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Dana Riesenfeld
Giovanni Scarafile *Editors*

Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication

Explorations of Marcelo Dascal's Contributions to Philosophy

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Dana Riesenfeld • Giovanni Scarafile
Editors

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IN LOVING MEMORY OF SHLOMIT BOTTON-DASCAL (1968–2013) R.I.P.

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Introductory Essay: «Sob o mesmo céu». Listening and Dialogue as Ethics of Communication

Giovanni Scarafile

How is the vision of the face no longer vision, but hearing and speech?

—E. Lévinas, *Is Ontology Fundamental?*

Abstract In the introductory essay I study the conditions by which it is possible to carry on an effective philosophical dialogue, finding in listening the characteristics without which dialogue is likely to become a monologue of the deaf.

First of all, I consider the difference between listening and hearing. With this distinction one needs to consider the early aspects of the activity of consciousness where one can individuate the presence of a primordial immediacy that, although not yet clarified in its essential constitution, exerts pressure against the I.

The most recent studies in both cognitive sciences and phenomenology have confirmed the importance of such an enigmatic presence, above all when one considers the processes of attention. On the first side, the cognitive sciences, it's important to consider notions such as vigilance, voluntary attention, and orientation; on the second side, Husserlian phenomenology, there is the crucial difference between primary noticing, secondary noticing, and thematic intending.

Keywords Models of attention • Primary and secondary noticing • Thematic intending • Fallacy of obliteration • Tutelage of the other • Fear and rhetoric of the other • The eventness of the encounter

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Philosophical Dialogue is the title of the international workshop organized in November 2010 at Tel Aviv University to celebrate Marcelo Dascal's 40th year of academic activities. On that occasion, in a calm and friendly style, scholars from all over the world were united by the desire to discuss together the many aspects of Marcelo Dascal's philosophic-scientific thought.[1]

Actually this first fact represents, in its simplicity, an important factor in understanding the contribution of the Israeli-Brazilian philosopher to the advancement of science. In fact, in a day and age wherein professional academic life drives scholars to narrower areas of specialization, Marcelo Dascal manages to be a scholar in the classic sense: with vast knowledge, many areas of expertise and infinite curiosity; and all these aspects converge in highlighting the virtue of listening.

The reasons to be thankful to Marcelo Dascal are not only profoundly personal but also intertwined with the professional careers of each of us. Despite this multiplicity, we believe there is a unique matrix able to embrace in a single gaze such benevolence: Marcelo Dascal is the one who taught us to listen.

Listening is not a vague virtue amenable to a sort of philanthropy, nor is it the distinctive sign of a privileged club. It rather represents a multilayered notion. Its physiognomy reminds us of a rhizome, a metaphor that has already been used in philosophy by Deleuze and Guattari and before them by Jung, to allude to the connection between areas apparently far apart, yet related meaningfully.

In this introductory essay, I would like to clarify, at least partially, although in the awareness of the difficulty of the task, the meaning of the listening I'm referring to. In this way, I could make more explicit the substantial reasons to be grateful to our Master.

The clarification of the notion of listening, first of all, will include the exploitation of the differences between listening and hearing. This first necessary step requires investigating, above all by reference to attention, the first reports of the activity of consciousness. Afterward, it will be clear that listening is connected with a particular way of acceptance and protection of an alterity never obliterable, and also that listening is directly implied with the notion of event. All these aspects converge to highlight the need for a renewed idea of reason. A resemanticized reason, therefore, perceives further – through listening – its representative horizon.

1 Hearing and Listening

There are different kinds of listening. A first level, indicated by the term *hearing,* indicates the perceptual threshold by which we perceive sounds. First of all, it is a characteristic attributable to the auditory system, via the pathways of sound perception.

The difference between hearing and listening has an equivalent in the difference between seeing and looking. However, as Gadamer reports, while we can look away

[1]I would like to thank the Head of the International Board of Consulting Editors, Dr. Noa Z. Naaman, for her important contribution to the publication of this volume.

from something, we cannot hear away. Hearing therefore is not subject to our will. On the other hand, the impossibility of escaping the flow of data sensations makes evident our implication with the world. As such, hearing can be an antidote vis-à-vis the theoretical approaches which privilege the formal and eidetic dimension, rescinding the bond with the facticity, the concreteness of lived experiences. For this reason too, hearing constitutes an indispensable level since its activation is necessary for the development of another faculty, listening, as confirmed by Gadamer himself (2004: 458): "Hearing is an avenue to the whole."

Listening indicates a disposition to pay attention to something presented in the flow of hearing, although not yet clarified. Already in Aristotle's *Ethics*, the term "disposition" refers to a consolidated capacity, a virtue obtained with efforts and sacrifices. In the case of listening, the requested training is aimed at not ignoring the particular element which is present in the consciousness. Listening therefore is a disposability toward a request of attention in the dark, independently from the occurred clarification of the identity of the claimant.[2]

We have to acknowledge the presence of an "other," testified by the hearing, and asking for our not indifferent attention. We are in the same condition described by Lévinas (1985: 89): "And me, whoever I may be, but as a 'first person,' I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call." Lipari specifies such an indication in the following way: "Listening ... is essential to the ethical encounter – it is an invocation that can give birth to speech."[3]

In fact, it is *before* identifying and bringing back to our measure such an enigmatic presence, understood as "primordial immediacy that is prior to consciousness" (Lewin 2005: 377), that this not yet identified enigma presents itself as relevant for the I. The relevance of the enigma is reducible to its specific collocation in the flow of consciousness. It is present to the consciousness, but not yet identified by it. It, as it were, lives in an intermediate zone and from this position exerts an influence on the subject. The influence I am referring to corresponds to an involvement of the I, not episodic but substantial.

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[2]This indication seems to be confirmed by Lewin (2005: 375): "We first perceive intention, and only later discern whether the agent is human."

[3]The prominence of the pathways of sound perception as a condition of the possibility of listening should not lead us to believe that the other is only perceptible as a sound. The enigmatic dimension I am referring to can recall the meaning of Lévinas' words, "face of the Other." In this regard, Lipari (2012: 230) observes, "The face is neither figurative nor literal but is the expression of the demand of the other. Thus the face, like the face-to-face, is always dual. It is a relational and not an absolute term." Lipari again observes that "the revelation of the face is speech .... And yet quietly embedded in this assertion of responsibility – the ability to respond – lies the prior action of listening. It is hidden behind a face, despite the centrality of speech and speaking." With reference to the different ways in which the French phenomenology has understood the otherness, Dastur (2011: 165) has written: "For Levinas ... this experience of the face of the other is the experience of a speaking and not in the first place corporeal presence. There are consequently three different ways of finding an access to the other: the *look* for Sartre, *intercorporeality* for Merleau-Ponty and the *face* for Levinas." In conclusion, we can say that the enigmatic presence of the other is not reducible to any specific sensory dimension. This conclusion – I think – is magnificently summarized by Lipari's words: "aural eye that listens."

In this situation, two attitudes become impossible, although for opposite reasons: on the one hand, ignoring the enigma by the I – in fact, given the existing involvement, ignoring the enigma would amount to a repeal of the same I – and on the other hand, trying to clarify the enigma. The eventual clarification of the enigma corresponds to making it thematic and eliminating the intermediate position occupied by it. In this respect, the eventual success, that is, the fulfillment of the thematization of the other, would be the greatest defeat. Exposed to the full light of consciousness, the enigma would dissolve like snow in the sun, so losing its non-soluble density by which it could influence the I.

For all these reasons, it is essential to examine the main approaches to the study of the attention.

In more explicit terms, is it possible that an identification of the enigma without such an identification becomes a homogenization?

An important reference in studies about attention is the famous quotation by William James:

> Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. (James 1890: 403–404)

This quotation has represented a milestone, although nowadays most of the studies move away from it.

If one considers Watzl's warning (2011: 848), according to which "cognitive science shows that there are various attentional processes that only share certain similarities, but lack any fundamental unity," then it is easy to realize how and why most recent studies have made a distinction between different kinds of attention:

1. Focal vs. global attention, where the former is directed toward a particular object or event, while the latter is distributed over a broader framework (Treisman 2006)
2. On-off attention vs. degrees of attention, where the difference consists in the idea that attention may or may not be activated in accordance with a gradualness (Depraz 2004: 14)
3. Voluntary vs. involuntary attention, where the former is controlled by the subject's intentions, while the latter is unintentional, activated by the relevance of some sensory stimulus
4. Exogenous vs. endogenous attention, where the former is controlled by the stimulus, while the latter is internally controlled (see Smallwood and Scholler 2009)
5. Perceptual vs. executive attention, where the former consists in giving priority to certain stimuli, while the latter is a central processing capacity (see Pashler 1998)
6. The process of attending to something vs. the event of shifting attention from one thing to another vs. the state the process results in (see Watzl 2010; Wu 2011)

All these approaches have updated the oldest theoretical positions. However, we cannot renounce looking at these positions, hoping to find already there a useful model for our needs. Broadbent (1958) has equated attention to a filter able to

act as a selective mechanism. The selection would be based not on the analysis of the meaning, but evaluating other information, including intensity. I think that this particular approach – although not updated – contains some interesting aspects because it individuates an area standing before the thematization as an integrant part of the attentional phenomenon.

Now, considering the main theoretical approaches to the topic of attention in the context of experimental psychology, Vermersch selects three main constituents of the attention:

(a) *Vigilance.* Vigilance, a state of awakening to the world, based on the activation of a diffuse nerve structure called "the reticule."
(b) *Orientation.* Based on a structure and upon distinct nerve pathways whose times of response are in the range of 20–40 ms. It corresponds to a characteristic of identification and permits the organism to respond in the most rapid way.
(c) *Voluntary attention* or *consciousness.* This constituent has times of responses in the range of 400 ms, "which is the time corresponding to a semantic identification ..., thus a range of extremely slow measure (globally, a factor of 10) in relation to orientation" (Vermersch 2004: 53).

The main meaning of the previous schema consists in identifying the level of orientation, activated "without semantic identification" (Vermersch 2004: 52) and therefore once again with reference to a pre-thematic level.

Now, it remains to investigate what was the contribution of phenomenology to research on attention. In this regard, I will recall the §92 of the First Book of *Ideas* and then consider the *Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre Sommersemester 1908* (hereafter, *Vorlesungen*) (Husserl 1986) and finally *Experience and Judgment* (Husserl 1973).[4]

Starting from *Ideas* basically means that attention is not separated by the topic of intentionality. The merit of §92 of *Ideas I,* entitled *The Noetic and Noematic Aspects of Attentional Changes*, in fact reiterates this relationship of dependency.

In Husserl's words (1983: 224–225):

> Attention is usually compared to a spot light. The object of attention, in the specific sense, lies in the cone of more or less bright light; but it can also move into the penumbra and into the completely dark region.... The ray of attention presents itself as emanating from the pure Ego and terminating in that which is objective, as directed to it or being diverted from it.

Such indications, which already highlight that attention is dinamic, not static, phenomenon should be integrated by what Husserl writes in the *Vorlesungen*.

[4]Recalling Husserl's ideas on attention is here made independently from the chronology of his philosophical production. I don't consider the contribution of *Philosophy of Arithmetic* in which Husserl introduces the criterion for distinguishing between a plurality and a group and this criterion consists in a certain kind of regard. In this way, we find some anticipations of the acts of grasping which Husserl will develop in the more mature phases of his philosophy.

In that context, Husserl, discussing the difference between the consciousness of meaning and verbal consciousness, distinguishes three levels of attention:

1. *Primary noticing*. It consists in attending in a privileged way to an object rather than to other objects perceived in the same time.
2. *Secondary noticing*. An object or group of objects becomes the background of the main observation and therefore present but in a subordinated way.
3. *Thematic intending*. It is a special way of attending to something. It consists in living in the corresponding theme.

The importance of the just mentioned schema is highlighted by Depraz (2004: 14, my italics):

> Whereas intentionality is a formal model of the structure of consciousness, whose openness lies in a linear directedness towards the object, attentionality as modulation furnished every act of our consciousness with a *material fluctuating density* due to its inner variations and its concrete changeability.

It is exactly the possibility of a variation of the density of what is presented through the attention that constitutes a source of interest for my analysis. The gradualness means, at least theoretically, the admission of a *not soluble density,* the most important feature of the other.

In *Experience and Judgment* Husserl talks about a form of contact with things, an act of grasping as a particular moment in the flow of consciousness, divided into three stages: a final stage of attentional grasp, also defined as the awakening of the I; an initial stage, without attentional grasp, which Husserl describes as pre-giveness (domain of passivity); between these two stages, there is a threshold.

Vermersch (2004: 68) observes:

> If there is a form of contact when consciousness stops on an object, clearly this contact is more or less light, either like an ongoing caress or like a light touch that ends as soon as it begins, or even like a grasp that immediately becomes a maintaining-in-grasp as it explores the thing.

As it is beyond the scope of this introduction, I would like to indicate here only that it is in this level that could be developed the difference between the voluntary aspect of grasping and the passive aspect in which a "prominence captivates the I and grabs hold of it" (Vermersch 2004: 69).

As stressed by Vermersch (2004: 60):

> The field of pre-giveness does not consist of an object (which in Husserl always presupposes intentionality), but of features, moments, parts, all of which are more elementary than an object and are joined together by laws of association, controlled by concordances and discordances, and by different forces of affection that compete to achieve awakening, to attract the tendency of the I toward the grasp.... From this field, an element detaches itself and becomes more prominent, attracts the I, and thus opens up the passage leading to consciousness, at least direct and still non-reflective consciousness.

In the conclusion of this first paragraph, all the reported findings, although included within different disciplines, offer a frame of plausibility to the notion of

listening as an effective and authentic place where the other can be approached respecting its radical otherness, independently from every temptation to reduce it to the subject's categories.

In extreme synthesis, enigma seems to have a chronological priority over our need of synchrony, of reconduction to our temporal order. In this respect, probably in listening, we could refer to an urgency of the enigma to indicate the persistence of an element which does not permit any indifference by us. Even before revealing this element, we have the feeling that it concerns and turns to us. There is inherence rather than indifference.

Listening can be understood as disposition to report an enigma that affects us, from a time before our own. In addition, it "enacts an infinite surplus of welcoming, invitation and reception, no matter what is said or heard. The listening, in contrast to the heard, is an enactment of responsibility made manifest through a posture of receptivity, a passivity of receiving the other into oneself without assimilation or appropriation. The listening is a process of contraction, of stepping back and creating a void into which the other may enter" (Lipari 2012: 237).

2 Enigma and the Fallacy of Obliteration

As we have seen in the previous paragraph, the main problem in the identification of the other consists in the fact that complete success in revealing the other would coincide with the abolition of the enigma itself. In this regard, one could paraphrase Ricoeur's thought when he observes: "The evil is the critical point of each philosophy. If one understands it, it is the biggest success. But evil understood is no more evil; it ceases to be absurd and scandalous. If one does not understand it, then philosophy is no more philosophy" (Ricoeur 1995: 13).

From this point of view, enigma and evil share the same destiny. In fact, the identified enigma is not an ascertained success, but a failure of thought itself, because it makes comprehension to be like homogenization, the act of reducing the otherness to our own categories. This process can be indicated as the fallacy of obliteration.

Faced with an enigma, should we remain helpless? Without conceptual and operative instruments?

It is a radical question, valid on two fronts: the first, with reference to what must be reported by consciousness and, the second, with regard to who should do the reporting, that is, the subject.

The identity of such a subject is eminently thought of as a representation of the real. Discussing such an identity means wondering about the validity of the representation as a unique dimension of the identity of the subject implied in relation to the enigma. Does the presence of the other, revealed by listening, need a different modulation of such an identity?

Independently from the outcome of this question, it is clear that what is at stake is the subject itself, its entire constitution and not only some cognitive determination. I think that this is the primary challenge when the question of the other arises.

3 The Tutelage of the Other

The attention requested by the enigma should preserve its specificity. The institution of such a tutelage, of which the subject implied in listening is responsible, assumes the features of an acceptance, taking responsibility for the being itself of the other. In this way, the subject tries to be prepared for the encounter as much as possible.

In figurative terms, we could say that if only a concave chest can house within it a convex shape, in the same way the identity of the subject should be able to create conditions for an effective hospitality. Taking seriously such an indication involves the change of the most common attitude toward the other.

Even the eventual indifference through which the enigma is declared unknowable is destined to transform itself in implication, with which we indicate the belonging together, the making space: "We *belong* to the matter addressed when the ethical call enters us and has become a part of us, when we have made a space for it, a home for it," Lipari (2010: 349) writes significantly, remembering Heidegger.

The change of our attitude toward the other is the first step in order that the alterity present in listening gives birth to an effective encounter rather than to indifference. Such a configuration of the subject is the authentic center of gravity in the relationship with the other, establishing the correct perspective from which to consider the things.

It is the other itself, its enigmatic presence and density, that is to become the constant focus of our gaze. Only if we will be able to make the other's place our anchorage point, then the relation to be instituted will be intended to be authentic.

In this regard, as Leibniz well understood (2006: 164), "The *other's place* is the true point of view." Our task – Leibniz continues – consists in the most accurate possible configuration of the other. It is a challenging task – as noted by Dascal himself – and it has a cognitive and also moral or political value.

Only when I prepare myself to be in the other's place then I can see the world in a decentrated way and without the logic of egocentrism.[5] It is exactly in this process that one can find the other's place. Leibniz therefore alludes to an exit from themselves. It is such a movement that permits us to "know our duty with respect to our neighbor," allowing us to stimulate "our thoughts." The other's place, therefore, is not some kind of magical place where one can get an enhanced vision.

[5]As Lipari has written (2012: 228), "The self is always accompanied by a 'bad conscience' as to whether it has usurped the place of the other."

It is instead a process that, paradoxically, through the depowering of one's point of view, permits us to see the world with another's eyes and so to formulate different thoughts, precisely because they are produced in different conditions.

I think that such an emphasis of the procedural element, present in Leibniz's words, should be further developed. In this situation, the term "place" makes tangible the necessary eradication to acquire a different vision. The basic thesis, confirmed by Leibniz's words, sustains the inappropriateness of the reduction of the other to an *alter ego*. If the identity itself of the I can be achieved starting from an ecstatic perspective, that is, a perspective of decentralization, then what is at stake when we talk about listening is ourselves. For this reason, as Gadamer (2004: 355) observes, "In human relations the important thing is . . . the Thou truly as a Thou."

Only when this condition happens is the I not focused on oneself and can open oneself toward what is veiled. This openness makes effective human relationships: "Anyone who listens is fundamentally open. Without such openness to one another there is no genuine human bond." The attempt not to obscure the alterity of the Thou needs our best efforts.

4 Rhetoric and the Fear of the Other

Inside this process, two different but connected factors should be considered. They are the rhetoric and the fear of the other, two attitudes to be seriously taken and faced with realism. Both share the fact of not considering seriously the alterity.

Fear is a normal reaction when it springs from the warning of the risks that can derive from the exposure to the other. "Ex-ponere," root of the term exposure, indicates being outside one's self, being outside one's codified safeties, is a condition comparable to being on the open sea. The unknown of an alterity always on the verge of revealing itself exposes the I to some risk.

On the other side, the rhetoric of alterity is a way – even more devious – to avoid the encounter with the other. It represents a way of preventing, anticipating the real, and deciding for oneself the collocation of the other. The other brought back to the rhetoric is, it seems unnecessary to repeat, an other already reported, meaningless because it is subtracted from its own initiative.

Both the fear and the rhetoric of the other should be considered and should not be diminished. Thankfully, such impediments to a correct approach to the otherness are not able to subvert the order with which the other manifests itself in the chronology of lived experiences of the subject. From this point of view, they can be considered as second-level impediments rather than the anteriority of the choice which establishes the disposability of the subject. In other words, it is for subtracting me to the choice with which the disposability is established that I can take refuge in fear or in the false acceptance of the other, made possible by the rhetoric.

5 The Eventness of the Encounter

Obviously there may be numerous other obstacles to an authentic encounter of the other. They should be recognized and, as far as possible, avoided. One of these obstacles deserves special mention. It is what we would call *presumptive safety.* Basically it consists in the adoption of several forms by which the other is taken for granted. Taking something for granted means to presume, and therefore it corresponds to a depowering of the unfathomable dimension that can be considered the emblem itself of the other. The unfathomableness amounts to the will not to challenge the impossibility to predetermine in advance, that is, before the encounter itself, what the other is.

When such a threshold is passed through, then we subtract from the other its voice, overlapping our voice, naively believing that this approach is correct. In front of the other, such a way is not adequate because it reifies the other, artfully making it attributable to our measure. The so *anticipated* other, taken for granted, *presumed*, can't be authentically the other, but rather the other reduced to a thingly dimension.

Such a relationship corresponds to what Buber defined as an "I-it" relationship, in the knowledge that "without It man cannot live. But he who lives with It alone is not a man" (Buber 1958: 34).

These brief indications are intended to outline a sort of landscape, a set of conditions of possibility, in which one can eventuate the encounter with the other. The event is *par excellence* the unpredictable and not reportable. It is what makes us remain on the threshold of an imminence always renewing itself. The event indicates a personal infinity, that is, the unfolding of an action that never ends. This action absolutely inheres the one in front of which it unfolds. As such, the event indicates, but indirectly or in a negative way.

Inevitably, the event is an "object," in the sense that we should refer to it despite its ineffability. However, the specificity of its nature does not permit the ascription of any features. In fact, these eventual features or characteristics would demonstrate the occurred achievement of an action by the subject. Anyway what we have tried to indicate before is that the true encounter with the otherness is possible when the passivity of the subject is reached, not its protagonism consisting in the capacity of representing the world.

For these reasons, the status of the event is not at all obvious. As Morin (1972: 11) remembers:

> The event was removed to the extent that it has been identified with the singularity, contingency, the accident, the irreducibility, the experience .... It was removed not only by the physical-chemical sciences, but also from sociology, which tends to organize itself around laws, models, structures, systems. It even tends to be driven by the history that is, more and more, the study of the processes that obey to systematic and structural logics and less and less a cascade of sequences of events.

If one attributes value to the system, then what is singular and unique can acquire importance only to the extent that it can be functional to the system's survival. Such a survival should not be considered as an invariance. An event can be functional to

the system also when it contributes to the change of some features of the system, making it more suitable for the system's survival. From this point of view, therefore, event and system should not be considered as antagonists.

According to Morin (1972: 28), the event is framed within a temporal ontology, since time is a "coefficient of eventness" of everything. Furthermore, a pure event cannot be considered in absolute terms because it is always a function of the system.

Another observation of Morin's deserves to be briefly considered. There are events resulting from encounters between systems or between systems and perturbation of any origin. In neither of these two situations, however, the distinction between event and element, cited above, disappears: "The most developed systems are *structures of acceptance* more and more open to the event, and structures more and more *sensitive* to the event. Until now," Morin (1972: 29–30) continues, "human society is the organism whose sensitivity to the event is more open.... More sensitive systems have inside an antagonist bipolarity, i.e. a double *coupled circuit* containing and secerning the risk in itself, the event in the form of *alternative* possibility, chosen between two or more possible solutions, depending themselves from the intervention of internal or external events-factors."

We don't think that Morin's words specify something more of the event; they describe somewhat our need of reporting a phenomenon that otherwise would remain in its enigmaticy, labeled as negative and as such to be eradicated.

Carefully read, these words announce a scenario of prevision of what the event can imply. In a certain sense, they can be combined with the position of Jean Ladriére[6] who synthesizes four ways of depowering the event: (1) the explanation of a fact for subsumption under a law; (2) the explanation for reduction, or the indication of an element underlying the event; (3) the explanation through the origin; and (4) the optimization process, namely, the search for stable factors.

In other words, preparing a safety net to avoid unexplained situations is normal. This attempt, to which Morin does not escape, is inherent in the ascription of the event in the order of time. If something is, it eventuates in time. The necessary route to be followed by the event makes the event itself like an element. Such a reasoning seems very coherent.

Actually, what seems the biggest theoretical success constitutes the evidence of a defeat because it makes the reasoning itself fall into the fallacy of obliteration mentioned above. At least in the situations in which the other is an event, every abscription corresponds to a pejorative transformation. If that were possible, we should instead look for a process not finishing with the reification of the other, since such a conclusion is the proof of a failure of the entire process.

The otherness is intended to break every form that would contain the otherness itself: "The face of the Other," Lévinas (1969: 50–51) observes, "at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me."

[6]See the voice "Event" in Boileau and Dick (1993: 147–164).

I think that the eventness of the other may be thought of, perhaps more effectively, like an endless activity. The episode[7] of the encounter between Saint Augustine and a child trying to fill a sandpit with seawater may perhaps be enlightening. In fact, regardless of the authenticity of the episode, its scope, consisting in showing an analogy between the infinitude of the task of the child and the attempt of the philosopher to think the Trinity, remains valid.

In our case, even if it seems paradoxical, the infinitude of the task to solve the enigma, preserving it, corresponds to its inexhaustibility. Thinking of the other as an event is impossible if one tries a different way between event and element. Instead, if one thinks of the other as one who asks us to go back constantly and infinitely near any attempt to think about him, without taking for granted the final results of our grasping, then the task becomes more practicable, although extremely difficult.

A different I, unable to be complete without the other, replaces the presumed self-sufficiency of the subject: "You are not the same after what has passed between you" (Kaplan 1994: 18). This solution permits us to confirm some conditions of the event: not regularity, not deductibility, not irreversibility. They are features that, according to Piattelli-Palmarini (1972: 207), constitute necessary but not sufficient conditions: "To obtain the necessary and sufficient criteria one could add the condition of jump of value. . . . When one says 'confused' by an event, we are referring precisely to an unexpected and unpredictable alteration of the values and opinions."

Each event, instead of being included in the order of time, establishes a temporal order. Each revolution makes the event from which it was born the beginning of its calendar, of its time. There are key events, and they have the same effect on the life of many people: "Each of us brings his zero-times, be it the death of a loved one, the marriage, an encounter." Furthermore, "homeostasis of the human spirit has an ambiguous relationship with the events, between incorporation and removal, catabolism and anabolism, classification and exorcism. The event is the driving force behind every psychic dynamism, but the excess of events would destroy the event itself" (Piattelli-Palmarini 1972: 208).

It is so, indeed. Giving up the event, not to recognize it, means to be installed in the seriality of time, sacrificing originality of a different gaze, living the monotony of situations that are repeatable. On the other hand, the event asks to be materialized in history, to become an encounter; and that, as we mentioned, cannot be done independently of the adoption of measures appropriate to the nature of what one is facing.

6 Representation and Reason

The lived experiences, the role of the enigma, and the event of the other are concrete aspects of reason if one exceeds the unilateral conception according to which reason should be considered only within a cognitive and abstract dimension. Actually the

[7]The episode has been studied in Pillion (1908).

idea that the only admitted features of reason consist in pureness and abstractness constitutes an ancient heritage.

In the tradition of modern philosophy, for example, representation can be considered a metonymic dimension of the human, so representative of the human faculties that it summarizes them completely. The representation is par excellence the act of the rational faculty. In this regard, Heidegger's expression (2002: 68) is well noted, in which he defines modernity as the epoch able to reduce in image the world itself and whose culmination can be found in the fact that: "The being of beings is sought and found in the representedness of beings."

The entity is considered as opposed to a subject which attributes to itself the role of representing. As Corradi observed (2001: 21), "The correlative to the view of an independently existing domain of objects (generally equated with facts), is also the idea of an independently existing, non-contingent, non-affective subject."

The newness concerning the specific role of representation can be mostly evaluated if compared to the more dominant topics of earlier ages. In ancient Greece, for example, the world was considered an aggregate to the universe, and it could not be conceived outside of this primary relationship. Similarly, an autonomous subject separated from the universe, or a world independently represented by a subject, would be unconceivable. In the Middle Ages, there was also a different situation than that of modernity: in fact, the entity is considered an *ens creatum* and, as such, belongs to the order established by the Creator rather than existing within a representation.

References to the ancient Greeks or to the Middle Ages, despite their exiguity, provide evidence of a fundamental difference from the main characteristic of modernity, indicated by Heidegger as *persistence of the representation by a representing subject.* It should also be added that the ability to represent applies not only to the epistemological level but can be extended to cover additional areas. It is a much more general process, about which Ponsetto (1992: 26) observed:

> In pursuit of the autonomy of reason, Modernity aims to make man independent in relation to the world. The subjugation of the I to nature is progressively replaced by the acquisition of nature itself to the realm of reason. With this process one gets a more exact and detailed knowledge of the laws governing the different phenomena. Rationalization of the real and differentiation of individual spheres, in which it is articulated, reveal themselves as concomitant procedures and they rhythm to the progressing of reason in revealing in itself the mystery of things.
>
> As a process of differentiation, the emergence of rationality, however, tends to be seen as contrast between world and I, and it make assume to the I the role of constitutive principle of the truth and sense of reality.

The ultimate consequence of the process of representation is the derealization of the world, or the absence of the real character of what surrounds us.[8] The index of reality is replaced by a sort of artificial world, which consists of representations.

[8]See also Guardini (1960, 1963).

If *ex parte obiecti* we can talk about a progressive derealization of the world, the correlate of such a process *ex parte subiecti* is an "unaffective approach to our own cognitive functions" (Corradi 2001: 21). This results in abstracting the index of reality of things and making constant such an abstraction. In other words, "we have learned to hold the world away from us, and to somehow constitute ourselves as 'superior' epistemic agents through a willed estrangement from it" (Corradi 2001: 22).

The world becomes "represented world" by a subject, understood in an abstract way starting from the representative faculty and prescinding from the entire meaning of the human being, only inside which the representation find its ultimate significance. Undue projection, abstraction, and removal of the entire meaning of the human being are serious reasons that however cannot give us the possibility to renounce representation but rather to find the correct way to insert such an essential function within the circle of life.

7 Listening as Recovery of Wholeness of the Human

The itinerary followed so far has shown some elements of the essential structure of listening, distinguishing between two levels in which this attitude can appear. The itinerary also showed "anteriority" as a main feature of the other in relation to any initiative of grasping by the subject. All these dimensions are included in the notion of enigma, and they require a completely different approach, appropriate to the nature of what is presented to the consciousness. We have therefore considered the process of representation viewed not only as connected to the identity of the subject but as the most important aspect of reason. For all these reasons, reflecting on listening is ipso facto reflecting on the possible forms of not obvious rationality, never definitively acquired and increasingly able to account for the complexity of reality.

In this perspective, listening leads to the completeness of the human – a goal which is not achievable unless exposing those processes mentioned in this introductory essay, which favored the removal of the complexity of the human being. At the end of this brief *excursus*, one may perhaps be more explicit as to the reasons for our gratitude to Marcelo Dascal, at the outset defined as the "Master of listening." Arguing that he taught us to listen, then, means to testify that, in all his scientific activities, whether regarding the theory of controversies, or Leibniz's thought or pragmatics, he has routed us to a new version of reason.

It is this general interest which guides us to make sure that the debt of gratitude does not concern only his many scholars around the world but the whole scientific community. In fact, if reason is the excellence of the human, then Marcelo Dascal taught us the respect for the other and the wise conciliation between facticity and eidetic dimension of thought. Dascal, in short, has helped us to find the courage of independent thought. To think otherwise.

From this point of view, listening is not an optional component of thought, but its most eminent form, as declared by Gadamer himself (2004: 360): "The art of questioning is the art of questioning ever further – i.e. the art of thinking."

8 Synopsis of Essays[9]

The 18 original contributions in this volume enter into dialogue with Dascal's own prolific and voluminous philosophical work. The first three articles focus on philosophical controversy, a key concept developed by Dascal in a series of articles. According to Dascal, philosophy evolves by way of controversy. Each of these articles manifests this idea, centering on a philosophical controversy (*Regner*, *Mishori*, *Schulz*) *or on the very idea of a controversy* (Senderowicz). The next three contributions are related with Dascal's identity as a renowned Leibniz scholar. Roinila's article deals with Akrasia, Naaman-Zauderer writes about Leibniz's notion of justice, and Serfati develops the idea of origin of mathematics according to Leibniz. The following three articles pertain to Dascal's contribution to philosophy of language and deal with the new phenomena of emoticons (Dresner and Herring), with Brandom's deontic scorekeeping (Riesenfeld), and with the pragmatic notion of speaker's meaning (Amel). The next three articles concern political philosophical issues; Rudolph's article presents a controversy within the Protestant Church in Germany regarding the idea of "homeland," Baruch tackles the concept of toleration as related to pluralism, and Morris-Reich's paper explores how German social scientists confront issues of anti-Semitism. Next, Scarafile's article deals with the uniqueness of the mind of a genius as portrayed by Diderot. Following, Thiebaut's paper attempts to analyze the roots and origin of norms. Pombo Martins writes about the idea of the unity of science as manifested in the encyclopedia. The last two articles in this collection deal with the connection between logical concepts and (traditionally) nonlogical ones, abduction and habit in De Andrade et al., and finally, Rahman's closing paper develops a dialogical approach to logic. As pointed out, some of the articles in this volume are directly connected to, and influenced by, philosophical themes, ideas, and concepts developed throughout the years by Marcelo Dascal, while others bare a looser connection to his work. It is, however, the remarkable and multifaceted philosophical persona of Marcelo Dascal which conjoins the rich philosophical dialogue taking place in this book.

In conclusion, we would like to mention the title, *Sob o mesmo céu,* of a famous song, written by Lenine, a Brazilian songwriter. Played at the 2011 carnival of Recife with the most famous Brazilian singers (Elba Ramalho, Marina Lima, Nena Queiroga, Karina Buhr, Pitty, Zélia Duncan, Maria Gadu, Isaar, Roberta Sá, Céu, Fernanda Takai e Mariana Aydar), it is a modern hymn to the Brazilian identity,

[9]This paragraph has been written with Dana Riesenfeld.

and it recalls the mutual enrichment that comes from being part of a larger mission, overcoming all borders and flags ("Meu coração/Não tem fronteiras/Nem relógios, nem bandeiras").

The title of that song is an allusion to the courage of walking together to uncover the truth, to being continuously supported in this path and also to being part of a larger research community.

Marcelo Dascal has taught us to live *Sob o mesmo céu*, and we will never stop being grateful to him.

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The Exclusion Argument

Yaron Senderowicz

Abstract In *Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind,* I pointed out the epistemic merits of philosophical (metaphysical) controversies by examining a type of argument that is often used in philosophical controversies – the Relevant Controversial Alternative argument. Arguments belonging to this type aim to point out the relevance of the arguer's position to the content of the opponent's radically opposed position. An exchange that consists of Relevant Controversial Alternative arguments and responses to them is a cooperative intellectual project binding the representatives of competing positions together. Exclusion arguments are motivated by the opposite goal. These are arguments that aim to undermine the relevance of a radically opposed position to the content and goals of the position that one supports, that is, they aim to isolate one's position from the opposed one. In this chapter I examine the nature of Exclusion arguments and, in particular, the rational (epistemic) motivation to use them.

Keywords Controversies • Philosophical controversies • The pragmatics of controversies • Arguments • Rationality • Dascal • Kant

1 Introduction

Since antiquity, the practice of philosophy has involved polemical confrontations between representatives of opposed philosophical schools. The debates between philosophers seem to motivate the development of thought and to stimulate philosophy as a critical activity. Nevertheless, the idea that oppositions between

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philosophical schools and traditions and the confrontations they generate are in fact groundless reappears, time and again, in the history of philosophy. For example, in *Language, Truth, and Logic*, A.J. Ayer spells out one of the goals of his classical treatise as follows:

> One of the main objects of this treatise has been to show that there is nothing in the nature of philosophy to warrant the existence of conflicting philosophical parties or schools. For it is only when the available evidence is insufficient to determine the probability of a proposition that the difference of opinion concerning it is justifiable. But with regard to the propositions of philosophy this can never be the case. (1971: 176)

Many philosophers that disagree with Ayer's theory, nevertheless, make similar claims with regard to oppositions in philosophy. In their attempt to examine the possibility and nature of philosophical controversies, they likewise claim to know that nothing in the nature of philosophy "really" warrants the existence of conflicting philosophical parties or schools, even if their reasons differ from Ayer's reasons. This appears to be the case even when one does not think that oppositions between philosophical theories are groundless as Ayer does. Indeed, some philosophers that address the given polemical confrontations interpret them as confrontations that are caused by some real features of our philosophical scheme. Yet, what one claims to know is that these features are sources of natural mistakes and illusions that are ruled out on the basis of the interpreter's viewpoint. In the same vein, philosophers of the Hegelian school represent the philosophical oppositions and confrontations as a necessity of reason that is connected to the historical process of the self-realization of reason. Nevertheless, in this case too, one grasps the conflicts from a viewpoint on the basis of which one claims to know that they are, in fact, resolved.

It is interesting to note, however, that although this approach is prevalent, the main supposition that underlies it is not supported by the evidence provided by the history of philosophy or by the current state of philosophy. Our philosophical world is just as divided between opposed viewpoints as was the world of our predecessors, and the polemical confrontations that these opposed views stimulate are just as real today as they were in Plato, Kant, or Ayer's times. As far as the recognized public criteria of acceptability are concerned, no attempt to settle the philosophical oppositions and the disputes that they motivate "once and for all" has been successful.

The discrepancy between the common approach and the available evidence provides reason to search for a different methodology in attempting to respond to the question as to the role and the significance of conflicts and dialogical confrontations in philosophy. Given recurring failure to eliminate conflicts, one might wish to look for an account of the function and structure of polemical confrontations by attempting to examine their nature without attempting at the same time to construct a philosophical account that represents them as groundless. The attempt to examine the nature and the significance of polemical confrontations that is faithful to the evidence provided by the history of philosophy must, as a heuristic rule, begin by accepting the diversity of conflicting positions as a real feature of our intellectual climate.

Accepting the diversity of conflicting positions as a heuristic rule need not entail any sort of relativism. It is not equivalent to making any judgment regarding the nature of truth or the nature of any other philosophical concept. This heuristic rule does indeed require abandoning the sought-after, self-assured standpoint from which one "now" presumes to know the sources of oppositions in philosophy and how they can be resolved. But this requirement is motivated by a modest and reasonable supposition. As long as there are philosophers that provide good rational support for the contentions that conflict with one's own contentions, there is no reason to suppose that one's own claim to philosophical knowledge of the nature of our basic philosophical and metaphysical concepts is already secured.

The above heuristic rule enables one to uncover the features of real philosophical dialogues and the way in which these are involved in the rational process of constructing philosophical theories and forming philosophical positions. It requires us to grasp the conflicting positions and dialogical confrontations from the perspective of the dialogical process itself, that is, from a viewpoint that does not abstract them from their inherent pragmatic dimension of dialogical exchanges.

2 Controversies and Rationality

The claim that the study of polemical confrontations, not only in philosophy but also in science, theology, and politics, should presuppose the diversity of conflicting positions as a real feature of our intellectual situation and that it should address the conflicts from the perspective of the way in which they are expressed in real dialogical exchanges throughout history is probably one of the main features of Dascal's program in the study of controversies.[1] In a series of papers and books published in the last three decades, he underscored the significance of the pragmatic theory of controversies to the ongoing attempt to explain the nature of human rationality. In his view, there are no barriers separating radically opposed views that rule out the possibility of communication. There is no case of radical differences between positions in which a resolution is in principle not possible. Following Leibniz, he maintains that there are almost no limits to our ability to produce *rational arguments*, that is, to *persuade by means of reasons*, even in contexts in which contenders are separated by radical differences.[2]

However, Dascal's approach appears to be guided by an optimistic idea that – to the best of my knowledge – he does not attempt to justify. He seems to assume that entering a controversy with an opponent with whom one radically disagrees is generally *more rational* than avoiding it. My aim in the present context is to examine the cogency of this assumption.

[1] Dascal uses the term "controversy" in a quasi-technical sense. He distinguishes controversies from disputes and discussions. See in particular Dascal (1998a, b).

[2] See in particular Dascal (2008).

In *Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind* (2010), I examined several chains of controversies in current metaphysics of mind. I tried to clarify the positive role of controversies in pursuing philosophical knowledge by spelling out the features of one type of dialectical argument that will be hereafter called the Relevant Controversial Alternative (RCA) argument. This is a kind of argument similar to the one that Kant used in the chapters dedicated to the antinomies of pure reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998). As I have shown, an effective use of arguments that have the features of RCA constitutes chains of controversies that manifest an interesting feature: even though they are separated by radical differences, the parties involved in these controversies are bound by a cooperative and communal process of investigation. Yet, since all of the chains of controversies examined in this book had this feature, one could have been misled to suppose that dialogical confrontations between radically opposed views are always dialogical exchanges that have the character of a cooperative process of investigation. This was not my view. Nevertheless, I thought that it is possible to examine controversies that manifest a cooperative process without needing to clarify the nature of responses to radically opposed views that are based on another type of argument which will hereafter be called the Exclusion argument (EA). As will be clarified in what follows, one of the main differences between RCA and EA consists in the fact that RCA renders the contentions of a given position relevant to the content and goals of the radically opposed position. An effective RCA argument initiates a controversy, if the addressee's response to the contender's challenge either directly or indirectly accepts the claim that the argument indeed reveals that the contender's contentions are relevant to the addressee's position, even if – before a resolution is suggested – they conflict with the addressee's position. By contrast, EA aims *to undermine the relevance* of a radically opposed position to the content and goals of the position that one supports. In the first type of polemical dialogues the participants join forces in the search for a rational resolution of the difficulties and paradoxes related to the gaps revealed by means of the RCA arguments used in the exchange in the presumed shared view. By contrast, the second type of argument rules out the fruitfulness of the confrontation. In fact, it aims to isolate one's position from the opposed one.

I no longer believe that it is possible to examine the function and structure of controversies that involve the use of RCA or similar types of arguments without spelling out the nature and role of EA. The use of EA is prevalent in philosophy, which, among other things, indicates that we do not have the natural tendency to opt for cooperative activities through confrontations with others with whom we radically disagree. But, can one rationally justify the prevalent appeal to EA? If the use of EA is supported by rational motives, Dascal's optimism regarding the rational role of polemical exchanges must be questioned.

My intention here will be to begin to spell out the reasons for adopting a rational strategy that recommends minimizing the use of EA and opting for cooperative dialogical confrontations. It seems to me that the appearance of rational support for using EA is at least partly explained by the misrepresentation of the epistemic status of the user's philosophical theory. The significance of the study of controversies does not merely consist in the quest for a correct account of the role of polemical

dialogues in human rationality. Rather, by producing such a theory and by clarifying the advantages of rational polemical dialogues, the results of this inquiry are bound to influence the investigated subject matter. In other words, I suggest that the grounds that motivate the prevalent use of EA are closely associated with some of the reasons that underlie the contention that one *knows* that "nothing in the nature of philosophy warrants the existence of conflicting philosophical parties or schools" (Ayer 1971: 176) which is refuted by the evidence that the history of philosophy provides.

In the next section, I will briefly present the features of RCA. I will then clarify the nature of EA and will conclude by presenting some reasons that support the preference to enter a cooperative polemical exchange as a rational strategy.

3 The Relevant Controversial Alternative Argument

In *Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind* (2010), I suggested that Kant's arguments in the antinomies of pure reason in his *Critique of Pure Reason* could be viewed as the paradigm of a metaphysical argument. As I interpret it, the argument consists of two main steps. The first step establishes the antinomy itself. An antinomy is exposed by means of two lines of arguments, each of which aims to prove a given contention, thesis, and antithesis. Each of these contentions can be viewed as the symptomatic propositions of two conflicting philosophical positions that contain other propositions. The arguments used by Kant have two notable features. First, the arguments in favor of the thesis or the antithesis are effective only relative to what is believed to be true in the exact and the empirical sciences. The second point is that the arguments employ philosophical insights that are presumed to be shared by the proponent and the opponent, that is, insights the arguer presumes are obvious in the relevant community. Each line of argument can establish a contention assumed to be entailed by a proposition that expresses one of these insights. Hence, given the presumed shared knowledge, the overall argument of the first major step of the antinomy reveals an internal conflict of reason within itself. Before the argument is presented, these insights do not seem to conflict with one another.

The second major step of the argument consists of an attempt to identify the source of the conflict. That is, it points out another contention assumed to be shared by the conflicting parties, and yet, it is a contention that has an alternative. In Kant's case, the shared contention is the supposition that we know things as they are in themselves, and the alternative is the contention that we know things only as appearances and not as things in themselves. The argument aims to *persuade its addressees* that the conflict will disappear, in case one is willing to reject this supposition, that is, if one is willing to accept that we do not know things as they are in themselves. In this case, both contentions are either true together or false together. Hence, the goal of the overall argument establishes a metaphysical doctrine – Kant's transcendental idealism – by claiming that it is possible to resolve

the tension between the competing and incompatible contentions if one accepts this doctrine. Clearly, the ability to resolve these conflicts provides persuasive reasons to favor Kant's doctrine over competing doctrines.

Nevertheless, in contrast to what Kant seems to suppose, the rational power of these reasons is not an a-historical matter. It inherently depends on the presumed scientific knowledge that may change in ways that do not depend on what the arguer presumes. Kant's discussion in the chapters dedicated to the antinomies does not only leave out the historical dimension of the power of reasons. It also leaves out the pragmatic layers of the arguments. Interestingly, adding these layers to Kant's account does not weaken his insights, but rather renders them more intelligible.

The combination of Kant's original insights and the pragmatic dimensions of arguments constitute the following account of the type of arguments that he used: a metaphysical or a philosophical contention should be interpreted as a *presumption* that allocates *the burden of proof*, and accepting it as a presumption depends both on what is assumed to be known by all parties involved and on what seems to be unique to different research communities. For example, the contention that mental states and processes are physical states and processes is a strong presumption of current analytic philosophy of mind but not, I suspect, a presumption that Leibnizians share. But presumptions *can be challenged*. Arguments that have the features of RCA exemplify the way presumptions can be challenged. The premises of the argument are presumptions assumed to be accepted by the relevant addressees with whom one disagrees, and the conclusion drawn is the symptomatic contention of the arguer's position. For example, the premises of Kripke's argument in Chapter 3 of *Naming and Necessity* (1980) that are accepted by the physicalist entail the contention that the qualitative features of mental states are not identical to physical properties, which is a contention that dualists accept and physicalists dispute. Since the argument aims to establish the symptomatic proposition of the arguer's position by linking it to what the addressee presumes, a persuasive argument of this type makes the position that defends the disputed contention a *controversial relevant alternative* to the opponent's position.

Recognizing a position as a controversial relevant alternative on the basis of such arguments normally requires a response that goes beyond what was explicitly known before the controversy. More often than not, it requires the introduction of new concepts and the uncovering of new conceptual connections and can therefore be viewed as one of the sources of epistemic change in metaphysics and philosophy.

Controversies that evolve around arguments that have the features of RCA therefore clarify how communicative exchanges that involve radical differences between contenders can in fact be fruitful cooperative endeavors. The chain of controversies that evolved around Kripke's (1980) modal argument and Jackson's (1982) knowledge argument and the conceptual changes that it motivated exemplify the fruitfulness of controversial exchanges.[3] This chain of controversies also

[3]This chain of controversies is examined in Part Two of *Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind* (2010).

clarifies the fact that there is more than one available response to an argument challenging a given contention. Moreover, the conflicting responses to the challenge are bound to later become the source of new controversies that may also involve RCA arguments.

4 The Exclusion Argument

An exchange that consists of RCA arguments and responses to them is a cooperative intellectual project binding the representatives of competing positions together. As I noted above, an EA is motivated by the opposite goal. An EA is used in order to undermine the relevance of the radically opposed position to one's own position. Yet, I suggest that the contexts that invite RCA arguments are similar to the contexts that invite EA. In both cases, the arguer believes that she has better support for her case, given the available evidence. But the arguer that uses RCA arguments or that responds to them views the task of persuading her opponent as part and parcel of the task of defending her own position, while the arguer of EA is not driven by a similar goal. She does not aspire to persuade her opponent who, in her view, fails to respond to the power of the reasons supporting her case. She does not regard it as part of the task of providing support for her own position.

This difference can be clarified by pointing out the roles that the argument to an illusion plays in the contexts in which RCA arguments are used and in the contexts in which EA are used. In both cases, arguers recognize the insights or philosophical intuitions related to the opposed position as sources of illusions. In both cases, they aim to block the power of these intuitions by exposing what motivates the contentions of their opponents. Yet, while the challenged party in contexts in which RCAs are employed recognizes the relevance and the significance of the opponent's argument, this is not the cases in contexts in which EAs are used. For example, the claim that the intuition of distinctness (i.e., the intuition that mental (qualitative) states and physical states are distinct states) involves a cognitive illusion is one of the physicalists' responses to the challenge posed by dualists.[4] However, in this case, the claim to an illusion usually involves the recognition of the importance of the argument to which one responds and the significance of the insights upon which the argument is based. The claim that we are apt to be victims of such illusions is usually backed by a cognitive theory that singles out the rational or natural sources of the illusion. By contrast, although users of EA may also contend that their opponents are victims of some sort of illusion, nevertheless, they do not grasp the arguments to which they respond or the insights upon which they are based as significant or important. In particular, they do not believe that they need to *explain* the fact that their opponents continue to hold to their positions in spite of what the arguer believes

[4]See in particular Tye (2000), Papineau (2002), and Jackson (2004). Their appeal to cognitive illusions in their attempt to defend physicalism exemplifies this type of response.

to be "the conclusive evidence" that supports her position. Normally, as Ayer (1971) and Carnap (1959) do, they tend to view the assertions that express these insights as groundless or even meaningless and tend to interpret as irrational the fact that the opponent continues to make them in the face of evidence.

The addressees of the public use of EA are usually not the representatives of the opposed position. Rather, they are the audience of researchers that consist either of allies or of neutral observers. It is commonplace in these contexts to emphasize the strength of the presumptions that support the arguer's case. Typical strategies may involve the search for demarcation principles (see, e.g., Carnap 1959 and Ayer 1971) and principles of significance that aim to exclude the meaningfulness of the other's contention. But they may be less extreme than these.

One important feature implicit in the EA is the following: EA can often be interpreted as simultaneously expressing two conflicting issues. On the one hand, they express the *failure to understand* how the opponent continues to be committed to her position "in the face of the available evidence," and moreover, they also dismiss as insignificant what the opponent says. This tension raises also the following question: why does the arguer bother to exclude a position that she believes she knows to be groundless and insignificant? A reasonable answer to this question is that the objective of EA is to convince a neutral audience that might be tempted by the misleading insights that underlie the opposed position. Yet, this kind of response is incomplete as it stands. Ruling out the relevance of what one fails to understand cannot be explained merely on the basis of the motivation to be the guardian of the minds of others. The question we need to address is therefore the following: assuming that a proponent of a given position is convinced that the available body of evidence provides better rational support for her position, is it more rational for her to enter a cooperative project of polemical exchange that inherently involves the intention to persuade the opponents, or should she avoid entering this type of confrontation? It does not require much speculation to contend that users of EA are prone to answer that one should avoid entering the polemical exchange. In other words, I suggest that one of the convictions that motivates one to use EA is the supposition that it is more rational to avoid a cooperative polemical exchange than to be involved in it.

Indeed, it seems that one could present rational support for using EA in the relevant contexts. Clearly, not all responses to challenges are bound to lead to intellectual progress. As I suggested above, there is indeed evidence that supports the supposition that responses to opposed views that aim to persuade by means of reasons are fruitful. But there is also massive evidence that supports the contrary view, that is, cases in which the polemical exchanges do not motivate intellectual progress. In addition, intellectual progress is not feasible only by means of responses to challenges posed by a radically opposed view. It can be also achieved by other means. Clearly, these are motives that refer to one's own intellectual progress.

5 Optimism Vindicated

In Sect. 3 of this chapter, I clarified how communicative exchanges in contexts of radical differences could be the basis for intellectual progress. I spelled out the rational grounds that may motivate one to enter such exchanges. Yet, attempting to avoid the exchange also seems to have rational support. We therefore seem to be torn between two opposed poles pulling us in conflicting directions. The problem we seem to face here is that we *do not know in advance whether it would be more beneficial to enter an exchange than to avoid it*, and therefore, we do not know which course of action one should prefer.

We may begin answering this question by noting that there are conceivable cases in which it would be reasonable to interpret the intentions that underlie the use of EA as anything but intentions related to the prospects for intellectual progress. These are cases in which one misuses EA, at least as far as one's own rational epistemic goals are concerned. Misuse can easily be explained. Intuitions or insights are the unavoidable grounds based on which one can determine whether or not to take part in the exchange. Nevertheless, intuitions are fragile and defeasible grounds. Irrelevant motives may be inseparably mixed with the relevant motives. There are obvious limits to acts of self-criticism, and it is not possible to avoid the mistakes and illusions related to one's intuitive and immediate responses merely by relying on what is available to the self-criticizing person.

Not all challenges posed by opposed positions are worthy of a response, but we cannot know which challenges are *before we have made a serious attempt*. Given that one's own goal is the rational epistemic goal and that the relevant contenders that hold a radically opposed position are competent and knowledgeable philosophers, it is *more rational* to enter a cooperative polemical exchange with them than to avoid it. We can effectively protect ourselves from being deceived by the mistakes and illusions inherent in our intuitions only by exposing ourselves to radically opposed views in polemical debates. A reflective examination of them cannot lead to the same result. Yet, in spite of its being more rational, we are not naturally disposed to adopt this approach. If we wish to be rational, we ought to follow this advice: we should educate ourselves and others not to avoid the difficulties and confusion involved in this type of communicative exchange.

Dascal's optimism can be therefore defended. But a defense requires one to surpass the constraints of a purely theoretical descriptive project. The project must also involve an ethical and educational dimension that cannot be entirely separated from the theoretical dimension. I suspect, however, that this fits well his original intentions.

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Rationality and Controversy: Reading Darwin Through Dascalian Eyes

Anna Carolina K.P. Regner

Abstract Marcelo Dascal has made a major contribution to the study of rationality and argumentation. In the present text, I explore the impact of his approach on *the analysis of* Charles Darwin's 'one long argument', as Darwin calls his theory *of* the origin of species. Dascal's typology and analyses of polemic interactions – in particular, his analyses of controversies and their role in scientific argumentation – *provide* a strong tool for the understanding of the structure and performance of Darwinian argumentation. The backbone of Darwin's theory lies *in* comparison between opposing positions. Furthermore, *Dascal's approach* allows one to see the philosophical possibilities and implications of Darwin's naturalistic view of 'rationality', on the basis of Dascal's *distinctions* and relations between 'hard' and 'soft' rationality. On the one hand, Darwin's explanatory efforts fit into the domain of the *latter* one, typical of polemic debates. On the *other hand*, the reading of Darwin can show how Dascal's approach to rationality can be earthly embedded.

Keywords Marcelo Dascal • Charles Darwin • Rationality • Argumentation • Controversies

The contribution made by Marcelo Dascal to a new understanding of the philosophy and history of science is well known. In this paper, I intend to show how Dascal's groundbreaking work on rationality and the theory of controversies leads to a new reading of Darwin's theory of the origin of species.

In a broad sense, rationality can be understood as an activity of our faculty of reason, and there is no way of stepping outside rationality in order to think about

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this. 'Reason' is both 'observer' (what is going on?) and 'participant' (what should I do?). In this sense, thinking about rationality is thinking of it 'in action' (as 'doing something' in 'some way'), and then as 'rationality in context'. While it is 'in action' and, therefore, 'in context', rationality deals with a range of alternatives which includes the 'necessary' as well as the 'possible'. I consider the 'necessary' to be a particular niche within the much wider scope of the activity of reason.

Following Dascal's characterization of 'hard rationality',[1] I will refer to this niche as the realm of 'hard rationality'. Dascal says:

> By 'hard' rationality I understand a conception of rationality that has standard logic and its application as its fundamental model. This conception views logical inconsistency as the paradigmatic expression of irrationality and regards certainty as the principal aim and sign of knowledge. Since mathematics is the most successful implementation of rationality, hard rationality privileges what it takes to be the basic reasons of this success. Accordingly, it considers, as conditions of rational thinking and praxis or as their preferred manifestations, parameters such as: uncompromising obedience to the principle of contradiction; precise definitions formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; conclusive argumentation modelled upon deduction; formalization of this procedure by means of a symbolic notation and computability; axiomatization of domains of knowledge; and the like. (Dascal 2005a: 57–58)

The realm of 'hard' rationality is certainly very restrictive. Fortunately, as Aristotle had shown us in the past, now Dascal shows us that the rational domain is much larger, and that the realm of the possible is not abandoned to irrationality. For Dascal, the rationality of the possible belongs to the domain of 'soft rationality', and, in a different way to Aristotle's views concerning the rationality of the possible, his 'soft rationality' also includes much of science:

> By 'soft' rationality I understand, broadly speaking, a conception of rationality that seeks to account for and to develop the means to cope with the host of situations – theoretical as well as practical – where uncertainty and imprecision are the rule. Although acknowledging the applicability and usefulness of the high standards of rationality in certain fields, it rejects the identification as 'irrational' of all that falls short of them. It seals with the vast area of the reasonable, which lies in between the hard rational and the irrational. The model of the idea of soft rationality is that of a balance where reasons in favor and against (a position, a theory, a course of action) are put in the scales and weighted. But there is a deep difference between 'weighing' reasons and 'computing' them. For, except in a handful of cases, the weight of reasons are not precisely quantifiable and context-independent. Consequently, weighing them does not yield conclusive results whose negation would imply contradiction. The balance of reasons, unlike deduction, 'inclines without necessitating' – in Leibniz's felicitous phrase. (. . .) Soft rationality's logic is thus non-monotonic and cannot be reduced to standard deductive logic. It is the logic of presumptions that rationally justify conclusions without actually providing them, of the heuristics for problem-solving and for hypothesis generation, of pragmatic interpretation, of negotiation, and of countless other procedures we make use of in most spheres of our lives. (ibid: 58)

'Soft rationality' is therefore the appropriate area for the critical debate of alternatives, of opposing views, of weighing reasons, and for deliberating.

[1] Although Dascal may not share my view of the 'necessary' as a niche within the 'possible', it does not affect my agreement with his characterization of 'hard' rationality and his distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' rationality.

How does this work? Dascal's original contribution to the answer to this question can be found in his taxonomy of types of polemic (1994, 1998, 2005a, b). As shown by his chart for mapping their structure, which can be found in several of his works, these are 'discussions', 'disputes', and 'controversies'. They differ in relation to their objective, extent, procedures, preferential move, and closure. In discussions, the shared commitments, propositions, rules, and criteria allow the participants to clearly state and 'solve' the problem or divergence, which is seen as an error which can be successfully corrected. This is the realm of certainty, which belongs to 'hard rationality'. In disputes, there is a well-defined divergence which cannot be solved in the light of the divergent standpoints concerning ideas, attitudes, sentiments, and preferences. The important thing is to win over the opponent, regardless of how argumentatively persuasive the victor can be, and the dispute is 'dissolved'. In 'disputes', irrationality can win the day. 'Controversies', on the other hand, provide the ideal location for 'soft rationality'. They involve deep divergences concerning standpoints related to ideas, attitudes, preferences, rules, and methods, or about how they should be interpreted. They are 'quasi-dialogical', in the sense that, over and above the participants, there is a third party (the audience) which also acts as final arbiter (the scientific community).

Throughout his major work, the *Origin of Species*, Darwin undertakes a dialogue with some of the great minds of his time, while at the same time being an ordinary interlocutor. He does this by means of 'one long narrative' or 'one long argument', as he calls the *Origin*, which can be seen as consisting of a sequence of arguments in a debate with his contemporaries. The main idea he wants to convey is that species are produced in nature by means of natural selection. Is this a 'rational' attempt at explanation, and of what kind? I will focus on Darwin's definition of 'explanation', be it explanation of facts, concepts, theories, or procedures, and on the argumentative strategies he adopts which satisfy the conditions accounted for by a Dascalian approach.

Darwin was not a professional epistemologist. He was not concerned with defining the meaning of 'explanation' before undertaking the task of showing how new species originate in nature. In only one passage in his writings (and this is not a piece of his scientific writing, but of his *Autobiography*), does he give something which is close to a definition of this: "From my early youth I have had the strongest desire to understand or explain whatever I observed, that is, to group all facts under some general laws" (Darwin 1958: 141)? Thus, instead of looking for a definition by which to understand the Darwinian meaning of 'explanation', we can go through Darwin's scientific writings and see the way he uses the expression 'explanation' and its cognates in order to form this meaning. This will reveal a multifaceted meaning of the term 'explanation' and will help us discover the Darwinian view of 'rationality'. If we begin with the analysis of 'explanation' and its cognates, we can demarcate a semantic horizon where innovative meanings of 'explanation' occur, in addition to more traditional ones which account for the facts which are given to us by experience, by giving reasons for believing and supporting our expectations, clearly understanding and throwing light on facts and concepts, and according to a pattern or model that is acceptable to the scientific community (Darwin 1872: 383, 400).

As we go deeper into the analysis of these initial markers and gradually come to understand its semantic significance, we can see that the meaning of 'explanation' is based on five main points, each with its own spectrum of connotations. These points are as follows: (1) *comprehension of the meaning of facts*, (2) *giving reasons*, (3) *an argument*, (4) exhibiting *a causal nature*, and (5) a collection of *procedures*. Initially, these features do not seem to be innovative, but they take on a new significance with Darwin's treatment. Although it is not possible to offer an exhaustive analysis here, I will give a number of examples to illustrate just how Dascalian Darwin's explanatory efforts become.

Darwin is always clearly aware of the necessity of theoretical and argumentative mediation in our efforts to explain how or why things are as they are. In a remarkably modern way, he emphasizes that explanation always *depends on a given theoretical view or assumption* and, in particular, on the *comparison of different views*. This comparison nearly always involves the consideration of all the ontological and epistemological ingredients Dascal points out in characterizing the structure of controversies. Most of the time, Darwin refers to his opponents by name and compares divergences and convergences item by item. Comparing the accuracy and wide scope of his view with his opponents' is one of Darwin's basic strategies for building and defending his theory. One important result of this strategy is that 'explaining' means *presenting the best possible explanatory alternative*. Thus, as a result of its explanatory superiority, this best alternative, i.e., Darwin's own theory, becomes the *only possible (rational) explanation* (as in the case of Darwin's defence of the common origin of all pigeons). Another result of this is to show that difficulties decrease or even disappear with a deeper analysis of the matter (as in the case of Darwin's treatment of the difficulties raised against his theory).

Each opposing view includes ontological and epistemological presuppositions, and the criteria and procedures which lie at the heart of their explanatory hypotheses. Understanding them requires both a contextual and a pragmatic analysis, and there may be disagreement on specific points or on all of them together. A pragmatic analysis of how they linguistically express their disagreements and standpoints, as well as of the nonlinguistic factors that may interfere with the defence of their ideas and criticisms, helps us to understand the nature of their disagreements.

A further point in favour of the role played by controversies or dialogical structures in Darwin's thought is the connotation of 'explaining' as *formulating the right questions* (about what, how, why) and *generating patterns of questions and answers* in order to introduce and guide his investigation and respond to objections. In the third chapter, entitled the Struggle for Existence, Darwin says:

> BEFORE entering on the subject of this chapter, I must make a few preliminary remarks, to show how the struggle for existence bears on Natural Selection. (. . .) How have all those exquisite adaptations of one part of the organization to another part, and to the conditions of life, and of one organic being to another being, been perfected? (. . .) Again, it may be asked, how is it that varieties, which I have called incipient species, become ultimately converted into good and distinct species which in most cases obviously differ from each other far more than do the varieties of the same species? How do those groups of species, which constitute what are called distinct genera, and which differ from each other more than do the species of the same genus, arise? All these results, as we shall more fully see in the next chapter, follow from the struggle for life. (Darwin 1872: 48–49)

In the sixth chapter, where he deals with the difficulties facing the theory, he classifies the four main objections to it as follows:

> First, why, if species have descended from other species by fine gradations, do we not everywhere see innumerable transitional forms? Why is not all nature in confusion, instead of the species being, as we see them, well defined? Secondly, is it possible that an animal having, for instance, the structure and habits of a bat, could have been formed by the modification of some other animal with widely different habits and structure? Can we believe that natural selection could produce, on the one hand, an organ of trifling importance, such as the tail of a giraffe, which serves as a fly-flapper, and, on the other hand, an organ so wonderful as the eye? Thirdly, can instincts be acquired and modified through natural selection? What shall we say to the instinct which leads the bee to make cells, and which has practically anticipated the discoveries of profound mathematicians? Fourthly, how can we account for species, when crossed, being sterile and producing sterile offspring, whereas, when varieties are crossed, their fertility is unimpaired? (Darwin 1872: 133)

Darwin's explanatory attempt is then projected into the realm of *forming conjectures,* thereby showing the possibility and legitimacy of forming hypotheses and working with *suppositions* and *presumptions* where direct evidence is not available to support his claims. In other words, this explanatory effort proceeds within the field of what Dascal calls 'soft rationality'.

For Darwin, *reason* is the cognitive faculty by means of which *reasons* for our claims and beliefs are created or recognized, and 'explanations' are produced and fairly evaluated. Without excluding 'hard rationality' from the way in which Darwin refers to 'reason', we can infer that Darwin would gladly accept Dascal's concept of 'soft rationality'. Darwin says:

> If our reason leads us to admire with enthusiasm a multitude of inimitable contrivances in nature, this same reason tells us, though we may easily err on both sides, that some other contrivances are less perfect. (Darwin 1872: 163)

In Darwin's view, the emotional and the intellectual interpenetrate each other in our efforts as cognitive beings. A good example of this can be seen in the 'scientific' description Darwin gives of the larval cirripedes:

> In the second stage, answering to the chrysalis stage of butterflies, they have six pairs of beautifully constructed natatory legs, a pair of magnificent compound eyes, and extremely complex antennae; but they have a closed and imperfect mouth, and cannot feed. (Darwin 1872: 389)

Reason operates together with imagination in determining the following: 'To arrive, however, at a just conclusion regarding the formation of the eye, with all its marvellous yet not absolutely perfect characters, it is indispensable that the reason should conquer the imagination' (Darwin 1872: 146).

As the means or elements by which we give support to our expectations and claims, *reasons* constitute a list of items which go far beyond traditional 'logical' and 'empirical' reasons. The list includes *facts and empirical processes*, *studies*, *principles*, *kinds of reasoning*, *definitions,* and *theoretical views* on *beliefs*, *suppositions*, *mental habits*, *the authority of the scientific community*, nontraditional *procedures*, and *argumentative strategies.* In the whole explanatory context, *causal attributions* are privileged *reasons* for evaluating given explanatory suppositions. As to the question of the sort of things we ask about or give reasons for, Darwin's list

is flexible, diversified, and far from conventional. It includes *propositions*, *beliefs*, *suppositions*, as well as *facts*, *principles*, *difficulties,* and *attitudes* (*tendencies or inclinations to believe, accept*, *or reject beliefs and suppositions*). A network containing all these elements in a mutually supportive way is then created. Darwin explains the normal classificatory procedure of naturalists when they organize the Natural System by means of their (unconscious) adoption of the theory of the community of descent with modification as a guiding principle. This theory, in turn, is established by the integrity of an explanatory context in which the criteria for accessing the success of our explanations are determined.

'Explanation' as 'giving reasons' leads us to the meaning of 'explanation' as *an argument*. Darwin refers to the *Origin* as 'one long argument' and asks the reader to judge his theory in the light of this argument as a whole: 'AS THIS whole volume is one long argument, it may be convenient to the reader to have the leading facts and inferences briefly recapitulated' (Darwin 1872: 404). The connotation of 'explanation' as *an argument* has a multifarious character in Darwin's work. We cannot reduce Darwin's argument to the traditional models of 'deductive' or 'inductive' reasoning, since his *reasoning of probability* does not fit with strictly inductive patterns. Rather than establishing inductive generalizations, Darwin takes the particular cases he examines as 'exemplary', and this allows us to see more clearly the general reasons that already exist and are to be taken into account in explaining the general phenomena they illustrate. *Deduction* is an expression Darwin uses very often throughout the text, and this usage meets the general requirement for deductive arguments, in the sense that if their premises are true, the truth of these premises is then a condition for the truth of the conclusion.

In fact, most reconstructions of the general argument presented in the *Origin of Species* tend to show its hypothetical-deductive features. The Principle of Natural Selection is given as the necessary conclusion for the following premises: the Principles of Variation (PV), the Struggle for Existence (PSE – sometimes referred to as Malthus' Principle), Variation in Fitness (PVF), and Inheritance (PI). These reconstructions meet the condition according to which in deductive arguments it cannot be the case that if the premises are true (PV, PSE, PVF, PI), the conclusion (PNS) is false. However, there are at least two other scientific conditions which have to be met by deductive arguments in their normal version and which are not met by these reconstructions. In virtue of the semantic nature of the conceptual framework of the argument, the premises (at least PSE and PVF) are not independent from each other, in the sense that they cannot be corroborated independently. Furthermore, the premises are not independent from the conclusion, on which they depend for their intelligibility, as long as we cannot conceive of PSE without conceiving of PNS, and vice versa. Whatever the logic of the argument may be, it does not belong to the realm of *hard rationality*.

Many of the explanatory procedures Darwin makes use of do not belong to this realm either. Throughout the *Origin* Darwin refers to and makes use of a number of procedures usually classified as 'scientific', but other procedures and argumentative strategies he uses are quite innovative. For instance, in the case of *experiments*, Darwin does not focus on these as providing an 'empirical proof' in terms of

immediately conclusive evidence, but as being part of a wider explanatory context, where *the interplay of the actual and the possible* has a distinctive role. In every case, from *illustrations*, *analogies*, and *comparisons* in general to *experiments*, Darwin makes efficient use of *imagination*. However, it is in the use of *metaphors* that imagination achieves its most powerful expression. *Metaphors* are essential not only for conceptual clarification, as in the case of what is meant by naturalists when they talk about 'metamorphoses of parts', or the introduction of new concepts, as in the case of 'natural selection':

> Naturalists frequently speak of the skull as formed of metamorphosed vertebrae; the jaws of crabs as metamorphosed legs; the stamens and pistils in flowers as metamorphosed leaves; but it would in most cases be more correct, as Professor Huxley has remarked, to speak of both skull and vertebrae, jaws and legs, &c., as having been metamorphosed, not one from the other, as they now exist, but from some common and simpler element. Most naturalists, however, use such language only in a metaphorical sense; they are far from meaning that during a long course of descent, primordial organs of any kind – vertebrae in the one case and legs in the other – have actually been converted into skulls or jaws. Yet so strong is the appearance of this having occurred, that naturalists can hardly avoid employing language having this plain signification. According to the views here maintained, such language may be used literally; and the wonderful fact of the jaws, for instance, of a crab retaining numerous characters which they probably would have retained through inheritance, if they had really been metamorphosed from true though extremely simple legs, is in part explained. (Darwin 1872: 386)

The 'literal' (real) and the 'metaphorical' are revealed as interchangeable parts or phases of one and the same dynamic explanatory process.

At decisive points of the defence and justification of his theory, Darwin makes use of *metaphors,* as in the case of his allegation concerning the 'imperfection of the geological records'. This imperfection is explained by 'Lyell's metaphor':

> ... Sir Charles Lyell now gives the support of his high authority to the opposite side; and most geologists and palaeontologists are much shaken in their former belief. Those who believe that the geological record is in any degree perfect, will undoubtedly at once reject the theory. For my part, following out Lyell's metaphor, I look at the geological record as a history of the world imperfectly kept, and written in a changing dialect; of this history we possess the last volume alone, relating only to two or three countries. Of this volume, only here and there a short chapter has been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a few lines. Each word of the slowly-changing language, more or less different in the successive chapters, may represent the forms of life, which are entombed in our consecutive formations, and which falsely appear to have been abruptly introduced. On this view, the difficulties above discussed are greatly diminished, or even disappear. (Darwin 1872: 289)

Attempts to both clarify and justify can be seen united in Darwin's view of classification in terms of languages:

> It may be worth while to illustrate this view of classification, by taking the case of languages. If we possessed a perfect pedigree of mankind, a genealogical arrangement of the races of man would afford the best classification of the various languages now spoken throughout the world; and if all extinct languages, and all intermediate and slowly changing dialects, were to be included, such an arrangement would be the only possible one. Yet it might be that some ancient languages had altered very little and had given rise to few new languages, whilst others had altered much owing to the spreading, isolation, and state of civilisation of the several co-descended races, and had thus given rise to many new dialects and languages.

> The various degrees of difference between the languages of the same stock would have to be expressed by groups subordinate to groups; but the proper or even the only possible arrangement would still be genealogical; and this would be strictly natural, as it would connect together all languages, extinct and recent, by the closest affinities, and would give the filiation and origin of each tongue. (Darwin 1872: 370–371)

Among the argumentative strategies which are central to Darwin's one long argument are the *whole* ('one long argument, the entire narrative') and *part* (particular arguments, chapters) *movement* designed to put together the argument through successive retrospectives and projections; the consideration of his theory's *explanatory power as a whole* instead of looking at how it functions in particular cases, the *comparison of Darwin's views with those of his opponents'*; and *the treatment of difficulties/objections/exceptions* to emphasize its superior explanatory power. The *interplay of the 'real' and the 'possible'* consists in showing the absence of logical impossibility for the occurrence of what is being claimed, or the presence of its factual possibility judged from the point of view of analogy (or other relationships of similarity) with cases which are actually given. This interplay focuses on the existence or inexistence of contrary evidence and on what is logically and/or factually possible. By means of the interplay of what is actually given and what can possibly be given, the 'contrary' evidence can be shown to be only 'apparently' contrary. It becomes neutralized, losing its negative impact on our claims, or even becoming positive evidence for them:

> Although the belief that an organ so perfect as the eye could have been formed by natural selection, it is enough to stagger any one; yet in the case of any organ, if we know of a long series of gradations in complexity, each good for its possessor, then, under changing conditions of life, there is no logical impossibility in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of perfection through natural selection. (Darwin 1872: 165)

Finally, we must keep in mind, as Darwin asks us to do so from the very beginning of the *Origin*, that the *balance of reasons* is a central strategy of his argumentation:

> For I am well aware that scarcely a single point is discussed in this volume on which facts cannot be adduced, often apparently leading to conclusions directly opposite to those at which I have arrived. A fair result can be obtained only by fully stating and balancing the facts and arguments on both sides of each question; and this is here impossible. (Darwin 1872: 2)

The balance of reasons for and against a certain position is also central to Dascal's 'soft rationality'. For Darwin as well as for Dascal's model, the weight of reasons is not precisely quantified and context independent. Darwin's large array of facts and reasons when building an explanation depends on the entire network of reasons and factual evidence which he carefully examines. By exploiting alternatives and connecting the best of these to each other, the available evidence is mediated by the theoretical and contextual relationships on which it depends.

These contextual relationships form a view of nature as a self-sustained and dynamic system within which laws and principles operate. From this point of view, the order which regulates this system 'inclines without necessitating'. Nevertheless,

it is not just a Leibnizian 'inclination', nor is it a Leibnizian 'necessitation'. In Darwinian terms, the necessity ('order') we find in nature is not opposed to contingency. The order which operates in nature is what maintains it as a system, by acting on what is contingent, without which nothing would be ordered. The necessary and the contingent are not opposed to this order, and this particular relationship between them gives them a new meaning. Darwin uses the expression 'a necessary contingency', and we might add to this 'a contingent necessity'. This new approach to necessity and contingency is one of the results of what was perhaps Darwin's greatest internal conflict, that of God *vs.* Science. This is neither the rigid format of a mechanical law nor a design to account for so much suffering in the world. How is it possible to have order without an explanation in terms of design? How are laws themselves determined, and how do they operate in the world so as to produce not only regular events but new ones, such as the origin of new species? If chance is (as Darwin remarks in the *Origin* [1872: 106]) the name we give to our ignorance of cause, and if order is established through natural laws which allow for the appearance of new organic forms, then the answer to these questions requires a new way of conceiving nature. We encounter this 'regulated' world in Darwin's view of nature as a dynamic and self-sustained system whose 'laws' are conceived as the 'tendencies' determined (or made possible) by this system as long as it is self-regulated. There is no need of a 'supernatural' design. The emergence of this view brings out a feature which is very characteristic of controversies – that of innovative ideas.

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Extrinsical or Intrinsical Necessity? Hobbes and Bramhall on Free Will

Daniel Mishori

Abstract This chapter examines the ways in which Hobbes and Bramhall link liberty and necessity to inner or outer causes or "necessities" in their seminal controversy on free will. The chapter shows that Hobbes and Bramhall were not arguing on the particular Hobbesian doctrine of necessity, which focuses on intrinsical necessity or volitional determinism, but on ethical and theological consequences of predestination and determinism in general, and on Hobbes' denial of an autonomous free will. Consequently, Hobbes' particular doctrine of necessity and liberty could not have been refuted by Bramhall, who argues against deterministic doctrines in general and in particular against extrinsical necessity – not Hobbes' position. Bramhall denies that Hobbes could acknowledge internal deliberation, consultation, or election. However, Hobbes describes at length the process of internal computation and deliberation in terms of mechanics and internal motions of volitions or appetites, thereby purporting to make moral philosophy "scientific." External causes are only the beginning of complex internal causations which constitute the real beginning of voluntary motions, which are internally generated. Hobbes even employs an introspective argument, which later became commonplace in Empiricist argumentation. The introspective method or reflection was supposed to provide Empiricists philosophers with direct insight into the real essence of mental phenomena, and Hobbes explicitly contrasts this experiential proof with Bramhall scholastic verbalism. Given the importance of this controversy,

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it is surprising that the core of Hobbes argument was not debated. As the issues of intrinsical necessity and volitional determinism were not discussed, no wonder that this controversy could have never been resolved.

Keywords Hobbes • Bramhall • Free will • Liberty • Determinism • Introspection

1 Introduction

This chapter examines the ways in which Hobbes and Bramhall link liberty and necessity to inner or outer causes or "necessities" in their seminal controversy on free will. Focusing on the localization of "necessity" clarifies significant aspects of this controversy such as the real issues debated, or the problematic relation of the free-will doctrine to Hobbes' materialism.

As far as we know, neither Hobbes nor Bramhall succeeded in persuading one another. In fact, both of them refused to give in on most of the points debated or even to reach partial compromises concerning definitions of terms. Given the importance of this controversy to its contemporaries, its relevance to modern discussions in ethical theory, and its being an example of polemical exchange, it is important to understand why these disputants could not have reached mutual understanding and what they were really arguing about in this controversy.

I will argue here that these disputants were not arguing on the particular Hobbesian doctrine of necessity but rather on the ethical and theological consequences of determinism in general. Consequently, Hobbes' particular doctrine of necessity and liberty, albeit its difficulties, could not have been refuted by Bramhall, who argues against deterministic doctrines in general and in particular against extrinsical necessity – not the position that Hobbes is defending.

2 The Nature of the Controversy

To its contemporaries, the significance of the Hobbes-Bramhall controversy went beyond the domains of philosophical contemplations on ethics or metaphysics (Chappell 1999). According to Jackson (2007: 1–2) "it is very misleading to refer to the [Hobbes and Bramhall's] debate on free-will as merely philosophical or theological, for in mid-seventeenth-century England (and Europe) that issue was frequently intertwined with politics, that is, matters of concern to governments." Free will suggested adherence to Arminianism, "just a half-step from 'popery' . . . the religion of the Habsburgs, Bourbons and other rival continental powers" (Jackson, ibid.), while predestination (theological determinism) was associated with "Puritanism," another cause of political unrest. Quentin Skinner (2008) describes Hobbes as proposing a revisionist account of liberty, as the absence of external impediment to one's motion, against the neo-Roman (or "Republican") conception of liberty as

non-domination by another's will, including implications regarding political institutions. The Hobbesian account of freedom, according to Skinner, suggested that one could be the subject of an absolute sovereign Monarch and still enjoy "liberty": "Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign"[1] (Leviathan, II, xxi). Whether or not Skinner's interpretation is correct,[2] the issues of liberty, predestination, and free will were associated with grave political issues.

Bramhall wrote the *Vindication of True Liberty from Antecedent and Extrinsical Necessity* after an oral debate with Hobbes on the matter – in the house of the Marquis of Newcastle in Paris (1645), and after both authors stated their views in writing. Hence, Bramhall was already familiar with Hobbes' views on free will and necessity. Therefore, it is surprising that in the very title of his work, Bramhall purports to defend "true liberty" from "antecedent and *extrinsical*[3] necessity."

From Bramhall's title, one may assume that Hobbes' determinism confesses the direct (mechanical) influence of external causes on the human Will. Actually, Hobbes' view is different. His "volitional determinism"[4] describes the way in which human action is caused by the will, which is itself necessitated by *inward* causes: the appetites or aversions. If this is the case, then it is odd that Bramhall defends "true liberty" from *external* determinism.

3 Bramhall Refrains to Acknowledge Hobbes' Internalism

Keeping in mind that Hobbes proposes a version of volitional determinism, Bramhall's *Vindication* seems like a long series of attempts to evade the real issue of internal necessity. The passages from Hobbes' *Of Liberty and Necessity,* which are quoted by Bramhall, do not exhibit a single case in which Hobbes argues for his determinism with externalist (physically or mechanically oriented) terminology. At the same time, every quote of Hobbes is followed by a comment in which Bramhall repeatedly attributes to Hobbes adherence to external necessity.

For example, when Hobbes answers Bramhall's argument from the scriptures: "If a wife makes a vow, it is left to her husband's choice, either to 'establish it', or to 'make it void'" (DLN, iv). Bramhall infers from this quote that the scriptures manifestly prove the existence of election and "true" liberty (i.e., liberty from external necessitation). Hobbes' answer is as follows:

> For if there comes into the husband's mind greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily; and if the evil that will follow thereon in the husband's opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must follow. And yet in this following of one's hopes and fears consisteth the nature of election. (LN: 242)

[1] In this chapter, all peculiar spelling in the quotations is in the original texts.

[2] Hall (2010) argues that Hobbes had a more complex notion of freedom and liberty.

[3] In this chapter, all italics in the quotations are mine (D.M.).

[4] "Volitional determinism" is a term used by Van Den Enden (1979).

Bramhall comments that "supposing but not granting, that the will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, yet this proves [no antecedent necessity, but coexistent with the act]; no *extrinsical* necessity." In his justification, that "the will and understanding being but two faculties of the same soul . . . " (Vin., vii: 44), Bramhall ignores the fact that this is precisely Hobbes' own position: that the will is internally determined by our own various faculties. Bramhall immediately enforces his argument against the externalist (supposedly Hobbes), and argues: "suppose the will do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act; then there is a necessity indeed, but neither absolute, nor *extrinsical*, nor antecedent, following from causes *without* ourselves . . . " (Vin., vii: 44).

Even when he is referring to concepts which directly relate to Hobbes' internal necessity, such as Will, Election, Deliberation, or the Appetites, Bramhall makes the same "external" remarks. He emphasizes that "the will is not *extrinsically* determined to its objects" (Vin., xxx: 170), or "He that is determined by something before himself or *without* himself, cannot be said to choose or to elect" (Vin., vi: 37). Then, when arguing against Hobbes' appetites, he claims that:

> T.H. may say, that besides the power [to perform or forbear action], men have also an appetite to evil objects, which renders them culpable. It is true; but if this appetite be determined by *another*, not by themselves, or if they have not the use of reason to curb or to restrain their appetites, they sin no more than a stone descending downward according to its natural appetite . . . . (Vin, III: 32)

Hence, whereas Hobbes never doubts the agency of the person, Bramhall continues to argue against the external determination of appetites.

4 Bramhall Denies that Hobbes Could Acknowledge Internal Deliberation, Consultation, or Election

As part of his refusal to acknowledge Hobbes' internalism, Bramhall denies that Hobbes can allow deliberation, consultation, or election. Bramhall begins by arguing that Hobbes contradicts himself in the very first sentence of his treatise *Of Liberty and Necessity.* He says that "the very first words of T.H. . . . trip up the heels of his whole cause; – 'I had once resolved.'" Bramhall argues that "To resolve pre-supposeth deliberation; but what deliberation can there be of that which is inevitably determined by causes *without* ourselves, before we do deliberate?" (Vin, i: 24) Again, Bramhall ascribes to Hobbes determinism of causes *without* ourselves and concludes that such necessity excludes the possibility of deliberation:

> I may like that which is inevitably imposed upon me by another; but if it be inevitably imposed upon me by *extrinsical* causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, and impossible for me to choose, whether I shall undergo it or not. (Vin, ii: 28)

For Bramhall, "the question is plainly this – whether all agents, and all events . . . be predetermined *extrinsically* and inevitably without their own concurrence in

the determination . . . " (Vin, iii: 32). Again, Bramhall argues against external determinism and suggests that the very idea of internal deliberation would justify his doctrine of free will.

5 The Controversy Concerns the Consequences of Determinism, and Not Any Specific Version of It

The above quotations suggest that the controversy could have easily been resolved. If Hobbes does not endorse extrinsical necessary causes of man's Will, and allows deliberation and election, then the disputants may be sharing a common ground. The fact that they do not reach agreement on these issues needs to be accounted for. The fact that Bramhall repeatedly returns to the issue of external necessitation reveals his underlying intuition that necessity is something that is imposed externally, whereas liberty stems from the autonomous workings of a man's own will and understanding. If it is the case, then Bramhall may simply be unable to digest Hobbes' inward necessitation.

Supposing that Bramhall actually misunderstands Hobbes' precise position, one would expect that the controversy should focus on bridging the gap between Hobbes' position and Bramhall's misunderstanding of it. In fact, their basic disagreement concerns the doctrine of absolute autonomy of the will. Bramhall argues repeatedly against other versions of determinism. For instance, his argument from Adam's fall is stated as follows:

> . . . if either the decree of God, or the foreknowledge of God, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of objects, or the last dictate of the understanding, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. (DLN, xi)

According to Bramhall, any form of determinism is incompatible with "true liberty," which Adam should have enjoyed before his fall. Bramhall implies that if Adam could not be held responsible for his actions, which is the case if they were imposed upon him, then he was unjustly punished – a consequence which is intolerable from his theological point of view, regardless of any particular type of determinism.

Thus, both disputants focus mainly on the ethical, social, and theological "consequences" of determinism. Hence, Hobbes perceives Bramhall's fifth and sixth objections, that "praise and reprehension, and reward and punishment, are all vain and unjust" to be "the arguments of the greatest consequence" (LN: 248). Hobbes feels obliged to resolve Bramhall's theological difficulties and to discuss the prescience of God (and hence predestination) – a central point of disagreement between Arminians and Calvinists. Hobbes argues that "foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of things known, and not they on it" (LN: 246). From this we learn that Hobbes' determinism is compatible with the predestination resulting from God's prescience, and yet it is not derived from it, since his determinism is based on internal necessity.

Actually, the consequences of determinism cause Bramhall to "hate" Hobbes' doctrine "with a perfect hatred," as it is "dishonorable to God and man" (Vin, xi: 63), which he articulates in the following dilemma:

> Either I was *extrinsically* and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse, without any concurrence of mine in the determination, and without any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was not so predetermined. If I was, then I ought not to be blamed . . .
>
> If I was not so predetermined, then mine actions and mine will to act are neither compelled nor necessitated by any *extrinsecal* causes, but I elect and choose, either to write or forbear, according to mine own will, and by mine own power. (Vin, iii: 32–33)

Bramhall is preoccupied with the question of blame, and hence with sin and just punishment. He states that "to do a necessary act is never a fault, nor justly punishable, when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by *extrinsical* causes" (Vin, xxv: 162). In light of this statement, one may assume that his repeated arguments against *extrinsical* necessity are not accidental. It is much more convenient to argue against unjust punishment for a deed forced by outward causes, than for a deed that was caused by the necessary nature of one's inward constitution of conflicting appetites and learned habits.

6 The Ontological Nature of Volitions

The opposing ways in which Bramhall and Hobbes understand liberty and necessity are both determined by their relation to outward and inward processes, but in contrary ways. For Bramhall, Liberty is an intrinsical trait or "power" (Vin, xxx: 168) that depends on an autonomous and "rational" free will. Thus, "a free act is only that which proceeds from the free election of the rational will after deliberation" (Vin., xxviii: 165). Necessity consists of being effected by external physical causes. For Hobbes, on the other hand, "Liberty" is defined negatively with respect to outer obstacles and events, as "the absence of all impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and in the intrinsical quality of the agent" (Vin., xxix: 166). And in the *Leviathan*: "Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;)" (II, xxi). That is, liberty is freedom from extrinsical impediments, while "Necessity" stems from the inner workings of one's own mind which necessarily produce the will for an action. Hence, for Bramhall, liberty is intrinsical and necessity extrinsical. For Hobbes, Liberty is (defined) extrinsical and necessity (of the will) is intrinsical. However, they do not argue explicitly on that level.

Graeme Hunter proposed an explanation for the indecisiveness of the controversy, which could account also for Bramhall's refrain of disputing the particulars of intrinsical necessity. In *The Fate of Thomas Hobbes* (1989: 19), he argues that because Hobbes' presuppositions concerning the new science of mechanics were not understood, much less shared, by Bramhall, their discussion failed to be decisive. Hunter presented Bramhall as an old-fashioned intellectual, bound by the old ways

of scholastic argumentation. Hobbes, according to Hunter, had the advantage of being versed in his opponent's intellectual world, the scriptures and the scholastic tradition, whereas Bramhall, "handicapped as he was by ignorance of the new mechanical science," was not as familiar with Hobbes' new ideas.

However, it seems that the blame for Bramhall's "misunderstanding" of intrinsical necessity lays at least partially with Hobbes. According to Russell (2011), Hobbes' central aim was "to make moral philosophy genuinely 'scientific,'" i.e., a "naturalistic description of human beings in terms of the basic categories and laws of matter and motion" (p. 1). However, given that "naturalistic" or "scientific" analysis of volitions is given in terms of mechanics, matter, and motion, it is not clear whether the computational process of deliberation which Hobbes describes is identical with external, physical mechanics, or only analogous to it. The nature of volitions (or appetites) is not ontologically clear. Are volitions made of matter, which is subjected to mechanical causes, or matter merely provides a model for the working of the mind? Hobbes depicts volitions as beginning externally, affected by external agents or physical causes, but whether all internal occurrences are internal *physical* bodily movements is not entirely clear.

Gary B. Herbert (1989: 65) argues that "the two components of Hobbes' conception of (human) nature – mechanical movement and volitional activity – remain unreconciled." Hobbes could have said that since the appetites are nothing but material movements, which are subjected to the same mechanical laws as all other material objects, the will is necessitated mechanically. Perhaps, Hobbes was aware of the problematic ontological status of his volitions and deliberately chose *not* to clarify himself on this issue.

According to Samuel Mintz (1962), a contemporary of Hobbes, Ralph Cudworth noticed this difficulty in Hobbes' discussion and Bramhall's failure to respond to it. Mintz argues that:

> Cudworth felt it was only necessary to show that spirits exists. If it does not . . . everything in the universe is material, and is moved by *external* pressure only . . . Hobbes therefore denied free-will because he denied all spirituality . . . and made all cogitation, intellection and volition to be nothing but mechanical motion and passions from objects *without* . . . . (p. 127)

However, in his comment Mintz fails to notice that irrespectively of the nature of volitions, whether material or spiritual, volitions themselves constitute *internal* necessity, and not necessity from "without," from "external pressure."

7 Discussion: Arguments and Controversy

Hobbes' materialism is the background of this controversy, especially his attempt to account for human nature in terms of matter and mechanics. He describes "sense" as "pressure" from an "Externall Body, or Object" (Leviathan, I, i), and "memory" (and imagination) as a "Decaying Sense" (Leviathan, I, ii). Through the senses we

are being impressed by external forces. However, Hobbes also recognizes "Vitall" and "Animal" motions, "otherwise called Voluntary Motion" (Leviathan, I, vi). According to Hobbes:

> . . . Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of Whither, Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. (Leviathan, I, vi)

Thus, the external causes are only the beginning of complex *internal* causations which constitute the real beginning of different types of voluntary motions, which are internally generated, and not caused from without. Appetites and volitions, according to Hobbes, are governed by similar laws as external material entities, but it is not entirely clear whether volitions are identical or merely analogous to matter and mechanics. Whichever is the case, Hobbes' notion of the nature of volitions is an inherent part of his discussion of free will, and was, perhaps, a constant cause of misunderstanding as to his view of internal necessity.

Nevertheless, even if mental processes are basically (material) bodily movements, the causal chains do not proceed directly from external events, but are primarily (yet to be theoretically "translated" to mechanical movements) the causes of evaluation and deliberation of memories, habits, and the like, i.e., internal causation. At this point Bramhall accuses Hobbes of changing the meanings of liberty, election, and deliberation, which he certainly does. Hobbes does not reply directly to this accusation. Instead, he invites his readers to consult (to reflect on) their own experience, to *introspectively* examine the meanings of these disputed concepts:

> [what liberty is] . . . there can be no other proof offered but every *man's own experience*, by *reflecting* on himself, and remembering what he useth to have in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent or that action is free. Now he that so *reflecth* on himself cannot but be satisfied, but that "deliberation" is the considering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come; that by "spontaneity" it meant inconsiderate proceeding . . . ; that "will" is the last act of deliberation; that a "free agent" is he that can do if he will or forbear if he will; and that "liberty" is the absence of *external* impediments. (Vin.: 175)

With this suggested internal examination, Hobbes is making an appeal of a kind that will become commonplace in Empiricist argumentation (Mishori 2004a, b, 2005). The reflective method, which was discussed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume and praised by Thomas Reid of the Scottish School of Common Sense (Mishori 2003, 2004a), is supposed to provide philosophers with direct insight into the real essence of mental phenomena, an empirical proof. Hobbes, like the later Empiricists, explicitly contrasts this experiential method with the verbalism of the scholastic discourse:

> But to those that out of costume speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains, to consider what they think when they hear such words,

> no argument can be sufficient, because *experience* and *matter of fact* is not verified by other man's arguments, but by every man's own *sense* and *memory.* (LN: 276)

According to Hobbes, such reflection could provide evidence that "'deliberation' is the considering of the good and evil," or that the will is "the last act of deliberation." Bramhall does not respond to Hobbes' introspective challenge. From this fact we learn that not only Bramhall fails to acknowledge Hobbes' internal necessity, he also refuses to engage in the types of reflection (and argumentation) which could have contributed the effort to understand and argue about volitional determinism. These facts suggest that the two contenders were not really engaging in a rational effort to solve their controversy on free will. On the meeting point between old and new ideas, as well as old and new ways of arguing, their debate was more of a "dispute," in the sense of Dascal (1998), i.e., an effort to win their case in the eyes of third parties, the Marquis of Newcastle at first, and then possibly the general public, after Hobbes' manuscript has been published in 1654. Perhaps, when grave political implications were at stake, entrenchment in opposing views and debating mostly ethical and theological inconveniences of determinism was the most reasonable strategy for both contenders. Therefore, Bramhall does not argue against Hobbes' particular conception of intrinsical volitional determinism and concentrate on denouncing extrinsical determinism, predestination, and the ethical and theological consequences of Hobbes' denial of an autonomous free will. As the real issue of volitional determinism was not debated, no wonder that this dispute could not have been resolved.

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Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons

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Abstract One of the features of John Locke's moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* II, xxi, §70, Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations. In itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in Early Modern philosophy. Blaise Pascal's Wager is a famous example of a similar idea of balancing between available options which Marcelo Dascal has discussed in his important 2005 article "The Balance of Reason".

Leibniz, however, was not always satisfied with this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke's *Essay*, *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain*, II, xxi, §66, he presented an alternative model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits well with Leibniz's theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different inclinations to different goods.

I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the practical rationality of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. The topics include Leibniz's criticism of Lockean hedonism and the discussion of akratic behaviour in II, xxi of *Essay* and *Nouveaux essais*.

Keywords Locke • Leibniz • Decision-making • Decision models • Moral psychology

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1 Introduction

Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain or *New Essays on Human Understanding* (NE, 1704) is a fascinating, although one-sided, dialogue between John Locke (Philalethes) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Theophilus). One of its themes, although more or less implicit in Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (E, 1689), is ethics and the good life in book II, Chapters xx and xxi.[1]

I will examine Locke's somewhat controversial moral philosophy, especially the question of the goals of moral action and discuss Leibniz's critique of his views. To highlight professor Dascal's important work on Leibniz's conception of rationality, my main emphasis in this paper is on the different models of balancing reasons.

2 Locke's Ethics

Garrett Thompson sketches three kinds of moral views in Locke (Thompson 2001: 69–73). The first concerns natural law. He argues that universal laws which concern all human beings are knowable by reason and therefore morality is rational. This has nothing to do with innate ideas, however. Locke argues that conscience is the opinion of rightness or wrongness of one's own actions and that they are derived from education or custom (E I, iii, §8).

Locke's second moral view is related to the divine command theory. Morality is based on God's will which is revealed to men in religion and in universal laws (E I, iii, §6), and our greatest guide in learning the laws is the Bible, besides revelation. Following God's will requires control and therefore morality requires that we can be rewarded or punished and this happens in the afterlife. Locke argues repeatedly in the *Essay* and the *Reasonableness of Christianity* that the afterlife is the only possible basis for morality, because rewards and punishments after death are the only thing great enough to give people a convincing reason to act. This is made possible by the fact that God attaches pleasure to certain kinds of acts in order to reward us for obeying his laws (E II, xxviii, §5–8).

Closest to our everyday experience is Locke's third view in E II, xx, which relates pleasure and pain with good and evil. This very Epicurean view emphasizes pleasure which to Locke signifies whatever a person desires. Like Hobbes, he does not recognize a *summum bonum* because people desire very different things. The problem with this view is hedonism – there seems to be no other moral motive than each person's own pleasure (xxi, §41) unless our education manages to provide us with good reasons to find our pleasure in common good and useful things for our community.

[1]Page numbers to Locke's and Leibniz's works refer to the Nidditch edition of Locke's *Essay* (1975) (E) and the Bennett-Remnant edition of Leibniz's *New Essays* (1996) (RB). The page numbers in the Bennett-Remnant edition correspond with the Akademie edition of the same work (A VI 6).

3 Locke's Balance of Pleasure and Pain

According to Locke, men desire various things, and when they get them, they feel pleasure and, in the opposite case, pain. The lack of some object of men's desire brings about uneasiness in them (E II, xxi). But how does the apparent hedonism and moral rationality work together in Locke's moral philosophy? When God attaches pleasure to certain objects, it is evident that at least some will strive to obtain them. "Surely not everyone strives in this manner" is one's immanent thought. When people desire various things, it would seem that even the ones God recommends us to strive for are not necessarily the ones everyone pursues. Locke freely admits that people can desire things which are not good for them or to the common good (II, xxi). Even if one knows exactly what to do in a given situation, one can still be weak-willed and surrender to one's desires and thereby act against one's better judgement. This is precisely why God has to attach pleasure and pain to certain acts.

Perhaps this works. When we know that eating too much leads to nausea, we try to eat more moderately. However, one can argue that there are always bulimics who simply cannot help themselves, or those who just do not care. But these are minor problems. In more serious ethical problems, Locke strongly argues along the following lines: when we act sinfully, it is assumed that God will punish us. If the offence is serious, it can risk our afterlife. Are we ready to face eternal pain in hell?

This is Locke's balance of pleasure and pain which, as an argument, is a little similar to Blaise Pascal's famous Wager (*Pensées*, part III, note 233, 1670). Pascal argues that men cannot be sceptical all the way down because their existence is limited. They have to suppose that either God exists or he does not. Because human life is vain and wretched, we have nothing to lose by betting on the afterlife. If God does not exist, we lose nothing, and if he exists, we can only win (for details, see Hájek 2008).

Locke presents his version of the wager in II, xxi, §70. Although our desires are usually related to immediate pleasures, we have to understand that eternal misery is so powerful a pain that it should be avoided at all costs. Thus, we should use our reason and think what would be better: all the pleasures in this world or all the misery in the next.

> The rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has established, as the enforcements of his law, are of weight enough to determine the Choice, against whatever pleasure and pain this life can shew, when the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility, which no body can make any doubt of. (E 281)

Locke's reasoning is different from Pascal's in that he really does not go for the ultimate question – God exists and decides our fate, simple as that. A sophisticated estimation of probabilities is also ignored – the crucial issue is only whether the risk is far too great to take or not. Thus, the decision is between a virtuous and a sinful life. Locke emphasizes the avoidance of pain which has clearly an Epicurean character. He says:

> . . . though the vertuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure . . . but when infinite happiness is put in one scale, against infinite misery in

> the other; if the worst, that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can without madness run the venture? (E 281–282)

Later, in §70, Locke presents a very similar argument to Pascal's Wager:

> . . . if the good man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miserable. (E 282)

Right at the end of §70, Locke alludes to Pascal by saying that it is reasonable to live a virtuous life because in that case we can be certain that there is at least a possibility for a future life.

Locke's moral precept is very simple. We add to the one side of the scales infinite happiness and to the other side infinite misery. Independently of our life here in earth, we should think of the afterlife and make sure that there is a chance for infinite happiness. The model of a pair of scales Locke applies is traditional, an idea already applied by Homer and extensively discussed by Professor Dascal in his article "The Balance of Reason" (Dascal 2005).

Locke also applies the metaphor of a balance when he discusses the reasons for uneasiness in §57 of II, xxi. When we contemplate the remote, future good or infinite happiness of the afterlife, we can, by willing, strongly counterbalance the uneasiness (E 272). There is a constant battle going on between delight and uneasiness. Mankind's lot is alleviated in Locke's hypothesis by the fact that all goods are known to man, so we know exactly what to choose in a given situation. The problem for us, admitted by Locke in §60, is that the future good does not move us or create uneasiness in us – the motive in striving for virtue is only fear of God's punishment in the afterlife. But, as he says in §65, future pleasure is seldom able to counterbalance any uneasiness, of either pain or desire, which is present (E 277).

Men can, however, change the pleasantness or unpleasantness that accompanies actions. In §69 Locke argues that this can be done by "due consideration in some cases and practice, application and custom in most" (E 280). One can abstain from bread and tobacco at first by reasoning and, after a while, by habit. When one reaches a conclusion that tobacco is not good for one's health, one can remove the pleasure from the act of smoking, and after a while, abstinence becomes a habit. Locke argues that a similar procedure concerns virtue. Like drinking a bad-tasting potion for curing an illness and reaching a state of well-being, we can be accustomed to abstaining from pleasures to promote our eternal happiness. "But", Locke says, "the pleasure of the action itself is best acquir'd or increased by use and practice" (E 280). Habits can keep us on the straight and narrow. To this end, however, a proper education is needed. Locke argues that fashion and common opinion have handed down wrong notions with the result that our values are misplaced. Contrary habits change our pleasures and give enjoyment to that which is necessary or conducive to our happiness.

4 Leibniz's Critique of Locke's Views

Theophilus is keen to emphasize the moral hedonism of Philalethes. For example, in §55, he only cites from the *Essay* the Epicurean dictum "Let us eat and drink . . . for tomorrow we shall die" (RB 201). On the other hand, he agrees largely with Locke in that there is the present pleasure and the pleasure of the future life: "But if there were only the present, one would have to settle for the perfections which it offered, i.e., for present pleasure" (NE II, xx, §58; RB 202).

But Theophilus is more sceptical than Philalethes in recognizing the good. While the latter applies the example of drinking in §63, arguing that once we have experienced our first hangover, we would avoid drinking wine, Leibniz typically presents a mathematical example concerning curves which asymptotically approach a straight line in order to argue that a very short time can erase our memory. He discusses blind thoughts, symbols of future happiness and perfection which guide us when we are accustomed to virtue. These moments help us to recollect the virtuous action – in general, our attention is directed towards the present pleasures and pains. "Often one does not so much as raise the question of whether the future good is preferable – one acts solely on impressions, with no thought of bringing them into scrutiny" (RB 203). Like Locke, Leibniz relies on good habits which help us to stay virtuous: " . . . true happiness requires less knowledge but greater strength and goodness of will, so that the dullest idiot can achieve it just as easily as can the cleverest and most educated person" (II, xxi, §67; RB 207).

He also agrees with Locke that one can gain new motivation by carefully considering her actions and reflecting whether or not they are good to oneself, as in the case of consuming tobacco (II, xxii, §69). Thus, one can change the pleasantness or unpleasantness of a certain act. When Locke presents his wager in §70, Leibniz is surprised and happy. He says: "I am very pleased, sir, that you are now correcting the contrary claim you seemed to make before".[2]

Perhaps the greatest disagreement between Philalethes and Theophilus on this issue concerns the dichotomy of pleasure and pain. In II, xxi, §64 Locke argues that we cannot enjoy two pleasures at once, much less any pleasure, while pain possesses us. It is either pain or pleasure, uneasiness or delight for Locke. Leibniz goes on to give counterexamples: a man with a gout may be overjoyed because a great fortune has come to him and a man living in luxury may be unhappy because of a disgrace at court. To Leibniz, pleasure and pain is a mixture, and joy or sorrow depends upon which components prevail in the mixture (RB 203–204). He even goes on to compare the Lockean man to a little child who chases after the slightest of present sensible pleasure.

In §66 Locke applies the pair of scales metaphor and repeats that we should stick to the straight and narrow and not take the risk of damnation. While Leibniz certainly agrees with this, he thinks that balancing on the pair of scales is not

[2]Leibniz refers to E II, xxi, §55, where Locke mentions the Epicurean dictum.

sufficient in more complicated decisions (II, xxi, §67). He says that the question of how inevitable a result is cannot be compared with the question of how good or bad it is. This is the problem for casuistry – they make simple comparisons between the probability of a consequence of the moral act and the goodness of the act. Even though an act is good in itself, this does not mean that its consequences are necessarily good. So for Leibniz, one has to think of not only the value of the act itself but also the consequences which follow from it. When we give a coin to a beggar, we may feel a sense of perfection and a foretaste of the afterlife, but this act, although good in itself might, in the long run, lead to consequences which are not necessarily good. Thus, simple charity or even inadequate virtue does not necessarily grant us afterlife. In general, in our practical rationality, we have to take into account many different aspects, not only employ the pair of scales model where goodness and badness or pleasure and pain are weighed. Leibniz says:

> . . . in this as in other disparate and heterogeneous assessments with more than one dimension (so to speak), the magnitude of the thing in question is made up proportionately of two estimates; it is like a rectangle with two things to be considered, namely its length and its breadth. (II, xxi, §66; RB 206)

Leibniz is a pluralist concerning goods and he can be seen as part of the Aristotelian eudaimonist tradition. One tries to find an optimum where several goods are included in some degree rather than deliberate between the means of reaching one specific good. The model described in the citation above can be called, to follow Simo Knuuttila, a vectorial model of rational decision, and it can be understood as a functional analysis of different goods which are separate and in competition with each other (Knuuttila 1998). Instead of balancing two options with each other, the moral agent can map different goods (as in coordinates) and try to find a balanced optimum between them. In this optimum the goods are not necessarily present maximally, but only to a degree (for details, see Roinila 2007).

5 Case Study: *Akrasia*

To illustrate the differences between the reasoning about the good of the two philosophers, I will conclude my paper with a discussion of *akrasia* or weakness of the will in II, xxi, §33–35. Locke explains the phenomenon by uneasiness. He argues that the will is not necessarily directed towards the greatest good, but it is determined by the greatest uneasiness. The greatest good determines the will only in cases when our desire makes us uneasy in the want of it. But it is quite often the case that our desire is directed by less virtuous desires, as Locke notes:

> . . . let a drunkard see, that his health decays, his estate wastes; discredit and diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink, attends him in the course he follows; yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions, the habitual thirst after his cups, at the usual time, drives him to the tavern, though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another life . . . . (E II, xxi, §35, 253)

A little later Locke relates this case to *akrasia.*

> . . . thus he is, from time to time, in the state of that unhappy complainer, *Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequoer*[3]*:* which sentence, allowed for true, and make good by constant experience, may this, and possibly no other, way be easily made intelligible. (E II, xxi, §35, 254)

In Locke's view, men strive for virtue but are frequently hindered by uneasiness which is understood as a strong desire for an absent good, whatever that may be. As what is truly good is often weaker to motivate us than what is good in the sensual sense, we have to work really hard to resist the temptations which lure us continually. In other words, we have to weigh the future good against what is good in the present and decide each time if we are willing to risk the afterlife in the light of the present real or imagined needs. At most, we can suspend our action to reconsider the reasons and deliberate anew.

Leibniz comments on Locke's view extensively in *Nouveaux essais*. He cannot accept the view that the will is not directed to the greatest good, but does not consider uneasiness as necessarily a bad thing – there is uneasiness present in some form in all of our perceptions. This uneasiness or *inquietude* (Leibniz's preferred term; the corresponding word in English is disquiet) motivates us to strive for clearer knowledge and keeps us alert at all times. Thus Leibniz sees disquiet as a necessary and mostly positive part of the human condition: in addition to clear and distinct ideas, there are always minute, confused perceptions present in our minds which only occasionally become attended and conscious. Because of this, there is seldom only one distinct desire which takes a hold of us. Instead, numerous spurs to action are always present which may be mutually incompatible. The final volition is more or less a compromise or in an ideal case an optimum between different inclinations:

> Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete volition: it is the result of the conflict amongst them. There are some, imperceptible in themselves, which add up to a disquiet that impels us without our seeing why. There are several that join forces to carry us towards or away from some object, in which case there is desire or fear, also accompanied by a disquiet but not always one amounting to pleasure or displeasure. (II, xxi, §39, RB 192)

Leibniz seems to be saying that moral wrongdoing can happen in two ways. In the first case the deliberator is unable to discern the real from the apparent good. The minute perceptions blur our judgement and the disquiet which arises makes us believe that the wrong act is right in a given situation. The apparent good is mistakenly chosen instead of the real good – in other words, the optimization of what is good fails because of an error. This is not a case of *akrasia*, strictly speaking. It is rather the sheer inability (ignorance or error) to discover the real good in question.

In the second, more serious case, the real good, although it is present and apperceived, is rejected – it does not act as the motivational factor. This kind of case represents *akratic* action in the true sense for Leibniz (and one can find this

[3] "I see and approve the better, but follow the worse" (Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 7.20–21).

strong version also in Locke). The weak-willed agent judges one course of action to involve the greater good but is inattentive to it, while she is sensitive to the good involved in the worse course of action (Vailati 1990: 219). These apparent goods are often spiced up by lively sensual qualities, which arise from minute perceptions such as colour, smell, taste and other sensual pleasures. This is why the apparent goods are more desirable to a weak-willed person than the real good which may be less tempting. To use Leibniz's example, a person who perceives the smell of fresh cakes rejects one's diet and gives in to one's desire (II, xxi, §35). The real good recommended by the intellect is rejected by the will, and the consequent volition is directed to the apparent goods instead of the real good, which may be the second-best alternative.

> It is a daily occurrence for men to act against what they know; they conceal it from themselves by turning their thoughts aside, so as to follow their passions. Otherwise we would not find people eating and drinking what they know will make them ill or even kill them. (NE I, ii, §11; RB 94)

The difference between Locke and Leibniz is in the way the judgement takes place. According to Locke, we are always conscious of the objects of our will whereas Leibniz argues that we become conscious of them eventually. Thus we may be led to wrong goals due to inattentiveness.

Often the real goods in deliberation, such as virtue, perfection and the afterlife, are present in the form of symbols or blind thoughts, which are faint compared to the more concrete, vivid images of food, drink and sensual pleasures that accompany clear but confused perceptions. However, once the mind is sufficiently developed, it becomes sensitive to the real good.

> Sometimes they have the idea of an absent good or evil, but only very faintly, so it is no wonder that it has almost no influence on them. Thus, if we prefer the worse it is because we feel the good it contains but not the evil it contains or the good that exists on the opposite side . . . the finest moral precepts and the best prudential rules in the world have weight only in a soul that is as sensitive to them as to what opposes them. (NE II, xxi, §35; RB 186)

This complicated balance of spurs for action illustrates the hypothesis that Leibniz does not have the Lockean model of the pair of scales in mind here (although he applies it on many other occasions). In a situation where there are several inclinations to different directions present in the mind, he must have thought it more in terms of the vectorial model explained in the preceding section. The balance of reasons is more complicated in Leibniz's case: it is not for or against, it is more like a dynamical balance as in chemistry or mechanics. Leibniz describes it as follows:

> Since the final result of the balance is determined by how things weigh against one another, I should think it could happen that the most pressing disquiet did not prevail; for even if it prevailed over each of the contrary endeavours taken singly, it may be outweighed by all of them taken together . . . everything that then impinges on us weighs in the balance and contributes to determining a resultant direction, almost as in mechanics . . . . (NE II, xxi, §40; RB 193)

With the model one can map different inclinations or desires and reflect whether or not they concern apparent or real goods and what possible consequences they may

have. Like the pair of scales model, the vectorial model is heuristic, helping us to conceive the options in a given situation. For Leibniz, moral deliberation is the result of a complicated and dynamical choice between plural goods, whereas for Locke it is a question of choosing between good or evil, for a future good against taking any inherent risk.

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Harmonizing the Poles: A Note on Leibniz's Notion of Justice

Noa Naaman-Zauderer

Abstract Developing his new definition of justice in the six drafts of the *Elements of Natural Law* (1670–1671), Leibniz endeavors to settle two seemingly excluding assumptions underlying his preconception of justice. The first is that justice demands an active concern for the good of others. To be just, Leibniz insists, one must seek the good of others for its own sake, considering it an independent end and not only a means to one's own benefit. The second assumption is that "there is no one who deliberately does anything except for the sake of his own good." Adhering to the egoistic psychology of Hobbes and Carneades, Leibniz holds that "we seek the good also of those whom we love for the sake of the pleasure which we ourselves get from their happiness." In the fourth draft, Leibniz appears to find the key to the solution of his problem. "The answer," he writes, "certainly depends upon the nature of love." "To love," as he states earlier in this essay, "is to find pleasure in the happiness of another." In this chapter I attempt of analyze the solution that Leibniz offers in this early essay and to question its coherency. I will argue further that an interesting hint of a possible solution to the problem may be drawn from his later writings on justice, where his notion of disinterested love becomes more explicit.

Keywords Love • Justice • Charity • Wisdom • Empathy

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In the introduction to his recent book, *G.W. Leibniz: The Art of Controversies*, Marcelo Dascal discusses the sense of Leibniz's "eclecticism" and writes:

> It does not consist in the juxtaposition of apparently reconcilable theses belonging to opposed systems, without modifying such theses – as the Calixtines and others thought to be possible. Nor does it consist in the integration of diverse materials into a synoptic-syncretistic vision – in the Ciceronian way. It consists rather in developing a 'higher' viewpoint, wherein the theses in confrontation are inscribed in a more comprehensive order which grants them a new meaning within an harmonious framework. (Dascal et al. 2008: 1)

Many examples of this dialectic method, which features prominently in Leibnizian thinking as a whole, may be found in Dascal's valuable studies on Leibniz's theory of controversies. My concern here is to exemplify this crucial aspect of Leibniz's thinking by using it as an interpretive tool. I will analyze Leibniz's early attempt to reconcile two assumptions associated with his notion of justice that, ostensibly, are mutually exclusive. I will then suggest that applying his dialectic method to his proposed solution could prove significant in settling these apparent inconsistencies.[1]

In the six drafts of the *Elements of Natural Law* (*Elementa juris naturalis*, A.VI.1: 459–465) written in Mainz during the years 1670–1671, Leibniz develops his new definition of justice which he eventually characterizes, in the fourth draft, as "the habit of loving others ... as long as this can be done prudently" (A.VI.1: 465/L137).[2] This notion is rather close, though not identical, to Leibniz's mature definition of justice as the charity of the wise, or "wise charity" (*caritas sapientis*), which I touch upon briefly later.[3]

Attempting to reconcile an egoistic psychology with the possibility of human justice, Leibniz seeks to make two of his fundamental and seemingly exclusive assumptions compatible. The first assumption is that justice demands an active concern for the good of others. Leibniz insists that, to be just, one must seek the good of others for its own sake (*propter se*), considering it an independent end and not only a means to one's own benefit. The second assumption is that "there is no one who deliberately does anything except for the sake of his own good" (A.VI.1: 461/L134). Adhering to the egoistic psychology of Hobbes and Carneades, Leibniz claims that "we seek the good also of those whom we love for the sake of the pleasure which we ourselves get from their happiness" (A.VI.1: 461/L134). Taken together, these assumptions imply that the virtuous person must act on two different, apparently conflicting motives: an egoistic concern for oneself and a

[1] In this short lecture I discuss quite concisely Leibniz's early definition of justice and his dialectical method. Obviously, there is much to be said about both issues, and a more developed analysis will have to wait for another article now in the works.

[2] I am indebted to Ursula Goldenbaum for introducing me to this important issue a long time ago and for providing me with her scholarly studies on the topic (see her 2002: 209–231, 2003). For further various perspectives of the issue, see, for instance, Mulvaney (1968: 60ff.), Hostler (1975: 47–54, 57–59), Dascal (1993: 394–396, 1994: 113–115), Brown (1995: 411–441, esp. pp. 416–417, 425–426, 2011: 265–303), Riley (1996: 144–152), Piro (1999), and Naaman-Zauderer (2006).

[3] According to Grua, Leibniz's mature definition of justice as *caritas sapientis* occurred not before 1677 (Grua 1953: 2–3). See also Mulvaney (1968: 60, 72) and Riley (1996: 145).

genuine concern for others, neither of which is a mere means to the other. Leibniz explicitly states that, to meet the conditions of justice, these two motives for human action must not relate to each other as a means to an end: "There is in justice a certain respect for the good of others, and also for our own, *but not in the sense that one is the end of the other*" [*Est in Iustitia respectus aliqvis boni alieni, est et nostri, non is tamen ut alterum alteri finis sit*] (A.VI.1:463/L136; my emphasis). Otherwise, as Leibniz explains, a person could have been considered just albeit acting on mere mercenary motives:

> Otherwise it may follow that it will be just to abandon some wretched person in his agony, though it is in our power to deliver him from it without very much difficulty, merely because we are sure that there will be no reward for helping him. Yet everybody abominates this as criminal, even those who find no reason for a future life; not to mention the sound sense of all good people which spurns so mercenary a reason for justice [*alias seqvetur jure miserum aliqvem in exitio relinqvi, unde eum pene nullo negotio eripere in nostra potestate est, cum certum est praemium auxilii abfore. Qvod tamen omnes etiam qvi nullam futurae vitae rationem habent ut sceleratum exsecrantur. Ut taceam respuere omnium bonorum sensum hanc mercenariam justitiae rationem*]. (A.VI.1: 463/L136)

The problem that Leibniz confronts in this essay may be formulated as follows: insofar as we never deliberately do anything except for the sake of our own good, how can we seek the good of others in itself (*per se*) rather than to further our own?

In the fourth draft, Leibniz appears to find the key to the solution of his problem. He writes that the answer "certainly depends upon the nature of love" (A.VI.1: 464/L136). To love, according to Leibniz, is "to find pleasure in the happiness of another" (A.VI.1: 461/L134) or, in another version, to convert the happiness of another onto one's own.[4] And justice, as he asserts in this draft, is "the habit of loving others (or of seeking the good of others in itself and of taking delight in the good of others), as long as this can be done prudently" (A.VI.1: 464-465/L137), namely, in accordance with the dictates of reason.

At first glance, Leibniz's notion of love would appear to allow him to reconcile his two seemingly conflicting assumptions. The natural affection of love, thus understood, appears to satisfy both opposing interests: the self-oriented interest of increasing one's own pleasure and the altruistic interest of intensifying the happiness of one's beloved. Leibniz holds, moreover, that in increasing the happiness or the perfection of others we rejoin their happiness and thus *intensify* our own. In November 1671 he writes to Arnauld:

> [B]enefiting others proceeds at the rate, not of addition but of multiplication. . . . This difference between addition and multiplication has important applications in the doctrine of justice. For to benefit is to multiply, to harm is to divide, for the reason that the person benefited is a mind, and mind can apply each thing in using it to everything, and this is in itself to expand or to multiply it. (A.II.1:173-174/L150)

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[4] In the Preface to the *Codex Iuris Gentium* of 1693, Leibniz writes that love "signifies rejoicing in the happiness of another, or, what is the same thing, converting the happiness of another into one's own" (D IV, 295/ R 171). And he sometimes formulates his definition of love in terms of perfection, stating that "to love is to find pleasure in the perfection of another" (e.g., R 83).

The happiness of others, when regarded as an end, serves for us as a sort of reflector or mirror that multiplies our own. Although we may obtain a certain amount of pleasure while seeking our own good as an end, the kind of pleasure we can thereby attain is dull and limited by comparison with the pleasure we may obtain from seeking the good of others as such.

It is now clear why Leibniz considers his notion of love the key to the solution of his problem and why he thinks that "love is of the nature of justice" (A.VI.1: 465/L137). Leibniz's notion of love indicates that the good of others may be sought as an end and yet (or, rather, thereby) constitutes a source of our own pleasure. This notion does allow him to explain how both opposing interests *may be satisfied*: the increased pleasure one gains from striving for the other's happiness emerges as a *natural consequence* of one's "altruistic" other-oriented approach.

But to comply with the demands of justice as defined by Leibniz, I argue, it is not enough that *both interests be satisfied*. One must also act on two opposing motives, with two separate objectives in mind, each regarded as an end: to benefit one's neighbor and to benefit oneself. What determines the moral value of our actions, in Leibniz's perspective, is the kind of *motives* that actually induce us to act, not the consequences of our actions. And once we take this consideration into account, Leibniz's presumed solution appears debatable. The question that Leibniz's solution invites may be formulated as follows: what exactly does the virtuous person strive for whenever she or he desires the good of others for its own sake and, at the same time, finds pleasure in their happiness? If the greater pleasure one expects to attain by benefiting others is the genuine end, it would mean that one regards the good of others as a means to this end, as opposed to what justice demands. In this case, one will neither be considered "just" (or virtuous) nor be able to experience this intensified pleasure. If, on the other hand, it is the good of others that constitutes the virtuous agent's genuine end, it could prove challenging for Leibniz to explain what induces one to act, given that we never deliberately do anything except for our own benefit.

A possible reply is that, for Leibniz, the altruistic component of justice allows the good of others to serve *both* as a means for one's own benefit and as an end. Some support for this reading may be found in the following passage from the same fourth draft of the *Elements of Natural Law*:

> But, you ask, how is it possible that the good of others should be the same as our own and yet sought for its own sake? For otherwise the good of others can be our own good only as a means, not as end. I reply on the contrary that it is also an end, something sought for its own sake, when it is pleasant. (A.VI.1: 464/L136)

This line of thought, however, is not too helpful either. Individuals motivated by the aspiration to attain their own good may draw some extra pleasure from the knowledge that their actions are also beneficial to others. Similarly, one driven by purely altruistic motives may be pleased to find that her action is also advantageous to herself. Yet it seems implausible that one will be consciously and simultaneously motivated by a desire to attain two opposing ends, each one pursued for its own sake. For this situation to occur, both motives must be exactly equal in strength, driving

the agent to act with equal intensiveness. Otherwise, the more forceful or dominant of them will be the sole and exclusive end toward which one genuinely strives, while the other will serve as its mere appendage. Besides being phenomenologically implausible, such an "equilibrium" is by no means possible in Leibniz's framework, as it is ruled out by his "principle of sufficient reason."

Working on this issue several years ago, I thought we should read into Leibniz's alleged solution a distinction that he himself draws, in various contexts, between conscious and nonconscious motives for action. While it is unclear how the virtuous person might consciously and deliberately be acting on two conflicting motives, this view may be rendered plausible when we take this distinction into account. Leibniz alludes to the distinction in this early essay[5] and also in a letter to Arnauld from the same year (1671), where he describes the just person's inclination to love and benefit others as a persistent *conatus*, constantly driving him to increase his perfection, even when it cannot be fulfilled:

> The just man, the man who loves all, necessarily strives to please all, even when he cannot do so, much as a stone strives to fall even when it is suspended. I show that all obligation is fulfilled by the supreme conatus. (A.II.1: 173-174/L150)

In the later *New Essays,* Leibniz speaks of "the *instinct* which leads one human being to love another" (NE, I, ii, 2), determining us to act prior to any rational thinking. As we walk in conformity with the laws of mechanics without thinking about them, he explains, "God has given to man instincts which lead, straight away and without reasoning, to part of what reason commends" (*NE* I, ii, 9). A similar idea inheres in the preface to the *Mantissa Codicis Juris Gentium* (1700), where Leibniz insists that "the impulse to action arises from a striving toward perfection, the sense of which is pleasure," and that "there is no action or will on any other basis" (L 424).[6]

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[5]"All people sense this, whatever they may say; or at least they act according to it, whatever they may believe" (A.VI.1: 464/ L136). As Christia Mercer has shown, moreover, the reflective nature of the mind and the image of the mind as a mirror, which Leibniz first develops between late 1669 and 1671 in the *Elements of Natural Law*, bears significant ethical implications for the increase in the goodness of other minds. See Mercer (2001: 219). The relevant passage which she addresses from the *Elements of Natural Law* is the following: "Pleasure, however, is doubled by reflection, whenever we contemplate the beauty within ourselves which our conscience make, not to speak of our virtue. But as a double refraction can occur in vision, once in the lens of the eye and once in the lens of a tube, the latter increasing the vision of the former, so there is a double reflection in thinking. For every mind is something like a mirror, and one mirror is in our mind, another in the mind of someone else. So if there are many mirrors, that is, many minds recognizing our good, there will be a greater light, the mirrors blending the light not only in the eye but also among each other" (A.VI.1: 464/L137). For the manner in which "Reflective Harmony," in Mercer's wording, enhances goodness of other minds, see Mercer (2001, ch. 6, 214–220).

[6]Gregory Brown has recently objected to this interpretation, for various reasons, and has offered a different account of the dilemma that Leibniz attempts to resolve in this essay and of how this can be done (2011). Discussing his arguments would require me to exceed the scope of this paper and is left for a future article on the topic.

Leaving aside the aptness of this distinction for resolving the dilemma, I suggest that an interesting solution may emerge from the application of Leibniz's dialectic method, with which I opened this chapter, to his later writings on justice.

In accordance with his principle of continuum, Leibniz believes that divine and human justice differ only in degree. This implies that, to draw nearer to God's overall perspective and to acquire a higher stance in the hierarchy of perfections, each individual must strive to transcend her own point of view and broaden it as far as possible. Among the heuristic devices that Leibniz offers to this end, he suggests the so-called other's place principle.

In a short essay dated around 1679, Leibniz elaborates on the moral precept of putting oneself in the other's place, originating in the traditional directive known as the Golden Rule: "What you do not wish to have done to you, do not do to others." As Dascal has shown (1994: 111–115; Dascal et al. 2008: 163–166), Leibniz develops this precept into a wide-ranging heuristic principle he applies to a variety of practical and theoretical issues, including ethics, politics, argumentation, negotiation, jurisprudence, and legislation. When applied to ethical contexts, this principle is designed to help us measure our duty with respect to the other and act on the other's behalf. "Put yourself in the place of another," Leibniz states, "and you will have the true point of view for judging what is just or not" (*Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice,* R 56).

But what kind of participation does Leibniz envisage when instructing the virtuous person to locate himself in the other's place? And how may this relate to Leibniz's notion of love as the conversion of the other's happiness or perfection into one's own (L137, DM 1)? Discussing our love of God, which Leibniz regards as a kind of ideal model for our intersubjective relations, he states that "one cannot know God as one ought without loving him above all things, and [that] one cannot love him thus without willing what he wills" (R 59). As I have shown elsewhere (Naaman-Zauderer 2008), when applying this rationale to human relationships, Leibniz seems to hold that one cannot be fully acquainted with one's neighbor, all the more so to will what she wills, to wish what she wishes, through mere "intellectual" means. One must also imagine himself in his neighbor's concrete standpoint. Only then will we be able to transcend our own self-centered perspective and, as it were, capture the idiosyncratic perspective of the others. "To will what he wills" – the phrase that Leibniz uses in relation to our true love of God – is, in my view, the most accurate expression of the feeling of empathy that the virtuous person should experience for his neighbor. But this feeling of empathy should not be conflated with a full identification with the other that dismisses one's self-oriented interests.

In Leibniz's later definition of justice, the emotive and cognitive components of justice – charity (or the habit of loving others) and wisdom (or prudence) – are interdependent. The subordination of charity to wisdom means, among other things, that our feeling of empathy for the other should not imply a boundless altruism involving a complete assimilation into the other's standpoint. Leibniz insists that whoever is sure "that justice commands us to consider the interests of others while

we neglect our own, is born of ignorance of the definition of justice" (R 171). "The zeal of charity," he writes, "must be directed by knowledge . . . " (*De Justitia et Novo Codice*, GR II 621–622).

Underlying this approach is the idea that to ascend in the hierarchy of perfection and elevate ourselves morally and intellectually, we must transcend and expand our own point of view rather than simply replace one perspective with another.

The feeling of empathy for the other thus requires one to be simultaneously present in the other's concrete place while remaining firmly in one's own, thereby enabling an "outside" perspective on oneself.

It is here that we should invoke the Leibnizian dialectic method to account for the virtuous agent being moved by self-centered interest as well as other-oriented concern. These two interests are not simply conjoined but rather synthesized into a higher level that, to use Dascal's wording, "grants them a new meaning within a harmonious framework." At this higher level, the two synthesized interests emerge as mutually dependent. Our ability to experience empathy for the other is not only compatible with but also conditional on our self-oriented attitude. By the same token, openness to the other through the feeling of empathy allows one to contain an inner distance that enables the self-clarification required to broaden one's original perspective.

In his later essay on the others' place, Leibniz does not discuss directly the problem he addresses in the earlier *Elements of Natural Law*. Yet I believe that the interpretation I suggested here does justice to the main tenets of his view. Leibniz's deliberate eclecticism in a way invites this kind of active interpretive "intervention," so to speak, as evidenced in the following comment by Fontenelle:

> He didn't publish any body of mathematical works, but only a quantity of detached pieces, of which he could have made books, if he had wanted . . . He said that he liked to see the plants for which he had furnished the seeds growing in other people's gardens. These seeds are often more important than the plants themselves . . . .[7]

Abbreviations

A Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1923–, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (eds.), Berlin: Akademie Verlag. References include series, volume, and page.

D Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1768, *Opera Omnia*, L. Dutens (ed.), de Tournes, Geneva.

DM Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, *Discourse on Metaphysics*. References include section.

[7] Fontenelle (1740: 448–449), cited in Garber (2009: xvi).

G Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1875–1890, *Die philosophischen Schriften*, C.I. Gerhardt (ed.), 7 vols., Berlin: Weidmann. References include volume and page.

GR Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1948, *Textes inédits*, G. Grua (ed.), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

L Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1969, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, L. E. Loemker (trans. and ed.), 2nd edn, Dordrecht: Reidel.

NE Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*. References include book, chapter, and section.

R Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1988, *Political Writings*, P. Riley (Trans. and ed.), 2nd edn, New York: Cambridge University Press.

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On the "Sum of All Differences" and the Origin of Mathematics According to Leibniz: Mathematical and Philosophical Aspects

Michel Serfati

Abstract The principle of identity played an important part in Leibniz's system of the world. He situated it at the very foundation of mathematics (cf. letter to Clarke). Such a principle, however, now seems to be so general and abstract that one can hardly believe that we are able to derive all the mathematics from it. However, we have to trust on Leibniz and his systematic mind to have written in his letters to Clarke only what he truly felt and had felt for a long time. The purpose of the present study is to establish the truth of his statements by explaining how Leibniz perceived and used this principle in the effective creation of both the calculations and the concepts of his mathematics.

For Leibniz, the actual mathematical embodiment of the principle undoubtedly was (as he called it) the "sum of all differences," an important mathematical procedure, which was only invented by Leibniz, and is still in use today. In this perspective, I successively examine in this paper the Arithmetical triangle in *De Arte Combinatoria,* then in the Differential Calculus, and finally the Harmonic triangle.

Keywords Identity • Sum of all differences • Triangle • Arithmetical • Harmonic

1 Leibniz and Clarke: The Origin of Mathematics

The principle of identity played an important part in Leibniz's system of the world. In this paper, we will consider Leibniz's second paper in response to Clarke, dated late November 1715 (Robinet 1957: 5–36). Leibniz's correspondence with Clarke is an important element in his quarrel with Newton. In the words of Leibniz:

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> The great foundation of mathematics is the principle of contradiction or identity, i.e., that a proposition can't be true and false at the same time, so that A is A and can't be not-A. This principle is all we need to demonstrate every part of arithmetic and geometry, i.e., to demonstrate all mathematical principles. But, as I pointed out in Theodicy, the move from mathematics to physics requires a further principle, namely the principle of the need for a sufficient reason.

This excerpt is contemporary with the later years of Leibniz's life, in a time when his philosophical system is completed, so it is representative of a life of reflection and research. It proposes a surprising methodological task, to establish a mathematical principle that is both original and unique: the Principle of Identity (equivalent to the principle of contradiction) and also distinguishes this task from that of Physics and the physicist by adding a single principle, but of another nature, namely, the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Returning to the principle of identity which, for Leibniz, is situated in the foundations of mathematics, we would like to stress the following point: it is seemingly a principle which is purely logical, which can be used to answer the question of the origins. Such a principle, however, now seems to be so general and abstract that one can hardly believe that we can then derive all the mathematics from it. However, we have to rely on Leibniz and his systematic mind to have written in his letters to Clarke only what he truly felt and had felt for a long time. The objective of the present study is to establish the truthfulness of his statement by explaining how Leibniz perceived and used this principle in the effective creation of both the calculations and the concepts of his mathematics.

2 The Sum of All Differences

I will take as my main source the *Historia et Origo Calculi Differentialis*, a memoir from 1712 (GMV: 392–413).[1] Admittedly, the text is late and of its time, but it fulfills Leibniz's aims within the framework of his quarrel with Newton. This aim was to reconstitute après coup the history of his discovery of differential calculus in Paris in the years 1672–1676, if necessary by erasing the intermediate stages and the dead ends, all of which are reflected in the abundant harvest of manuscripts from the Paris period (see Hofmann 1974; Child 1920; GM and A.VII). In order to clarify this epistemological genesis, we also have, in addition to H&O and the manuscripts, the official birth certificate of calculus, namely, the *Nova Methodus pro maximis* (. . .) published in the *Acta Eruditorum* in October 1684 (GMV: 220–226). The *Nova Methodus* is probably one of the most studied texts in the history of mathematics. However, H&O, written 4 years before the death of its author, remains an important text.

[1] Hereinafter H&O. English translation in (Child 1920: 22–57)

Leibniz places the origin of his calculus in the calculation of what is now called sums of finite differences. Here is the presentation of his discovery by Leibniz:

> The author of this new analysis, in the first flower of his youth added to the study of history (and jurisprudence...) properties and combinations of numbers (...). For if one of two things is equal to a part of another the former is called the less, and the latter the greater; and this is to be taken as the definition. Now, if to this definition there be added the following identical and undemonstrable axiom, "Every thing possessed of magnitude is equal to itself," i.e., A = A, then we have the syllogism.... (GMV: 395 = Child 1920: 29)[2]

Leibniz's invocation of definitions and identical truths is important here. Some are primitive, such as "A is A," namely, the principle of identity, which is in this case for Leibniz the origin of the origins. From a logical perspective, which could appear to be sterile (!), Leibniz, on the contrary, draws out nontrivial mathematical consequences. As Leibniz (quite rightly) places on the one hand his calculation of the differences in the greatest of his mathematical works, and on the other hand "A − A = 0" as the principle of the calculation of these differences, we can now better understand the meaning of his letter to Clarke. Leibniz's method is what I call the *dissociation of identity*. He continues in the same vein in H&O (GMV: 395–396). Let us start, he says, from "A = A" or "A − A = 0," which he writes by arbitrarily introducing some auxiliary numbers:

$$\begin{array}{c} A - A + B - B + C - C + D - D + E - E = 0 \\ \{+L\} \quad \{+M\} \quad \{+N\} \quad \{+P\} \end{array}$$

He then continues :

> If now A, B, C, D, E are supposed to be quantities that continually increase in magnitude, and the differences between successive terms B − A, C − B, D − C, E − D are denoted by L, M, N, P, it will then follow that
>
> $$\begin{array}{c} A + L + M + N + P - E = 0 \\ \text{i.e.,}\ L + M + N + P = E - A; \end{array}$$
>
> that is, the sums of differences between successive terms, regardless of their number, will be equal to the difference between the terms at the beginning and the end of the series. For example, instead of A, B, C, D, E, F let us take the squares, 0, 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, and instead of the differences given above, the odd numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, will be disclosed; thus,
>
> $$\begin{array}{ccccccc} 0 & & 1 & 4 & 9 & 16 & 25 \\ & 1 & 3 & 5 & 7 & 9 & \end{array}$$
>
> From which it is evident that
>
> $$\begin{array}{c} 1 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 9 = 25 - 0 = 25, \\ \text{and}\ 3 + 5 + 7 + 9 = 25 - 1 = 24; \end{array}$$
>
> and the same will hold good whatever the number of terms or the differences may be or whatever numbers are taken as the first and last terms. (GMV: 396)

[2] In H&O, Leibniz constantly speaks of himself in the third person.

Leibniz, after immediately repeating the operation, then calculates what he calls the differences of the differences (second differences), then the third differences, and notices finally that in a sequence of kth powers, there is always a stage at which the sequence is zero (a property which is obviously characteristic of polynomials only). Leibniz keeps these images in mind in the general case of his higher order differentials and incorporates these conceptions into two major examples, the arithmetical triangle and the harmonic triangle, which are however endowed with a very different historical and epistemological status. While the arithmetical triangle was a well-known mathematical object in Leibniz's time, the harmonic triangle, however, has remained a Leibnizian specificity up to today.

3 The Arithmetical Triangle

3.1 The Inverse Problem of Differences

It is within this context that Leibniz began to consider the arithmetical triangle as a new figure of thought. The simple diagram above shows how to construct the differences-sequence dx of a sequence x. Leibniz then went on to the opposite problem: having been given a sequence (of integers), how can one build the sequence, of which it is the sequence of differences? In order to test this, he started with the simple infinite constant sequence $X1$, in which all terms are equal to 1:

$$X1 = 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ \ 1\ldots$$

It is immediately obvious that the sequence of which this is the difference is that (denoted $X2$) of all integers:

$$X2 = 1\ 2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6\ 7\ldots.$$

Therefore, in order to build $X3$, of which $X2$ is the sequence of differences, it is merely necessary to copy the first two lines above ($X1$ and $X2$), thus creating the beginning of a table and to fill in the third line of the table, step by step, as follows: the first element is the unit, and every element following in the line is equal to the sum of two elements: on the one hand, the element situated immediately above it, and on the other hand, the element situated immediately to its left. $X3$ can therefore be obtained using the following table:

$$\begin{array}{l} X1 = 1\ 1\ 1\ \ \ 1\ \ \ 1\ \ \ 1\ \ \ 1\ldots \\ X2 = 1\ 2\ 3\ \ \ 4\ \ \ 5\ \ \ 6\ \ \ 7 \\ X3 = 1\ 3\ 6\ 10\ 15\ 21\ldots \end{array}$$

$X1$ is the sequence of the differences of $X2$ (hereinafter d-sequence of $X2$) and $X2$ is the sequence of the sums of $X1$ (s-sequel of $X1$). Similarly, $X3$ is the s-sequence of $X2$, etc. In this construction, we can immediately recognize (as did Leibniz) the arithmetical triangle. The arithmetic triangle is therefore able, in this case, to resolve the inverse problem of the differentiation.

3.2 Brief History of the Arithmetical Triangle

Since Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the arithmetical triangle and binomial coefficients have constituted major issues, which have attracted the attention of, for example, Omar Khayyam and Stifel (Pensivy 1986: 1–2). Among Leibniz's predecessors in the sixteenth century were Tartaglia, Butéon, and Cardan, whom Leibniz honors in the preamble to the *De Arte Combinatoria* of 1666 (GMV: 16). Another contemporary work at the time of Leibniz, Pascal's *Traité du Triangle Arithmétique* (1654, published in 1665) finally provided decisive theoretical answers (Mesnard 1970: 1166, 1289–1332).

The term "arithmetical triangle" recovers three aspects which are historically and epistemologically different: the purely tabular aspect (the generation of a two-way table from a line – a "combinatorial" question in the Leibnizian sense, which is very different from Descartes' conceptions!); the computations about enumerations aspect ("combinatorial," in the modern sense), and finally a strictly algebraic aspect, with the "binomial formula," which we shall not analyze here. Instead, we will evoke the first two aspects briefly.

3.3 The Generation of the Arithmetical Triangle

From the infinite sequence of numbers which are all equal to one (a sequence called "generating"), the arithmetical triangle provides an automatic method for generating a double entry array of which the terminal form is, according to the authors, a triangle or a square.[3] We will give the following example of a square from H&O (GMV: 396):

The method of generation described above obviously applies regardless of the generating sequence: each new element is the sum of that which lies just above it and that which is located immediately to its left (a founding principle today symbolized by the formula $\binom{n}{p} = \binom{n-1}{p-1} + \binom{n-1}{p}$). The data of the rule and

[3]Both presentations are logically equivalent, but presentation as a square often corresponds to generating the array, element by element, while the presentation as a triangle refers mostly to computations by parallel lines, as Leibniz did in his differential calculus.



Fig. 1 The generation of the arithmetical "triangle"

the generating sequence are sufficient to construct without ambiguity, one by one, the terms of an infinite double entry table. The integers obtained by the method were called "binomial" coefficients by Stifel (the term used today) and "combinatorial" by Leibniz.

The remarkable properties of this table have made it the subject of various studies (which we will not examine in detail here), particularly its symmetry (it is apparent in the Fig. 1 but has not been postulated *a priori* and must be demonstrated; today it is written $\binom{n}{p} = \binom{n}{n-p}$). In addition, the property of the value of the sum of all elements of the diagonal of rank n, namely, 2^n. Another important question concerns the value of an element when one knows its place, that is, its line and column numbers. Without constructing the triangle step by step, for example, how can one calculate the binomial coefficient of rank 4 in the line of rank 14? The naive reader at the time could easily see from the triangle above that, following an intuitive search, the value of the result was not obvious. As mentioned above, Blaise Pascal's *Traité du Triangle Arithmétique* and its appendices provided answers to most of these questions (Mesnard 1970: 1288–1299).

After 1666, the manuscripts of the Paris period attest to Leibniz's continued interest in the arithmetical triangle, e.g., (AVII 1: 526) and (AVII 1: 583).

3.4 Tables in Leibniz

We can recall Leibniz's taste for tables and tables of numbers. In many texts, he emphasizes the importance of mathematical tables (i.e., double entry structures) and also tables of formulae ("canons"), such as in *De primitivis et divisoribus ex tabula combinatoria* (GMVII: 101), *De condendis tabulis algebraicis* (GMVII: 189–196), and *De Combinatoria et usu serierum* (GPIV: 415–416).

One of the formal aspects of a double entry table, which is simple and connected to its very nature, is that compared to the structure of a linear (or *total*) order; the user of a table (which is a *partial* order) earns through the variety of two points of view on the matter what he loses in the possibility of direct comparison. The change from the one-line structure to that of a table enriches the possibility of comparison of a family of data which can henceforth be considered from two points of view,

embodied, respectively, in the vision by columns or by lines. This possibility of multiple points of view of the matter was important in the philosophical reflections of Leibniz.

On the other hand, no other process that the table embodies better the reject of the Cartesian order; we know the deep attachment of Descartes to a finite total order, an armature of any object of knowledge (Serfati 1994: 71–75). Descartes was always searching for an existing and hidden order inside every object of knowledge (order here is to be taken in the sense of a linear and finite order). This figure of thought is present in all his work after the *Regulae*. Unsurprisingly, we can note that none of the mathematical works of Descartes refers to an array of numbers of any kind. In Pascal's and Leibniz's arithmetical triangle, on the contrary, the linear order of the constant generating sequence is given up in favor of the lattice structure which it engendered: this double entry is characteristic of the abandonment of the Cartesian total order. It is therefore understandable that, for this reason also, Leibniz could not help but be impressed by the structure of the arithmetical triangle.

Leibniz was always very interested in the mathematical works of Pascal, which he read in Paris (cf. Gerhardt's article, "Leibniz and Pascal," in Child 1920: 196–227). For instance, in his (remarkable) proof of the arithmetical quadrature of the circle, Leibniz referred explicitly to Pascal's *Traité du Sinus du Quart de Cercle.* Thus, on the subject of the arithmetical triangle, he joined again Pascal in his conceptions.

3.5 The Arithmetical Triangle in De Arte Combinatoria

Leibniz had been interested in the arithmetical triangle well before his Parisian period. Indeed, it appears in *De Arte Combinatoria*, which is written in his youth (1666). The arithmetical triangle is one of the few mathematical figures to enter into the mathematical works of Leibniz, both before and after his stay in Paris.

De Arte Combinatoria is a contemporary text of his doctoral thesis (see comment by Gerhardt, GMV: 3–6). What we now call combinations of two or three elements, Leibniz denoted in the *De Arte* (GMV: 14–15) as *Com* 2 *natio* or *Com* 3 *natio*, and he reformulated an instance of the standard problem as follows: the number being equal to 5, calculate its *complexions*, that is, Com 1 natio and Com 2 natio. Leibniz also says that the exponent is 2 or 3 (Problem 1. *Dato Numero and Exponente Complexiones Invenire*). In response and without proof, Leibniz provides what he calls the *Table Aleph* of the *De Arte* (GMV: 17), which is simply a form of the arithmetical triangle, as it provides the answer: the elements of the arithmetical triangle are the ones which supply the desired enumeration. Through many digressions, *De Arte Combinatoria* is in fact dedicated to the connections between the whole and the part.[4]

[4]On this point, see GMVII: 273–274, "In Euclidis $\Pi P\Omega TA$," GMV: 207; GMIII: 321–322; GMV: 395–396; GMVII: 20; and C. 1903: 518.

Fig. 2 The triangle in the differential calculus



Fig. 3 The logical scheme of the arithmetical triangle



3.6 The Arithmetical Triangle in the Differential Calculus

Here is the triangular representation which Leibniz gives in H&O (GMV: 404) (Fig. 2).

In this diagram, Leibniz made an analysis of the triangle along lines which run parallel to its sides (i.e., in one or the other of the two orthogonal directions) and not by its elements nor by its diagonals. Every line of the arithmetical triangle is indeed the line of the sums of the line immediately above it and, at the same time, that of the differences of the line situated immediately below (see this logical scheme in Fig. 3). The essential, foundational, and traditional property of the arithmetical triangle, namely, the automatic generation of binomial coefficients, is here temporarily obscured.

Where his predecessors had been using simple computational mechanics, Leibniz generated a structural model, as we have noted in a previous article (Serfati 2010: 4, 5, 11). We shall explain this model briefly below, using mathematical symbols which are similar to those used by Leibniz in the H&O, but slightly more modern.

As to notations, Leibniz uses the sign x, for example, to indicate "any term" of a sequence. He insists largely on the novelty which he creates in this way. Therefore, he says, for example, x^3 or $x\ (x+1)/2$ will indicate sequences associated with the given sequence x without ambiguity. This literal, typically functional point of view (based on the set of all the real sequences), was profoundly new at the time of Leibniz. On the other hand, Leibniz also uses the symbols d and $\int$ for differentiation and summation, naturally, simply as two mappings applied to a sequence x (thus

giving dx and $\int x$). Let us note finally that Leibniz employs the term "series" indiscriminately, where today we distinguish between sequences and series.

4 Extension of the Arithmetical Triangle: A Sketch of a Pattern

In the arithmetical triangle, the generating sequence is that of natural integers. By extension, Leibniz elaborates on a general pattern of calculation that we can explain in modern terms: to a given sequence of real numbers, denoted x, with the general term x_n $(n \geq 1)$, Leibniz associates two other sequences. First, the *differences-sequence* of x, denoted dx, the general term of which is $(\mathrm{d}x)_n$, and which is defined by

$$(\mathrm{d}x)_n = x_n - x_{n-1}\ (n \geq 2) \tag{1}$$

and another sequence denoted $\int$ (*sums-sequence* of x), with general term $(\int x)_n$ defined by

$$\left(\int x\right)_n = \sum_{1 \leq k \leq n} x_k\ (n \geq 1) \tag{2}$$

Considered as mappings on the set IR^{N} of all the real sequences, d and $\int$ are two reciprocal operations. We indeed have for every n:

$$\left(\mathrm{d}\left(\int x\right)\right)_n = x_n \tag{3}$$

and

$$\left(\int \mathrm{d}x\right)_n = x_n - x_1 \tag{4}$$

The relation (4) is nothing but the fundamental property above drawn by Leibniz, namely, *the sum of all differences is equal to the difference between the extreme terms*. Therefore, (3) and (4) are equivalent to the fact that d and $\int$ are a couple of one-to-one reciprocal mappings (up to the constant $-x_1$).[5]

$$\mathrm{d}\left(\int x\right) = \mathrm{Id}_S \text{ et } \left(\int \mathrm{d}x\right) = \mathrm{Id}_S - x_0$$

[5]This is usually called the constant of integration (or of summation).

5 The Harmonic Triangle

After giving up on the arithmetical triangle and its increasing sequences of integers, Leibniz then adapted his pattern to a significantly different situation involving decreasing infinite sequences converging toward zero, embodied in the harmonic triangle. This is a very interesting question, which I cannot develop further here but to which I refer in a forthcoming publication (Serfati 2011). This triangle is an invention of Leibniz alone (which he developed from a question put to him by Huygens), and which will remain specific to him. However, in the harmonic triangle, the essence of the reciprocal property of the arithmetical triangle remains, but in the opposite direction. By analogy, Leibniz used this pattern of reciprocity constantly in geometry, embodied in the couple tangents/quadratures (see Breger 1986). It is clear that Leibniz thought he may have found the origin of all mathematics here (or at least Leibnizian mathematics . . .). Therefore, through his two triangles, this origin has been in the final analysis the direct consequence of the relation A = A, which was derived from the principle of identity.[6] From this dissociation of identity (see above), we could conclude here that, for Leibniz, the very nature and identity of a (mathematical) object (namely here, a sequence) are nothing else than the collection (namely the sum) of all its differences, those whom it happens to meet through all its changes.

6 The "New Calculus"

From this pattern, which was rooted in the two triangles, Leibniz drew out an entirely new conception of computing and writing mathematics, inside which algebra and analysis could meet, which he called at first "new calculus," and which from the 1690s onward he called the "analysis of transcendents."[7] This calculus was composed of seven operations, and not five, as in the works of Vieta and Descartes.[8] He added d and $\int$ as two new fully fledged assemblers. In Serfati (2005: 274–283), I detailed how Leibniz outlined exhaustively the connections between the two new operations, first with the five former operators and then with one another. For its author, it was indeed a completely new method of computing, in the fullest sense. This design, which has rarely been analyzed by critics (with the notable exception

[6]Most of the correspondents of Leibniz do not accept this conception, in particular Johann Bernoulli, who found it circular (GMV: 396). See Hofmann (1974: 14, footnote 13).

[7]A later stage in Leibniz's conceptions indeed resulted from the seeming impossibility of certain summations. This led to the concept of (mathematical) transcendence, in one of the Leibnizian senses. On the detailed reasons for this change and on its history, see Breger (1986).

[8]Namely, the four common operations, to which was added the extraction of roots.

of Breger 1986), was a fundamental figure of thought for Leibniz. He describes it beautifully in a famous text of 1694, *Considérations sur la Différence qu'il y a entre l'Analyse Ordinaire et le Nouveau Calcul des Transcendantes.* For example:

> For, this method, or this *differential calculus*, serves not only for the differences, but also for the summations, which are the reciprocal of the differences, more or less as the ordinary calculus does not serve only for the powers, but also for the roots, which are the reciprocal of the powers. And the analogy goes even further (...) And I have thereby provided a general way in terms of which all problems, not only of differences or summations, but also of difference-differentials or summations of summations and beyond, can be constructed sufficiently in so far as practical matters are concerned [...]. (GMV 308).[9]

7 From Sequences to Geometry

The modalities of the transition between the previous discrete scheme (sums and differences of sequences) embodied by the two triangles to that of geometry (tangents and quadratures) are mentioned by Leibniz, but only in an allusive way, in H&O. This analogy, which he uses to organize geometric Leibnizian calculus, however, can hardly be justified mathematically. Leibniz provides a solution within the framework of his metaphysical principle of continuity (Serfati 2010: 10–12).

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Emoticons and Illocutionary Force

Eli Dresner and Susan C. Herring

Abstract The term "emoticons" short for "emotion icons" refers to graphic signs, such as the smiley face, that often accompany computer-mediated textual communication. They are most often characterized as iconic indicators of emotion, conveyed through a communication channel that is parallel to the linguistic one. In this chapter, it is argued that this conception of emoticons fails to account for some of their important uses. We present a brief outline of speech act theory and use it to provide a complementary account of emoticons, according to which they also function as indicators of illocutionary force. We conclude by considering how our analysis bears upon broader questions concerning language, bodily behavior, and text.

Keywords Computer-mediated communication • Emoticons • Illocutionary force • Pragmatics • Speech acts

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1 Introduction

The term "emoticons"—a blend of "emotion" and "icons"—refers to graphic signs, such as the smiley face, that often accompany textual computer-mediated communication (CMC). The addition of graphic signs to printed text made its debut in CMC in 1982, when the rotated smiley face :-) was first proposed—along with a "frowny" face :-(—by a computer scientist at Carnegie Mellon University, Scott Fahlman, as a means to signal that something was a joke (or not) in messages posted to a computer science discussion forum (Krohn 2004). Since this early stage in the history of CMC, hundreds if not thousands of similar signs have developed, many of which have been catalogued in dictionaries (e.g., Godin 1993; Raymond 1996) and on websites (e.g., Netlingo n.d.; Wikipedia 2009b).

The prototypical emoticons are facial expression icons, and the discussion that follows focuses on the Western-culture variants of these, as used in English CMC. The term "emoticon" reflects how these signs are typically conceived today, both in CMC research and in popular culture: They are construed as indicators of affective states, the purpose of which is to convey nonlinguistic information that in face-to-face communication is conveyed through facial expression and other bodily indicators. In textual computer-mediated interactions, these valuable channels are missing; the argument goes (cf. Kiesler et al. 1984), and therefore a replacement for them was created in the form of emoticons.

This line of analysis seems to account for some uses of facial emoticons and, indeed, may partially apply to all uses. Moreover, it seems plausible that some mechanism of compensation is responsible for the widespread introduction of these signs into interactive textual communication, and the suggestion that they are doing something that is performed through non-textual means in everyday, face-to-face communication is reasonable. However, as we argue in this essay, the term "emoticon" misrepresents this function, at least with respect to many common and important cases. In such cases, the primary function of the smiley and its brethren is not to convey emotion but rather pragmatic meaning, and thus this function needs to be understood in linguistic, rather than extralinguistic, terms.

2 Emoticons as Emotion Icons

Emoticons are almost universally conceived of as nonverbal indicators of emotion. This view is given explicit expression throughout the CMC literature. Thus, Walther and D'Addario (2001) quote (and accept) the definition of emoticons suggested by Rezabek and Cochenour (1998: 201) as "visual cues formed from ordinary typographical symbols that when read sideways represent feeling or emotions." Wolf (2000: 828) cites the *Hackers' Dictionary* definition of an emoticon as "an ASCII glyph used to indicate an emotional state," noting that this is "the generally accepted definition" of the term. The Wikipedia (2009a) defines an emoticon as "a

textual face of a writer's mood or facial expression" (n.p.). Even linguists, such as Crystal (2001: 36), describe emoticons as "combinations of keyboard characters designed to show an emotional facial expression," and Baron (2000: 242) refers to them as "emotion markers."

This conception is reflected in the questions and hypotheses that have been raised with respect to emoticons in recent research (e.g., Derks et al. 2007; Provine et al. 2007; Walther and D'Addario 2001; Wolf 2000). For example, the significance of emoticons in Walther and D'Addario (2001) is presumed to be affective—either positively or negatively so—and the hypotheses of the study were formulated to find out how the affective value of emoticons combines with the linguistic messages to which they are attached.

The belief that women express affect more than men do, coupled with the association of emoticons with affect, has also led researchers to examine the relationship between emoticon use and gender. Two studies of asynchronous public discussion forums—Witmer and Katzman (1997) and Wolf (2000)—found that women used emoticons more often than men did, although in Wolf's study men used emoticons more often to express sarcasm. Similarly, Baron (2004) observed that the overwhelming majority of emoticons in her corpus of synchronous private instant messaging were produced by women, and Herring (2003) reported that women in the public Internet Relay Chat channels she observed typed three times as many representations of smiling and laughter (including emoticons) as men.

However, as we now turn to argue, the conception of emoticons as expressing affect is incomplete at best, since it leaves out of the picture important aspects of their use. For one thing, as a quick look at any emoticon dictionary shows, many facial emoticons do not seem to express a single emotion, or indeed any emotion at all. Is a face with the tongue sticking out—for example, ;-p—a sign of a specific emotion? Various sources attribute to it the meanings of teasing, flirting, and sarcasm, all of which may be associated with emotional states, but which are not emotions per se. Or consider the familiar winking face ;) : Conventionally, it indicates that the writer is joking, but surely jokes are not associated with a single emotive state. People may joke when they are happy or sad. Finally, we turn to the smiley face itself: Its function is not only to express happiness or any other single emotion. Wolf makes a similar point in discussing her finding that males used smileys for the purpose of expressing sarcasm more often than females did. "While it can be argued that sarcasm and teasing, for example, derive from or comprise different emotions," she writes, "whether they constitute an emotion is debatable" (2000: 832). Emoticons, then, seem to express not only emotions but other things as well. Are these attitudes? Intentions? Previous research on emoticons does not offer an answer to this question.

A related deficiency of the conception of emoticons as emotion icons is that it depicts the contribution of emoticons to computer-mediated interaction as independent of language. According to this conception, our interpretation of the nonverbal channel may influence our understanding of the linguistic one, but the two have meaning independently of each other. This conception seems to be at odds with some of the observations made above, however. Consider the use of smileys as

indicating sarcasm. Should not this function be accounted for by relating smileys to the linguistic channel? As opposed to, for example, confidence or stress indicators, "sarcastic" emoticons seem to have no self-standing content on their own, but rather contribute to—indeed, provide a vital cue as to how to interpret—the linguistic content of messages. When used this way, emoticons seem to be a part of the text, on a par with punctuation marks, which can also signal sarcasm. (Consider, e.g., "Oh, great!" vs. "Oh, great."—the former conventionally expresses enthusiasm, while the latter may imply just the opposite.) The current construal of emoticons seems not to be able to accommodate this aspect of their use.[1]

Emoticons, then, do not always function as vehicles for emotive expression, and their meaning is sometimes more closely tied to language than what is allowed for by their construal as emotion icons. At the same time, it is clear that emoticons do not comprise new lexical or morphosyntactic constituents of English. Thus, what is required is a theoretical framework that situates emoticons (or, rather, some of their uses) between the extremes of nonlanguage and language.

We argue that the theory of speech acts can provide such a framework (Austin 1962; Searle 1969, 1979). In particular, the thesis of this essay is that in many cases emoticons are used not as signs of emotion but rather as indications of the illocutionary force of the textual utterances that they accompany. As such, they help convey the speech act performed through the production of the utterance. These uses of emoticons do not contribute to the propositional content (the locution) of the language used, but neither are they just an extralinguistic communication channel indicating emotion. Rather, they help convey an important aspect of the linguistic utterance they are attached to: what the user intends by what he or she types.

3 Communicative Functions of Emoticons: From Emotion to Illocutionary Force

The following examples and discussion focus on the most frequently used emoticon types, as reported in the literature: smiles, winks, and to a lesser extent, frowns.[2] We identify and illustrate three ways in which emoticons function: (1) as emotion indicators, mapped directly onto facial expression; (2) as indicators of non-emotional meanings, mapped conventionally onto facial expressions; and (3) as illocutionary force indicators that do not map conventionally onto a facial expression.

[1] Provine et al. (2007) draw a parallel between what they call the "punctuation effect" of laughter placement in speech and signed language and the placement of emoticons in written CMC, but they do not suggest that emoticons function like punctuation.

[2] These examples are drawn from the second author's archives over the last 10 years, and include private email, private chat (Instant Messaging), public chat (AOL chat; Internet Relay Chat), and public discussion forum postings. This sample is not systematic, and no attempt is made to advance claims about the frequency of occurrence of any usage based on it.

First, emoticons are sometimes used to express or perform emotion, where the emoticon iconically represents an emotional facial expression. Two examples of this use occur in the following excerpt from an instant messaging (IM) conversation between the second author and one of her doctoral students about an upcoming Association for Internet Researchers (AoIR) conference. (The IM clients both are using automatically converts ASCII emoticon sequences into their graphical counterparts.)

> Student: just wanted to let you know that [jason] found me a place to stay at AoIR, so it looks like I'll be going ☺
>
> [. . .]
>
> Professor: I wish I could be at AoIR.
>
> Professor: ☹

The smiling face in the first instance seems unproblematically to express the student's happiness that he could attend the conference. The frowning face in the second instance expresses sadness or regret, consistent with the professor's comment, "I wish I could be at AoIR." These examples constitute expressive acts, according to Searle's (1979) taxonomy.

Many other uses are less straightforwardly affective, however. Consider the use of the winking smiley, which is often used as an indicator that the writer is joking, teasing, or otherwise not serious about the message's propositional content (e.g., Wolf 2000). Clearly, joking is not an emotion—one could joke while being in a variety of distinct affective states. Rather, joking is a type of illocutionary force, something that we do by what we say. (This is as opposed to being funny, which might be described as a perlocutionary force [Austin 1962], on a par with being persuasive.) In the following public email post to the AoIR mailing list, the winking smiley is used to indicate that the utterance that immediately precedes it is not intended as a serious summon of the (deceased) media scholar Marshall McLuhan, but rather as a joke:

> Paging Mr. McLuhan.... ;)

The winking emoticon here is best conceived of as a sign of the force of what has been (textually) said, rather than as an indication of emotion.

One could argue that this usage represents a facial expression—a physical wink also conventionally signals that the speaker is not serious about what he/she is saying—even if it does not express an emotion per se. Thus, it could be considered to be iconic, rather than pragmatic, in nature. Not all uses of the winking icon indicate joking; however, some indicate other illocutionary forces. Consider the winking face at the end of the following example, a message posted to the same AoIR mailing list in response to a contributor's recommendation for a way to remix YouTube video that involves an extra step:

> I would like a non-circumventing solution ;->

Here the writer is serious about the propositional content of the preceding message; he would truly prefer a non-circumventing solution to his video remixing problem.

The winking emoticon indicates that the message should not be taken as a request or a demand, as its form ("I would like") otherwise suggests. Instead, the winking icon seems to downgrade the utterance to a less face-threatening[3] speech act, a simple assertion of the writer's preference. (According to Searle's [1979] taxonomy, the emoticon can be described as indicating that the force of the sentence preceding it is assertive rather than directive.) This usage neither expresses emotion nor does it mimic a physical wink; its sole function seems to be to indicate the utterance's intended illocutionary force, which it does through mitigation of face threat.

Similarly, consider the use of the standard smiley, which also often serves mitigating functions. In the following private email example, a student uses a smiley to mitigate her request to the second author for assistance:

> I wonder if you could recommend me some good readings related to conversational data. We just collected some IM data and are about to conduct some analysis on it. Since I've never worked on this kind of data before, I am writing for some suggestions.:)

It would be odd in this context to interpret the smiley as indicating happiness or some other positive affective state; if anything, the student is anxious about imposing on the author. Thus, in contrast to the previous example, here the emoticon functions not to help the reader of the message identify the general type (or category) of the illocutionary act performed, but rather to modulate an already identifiable act.

One might argue that people smile in face-to-face communication when they are anxious, too, and that this usage, if not emotive, at least maps more or less directly onto the way facial expressions function in physical space. To argue thus is to acknowledge that facial expressions do not always represent emotions—that they are associated with other meanings, some of them partially or entirely conventional (such as the polite but bored smile used to disengage from an uninteresting conversation at a cocktail party). Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine the writers physically smiling when they produced the following electronic examples. In these messages, the smileys indicate that the intended meaning of the preceding utterances is not as it otherwise appears—in effect, that the utterances were intended as one kind of speech act, rather than another. In each case, the smiley downgrades a strong complaint to something else.

> JKingsbury: GUIDE> have you ever made a home page on aol?
>
> Guide ASH: JK, yes and I can't get rid of the stupid thing! :)

In the above example, posted to a help chat room on the Internet service provider America Online (AOL), the guide appears to make a strong complaint that is not a helpful response to the user, JKingsbury's, query about how to make a home page on AOL. The smiley at the end alters the pragmatic meaning of the utterance, however: Rather than being a rude, selfish gripe, it becomes a mild, humorous complaint that

[3] On face threats and speech acts, see Brown and Levinson (1987).

demonstrates a friendly attitude toward the user. Under no reasonable reading is it possible to construe that the guide is happy that he cannot get rid of his home page, as a smile literally suggests.

Another clear example is the following message, posted recently to a Yahoo! fibromyalgia support forum:

> i'm 23 with CFS/FMS[4] and some other things. i was diagnosed about 3 years ago, but i've been ill much longer than that. i'm sick of the crying and moping too. i was actually in a really down mood and decided to get on to see if anyone had posted. i've been inactive for awhile. i'm in a pretty bad flare-up right now, and that def. affects my mood. I am very sensitive and cry easily, and gets even worse when i feel awful :)

The writer is obviously not happy about the conditions she describes; she explicitly states that she has been "crying," "moping," and feeling "down"—affect opposite to what a smile usually indicates. Claiming that the smiley indicates positive emotion in this case would be perverse. It seems rather that the smiley functions to mitigate what otherwise could be read as a self-pitying list of complaints, suggesting the interpretation that the author is not complaining but rather merely asserting or describing her situation. (Whether the smiley has that perlocutionary force, or effect on the reader, is a separate question.)

4 Discussion

In the previous section, we illustrated the applicability of our theoretical framework to examples of actual emoticon use. In this section, we discuss several further issues and questions that our account gives rise to.

First, it should be clear that the account presented here does not rule out an iconic mapping between the function of emoticons and some bodily and facial movements. It is not the case that the received view of emoticons that we have been critiquing retains such a mapping, while our account does not. Rather, what has been described here with respect to emoticons applies, mutatis mutandis, to bodily gestures as well and coheres with a large body of research that ties gesture to language. As McNeill (2005: 4) writes: "It is profoundly an error to think of gesture as a code or 'body language', separate from spoken language. (. . .) (G)estures are *part* of language" (italics in the original). The meanings expressed by gestures are conventionalized to varying degrees, like those expressed by emoticons. Moreover, Kendon (1995) claims that some gestures function as illocutionary speech acts, making visible the implications of what is being said. Our account of emoticons resonates with this outlook, and may be viewed as lending support to it, by pointing to expressions of (facial) bodily movement in text.

[4]CFS/FMS = Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Fibromyalgia Syndrome.

Second, the loose connection between emoticons and the speech acts they sometimes help carry out—such that there appears to be no simple one-to-one mapping between any of the commonly used emoticons discussed in this paper and a particular illocutionary force—is in accord with the general relation between textual markers and speech acts. The relationship of markers such as sentential mood and utterance final punctuation to pragmatic force is quite loose, and according to some views, may not be amenable to complete regimentation and conventionalization. This state of affairs should not be taken to falsify the widely accepted conception of such structural apparatuses as indicators of illocutionary force, nor should it be taken that way vis-à-vis emoticons. In all cases, contextual interpretation is involved, which the textual markers contribute to rather than make redundant.[5]

The question of context raises a third issue: What factors condition the use of emoticons and the ways in which they are used? Although we have argued on a conceptual level for a shared function of commonly used Western-style emoticons in English CMC—as a textual indicator of illocutionary force—the forms and meanings of emoticons vary considerably in actual use, as the examples discussed above of smiling and winking faces illustrate. Technological considerations motivate emoticon production in the first place, in that typed (especially sideways) emoticons are native to CMC. It should be evident from our analysis that the functions of emoticons extend beyond substituting for facial and gestural "cues filtered out" in textual CMC; at the same time, technological factors influence the extent to which emoticons are used and which ones are used in different CMC modes. Thus, for example, efficiency considerations, which are more pertinent to synchronous CMC than to asynchronous CMC, should affect users' decisions to employ emoticons, if we consider emoticons to be shorthand substitutes for longer textual expressions of intention. In support of this view, emoticons tend to be found more frequently in synchronous chat than in asynchronous discussion forums (but cf. Baron 2004). In addition, the availability of graphical emoticons—for example, via pull-down menus in some IM clients—should promote the use of more diverse (and less commonly used) emoticons; this is supported by the findings of Provine et al. (2007).

Finally, our analysis of emoticons as illocutionary force markers can shed light on a fourth issue: the apparent paradox that emoticons mimic (often non-intentional) facial expressions, although they are intentionally produced. In Goffman's (1959) terms, facial expressions are expressions *given off* rather than expressions *given*. Emoticons, in contrast, are always produced consciously and intentionally, on a par with other aspects of written language. The use of emoticons as emotion indicators seems difficult to explain in this respect. Non-intentional "expression given off" is usually taken to be a more reliable cue to interpreting other people's emotive states than intentional "expression given." It follows that the representation of a bodily channel that in some cases involves involuntary expression in the intention-governed

[5]See Sperber and Wilson (1986) for an account of the way context helps determine the speech act performed through the production of a given utterance.

domain of textual expression should be detrimental to its perceived value as an indicator of emotion, and the apparent success of this representation is left unaccounted for.

The construal of emoticons as indicators of illocutionary force partially obviates this paradox. The illocutionary force of an utterance is part of what a speaker means by the utterance, part of what he or she intends to convey by making it. Force is fully within the domain of the intentional—it is expression that is given. Thus the appearance of intentional indicators of force in CMC, possibly replacing some non-intentional indicators in face-to-face communication, does not present any theoretical difficulty, and it is not necessary to assume that users are unaware of the switch from non-intentional to intentional expression or find it problematic. The question of whether and how similar considerations might be invoked in order to address the problem of emotive uses of emoticons remains; we leave this as a topic for future research.

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Brandom and the Boy Who Cried Wolf

Dana Riesenfeld

Abstract In this chapter I distinguish between two types of rules: necessary and normative rules. These two types, I claim, are mutually exclusive. Normative rules that ought to be obeyed cannot be said to be necessary, and vice versa; necessary rules which cannot be broken, cannot be said to be normative. Brandom's inferential rules, however, attempt to be both normative and necessary. According to Brandom, the status of inferential rules is that of a normative necessity, i.e., rules that both ought to be followed and that must be followed. The idea of a normative necessity, I argue, represents a deep problem in the philosophical use of the concept of rule rather than solve it.

Keywords Brandom • Rules • Normativity • Necessity • Inferentialism

1 Introduction

David Lewis, Brandom's teacher, famously said:

> It is the profession of philosophers to question platitudes that others accept without thinking twice. A dangerous profession, since philosophers are more easily discredited than platitudes, but a useful one. For when a good philosopher challenges a platitude, it usually turns out that the platitude was essentially right; but the philosopher has noticed trouble that one who did not think twice could not have met. In the end the challenge is answered and the platitude survives, more often than not. But the philosopher has done the adherents of the platitude a service: he has made them think twice.

In this chapter I attempt to question a platitude regarding types of rules and, finally, salvage it. I think that it is platitude that the rule $2 + 2 = 4$ is a different type of rule from: "Borrowed money ought to be returned." I believe that we intuitively

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agree, without thinking twice, that these two rules are essentially different. However, I do not only think that these rules are *different*. I will argue that these types of rules are *mutually exclusive*: that a rule, any rule, cannot be of the same type of the first rule and of the same type of the second rule at one and same time. I call the first type of rule a "necessary rule" and the second type of rule a "normative rule," and I claim that necessary rules and normative rules are mutually exclusive, i.e., that no rule can be both necessary and normative. Incidentally, this does not mean that *all* rules are either normative or necessary; there are other categories of rules that are neither normative nor necessary.

Although I consider the intuitions regarding the difference between necessary and normative rules to be quite commonsense, some philosophers seem not to concur with this dichotomy. One of them, around which this article is centered, is Robert Brandom. In order to perform the complex and various tasks Brandom assigns to what he dubs "inferential rules"; these rules, I claim, must be both normative and necessary. In the following I give a general outline of what Brandom calls "inferential rules"; I then argue that in order to fulfill the communicative role Brandom assigns to them, inferential rules need to be both necessary and normative; and finally, I argue against the possibility of a normative and necessary rule.

2 Brandom on Inferential Rules

Let me start by giving a very general and rough outline of the monumental Brandomian project, called inferentialism. Brandom's inferentialism is a detailed and intricate elaboration of the basic idea that language is essentially the game of giving and asking for reasons. Within inferentialism, the role of normativity is crucial. "There is a need," Brandom claims, "for a [...] notion of primitive correctnesses of performance *implicit* in *practice* that precede and are presupposed by their explicit formulation in rules and principles." "There is a kind of correctness that does not depend on explicit justification, a kind of correctness of practice" (1994: 21–22, italics in the original). This primitive notion of correctness, for Brandom, is normativity. Brandom regards normativity – more specifically, the normativity of action – as a primary concept within his theory of language and communication: "There is a kind of correctness that does not depend on explicit justification, a kind of correctness of practice" (1994: 21–22).

Normativity is primary for Brandom in three interrelated senses: First, it is conceptually prior as it is an atomic concept, irreducible to any other concept. Second, the normative dimension of linguistic practice is ineliminable, i.e., not dependent on any other concept, and yet has the entire conceptual apparatus (reference, truth, rational action, representation) depend on it. And, finally, it is methodologically prior in that it comes first in the order of explanation.

As humans, we are discursive beings, and, as such, we exist in a space structured by norms. For Brandom, these norms are objective and social. Moreover, Brandom argues that norms are objective *because* they are social, i.e., that it is the social nature

of norms which gives them their status as objective. I cannot, within the scope of this chapter, explain the justification Brandom gives to support his claim that norms are objective, but I will touch upon some aspects of it later on.[1]

One of the cornerstones of inferentialism is Brandom's distinction between what is explicit and what is implicit. Brandom argues that "the practices that confer propositional and other sorts of conceptual content, implicitly contain norms concerning how it is *correct* to use expressions, under what circumstances it is *appropriate* to perform various speech acts" (1994: xiii). As a philosophical stance, inferentialism shifts from the idea that our norms are made explicit *in our rules* to the idea that norms are implicit *in our practices*.[2] The picture painted by Brandom is this one:

> To express something is to make it *explicit*. What is explicit in the fundamental sense has a *propositional* content – the content of a claim, a judgment, or belief (claimable, judgeable, believable content). That is, making something explicit is *saying* it: putting it into a form in which it can be given as a reason, and reasons demanded for it. Putting something forward in the explicit form of a claim is the basic move in the game of giving and asking for reasons. (1994: xviii)

Here is a very simple example: the meaning of "red" within inferentialism could be stated, thus, someone who says that $\boldsymbol{x}$ is red undertakes a commitment to a number of claims, that $\boldsymbol{x}$ is colored, $\mathbf{x}$ is extended, $\mathbf{x}$ is not green, and so on.

Summing up Brandom's point, we may see that linguistic practices make *implicit* normativity *explicit* via moves in the language game wherein our linguistic practices are rule-governed. The rules governing our linguistic practices are, he claims, inferential rules. In practice, those inferential rules are manifested by what Brandom calls: "deontic scorekeeping."

3 The Practice of Deontic Scorekeeping

The term "scorekeeping" is taken from Lewis' 1979 paper "Scorekeeping in a Language Game." The name "scorekeeping" is an elaboration of the Wittgensteinian metaphor: thinking of language as a network of language games, we can assume that scores are kept within the language game, "At any stage in a well-run conversation, a certain amount is presupposed . . . Presuppositions can be created or destroyed in the course of a conversation. This change is rule-governed, at least up to a point" (1979: 339). Presupposition provides a clear illustration of the idea of

[1]The idea that norms are objective *because* they are social has to do with what Brandom calls "I-Thou symmetry of subjective discourse attitudes and objective discursive statuses." Briefly, the idea is that there is a distinction between " . . . what is merely held (true) and what is correctly held (true)" (1994: 599) without assuming that the community has a privileged perspective on what is objectively true.

[2]This shift, Brandom claims, makes his concept of rule immune to Wittgensteinian charges of regress in the sense that it does not employ a Platonistic concept of norms as rules.

scorekeeping. If I say "even a three year old could do it," I add to the conversation the new presupposition, namely, that the deed is very easy. This addition, via the presupposition, immediately changes the conversational score. Another prominent example are the material inferences. If, e.g., I say that "today is Thursday," then materially I am committed to the truthfulness of "tomorrow will be Friday" (1994: 97–98).

Brandom's and Lewis' notion of scorekeeping are not identical, but what is important for our purposes is that Brandom makes use of the idea that meaning is dependent on keeping track of one's own and of others' commitments and entailments. Commitments and entailments are, for Brandom, the basic normative statuses, the basic moves in the game of giving and asking for reasons. So, at any stage of the game, the speaker is committed to certain claims and entitled to others. Brandom calls this kind of scorekeeping "*deontic* scorekeeping," since commitments and entailments are analogous to the classic deontic operators, namely, permissions and obligations:

> Deontic scores consist in constellations of commitments and entitlements on the part of various interlocutors. So understanding or grasping the significance of a speech act requires being able to tell in terms of such scores when it would be appropriate (circumstances of application) and how it would transform the score obtaining at the next stage of the conversation of which it is a part (consequences of application). For at any stage, what one is permitted or obliged to do depends on the score, as do the consequences that doing has for the score. Being rational – understanding, knowing how in the sense of being able to play the game of giving and asking for reasons – is mastering in practice the evolution of the score. Talking and thinking is keeping score in this sort of game. (1994: 183)

Like Lewis, Brandom compares his deontic scorekeeping to scorekeeping in a baseball game. After each move of the players, the score is adjusted accordingly. The notion of commitment corresponds to the notion of "strike" – the situation where the referee rules that the pitcher threw the ball outside of the designated boundaries. The comparison to baseball is by no means marginal: unlike "purely formal games" (1994: 183) like chess and tic-tac-toe, baseball is only *partly* formal. The difference between purely formal games and partly formal games is defined by the notion of "material content" as opposed to formal content. Purely formal games have a formal content while partly or impure games have a material content as well as a formal one. The idea is that the decision of whether a pitcher's throw is a "ball" or a "strike," although these terms are governed by the formal rules of baseball, is contingent on other relevant concepts such as the swinging of the bat, the passage of the ball through a certain region of space which is relative to the position of the batter's body. This is very different from the decision of whether a move constituted a checkmate or not. And this is also the case of linguistic scorekeeping; it is an impure game which has a material content. The difference between formal and partly formal games amounts to the fact that although both types of games are rule-governed, the question whether a move has been carried out correctly or not is always decidable *before* the move is made in formal games and always *after* the move is made in partly formal games.

In baseball, the final authority on whether a rule has been applied correctly or not lies with the referee, or umpire, as they are called in baseball. Brandom cites a famous baseball jest that of the escalating claims of the three umpires:

> First umpire: I call 'em like I see 'em.
>
> Second umpire: I call 'em like they is.
>
> Third umpire: Until I call 'em, they aint!

He uses this story to illustrate an important point: in baseball, as is in linguistic scorekeeping, all three umpires are justified in making their claims. How can this be?

Brandom speaks of two dimensions of authority: constitutive and normative. In one sense, the third umpire makes the throw into what it is: a strike or a ball; but in another sense, he can only do so in normative surroundings in the sense that his actions are measured against a normative background: "... on the one hand, the actual attitudes of the scorekeepers are essential in determining the score (third umpire). On the other hand, the formation of these attitudes is itself subject to norms; scorekeeping is something that can be done correctly or incorrectly. This is not, of course, because it is in general governed by explicit rules" (1994: 184). The umpire exercises his constitutive authority, but this authority only makes sense because it is employed in a normative surrounding.

It is important that scorekeeping rules are stated in a normative (non-scorekeeping) vocabulary. This secures the possibility of an umpire being wrong, or, analogously, that a scorekeeper wrongly attributes commitments wherein someone isn't really committed. Deontic scorekeeping is too an expression of normative rules, stated in normative vocabulary. This principle is what Brandom calls "norms all the way down" (1994: 627). Brandom's point here is of utmost importance: it is crucial for his project to strictly pry apart being wrong (violating a norm) from merely being attributed such wrongdoing. Like in baseball, wherein the referee can be wrong, so can participants in a language game be wrong. Scorekeepers can be wrong about what the score is: i.e., attribute a commitment or an entitlement in case someone is not committed or not entitled and not attribute a commitment or entitlement to someone who is committed or entitled to that attribution.

4 The Boy Who Cried Wolf

Let us now look at an example of a very specific situation, that of the boy who cried wolf. Brandom makes use of this familiar tale: the shepherd boy amuses himself by calling out "wolf." The villagers, who think that the herd is under the attack of wolfs, rush out to save the boy and the sheep only to find out that he is mocking them. He does so twice, and in the third time, when a wolf really comes to devour the sheep, no one comes to his rescue.

Brandom notes that he uses this tale as an example of a violation of a norm: "In the ideal Sprachspiel being described, making a claim one is not entailed to . . . is a kind of impropriety, the violation of a norm" (1994: 179). And a little later on:

> Having several times committed himself to the claim that a wolf was present (thereby licensing and indeed obliging others to draw various conclusions, both practical and theoretical) under circumstances in which he was not entitled by the evident presence of a wolf to undertake such a commitment and to exercise such authority, the boy was punished – his conduct practically acknowledged as inappropriate –by withdrawal of his franchise to have his performances treated as normatively significant. (1994: 180)

The general context in which Brandom considers the case of the boy who cried wolf has to do with the difference between warranted and unwarranted assertions. For Brandom, lack of entitlement must have a visible result within the language game in the form of a sanction or punishment (1994: 178–179). I, however, in the context of the present discussion would like to use Brandom's example in order to make a point about the role rules have in his theory. I would like to ask now, what type of rule is the rule that its violation had made the boy's action to be incorrect? Let us first make that rule explicit. In Brandom's terminology it is something like: when uttering P ("I am being attacked by a wolf!") the boy is committed to what p entails; i.e., that a wolf is in the vicinity and that he is attacked by it. In the first two times, the boy lied.

More specifically, is the rule violated by the boy a normative rule or a necessary rule? In what follows, I claim that the answer is neither. For Brandom the norm which was violated by the boy is really more than a norm, it is a super-norm, a unique type of necessity I call a *normative necessity*. That the boy has violated a norm, according to Brandom, is clear. But I claim, moreover, that for Brandom the norms implicit in our linguistic practices are necessities. Yes, they are *normative* necessities, but they are necessities nonetheless. I claim this because I think that for Brandom, the boy not only *ought* to have spoken the truth, he *must* have spoken the truth. The necessary aspect of the norm reveals itself whenever Brandom speaks of the constitutive role of inferential rules. "Endorsing a rule, gives it a grip on us" (1994: 52), Brandom says. Once we are in the grip of a rule, following it is not merely what we ought to do, it is what we must do: i.e., that it is necessary to follow inferential rules.

That inferential rules transcend normativity can be seen drawing attention to a few characteristic features. Inferential rules are necessary in that they define normative statuses: a scorekeeper is committed to p or entailed to p *necessarily*. Brandom insists on this point because he does not want his norms to collapse into a matter of opinion. Like the umpire who can go wrong, so can we scorekeepers. What accounts for the possibility of our being wrong in our attributions of normative statues is that the attribution of statuses does not collapse *into being* correct or incorrect. Brandom, like Kant, is faced by the need to explain what makes norms obligatory, what elevates the norm from being a mere recommendation into a binding decree. The solution, taken by both Kant and Brandom, is the creation of a hybrid notion of necessities which are nonetheless normative as well.

In the case of the boy who cried wolf, Brandom says on the one hand that he has violated a norm but also says, on the other hand, that by so doing the boy has disqualified himself from being treated as normatively significant. This is another sign of a normative necessity; when broken, it breaks down with much greater noise than an ordinary norm. While Brandom claims that it is norms all the way down, I claim that it is really *normative necessities* which are all the way down. Only a normative necessity is sufficient in securing the difference between following a rule and mistakenly thinking that one is following the rule. On the one hand, the rules of the game of giving and asking for reasons are necessary rules – they define our discursive actions as such. On the other hand, these rules are normative, in that they can be carried out correctly or incorrectly.

5 Necessary Versus Normative Rules

Let me now return to the example of the two types of rules with which I began with. The following chart presents what I take to be the difference between normative rules and necessary rules:

Type of rule	Necessary rule (one that *must* be followed)	Normative rule (one that *ought* to be followed)
Example:	$2 + 2 = 4$	Borrowed money *ought* to be returned
Points of similarity		
1.	No action can change the *necessary status* of the rule (i.e., even if no one follows the rule, it is still necessary)	No action can change the *normative status* of the rule (even if no one follows the rule, it is still a norm)
2.	Some actions are regarded following of the rule and some actions are regarded as not following the rule	
Points of dissimilarity		
1.	No action can be regarded as a violation of the rule. There are no instances of violation of a necessary rule, only instances of mistakes	There are actions that are correct or incorrect following of the rule, i.e., there are violations of the rule
2.	One cannot choose to act not in accordance with the rule ("I know that $2 + 2 = 4$, but I chose not to obey it . . . " makes no sense)	One can choose to act not in accordance with the rule ("I know borrowed money ought to be returned, but I chose not obey the rule" makes a lot of sense, unfortunately)
3.	The rule *defines* correctness	The rule is a *standard* against which correctness is measured
4.	A necessary rule reflects a fact or an existing state of affairs	A normative rule reflects or constitutes a value

(continued)

(continued)

Type of rule	Necessary rule (one that *must* be followed)	Normative rule (one that *ought* to be followed)
5.	There are no exceptions to the rule ("Usually 2 + 2 = 4, but sometimes it isn't" makes no sense)	There may be exceptions to the rule ("Usually borrowed money should be returned, but not always. The person the money was borrowed from can decide, in retrospect, that it is a present")
6.	Reasons to follow the rule are exhausted by the letter of the rule	Reasons to follow the normative rule are not exhausted by the letter of the rule

6 Conclusion

"The most urgent question for Kant is how to understand the rulishness of concepts, how to understand their authority, bindingness, or validity. It is this normative character that he calls *Notwendigkeit* (necessity)". "... by 'necessary' Kant means 'in accord with a rule'" (1994: 10).

According to Brandom, for Kant being necessary is being rule-governed. When talking about Kant, Brandom does not actually use my term normative necessity; he does speak of a "rational necessity" (1994: 30). But if being necessary is just being "in accord" with a rule, how can Kant prevent his rule from becoming an unbreakable necessity? Of course, we are all familiar with Kant's solution, quoted by Brandom: "our dignity as rational beings consists precisely in being bound only by the rules we endorse, rules we have freely chosen (like Odysseus facing the Sirens)" (1994: 50). "We bind ourselves with norms," he says a little later on (1994: 51). Brandom illustrates the situation of being self-bound by norms via the image of the chained Odysseus. From my point of view, this is the most beautiful illustration of the idea of a *normative necessity*: the image of Odysseus willingly tied to the mast of the ship, listening to what no man alive had heard; the enchanting voices of the sirens. A most beautiful image, but a wrong one, according to my account. For when Odysseus chose to be tied to the mast, there was nothing necessary about it, and when he was already bound in chains, there was nothing normative about it. I then call for a change in imagery, and the image I choose for a normative necessity is that of an omnipotent being, attempting to create the stone that he cannot lift. And in my terms, an omnipotent being trying to create a necessary rule which can also be broken.[3] With the change of imagery, perhaps a new slogan should also be adopted as well. Brandom likes to quote Sellars who defined linguistic rules as "fraught with ought." On the same note, I have claimed in this chapter that rules cannot be fraught with ought and, at same time, mustered with must.

[3]My critique of the Brandomian normative necessity may also have certain ramifications regarding Kant's explanation of autonomy as a normative necessity. This issue is, however, beyond the scope of the present chapter.

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Speaker's Meaning: With Reference to Marcelo Dascal's Book *Mashav HaRuah*

Rodica Amel

Abstract Starting off with the idea that Marcelo Dascal's book *Mashav HaRuah* is a confession, our present study will be focused on the concept of the *speaker's meaning* – an important interpretative tool in Dascal's pragmatic philosophy.

With the intention of using this concept for a better understanding of the author's voice as it is heard in the book *Mashav HaRuah*, we will establish three differentiated levels of approach:

(a) What the speaker intends to say and is actually saying (the speaker's discursive intentionality)
(b) Speaker's referential strategy (the speaker's referentially selective attitude)
(c) Speaker's moral argument (icon of speaker's identity)

Our commentary will follow a *pragmatic & beyond* point of view, by performing pragmatic and hermeneutic inquiries. In our interpretation, "hermeneutic" means the meaning constitution of axiological concepts, those relevant for *Mashav HaRuah* (author)'s persona.

Keywords Exegetic strategies • Polyphony • Conceptual synthesis • Confession of faith • Metaphysical transubstantiation

1 Points of View

1.1 Common Reader's Receptivity

For a common reader, Dascal's book, *Mashav HaRuah,* is an account of a reality disposed on two fronts: in the foreground stands the academic life and activity,

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carried on in Tel Aviv University, more precisely in the Faculty of Humanities, an ample dynamics which is focused on the dean's managerial commitment, during his tenure of office for 5 consecutive years, 1995–2000; simultaneously, the reader's attention is caught by a large, agitated, and conflicting image of Israeli life displayed in the background. The book sums up the speeches uttered by the dean of Humanities, invited to open several scientific meetings and official ceremonies – symposiums, colloquiums, and other manifestations – that took place in the Tel Aviv Campus during his tenure of office.

After finishing his work as Dean of Humanities, Marcelo Dascal, professor of philosophy, much involved in the activity he had run through, reflected upon his experience, both as a person and as a philosopher, reexamined all the speeches he had uttered, realizing their unitary character, their argumentative value for the/his pragmatic research, and decided to publish them in a book.

In the new form, it becomes obvious that the speeches, thematically organized, are of a less-official style as usually expected. Therefore, the book counts as a collection of essays about the most controversial problems characterizing the Israeli society. The image of the "reality" it presents is much deeper than it seems at first sight. The diversity of issues in debate and the way the subjects were organized in the book allow the reader to grasp the things.

1.2 A Book of Confession

The book starts with the author's confession (the introduction) regarding his professional and moral concerns before entering the office, the need he feels to put order in his mind. By visiting all the departments that belong to the Humanities, by inquiring about the work performed by the people there, he becomes progressively more empathic with his academic colleagues and more aware about his future duties.

The confession in the afterword is more likely a professional exposition. The speaker's reflective consciousness is able to establish and share a conceptual synthesis of his experience with listeners/readers.

A trained reader can consider the problems presented both in the introduction of the book and in its afterword, the frame within which the entire book should be interpreted. Responsive to such a point of view, the reader's interest will be increased, being able to find relevant details for the *speaker's meaning* in the collection of speeches.

From the perspective emphasized above, Dascal's book can be placed within the literary genre of *confessions,* the author becoming actually conscious, *self-enlightened* about one's own (philosophical) choice. The book is a *confession of faith* – the author's philosophical testimony.

A *confession* is a very intimate narrative, but, in this case, the "intimate" matter the reader uncovers is an intellectual concern, sometimes extremely tense. The reader may be confused by the double game the speaker/writer plays, the super-position of the roles he keeps up: the dean's social and philosophical commitment.

1.3 A Pragmatic & Beyond *Point of View*

In what follows we will embrace a *pragmatic* & *beyond* point of view. Starting off with the idea that the book *Mashav HaRuah* is a confession, our present study will be focused on the concept of the *speaker's meaning*[1] – an important interpretative tool in Dascal's pragmatic philosophy.

With the intention of using this concept for a better understanding of the author's voice as it is heard in his book, we will establish three differentiated levels of approach:

(a) The *speaker's meaning* – what the speaker intends to say and is actually saying (the speaker's discursive intentionality, respectively, the speaker's point of view)
(b) The *speaker's meaning* – the speaker's reference to contextual facts (the speaker's referentially selective attitude)
(c) The *speaker's meaning* – icon of the speaker's social, scientific, and moral identity (who stands behind the speaker's words)

Once we have said that our commentary will follow a *pragmatic* & *beyond* point of view, our intention is to pursue pragmatic and hermeneutic inquiries. In our interpretation, "pragmatic" means setting up the author's discursive strategies and the meanings they carry. "Hermeneutic" means the transubstantiation of meanings into axiological values, respectively, the meaning constitution of axiological concepts, those relevant for *Mashav HaRuah* (author)'s persona.

2 Pragmatic Inquiry

"Comment extraire de ce qu'un discours quelconque dit et de ce qu'il montre celui de ses sens possibles auquel ce discours est censé nous diriger" represents – says Dascal (1996: 1375) – the main problem of pragmatics. The quoted paragraph is formulated by Dascal in an assertory way. It resumes the pragmatic thesis regarding the discourse comprehension: *to know how* (how language is used), as opposed *to know what* (what language makes reference to).

The same paragraph formulated in interrogative form will direct us "vers un sens privilegié" (1996: 1376) – the *speaker's meaning* – the "sense" in which we should read Dascal's book, *Mashav HaRuah.* While inquiring the *speaker's meaning*, we should establish who the *speaker* is in Dascal's book.

[1] See Dascal (1992: 41), his definition of the *speaker's meaning*: "what is intended to be conveyed by the utterance." See also note 7 below.

2.1 Game Parameters

By referring our problem to the same text quoted above, *Game in language,* we may find some considerations useful to begin with our commentaries: "Faire l'exégèse du texte … l'exégète doit exhiber sa comprehension, en poursuivant comme il faut le jeu (ou les jeux ?) exemplifié(s) dans le texte" (1996: 1373).

Our exegetic strategy proposes an extremely general game scheme,[2] in conformity with which we shall establish: the role of the author, how many "voices" or parts he plays, his discursive strategy and commitment, his identity, and the identity of the other "players" in each interaction (if there are more than one), the dialogical distance between players.

Mashav HaRuah is a book written in the first person. The author is the *speaker*, who performs his speech acts on two registers. First, the author of the book – which is a collection of public speeches – addresses himself to the large public, an undetermined, undefined "interlocutor," including the exegete. Then, the author calls the reader to "witness" an embedded interaction – the dean's/author's speeches addressed to his academic colleagues, interlocutors with a well-determined identity of scholars, their professional power and horizon of perception being more or less presumed by the speaker.

The discursive identity of the author depends on his discursive strategy which is differently oriented in each of the two interactions described above. In spite of the two strategically different targets, the polyphony of the author's voice is maintained: *the voice of the human person,* his consciousness with psychological and spiritual concerns; *the dean's voice,* the author's social and professional commitment; and the *voice of a scholar*, the author's cognitive identity, his cognitive concerns and experiences, his theoretical arguments and conclusions. It stands in the "interlocutor's" power of judgment to detect the loudness of each voice and the direction it comes from. Given the discursive formula of this book – that of a confession – it is equally important what the common "interlocutor" says about the author's identity, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, how the exegete establishes the speaker's identity by finding some limits to his interpretative acts. Due to his conceptual tools, the exegete has a privileged status. For him, the author's identity is a dynamic joining of parameters, an interpretative construction, derived from the speaker's discursive strategies, namely, from the speaker's referential and intentional attitude. All interpretative acts are projected by the exegete on an extended background, co-textually and con-textually increased.[3]

[2]We refer to the classical definition of strategic games, in conformity with which a *game* is an instance of cooperative behavior, a contest conducted under prescribed rules that lead to conflict resolution.

[3]Dascal (1987, 1990), in his pragmatic procedure of interpretation, applies intertextual techniques: *co-textual* (the appeal to additional texts) and *contextual* (the appeal to situational data).

2.2 The Author's/Speaker's Discursive Strategy

Since Professor Marcelo Dascal has realized that the publication in a book of almost all speeches he uttered in the occasion of opening academic ceremonies could engender public interest, he has become much more determined to inform the readers about the academic life and also to exhibit the seriousness with which academic research approaches the conflicting reality of Israel. Under the literal meaning, the reader uncovers the author's real intention, that of offering a key for understanding the Israeli reality, in order to improve it. Usually, such a collection of public speeches displays rhetoric relevance, but in this case the author has had in view an updated "document".

The embedded structure of interaction, in which the book has been conceived, compels us to establish more than one level of interpreting the *speaker's/writer's/author's meaning*. The embedded speeches, which constitute the main matter of the book, represent the authoritative arguments used by the author in order to justify his choice of being an *auteur engagé*.

Engagé in which sense? Is this a professional, a social, or a moral commitment?[4] We will begin with the first aspect; the two others will be analyzed in the third chapter.

An exegete familiar with Dascal's philosophical activity may judge the relationship between the *speaker's meaning,* in the book *Mashav HaRuah*, and the whole scientific work of a scholar who has been contributing to the foundation of the theory and meta-theory of pragmatics and controversy. From the first glance, by reading the book's table of contents, the *speaker's meaning* becomes obvious. The philosophical emphasis laid on each opening speech is "translated" by the titles of the chapters under which the respective speeches are reproduced. Leader of the theory of dialogue interpretation, Dascal, being a philosopher, pushed the communicative theory in the direction of the new epistemology, that of cognitive studies regarding a truth governed by soft rationality, namely, the truth searched in conformity with the principle of *tertium datur.* Specialist in Leibniz's philosophy, much influenced by him, professor Dascal extended the principle of "soft rationality" with two ideas borrowed from Leibniz: to consider not only your own desires but also those of the others – Leibniz's *principle of charity* – and to put yourself in the position of the other, *la place d'autruy* (Dascal 2000: 27–28). Involved in a comprehensive project of publishing Leibniz's *opera completa,* Marcelo Dascal discovers another Leibniz, Leibniz the *polemist* and the theoretician of controversy.

Led by the German philosopher in his effort to establish the cognitive fundaments of controversy, Dascal finds many similarities between his project and the old Talmudic tradition. By casting a philosophical glance upon the writings of the Masters of Jewish dialectics, he was able to realize an original synthesis and to found his own philosophy of *ars disputandum*.[5]

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[4]By "moral commitment" we mean a commitment assumed by consciousness.

[5]See Dascal's commentary about his recently published study *Ars of Controversy,* in Scarafile (2010: 11).

The *speaker's meaning* in *Mashav HaRuah* cannot be rightly interpreted without reference to the theses of cognitive pragmatics and epistemology, developed by professor Dascal. In accordance with Leibniz's metaphysics and Talmudic dialectics, Dascal's epistemological strategy is *other-oriented*. It emphasizes the importance of public debates, during which the confrontation of contrary arguments is not a competitive fight, but a creative opportunity for each intervention to contribute in solving a problem, for the benefit of the "growth of knowledge" (Dascal 2000). Multi-perspectivism, cultural pluralism, interdisciplinarity, the will for dialogue, and the *balance of reason*[6] are the main issues in Dascal's philosophy of controversy. As these concepts are frequently mentioned in his opening speeches, they make explicit the sense in which one should explain the *speaker's meaning*, for instance, "*to know how* to use language" (p. 72); "the process of de-dichotomization" (p. 83); "*ego's strategies*" (p. 105); "opening the *dialogue beyond ideological and linguistic borders*" (p. 112); and "*argumentative strategies*" (p. 133).

Although the author is the *speaker* in both interactions, the speaker's strategy in opening speeches with the occasion of academic ceremonies is different from the *speaker's strategy* of the entire book. The speaker's/author's strategy in opening speeches should be judged as far as it is part of the *speaker's meaning* of the book. In both conditions we hear the *dean's* and *professor's voice* modulated by the author's consciousness.

The way the speaker is addressing his words to his academic colleagues is equivalent to a form of *captatio benevolentiae,* formulated in theoretical terms. The speaker dean tries to establish a common language between different specialties, a bridge for cooperation. A more powerful (*speaker's*) intention is to make the "interlocutors" (his academic colleagues) familiar with the theoretical methodology of a *debate,* in order to diminish the dialogical distance between conflicting parts.

On the other hand, the reader is informed about the degree of the scholars' commitment to problems which are of current interest and he, the reader, is "initiated" in the way the specialists approach the problematic reality. The strategy of taking the reader to "witness" vital questions is frequently used in television talk shows. By judging the book from the perspective of the common reader, we discover that the "didactic" reason prevails over the informative one. By bringing all the theoretical issues in "public debate," the author rejects the taboo of scientific language and emphasizes the rational relevance these issues have in understanding the current life. Everybody is involved in trivial or serious polemics. The *didactic*-oriented strategy of the *speaker* explains why there are numerous repetitions, why the author makes use of well-tempered scientific language. It is difficult to put a complicated matter in a simple way, and the author, who masters this cognitive operation, follows the reductive strategy with the intention of being part in the process of the general emancipation of the people's mentality.

[6]See Dascal' explanation of Leibniz's syntagma *balance of reason,* or *image of scales,* in Scarafile (2010: 12).

2.3 The Author's/Speaker's Referential Strategy

The referential aspect of a discourse – "ce qu'un discours quelconque dit et … ce qu'il montre" – is part of the *speaker's meaning,* the "sense" in which we should read Dascal's *Mashav HaRuah.*[7] The narrative of the book follows a strategic plan, in conformity with which the author transforms the embedded academic interaction (the dean's illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, performed in opening speeches addressed to his academic colleagues) into a referential field for his confessions. Dominated by a perlocutionary intention (the *speaker's meaning*), the "content" of the book has got selective structure. Consequently, we see no reason not to call this aspect the *speaker's referential strategy.*

In what follows, we shall first present the referential background and after that the way the author/the dean uncovers the reasons of his selective points of reference.

2.3.1 Comprehensive Image of Israeli Reality

In the way the dean addresses his words, the reader gets indirectly a comprehensive image of the conflicting reality of Israel, becoming witness of the academic research and the degree of academic implication in problems largely debated: The Murder of Yitzchak Rabin, the Grief and Beyond; Europe and the Peace in Middle East; The Web of Violence; *Shoa* and the Evil; Racism and Anti-Semitism; Orientalism or Epistemological Pluralism in Israel?; Historical Truth or National Myth; The *Tanaims* and the Importance of Dialectics; Arabs and Jews in Israel, Dynamic Perspectives; Germany–Israel: a Culturally Multidimensional Web; Linguistic Pluralism; The Cryptic Meaning of the Scrolls, etc. – and these are only some examples.

2.3.2 *Le tour de la chose*

The book, *Mashav HaRuah,* is not a simple collection of public speeches, but a unitary complex of problems, the matter to which the book "refers." The embedded matter in the dean's confession is relevant for the author's referential strategy. Professor Dascal wants to share his *theory of controversy,* with his colleagues from different departments. Simultaneously, the dean's speeches explicitly emphasize those problems which, important for the theory of controversy, have public relevance: The Weight of Rationality in Conflict Settlement; Dialogue without A priori Conditions; Multistratified Identity; The Polyphony of Polemic Texts; Hermeneutics and Science; Three Prejudices about the Prejudice; Descartes: a Permanent Polemic; Relevant Philosophy, etc.

[7] "Yet, no matter how minor is its (=literal meaning) contribution to context, it seems to play a crucial role in the process of leading the hearer to the identification of the relevant items of contextual information, which have to be used in order to come up with an interpretation." (1987: 262)

In published form, the referential management opens a new door toward the *speaker's meaning*. Addressed to common readers, the author's confession makes public his intellectual concerns – "the literal meaning." He "presents" his speeches addressed to his colleagues with a *demonstrative* intention. By the many references to theoretical issues, he shows *how* the conflicting reality might be judged rationally, less impulsively.

In front of his colleagues, the philosopher presents a theoretically simplified program. His affirmations, his ideas, are submitted to a test of theoretical resistance, challenging reaction, looking for an approval. While reading the book, having a global view, the academic public may better judge the social frame (*context*) within which their debates have taken place, and they may judge the theoretical design formulated by the author (*co-text*). The confession in the afterword – the last chapter – is particularly addressed to them. On the occasion of a colloquy on a geographical topic, the author, having the intention of finding himself on a common ground with his colleagues, opens the debates by an exposition regarding "geographical metaphors in scientific language", for instance, *ground, territory,* and *beyond (pragmatics)*.

By deciding to publish this book, the author himself is able to approach the whole matter more critically. As he gives the same opportunity to his colleagues, they can make "le tour de la chose" together (in Leibniz's words, quoted by Dascal 2000: 33). The published form of the speeches facilitates the step toward objectivity.

3 Hermeneutical Inquiry

The *speaker's meaning* is the icon of the speaker's social, scientific, and moral identity. In certain kinds of discourse, when the interpretation of the *speaker's meaning* regards problematic issues, beliefs, and ideas that concern the person who stands behind the speaker's words, the following question arises inevitably:

Who is the speaker? This question, in our particular case, cannot be avoided because our exegesis is dealing with a book of *confession,* in which the speaker, becoming conscious of what he is doing, tries to define himself. The *speaker's meaning* in a confession is to express what is most profound in the speaker's mind – his beliefs. What in French is called "*Une prise de conscience*" becomes a *confession of* (intellectual) *faith* – a moral commitment.

In order to give a complete account of the *speaker's meaning* in Dascal's book, *Mashav HaRuah,* the interpretation leads beyond the pragmatical frame, beyond questions regarding the players' identity, beyond the polyphonic problems regarding the "voices" that are heard in the *speaker's meaning,* but not so far as to search a metaphysically absolute speaker.[8]

[8]The poetic language could be an example of the ontological constitution of the poetic subject – speaker in language.

The *speaker's meaning* is a cognitive parameter, pragmatically defined. If this parameter acquires a moral dimension, the cognitive load is increased, requiring axiological determination. From this point onward, the interpretative exegesis steps beyond pragmatical border and begins a hermeneutical inquiry.

From our point of view, hermeneutics represents the constitutive procedure of an alternative to epistemic truth, the doxastic truth, or the truth of beliefs. Doxastic truth objectifies the content of beliefs in language, by dialectically displayed interpretative movements.[9] Because beliefs are subjective acts with cognitively poor relevance, the hermeneutic procedure is more than a semantic interpretative tool; it represents the way the "semantic truth" of beliefs *could* be validated. Two cognitive stages prepare the validation: the belief's content should be assumed by consciousness and the belief's content should be referred to a principle of transcendence. These remarks are necessary in order to put a new accent upon the cognitive steps our exegesis is prepared to take. As our hermeneutical inquiry examines the author's moral concerns, it has no ontological implications.

By making a synthesis of the pragmatical analyses – as professor Dascal proposes – we obtain the hermeneutical answer to the question *Who is the speaker?* In this answer, two perspectives converge: that of the speaker himself, who assumes his professional and social commitment, and that of the reader/the interpreter/the exegete, who, being interested in establishing the moral significance (relevance) of the speaker's words, "translates" the pragmatically defined meanings into their axiological correspondents.

3.1 The Speaker's Own Image

From Dascal's assertion: "Hermeneutical theses can be rephrased as pragmatic principles (and vice versa)" (Dascal 1989: 240), we choose the "vice versa" alternative: *Pragmatic theses can be rephrased as hermeneutical principles.*

Hermeneutics is a cognitive procedure applied to beliefs which have no other reference than the meanings extended in consciousness.

The cognitive functions of consciousness are governed by two principles: the principle of opposition and the principle of transcendence.

The inner dialogue of a confession is the best example. The first step in consciousness is done by the speaker who commits himself morally. *Une prise de conscience*, as we define Dascal's *Mashav HaRuah,* represents a complex act, both cognitive and self-evaluative. Once the *moral commitment* is confessed, the speaker submits his own sense of self-determination to the *other's* judgment. In Dascal's book, the author confesses his professional and philosophical dilemma.

[9]Starting with Heidegger (1963), Gadamer (1976, 1977), and other philosophers, we developed our own hermeneutical point of view. For the constitution of doxastic truth, see R. Amel (1999), for its conceptualization (2008) and for its validation (2010).

The reader finds the dean's concerns regarding his responsibilities both as a dean and as a humanist; his promise never to make a conventional speech, but to speak about issues that have matter in them; his care for maintaining a comprehensive look upon the academic activity in the Tel Aviv Campus, upon issues that could bring new light for his research.

Once uttered, the personal, intimate troubles are contrastively judged and objectified. The speaker is ready to receive the reader's/interpreter's verdict. A *confession of faith* is *meant* to "challenge" the interlocutor, in a *virtual dialogue*. The hermeneutical mechanism is triggered and organized due to the two principles that govern the cognitive functions of consciousness: the principle of opposition and the principle of transcendence.

The cognitive themes of dialectics – the contrast, the confrontation, the *principle of charity, being in the position of the other,* etc. – evince the importance of the principle of opposition and its cognitive gain. The dialogue is not only the way of convincing or persuading the other but the way the speaker wants to become conscious of the question that troubles himself. Frequently, Dascal mentions the retroactive character of dialogical interventions, but in a different perspective than ours.

A more important cognitive function of the *other* is that of introducing the principle of transcendence. The subject of beliefs shares with his opponent, with the *other,* in *dialogue,* the same need of making possible the validation of a truth which has semantic roots and a spiritual (moral) object of reference. In our opinion, the complex philosophy of the *other* – to which professor Dascal has an important contribution – is inherently placed in the field of value. The question is how to conceptualize it?

3.2 The Reader's Interpretation of the Speaker's Meaning

An act assumed by consciousness stands in the incidence of an axiological category.

The author's intellectual confession renders explicit *his* choice of reaching a clear-cut conceptual form of expression. The conceptualization supplies a cognitive gain, by raising the issue from an empiric to a paradigmatic level. In our case, at this point, the *personal voice* of author's consciousness interferes with the *voice of the scholar. The way* professor Marcelo Dascal, the philosopher of controversy, conceives of the *conceptualization* of a problematic matter is dialectically displayed: an open-to-critics inventory of facts and, then, preparing the theoretical synthesis.

We speak about *a confession of faith*, which has a value in itself, being a moral act. *A confession of faith* is performed in a virtual dialogue with an "interlocutor"/the reader upon whom lays the responsibility of the evaluation.

The reader's interpretation of the *speaker's meaning* in confessions should go further than pragmatically explaining the speaker's discursive intentions.

An evaluation of the *speaker's meaning* is absolutely necessary, in order to appreciate the authenticity of the confession. From the two principles mentioned above, the principle of transcendence is the most active. The evaluative interpretation performs a semantic transfer, from the empirical facts to the higher-ordered position of values. This operation can be equated with Grice's argument concerning the *metaphysical transubstantiation,* a procedure for redistribution, but not the invention of properties. For example, properties accidentally meant for *humans* become properties of a new psychological type, called *persons,* as essential ones (Grice 1991: 114).

When the confession is focused on intellectual themes – philosophical, ethical, aesthetical – the interpreter (both the speaker himself, with a higher power of self-determination, and the "interlocutor") tries to reach a correct conceptualization.

For instance, how to evaluate the dean's concerns? Are they proofs of a professional or a moral commitment? Do the dean's words mean only that he assumes all the difficulties his social/pragmatic duty require, or can one see the intellectual responsibility of an open-minded humanist in an old to new world through them?

The hermeneutical steps toward conceptualization represent reflective acts, quite creative, that follow the "dialectical program" established by Dascal in his *ars disputandum.*

4 Instead of Conclusions

Two questions:

1. In an explicit way, we adopted for our exegesis a *pragmatic & beyond* point of view. Consequently, how to define hermeneutics as against pragmatics, an extension, or a higher theoretical movement?

   When beliefs represent the previous step in the dialogical way to *episteme,* the process of their critical analysis belongs to pragmatics.

   When beliefs represent acts in consciousness, hermeneutics is the specific procedure of their "rational" interpretation. Hermeneutics is the field inside which the disputed "truth" has semantic nature.
2. In the last chapter we have made the affirmation that any act/fact assumed by consciousness inherently stands in the incidence of an axiological category. Consequently, is the axiological conceptualization that any belief requires part of the process of "transcendantalisation de la pragmatique" (Dascal 2000: 1376)?

   Given the limits of our present exegesis, the answer is negative. In spite of the fact that the axiological determination of the *speaker's meaning* activates the principle of transcendence, the hermeneutical inquiry maintains its controversial character, on the higher level of the axiological metalanguage, without a "tournure kantienne de cette question" (2000: 1376).

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Religion and Politics: The Controversy over the Political Mandate of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) Relating to the Eastern Policy 1950–1972

Hartmut Rudolph

Abstract In the decade earmarked by the Cold War between East and West, one can observe among intellectuals in West Germany, above all within German Protestantism, a growing awareness of the inadequacy of the prevailing politics of Konrad Adenauer's government. The rigid insistence on Germany's alleged legal claim to the earlier Eastern (now Polish) territories and the refusal to acknowledge the German Democratic Republic hedged in the possibilities of operations in foreign policy. Since the early 1950s, the official policy in West Germany consigned to those driven from the East in all of West Germany (16.6 % of the total population) a so-called Recht auf die Heimat, i.e. right to the land, which one has fled from. The word of the German Protestant Church on this subject was not unified. On the one hand there was theological support given to the demand for a restitution; on the other hand, one saw in the loss of the homeland a consequence of the German guilt, i.e. the judgement of God which must be acknowledged. The result of heated controversial discussions in the 1960s was a common Word of the church, not prescribing for politicians compellingly necessary decisions, but targeting on the preconditions of political action, or as one might say, on political hermeneutics. This act of ecclesiastical pastoral care made an essential contribution to the "Neue

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Ostpolitik" (New Policy for the East) successfully promoted by Willy Brandt, which made possible a rapprochement between the Federal Republic and its neighbours in the East.

Keywords West German policy in the Cold War era • Public word of the Protestant churches contributing to the political discourse • "Neue Ostpolitik" (New Policy for the East) • Political hermeneutics

1 On the General Political Situation in the German Federal Republic Around 1960

Somewhat more than 15 years after the end of the Second World War, in the decade earmarked by the Cold War between East and West, one can observe among intellectuals in West Germany, above all within German Protestantism, a growing awareness of the inadequacy of the prevailing politics in the era of Konrad Adenauer's government. In 1957 the Christian Democratic Union had won an absolute majority for the first time. What this meant was, on the one hand, an expansion of the so-called social market economy, a partially restricted capitalist arrangement through protection of workers' rights as well as the state's social guarantees for the unemployed and others in need, and, in addition, with its view to integrating the West and bolstering anti-Communism, i.e. drawing of a sharp line vis-à-vis the states in Middle and Eastern Europe which were then subject to Soviet influence. While the German Democratic Republic, indeed standing under Soviet influence, had, quite soon after its founding, recognised as final the western border of Poland settled on in 1945, West Germany not only refused to recognise the German Democratic Republic under the Law of Nations but also made propaganda for Germany's claim to the earlier German territories on the other side of the Odra-Nysa line. No one was prepared to recognise these earlier German areas as now belonging to Poland under the Law of Nations. The Eastern territories thus lost comprised approximately a third of the earlier territory of the Empire from which since 1944 around nine million people had fled to reach or be resettled in the four zones of occupation under Allied governance, that is, the later Federal Republic and the later German Democratic Republic.

The controversies which can only be sketched here in brief, concerned the question of which goal West German policy should follow vis-à-vis the neighbours to the East, especially with regard to the then People's Republic of Poland. At the beginning of the 1960s, the policy of the Federal Republic was more and more obviously caught in a dead end situation[1]: the rigid insistence on Germany's alleged legal claim to the earlier Eastern territories and the refusal to acknowledge the

[1]For the general situation in Germany at the "end of the post-war area", cf. Greschat (2010: 290–313).

German Democratic Republic hedged in the possibilities of operations in foreign policy. The Federal Republic's claim to alone having the right to represent Germany forced the country to break off diplomatic relations with those states which were ready to recognise the German Democratic Republic as a second German state. With this the German Federal Republic damaged its international possibilities of influence and also suffered economic damage, which could be seen above all when Yugoslavia acknowledged the GDR in accord with the Law of Nations and West Germany thereupon severed diplomatic relations with Belgrade.

One can say that West German policy had landed in the situation of increasingly blocking itself. The parties represented in parliament and the government of the Republic propagandised their claim to the formerly German regions in the East which were lost after 1945. Since the early 1950s, the official policy consigned to those driven from the East a so-called Recht auf die Heimat, i.e. right to one's homeland, the land of one's birth or the land which one has fled from, that is, they asserted that being driven out and losing the regions in the East was a question of a process in contradiction to the Law of Nations. Both the government and the political parties believed that, in consideration of votes to be cast in the elections, they would be bound to be supported in their position when the issue was the refugees from the East and those driven from it. These groups constituted a third of the German landers, in all of West Germany 16.6 % of the total population.

2 The Public Utterance of the Church

Following the collapse of the Nazi regime, the Protestant churches in Germany represented an authority such as had not been present since the days of the Reformation. Although large sections of the protestant churches had collaborated with the Nazis, in the early phase of the post-war period, even considering the political groups and parties which had resisted the Nazis, there was no institution whose public utterances had more weight. The guiding leadership of the protestant churches was radically renewed and occupied by leading representatives of the "Confessing Church" (Bekennende Kirche) which had tried to resist the attempts of the Nazi rulers to make the churches cave in. As early as October 1945, the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) had accused itself in a public statement, the so-called Stuttgart declaration of guilt. Its most important part, translated into English, is as follows:

> [...] with great pain we say: By us infinite wrong was brought over many peoples and countries.[2] That which we often testified to in our communities, we express now in the name of the whole church: We did fight for long years in the name of Jesus Christ against

[2]The original text in German: "Mit großem Schmerz sagen wir: Durch uns ist unendliches Leid über viele Völker und Länder gebracht worden" (*Kirchliches Jahrbuch* – Joachim 1950: 26; cf. Boyens 1971: 397).

> the mentality that found its awful expression in the National Socialist regime of violence; but we accuse ourselves for not standing to our beliefs more courageously, for not praying more faithfully, for not believing more joyously, and for not loving more ardently.
>
> Now a new beginning is to be made in our churches. Based on the Holy Scripture, with complete seriousness directed to the lord of the church, they start to cleanse themselves of the influences of beliefs foreign to the faith and to reorganize themselves. We hope to the God of grace and mercy that He will use our churches as His tools and give them licence to proclaim His word and to obtain obedience for His will, amongst ourselves and among our whole people. [. . .].
>
> We hope to God that by the common service of the churches the spirit of violence and revenge, which today again wants to become powerful, will be directed to the whole world, and that the spirit of peace and love comes to predominate, in which alone tortured humanity can find healing. [. . .].[3]

After 1945 the political weight of the word of the church among the entire public – including, as well, its nonchurchly elements – was incomparably greater than, say, today or in recent decades. In the first years after the war, the churches took a considerable part in establishing the sense of things and the political retraining of the German people, a great majority of whom had followed the policies and ideologies of the Nazis. But solving the immense material problems, nourishment, living quarters and work for the millions of refugees from the East was unimaginable without the churches, the only institutions with international contacts through which they could mobilise help (cf. Wischnath 1986; Rudolph 1984: 44–51). Increasingly in the immediate period following the war, and as the sole institution, the churches offered the refugees from the East the possibility of organising themselves and thus obtaining a public voice (cf. Rudolph 1984: 52–98). With the refugees from the East it was, in a majority of cases, a matter of Protestants attached to their churches with fidelity. Both in consideration of their previous homeland and also in consideration of the areas that took them in, one can speak of what is called in German Volkskirche, i.e. established firm structures of the churches within people's social and cultural live.

3 Positions of the Church on the Right to One's Homeland and on the Relationship with Poland

As early as the beginning of the 1950s, the word of the Protestant church on the question of the homeland in the East was not unified (cf. Rudolph 1985: 1–68). Differing from Roman Catholic practice, in Protestantism, there is not a single body

[3] *The Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt by the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany* (October 19, 1945). Translated by Harold Marcuse. http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/niem/StuttgartDeclaration.htm (accessed 2011/08/03). The declaration provoked a scathing criticism in the most part of the general public in Germany. Even the bodies of the regional protestant churches, the so-called Landeskirchen, and of the single parishes often were stingy with approving of such declarations of guilt; cf. Boyens (1971), Koch (1972: 26–45), Greschat (2002: 131–164) and also see, e.g. on the discussion in the Lutheran Landeskirche of Hanover: Lindemann (2002).

which could dictate to the individual believer and to his conscience what he has to do. On the one hand, especially with the church organisations of the refugees from the East, there was forceful theological support to the demand for a restitution of the relations regarding ownership such as to help the adoption of the injured rights of those driven from their homeland. "Homeland" belonged to these theologians to the order implanted on creation by God. On the opposite side, particularly in circles from the Confessing Church, contrary positions were taken. They maintained that the insistence on the right to the homeland represents the view of homeland as something absolute. But homeland, in their view, was only an earthly value. God gave us the right to homeland in His eternal kingdom. Those theologians who oriented themselves on Karl Barth's theology saw in the loss of the earthly homeland a result of the crimes which the Germans had committed against the peoples in Eastern and East-Middle Europe; in theological terms, they saw in the loss of the homeland a consequence of the German guilt, i.e. the judgement of God which must be acknowledged.

In the sense of the Christian doctrine of the reconciliation in accordance with which "God through Christ reconciled us all with Him Himself", the synods, i.e. the members of the parliament of the Protestant Church, in the Rhineland (cf. Rudolph 1985: 62–68), made the following demand: "Reconciliation must not merely remain a pious word ... [but] should give us the courage for a new life together with the peoples in Eastern Europe on a basis of reconciliation". Hence, the synods pose the question in their decision: "What can we do on this reconciliation?" They are describing both domestic and external difficulties. Domestically it is the clinging to the abstract claim to right which at the time belonged to a certain extent to the doctrine of the state; neither the government nor the opposition dared to give up the goal of a restitution of the former relationships pertaining to ownership in the East; putting it plainly: the recognition, according to the Law of Nations, of the western border of Poland as created in 1945. In the external political area, it was the ideology of the Cold War which hindered an approximation of East and West, because each side was afraid of being weakened, if the opposition between East and West were lessened.

The word of the Protestant Church in the Rhineland, which was published in 1961 under the title "The Way of Reconciliation", demanded for the first time, as it appealed to a central idea of Christian belief, exertion on behalf of peace with the neighbours to the East, the Poles above all, on the basis of a recognition of the status quo, and that means the renunciation of the earlier German territories in the East. "Should the call of the Gospel for peace be rejected by the peoples, they will go under, all together; if it is listened to, they will live together".

The effectiveness of this call on the part of one of the largest Landeskirchen in Germany remained limited. The broad political public attention was accrued only by another declaration, the so-called Tübingen Memorandum of November 1961 (cf. Rudolph 1985: 69–85). Its eight authors did not argue in a theological fashion as in the texts presented previously, but they proceeded from the political analysis of the German interests, i.e. they remained in the realm of political immanence.

They demanded a more serious and honest involvement in the political acts which admitted no hope of a reunification and still less recovery of the once German areas in the East which now belonged to Poland. To be sure, these authors had stepped forward as private persons. Nonetheless, they were for the most part prominent representatives of German Protestantism; one of them was the President (you can also say: bishop) of the Protestant Church in the Rhineland. Thus, the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) was involved in the heated discussions which broke after publication. There was no city in which disagreements about the theses of the Memorandum failed to take place at public meetings. The utterances within the Protestant church, as could be expected from the oppositions which I have already indicated, were controversial. Whereas some people, with good theological reasons, rejected the statements of the Tübingen Memorandum and viewed an abandonment of the law as theologically illegitimate, others gave utterance to the very opposite view that the Christian Gospel precisely demanded such renunciation of one's rights and, tied up with this, a fundamental turn-about of German policy vis-à-vis the neighbouring lands to the East.

The EKD's taking a public stand was increasingly seen as unavoidable. In 1963 the Council of the EKD instructed its Advisory Board for Public Responsibility (i.e. for Politics),[4] to prepare a position paper (cf. Huber 1973: 380–420; Rudolph 1985: 86–149). The dilemma of the mode of argumentation on the part of the ecclesiastical-theological side resided in its ending decisions that were, politically, totally contrary decisions, able to provoke a cleavage or a schism of Protestantism. This became clear, already in the opening months of the board's work. It was facing two lists of theses: whereas the theologians of the ecclesiastical organisations of the refugees from the East saw their expulsion as something "forbidden by the Gospel" and themselves as obliged by the Gospel to "raise their voice against a declaration of renunciation", the theologians from the Brotherhoods appealing to the Confessing Church said: "The abandonment of the German claim to the lost regions in the East and the rejection of returning" are "required by the Gospel for the take of good life together with our Eastern neighbours".

4 The Factual Outcome of the Controversy

Here it is not a question of the extremely complicated depiction of the history of this problem, but rather the question of how the Protestant Church sought a way out of this dilemma, a kind of settlement of the irreconcilably opposed positions. Within this chapter it only can be sketched in somewhat crudely what the factual outcome of the controversy was.

[4]In German: Kammer (der EKD) für öffentliche Verantwortung.

This was recorded in two documents: the famous East Memorandum of the EKD on the policies related to the East 1965[5] and, reflecting it, the Declaration on the subject of Expulsion and Reconciliation issued by the Synod of the Protestant Church in Germany, EKD.[6] This document considered the turbulent discussion embracing all the social and political aspects of the problem.

What was new about both those documents lay in the relation of theological argumentation to political decision. In the sources named hitherto, a definite political decision was asserted as flowing directly and necessarily from the belief in the Christian Gospel. The East Memorandum abandons such a theological claim. It no longer sees the task of the church as one of prescribing for politicians compellingly necessary decisions taken from Christianity, but the Word of the church should rather target on the *preconditions* of political action, or – as one of the authors expressed it, the fertile subsoil of political decision – one might say, the word targets on political hermeneutics.

The point of departure derived from the Christian faith is rather the recognition that the political discourse is carried on in a limited way, and suffers from a self-blockade causing a rigid policy stemming from the Cold War and hinders a perception of the relationships keyed to political reality. Thus, the church understood its utterances, its Word, as an act of political charity through which the rigidity and blockading of policy should be resolved. The political decisions do not admit of being derived directly from theology, but – this is the crucial point – the Gospel, the Christian idea of reconciliation, liberates political reason for considerations which, far from excluding the renunciation of rights, allows this, when the political situation makes it necessary, to appear requisite. Thus it is a question of freeing up reason to carrying out decisions that take into consideration not only one's own interests but all interests, including those of the Eastern neighbours, Poland especially.

This act of ecclesiastical pastoral care ("politische Diakonie"), as is well known, made an essential contribution to the fact that 5 years later, the result of the "Neue Ostpolitik" (New Policy for the East) successfully promoted by Willy Brandt led to the Treaty of Warsaw (and in the same year to the Treaty of Moscow) and thus made possible a rapprochement between the Federal Republic and its neighbours in the East. The contribution of the Protestant Church in Germany to this result can be described as a successful endeavour to "de-dichotomize" the fierce debate and thus to "create space" (Dascal and Firt 2010, 156seq.) for the way out of a political self-blockade.

Anyone who knows Marcelo Dascal's reflections on controversies and, in that connection, comes to terms with Leibniz will understand why the author, as a Leibniz scholar and as such akin to Marcelo Dascal, has chosen this example of our contemporary history as the topic of this chapter.

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[5] *Die Lage der Vertriebenen und das Verhältnis des deutschen Volkes zu seinen östlichen Nachbarn*. In *Denkschriften* (1978: 77–126).

[6] *Vertreibung und Versöhnung*. In *Denkschriften* (1978: 128–132) the discussion of the synods is fully documented in *Berlin und Potsdam 1966* (1970), cf. also: *Vertreibung* (1966), passim.

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The Dynamic Role of Toleration in an Emerging Pluralism

Herzl Baruch

Abstract While both pluralism and toleration accommodate diversities among individuals and groups, from a liberal perspective, it seems that the development and spread of pluralism since the middle of the twentieth century has to do with limiting the role and scope of toleration. In this chapter I focus on two major liberal approaches that examine the changing relations between toleration and pluralism amidst the present pluralist condition: One approach, defended by Popper, emphasizes the problem of toleration becoming "easygoing," even toward intolerance and violence. Second approach, defended by Horton, Heyd, and others, emphasizes the growing difficulties to justify and practice genuine toleration. However, both approaches have a similar solution: restricting toleration within the bounds of a legitimized model of pluralism. Examining the arguments and assumptions of both approaches, I suggest that with the spread of pluralism, within liberal and illiberal models, the "new" role of toleration is to challenge the "unreasonable" and the "illegitimate" beyond any pluralist model and thus prevent a hasty and seemingly necessary move from pluralism to intolerance. I then propose a maxim: If from the perspective of any pluralist model some beliefs and practices are (or become) unreasonable or illegitimate, try first a tolerant attitude, and only then, if toleration fails, appeal to intolerance.

Keywords Toleration • Intolerance • Monism • Pluralism • Liberalism

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1 Introduction

Toleration and pluralism although they are embedded in different, even opposite, practical and theoretical frameworks, have, nonetheless, a close relationship. While both accommodate diversities among individuals and groups, from a liberal perspective, it seems that the development and spread of pluralism since the middle of the twentieth century has to do with limiting the role and scope of toleration. Even though liberal thought has its origins on tenets of an absolutist monism, the modern establishment of toleration – as for example with Locke's delegitimization of the use of power by the state to get people to maintain or change their beliefs – has the effect of "softening" monist tenets of liberalism and even of moving toward the extension of pluralism.[1] That is to say, with the rise of toleration, a minimal sense of allowing a pluralist condition though not necessarily an explicit attitude of value pluralism (in short, pluralism) has emerged.[2]

In general, the traditional version of toleration was explicitly required in order to protect "hard" monism; yet it had a significant contribution in the shift from monism to pluralism, in a way that is reminiscent of a "Trojan horse." In other words, toleration makes it possible to create, preserve, and advance pluralism, and when pluralism has developed and spread, it basically urges all parties to act with more toleration. Thus, toleration becomes less a principle in one direction, from the majority to the minority, and more a reciprocal principle.[3] Within liberalism, Voltaire and Mill are two prominent philosophers who elaborated on the relation between toleration and weak pluralism.

However, the traditional notion of toleration engaged in solving problems of a more homogenous framework can no longer have the same role amidst a more pluralist framework. Thus, the dramatic expansion of pluralism during the last

[1]Locke didn't develop the notions of conceptual and value pluralism. Probably, this is due to his belief that in ethics, as in mathematics, absolute certainty is possible.

[2]Dascal (1993) traces the origins of modern value pluralism to Leibniz, as a "defense of the moral legitimacy and value of a variety of particular socio-political formations," based on the view that universalism and particularism should be reconciled (1993: 388). Leibniz's goal, however, was to redirect French imperialism outward against non-European societies, and such proposal, as Dascal suggests, "clearly disregards the welfare of humankind as a whole" (1993: 391). I suggest in Sect. 4 that in any pluralist model, such a problem might arise, explicitly or implicitly, and that those not included in the pluralist interaction may not be tolerated.

[3]Williams (1996: 18–19) distinguishes two uses of toleration: We usually think that "toleration is an attitude that a more powerful group, or a majority, has (or fails to have) toward a less powerful group or a minority ... But more basically, toleration is a matter of the attitudes of any group to another and does not concern only the relations of the more powerful to the less powerful." I suggest that the more "basically" use of toleration is amidst pluralism, not monism. The major reason for this is that in a pluralist condition, in which the principle of pluralism is spread, there is a dynamic change between majorities and minorities and even that many individuals and groups share different ways of life both as belonging to the majority and the minority at the same time. For example, a person or a group may share the majority religion and at the same time a minority political group.

decades has brought into moral and political discourse new problems and challenges of stronger versions of pluralism, and with it a reexamination of the relation between pluralism and toleration.

In this chapter I focus on two major liberal approaches that examine the changing relations between toleration and pluralism and the growing advantages which pluralism gains over toleration amidst the present pluralist condition: One approach, defended by Popper (1945, 1987, 1994), emphasizes the problem of toleration becoming "easygoing," even toward intolerance and violence, thereby endangering liberal and tolerant society. A second approach, defended by Horton (1996), Heyd (1996), and others, emphasizes the growing difficulties to justify and practice genuine toleration. Thus, the scope and role of toleration in accommodating differences narrows even more and is expected to disappear and be replaced by pluralism.

Whether the "new" problem of toleration has to do with getting too easy or too difficult to conceptualize and practice, both Popper's and Horton and Heyd's approaches have a similar solution: restricting toleration within the bounds of pluralism. Examining the arguments and assumptions of both approaches, I suggest, however, that toleration isn't only a moral principle which may be restricted within the bounds of pluralism. Rather, it is a moral principle whose role is being revised and continually developed in a dialectic relation with the spread of pluralism.

In Sects. 1 and 2, I critically examine the arguments of both approaches to narrowing toleration amidst the spread of pluralism, and in particular amidst the spread of liberal pluralism. Then, in the third section, I discuss the notion of pluralism as encompassing both liberal and non-liberal frameworks. Thus, the role of liberal pluralism is understood not only within its own merits but also in its interaction with non-liberal pluralist views. Finally, in Sect. 4, I propose my view of the dynamic role of toleration in the context of the expansion of pluralism.

2 The Dangers of Unlimited Toleration

According to Popper, liberal society is often obsessed with unlimited toleration and (irrational) fears to be intolerant to intolerance and violence (1945, v.1: 265, 1987: 17). Unlike his predecessors such as Voltaire and Mill, he suggests restricting toleration rather than expanding it. In particular he resents the lax version of toleration, that of tolerating intolerance and violence, maintaining that such an "easygoing" toleration undermines the tolerant tradition of the open society. Such irresponsible toleration is best exemplified in the toleration of the Nazi movement which was democratic to start with and ended in hard-core fascism.[4] So, he proposes

[4]In *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945), the modern spells of totalitarianism which are argued systematically are almost solely the Hegelian via Marxist doctrines, while the origins of Fascism, Nazism, and modern Racism are widely neglected and thus not challenged systematically. In one

to limit toleration only to those who are tolerant and to intolerant individuals and groups who do not propagate intolerance and violence. The latter will be kept in tight watch, while the first may be partners in the quest for truth. Toleration between two tolerant agents is well captured in the aphorism: "I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth" (1945, v.2: 225). In other words, toleration is constructed mainly for interaction among tolerant participants who disagree with each other but, nevertheless, have common goals and procedures.

Popper's formulation of the "new" problem of toleration amidst a developing pluralist condition is original in diagnosing that toleration might be abused by both the tolerator and the tolerated. Therefore, not only the state and the more powerful group (majority) but also the less powerful groups (minorities) should be tolerant. What concerned Popper was that in a pluralist democracy, a tolerated minority might soon become a majority and, as he puts it, in such circumstances "minorities would arise who are unwilling to reciprocate the tolerance offered to them by the majority" (1987: 18). The classics who defended toleration didn't foresee "this particularly unpleasant situation" nor "the rise of a democratic society in which toleration has become the accepted principle; not only religious toleration but also political toleration" (1987: 18–19). Voltaire's dictum "let us pardon each other follies" is adopted by Popper more urgently in present pluralist condition to demand from all parties to be tolerant.

How would individuals and minority groups pass the test of being tolerant? In an article on toleration and interpretation, Dascal (1989) argues that Popper's notion of toleration is restricted only to the members of the open society. Such restrictive notion of toleration, writes Dascal, is also found in Mao's writing, that of restricting toleration only to the members of the communist party. So what we may come up with in both cases is a danger of escalating to intolerance toward those who in the first place aren't included in the "right" group.

I would like to add here an idea that I have elaborated elsewhere (Baruch 2008) that Popper didn't notice a new "pleasant situation" that has emerged at about the same time as the emergence of fascism, namely, Gandhi's nonviolent resistance. This resistance involved the toleration of the politically intolerant rule of the British in India. Not only that Gandhi's concept and maxims of toleration began with a long and winding project of tolerating the intolerant, but he brilliantly assumed the possibility for a dynamic change toward de-suppression and more toleration. His efforts were to reciprocate toleration but this time in the direction from the minority to the majority. Obviously, it may rightly be claimed that the British were relatively tolerant, compared to the Japanese and the Nazi Germans. But this claim also implies that there are significant cases in which Popper's maxims ("do not

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of his latest lectures named *The Collapse of Communism* given on 6 March 1992, he maintains that "the Marxist victory in Russia [. . .] had led everywhere to a sharp polarization between Left and Right. First in Italy under Mussolini, this polarization led to Fascism, soon to be copied by Fascist movements in other European countries, especially Germany and Austria, and to an endemic civil war – very one-sided, since it consisted mainly of terrorists of the Right" (Popper 1999: 127; compare with Popper 1992: 33).

tolerate the intolerant" and "tolerate only the tolerant") shouldn't be adopted at all, because there are persons and groups who are intolerant in one domain (say, the political, in the case of British colonialism) and are tolerant in many others domains. This point, however, holds not only for old liberal agencies, political and economic, but also for new emerging powers like the Chinese who exhibit ambivalence and contradicting tendencies of being tolerant in one domain and intolerant in others.

3 The Growing Difficulties to Justify Toleration

The second liberal approach to give an account of toleration amidst the pluralist condition is relatively new and maintains that genuine toleration becomes more difficult and even almost impossible to justify morally. Horton (1996: 31–34) and Heyd (1996: 4), two leading representatives of this approach, claim that toleration cannot be justified in cases, like racism and homophobia, and that the scope and role of toleration has been narrowed. For Horton racial restraint of one who is "intensely prejudiced against a particular racial group" cannot be a genuine case for toleration because "to regard such restraint as straightforwardly virtuous also seems to imply that my racial prejudices are in some way either acceptable or their wrongness entirely irrelevant in judging whether or not I am tolerant" (Horton 1996: 31–32).

So Horton restricts genuine toleration only to those cases in which restraint doesn't imply that intense prejudices are in any way acceptable. But "Tolerance can sometimes be an appropriate and important virtue in the context of conflicting religious beliefs. Tolerance can allow the possibility of peaceful and harmonious coexistence without compromising the integrity of reasonably held and valuable convictions" (1996: 33–34). Horton then goes on: "a religious belief is accepted as having value even by those who do not subscribe to it" (1996: 42). Heyd (1996: 5) adds that just as toleration isn't thought to be a moral virtue when someone is refraining from rape or murder, it shouldn't be thought so as well, when someone is restraining his/her racist or homophobe attitude. "The homophobe's restraint toward homosexual behavior cannot, accordingly, be defined as a case of toleration, because there are not good reasons to object to the behavior in the first place" (Heyd 1996: 5). He also gives the example of tolerating abortion which at present is a genuine case for toleration, but in the future may no longer be (1996: 6).

Are racism and homophobia analogical to violent actions like murder and rape, which undisputedly shouldn't be tolerated? I think they aren't analogical. It's not only that murder and rape don't necessarily have to do with problems of differences and diversities but that they should and can be prevented or punished in any case, even if these actions are immersed in one's way of life or set of beliefs. Racism and homophobia, on the other hand, are much more complex issues as they cannot be prevented or punished, unless they are expressed as violent actions. Thus, hatred and prejudices, even though they cannot be held to be valuable convictions, may be part of a way of life and a set of beliefs, which *are* considered to be valuable.

According to which standards, then, is toleration to be justified? The standards of justification suggested above are liberal, or more precisely "progressive liberal." Narrowing the notion of toleration, as proposed by Horton and Heyd, leads to the exclusion of many groups and individuals in a democratic society, such as communitarian groups, less "progressive liberal" individuals, and probably even the majority of citizens in an emerging democracy. According to Horton and Heyd, new conflicting political and cultural beliefs and actions aren't eligible for a genuine case for toleration, only traditional religious convictions challenging new problems would. Thus, it is not clear if illiberal views (e.g., Gandhi's, Freire's, and Dalai Lama's) would be able to meet the basic requirements for toleration as requested by Horton and Heyd. In addition to that, it is not clear if liberal toleration since its classical origins is at all justified in Horton's and Heyd's argument.

As a matter of fact if the notion of toleration is too restrictive, then many cases would be excluded of the requirement to tolerate and of the possibility to accommodate serious problems of diversity. For example, the problems in Northern Ireland might not count as a case of toleration, because in the first place in a progressive liberal democracy such as the United Kingdom, religious/political hatred between Protestants and Catholics is objected. I think that today, in Northern Ireland, toleration is required as a *major* moral principle and thus may open opportunities for less hatred and less prejudices. We may say then that there is a learning process involved, a process that may lead to attributing some respect to the other, thereby, eventually, easing hatred and dissolving prejudices. Pluralism in Northern Ireland would be welcome of course, though probably it would be slow to develop in the present. In this case, as in many other cases where hatred and prejudices infect a way of life, including the most progressive liberal way of life, if the notion of toleration is too restricted, as suggested by Horton and Heyd, and pluralism difficult to practice, then problems that deteriorate into intolerance and violence may not be easily accommodated.

4 Liberal and Non-liberal Frameworks in Pluralism

Both approaches discussed above, that is, Popper's and Horton and Heyd's, are concerned with the problematic role that toleration plays amidst pluralist liberalism. Toleration either becomes unlimited to endanger open society (in Popper's view) or an almost impossible virtue because it cannot meet progressive liberal standards (in Horton and Heyd's view). Even though they diagnose different, almost opposing, problems of toleration in a pluralist condition, they come out with a similar solution. Both suggest that the spread of pluralism leaves little room for toleration in challenging differences and diversity. Thus, according to them, toleration, having no independent role, becomes part and parcel with a pluralist way of "tolerating."

My question is: To what extent should the relation between pluralism and toleration be limited to a liberal framework, as thus assumed? I suggest that

though liberal pluralism has an important role in the spread of pluralism, it cannot encompass the whole range of pluralism. Liberal pluralist models may be also, and in fact they are, challenged by constructing proper interchange with non-liberal models (communitarian, (neo)Marxist, Buddhist, etc.). In other words, although there is a special link between liberalism and pluralism, pluralism is also linked to non-liberal ways of life too.

For example, since the late nineteenth century the labor party in the United Kingdom, within a communitarian rather than liberal approach, has contributed to the expansion and advancement of a pluralist democracy.

Many democracies in Europe today are confronting similar challenges of enhanced pluralism, in particular with non-Christian and non-Jewish religions and non-European cultures (many of which are religiously Muslims and culturally Africans and Asians). However, not all of them may accept the strong liberal tenets many of them can contribute to develop democracy and pluralism, and, at least indirectly, liberalism as well.

An additional example of developing pluralism outside the liberal framework is that of decolonization. While decolonization may be liberating, it isn't necessarily a liberal act, in that it doesn't intend to promote individuality and liberalism. In this respect not all national liberation movements are committed to liberal values. However, the contribution of decolonization to the spread of pluralism, both as a fact and as an attitude, has affected, among other things, the development of liberal pluralism.[5] In this respect Dascal's (2009) notion of the "colonization of the mind" is of particular importance for advancing pluralism, since "the most visible forms of political colonialism have for the most part disappeared from the planet by the end of the millennium . . . ." Dascal questions whether total decolonization of the mind of the colonized, in the sense of a "complete cleansing from the foreign model" (2.2), is possible. One major problem that is raised here is the danger that decolonization of the mind would lead to new forms of radical colonization.

Pluralism, then, is a much wider phenomenon than liberalism. Therefore, in its quest for universalism, pluralism has to take into account other ways of life, communitarian and Buddhist for example, and not only liberalism. Universality then would be resolved by pluralist models of interaction and not by presupposing that one view is superior to another. Presupposing superiority by any group might result at best with closed models of pluralism. Liberals may only assume, as others would, that they have good, and even better, reasons in justifying their view to start with. Since pluralism in general includes both liberal and non-liberal views, the development of pluralist models may be possible within and between both liberal and non-liberal ways of life. Liberals, then, may enter into a dialogue with other ways of life to create a broader network of pluralist models.

[5]The spread of Buddhist ways of life and thought in the west, that undermines the idea of the "self," is an additional example for an illiberal view whose contribution to pluralism today is significant.

5 The Spread of Pluralism and Reciprocal Toleration

Going back to the relation between pluralism and toleration, the question is: even if such a broad network of pluralist models develops, does it follow that pluralism absorbs toleration, or on the contrary, may toleration be still considered to be an independent principle? In order to answer this question I suggest to give two examples – one from Leibniz and the other from Popper – that illustrate the ways in which those who do not take part in any given model of pluralism are perceived and understood from within the model. In the case of Leibniz's model of political pluralism, as mentioned earlier (note 2), those outside the recommended pluralist model, i.e., non-Europeans, are extremely not tolerated. In the case of Popper's pluralist model as well, intolerance was suggested toward those who are outside the model, that is, the non-liberals and those that favored the closed society. To generalize, those who are part of any given pluralist model may be accepted and understood as different and hence presupposed to have "reasonable" and "legitimate" beliefs. In this respect they would be "tolerated." But those outside the model probably would be perceived as having "unreasonable" and "illegitimate" beliefs, and therefore their beliefs would be considered as unacceptable. Accordingly, they might not be tolerated.

Since the pluralist cannot "tolerate" unless differences are fully accepted to start with, a question arises: How does the pluralist challenge the unacceptable? While the genuine tolerant restrains disapproval by a grudging partial acceptability and in this respect is immersed in a conflicting attitude, the pluralist cannot appeal to a partial acceptability. In fact, in order to promote an "open" interaction, both cooperative and competitive acceptance of differences within the pluralist model is required. The problem, however, is that what is outside the model may not be tolerated since it cannot be shared in a dialogical way. Thus, the pluralist may too easily tend to be intolerant to those outside the model, unless reflecting on the issue *some* acceptable aspects will be found. For example, in Mill's notion of pluralism, individualism is a necessary condition for sharing a pluralist model. Since the organized workers do not appeal to individualism and support socialist claims which reject private property, among other things, they cannot indisputably share his model of pluralism. But the issue isn't straightforward in that Mill also understands and *accepts* some of their beliefs, like concerning themselves with the welfare of others. Such understanding takes into account other values, like the freedom to organize, which for Mill is inseparable from the principle of human liberty (1989: 15, 223). It is, I think, in these aspects that it would be plausible to interpret Mill as tending to adopt a "narrow" pluralist attitude toward socialist workers and thus rethink his pluralist attitude, or adopt a stronger notion of pluralism.

I suggest that it is beyond the limits of any given pluralist model and in these "frontiers" within the wider network of pluralism that toleration in the context of pluralism is required as an independent principle. Put differently, toleration should

be considered to be an intermediary and contradictory principle between pluralism and acceptance, on one hand, and intolerance and nonacceptance, on the other. Thus, toleration within the context of developing pluralism may be called for not only because it is better to be tolerant than intolerant. Rather, it may be called for because there are issues in which growing nonacceptance and misunderstanding could escalate both within the model and outside of it, into full nonacceptance and intolerance.

As the widening network of pluralism is, I believe, in its beginnings, it is too early to determine whether toleration in a pluralist context is not only required beyond the limits of pluralist attitudes and for reconciling between different conceptions and models of pluralism but also as reminiscent of a Trojan horse. To be reminiscent of a Trojan horse would assume that toleration amidst a pluralist context would result, at least in some issues, in consequences that the pluralist didn't intend to bring about. They are, thus, unexpected from a pluralist perspective. I assume that in many cases, from the sole perspective of the pluralist model, such consequences cannot be prevented. Therefore, it is particularly important that any pluralist model would also be critically examined from the outside, either by competitive pluralist models or by non-pluralist perspectives. The advantages of the dialogical features of pluralism in a given framework do not remove its possible disadvantages toward the outside. Toleration, then, may be required to challenge controversial issues raised between different pluralist approaches. Moreover, toleration can play a significant role in assisting pluralism to realize its universal ambitions. Therefore, as pluralism is spreading today, toleration may be required in a way, that is, in some aspects, different from the role that it had in the past, particularly in challenging problems in a monist context.

I would like to conclude by answering the question whether toleration within the context of pluralism is totally a different concept not having a new name yet. I think that the concept of toleration in its core, i.e., as a contradictory and conflictive principle of partly accepting what is disapproved, is preserved also amidst a pluralist condition. However, unlike the traditional notion of toleration in the context of monism, toleration in the context of pluralism may require in its margins slight changes, as the examples discussed above (like Gandhi's and Northern Ireland's cases) show. Thus, toleration may be more reciprocal and less paternalist; its directions would spread both ways rather than only from the majority to the minority, and so on. The practical maxim for toleration would be quite similar in both contexts: If from any pluralist or monist perspective some beliefs and practices are thought to be unreasonable or illegitimate, try first a tolerant attitude and only then, if toleration fails, appeal to intolerance.

In short, the development and spread of pluralism during the last decades has to do with a growing emergence of a more reciprocal notion of toleration. In this respect, one has to be attentive to the major issues of toleration in the margins of different spheres of pluralism developing today.

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Elements of Controversy: Responses to Anti-Semitism in Nascent German Social Science

Amos Morris-Reich

Abstract Employing Marcelo Dascal's theory and typology of controversies, this chapter attempts to pull together certain elements of the writing of Georg Simmel (1858–1918), the founder of formal sociology; Franz Boas (1858–1942), the founder of cultural anthropology; and Arthur Ruppin (1876–1943), the founder of Jewish sociology and demography, and interpret them with regard to the then contemporary social, political, or scientific anti-Semitism. Through a comparison of their writing, the chapter argues that Ruppin was engaged in a discussion with anti-Semitic writers, as the object of disagreement, anti-Semitic reaction to Jewish difference, was treated as being well circumscribed. Simmel was engaged in a dispute, the source of disagreement rooted in differences of attitude, feelings, or preferences, transcending Jews as a specified object. Boas approached a controversy, revolving around specific objects and problems but spreading to broader methodological issues. The chapter points to the fact that none of these discourses meet Dascal's minimal definition of a controversy, because of the absence of a structured sequence of polemic exchanges (POPO). The chapter attempts to answer why this is so.

Keywords History of antisemitism • History of sociology • History of anthropology • Jewish history • European history

1 Introduction

The starting point for the following deliberations is this curious fact: in the intense social scientific writing that directly or indirectly touched on "the Jewish problem," "Jewish difference," or "the Jews" in the final decades of the nineteenth century

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and the first decades of the twentieth, virtually none conforms with Marcelo Dascal's sequence of proponent–opponent–proponent (POPO), a sequence that serves as a condition for defining polemic exchanges as a controversy, a debate, or a discussion (Dascal 2000).[1] The development of the social sciences occurred simultaneously with the rise of the anti-Semitic movement, a movement that was at first political in nature but which was also advocated in various ways in academic publications. It is easy, in this context, to point to a plethora of attitudes toward the above signifiers based on different methodological, epistemic, ontological, and ideological outlooks. It is also not hard to document clashes in the academic sphere between various views on these signifiers. There is no question, then, that in the various fields that were undergoing codification as the "social sciences" in the final decades of the nineteenth century, "Jews" and "the Jewish question" were subject of heated disagreement. One need only recall the exchange between German historian Heinrich von Treitschke and Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz or that between Treitschke and Roman historian Theodore Mommsen.[2] Unlike these famous controversies, that in different ways touched on Jews and anti-Semitism, those of the academic founders of modern German social science, while displaying various modes that approach a controversy, fall short of the POPO criteria: the production of competing "facts," different interpretations of the same facts or facts drawn from the same repertoire, and the appropriation of empirical facts by opposing writers and their reinterpretation (see Hart 2006).

There is virtually no record of a sequence in which writers would directly address and challenge each others' presuppositions, arguments, modes of argumentation, and inferences. In this chapter I will show, in a very brief form, elements from three responses to anti-Semitism that approach the three modes of controversy.[3] But underlying the following discussion is the question, to which I return in my concluding comments, as to how we explain the fact that we find in this sphere only elements of controversy rather than a true controversy, and that this is so on both fronts, so to speak: that of the typology of controversies, and that of early formulations of social science with regard to Jews, Jewish difference, and anti-Semitism.

In the following I attempt to briefly demonstrate responses to social, political, and scientific anti-Semitism that approach the three types of polemical exchange by drawing on the work of Georg Simmel, one of the founders of academic sociology; Franz Boas, the founder of American cultural anthropology; and Arthur Ruppin, the founder of German Jewish sociology and demography. The three were involved in different ways and to different degrees in exchanges that could be interpreted

[1]For an application in a different field, see Dascal and Cremaschi (1999).

[2]For historical particulars of the exchange between Treitschke and Graetz, see Lindemann (1997). There is immense literature on the *Antisemitismus Streit* which to a great extent was fired by the exchange between Treitschke and Mommsen. For a recent account, see Krieger (2003).

[3]For a wider historical background, see my "Circumventions and confrontations: Responses to antisemitism in Georg Simmel, Franz Boas, and Arthur Ruppin." For a more detailed analysis of these responses in rhetorical terms, see "Argumentative patterns and epistemic considerations: Responses to antisemitism in the conceptual history of social science."

as polemical: dispute, debate, and controversy. In each case I pull out just one typical thread from their respective extensive writing and interpret it according to the pragmatics of the typology of controversies. Treating the writings of Simmel, Boas, and Ruppin as a site of intense controversy and distinguishing between strategic moves (tied to overall aims) and tactical ones (contingent on demands), it is possible to show that with regard to anti-Semitism, the three were engaged in three kinds of discourse: Ruppin accepted many of anti-Semitism's assumptions about Jews while repudiating their judgment – Ruppin was engaged in a "discussion" with anti-Semitic writers, that is, a polemical exchange whose object is a well-circumscribed topic or problem. Simmel denied the racial foundation of anti-Semitism, based on radical individualism – Simmel was engaged in a "dispute," which may appear to revolve around a well-defined object, but its source of disagreement is rooted in differences of attitude, feelings, or preferences. Rejecting biological determinism in the name of cultural relativism, Boas subsumed anti-Semitism into racism – he was involved in a "controversy" with anti-Semitic writers; a controversy may begin with a specific problem but spreads to other problems and disagreements, such as methodology.

Georg Simmel (1858–1918) was born in Berlin to parents who had converted to Protestant and Catholic Christianity before his birth. While he was aware that the family was ethnically of Jewish descent, he was brought up a Protestant. Franz Boas (1858–1942) was born in the same year as Simmel, in Minden (Westphalia), to a Jewish family highly acculturated to German culture. The family was not religious or observant but celebrated the major Jewish festivals. Arthur Ruppin (1876–1943) was born 18 years after Simmel and Boas, in Rawitsch/Rawicz, Posen, then Prussia and today Poland, and was brought up in a mildly observant family.

2 Georg Simmel: Circumvention as Strategy

Simmel never referred to anti-Semitism as a circumscribed social phenomenon or even employed the word "anti-Semitism" in his publications. This does not reflect lack of interest on Simmel's behalf, or his failure to notice the existence of anti-Semitism in German society, but rather it is a sign that he viewed it as a particularly sensitive matter that necessitated great caution (Köhnke 1996: 145). Simmel supported Jewish integration into German society and culture and, as Köhnke has observed, viewed any public allusion to anti-Semitism by individuals of Jewish descent as a potential obstacle to that integration. Substantiation for this interpretation can be found in the fact that in his private correspondences, Simmel refers more than once to anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (Köhnke 1996: 147).

His response to anti-Semitism is evident in several interconnected layers, ranging from general epistemic considerations to more specific allusions to race or Jews. Simmel does not deny the reality of markers of Jewish difference, but, based on a specific set of sociological principles, attempts to undermine the anti-Semitic claim

that these markers are biologically innate or racially determined. His sociological theory conditions references to Jews, racial difference, or anti-Semitic sentiments to the status of secondary social constructions. Rhetorically, his strategy is to circumvent the definition of anti-Semitism as a separate object or set of social interactions with distinctive characteristics.[4]

I demonstrate Simmel's pitching of his response to the theoretical register by analyzing the way his notion of "social type" impinges on the interpretation of Jewish difference. Specifically, this notion transforms differences commonly conceived as racial into socially constituted ones. Simmel developed the notions of social form and social type in terms of individual "interaction," as individual interaction sustains society and is the ultimate basis of sociology (see Frisby 1992: 5–19).

His insistence that social forms and social types were the result of individual interaction undermined common conceptions of society and culture as deriving from natural strata, as well as biological conceptions of "*Volk*" or "race." Thus, his concept opposed the terms of discourse that supported the representation of Jews as foreign to the "body" of the nation, race, or the state.

Simmel develops the notion of "social type" in his programmatic essay "How is society possible?" and employs it for the analysis of numerous such types (1971: 6–22). It is developed through the discussion of three "sociological a-priorities." The first principle is that the picture of another person is distorted in principle (1971: 9). This is because every person has a core of individuality which cannot be subjectively reproduced by another. As a result, we think of the individual with his or her singularity under universal categories. In order to recognize that individual, we subsume him or her under a general type.

This sociological apriority is closely connected to an additional consideration, namely, that the other person is never "entirely himself" but only a fragment of himself. Yet, humans cannot grasp fragments, only wholes (1971: 10). As a result, the other person is typed according to the idealization of his personality from given fragments. Simmel's second sociological a priori consideration is that "each element of a group is not a societary part, but beyond that something else" (1971: 10). This "constitutes the positive condition for the fact that he is such a group member in other aspects of his being" (1971: 10). Simmel's third principle is that "society is a structure of unequal elements," but the possibility of belonging to a society rests on the assumption that each individual "is automatically referred to a determined position within his social milieu, that this position ideally belonging to him is also actually present in the social whole" (1971: 18). This precondition is at the basis of the claim that for every given personality, a position and a function exist within the

[4]His strategy of dealing with anti-Semitism, therefore, reflects his style of conducting controversy: indirect allusions characterize also his controversies with Emile Durkheim and with Wilhelm Dilthey. On his controversy with Durkheim, see my "The Controversy over the Foundation of Sociology and its Object: Simmel's Form versus Durkheim's Collectivity."

society to which the personality is "called," and there is an imperative to search until it is found. Particular social types are conceived as cast by the specifiable reactions and expectations of others.

These a-priorities are at the root of Simmel's entire sociological work. They can also be seen as a response to anti-Semitism in the following way. Simmel maintains that the creation of social types rests on an intimate dialectics between individuals and others. Types, therefore, are to a great extent "negative," that is, imposed by way of interaction. The relations are with others who assign an individual a particular position and expect him to behave in specific ways. Furthermore, this is not entirely an individual matter in the sense that his characteristics are seen as attributes of the social structure. The gist of this interpretation is that an individual assigned to a certain type, be it that of the poor, the whore, the stranger, or any other, has his individual features completed (*ergänzt*) into more general categories of types. In other words, types are socially mediated categories rather than naturally classified differences. Both "social form" and "social type" establish the sociological method on methodological individualism and view social relations and social identities in individual terms. While Simmel's motivations cannot be reduced to countering anti-Semitism, these principles clearly contest biological, racial, and historical collectivistic accounts of Jews, Jewish difference, and anti-Semitic sentiments or social forms. This theory frames Jews as individual humans who are classified as "Jews" following the sociological a priori principles elucidated above; similarly, it classifies anti-Semitism as a social form, a condensation of individual interactions, rather than a racial instinct.

Simmel's sociological theory determines anti-Semitic sentiments as, ultimately, secondary results of individual interactions. His radical epistemological individualism rules out the possibility of a social form being racially determined. This interpretation of anti-Semitism is opposed widespread late nineteenth century views that anti-Semitism was primarily a natural or biological phenomenon, constituting the instinctive aversion of non-Jews toward Jews.

3 Franz Boas: Dispute over Method

Boas was a student when anti-Semitism became a recognized, institutionalized student movement (Cole 1999: 58–59). It is possible to argue that Boas's writings address anti-Semitism in three different anthropological arenas: first, contributions to the field of physical anthropology; second, articles that addressed anti-Semitism and racism directly; and third, works that undermined racist scientific methodologies. Here I will demonstrate the latter group.

The most important aspect of Boas's response to anti-Semitism, however, is found in his methodological criticism of racist anthropology.[5] The essay "On Alternating Sounds" (1889) illustrates how Boas employs methodological grounds

[5]Stocking (1968).

in order to counter racist anthropology. The article was a response to a paper presented a year earlier by anthropologist and linguist Daniel Garrison Brinton. Brinton observed that in the spoken languages of many Native Americans, certain sounds regularly alternated. Based on evolutionary theory, Brinton interpreted this as a sign of linguistic inferiority, claiming that Native Americans were at a lower stage of evolution. In his response, Boas argued that "alternating sounds" was not a feature of Native American languages but rather a reflection of the culturally determined nature of human perception. What Brinton conceived as alternating sounds did not reflect how the Inuit might pronounce a word, but rather how one phonetic system (the English one) was unable to accommodate another one (the Inuit). Employing a form of neo-Kantian critique, Boas made a unique contribution to the methods of descriptive linguistics. Yet, his ultimate goal was that the perceptual categories of Western researchers risk systematically misperceiving a meaningful element in another culture. What appeared to be evidence of cultural inferiority was, in fact, the consequence of unscientific methods, and reflected Western beliefs as their perceived superiority. This essay did not touch on anti-Semitism directly, but bore on Jews, who in Europe were marked as primitive remnants of an inferior life-form that inexplicably had survived into modern society (Steinberg 1995: 59–114).

Boas's major contribution was his "normalizing" of anti-Semitism. Aligning Jews with other minorities, he transformed anti-Semitism into a sub-case of "racism" and "prejudice," and subordinated anti-Semitism to racism.

4 Arthur Ruppin: A Debate with Anti-Semites

"Antisemitism cannot be overcome by opposing its arguments alone," Ruppin claimed in *The Sociology of the Jews.*[6] This statement captures an aspect of Ruppin's attitude, more pragmatic than Simmel's theoretical and Boas's methodological register of response.

The study of anti-Semitism became a cornerstone of his academic project, inherent to his model for the sociological and demographic study of contemporary Jewry from his *Die Juden der Gegenwart* (1904), through *The Jews of Today* (1913), *Soziologie der Juden* (1930), *The Jews in the Modern World* (1935), to *The Jewish Fate and Future* (1940) which was published after Germany had invaded Poland, with its huge Jewish population, and the outbreak of WWII.

Ruppin's perspective on anti-Semitism is intertwined with his Zionist convictions. His response to anti-Semitic representations is based on certain ontological assumptions concerning social reality. While according to Ruppin anti-Semitism was a multilayered phenomenon, at its most primitive, fundamental level, anti-Semitism flows from a "group instinct," an anthropological, permanent feature of

[6]Ruppin (1930: 41 [Hebrew, translation mine], 1940: 207).

human nature[7]: "Any person who is not born within the group but enters its territory as a migrant, or as a member of a subjugated group, is regarded an alien" (1940: 207). The elements of controversy directed against anti-Semitic accounts found in Ruppin's writing, therefore, are not attempts to provide an alternative theory that would explain anti-Semitism or to dispute the methodology of anti-Semitic writers, but rather expressions of his disagreements with the particulars of anti-Semitic representations of Jews and Jewish difference. This stance is at the basis of the "statistical wars" in which Ruppin was engaged.

It is precisely in this that one finds the element of debate in Ruppin's (1930) response: even when he counters anti-Semitic accusations, Ruppin's categories do not fundamentally differ from those of his anti-Semitic opponents. For instance, when Ruppin criticizes racial anti-Semitism, he attempts to refute its allegations based on what he asserts to be the superior standard for the measurement of interracial hatred: the rate of intermarriage. That is, his refutation is based not on the register of the particular statistics, but on shared acceptance, at least implicitly, of the veracity of such a category of interracial hatred. Rather than moving from a specific social phenomenon to a general category, his direction is the opposite, from universal categories of analysis to the specific features of anti-Semitism as a phenomenon. Indeed, from descriptions of the anti-Semitic accusations, Ruppin moves directly to a detailed discussion of statistical rates of Jewish criminality, in order to repudiate anti-Semitic allegations; likewise, he dealt with other features of Jewish life that were statistically measured such as alcoholism, mental disorders, rates of suicide, and medical pathologies. On all these Ruppin disputed the statistical representations of his anti-Jewish opponents not by calling into question the categories, or the validity of the statistical methods and techniques, but by providing alternative statistical representations. Ruppin responds to anti-Semitic accusations from what he perceives as empirical reality, based on the same categories. In agreement with Dascal's typology, of the three, only Ruppin sought agreement with his opponents.

Ruppin refers to the "slender" foundations of the Aryan theory and his interpretation of that theory is primarily functional: the theory comes to reawaken the defeated German people, a means of restoring confidence. Ruppin's discussion of the theory is remarkably ironic, even sarcastic (1930: 233–234). In *Sociology of the Jews* (33–36), Ruppin attacks Aryan racial theory and denies that it is the objective source of anti-Semitism. He also emphasizes, quoting Nazi racial writer Fritz Lenz, the placing of races in a hierarchical structure. Ruppin (1940) returns to the social aspect of hatred, insisting that anti-Semitism (like anti-African racism) has an important social element to it, namely, the "unbearable fact" of the freed slave. Ruppin distinguishes Christian anti-Jewish sentiment from racial anti-Semitism and criticizes, in particular, the Aryan racial theory of the "spiritual Judaization" of culture. He opposes the view that anti-Semitism is a specifically modern phenomenon and, in practice, views its expressions as manifestations of

[7]See also *Sociology of the Jews* [Hebrew], 30.

one and the same phenomenon. Ruppin's historical account differs, therefore, from Simmel's or Boas's, as Ruppin is not driven to separate between "objective" and "subjective" features of anti-Semitism, nor does he attempt to follow the role of the subjective in constituting the "objective." His rejection of a "general theory" of prejudice of which anti-Semitism is only a sub-case is at the core of his concepts and rhetorical strategy.

5 Concluding Comments

This chapter has pulled together certain elements of the writing of Simmel, Boas, and Ruppin and interpreted them with regard to social, political, or scientific anti-Semitism and in relation to their fit with Marcelo Dascal's three types of controversy. Ruppin was engaged in a discussion with anti-Semitic writers, as the object of disagreement, anti-Semitic reaction to Jewish difference, was treated as being well circumscribed. Simmel was engaged in a dispute, the source of disagreement rooted in differences of attitude, feelings, or preferences, transcending Jews as a specified object. Boas approached a controversy, revolving around specific objects and problems, but spreading to broader methodological issues.

As mentioned earlier, among the founders of the German social sciences, there is no record of a sequence of polemical exchanges that qualifies, according to Dascal's definitions, as a controversy. In my brief concluding comments, I would like to take a step back and suggest an explanation of this fact, attempting to draw from it several tentative conclusions regarding the historical subject at hand as well as about the definition of controversies in a wider sense.

This chapter focused on three writers. The two older of the three, Simmel and Boas (both born in 1858), were born to a generation that was deeply committed to German liberal cultural values and to the idea of the integration of German Jews into German society. While politically there is no question that they greatly opposed anti-Semitism as a political movement, as a set of beliefs, and as a social phenomenon, both intuitively believed it would be counterproductive to challenge the views of their opponents directly. Both also recognized, as we have learned above, that the true source of disagreement between them and anti-Semites was wider than the latter's prejudices concerning Jews, and pertained to much broader theoretical, methodological, and ontological matters that touched on questions of what society is and what a modern society is. Ruppin (who was born in 1876) belonged to a generation that was forced (and was able) to confront anti-Semitism more directly (Zionism, of course, in certain respects involved such a mode of response).

Simmel and Boas, arguably more than Ruppin, also belonged to a generation that developed over the course of their career the epistemological basis for their respective disciplines. Their style of argumentation, which is in many respects very different, shared the tendency to define the field of enquiry, its possible objects of enquiry, and its modes of study in a positive as well as a negative sense. What I

mean by "negative sense" is that their respective definitions decided what was not within the purview of their respective fields (and therefore would have to be studied elsewhere) as well as what could qualify as a social explanation. This cultural mode of writing does not encourage controversies and could be viewed, in certain senses, as a form of "autism." Nonetheless, in certain respects, as a strategy, it was in fact a very powerful way to deny the symbolic presence of that with which they disagreed. Avoiding controversies on subjects they did not want to acknowledge allowed them not only to define unilaterally their respective fields but also to avoid having to deal with the challenges of their opponents. They could choose to avoid entering controversies on anti-Semitism and the Jewish question, however, only because this fitted the larger academic discursive culture, in which to establish the epistemic, ontological, and methodological principles of a given field did not necessitate entering into controversies with competing or opposing views.

Of the three, Ruppin came closest to engagement in a controversy centered directly on Jews that was not centered primarily on or diverted to methodological or theoretical questions. This makes the work of the historian easier than in the other more ambiguous and sometimes camouflaged modes, where the historian must deduce disagreements interpretatively from contexts, co-texts, and subtexts. The "cases" of anti-Semitism and the Jewish question, then, can serve as powerful heuristic devices for probing modes of academic culture.

By way of conclusion I would like to shift the perspective from the subject of anti-Semitism to that of the powerful typology of controversies, and to certain questions to the answer of which this typology could be put by way of the cases discussed above. If, indeed, the POPO criteria defines a controversy, we would have to conclude that in the field of nascent German social science, no controversy took place with regard to anti-Semitism and the Jewish question. If, however, we believe anti-Semitism and the Jewish question were, in fact, a highly controversial subject, then we would be inclined to consider that on some occasions and in some circumstances, softer, more flexible definitions unearth polemic exchanges where the comprehensive classification is not met.

Another important observation by Marcelo Dascal is helpful at this point. Dascal adds that for the analysis of polemical exchanges, one must also consider in what kind of exchange actors perceive themselves to be participating; in other words, whether they conceive their own and their opponents' views as mutually exclusive and whether they view the exchange as a discussion or a dispute, a fact that determines their expectations and interpretations in the debate. Indeed, in this sense, Simmel and Boas – maybe even more than Ruppin – believed they were engaged in a discourse that was mutually exclusive. The specific variant of controversy studied here suggests that in certain historical and cultural contexts, the conventions of controversy differ and, in this case, the decision whether to confront a writer by name or to address a subject directly may itself have expressive dimensions, which should not be interpreted as lack of polemic intent but rather, on the contrary, as the presence of serious disagreement; it is, so to speak, "the continuation of controversy by other means."

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The "Esprit Prophetique": Brief Remarks on the Phenomenology of Genius in Diderot

Giovanni Scarafile

Abstract In this chapter, my intention is to highlight some aspects of the idea of genius formulated in Diderot's thought. The approach is not merely philological or historiographical. Instead, I am interested in studying the actuality of a notion that tantalizes us because of the multiplicity of its aspects, starting from the so-called prophetic spirit.

According to Diderot, this form adopted by an unidentified quality of the human soul does not coincide with imagination, judgment, wit, warmth and vivacity, and sensibility or taste, although it shares some features with each of these faculties.

This research, carried out with reference to the main categories of the Husserlian phenomenology, permits individuation of the core of the prophetic spirit in a special form of intuition, the intuition of essences.

Keywords Studium and ingenium • Responsiveness • Intuition • Facticity and eidetics

1 Introduction

In this chapter my intention is to highlight some aspects of the idea of genius formulated in Diderot's thought. My approach is not merely philological or historiographical. Instead, I am interested in studying the actuality of a notion that continues to tantalize us because of the multiplicity of its aspects.

For this reason, after identifying the theoretical core of Diderot's argument, I will try to put forward an actualization of that idea, with reference to the categories of Husserlian phenomenology.

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The starting point is the following sentence from Diderot:

> In men of genius: poets, philosophers, painters, orators, musicians, there is some particular, secret, indefinable quality of the soul without which they can execute nothing great or beautiful. Is it imagination? No. I've seen good and strong imaginations that promised much but that came to nothing, or very little. Is it judgment? No. There is nothing more common than men of great judgment whose productions are flabby, soft, and cold. Is it wit? No. Wit says pretty things but only does small ones. Is it warmth, vivacity, impetuosity? No. Warm people do much and produce nothing of worth. Is it sensibility? No. I've seen some whose souls were quickly and profoundly touched, who can't hear an elevated tale without being lifted out of themselves, transported, drunk, mad: it's a pathetic trait and, without shedding tears, they stammer like children when they speak or when they write. Is it taste? No. Taste effaces defects more than it produces beauty: it's a gift that we more or less acquire, and is not in the domain of nature. Is it a certain conformation of the head and the viscera, a certain constitution of the humors? I'll agree to this, but on condition that we confess that neither I nor anyone else has a precise notion of this, and that we add to it the power of observation. [. . .]. The power of observation of which I speak is exercised without effort, without contention. It doesn't look, it sees. [. . .] It has no present phenomena, but it affects everything, and what is left is meaning that the others don't have. It's a rare machine that says: That will succeed . . . and it succeeds. That will not succeed . . . and it doesn't succeed. That is true or false . . . and that is the case. It is noted in great things and small. This kind of prophetic spirit is not the same in all conditions of life (Diderot 1875, IV: 26–7).

Diderot's words enable us to express more explicitly the sense of the "prophetic spirit" that seems to embrace many requisites. It is the form adopted by an unidentified quality of the human soul which according to Diderot does not coincide with imagination, judgment, wit, warmth and vivacity, and sensibility or taste, although it shares some features with each of these faculties. Even in the words I have quoted, Diderot immediately makes it clear that the "prophetic spirit" is not something esoteric. That explains the emphasis on the physiological aspect which is one of the conditions allowing genius to exist without being the sole factor responsible for its emergence.

Firstly, we can say that the prophetic spirit is the completion of the spirit of observation and it can be considered an *excess* compared to the many attempts to define it, thus gaining a special status.

Through the eyes of the skeptic, the fact that after any attempt to get closer to the concept of "prophetic spirit" all you get is an emphasis on its invisibility seems to be convincing proof of its nonexistence.

Before starting the analysis, we therefore recognize that the only way to determine the value of this dimension is the negative way, as it is far easier to indicate what the prophetic spirit is *not*.

The obvious difficulty of identifying the prey is in a sense a dialectical concept, because it is also related to the position of the hunter. To use the metaphor of the hunt, we could say that the fact that the prey is so difficult to dig out does not excuse us from trying to capture it.

There may be several ways to hunt a prey that leaves few traces, and not all of them will be equally effective. For this reason it may be useful to explain the method we will try to follow.

2 The Method of Hunting

In an essay published in 1990, dedicated to the structure and evolution of the form of the scientific essay,[1] John Swales indicates three indispensable steps in a scientific article (1990):

1. Establishing an intellectual territory
2. Defining a niche in that territory
3. Occupying that niche

In this way, the author defines a sort of paradigm that can be used to advantage when one has to venture into broad areas of research which at least at first are not well defined.

In applying the above paradigm, I will divide this chapter into three parts:

1. Establishing a territory, i.e., referring to the context in which Diderot's words are found
2. Defining a niche, i.e., trying to explicitly express the sense of his words within the evolution of his thought
3. Occupying that niche, i.e., trying to grasp the relevance of these words

According to the Latin writer Marco Terenzio Vallone, genius is "The God [. . .] who has command and control of everything that is begotten" (Deus est qui praepositus est ac vim habet omnium rerum gignendarum).[2]

The Latin term "genius" indicates a divinity generated within every man with the task of directing his actions. From an etymological point of view, there is not a great difference between genius and *ingenium*. In fact the two words indicate two shades of meaning: *ingenium* is the power of reasoning and combining ideas in the most appropriate way while genius is the creative faculty of the intellect brought to life internally with great passion. These general characteristics help us to set the frame in which our task can be carried out.

The concept of genius developed rapidly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in a context characterized by the contrast between *studium* and *ingenium*. With *ingenium* we refer to an aptitude or disposition, or something not yet possessing the constancy of application, whereas *studium* indicates such constancy. This is the main meaning of the Latin term which is accompanied by other important aspects such as desire, interest, and care.

In the period when Diderot lived, the term genius was used above all, though not exclusively, in France in two expressions: *avoir de génie* and *être un génie*.[3] The first linguistic use reveals that genius is, as it were, separable from the one who embodies it; the second, on the other hand, highlights the indissoluble link between genius and the individual so that genius becomes the mark of individuality.

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[1] See also Gross et al. (2002) and Gross (1996).

[2] Quoted in Aurelii Augustini, *Opera Omnia*, PL 41, *De Civitate Dei contra Paganos*, VII, 13.

[3] See also Franzini and Mazzucot-Mis (2003), Moretti (1998), and Onnis (1970).

The emergence of the concept of genius can be attributed to two factors:

1. Specific historical and social conditions, such as the space given to a group of intellectuals who aim to affirm the originality of their own intellectual conquests in contrast to the social classes they belong to.
2. The affirmation of a specific theory of art, to a certain extent independent of reason. As Dieckmann observes: "A work of art is no longer judged by the degree of conformity with traditional patterns and rules, but by the degree of delight it gives, and this delight is caused, not by rational structure and intellectual simplicity, but by the free play of imagination and emotion" (Dieckmann 1941: 154).

This structure of the art would become more explicit in some authors such as De Bos, who developed a system that could give an autonomous meaning to emotion and imagination, quite apart from the value attributable to these two human dimensions by rationality, while not disregarding the value of rationality.[4]

3 In Diderot's Thought

The development of the idea of genius in Diderot's thought can be traced through at least three phases: first, Diderot comes to the idea of genius due to the critical interest felt in the concept of enthusiasm. In the second phase, Diderot investigates the rational and technical processes of artistic creation. In the third phase, he shows an interest in physiology, because of the influence of the medical school of Montepellier. In addition, in the dialectical definition of the idea of genius in the thought of Diderot, there were three main interlocutors: Du Bos, Batteux, and Helvetius.

The idea of genius in Diderot, then, although autonomous, is substantiated by some elements on which there was widespread debate at the time. One of these elements is, as we have seen above, constituted by a revaluation of the role of emotions and feelings in the context of the human, as opposed to bringing these elements back to reason, considered the only valid paradigm in which you can include every dimension of reality.

Diderot belongs to this line of thought, but that doesn't prevent him from distancing himself from unilateral praise of these different dimensions of rationality. It is significant that in the *Paradoxe sur le comédien* he writes that "La sensibilité n'est guère la qualité d'un grand génie" (Diderot 1875, VIII: 368). These words

[4]In this sense we can interpret some references to the physiology of the genius found in Diderot: "Arts consiste dans un arrangement heureux des organes du cerveau, dans la bonne conformation de chacun de ces organes, come dans la qualité du sang, laquelle se dispose à fermenter durant le travail, de manière qu'il fournisse en abondance des esprits aux ressorts qui servent aux fonctions de l'imagination" (Diderot 1875, XIV : 322–3).

reveal that the revaluation of feeling is not acritical and that, to be valid, some limits must be established as conditions of possibility. As Dieckmann observes: "The polemic aims at and hits only 'sensibilité' and misses true feeling" (Dieckmann 1941: 170).

Diderot shares some aspects of the critical view of the idea of enthusiasm asserted in the sixteenth century in Shaftesbury's *Letter Concerning Enthusiasm.* This sharing is made explicit in the pairing of enthusiasm-monster. The monster, in fact, is the one who has exclusively and unilaterally developed only one human characteristic above all others. When that happens, genius "is reduced by Diderot to an abnormality in man and called a monster," while "The greatness of the genius consists in his self-control, in his ability not to take account of himself, not to be subdued by the vacillation of the emotions, but to create in his mind a higher reality, some ideal image independent of nature, and to bring this image into conformity with reality" (Dieckmann 1941: 171).

Although within a context that in critical terms had dealt with ideas like enthusiasm, in the article *Éclectisme* of the *Encyclopédie* Diderot writes: "L'enthousiasme est un mouvement violent de l'âme, par lequel nous sommes transportés au milieu des objets que nous avons à représenter" (Diderot 1875, XIV: 322). Now, the question is: what characteristic of human existence must we consider when we want to explain this sort of *projection* into objects? Is it only a metaphor or does it correspond to something that we could explain more clearly?

There are three other important statements made by Diderot which will be useful in our attempt to clarify the sense of the "esprit prophétique." They are respectively dedicated to the *esprit de divination*, *expressions énergiques*,[5] and to *promptitude.* In one part of *Pensées sur l'interprétation de la Nature,* devoted to describing the instinct of scientists, in particular of experimental physicists, who have observed nature so closely that they can foresee the development of what they have observed, Diderot writes:

> So the most important service that they have to render to those whom they initiate in experimental philosophy, is less to instruct them in the process and result, that to cause them to acquire that spirit of divination through which one *sniffs out,* so to speak, unknown processes, new experiments, undreamed of results (Diderot 1875, II: 24).

The genius can use language in a special way, consisting of the invention of new words. It would be easy to suppose that Diderot refers to the coinage of neologisms, but this is different. As Dieckmann observes, it is rather "original expressions which Diderot, in the aesthetics of the drama, calls le beau propre, *les expression énergique*. By the gift of creating the true expressions of the inward movement genius keeps language alive" (Dieckmann 1941: 177).

In addition, in his *Éléments de Physiologie*, Diderot offers another element of the specificity of genius. The degree of brain activity – he says – and its high capacity for synthesis is an important characteristic of the genius.

[5]See also Doolittle (1952).

What direction is indicated by these statements taken from Diderot's works? What is the image of the genius that emerges from these pointers?

1. The capacity to go beyond the visible side, the observation of the real, in order to seek what is constant in changeability.
2. Such an approach requires the willingness to try to tune in to what we observe. The establishment of a critical gaze does not appear to be immediately achievable.

When faced with things, it seems that the condition for understanding the universal element is a modification of individual *responsiveness*.

The condition for accessing the universal component, inherent to the experience of things, even the most unnameable, is the critical verification of a *Zentrierung*, the investment in one's own life. It is in the space of this centering that philosophizing is defined. Here there arises a new order of the tasks of reason, not to exalt impassivity but to represent the courage and responsibility of incarnation, as the authentic condition for a form of thinking in the sense of participating in the core of a finite human person in the essentiality of all possible things. In this sense, philosophy is a form of life and of experience (*Erlebnis*).

I like to use the word "testimony" to mean the conjunction between philosophy and life. It's a dangerous word because it has an important religious heritage. Despite this, I think that the use of this term is appropriate.

Would Diderot agree with this explicitation of his thought?

In *Paradoxe sur le comédien,* he seems to confirm such an interpretation and at the same time to offer another suggestion. He writes:

> Ce n'est pas que la pure nature n'ait ses moments sublimes; mais je pense que s'il est quelqu'un sûr de saisir et de conserver leur sublimité, c'est celui qui les aura pressentis d'imagination ou de génie, et qui les rendra de sang-froid (Diderot 1875, VIII: 374).

The place where all the preceding pointers are summarized and where the meaning of genius can be pinpointed is a specific mode of intuition. So this is the way to try to explicitly express the relevance of that concept for us. How can we transfer Diderot's indications of the concept of genius into a phenomenology of the life of the consciousness? There are several possible answers to this question. I would like to examine what Husserl writes in §3 of *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,* where he refers to the intuition[6] connected with presentative acts:

> Of whatever sort intuition of something individual may be, whether it be adequate or inadequate, it can take the turn into seeing an essence; and this seeing, whether it be correspondingly adequate or correspondingly inadequate, has the characteristic of a *presentative* act. [...]. Seeing an essence is therefore intuition; and if it is seeing in the pregnant sense and not a mere and perhaps vague making present, the seeing is an *originarily* presentative intuition, seizing upon the essence in its "personal" selfhood (Husserl 1998: 9–10).

[6]See also Aportone et al. (2003), Lévinas (2002), and Raggiunti (1967).

It seems to me that in this passage the following interrelated aspects should be highlighted:

First, talking about intuition means trying to bring the encounter between man and the world to its conditions of possibility. Any insight, Husserl says, is always unilateral, linked to *Abschattungen*, the overshadowing that gives us the thing by gradual approximation and then within the limits, namely, the specificity of our position. Here is a specific mode of intuition that presents us with the thing in the flesh. This intuition "has the characteristic of a presentative act" Husserl says.

The difference between an intuition of something individual and what, although not belonging to the sensible matter of intuition, goes beyond the individual dimension and thus gives access to a bigger dimension is the intuition of essence. It is a specific modality of intuition that you can access by way of individuality. This means that facticity and eidetics are closely joined and that the seeing permitted by intuition is originally presentative. We could perhaps say that this particular seeing gives us the gaze on the world before any possible predication.

There is another connection that I find important. What we are talking about in fact should be indicated also as communality between phenomenon, essence, and *Erlebnisse*.[7] The realm of the *Erlebnis* is therefore the home of testimony. In this way, it seems to me that testimony loses any nebulous features and is brought back to the rules of the life of consciousness. The prophetic spirit holds prediction within it. In the light of eidetic intuition, we could say that such a level of anticipating the real is not something marginal or peripheral but is the real essence itself. The consciousness is not an ontological region, but that region that *epoché* makes it possible to consider.

In this talk I have tried, starting from some of Diderot's words, to find traces of the original sense of these words, firstly by considering the context of the philosopher and then the dialectics of his intellectual relationships.

In the last part, after identifying the core of Diderot's words on genius, we have tried to make it explicit with reference to the rules of the life of the consciousness. Were we able to capture the prey? I cannot say. My intent was to stake out the boundaries of a problem that has many possible aspects. There seems to be an agreement between this attempt and the task of philosophy according to what Odo Marquard observes:

> someone who gives no answer at all to a problem finally loses the problem, which is not good. Someone who gives only one answer to a problem thinks he has solved the problem and easily becomes dogmatic, which is not good either. The best thing is to give too many answers. That approach [. . .] preserves the problem without really solving it. [. . .] in just that way (divide and think!) leave the problem open, so that the experience of philosophy [metaphysics], overall, is like that of the lion-loving lion-hunter who, when he was asked how many lions he had already brought down, could admit that the answer was none, and

[7]In the English translation of Husserl's book *Ideen zu eienr reinen Phaenomenologie* the term *erlebnis* is translated with "mental process." It seems to me that such a translation is not able to capture the component of partecipation to which I referred earlier.

> received the consoling response that with lions, that's already a lot. That is exactly what happens to philosophy (metaphysics) [. . .]. The number of problems that it has solved is none. But for human beings, that is already a lot (Marquard 1991: 24–5).

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On What Is Harmful: The Negative Basis of Normative Agreements

Carlos Thiebaut

Abstract The notion of harm, as a negative experience of what could have been avoided and should be avoided in the future, is understood as a process of understanding actions, behaviours and institutions that not only imply these modal shifts, away from what is taken to be necessary or unavoidable, but also as a learning process in which different epistemic and attitudinal perspectives are at play that are summarily described. This understanding of harm experiences can help to understand the normative force of moral and political agreements.

Keywords Harm • Moral force • Avoidability • Practical necessity • Epistemic perspectives • Attitudinal perspectives

1 Experience and Normativity

The origin of norms has always been a major interest in philosophical reflection, but we continue to lack a clear conception of our normative views to come about, in part due to the ambiguous meaning of the idea of origin. When we inquire about the sources of normativity, we seem divided between a genetic drive that tries to devise explanatory models on the basis of historical and social contexts and an interpretative and philosophical thrust that aims at understanding how human practices and action require or are tied to norms and principles. But even in any of these two fields of problems, the question of the origins of normativity seems still perplexing. We face a myriad of considerations that render the question itself almost

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unapproachable, not only in relation to the historical roots of norms, values, laws or other general or specific normative concepts but, above all, in relation to the ways in which we articulate judgements in the present that relate to what should be valued and proposed or, more clearly, what must be interdicted or prohibited. It would exceed my aims and space in a short article to elaborate the reasons of this lack of understanding; but let me point out, as a further epistemological claim I will not be addressing directly, that the academic segregation of disciplines has rendered a limited and constrained comprehension of what we take to be avoidable or desirable. Powerful as the insights, methodologies and results of the social sciences are in rendering the causal processes that have historically given rise to past normative perspectives and institutions, and that make those approaches certainly inescapable due to their heuristic strength, they do not seem to provide a sufficient basis for understanding what was at stake at a certain point in time and how those values and norms came to be justified, advisable or unavoidable in the eyes of the persons, groups or societies involved. Similarly, in ongoing situations and conflicts, when we face circumstances that require actions in the light of correct normative judgements, causal explanatory approaches, as complex as they might be, do not shed light on the normative force, or lack thereof, that enables and presses upon us those normative judgements.

These questions have been framed as the motivational component of judgements and, even more reductively, they have been encroached by different approaches in moral psychology or in theory of action. Again, as insightful as these advances have been, I would suggest that what is lost is the experiential dimension of the need of such normative judgements that not only relate to individual attitudes and capacities but mainly to socially shared understandings that result from collective processes of sensibility formation and cultural conformation. Moral, political and juridical philosophy has, on its part, deployed a wide array of theories that frame what we should understand by moral correctness or by just principles and institutions, via different discourse and reason-giving models that focus on the assessment of the better arguments and reasons when deciding what should be done. But again, what seems to be lacking in these philosophical strategies is the link between the mental, emotional and cognitive capacities at play in forming a judgement and the historical contexts in which the need for that judgement arises. This link, I would suggest, comes, on the one hand, by the idea of an experience of collapse, of inadequacy or of insufficiency of previous understandings and judgements and, on the other, by the pressing demands to arrive at new accounts and assessments. This idea of experience, which draws on the pragmatist tradition, underscores the idea of normative agreements and judgements as a result of learning processes. The analyses of these processes seem to require not only the collaboration of different – now compartmentalized – disciplines but of a unifying perspective that can catalyze its different dimensions.

2 Reconstructing Negative Experiences: The Negative Approach to Evil

In the last decades of the past century, a general trend of thought, which cuts through the distinct epistemological approaches I have been referring to, began to articulate around what could be called a negative approach. A first, common, contended trait of this approach is to conceive the institutions of morality and justice by way of their negation and frustration. Thinkers from different traditions – as Arendt (1964), Shklar (1984, 1990), Feinberg (1984), Margalit (1996), Scarry (1985) or Honneth (2007), just to mention a few – have provided theoretical elaborations that focus on the meaning and structure of normative understandings, agreements and institutions that face up to and respond to negative experiences of violence, oppression or wrongdoing. These experiences have been massively present in the twentieth century and depressingly linger on our times from the Holocaust to torture and dictatorship, from the Gulag to the bombing of civilians, from humiliation to misrecognition, exclusion and poverty. They have been clustered under different names and concepts the very uses of which have raised complex problems of interpretation. Can a single concept – be it evil, wrongdoing or harm – capture the non-reducible particularities of experiences that, like the Holocaust, resist comparisons in their sheer, radical negativity? How can a single conceptual type cover the wide array of causes, for example, natural and human, social and individual – that seems to underlie this negativity?

In spite of these epistemological difficulties, it does seem, nevertheless, that even the avoidance of comparisons and of homogeny operates in our judgements – and cannot avert doing so – with type-like terms or labels that, in each chosen case, underscore the type of negativity highlighted. *Evil* has been the most usual philosophical label to refer to these experiences of negativity. The term *evil* has a powerful history in different religious and philosophical traditions that have imprinted in it their special meanings. I would argue that, in spite of these differences, the term evil is tied to two related ideas when understanding negative experiences: they appear, at the same time, as both incomprehensible and unavoidable or necessary. Certainly, these two traits seem to be present in experiences of negativity inflicted by human beings. It is not infrequent that victims label them as beyond intelligibility and even the spectators seem to share an equally puzzled or bewildered attitude towards actions, institutions or behaviours that they deem as beyond the limits of any minimal notion of a moral community. While incomprehensibility appears in the first-person perspective of the victims and in the third-person perspective of the spectator, offenders, on their part, tend, when indicted or accountable, to justify their actions under some sort of necessity and appeal, thus, to due obedience or to unintended consequences of otherwise necessary actions. But even in experiences of natural disasters, which sometimes

model the understanding of human wrongdoing, we see their evilness under the category of inescapable necessity. In the different experiential and epistemic positions and perspectives we may adopt in these experiences of negativity that overwhelm us, their incomprehensibility and necessity as retained in the concept of *evil* make us face the fragility of the human condition and the residue of what is not easily explicable in human behaviour and action.

But the negative approach has also raised doubts about these two conceptual traits of evil if its experience is to be understood as belonging to what need not and should not have happened and to what should not happen again. Thus, a second trait of what I am calling the negative approach is that it strives to leave behind previous, metaphysical or theological, understandings of evil and bring them to earth into the realm of human action. From this perspective, even when retaining the name of evil, its nature and experience seems to require post-metaphysical qualifications, as in Arendt's *banality* of evil (1964) or in Ophir's *superfluous* evils (2005). But also when other terms are used, the same post-metaphysical intuition is at play, as in Card's *inexcusable* wrongs (2010). In diverse ways, both in defining what negativity is and how it is understood and experienced, necessity and incomprehensibility are the initial modal and cognitive dimensions that play a crucial role in the experience of negativity, in its understanding and its refusal. But, strictly speaking, the experiences of negativity I have mentioned face and oppose the idea that evil is necessary and that it should remain in the realm of the incomprehensible. Thus, the negative approach has emphasized that if negativity is to be understood as an experience that calls for conceptualization and action, its modality requires a shift from necessity to possibility, both in understanding and in judgement. Whatever caused negativity has first to be understood as avoidable, as belonging to the realm of what should have been otherwise so that it can, subsequently, become subject to an ulterior modality, that of practical necessity in virtue of which imperatives in the form of the "Never again!" formula are shaped. Experiences of negativity strive also with the dimension of incomprehensibility. Rather than letting them remain unexplained, adjudications of responsibility work to bring to the fore the set of intentions, causes and processes that brought about the causation of evil.

In an analysis of toleration that I shared with Marcelo Dascal some years ago (Thiebaut 1999), I suggested that the term *harm* is especially suited to serve this shift in our modal understanding of negativity and this resistance to inexplicability. There are two traits of the concept of harm that are, I think, especially salient for this purpose of understanding negative experiences: in the first place, it has a clear "political, non metaphysical" ring to it that could serve, beyond divisive philosophical or cultural interpretations, to highlight the modal shift I have just referred to; in the second place, as I will point out in a moment, and because it is a moral or cultural term also loaded with political and legal implications, it cuts through the different epistemological and disciplinary approaches that are present in the labouring of harm.

3 A First Step: The Harm Principle

The concept of harm has been a key term in the liberal tradition that has, for better or worse, modelled its meaning. Its most significant uses stem from von Humboldt's (1969) analysis of how to establish a criterion for the non-interference of the State, and Mill's formulation of the Harm Principle in *On liberty* (1859) set the agenda of the paradigmatic use of the concept. As is well known, the principle states that public intervention on private behaviour can only be legitimately allowed for the sake of preventing harm to others. Thus, the concept of harm seems to operate in a clear-cut division between the private and the public, of what might be privately allowed or tolerated but publicly forbidden. The private/public division, nevertheless, is a blurry frontier and many moral experiences of negativity can be seen, precisely, as breaking through and exposing behaviour that, until a certain moment in time, had been private and that can, nevertheless, be shown to have public relevance. As feminist critique and gender studies have underscored, private institutions as the family are the place for wide, unseen, harmful practices. In spite of this haziness, the Harm Principle has also been a clear instrument in fostering toleration precisely of private practices that do not harm others nor the community in which the citizens entertain them live. But it may be more interesting to point out that, precisely in these conflicting borders of privacy and publicity, the very idea of the public definition of what turns out to be normatively relevant comes to the fore. If, according to the initial liberal understanding of the Harm Principle, only those actions that cause harm to others could be prohibited, the public sphere itself is normatively defined according to what can be publicly accorded to be, precisely, harm and to what is, by contrast, tolerable or acceptable, legally or socially: in its definition of what is harmful a society defines its normative self-understanding.

But not only the frontier between the private and the public is problematic and problematically defines, in its turn, the public sphere. The very notion of what is harmful to others is itself object of different, conflicting interpretations. Already since the first formulations of the principle in the nineteenth century, an ongoing debate has been taking place around who and why, and on the bases of what reasons, can establish the criteria in virtue of which a certain action or behaviour can be thought to be harmful. A first, communitarian interpretation (Devlin 1965) of what is harmful understands these criteria as equivalent to what is taken to be relevantly valued by a community, as what is expressed in its main evaluative practices and institutions or as what is taken to be its cultural or political identity. In this interpretation, for example, even some seemingly private actions should be prohibited, for the cultural and moral life of the community is taken to be challenged or endangered by them. The community, according to this interpretation, is the harmed party. A second, opposed, interpretation – the one that moved, precisely, Humboldt and Mill in the past or Hart (1963), Shaklar (1984) and Margalit (1996) in the present – that harmful practices are to be understood in terms of a particular

person who is ill-treated in her interests, rights or basic self-respecting qualities. I will not go into the different nuances and the wide array of issues involved in the debate, a debate that has extended in the different fields of penal justice, civil litigation and political institutions. But I would like to point out that this debate (and the subsequent restriction of its meaning basically to penal contexts) has frequently obscured the basic normative intuition underlying the notion of harm (Harcourt 1999). These current technical uses of the term harm tend even to forget its everyday meaning as an inflicted wrong that was not inevitable, that should be rejected and that should not be repeated again. It is this notion of harm, understood in wider terms, and related to wrongdoing or injuring, that incorporates not only legal but, above all, moral or ethical implications that I propose to recover.

But, even more clearly, a further qualification needs to be added. In spite of their important differences, both the communitarian and liberal interpretations I have just sketched seem to share a similar philosophical attitude or perspective that runs the risk of effacing the experiential dimension of negative experiences. They both promulgate, though in antithetical ways, a detached definition of harm according to a privileged point of view, be it that of the community or of the philosophical or political definition of inherent rights, interests or qualities of the individual that are taken in each case to be wronged. But from where do these definitions extract their force? How and why does a community define a behaviour or action as harmful? How and why can a society define what should not be harmed, be it the dignity of persons or the fragility of their bodies and lives?

4 Naming and Labouring Harm: The Public Response to Negativity

I understand the basic normative intuition underlying the notion of harm, and even of the Harm Principle, as the very idea of a learning process of reacting and responding to negativity, as striving to define something, previously unacknowledged or passively endured, as the object of explicit rejection. To come to name something a behaviour, an action, an institution – as harmful requires, certainly, a collective, public agreement in terms of which the "we" always implied in moral and political judgements establishes a definitive, rejective assessment, albeit – as we know – it may be later rebutted or forgotten. But even this contingent learning process is not easy to achieve. It requires the intervention of different epistemic perspectives, of different types of discourse according to the issue at stake, and the not always easy assistance of the different voices, figures or positions present in experiences of negativity.

To start with these figures or positions, the achievement of a judgement of harm requires the confluence of different frequently opposing voices: the victim, the wrongdoer, the witness, the judge and the political and moral community that gives voice to the imperative through which that behaviour, action or institution is named,

precisely, as harmful. In the last 60 years – and the experience of the Holocaust has been a guiding light in this process – we have gained awareness of the different forces these voices embody as well as the diverse dangers they also carry along.

With varied intensities these voices or figures embody different epistemic and attitudinal perspectives that have philosophical relevance and that can give us a better understanding of what the achievement of a normative agreement might amount to. It also introduces nuances into what are normally taken to be the discursive practices through which these agreements are arrived at. In the first-person attitude – as exemplified in the victims and the witnesses – the fact of negativity is shown as embodied in someone who has suffered torture, deprivation, humiliation or pain. This perspective anchors in such negative terms the result of an action that, contrary to other justifying attitudes, is shown to be both as unnecessary and as avoidable. Even more, this perspective gives motivational force to the imperative of the practical necessity that those actions should never happen again. The first-person perspective remains, all throughout the process of the labouring of harm, of naming it, understanding it and facing it, a determining perspective. The second-person attitude – frequently embodied by the witness, who often has a bridging situation, but also by the caregiver and, perhaps chiefly, by the concerned spectator – underlines the attentiveness to harm and a receptive perspicuity that should be transferred to the judge and the community. Finally, the third-person attitude – the attitude of objectivity, of defining the reality of what happened or is happening – seems to complement the affirmation of negativity experienced and expressed in the first-person attitude. All these perspectives are required in defining an experience of negativity if the known dangers of fake victimism, of social blindness or of unconcerned disinterest – so recurring in dealing with these experiences – are to be avoided. The achievement of an adequate judgement concerning a negative experience requires all these perspectives and attitudes that – I would underscore – are the places in which valid reasons gain their force. First-person, second-person and third-person reasons intertwine and assist – again with differential forces according to contexts, situations and patterns of relevance – in the formation of judgements and agreements. But, as I have already suggested, these perspectives intertwine in the we-perspective, the first personal plural perspective, which articulates the idea of moral and political community that defines what is ethically intolerable and underlies individual moral judgements.

These types of perspectives, attitudes and reasons frame the notion of harm in more full-blown terms than those that were initially allowed in the interpretations of the harm principle as deployed in previous and current philosophical discussions and forensic practices. But, at the same time, they show the deep meanings of these practices and institutions. Arriving at a shared normative agreement of what is harmful can take the particular form of a decision in court; but it needs – even there – the presence of the different perspectives and reasons as they permeate everyday morally relevant interactions and discourses. Equally, and in wider, cultural or societal terms, more significant experiences of harm – precisely those that gave impulse to the negative approach I mentioned before – like cruelty, humiliation

and deprivation, require all of these perspectives if the learning process that can achieve the formation of a normative judgement is to be solidly, though contingently, established.

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Unity of Science and Encyclopaedia: From the Idea to the Configurations

Olga Pombo

Abstract Unity of Science is a regulative idea and a task. That is why it has been grasped through the most extreme metaphors of an invisible totality and has given rise to some epistemological programmes and even intellectual movements. But, before to mount up to such exemplary issues, I will pay attention to the deep, institutional configurations of Unity of Science (Library, Museum, "République des Savants", School and Encyclopaedia) and to their polyhedric articulations. More than a game of complementarities, what seems to be interesting is to show that their structured relationship is endowed with important descriptive and normative capacity.

Keywords Unity of Science • Metaphors of an invisible totality • Institutional configurations of Unity of Science (Library Museum "République des Savants" School and Encyclopaedia)

1 Introduction

Let me begin by saying that I am quite aware that Unity has been (and still is) entirely out of fashion. First in art, then in philosophy and afterward in life itself, we are today most concerned with multiplicity, fragment and difference. If at all considered, unity appears just in the form of a patchwork, a mixture of various and heterogeneous elements. That is to say, we lost the hope in totality, in harmony and in unity. And we have good reasons for that. Mainly political.

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In science, too, we have to recognize the absence of unity which seems to characterize the scientific activity of our time. Epistemology, Philosophy of Science and above all Sociology of Science of the twentieth century have repeatedly stressed the increasing specialization of scientific knowledge,[1] the acute fragmentation which characterizes the unprecedented disciplinary situation we witness today. An explosive situation whose critical assessment is made long time ago[2] and whose effects can be felt at different levels of contemporary scientific activity, namely, at its institutional forms, organizational structures, heuristic capacity and cultural dimension.

We know that specialization – even if a necessary condition of the progress of scientific knowledge – changes the very nature of scientific endeavour. Because the specialized sciences do not face the World anymore, because, for particular disciplines and specialities, the very idea of World becomes useless: They can turn its back to the explanatory/unifying dimension of science and cheerfully enter the kingdom of practical positivity, looking for efficient yet fragmentary performances. That is, specialization runs together with instrumental reason which reduces science to the calculus of measurable entities and makes science to give up of the explanation and of the understanding of the World.[3]

The debate on post-modernity – which has polarized the philosophical community of the 1970s and 1980s of the twentieth century – made of this cynical (and sceptical) conception of science one of the main points of its analysis of actuality. Lyotard and Habermas – even if in opposite places of the border which divided moderns and post-moderns – do agree in the consideration that science is not anymore legitimated by the search of the truth but *only* by its technical applications. As Lyotard wrote in *La Condition Post Moderne* in 1979, since performativity depends on financial support of research, "there is no truth without money". And Habermas, underlying too the increasing dependence of science from the interventionist activity of political and economical power, stresses that science

[1] As mentioned by Carrier and Mittelstrass (1990: 17), a catalogue of German universities in 1990 already declared more than 4,000 research areas. By its side, the National Science Foundation at the USA, at 1940, declared 54 specialties, at 1954 74 only in Physics and at 1969 several thousands.

[2] Already in 1929, Ortega Y. Gasset vigorously denounced what he called the "barbarian specialist" (1929: 173). And precisely 30 years later, in 1959, Snow (1959: 15) considered as sociological evidence the break between the natural and the human sciences. As he wrote in his celebrated *Essay*, the rupture is such that "Scientist never read a single work of Shakespeare and literary intellectuals do not know the second law of thermodynamics" (1959: 15).

[3] As Prigogine and Stengers write (1988: 208), "some people try to reduce science to a simple research of general relations allowing to foresee and dominate the *phenomena*. But this 'adult' and not enchanted conception of rationality can never prevent the belief which is at the root of the passion of physicists: their research aims to understand the world, to make intelligible the movement of nature and not only to describe the way it behaves".

is not anymore legitimated by the attempt of unification of knowledge but rather by the proliferation of its technical effects.[4]

However, Unity of Science cannot be dismissed in such an easy way. It is true that there is today a "surface effect" which can lead us to declare the death of Unity of Science, as we have declared – perhaps in a too much speedy way – the death of God, the end of Art, the death of Ideologies or even the end of History.

But, Unity of Science is a too deep, old and decisive aspiration, an aspiration which runs through the whole history of western thought, always in tension and constant alternation with the opposite tendency toward specialization. Science is made of both tendencies, of both ingredients. Specialization favours the precise delimitation of the object of research, allows the rigour and profundity of analysis, reduces the number of methodologies and techniques necessary to the research on a specific discipline, helps the checking and establishment of the technical concepts necessary to the theoretical construction of each speciality, makes easy the knowledge of bibliography, restricts the extent of scientific communities and thus facilitates a better communication among the researchers of each speciality. Unity of Science corresponds to the comprehensive aim which underlies scientific activity. We could even argue that Unity of Science corresponds to the very essence of knowledge. In fact, what could it mean to know the World unless to identify similarities and to formulate universal laws – in a word – to have a unified description of it?

That is why – in my point of view – we cannot simply say that today Unity of Science is nothing but a nostalgic, old fashion idea. On the contrary, Unity of Science is something which – at the minimum – has the responsibility of avoiding the complete spread of knowledge and disciplines which would result if a total absence of integration among research would be the case. That is why, after a period when it seemed to be completely surpassed by the increasing and speedy process of specialization of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, Unity of Science appears (today as yesterday) as the transversal rationality which (now, perhaps, even more than before) links the different disciplines.

2 Signs

Several signs can be interpreted under this light. Let me briefly point just to three: First, the appeal to interdisciplinarity which characterizes our recent epistemological situation, namely, the last three decades of the twentieth century. I am speaking about the fact that the progress of scientific knowledge and the creativity of their researchers are more and more resultant from interdisciplinary practices

[4]As Habermas states in *Technick und Wissenschaft als Ideologie* (1968): "the autonomy of disciplines is the epistemological *correlatum* of the non autonomy of science in its whole, face to the technical world where it gets its legitimacy".

and their heuristic potentialities, conceptual migration, irradiation and decentring processes, cross-fertilization, problem convergence methodologies, etc.[5] Second, the emergence of new kinds of disciplinary arrangements resulting from the internal reorganization of the knowledge cartography. I mean, the constitution of *hybrid disciplines* built on the border of two traditional disciplines (like Biochemistry, Psycholinguistics or Genetics Engineering), of *interdisciplines* resulting from the intersection of science with industrial and organizational areas (like Organizational Sociology or Operational Research) and *inter-sciences*,[6] built on the confluence of different areas (such as Cybernetics, System Theory, Cognitive Sciences, Sciences of Complexity) dealing with too big problems unable to be faced by one unique discipline, as in the case of cognition, complexity or climate. Third, the important curricular experiences which are taking place, and which will have to be further developed in the near future, in the generality of universities,[7] all over the world. All these experiences are intended for flexibility, transversability and interdisciplinary integration[8] – see the many interdepartmental programmes, the diverse nets and inter-university groups, licences, masters, PhD and postdoc curricula.[9]

[5]Something which I have tried to systematize elsewhere according to a set of proposed categories for the analysis of scientific practices (importation, cooptation, convergence, decentration, commitment, crossings, etc.) (cf. Pombo 2004).

[6]Which Boulding (1956: 12) names as "multi-sexual interdisciplines".

[7]In what concerns University, the aim is to recover the interdisciplinary vocation of University while metaphor of the very articulation of the diverse kinds of knowledge, as it has been presented in Kant's *Der Streit der Fakultäten* (1798) and later theorized by Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel and Humboldt during the famous reform of the University of Berlin at 1810. As Schleiermacher wrote, it is the aim of university "to examine the particular, not in itself, but in the net of its scientific relations, to inscribe it in a vast set without never putting it apart from the unity and the totality of knowledge". Later, Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) will recognize the dangers to which University is submitted, namely, those which come from specialization of scientific knowledge and from the fragmentation of University in an amount of schools (cf. Jaspers 1965: 103–107). Also Habermas (1987) will recognize the integrative capacity of University which he defines as the place of the "convergent interaction" (Habermas 1987: 8) of the "subjectively shared awareness according to which some do things different from other but all together fulfill, not a function but a set of convergent functions" (*ibid*). Habermas grounds this possibility, not anymore at the hierarchical position of philosophy as the basis for culture and for unity of science (cf. 1987: 6) but in the communicative rationality which subsists at the heart of the public community of researchers (cf. 1987: 9).

[8]Put forward in France during the events of May 1968 as a student revindication, interdisciplinarity is in fact at the root of multiple experiences, of varied scope and amplitude. Curiously enough, in France, philosophy is the leader of the movement in favour of interdisciplinarity. See, for instance, the *Rapport de la Commission de Philosophie et d'Épistémologie* put forward by Jacques Bouveresse and Jacques Derrida, at 1988, for the French Minister of National Education (cf. Derrida 1990). On the contrary, in England and in the majority of anglophonic countries, it is science teaching which seems to go in front of the process. See the case of the celebrated projects "Nuffield Combined Science", "Scottish Integrated Science" and "Harvard Project Physics: An Integrated Science Course", created in the 1970s (cf. Rutherford 1971).

[9]See the case of the strong interdisciplinary programme developed since 1971 at the University of Chicago, the "Midwest Faculty Seminar" (cf. Walshok 1995: 207–224).

So, the situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century seems to me to be the following: on the one side, we have the (postmodern) abandon of the idea of Unity of Science, the attempt to consider it as an aged, bizarre and entirely surmounted idea; on the other side, we have the (modern) claim for unity of science as a living aspiration whose integrative signs continue to be disclosable under the fragmentary situation of contemporary scientific practice.

We can regret the lost of the idea or even to glorify its death. We can live without the aim of a Unity of Science, surviving with (or taking profit of) the sceptical (relativistic) situation opened by throwing it away. Or we can go on stressing its regulative nature and actively looking for its renewal, trying to understand its condition, attributes and main features.

In this case, we will argue, as many before us have done – Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Diderot, Kant, Carnap or Neurath just to quote some of the big names – that the idea of Unity of Science coincides with the very idea of science. In its simplest description, Unity of Science is the unification of experiences, of methodologies and of laws and theories. In this sense, Unity of Science is the major cognitive task of Science itself.

If we take this position, we will remind that the idea of Unity of Science gave rise to several important theoretical programmes which have crossed the History of Science and Philosophy and we will look carefully to them. We will commit to memory the remote and magnificent *Ars Magna* (1306) of Ramon Llull (1235–1315),[10] those marvellous monuments built at the beginning of the seventeenth century, as the *Instauratio Magna* (1857–1874b) of Francis Bacon (1561–1626)[11] or the *Mathesis Universalis* – that baroque project differently formulated by Descartes and

[10]With a first version in 1271, the *Ars Magna Primitiva*, Lull will go on rewriting the *Ars* during 23 years, always looking for a more simple, more accessible, universally appropriate form. However, the two last versions, one more extensive under the title of *Ars Generalis Ultima* and another shorter and easier to manipulate, under the title *Ars Brevis*, are both from 1308. See the classical study by Tomás and Joaquín Carreras y Artau (1939: I, 427–455).

[11]Bacon's *Instauratio Magna* is the proclamation statement of modern science and of its future discovery (see exploration) of the natural and human world. There is no divine light to illuminate the voyage unless the doubtful light of senses. Science is a human, collective task whose Unity is resultant from a plural set of determinations. In fact, for Bacon, Unity of Science is the outcome of several features: a common object (the Unity of the World which science must mirror), a final hedonistic aim (the happiness of humankind), a common organizational structure (the organic community of men whose life is devoted to science) and, last but not least, a new universal methodology. Bacon is aware of the importance and novelty of his inductive logics as the methodological support of modern science. We understand his audacity in the *Novum Organon* (1620): "As common Logics, which covers all by the syllogism, does not only apply to nature sciences but to all sciences without exception, so this inductive method shall be used by all sciences" (*Novum Organon*, 127).

Leibniz[12] – or, more recently, that large movement of *Unified Science*[13] taken up by the logical positivism at the first decades of the twentieth century.[14]

In all these cases – we will stress – we face strong programmes of Unity of Science taking Mathematics or Physics as the central exemplary science, accepting reductionism and its various implications, or trying to get away from it. Strong

[12]Mathesis Universalis concerns a totally formalized science, unique, universal and free from error, from doubt and from uncertainty. A universal science which would assemble all human knowledge in an integrative, exhaustive way. Not by additive accumulation but by a process of deduction and logical engendering on the basis of a set of primordial categories, pure concepts or primitive terms. Two main postulates are present here: reality can be entirely apprehended by reason; mathematics is the key, the method and the model of such intelligibility. For Descartes, Unity of Science has its ground, not in the unity of the World, as for Bacon, but in the unity of human reason. It is in this context that Descartes points to a Mathesis Universalis as a universal science which (I quote the *Regulae* IV) "must contain the first principles of human reason and which must extend to the rising of truths in any subject" (Descartes 1963–1973, *Oeuvres*, I: 94). Mathesis Universalis, thus constructed on the basis of the clear and distinct principles, evident for any rational being, is thus warranted, from its beginning, by the return of a solitary reason to indubitable principles, subjectively constituted, on the basis of which all other truth will be deducted. On the contrary, for Leibniz, the main point concerns mathematics which he considers to be the centre, the source of any inventions and discovery. However, differently from Descartes – for whom mathematics is valuable most for the intuitive character of its first propositions – for Leibniz is by the formal rigour of its demonstrations that mathematics can constitute the model of true knowledge. As Leibniz states in a classical text against Descartes, *Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis*, published in the *Acta Eruditorum* in 1684: "logical laws, the same geometers use, constitute the truth criteria for propositions which cannot be despised. Nothing can be admitted as valid and certain which has not been proved, either through an accurate experience, or by a solid demonstration. Yet, a demonstration will be solid only if it respects the form prescribed by logics" (Leibniz, GP, IV: 425). Now, because only logical laws can guarantee the rigour of a demonstration, that rigour cannot lay in dependence for subjective certainties. Such rigour must be conquered inside a symbolic system, which, by making stable and visible the most abstract thoughts, could offer a sensible *medium* that guides, supports, raises or even substitutes natural reason. As Leibniz writes, in a clear anti-Cartesian tone: "the true method must provide us a *filum Adiadnes*, that is, a crude and sensible mean, which should lead the spirit as drawing lines in geometry which are usually prescribed to apprentices in arithmetics" (Leibniz, GP, VII: 22). For further developments, see our Pombo (1987).

[13]Unity of Science will get here the character of a movement. In fact, with the neo-positivism, the expression corresponds not only to a theoretical programme on the technical problematics of Unity of Science (an articulated, even if not always coherent, sum of thesis inspired by the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle) but also to a set of concrete initiatives undertaken in order to encourage Unity of Science (the organization of six *International Congress on the Unity of Science*; the foundation, first in Haia (*Mundanaeum Institut*) and then at the USA, of the *Institute for the Unity of Science*; the publication of the *Library of Unified Science*; the edition, after 1930, of the famous journal *Erkenntnis* (afterward, named as *Journal of Unified Science*) by Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach; and, above all, the project of the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*).

[14]We could, naturally, consider several other projects for the unification of knowledge, each of them actualizing a singular form of articulation between philosophy and the idea of Unity of Science. For instance, a deductive metaphysics, where philosophy is the form of knowledge par excellence, as it was the case in Spinoza; a unity which corresponds to the regulative power of a transcendental

programmes require, more or less convincingly, the constitution of a scientific universal language as a major procedure for Unity of Science and have mostly a logical and methodological content.[15] In all cases, they try to clarify the levels into which Unity of Science should be conceived, to understand its rules and functional procedures, to analyze its mechanisms and to discuss its metaphysical significance.

Unity of Science is in all cases a regulative idea. It can be viewed at the formal level of unity of language, at a mere methodological level or in its strongest sense, as unity of laws and theories. It can be thought as doubling the unity of world or as expressing the unity of reason. However, in all cases, those programmes and their contemporary developments are acts of methodological anticipation by which one intends to promote, to build up or at least to facilitate the historical process of science unification. That is, the claim for unity of science is in all cases pursued in a normative way.

3 Hypothesis

Now, my hypothesis is that Unity of Science is more than a regulative idea, more than a project aiming to promote science unification, more than a philosophical, normative task.

What I would like to stress is that Unity of Science is also a practical and institutional feature, a set of material forms by which Unity of Science has been and continues to be silently pursued. They are universal institutions embodying the systematic coherency of the knowledge. I mean the Library, the School (namely, the University), the "République des Savants", the Museum and the Encyclopaedia. A set of structured procedures, cultural incorporations and concrete practices which – sometimes by imponent or even monumental forms, other times in an almost virtual regime – have as they aim to organize and to promote the coordination of the different sciences.

Some more ostensively (University, "République des Savants"), others more in a soundless, subterranean way (Museum, Library, Encyclopaedia), they all have descriptive, prescriptive and prospective elements – *descriptive* in the sense that they all try to distinguish the several particular sciences, to identify its relations

structure, as for Kant; a theoretical and practical unity which has in self-consciousness its radical ground, as for Fichte; an absolute knowledge with the capacity to enclose in itself the contradictions of a becoming totality, as it was the case with Hegel. For further developments on the most important programmes for Unity of Science, cf. Pombo (2006a).

[15] In one case, the inductive logic is the paradigm, in the other, the primacy is given to mathematics.

and to recognize its more significant articulations; *prescriptive* because they all establish links of proximity and subordination between the several disciplines, not only putting them side by side but instituting their unifying pole, that is, because they all seek to systematize the work, chaotic in itself, of knowledge production; *prospective* since they all look for the production of new knowledge. I mean, they all are not only open to novelties but able to previously design the structures in which those novelties can be recognized in its newness and integrated in the systematic whole. In other words, more or less intensively, each of those configurations pursues the idea of Unity of Science, trying to realize it effectively, day after day, in their own functions and competencies.

What I am proposing here is a peculiar way of understanding Unity of Science taking in consideration not only its scope as a regulative idea, independent, so to speak, of its material conditions, but also the set of concrete mechanisms responsible for the effective production of scientific knowledge.

We know that those configurations of Unity of Science (Scientific Community, School, Library, Museum, Encyclopaedia) have a specific historical nature. They were born simultaneously, at a particular historical situation, when the discovery and accumulation of knowledge justified their invention. Against *polimatia* which already Heraclitus, at the sixth century before Christ, has denounced[16] and against the additive accumulation of information – a danger to which we are today mostly exposed – Greeks have invented School[17] and, together with it, they invented science

[16]We can read on a fragment by Heraclitus, "numerous knowledge does not teaches intelligence" (Diels 1952: 40). From the Greek *poli math*, science of the multiple, the polimatia condemned by Heraclitus, first great philosopher of unity, was though out as the juxtaposition of data and fragmentary information, that is, as the amount of what is seen face to what cannot be seen at all. As Bollack and Wisman write (1972: 152), "unable to identify and to enunciate the unity of things, then men thought out the multiple".

[17]One of the decisive reasons for the emergence of science and philosophy would have been the new language practices that became possible in the Greek cities democratically organized. There, it would have been developed new communicative conditions, habits of dialogue, of discussion and of rational argument, never before experienced in human communities. In contrast to the traditional, millenary forms (mythic and narrative) of knowledge transmission, it appeared in Greece new forms of transmission of knowledge (the school was invented), new ways of using language that will result in the formation of new types of knowledge, basically, mathematics – a word meaning precisely what can be thought – and philosophy, the mother of all sciences. What we want to stress is that it is not the accumulation of scientific knowledge that is on the basis of the appearance of teaching. Rather, it is the emergence of teaching that makes possible the creation of scientific knowledge. Science and philosophy, as we know them today, are therefore the product of a long history of school along which specific forms of using language were imposed, discursive rules, ways of doing and saying and forms of producing, analyzing and explaining linguistic practices endowed with the rationality inherent in the very practice of communication. For further details, see Pombo (2002b: 182–228).

as a cooperative task.[18] In that moment, also appeared the Library,[19] the Museum[20] and the first Encyclopaedic synthesis.[21]

I will not go further on with that narrative. Let me just stress two points: First, the history of these configurations is somehow parallel. They all respond to the movements of History of Science, and, at the same time, each of them has its own, particular History. Second, they cross time all together as *constitutive elements of science production.* There will be no science without "république des savants", without school, without library, without museum and without encyclopaedia. Each step in the advancement of scientific knowledge needs to be prepared by those material structures, recognized by them in its novelty, legitimized, integrated in the already known, in the systematic whole.

In this sense, those material configurations could be said to constitute the condition of possibility of scientific production, a kind of an empirical, transcendental

[18]Science is never a solitary form of knowledge. Its *topos* of production is a community of peers which only can accept, recognize and validate the produced statements. But even before the call for discussing the results of research, the work of invention and production of knowledge takes place within a communicative network. As Schleiermacher wrote "is a hollow illusion to assume that an individual who is engaged in scientific activity can live alone with their work and their projects: how much it seems that he works alone in the library, at the desk or in the laboratory, his knowledge activity is, inevitably, interior to a public community of researchers" (Schleiermacher 1808: 258).

[19]As Patrick (1972) shows, Aristotle was the first to make a systematic and useful collection of books for his school. According to Patrick, "Aristotle, whom Plato called 'the reader', appears to be the first to recognize the value of organizing a library for a philosophical school" (1972: 97).

[20]Let us think about Alexandria's Library and Museum. As Strabo says, at the Library of Alexandria were together "all the books ever written on the inhabited earth". Those books were there made available to scholars who Ptolemy Soter has invited to Alexandria and installed in the Museum of which the Library was a necessary complement. We know that what it is behind the foundation of these two major cultural institutions is the Aristotelian idea of science, a collective undertaking requiring the combined effort of a republic of wise men. The great inspiration for the cultural policy of Ptolemy Soter was Demetrius Falero (350–283 BC), disciple of Theophrastus (372–287); successor of Aristotle in the *Lyceum* where he created, along with the particular library of Aristotle, a *Museion;* and true predecessor of the *Museum* of Alexandria. What matters however to emphasize is the symbolic fact that the destiny of the Library is so crossed, and from that inaugural moment forever, with the destiny of the Republic of the wise. For more developments, cf. Pombo (2002b).

[21]Encyclopaedism in Greece happens only in school context. The fragments of more clearly encyclopaedic nature that arrive to us were produced by Speusippo (393–339 BC), nephew of Plato and his successor at the Academy. Speusippo would have assembled and compiled significant part of the content transmitted in the classes, a series of writings on natural history, mathematics, logics and metaphysics. His aim would have been to give students an overall presentation of the material under study. Thus, Encyclopaedia is born as a school requirement seeking to preserve and extend by the written word, the teacher's spoken word. Regarding Alexandrian encyclopaedism – compilation, *varia*, abstract, collection of fragments and *mirabilia* – it was induced by the presence of Library and by the reading and writing practices which were constituted there. For a study on the history of encyclopaedism, cf. Pombo (2006b).

plan, a historical *a priori* (to put it in Foucaultian terms), not epochal (as the *episteme* in Foucault), but material, factual and, simultaneously, universal, necessary and transversal to time.

As different procedures of production of knowledge aiming at a same objective – Unity of Science – they establish among them multiple relations of interdependence and complementarity, a kind of polyhedric articulation whose structured relationship is endowed of important descriptive and heuristic capacity.

How could library exist without the community of researchers who produce the books, the journals, the papers, the letters and the documents of all kind which the library ranges in its armoires?

How could the *république des savants* function without the school (university) where new generations of researchers are prepared to continue scientific endeavour?

How could library survive without its metonymic translation in the pages of an encyclopaedia? Without encyclopaedia, as ordered presentation of knowledge, library would become a Borgian labyrinth of horror – a horror with which the very idea of School and learning would have been impossible.

Yet how would it be possible to read a simple entry of an encyclopaedia if what we have learnt in all the schools, the museums and the books of all libraries had been forgotten?

What I mean is that each step inside science is already prepared by these configurations of Unity of Science and inscribed in their articulated relationship.

> Let me just invite you to contemplate, in a very superficial way, that splendorous configuration of Unity of Science which is Library, and to glance, as if by an angel's eye (may be that of Wim Wenders famous movies on angels and libraries), the perfume of its articulations. There, we will see all the books ever written offered to the attention of the universal research community who has left their school classrooms, their laboratories, their amphitheatres, in order to seek for an old, yet precious, work concerning a particular, rare species of plant, of stone, of animal, of which, the day before, he saw a splendid exemplar in the Museum and which he has discovered that – perhaps – it could give him the proof, the confirmation, the evidence of an hypothesis he has dreamed, many years ago, when he has presented his first dissertation. That idea has been afterward abandoned, under the pressure of other research programmes. But it has not been forgotten and now came the moment, in his entire life, in which he decided to freely care about that hypothesis of his youth. He enters the Library, feels the silence of its rooms and corridors, admires the immense sleeping giant who lies over its bookcases, tables and armoires and realizes that he must begin by looking for that extraordinary animal, plant and stone, in the pages of a humble Encyclopaedia.

What is fascinating to see and constitutes a further argument in favour of my hypothesis is that, today, under our very eyes, we witness an unexpected

reinforcement of these articulations. The digital, electronical technologies are producing a *medium* in which what I have designated as "configurations" of Unity of Science are being virtually integrated. I mean the net, that opened, dialogical structure, connectable in all senses, constantly reformulable, incomplete but allowing the cross connection – the link – of the diverse branches of human knowledge. Yet, decentred and adopting proliferation as its regime, never the net falls in the pure disorder, in the complete labyrinth. Made of diverse, heterogeneous elements, the net is above all a combinatory device, an inventive space which accepts the fragment and the spreading of itself but yet aspires to order and to articulation.

What I mean is that perhaps in the net, all the configurations of Unity of Science came to join. By the net pass the destiny, not only of Scientific Communities whose cognitive exchanges are today mostly performed through the net but also of Encyclopaedia whose combinatory and heuristic regime develops; of Library, which, under our eyes, is becoming a universal electronic institution; of (virtual) Museum, which tends to be totally accessible; and, at last, of School (University), which is being deeply transformed by the net.

Of course, with the net, we cannot speak anymore about Unity of Science in a strong sense. What the net gives us to see is a large, immense, proliferous, enormously extensible – and also dramatically weak – idea of Unity of Science. An idea of Unity of Science able to live side by side with the plurality of research programmes, with the diversity of methods, with the multiplicity of languages, with the variety of subjects, from old findings to the newest discoveries. With the net, Unity of Science is not anymore a regulative idea but turns to a plural entity. The net is also the place where we are confronted with the well-built connection between Unity of Science and Encyclopaedia. I mean, the net is today a material (virtual) structure in which what I have called the configurations of Unity of Science are being congregated and in which the destiny of Encyclopaedia is taking place.

4 Unity of Science and Encyclopaedia

The connection between Unity of Science and Encyclopaedia can be appreciated from the side of the encyclopaedia and from the side of Unity of Science.

From the side of encyclopaedia, it would be necessary to analyze the history of encyclopaedism, at least during the second half of the twentieth century. In fact, the net has been prepared by the recent developments of encyclopaedism, namely, at the second half of the twentieth century. At that moment, encyclopaedias[22] set out to offer a set of metadiscursive resources aiming to improve the decentred use

[22]That is the case of the *Encyclopaedia Universalis* (1968–1975) and the *Enciclopédia Einaudi* (1977–1984b) which both became more integrated, more decentred, more interdisciplinary, more combinatory and thus more concerned with heuristics.

of the information provided. They begun to reinforce the work of indexation, to advise research issues, to suggest reading per courses, to anticipate conceptual nets of possible articulations, etc.[23] The main idea is that "totality is not the fruit of a series of additions but of the complexity of the articulations" (Romano 1977–1984a: XVII).



"Relations Tables" of the *Universalis* and "Reading Zones" of the *Einaudi*

From the "Relations Tables" of the *Universalis* to the "Reading Zones" of the *Einaudi*, the recent history of encyclopaedism put us face to face to combinatory processes announcing the "surfing", the "navigation",[24] at the universal electronic encyclopaedia which, everyday, is becoming more and more real.

We cannot analyze here the novelties arising in recent developments of encyclopaedism.[25] Another paper would be necessary. Let me just stress – without giving

[23] As one can read in the introductory note with which Claude Gregory opens the *Organon* of *Universalia*, "it is a reader´s job to work out the project" (1968–1975, vol. XVII: XI). The same at the *Einaudi* whose aim was "to concentrate on the more important elements of the cultural discourse organized in the last half century" (Romano 1977–1984a: XIII). The *Einaudi* thus explicitly gains a heuristic and interdisciplinary scope. Interdisciplinary, in that it implies the ability to "enter the logic of various subjects in order to see how could one transmigrated concept be enriched with new abilities in order to become broader and more fertile, in limit, to become completely different" (Romano 1977–1984a: XV). Heuristic because, not wishing to identify the knowledge acquired in the past nor even to review the knowledge of the present, encyclopaedia aims to open itself for new conceptual structures, for the new objects of study and research, aiming to give an account of "the ways which contemporary research is following, the organizational structures and – especially – the possibilities existing in each field" (see Romano 1977–1984a: XIII).

[24] Significantly, the concept of "navigation" appears explicitly at the *Organon* of the *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, vol. 17: 595.

[25] Namely, in what concerns electronic and online encyclopaedias whose main advantage is facility and speed. A second feature of this new type of encyclopaedias concerns its radical actuality. The passage from virtual to actual is always local, dependent on the subjective activation of a specific mechanism.

the correspondent demonstration – that we assist today, not only the surprising renewal of encyclopaedism but almost to its vertiginous accomplishment in the information technologies and in their unitary (see "totalitarian", since there is a danger, here) ambition.

With all its difficulties, discrepancies, imperfections, terrible noise, trash and inconsistencies, yet the net – and the encyclopaedia of which it constitutes the last potentiation – represents the maximum of integration which mankind has been able to attain. As Neurath said, "It is contrary to the principles of encyclopaedism to imagine that we could eliminate all the difficulties. To believe in that is to adopt a kind of the famous Laplace's devil which had a complete knowledge of the present facts sufficient for complete foreseeing of the future. That idea of the system is opposite to the idea of the encyclopaedia: the anticipated completeness of the system is opposite to the incompleteness of an encyclopaedia" (1938: 20–21).

By the side of Unity of Science, we have to give reason to two big giants of the past and try to put ourselves, as small dwarfs we are, at their back. I mean Leibniz and Neurath, perhaps the architects of the two programmes of Unity of Science in which the idea of encyclopaedia more explicitly coincides with philosophical activity itself.[26]

Concerning Leibniz, let me just briefly state – again without having the possibility to demonstrate it – that the rational care to the symbolic level is the key note of Leibnizian philosophical project of Unity of Science. This means that, according to Leibniz, *Mathesis Universalis* implies the construction of a philosophical language or *Characteristica Universalis* which accurately will be able to express thought and its internal articulations and thus will be able to transform all reasoning in infallible calculations. That is why, in Leibniz, *Characteristica Universalis* and *Mathesis Universalis* are deeply articulated with the project of an *Encyclopaedia*.

We know that Encyclopaedia is a deeply anti-Cartesian project. In opposition to Descartes, for whom what matters is a lonely search for truth, a break with all tradition and a new start from the very beginning of his own evidences, the Leibnizian encyclopaedic project points out the idea of anchoring the new in the old. What matters to Leibniz is not to despise, but, on the contrary, to take as starting point the work done from all who had precede us and for all who live and work at our side. That is why Leibniz has been so fully committed, all along his life, to the development of what I proposed to label as the material configurations of the unity of science: academies, encyclopaedias, journals, books, etc.

For Neurath too, Encyclopaedia is the most perfect way of setting up the sum total of sciences, the appropriate form of science unification, always incomplete and provisional but nevertheless comprehensive. Accordingly, he argues that "it is not the system but the encyclopaedia which constitutes the genuine model of science in its all" (1938: 20).

[26]For a comparative study on Leibniz and Neurath's encyclopaedism, cf. Pombo (2002a).

We know that it was Neurath who tied this link and assumed the correspondent charge.[27] Without entering in details concerning that assignment, let me just point some major features of Neurath's project:

1. His anti-systematic nature, the antifoundationalist refusal of any absolute point of view from which would be possible to deduce the propositions of the particular sciences. As Neurath states: "For an empiricist, it is absurd to speak of a total and unique system of science. He must conceive his work as aiming at the exactness and systematization but inside the constantly changeable framework of encyclopaedia" (1936: 188).
2. His acceptance of provisional and historical nature of all synthesis.
3. His connection with the search of a scientific language, that is, his Leibnizian inspiration. I quote Neurath: Leibniz was "the first and the last of great philosophers to seriously advocate finding a calculus universalis adequate to scientific progress" (1938: 15). What allows us to stress that, though apparently modest, Neurath's encyclopaedism was, after all, extremely ambitious. It aimed to conciliate the empiricism of Bacon and Diderot (not interested in logical formalization) with the panlogicist rationalism of Leibniz.
4. His large, ideological, political and social purposes. As we know, in addition to its primordial cognitive functions, the movement for Unified Science was committed to the belief in the capacity of Unity of Science for answering the problems of men's life.

Significantly, in a posthumous text, wrote few times after the end of the Second World War and 3 days before his death, Neurath still imagines that the Unity of Science movement can contribute to international co-operation: "I hope that we, who have tried to create a kind of universal jargon as a lingua franca for sciences, have given support to the intellectual synthesis, offering people a proper medium of communication their arguments (. . .), a sort of platform where all the types of discussion could have place" (1947: 82).

Maybe that – as Leibniz and Neurath pointed out – encyclopaedia is the very model of Unity of Science.

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[27]The original plan, conceived by Neurath around 1920, was presented, discussed and approved at the *First International Congress for the Unity of Science* held at the Sorbonne in Paris, 1935. The Encyclopaedia was intended to provide the publication of a series of 260 independent monographs in about 26 volumes. It would be designed to have the structure of an onion, including a heart formed by 20 books dedicated to the foundations of Unified Science and organized into four major sections: the first devoted to the theoretical analysis of the problem of the Unity of Science, the second on methodological issues, the third aimed at giving an overview of the current systematization state of the various sciences and the fourth intending to give an account of the main applications of science in the field of private education, medicine, engineering and law. All the other books planned would be located around the heart, as overlapping layers. They would be dedicated to the various particular sciences dealing with problems specific to each of them (cf. Neurath 1937: 139 and 1938: 24–25). Neurath also envisaged the publication of a supplement in ten volumes comprising one *Atlas* or *Isotype Thesaurus* that would include maps, graphs and other pictorial representations as "means of unified visual aid" (Neurath 1938: 25). Neurath also believed it would be possible to hold simultaneous editions in English, French and German aiming to gather the input from a wide range of European and Asian collaborators.

5 Concluding Remarks

Let me finish with a few remarks regarding encyclopaedia as a possible model of Unity of Science.

1. What is lovable in encyclopaedia is the possibility it offers of a plural unity. What, in my point of view, makes of encyclopaedia "the genuine model of science as a whole" (Neurath 1938: 20) is that it concerns a kind of knowledge which, simultaneously, is total and various. In fact, encyclopaedia supposes not a totalitarian vision but a comprehensive, harmonious framework able to integrate the diversity of elements.
2. Encyclopaedia is a deeply Leibnizian endeavour aiming at synoptic view but which, at the same time, caring for the minimum detail, listening to the most humble idea. Encyclopaedia is an excessive design, much immoderate, much extravagant, but also very much attentive, gentle and compassionate. We need to escape schematic totalities. We have learnt that need, for we know that they are not interested in the fragile, in the insignificant, in the concrete and tangible. Of course, the dream of a totality which stands close to the particular is an immense, impossible dream. But that does not mean that it should not be desirable.
3. We know that encyclopaedia is a very immoderate, extravagant, exorbitant, unfinished project. Rigorously impossible to achieve. But we also know that it is a generous project or, as Neurath used to say, "A program's life for men of good will" (1936: 200).
4. Further, encyclopaedia does not have any territorial imperialist conception of knowledge. To progress in knowledge is not to conquer a foreign country. To know is to discover new articulations, to invent a new interdisciplinary forum, to establish new fraternities.
5. Behind that, encyclopaedia follows a combinatory regime. One can enter wherever one wishes to. Everyone can enter. There is no royal entrance.

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Habit, Self-Organization, and Abduction

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Abstract In this paper we discuss the hypothesis of Dascal (Artificial intelligence as epistemology? In: Villa Nueva E (ed) Information, semantics and epistemology. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 224–241, 1990) according to which the main characteristic of intelligence is the ability to adapt pragmatically to changes in the context in which one is immersed. Our investigation is an inquiry into the role played by habits, in order to establish criteria according to which agents act in the world in reasonable and relevant ways. To begin with, we investigate the logical form of habits, focusing on the distinction between "rational habits" and "crystallized habits" ("degenerated habits"), and their function in the structuring of actions. We argue that habits manifest themselves in terms of a hypothetical prescription: If A (a circumstance), then B (a behavior). Our hypothesis is that habits can be transformed into abilities by means of processes of secondary self-organization that involve the dynamics of rupture, acquisition, and improvement of previous habits. More specifically, we suggest that abilities, characterized as habits that have been refined or perfected, involve a process of secondary self-organization which can be triggered by (a) the perception of (an agent's own) habitual behavior and the recognition (by the agent) of the necessity of altering part of this behavior and (b) experience of

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a doubt that may initiate rational abduction. Furthermore, we adapt the notion of abductive reasoning, as defined by Peirce (In: Hartshorne C, Weiss P, Burks AW (eds) Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols 1–8. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1958), to deal with the creation of hypotheses of conduct and, in particular, the transition from the experience of a doubt to the acquisition of a habit (understood as a readiness to perform an action).

Keywords Habits • Self-organization • Abductive reasoning

1 Introduction

The concept of *habit* has aroused the interest of contemporary philosophy, especially within the areas of ecological philosophy, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. Such interest is due especially to the fact that the processes of generation, improvement, and substitution of habits and abilities play a cognitive role of the highest relevance in the evolution of intelligent action. Thus, for example, Dascal (1990) points out that one of the main characteristics of intelligence is the ability to adapt pragmatically to changes in the context in which one is immersed. Referring to the field of artificial intelligence (AI), he argues that:

> ... The crucial question (for AI) is not that of 'representation of knowledge', nor that of 'providing (more) knowledge' to a system. Rather it is the question of designing systems that are not enslaved by something labelled 'knowledge', i.e., systems which are able to reject justifications that do not seem reasonable to them, and to select pragmatically even the criteria themselves of what is to be considered, in each context, as reasonable and 'relevant' .... (Dascal 1990: 236)

Anticipating in 1990 what today constitutes one of the central hypothesis of the theory of embedded embodied cognition, Dascal stresses the importance of *pragmatic aspects of knowledge* in the study of intelligence:

> Researchers in AI should direct their attention to the question of whether it is possible to develop systems which are not subordinated to the knowledge and to the rules and criteria which are supplied to them *ex machina*, and if so, how. And they should not forget that this pragmatic aspect of knowledge derives from the public/social character of justification. (Ibid.)

For many decades, the pragmatic aspect of intelligence was not given priority in AI research projects, but at present its importance is almost unanimously recognized. It is our understanding that the way to investigate the pragmatic dimension of intelligence is by means of the study of the processes that form habits and abilities.

With the purpose of clarifying the concept of *habit*, in the first section of this article we investigate the logical form of habit. We first define habit as a relation between antecedents and consequents which constitute ordered pairs of conditional prescriptions, understood as dispositions that generate patterns of action. We suggest that habit constitutes a readiness to act in a certain way (the consequent) under certain circumstances (the antecedent).

In the second section, we analyze the process of secondary self-organization (Debrun 2009), with the objective of clarifying the process of generation, improvement, and substitution of habits and abilities. Given a system, a self-organized process is characterized as the result of the interactions between the elements of which it is comprised, without following the dictates of central controllers or supervisors (Bresciani and D'Ottaviano 2000). Secondary self-organization occurs when the system acquires stability and is directly related to a system's capacity for learning and to the potential that a system develops for dealing with new events (Debrun 2009). We argue that in the case of abilities that result from the refining of habits, a process of secondary self-organization is present, making possible the emergence of *criteria of relevance* that direct the development of such abilities (Gonzalez 2005). A question that presents itself is this: How can the reasoning that is possibly implicit in this process of emergence be explained? A working hypothesis is that *abductive reasoning* is a good candidate for use in resolving this question.

Finally, in the third section, we adopt the notion of abductive reasoning, as defined by Peirce (1958), in order to deal with the process of the creation of hypotheses of conduct. We argue that habit and doubt bring about consequences that are contradictory, while at the same time also complementary, to our experience of the world. Habit, on the one hand, offers support for conduct. Doubt, on the other hand, can be a paralyzing "sentiment," but it can also stimulate the formation of new habits. We argue that the passage from paralyzing *doubt* (which offers no support to conduct) to *habit* (conceived as a readiness to conduct action in a certain way) unites characteristics of a process of secondary self-organization that incorporates features of abductive reasoning, thus aiding the emergence of action-directing relevance criteria.

2 The Logical Form of Habit

The objective of this section is to describe the logical form of habit. We may define habit as a hypothetical conditional sentence: *If A, then B: if circumstance A occurs, then the behavior B will probably be adopted by agent S*. This characterization was given by the philosopher Charles S. Peirce (cf. Peirce 1958). More specifically, Peirce considered that X is a habit if X is a readiness to act in a certain way under the influence of certain circumstances. Based on this definition, we specify the following condition for the constitution of habits*:* X is a habit if X is a relation R between circumstantial antecedents and behavioral consequents which constitute ordered pairs of conditional hypothetical prescriptions. R may be established by satisfying the following sentence: A happening $\underline{a}$ is in relation R with a behavior $\underline{b}$ if the occurrence of $\underline{a}$ is (in most cases) followed by the adoption of behavior $\underline{b}$.

Although we are suggesting that habit can be *represented* by a binary relation, we are not, however, arguing for the hypothesis that habit has a binary *nature*. As a relation, habit in fact possesses a *triadic nature*, given that it involves an antecedent, a consequent, and a connection (represented by the relation itself)

between antecedent and consequent. Freely using Peirce's terminology, we may say that habit is thirdness (the category of regularity) and not secondness (the category of otherness). In this sense, when we analyze a habit X, we have the following:

1. A set C_i of circumstances in which X may be applied with success
2. A set C_q of consequences that will probably follow if X is applied to the elements of C_i
3. A "readiness" to adopt the behavior prescribed by X if any of the circumstances of C_i occur

The "readiness" to adopt the prescribed behavior reflects the weak degree of determination present in the connection between antecedent and consequent in a habit. That is to say, much more than a *mere occasion* for the application of a *rule of action "if A, then B,"* the occurrence of circumstance A tends to weakly determine the actualization of the behavioral consequent B prescribed by habit X. The degree of determination is weak because (1) we may impede the actualization of behavior B, e.g., by rational reflection, and (2) we can alter habit X by means of the dynamics of action.

We would like here to concentrate on the "readiness to act in a certain way" furnished by habit. The first question to be responded to is the following: What is the function of habit? Among the various conceivable functions of habit, the most important would be that of *avoiding surprises*. If a behavior has led to positive consequences when applied in a certain circumstance, then, when the circumstance occurs, we may behave in the usual manner, unsurprised, because the usual manner will probably lead us to the desired positive consequences. On the other hand, an alternative behavior could bring about undesired consequences, and therefore we would simply prefer not to adopt it.

When successful, a habit can make possible the establishment of a skilled behavior. Under normal conditions, we have no need to imagine possible behaviors before acting effectively – a behavior spontaneously presents itself as "the option to be adopted." However, special circumstances, such as climbing a mountain on a rainy day, realizing a complex artistic performance, or executing a precise movement in a soccer game, for example, require the refining or perfecting of common habits that can result in the production of abilities which involve criteria of relevance.

If we find ourselves in a context in which we do not have at our disposition successful behaviors as responses to the circumstances, we may (a) imagine lines of behavior before acting in an adequate fashion or (b) permit new spontaneous forms of organization to manifest themselves pragmatically in the process of the restructuring and refinement of habits. In the first case, reason plays an important role, that of conceiving the possible results of different behavioral lines to be adopted. We would have, in this case, the perception and conception of a behavioral line and its presumed results.

In the second case, in which spontaneous forms of organization are manifested in the process of the restructuring and refinement of habits, we do not necessarily

depend on reason to foster an adequate line of behavior, as such a line of behavior is already pragmatically ingrained in the dispositions of the totality of the system of habits in question. It is as if certain habits were directly connected to sensory perception, memory, and behavior, occasioning the unfolding of successful forms of behavior. In this case, we behave in a way that is at the same time skilled and spontaneous (without the constant control and vigilance of conscious experience), on the basis of both old habits and self-organizing processes. Without being able to count on this pragmatic process of the ingraining of habits, we would have to conceive hypotheses of action and test new lines of behavior by means of prescriptive rules, as in AI modeling. In the next section we propose a characterization of this process and argue that in its formation a habit constitutes an important organizational component for the understanding of the emergence of pragmatically constituted criteria of relevance.

3 Ability and Self-Organization in the Emergence of Criteria of Relevance

In an inspiring passage in the article "The Idea of Self-Organization," Debrun presents an example of an attempt at self-structuring that is decidedly not a process of secondary self-organization: an unsatisfied "subject" decrees that "[. . .] from now on, I will redo my life on a completely new basis" (Debrun 2009: 45). The "subject" dreams of obtaining the illusory result that he or she can exist independently of the pragmatic process which characterizes the constitutive system of his or her identity, and intends to prescribe a magic formula that transforms, by decree, his or her unsatisfactory system of habits, ignoring the surrounding conditions. Here, in contrast to examples of self-organization, the "subject" wishes (or intends) to exercise the role of absolute central controller over his or her existence. Debrun argues that, first, if it were possible to "redo my life on a completely new basis," we would be dealing with a hetero-organization imposed on the subject by him or herself. Second, he argues that it is quite improbable (if not impossible) that a "subject" *S* would be really capable of completely self-structuring him or herself.

In contrast with hetero-organization, self-organization is a phenomenon of the creation and/or restructuring of an organization. Debrun (2009) characterizes the spontaneous "creation of an organization" as *primary self-organization*, in which there occurs a transition from independent elements to interdependent ones, without the domination of an absolute central controller. Once an organization is created, self-organization as the "restructuring of an organization" is characterized as *secondary self-organization*.

Secondary self-organization is developed within an already constituted system, which can be defined as a structure with functionality. The structure consists of a (nonempty) set of elements and relations. The organization of a system, which

is essentially the same as the system itself, constitutes a nonrandom arrangement of elements (particles, fields) and relations, and the system may be considered a structure in activity (Bresciani and D'Ottaviano 2000). According to Debrun, there is secondary self-organization when a system reaches, by means of operations exercised upon itself, a higher degree of complexity. For secondary self-organization to occur, at least three conditions must apply: first, the elements must possess "a certain degree of autonomy;" second, the relations between the elements must be susceptible to alteration; finally, there occur processes of adjustment between the elements of the system as a result of learning.

As organization involves a universe of elements, relations, and functionality (Bresciani and D'Ottaviano 2000), self-organization is developed through the interaction of such elements in a nonmechanical fashion. As Debrun points out (2009: 32): "... these elements cannot be of such nature that its presence mechanically determines the process that will happen having them as a basis. If that were the case, the intuition that we have of 'self production' would be nullified."

Summarizing, secondary self-organization constitutes a process of adjustment and refinement that occurs, without a central controller, in a primarily organized system. It is our hypothesis that criteria of relevance, the directors of skillful action, emerge from the process of secondary self-organization by means of the actions of agents (internal or external to the system) who are embodied and embedded in specific contexts. It is in the pragmatic dimension of existence, and not by decree or by the establishment of rules imposed by a central controller, that criteria of relevance emerge and are established in the directing of skilled action.

Criteria of relevance are fundamental, in this perspective, for the characterization of the *parameters of order* that emerge from the dynamics of *parameters of control* generated by means of the spontaneous interaction among the elements that constitute a complex system (Haken 2000) and by the system's interaction with the environment. A game of soccer can help us illustrate the relation between parameters of order (which reflect, in our view, the organization of the system) and parameters of control. The players, the referees, the grass, the ball, and other elements constitute parameters of control, while the parameters of order will emerge from the pragmatic dynamics which are established among these elements during the game, expressing the presence of criteria of relevance. Even though parameters of control are necessary conditions for the realization of the game, habits establish the readiness to act in a certain way, molding the style of the game and directing (not necessarily in a determinate fashion) the action of the players. When this action is successful, we say that it is a case of "skilled action," which involves criteria of relevance. But, in the context of this interpretation, what would be the difference between skillful action and action that merely expresses a habit? How can we explain what occurs in the process of the generation of criteria of relevance? These are questions for which we have no algorithms available to serve as answers. However, in conclusion, we will now outline a proposal of investigation based on Peirce's reflections on the pragmatic nature of abductive reasoning.

4 Habit, Ability, and Abductive Reasoning

Habit, as we argued in the first section, has the conditional form *If A, then B*. Thus, we may conceive of a habit as a *relation between circumstances and behavior inscribed in the patterns of action of an individual*. Circumstances and behavior both being susceptible to analysis from a third person perspective, allow inference an operative habit *H* from the *frequency* with which an agent *S* adopts the course of behavior *B* given circumstance *C*.

Adopting the Peircean pragmatic approach, we may outline a distinction between *rational operative habits* and *degenerated operative habits*. As operative habits, both of them furnish a readiness to act in a certain way under the influence of certain circumstances. However, in the case of a rational habit, this readiness must be in conformity with a certain purpose. Thus, if we recognize that a habit is not in conformity with a goal or a purpose, we may be able to modify that habit. The failure in attempts to modify a habit (*in the absence of physical and/or physiological impediments*) points to a certain degree of degeneration (or crystallization) of this habit, characterizing it as degenerated. Be that as it may, a purpose *P* having been chosen, the decision to modify a habit that does not foster or bring about the achievement of *P* constitutes an important step in the restructuring of the behavioral system.

In a *system of behavioral habits*, a decision "[...] will be integrated in the process, contributing to give it meaning or vigor," but, "it is not known, however, how the previous phases of the process [in this case, the habit we wish to alter and its relation with other habits] will react to its beginning. The reaction can even be negative" (Debrun 2009: 34). That is, when we decide to alter part of our behavior, this decision, as a commitment we assume with ourselves, does not guarantee, in and of itself, that a restructuring will be successful.

The decision to alter part of our behavior can turn out to be weak, or even contradictory. What is really important, says Debrun (2009: 60), "is the sedimentation of 'something', which can be even the project itself [e.g., a commitment to modify our behavior], or something similar, that will have received the 'stamp' of interaction."

As we have suggested, behavioral organization, expressed as a system, constitutes a set of interconnected or interrelated habits. For us to be able to alter a habit *H*, we must also alter, to a greater or lesser degree, the habits {*I*, *J*, *K*, *L*, *M*, *N*, ...} associated with *H*. It may be that an initial process of behavioral change meets an obstacle, due to some kind of crystallization, in a habit *I* (that does not foster purpose *P*) associated with *H*. It may also be that the "subject" decides to insist on this line of conduct, being capable of impeding for a certain amount of time, but not in a definitive way, the actualization of the consequents that are (weakly) determined by habit *I*. It may even be that the alteration of a conduct should be redefined. Whatever the case may be, habits have to be interrelated among themselves in order for an alteration to reflect an adjustment among them. We arrive, now, at the following definition of *rational habit*: *X* is a *rational habit* for subject *S* in the instant t_1 *if and only if* (a) *X* brings about successful consequences for *S* in t_1 and (b) *S* can change *X* in t_2 if the consequences of *X* in t_1 become non-successful for *S*.

Therefore, a rational habit is a habit that, given a goal, tends to bring about successful consequences in conformity with such a goal, or a habit which is weak or transformable, that is, one which can participate in a process of secondary self-organization in the generation of abilities which can contribute to the realization of this goal.

Even though the subject cannot impose habits that are representative of an alternative version of him or herself on his or her own behavioral organization, this does not imply that a change of habits is not possible. It is possible, and the weak connection between the antecedent and the consequent of a habit guarantees this. However, it is reasonable to claim that the alteration of habits admits possible variations in directionality, which may include a return to the earlier version that the subject wishes to overcome, as well as a return to the path toward the desired alteration. In the development of the process of the alteration of habits, the earlier version of the subject will always be there (potentially), and there will not be a precise break in continuity between the earlier version and the alternative one in construction. Sometimes the subject may be much more like what it was earlier and much less like what it would like to be alternatively. The course of time will show what (and to what degree) the agent has been capable or incapable of changing with regard to his or her behavior. In both cases, however, action develops as the result of criteria of relevance pragmatically established.

Changes in circumstances, such as structural, functional, or environmental changes, among other things, can occasion a temporary disorganization in systems of habits, allowing for the appearance of doubts regarding the relevance and efficiency of certain habits. Such doubts, for their part, can make way for the generation of new criteria of relevance in the establishment of goals or purposes. In a certain sense, the evolution of the behavior of an agent may reflect the evolution of his or her reasonableness. If, in the application of behavior *B* to circumstance *A*, there is concordance between a hoped-for result *R* and what has in fact resulted, then the habit *If A, then B* is reinforced as efficient.

According to Peirce, habits "[. . .] guide our desires and shape our actions." Belief (understood as a strong habit) is an "indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions" (Peirce, CP, 3: 370). On the other hand, doubt can "paralyze" behavior (the functionality of the system). If, in the application of consequent *B* of habit *If A then B* to antecedent *A*, there is no concordance between the hoped-for result *R* and what is in fact the result, then a doubt is established in the behavioral system. The agent will not know what to do when a similar antecedent appears again. In virtue of its not offering support for behavior (and fostering instability), the doubt must be eliminated.

We are assuming that the behavioral system seeks stability. Thus, under the influence of a doubt, there will occur an attempt by the agent to restructure the set of habits within which the doubt has arisen. According to Peirce (1958), persistent doubt initiates a process of thought which does not cease until belief, or habit of action, in the form an explicative hypothesis, is established and the doubt is eliminated. The process of the generation of hypotheses constitutes the essence

of abductive reasoning (or abduction). Abduction may be described as having the following form:

(a) A surprising fact C is observed.
(b) But, if A were true (a true hypothesis), C would follow as a matter of fact.
(c) Therefore, there exist reasons to suspect that A is true.

We would like to propose an interpretation (adaptation) of Peircean abduction to deal with the generation of criteria of relevance in the search for hypotheses explicative of a surprising fact. According to this interpretation, *surprising fact* is equivalent to "the consequent of habit H (a behavior) produces result R_1 (which does not lead to purpose P), and R_1 is different from hoped-for result R, which fosters purpose P." Furthermore, "true hypothesis" (which presupposes correspondence between theory and fact) is interpreted as "correspondence between a potential result R (which fosters purpose P) and the real result R' (identical or similar to R, and also fostering purpose P); R' is derived from the application of behavioral sequence S_b to circumstance C_1." The proposed interpretation/adaption is presented below:

1. A behavioral sequence S_b, frequently experienced as efficient when applied to circumstance C_1, has been experienced as inefficient; Doubt D is established.
2. An alternative behavioral sequence S_{ab} is created as a hypothesis of action.
3. If the alternative behavioral sequence S_{ab} were to be applied efficiently to circumstance C_1 (in place of the earlier behavioral sequence S_b), then the instability generated by D would probably be overcome.
4. Therefore, there exist reasons to apply the alternative behavioral sequence S_{ab} to circumstance C_1.

In this pragmatic context, criteria of relevance can emerge in the form of parameters of order which make possible the establishment of new goals, as well as the restructuring of the system of habits of action which, when successful, are transformed into abilities.

This being the case, the next time that a circumstance similar to C_1 appears, the system/agent will tend to test the hypothesis S_{ab} that was established in accord with the new criteria of relevance or parameters of order. Although still under the influence of the old system of habits, the hypothesis S_{ab} can be *accepted, rejected, corrected, adjusted, and incorporated*. What will be the case depends on the interaction between S_{ab} and the habits already present in the system, now under the influence of new criteria of relevance. In cases where S_{ab} is progressively and inductively reinforced by experience, a reevaluation of competing hypotheses that are inconsistent with S_{ab} will be required. Thus, the acceptance and or rejection of S_{ab} will require the adoption of a new criterion of relevance that will direct an organizing adjustment in at least some of the ordered pairs of antecedents and consequents pertaining to the different habits present in the system.

But perhaps most important, in relation to the possible transformation of a hypothesis of behavior into a habit, is the following: What is presented as a *hypothesis* must, in the presence of a circumstance which generates doubt, instantiate a

successful action in relation to the goals currently established. Successive efficient applications of such a hypothesis (a type of inductive evaluation that reveals the extent of its range of application) end up transforming it into a habit, making explicit the criteria of relevance emerging from the process of secondary self-organization that here incorporates abduction.

In sum, a doubt can stimulate the formation of new habits resulting from the emergence of new criteria of relevance in the system. But beyond this, the transition from doubt to habit can result from a process of secondary self-organization. In the first place, such a transition occurs within an already constituted system according to established criteria of relevance. Second of all, different from a transcendental subject, the embodied and embedded subject *S* realizes (pragmatically) the task of the creation, adjustment, and incorporation of a hypothesis of action. Finally, the creation of a functional habit applicable to a circumstance experienced as problematic suggests a complexification (in a greater or lesser degree) of the system of habits of an agent according to new criteria of relevance.

5 Final Considerations

Our reasonability and functionality as embodied and embedded pragmatic agents find an impressively wide range of possibilities of action in the establishment of criteria of relevance which foster goals or purposes on diverse planes of experience. Once certain criteria of relevance have been adopted and a purpose *P* established, habits which foster *P* can be identified, strengthened, and refined. We can also exert ourselves to change and weaken habits which are manifested as obstacles to achieving *P*. In extreme cases, new criteria of relevance can emerge in processes of secondary self-organization with the consequent abandonment of earlier goals and habits. Despite the fact that in the flux of life (or experience) great changes are not frequent, they can signal changes in the criteria of relevance incorporated in skilled action, the remaining activity being the mere repetition of habits.

In conclusion, the hypothesis and the arguments elaborated here attempt to show that criteria of relevance may emerge spontaneously in the form of parameters of organization and are manifested through abilities, making possible the maintenance of self-organized systems. In pragmatic contexts, criteria of relevance especially stand out when instabilities threaten the equilibrium, maintenance, and development of systems which encounter doubt. As Dascal (1990) points out, the main characteristic of intelligence is the ability to adapt pragmatically to changes in the context in which one is immersed. This pragmatic ability seems to be present in all living creatures. One great difficulty, which was noted by Dascal in the 1990s and which continues up to the present time, resides in the question of whether it is possible to model such pragmatic ability in artificial systems. Only the passage of time will give us indications about the capacity of artificial systems in the generation of such abilities. At the moment they appear to be a central characteristic of living beings embodied and embedded in a social environment.

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Dialogues and Monologues in Logic

Shahid Rahman

Abstract The dialogical framework is an approach to meaning that provides a pragmatist alternative to both the model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical semantics. However, since dialogic had and still has a bias towards antirealism, it has been quite often seen as a version of the proof-theoretical approach. The main claim of this chapter is that the proof-theoretical approach as displayed by a tableaux system of sequent calculus is, from the dialogical point of view, a monological approach and cannot provide a purely dialogical theory of meaning. Indeed, in general, validity is monological, in the sense that a winning strategy is defined independently of the moves of the Opponent. In the dialogical framework, validity should be based bottom up on a dialogical semantics.

The dialogical approach to logic is not but a semantic rule-based framework where different logics could be developed, combined or compared. But are there any constraints? Can we introduce rules ad libitum to define whatever logical constant? The answer is no, for logical constants must be governed by player-independent dialogical rules. The approach of the present chapter has been influenced by Marcelo Dascal's reflections on meaning, pragmatics and dialogues. In fact, on my view the dialogical approach to logic offers a framework for developing logic as closest as possible to his own theory of meaning and soft rationality.

Keywords Dialogical logic • Strategies • Proof theory • Pragmatics

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1 Introduction

The dialogical framework is an approach to meaning that provides a pragmatist alternative to both the model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical semantics. However, since dialogic had and still has a bias towards antirealism, it has been quite often seen as a version of the proof-theoretical approach. The main claim of the chapter is that the proof-theoretical approach as displayed by a tableaux system of sequent calculus is, from the dialogical point of view, a monological approach and cannot provide a purely dialogical theory of meaning. Indeed, in general, validity is monological, in the sense that a winning strategy is defined independently of the moves of the Opponent. In the dialogical framework, validity should be based bottom up on a dialogical semantics.

The dialogical approach to logic is not but a semantic rule-based framework where different logics could be developed, combined or compared. But are there any constraints? Can we introduce rules ad libitum to define whatever logical constant? The answer is no, for logical constants must be governed by player-independent dialogical rules. The approach of the present chapter has been influenced by Marcelo Dascal's reflections on meaning, pragmatics and dialogues. In fact, on my view the dialogical approach to logic offers a framework for developing logic as closest as possible to its own theory of meaning and soft rationality.

2 Dialogical Logic

2.1 The Dialogical Framework

Dialogical logic, developed by Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz, was the result of a solution to some of the problems that arouse in Lorenzen's *Operative Logik* (1955, cf. Lorenz 2001). We cannot discuss here thoroughly the passage from the operative to the dialogical approach, though as pointed out by Peter Schroeder-Heister, the insights of operative logic had lasting consequences in the literature on proof theory and still deserve attention nowadays (see Schröder-Heister 2008). Moreover, the notion of *harmony* formulated by the antirealists and particularly by Dag Prawitz has been influenced by Lorenzen's notions of *admissibility*, *eliminability* and *inversion*. However, the dialogical tradition is rather a rupture than a continuation of the operative project, and it might be confusing to start by linking conceptually both projects.

Dialogical logic was suggested at the end of the 1950s by Paul Lorenzen and then worked out by Kuno Lorenz.[1] Inspired by Wittgenstein's *meaning as use,* the

[1]The main original papers are collected in Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978). A detailed account of recent developments can be found in Felscher (1985), Keiff (2004a, b, 2007, 2009), Rahman (2009), Rahman and Keiff (2004), Rahman et al. (2009), Fiutek et al. (2010), Rahman and Tulenheimo (2009), and Rückert (2001, 2007). For text book presentations see Fontaine and Redmond (2008) and Redmond and Fontaine (2011).

basic idea of the dialogical approach to logic is that the meaning of the logical constants is given by the norms or rules for their use. This feature of its underlying semantics quite often motivated the dialogical approach to be understood as a *pragmatic* approach to meaning. I concede that the terminology might be misleading and induce one to think that the theory of meaning involved in dialogic is not semantics at all. Helge Rückert proposes the formulation *pragmatistische Semantik* (*pragmatist semantics*) that might be more appropriate.

Anyway, the point is that those rules that fix meaning may be of more than one type, and that they determine the kind of reconstruction of an argumentative and/or linguistic practice that a certain kind of language games called dialogues provide. As mentioned above the dialogical approach to logic is not a logic but a semantic rule-based framework where different logics could be developed, combined or compared. However, for the sake of simplicity and exemplification, I will introduce only the dialogical version of classical and intuitionist logics.

In a dialogue two parties argue about a thesis respecting certain fixed rules. The player that states the thesis is called Proponent (**P**); his rival, who puts into question the thesis, is called Opponent (**O**). In its original form, dialogues were designed in such a way that each of the plays ends after a finite number of moves with one player winning, while the other loses. Actions or moves in a dialogue are often understood as *utterances* (cf. Rahman and Rückert 2001: 111; Rückert 2001, Chapter 1.2.) or as speech acts (cf. Keiff 2007). The point is that the rules of the dialogue do not operate on expressions or sentences isolated from the act of uttering them (Tulenheimo 2009). The rules are divided into particle rules or rules for logical constants (*Partikelregeln*) and structural rules (*Rahmenregeln*). The structural rules determine the general course of a dialogue game, whereas the particle rules regulate those moves (or utterances) that are requests (to the moves of a rival) and those moves that are answers (to the requests).

Crucial for the dialogical approach and that distinguishes it from all other approaches are the following points (that will motivate some discussion further on):

- The distinction between local (rules for logical constants) and global meaning (included in the structural rules).
- The symmetry of local meaning. This feature amounts to player independence. Let me call it the *purely dialogical approach to meaning*.
- The distinction between the play level (local winning or winning of a play) and the strategic level (global winning or existence of a winning strategy).

2.2 Local Meaning and Global Meaning

2.2.1 Particle Rules

In dialogical logic, the particle rules are said to state the *local semantics*: what is at stake is only the request and the answer corresponding to the utterance of a given logical constant, rather than the whole context where the logical constant is embedded.

- The standard terminology makes use of the terms *challenge* or *attack* and *defence*.

Tero Tulenheimo pointed out that this might lead the reader to think that already at the local level, there are strategic features and that this contravenes a crucial feature of the dialogical framework. Indeed, it is better to think at this level of meaning of the allowed moves as *requests* and *answer* (see Keiff 2007; Rahman et al. 2009). However, the dialogical vocabulary has been established with the former choice, and it would be perhaps confusing to change it once more. Thus, after some hesitation I will continue to use the terminology of challenges, etc. but insist once more that at the local level (the level of the particle rules), these words should be devoid of strategic underpinning.

The following table displays the particle rules, where X and Y stand for any of the players **O** or **P**:

$\vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \neg, \forall, \exists$	Challenge	Defence
X: $A \vee B$	**Y**: ?-$\vee$	**X**: A *or* **X**: B (**X** chooses)
X: $A \wedge B$	**Y**: ?$\wedge$1 or **Y**: ?$\wedge$2 (**Y** chooses)	**X**: A *respectively* **X**: B
X: $A \rightarrow B$	**Y**: A (**Y** challenges by uttering A and requesting B)	**X**: B
X: $\neg A$	**Y**: A	— (no defence available)
X: $\forall xA$	**Y**: ?-$\forall x/k$ (**Y** chooses)	**X**: $A[x/k]$
X: $\exists xA$	**Y** ? $\exists$	**X**: $A[x/k]$ (**X** chooses)

In the table, A[x/k] stands for the result of substituting the constant k for every occurrence of the variable x in the formula A.

Let us briefly mention a crucial issue to which we will come back later on.

- *Dialogical meaning*: The particle rules are symmetric in the sense that they are player independent – that is why they are formulated with the help of variables for players. Compare with the rules of tableaux or sequent calculus that are asymmetric: one set of rules for the *true*(left)-side, other set of rules for the *false*(right)-side. The symmetry of the particle rules provides, as we will see below, the means to get rid of tonk-like-operators.

2.2.2 Structural Rules

(SR 0) (starting rule):
The initial formula is uttered by **P** (if possible). It provides the topic of the argumentation. Moves are alternately uttered by **P** and **O**. Each move that follows the initial formula is either a request or an answer.

Comment The proviso *if possible* relates to the utterance of atomic formulae. See formal rule *(SR 2)* below.

(SR 1) (no delaying tactics rule):
Both **P** and **O** may only make moves that change the situation.

Comments This rule should assure that plays are finite (though there might be an infinite number of them). There are several formulations of it with different advantages and disadvantages. The original formulation of Lorenz made use of ranks; other devices introduced explicit restrictions on repetitions. Ranks seem to be more compatible with the general aim of the dialogical approach of distinguishing between the play level and the strategic level. Other non-repetition rules seem to presuppose the strategic level. One disadvantage of the use of ranks is that they make metalogical proofs quite complicated. Let us describe here the rule that implements the use of ranks.

- After the move that sets the thesis players **O** and **P,** each chooses a natural number n and m, respectively (termed their repetition ranks). Thereafter the players move alternately, each move being a request or an answer.
- In the course of the dialogue, **O** (**P**) may attack or defend any single (token of an) utterance at most n (or m) times.

(SR 2) (formal rule):
P may not utter an atomic formula unless **O** uttered it first. Atomic formulae cannot be challenged.

Comments One way to see this rule is to assume that the atomic formulae encode a certain kind of justification or grounding and the proponent can, in Andreas Blass' words (Blass 1992), copycat it.

Indeed, assume that there is no such formal rule, that atomic formulae can be challenged, and that **P** uttered an atomic formula that **O** uttered before. Assume further that the atomic formula encodes a certain kind of justification. If **O** challenges a given atomic formula, **P** can also challenge the same atomic formula and then copycat the justification that **O** provides when he responds to **P**'s challenge. The formulation of the formal rule above abbreviates this process.

The formal rule introduces an asymmetry in relation to the commitments of **O** and **P,** particularly so in the case of the utterance of the conditional. Indeed, if **O** utters a conditional, then **P** commits him to a series of moves that must at the end be based on atomic moves of **O**. If it is **O** that challenges a conditional, no such commitment will be triggered. But it would be a mistake to draw from this fact

the conclusion that the meaning of the conditional is not symmetric. The very point of symmetry is that it is a property of the meaning of the logical particles rather than of the dialogue as a whole where **P** is committed to the validity of the thesis. More precisely the asymmetry of the winning strategy is triggered by the semantic asymmetry of the formal rule. It is the possibility to isolate meaning (local and global) from validity commitments that allows dialogicians to speak of the symmetry of the logical constants, and this prevents tonk-like operators from being introduced in the dialogical framework (see 3 below).

Another way suggested by Helge Rückert is to see the formal rule as establishing a kind of game where the Proponent must play without knowing what the Opponent's justifications of the atomic formulae are.[2]

However, the dialogical framework is flexible enough to define the so-called material dialogues that assume that atomic formulae have a fixed truth-value:

*(SR *2) (rule for material dialogues):*

Only atomic formulae standing for true propositions may be uttered. Atomic formulae standing for false propositions cannot be uttered.

(SR 3) (winning rule):

X wins iff it is Y's turn but he cannot move (either challenge or defend).

Global Meaning of the Logical Constants

These rules complete the local meaning of the logical constants by establishing rights and obligations of a player in relation to the moves of the rival.

(SR 4i) (intuitionist rule):

In any move, each player may challenge a (complex) formula uttered by his partner or he may defend himself against the last challenge that has not yet been defended.

or

(SR 4c) (classical rule):

In any move, each player may challenge a (complex) formula uttered by his partner or he may defend himself against any challenge (including those challenges that have already been defended once).

- Notice that the dialogical framework offers a fine-grained answer to the question: Are intuitionist and classical negation the same negations? Namely, the particle rules are the same but it is the global meaning that changes.

In the dialogical approach, validity is defined via the notion of *winning strategy*, where winning strategy for X means that for any choice of moves by Y, X has at least one possible move at his disposal such that he (X) wins.

[2]Personal communication, Nancy April (2010).

Validity (definition):

A formula is valid in a certain dialogical system iff **P** has a formal winning strategy for this formula.

Thus,

- *A* is classically valid if there is a winning strategy for **P** in the formal dialogue Dc(A).
- *A* is intuitionistically valid if there is a winning strategy for **P** in the formal dialogue Dint (A).

Examples See Appendix.

2.2.3 Addenda

Lorenz (2001: 259) adds a condition (rather than a rule) that he calls the *crucial-dialogical* condition:

> Neither player is forced to defend himself against a challenge (where a formula has been uttered) unless the formula uttered in such a challenge has been defended upon finitely many counterattacks.

As we will discuss below, this rule understands the switch of "utterance-sides" triggered by a conditional, such as the core of dialogicity in logic.

3 Dialogues and Monologues: Play Level, Strategic Level and Tonk

3.1 Monologues: Strategic Level and Tableaux

As mentioned above in the dialogical approach, validity is defined via the notion of *winning strategy.*

A systematic description of the winning strategies available for **P** in the context of the possible choices of **O** can be obtained from the following considerations[3]:

If **P** is to win against any choice of **O**, we will have to consider two main different situations, namely:

- The dialogical situations in which **O** has uttered a complex formula
- Those in which **P** has uttered a complex formula

[3]Lorenzen (1978: 217–220). The relation with natural deduction has been recently worked out in Rahman et al. (2009: 301–336).

We call these main situations the **O**-cases and the **P**-cases, respectively. In both of these situations, another distinction has to be examined:

1. **P** wins by *choosing* between two possible challenges in the **O**-cases or between two possible defences in the **P**-cases, iff he can win with *at least one* of his choices.
2. When **O** can *choose* between two possible defences in the **O**-cases or between two possible challenges in the **P**-cases, **P** wins iff he can win *irrespective* of **O's** choices.

The description of the available strategies will yield a version of the semantic tableaux of Beth that became popular after the landmark work on semantic trees by Raymond Smullyan (1968), where **O** stands for **T** (left side) and **P** for **F** (right side) and where situations of type **ii** (and not of type **i)** will lead to a branching rule.

However, tableaux are not dialogues. The main point is that dialogues are built up bottom up, from local semantics to global semantics and from global semantics to validity. This establishes the priority of the play level over the winning-strategy level. The levels are to be thought as defining an order. From the dialogical point of view, to set the meaning of the logical constants via validity is like trying to define the (meaning) moves of the king in the game of chess by the strategic rules of how to win a play. Neither semantic tableaux nor sequent calculus gives priority to the play level. The point is not really that sequent calculus or tableaux do not have a play level, if with this we mean that one could not find the steps leading to the proof though there is one. What distinguishes the dialogical approach from other approaches is that in the other approaches – if there is something like a play level – the play level is ignored: the logical constants are defined via the rules that define validity.[4] The dialogical approach takes the play level as the level where meaning is set and on the basis of which validity rules should result. Within the dialogical approach, the more basic step of meaning at the play level is the setting of player-independent particle rules (i.e. symmetric rules): the difference between **O** (**T**)-rules and the **P** (**F**)-rules is a result of the strategic level and the asymmetry introduced by the formal rule. These considerations lead us to tonk. One can build tableaux-rules for tonk and tonk-like operators but, from the dialogical point of view, they have no semantic underpinning.

3.2 Tunk and Tonk

Let us discuss this point with the example of tableaux-rules for a tonk-like operator that we call *tunk*. Assume that we take tableaux-rules (or sequent-calculus) for **T**(left)-side and **F**(right)-side to set the meaning of logical constants. Under this assumption the following rules set the meaning of tunk:

[4]The point that other systems have also a play level has been stressed by Luca Tranchini in the workshop Workshop Amsterdam/Lille: *Dialogues and Games: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models*, 8–9 February 2010, Lille.

(**O**) [(**T**)] *A*tunk*B*	(**P**) [or (**F**)] *A*tunk*B*
(**O**) [(**T**)] *A*	(**P**) [(**F**)] *A*
(**O**) [(**T**)] *B*	(**P**) [(**F**)] *B*

Such a constant, when added to the standard tableaux-rules of, say, classical logic, renders proofs for

$$A\text{tunk}\neg A \text{ and for} \neg\,(A\text{tunk}\neg A)$$

Moreover, if we apply the cut-rule based on the formula *A*tunk*B,* it is possible to obtain a closed tableau for **T***A*, **F***B* for any *A* and *B.* The point is that in dialogues tonk-like operators are rejected because there is no symmetric particle rule that justifies the tableaux-rules designed for these operators. Indeed, let us attempt to define a particle rule for tunk. Let us thus assume that for a given player **X** that uttered *A*tunk*B,* the challenge (if it should somehow meet the tableaux-rules) must be one of the following:

1. (**Y**) show me the left side and (**Y**) show me the right side. Here it is the challenger who has the choice.
2. (**Y**) show me at least one of the both sides. Here it is the defender who has the choice.

Now whatever the options are, one of them will clash with one of the tableaux-rules described above:

- If we take option one, **O** has the choice and this should yield a branching on the **P**-rule (the **P**-rule is of the type of situations **ii** mentioned above).
- If we take option 2, **O** has the choice rule and this should produce a branching on the **O**-rule (the **O**-rule is of the type of situation **ii** mentioned above).

Prior's original tonk takes half of the rule that delivers the grounds for the assertion of a disjunction (half of the introduction rule) and half of the inference rule for the conjunction (half of the elimination rule). This renders the following tableaux version:

(**O**) [(**T**)] *A*tonk*B*	(**P**) [or (**F**)] *A*tonk*B*
(**O**) [(**T**)] *B*	(**P**)[(**F**)] *A*

From the dialogical point of view, the rejection tonk is simpler than the case of tunk: the defence must yield a different formula, namely, the tail of tonk if the defender is **O** and the head of tonk if the defender is **P**. This means, once more, that the attempted particle rule for tonk is player dependent, and this should not be the case.

The point is that the tableaux-rules for tunk and tonk are not based on particle rules that are player independent and are thus not apt to render a *purely dialogical*

local meaning. Moreover, the only rules tableaux have are player dependent, they are so to say *monological*. That is why, according to the dialogical analysis, external criteria such as harmony have to be introduced in order to reject tonk-like operators. The dialogical analysis sketched above seems to suggest a generalization that should capture some of the effects of Lorenzen's inversion rule and that will take the form of kind of local soundness and completeness for the dialogical framework. In fact the argument sketched above shows that the tableaux-rules find no correspondence in the dialogical framework. The tableaux-tunk rules allow proving formulae that correspond to no winning strategy of **P**.

4 Conclusions

Is there then any limit to the dialogical framework for the introduction of logical constants? As well known, since the work of Dag Prawitz,[5] the natural deduction framework provides some criteria for the introduction of logical constants, which, as mentioned above, are rooted in Lorenzen's inversion principle and are known as *harmony*. In the natural deduction framework, there are only two sets of rules, and thus one might be thought as setting the meaning and the other as setting inferences that vehicle this meaning. In such a framework, *local soundness* or reducibility says that any derivation containing, say, an introduction of a logical constant followed immediately by its elimination can be turned into an equivalent derivation without this detour. It is a check on the *strength* of elimination rules: they must not be so strong that they include knowledge not already contained in its premises. Dually, *local completeness* says that the elimination rules are strong enough to decompose a connective into the forms suitable for its introduction rule. It is still an open question whether harmony should or not be based on the introduction rules as setting meaning rather than in the elimination rules.

The nice point is that in the dialogical framework, we have in fact several different sets of rules. I will separate two of them, those that set the meaning (particle + structural rules) and those responsible for the inferences setting validity, that is, the winning strategies described by an adequate tableaux or sequent calculus. Thus, the version of harmony appropriate to dialogical logic is the local soundness and completeness of the calculus purported to describe the winning strategies of a given system. In the particular case of tunk mentioned above, the point is that the tableaux-rules are unsound in relation to the semantics established at the play level by the joint collaboration of the particle and structural rules. The basis of the latter set of rules is the purely *dialogical feature* of the particle rules, that is, their player independence. The tunk-operator is rejected since the tableaux-rules with the help of which it has been described are too strong, i.e. the tableaux-rules prove more than the dialogical semantics allow. What we must do then in order to test if an operator

[5]Prawitz (1979, Ch. IV). See too Sundholm (2000, 2001, 1983a, b), Read (2008, 2010).

is or not a tonk-like operator is to prove soundness and completeness in relation to the dialogical system described above. Winning strategies involving the notion of validity (that are in fact essentially *monological*) should be based on a purely dialogical semantics.

According to this argument, such metalogical proofs are crucial for the general means of the dialogical framework as a framework. In fact, Lorenzen and Lorenz started this path, which must now be worked out for the dialogical systems recently developed.

But can we not produce tonk-like operators only at the play level? For example, let us take a particle rule for a tonk-like operator that gives as an answer to the challenger, say, the head of tonk. Such a rule is possible, but the result is not very harmful, as it amounts to the introduction of an operator that is equivalent to any formula. Thus, it is fully redundant. A similar variation of tonk seems hard to find. Indeed, if we fix the meaning of tunk, say, by establishing that the defender has the choice, then the particle rule will be exactly the one for disjunction. Another open question is about the limits on the structural rules. Can we freely combine a structural rule with the introduction of an arbitrary particle? The results coming from linear logic and substructural logics seem to indicate that there are many delicate interrelations to be taken into consideration. Deeper research is still due; however, let us fix some points towards *dialogical harmony*:

Dialogical Harmony

1. Particle rules must be player independent.
   This should also be understood, as pointed out by Keiff, that the particle rules should be defined independently of who is the player that is restricted by the formal rule.[6]
2. Global meaning of the logical constants must be player independent.
   This assumes that within the structural rules, a global meaning for the logical constants can be distinguished. This also assumes that the global meaning does not "undo" the player independence of the particle rules.
3. The particle rule of a logical constant must be given independently of the inner structure of the formula in which this logical constant occurs as a main operator.
4. Appropriate tableaux systems must be build up bottom up.
   In other words, those tableaux systems (or sequent calculi) that render a proof theory for a given dialogical semantics must be sound and complete in relation to the latter.

[6]Personal discussion with Keiff. Keiff has in mind a kind of negation introduced by Rahman and Rückert (2001).

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Appendix

Examples

In the following examples, the outer columns indicate the numerical label of the move and the inner columns state the number of a move targeted by an attack. Expressions are not listed following the order of the moves, but writing the defence on the same line as the corresponding attack, thus showing when a round is closed. Recall, from the particle rules, that the sign "—" signalizes that there is no defence against the attack on a negation.

For the sake of a simpler notation, we will not record in the dialogue the rank choices but assume the uniform rank: **O**: n = 1 **P**: m = 2.

In the following dialogue played with classical structural rules **P'** move 4 answers **O**'s challenge in move 1, since **P**, according to the classical rule, is allowed to defend (once more) himself from the challenge in move 1. **P** states his defence in move 4 though, actually **O** did not repeat his challenge – we signalize this fact by inscribing the not repeated challenge between square brackets.

O			P	
			$p \vee \neg p$	0
1	$?_{\vee}$	0	$\neg p$	2
3	p	2	—	
[1]	$[?_{\vee}]$	[0]	p	4

Classical rules. **P** wins

In the dialogue displayed below about the same thesis as before, **O** wins according to the intuitionistic structural rules because, after the challenger's last attack in move 3, **t**he intuitionist structural rule forbids **P** to defend himself (once more) from the challenge in move 1.

O			P	
			$p \vee \neg p$	0
1	$?_{\vee}$	0	$\neg p$	2
3	p	2	—	

Intuitionist rules. **O** wins

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A Controversy that Never Happened: Ancient and Modern Concepts of Opinion, Knowledge, and Information-Seeking Behavior

Peter J. Schulz

Abstract This chapter traces the distinction between knowledge and opinion from Plato to contemporary social science and shows how ancient thinking is linked to modern conceptualizations of health-related knowledge and its consequences for health behaviors. While Plato was concerned with how a human can distinguish his own knowledge from his opinions, and with the role that certainty plays therein, contemporary social science is concerned with differentiating humans' subjective and objective knowledge from an observer position. Elements of these distinctions find their way into a model of the complex relationships between health information seeking, subjective health knowledge, health literacy, and empowerment to explain health behavior. The sketch shows that ancient philosophy can help understand and conceptualize contemporary variable-oriented modeling.

Keywords Knowledge–opinion • Subjective–objective knowledge • Information-seeking behavior • Health literacy and empowerment

1 Introduction

Controversies feed on the assumption that the representatives of opposing positions have at their disposal the knowledge that allows them to take a stand opposite to what their respective opponents hold. It would not suffice if parties in controversy were to refer to nothing but what they have expressed and related to the other side in the form of sentences. It is true that controversy will begin with conflict over sentences, but it will only be able to develop in a meaningful way if the parties begin to expound the reasons why they think they can take a particular stand that

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is voiced in sentences. Only in the defense of claims does it come to light to what degree the parties not only have command over sentences but also an understanding of the subject matter itself. Moreover, not only understanding is revealed here, but it also becomes apparent whether there are incongruities between the claims made and the knowledge of the person who makes them.

In a wealth of profound studies on controversies, Marcelo Dascal has described the forms of the course of argumentative conflicts and produced an abundance of stimulating ideas for future research. This chapter deals with an aspect that has been a foundation of controversies since the beginning of philosophy: the distinction between knowledge and opinion. That this distinction is crucial needs no further explanation. What is likely to be less familiar is the fact that some central assumptions in the discussion of this distinction for instance in Plato's philosophy can well be related to comparable discussions in contemporary social science. What aspects of social science studies could Plato have taken note of? And what could modern social scientists interested in the subject of knowledge and opinion learn from Plato? To the best of our knowledge, no contemporary theorist has ever considered ancient theories as useful for their own conceptualization. By contrasting both positions, which can only be done roughly, we intend to describe a potential controversy that has not really taken place. One is inclined, however, to regret it has not really occurred; for its benefit—this chapter assumes—would have been considerable. In the following, we will compile in summary what can be found on knowledge and opinion in Plato and then, in a second step, turn to this subject as it is treated in some contemporary social science studies. Finally we will sketch a model of how the synthesis of central assumptions could be presented in a topical research area within health communication. We will start with a brief description of the distinction in Plato and move on to a conceptual clarification in social sciences.

2 Knowledge and Opinion in Plato

Plato is certainly not the only ancient philosopher who dealt with the difference between knowledge and opinion. Other authors, among them Aristotle or the stoics, offer quite extended discussions about the distinction between knowledge (episteme) and opinion (doxa). But Plato is the first author in ancient philosophy who deals with the distinction in a systematic way. His entire work is based on the distinction, and it is hardly imaginable to understand his philosophical insights without considering what he contributed to this topic. Other philosophers who deal with the difference will, whether they agree or disagree, take Plato as the reference point. Therefore, we take Plato's discussion as one position in the controversy between ancient and contemporary concepts of knowledge and opinion.

One of the possibly most famous narrations on the subject of opinion and knowledge is Plato's allegory of the cave (Rep. 514a–520a). It tells of humans who, from their birth on, are living in a cave, everyone tied to their particular place. In their back, there is a wall, and behind the wall is a path on which other humans walk.

The walking humans carry artifacts, plastic reproductions of living things which, by a fire burning in the back, cast a shadow on the wall the tied humans have in view. The tied humans themselves also cast a shadow on this wall, without knowing it is their own shadow they are watching. Now for the human beings in the cave, the world of the shadows is the only reality they can recognize. To know it as a shadow world it is not enough to free a human being from his ties; he must also be pressured to turn his head, to stand up, and look at the fire. Only then would he understand that the objects constitute a higher form of reality than the shadow they cast. Were one to guide the humans from the cave outside, they would, after getting used to the light, understand what the real artifacts are. No one who ever walked outside the cave would be willing to return to the dark: too high would be risk to be killed by the cave men that prefer existing under the misapprehension of their opinions over acquiring true knowledge of reality.

Two different interpretations of the difference between knowledge and opinion in the works of Plato can be pointed out in relation with this allegory. For once, there is an objectivist reading (Wieland 1999), according to which knowledge and opinion can be distinguished with regard to their proper objects. According to this distinction, there are objects of knowledge and objects of opinions. Whereas opinions deal with changeable objects—the shadows and artifacts in the allegory of the cave where objects are dependent on circumstances—objects of knowledge are those that allow the human recognition a true and full understanding. This line of interpretation implies that there is no way of turning opinions regarding specific objects into proper knowledge about them. If one follows this interpretation, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as knowledge of the shadows and artifacts the cave men in the allegory watch. Only the ascension to bright daylight, which makes them recognize the true nature of things, allows knowledge of objects and, in consequence, of the relationship of objects to their shadows.

The other, subjectivist reading of the difference between knowledge and opinion in Plato proceeds from the assumption that the objects of opinions and the objects of knowledge come from the same class of objects. This means that knowledge and opinions cannot be qualified with regard to their objects, but that one and the same thing can be the object of knowledge as well as of opinions. The transition from opinion to knowledge is possible, and it happens by substantiating opinions, providing reasons for them. Distinguishing opinion and knowledge in this sense is close to the modern view that calls somebody knowing who not only intends a matter but also achieves it and is aware of this and able to give reasons for it (Hintikka 1977). According to Plato, the difference between opinion and knowledge goes along with different levels of certainty that can be ascribed to both forms. Opinions are open to errors, whereas knowledge enjoys the privilege of certainty.

Besides the distinction of knowledge, which is certain to be true, and opinion, which might be erroneous, Plato also discusses the concept of a true opinion that is an opinion which refers to the object in a correct way (e.g., Men. 99b; Symp. 202a; Krat. 387b). This would be in some way trivial had Plato not used the description of a true opinion to clarify another epistemic problem: Whether an opinion is true or false can easily be decided from an external point of view. If, however, the person

who holds an opinion himself is involved in judging whether it is truthful or not, he does not have the proper criteria to make such a judgment. Therefore, from a merely subjective point of view, he can only say whether he believes his opinion is correct or not, but he certainly does not know this. Even if somebody holds a correct opinion about an object in question, he cannot vouch for the correctness of his opinion, just because it is merely an opinion.

There is another quality according to which knowledge and opinion can be distinguished, beyond the aspects taken from Plato's work that were mentioned so far. Recalling this aspect is important if only for the reason that it apparently does not receive the attention it deserves in the contemporary discussion of the two concepts, even if authors such as Gilbert Ryle (1949) or Polanyi (1973) have emphatically called it to mind. This quality is alluded to in the allegory of the cave when it is stressed that only those cave men can achieve knowledge who learn from their own experience—and this means from taking the path out of the cave—how different reality looks outside of the cave. What they can relate to their fellows who have chosen to remain in the cave are merely assertions that cannot be perceived by their listeners as something else than opinions. The knowledge that a person acquires who chooses the path out of the cave cannot be communicated as such. This is so because it is linked inseparably with its owner, other than opinions, which can be shared. In another work, the dialogue Menon (Men. 97a), Plato uses another example for explicating this quality of knowledge and its categorical difference from opinion: Only a person who has walked the street to Larissa himself can have knowledge of it. He who knows it from reports only might hold, at best, a true opinion of it. It certainly would not make a difference to a person seeking orientation whether he learns a true opinion or hears from someone who knows the way because he has walked it himself. But the example makes clear why Plato, at another place, qualifies knowledge, in contrast to opinion, as free of error: an experience that yields knowledge with regard to a particular slice of reality is something you have made or not made, but it cannot be called false or wrong. Knowledge is therefore, other than true opinions, free of error as it turns out not to be a propositional object. This conception of knowledge and its differentiation from opinion and the gradation of the certainty of knowledge have basically no part in the contemporary discussion of subjective and objective knowledge.

3 Objective and Subjective Knowledge in Contemporary Social Sciences

The study of knowledge in social sciences has a long history. It is a rather well-defined construct in psychology, consumer research (Flynn and Goldsmith 1999), as well as in related fields. Following a widespread distinction, knowledge falls into three categories. The first category is objective knowledge, meaning the amount, type, or organization of what an individual has stored in his memory (Brucks 1985). Certainly, this type of objective knowledge exists although the measures

of objective knowledge are never objective in themselves. They always depend on how individuals will report on their objective knowledge. The possible vagueness of the measures of objective knowledge, however, is quite different from what is meant by subjective knowledge. This construct refers to an individual's perception of how much he/she knows. Another way to describe subjective knowledge is "a consumer's belief about his/her objective prior knowledge" (Spreng and Olshavsky 1991). In other words, subjective knowledge indicates self-confidence levels. The third category that sometimes has been discussed in the context of how objective knowledge relates to subjective knowledge is the amount of experience an individual has gained with a specific object or topic. This third notion comes close to Plato's concept of knowledge by direct experience, although it has rarely played a role as central as it does in Plato's theory of knowledge.

For each of these three distinct constructs, there are several measures available. The way objective knowledge is measured depends on the type of object that is known, whether for instance it is a specific product category or a more general area of knowledge, such as the weather or beneficial health behavior. For subjective knowledge as the individuals' perception of the amount of information they have stored in their memory, a measure was developed by Flynn and Goldsmith (1999). Experience—for example, in the field of consumer research—is usually operationalized as the ability to perform product-related tasks (Alba and Hutchinson 1987). Describing ways of measuring these concepts highlights a difference between these concepts and Plato's thinking. Plato was concerned with how the subject, the person who holds knowledge and opinions, can be able to tell the one from the other. The modern concepts of subjective and objective knowledge, in contrast, view the matter from the perspective of an outside observer.

Now, although what we think we know (subjective knowledge) and what we actually know (objective knowledge) are two different things, they are assumed to be related to each other. One way both constructs could be interconnected is to assume that what an individual believes he/she knows should be some function of what he/she actually does know (Radecki and Jaccard 1995). A meta-analysis of studies in the past three decades that Carlson and colleagues (2009) conducted in the field of consumer research, indeed demonstrated that overall a moderate positive relationship between subjective and objective knowledge was evident. However, studies in different fields have shown that people tend to overestimate their objective knowledge, that they are overconfident about themselves (Alba and Hutchinson 2000). Pieniak et al. (2010), who conducted a study on fish consumption, found that subjective knowledge was more strongly associated with behavior than actual (objective) knowledge. One way out of this maze is to trace back the strength of the correlation between objective and subjective knowledge to the type of knowledge involved. On a more general level, when objective knowledge referred to matters other than products such as medical services (Duhan et al. 1997) or health plans (Capraro et al. 2003), the correlation was rather weak.

On top of the problem of how strongly objective and subjective knowledge are correlated, another question arises: whether subjective knowledge has any effect on individuals' information-seeking behavior. The rationale for linking

subjective knowledge with information seeking is rather evident: the perception of the limitation of one's own knowledge should result in subsequent information-seeking behavior; the perceived knowledge is a motivating factor in the learning process (Park et al. 1988, 1994; Raju et al. 1995). Therefore, it is hypothesized that subjective knowledge will impinge on information-seeking behavior in the way that higher levels of perceived knowledge will lead to lower levels of information seeking (Radecki and Jaccard 1995).

4 Conceptual Framework of Underlying Factors of Health Behavior

Contrasting the two traditions, it appears that Plato's thinking on knowledge and opinion largely corresponds to the modern concepts of objective and subjective knowledge. Plato could have agreed to the idea that knowledge and opinions can be distinguished by different degrees of certainty. But there is another and more surprising similarity. The transition from opinion to knowledge is more complicated than the model of different degrees of certainty suggests. For as long as a person does not recognize that the opinion he/she holds is in fact just this, a poorly substantiated opinion, but assumes it is certain and error-free knowledge, he/she will have no motivation for orienting behavior on anything else but opinion. As obvious as the difference between knowledge and opinion might be in the perspective of an outside observer, it is less plausible when measured against the view of the insider, i.e., the person who holds opinions or knowledge. This is the problem that Socratian *elenchos* addresses. The dialogues in which Socrates confronts his partners with their lack of knowledge demonstrate how the partners' opinions in their putative certainty block the path to knowledge. To be able to walk this path, a new interpretation of one's own knowledge is required. Modern social science draws attention to a comparable matter when it finds a weak correlation between subjective and objective knowledge. Several studies suggest indeed that perceptions regarding how knowledgeable individuals are about a specific content domain are often but weakly correlated with the individuals' objective knowledge (Kruger and Dunning 1999; Radecki and Jaccard 1995; Jaccard et al. 2005).

In the following, we briefly outline a conceptual model that brings together the previously discussed concepts of subjective and objective knowledge and information-seeking behavior, putting them in the field of health behavior. Figure 1 presents the overall conceptual model that we propose for examining the relationships between the major determinants of health behavior. The concepts of subjective knowledge and information search have been discussed in the prior paragraph. With regard to objective knowledge, we propose that this is part of the overall and multidimensional concept of health literacy that includes three concepts, namely, (1) declarative knowledge, e.g., information about health and medicine; (2) procedural knowledge, i.e., rules guiding reasoned choice about the proper course of action; and finally judgment skills (Schulz and Nakamoto 2005, 2013). With the concept



Fig. 1 Health empowerment and its effect

of empowerment, we refer to the individual taking increased responsibility for and a more active role in decision making regarding his or her health. In the literature, there are different emphases, and no proper theory of patient empowerment has so far been developed (Aujoulat et al. 2007).

First, we draw on the concept of psychological empowerment. This view highlights the subjective experience of empowerment. Spreitzer, in her measure of empowerment, identifies four constructs inherent in (organizational) empowerment—meaningfulness (or relevance), self-efficacy (or competence), self-determination (or choice), and impact (Spreitzer 1995). These four cognitions can be summarized in the following four propositions: "I feel that doing this is relevant for me," "I am able to do this," "I can choose between different ways," and "I can make a difference." Within our context, these four propositions reflect an individual's orientation in dealing with a specific health condition. We term these volitional components because they relate particularly to the motivation one feels to participate in health planning, decision making, and behavior.

Our framework, as it is shown in Fig. 1, maintains first that subjective knowledge influences subsequent information-seeking behavior in a specific health domain. Prior research has found evidence that subjective knowledge impinges on information-seeking behavior such that higher levels of perceived knowledge lead to lower levels of information search (Radecki and Jaccard 1995). The idea that individuals who consider themselves as knowledgeable in a specific domain of knowledge will be less willing to check for additional information on this topic is quite familiar to Plato.

Subjective knowledge is influenced by two variables, objective knowledge as a part of health literacy and empowerment. As to objective knowledge, common sense would suggest that what people actually know should impact on what they believe they know. And the other two concepts that are part of health literacy, procedural knowledge and judgment skills, should equally impact on the confidence in one's own knowledge. (However, previous studies have shown that the relationship between objective and subjective knowledge is moderate.) On the other side, what an individual believes he/she knows is also a function of other variables that are all

included in the construct of empowerment. One is meaningfulness, which addresses the personal relevance of the topic to the individual. As previous studies have shown, the meaningfulness of a topic influences attention and comprehension of information about the topic in question (Greenwald and Leavitt 1984). More generally, meaningfulness will influence self-assessments of knowledge. The direction of this influence, however, remains open. It might even lead to over confidence in one's own knowledge: The more meaningful the topic appears, the more the individual may overrate his confidence. Similarly, the other concepts of empowerment, namely, self-efficacy, self-determination, and impact, may impinge on subjective knowledge. Meaningfulness, in addition to its direct impact on subjective knowledge, may also directly influence the information search. The more relevant a certain topic appears to the individual, and the more the individual's subjective knowledge is considered to be low, the more it is expected that the individual will search for further information. In this sense, information-seeking behavior will be directly influenced by meaningfulness.

The next relationships we have briefly to describe are (1) the impact of information-seeking behavior on health literacy, (2) how health literacy will have an effect on health behavior, as well as (3) how empowerment is expected to impinge on health behavior. To the first one, information seeking and health literacy are considered to be positively correlated: the more people are seeking information on a specific health topic, the more they are expected to show a higher level of health literacy. Also, from several studies we know that health behavior is positively related to the level of health literacy. As described above, the construct of health empowerment focuses on the importance of autonomous action by the patient serving his or her own health interests (rather than on compliance with directives from healthcare professionals). This view of empowerment highlights the need for a person to have not only information but to be able to use that information in making judgments and decisions. We expect that an increase of health empowerment will on one side increase the information search of the individual: the more the individual is convinced that he or she can make a difference, the more he or she is likely to search for additional information on their own health condition. And the less the person considers herself as being able to change her own condition, the less she will try to look for more information. Additionally, health empowerment is supposed to impinge on health behavior. For this relationship we refer to all the literature that has given evidence for how a high level of self-efficacy will increase healthy behavior of the individual.

5 Conclusion

This chapter has briefly reviewed Plato's distinction between knowledge and opinions and the role that certainty plays in distinguishing them. It has then introduced two related concepts from modern social science, objective and subjective knowledge. Finally it has sketched how both can be employed to model the complex

relationships between information seeking, subjective health knowledge, health literacy, and empowerment to explain health behavior. The sketch shows that ancient philosophy can help understand and conceptualize contemporary variable-oriented modeling.

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Postface: Philosophical Dialogue

Marcelo Dascal

Abstract On November 10–11, 2010, Marcelo Dascal's 40 years of academic scholarship were commemorated by an international conference held at Tel Aviv University and the Peres Center for Peace in Tel Aviv/Jaffa. Marcelo's colleagues from Israel and other countries, former and current students, family, and many friends, as well as the Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and the chair of the Department of Philosophy, welcomed the lecturers who contributed to the intensive program of those two exciting days. I wish to express my gratitude to my University, to my family, to the participants, and especially to all those who helped to organize the moving event in cooperation with Dr. Noa Zauderer-Naaman, whose tireless efforts assured its success.

Keywords Controversy • Dialectics • Ethics • Leibniz • Pragmatics • Presumption • Rationality • Thought

In the present "Postface," it will be clear that the focus of my thanks to all those present in this event derives from the peculiar nature of the title "Philosophical Dialogue," which characterizes the rich variety of philosophical exchanges. I confess that I was moved when I realized that in several of these exchanges, I identified signs of the challenging dialogues and debates held in seminars, conferences, research meetings, and conversations with MA and PhD students about the orientation of their work. Though some of these dialogues sometimes closely followed what had been discussed earlier in my presence, many of them were surprisingly original in their interpretations and applications of the topics and concepts they employed, e.g., concepts such as hard and soft rationality, presumption, controversy, dialectics, philosophy of science, pragmatics, communication, thought, argumentation, logic,

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conversation, rhetoric, relevance, and ethics and references to famous thinkers such as Leibniz, among others.

As I usually do in similar events, throughout the 2 days of Philosophical Dialogue, I have been attentive to all the lectures, asking several questions, proposing a few suggestions, and receiving relevant and sharp replies, many of which positive. As a result, several exchanges between parts of the audience and of the speakers became independent interesting philosophical dialogues about certain issues. An example is the chapter of Shahid Rahman, "Dialogues and Monologues in Logic," whose Introduction explains:

> The dialogical framework is an approach to meaning that provides a pragmatist alternative to both the model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical semantics. However, since dialogic had and still has a bias towards antirealism, it has been quite often seen as a version of the proof theoretical approach. The main claim of the paper is that the proof theoretical approach as displayed by a tableaux system of sequent calculus is, from the dialogical point of view, a monological approach and cannot provide a purely dialogical theory of meaning. Indeed, in general validity is monological, in the sense that a winning strategy is defined independently of the moves of the Opponent. In the dialogical framework validity should be based bottom up on a dialogical semantics. The dialogical approach to logic is nothing but a semantic rule-based framework where different logics could be developed, combined or compared. But are there any constraints? Can we introduce rules ad libitum to define whatever logical constant? The answer is no: logical constants must be governed by player independent dialogical rules. The approach of the present paper has been influenced by Marcelo Dascal's reflections on meaning, pragmatics and dialogues. In fact, on my view, the dialogical approach to logic offers a framework for developing logic as close as possible to his own theory of meaning and soft-rationality.

Another example is the chapter of Rodica Amel, "Speaker's Meaning," where she analyzes how M.D. performs as the speaker-author of his Hebrew book *Mashav Haruah* (= *Changing Wings: Humanities in a New-Old World*). She begins by describing the book and its relation to the Israeli "reality" its author-speaker has to represent and face:

> For a common reader, Dascal's book, Mashav HaRuah, is an account of a reality disposed on two fronts: in the foreground, the academic life and activity, carried on in Tel-Aviv University's Faculty of Humanities, an ample dynamics which is focused on the dean's managerial commitment during his tenure of office for 5 consecutive years, 1995–2000; simultaneously, the reader's attention is caught by a large, agitated, and conflicting image of Israeli life displayed in the background. The book sums up the speeches uttered by a Dean of Humanities invited to open several scientific meetings and official ceremonies – symposiums, colloquiums and other manifestations – that took place in the Tel-Aviv Campus during his tenure.
>
> After completing his dean's task, M. Dascal, professor of philosophy, much involved in the activity he had run through, reflected upon his experience, both as a person and as a philosopher, reexamined all the speeches he had uttered, realizing their unitary character, their argumentative value for his pragmatic research, and decided to publish them in a book.
>
> In the new form, it becomes obvious that the speeches, thematically organized, are of a less official style as usually expected. Therefore, the book counts as a collection of essays about the most controversial problems characterizing the Israeli society. The image of the "reality" it presents is much deeper than it seems at first sight. The diversity of issues in debate and the way they were organized in the book allow the reader to grasp that reality.

In what follows, Rodica stimulates the curiosity of the reader by referring to the speaker-author's conception of pragmatics as viewed in one of his earlier writings: "Comment extraire de ce qu'un discours quelconque dit et de ce qu'il montre celui de ses sens possibles auquel ce discours est censé nous diriger" represents – says M. Dascal (1996: 1375) – the main problem of pragmatics. ["How to extract from what any discourse says and from what it shows the possible meanings towards which this discourse is supposed to lead us" represents the main problem of pragmatics.]

Mashav Haruah is a book written in the first person. The author is the speaker, who performs his speech acts on different registers. The discursive identity of the author depends on his discursive strategy being more or less presumed by the speaker which is differently oriented in each kind of interaction. In spite of the strategically different targets, the polyphony of the author's voice is maintained: the voice of the human person, his consciousness with psychological and spiritual concerns, the dean's voice, the author's social and professional cognitive concerns and experiences, the voice of a scholar, the author's cognitive identity, and his theoretical arguments and conclusions. Which of these voices' rhetoric is the reader expected to capture is left by Rodica Amel for the reader to decipher.

Only by carefully reading and rereading the nearly 20 articles of Philosophical Dialogue will the reader be aware of the book's richness of contents and interpretations. In particular of the various pieces that correspond to M. Dascal's achievements that are present in most of the articles included in the book. This is the reason for interrupting the above list of examples and jumping to another list of dialogic philosophy well represented in this book, a source based on what is perhaps the best known source of Dascal's published work, *G.W. Leibniz's: The Art of Controversies*.

The genre dialogue was quite popular in Leibniz's time. He himself wrote many philosophical pieces in this genre, which include, among others, his well-known major works, i.e., the Nouveaux Essais and the Theodicy. No doubt he was an authority in this field, whose superb performance was worth imitation by whoever ventured in the genre. To illustrate the variety of his dialogical practice, let us consider a few examples.

By the end of 1677, Leibniz was appointed by the Duke of Hanover as his advisor for juridical affairs. He was assigned by the Duke to accompany the Apostolic Vicary Nicolaus Stenus in his visit to Hanover. This Danish scientist had converted to Catholicism and became Pope Innocentius XI envoy to the Lutheran Hanover in order to explore the possibility of reunification of the Christian churches – an idea cherished by Leibniz, who held a long conversation with Stenus. The conversation was carefully transcribed by him, serving as raw material for the fictional "Dialogue between Poliandre and Theophile." In spite of its political failure, this dialogue is considered one of Leibniz's "mystical dialogues," in Baruzi's terms, and contributed to his later intensive irenic activities.

Another more successful example is the dialogue "Conversation between Father Emery the Hermit and the Marquis of Pianese, Minister of State of Savoy – a dialogue which yielded a Remarkable Change in the Minister's Life," to which

Leibniz also gave the title "Dialogue about the Application one must have for One's Salvation" – a title that stresses the religious aim of persuading a former believer to return to the most important of beliefs, i.e., Salvation. The two characters in the "Conversation" represent paradigmatic persons, exemplified in Leibniz's environment and certainly relevant for his dialogical purposes. Both of them are in fact products of disenchantment: one of them becomes a skeptic who regards both religion and science as unable to overcome the predominant vanity and intrigue of court life; the other withdraws from such a life in order to restore the integrity and power of his faith. Between the skeptic who is on the verge of cynicism and the deeply religious isolated hermit, the dialogical exchanges seem at first to generate an abyss that prevents the very possibility of a conversation, not to say of persuasion of the former by the latter. At the beginning, while displaying a certain curiosity vis-à-vis the personality of the famous hermit, the marquis does little more than presenting one after the other the familiar skeptic topoi. The hermit, however, does not endeavor to persuade the marquis to accept a system of beliefs or any given method; he rather lures the marquis into a discussion where reason is used in an unprejudiced way to lead him to salvation through a faith that, free from commitment to any pre-established dogma, is capable of meeting the requirements of rationality, beyond the limits of any particular confession. The nearly 30 pages of this dialogue reveal not only the Leibnizian-rich argumentative steps but also his ability to recognize and respect the weight of his opponent's apparently insurmountable doubts.

From a dialogical viewpoint, what is remarkable is how Leibniz, having depicted the extreme conditions of a court such as that of the marquis, successfully demonstrates how even in such a situation a true and useful dialogue is possible.

Nevertheless, not all dialogues Leibniz is concerned with have to do with religious issues. In the short originally Latin text I translated as "On the Dialogistic Art," it is on other characteristics of dialogues that he is primarily interested. In this little piece, he is not concerned with the efficacy of the genre as a literary, persuasive, or philosophical device but rather as a tool for properly handling controversies and other kinds of debates. The main condition he sets up for the correctness and success of such exchanges is the impartiality of the dialogue author, who is required not to favor one or the other of the disputants but to remain totally neutral as to the controversy's result. Here is the way the obedience to this condition should be followed, according to Leibniz:

It is usual to write dialogues in such a way that the author favors one side. The truly philosophical dialogistic art would be to write so that both sides dispute with equal art, and that those things that a ferocious adversary could say be actually said. Thus, ultimately, the triumph of the dialogue would be the triumph of the cause. Indeed, it would then be like a colloquium and a judiciary conference of the litigating parties – the dialogue's author acting, as it were, as a judge or, if you prefer, as president and moderator.

The figure of a moderator is also present in "On Controversies," Leibniz's 1680 summary of a conversation he had with Prince Johann Friedrich of Hanover, who was seeking advice on advancing the negotiations for the reunification of the Church. He begins by telling the Prince that "The variety of studies I have been forced to undertake interrupted a long time ago my project of working at an exact

discussion of some controversies," to which he adds: "I think it is now time to come back to it, since I have been asked to treat in depth the important question of the signs of the true Church." His interrupted work, he claims, comprised a "very peculiar method" he had developed for himself, a method that had "two great advantages: first, it could not be disapproved by anyone; second, it would lead to the end, furnishing a sure means to arrive at a conclusion." The Prince objected that many others had already proposed new methods that did not yield any advancement; but Leibniz called his attention to the difference between his promise and theirs: "for they always promise very easy methods, by which they hope to convince their adversaries in a short time; whereas I declare that the method I undertake is very difficult, and that it requires great dedication and a great deal of time."

The Prince, partly satisfied with this response, requested at least "some visible sign of the advantage of this method – a sign capable of appealing to everybody, even before getting to the details." The Prince's request, Leibniz claimed, anticipated what he intended to say about his method, namely, "that indeed there is here a rather surprising sign of the virtue of this method, which made it visible that it is one of a kind," a statement to which he added: "You will agree, Sire, that there is nothing that makes a dispute more commendable than the moderation of the disputants; well, I claim that this moderation will be manifest here in a quite special and indisputable way."

The dialogue continues, with the Prince complaining that Leibniz speaks enigmatically, whereas he does not understand a word of what he says, and with Leibniz's bold reply: "Your Highness will be satisfied by my clarification." What I purport to do, he says, "is to write down controversies in such a way that the reader cannot know which party is favored by the author ... Everybody would be forced to admit that the form of my undertaking imposes upon me moderation, and that I couldn't so disguise myself without sweetening things and retaining a measure of impartiality everywhere." The Prince, still not understanding the rest, declares the invention excellent: "If you succeed in realizing it, and if you are able to write down controversies without letting it be known which party you favor, I anticipate an extraordinary success for you. People will be attracted by such an unexpected novelty and everybody will want to read your works by virtue of their rarity."

After describing various features that encumber disputes and confound disputants, such as apparent contradictions of the adversaries, repetitions of the reasons adduced, ad hominem arguments, malice, abuses, mistakes, findings that bring reasons to one's side, as well as "abilities one learns by oneself and practices without thinking in the heat of the dispute," which are also disturbing for disputes and controversies, Leibniz spells out, under the title "It must be noted," the six conditions that the "moderator" or the "expounder" must fulfill in order to prevent the abovementioned disturbances and to ensure the proper application of the "method":

1. "that this method will first be applied to the question of the Church and what depends upon it, as an experiment, since the decision on this question would provide a precedent for all the rest;

2. that he who uses this method will be neither judge, nor party, nor reconciliator, but only expounder;
3. that the expounder's faithfulness will be apparent in that no one will be able to guess which party he belongs to – which is unheard of in controversies, and can be taken as a palpable sign of moderation and equity;
4. that he will maintain a certain indisputable order which will bear the clarity of evidence, and which must exclude formally the five difficulties indicated above;
5. that he will summarize the disputes as much as possible, so that one can see all their economy, even though what often makes these things prolix and difficult is not so much their nature as the complicated and ambiguous expressions used by the authors, which one must develop so as not to let them say that their reasons have been neglected;
6. that it will usually be easy for a man of common sense to make his judgment based on the report given, without any need that the expounder declare [his own opinion]."

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Rodica Amel (retired) was a researcher at the Linguistic Institute of Bucharest (1968–1984) and at Tel Aviv University (Department of Philosophy) (1987–1991). In the past 7 years (2004–2010), she has been affiliated to Bucharest University (Department of Foreign Languages), teaching pragmatics, semiotics, and Hebrew. Her principal research interests include pragmatics (strategy of conversation), semiotics, rhetoric (argumentation), philosophy of language, and poetics. Among her publications are "Saturation Levels in Dialogue" (*Kodikas*, 1989), "Antithetic Reason" (*Manuscrito*, 1993), "Relevance and Justification" (*Semiotica*, 1994), "Doxastic Dialectic. The Persuasive Truth" (*Revue Roumaine de Linguistique*, 1999), and "Sign Systems – Reference Systems" (*Kodikas*, 2008).

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