential families of Tirana in the nineteenth century. Their name is still associated with an area of the city and nowadays, as we shall see, with one of the multifunctional tower centres included in the new urban master plan of Tirana.
4. Albania gained independence from the Ottomans in 1912. Initially, Durrës was designated as the country's capital city. Later, Tirana was chosen as the capital city for its central location and as a compromise between the two major cultural groups; the Gheg in the North and the Tosk in the South.
5. Early twentieth-century architects who embraced this concept proposed the creation of 'garden city communities' in metropolitan areas. Garden city communities were usually conceived as residential neighbourhoods surrounded by parkland and pasture.
6. Such a 'compact city' would easily meet the needs of the city's population. In 1923, Tirana had a population of 10,845 inhabitants, which by 1937 increased to 35,000.
7. Noteworthy, ordinary citizens were forbidden from owing a private car. In the 1970s there were 600 cars in the whole of Albania. This contrasts quite sharply with the 300,000 cars that were registered in 2015 in Tirana alone.
8. Following the administrative–territorial Reform of 2015, Tirana is now composed of 24 administrative units (*mini bashki/njësi administrative*), which include the 11 mini-municipalities (*mini bashki*) that existed before

2015, and 13 new territorial divisions (see, Pojani 2010a). The city of Tirana has become the biggest metropolitan area in Albania; it is the only city with a population of over 500,000 inhabitants.

9. Edi Rama's scheme aimed at making Tirana a dynamic "world class" city, comfortable for foreigners and the new Albanian élite and that could attract further investments.
10. Since the collapse of communism, accusations of corruption (no matter whether they are proved or unsubstantiated) have become part of political competition (see Prato 2011).
11. *Agjencia e Legalizimit, Urbanizimit dhe Integrimit të Zonave/Ndërtimeve Informale* (http://www.aluizni.gov.al/). Since its establishment, ALUIZNI has registered 350,000 demands for legalization of former illegal constructions. Of these, 80,000 are multi-function buildings that include residential apartments and shops.
12. 35% of Albania's enterprises are located in the Durrës–Tirana region, 60% of foreign investments are made in this area, and it is estimated than one million people live in this metropolitan area.
13. Elsewhere, I have analysed the geopolitical relevance of Corridor VIII for the European Transport Network with particular reference to Albania's strategic position (Prato 2014). The Tirana–Durrës region plays a central role for the successful development of this route and is regarded as EU's gateway to the East. It is expected that all infrastructures and multi-modal transport system of Corridor VIII (which includes sea and river ports) will be completed by 2028. The Corridor's main route passes through Bari and Brindisi on the western Adriatic coast, Durrës, Tirana, Skopje and Sofia in the Balkans, Burgas and Varna on the Black sea. It links to Turkey through a branch leading to Greece along Corridor IV. Apart from this West-East Axis, as part of the expansion of the European Transport Network, a North-South axis will pass through Durrës. This is often referred to as the Adriatic-Ionian motorway that connects Croatia to Greece along the Adriatic and Ionian coastline.
14. The 1991 Law on Land awarded land to citizens according to a system of 'distribution'. The 'restitution' of land was regulated by a later Law passed in 1993.
15. Albania's GBP per capita is among the lowest in Europe.

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CHAPTER 3

Post-Socialist Europe and Its "Constitutive Outside": Ethnographic Resemblances for a Comparative Research Agenda

Giovanni Picker

Introduction

The "post-Socialist Europe" label has been criticized for not being able to fully capture post-1989–91 social and cultural processes in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia; not only for simplifying and lumping together rather different political, economic and social experiences but also for supporting "allochronism" (Fabian 1983), denying contemporaneousness and agency to the people of the region(s) (cfr. Buchowski 2012: 77–78). In approaching post-Socialist Europe from an internal and diachronic perspective, i.e. focusing only on Central and Eastern Europe and Russia and only on temporality, this line of criticism claims that present-day social conditions cannot be seen exclusively as a result of the past. By contrast, in this chapter I propose to reflect critically on the "post-Socialist Europe" label from an external and comparative synchronic perspective: rather than from its inside, I want to discuss post-Socialist Europe in relation to its outside. Rather than asking, What is post-Socialist Europe in relation to Socialist Europe?, my question is, What is suppressed, when it comes to post-Socialist Europe? – in other words, What is, exactly, *non*-post-Socialist Europe?

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_3

Derrida's concept of the "constitutive outside" is a useful reference here: "[t]he elements of signification function not through the compact force of their nuclei but rather through the *networks of oppositions* that distinguish them and then relate them one to another" (Derrida 1991: 63; emphasis added). The concept has then been rearticulated by Stuart Hall (1991) who saw in "the rest" the pivotal constitutive element of "the West". Shifting from critical theory to located historical, political and cultural contexts, the theoretical question becomes, "What kind of "networks of oppositions" does post-Socialist Europe entail?" One set of these "networks" has been established with Socialist Europe, and the subject has received quite a large attention (e.g. Verdery 1996; Burawoy and Verdery 1999). A second set of networks has been established with Post-Socialist *non*-Europe – this has provided a meaningful register for a comparative critique primarily of Latin American socio-economic and political dynamics (e.g. Lijphart and Waisman 1996; Gerskovits 1998; Terry 1992). To date, however, there has strikingly been no effort in questioning synchronic "networks of oppositions" with what can be called *non*-post-Socialist Europe.

In order to contribute to filling this gap, I start by asking a simple, perhaps naive question – Why are post-Socialist Portugal, post-Socialist Sweden, or post-Socialist Luxemburg, among others, never an issue? The answer may be rather straightforward: by "Post-Socialist Europe," one can easily say, what is actually meant is post-*State*-Socialist-Europe. Adding one more hyphen and the fundamental "State" would probably make the expression historically and philosophically more correct. Indeed, Socialism as such was and is primarily a *social philosophy* which imagines itself to be universal in nature and international in project (Engels 1970[1882]). However, my interest lies beyond striving for nominal accuracy; rather, I am inspired by two main research streams – the first can be summarized by what Melegh called "East-West slope" (2006), namely, a documented orientalist public discourse, emerging in the early 1990s, of an alleged moral, political and "civic" superiority of Western Europe vis-à-vis Eastern Europe (see also Wolf 1994; Todorova 1997); the second source of inspiration is a growing sense in anthropology that the production of knowledge on Eastern Europe should not only come from its Western counterpart, but rather from "merg[ing] perspectives from the 'East' and 'West' in order to create a truly equal and innovative anthropology in Central and Eastern Europe" (Buchowski 2012: 82).

Moving from these standpoints, this chapter examines, from a historical-ethnographic and comparative perspective, present-day fragmented resemblances and disjunctures between post-socialist Eastern and *post-socialist Western* Europe, in view of proposing a comparative ethnographic perspective. By focusing on the governance of socially marginalized Romani people in Cluj-Napoca (Romania) and Florence (Italy), I will show that in both temporal units (i.e. pre- and post-1989) the two cities display ethnographic resemblances, and that if one desperately wants to look for hierarchies between the two, the Romanian city might well earn a superior position. However, rather than creating disparities and hierarchies, which may serve less to explain social processes than to perpetuate Manichean representations typical of orientalist knowledge, my conclusion will point at the importance of engaging ethnographic comparisons of "West" and "East" in order to demythologize, de-dichotomize and ultimately refine knowledge on (Post-) socialism.

From Forced Inclusion to Forced Exclusion across the East-West Divide

Post-Socialism in Western Europe is a real condition. It speaks of a fading-away utopia, a massively powerful cosmology which had once grounded sociality, inspired masses and workers' households, provided hope, meaning-making, intellectual and emotional strength, and ultimately produced fundamental social change which people in Western Europe have enjoyed for many years even after 1989. For instance, Left-wing class politics fighting for the interests of the working classes against the exploitative capitalist elite substantially shaped the lives of the working poor in many Italian, Spanish and French regions (e.g. Shore 1990; Pratt 2003; Però 2007). Furthermore, feminist politics supported primarily by Communist and Socialist parties engendered social dynamics including the successful referendum for adopting abortion and divorce laws that are still part of many women and men's collective memories in a number of countries (Papadogiannis and Gehrig 2015). For many Western European citizens who benefited from, and enjoyed, Left-wing politics, 1989 represented a shocking turning point after which their structured cultural and political references vanished more or less rapidly. Moreover, the early 1990s' global emergence of neoliberal ideologies and their supporters, including increasingly powerful institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, have been shaping the socio-economic opportunities of the marginalized in

both parts of Europe, and surely beyond. Therefore, looking ethnographically across (post-)State-Socialist Europe and (post-)-non-State-Socialist-Europe can illuminate qualitative resemblances which may be neglected if the attention is exclusively put on the macro impact of the vanishing iron curtain on Eastern European economy and society.

Stemming from these considerations, ethnographically comparing instances of local governance of marginalized Romani families can shed light on similarities and differences between modes of governing deemed "others within" in both Socialist and today's (post-Socialist) Europe. Since the late Middle Ages, Romani people have come to constitute the largest minority in Europe (Liegeois 1994). As a number of authors have documented (e.g. Crowe 2003; Lucassen et al. 1998), for the majority of their history Romani people have been refused participation in local and national polities, largely due to the stigmatization they have continually faced. Since the early fifteenth century, both state policy and everyday expressions of exclusion have contributed to the marginalization of Romani people, pushing them either towards rural areas – typically in Eastern Europe, or urban peripheries – typically in Western Europe (Plésiat 2010). In this context, efforts towards forced inclusion, i.e. assimilation, have continued in both parts of Europe since Empress Maria Teresa's measures of forcibly sedentarizing Romani collectives in the eighteenth century. WWII saw the apogee of nationalist and genocidal policy across the East and the West; from 1945 to 1989 both Eastern and Western European states carried out important measures addressing Romani people, and continued the politics *forced inclusion*, steered by the official idiom of "social integration" in the West, and "assimilation in the working masses" in the East. Past 1989, and most prominently since the early 2000s, across the East-West divide a converging path towards a *forced exclusion* became explicit: public agendas and state rhetoric gradually but steadfastly enacted disciplining and repressive public actions, often making headlines in Europe and beyond (Picker 2010; Van Baar 2011; Stewart 2012). Against this historical background, Cluj (Romania) and Florence (Italy) seem to display particularly explicit ethnographic resemblances

Post-Socialist Cluj, Romania

Until the early 2000s the history of Roma governance in Cluj is rather straightforward. In the 1960s Ceausescu's sedentarization policies lead

almost inevitably several Roma families to move from the countryside to the urban area, in particular to Iris, the main industrial neighbourhood. Since then, the neighbourhood acquired the "Gypsy stigma", becoming the "Gypsy neighbourhood" of Cluj, namely, a dangerous place, in which social abandonment, moral decay and crime were discursively lumped together in a suspicious alchemy informing several urban legends. Those legends maintained, and still largely maintain, that *Țigani* (literally "Gypsies") are the major cause of all the problems (see Picker 2013). Territorial stigmatization was still prominent when in 2008 I started my fieldwork in and around the neighbourhood. While spending long afternoons in the local pub with workers going home from their shifts, I became acquainted with the idiom with which Irisians, i.e. the neighbourhood's inhabitants or simply those who worked there but nonetheless imagine some sort of belonging to the neighbourhood, experienced their social environment and the "Gypsy stigma" they acknowledged as being rooted in the urban imaginary.

The early 2000s and 2010 mark the beginning of a new trend in governing marginalized urban Romani households in Romania. Between 2000 and 2003 for the first time the city council designed and implemented an ad hoc policy for about 50 people of Romani background living in vulnerable conditions in various parts of the city centre. They were relocated to an ad hoc settlement of containers very close to the railway in the peripheral zone of the regional landfill, which is called Pata Rât. Due to the proximity to the railways, the relocated families could not obtain the certificate of dwelling, called *extras de carte funciara*, which would have allowed them to get a lawful residence certificate, and thus access local public services (Rat 2013). In December 2010 the municipality ordered another, far larger, eviction, relocating 56 Romani families, i.e. 270 people, from the city centre, Coastei street, to an ad hoc settlement right close to Pata Rât, far beyond the urban perimeter. Carrying out evictions and relocations is a rather common governance practice in Romania and in other European countries (both East and West) when it comes to Romani families, as if they were legitimately eligible of differential treatment by local public authorities (Vincze and Rat 2013). My ethnography of the conditions within which the 2010 eviction took place accounted for civil servants' tacit knowledge about, and representations of, Romani households in Cluj (Picker 2013). One small instance of these representations is the

definition of the situation by the senior civil servant who designed and ordered the eviction:

> The problem of Romani citizens in Coastei street is an old one. First there were four flats, which were owned by the municipality and rented out to some families – there were Romanian and Romani families. We relocated 40 families, of whom 18 had already regularly paid to the municipality part of the rent in advance for a certain period of time, while 22 were abusively occupying the municipal property. (. . .)
>
> But you should consider that those flats were insalubrious and inadequate to a decent life in Cluj-Napoca municipality, with regards to general public health laws. It was a potential risk for public health. Moreover, with the passing of time, the number of the flats swelled and those families started developing major prejudices vis-à-vis other Clujeans (. . .) What happened? We have granted a land, we built up modular housing units, and in the moment when this housing were completed, we asked the Roma living in Coastei to apply for those new housing.

And later on, a more explicit view of Romani people:

> You should also see who are the people targeted by this policy. I wonder, what is their mentality? That's because a public policy can be very good, but if it's not applicable, meaning that the people for whom it is designed to be implemented see reality in a completely differently way . . . then everything becomes complicated.

This excerpt provides a sense of common representations of marginalized urban Romani households. Instantiating the deep-rooted discourse of an alleged unchangeable "mentality", as the civil servant did, speaks more of state approaches than of Romani people's alleged characteristics; it accounts for the difficulty of improving the institutional approach to marginalized fractions of the urban population in Eastern Europe. The "mentality" referred to by the civil servant, moreover, is deemed different from the majority's as well as the main reason why a "good" public policy cannot be applicable; therefore, that "difference" is not neutral or void of value judgement, but squarely inscribed within the production of socio-economic, symbolic and spatial hierarchies, ultimately contributing to keep Romani people at the bottom of the urban class structure and outside the spatial boundaries of the city.

In addition to those fundamental representations, the urban economic context of the 2010 eviction included three essential issues: (a) increased cutbacks in social service spending and the reliance on more repressive forms of social control, (b) urban restructuring following a clear neoliberal agenda constituted by development projects aiming to create real estate and corporation profit without paying attention to social costs and (c) the national increase of class inequalities alongside ethnic and racial lines. (a) Between 2010 and 2011 the number of Clujean families on social benefits dropped from 170 to 110. The government of the poor, at the same time, has not been reduced, but possibly intensified by increasing the number of police branches in major Romanian cities, aiming in this way to control the potential petty-criminal marginalized, and to more directly respond to the majority's sense of insecurity. Interestingly, at times Western European institutions have chiefly been involved in this process of governing the poor - for example in Bacău (Eastern Romania) as the chief police officer explained to me, this process has been managed by the Swiss state police. (b) From clearing the city centre of worker households (Petrovici 2007) to public-private partnerships for large development projects in Iris (Picker 2014), since 2004 the urban political economy has followed a clear and rather steadfast neoliberal direction, attracting foreign direct investments especially by corporations seeking cheap labour. (c) Within a larger, national context, Romania is one of the most unequal Eastern European countries with regard to income per capita – from 1987/1990 to 2007/2008 the income inequality index increased from 23 to 31 (Hirt 2012: 42); moreover, in 2002 the UNDP (2002) reported that in Romania 80% of interviewed Romani people stated that they believed their living conditions were better in the past. Against this background the relocation to Pata Rât provoked the fall of the families' average income by 30%, and 28% of adult men lost their jobs (ERRC 2012).

The 2010 eviction, therefore, can be viewed as one of the signs of the wider process of socio-economic neoliberal restructuring. The two main official reasons for carrying out the eviction were the continuous complains by their neighbourhoods and the bad hygienic conditions of Romani families' housing in the city centre. (Municipal Directive 127/2010). As for the first one, when in summer 2011, helped by two police officers, I looked in the local police database for official complaints in the area, over the last 4 years, I found four complaints only: one of them was about a car burning, and only the other three were mentioning *Țigani*. As for the second official reason behind the eviction, i.e. bad hygienic conditions, its

validity remains profoundly questioned by the decision itself of relocating those Romani families to a landfill (see Picker, 2017, for a more detailed discussion of hygiene).

In conclusion, the 2010 eviction is a clear expression of forced exclusion. While Socialism set out to include, in its own assimilationist way, Romani people in the urban working classes, post-Socialism seems to increasingly participate in another, unprecedented in this part of Europe, form of policy – pushing them to extreme urban peripheries and rural areas, even near landfills.

Post-Socialist Florence, Italy

Yugoslav Romani adult men began travelling to Florence in the 1970s, trying to establish business, particularly in second-hand car trading. By the mid-1980s a number of poor Romani families from Kosovo and Bosnia, the two most affected countries of Yogoslavia's collapse, were living in trailers and improvised housing in the outskirts of Florence. In 1988, as neighbours' protests mounted, the Left-wing regional council passed a law ordering the construction of camps. The law was entitled *Interventions to protect the Romani ethnicity* and it was the first law exclusively addressing Romani people in the region. It was based on the false assumption that Romani people are all nomadic people and therefore those who just arrived from Kosovo and Macedonia need a place to stop their wandering life, in order to both become socially integrated and keep their vagrant traditions – what better choice than providing them with equipped camps? Accordingly, the 1988 law put a strong accent of sedentarization: only those who would choose camps as their permanent, sedentary housing solution, were entitled to various social services. This example shows that the pre-1989 forced inclusion of Romani people occurred in both regions of Europe, not only in the East.

Together with Bologna, Florence is Italy's most prominent Left-wing city (and Tuscany, along with Emilia Romagna, the most leftist Italian region). Since 1945 the city has almost constantly been governed by leftist and centre-leftist mayors and the 1988 law was proposed and unanimously accepted by a Left-wing regional council. This deeply rooted tradition should not be seen as a mere political expression of the majority, but rather as a strong social force able to shape individual, family and group lives (Kertzer 1996). The communist party's sections, unions and neighbourhoods activism has been able to mobilize and provide solid cultural and

intellectual references to hundreds of thousands of Florentine as Tuscan workers for the most part of the twentieth century. It is interesting to view the forced inclusion of Romani people from this angle – camp sas the spatial refractions of Left-wing ideas of diversity and integration: indeed, much of the expert knowledge on "nomadism" upon which the 1988 law was based, came from Left-wing NGOs (Picker 2011). Therefore, there also was the civil society, not only the state, behind the forced inclusion of Romani people in Florence in the late 1980s – a Left-wing civil society, which considered camps as the best solution for dispossessed and homeless Yugoslav citizens. What neither the state nor the civil society understood was that in Yugoslavia, those Romani families used to live in block of flats, have regular jobs and even organize in Romani associations and groups according to Tito's politics of cultural recognition which started in the mid-1970s. Since the mid-1990s, the Florentine civil society has been promoting the politics of "going beyond the nomad camp!" ("*al di là dei campi nomadi*!"), by criticizing the camp as degrading and segregating devices.

In 2007–08, when I have done fieldwork in Florence, local associations and NGOs fighting against the segregation of Romani people were still deeply rooted in the grassroots tradition of pre-1989 communist party's activism. The most Leftist Italian national NGO is ARCI, which was founded in Florence in 1957 as an anti-fascist organization, and which still frames its militant action as embedded within the communist tradition of class struggle. The legacy of this tradition is palpable in the ARCI Florence headquarter, in continuous dialogue with present-day syncretic forms and expressions of political affiliations. At the entrance of the building, you are welcomed by a series of Che Guevara posters, rainbow-like peace flags and reggae music – not too loud, in the background. Through the corridor and up the stairs, you're constantly greeted by Malcom X, Martin Luther King and Gramsci, who does not seem to be aware of the latest Bandabardò concert – a popular Florentine SKA and folk music group – which is advertised right on the forefront of the organic intellectual. This Left-wing patrimony is palpable not only in grassroots associations, but also in the city council social inclusion department: civil servants all embrace values of solidarity, social inclusion and equality. Therefore, the whole governance apparatus – private (NGOs) and public actors, are largely leaning to Left-wing values.

In 1988 the first camp was constructed in the north-west periphery of Florence, and was named Olmatello, after the street where it was built.

Surrounded by a 2-meter concrete wall, the Olmatello camp was initially equipped with very basic facilities such as modular housing and one toilet. At the beginning the handful of inhabitants found there a useful shelter, although extremely far from any service, including grocery shops. Little by little, the number of people swelled, primarily following the early 1990s' growing conflicts in Yugoslavia. This brought to an unbearable situation of very precarious material conditions, provoking serious hygienic issues. The municipality responded by installing a couple of other toilets and showers, but since 1992 it adopted a politics of forced evictions which went on for 3 years. Meanwhile, another camp appeared, called Poderaccio, at the opposite end of the urban periphery. The 1988 Law was then amended twice, and the second time, in 2000, the new law was still using the misnomer "nomads", perpetuating in this way the false assumption behind the initial idea of building camps. In 2007, when I first visited Olmatello, there were about 140 people living in very precarious economic and hygienic conditions, and many of them had been living there since 1988.

In 2007 Florence was governed by the Democratic Party (PD), the leading national Left-wing party, and district presidents were, as a rule, the direct emanation of the local political majority. One of the issues that during my fieldwork I was investigating was the ways in which district council was governing Olmatello. Civil servants at that time were planning to demolish the camp and relocate all Romani families to "proper" (*normale*) housing. My interest increased as I found out about the ways in which civil servants conceived the process towards proper housing:

> *Since 1999, our priority has always been the dismantling of the camp. Since it could not be done immediately, we proceeded in three directions: we bought new mobile homes, we formed a community center with a mosque, and have secured the electrical and water. Our priority has always been to strive for the dignity of the people who inhabit the area. Collaborating with associations and cooperatives has proved particularly successful, for example, in finding jobs for Romani people. The collaboration with the police has also been invaluable for the control of illegal actions and in general for keeping the camp within legal regulations; for example, if a family builds a shed without permission, I send a technician in the neighborhood, and if the family does not follow the technician's advice to demolish the shed, I will then send a municipal ordinance, but if they do not obey, I call the police who go immediately to the camp and demolish everything. This tug of war is particularly recurrent, but we also realized that if we threaten them [i.e. Romani people], then the last day before the deadline we*

set up, they do what the were asked for. It is a work of patience and weaving relationships, intimation and threats.

This type of management, which included temporary choices (the three strategies for dismantling the supposed shed) and a particular type of social bargaining (through tugs of war and threats) had a very significant impact on camp residents, who were living in a perpetual state of emergency. At the beginning of June 2007, a family in the camp told me about a letter which had just arrived from the district administration – an eviction notice, which applied to all families who had not complied with the camp regulations, namely, not leaving the camp for more than 3 months. Aiming to understand the conditions of camp residents, I got to know Beli (34 years old), married to Lada (35 years old), both of Pristina, with whom I talked about the letter and their family history. They had been living in the camp since 1996, and when we talked they were staying in a trailer with three children: Ana (6 years), Lesa (4 years) and Kiko (2 months). When Lesa was born the city council sent them to live at the council's expenses by a landlord, but after 8 months, the money ran out. They were then placed just outside the camp, in a trailer, but when Lada discovered her pregnancy of Kiko, the domestic space became insufficient. There was a larger trailer parked inside the camp, empty, and they occupied it. Neither Beli nor Lada had a job, and Beli was only doing on a few occasional collaborations. He had received a residence permit, which he could renew from then to 3 months, but Lada had arrived in Italy as a refugee and had never had a residence permit. Holding the eviction notice in his hands, Beli told me he did not know what to do, had no alternative but to stay where he was and at the same time feared daily the imminent expulsion.

This little snapshot of the ways in which "nomad camps", as they are usually called, are governed is just one instance of power dynamics which I very often came across during fieldwork in Florence. Against this background of existential precarity and tensions with the district administration, one may wonder where the legacy of Gramsci, Martin Luther King and Malcom X have gone, in the life and professions of post-Socialist Florence's civil servants. In addition, and perhaps more strikingly, one wonders where those intellectual and cultural references were, when in the 1980s Romani families were forcibly "welcomed" into the Olmatello camp. In conclusion, by looking at the ways in which dispossessed

stigmatized "nomads" were and are being governed in post-Socialist Florence we can make sense of post-Socialist transformations in *non*-post Socialist Europe, i.e. Western Europe; that is – how a city in which Socialist and Communist ideologies informed masses of workers, intellectuals and civil servants, by providing collective meanings, inspirations and identities, has been changing its attitudes towards the dispossessed and the marginalized, from forced inclusion to forced exclusion.

Conclusion: Towards a Comparative Ethnography

Taking distance from notions of "Post-socialism" as exclusively pertaining to Eastern Europe, in this chapter I have proposed to include Post-socialist Europe's "constitutive outside," i.e. Western Europe, and to see (post-) Socialism as a wide process across Europe. The two brief discussions of Cluj and Florence shed light on fundamentally common social transformations across both the East-West and the pre-post 1989 divides: the governance of largely dispossessed Romani people has followed clear paths of forced sedentarization and inclusion before 1989 ("social integration" in the West and "assimilation in the working class" in the East) and urban policy of segregation and degradation after 1989, and especially after 2000. These common transformations show in both cases the links with pre-1989 Socialist ideologies, which in the East informed state narratives and economic organization, and in the West shaped Left-wing politics and by extension the lives of millions of workers. The slow evaporation of Socialism as a mobilizing social force is palpable in the post-2000 dominant doctrine of urban governance of social marginality, which in both parts of Europe has increasingly prioritized disciplining and repressive approaches, centred around the issue of security and anti-social behaviour.

While the public discourse has been relying on an orientalist understanding of Eastern Europe for about six centuries, the challenge here is to stop producing Manichean visions opposing East and West. Rather, it should be clear, as the ethnographic snapshots have shown, that a lot can be done for considering the two socio-historical trajectories as similar, and largely converging. Hence, alongside underlining economic and political differences between East and West it is as heuristic to understand the common development of state capitalism in both parts of the old continent since 1989 (and earlier).

As I have shown, post-Socialist Europe's "constitutive outside," i.e. non-post-Socialist Europe, can be seen not as entirely different from its

counterpart, nor, undoubtedly, as "better" or "more civilized". However, Western Europe functions in the East-West slope rhetoric as the "good" half, and this looks as a clear result of a Manichean reasoning squarely embedded in the history of Orientalism and Balkanism. When it comes to the governance of Romani people, Italy has nothing positive or "civilized" to teach to Romania. "Socialist" forced inclusion and post-Socialist forced exclusion seem to have gained and still gain a certain popularity among civil servants in both countries. The "East-West slope" (Melegh 2006) if ever, in the case of Roma governance, should probably be inverted. However, rather than inverting the "slope", it would probably be more useful to acknowledge that Europe, both East and West, is increasingly following the path of neoliberal socio-spatial restructuring which is proper to late state-capitalist transformations, politics and inertias. Florence nomad camps account for the 1980s local politics of segregating Romani households in the urban peripheries in the name of social integration. Notwithstanding the often-celebrated process of transition to democracy, in Post-Socialist Cluj, similarly to post-Socialist Florence, things do not seem to have evolved towards a more "democratic" and "tolerant" governance. Perhaps no other research approach than ethnography can grasp subtle nuances which reveal how limited public discourses are, and – through comparison – how short of explanation dichotomic thinking is likely to fall.

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CHAPTER 4

The Containment of Memory in the "Meeting Place": City Marketing and Contemporary Memory Politics in Central Europe

Hana Cervinkova and Juliet Golden

Berlin is a city of remembrance, with countless monuments, memorials and museums commemorating the past conflicts the city has endured. In Berlin, these constant reminders of the past create an environment of remembrance and a shared dedication to never let these crimes happen again. Wroclaw, on the other hand, is a city of forgetting. Traces of the German history are removed or hidden to cover up the past. Because this city contains so many

With the support of RVO: 68378078

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_4

> people victimized by the conflict, they seek to forget the past of German occupation (sic) and crimes so they can begin to create a Polish identity separate from the former German identity of the city. (Syracuse University Abroad Student in Wroclaw, 2013)

Introduction

We focus here on the Polish city of Wroclaw to address issues of contemporary memory politics in urban Central Europe. In 1945, the German city of Breslau was transferred to Polish administration that applied national heritage policy drawing a thick line between the city's German past and its Polish present. After the watershed year of 1989, Wroclaw seems to have taken an alternative approach, marketing itself as the multicultural "meeting place" or a "city of encounters," a European metropolis with ambitions to build on its multicultural heritage. We argue, however, that the city's self-labeling, which serves as a marker of distinction on the global market, is a form of neo-liberal containment rather than a serious change in how the past of the city informs current policy. Following a decade that began in the early 1980s when both scholars and local citizens began delving into what Jan Assmann terms cultural memory, a vast archive of the city's past that greatly exceeds the instrumentalized horizons of collective memory, we see the current policy as contributing to the narrowing of the horizons of collective memory that helps exclude from the discourse and practices of contemporary identity building the diverse cultural memories of "the other."

Archives of Cultural Memory

Wroclaw's dramatic history in the course of the twentieth century is a textbook example of the complexities of Central European geopolitics. Situated to the east of the Oder-Neisse, which became the demarcation line for the post-WWII redrawing of the European map, former German cities, including the metropolis of Breslau, became a part of the new post-WWII Poland. Renamed and resettled by Poles, Wroclaw underwent profound processes of Polonization in the post-war era, which involved the construction of a new master narrative – a heritage policy that relied on a much altered version of collective memory promoting the idea that Wroclaw at its origins had been Polish and therefore Poles who settled in

the city after WWII were actually returning to their homeland. Elaborate historical studies were issued that proved that the newly acquired city had been truly historically Polish and its post-war transfer to Polish hands should be seen as an act of historical justice. Material remains of the former German presence were either removed or Polonized – German and German-Jewish monuments and cemeteries were destroyed and sometimes replaced by Polish ones; streets and buildings were renamed and German homes were settled by Polish families who had to come to terms with the challenges of living their lives in what was essentially German urban fabric (Davies and Moorhouse 2002; Thum 2003; Stern 2006).

The official decision by the victors of WWII produced complex physical and cultural displacements ridden with human tragedies and suffering. Polish cities abandoned in the East were settled by Russians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, while Poles inhabited homes of Germans who were forced to leave and settle in post-war divided Germany (Davies and Moorhouse 2002; Thum 2003). The undoubtedly painful consequences of these displacements of different peoples and the ensuing economic, political and social challenges were contained by nation-state building projects after the war, whose success relied also on the management of collective identities through heritage and memory politics (Thum 2003; Ashworth et al. 2007).

The paradox of Wroclaw lies in the fact that this city, which had been a part of Germany until the end of WWII and therefore was the common stage for the triumphs, traumas and crimes of Germany's past, in the post-WWII years was inhabited by Poles, whose historical experience and awareness were radically different. A quintessentially German stage and theatre was now occupied by Polish actors and Polish scripts. With the onset of Communism and the Cold War, the Polish script required the squelching of the enormous archive of cultural memory embedded in the city and the imposition of a new master narrative whose bonding force drew on an entirely different cultural memory that initially did not have any connection to the place.

Drawing on Jan Assmann's notion of cultural memory seems particularly useful in trying to understand the inner workings of the cultural politics of memory in Wroclaw (and in Poland). Assmann, on the one hand, distinguishes cultural memory from communicative memory, which for him is essentially an embodied memory with a generational span. Communicative memory, according to him, "includes those varieties of collective memory that are based exclusively on everyday communications" (1995: 126).

Assmann expands Halbwachs' notion of collective memory not only beyond the realm of individual psychology, but also beyond the limits of the social exigencies and bonding forces for which "the past is always 'instrumentalized'" (2005: 24). For Assmann, cultural memory relies "on the interaction between the psyche, consciousness, society and culture" (2005: 9), and while its archive is often pulled from to serve collective bonding memory, it is a much wider concept from the former, including "the noninstrumentalizable, heretical, subversive, and disowned" (2005: 27). It is a vast archive of sources of "age-old, out-of-the-way, and discarded" knowledge (2005: 27) that "has lost every link to collective identity, however broadly conceived, and therefore possesses neither horizon nor force"[1] (2005: 29). In the case of post-WWII Wroclaw, the collective bonding memory relied on the officially prescribed, top-down driven heritage policy that suppressed the city's cultural archive that embodied primarily the German and the Jewish past.

The events of 1989 set the stage for radical changes. In the early years of democracy in Poland following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the reign of Soviet Communism, the urban spaces of Wroclaw seemed to unleash intoxicating multilayered narratives that challenged the once dominant centrally commanded discourse of the post-WWII years. With eyes newly attuned, hidden contents in the battered and remade cityscapes revealed themselves. Local publishing houses were established that specialized in the printing and distribution of photographs and literature on pre-war Breslau that had long been locked away in the archives (Bińkowska 1993). Publications and conferences with international experts were organized on Wroclaw's unique modernist architectural legacy from the interwar period (Lose 1998). Local historians started to reflect critically on the extent to which the city's pre-war German past had been silenced in scholarly work (Zawada 1996). To retell its history, the municipality itself ordered a new history to be written by outsiders – British historians Norman Davies and Roger Moorehouse (Davies and Moorhouse 2002). A wave of German nostalgia tourism began with people visiting their family's former homes, interacting with Polish inhabitants and undertaking joint efforts at preserving pre-WWII monuments. Finally, in this period of birth of the Internet era, an enormous public forum (Wratislaviae Amici) was created where people could share their own archives on the city that spanned the distant past to the Polish present. As a result, the city's archive of cultural memory began to emerge in this period of transformation as a palimpsest of cityscapes that seemed to invigorate new notions of collective identity and citizenship informed by new pluralistic imaginaries of place.

The events in Wroclaw were not isolated. They echoed similar changes throughout Poland and other countries as issues of memory and forgetting had at the time "emerged as dominant concerns in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union" (Huyssen 2000: 24). The crumbling of state socialism brought to an end the exclusively top-down state-driven policies on heritage and collective memory, releasing with full force grassroots and locally animated explorations of the multifaceted archives of cultural memory (Sieroń-Galusek and Galusek 2012). However, it is important to emphasize that this process actually began earlier, when in the different countries of the former Soviet bloc we saw the emergence of civil action that included the growth of interest in alternative interpretations of the past that helped create foundations for the processes of democratization that were launched on the political level in 1989 (Traba 2006). The re-reading of city spaces in places like Wroclaw began in the last decade of Communism when issues tied to historical memory and forgetting, and urban spaces began shifting from the private spheres to the public realm (Krajewska and Kamieńska 1982; Sieroń-Galusek and Galusek 2012). We see this shift as the prelude that "prepared the groundwork" for the subsequent events and approach to memory in the immediate aftermath of 1989, which seemed to favor a bottom-up approach to the past and held a promise for pluralistic formation of collective memories.

This period of decentralization of memory coincided with the decentralization of local governance in Poland in the 1990s, which allowed for the formation of local city councils and the direct election of city mayors. These legal changes led to the delegation of various local public functions from the state to the cities and regions, and the opening of the city treasury to local tax income. In the last 20 years, Polish and other Central European agglomerations have become important players in the neo-liberal landscape of the Central European economy, culture and politics. Polish cities are now the drivers of regional economies and the concentration of financial and social capital in the hands of the mayors is spectacular (Cervinkova 2013). Wroclaw, the fourth largest city in Poland, has experienced an unprecedented urban development. The current Mayor of Wroclaw, Rafał Dutkiewicz, has been repeatedly featured in the national and international media as one of the most successful managers/politicians in the country, leading a city with a record absorption of European Union (EU) funding and attractiveness to foreign investors (lucy 2012).

We have argued elsewhere that central to Wroclaw's economic success was a carefully selected and nurtured cultural politics focused on creating

the city's internal and external image as a place open to other cultures (Cervinkova 2013). This strategy implicitly drew on an openness to the archives of cultural memory of the non-Polish past of the city. It was in the context of this heritage strategy that Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse were commissioned by the first democratically elected Mayor of the city (who later served as the Polish Minister of Culture) Bogdan Zdrojewski to write Wroclaw's official history (Davies and Moorhouse 2002). The book, called *Microcosm*, projected the city's self-representation as a "multicultural metropolis of the Polish borderlands" (Municipality of Wroclaw 2010). The city's official promotional slogan *Wroclaw – the Meeting Place* (*Wrocław – miasto spotkań*), came to embody Wroclaw's self-portrayal as an open and friendly place also to the outside and outsiders. This branding, we argued, has facilitated Wroclaw's economic strategy focused on attracting foreign investments and large international events as the drivers of the local economy (Cervinkova 2011b, 2013). Not only has the city celebrated great success in attracting investors, but it has recently won in several European and worldwide competitions to host large international events, including the European Soccer Championships (2012), the European Culture Capital (2016) and the World Games (2017). Wroclaw is thus a good example of a Central European city that has been successful in the practice of place marketing; a key element of neoliberal urban economy, which thrives on inter-city competition for a privileged position on the global market (Harvey 2001; Brenner and Theodore 2002).

Central to these cultural and economic processes were concurrent political goals of promoting Wroclaw as a European-minded city to the international community. *Wroclaw – the Meeting Place*, a slogan and a strategy has created the city's image of cultural openness and has helped inscribe it as an important urban hub to the European-wide integration processes (Cervinkova 2011a, 2011b, 2013). Sociologists from the University of Wroclaw demonstrate that this marketing strategy has also "worked" on the inside. In their recent research Dolińska and Makaro show that while Wroclaw continues to be an ethnically and religiously homogeneous city, Poles who live in the city consider it to be multicultural and look upon themselves and their community as more culturally open than the rest of Poland. As sources of multiculturalism, respondents mostly refer not to the presence of minorities in the city, but to the number of international visitors and Wroclaw's historical heritage, while their knowledge of local history that goes farther back than 1945 is very limited (Lewicka 2006; Dolińska and Makaro 2013). The authors also point to a remarkable correspondence

between the language used by respondents in revealing their ideas on the city's heritage and the marketing discourse of the municipality, leading them to the conclusion that multiculturalism functions as a form of a myth both on the inside and outside (Dolińska and Makaro 2013).

This finding is congruent with recent historical work that has noted a wider tendency in contemporary Poland to once again ascribe authorities with the role of the creator of memory. Robert Traba, for example, insightfully defines a process, whereby the state has come again to be looked upon as the heritage setter – and defines this as the undoing of the democratically participatory nature of memory work that characterized the period immediately between and after 1989 (Traba 2006). The borders of collective memory, once expanded for a short period in the l980s and 1990s through various participatory social, intellectual and cultural initiatives to include the memory of previously excluded others, are now being redrawn in the narrowest of terms, with deep implications for contemporary local and national identity and citizenship.

In the absence of actually existing cultural diversity characterized by the co-habitation of people of diverse cultural backgrounds, the contemporary policy of Wroclaw's multiculturalism in the context of the culturally homogeneous Wroclaw draws from the German past as a representation of diversity and multiculturalism. However, we argue that while this strategy is successful in terms of city marketing, it does not encompass serious consideration of the archives of cultural memory and is, in fact, a form of heritage politics that we propose to identify as "containment."[2] In order to illustrate this process of memory containment through public policy, we draw on our ongoing work in urban educational anthropology and discuss two examples of urban sites in Wroclaw, which we regularly study with our students. We will focus on the historic exhibition and mass-meeting complex of Centennial Hall (inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage list) and the Monument of Shared Memory (recently erected to commemorate the more than 70 German cemeteries in Wroclaw destroyed by Poles in the post-war years). We choose these sites as study examples for our students because of their prominence in the city's heritage-based marketing strategy.

The Hall of Two Names

One of the prominent examples of the complexities of Wroclaw's cultural policy of memory containment is Centennial Hall, a giant mass meeting complex from 1913. At the time of its construction, the German city of

Breslau took the bold move of creating an exhibition and cultural center that could accommodate an audience of 10,000. A recent addition to the UNESCO World Heritage List, Centennial Hall is recognized as a seminal achievement in world architecture largely due to the innovative application of what was then a new building material (reinforced concrete) to the construction of public use structures. The outcome of the bold design, by the then Municipal Architect Max Berg, was an imposing reinforced concrete building that featured the largest dome to have been built since the Roman Pantheon.

Important for our discussion on how the past plays out in the current politics of memory is to understand the ideological motivations that accompanied the construction of this important monument of world architecture. The impetus for the creation of Centennial Hall came at a time when Germany was planning national celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the victory over Napoleon as an outcome of the Battle of Nations at Leipzig in 1813. For the anniversary year, monuments to this victory appeared all across the country. Breslau had long sought to build an exhibition and mass meeting complex inspired by World Exhibition sites (Ilkosz 2006). The construction of the hall was thus a result of the marriage of local political priorities that sought to create a meeting complex for a mass audience on the one hand and the need to respond to the challenge of recognizing this important national anniversary on the other hand. The name, Centennial Hall, is a reminder, then, of this event central to the German national project.

After 1945 when German Breslau became Polish Wroclaw, Centennial Hall, largely unscathed by the war, became the focal point of post-war Polonization efforts. Renamed People's Hall, it served as the venue for the so-called Recovered Territories Exhibition and the Congress of Intellectuals for Peace in 1948. Both events were prepared by the Communist Polish government as tangible diplomatic efforts and symbolic presentations to show that the government had made important strides in the lasting integration of the former German territories into the bourgeoning post-WWII Polish nation. New life was surprisingly easily breathed into the highly functionalist structure envisioned by Max Berg, which was largely bereft of patriotic references embedded in the architecture itself. The name change was enough to allow the complex to serve the needs of the nation and Polish Wroclaw under state socialism. As one of the few mass meeting and exhibition facilities in Poland, the People's Hall continued to operate as an iconic meeting spot in the city.

After 1989, the hall was as an inspiration to the city's post-Communist identity. The hall, as a unique venue on the national scale led local policy makers to the idea that the city could seek prominence and prosperity through the organization of large-scale national and international events. People's Hall has become a focal point of the city's development and promotional strategies, eventually subsumed under the slogan *Wroclaw – the Meeting Place*.

This important urban site became entangled in a public debate about memory in 2006, when, as a monument of twentieth-century architecture, it was inscribed onto the UNESCO World Heritage List. The addition to the UNESCO List was the result of the dissemination of the original research carried on in the 1980s and 1990s by a Wroclaw architectural historian Jerzy Ilkosz. Ilkosz tapped into the vast archive of architectural history and through his publications opened people to an understanding of the city's material heritage as a legacy of early-twentieth-century German architectural genius and placed it in its larger international context. The outcome of this grassroots, but scholarly, rigorous memory work was the official application for adding the monument to the UNESCO List. The name used to refer to the monument was Centennial Hall, a translation of the original German name die *Jahrhunderthalle* and not of the post-WWII Polish name *Hala Ludowa* (People's Hall). Following the inscription, city managers launched promotional efforts aimed at reinvigorating the hall to compete as a vital international conference center, promoting the complex under the original name Centennial Hall and its Polish equivalent *Hala Stulecia*. This move provoked heated, complex and long-lasting debates on a local and national scale about the city's German past and limits of how that past figures in the present and future of the city and the nation.

For some, the return to the German name symbolized a threat of the re-Germanization of Wroclaw and by extension of the larger pre-war German territories. The debate which took place in the local and national media, and which drew comments of both top politicians and regular Polish citizens, exemplified the volatility tied to German heritage in today's Poland. The then-Polish Prime Minister, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, publically attacked the Mayor of Wroclaw for alleged "pro-German" policies, and a right-wing commentator, Piotr Siemka, compared the 2006 renaming of the Hall to the "summoning of Prussian ghosts" (Maciejewska 2009). Put on the defensive, the Mayor of Wroclaw (himself a conservative politician), adopted a policy of treading a fine line between appearing

as a defender of the Polishness of Wroclaw, and at the same time, an open-minded, pro-European leader. The policy that he adopted is a remarkably good example of what we call the "cultural politics of memory containment." The mayor chose a path, which would not jeopardize the basis of the city's promotional strategy that presented the picture of Wroclaw as an open city, while not offending his conservative constituency, both local and national, given his political ambitions on a nationwide scale. Consistent with the logic of containment, he officially advocated for the use of both names – Centennial Hall and People's Hall, while in official literature, the former name was deployed and the public management company overseeing the operations of the hall retained the name from the post-WWII Polish socialist era People's Hall, Inc. (*Hala Ludowa* Sp. z o.o.). In this way, the mayor could continue pursuing his city-marketing strategy in the international economic and political arenas, while effectively avoiding a public debate that would engage citizens in seriously considering the cultural memory of the city, expanding thus the horizons of public memory.

The Monument of Shared Memory

Another intriguing example of the cultural politics of memory containment in today's Wroclaw is the Monument of Shared Memory. The Monument of Shared Memory occupies a privileged position as a flagship of the city's official openness to its multicultural past. The monument was erected in 2008 by the Municipality in a park in the southwestern part of the city. Since then, the Mayor and other city officials have repeatedly referred to the monument in their public presentations and regularly take foreign delegations of visitors to the monument on official tours of the city. We argue, however, that contrary to its name and alleged purpose, the Monument of Shared Memory does not function as a living site of memory. On the contrary, it has served to contain the work of remembering and halt the possibility of inspiring practices and deliberations tied to the hard work of public memory.

The genesis of the idea for building the Monument of Shared Memory was both ideological and practical. Since the end of the war, and especially in the 1970s, more than 70 German cemeteries were razed as a result of official decisions and national policy. Inherent in the razing of hundreds thousands of graves were concrete questions concerning the fate of decaying human remains, but also of the gravestones themselves. In the 1980s,

the city faced the problem of removing thousands of German gravestones to expand the Osobowice municipal cemetery. In an effort to rid itself of this problem, the city gave the right to these gravestones, many of them of artistic value, to a private stone masonry company in exchange for their removal and preparedness to making them available for public works projects. For example, some of these stones were used as stone tiling in one of the historic rooms of the City Hall in the 1980s, while in the 1990s, they were used to make the stairs and the entry way of one of the Social Security offices. By 2000, however, reports of large piles of remaining gravestones situated in a village on the edge of the city where the company had its headquarters crept into the press, forcing the city to address the problem. Not able to quiet the controversy and its potential impact on the public image of the "open city," the outcome was a public architectural competition for the construction of the Monument of Shared Memory that would incorporate a representative selection of these stones in a memorial to the destroyed cemeteries of the city.

The winning design, erected in 2008 in the Grabiszyński Park at the site of a former cemetery features a 60-meter long granite wall. As a concept, the monument aims to honor representatives of all faiths who lived in the city and whose remains were buried in the urban necropolises in the pre-WWII era. Mounted in the granite wall are therefore single stones, which were allegedly selected from among the enormous piles of gravestones sold into private hands. The monument also includes a large granite panel with an engraved list of the destroyed cemeteries and another one with the following sign in Polish and in German: "To the memory of former citizens of our city, buried in the no-longer existing cemeteries." This text is signed "People of Wroclaw."

As important as the gesture of building a monument to destroyed cemeteries may seem, we argue that the Monument of Shared Memory serves rather to contain than inspire the work of memory. This containment, which we see as characteristic of Wroclaw's cultural politics towards memory, is evident on multiple levels. First, nowhere in the narrative sections of the monument do we find a reference that the cemeteries were actually destroyed and by whom. There is a certain anonymity to the radical Polonization process inherent in the monument, but one which is not explicitly stated and actually almost ignored. As a result, the sign absolves today's "People of Wroclaw" of the need for critical reflection on historical responsibility. The shrewd phrase frames the brutal physical destruction of cemeteries, which many Poles living in the city today

must have witnessed, as an unexplainable disappearance carried out by an intangible entity.

Secondly, nowhere in or near the monument do we find a mention that the structure is located on the grounds of a former crematorium and one of the destroyed cemeteries that it commemorates. This absence of physical markers, however, is true for the whole of Wroclaw. The former German cemeteries were in prominent places throughout the city. Many of these properties were redeveloped for commercial purposes, while others were turned into parks. However, people who live in or visit Wroclaw do not know that in the daily practices of moving through the cityscapes they are stepping on the remains of peoples whose burial sites are no longer marked with gravestones that were shipped away and used for other purposes.

Finally, the site chosen as a location for the Monument of Shared Memory is in fact insulated from the daily life of the city and inhibits the practice of remembering, which relies on people interacting with the physical monument. Once again, we refer to the insightful reflection of our students: "When we went to the actual memorial, I was struck by how difficult it was to get there. Crossing a busy highway and tram tracks does not exactly invite visitors . . . to visit the memorial. I'm not sure if it was simply a question of space, but it did not seem like the public was all that welcome at the memorial" (Student in a Summer Program in Wroclaw, 2012).

The Monument of Shared Memory is an eloquent example of what Robert Musil famously termed the "invisibility of monuments" – which while prominent in their size, escape our attention, becoming invisible despite their monumentality (Musil 1987). The 60-meter long and 5-meter high monument is tucked away in the middle of a suburban park, detached entirely from one of the largest functioning municipal cemeteries in Wroclaw, which is frequented by crowds of people as a part of the Polish tradition of visiting and caring for family graves on a regular basis.[3] There is no sign directing visitors to the monument. Moreover, it is located literally on the "other side of the tracks" so that knowing and determined visitors must undertake a risky crossing of a busy street and tram lines to reach it.

The Monument of Shared Memory is a good example of the official cultural politics of memory containment. It is more a symbol of an effort at achieving closure to a thorny political issue than a contribution to an ongoing dialogue of collective memory. For in Wroclaw, the conundrum of old graveyards and gravestones reappearing is a

recurrent problem and city authorities remain baffled with how to manage the problem. Notably, in 2009, when a much needed highway bypass was being constructed, several thousand German gravestones and human remains were uncovered and the city had "nowhere to take them." Tellingly, the manager of the City Greenery Office, when asked to comment by a local journalist on the fate of the unearthed burial grounds, referred to the subject as being "closed," saying: "The Monument of Shared Memory is our symbolic gesture honoring all dead residents of the city. However, the composition [of the monument]...is a closed work and does not allow being expanded by additional gravestones" (Saraczyńska 2009).

Conclusions

In this paper, we consider the example of the Polish city of Wroclaw, an economic success story of post-1989 transformation, and argue that key to its development is a neo-liberal marketing strategy whose aim is to create a distinction for the city in the rising global competition. This strategy, we argue, relies on a particular heritage politics, which we refer to as containment of memory. Through this concept, we want to capture the paradoxical process whereby the city markets itself as open to its multicultural heritage, while in reality, it engages in practices which stifle the opening of the realms of collective memory to public explorations and deliberations on the multicultural past of the city. Drawing on Jan Assmann's concept of cultural memory, we argue that these developments are a reversal of a process that we observed in the decade that began in the early 1980s. During that time, we saw the flourishing of an organic work that drew on the city's expansive archives of cultural memory. This work created the conditions for the opening of public memory to include the German past and those who were religiously and ethnically different. In today's Wroclaw, similarly to the rest of the country, we see the restoration of control over public memory to the hands of authorities at the expense of public memory's important role in fostering pluralistic conceptions of participatory citizenship and democracy.[4] We see the City's instrumental use of multiculturalism as a form of containment of memory, which has implications for the future development of democratic society at a critical phase of the European integration project.

Notes

1. Gregor Thum draws on Assmann's concept of cultural and communicative memories in his article from 2009. However, we differ in our understanding and application of these concepts as they relate to Wroclaw. For Thum, cultural memory equals the myth that the Polish authorities imposed on the city in the post-WWII era that denied the city's German past, while communicative memory for him refers to the everyday communication between Polish people in Wroclaw who lived their lives among German objects and memories (Thum 2009: 79–80).
2. We would like to acknowledge the inspiration we drew from the work of Shari Poppen who uses "containment" to refer to the practices of silencing and suppressing of critical democratic school culture in American classrooms after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the ensuing War on Terror (Poppen 2002).
3. It needs to be underscored that the existing municipal cemetery adjacent to the Monument of Shared Memory was established on the remains of a liquidated pre-war German cemetery, where Poles are buried along with the former German inhabitants, a fact that is also not indicated for visitors.
4. In the face of this trend towards the return of control of work on memory to the authorities, we would like to point out some notable exceptions of non-governmental organizations doing serious work on public memory such as the Borderlands Foundation in Sejny and the Brama Grodzka in Lublin.

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CHAPTER 5

Discourse on Public Spaces: Praguers in the Process of Globalization Changes and the Neoliberal Economy

Zdeněk Uherek

New Dynamics in the Discourse About Public Space in Prague

Although the theme of public space has often been discussed, interest in it clearly increased in the Prague milieu at the beginning of 2012. This trend was helped by, among others, the former Lord Mayor of Prague Tomáš Hudeček (Lord Mayor 2013–2014), who was a mathematician and geo-computing expert. With his initiative "return Prague to the Praguers" and

The chapter was created with the support of the Progress Q22, Anthropological Inquiries within Humanities, Natural a Historical Sciences. The terrain data from 2013 to half-year of 2014 was for a gathering with a joint project of the Institute of Ethnology of the ASCR, v.v.i. and Open City o.p.s. *The analysis of the users and the usage of the urban public space of the Capital City of Prague*. For assistance in collecting the data, I would like to thank Anežka Jiráková, Blanka Kissová and Marie Hlavičková, particularly then Veronika Beranská, who besides the collection of data edited the final report from the research and commented also on this text.

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_5

his campaign "Prague as a place for life" (Hudeček 2014) he created a space for a wider exchange of ideas. The exchange also included the voices of the people of Prague and not-for-profit organizations who began to assert themselves (IPR 2016).

In 2012 Tomáš Hudeček introduced the "City for People" campaign, which he co-authored as deputy mayor (Hudeček 2012). It allowed for a wide range of steps that provided for dynamic discussions. In the Prague Municipal Government, the Office of Public Space was established. Its aim was "asserting and defending the existence of public space itself" and "influencing public space in the direction of quality…" (Kancelář veřejného prostoru 2013). On November 7, 2013, local city authorities approved the transformation of the former Department of the Development of the Capital City of Prague into the Institute of Planning and Development of the Capital City of Prague. Among the transformational changes this conceptual unit was substantially strengthened in terms of personnel. The Institute of Planning and Development of the Capital City of Prague created new dynamics in the Metropolitan Local (Zoning) Plan. In 2013, the Office of Public Space drafted the "Manual for the Creation of Public Spaces" (Manuál 2013) and in 2014, the "Strategy for the Development of the Public Spaces of the Capital City of Prague" was published (*Strategie rozvoje veřejných prostranství* 2014a, b). In the aforementioned documents new regulations were proposed, which limited the size of advertisements in the city, created new regulations for the occupation of public spaces and attempted to stimulate the creation of urban green spaces.

The unprecedented openness of the discussion on public space in Prague, which was co-initiated by the young (35-year-old) Lord Mayor of Prague, became not only a promise of positive changes in the approach of the leadership of the city toward its citizens, but it also revealed a number of problems in relation to public space.

The field data, which we present in this text, come from an investigation that was initiated by Open City, which is a non-governmental not-for-profit institution. They were collected by the Institute of Ethnology in 2013–2014 with the intention of identifying ways city residents utilize and speak about public space. The research included long-term participant observations in selected public spaces, two focus groups with city actors, 100 directed interviews with Prague residents, and 10 interviews with experts who actively reshape Prague's public spaces such as artists, architects, NGO leaders and activists.

The aim of this chapter is to summarize the discourse about the public spaces used Prague's inhabitants, especially in 2013–2014 and to explain their basic motives and reasoning about public space utilization.

Criticism of Specific Phenomena in Public Spaces

On June 15, 2013, the Institute of Ethnology of the ASCR, v.v.i., along with the Open City NGO organized a focus group on the theme of public spaces in Prague. The focus group was comprised of representatives from the not-for-profit sector – students, academicians, architects, urban planners, officials and others; mainly middle class, denizens of Prague, who predominate in the city. A local communal politician, 30–40 years of age, and member of an influential NGO also participated and, in relation to public spaces in Prague, lamented on the failure of "*The political communal representation.... in this city.*"[1]

The comments by the local politician in my opinion well demonstrate the form in which Prague's public spaces were frequently discussed at the time, and which continue to this day. It is especially interesting to note that this politician spoke negatively about communal politics as if he was not part of them. It was clearly more pleasant for him to present himself as a member of the not-for-profit sector. He aggressively added to the criticism of others present; especially in the evaluation of the situation in the inner city, primarily in Prague 1 (the historical part of the city).

The members of the focus group were clearly outraged that, particularly in the historical parts of the city, they did not have enough space and amenities. Criticism was also heard on the lack of services and suitable shops in the city, as well as the lack of greenery. Focus group members complained of noise, lack of safety, absence of sanitary facilities and probably thanks to the fact that the focus group took place in the summer months, the ubiquity of tourists.

It might also be that the focus group primarily discussed the theme of tourists in the center of Prague thanks to my opening speech, during which I asked whether we have already written off some parts of the city for the local population. During the discussion, the above-mentioned local politician answered my question by stating: *"I think that we have already written them off."*

Other group members also lent criticism in a highly impersonal spirit. From their comments, it was clear that they did not feel in any way responsible for the negative state of affairs. On the contrary, they made

it apparent that their ideas, opinions and recommendations are not of interest to the responsible persons as their voices are not taken into account. It arose during the focus group that the permanent residents want different Prague than the one in which they now live. They believed their own ideas and reality are different, and that the main responsible bodies for the poor state of affairs are local administrators and politicians.[2]

In our discussions, the denizens of the city adopted negative attitudes toward the city administrators as they did in other opinion surveys carried out, for example, by the Public Opinion Research Centre (Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění 2014).[3] The populace is, according to recognized agencies of public opinion research, disgusted to such a degree by the political scene that they do not even participate in elections (STEM 2013).[4] Criticism of anything that emanates from Prague political circles and the distance from public politicians in such an atmosphere becomes a public declaration of belonging to "decent people." This rule of "distance" apparently appears on many levels and plays a significant role in their evaluative judgments. This aspect undoubtedly affects also the criticism of the current conditions of public spaces.

Opinions of the People of Prague on Public Space and Its Users

The continuing lack of interest of the public administration and the municipal authorities in the opinions of the people of Prague on public space is clear, inter alia from the fact that the local institutions did not generally assess the opinions of the citizens in this area. There are only a few professional analyses in this field, which signals that there was no institutional demand for them. Other than our own work, already cited several times, which concentrated mainly on the observation of public spaces in Prague (Uherek et al. 2014), it is worth also to mention the Manual of Public Spaces presented above, which is up to date but does not focus on public opinion (Manuál tvorby veřejných prostranství hlavního města Prahy 2013). Of the recent studies conducted in Prague, the work by Ondřej Marek et al. *Občané a veřejná prostranství* [The Citizens and the Public Areas] should also be noted. In it, alongside the ideas and declarations of the authors, the results of a survey addressing the target group regarding the realization of modifications of the inner courtyard in Prague 7 (Marek et al. 2005) are presented. The social geography of Prague is generally treated in work presented by Martin Ouředníček

(Ouředníček et al. 2006). Prague is also partially touched on in the study *Kvalitní veřejné prostory* [The High-Quality Public Spaces] conducted by Marie Římanová et al., where good examples and an instructional text on how to collect the data are presented, but not the data itself (Římanová 2011). A few mostly theoretical works were published by Pavel Pospěch (Pospěch 2013) and Petr Kratochvíl (Kratochvíl 2012, 2013). Last but not least, the excellent diploma work by the sociologist Berenika Kučerová *Praha očima svých obyvatel* [Prague in the eyes of its population] (Kučerová 2007) should be mentioned. In this work, field research was conducted which focused on the opinions of the population of Prague on public areas (Kučerová 2007). In many regards, our theme is also touched upon by the dissertation work by Tomáš Brabec *Uzavřené rezidenční areály a rezidenční separace v Praze* [Closed residential complexes and residential separation in Prague]. The work does not deal directly with public spaces themselves but with the behavior of people and their preferences (Brabec 2014).

This modest list of works shows how the theme of public areas in Prague is under-researched. However, the sporadic data does indicate certain trends that the population of Prague considers under the term "public space" and which positions they take toward it and the demands they make on it.

From the survey conducted by the Institute of Ethnology it appears that the respondents, just like the experts, agree that public spaces should be generally accessible. The call to define public space evoked, besides a list of elements, a need to particularly emphasize features and activities in public spaces which they considered to be positive. Respondents said that they use public space mainly for relaxation and rest (107 statements), meeting and contact with people (54 statements) and for sport (27 statements). Only 21 respondents mentioned traffic (Uherek et al. 2014: 24–25). Relatively few said that they park their car, walk their dogs in public places, or that they use public space for moving around and other everyday activities. A similar discursive trend can be seen with architects and urban planners. For instance, in the publication *Kvalitní veřejné prostory* [The High-Quality Public Spaces], a trend can be observed of speaking of public spaces as an "expanded home" and good examples, as well as pictorial documentation, were focused on the relaxation function, the propagation of residential streets, pedestrian precincts and quiet zones (Římanová 2011). People usually cover in reference to the topic of public space suggestions to modify

spaces between houses to serve as seating for adults, and for children's games, as opposed to using the space for parking.

The accented theme of the quality and habitability of public space was connected with the idea of home, relaxation and pleasant experiences naturally increase the interest of people in public space, but it also raises the demands upon it. In the Prague milieu, as has already been indicated, the distinctive values demanded (ranked from the greatest frequency to less frequent answers) were cleanliness, greenery, sufficient space for sitting (tables, benches), sufficient social facilities, order, safety and maintenance.

The increased demands for improving the quality of public spaces are, however, also reflected in the increasing demands on the people who appear in public space. When asked what is most redundant and undesirable in public space in Prague, the following items most often appeared (ordered from maximum frequency) (1) homeless people, beggars, narcotic addicts, unhygienic and maladjusted people; (2) untidiness, dirt; (3) vendor stands, businesses for tourists, Russian souvenirs; (4) advertisements; and (5) means of transport, parked cars.[5] In the articulation of the positive examples of vivid Prague public spaces, the respondents most frequently mentioned parks and gardens. As negative examples of public spaces they used the busiest and most problematic areas of Prague in terms of security. One example is Wenceslas Square, where tourists and foreigners often congregate, as survey respondents stated, or in the park around the main train station with its large number of homeless people (Uherek et al. 2014: 19–28). Places most frequented by tourists were evaluated from ambivalently to negatively.

Very similar results were recorded in the already mentioned work by Berenika Kučerová. It is clear from her text that the people of Prague seek another type of entertainment, have a different tempo of movement, seek other services and are willing to pay different prices for them than tourists. The situation for the city dwellers, therefore, is hardly acceptable in some parts of the inner city, which are also conservation areas. As shown in the work by Berenika Kučerová, the people of Prague have a positive relationship to the center of the city. They appreciate its aesthetic and cultural values as do tourists, but they seldom visit these historical places. The tourism industry does not suit them. One of her respondents for instance said: *"That genius loci is exceptionally deflated by the tourism. It can appear, but it has to be some moment, which does not entail, is not burdened by that unauthentic mass tourism."* (Vít, 30 years old) (Kučerová 2007: 65).

It also appears in the findings of Uherek, Beranská et al. that, in their free time, the people of Prague prefer greenery and well-arranged functional parks rather than tourist areas (Uherek et al. 2014).

Besides the relation of the distance to the tourist-crowded areas of Prague, the populace of the city also condemned the businesses that are tied to tourists. They condemned the sale of tacky souvenirs, cheap jewelry, Russian military caps and other artifacts, which have nothing in common with Prague or the Czech Republic. They also looked negatively upon the advertisements, the vendor stands and other attractions, which the respondents called "*byznys*" in Czech (Uherek et al. 2014).

"*Byznys*" and "*Služba*" in Prague Context

The word "*byznys*" in Czech is the word "business" borrowed from English and it is pronounced the same way. At the most general level, it means the same as in English, i.e. enterprise, trade, but in Czech it is used almost exclusively in the sense of enterprise for the purpose of creating enormous profit or for becoming rich. For instance, the care for the ill under standard conditions is not "*byznys*" even though the staff are paid for this activity. "*Byznys*" from the care of the ill could happen in the Czech sense of the word only if the staff made disproportionate amounts for the care. In that case, it could be said that caring for the ill is a "*byznys*" for them; meaning an unexpectedly lucrative activity.

"Business" in the Czech conception equates the enterprise with profit. It is an enterprise that disregards anything except money. It is possible to say in Czech: "He has an interesting job" [*Má hezké povolání*]. This sentence means that the person makes money for his livelihood and also acquires many positive stimuli from it. The sentence: "He has an interesting byznys" [*Má hezký byznys*] sounds strange, and is a sentence that a native speaker would not create, but if so, it would mean that the person has the opportunity to make a lot of money. In the same way, a native speaker does not use the collocation: "he was a good byznysmen" [*byl to hodný byznysmen*] or "that byznysmen had a heart of gold" [*ten byznysmen má zlaté srdce*]. On the other hand, a merchant, entrepreneur, tradesman or a rich man can have a heart of gold, although even here that is not generally assumed and a certain tension can be felt in the collocation. The word "*byznys – business*" comes as if from outside and has a positive connotation only in relation to money. In the focus group interviews on urban space and in the survey of the actors, the word "service" (*služba* in

Czech) often had the opposite connation; doing good to the benefit of a certain group. "*Služba*" is on the contrary a word associated with philanthropy. "Service" could also be a profitable activity, but the theme of one's own personal benefit is suppressed in the actual meaning of the word in Czech.

"Service" and "business" could touch upon the same activity, but for each label a different aspect of the exchange is suppressed. Whereas business accents the act of receiving money, service accents the provision of goods or other property. To do "business" in the public space was in the conception of our respondents the making of money off of tourists and acquiring from them unjustifiably high prices for goods and activities; the goal of which was nothing other than acquiring money. Also, the examples of goods sold to tourists that respondents gave were military caps, glass, crystal and Russian matryoshkas. The Prague residents made clear by the examples of these commodities that it is "junk" which has no meaning, and which not even tourists need. In relation to "business," some of the actors used the phrase "money laundering," not because it had been proven that such activity actually took place, but to emphasize that the commerce for the tourists had no significance for anyone other than the merchants themselves.

"*Služba*," or "service," on the other hand, meant activity that benefited Praguers. The sale of foodstuffs, things for the household and other merchandise that make the life of the local inhabitants easier, but which unfortunately currently do not have a place in the city center.

The research on public spaces in Prague was framed by a number of hypotheses. Different generational interests, different interests of the rich and poor and those of people in various professions could be assumed. In the population of Prague, however, there was no majority opinion on these differences. The basic division that was meaningful to them was the division into the inhabitants of the city, tourists (possibly foreigners), socially pathological individuals or the homeless and entrepreneurs mainly in the area of tourism. Through the lens of most of the inhabitants of the city, these groups have interests that are difficult to reconcile.

Post-Socialist Gateway City

Particularly in Central Europe, Communist Party coups followed the process of industrialization and urbanization. Urban centers formed here long before the emergence of the Iron Curtain and fulfilled most urban

functions continually as was true of the cities in Western European states. Nevertheless, ownership rights here were specific to the Communist period, because the main owners of property were the state and municipalities. During the Communist period, the linking of cities with the world economic system and global events was generally weak. This included the world of symbols, meanings and predictable behavior. Instead, other than intrastate contacts and contacts between socialist countries, cities were to a great extent isolated from global context. Post-socialist urban systems entered upon the global urban stage almost overnight as the Iron Curtain fell and setting off the transformation processes.

If we speak of a social transformation in the Czech Republic after 1989, it is possible to label Prague as its true center and as the foremost carrier of a number of positives and negatives, which the social transformation of the Czech Republic brought. Prague after 1989 certainly also became a global city. The course of the Velvet Revolution, its inclusion as a "world event," the new opportunities for investment and last but not least the international public figure of Václav Havel that attracted investors, international personalities and corporations to Prague. Already by 1990, Prague had been visited by American President George Bush, Catholic Pope John Paul II and Tibet's Dalai Lama. A wide range of global personalities of rock and folk music had also performed here. In addition, meetings of important world organizations began to take place here.

Whereas other parts of the country, including large cities, only gradually changed their original characteristics as local or regional centers, Prague became a typical "gateway city." Prague provided direct access to the nation state, as did other capital cities of states preparing for accession to the European Union (Dostál 2004: 15). Prague became the seat of the central offices and important corporations that facilitate transnational activities, including the possibility of meeting with supranational entities. The role of gateway cities in these transformational processes results in a tendency toward a monocentric system that dominates the given state (Dostál 2000), which reduces the influence of other large cities. Processes of this type were recorded not only in the Czech Republic, but also in Poland, and the eastern part of Germany. Gateway functions were also fulfilled by cities in the western parts of Germany, in Hungary, in Slovakia and in other countries (Haase et al. 2011).

The role of Prague as a gateway is demonstrated by a wide range of indicators. Prague, which is considered as a separate region of the Czech Republic,[6] currently has 1,259,079 residents (Statistical Yearbook of the

Czech Republic 2015: 67). It is the region with the lowest unemployment rate in the Czech Republic[7] and with the highest per capita income.[8] More than a third of the foreigners in the Czech Republic live in Prague (Uherek et al. 2008). The proportion of foreigners in Prague is 13.21%, whereas the percentage of foreigners in the entire Czech Republic is 4.21%.[9] Prague is also the place with the highest number of short-term visitors, the majority of whom are tourists. Every year, approximately six million guests stay in lodging facilities in Prague, which is roughly five times more than Prague's permanent residents. In 2013, visitors to Prague had 13,617,000 overnight stays, and foreign guests stayed an average of 2.62 nights. In 2015, 15,917,265 overnight stays were recorded.[10] This number includes those who spent at least one night in Prague hotels and hostels, and implies that the real number of visitors of the city is higher. This suggests that at any one moment approximately 43,000 people reside in mass lodging facilities in Prague. Most of them come from the Russian Federation. These visitors with Russian passports also spend the most days in Prague (4 days on average). Second place belongs to guests from Germany and third place from Italy (ČSÚ 2014). 65% of foreign visitors to the Czech Republic spend some time in Prague.

The enormous growth of tourism in connection with neoliberalism shows that tourism is one of the most dynamically growing branches of the economy (Wearing et al. 2010: 2–3). It is a welcomed and supported phenomenon of neoliberal economics. The need to travel and discover new spaces is commercialized to the full extent in the neoliberal context. This is promoted by travel agencies and the media, which reinforce imaginaries about what can be seen and experienced in individual tourist hotspots (Salazar and Graburn 2014). Employees of travel agencies, guides in tourist centers and other tourism industry employees not only co-form these imaginaries but also ensure that they are transformed into personal experiences for tourists. As a result, they lead tourists to one place regardless of personal taste, mood and convictions of individuals. They are squeezed onto one street and, in the case of Prague's heritage center, stretch like a monolithic crowd between Old Town Square and Charles Bridge. In this turmoil and bustle, they experience the dominant themes of the "Land of Stories" as the Czech Republic is now presented in tourist guidebooks. The central point of "Mysterious Prague" is the panorama of the castle from the Charles Bridge, to which winding medieval streets lead. These media images thus turn the crowded route into a personal experience in Prague for several tens of thousands of tourists daily. For instance, as many as 30,000 people a day cross the narrow tourist

hotspot of the Charles Bridge (ČTK 2007). As indicated by Berenika Kučerová, Praguers, precisely because of the overcrowding, prefer to avoid this place even though they also like the panorama (Kučerová 2007). As shown by the comments from the previously mentioned focus group at the Institute of Ethnology, Praguers are enraged that the center of the city is impassable due to the large number of people who congregate there.

It is understandable that for the population of the city it is an extreme change, which can be positively interpreted from the perspective of the demand of the population of the Czech Republic and Prague. In 1989, the slogan "We want to go to Europe" was heard from the mouths of the supporters of the Velvet Revolution; most of whom were Prague inhabitants. The slogan was fulfilled many times over for Prague. Prague is now not only a part of Europe but also of the globalized world. Why then does its population not enjoy it?

Stolen City

In 2014 new building regulations were proposed in Prague, which would, inter alia, regulate the size of advertisements, occupations of public space and other problem areas about which Praguers had long complained. Alongside the positive reactions, we recorded also negative responses. "Prague will lose hundreds of millions," proclaims the critical websites (Prahapodlehudecka/Prague according to Lord Mayor Hudecek 2014). Naturally, travel advertisements and the tourism industry, the rental of space and other commercial activities bring money to Prague, according to the authors of the website. But, what does the word "Prague" mean? At first glance, the banal answer – "a city," is not in this case as banal as it would appear. We return to it as the elementary question of "What is the city?" which we can define primarily as

- physical space, geographically defined territory or the material attributes amassed on the given territory;
- material space connected primarily with its administrator or owner;
- material space plus any populace that is found at the given moment on its territory;
- the space inhabited by the people who live in the milieu.

The selection of a certain type of answer can be used to judge whether Prague will be poorer or richer. In the center of the city, rents are rising,

the environment is worsening, an unsuitable assortment of shops is emerging and services are becoming more expensive. In the opinion of the population, safety is decreasing as are many other indicators of the quality of life. Although the influx of tourists and entrepreneurs has a number of positives, it also brings many negative aspects into their lives of local inhabitants. The center of the city is being depopulated. The local residents probably do not profit from the tourism industry, or only a small number of them do. Exactly, if the thesis that Prague is becoming richer is true, then the thesis that those in the city who do not become richer are not a part of Prague must also be true.

From our interviews and research investigations so far, it is possible to derive the following story that is subjectively told in various excerpts from narratives:

Until 1989, Prague was predominantly a city of employees, a large part of which had similar incomes, similar working conditions and similar possibility of recreational activities. They lived in the city in rented flats. Only a small part of the apartment stock was in private hands. Flats mainly belonged to the state, the city or industrial enterprises. They however lost control over them for the most part, and some of the city's population could act toward them like toward inheritable private property.[11] Although the previous socialist state nurtured among city residents the idea of an external enemy from the West, they did not believe it much. They distinguished between "us" and "the state" which was dangerous but foreseeable. Prague was mainly a city of the middle class, and professions were frequently related to state activities.

After 1989, neoliberal economics opened to the citizens of Prague a route to the world and allowed them to handle their fate freely. They believed that they had enough abilities and skills for that, but in any case, they underestimated the importance of having means for doing business. The majority of them had only enough money for the privatization of their own flat. In Prague, employees dominate to this day. Most Praguers retained their teaching, official and other middle class positions. A more distinctive movement was recorded only in service jobs. In the *Census of People, Houses and Flats* in 2011, it was reported that of 600,730 economically actively employed inhabitants in Prague, 439,646 were employees and 102,020 worked on their own account (they were self-employed) (Census 2011).

Doing business in the tourism industry was undertaken most often by entrepreneurs from outside of Prague. Frequently they came from abroad, and foreign employees worked for them. Paradoxically, the newcomers are

often not from the West, toward which the Czech Republic wanted to connect, but from Eastern Europe and from Asia. These new groups of inhabitants are connected with the city by ties, which we could label as "byznys," that is taken away from the local inhabitants. If the tourists seek authenticity, they are disappointed. Only the material scenes are authentic. The people who offer services and make money from these scenes usually do not have much in common with the autochthonic inhabitants. It cannot be said that the actors in the tourist industry use the city only for the stages for their own "business." Some of them also live in it but, as shown in our data, the original inhabitants do not perceive them in that way but consider their social and economic activities as "alien." They do not see them making either a contribution for Praguers or for tourists. They do not appreciate the fact that part of the profits of the new businesses are taken in the form of taxes and also benefit them. On the contrary, they assume that someone other than themselves profits from the collected means.

It might seem as though the inhabitants of the city of Prague lost in a free entrepreneurial competition, but the majority of them did not participate in any competition. They were not interested in changing their positions in schools and offices for jobs as salespersons of souvenirs, masseurs, waiters, hotel receptionists or prostitutes. The vast majority were not interested in doing business in a hostelry, or establish a museum of wax figures in the center of Prague. Since real estate in the center of Prague was not their property, for the past 20 years, as voters they could only with difficulty slightly influence the transformations of Prague. Entrepreneurs negotiated with property owners, who very often were the State or municipality itself. One might expect that the municipal authorities and other institutions would serve their constituents, but in post-communist states they themselves have become important entrepreneurial entities on the market with plots of land and real estate. Therefore, they themselves are doing "business."

Saskia Sassen has often pointed out that globalization does not eliminate the existence of the state as a social institution and the same is applicable for other more local power units. On the contrary, she convincingly showed that globalization is connected with: "enormous complexity, institutionalization, formalization and centripetal force of the nation-state, the unit that has absorbed all major building blocks of society over several centuries" (Sassen 2006: 401).

The state in the global neoliberal era has significantly changed its function. It has almost entirely separated legislative and executive power from one another. Its public functions underwent a process of deregulation, privatization and marketization, which Saskia Sassen considers to be indispensable conditions of economic globalization. As she says: "changes inside the state can be seen as part of the epochal transformation of the current age" (Sassen 2006: 410). In this process, also part of the executive is privatized and these processes necessarily change the relation of the citizen and state and the significance of citizenship as such (Sassen 2006).

In the case of a post-socialist city, municipal authorities acquire the position of independent entrepreneurial entities and our respondents perceived it as such. They saw them as adversaries doing business along with the developers and the sellers of Russian caps and matryoshkas. Together with them, municipal authorities shared in the profit, which in the end the nouveau riche squandered in their own ways. The municipality in the best-case scenario might invest their acquired wealth in the city and improve the scenes for the tourism industry. But, as Prague citizens expect, it hardly invests for the benefit of the city's inhabitants, as they are viewed as likely to interfere with their activities; such as when a property owner in a lucrative spot is hindered by his tenants when he wants his block of flats converted into a shopping mall. The tension that was thus created between the leadership of the city and its inhabitants was clearly evident in the speeches of the local politician, with whom we started this text with a quote, and who knew very well that he represents an institution that does "business" despite having been established to perform "services" for the citizens. The state and municipalities in the minds of the local people illegally enriched themselves twice. The Communist regime allowed them to acquire property for free, and neoliberal capitalism made it possible to sell it for a profit.

The End of Neoliberalism or Mere Populism?

The tourism industry is a significant element in many European cities. The local inhabitants usually manage to benefit from it. They rent flats, run restaurants, sell souvenirs or at least beg for money. The wide separation of the inhabitants of Prague from the economic activities that take place in it is so striking that Prague has become almost a model laboratory of neoliberal transformation of a post-socialist city.

Here space is not linked with the common interest of its inhabitants, but is parceled out to remote individual economic activities. As Saskia Sassen argues, cities have a significant role in the process of globalization. She explained in *The Global City: Introducing a Concept* that the importance of large cities increases with the process of privatization and deregulation, because the firm tie between the state and the space is loosened (weakening of the nation as a spatial unit) (Sassen 2005: 27). Cities as spatial units can exceed the state and simultaneously act at the regional, national and global levels (Sassen 2005). In the same way, in the case of Prague, the tie between the city as an entrepreneurial entity and the inhabitants of city, who do not participate in important activities in the city, is weakened.

As pointed out by Ulf Hannerz, global cities are centers of a plurality of private and public interest, i.e. a crossroads of many influences, with persons of many state citizenships and identities. Cities transcend their inhabitants and vice versa: only a part of them stays permanently in global cities. Global cities are nodes on the network of networks, center–peripheral relations transcending nation states (Hannerz 1992, 1996). The social cohesion of the inhabitants in global cities is necessarily weakened by the extreme diversity of their dwellers, but it cannot be entirely destroyed. Politics in a transforming state, which also, as we have shown, is closely tied to "business," is, however, even in the period of neoliberalism a "game of common interests." Otherwise, not even politics could exist. Elections then, even in a neoliberal state, remain a "selection system" for those who will provide citizens with the best "service."

In 2014, across the political spectrum, during pre-election political party efforts in Prague, slogans were offered in the spirit of a return to service for the citizens. It was precisely in the spirit of slogans, which already a few years before these elections the Lord Mayor Tomáš Hudeček also tried to introduce into political discourse. To increase the current "salability" of communal politicians, previous references to "the journey to Europe," attracting investors and worldwide reputation were noticeably absent. The winning party, ANO, bet on slogans telling the citizens: "we will just arrange it," "we will keep an eye on it," "we will take care of it," e.g.: "A cultural milieu for our children? We will just take care of it." The close second in the campaign, Top 09, selected the central slogan "We will return Prague to you" (Volební bilboardy 2014).

The campaign behavior of the political entities in the 2014 Prague municipal elections was, as expected, characterized by populist sentiments. However, it was also marked by a clear shift in message and tone reflecting public opinion that manifested itself in the changed behavior of distinct economic and political power entities.

Conclusion

Neoliberal policy in post-communist countries has become an ideal instrument for the legitimization of large property transfers under unclear circumstances. It was an instrument for the privatization of property, which for many decades had served the people of Prague, who did not even endeavor to acquire it because they did not understand what they could lose if they did not compete for it. Neoliberalism made it possible for the public space of the city to become an asset for the enterprises of people who had nothing in common with the city. As Manduhai Buyandelgeriyn clearly argued, evolutionism, Marxism and neoliberalism form a common line of diachronic thought on global development as a continuum controlled by forces and laws, which are outside the entities involved (Buyandelgeriyn 2008). The idea of economic forces, which guide human behavior connects neoliberalism directly to Marxist-Leninist teachings (Buyandelgeriyn 2008). It lent itself well to the transformational rhetoric adapted by politicians who grew up and were educated in Communist states. The adaptation of neoliberalism into the previous communist discourse was logically possible by merely reversing positive and negative signs.

The exchange of the positive and negative connotations of the terms *state* × *private; collectivization* × *privatization; regulation* × *deregulation; ideology* × *market* provides a scope for an extensive change of ownership rights. The results of this transformation are locally determined and as demonstrated by Katherine Verdery and Michael Burawoy, barely predictable (Verdery 1996; Burawoy and Verdery 1999) inter alia also because through decentralizations the large-scale economics of the state is ground into a plurality of microeconomics (Buyandelgeriyn 2008). Simultaneously, the status of the actors involved can be maintained or only partially changed (those who managed or ran things in the previous regime are frequently now also owners).

In the Prague example, at first only gradually, and not more distinctly until the second decade of the twenty-first century did the public, or rather

the inhabitants return as more important actors. In global neoliberal Prague that had not been necessary, or indeed desirable, for market transactions. Taking into consideration the discursive scene, their involvement logically takes place superficially in the form of discussion about public space in which the interest of individual actors most visibly clash. The discussion about tourists and the homeless in this scene symbolizes a deeper concern about the development of commercial activities, the preferred values of the citizenry and the social pathologies that the city should address. The fact that the municipality began discussions with the inhabitants of the city about these topics, without interest in buying or renting some plot of land, might be a signal of efforts to establish social cohesion on other than neoliberal principles. In neoliberalism you do not discuss what is not economically advantageous. Tourists are not the subject of criticism by inhabitants because their presence is undesirable but because they are the most visible and most tangible symbol of "byznys." They represent to Praguers nonsensical activities that could lead to economic success, without concern over who will profit from the transactions and how it will affect the inhabitants of the city. The Office of the Public Space even learned how to involve Prague dwellers. In 2015 they produced a draft of a new manual: Manual of Participation in Planning of the City, which declares a new quality of communication with Prague dwellers in city planning (IPR 2015).

Today it is unlikely that a situation will be created in which owners, inhabitants, entrepreneurs and public authorities are the same physical bodies who make decisions about who has the right to use the city and its public spaces as instruments of their interest and the place through which they communicate with the outer world. Despite the difficulties discussed in this chapter, on the symbolic level it is useful to revive this ideal because it is unsustainable in the long-term to disrupt the relationship between city inhabitants and the physical environment in which they live.

Notes

1. Focus Group June 15, 2014, participant A6.
2. In the survey, which we conducted within our investigation on the theme of public space, the vast majority of those questioned stated that public spaces should be taken care of by the municipal authorities or the offices of the town districts or the owner, which in the case of public spaces is again "the

city". Answers of a different type appeared only exceptionally (Uherek et al. 2014: 27).

3. The research was conducted in a questionnaire form on a sample of 1061 respondents on March 3–10, 2014.
4. For instance in the senate elections on October 17–18, 2014, the voter turnout was 16.9% of qualified voters, the elections to the representation of communities and towns enjoyed greater interest, although 44.46% of qualified voters participated. See http://www.denik.cz/volby/komunalni/. Accessed October 19, 2014.
5. Respondents answered an open question, they did not select from any list; the list was created only after the fact based on their responses.
6. The Czech Republic currently is divided into 14 regions.
7. In Prague was the share of unemployed in the ages 15–64 as of 31 July 2013 3.1%, whereas in the Czech Republic it was a total of 7.44%. In July of 2016 it was 3.89% whereas for the total of population in the Czech Republic it was 4.1%. There was also the second highest number of vacant positions in the Czech Republic here after the Central Bohemian region (16,627 vacant positions in June 2016) (Source of the data: Czech Statistical Office and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the CR).
8. The average monthly wages as of April 2016 were a total of CZK 32,934 in Prague. The average gross monthly wage in the Czech Republic in the first quarter of 2016 was at CZK 26,480 (Source of the data: Czech Statistical Office).
9. Data as of 31 December 2014, Source of the data: Czech Statistical Office.
10. http://www.praguewelcome.cz/cs/infocentrum-b2b/info-servis/praha-ve-statistikach/. Day accessed August 8, 2014; Statistický bulletin hl. m. Praha – první čtvrtletí 2016.

    Calculated by Zdeněk Uherek based on data from the Czech Statistical Office.
11. Part of the flats was also co-operation ownership.

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j9ODggKaAQJLYu5cfoA7GAGCBNg5Lm-KEEENvh5Kzk0J3t2r7rKUMkl nboCjsDY_6Jqn8BjEyIHXXsip1GCRNYsq3P3_N7z8-9Z7ClgPkLnGAUqyB EZSzb-5jbUw-__yye342DtQfZkGF_DzcVExXIqLYgss1CP-U7u2DGzPdpv eb0tLsClpod1AiYRDL0GyhhqE1CToREJ4IlhFZ8QhUMRh4gFTDXlw8xb aESjaPXTa7AKta0xU9vs37BCuP7Mjr7u7plwaQLM5EXHjFfBB1CiYKcazQ c80THDaTadiETebTK_KKuYOF_21hwKlSRFhEaMR15HAttV8Gy2-w4Rt8 x-k7CnIG-M9LXN7KRJ8vMp0xhBflXpHUlAtrSiCmNOCap-gZdyLowG3n xKBYFK-_o9GHbKefDX-vHNvCcf7q5_Xf5c9OCsQrYCQ5jouPNjXAHcdQ g4kfv-uOHq8dflglYB41NyutbnHeNK0vBRLVW-Dqs7MNqrVQfNQ8_l4rD KntQqJeOjgunhaI0R5O8v81qWl_TTmysrW9ynr4AvNhNF2kCAAA.&v=&v o=H4sIAAAAAAAAAHWPv07DMBDGry2hf4WAgY1HaMWCBBO42CVW k7hK0iAyYWjUgkIbErdkQmKBgRV2Bsa-BOIJWJkQOzMjXIoEA-IkW3fy_ b7v8_QdtCSGpRM5kY2xOg4bukwGpoy04svj08rBcwHyLaiEI9lrySM1ijm U1SAOksEo7KXR1jZkVTsv4b2Ip6qg3HWY3SE2MZMzuAD4s5P7MQzls N_gQxX0g3j57f7h4_J6Iw85DtpEhuMgjWHxd88anx4G8dX0brV6-3qTB0gj FCv8Z6Igt6tA6yXra5tpirEcXezNYuGLpaCoC2oJl0QK5tuC7nAHuwolrvCI QyhRUEAy41ziibYwOHICZ3e_44umTfzMuIS0RXSD0WzC32ses302CzX3 iaWghkDLNr8Z9HVJs2u0Ub_EKbPcjoeiC45Bm3XPYfWuz0yefgEL3Kc5lw EAAA.&void= Accessed October 31, 2014.

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CHAPTER 6

Colonial Factors Hidden in City Center Revitalization: Chernivtsi as an Imperial Formation

Karolina Koziura

The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted not only in the establishment of newly independent states but also in sovereign nations longing for common national histories and memories. In this sense, the last 25 years in the history of Central and Eastern Europe has been a difficult and very often contradictory time of simultaneously building democratic institutions, establishing market economies and searching for new identities frequently by rediscovering their pre-Soviet "lost past" (Gruber 2002). One of the most important questions raised throughout this period concerned the future of leftover Soviet signage in post-Soviet urban landscapes (Wanner 1998). Together with often very rapid de-Sovietization politics, a new trend became part of the "European City" model (Molnar 2010). This had been embodied in a number of urban reconstruction projects conducted under the labels of "Little" Viennas, Romes, Venices and Parises.[1] Neither the size of the city nor its significance mattered when it came to reshaping local urban memory and identity. Central European capitals found themselves in an in-between position as bridges between East and West, the Soviet past and the European future (Lisiak 2010, 2).

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_6

The redefinition of place and identity is one of the most significant features visible in contemporary Ukrainian cities. This is connected not only with the recent law on de-communization introduced by the Ukrainian government but also with the complicated history of this country, which developed under the shadows of different empires.[2] Certainly, the post-socialist city framework contributes to the question of spatial continuities between the socialist past and the post-socialist present, mobility and transnational social and economic practices, as well as the understanding of power and conflict in the contemporary cityscapes of Central and Eastern Europe (Hüwelmeier 2013). At the heart of this essay, however, lies the assumption that post-socialism reveals only partially the cultural kaleidoscope of contemporary Ukrainian cities. Urban space might then be a useful tool to investigate different influences, power relations and hierarchies established over the centuries in Central and Eastern Europe (Males and Sereda 2010). Kyiv (Hamm 1995), L'viv (Czaplicka 2005), Odessa (Richardson 2008) and many other Ukrainian cities have been subjected to constant shifts of power between dominant and subjugate cultures, population exchanges and symbolic and material transformations. In this sense, postcolonial theory might shed a new light on the understanding of the history and culture of Central and East European societies. The aim here, however, is not simply to apply postcolonial theory to contemporary Ukrainian cityscapes. It is rather to think metaphorically and epistemologically about the East European region through colonial lenses. Every post-coloniality should be situated and understood in a given socio-cultural context (Spivak 1987, 56).

Chernivtsi's history is marked by constant shifts between different empires and states such as the Austrian, Romanian, Soviet and Ukrainian. Each left its imprint on the ethnic composition and built environment of the contemporary city. Although the city center was actually built by an Austrian governor, it was during the socialist period that the city changed significantly. From being a rather peripheral, trade-oriented city, it was turned into a highly industrialized center with a large number of state-owned factories and new Soviet-style suburbs. Symbolically, the traces of the Austrian past were replaced by new Soviet signage in the form of street names, monuments and official symbols. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of the new state of Ukraine and, as a consequence, Chernivtsi became a new national frontier on the intersection of the Ukrainian, Romanian and Moldovan borders. Once again, the cityscape became a powerful stage for local micro-dynamics of power, place and identity construction that was embodied in the reconfiguration of the ideas about

Chernivtsi's past and future. The culmination of this was the project of the revitalization of the city center conducted in 2008. Marking the city's 600th anniversary, the municipality decided to transform the central urban space from a traffic junction to a pedestrian zone with restored squares, a closed street, new pavement, benches, numerous garden cafes, restaurants and exclusive shops. The renovation highlighted the Austrian origin of the city with eclectic architecture, the beautiful opera house and the charm of paved alleys. Chernivtsi started to fully resemble other Central European cities, including Cracow, Prague and Vienna.

Here I ask what kind of narratives does the revitalization reveal, whose history is transmitted through it and whose is forgotten? What can it tell us about the post-1991 development of Chernivtsi, and who is represented through it? In answering these questions, I argue that the 2008 revitalization project revealed two dominant trends in the development of post-1991 Chernivtsi, namely, de-Sovietization and Westernization in the heart of which, however, lies a strong tendency to nationalize the cityscape hidden in the cosmopolitan representations of past glory. Different interpretations of this cosmopolitan myth serve various ethno-national groups such as Ukrainians, Romanians and Jews in trying to demonstrate their primacy as well as their different roles in the history of Chernivtsi. The post-Soviet urban transformation was not, then, an easy and straightforward process. Rather, it required the local national ideology, which serves different groups, to go beyond the traditional exclusionary narrative of the past and incorporate new elements such as the above-mentioned de-Sovietization and Westernization.

In order to show the various narratives revealed by the 2008 revitalization project, I first discuss the way in which different national groups that inhabit Chernivtsi construct their own cosmopolitan myth in reference to their role in the history of the city. Recounting the history of Chernivtsi is complicated by the prevalent nostalgic discourse on the peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups during the reign of the Austro–Hungarian Empire. Second, I draw in the theoretical framework of this work from postcolonial studies, which help me to show the complexity of the urban formation of Chernivtsi. Finally, I discuss the contemporary urban politics of Chernivtsi in the light of the recent revitalization project in which the past, present and future of the city meet.

This chapter is part of my broader research project on the urban transformation of post-Soviet Chernivtsi. In the course of 2 years of fieldwork conducted between 2010 and 2015, I collected 25 semi-structured interviews with city officials, architects and activists. This was supported by

a number of informal conversations with city dwellers. Additionally I conducted historical and archival research, attended public meetings, participated in the life of various national and religious communities and took part in Jewish revitalization projects. In the later phase of my research, I was especially interested in the transformation of the built environment in the history of Chernivtsi and the present attempts to recreate the historical and multinational image of Chernivtsi. I intend to bring to light the micro-dynamics of place and identity construction embodied in different and very often contradictory political struggles. Although I draw from the entire body of research I have accumulated throughout my fieldwork, the primary data were collected by the analysis of local newspapers, by interviewing local officials and urban dwellers, by surveying physical sites in which revitalization was conducted and through the detailed analysis of changing visual representations of Chernivtsi.[3]

Myths of *Czernowitz/Cernăuți/Chernovtsy/Chernivtsi*

Nowadays, Chernivtsi is a regional center of the historical region of Northern Bukovina in Western Ukraine. It is inhabited by approximately 220,000 citizens of 65 different nationalities.[4] Chernivtsi and Northern Bukovina are perceived as two of the most multiethnic places in contemporary Ukraine. In the past, they were a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the city was named *Czernowitz* (1775–1918). Under the Kingdom of Romania, it was renamed *Cernăuți* (1918–1940 and 1941–1945) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic called it *Chernovtsy* (1945–1991). After 1991, under the independent Ukraine it was given its modern name *Chernivtsi*. In each of these cases, the name of the city was a multifaceted symbol which represented certain meanings and interests. Under concrete names are hidden balances of powers within society, calling for a revolution in the symbolic space. Every time Chernivtsi changed its governor, the city's space transformed as well: new buildings and monuments were raised (very often in styles in purposeful contrast with the previous style implemented by the former ruler); streets were renamed; a given national group became dominant and others found themselves on the margins of the local culture and economy (Koziura 2014).

The most powerful cosmopolitan myth refers to the time when the city belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1775–1918). At that time, the city was transformed from a peripheral rural settlement into a significant

center of the eastern Crown Land within the Empire, which attracted migrants from different parts of the country. Soon, the city became a melting pot of different ethno-national groups including Germans, Romanians, Ukrainian, Poles and Jews. Although the different nationalities balanced each other, German-speaking Jews made up a slight majority.[5] They were not only the economic elite of the city but also the carriers of German imperial culture and language.

In the literary representations of Chernivtsi and the Bukovina region, the locales were described as places of high culture, exotic borderlands caught between West and East and a multicultural periphery (Koziura 2014). Prominent Jewish and German writers were the first group who shaped the image of the city.[6] As Karl Emil Franzos concluded in 1876, Bukovina was a "Half-Asia," a place where European culture coexisted alongside Asian barbarism, where Western progress contrasted with Eastern indolence, and where there existed "neither bright day or dark night but rather an eerie twilight" (Pollack 2008). Later, it started to be perceived as "Jerusalem on [the] Prut river," mostly because of the predominantly Jewish character of the city, and finally as "a small universe, [of] urban culture, [and] the fascination of café[s]" (Shevchenko 2004). The myth continued during Soviet times and was repeated mostly by foreign writers, publicists and politicians. Just to name a few examples, Zbigniew Herbert, a Polish poet who had never been in Chernivtsi, said in an interview that Chernivtsi was the last European city. Hans Prelitsch described it as a multinational, multi-religious symbiosis, "a model for a united Europe." Oskar Beck called it "the Switzerland of the East" (Czyżewski 2008). Indeed, the Austrian Czernowitz was a multilingual and diverse city with strong European influences, visible mostly in its built environment and known for the peaceful and tolerant coexistence of its inhabitants. Certainly, while other European regions were witnessing open national conflicts, Bukovina seemed to be a quiet place. It is a mistake, however, to assume that the atmosphere of Czernowitz was totally free of prejudices. The local Ukrainian and Romanian elites were mostly antagonistic toward each other. They both occupied the same economic position (rather rural) and were similar in their demographics. The biggest difference was their faith. While Romanians were Orthodox, Ukrainians were predominantly Greek Catholic. Both groups also claimed their own primacy in Bukovina lands and constructed their visions of the region as the heart of their later nation states (Koziura 2016).

The beginning of the 1990s was a time in which the myth of cosmopolitan Chernivtsi returned to the city, and an initial literary inspiration was transformed into a dynamic political resource. At first, a number of books were published with reference to the Jewish heritage of the city. Then, the Museum of the History and Culture of Bukovinian Jews opened. The National Houses started to work actively to promote the heritage of their national communities, and finally a Jewish school opened. The multiethnic rhetoric entered the official politics of the local municipality.

In contemporary Chernivtsi, several groups have attached themselves to this multiethnic version of the city. The first one is formed largely by Chernivtsi Jews living in the diaspora. They perceive themselves as heirs of the Austrian-Jewish tradition and culture of the old Czernowitz.[7] In their descriptions of the city, they use German names that are today unknown to recent residents. In the contemporary buildings they see previous hotels and bookstores, and finally in present tenements they see their previous homes. Interestingly, however, the local Jewish population, whose origins lie in post-Second World War migrations into the city, does not find a place in the narrative and is largely excluded from it.[8] Another group interested in the maintenance of the cosmopolitan myth is composed of Ukrainians. For them, the myth serves particular national interests in proving their primacy and importance in Bukovina's lands. There is, of course, some sort of a distinct Ukrainian national narrative, reflected in local history books about Bukovina. It is centered on the presence of the Kievan Rus in medieval times and later on the activity of Ukrainian national leaders during Austrian rule. Although this representation was very popular and widespread in the beginning of the 1990s, today the image of a distinct, ethnic Ukrainian history of Bukovina is perceived as rather old-fashioned and radical. Instead, the Ukrainian national narrative has been included in the cosmopolitan myth of the city, which in fact represents the perception of the city's long-term bond with Western influences and connections with intellectual life and high culture. Interestingly, the Ukrainian and Jewish interpretation of the cosmopolitan myth of Czernowitz is clearly anti-Romanian. When in 1918 the land of Bukovina became a part of the strongly nationalistic Romanian state, for local Jewish and Ukrainian elites it was the end of the multiethnic balance. They were the first groups targeted by the strong politics of Romaniazation and open anti-Semitism. For Romanians, however, Chernivtsi and Bukovina were perceived as an integral part of Greater

Romania, and the Austrian presence in the region was simply described as a "kidnapping" – *rapirea Bucovinei* (Eminescu 1905).

The myths of cosmopolitan Czernowitz were similarly forgotten in 1944, when Chernivtsi became a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The social life of the citizenry was moved from the city center to micro-districts (*mikrorayony*), newly established, self-contained communities of residential quarters located on the outskirts of cities and centered on industry (French and Hamilton 1979, 11). Soon they became self-sufficient districts in which workplaces, apartments, hospitals, cultural centers and other markers of urban life were located. They were designed according to the Soviet idea of functional modernism (Abitz 2006, 223). Moreover, since 1944 Chernivtsi has witnessed two kinds if immigration. The first is related to rural–urban migrations and the second to the migration within the Soviet Union itself. In this way, the pre-war character of the city as well as its ethnic balance was breached. Thus, the significance of the old city center of Chernivtsi was diminished and moved to the industrial suburbs. This does not mean, however, that the city center was totally neglected. The Soviet authorities decided to change the symbolic meaning of the city center through changing the street names to commemorate Soviet heroes, raising monuments to Soviet leaders and rewriting the history of public buildings.[9] The Soviet culture was also transmitted through another important element, namely the Russian language, which in this period dominated not only the official media but also everyday communication.

Since 1991, in Chernivtsi one notices two processes. On the one hand there is the process of breaking symbolic ties with everything associated with the Soviets and with Russian culture, and on the other is the reestablishment of the long-term ties with the Western fundaments of the city. As shown by the example of the 2008 revitalization project, the local Ukrainian national idea was created in the clash between these two narratives and images of the city.

Chernivtsi as Imperial Formation

To read post-1989 cities of Central and Eastern Europe through post-colonial lenses means assuming that colonial elements still continue to shape the culture of the contemporary urban spaces. This takes place in the form of positive (or negative) relationships with former colonial powers, nostalgic memories and, finally, the popularity of nationalist ideologies

(Lisiak 2010, 16). The superficial closeness of Eastern Europe to the global history of domination and conquest cannot, however, lead to the simple application of postcolonial theory to the region. Especially in the case of Ukraine, extreme difficulties lie in the way of applying such terms as *colony* or *metropole* to its history. Not only does the complicated position of this country, which developed under the shadows of many Central European Empires, challenge this distinction, but also the traditional historical images of empires as fixed and steady forms seem to be irrelevant here. In light of the recent rethinking of the postcolonial canon (Stoler et al. 2007), such terms as *colony, metropole* and even *empire* seem to lack relevance. Rather, the new comparative framework invites thinking about the imperial formations through the politics of displacements and reconfigurations of power. Imperial politics, then, are not simply fixed cartographies of power visible through clear-cut colored maps of Europe but rather constant shifts of relations between colonizer and colonized, citizens and imperial subjects and forms of domination and subjugation (Stoler et al. 2007, 12). Historically, then, Ukraine may be perceived not simply as a subject under different colonial powers but rather as a dynamic frontier a multidimensional space of becoming shaped by the fluidity of cultures, ethnicities and languages (Portnov 2015). Postcolonial urban space is not simply a natural, physical entity but rather, primarily a relational identity created by various interactions, co-constituted through complex impositions and interpretations of economic structures, state practices and social imaginaries (Goswami 2004, 6). Interestingly, when it comes to Central and East Europe, the Soviet Union, together with its monumental architecture and metropolis aspirations, is perceived as the main colonizer. After 1991, the historiography of the region was largely formed by post-socialism, a once useful theoretical category for describing the transitory realities of Central and East European societies after the fall of communism (Burawoy and Verdery 1999). It was soon realized, however, that post-socialism as a framework fails to satisfy the local production of knowledge (Cervinkova 2013), contributes to existing hierarchies of knowledge and power (Buchowski 2004), and simply does not describe adequately the complicated reality of the societies living there (Kurti and Skalnik 2009). It is still confusing whether post-socialism has ended (if yes when?), is still going or maybe has never happened.

Similarly, scholars used to perceive the post-1991 development of Central and East European cityscapes only through Soviet/post-Soviet lenses (Andrusz et al. 1996; Stanilov 2007). Certainly, the remnants of the

previous regime, widely visible physically and symbolically in almost every city, posed the biggest challenge for various revitalization projects. It seemed as if by destroying the monuments of the past, the urban dwellers wanted to erase the memory of communism. Agata Lisiak (2010) rightly notes that Central and East European cities should be called "(post)colonial" in order to highlight the two centers of power that have shaped their space. These are the just-mentioned Soviet colonizer, whose remnants are visible predominantly in architecture, infrastructure, social relations and mentalities, and the current colonizer in the form of the Westernization extending over all spheres of urban life (Lisiak 2010, 36). For Lisiak (2010), Westernization from the outside is a process by which a non-Western culture is transformed by (what is associated with) Western culture; for example, in the rise in the ubiquity of consumer goods, of economic influence, of cultural exchange and of the establishment of Western institutions. The Westernization from within, on the other hand, is a situation in which a non-Western culture tries to emulate the Western one and introduces political, economic, social and cultural developments associated with the latter (Lisiak 2010, 35). It seemed as if, from Berlin to Prague, Budapest to Warsaw, the "European City" (Molnar 2010) became a master framework for various projects of urban reconstruction.

Still, however, the recent de-Sovietization and Westernization only partially reveal the multidimensional problem of the spatial reconfiguration of Central and Eastern European cityscapes. The "thinking between the Posts" (Chari and Verdery 2009) covers not only the revisiting of Cold War divisions but also strengthens the analysis of societies and nations developing in the shadows of empires. In the case of Ukraine, seen as a highly contested borderland, such analysis would entail the understanding of not only the Soviet but also the pre-Soviet past in contemporary developments. As the example of Chernivtsi shows, the past is not merely a static resource but rather an active and dynamic factor in the contemporary reshaping of urban space, politics and imaginaries. Distinctions between dominant and subjugated, Western and non-Western cultures, as Lisiak (2010) seems to suggest, simply do not capture the reality of the situation.

The City Center Revitalization

As noted previously, the revitalization of the city center of Chernivtsi took place in 2008. The newly revitalized places became some of the most powerful symbols of the new urban life in Chernivtsi. According to

Bitušikovă (1998), the examples of the numerous city centers' reconstruction in the former Eastern bloc does not differ from similar reconstruction efforts in Western European cities. The difference is hidden, however, in the intensity of feelings and enthusiasm of city inhabitants encountering these transformations as well as the different narratives that accompany the changes. From this perspective, in Chernivtsi two factors remain the most important: which places actually became revitalized and people's attitude toward them.

As previously discussed, three city squares were changed completely. They were built during the Austro-Hungarian period and were perceived as important centers of city life. Nowadays, they share the city's predominant eclectic architectural style. The first of those renovated was the main square together with the town hall and the monument to Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko that was located there. The town hall got new elevations and a small garden was built in the yard inside, which functions as the town hall gallery. A mosaic coat of arms made of flowers was established in front of the gallery and the coats of arms of partner cities from all over the world were placed in the pedestrian zone. The space in front of Taras Shevchenko's monument, although too small for mass events, became a place where city residents like to sit and chat with friends. It has a number of benches as well as flowers, and is one of the most popular places for young couples to meet.

The second renovated square was Philharmonic Square, situated a little bit peripherally to the main square but still within walking distance. During the Austro-Hungarian period, a market occupied the space. Thus, citizens of the epoch were widely familiar with the place. Moreover, one of the biggest hotels, the Brystol, was situated there (today there is a dormitory). Currently, in the central part of the square are a fountain and a garden pub. During the summer, this is the most common meeting point for young Chernivitzians, who like to sit in the garden listening to jazz music from the huge speakers that hang on the lamps. Interestingly, during the Second World War, the square was a part of the ghetto where the majority of the Jewish citizens were forced to live. Today, however, there is little information about this period. There is only a small sign with information about the ghetto located on one wall further down the street.

The third place, which faced the biggest changes, was the Turkish Square situated on the hill in the southeastern part of the city center. Before the war, a huge well, which supplied the city's citizens with

drinking water, was located there. The square sits in the historically Jewish part of the city (the ritual bath was also located there). Before the revitalization, the square and the Turkish bridge were restored. At present, it is one of the most touristic places in Chernivtsi and features a beautiful view of the Carpathian Mountains.

Nevertheless, one of the most significant changes for the citizens was the restoration of Kobylanska Street, the most representative street of prewar Czernowitz. Before the war, it was called *Panska Street* (Master Street). Here, according to the memories of my friend, local elites and wealthy people wandered on Sundays.[10] During Soviet times, the street was opened to traffic and did not have much in common with the image of its past glory. In the beginning of the 1990s, the street was renamed Kobylanska Street, in honor of Olha Kobylanska who was one of the most prominent Ukrainian poets, who lived in the city. After 2008, it again was closed to traffic and numerous benches and trees appeared in the middle. Garden cafes and restaurants were opened and small cobblestones with the names of the city in five languages (Ukrainian, Polish, Romanian, Yiddish and German) were installed in the pavement. The street became one of the most characteristic and distinct places in the city for both its citizens and visitors.

The Jewish diaspora community was the first to endorse the project. For them, revitalization was a manifestation of their vision and representation of the Austrian city. The main square finally looked like their imagined Ringplatz and the student dormitory resembled the once-glorious hotel. The city that they could reconstruct only through old photographs and memories gathered from earlier generations was finally realized. They still, however, felt neglected in the process. From their perspective, the Jewish roots of the city were not stressed enough. The huge Jewish necropolis was not included in the revitalization project. The members of the diaspora needed to found their own memorial boards, and even the borders of the previous ghetto were not adequately marked. Instead, the local Ukrainian elites produced their own vision of the history of the city.

The shape and direction of the renovations were widely discussed in the local press. In 2008, in every issue of the local municipal newspaper, *Chernivtsi*, an article connected with a particular revitalized place was published. Usually, there was a short history of the place with old photographs from the Austrian period included.[11] In fact, all of the renovated places are to some extent connected with different ethnic groups. For example: Philharmonic Square was a German market; Turkish Square was

known for its Jewish ritual bath; Kobylanska Street had been widely used by local German-speaking elites and the city hall was a place of multiethnic governments in different periods. Surprisingly, in these newspaper articles there is information proving only the "Ukrainesses" of Chernivtsi. Each of the revitalized places is connected with prominent Ukrainians or events important for Ukrainian nation building. There is little or no information on the Jewish, German, Romanian or Polish associations with these places. Although Chernivtsi's center was renovated based on the image of the Austrian city and the cosmopolitanism associated with it, in fact, the general ideology behind this project was to build a Ukrainian identity out of particular places and eventually the whole city. The ideas of Ukrainian identity were deeply embedded in the vision of Chernivtsi as a European capital through which Western ideas and values could be transmitted. Interestingly, the idea behind the myth of cosmopolitan and European Chernivtsi was also appropriated by the city's Romanian elites. Although traditional Romanian historiography projected Bukovina as a heartland of the Romanian nation stolen by Austrians and Ukrainians, nevertheless, the Western vision of the city serves the Romanian elites as a useful tool for building their European aspirations. They also share with Ukrainians the anti-communists' commitment to the myth. As such, the revitalization projects were among the most important de-Sovietization waves in post-1991 Chernivtsi. The second wave was marked by the recent de-communization law conducted in the aftermath of the so-called Euro-Maidan revolution, the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the war in Eastern Ukraine. As a result, the main heroes symbolically marked in the public spaces of Chernivtsi today are the victims of the recent revolution—the so-called "Heavenly Hundreds."

The cityscape of Chernivtsi is a product of imperial formations, multi-dimensional shifts of power, taxonomies, politics and imaginaries. It is a contested space, co-constituted by the colonial agenda of the Habsburg Empire, the nationalizing project of Greater Romania, the subject of Soviet modernization and finally post-1991 Ukrainization. For contemporary urban planners and activists, a common vision of this past seems to be a necessary element in the modern process of urban identity construction (Lowenthal 1985). Space, however, does not accept change passively. Rather it accumulates historical experiences. Past events which were very powerful are still present in the landscape. Space is both a model of a representation of the remembered past, as well as a model *for* a construction of peoples' memories (Geertz 1973, 90). The cosmopolitan myth, so

evident in the imagery of past glory and imperial nostalgia (Van Assche 2009), especially highlights the meaning of the past for contemporary politics. It is a powerful tool in shaping not only people's sense of identity but also their attachment to particular places within the city. In this sense, the cosmopolitan myth lies at the heart of nationalist ideology according to which a people's own nation is in the center of the universe, and which they perceive as the first nation on a given land (Schöpflin 1997; Smith 1997; Wilson 1997). In the case of Chernivtsi, the cosmopolitan myths are included in the national visions of every ethno-national group connected to the city, and in each case serve different political agendas.

Conclusion

The city center revitalization became an important moment during more than 20 years of Chernivtsi's transformation, and through which various aspects of (post)colonialism were revealed. Until the 2000s, the city had undergone a rapid transition that broke with its Soviet heritage, and then entered into a slow process of Westernization from the outside. Its main characteristics were the changing patterns of the urban economy (from an industrial to a trade center). With it came increasing numbers of shopping centers, Western chain stores, fast food restaurants (especially in the districts closer to the city center) and finally establishment of organizations responsible for ethnic and civic revival.

In the Chernivtsi cityscape, the last 20 years are marked by a slow Ukrainization process. The huge monument of Taras Shevchenko was established in the city center. A number of memorial boards appeared on public buildings. Ukrainian flags became widely visible and, finally, the Ukrainian language entered public spaces as the most important. The revitalization process, which happened in 2008, was a moment in which the citizens of Chernivtsi started to think about themselves as being Europeans inhabiting a "little Vienna." The old center, together with other eclectic architecture, again became the most representative part of the city. However, it is necessary to take into consideration that in actuality cosmopolitanism has hidden a strong desire to nationalize the city. Although the strongest politics are manifested by Ukrainian elites, Romanian and Jewish elites also have their own agendas. In the unfolding of this process, the Soviet micro-districts remained neglected and industrial areas centered around closed factories and enterprises, and the city center experienced a revival of cultural and social life.

The example of Chernivtsi shows that, as to the question of (post) colonialism, it is not possible to understand it merely in terms of 70 years of Soviet influence and recent transformations. The colonization of this borderland seems to have been a stable factor in the development of this urban setting. Despite a number of various attempts, the peripheral Chernivtsi has never changed into a national heartland. Thus, the post-1991 city is a hybrid of both the present processes which are connected with modernization and globalization as well as past influences and the presence of various other cultures in the region. The question remains, however, whether the shape of today's Ukrainization of the city will endure or, as history may show, one day change again.

Notes

1. From a more globalized perspective the phenomena of the "European City" is described by Judit Bodnar in her lecture *Paris of the East Urban Theory of the West: Cities and Theories after the End of the East/West Divide available at* https://vimeo.com/32445253; a more historical account is presented by Olga Sezneva (2012) in her analysis of the politics of belonging in contemporary Kaliningrad.
2. In 2015 Ukrainian parliament introduced a controversial law on decommunization according to which all Soviet symbols and names should be removed from public space. It resulted in the huge wave of renaming hundreds of official city names and streets and the demolition of monuments mostly in the eastern parts of the country. These changes also came to Chernivtsi and in the following article I discuss some of them.
3. The last phase of my research and the writing of the following article was possible thanks to a grant from the Polish National Science Center no. 2012/07/N/HS3/04169.
4. Based on the All-Ukrainian Population Census from 2001, source: http://city.cv.ua/portal/8/801-801.html.
5. According to the census from 1910, in Chernivtsi lived 87,000 citizens, among them: 28,613 Jews, 15,254 Ukrainians and 13,440 Romanians (Krughlashov 2011).
6. Czernowitz became well known mostly because of the poetry of Paul Celan and Rosa Auslander, two Jewish authors who were forced to emigrate during the Second World War.
7. The members of local Austrian-Jewish community who migrated from the city during and after the Second World War formed a kind of diaspora mailing list known as Czernowitz-L. Not only did its members create an online discussion platform through which they share their memories of

living in the city, but they also meet each other in person and visit Chernivtsi. Also, recently they started to influence local politics of cultural heritage through stressing the importance and need for restoration of the Jewish heritage sites in the city.

8. Most of the Jews who migrated to the city after 1945 were Russian speakers and industrial workers. Thus, nowadays they do not see connections with the local Austrian-Jewish heritage.
9. It is clearly visible in numerous maps and guidebooks which were published about Chernivtsi in the Soviet period.
10. During my research, I conducted a series of walks around the city with members of the previous Austrian-Jewish community of the city. The results of this walking memory paths project is published on the website: projectchernivtsi.wordpress.com.
11. This information came from my research in the city's archive during the second phase of my fieldwork from May 2010 until February 2011.

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CHAPTER 7

The Dispersed City: *The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan* by Borislav Pekić in Light of the Urban Revolution

Ivana Bašić and Petrija Jovičić

The city's identity – the city is a preferred space of European civilization – is interconnected with collective and individual identity. As Leonardo Benevolo points out in "*La città nella storia d' Europa,*" "European cities are born with Europe and in a sense give rise to Europe, and maybe are the most important sense of the European existence as a separate historical identity, the main characteristic of the European civilization [. . .]" (2004, 7). This connection between the city and European culture is realized in literature and the collective sub-consciousness, which according to Benevolo, identifies civilization with the city (Benevolo 2004, 15), planting its roots in the early formations of mythical thinking.

In fact, according to Cassirer, the shape of this space is embedded in lifestyle; as an analogy between space and ideas has existed since the beginning of mythical consciousness. The augur observes the sky, dividing it into segments in the east-west direction which is vertically separated by an imaginary north-south line. This original coordinate scheme – *decumanus* and *cardo* – was fundamental to ancient religious

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_7

notions. This scheme was subsequently carried into the spheres of law, social and state lifestyles because it defined ownership and the symbolic sphere that marks and protects it. The temporal connections as such were developed from among the space correlations while every orientation in time had an assumed orientation in space. This notion is something that is also valuable in language. For example, the Latin word *tempus* originated from the term and idea of *templum*, pretty much in the way as *contemplari* etymologically and originally has the same derivation. The way we organize space is correlated with our perception of time and our way of thinking about it.

The act of division, in the legal and religious senses, creates a bond of ownership as an additional feature of the sacral order of space. The limitations, determined by the divisions of the times of day and night, are closely connected with the Roman legal divisions of *ager publicus* and *ager divisius et adsignatus*, or between public and private space: Like the god before them, the state, the community, and the individual now acquired a definite space through the intermediary of the idea of the *templum*, and in this space they made themselves at home [. . .] This system also dominated the structure of the Italic cities, the grouping and order within the Roman camp, and the ground plan and inner arrangement of the Roman house, makes it clear how progressive spatial limitation, like every new boundary established in space by mythical thinking and mythical-religious feeling, became an ethical and cultural boundary. This relationship can be followed down to the very beginnings of theoretical science. (Cassirer 1955, 101)

Aristotle pointed out the link between man and city, while speaking about ethics in "Politics" (2015), giving the city the primary role over an individual:

> Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this

> sense makes a family and a state. Further, the state[1] is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part. (Aristotle, 1253)

The boundaries of the city for Aristotle and the Ancient Greeks were the reach of a human voice, i.e. the measure for an agreement between two parties. Probably the most famous "urban metaphor," the Tower of Babel, was developed not only from the idea of the diversity of urban populations but also from the idea of the physical size of city and the reach of human voice. Beyond the human measurements of a city and its buildings, its disintegration begins: "And that is, without a doubt, at least for now the only imaginable way of the city defence from the total and chaotic disintegration." As the architect Bogdan Bogdanović pointed out, "If the processes of lawlessness were to be avoided, firstly small *urbane cities* should be developed in human heads, for what is necessary to learn again the forgotten virtue of *reading the city*" (Bogdanović 1994, 22).

The intellectual practice of urban semiotics is founded on the idea of the city as a symbolic form and a complex system for demarcation[2] as well as on "reading the city" as text. The semiotic for a city might correlate with the urban material structure, supported by larger or smaller turbulences in time:

> The existence of semiotics can be noticed in some cities which are *read* (interpreted) using a codded way and can be observed as reflections of a particular system of symbols with appropriate meanings – a picture of some city is observed as a unique and complete text formed by many symbols that defines how a city is perceived and often mythologized (Radović 2013, 10).

According to Radović, a city "consists of quality textuality and that it is possible to observe it as a constellation of signs and symbols, or as a type of language, or system of hieroglyphs." It can then be assumed to be a text, or "symbolic polygon on which politics is shaping cultural and symbolic adaptation in coherence with political and/or national imagination" (Radović 2013, 11–12).

The city, as a human construct, can also be treated as an interlocutor or the Lacanian mirror which reflects its subject. This then becomes a sign for another subject while creating an intricately interconnected network between the subject and the sign.[3] According to Lynch, observations of

a city create distinctive pleasures no matter how ordinary the observations may be. During different urban events, sequences of the picture can be inverted, interrupted, abandoned or segmented for different people: "At every instant, there is more than the eye can see, more than the ear can hear a setting or a view waiting to be explored. Nothing is experienced by itself, but always in relation to its surroundings, the sequences of events leading up to it, the memory of past experiences. [. . .] Every citizen has had long associations with some part of his city, and his image is soaked in memories and meanings" (Lynch 1960, 2). We are not merely observers of the spectacle, as Lynch points out, but integral parts of it – a picture of a city and its meanings consists of a physical or objective picture, which is perceived and becomes an individual's mental picture composed of sensations, memories, emotions, demeanour or desire. The city becomes something more than a habitat – it is part of our internalized identity, a continuous companion, a place from which one cannot leave, a picture which deserves to be seen by an observer regardless of the perspective – or as it is said in Cavafy's poem "The City" – "This city will always pursue you. You will walk/the same streets, grow old in the same neighborhoods,/will turn gray in these same houses."

The "inner city" – a city inside our heads or in "the heart of mortals," is Heideggerian "poetic dwelling which cares for a man."[4] This is an essential subject of urban semiotics and urban literary anthropology. Of course, this academic division into fields and disciplines when talking about urban themes is conditional. However, it does demonstrate the importance of the perspective of the analyser rather than the greater or lesser propriety of using a particular methodology when talking about multi-layered urban phenomenon. In this case, the Lefebvreian question arises:

> Shouldn't we make use of the entire realm of philosophy, along with scientific understanding, in our approach to the urban phenomenon? [. . .] What prevents it from assuming the meaning it had in connection with the city and the town, metaphilosophy separating from philosophy the way urban society emerged from the dispersed city? (Lefebvre 2003, 64–65)

The relationship between literature and the city is complex. The city, according to Lehan determined the destiny of culture during the last 300 years, and is inseparable from personal as well as national destinies. Urbanism as a product of the Enlightenment became the "heart" of European culture – a source of political order but also of social chaos.

Therefore, the city can be viewed as a progressive construct which created an urban style beyond a literary style and vice versa. The development of the city is inseparable from the development of different literature movements – especially novels and their narrative models – comic realism, romantic realism, naturalism modernism and post-modernism.[5] Lehan noted a peculiar parallelism between the concept of the city in literature and in urban theory so that both interconnect while offering different ways of "reading the city" (Lehan 1998, 5–7). The rise and the fall of the city represent major themes in literature; so complex that it cannot be discussed in two or three themes, especially as to post-modern criticism in which the city, and our relationship to it, becomes the crucial question in literature (Ibid., 14). As Lehan argues "From Defoe to Pynchon, reading the text has been a form of reading the city" (Ibid., 7).

The novel *The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan* (1970) by Borislav Pekić is a peculiar artistic reading of the city, in parallel with understanding the position of the subject which is surrounded by the city; developing a reciprocal and mutual coexistence. This novel, a distinctive testament, an architectural and asset-owned pledge of the narrator (Arsenije Njegovan) becomes a narrative about Belgrade, which paradoxically (even though it is marked as the first urban novel in Serbian literature[6]) tells a story about the moment of its divergence: "the first urban Serbian novel described the twilight of the newly formed urban class. And in such a way the complete case of the formation of the urban class has ended before it begun" (Pantić 2007).

The author of the novel (Pekić) told the story of the house owner, Arsenije Njegovan, in his passions as a developer and owner as "a portrait." However, it is not only a portrait of a person preoccupied with a passion for building development and buildings, but more a portrait of a real versus an ideal city that compete with each other in the author's subconsciousness. The whole narrative is conceptualized around three events, which, according Radovan Mikić:

> ... form one historical, and for Arsenije Njegovn symbiotic formation. [...] The events discussed herein are the encounters with the red Armenians in 1919 in Voronezh, and an array of pictures describing the seriousness of that moment, the encounter with the demonstrators on 27th March 1941, which becomes the first crossroads in Arsenije's life, and the encounter with the student demonstrators in 1968" (Mikić 2002, 15).

Encounters with the crowd, according to Lehan, always describes a city: "The city often presents itself metonymically, embodied by the crowd. [. . .] No matter how different the aggregate, the crowd dominates the urban fiction of both the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. [. . .] Each crowd offers a way of reading the city" (Lehan 1998, 8–9). In *The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan* all three cases are in fact encounters with a horde. At Voronezh in 1919, a horde armed with sticks, mattocks, hammers and adzes had dragged according to their appearance all of the well-off people and house owners to a nearby ditch and beat them. The next encounter with the urban horde, the encounter with the demonstrators on the 27th March 1941, causes Njegovan's fear to re-surface and not only the fear of this concrete crowd in the street but of the crowd in general.

Arsenije's encounter with the city represented in the crowd was an encounter with a "galvanised crowd's carcass'" which "breaths loudly as a Biblical beast which crawls on its belly back to the marshes (Pekić 2002, 121); with a "yelling crowd (Ibid., 126); "uncivilised crowd" (Ibid., 128); "chaotic pack" (Ibid., 129); "whirling crowd" (Ibid., 137); "uncivilised demeanour" (Ibid., 137) and "rebellious behavior" (Ibid., 138). This crowd with banners is perceived by Arsenije as the Bolshevik danger, which wants one and the same – his houses. During the last two encounters he was injured because in the commotion he lost his hat, which for him represented "a token of urban dignity," "honour, dignity, legitimacy and sanctity" (Ibid., 272, 273) and therefore in his notes he concludes: "It could be said that all revolutions begin from a hat, from destruction of symbols for dignity, from tearing down insignia." The crowd that confronts Arsenije is the same crowd that he feels at one particular point carries the hatred aimed at banks and bankers, and is a visible manifestation, an inner protest described by Lefebvre as "the dispersed city."[7]

In fact, Lefebvre argues that a conflict between habitat and dwelling had arisen at the end of the nineteenth century because the, then new, urban idea, that was as powerful as it was unknowingly reductive, pushed habitat aside and emphasized the basic function of dwelling in such a way to limit humans to a few elementary acts: eating, sleeping or reproducing:

> Habitat, ideology and practice, had even repressed the elementary characteristics of urban life, as noted by a very shortsighted ecology. These included the diversity of ways of living, urban types, patterns, cultural models, and values associated with the modalities and modulations of

> everyday life. Habitat was imposed from above as the application of a homogeneous global and quantitative space, a requirement that "lived experience" allow itself to be enclosed in boxes, cages, or "dwelling machines." (Lefebvre, 81)

Along with the disappearance of the city according to its human measure, and the development of dwellings of this sort, the formation of masses and mass culture also evolved. It was something that could be turned into a horde ready, as in *The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan*, to penetrate forcefully into the centre. It was an integral part of the process of divergence in the city that began with the bourgeoisie and ended in the cessation of reciprocity and dialogue,[8] and the formation of "communes," and revolutionary urban practice:

> The city affirms its presence and bursts apart. The urban asserts itself, not as some metaphysical entity, but as a unit based on practice. [...] However, the truth (the fragmentation of the city through gentrification) was hardly apparent to their contemporaries. What would it have taken for the truth to become apparent? The Commune, considered as a revolutionary urban practice, with its myth and ideology, its utopia (decentralization, Proudhonian federalism). The workers, chased from the center of the city to its outskirts, returned to the center occupied by the bourgeoisie. Through a combination of force, luck, and good timing, they took control of it. (Lefebvre, 109–110)

The process of the total divergence of the city and disappearance of urban society was indicated with the arrival of Fascism and Bolshevism. These two seemingly opposing but integrally cooperative consequences of the development of industrial society were indicated at the beginning of the novel by pictures of bombarded Belgrade, which also appear as an echo and visible result of more dramatic events for Njegovan. These events were invasions of "the Barbarians" into the city that provided an interesting parallel to the incursion of ideal urban development and dominance of property ownership. In fact, the route that Arsenije's developmental and urbane ideas takes is an analogue to the process described by Lefebvre in relation to the idea of humanism and the idea of the city. Dialectic anthropology, according to Lefebvre, has developed from this urban problem, adding some elements and views deeply rooted in ancient philosophy. The development of rationality, which cannot be understood without philosophy, went from the Aristotelian logical sense,

to Descartes' analytical sense. Then Hegel's and Marx's dialectic senses were added on, while the philosophic sense was attributed with the industrial practical sense (Saint Simon and Marx). The industrial practical sense was overwhelmed by urban rationality during its formational phase. Here the rationality of thought surrendered itself to the rationality of organization. This cannot continue without posing questions of finality and meaning; questions that depend on the rationality of execution. The development of sense and meaning was followed by Humanism; from Abstract Humanism (Liberal and Traditional) that celebrated human beings and their abstract plans, to Critical Humanism which denied Abstract Humanism and led to Concrete Humanism that aimed for total finality and planning (Ibid., 72–74).

Along the way, Arsenije crossed over from the path of devotion to buildings and development in which the idea of human dwelling is suppressed. Instead he transforms the idea of development of dwellings in celebration and love towards them by attributing abstract human characteristics to them. Finally, while going through this phase of self-questioning the developer arrives at the idea of the total control of dwellers and the city; a city plan essentially set in stone.

By observing the demonstrations in 1968, the excited Arsenije interprets the upheaval as an urban mistake and supports the idea of Solieri's enclosed cones which at first were alien to him:

> It is an urban mistake, gentlemen – I have exclaimed. *C'est une faute urbanistique!* The labor suburbs that are circularly orientated surrounded, as I say, chained the merchant heart of the city, and is improvidently allowed, even the supported concentration of proletariat across low income neighborhoods and industrial regions – the eternal legions of rebellion and destruction . . . [. . .] About, Solieri, the gentleman, I say . . . about Paul Solieri the man who projected the city suited to bees' hives or, more precise if you will, the conical ant colony with internal channels! As the dwelling, work and social life are concentrated at the same place, that magnificent city is appropriate to have an absolute control over it. Its exits can easily be controlled and its products taken without fear that they will carry revolutionary ideas and behaviors . . . " (Pekić 2002, 267)

What attracts Njegovan's attention is the process of transformation of Belgrade. Arsenije Njegovan does not see this as problematic: "I was convinced that there is nothing wrong that a town from year to year

undergoes a transformation, builds and expands. Wasn't it me who also contributed to its metamorphosis; wasn't it me who demolished the run down houses and then built my own houses? [...]" (Ibid., 77). We are talking here about fear of a different type of transformation; a fear of the loss of the idea of the correlation between ownership and dwelling: "the word was about disintegration of the system of ownership; about subtotaling that real human system under a new one which is unreal, not human; about transformation of the items into symbols, things into numbers and calculated operations" (Ibid., 139).

Arsenije initially experiences development and ownership similarly in the spirit of Heidegger's idea of development and dwelling as a way "between the matter and its produced shapes, and spirit and its capacity to manufacture establishing a reciprocal but corrective relationship, in that sense making labor over matter according to the spirit," while "the dwelling would overcome the owner in the same sense as the owner would overcome the dwelling" (Ibid., 143). At first, the changed industrial relationship between the development and dwelling to Arsenije is aversive; he rebels against the obscene "facades of integument" of industrial origin; the dead and cold forms made by machines, but he is proud of his houses which have individual life (Ibid., 205–206). At the same time, he feels negatively about all developments that were not designed for dwelling but instead for some form of public function, including hotels, which despite their temporary nature and adaptability conform "to average measurements which exhort the mutual dwelling, in a serial, for everyone a bearable and harmonious spirit" (Ibid., 209).

Njegovan's rebellion is not a "traditionalist" stance because he is not an admirer of the past. For him, the Turkish *mahala* (town) is as alien to him as are modern undefined buildings. He rebels against his own idea of conscious development, and therefore points with pride to the homes of the Njegovan family who had "appeared with dignity and European indigenousness" as opposed to the Oriental urban negligence of broken alleys and the one-way streets of Turkish ghettos (Ibid., 203–204). Here from derives the opposition and critique in his opinion on the development of New Belgrade, which he has been observing during his 27-year-long voluntary spatial and temporal isolation, from the window of a run-down attic of his home at Kosančićev venac through his wife's theatre binoculars. Arsenije's view passes over an awkward concrete silo which appears to him as an "undefined building not qualified to be leased or accepted as a gift even though the perfect location at Ušće and Veliko ratno ostrvo." Then

his attention would be attracted to an "extravagant mansion of asbestos splendor possibly belonging to the Royal family." Finally, his eye would arrive at Novo naselje, the anchor of all of his imaginary walkabouts: From this slightly skewed vantage point and a fair distance, the newborn city had a negligent appearance of some unfinished wooden model. It reminded me of a certain yearning, a provisional pile of boxes, squares, cardboard towers and paper vegetation barely glued to a piece of model plywood [. . .]" (Ibid., 36).[9] The landscape is described by characterlessness, twin uniformity and the insignificance of its scenery: "From them some inhuman fatalism radiated, which as insignificant as it was could make every real home owner sad" (Ibid., 36–37).

Arsenije Njegovan recognizes in the new settlement the attributes of modern suburbs that Ratko Božović describes as a modern city:

> Nature is endangered in the cities, the fundamental human values of communication have been betrayed, and culture goes along with communication. The modern city has brought an apparent lack of space, narrowness and tenebrous atmosphere; it degraded the ecological system. [. . .] A man has been obscured by the verticality of high-rises; that uncharacterized *vertical village*. Obscure and degraded nature cannot be saved by modern pretentiousness. (Božović 2009, 19)

While thinking more as a builder than as a property owner, Njegovan is occupied by the idea of ideal home ownership that he wants to offer to the public. Consequently, this causes the loss of his beloved home *Nike,* and the lynching that took place on 27th March 1941 by the mob that caused him to withdraw into voluntary isolation. The same disagreement with the reality, draws him again into a conflict with the mob at the 1968 demonstrations. He understands that the desire for home ownership is intrinsic to a developer's profession, while fiscal values play a secondary role for the development of new houses. He also understands the mutual values of houses arguing that "surrendering without prejudice, and with love assures longevity and prosperity" (Ibid., 53). Njegovan's idea of ownership takes for granted that the relationship between the subject and the object of reality such that "life itself won't have to go around as a ghost which in some imaginary world is looking for its roots, or even reasons," but the relationship that will have life among waves of events "like in its own sea, as a known defined thing, and with things, no matter whether they are his own creations or not; with things he used so far in a barbaric

way, now equally exchanges his own self" (Ibid., 86–87). In his opposition to inverted unilateral ownership, Njegovan posits a two-way, parity and reciprocal ownership in which "the subject and the object have mutual ownership so far that any consequence that would make any difference between them is erased, so that both sides own are owned by each other [. . .]" (Ibid., 92).

This stance by Njegovan literally leads him to an obsession with one house, that of his cousin Stefan. His initial relationship to this house was one of intolerance bordering on hatred. This house, nicknamed by its neighbours "a silly house," is in fact an indication of an urban phenomenon. According to Lefebvre, one of the crucial attributes is the ability to compact:

> The urban consolidates. As a form, the urban transforms what it brings together (concentrates). It consciously creates difference where no awareness of difference existed: what was only distinct, what was once attached to particularities in the field. It consolidates everything, including determinisms, heterogeneous materials and contents, prior order and disorder, conflict, preexisting communications and forms of communication. (Lefebvre, 174)

Nike, as Njegovan intimately called this unusual house, compacted via its own will unpredictably different and opposing styles:

> Her look, formed by being inspired by the Baroque noble *Hôtel particulier* with some instances of a Chinese *pagoda* has given an impression of a real but miniature castle in the middle of a provincial town with its tin roof in the shape of butterfly wings; from its groin, a rotten baroque dome bloomed as a puss-like ulcer, as a breast surrounded by circular lantern, with a tympana in the middle of the façade – a blind triangular Cyclops' eye [. . .] with its French windows and glamorously shaped portal replacing the entrance door, with its interior, which did not fall behind the frontal end of the house; it was plastered with expensive clapboards; alabaster eaves, lacquered oak floorboards with spiral stairwells and marbled *podestà* (landings); therefore on the inside even though the furniture was not uniformed on its way to the external compromise of the incongruous style by Stefan's Jelena and the patriarchal heritage of her loathed mother-in-law reminiscent of a pillow-like chest in which precious treasures were collected. (Pekić 2002, 94)

Firstly, he experienced this house as a malignant growth; as a tantrum of insanity which hysterically enjoys itself in the freedom of self-shaping; which does not care about the unity of objects within urban

space and its spirit. Whilst observing the house "which has been collecting so to speak all of my favorite architectural styles, however insatiably it was doing so, without selection, collecting everything without an order, though never crossing the line of demarcation over which it would become too personal rendering it impersonal," Arsenije is developing a romance and a lover's relationship with it. While talking about the relationship with the house, he uses erotic metaphors, comparing his lust towards the house with the love between Abelard and Heloise in which there are transgressive conspiratorial charms, and "worthy compensations to the abundance of the lightning changes of feelings which we indulged in" (Ibid., 107). The house became his secret lover. It was a relationship that took on all the characteristics of an erotic relationship; from unsatisfied desire, love, ecstasy and jealousy, which led Njegovan to give all to Nike and thereby become his possession.

The erotic relationship with the house embodies the urban phenomenon of "gathering a difference," which evoked resistance and hostility that borders on hatred. It is symbolic of other important features of the urban phenomenon. It is the desire:

> The urban could also be defined as a place of desire, where desire emerges from need, where it is concentrated because it is recognized, where Eros and Logos can (possibly) be found side by side. Nature (desire) and culture (categorized needs and induced facticity) come together during the course of a mutual self-criticism that engenders impassioned dialogues" (Lefebvre, 176).

According to Lefebvre's interpretation the unrecognized and neglected relationship between Eros and Logos, desires and space, sexuality and society during the industrial epoch become overwhelmed by the principle of reality. While in urban society, the principle of pleasure is banished because desire and sexuality belong to the "extra-social social." Longing, on the contrary, tends towards illegality, and makes of itself a mystery, strange and offensive, in order to skirt social norms and forms. Through the cracks in the logic of space, the constraints of subordinate growth and urban logic, Eros enters and desire swells. Without it "human material" being shapeless, would soon be forced into an absolute form, warranted and inspected by a state that solidly resting on a mass of "subjects" and "objects" (Ibid., 86).

It is this obsession with the house that changes Njegovan's fate and leads him to the spatial and temporal isolation of the urban lifestyle. While on his way to the house auction, he is drawn into the March demonstrations, after which he lives in complete isolation. However, this primarily temporal isolation,[10] although explained by his despair over the loss of the much desired house, has a much deeper symbolic motivation. His ideology of possession and his obsession with the space of the house itself, its architectural "ideology" essentially destroys its temporality and historicity. This in turn brings him to inverted reasoning and explanations of historical events that result in "estrangement." It also creates a comic effect, as well as a conflict with reality that literally and metaphorically "sweeps him off his feet." His exit from the house represents the lost chance for its total possession and ends with a fall and injury.

Arsenije's temporal isolation and his literal and symbolic "falls" in every encounter with the city may also very well explain Lefebvre's understanding of space – in which space, be it social, urban, economic or epistemological, cannot provide shape, meaning and finality, but rather only be a medium and means. Space never has its own existence, but is always a referent to something else that is existential and simultaneously essential time (see Lefebvre, 84–86). Connecting time and space, or recording time in space, is the ultimate subject of knowledge and, because of his obsession with space itself, Arsenije is deprived of this essential dimension of knowledge. As a result, he erroneously describes phenomena and events in the wrong time period or in the wrong way Thusly he creates a parallel, inverted world about demonstrators protesting against the Tripartite Pact, and completely misunderstands the protests in 1968 against the "red bourgeoisie," He becomes fixated on the one idea that is common to the demonstrators and himself – the hatred of the bankers and banking offences:

> I hated banks, I hated banking and bankers, I hated even banknotes, I despised from the bottom of my ownership soul everything what was intentionally placed between the Estate and the Possessor everything what was turning the reality of possession into the power of emptiness, hollowness and cooked books, in the spooky game of the bourse's symbols..." (Pekić 2002, 136).

Arsenije's stance on the mission of developers is in opposition to their fiscal interest. He does not see the buildings as ordinary handicrafts that

take on the dullness of their materials, but as personalities, which are not faithful reflections of human personality and will; over which neither the builder or homeowner have full control. This liveliness and personality of houses he believes comes from their own spirituality: "Of course it is this spirituality that has helped us enjoy in them, feel them, exploit, yes Sir, I am not afraid of this bold claim, we have abused houses, without thinking to what they manifested as being in touch with us, not once, therefore not taking into account their soul" (Pekić 2002, 248).

Njegovan's idea of building and habituating at times nears Heidegger's idea of the poetic in the dwellings of man – but because of the obsession with possession and construction as independent subjects, even the mutual possession of a man and a building betrays this meaning. Heidegger argues that a building is actual: "(1). Building is really dwelling. (2). Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth. (3) Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and building that erects buildings" (Heidegger 2001, 146).

Love for buildings without residents, like the construction of homes by ordinary people for profit, betrays the essence of the building as a dwelling-place. In Njegovan's vision, houses began to live their independent lives from the lives of house inhabitants. It is due to this reduction in the essence of housing construction that Arsenije became receptive to the image of New Belgrade that he at first rejected, but with which he finally became fascinated. Within Arsenije's consciousness there was a process analogous to that which led to the dispersion of the city, because his "ideal city" ceased to be a humane city, and became a creation devoted to only to itself.

As Njegovan initially noted, the buildings of New Belgrade were characterized only by their efficiency. Essentially, they were not intended as dwellings but built for homeownership exclusively on pragmatic principles: "In spite of that, the more I have studied them, the more reasons I had to recognize them from the particular market point of view, which does make the ancient essence of homeownership, were remarkably efficient, more efficient than my leases" (Ibid., 37). A direct encounter with New Belgrade awakens Njegovan's own homeowner's instinct: "Hey, five hundred rooftops! Five hundred fundamentals with basement cellars! And here is a common foundation and a common roof. What a financial saving! What a deposit to invest in new houses!" (Ibid). New Belgrade makes a hypnotic impression on Arsenije to the point that he begins to accept a suspended facade that is a symbol of simulation and "the society of the

spectacle." that give priority to layout and presentation. These were architectural elements that he previously observed with contempt, and consequently he begins to fantasize about Arsenije's city (Ibid., 256–257).

This moment of transformation before the picture of the urban habitat and the rejection of his former negative attitude towards everything that is apparent takes place at a time when Arsenije accepts the principle of benefits – just as Debord explains:

> The spectacle subjects living human beings to its will to the extent that the economy has brought them under its sway. For the spectacle is simply the economic realm developing for itself at once a faithful mirror held up to the production of things and a distorting objectification of the producers (Debord 1994, 7).

Arsenije, prompted by the sight of New Belgrade, changes his original architectural dream of the ideal city into an urbane dream of total impersonal regulation, and opposing the changes:

> No, nothing will no longer be adjusted; on the contrary, everything will be forced to adapt to them. Those final, sealed, impenetrable and indestructible alliances of ownership and architecture to which nothing can be either added or taken away, once and for all will stand in the way of the hysterical reconstruction of our cities, and our lives. There will no longer be subversive dreams of a dynamic city, behind which are hidden Bolshevik aspirations for change of order; the city unstable in all dimensions which will change its face with even the most damaging need; the city which will in its careless fickleness – destroy in the meantime my houses – take away the origin, history and sense of responsibility; the city that is changing, never definitive, never completed, as well as those damn bank speculations, as it must have been inspired, makes every ownership of assets and houses meaningless" (Pekić 2002, 258).

That new city, as it will be revealed, is nothing other than an urban village, a settlement without spirit and the essence of dwelling as it is pointed out by Debord:

> The history of the economy, whose development has turned entirely on the opposition between town and country, has progressed so far that it has now succeeded in abolishing both of these poles. The present paralysis of overall historical development, due to the exclusive pursuit of the economy's

> independent goals, means that the moment when town and country begin to disappear, so far from marking the transcendence of the split between them, marks instead their simultaneous collapse. The reciprocal erosion of town and country that has resulted from the faltering of the historical movement by whose means the existing urban reality should have been superseded is clearly reflected in the bits and pieces of both that are strewn across the most advanced portions of the industrialized world (Debord 1994, 52).

This suggestion of creating urban settlements as opposed to the idea of "the urbane center" hides the danger greatly feared by Arsenije; the incursion of the mob into the city, and its destruction and dispersion. His fantasies of Arsenije's city as "a revolutionary business concept," is interrupted by the incursion of the crowd from the direction of New Belgrade. Arsenije witnesses again a new incursion by the mob into the city, which, this time is rebelling against "the red bourgeoisie." The urban revolution is not only a feature of capitalism, but also affects socialist countries as well as Lefebvre explained. Characteristically, as in Njegovan's fantasies about Arsenije's city, it usually takes the "parole of an anti-city" (Lefebvre 2003, 111). There is a boundary line between New Belgrade and *Stari grad*. It is Branko's Bridge, over which the incursion happened, making it a symbolic and actual confirmation of Lefebvre's notion of urban boundary lines that no longer run between city and country: "In this case, the boundary line does not divide city and country but cuts across the urban phenomenon, between a dominated periphery and a dominating center" (Lefebvre, 113).

In Arsenije's dream of complete centralized ownership control of the urban settlement, tenants are isolated by their respective total privacy. While they have keys from their own lives, the duplicates will be held only by Arsenije (Pekić 2002, 257). The crowd is created when they walk out of their lonely and isolated cages to protest against control and centralization. The urban, namely, the unification of "differences arising from or resulting in conflicts." According to Lefebvre's this character of gathering

> . . . is the source of the latent violence inherent in the urban, as well as the equally disturbing character of celebrations and holidays. Immense crowds gather along the unstable border between joyous frenzy and cruel frenzy, trancelike in the grip of ludic enjoyment [. . .] The signs of the urban are the signs of the assembly [. . .] (Ibid., 118).

The madness of the crowd, in Arsenije's grotesque, unassuming interpretation of history takes on carnival-like characteristics. And at the height of his madness in his urban dream he sees himself not as a builder who never fully controls his own creation, but as a controller and corrector of society and historical changes. As Lefebvre describes it:

> The urbanist imagines himself caring for and healing a sick society, a pathological space. He perceives spatial diseases, which are initially conceived abstractly as an available void, then fragmented into partial contents. Eventually, space itself becomes a subject. It suffers, grows ill, must be taken care of, so it can be returned to (moral) health. The urban illusion culminates in delirium. Space, and the thought of space, lead the thinker down a dangerous path. He becomes schizophrenic and imagines a mental illness – the schizophrenia of society – onto which he projects his own illness, space sickness, mental vertigo (Lefebvre 2003, 157).

The madness of the mob penetrating the city along with Arsenije's mental dizziness, ultimately betrays the idea of the human architecture and symbolizes the final dispersion of the city. The essence of the urban cannot begin on the ruins the city alone: "However, urban society cannot be constructed on the ruins of the classical city alone. In the West, this city has already begun to fragment. This fragmentation (explosion-implosion) may appear to be a precursor of urban society. It is part of its problematic and the critical phase that precedes it" (Ibid., 169).

The picture of Belgrade in *The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan*, is developed from the description of the first European buildings in a small oriental, urban and messy *tsharshi* (from the Turkish *çarşı*, meaning marketplace or downtown), through the founding of an urbane Belgrade. Interrupted by conflicts and wars, it offers glimpses of the future large urban settlement where the balance between a man and the city is lost. Thereby the meaning and purpose of human existence, and residence also ends as it is dispersed through the prism of consciousness of Arsenije Njegovan. His spiritual and intellectual survival reflects, although unknowingly, social events that become a symbol of the disfigured shape of the city. The city contains the seeds of its own destruction; suburban, alienated, helpless and angered by its helplessness, and the violently passionate crowd. The city, because of the elimination of the its human measure and essence, attracts the anti-urban spectre that threatens it with an irrevocable death. The measure of the city, as Aristotle argued,

reflects the extent of communication between its members, and along with it, the measure of its ethics.

The city-destructive battle cry echoes everywhere where its population cannot engage in dialogue because the "urbane city" became unavailable. As Ratko Božović argues:

> Despise, fear and uneasiness, in essence are the explosions of the city-destructive energy and untamed power of barbarism, and therefore the dispersion of the city in civilization in which the pragmatic structures of technocratic world and the extreme neo-liberal market tendencies became desensitized towards the values of human individual self-realization (Božović 2009, 12–13).

The end of humanistic city construction also resulted in the ritual destruction of cities, the bombardments of cities in Korea, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Sudan, Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine or Palestine to mention only some that have occurred since the end of WWII, despite widely proclaimed slogans of world peace, democracy and tolerance. The dispersion of the inner city means the loss of intimacy, empathy, identity, poetics of the meeting, as well as aesthetic and ethical components of dwelling places. In its place is found civil negligence of human souls, and an anti-urban Man.

The city can no longer be the saving ark of gopher wood,[11] a refuge from the Deluge from the First Book of Moses, whose name is mentioned at the start of *The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan*. The city is transformed into a box that isolates binds and traps. It disappears. It is dispersed. It becomes the culprit and the cause of "the flood," leaving the reader to ask, with Arsenije, the last question – "So where are they, where are those houses? . . . " and keeps on listening until the final cryptic answer: "*Tout cela . . . est . . . UN . . . MOD . . .* "[12]

Notes

1. During Aristotle's epoch, city-states existed.
2. "Urban semiotics concern the articulation of ideology with settlement space. It represents one of the most recent applications of the semiotic approach to cultural analysis. The field is characterized by the following: a wide variety of approaches with limited critical review; a proliferation of terminology and the lack of its systematization; the fact that virtually all the

important work is being carried out in Europe, especially France and Greece; a relative lack of general theories, and, finally, a "weak sister" relationship with its more robust relative, architectural semiotics. [. . .] Urban semiotics is a branch of the semiotic study of settlement space, where that space is the city. This branch of semiotics possesses several objects of analysis, including the material structure of the built environment, the image of its inhabitants, the codes of meaning, found articulating with space, and the discourse of urban planners, analysis and academicians" (Gottdiener 1983, 101–102).

3. About the *signifying chain*, see Lacan 1977.
4. "Man does not dwell in that he merely establishes his stay on the earth beneath the sky, by raising growing things and simultaneously raising buildings. Man is capable of such building only if he already builds in the sense of the poetic taking of measure. Authentic building occurs so far as there poets, such poets as take the measure for architecture, the structure of dwelling" (Heidegger 2001, 225, 225).
5. "While the romantics are often thought of us being unsympathetic to the city to the point of hostility, this is not completely true, as we see in romantic realism. Here a mystic construct is superimposed to explain its meaning in symbolic, religious or mystical terms. Modernism is the second stage of romanticism, the older view of the city transformed by the new literary techniques. As the modernist move toward new forms of subjectivity, the meaning of the city becomes more dense, until we see the city through layers of historical meaning, or into it blurs into the opaque vision" (Lehan, 5).
6. According to Mihajlo Pantić, this novel could be considered as "the first real, complete, artistically rounded urban novel in Serbian literature," while the term urbane does not consider the thematic dimension only but also "the homology or equivalence known from Hegel's and Lukac's theoretical thoughts, between the urbane epoch and the novel which is a representative form of the epoch" (Pantić). Pantić also refers to the opinion of Predrag Palavestra, who in his book "Postwar Serbian Literature from 1945 to 1970" claimed that "'The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan' is one of the first authentic urban and urbane novels of the postwar literature." This is supported by the fact that in the Pekić opus this novel actually begins the historiography of the genealogy of the Njegovan-Turjaskis which is being developed in the "Golden Fleece," which will announce Serbian literature in the European context that, "with some delay received an urbane genealogical saga of a higher level of literal ranking" (Ibid.).
7. The novel *The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan* and Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution* both published in 1970, eliminate any chance that Pekić could have been influenced by Lefebvre's thought. A considerable similarity between Lefebvre's theoretical analysis of the urban phenomena and Pekić's artistic expression of the city is rather an indicator of the mutual

spiritual agreement between the artist and the scientist, as well as the extent to which an artistic word can be not only a testimony to the spirit of an epoch, but a very serious and well-founded anthropological study.

8. Inability to establish dialogue, misunderstandings and different modes of disregard are present on multiple levels on the pages of this novel, with a specific confusion of the language which follows the construction of any excessive construction. In *The Pilgrimage of Arsenije Njegovan* the confusion of language was achieved by introduction of the Ijekavian dialect used by the speaker during the demonstrations on 27th March, 1941 whose speech Arsenije does not follow but is preoccupied with the thoughts of his beloved home *Nike*, in order to respond to a call to abolish the power of capital over people, which then led to the misunderstanding that ended tragically for Arsenije, and the subsequent introduction of a conversation in French with a stranger during the demonstrations in 1968, advises Arsenije that a revolution had started, but Arsenije understands this information as a result of the foreigner's misunderstanding of the language.
9. Compare with Nietzsche's protest against the buildings of his time and the analogy which he puts forward between the human soul and the look of houses: "For he wanted to learn what had taken place among men during the interval: whether they had become greater or smaller. And once, when he saw a row of new houses, marvelled, and said: What do these houses mean? Verily, no great soul put them up as its simile! Did perhaps a silly child take them out of its toy-box? Would that another child put them again into the box! And these rooms and chambers – can men go out and in there?"(Nietzsche 2003, 154–155).
10. For a better understanding of Njegovan's story, Radivoj Mikić argues to differentiate carefully between the synchronous and retrospective timelines of narration – "synchronous includes the events that take place on 3rd June 1968. That day Arsenije Njegovan [. . .] got out of the house to, led by ominous indications, determine the actual state of his homes and property. Having spent 27 years in the house was in fact 27 years of isolation from everything that is going on out there (in the city, in the country, in the world), he does not know anything about the character and direction of social changes that had occurred since 1945. Stepping out into the street, Arsenije was carrying a picture of social relations around the beginning of the WWII, instead he is faced with social reality based on for him yet unknown principles" (Mikić, 15–16).
11. "Make for yourself an ark of gopher wood; you shall make the ark with rooms, and shall cover it inside and out with pitch. Behold, I, even I am bringing the flood of water upon the earth . . . " (Genesis, 6).
12. The editor of the manuscript, in an attempt to decipher the meaning of these last words, and the state of Arsenije K. Njegovan's spirit during the

night of homeowner's death, gives interpretations of Arsenije's last words. They are an encrypted response to Arsenije's question, as the editor in his explanations actually states the characteristics of modern urban civilization:

> And that could mean: *Tout cela est un mode* (*This is all one way, one form);); Tout cela est une modèle (All of this is a form, a mold, a model); Tout cela est un modérateur (All of this is a conciliator, a regulator); Tout cela est un(e) modernization (All of this is a modernization); Tout cela est un(e) modification (All of this is a change, an alteration)*. (Pekić 2002, 327)

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CHAPTER 8

The Perception of Language (Dis)Similarity: Slovak and Hungarian Ethnic Minorities in Prague

Marianna Mészárosová

Language, beyond its fundamental communication function, serves to ascribe meanings to the surrounding environment. This ascription happens by means of words and speech that are meaningful for the members of a given society. "Language is not just a representation of an independently established world" (Duranti 1997, 337), but aids in the comprehension and consequentially the categorization of acquired information and experience in a given context. Differences in linguistic expressions and meanings can be observed within a single society and can also refer to attitudes towards speech itself. In the following pages the center of interest is the position of the Slovak language in linguistically Czech, as well as Hungarian areas, which provides insight about the perception of Czech and Slovak kinship.

The main aim of this chapter is to point out the relevance of language, using examples of Slovak and Hungarian minorities in Prague. This relevance stems from attitudes and meanings that arise among the members of both target groups towards their own language in their new setting. As the scholarly literature highlights, changes in environment and interethnic relationships transform and modify elements of ethnicity.[1] This process

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_8

of re-socialization is inevitable when language acquisition takes place in a different community. These surroundings also influence language expression (Tužinská 2010, 71). As shown by empirical findings, the importance of the environment (domestic, foreign, bilingual or minority) was, from the position of Slovaks, demonstrated by their diverse views of cultural and linguistic kinship. The issue of similarity has another meaning in the case of ethnically dissimilar Hungarians who have coexisted with Slovaks. Accordingly, attention was paid to Hungarians for whom Slovakia is not only a place of permanent residence but also their birthplace.

The question of language (dis)similarity arose during the examination of the relationship of culture to the social space of Prague. As to this relationship, I paid attention to the meaningful attributes of ethnicity such as identity expressed among the members of Slovak and Hungarian ethnic minorities. Study of this interrelationship took place in three defined areas. The first was the attitude of target groups towards the urban and multicultural spaces of Prague. The next referred displays of cultural diversity by both ethnic groups in the new social spaces, and the third area focused on the role of Prague in connection with the Slovak-Hungarian interethnic contacts. My intention was to verify the hypothesis that space is a medium which contributes to the strengthening, or weakening, of intensity of interests in relation to the components of ethnicity in the background of actual conditions. This hypothesis arose from the idea that "culture does not require place but can be sustained by peoples who do not live in the same place and who have never met" (Hall 1995, 183). In regard to ethnic identification, Eriksen also pointed out the role of the situation and the presence of those with whom we identify (Eriksen 2007, 28).

A brief introduction to the theoretical basis of the main research problem is necessary to understand the question dealt with in this chapter. On the whole, the uniqueness of this selected problem rests in the enrichment of a mutual conditionality of space and culture among ethnically and linguistically related groups within the space of Central Europe. In this sense, conducting research on Slovaks, who according to the Indo-European language family belong to the same West Slavic language group as Czechs, led to particularly valuable information. Considering the minority position of Hungarians, both in their place of origin and in the target country, their perception of similarity created the possibility of acquiring, as well as improving, their Slovak language ability in Prague's environment.

Methodological Aspects of the Research

The research on the theme of language (dis)similarity was based on qualitative techniques. The most relevant methods were semi-structured interviews in the mother tongue of respondents, and "complete participation" which is one of the possible modes of participant observation. Duranti sees this mode as enabling the researcher to interact in a competitive way with the groups and at the same time perform with them in the subject of interest (Duranti 1997, 99–100). This was also accomplished using the mother tongue of the target groups.

My participation in cultural, religious and social events was multifaceted. For example: assistance in the preparation of balls and other occasions; engagement with the singers and folk dancers during rehearsals; implementation of the stations of the cross and participation in the church services; personal presence on tourist trips and on various other spare time activities with the members of Slovak and Hungarian minority groups. During my involvement in the aforementioned events my position of researcher was known and over time seemed to them less important because of my activities. As regards the measure of my identification, in accordance with my citizenship I was a real member of the studied communities in both cases. However my identification began to be distinguished according to my nationality. From the side of Slovaks and Hungarians the differentiation came when they, after an interview or during time spent together in one of the events, would come to know my personal attitudes, ethnic identity and sense of belonging. When I did not hide my identity, I was able to gain information and opinions about the coexistence and interethnic contacts of Slovaks and Hungarians.[2] On the whole it can be said, that my complete participation increased my knowledge about their ways of life by and gave me an opportunity to live with them on a daily basis.

As to language competency, substantive relevance can be found in the "usage and interpretation of language with a suitable socio-cultural way" (Pokorný 2010, 303). In line with the absence of a language barrier between researcher and the studied communities, this could be shown by using an emic approach. Moreover, due to my acculturation and functioning in a bilingual Slovak – Hungarian setting in the southwest part of Slovakia, I had experience and knowledge about the life and culture of both ethnic societies. In addition, my long-term residence in Prague was helpful because I encountered and underwent the difficulties of

coming to and adapting to a new country. I also felt the sense of abandonment of a familiar way of life back in the homeland.

Language, besides being a fundamental communication function, aided in creation of contacts and relationships with members of the target groups. In the case of Hungarians, the initial subjects of research came from among Prague's academic circle of students, whilst the first contacts with Slovaks were mediated by people from Slovakia. The variance in the number of residents was a crucial reason behind this approach.[3] Later, by means of the social networks of identified respondents, snowball sampling was used.

The semi-structured interviews, and information gathering from complete participation, took place in various locations around Prague during 2011–2012. The research sample was notable for the diversity in the social, cultural, economic and the religious aspects of life of the respondents. The subjects chosen were similarly representative of their ethnic group according to age (from 20 to 60), gender, citizenship (Slovak), nationality (Slovak and Hungarian), socioeconomic status (secondary and undergraduate education) and occupation (students and employees) and, finally, according to the religious denomination.[4] Motivating factors in connection with migration were, primarily, obtaining higher education and superior positions in the professional sphere.

The Period of the Common State of Czechs and Slovaks, and the Situation After 1993

The reflections on the Czechoslovak Republic in respondents' comments provide insight into this historic period. The accent on the existence of the historical common state influenced the initial expectations upon their arrival to this familiar "neighboring" country. In the context of the aforementioned former state a regretful statement was observed on the part of Slovaks because there was no celebration of the Independent Czechoslovak State Day on October 28, as per the Public holidays in the Slovak Republic. The results of the analyzed empirical data showed, that the reference to an absence of this public holiday was in relation to an important historical event during a common history of Slovaks and Czechs. Therefore in the following outline attention is paid to those historical facts and conditions, which impacted on their coexistence, as well as the usage and perception of the language of

Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians within one state. On the whole it is important to understand that the selection of stable cultural components is dependent on historical conditions (Buzássyová and Ondrejovič 1997, 143).

The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the establishment of the first Czechoslovak Republic on 28 October 1918, ushered in a change of power and position (ruling, minority and foreign) for the present nations. On the basis of the concept of a single Czechoslovak nation, Slovaks and Czechs became part of the same state, whilst Hungarians in the new state became an ethnic minority. This distinction served as part of the formation of "Czechoslovakism," the official state ideology of the First Czechoslovak Republic, and excluded every ethnic minority both from the Czechoslovak nation and from having a state-forming status (Bakke 2004, 23). On the other hand, this ideology was viewed differently by Slovaks by contributing to the negation of Slovak national identity (Botík 2007, 61). In addition, as the relevant literature shows, Slovaks made up a part of a fictive Czechoslovak nation-state. This fiction was based on the non-existence of the Czechoslovak language in a philological sense (Rychlíková 2011, 12–13). The fact remains that this new national language consisted of Czech and Slovak, both of which were used in parallel, even though, from the perspective of the official language, they were differentiated and separately practiced.

The interrelation between all three ethnic groups was marked by the essential state-building and developmental needs of a newly established independent republic. Building the new state required educated, and loyal people. The latter of which it was assumed Slovaks lacked as a result of thousand year coexistence within the old Kingdom of Hungary (Buzássyová and Ondrejovič 1997, 144). A transposition then occurred wherein the Czech intelligentsia replaced Hungarians in civil and public services (Botík 2007, 171). This loss, together with their new "minority" position within the Czechoslovak Republic, was seen by Hungarians as a "cultural, historical and nationalist degradation" (Botík 2007, 74). However, their mother tongue, along with the national Czechoslovak language, could be used officially in villages where their numbers reached at least 20%. As regards the Slovaks, they became disadvantaged as a consequence of a large migration of workers from Czech areas. This migration wave brought more professionals and, at the same time, less qualified workers such as clerks and janitors for required positions. As a result of the domination of Czechs in state administrations, and in

state-supported areas, there was a lack of job opportunities for Slovaks which they handled by emigrating (Botík 2007, 171; Nosková 2011, 63). This situation and resulting arguments gradually led to an anti-Czech atmosphere and eventual dissolution of Czechoslovak Republic. The era of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the independent Slovakia (1939–45) was mirrored, together with the departure of Czechs from Slovakia.

A different national structure, and new relationship towards ethnic minorities (Hungarian, German) arose, when Czechoslovakia was reestablished after the end of Second World War (1939–45). The expulsion of the Hungarian and German populations took place, which was perceived as retaliation for wrongdoings against the Czechoslovak Republic during the war. In this connection the acceptance of the Beneš Decrees meant the loss of citizenship and confiscation of tangible personal and real property of both minorities (Botík 2007, 75; Nosková 2005, 102). Another example of retaliation was forced migrations, which in the case of Hungarians took place between the years 1945 and 1949, and was directed at Hungary and Czech areas.[5] Changing the ethnic makeup of Czechoslovakia also contributed to the process of re-Slovakization. This government assimilation program enabled "Hungarianized" Slovaks to reclaim their Slovak nationality' (Botík 2007, 75) and led to the decision of Hungarians to change their ethnicity to Slovak to avoid coercive conditions and measures (for example as discrimination, deprivation of many rights, displacement to Hungary, and so on).

For the Hungarian ethnic minority the year 1948 represented a restoration of their civil rights, a gradual renewal of their educational and cultural institutions, and the use of the Hungarian language in official communication. Cultural expression and education in their mother tongue were further guaranteed by the Socialist Constitution of 1960. Some Hungarians, who were transferred into Czech areas, decided to stay there because of the poor job opportunities and the confiscation of their property in their Slovak homeland. This determination to remain went hand in hand with a requirement to learn the Czech language and become a stable settler (Nosková 2005, 110–11; Rychlíková 2011, 21–22). For the majority groups, the years 1945–1948 were marked by the search for a new mutual relationship, and the 1948 Constitution brought the end of the Czechoslovak nation. According to it, the Czechoslovak Republic was a unitary state composed of two equal Slavic nations – Slovaks and Czechs –none of which were considered a "minority" (Nosková 2011, 64–65; Rychlíková 2011, 21). Another essential event with regard to the

formation of this relationship was the Constitutional Act concerning the Czechoslovak Federation, which took effect in 1969. On the basis of this act the unitary state was divided into two republics – the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic. Each had its own national administration and equal status to the Federal government. Simultaneously, and ironically, for the first time, the possibility of a Slovak minority within the Czech Republic and conversely for Czechs in the Slovak Republic emerged (Rychlíková 2011, 25–26).

From the 1950s until the end of 1992 migration for employment was continuous and was officially viewed as an "internal" migration. This search for work was also true of Hungarians most of whom came from Slovak areas and were familiar with Czech language and culture (Nosková 2005, 112; Holas 2010, 611). Prague began to be the main work destination, and on 1 January 1993, it became the capital of the sovereign Czech Republic after the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The formation of two independent states meant a new situation for residents of the country. Distinctions were now made on official majority and minority group status, citizenship, as well as Slovak or Czech ethnic identity.

The Czech minority in Slovakia had a low regional concentration and were dispersed throughout Slovak territory. They were however more concentrated in large cities by virtue of their previous professional employment. The phenomenon of Slovak-Czech intermarriage contributed to the acceleration of assimilation for this ethnic group. In relation to this other factors were important such as the language similarity or affinity, and the lack of formal education in the mother tongue. This was true not only of Czechs within Slovakia, but also of Slovaks in the Czech Republic (Botík 2007, 174). In addition, their geographic dispersion facilitated a blending of both nations (Rychlíková 2011, 41). According to Šrajerová, the assimilation of Slovaks in Czech areas was conditioned by the "socio-professional structure, level of education, field of interest, personal value orientation, distance between target and mother country, including the compact or dispersed living with type of residence and duration of stay" (Šrajerová 1999, 151).

Literature on Slovaks in Prague and to the integrating influences of the capital city this minority in a Czech environment refers to the weight of historical facts and conditions, such as the fact that Slovaks in the beginning did not see themselves as members of a minority group. In 1993 their basic work and living conditions were similar to how they

were before the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (Rychlíková 2011, 31). As to their consciousness of the common state, scholars noted an essential awareness and acceptance of Czech citizenship among Slovak citizens. Together with clear state borders and the operation of Slovak media, cultural and linguistic self-realization was enhanced. On the other hand, as self-realization increased, attachment to the former state weakened, especially among the younger generation (Sokolová 1999, 139). The Slovak community in Prague is particularly characterized by a predominance of intelligentsia, and with a deeper national feeling and interest in their own ethnic life and their homeland. On the whole, Slovaks in the Czech Republic represent a "non-compact group with a various territorial provenance, standards of living, types of educational degree, different denominational membership and degree of ethnic consciousness" (Šrajerová 1999, 151).

The position of the most vigorous ethnic minority within Slovakia, along the south and south-east part of state borders, is a result of the political division of the former state and formation of a new one. Since the eleventh century the concentration of Hungarians in these areas has been continuous. This residential concentration enabled ethnically homogenous marriages and moreover contributed to the reproduction and persistence of their cultural traits and traditions (Botík 2007, 76). Today, one can easily observe Slovak-Hungarian intermarriages and the increasing tendency of families to place their children in the educational institutions of the majority (Botík 2007, 79). The latter phenomenon varies by each region populated by the Hungarian ethnic minority, and is done to improve living conditions in Slovakia. Results of a survey by the Forum Minority Research Institute in 2007, showed that the sense of belonging among Hungarians within the territory of Slovakia is associated with positive feelings, whether or not it makes their life easier or harder. Four prime fields were probed: education, employment, official communication and ascent to the post of state administration. Disadvantages were seen as due to inadequate language facility (Lampl 2007, 19–21). A similar situation can be pointed out in the case of Hungarians in Prague. Their parents request that their school-aged children not be burdened with more homework, because once a week they attend Hungarian classes at the Hungarian Institute. According to linguistic research on cognition, the minority mother tongue of Hungarians as opposed to Slovaks, can be more favorably developed because of the absence of factors favoring assimilation (Botík 2007, 79). In this regard, support for minority educational and cultural institutions plays an important role.

Together with supportive political conditions, multicultural and multinational environments, positive interethnic relationships and long-term coexistence with another nation have varying impacts on the intensity of ethnic identity and tolerance. In this regard, the intertwining of cultural traits and acceptance of dissimilarity are noticeable in Czech society such as found in Prague, large industrial centers and in the borderlands (Moravcová and Nosková 2005, 71).

Theoretical Background and the Question of Translation

To understand a culture and language it is necessary, according to Blommaert, to put "in the whole of the system in which a group operates" (Blommaert 2005, 8), and then look for the explanation of culture and language in the given environment in which they occur (Blommaert 2005, 8). Considering how language operates differently in different settings, and how the language, itself, and its use matters for members particular groups, it is clear that the contextualization of language is essential (Blommaert 2005, 14). In this regard the perception of one's own language and the (dis)similarity between Slovak and Czech has been considered by analyzing discourses to discover the "dominant ideas, expectations and rules" (Sikka 2010, 37) which were taken for granted among the members of both target groups.

The scholarly literature primarily dedicated to linguistic anthropology, underlines the conditionality of communication by its context. There is also a coincidence of a range of other phenomena (visible and non-visible). Within this range are: space (historical, geographical, social), time, participants, non-linguistic or non-verbal influences, and so on (Tužinská 2010, 52–58). In this connection Pokorný includes within these other factors the social status of participants as well as their aims (Pokorný 2010, 303). We also cannot overlook the expectations and the life experiences, which have a remarkable influence on the preconceived image of the country as a whole and the local majority society. In the context of perception, these inputs and expectations are universal (Tužinská 2010, 62) and their relevance is more powerful in that they are retained in particular languages. To illustrate the decisive function of linguistic and cultural knowledge, Tužinská points out the necessity of cognition of both phenomena during the act of translation. It is required to be aware of the fact, that with translation we allow, in a sense, the shift of meaning in spite of the effort to maintain adequacy, pragmatic and grammatical

correctness, including stylistics and aesthetic levels too (Tužinská 2010, 52). From here on in this chapter I will present analyses of discourses, but without the precise utterances of the individual respondents.

To elucidate the following analyzed discourses I employed the perspective of Hall's "Theory of Articulation." His articulation theory attempts to illuminate those conjunctures through which "people knit together disparate and apparently contradictory practices, beliefs and discourses in order to give their world some semblance of meaning and coherence" (Trimbur 1993, 41). In other words, language – as an embodied medium of cognition – serves as an expression of discourses and also makes for revelation of cultural propensities in spatial behavior (Levinson 1996, 356). In addition, the registered discourses in practice are already combinations of (un)similar ideas, beliefs, expectations and so on, and their final form could continually change by virtue of actual spatio-temporal and other internal or external conditions. The following interpretation of frequently occurring signs can aid in the explanation of these assumptions.

Relevance of Language and the Slovak-Czech Linguistic Kinship

Interpreting the position and meaning of the Slovak and Hungarian languages in Prague's environment takes into consideration the initial expectations and formulated perceptions of the former common state[6], as well as prior relationships and attitudes towards the majority Czech society. Attention was also paid to the temporal factors such as arrival in a particular state. Other contributing factors were experiences acquired from the short-term visits to Prague, the presence of close relatives and life partners, and finally the narrated tales about Prague from parents and grandparents. Extended stays abroad, specifically in a less familiar linguistic setting, also explicitly influenced varied perceptions of the cultural and linguistic kinship. This was the situation for Slovaks, who after living abroad (for example in Great Britain, Germany, France and Argentina) found more similarities than differences between themselves and Czechs. This was the consequence of their shared otherness, not only linguistically but also cultural, among ethnic groups in countries where they previously lived. An understanding of linguistic dissimilarity was also brought to Prague by Slovaks with experience in the former Czechoslovakia. Despite the view that the Czech Republic is a common state, one half of this group considered the Czech Republic a foreign country, while other

half regarded it as a home where differences did not exist. Initially, Slovaks felt an historical kinship with Czechs and this contributed to the sense of being "at home" in Prague. But, after over time, and experiences from interactions with Czechs their attitude shifted towards a focus on the dissimilarities. Besides language, the differences they perceived were related to ways of thinking, character qualities and issues of faith.

From the point of view of Hungarians, both Slovak and Czech were useful languages. For those Hungarians who did not speak Slovak fluently, its similarity to Czech made it possible to master it even though preferred the Czech language in practice. According to respondents, the use and knowledge of Slovak was helpful in learning the Czech language, which was more highly valued by the majority society.

The extent that the use of their own language mattered for the Slovak and Hungarian ethnic minorities was indicated in several different ways. For example, it gave Slovaks a better sense of self and being "natural." In addition, the verbal presence of their mother tongue in Prague also helped satisfy the need, for contact with it in its written form. For Hungarian speakers, language was an important element of ethnic identification, along with religion, and other cultural traits. It served as a tool for understanding as well as for better expressing of thoughts and emotive feelings. Maintaining the Hungarian language contributed not only to the strengthening of Hungarian communities and institutions[7], but also to the positive evaluations of its use, and acceptance by the Czech majority.

Slovak had served as an effective form of communication and understanding for Czech nationals. For Prague's Slovak minority, using Czech became permanent after their decision to remain in the Czech Republic. For Czechs, exposure to Slovak during the process of socialization was noted as one of the main causal agents. Slovaks also reported an absence of language differentiation because of opportunities to read a book, watch or hear television and radio broadcasts in either the Slovak or Czech language. However, the younger generation (under 25) of Czechs had observable difficulties with comprehension of the Slovak language as reported by members of both target groups.

Conclusion

The empirical results of my study confirmed again the fact that language functions as both a connecting and differentiating force. On the one hand, the members of the Slovak ethnic minority referred to Slovak-Czech linguistic

(dis)similarity, while on the other hand Hungarians primarily sought to categorize or separate themselves from the majority group. People made such categorizations or classifications not only in accordance with their life experiences, but also according to varying information received at a particular time and in particular spaces. The initial expectations, and minority or majority status in their homelands, including language competences in the case of Hungarians, shaped to a great extent the perception of their language position in the new setting. Past historical conditions also contributed to an understanding of each groups' interests and attitudes in relation to their different senses of ethnicity. The articulated ideas, expectations and cultural norms of Slovaks and Hungarians in Prague also provided a platform for them to better understand their place within the dominant Czech social world that surrounded them.

As many scholars, not only linguistic anthropologist, have pointed out the text of discourses have to be properly "contextualized in each phase of their existence" (Blommaert 2005, 64), and a certain shift in context can be observed when the production, reproduction or consumption of a discourse took place. Finally, it is important to remember that the results presented in this chapter arose in the context of the urban and multicultural space of Prague, and the question of language (dis)similarity might have very different results in the Moravian region.

This chapter had examined the similarity between the Slovak and Czech languages from the position of the Slovak minority in Prague. On the whole, taking language similarity into account explains contemporary attitudes of Slovaks toward their social position within Prague's multicultural spaces. Perception of this similarity requires one to examine the whole context in which people's sense-making practices develop. The data was derived from semi-structured interviews, participant observations and direct participation with Slovak and Hungarian ethnic minorities.

Notes

1. Saville-Troike in *The Ethnography of Communication* mentions specifically the process of enculturation, during which individuals of a certain linguistic community acquire attitudes that become basic to its characterization (Saville-Troike 2003, 183). Detailed references are made to the Slovak ethnographer, Ján Botík, about ethnic processes and changes (Botík 1991, 18–24).
2. In connection with the perception of coexistence and interethnic contacts of Slovaks and Hungarians research results show that this question was

important primarily by those in Prague who intended to return home to Slovakia. This was more frequent among Hungarians because of their minority position in the place of origin. In the case of the Slovak community in Prague the question of interethnic contacts and conflicts was not as important. It was also noted that Hungarians had better opportunities in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia.

3. The census results from 2011 show, that the total number of Hungarians in the Prague area was 1,419, whilst the number of Slovaks was 23, 089 (Český statistický úřad 2014). In the case of the Czech Republic the census took place from midnight 25th to 26th of March 2011.
4. As far as religion is concerned, the majority of Slovaks claimed they were either Roman Catholic or non-practicing. Small numbers were devotees of the Evangelical church. As for the Hungarians, the dissimilarity was indicated by their affiliation with several denominations: Calvinist, Evangelical or Roman Catholic.
5. The bilateral population exchange between Czechoslovakia and Hungary acquired an involuntary character. Czechoslovak public authorities compiled a list of Hungarian inhabitants who were the transferred into Hungary. In this regard, Nosková points out the unequal situation, which was traced to the arrival of large numbers of Slovaks from Hungary. Another reason was the rejection of the Hungarian government to admit more members of Hungarian ethnic minority because of the deficiency of food supplies, overpopulation and currency inflation (Nosková 2005, 103). The movement and dispersion of Hungarians into Czech areas, according to the enactment of community services, appeared in response to the Hungarian migration problem.
6. I have in mind the Republic of Czechoslovakia, which originated in 1918 and changed its constitution several times. The period of a common state finally ended on 1st January 1993.
7. In the case of Hungarians the mention of Hungarian associations (for example the Association of Hungarians in the Czech Republic, Iglice, the Association of Hungarian Families), Hungarian Reform Congregation, and the Hungarian Institute of Prague was more common among respondents than by Slovaks. Within the group of Slovaks most references were made to their richly developed virtual community (www.somvprahe.sk). The virtual community of Hungarians (www.aed.cz) should be mentioned.

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CHAPTER 9

Politicking Imperils Democracy: Contested Public Space in Naples

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The observably difficult relationship between citizenship and governance across Europe and elsewhere in the West highlights the importance of gaining empirical knowledge on how dominant groups manage power and relate with the broader society.[1] In this Chapter, I address key dynamics of citizenship and, by extension, of integration versus exclusion and tolerance versus toleration.[2] I draw on anthropological research in Italy to reflect on mismanagement of the power to rule that breeds intolerance and conflict in a social, economic and cultural context traditionally oriented to hospitality and tolerance. Looking specifically at contested public space, I study in detail how mismanagement of power fosters difficult relationships between the autochthonous population and the growing number of immigrants.[3]

Earlier reflections on the issues studied in this Chapter were discussed at the Annual Conferences of the Commission on Urban Anthropology held in 2012 and 2015, hosted respectively by The Institute of Ethnology, Prague and by Brooklyn College, City University of New York. The present text benefits from the comments offered by participants in those events and by anonymous readers.

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_9

I collected the Naples ethnography on which the present analysis is based through long-term fieldwork between 2012 and 2013 and three-month up-dating visits in 2014 and 2015. I employed a combination of participant observation, which involved sharing formal and informal situations with my informants and their networks, prolonged interviews and the construction of case studies of people and situations. In particular, I interviewed people at the receiving end of decision-making. I asked questions to clarify my informants' behaviour and to find out why some rulers' actions were received as unjust and, in the words of many, "maybe legal but morally illegitimate."[4] I constructed case studies of relevant situations and events; many of which focused on what at the grassroots were seen to be rulers' self-serving actions and policies informed by zealous ideology, bigotry and politicking. Comparing and contrasting information gathered through these methods of enquiry and the analysis of documentary material and media reports has helped to identify key aspects of this problematic across the social spectrum. The situations in which I collected the empirical material will also be the object of analysis.

The Context: An Outline

I have long been interested in the social, political and economic dynamics involved in the management of the urban space, public and private.[5] The ethnographic study of Naples rulers' misuse of power over two decades led me to hypothesize a serious crisis of legitimacy (Weber 1978b, 213), whereby power without legitimacy appeared to be in danger of becoming power without authority (see n. 5). There was a serious risk, I suggested, that this developing situation would result in an irreparable erosion of trust not just in politicians but, more worryingly, in politics and the democratic process. This risk became stronger as the Naples rubbish crisis of 2005–2007 (Pardo 2011) led to devastating judicial inquiries and to equally devastating years of political and administrative stagnation compounding, as we shall see, misgovernance.

Ordinary Neapolitans, I have pointed out (Pardo 2009, 2011), have long had reason to feel that they are treated as second-class citizens. This needs to be understood in the light of the long-established view among the Italian powers-that-be, as well as among an influential proportion of the national and international intelligentsia, that Southerners are essentially corrupt and that Southern society is undermined by a cultural sympathy with criminality and a lack of civic sense (see, for example, Putnam 1993). I have shown how, this

seriously flawed view of the autochthonous population has helped to justify rulers' defiance of fundamental principles of representation (Prato 2000), obligation and entitlement. Received at the grassroots as a profoundly unfair fabrication, it has long helped to justify lack of investment, adverse credit policies and legislation that meets the selective interests of a few to the disadvantage of the many.[6]

Adding to these significant difficulties, for a long time political power in the city and the Region has been observably obnoxious to ordinary people's culture and way of life. Moreover, in recent years, while the general economic crisis has gradually translated into joblessness for many traditionally unemployed hard workers (Pardo 1996: Ch. 2 and 2012a; SVIMEZ 2015, 6–12; ISTAT 2016), local rulers have practised an interesting combination of selective actions and instrumentally targeted inaction, the effects of which have further penalized local economic activities. Governance has, thus, become further discredited.

Against the background of this contextual gap between citizenship and governance, I have examined complex and varied relations among immigrants (legal and illegal) and between immigrant and native entrepreneurs (Pardo 2009, 2012a). The ethnographically based analysis of these relations has illuminated the many ways in which they interact with the wider system suggesting that the areas of the economy in which these different people operate are not isolated from each other; instead, they interact significantly with each other. Equally important, I have argued, the integration or failed integration of many immigrants must be read in the context of the failed full integration of native people.[7] Keeping in mind that entrepreneurship is notoriously frustrated in South Italy by overcomplicated regulation and by the difficulties caused by the aforementioned flawed view of Southerners, I have pointed to important action that is needed in economic policy and in the administration of the urban situation in order to encourage local entrepreneurialism—both native and immigrant (Pardo 2012a).

Regrettably, mismanagement of the power to rule has raised conflict between citizens and non-citizens—including legal and illegal immigrants—who are officially non-existent but in fact very much present, and visible, in the economic fabric of the city. Much of such conflict arises over public space that not only carries complex cultural meanings but is also seen as a critical economic resource. A key question is, "What is the exact relationship of rulers' ideology and actual practices to ordinary people's culture and actions?" The descriptive analysis of selective

rule and of double standards in the treatment of Neapolitans and immigrants will help to address this question. We shall study how the morality and practical implications of this "everyday reality" have turned ordinary Neapolitans' traditional tolerance of diversity into an uneasy kind of toleration (see n. 2) that in some cases has turned into resentment of non-native urban dwellers and violent action.

The *Revolutionär Neapels Bürgermeister*: New Rulers, Old Broom

In 2011 a new administration was elected to power in Naples, in a sense by default. The new mayor was an ex-public prosecutor (Chiocci and Di Meo 2013) and MEP for a small party led by another ex-public prosecutor. Recently dubbed "*Revolutionär Neapels Bürgermeister*" in the German magazine *Stern* (11 June 2015), this man enjoyed the support of radical organizations and of various fringe interest groups, such as No-global, "*indignados*" and pro-immigration associations.[8] He ran a progressively radical electoral campaign that vilified previous administrators. He benefited from weak competition, as the political scenario that I have outlined earlier was made absurdly fascinating by self-harm on both sides of moderate politics. The Centre-left, crippled by in-fighting and publicly aired cross-accusations of corruption among the main prospective candidates, had ended up nominating a candidate who was honourable but unknown to the public. The Centre-right had been seriously undermined by sustained "friendly fire" against the official candidate, a reputable businessman some of whose most prominent internal opponents were later indicted for serious crimes. Widely discussed in the local media and the "social networks," this situation strengthened ordinary Neapolitans' informed disillusionment with local politics. So, unusually for Italy, only 50.37% of the electorate cared to vote. Benefiting from the vociferous support of the listed groups, the new mayor was elected by 65% of those who did vote.

Uncompromisingly anchored in his radical ideology and in his rhetoric of "alternative" politics, the new mayor styled himself as *the* leader of a colourfully termed but never truly specified "orange revolution." He pledged a *renaissance* of the city, perhaps trusting that his pledge might not sound stale to Neapolitans because enough time had passed since an ex-Communist mayor had made a remarkably similar pledge in the mid-1990s (Pardo 2012b). Embodying a déjà vu vignette in the eye of many

local informants who *this time* refused to suspend disbelief, his administration promised a new order marked by honesty and legality. A recurrent theme in local debate now is that, as in past times, this "new broom" approach has concretized in a plethora of questionable actions; among them, an instrumental use of public space and resources.

Notoriously, in Italy the public sector is used for political patronage—to recruit clients and govern support (Pardo 1996: Ch. 6, Fukuyama 2015), and the principle of a bureaucracy functioning in the collective interest not on favouritism and corruption is not fully established (Pardo 1996: Ch. 6 and Prato 2000). In past works, I have addressed a kind of corruption that is designed to fall within the strictly defined boundaries of the law, which when deemed necessary are expanded through *ad hoc* legislation (Montefusco 1997; Miller 2004; Pardo 2000, 2012b). I have examined the attendant clientelism based on exchanges where jobs, contracts and well-paid consultancies are *given* to people who control large packets of votes (Pardo 2011). And I have discussed how local rulers have also perfected a system privileging lobbies and interest groups through selective policies and targeted funding. This method continues to be applied, vigorously.

In a democracy, *good government* means—unquestionably and above all—that rulers must take care of all citizens, not just of those in line with their approach (Pardo and Prato 2011a). Failing to meet this fundamental principle, Naples' rulers have engaged in selective pandering to their constituency. They have allocated public money to various small but vociferous interest lobbies. Like some of their predecessors, they have made large proportions of the urban environment deteriorate almost beyond repair and have used public space to implement their agenda and values. Later, we shall see how some of these actions have encouraged unfairness and lawlessness; now, let us look briefly at some equally significant examples.

In recent times, radical groups' illegal occupation of public space—including buildings of historical value—has been consistently tolerated; in some cases, it has been legalized through *ad-hoc* municipal decrees that overemphasize the moral relativism of law (Fuller 1964; Saltman 1985).[9] Other examples abound. European Union (EU) funds earmarked for contributing to the development of an "integrated urban transport system" have been used to establish throughout the city cycling lanes consisting in white lines and cycle symbols painted on pavements, walk-sides and other pedestrian areas.[10] In an attempt to stress their ecologist credentials, on taking office these ruling élites closed to traffic most of the city's world-famous seaside promenade, via

Caracciolo and its continuation, via Partenope.[11] The purpose, they claimed, was to allow citizens to enjoy this important part of the city's urban heritage free of pollution and noise. For a while, they capitalized on capturing this space by staging there political rallies, mass parties, sporting events and progressive art shows. Again, following in the steps of their ex-Communist predecessors (Pardo 1996; 2012b, 67), they have used these events to put across their rhetoric about the "right things to do," about who is a good citizen and who is not, and the attendant criteria of inclusion and exclusion. As in the past, the line-towers are lent moral weight and legitimated in terms of civic consciousness; the unaligned are marginalized.

I have mentioned that the "orange revolutionaries" won power by making grand promises. Commenting in the local press, their critics now note that their rule has been mired in administrative weakness and bureaucratic inefficiency.[12] They are seen to be struggling with reconciling their ideology of "right" and "wrong" with ordinary people's values and lifestyles. They would appear to have lost credibility also because they have repeatedly dallied in what many informants have described as expedient legalism. For example, I have been asked to note, "while in office, the mayor received a 15 months suspended jail sentence for abuse of office and a hefty fine for libel. He was subsequently suspended from office by the judicial authorities. He appealed and one month later managed to be reinstated on a technicality." Similarly, his deputy received a 1-year suspended jail sentence for having assaulted a policewoman. He, too, is still in office.

Double Standards in a Context of Misgovernance

Management of power in Naples appears to be marred not only by selective actions but also by double standards in the application of the law. For instance, informants across the social and economic spectrum compared local authorities' strict application of the law to autochthonous traders and entrepreneurs with their *de facto* tolerance of the unlicensed street selling practised throughout the city by hundreds of immigrants. Discussing this problem and that mentioned at the end of last section, Lino (Pardo 1996, 6; 2012b) pointed to a weakening of ordinary people's right to justice—a fundamental of citizenship (Marshall 1950b; Dahrendorf 1996, 37 ff., Rees 1996)—as he remarked, "every day we have to contend with the authorities' laissez-faire attitude towards immigrants' illegal practices, their punishing application of the law to us Neapolitans and their sly (*furbo*) manipulation of its loopholes when it

comes to the rulers' and other big shots' (*pezzi grossi*) own criminal convictions."

Interesting kinds of entrepreneurship do, nonetheless, take place. The connections and conflicts among three different kinds of entrepreneurialism in a large area near the main railway station will provide further, graphic illustration of local politicking. One kind involves the scavenging and sale of rubbish. Naples residents are required to put their rubbish in plastic bags and then deposit these bags overnight in dumpsters permanently placed by the walk-side; the dumpsters are emptied early in the morning. Immigrants, mainly Roma, are regularly seen rummaging in these dumpsters and then proceed to display and sell any objects they have scavenged (mainly shoes and clothes) from rugs thrown on the pavement. This phenomenon takes place in the centre daily, for all to see. Local residents and traders note that their complaints are met with indifference by officers who seem to be "informally instructed" to turn a blind eye. "So," they add, "despite the legal and health issues involved, this kind of trade goes on unchallenged, including in the very hot Summer time." It is of course no consolation to Neapolitans that a similar trade also takes place elsewhere in Italy under similar styles of local governance.

A second kind of entrepreneurship is practised by licensed traders operating stalls in the city's large markets.[13] Making the headlines in the local press, the authorities have repeatedly taken punishing action against many of these traders because they over-use public space. One morning I went to see Peppe, a stall-keeper whom I have known for many years, to find that his stall had shrunk to half the normal size and that a white line had appeared on the pavement delimitating the point beyond which traders could not display their wares. That morning, Peppe and his fellow traders reported to me, "municipal police had appeared out of the blue" and while council workers painted the white lines, they had progressed to "fine heavily everyone for having exceeded the space allocated on their trading licenses." Shopkeepers were fined too but they said they could continue to operate. The stall-keepers were hit particularly hard because they relied on displaying their wares as widely as possible for their living. The police continued to patrol the area for several weeks, ensuring that all traders abode by the law.

Throughout central Naples, examples abound of this problematic issue of the not-strictly legal occupation of public land and of the actions described above by the authorities. Over the years, Giovanni, a shopkeeper in his mid-forties who sells cookware and other kitchen essentials has been

repeatedly fined for "unlawful occupation of public land and for posing a hazard to pedestrians." In the past, he set up a small stall on the sidewalk just outside his shop and was fined because he did not have a license to do so. Subsequently, he applied for a license and was granted a permit to use a small portion of pavement by the entrance to his shop. While I was doing fieldwork, we met regularly for a coffee and a chat. He reported that the previous year the municipal police had raided the area and had found him in breach of the law because he had used more than the few square metres allowed by his license. He had been fined again and had to close the shop, which he did—for a week. He risks serious charges and is obviously worried but, he stresses, "As you see, the shop is very small. What hope would I have of selling anything if I did not show my merchandise on the pavement? I have applied to the Council for a license to occupy a few metres of the walk-side by the shop's entrance but the space that they have officially allowed me to use is just too small. Mind you, unlike the illegal peddlers who operate just outside the shop, I've always made sure that I don't bother anyone and that people have enough space to walk by unhindered. I have to do this; you see, I've a family to support—I just have to take the risk."

One also observes situations like that described by a computer technician in his early-thirties who lives close to Port'Alba, a traditional bookshop area closed to traffic. He said, "I can't stand the double standards practised by the authorities in my city. Anyone who arrives in Naples by train knows that immigrant peddlers monopolize large parts of the pedestrian areas selling all sorts of illegal merchandise. Anyone who takes a short walk from the station and the subway in any direction will find the pavement strewn with rubbish, and the stench is indescribable. A municipal police station is nearby, but the officers seldom intervene. On the other hand, legitimate trade is made to suffer in all sorts of ways. For example, the exposition of books for sale outside the bookshops of Port'Alba, a traditional haunt of bibliophiles and tourists, is regularly subjected to official harassment. This is a place where you can spend hours leafing old and new books, maps and so on. Agents of the municipal police often raid the place, close the stalls and fine the booksellers. There has been lull in such behaviour following a much publicized protest by prominent local intellectuals that was quickly joined by thousands of ordinary Neapolitans. However, the other day firefighters imposed the closure of the stalls arguing that they are a potential fire hazard."

A third kind of entrepreneurial activity takes place between mid-November and early January in central Naples that is well in tune with

the local culture of *sapé fa* (literally, cleverness). *Sapé fa* is basically informed by a strong emphasis on pooling *all* personal resources (monetary and non-monetary) in the pursuit of goals and of betterment. In economic terms, this often translates into establishing or expanding *independent* small-scale enterprises through mobilization of information and network. Many such small businesses are rooted in the informal sector,[14] beyond the limits of the strictly legal (a predicament resented by many as difficult and problematic, mired in anxiety and uncertainty), but generally address the market as a whole. Elsewhere I have addressed important questions regarding the permanently (re-)drawn and contested demarcations between legal and illegal work as part of the global development of the modern economy (Pardo 1996, 2012a, 2012b). Here, let me just mention that a variety of small- and medium-sized companies informally use workshops that produce goods evading tax on the purchase of raw materials and on the sale of finished products, as well as employment tax and other welfare state contributions. Vindicating the point that the formal and the informal are part of the same market, and interact, many such products find their way into the legal market (Pardo 2012a). A sizeable proportion is sold throughout the Christmas period, including in the kind of seasonal street market that I shall now describe.

Traditionally, in the run up to Christmas and the Epiphany, hundreds of extra stalls selling gifts, Christmas decorations, fireworks and toys are given permission to operate in central Naples. At this time of the year, a large area near the railway station becomes a popular trade hub. In December 2013, the strained relationships between local traders and the Naples administration took a turn for the worse as the City Council decided not to grant these permissions on health and safety grounds. Protests ensued and police in riot gear moved in. Before anyone could get hurt, traders dismantled the stalls that they had put up in anticipation of obtaining the permits.

Peppe and his sons and daughters are among the traders who operate these seasonal stalls. Officially unemployed, throughout the year Peppe's children work for cash in restaurants and bars and do other black market occasional jobs. The seasonal Christmas trading accounts for most of their yearly income. Prevented from trading, and "sorely aware" that unlicensed immigrants' street selling continued unchecked throughout central Naples, Peppe's eldest son remarked, "My family will now be in real trouble, while illegal immigrants can sell what they want where they want." As the rubbish trade had also gone on throughout, he added,

"Why I can't sell my wares but they can sell my rubbish?" A shopkeeper, joined in saying, "since these people started doing this, sales have dropped by 50% because the street is always dirty and unhealthy." Interestingly, until then my Neapolitan informants had discussed the rubbish *trade* as disgusting but they had not expressed strong negative feelings against the *traders*. At this junction, however, I witnessed their traditional tolerance of immigrants in general turn into intolerance (see n. 2).

Worryingly, within days a group described in some local media as "Fascist extremists" found their way to gaining ordinary people's consensus by exploiting the socio-economic cracks caused by mismanagement of power. They mounted an organized attack against some rubbish sellers. They were soon joined by local residents, many of whom also threw water and heavy objects from their windows on the rubbish traders. The municipal police intervened. Several protesters were injured; some were arrested, charged and later released. The protests and violence on both sides continued for several days, later evolving into a kind of vigilante phenomenon whereby people armed with baseball bats roamed the neighbourhood assaulting anyone who looked like an immigrant regardless of whether they had anything to do with trading rubbish.

Immigrants who have endeavoured to integrate in the local society are also directly affected. The traders (shopkeepers and licensed stall holders) and shop assistants (who work in Italian shops) among them with whom I spoke invariably said that they resented the behaviour of fellow immigrants who demanded all sort of favours and free goods and services, and especially of those who dallied in illegality, even in criminality, and who on occasions hurled abuse at protesting locals.[15] "They give a bad name to foreigners as a whole," said Maria, a South American graduate in economics in her late-thirties who emigrated to Italy over 20 years ago and whom I met during a previous fieldwork in 2004.[16] Having initially worked informally as a maid, Maria slowly moved on to establish an unlicensed enterprise and, later, a formal business. Now married to a Neapolitan self-employed electrician with whom she has two children, she runs a successful legal business in partnership with a Neapolitan woman. Maria says she feels "threatened as a woman and as a businessperson, and disappointed as an immigrant, by so much blatant illegality tainting the diverse immigrant community in Naples." Echoing the remarks of a young Ukrainian couple who manage a small shop specializing in East European food, a man in his forties from Sri Lanka who runs an internet café and call centre in the area where most rubbish sellers run their business remarked, "I've strived to make it here.

Now I'm afraid for me and for my family, for my wife. I get death threats every day and my customers are afraid to come to the shop. If this continues, I'll be forced to close and go away." As I was listening to this, a group of North-African peddlers took direct action dispersing the few rubbish sellers who were still hanging around by throwing empty beer bottles and other impromptu missiles at them.

One year later, on a late November night, following renewed violent protests against the rubbish traders, the local administration decreed that anyone caught rummaging in dumpsters would be fined 500 euros on the spot.[17] Within 24 hours, 28 fines were issued (*La Repubblica Napoli*, 27 November 2014). Over the following days, hundred more fines were issued and left uncashed because the transgressors were officially destitute. Many fines could not be issued because the transgressors could not be identified.

Meanwhile, unlicensed street trading has continued to grow. Often making it difficult for people to walk through, street sellers of foreign origin (mainly from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Philippines and North-African and Sub-Saharan countries) crowd central Naples' most popular sidewalks, squares and pedestrian areas, from Piazza Garibaldi[18] to Piazza Plebiscito[19] to the seaside promenade. Marred over the last few years by lawlessness,[20] these areas of the centre are home to a multitude of hawkers who peddle all kinds of wares, from cheap costume jewellery to cigarette lighters, to CDs, DVDs and assorted knickknacks, mostly on rugs or improvised cardboard stalls. Many sell imitation or counterfeit merchandise; from designer bags to sunglasses, to shoes to jackets. They often do so in the vicinity of shops that sell the genuine legal versions of such merchandise. Huge difference in prices makes competition very difficult; as a shopkeeper put it, "Only people interested in the law refuse to buy counterfeit or 'simply' cheaper imitation goods. Not everyone can afford to stick to his principles, though." I recorded several complaints on the unfairness and unsustainability of this situation along lines similar to those expressed in the numerous protests lodged with the authorities over the years by traders and their Associations.

While the demographics of immigration are observably high and increasing, it is of course difficult to say precisely how many people are illegally in Italy; their permits may have expired or they never had a permit. Kasun, Sabbir and Jakab, explained why they operated "informally." Kasun is a 44-year-old man from Sri Lanka who sells mobile phone covers from an improvised stall.[21] I met him on several occasions, establishing a relationship or relative trust that

yielded precious information. He maintains that "it is easier to trade informally because it would be difficult to start a business legally."[22] Sabbir, a 35-year-old man from Bangladesh who sells cheap jewellery and perfume from a stall similar to Kasun's, also remarked that operating informally conveniently allowed him "to move beneath the radar of the authorities. I do not have to fulfill legal requirements and register my stall." Jakab, a 29-year-old man from Senegal who sells hats and counterfeit designer wallets displayed on a rug on the pavement, said that he had recently arrived in Naples and worked in partnership with some friends from his country, who had been here longer, had welcomed him, had set him up in business and shared lodgings in the periphery with him.

Legal immigrants hold a permit to operate in designated market areas only.[23] Some street sellers among them who have long been living in Naples and speak fluent Italian told me that their communities (specifically, Sri Lankan and Filipino) help people from their ethnic group to fill the forms and obtain a permit to trade.[24] Observation suggests that there is much solidarity and communication among immigrants of the same ethnic group, which may extend to peddlers from other groups when necessary. I do not know the legal status of Jakab and Sabbir; our relationship was not sufficiently well established for me to ask this kind of question. However, while describing "the reality of being an immigrant in Italy," Kasun pointed, among other things, to an interesting aspect of competition as he remarked, "you know, everyone here (meaning the street sellers operating where he usually sets up his stall) has a permit to stay in Italy but not everyone has a permit to sell."

To my suggestion that there might be risks to operating informally, Kasun, Jakab and Sabbir responded saying that it is easy to avoid the police and, most important, "once one runs away one cannot be traced." They also remarked that the police rarely show up and when they do they turn a blind eye or move in slowly, giving them time to pack up and move elsewhere. Sometimes, I was also told, the police take goods that they like from the stalls, silently allowing the keepers to assume that they can keep trading there. When I asked how they could "pack up" (relatively) quickly, Jakab said, "That's easy; I just pick up the four corners of my rug, wrap the lot and go. Anyway, we alert each other and usually have time enough." Apparently it is equally easy for their stalls to disappear. Like Kasun, Sabbir explained, "I just lift the cardboard sheet on which my wares are fixed, fold the cardboard box holding it and move on." As for the limited capital needed to start this kind of business, we know about Jakab; not unlike Neapolitan small

entrepreneurs (Pardo 1996, 2009, 2012a), Kasun said that he had borrowed from his brother (who runs a kebab shop in the city and whom he joined "a few years ago"), while Sabbir borrowed money from friends, which he says he has repaid.

To sum up, while the "orange revolution" stalls and the economic downturn show no sign of ending, illegal street-selling thrives, licensed traders who break the law continue to be fined, vigilantes continue to operate on and off in some residential quarters and local taxes keep increasing, now the second highest in Italy.

Conclusion

We have seen that, perhaps predictably, here as elsewhere in Europe a slanted style of governance enjoys dominance despite dallying in politicking and double standards that may meet selective interests but do harm to the rest of society—legal and illegal, autochthonous and immigrant—and significantly frustrate acceptance, inclusion and productive cooperation between autochthonous citizens and immigrants. We have studied examples of how mismanagement of power has contributed to turning tolerance into toleration and toleration into ugly forms of exclusion and violence. In brief, the analysis given here has brought out important reasons why local governance has lost legitimacy among Neapolitans; more importantly, it has brought out good reasons why the *principle* of governance has been seriously undermined. The implications are sobering.

In theory, a healthy democracy cannot afford to ride roughshod over people's values, beliefs and life styles. As this ethnography suggests, misgovernance—particularly misgovernance that draws on a selective agenda and double standards—may survive and even flourish, for a while. The problem is that in the long run it dangerously imperils democracy as it engenders citizens' distrust of its key institutions. Current events across Europe powerfully suggest that the implications and ramifications of this kind of distrust reach far beyond the implosion of some local élite group.

Notes

1. With reference to Mediterranean Europe, this issue is addressed comparatively in Pardo and Prato eds 2011b.
2. On the critical distinction between *tolerance* and *toleration*, see Pardo (2009, 112–14). Prato (2009b) has developed a comparative discussion of

the dynamics that make the former turn into the latter, of the attendant responsibilities and of the conceptual, social and political implications of this shift.

3. Officially, in 2015 there were 48,565 foreign residents in the city, accounting for 5% of the local population (Comune di Napoli 2014 and 2015). Sri Lankans are the largest community (25.4%), followed by Ukrainians (16.9%), Africans (11.4%) and Chinese (10.2%).
4. Interviews with Neapolitan informants were conducted in Italian and Neapolitan. As I had no knowledge of immigrants' native languages, I conducted interviews with them in Italian, English or French.
5. See, for example, Pardo 1992 and 1996 and, more recently, 2010 and 2012b.
6. See Pardo 1996, 2010 and 2012b. It will be useful to remind the reader of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno (literally, Fund for the South), established in 1950 by the central government and discontinued in 1984. In 1992 the central government also ceased all 'extraordinary intervention' in the South. The Cassa was intended to stimulate economic growth through the development of the infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) and through credit subsidies and tax advantages. However, while large companies benefited, small and medium enterprises did not. The literature on this issue is vast. Lepore (2013) has recently offered an assessment.
7. Prato (2009a) has provided a similar account with reference to the historical Albanian immigration in South Italy.
8. Some locally-based pro-immigrant associations are under judicial investigation, accused of misappropriating public money in the order of millions of Euros. Allegedly, part of this money has been used by the association's hierarchy for private gain and part has been used by local politicians for clientelistic purposes (see *Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno*, May 23, 2015 and *Il Mattino*, May 24, 2015).
9. This kind of action is exemplified by the case of the Asilo Filangieri. This important historical building was restored at public expense to be used as a venue for international cultural events. It was, however, illegally occupied by radical groups and has since deteriorated (see *Il Mattino*, March 12, 2016). Recently, a Municipal decree has turned those illegal occupants into legal occupants (*Corriere del Mezzogiorno*, January 4, 2016).
10. The City Council is responsible for local transport, important parts of which are found wanting. In her criticism of the present administration, the local leader of the Partito Democratico (the major Leftist party) recently noted that "in 1997 there were 800 buses, now there are 300 and they are 17-year-old" (*Il Mattino*, April 2, 2016).
11. This decision was opposed by traders, who lost customers, and by ordinary citizens who resented the consequently increased traffic in the rest of the city

centre. Over time, the pedestrianized part of the promenade has gradually shrunk to a quarter-mile portion of via Partenope. Meanwhile, the adjoining public park has deteriorated into a wasteland.

12. Criticism in this line is regularly argued in the local papers; see *Il Mattino, Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno, La Repubblica Napoli* (2016).
13. Widespread across the world, street vending is certainly not a marginal economic activity. Its significance and, in some cases, international reach, is recognized in the literature (see, for example, Pardo 1996 and 2009; Da Silva 2013; Marovelli 2014; the contributions in Graaff and Ha eds 2015).
14. A quantitative assessment of the informal sector is, of course, extremely difficult. However, it may be useful to mention some estimates made by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). According to ISTAT (2010), in 2008 the economic value of the informal sector was between 255 and 275 billion Euros (16.3% and 17.5% of the GDP). In 2013 what ISTAT calls "shadow economy" was valued at about 190 billion Euros (11.9% of GDP), an increase compared to previous years (11.7% in 2012, 11.4% in 2011). Overall, in 2013 informal and illegal economic activities amounted to an estimated 206 billion Euros (12.9% of GDP; ISTAT 2015). According to SVIMEZ (Associazione per lo Sviluppo dell'Industria nel Mezzogiorno, Association for the development of industry in South Italy), in 2010 roughly six million Southerners of working-age were involved in informal activities (SVIMEZ 2010, 8).
15. See, for example, Pardo 2012a. Recently, the newspaper *Il Mattino* posted a video on its website: http://ilmattino.it/napoli/cronaca/suk_contraffazione_teatro_san_carlo_napoli_venditori_aggrediscono_verbalmente_donne-1645889.html
16. Elsewhere (Pardo 2009, 116–18), I have described at length Maria, her story, her embodiment of the complex relationship between the formal and the informal and her successful path to integration.
17. The text of this decree of November 2014 reads: "Those found in breach of this order, are to be punished by the application of the fine of Euros 500.00 in accordance with art. 7a TUEL and art. 16 of the Law of 24 November 1981 No 689 and s.m.i. and with the immediate destruction of the waste collected from the rubbish bins and of the equipment used for its collection and transportation" (my translation); see: http://www.napolitime.it/59631-mercato-abusivo-dei-rifiuti-napoli-il-sindaco-ferma-questa-pratica.html
18. This is the large square outside Naples central railway station. Over the last 25 years, much of this large open space has been gradually appropriated by immigrants. There and across the adjacent areas various ethnic groups meet regularly to socialize. Traders from various countries run shops and licensed and unlicensed businesses.

19. Since 1993, this large, highly symbolic square has been closed to traffic and is now in a partial state of disrepair, including uprooted paving stones and large patches of weeds. In a modern version of the tried and tested "bread, circus and gallows" tactics, it has been extensively used by local rulers to stage mass events (Pardo 2012b, 67–68), which continues today.
20. Among the many examples, see reports in *Affari Italiani* (April 4, 2013), in *Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno* (February 29, 2016) and in *Il Mattino* (April 3, 2016).
21. Like many similar traders, he also sells sunglasses in the summer and umbrellas in the winter.
22. The reports of the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) both meet and clarify this aspect (see, for example, ISTAT 2015).
23. According to the Naples Sportello Unico delle Attività Produttive (SUAP; literally, Office for Productive Activities), in December 2015 there were 6,000 authorized immigrant street sellers. Such a figure is estimated to have grown to 10,000 over the first three months of 2016.
24. Permission to practise an itinerant trade can be legally obtained by applying on-line to the SUAP. Authorization is generated automatically.

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CHAPTER 10

African Migrants and European Expatriates in Port Elizabeth, South Africa

Henk Pauw, Carla Collins and Stephanie Gouws

Introduction

The continuing rise of interest in international migration stems firstly from the growing impact of economic, political and social globalisation; and secondly by the increase in high and low level conflicts in many parts of the world forcing people to flee to countries that offer some stability (Santo Tomas *et al.* 2009; IOM 2010, cited in Statistics South Africa [StatsSA] 2012, 8).

With business becoming global, the corporate world has experienced a need for expatriates. Expatriates are employees who are sent on international assignments by their multinational companies. The 2002 Cendant Mobility Survey of 175 global companies revealed that of the 3.4 million people employed by these companies, over 200,000 employees were "globally mobile" (Francesco and Gold 2005, 166, quoted in Gouws 2011, 15). Ferraro and Briody (2013, 221) referred to Mercer's *2008–2009 Benefit Survey for Expatriates and Globally Mobile Employees* that included data from 243 global firms for a total of 94,000 expatriates (an increase of 44,000 since 2005–2006). Of these companies, 47% reported that they deployed more expatriates (employees working one to five years abroad on one assignment before returning home) and 38% were deploying more, what they called, "global nomads" (employees taking one expatriate assignment after another).

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_10

On the other hand, cross-border migration has become a key human rights issue in the age of globalisation. In this regard, in reference to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM 2011), StatsSA (2012) stated that international population movements, whether legal or illegal, forced or voluntary, impact not only upon the countries of origin and destination, but indeed worldwide (Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, 8). Furthermore, as to the positive and negative connotations attached to international migration it is more often than not the last-mentioned connotation that is accentuated and this often gives rise to views and debate to be biased, polarised and usually negative (StatsSA 2012, 8).

The lack of correct information often leads to speculation about the actual number of immigrants in a country. Public opinion and the mass media tend to overestimate the number of immigrants and in this regard South Africa is no exception. According to StatsSA (2012), in 2010 the foreign-born population in the world was estimated to be 214 million persons, accounting for 3.1% of the world's population (IOM 2010, quoted in StatsSA 2012, 11). The 2011 South African census figures released in October 2012, indicated that 5.7% of the enumerated population were born outside South Africa (StatsSA 2012, 17).

Contributing to the number of displaced people around the world are foreign African migrants[1] coming to South Africa, which has apparently increased since 1994. According to various bills, policies and acts of the government, migrants are afforded certain rights, depending on their status in the country. Despite this, local citizens discriminate against some of these foreign nationals in sometimes violent ways. In addition, it has been alleged that foreign African migrants have also been subjected to bribery and corruption from South African Police Service (SAPS) officials and officials of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) (see also Barbali 2009, 132–33; Moorhouse 2010, 124; and; Kritzinger 2011, 113).

Judging by media headlines xenophobic behaviour towards non-South Africans is evident. The following examples, selected at random, are informative in this regard: "*Xenofobie-sweer bars*" (Xenophobia sore bursts) (Gerber 2009), "*Xenophobia fears escalate*" (News24 2010a), "*Several hurt in xenophobic attacks*" (News24 2010b, "*Somali shops looted, burnt in PE*"(News24 2011a), "*G'n vordering met xenofobie – verslag*" (No progress with xenophobia – report) (Gibson 2011), "*Betogings oor dienste en xenofobie 'hou verband*'" (Demonstrations over services and xenophobia

"related") (Die Burger Wes-Kaap 2011), "*Xenofobie 'is net 'n gerug' in SA*" (Xenophobia "is merely a rumour" in SA) (Die Burger 2010) and "*Govt in denial about xenophobia – report*" (News24 2011b). The recent (September 2013) attacks on Somalis and the looting of their shops in New Brighton and KwaZakhele (Port Elizabeth townships) are further examples of the problem although a SAPS spokesperson denied that the attacks had anything to do with xenophobia (Nel 2013). Although this problem occurs nationwide, research was focused in Port Elizabeth, which was fast becoming a popular destination for foreign Africans due to Port Elizabeth being regarded as safer and more peaceful than the larger cities.

This chapter is based on two studies done in Port Elizabeth. The first study was by Collins (2008) about foreign African migrants in Port Elizabeth. Collins used in-depth interviews with 50 foreign African migrants and also conducted four group interviews ranging from 10 to 15 interviewees at a time. She also interviewed four members of the SAPS involved with matters pertaining to African migrants and one official from the DHA. The studies done by Barbali (2009), Moorhouse (2010) and Kritzinger (2011) of foreign African migrants in Port Elizabeth serve as a comparison to the study by Collins (2008). The second study by Gouws (2011) examined the cultural adjustment of 10 domestic partners of German expatriate employees working in the automotive industry in Port Elizabeth. In her study, Gouws used questionnaires that were followed by in-depth interviews based on the questionnaire results. Being a child of expatriate parents the study became, for her, an auto-ethnography. The aim of these studies was to understand the situation and experiences of two types of migrants in Port Elizabeth and how they were received by the local population.

Migration

Migration entails the geographical movement of people from one locality to another, and has occurred throughout time and across space. Migration was, and is, very often the result of wars and internal conflict, as well as, historically, a result of deportation and slavery. Migration may take place as a result of push and/or pull factors. Examples of pull factors are increased employment opportunities, democratic government, a perceived better quality of life, religious freedom or even a more favourable climate. Push factors are those factors which are perceived as being negative in the home country, such as political unrest, conflict or war,

violence, famine and other natural disasters (Kendall 2010, cited in Moorhouse 2010, 50).

On the other hand we find the migration of expatriates is a result of the global economy. Some expatriate assignments are means of managing foreign subsidiaries: to transfer knowledge and experience from headquarters, to compensate for a lack of qualified locals or to standardise procedures across organisational units (Mohr and Klein 2004); some employees are also sent on expatriate assignments to develop their managerial skills (Shay and Baack 2004; Black and Gregersen 1999; Mendenhall and Stahl 2000) (cited in Gouws 2011, 12–4).

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2000) defines a migrant as a person that moves from one region to another by chance, instinct or plan. In other words, migration can be movement within national boundaries or between national boundaries. Migration, furthermore, can be temporary, circular or permanent in the form of immigration. Hannerz (1990, 43), however, refers to expatriates as people who have had a choice to live for some period in a foreign country and when it suits them they can go home. For Gouws (2011, 10) this is the key difference between expatriates and other types of migrants as expatriates, while living and working in a foreign country for a predetermined period of time, are always comforted by the knowledge that once the period of time has elapsed they will return to their home countries.

Kritzinger (2011, 37) mentioned that migrants themselves are as diverse as the reasons why they migrate. Voluntary migration occurs as an adaptive response to meet economic needs and strategies for themselves and their families' survival. Involuntary migration occurs when people try to escape violence, natural disasters or move as a result of "development."

The DHA indicated in their May, 2007 statistics that the number of refugees was 35,570 and legal and illegal Zimbabweans alone were up to three million (Collins 2008, 3). These kinds of statistics, furthermore, have never been truly accurate. However, the 2012 Global Trends Report by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), entitled *Displacement. The New 21st Century Challenge*, stated that for the first time since 2006, South Africa was not the number one host of new asylum-seekers in the world (UNHCR 2012, 25). According to the same report South Africa received 61,500 applications

in 2012 for asylum or refugee status as opposed to the 2009 all-time high of 223,000 applications (2012, 3, 26).

As far back as 1994, the SAPS estimated that there were fewer than two million undocumented migrants in South Africa. That same year, the press claimed the police estimates to be as high as eight million (Brunk 1996). The SAPS in its 2008/09 annual report, said that the number of "undocumented" foreigners in South Africa may vary between three and six million people. The report further stated that these illegal immigrants may be part of the "economically-active age group," but also the "high crime-risk age group" (Mail& Guardian 2009).

On World Refugee Day the United Nations High Commission for Refugees indicated that South Africa receives about 181,000 asylum applications every year (Van Wyk 2011). According to a DHA official interviewed, foreign Africans used to come predominantly from neighbouring African countries but now they encompass all African nationalities. The laws have also changed, making it easier for foreign African migrants to enter South Africa, and "too easy for some" by not having stricter requirements and certain fees. However, once here, they do not allow foreign migrants enough opportunities to make their journey worthwhile. The official was, furthermore, of the opinion that the borders have especially opened up more for refugees and recently the DHA had more problems especially with illegal immigrants (Collins 2008, 131, 134–35).

Problems of Racial Discrimination in South Africa

Racial discrimination has characterized South Africa since the arrival of white colonists in 1652, when three ships of the Dutch East India Company established the first permanent white contact with the San and Strandloper Khoi at the Cape of Good Hope (Du Toit 1976, cited in Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982, 140; Lipton 1986, 17). Black people in South Africa had no freedom and rights, except in their rural homelands whereas white immigrants have always been welcomed and were given freedom and rights in the country.

Since South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, the separation laws have been abolished. According to Harris (2002; in Hook and Eagle 2002,169), at least in terms of the law, segregation has been replaced by unity, legislated racism has been replaced by equality and apartheid has been replaced by democracy. However, Harris (2001, 6) further commented that regardless of these political changes, racism, accompanied by

violence, still persists. Racism is also still prominent in South Africa's immigration legislation and practice.

There are now new victims, the foreign African migrants, who also experience discrimination despite being from African descent as well. Petrus (2001) called this phenomenon "neo-racism," where the same people who were discriminated against in the apartheid era are now expressing xenophobic behaviour towards foreign African migrants. In South Africa, the displaced people are being discriminated against and treated as if they should be blamed for living in a foreign country. For many of these people, their situation is, however, inevitably due to the global processes occurring in the world today.

Foreign African Migrants in Port Elizabeth

Demographics

Of the 106,173 temporary residence permits issued in South Africa during 2011, 71.7% of the African nationals came from Zimbabwe (15,628 – 27.2%); Nigeria (12,210 – 21.2%); Lesotho (2,706 – 4.7%); the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2,601 – 4.5%); Ghana (2,097 – 3.6%); Malawi (2,047 – 3.6%); Angola (2,039 (3.5%) and Cameroon (1,863 – 3.2%) (StatsSA 2012, 23). As far as the types of temporary permit recipients were concerned, relatives' permits accounted for 38.4%, followed by study (23.1%), visitors (20.0%) and work (15.3%) permits (Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, 25).

Nationals from Africa accounted for 5,922 (59.2%) of the 10,011 permanent residence permits issued to recipients from 128 countries in 2011. Nationals from Zimbabwe (1,131), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1,054), Nigeria (736), Somalia (432), Congo (431), Lesotho (417), Rwanda (166) and Kenya (150) received 76.3% of the permits issued to nationals from the Africa region (Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, 37). As far as the types of permanent residence permits were concerned, most of the 5,922 recipients from Africa, were given permits based on: relatives (54,3%); refugees (27.9%) and work (15.9%) category status (Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, 39).

Africans from various African countries, ranging from Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria in the northwest, to Congo in central Africa, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi to the east, and Zimbabwe are found in Port Elizabeth. They seem to be mostly male;

although this does not necessarily imply that there are more men than there are women migrants in Port Elizabeth. It may also indicate that immigrant women in Port Elizabeth do not lead a very public life. An interesting study in Mozambique by Lubkemann (2007) suggested that men who migrated to South Africa did not want their wives to follow them because after coming to South Africa the women from Machaze [in Mozambique] will become "corrupt" like the South African women are and will always spend money. For this reason, and other economic and social reasons, men from Mozambique prevented their wives from joining them in South Africa. However, Moorhouse (2010, 120) found that some of the Zimbabwean women initiated the move to South Africa with their husbands and children following, while others migrated on their own.

Collins (2008, 79) found that most of the migrants were single males under the age of 30. They could speak English as their second, third or fourth language although some Somalis were not very fluent in English. Most of them were able to obtain the school leaving requirements in their respective home countries. Those who were unable to do so left school in order to earn money for their families, or because of political reasons. Many interviewees from Somalia, for example, left their country before they were able to finish school or their tertiary education, mostly because of civil war breaking out. Therefore not many of them had the opportunity to work there either. A significant number of migrants finished their tertiary education in their home countries while many did work in their home countries before they migrated (Collins 2008, 81). They travelled to South Africa by foot, plane, ship or road transport.

Reasons for Leaving Their Home Country and Coming to South Africa

According to Collins (2008) the migrants from West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal) left their countries in order to travel and see the world. Those from countries in East Africa mostly left because of civil war (Somalia and Ethiopia) or harsh living and economic conditions (especially Zimbabwe in southern Africa). Mostly, the migrants came to South Africa because they wanted more opportunities, to make more money (Collins 2008, 83–88; see also; Barbali 2009; Moorhouse 2010; Kritzinger 2011). Moorhouse (2010, 59), in this regard, referred to Landau and Segatti's (2009) "three P's" of migration' namely "Profit,"

"Protection" from political persecution, disasters and violence, and merely "Passing through" South Africa to other destinations in the world.

The general consensus amongst foreign African migrants is that Port Elizabeth is easier to live in than the bigger cities in South Africa. Port Elizabeth is also perceived to be safer compared to the rest of the bigger cities in the country. Some knew friends or had relatives in the city. However, instead of flocking to the cities, foreign African migrants also seem to be moving into smaller towns where there is less competition when looking for a source of income (Collins 2008, 128). The local Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University also has a significant number of students from the rest of Africa.

Manner of Reception and Status of Foreign African Migrants in South Africa

The DHA applies the Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, and the Immigration Amendment Act, No. 19 of 2004. These Acts have replaced the Aliens Control Act, No. 96 of 1991, and also "go hand in hand with the Immigration Regulations." The Refugee Reception Office adheres to the Refugee Act, No. 130 of 1998 (Collins 2008, 132–33).

Sichone (2004, 3 in Barbali 2009, 132) referred to the various visas, documentation and passports that foreign African migrants need as "global apartheid" depicting a *laager* mentality whereby people originating from outside a national border are seen as enemies. Asylum seekers' permits do not allow foreign African migrants many rights and opportunities in South Africa. This is probably why some "employers are skeptical" as these permits are only valid for about two months at a time and might not be renewed the next time.

Asylum seekers and refugees form a specialised group of immigrants in that they are forced to leave their country. The public and media often use the concepts *asylum seeker* and *refugee* in a loose manner with the result that misunderstanding and wrong information are rife regarding who refugees and asylum seekers are. The broad public tend to brand all kinds of immigrants, especially those from less developed countries as "refugees" and particularly as "economic refugees" with the result that negative attitudes of resentment, discrimination and xenophobia regarding the presence of such immigrants develop. Recipients who were given permanent residence during 2011 based on their refugee status were primarily from war-torn conflict

countries in Africa such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Congo, Rwanda and Burundi (Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2012, 50–51).

Many foreign African migrants are in South Africa on asylum seekers' permits,[2] very few had received their refugee cards, some have work permits, while others have (sometimes expired) visitor's permits. According to Collins' (2008) informants, to obtain the necessary documentation, they often had to bribe either a security guard at or an official of the DHA. What they normally received is a temporary document.

After asylum status, foreign African migrants receive refugee status if approved, which gives them a Refugee card, and also possibly a travel document. After five years of living in South Africa continuously, foreigners can apply for residency, and after another two to three years they can apply for citizenship, which means they have all the same rights except for voting, and still have a different ID number.

According to an official at the DHA interviewed by Collins (2008), generally, crime, drug dealing, corruption and fraud have been on the increase amongst locals and foreigners. Bribery and corruption within the department usually involve department officials who facilitate illegal papers and permits, who issue permits even if requirements are not met, or they use another person's file number without he/she knowing it. In fact, three DHA officials were fired during 2007 as a result of corruption regarding the issuing of documents (Collins 2008, 132).

Experiences with South African Citizens: General Treatment and Discrimination

Although most literature available on the subject suggests that xenophobia is a serious problem that seems to occur everywhere in South Africa, a study done in Govan Mbeki Avenue, Port Elizabeth by Pauw and Petrus (2003) showed that harmony between the local and foreign Africans does exist in certain areas of Port Elizabeth. A similar observation was made by Barbali (2009, 129). Some of the South African research participants in the study by Pauw and Petrus (2003) were actually not disturbed by foreign Africans, and expressed the opinion that the foreign Africans create jobs for locals and contribute to the country's economy. However, others in the same study felt foreign Africans did not contribute to the economy as they took money out of South Africa, did not pay taxes, did not invest in the country and underpaid their employees.

Moorhouse (2010, 74, 126) referred to the lack of assimilation of migrants into the local communities where they found themselves in general, but also specifically of most of her women interviewees. Foreign migrants therefore are marginalised and tend to seek contact with people from their home countries and even their own ethnic group for the purpose of social support structures and friendship. Kritzinger (2011, 127) suggested that this contributed to their liminality and "othering," thereby influencing xenophobic behaviour towards them. The women in Moorhouse's study who did manage to assimilate did so by being members of a Church (2010, 137–38). The women further referred to differences in culture and language between themselves and the local Africans as contributing to misunderstanding, a lack of communication and a sense of difference (Moorhouse 2010, 143–54). However, it seemed that the South African inhabitants of Gqebera (a section of Walmer township) did not assist in the process of the assimilation of the migrants where at the same time the Zimbabwean women in her study themselves did not really try to integrate with the South Africans (Moorhouse 2010, 175).

Verbal abuse (e.g., being called *amakwerekwere*)[3] has been the main expression of xenophobia in Port Elizabeth, according to most interviewees and a few others have been victims of theft (see also Moorhouse 2010, 153; Kritzinger 2011, 127, 129). None of the 63 Senegalese men to whom Barbali had spoken experienced violence directed towards them by local people, although they did experience verbal abuse (2009, 114–15). Most of the research participants in the studies of Collins (2008), Barbali (2009) and Kritzinger (2011) did not stay in townships and, in fact, regarded the townships as unsafe and violent places. Moorhouse's (2010) research participants made frequent reference to staying indoors at night due to fear of their safety. Thus, where the foreign African migrants live and work has an influence on whether they experience xenophobia or not (see also Barbali 2009, 115). Even though many foreign African migrants resided in violent areas in their home countries, many of them seemed to be surprised by the high levels of violence and crime in South Africa (Harris 2001, 9).

Violent attacks, which have been declared as xenophobic in nature, have mainly occurred towards Somali shop owners in township areas such as Walmer, Motherwell, New Brighton, KwaZakhele and KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage – with Port Elizabeth and Despatch, part of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality). In Motherwell, for example, at least 20 Somali-owned shops were plundered during 2007 and one owner

claimed to have lost about R55,000.00 (+/US$5,500.00) (Nofemele 2005; Rulashe 2007; Olivier 2007, 4).

Foreign African Migrants' Access to Housing, Education and Work

The African migrants in the Port Elizabeth study by Collins (2008) mostly resided in the suburb, Central, while only a few lived in North End. Somalis mostly resided in Motherwell. There was a general satisfaction with their living conditions, at least compared to their home country, as they had the necessary amenities available to them, such as a bathroom with a bath/shower, a toilet and a sink, as well as a kitchen with at least a stove as a basic cooking facility. As most of them resided on temporary asylum seekers permits, accommodation was sometimes difficult to find with an asylum seeker's permit, which is only valid for about two to three months. Landlords are sceptical of renting to the asylum seekers because of their impermanence in the country, as well as the stereotypical idea that all foreign nationals are involved in crime (Collins 2008, 111–13).

According to SAPS members interviewed, some flats in Central were in an inhospitable state. These flats were usually occupied by Nigerian nationals who were known to be drug dealers (Collins 2008, 113). Most Nigerian nationals claimed that they were unable to find good, legal jobs and were unclear on what their daily activities were. Nationals from Ghana were mostly hair salon owners or students. Somali nationals in Motherwell all owned, or worked in, convenience stores, but the majority of the migrants were traders in the informal sector (Collins 2008, 115–18; Barbali 2009; Kritzinger 2011). Some of the women in Moorhouse's study (2010, 118–19) complained that, in order to survive, they had to become domestic workers although they had been housewives or businesswomen and one a primary school teacher in Zimbabwe.

Experiences in South Africa varied amongst different foreign African migrants, depending mostly on their living conditions in their country of origin. Some of those who came from a fairly prosperous life back home had the worst experiences in Port Elizabeth with officials and locals, because they were used to better treatment and respect. The opposite was true for those who came from poorer backgrounds, who rather had more problems with locals as they lived in poorer areas in Port Elizabeth, than with officials, because they almost expected to be treated in a disrespectful manner (Collins 2008, 128).

The DHA official interviewed did not believe that people were stuck in South Africa as some interviewees in the study claimed. Also, in the experiences of several employers in Port Elizabeth, some foreign African migrants seemed harder-working until their work permits were approved, where after they usually "run off." Foreigners should have access to housing, education and work, otherwise there would be "chaos," but they should not be here "free of charge." The official was also of the opinion that foreign African migrants are not beneficial to South Africa, but are rather a problem and locals usually move out when the foreigners move in (Collins 2008, 134).

The Main Problems Experienced by Foreign African Migrants

The biggest problems faced by foreign African migrants included name-calling and general discrimination from mostly local Africans. Moorhouse (2010, 67) referred to Motsemme (2003) who mentioned that some South Africans alleged that they can visibly differentiate between themselves and other Africans in that Africans from outside South Africa's borders are blacker in pigmentation, have a different build, head-shape and walk differently.

Foreign Africans are not welcomed by everyone in Port Elizabeth. Nigerian nationals suffer from stereotypes such as that they are all criminals and drug dealers, whereas Somali nationals suffer from violent attacks and robberies in their stores.

Furthermore, foreign African migrants claimed that they are unable to open bank accounts and that local employers do not hire foreign nationals (see also Moorhouse 2010, 65–66). A small number of them had fewer problems with citizens, but more with officials from the SAPS and the DHA. Allegations of corruption, abuse and hostility of officials abound (Collins 2008, 128; Barbali 2009, 132–33). Sichone (2004, 9, in Barbali 2009, 138) referred to this behaviour as "institutional xenophobia."

However, some foreign African migrants viewed local Africans as lazy and uneducated. According to them local African men were always drinking and men and women also were "sleeping around" (see also Barbali 2009, 117 and; Moorhouse 2010, 143, 147–48). Collins (2008) quotes an interviewee from Senegal saying that the local South Africans play and do not work. In fact, they do not know how to work and they "steal."

Furthermore, the media does not teach in South Africa and even has sex on TV. As far as he was concerned people learn a lot more in Senegal and the local people should be taught about the world because they are too ignorant (Collins 2008, 121).

The South African Police Service (SAPS) and Law Enforcement Regarding Foreign African Migrants

SAPS officials interviewed had problems mainly with foreign nationals from Nigeria (the Yoruba and Igbo tribes to be specific) and some from Tanzania. The problems involved drug trading (their main target market is the white youth) and prostitution (with payment in the form of drugs) and possession of stolen property. SAPS had been involved in numerous drug raids and arrests in the suburb of Central (Port Elizabeth). According to the police officers in 1996 and 1997 there were only a few Nigerian nationals in Port Elizabeth. Since then the numbers had risen, together with crime in the areas. As they move into old derelict buildings they cause further urban decay (Collins 2008, 135).

The SAPS officials did not have much information on xenophobic attacks on foreign African migrants in their area of jurisdiction. The SAPS has a strong policy against stereotyping Nigerian nationals as criminals, as well as against xenophobia. There were also other foreign nationals who helped the police with information regarding illegal activities in the different suburbs. Reception into local townships has not been good for foreign African migrants, especially the Somalis. They have always been intimidated and the targets of killings, arson and plundering of their shops, while the police have acted as the middle man. The police explained that Somalis have "home shops" in Port Elizabeth, as they also have in their country, where they sell anything, but mostly necessities. This implies that they use part of their homes for their business. Should Somalis be the target of an attack, they usually own weapons to protect themselves as this was the way they were brought up in Somalia. Before February 2007, the local community complained about the Somalis moving into their neighbourhoods, especially concerning the illegal firearms they claimed Somalis owned. In February 2007, there was a public uproar after one Somali, after being robbed, accidentally wounded a 15-year-old boy in a shooting. Consequently, other Somalis were also targeted and their shops were plundered. Police helped remove Somalis from Motherwell, and attempted

to save their shops by moving the stock to a secure place. Unfortunately businesses were already destroyed or damaged quite severely. Some Somalis went to the newspapers and claimed the police partook in the raids on their shops, even though their goods were replaced when they finally returned home after numerous discussions and consultations with the police (Collins 2008, 138–39).

After the attacks and chaos in Motherwell in February 2007, the police believed the situation has become more balanced and "symbiotic." However, a deep hostility against foreigners can still be sensed amongst the local inhabitants. Every Somali shop now has a register that the police fill in upon their visits. This way they can keep track of anything suspicious, whether the shop is being targeted or not (Collins 2008, 140). As mentioned before, Somalis again were attacked during September 2013. This also happened after an alleged shooting incident took place.

Xenophobic Behaviour Towards Foreign African Migrants in South Africa

For Petrus (2001) xenophobia is a psychological condition where people of a particular cultural background distrust and experience fear of people from other cultural backgrounds. Harris (2002; in Hook and Eagle 2002, 170) quoted Tshitereke (1999) who was of the opinion that xenophobia could lead to intense tension and violence by South Africans towards immigrants. In other words, xenophobia can be regarded as an activity or a "violent practice" that can result in bodily harm and damage (Harris 2002; in Hook and Eagle 2002, 170).

South African citizens are not well informed about the lives of foreign African migrants in South Africa. Their information is mostly obtained from second-hand sources like newspaper articles or by word of mouth. Most citizens seemingly have very little, if any, contact with foreign Africans in South Africa therefore information tends to be exaggerated, leading to generalisations and stereotypes. Ironically, in the survey done by the Southern African Migration Project, it was found that only 4% of the people involved in the survey had a large amount of contact with foreigners, while 80% had very little contact (Crush 2001, 5). As a result of this misleading information, many local South Africans discriminate against foreign Africans verbally and physically, which has been classified as xenophobic in nature.

The Senegalese in Barbali's study explained xenophobic attitudes among South Africans as a consequence of the isolation of apartheid and ignorance about the world as South Africans do not travel and do not seem to have the same curiosity about the world that non-South Africans have (2009, 142; see also Collins 2008, 121). Kritzinger (2011, 48) found that ambivalence, and even open hostility, formed the social and political attitudes of South Africans towards Zimbabweans. Foreign African migrants therefore live with the threat of xenophobia on a daily basis, while at the same time they experience regular incidences of verbal attacks from South Africans, discrimination at public health facilities and when trying to renew their permits (2011, 60, 129).

Barbali (2009) was of the opinion that anti-migrant sentiments are found in all sectors of South African society. Violent outbreaks of xenophobia experienced in South Africa can therefore not simply be explained away through theories of frustration of the unemployed and impoverished classes. Individual politicians, the media and various sectors of government are also responsible for the perpetuation of hostile attitudes towards non-South African citizens (2009, 36).

South Africa and the Future

On the whole, migrants from Ethiopia, Somalia and Zimbabwe would prefer to return to their own countries when the situation there improves. Others would ideally like to have the option of moving between their own country and South Africa if they could afford it. Nigerian nationals were the most likely to want to stay in South Africa. Other foreign African migrants said they would like to stay in South Africa if not for the high levels of crime (Collins 2008, 129). In her study, Harris (2001, 8) found that many foreign African migrants see South Africa as a mere temporary part of their journey. This contradicts the xenophobic perception that foreigners "flock to South Africa to stay forever."

On an academic and governmental level, support for migrants in South Africa seems affirmative. The main issue is discrimination against illegal African migrants, also affecting legal foreign African migrants and refugees.

Barbali (2009, 30–31) stated in this regard that xenophobia can be linked to current national legislation with roots in the institutional racism of the past. The implications of present legislation are that human rights afforded to migrants by international laws are abused and non-democratic

attitudes such as xenophobia institutionalised. Therefore, the eradication of xenophobia will require a revisit of all policies and legislation.

German Domestic Partners in Port Elizabeth

According to StatsSA (2012, 21), of all the temporary residence permits issued during 2011, 2,805 (2.6%) were issued to Germans. The study by Gouws (2011) essentially focussed on the cultural adjustment of the domestic partners of German expatriates and how they experienced their situation in Port Elizabeth. Of the ten participants, eight were married and two were cohabiting. Half of the participants were under the age of 31, and all were under the age of 50. Half of the participants had children under the age of 15. Only one of the participants was not employed prior to her relocation to South Africa, as she was studying at a tertiary institution. Two of the participants were working at the time of the interviews. Both had jobs which allowed them to work wherever they lived. While the sample did not seek to restrict itself to female participants, all of the participants were women. This is unsurprising, given that the vast majority of people accompanying their domestic partners on international assignments are women (see, for example, Punnett 1997) (Gouws 2011, 75).

Cultural Adjustmen

"Cultural adjustment" is seen as any coping skills acquired or changes made by the participants in order to function effectively in South African society. This may include adjustments to their daily routines, beliefs and values (Gouws 2011, 7).

Some participants mentioned their irritations with daily living in South Africa regarding punctuality, unreliability (e.g., keeping promises) and personal space. The widespread poverty in the country, untidiness and lack of maintaining historical buildings are of concern to some of them. In some instances there were no real problems with South African "culture" but more the missing of elements of German culture – especially the freedom of movement in Germany that is restricted in South Africa due to the high crime rate (Gouws 2011, 144–45).

In general the participants mentioned the positive aspects of living in South Africa more than the difficulties that they encounter. This refers especially to the friendliness and openness of the local people – as one person mentioned: if you cannot speak English very well people try hard to

understand and help you, something that will not happen in Germany when you speak bad German. The relaxed style of living is good when one is on holiday but not when you are working (Gouws 2011, 145–46).

Others mentioned how much they enjoyed their lifestyles in South Africa. All of the participants felt that they had an elevated lifestyle in South Africa. They were living in houses which were more luxurious than their homes in Germany with some even having swimming pools, and being able to employ housekeepers (considered to be a luxury in Germany, but all participants made use of them in South Africa). Furthermore, their children could participate in sports activities at school. Adding to this is the natural beauty of the country, the good weather and being able to enjoy the beaches and nature of the Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth) (Gouws 2011, 146).

While no participant appeared to be struggling to adjust to South African culture, it is important to consider that many of the participants may have been sensitised specifically to South African culture prior to their arrival in South Africa. Seven of the participants had been to South Africa for one to two weeks on a "look-and-see" trip prior to their relocation. One participant had lived in South Africa almost 20 years prior, accompanying her husband on their first international assignment. Two participants had holidayed in South Africa and, based on their holidays, had hope for an international assignment in South Africa (Gouws 2011, 104–12).

One should equally consider that many of the participants may have been sensitised, in a more general way, to cultural differences. Three of the participants had accompanied their domestic partners to other countries on international assignments before their relocation to South Africa (Gouws 2011, 98–100).

The bigger issue for most of these women seemed to be role adjustment – that they cannot pursue their own careers in South Africa. This is due to, amongst other things, South African work permit restrictions which make it remarkably difficult – and often impossible – for the domestic partners of expatriate employees to work in the host country (Gouws 2011, 125–29). Not having a job could mean a loss of part of identity, giving up an income, self-esteem and social standing.

Conclusion

In general the foreign African migrants did not experience xenophobic behaviour other than name-calling. However, xenophobic violence directed to Somali shopkeepers in the townships did occur. It seems

that whether a person may be subjected to violent expressions of xenophobia or not is related to where the person works and stays. When foreign African migrants are staying in the same area as Africans from South Africa the chances are that violence directed towards the foreign African migrants is a possibility. This can be related to competition for resources as was highlighted in the reports by the Centre for Violence and Reconciliation and the Sociology of Work Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand published in 2011 (Die Burger Wes-Kaap 2011). It is estimated that about 30% of the people in urban areas in South Africa live in poverty. In Port Elizabeth the problems experienced by the migrants were essentially with officials from the Department of Home Affairs and the South African Police Service to a lesser extent. To obtain the necessary documentation to legalise their stay in South Africa was a nightmare for most of the foreign African migrants.

The German expatriate women demonstrated agency over their situations, conceding that assistance from human resources departments in their partners' respective companies was non-existent to woeful at best, but proactively taking responsibility for their own cultural adjustment by using one another as a system of social support, befriending host country nationals, and educating themselves about South African culture and culture shock. What some participants struggled to adjust to was not South African culture, but rather not being able to work. Their inability to work seemed to be difficult for them and was perceived as providing some necessary routine to their lives.

A glimpse in the lives of foreign African migrants and expatriate German women in Port Elizabeth can only truly be understood within a global context. One cannot isolate their lives from the impact of world affairs and expect to understand their situation.

Zygmunt Bauman (1998, 2–3) described the effects of globalisation as being divisive as well as unifying – the causes of division are identical to those which are unifying. Integral to the processes of globalisation is segregation at a spatial level, giving rise to separation and exclusion.

We argue that one of the effects of globalisation is the large numbers of (specifically poor) displaced people worldwide. Migration, leading to displaced people around the globe is just one of the consequences of globalisation, a seemingly irreversible development. Another term, "transnationalism," which is essentially used to explain the new

interaction between people across borders, was promoted by globalisation. For Vertovec (1999, 1) transnationalism involves a multiplicity of ties and interactions which link people and/or institutions beyond the borders of nation-states. Landau and Vigneswaran (2007, 2) said that transnationalism is seen as offering an improved clarification of why people migrate. As Baumann (1998, 2) remarked, globalisation for some involves localisation for others, bringing a new freedom for some but for others a "cruel fate."

Generally, one's wealth determines one's level of mobility in the world. It is clear that the richer you are, the more mobile you become, whereas the opposite is true for the impoverished. Even though one might have the initial means to move from one country to another (as in the case of migrants), it does not signify a prosperous life in the new country; except if you migrate because of being an expatriate. Many migrants become trapped in the foreign country because financially they are unable to succeed because they are not given opportunities, and thus are unable to return home except for expatriates. As Bauman (1998, 2) said, the local in a globalised world signals "social deprivation and degradation." Furthermore, there is a breakdown in communication between the global elite transcending borders and the "localised" rest (1998, 3). Bauman (1998, 13) continued that the elites of a specific country have always been inclined to create a culture of their own, which has today resulted in a world where the elites have more in common with the elites across the borders than with the rest of the population in their own country. His comment was supported indirectly by Bill Clinton (former President of the United States of America and one of the most influential elites) who said that the difference between domestic and foreign politics has disappeared. Elites also chose to isolate themselves and are willing to pay for it in a lavish way. However, for the rest of the population being cut off means they must pay the "cultural, psychological and political price" of this isolation (Bauman 1998, 21).

Port Elizabeth, we believe, has not experienced the same impact of foreign African migrants residing within it, as did the bigger cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, etc. More specifically, Port Elizabeth has not experienced the large numbers of asylum seekers outside the doors of the refugee reception office, which has apparently become a problem in the bigger cities of South Africa. However, bribery and corruption are evident within the DHA, as mentioned by the foreign African migrants and officials of the DHA.

Notes

1. The term "foreign" is used to refer to the African migrants from the rest of Africa so as to differentiate them from African migrants from within the boundaries of South Africa.
2. The asylum centre in Port Elizabeth was closed down on 30 November 2011 (Hendriks 2011, 7). This has made it even more difficult for asylum seekers to obtain the necessary documentation as they have to either go to Cape Town (800 kilometres away) or Johannesburg (1,000 kilometres away) to obtain the necessary documentation.
3. Literally meaning "chirping like birds" referring to the sound when some of the foreign African migrants speak in their respective home languages.

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CHAPTER 11

Italian Americans and Others in New York City: Interethnic Relations from the Field

Jerome Krase

Introduction

This essay looks at Italian Americans and their relations with other ethnic groups in New York City over the last seven decades. Such interactions, especially with African and Chinese Americans, have largely been defined by the most notorious of incidents covered in the mass media, such as the 1989 murder of Yusuf Hawkins in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn, as well as periodic frictions in Manhattan's iconic Mulberry Street Little Italy. It is the intention of this chapter to both offer a context for and an objective analysis of these tragic events and local tensions. It hopes as well to correct some of the resulting stereotypical mass media distortion by providing insights, some based on personal experience, into these troubling encounters. In the process, it is hoped that the characterological distortion of Italian Americans as categorical bigots will be addressed by providing a cultural analysis, and historical facts that document the positive activities of Italian American organizations with African Americans, and Chinese Americans over the period in question.

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J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2_11

Seeing Italian Americans

Hyphenated American ethnic groups are defined in many ways. Italian Americans are seen as one of the most highly assimilated white ethnic groups (Alba 1985), yet recent U.S. Census data on "Ancestry" shows that approximately 17,800,000 Italian Americans were self-identified (ACS 2009). This demographic fact raises the question of how one can make sweeping generalizations about such a large group. This is the first lesson in social stereotypes, their inadequacy and their ultimate inaccuracy. Some common traits, or character, of Italian Americans in the narratives drawn from the mass media are a propensity toward violence and antipathy toward other ethnic and racial groups. For Fischer, such "characterological coherence" that has to do with the believability of the characters in the story (1987, 146, 315–16). This ubiquitously negative image of the group is not derived from a vacuum but is dependent on prior knowledge most of which is drawn from the popular media. The first element of these stories is their internal consistency, which Fischer calls "argumentation" or "structural coherence" and involves how well the parts of the story stay together. The second, what Fischer calls "material coherence," is the difference between a particular story and other comparable stories.

Italians in America are prime examples of what Novak called America's "Unmeltable Ethnics" (1972). For over a century they have suffered from negative stereotyping and even when they were victims of a mass lynching in New Orleans in 1889, the press described the "dagoes" as "dangerous," "lazy," "filthy," "cruel," "ferocious," and bloodthirsty" (Gallo 1981, 120–21). A century after New Orleans, La Gumina documented this symbolic history in text and illustrations in newspapers and other periodical literature (1973). The image persists today despite the presentations and protestations of more or less objective scholars and ethnic group spokespersons (Lichter and Lichter, 1982). Unfortunately, although major Italian American organizations are active in combating the negative organized crime stereotype, most have neglected other equally damaging images such as antipathy toward diversity and multiculturalism. The danger of the social "reactionary" and racial "bigot" stereotypes is that Italian Americans can be scapegoats for the failures of minority groups thereby making neighborhood inter-group cooperation even more difficult.

Italian Americans and Blacks

In 1968 *The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* warned "Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal" (1968, 1). Despite its progressive reputation, New York City was no exception to this rule. For some, the 1970s were the low point in the city's history characterized by crime waves, drug epidemics, welfare explosion, police corruption, housing abandonment, arson, deindustrialization, massive white flight and near municipal bankruptcy. One iconic event was the 1977 summer power blackout during which Black and Latino neighborhoods were burned and looted, resulting in more than 3,000 arrests. The election of Edward I. Koch as Mayor that year was a watershed for Democratic Party municipal politics as groups were pitted against each other in elections as well as the distribution of the city's diminishing largesse. As a consequence, between 1960 and 1980 nearly 700,000 people, the vast majority White, left the city.

In the 1980s, the front pages of the city's newspapers featured many alleged incidents of racially motivated violence. The Black press was especially active in this regard as "On September 15, 1983, artist and model Michael Stewart died on a lower Manhattan subway platform from a chokehold and beating he received from several police officers. A year later, on October 29, an elderly grandmother, Eleanor Bumpers, was murdered by a police officer in her Bronx apartment as he and other officers tried to evict her. Later that year, on December 22, a white man, Bernhard Goetz, shot and seriously wounded four black teenagers he thought were going to rob him on a subway train in Manhattan" (BlackPast.org 2013). Inter-ethnic tension was further heightened in the spring of 1989 when a 28-year-old white woman was raped and savagely beaten while jogging in Central Park, allegedly by a group of black and Latino youths. According to Pitt they "...were part of a loosely organized gang of 32 schoolboys whose random, motiveless assaults terrorized at least eight other people over nearly two hours, senior police investigators said yesterday. Chief of Detectives Robert Colangelo, who said the attacks appeared unrelated to money, race, drugs or alcohol, said that some of the 20 youths brought in for questioning had told investigators that the crime spree was the product of a pastime called *wilding*" (1989).

Unfortunately, during that bloody decade, two New York City neighborhoods where many Italian Americans reside were also the scenes for violent

incidents that helped to perpetuate brutish stereotypes of Italian Americans. Vincent S. Romano, who headed the Order Sons of Italy Commission on Social Justice described the most horrific bias crimes. The first was on December 19, 1986 when an African American man was killed in a white ethnic, mostly Italian and Jewish American, neighborhood of Howard Beach, Queens. He was with two others from the predominately African American neighborhood of East New York, Brooklyn. The car they were driving broke down and when they looked for a telephone they were assaulted by a gang of white youths, which included Italian Americans. Cedric Sanford was beaten viciously and Michael Griffiths was hit by a car and died as he tried to escape. A few days later the Rev. Al Sharpton led a protest march through the neighborhood.

> The incident and the march received extensive media coverage, and racial tensions in the community and in the city, overall grew. Although many Howard Beach residents held prayer services for the victims under the auspices of local churches and civic groups, these activities were mostly unreported by the media . . .

The second tragedy occurred on August 23, 1989, in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn. There Yusuf Hawkins, a 16-year-old African American, who came to buy a used automobile, became the victim of a racially motivated murder by a gang of seven young white men. Most coverage in the mass media suggested that Hawkins was the victim of the Italian American community anti-African American stereotyping. In contrast to the media coverage, most local residents were shocked at the murder and did not see, as the press did, that the gang was "protecting" the neighborhood. As was true of media coverage of the horrific Howard Beach incident, these local realities were not pursued.

> Instead, the predominant images on TV were of young Italian American youths carrying watermelons and shouting at marchers (led by Al Sharpton) who had come to Bensonhurst to protest the murder. Efforts by religious and community leaders to hold vigil and prayer meetings to decry the killing and to bring calm to the area went unreported . . . (Romano 2000)

The murder of Yusuf Hawkins was visually framed by Kifner's front page *New York Times* article "Bensonhurst: A Tough Code in Defense of a Closed World" (1989) thusly:

> This is a closed, insular world, this enclave in Brooklyn where Italian is as likely to be spoken as English, a world of tightknit families and fear and hostility toward the outside. It is a world, too, where the young men who gravitate each night to a specific street corner or candy store to hang out with their friends grow up with a macho code…

The Hawkins murder drew added attention because it followed the "wilding" in Central Park that quickly became an issue in the hotly contested New York City mayoralty campaign that carried thinly veiled racial, ethnic and religious overtones. The 1989 Democratic Party Mayoral primary was another divisive contest. After the Hawkins murder, African American David Dinkins defeated Jewish three-term incumbent Edward I. Koch. In the general election for Mayor, Republican Party "Law and Order" Italian American, Rudolf Giuliani, lost to Dinkins who was portrayed as a "conciliator" (Reft 2008).

There were several excellent analyses of the damagingly superficial media coverage of this allegedly "racially motivated" homicide that came to symbolize Italian American neighborhoods. Strugatch did the best concurrent work as journalists flocked to Brooklyn to write about a local incident that had quickly garnered national, and international notoriety (1989. See also: Stone 1989, Krase 1994a.) Strugatch framed the murder less racially than other reporters as to motive: "A black youth was killed while walking down a Bensonhurst street by a young white man who mistook him for the new boyfriend of the girl he had formerly dated" (27). Strugatch didn't report that the murderer's ex-girlfriend was Puerto Rican and that the ethnic and racial context of the incident was even murkier than that in Howard Beach. For example, one of the six defendants in the murder case had a German surname, and the gang's ringleader, Keith Mondello, was half-Jewish (Stone 1989; Tricarico 2001). Also, one of the Bensonhurst gang members, Russell Gibbons, who carried baseball bats to the attack, was Black. As cited by Tricarico, a reporter, Mitch Gelman, had asked: "The most obvious question: What was a black man doing with a group of white guys who intended to beat up a group of black guys for coming into their neighborhood?." "They're my friends." He answered. "We do everything together. If I was in trouble Keith Mondello would come to my side. I was there for him" (Gelman 1992; in Tricarico 2001, 308).

As summarized by Strugatch, for the media, Bensonhurst lay in the "southern underbelly" of the city and was "inhabited almost entirely"

by unemployed 18- to 22-year-old men dressed in "tank tops and T-shirts who were proud of their whiteness and don't like blacks. Although their parents, and other middle-aged people were not to be seen, easily found are "... elderly ladies who sell sausages at church-sponsored street fairs and retired gentlemen who linger outside the local members-only social clubs before entering to sip cappuccino in the semi-darkness." He then asked: "Where were the verifiable community leaders, the usual suspects invariably rounded up for community snapshots on the real estate beat? Where were the school principals, the chair of the school board, the chamber of commerce president, the zoning board chair, the local historian – even the president of the Kiwanis Club? Where were the people who could speak in complete sentences? Evidently, articulate community leaders were not on street corners, and so they were not interviewed" (27).

Strugatch noted that although one cannot cover a racially motivated homicide without making "a connection between a neighborhood's character and individual acts" (28), this "reportorial instinct" should not be followed simplistically. According to his analysis, "the coverage of Bensonhurst, like Howard Beach before it, mimicked the methodology and approach of mainstream sociology with none of its scientific rigor. And most of the journalists purveying this pop sociology presumably failed to recognize the masquerade" (26). As to why such a biased view emerged and was so widely broadcast, he opined that "Bensonhurst is not the kind of place most reporters would pick to live. Few seemed to understand the rhythms of the neighborhood. To them, one street corner source seemed as good as the next, especially when one's suppositions were confirmed so readily" (28).

The troubled history of Afro-American and Italian American relations in the 1970s and 1980s spawned several highly successful films. Spike Lee's *Do the Right Thing* (1989) is probably the best known. In gentrifying Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn tensions grow between black residents and those they see as exploitive "outsiders" such as a Korean green grocer. The focus of the anger becomes the Italian American family who had for decades run a local pizzeria. Tension builds between black customers and the Italian American males before finally exploding in a riot during which the pizzeria is destroyed by fire. Lee also explored interracial romance in his 1991 movie *Jungle Fever*, in which a married black architect from Harlem has an Italian American secretary from Bensonhurst.

Italian American Leaders and Organizations

Italian American leaders and organizations confronted the growing divisions in the city following the turbulent 1960s in many ways. Following the ethnic bridge-building tradition set by Vito Marcantonio, Fiorello LaGuardia and Gino Baroni. In the early 1970s, Secretary of New York State Mario Cuomo mediated a controversy over the building of low-income housing in the predominantly Jewish neighborhood of Forest Hills, Queens. Protests against the project were occasionally violent as locals expressed fears of it becoming a black ghetto (Cuomo 1974). In the Spring of 1976, the American Italian Coalition of Organizations (AMICO) helped organize an all-day seminar on "Policies and Strategies for Multi-Ethnic Cities: Focus on New York City" sponsored by the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America. Among the 25 specially invited participants were the ethnic and civil rights leaders Frank Aricale, Herman Badillo, Irving Levine, Bayard Rustin, Betty Lee Sung and Percy Sutton. Representatives of city agencies such as the Human Rights Commission, headed at that time by Eleanor Holmes Norton, also attended.

Despite his "Law and Order" reputation, during his two terms tenure as Mayor, Giuliani supported the efforts of Italian American groups, such as Community Understanding for Racial and Ethnic Equality (CURE) and its parent organization the Coalition of Italian American Organizations (CIAO). Speaking about the group's efforts to "build bridges between racial and ethnic groups" at a ribbon cutting for CURE's new building he said: "You understand all of the things that make the Italian-American community unique, and make us all so proud of our culture, but you also realize that New York City is strong because of how people from different cultures and backgrounds come together and learn about each other" (Archives of the Mayor's Press Office 1998).

CIAO's founder Mary Crisalli Sansone provided her own counter narrative to the broad stroke of Italian American bigotry:

> This is how I have structured all of the community and race relations work that I have been involved with over the years, whether it be forming the first-ever coalition of African Americans, Hispanics and Italians with Monsignor Gino Baroni and Bayard Rustin, marching with Martin Luther King during the civil rights movement, or keeping peace in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn after the Yusef Hawkins slaying in the 1980s….

> I have been personally involved in mediating and intervening in community issues or conflicts that people thought were based on religious, racial or ethnic discrimination which turned out to be nothing of the kind. As with most conflicts or disagreements, they were based on simple misunderstandings or a lack of facts. (CURE 2006, 2)

As to other reactions to the murder in Bensonhurst, Gardaphe noted "...a number of Italian American intellectuals, such as Robert Viscusi, Jerome Krase and Marianna DeMarco Torgovnick, wrote essays and editorials that attempted to demonstrate that not all Italian Americans were racists. These essays, accompanied by the actions of New York's radical activists, Italian Americans for a Multicultural United States (IAMUS), marked the beginning of a culturally critical interaction that led to the creation of larger public forums such as the 1997 American Italian Historical Association's national conference "Shades of Black and White: Conflict and Collaboration between Two Communities."...You could not appreciate these shining moments of clarity in Italian American consciousness unless you were aware of some of the shadows cast upon Italian America by racist acts" (2010, 3 see also: Krase and DeSena 1994). At the time, there was no distinction in the media between the civil rights of Italian Americans and the Italian American Civil Rights League created by murdered mobster Joseph Colombo.

Behind the Scenes of the Bensonhurst Incident

At the time of the Hawkins murder I was Director of the Center for Italian American Studies at Brooklyn College and served on the Board of Directors of the American Italian Coalition of Organizations that I helped co-found in 1977. I received a call from Frank Lombardi at the *New York Daily News*. He was a relative of a Brooklyn College student who had taken my Italian American Studies class. He told me that a "black kid" by the name of Yusuf Hawkins had been murdered by a mixed, but predominately Italian American, mob of miscreants. Lombardi asked how this could happen. My initial response was that Yusuf unknowingly had crossed Bensonhurst's invisible border. Having worked with many groups there, I described the community as "insular," so I, and the easy-to-quote label, carried the story to John Kifner at *The New York Times*, then to PBS' McNeil-Lehrer Report, and beyond. Yusuf was killed by Italian American insularity. As a major source for the initial stories on the murder I referred

reporters to local and citywide Italian American Organizations and leaders. However, they were hardly ever mentioned. Bensonhurst's New York State Assemblyman Frank Barbaro (1990) and New York City Councilman Sal Albanese (1990) did manage to have Op-Eds published in *New York Newsday*, but only later as commentary on the trial of the perpetrators.

Youth and Ethnic Culture

As to a cultural understanding of the terrible incident, as was true of most gang violence, the killing was more a matter of turf and male youth culture than ethnic-based racial animosity. Tricarico saw it as part of the stylized Italian American "Guido" street culture similar to that practiced by young urban Blacks and for which he cited Elijah Anderson ethnographic work *The Corner* on black youths. (1990) "While aggressive masculinity is still in the picture, Guido stylizes lower class urban tendencies. Stylization has always acted on lower class American street culture. Anderson maintains that "the basic requirement" of the "code of the street" is "the display of a certain predisposition to violence," relying on "facial expressions, gait, and direct talk" as well as "clothes, grooming and jewelry" (2010, 173).

Beyond the individual and small group analysis of the murder in Bensonhurst, the Italian American culture of community also helps to explain the neighborhood's residents response to Hawkin's accidental intrusion, as well as that of the media and subsequent protest marches. Central to the idea of Italians in America is the notion of the neighborhood, or ethnic enclave, that is most frequently expressed as their residence in one or another "Little Italy." These local communities provide the context for understanding relations with neighbors and strangers. As once *The Ghetto* stood for Jews (Wirth 1928), *The Dark Ghetto* (Clark 1965) still stands for many African Americans, *Barrios* for Latinos, and Chinatowns for Asians, symbolically Little Italy stands for Italians in America (Krase 2003). Italian American culture has an especially strong territorial orientation. For example, Alba, who has cast Italian Americans into the "Twilight" of their ethnicity, noted that "the concentration of Italian American loyalists in neighborhoods with a definite ethnic character keeps alive the notion of an Italian-American ethnicity, even in the midst of wide-spread assimilation" (1985, 162). As to the source of this staying power can be found in a definitive study by the Giovanni Agnelli

Foundation that showed that central Italian values revolve around territory (1980, 36–37).

In the 1970s and 1980s I often consulted with the New York City Human Rights Commission's Office of Neighborhood Stabilization. They sent me to speak to local organizations and address the fears of residents at public meetings in racially changing neighborhoods. The reputation of Italian Americans and Italian American neighborhood groups as vocal opponents of some liberal policies such as local school desegregation and housing integration is not undeserved. For example, family members regularly walked Italian American grade school children home, often for lunch. Much of their opposition to desegregation was to the busing of their children out of the local area and the loss of control over, and observation, of their young children. As a result, parents increasingly sent their children to local private and parochial schools that in many cases were better integrated than the increasingly segregated local public schools.

It is not difficult to understand their negative attitudes toward poor minority groups. Italian enclaves were located in or near almost every instance of rioting and looting in the city, such as in Harlem in 1964, Brownsville in 1967 and Bushwick in 1977. Italians remained near the South Bronx as large portions of it were reduced to rubble by arson in the 1970s and 1980s. Italian neighborhoods persisted near low-income public housing projects that were built in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, as well as near major urban renewal and transportation development projects such as the building of the Verrazzano Narrows Bridge (Talese 1964). Today, only small pockets of stubborn resistance remain in these once large vibrant Italian neighborhoods. They lingered during the greatest periods of "White Flight" and spreading "Urban Blight" in New York City. By the turn of the Twenty-first century they became the largest European ethnic group in the city (Alba et al. 1997).

Despite the perception that the Italian American community had few social problems and economic needs, Miranda and Rossi (1976) found that many Italian Americans were being left behind. Therefore, in 1978 the AMICO was established by civic leaders to represent the interests of two million Italian Americans. AMICO was awarded government contracts to operate senior citizen, day care, housing and other programs in, often racially changing, neighborhoods. AMICO had to compete with other groups for diminishing public and private

funds as government funding was divided along Black, White, Latino, Jewish and Christian lines.

Resisting Change: The Asian Invasion

Starting in the 1950s, and increasingly in the 1960s, Italians sensed that their neighborhoods were under attack. Gentrification threatened the Italian part of Greenwich Village, blue-collar jobs disappeared in SoHo, the art scene grew and rents rose (Tricarico 1984). East Harlem's Italians were still reeling from 1950s racial "blockbusting" while elsewhere low-income housing projects and other public developments brought in more strangers. In Greenpoint, Brooklyn absentee landlords forced out old-time white ethnics, and DeSena (1990) documented the defensive practices of locals to prevent the influx of blacks and Latinos (see also Rieder 1985).

Miranda saw the protective shields Italian Americans drew around their enclaves positively:

> The tenacity in clinging to the old neighborhoods, partly sentimental, but also derivative from the extended family pattern, can act as a glue to hold the cities from becoming racial ghettos. The Italians have shown a readiness to live in neighborhoods adjacent to those of blacks and Puerto Ricans and fight it out for the turf. This is more promising than the discreet avoidance practiced by the groups who deplore the rumbling and name calling of black–Italian confrontation. The resistance to change is an index of inner strength (1974, 447).

In the late 1980s, Freeman sympathized with working-class Italians who suffered from landlord "milking," mortgage delinquency and abandonment (1987, 234). The most vibrant Little Italies at that time in The Bronx and Brooklyn were threatened by racial transition, school integration, high crime rates, housing deterioration, lower property value and blockbusting. Italian Americans felt they were being singled out for attack by various coalitions of nonwhites, and "liberals." More accurately, Italians had stayed a decade or two beyond their welcome in a city in flux. Because of their central city locations, and lower rents, traditional Italian areas became magnets for newer immigrants. In Belmont, Latinos and Albanians transformed the neighborhood. Russians and Chinese invaded Bensonhurst where Italian Americans also defended their

shrinking turf against a large influx of undocumented, especially Latino, workers and residents (Krase 1994b).

Napoli (2004) set the tone for his essay on the "Asian Invasion" of Little Italy as Chinatown moved northward by quoting the writer Pietro Di Donato: "I remember what the pigeon fancier on the Mulberry Street roof said, "Sure I like it here. Why should I leave, I'm with my own people? Is there any place better?" (1970, 149). Slowly but surely however Lower Manhattan's ethnically exclusive Little Italy has disappeared, replaced by a major tourist destination: an Ethnic Theme Park (Krase 2003). The transition from Italian enclave to Italian American tourist attraction, however, was neither a smooth nor an easy process. Italians and Italian American organizations tried not only to remain in the community but also to maintain its Italian identity. Their resistance lasted for over 30 years.

Conflict to Cooperation in Little Italy

In the 1980s, AMICO, the Little Italy Restoration Association together with Chinese organizations joined to prevent the wholesale demolition of property in the area for the building of the Cross-Manhattan Expressway. They also dealt with the episodic intergroup violence that scarred the period. The Museum for Chinese in America and local Italian Americans documented the experiences of Chinese and Italian students at a local public school. One result of cooperative efforts like these was the creation of The Two Bridges Neighborhood Council that still symbolizes the communities between the Brooklyn and Manhattan Bridges. The Council was created in the 1950s when it was mostly a tense and occasionally violent working class area. The group brought together local civic and religious organizations to work on common problems. From their website:

> The Chinese and Italian communities have co-existed and overlapped – and occasionally conflicted, for nearly a century and a half within the historic boundaries of the neighborhood. . . . Today, the Italian and Chinese communities persist within historic Chinatown & Little Italy, preserving many of the food, language and cultural traditions brought to the neighborhood by immigrant ancestors (http://www.twobridges.org/ Accessed July 13, 2016).

There are other narratives about the "Asian invasion" during the last two decades when real estate agents circulated flyers warning that it was "time

to sell." These tactics were also used in other areas, but with reference to the threat of African Americans. The Director of the highly rated AMICO Senior Citizen Center in Bensonhurst noted that it went from almost totally Italian American in 1980 to half Chinese in 2010. AMICO's Day Care Center today has very few Italian American children but the group continues to receive excellent reviews for the delivery of services to its clients.

> From the start of the center in 1973, the center's membership was predominately Italian American (IA). Ninety five percent (IA) and five percent other white European groups, mostly non-Orthodox Jews, Norwegians and Irish (many of the Norwegians had Italian surnames because of marriage and came from Bay Ridge). There was a very small of number of others, Hispanic and one or two African Americans who were not typical. This trend remained the same for the 1980s and most of the 1990s. In the late 1990s we started to see an influx of Asians, mostly from China, and the Cantonese region. Some were from the villages surrounding the region and used a somewhat different dialect.
>
> The influx of Asians rose steadily in the 2000s; first 10% of the membership, then 20%, then 30%, finally to where it stands today at 47%. Of course, while the Asian population was increasing, the white European was decreasing. We also started to see a small increase in the Hispanic population, mostly from the Sunset Park community [more recent immigrant groups from Columbia and Ecuador (not Puerto Rican)]. That's about where we stand today. (Joan Pastore e-mail correspondence 6 June 2012)

When I later interviewed Dr. Pastore, she made an analogy for the change at the center to how later generations increasingly marrying outside the group. She also noted that Italians who entered the USA in the 1960s were more open to diversity then other Italian American clients at that time. Although in the beginning there were some negative incidents, they decreased as years went on. Quiet tolerance developed but despite a great deal of interaction, the ethnic groups still remain separate. There are occasional problems but "peaceful coexistence" is the rule that is, in her opinion, more due to language barriers. Twelve years ago, she was told by New York City authorities to expect more new immigrant elderly poor and "As the neighborhood changed, we changed."

Conclusion

In this essay, I have tried to counter and explain the simplistically negative perception of Italian Americans in their relations with nonwhites in New York City over the last seven decades that have been defined by the most notorious violent incidents covered in the mass media. I conclude here with a sample newspaper articles on oxymoronic "multiethnic" Little Italies. The reader is asked to consider, given the stereotype of Italian Americans as racist and bigoted characters, as Fisher might ask, "How believable are the characters in the story?" (Fischer 1987, 315–16).

Despite the demographic realities of their "actual" disappearance, three of New York's oldest Little Italies "virtually" retain the title: Mulberry Street, in Manhattan; Bensonhurst, Brooklyn and Belmont in the Bronx. Both Mulberry Street and Belmont also remain as major and minor tourist attractions (e.g. ethnic theme parks) respectively. Although a small minority of Italians lives there, no one claims that Mulberry Street is a "real" Italian neighborhood, but some in Belmont struggle to maintain a semblance of ethnic authenticity.

One might think of the descriptions that follow as additional text about the contested meanings of the character of Italian Americans and competition for local dominance. In "A Romantic Ideal of Italy, Over a Samba Beat," Gonzalez (2004) reported that Francesco Castiglione hoped to "save" the Italian character of Belmont by adapting to the changing ethnic composition of the neighborhood and by singing musical blends on the local sidewalk café music scene. Castiglione explained "Just as Astoria isn't just Greek anymore, Arthur Avenue probably has more Albanians, Mexicans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans than Italians. But romantic notions – of food, the old days and older ways – still sell." Another local, Nick Santilli, said: "The Italian soul is here, but it is disappearing"; and café owner, David Greco, wanted his place to stay as an Italian bar: "What I do not want is to sell this so it becomes another Albanian club." Gonzalez closes this article with: "At Francesco's season premiere two weekends ago, the patrons at an Albanian restaurant across the street barely looked up as he set up his keyboard, accordion and amplifier. Mexican laborers walked home, tired and grimy, clutching bags from McDonald's." Similarly, Gold's (2004) story "Love, Discord and Cannoli" concludes Belmont's "Arthur Avenue has long ceased to be solely the province of Italians, as it was for about three-quarters of a century, but places like Egidio's have endured as treasured repositories

of the neighborhood's authenticity." "Well, the Ices are still Italian" is the way that Berger (2002a) framed his article about how Bensonhurst, Brooklyn – New York City's largest Italian neighborhood – was losing its Italians: "The 2000 Census shows the number of residents of Italian descent is down to 59,112, little more than half that of two decades ago, and departed Italians have been replaced by Chinese and Russian families." Despite the shrinking population, Bensonhurst's major commercial street, 18th Avenue, still carries the title Cristoforo Colombo Boulevard, which provides a sharp contrast to the ethnic changes. Earlier, Berger (2002b) had registered the end of Italian dominance in Harlem thusly:

For 52 years, Claudio Caponigro has watched through the window of his barbershop as Italian Harlem has changed around him. But, with a few exceptions, he and his shop have hardly changed at all... But largely as a result of a vigorous ethnic mobility, typical of many New York City neighborhoods, it is down to a relative handful of Italians and a handful of Italian stores – the 110-year-old Morrone Bakery; Patsy's and Rao's restaurants; two funeral homes; and Our Lady of Mount Carmel Roman Catholic Church, where a few elderly neighborhood residents go to say their novenas. Ask one of them, Gena Bolino, how many Italians are left and she will respond: "You can count them."

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Index

J. Krase, Z. Uherek (eds.), *Diversity and Local Contexts*, Palgrave Studies in Urban Anthropology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53952-2