The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Authoritarianism

PURITANISM
VERSUS DEMOCRACY
AND THE
FREE CIVIL SOCIETY

Milan Zafirovski

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Puritanism, Democracy, and Society

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Puritanism was not merely a religious doctrine, but corresponded in many points with the most absolute democratic and republican theories.

<div align="right">Alexis Tocqueville</div>

Few bodies or parties have served the world so well as the Puritans.

<div align="right">Ralph Emerson</div>

Puritanism and democracy have worked together [and America] is a lineal descendent of Puritanism.

<div align="right">Edward Ross</div>

Puritanism [has] the anti-authoritarian tendency.

<div align="right">Max Weber</div>

Puritanism was a cutting edge which hewed liberty, democracy, humanitarianism, and universal education out of the black forest of feudal Europe and the American wilderness.

<div align="right">Samuel Morison</div>

Contents

Introduction

As both sociologists and economists will certainly notice, the title of this book is deliberately analogous to and inspired by that of Max Weber's famous work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. However, what Weber would call substantive or sociological differences from his work lie beneath this deliberate analogy or terminological near-identity. The "spirit of authoritarianism" is particularly indicative of these differences, not only substituting for (and coined after) another term ("capitalism"), but also proposing a different substantive, mostly noneconomic concept to be examined, too, in relation to the original explanatory factor or correlate, Protestantism. In a nutshell, exploring the relations between Protestantism and authoritarianism is substantively different from, though formally similar to, Weber's analysis of those of the Protestant ethic to capitalism; so the difference is more than replacing a single term by another.

Hence, this is *not* still another study elaborating, revising, criticizing, or reinterpreting Weber's ever-controversial analysis, but a relatively novel and perhaps even more controversial endeavor to reexamine a problem that he and other sociologists and economists have somewhat sidestepped, underestimated, or unsatisfactorily (spuriously) solved. Generally, this is the problem of contemporary political–social authoritarianism in association with Protestantism, as substantively distinct from, though often related to, that of the modern capitalist economy in its Weberian elective affinity with the Protestant ethic. This basic sociological distinctiveness of "authoritarianism and Protestantism," as a non- or secondary Weberian problem compared to that of modern capitalism and the Protestant ethic, makes this work and its main argument substantively distinct from Weber's well-known thesis in his famous work, in spite of the almost identical title. In short, like any other, this book should not be judged by its "cover" (title).

As well-known but instructive to recall, Weber explicitly posits, emphasizes, analyzes, and documents essential affinities or intimate connections between Protestantism, especially Puritanism or Calvinism, and modern capitalism as an instance of what he calls the "degree of elective affinity between concrete structures of social

action and concrete forms of economic organization."[1] By contrast, Weber's socio-logical theory only implies, de-emphasizes, and underanalyzes such affinities and links between Puritanism or Protestantism as a whole and authoritarianism, though he provides some seminal insights on the matter to be recognized and incorporated as foundational and inspiring into the present work. For illustration, he refers to the "unexampled tyranny" of Puritanism, Puritan "authoritarian moral discipline," Calvinist "absolutely unbearable" church control, and the like. By analogy to those between Calvinism and modern capitalism, Weber could describe the affinities of Puritanism with authoritarianism as an instance of the "degree of elective affin-ity between concrete structures of social action and concrete forms of *political* organization." In Weber's framework the actual or possible affinity of Puritanism with authoritarianism or alternatively democracy, as a social–political system, is secondary and submerged to its assumed primary link with modern capitalism as an economic structure.

Moreover, Weber assumes and emphasizes what he calls the "anti-authoritarian tendency of Puritanism" an assumption that hence assumes way or rules out the alternative problem of Puritan authoritarianism. Such assumptions[2] are in exten-sion the likely reasons for the assuming away, omitting, or neglecting the possible connection of Puritanism and authoritarianism by most orthodox economists as well as many Protestant sociologists in the Weberian tradition[3] (Zaret 1989) in the economic and sociological literature. In particular, Parsons (Alexander[4] 1983;

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[1] For reasons of space and economy of exposition, references for Weber and other classical sociologists and economists are not provided assuming that their main ideas and works are fairly familiar to most readers.

[2] In particular, Weber remarks that in England Puritanism probably both transformed the calculating spirit that "is in truth essential to capitalism, from a mere means to economy into a principle of general conduct," and "enabled its adherents to create free institutions and still become a world power." Thus, he suggests that Puritanism had the "effect of political freedom," so promoting a "sense of responsibility" in politics, just as affecting the "calculating spirit of capitalism". In passing, this is in some tension with Weber's description of the 1640s–1950s Puritan Revolution, e.g., the rule of Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints," as abortive and thus transient, as well as his observation that the "direct influence" of English-American Puritanism "had paled considerably in the meantime," e.g., since Franklin. If so, then it is dubious to attribute such durable effects of "political freedom" and even the "spirit of capitalism" to Puritanism. To be sure, one can distinguish the temporary success or failure from the enduring legacy or influence of the Puritan Revolution in England, but this is also questionable, given that Puritanism was not only defeated but also largely discredited or neglected in the aftermath of the Civil War in favor of eventually restoring the pre-Revolutionary fusion of the Anglican Church and the Monarchy.

[3] McLaughlin (1996:248) comments that, according to Freudian–Marxian sociologists or social psychologists like Erich Fromm, the "Weberian theoretical tradition ignores Luther's and Calvin's emphasis on the fundamental evilness and powerlessness of men," as a sort of Protestant theological–historical conduit to modern authoritarianism, including fascism.

[4] Alexander (1983:132) suggests that Parsons' "complex relation to the Puritan heritage is evident." More explicitly, Giddens (1984:273–274) objects that Parsons' claim that "half a million years of human history culminate in the [Puritan-based] social and political system of the United States [is] more than faintly ridiculous."

Mayway 1984) and other Weberians embrace Weber's assumption of the anti-authoritarian, just as pro-capitalist, tendency of Puritanism, thus effectively assume away the problem of Puritan authoritarianism. Parsons (1967:53) contends that the "primary source" of modern European individualism,[5] so liberalism, including the Enlightenment,[6] and democracy resides in Protestant, distinguished from Catholic, Christianity, notably the "immediacy of the individual soul to God, inherent in" Protestantism, including both Lutheranism and Calvinism or Puritanism.

Weber's omission[7] of or de-emphasis on the problem of Puritanism and authoritarianism is curious and dubious. This holds true insofar as the potential affinity between Puritanism and authoritarianism is no less pertinent for contemporary society and sociological theory than that between the Protestant ethic and modern capitalism as what he calls the "most fateful force in our modern life," which, incidentally, reflects his economic background or Marxian–Austrian residues, with almost "absolute power" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). He could also describe authoritarianism or totalitarianism as the most "fateful" or rather fatal force in contemporary society if he lived longer to witness the authoritarian or totalitarian destruction of liberal democracy or democratic capitalism in interwar Europe, including his Germany, and the ensuing destructive global war.[8]

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[5] Also, Elias (2001:161–162) suggests that seventeenth century English Puritans possibly first made a distinction between "what is done individually and what is done collectively," as a "preliminary to the further development" of the concept of the individual or "individualism" versus "collectivism" and "socialism."

[6] Weber comments that the relations of the "whole English Enlightenment," exemplified by Locke, and so liberalism to Puritanism "have often been set forth," but does not say if this assumed link is historically valid.

[7] Possible reasons for Weber's neglect of the elective affinity of Puritanism or Calvinism with authoritarianism can only be assumed ex posteriori by hazarding a guess. One reason is treating this affinity or connection as secondary and impertinent by comparison to that of Puritanism with modern capitalism. Another reason is the general economic and nondemocratic bias, due to his initial training in economics and the respective influences of both Marx and Menger, an early Austrian marginalist economist, manifested in the preoccupation with capitalism or the market economy while relatively neglecting political democracy or its obverse, authoritarianism. Still another reason is assuming that such affinities are logically nonexistent on the implied equation or intrinsic link, like in apologetic economics, between modern capitalism and democracy as the supposed capitalist outcome or "epiphenomenon," as well as historically or empirically absent, specifically that Protestantism has been democratic rather than authoritarian in history and reality. Such a reason is also expecting that Puritan "authoritarian moral discipline" or "tyranny" is harmless or inconsequential to a democratic polity and free civil society. A last likely reason is Weber's Protestant background and likely distaste for Marxian atheism and anti-Protestantism, even though hardly being an orthodox, let alone fanatical, Protestant. And, these particular reasons are probably intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

[8] In a sense, WWI that Weber witnessed might have provided the grounds for such a description of authoritarianism. This, like the next, war was in essence an authoritarian enterprise or product, but perhaps his lingering economism, i.e., obsession with modern capitalism analytically equated or favored to liberal political democracy, and in part German nationalism prevented him from doing so.

The Puritan–authoritarian affinity is also assumed way and omitted by supposing, as most economists explicitly do, and Weber occasionally implies, a sort of equivalence of capitalism and the inverse of political–social authoritarianism, i.e., liberal democracy and free civil society.[9] On this supposition, since capitalism *is*, or necessarily leads to, a system of liberal democracy and a free civil society, Puritanism's elective affinity with this economic system also means an intimate link with democracy as a political regime, which logically or empirically makes that with authoritarianism a nonissue or spurious problem. This in part accounts for the omission or neglect by Weber and most orthodox or Protestant economists of the factual or possible affinity of Puritanism and authoritarianism. In turn, so long as the association of modern capitalism with political democracy and a free civil society is not inherent and unequivocal but rather admittedly problematic (Friedman and Friedman 1982), the assumed away, neglected or submerged link between Puritanism and authoritarianism reappears or reinforces itself as an analytical and empirical problem to be reexamined. Let us designate this missing link or affinity between Puritanism and authoritarianism, as moral–religious and social–political systems, respectively, the derived or pseudo-Weberian problem. The latter recognizes that Weber implies or intimates, but, for various reasons, does not explicitly assume and systematically examine the problematic nature of Puritanism and Protestantism overall in relation to political democracy and a free civil society. This is in contrast to, for Weberians (e.g., Parsons),[10] the unproblematic

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[9] To do justice to Weber, he recognizes, seemingly echoing Marx, that authoritarian–hierarchical relations "actually exist in the capitalist enterprise" and even that in the latter, "authoritarian constraint not only continues, but, at least under certain circumstances, even increases." Apparently, this is the recognition of what contemporary observers call the "factory of authoritarianism" or lack of industrial democracy in the capitalist economy rather than of an authoritarian or undemocratic political system within modern capitalism. Overall, a sort of conventional wisdom, especially among conservative–libertarian US economists like Mises, Hayek, and Friedman as well as politicians, is that authoritarianism within "free enterprise" or the absence of industrial democracy, including lack of worker participation and union organization, can or should coexist and is even compatible with political democracy as well as a free civil society in American capitalism. Though more sophisticated and moderate than these economists, Weber in part contributed toward establishing this view by apparently assuming that "authoritarian constraint" in capitalist enterprise can correspond to, rather than contradict or undermine, as Marx implies, formal political democracy in terms of "legal–rational" authority or legitimation via "free elections," for example.

[10] Parsons (1975:667–678) suggests that the "economic behavior which [Weber] focused on the Puritans was both economically rational in the traditional sense and an attempt to implement a value commitment independent of considerations of personal advantage, notably in the utility of commodities. Weber [analyzed] how the religiously pious Puritan was motivated in economically productive activity." In particular, he comments that in the *Protestant Ethic* Weber "asserted the independent influence of religious orientations and values relative to economic and political interests" in a sharp "methodological break with the historical schools, including Marxism," though in his general comparative sociology of religion, as his "most important area of relations between society and cultural systems," stressed the "interdependence of religious and other social phenomena" (Parsons 1965:175). Further, he complains that Weber's theory of the relationship between ascetic Protestantism and capitalism is "persistently criticized in terms utterly inapplicable to [it]" (Parsons 1967:19).

association of Puritanism with contemporary capitalism as an economic system, including modern science and technology (Merton 1968),[11] that may or may not be linked with a democratic polity and culture, though problematic for others since, for example, Sombart's critique[12] of Weber's thesis from the *Protestant Ethic*. Simply, the derived Weberian problem is one of Puritanism and political-social authoritarianism or even tyranny[13] (Bendix 1977:55–57), by analogy to Weber's original problematic of Calvinism and modern capitalism or a free market economy.

This study effectively begins where Weber essentially leaves, with some pertinent insights and premonitions, after arguing and substantiating the thesis of an elective affinity between ascetic Protestantism and modern capitalism, as do, for similar or varying reasons, most conventional economists as well as many Protes-

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Also, in apparent reference to Weber, Dahrendorf (1959:186) invokes the "role of a particular interpretation of Calvinism for early English capitalists" as the case of an available ideology functioning as a program for social groups. In turn, Bendix (1977:51–52) comments that "Weber's particular thesis—that Puritan ideas had influenced the development of capitalism—was a concept he contrasted with another type of economic activity [i.e.] 'traditionalism.'" Also, Habermas (2001:139) comments that Weber "develops his famous argument of an affinity between Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism to explain the motivational basis of the elites who support these new institutions." Similarly, Loader and Alexander (1985:6) remark that Weber "generally conceived of [value-rationality] as relating to rationalized forms of religion, like Puritanism, which were precursors of truly 'modern' rational action." However, in his later writings Alexander (1998:171–172) admits that "if the Italian capitalists of the early modern city states [manifested] the capitalist spirit [then], the Weber's correlation between capitalists and Puritans is based on a restricted sample and fails to substantiate his theory." Some early US sociologists also note that both Puritanism and the American capitalist philosophy (old and new) of success "recognized the law of prosperity as a cardinal statute" (Griswold 1934). Lastly, Boudon(1988:758) admonishes that the "correlations between Puritanism and capitalism are also due to a number of well-identified historical and social factors to which Weber devoted little attention." More important to the present study, one can add that Weber, also devoted little attention to, though intimated, the second "correlations" between Puritanism and authoritarianism in favor of the first.

[11] Collins(1985:116) refers to the Weber "thesis" on Puritanism and capitalism and the "Merton thesis" on Puritanism and science.

[12] Sombart writes in his book *The Jews and Modern Capitalism* (published in 1911) that "only recently Max Weber demonstrated the connexion between Puritanism and Capitalism. In fact, Max Weber's researches [*in the Protestant Ethic*] are responsible for this book." Sombart's counterargument is that the "dominating ideas of Puritanism which were so powerful in capitalism were more perfectly developed in Judaism, and were also of course of much earlier date."

[13] Bendix (1977:55–57) perhaps comes most closely to identifying the Weberian second problem of Puritanism and authoritarianism by citing Weber's expression the "unexampled tyranny of Puritanism," cited as "Protestantism." Yet, he seems, like Parsons, to understand this "tyranny" as a metaphor or hyperbole not to be really taken at face value rather or less than a useful concept and working hypothesis. Also, similar to Parsons, Bendix focuses on Weber's demonstration or thesis of the elective affinity of Calvinism, explained by its "ascetic tendency," and the spirit of capitalism rather than authoritarianism or "tyranny." Similarly, Habermas (2001:139) comments that Weber "develops his famous argument of an affinity between Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism to explain the motivational basis of the elites who support these new institutions."

tant sociologists (e.g., Parsons 1966)[14]. The study attempts to retrieve and reestablish Weber's assumed away, subdued or "buried" affinity between Puritanism or Calvinism and authoritarianism in Western societies, including American society. This attempt is undertaken against the background of, besides Weber's classic problem of Calvinism and capitalism, the sociological and economic literature in which such an affinity is also downplayed, subdued, and even reversed via the assumed opposite link of Puritanism with political democracy and a free civil society, as in part a dubious Weberian theoretical legacy.

Further, the Weberian assumed anti-authoritarian, i.e., pro-democratic and libertarian tendency, of Puritanism and Protestantism overall, so its link with democracy and a free civil society rather than authoritarianism, has become a sort of conventional wisdom or paradigm, even a venerable mythology in the scientific literature and beyond. This is in conjunction with and even by derivation from the assumed affinity between Puritan Protestantism and modern capitalism, as another Weberian legacy, theoretical paradigm and even "beloved myth" (Delacroix and Nielsen 2001) in the literature and Western Protestant societies. Moreover, the second paradigm has been more questioned and subject to doubt and rejection, and increasingly so during recent times (Lachmann 1989),[15] since its original formulation by Weber than the first usually taken as granted as a self-evident axiom by most Western, especially Protestant social scientists, with rare or more silent dissenting voices. Thus, that Puritanism or Protestantism generally has been historically associated with Western, especially American, liberal democracy and a free civil society is perhaps even more categorically and widely assumed and accepted than its Weberian connection with modern capitalism, including science and technology (Becker 1984), in the scientific literature and beyond to the point of becoming a near-universal, deep-seated, and cherished belief in Puritan-based societies like America. As some contemporary sociologists note, since its beginning "in sociology, key elements of liberal-democratic ideology are seen as secular extensions of Protestant (especially Puritan) ideas" (Zaret 1989:163).

For example, early US sociologist Edward Ross argues that "Puritanism and democracy have worked together," though his remark that democracy has thus provided its own "antidote" and his warning about what he calls "Puritan tyranny"[16]

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[14] In Parsons' (1966: 79–80) view, the main elements of Weber's ascetic Protestantism are, alongside asceticism, "a drive for active mastery over worldly things and interests, 'rationality', ethical universalism, and functional differentiation and specialization."

[15] Lachmann(1989:47), in a review of recent theories of the origins of capitalism in Western Europe, remarka that "few Weberians or Marxists have addressed the specific role of Protestantism in fostering rational economic action; instead they speak of modernization or of the rise of the West." In turn, Cohen (1980:1340) contends that "although Max Weber believed that rational capitalism developed initially and primarily under Protestantism, it was born and developed extensively in pre-Reformation Italy [so] capitalist rationality advanced under both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, and the religious factor had little effect on its early development."

[16] Thus, Ross suggests that "there must a wise middle course" between "Puritan tyranny and Restoration profligacy."

may have different implications, as seen later. He describes, by assumption, demo-cratic America *cum* the land of freedom as a "lineal descendent" of Puritanism, thus anticipating and specifying Weber's assumption of the Puritan "anti-authoritarian tendency." Further, Ross' predecessor, conservative philosopher Emerson[17] asserts that "few bodies or parties have served the world so well as the Puritans," in po-litical and other, including economic, terms. Though more ambivalent than most US or Protestant writers, French Catholic Tocqueville also notes, in reference to early Puritanism in New England, that a "democracy more perfect than antiquity had dared to dream of started in full size and panoply from the midst of an an-cient feudal society [old England], including a 'body of political laws' that was in 'advance of the liberties of our age.'" He regards Puritanism overall as "not merely a religious doctrine," but also a political theory corresponding "in many points" to the "most absolute democratic and republican" theories in the Western world. Next, Durkheim implicitly subscribes to or, as Parsons would put it, con-verges on Tocqueville–Weber's view of democratic tendencies in Puritanism by characterizing in his analysis of the impact of religion on suicide Protestantism by "free inquiry" that "multiplies schisms" and permits "greater concessions" as well as "less consistency," resulting in a "less strongly integrated church," thus more suicides, than Catholicism. However, unlike Tocqueville and especially Weber, Durkheim is less, just as Comte, concerned with distinguishing Puritanism or Calvinism from other early Protestantism, including Lutheranism as the original Protestant type.

Also, Marx, though from a different critical or radical theoretical posi-tion, specifically associates capitalist democracy with Protestantism,[18] including

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[17] Gould (1996:215) comments that Emerson's praise of Puritans "situates him in a more conventional cultural position vis-à-vis his Puritan ancestors" than the rarer contrary view.

[18] Marx remarks that "Protestantism, by changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays, plays an important part in the genesis of capital." This almost admits or adum-brates Weber's subsequent thesis about the cardinal role of the Protestant work ethic, of which "changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays" is no doubt a particu-lar expression or effect, in the creation of the "spirit and structure" of modern capitalism. So does in part Comte's earlier observation about the "industrial superiority of Protestant nations." Notably, Marx finds a connection of English Puritanism and Dutch Protestantism with "money-making" or the "cult of money" in that they all share self-denial, self-sacrifice, economy and frugality, contempt for "mundane, temporal and fleeting" pleasures in favor of the "chase after the *eternal* treasure," spiritual (the first) or material (the second). In particular, he suggests that market free competition in England was first "conquered" by the 1640 Puritan Revolution, just as in France by the Revolution of 1789, and "everywhere" else by revolutions. In addition, Marx likens "bourgeois" political economy's criticism of earlier economic systems like feudalism with Protestantism's attack on Catholicism, as well as Christianity's against heathenism. *Prima facie*, Marx's connection, including his free-competition explanation of the Puritan Revolution, also suggest admitting or antici-pating that of Weber between English Puritanism and modern capitalism whose spirit or ethos is, as he puts it, the "earning of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life." Curiously, Weber, like most sociologists and economists, including Parsons, ignores or downplays these remarks that are seemingly *not* incompatible with his thesis and generally countervailing emphasis on the influence of

English Puritanism, as the "most fitting form of religion." He considers both democracy and Puritanism, as political and religious phenomena, to be "bourgeois developments," the effects of capitalism as an economic system, thus probably provoking Weber's opposite, though qualified or heuristic, thesis. In turn, responding to Weber's thesis grounding capitalism in, paraphrasing Marx, Protestant developments, Tawney (1962: 234–272) suggests that Western, specifically English and American, democracies owe more to Puritanism than any other movements, in virtue of its "enormous contribution" to political freedom and social progress, such that though its "theory had been discipline; its practical result was liberty." In Parsons' terms, most classical sociologists, from Tocqueville and Marx to Weber and Durkheim, evince a convergence on a voluntaristic theory of Puritanism or Protestantism as a whole as a democratic religious-political system, though with some occasional doubts and qualifications among them and their colleagues like Comte, Pareto, and Simmel. And, as hinted, following Weber and Durkheim, Parsons himself adopts and elaborates on such a voluntaristic Puritan theory.

In addition, contemporary sociologists adopt and elaborate on the theme of Puritanism *cum* voluntarism, i.e., freedom, democracy, as well as capitalism. In a view, the Puritan revolution in seventeenth century England, for example, was, alongside the French Revolution and the American Civil War, a case of bourgeois–liberal revolutions involving efforts to overcome "obstacles to a democratic version of capitalism" and create a "combination" of capitalism and parliamentary democracy[19] (Moore 1993:413–415). Other contemporary sociologists suggest, referring to Parsons, that early Puritanism in England and America was an individualistic, liberal, democratic, and utilitarian ideology and politics in that it purported to rebuild polity as well as civil society or community on "more spiritual and horizontal terms" (Mayway 1984) than its predecessors or competitors in the Christian religion. This apparently associates Puritanism and utilitarianism with voluntarism or voluntaristic social action in the Parsonian sense. So does the view that the principle of voluntarism developed in American Puritanism as a "formulation of social conduct," including the individual's relation to government, though radical individualism is seen as "alien" to Puritan doctrine (Tiryakian 1975:24). Many other, especially US, social scientists express similar views, with some linking

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religious and other ideas on economic phenomena in reaction to or reversal of Marx's perceived one-sided causal, from-economy-to-religion, chain. Recall, Parsons maintains that Weber "brought out most sharply his methodological break" with Marxism by asserting the "independent influence of religious orientations and values" in relation to economy in the *Protestant Ethic* (and other works) as well as the "interdependence of religious and other social phenomena" in the comparative sociology of religion. However, dealing with this issue is beyond the scope of this book.

[19] In this respect, Moore (1993:413–415) seems to follow Marx's explanation of the 1640 Puritan Revolution in England, just as the French Revolution of 1789, in terms of a struggle for free competition and so capitalism. However, both overlook or downplay the fact that the "bourgeois" Puritan Revolution was ultimately, in Weber's words, "abortive," as witnessed by the collapse of Cromwell's Holy Commonwealth in 1660, and thus Puritanism generally defeated, discredited, or ignored in England since this failure.

American Puritanism with English (Locke's) liberalism,[20] individualism and even secularism (Hartz 1963). Others argue that the American values of freedom and liberty are "related to the Calvinist doctrines of religious transcendence and human sin" (Means 1966:378), as originally transplanted and implemented in Puritan New England. In light of such views in the literature, some analysts note the prevalence of "naïve assumptions about Puritanism and liberty" (Coffey 1998:962). In this sense, the "story of the Protestant contribution to freedom is a familiar one: the doctrines of Luther, Calvin and Puritanism often have been linked to the development of modern spiritual and political freedom" (McLaughlin 1996:248).

In sum, the prevalent, though certainly not consensual and unquestioned, view in the sociological and other literature seems to be that Puritanism or Protestantism overall has been conducive to liberal democracy as a political system as well as to a free civil society, just as, in an assumed capitalist–democratic association, to contemporary capitalism as an economic mode, including modern science and technology. Therefore, this view of Western liberal–democratic ideology and practice and of capitalism as "secular extensions of Protestant ideas" assumes away, misses, or downplays the actual or possible affinity between Puritanism and the antipode of democracy and a free civil society in the form of political–social authoritarianism. This is in essence what this book argues and demonstrates, i.e., that Puritanism constitutes or engenders political and social authoritarianism and hence the antithesis or what Ross calls "antidote" (or "poison") of liberal democracy and free civil society rather than being democratic and libertarian.

The book is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to Puritanism and authoritarianism by specifying the concepts. Chapter 2 analyzes the relationship of Puritanism to political authoritarianism and argues that the former constitutes or leads to the latter in the sense of an antithesis of liberal democracy or a free polity. Chapter 3 considers whether and to what extent Puritanism relates to social authoritarianism, arguing that the first entails or results in the second in the sense of an antithesis of civic liberties or a free civil society. Chapter 4 continues the analysis of the connection of Puritanism to social authoritarianism. Chapter 5 focuses on neo-Puritanism or contemporary Protestant fundamentalism in relation to authoritarianism, and proposes that it continues to contain or generate authoritarian tendencies and outcomes. Chapter 6 deals with the legacy of Puritanism in contemporary Western, especially American, society and posits that this heritage is mostly authoritarian in character, content, and form.

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[20] In addition, historian Ashton (1965:580) remarks that English Puritanism "became a seedbed for modern liberalism" by reason of both its "conflict with the government" (the Crown) and its "purely religious matters." He adds that in seventeenth-century England Puritanism and constitutional parliamentary and bussines opposition were "three intimately linked lines of attack" on the Crown (Ashton 1965:581). Overall, Ashton (1965:583) suggests that Puritanism has much wider social implications than only its impact on the bourgeoisie and the rising capitalist class," as Weber largely assumes. In particular, Kloppenberg (1998:25) contrasts what he calls "the sober Puritanism of Locke" with the "stark individualism of Hobbes."

1
Puritanism and Authoritarianism

Puritanism

General Puritanism

At this juncture, two types or meanings of Puritanism can be distinguished—general and specific. In general, Puritanism signifies an idea and practice of moral, religious, and other spiritual as well as material purity or purification: austerity, asceticism, rigor, perfection, virtuosity, holiness, sanctity and sainthood, absolutism, or totality, including total methodical control or absolute restraint of oneself and others. In the sense of methodically seeking and attaining purity or perfection in respect to human sins, vices, or evils, most ethical and religious systems are to some extent puritan, purist, or "Methodist." This is what Weber essentially means by suggesting that the great historical systems of religion,[1] from Buddhism and Confucianism to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, "have all been religions of restraint" (Bell 1977:431) and to that extent puritan or ascetic. For example, he specifically refers to the pre-Christian Pharisees as Puritans in this sense, though compounded with an apparent attribute of ambivalence, duality, or hypocrisy, which has eventually become or perceived as their defining attribute, in respect of methodical restraint and absolute purity. Generally, Weber suggests that Puritans in the sense of religious virtuosi or saints have been common to most religions of salvation, from pre-Christian Antiquity to early, medieval, and modern Christianity to Islam.

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[1] Also, Lenski (1994:8) comments that Weber focused on the "religious ideas that differentiated one region from other parts of the civilized world. For him, Puritanism, Catholicism, ancient Judaism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and modern secular rationalism each had profoundly influenced the societies in which they were dominant, and each had given rise to a unique and distinctive social and economic order." Similarly, Inglehart and Baker (2000:19) find that the "broad cultural heritage of a society—Protestant, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Confucian, or communist—leaves an imprint on values that endures despite modernization." For the present purpose, all these religious and cultural systems, including communism and even in part secular rationalism, can be considered (featuring) varying forms or degrees of "Puritanism." This places its Protestant form in a comparative-historical perspective and thus makes it less new or exceptional than usually claimed both by its representatives and adversaries.

Hence, he defines Puritanism, while calling it a "highly ambiguous word," in terms of an "ethic of virtuosi" premised on the "methodical religious doctrine of sanctification." No wonder, a particular, initially strident, yet subsequently moderate, Protestant version of Puritanism has designated itself as "Methodism" to emphasize and even further intensify such "methodical" doctrine and practice of sanctification, purification and moral perfection or what Pareto less neutrally than Weber calls a "kind of insanity" [sic!].

The above indicates that the general meaning of "Puritanism" and "Puritans" is purism and purists, i.e., virtuosi, saints, angels, apostles, ascetics, primarily, but not solely, in moral–religious and other spiritual terms, and secondarily in a material, including economic, sense (e.g., economist J. M. Keynes refers to "financial purism" or "puritans of finance"). Thus understood, Puritanism and Puritans are found or implied in virtually all religions, theologies, moral codes, and cultures and at all times: Western and non-Western ethics and societies, both early and late Christianity, including Catholicism, Protestantism, and in part the Orthodox Byzantine Church, and non-Christianity, from pre-Christian Pharisees to post-Christian Islam, as well as during Antiquity, medievalism, and modernity. For instance, Weber registers "the puritanical sect of the Donatists in Roman Africa," thus implying that Puritanism in general is intrinsically sectarianism, as a case of a peasant-based strict moralistic or "rational ethical" movements in Antiquity.

In general, what contemporary sociologists call "puritanical forms of biblical fundamentalism" are found in Christian as well as Islamic, Jewish, and other non-Christian religions (Turner 2002:113). Its pre- and non-Christian types include Puritanism in, for example, Confucianism (Berger and Hsiao 1993; Pocock 1962), Hinduism (Archer 2001), Buddhism (Stark 1999), Islam (Archer 2001), e.g., Islamic and counter-Islamic Puritans (Scott 1977), and ancient Greece (Calhoun 1925), notably Sparta, and Rome, including Weber's Roman Donatists. Pre- or non-Protestant Christian Puritanism is present in, albeit in varying degrees, Catholicism, including, in Marx's words, "the Puritans of the [Catholic] Council of Constance,"[2] as well as, as Weber[3] suggests, in part and under external influence Orthodox Christianity. Also, Pareto notices that long before Protestant Puritanism, as well as secular ascetic religions such as socialism and nationalism, including British imperialism and American jingoism, Catholic and other medieval monks "had carried this kind of [Puritan] insanity to the utmost limit."

Moreover, Puritanism in the sense of ascetic austerity and restraint and Puritans as moral saints and virtuosi can also assume various non- or quasireligious forms, elements, and faces, as in antireligious ideologies or secular "religions" in

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[2] In an almost Veblenian sarcastic manner, Marx comments that "the Puritans of the Council of Constance (1414–1418) complained of the dissolute lives of the popes and wailed about the necessity for moral reform. Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly thundered at them: 'Only the devil in person can still save the Catholic Church, and you ask for angels.'"

[3] For example, Weber observers that the "passionate participation of the Byzantine army in behalf of the iconoclasts was not a result of conscious puritanical principles, but that of the attitude adopted by the recruiting districts, which were already under Islamic influence."

Pareto's meaning and social systems. Such non- or pseudoreligious Puritan versions or proxies are exemplified by fascist, including Nazi (Kirkpatrick 1937), and communist Puritanism and Puritans (Faris 1961; Hollander 1966[4]; Kelley 1984; Meyer 1967; Wallerstein and Zukin 1989; Walzer 1963). Typically, fascism, notably Nazism, and communism tend to be Puritanism in this sense, yet with secondary (Nazis) or devoid of (communists) religious bases and sanctifications, though with some exceptions, viz. Vatican-allied Italian, Spanish, and other Catholic–theocratic fascists. These religious differences in mind, Puritanism underscores and historically predates fascism, notably Nazism, as well as communism as doctrines and systems of austerity and restraint, and Puritans are also embodied in and prefigure fascists and communists as self-proclaimed moralist saints, as elaborated later. However, within Western society since the reformation Puritanism has acquired a specific form and meaning associated with a special brand of Christianity, thus alternatively dissociated from other Christian, notably Catholicism, and non-Christian religions, in a long evolution from Weber's puritanical and hypocritical Phariseeism and Donatism. Simply, these new Christian Puritans were (self-described as) special, new, reformed, or revolutionary, and so different relative to Weber's non-Christian proto-Puritan and hypocritical Pharisees and Donatists, as well as, as Pareto implies, their proxies in Christianity like early and medieval Catholic monks. In short, this introduces the Christian–Protestant revival or variant of Puritanism discussed next.

Protestant Puritanism

The specific and prevalent type and meaning of Puritanism within Christianity and Western society, starting with the protestant Reformation, encompass Puritan ideas and practices, i.e., moral purity, austerity, asceticism, rigor, perfection, virtuosity, absolutism, religious holiness or sainthood, and total methodical restraint, in Protestantism, notably Calvinism.[5] In Weber's terms, with its methodical pursuit of moral purism, sainthood or "sinless perfection," or simply, as one of its branches was called, perfect "methodism" in asceticism, Puritanism

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[4] Hollander (1966:357–358) finds that in the Stalinist literature the Puritanism of the hero "is not unlike the Western conceptions of the Puritan: intensely concerned with spiritual [ideological] values, minimizing the importance of self in humility to a super-personal case, constantly on guard against violations of his moral code, impatient with those violating it [and] toward himself [as] the main psychological source of self-denial." Notably, he considers such Puritan concerns to belong to "totalitarian values and controls" in Stalinist and other countries.

[5] Urdank (1991:524) observes that early modern Calvinism and some other Protestant sects like Quakerism "generally embraced a high-tone Puritanism that greatly prized the control of affect." This observation suggests that "Puritanism" in its general meaning, as found in Catholic Christianity and other religions, preceded and shaped Calvinism and ascetic Protestantism as a whole, but does not make it clear that in its specific and prevalent meaning Puritanism was rather a Calvinist creation, derivation, or extension originally in England and subsequently America.

thus understood represents the "staunchest" or most extreme form of ascetic Protestantism[6] as originating or epitomized in Calvinism, in contrast to its non- or less-ascetic types, including Lutheranism and Anglicanism seen as closer to Catholicism at least in this respect.

In this respect, Weber's implied distinction[7] between pre-Protestant, especially non-Calvinist, and Protestant, notably Calvinist, Puritanism is basically equivalent or parallel to that between Christian asceticism or monasticism in pre-Protestantism like monastic Catholicism and Protestantism.[8] By analogy to his general definition, he implicitly defines Puritanism in the specific sense as the Protestant ethic of virtuosi or moral saints theologically premised on the Calvinist "methodical religious doctrine of sanctification." Hence, Puritans in the narrow sense are simply the "religious virtuosi" or "saints" of Protestantism. Ironically, none than Marx anticipates Weber by using identical terms, viz. the "sober virtuosi of Protestantism"[9] and universal Christian asceticism overall, to describe New England's Puritans. Specifically, to specify what he sees as a "highly ambiguous word," Weber proposes to use Puritanism "always in the sense which it took on in the popular speech of the 17th century, to mean the ascetically inclined religious movements in Holland and England without distinction of Church organization or dogma." Apparently, this proposal refers to original Puritanism or Calvinism in Europe but can be readily extended to its subsequent derivations and ramifications in America, notably New England, from the seventeenth century. Similarly, Simmel suggests that Puritanism or Calvinism was the "orthodox party" of Protestantism, distinguished from Lutheranism as the "liberal," following the Protestant split, especially the "confessional controversies" between Lutherans and Calvinists (the Reformed Church) in seventeenth-century Europe.[10]

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[6] Referring to New England Puritanism, Weber remarks that the "inner-worldly asceticism of Protestantism" was represented in the "ancient Puritan tradition." Also, he notes that early European Puritans or Calvinists accused Lutherans in Germany and elsewhere of a "virtual reluctance to becoming holy." Overall, Weber incorporates Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism, and Baptism into the "forms of ascetic Protestantism." This implies that he considers early English Puritanism essentially equivalent to or derived from Calvinism, though distinguished from Pietism as a mostly continental, especially German, phenomenon, as well as Methodism and Baptism in their initial forms, though he describes Methodist movements as the "revival" and "emotional intensification of the Puritan type," and Baptists sects in similar terms. Reminiscent of Weber, Merton (1968:628) describes Puritanism as an "ideal-typical expression of the value-attitudes basic to ascetic Protestantism generally."

[7] Weber implies the distinction in remarking that "the non-Calvinistic ascetic movements, considered purely from the view-point of the religious motivation of asceticism, form an attenuation of the inner consistency and power of Calvinism."

[8] Strictly speaking, Weber would also distinguish "Puritan" or "Calvinist" from "ascetic" or "austere" and sectarian in the sense that while all "Puritans" or "Calvinists" may be ascetics and sectarians, the converse is not always true, as shown by pre-Christian Pharisees, Medieval Catholic, and other monks.

[9] For example, Sombart observes that "walk with a sober pace, not tinkling with your feet," was a canon of the Puritan rule of life.

[10] This is inferred or interpreted from Simmel's statements, first, about the "confessional controversies" between Lutherans and Calvinists ("Reformed") during the seventeenth century, and second, that, in consequence, Protestantism split into "a liberal and orthodox

Elaborating on and evoking Weber and Marx, other analysts characterize Puritanism as "iron" (Tawney 1962:211), militant (Israel 1966:597), or radical (Coffey 1998:962; also Loewenstein 2001) Protestantism. In this sense, "Puritanism" is in essence another name for "Calvinism" also described as such a type, i.e., "orthodox party," of Protestantism and usually, though not invariably, adopted as an interchangeable term by Weber as well as Tocqueville, Mill, Marx, Simmel, and others (Tawney 1962). Thus, Weber usually adopts and understands the term Puritanism in the sense of what he calls "radical Calvinism." Consequently, early Puritans in Great Britain were described both by themselves and others such as Anglicans and Catholics as the radical, extreme or "hotter sort" of Protestants (Gorski 2000:1453).

Weber specifically includes among the Puritans in seventeenth-century England and Holland, for example, "Independents, Congregationalists, Baptists, Mennonites, and Quakers." Contemporary analysts also incorporate Presbyterians, Separatists, and non-Separatists, as well as in part Anabaptists and Quakers (Sprunger 1982:ix), and distinguish Presbyterian groups as relative political "moderates" from the Independents like Cromwell et al. as "extremists" within early English Puritanism (Israel 1966:592). Virtually all these groups moved to America, specifically New England, as contrasted to Virginia as an initial destination for Anglicans, both prior (the 1620s–1630s) to and especially after, as Weber puts it, the ultimately "abortive" Puritan Revolution and rule through Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints" and the monarchy Restoration (the 1660s–1670s). Subsequently, Puritanism comprised other ascetic Protestant movements, including notably, as Mill and Weber suggest,[11] Methodism to become increasingly salient as a sort of revived, emotionally intensified, modernized, and eventually mitigated Puritan form, first in England and then in America, especially the South and Mid-West. In this sense, some analysts suggest the existence of many diverse Puritanisms[12] (Kearney 1965) rather than a single and homogenous Puritanism in both early Europe and America.

In comparative-historical terms, Puritanism in this specific meaning was Calvinism derived, transplanted, or diffused from continental Europe, where, in Calvin's

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party," respectively. Admittedly, this inference or interpretation is not the sole possible, as the opposite could be made too—viz. Calvinists as "liberal" and Lutherans as "orthodox" Protestants—but probably the most plausible, at least for the purpose at hand. This especially holds true of a Weberian framework, in which, as Weber typically implies, Calvinism or Puritanism is the orthodox, radical ("hard-core") or staunch, and Lutheranism liberal, moderate ("soft") or traditional Protestantism.

[11] J. S. Mill implicitly includes Methodists into Puritans or Calvinists, and Weber defines Methodism as the purported "revival," notably "emotional intensification," of Puritanism via pursuing "sinless perfection" and thus initially attempting to be morally "purer" and more "methodical" and emotional than anything else before in Protestantism.

[12] Kearney (1965:105) suggests that "Puritanism" is "analogous" to terms like "socialism" or "romanticism," and so "there are as many 'Puritanisms' as are there 'socialisms' or 'romanticisms.'". He cites the New England's Puritan colonists as showing that "Puritanism of the 1630s offered a variegated appearance" and infers that the "tensions and differences that exploded after 1640 were already in existence" (Kearney 1965:107).

Geneva, it originated in the 1530s, first to England in the late sixteenth century and then to colonial America, notably New England,[13] during the seventeenth century. That is what Weber implies by typically treating Protestant Puritanism in general as, or equating it with, radical Calvinism, and describing in particular New England's Puritans as "strict Calvinists" like those in Geneva a la Calvin et al. So does Sombart, who, alternatively, states that Calvinism "is only Puritanism." Only in the sense of an English-American seventeenth-century derivative, transplant, diffusion, and radical implementation of sixteenth-century Calvinism can one describe Puritanism as "Anglo-Saxon"[14] (Mises 1966:87), with essentially European origins and prototypes, e.g., in Germany (Billings and Scott 1994), as most analysts do. Thus, Tocqueville, referring to the American Pilgrims, describes Puritanism as the "English sect" defined by the "austerity" and "rigor" of its principles theologically rooted in Calvinism. Also, Tawney (1962:198) depicts Puritanism as the "true English Reformation" crucially derived from, influenced by and continuing that in Europe, notably its radical, militant or fanatical (Walzer 1963) Calvinist, preferred to its more traditional and moderate Lutheran, movement in turn influencing Anglicanism. In short, Puritanism, to paraphrase Sombart, "is only" Calvinism, derived from and moved beyond Calvin's Geneva to England and America, just as Calvinism is merely Protestant or general Puritanism in his sense. If, as Simmel remarks, in the seventeenth century Protestantism split into "a liberal and orthodox party," as the result of the "confessional controversies" between and embodied by Lutherans and Calvinists (Reformed) respectively, then English Puritanism joined the second rather than the first group, in turn at least tacitly joined by Anglicanism.

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[13] Foerster (1962:9) remarks that "in the fundamentals of their faith" US, like English, Puritans "usually found themselves in large agreement with the teachings of John Calvin, the French Protestant reformer of Geneva." He adds that "when the Puritans of New England agreed with Calvin, they did so not because Calvin was authoritative for them but because his teachings seemed confirmed by the Bible and experience." Moreover, he uses "Puritanism" and "Calvinism" as synonyms, viz. the "Calvinistic structure" of the Puritan "Holy Commonwealth" in New England. That these US Puritans and their modern evangelical descendents or proxies would "agree" or become identified with the teaching of a "French Protestant reformer" seems highly ironic from a historical and contemporary perspective in light of the persisting and even recently intensifying anti-French, often linked with anti-Catholic and antiforeign (Merton 1939), sentiments in Protestant fundamentalism. This sometimes reaches a sort of mass hysteria in religious–political conservatism (e.g., the "freedom-fries" episode prompted by Bible-Belt and other conservative congressmen), as happened in America during the 2000s. Overall, it is one of those supreme historical ironies that a "French" should effectively define the "spirit" of Anglo-Saxon Puritanism and to that extent, i.e., at least in respect of America's founding by the Puritans, what US religious–political conservatives celebrate as the American "national character," though less the English "soul" given the initial, counteracting, and perhaps ultimately prevailing religious influence of Anglicanism as the Puritan arch-enemy. Simply, what Weber describe as the "strict Calvinists" of Geneva (and later Holland) and New England meet, with the first apparently influencing and inspiring, thus becoming "role models" for, the second.

[14] Mises' (1966:87) full statement is that "Puritanism was Anglo-Saxon, but so was the lasciviousness of the British under the Tudors, the Stuarts, and the Hanoverians."

Other analysts suggest that, historically and comparatively, Puritanism was a sort of Calvinism without Calvin.[15] In this view, the development of Calvinist doctrine after his death took a "Puritan direction" (Birnbaum 1953; cf. also Hartz[16] 1963), especially in old and New England and to a lesser extent continental Europe (e.g., Germany, Holand, Switzerland, France). Reportedly, after Calvin's death, Calvinism from its birthplace Geneva "spread eastward to the Continent and westward to [England and] America among English-speaking people"[17] (Sprunger 1982:458). Specifically, Puritanism emerged in England during the 1560s and "consisted of various cross-currents of though and opinion, generally calvinist in tone and possessing a certain continuity from [that time] to the Cromwellian period and beyond [i.e. the 1640s]" (Kearney 1965:105). Thus, the early Puritan sects and denominations in England and subsequently colonial America, as well as temporarily Holland,[18] were descendents or followers of Calvinism rather than Lutheranism (Munch 1981). In this respect, the Anglo-Saxon "hotter sorts" of Protestants,

[15] Bremer (1995:15) finds that in England between 1548 and 1660 "more of Calvin's works were published than of any other author."

[16] Moreover, Hartz (1963:369) argues that American Puritanism was not only Calvinism without Calvin, but rather *with* Locke and so entwined with or transformed in English liberalism and to that extent pseudo- or even non-Calvinist. Arguably, in America "fragmentation would detach Puritanism from the European past, would elevate it to the rank of a national absolute, [yet] in secular terms: the movement of Locke from the Old World ("the depravations of Europe") to the New, not quite the movement of Calvin." This argument apparently overlooks or downplays New England's theocracy Weber and others identify as the Puritan-American version or emulation of Calvinist theocracies or "state churches" in Europe. An instructive sociological critique of the assumed Puritan links with liberalism and democracy in old and New England is found in Zaret (1985, 1989).

[17] Sprunger (1982:458) actually uses "Puritanism" instead of "Calvinism" but the latter is apparently a more accurate or precise designation. Specifically, Calvinism, from Calvin's Geneva, "spread eastward to the Continent," especially Germany, France, and Holland, generating, as Weber noted, for example, German Pietism, as well as French Huguenot movement, and westward "among English-speaking people" in England, Scotland, and America to produce "Puritanism" in the strict sense. In this sense, Europe—with the partial exception of Holland due to its Puritan exiles from England, from the late sixteenth century as well as following the restoration of the monarchy in the 1660s—did not really know "Puritanism" that was an eminently "English-speaking people" derivative Calvinist phenomenon, but only original Calvinism and its continental derivations, including Pietism. For example, following Weber's distinction, Merton (1968:628–629) distinguishes between early English Puritanism and German Pietism as varying Calvinist spreads or derivatives in his analysis of their effects on modern science. As Sprunger (1982:458) adds, "unlike areas like Scotland or the Netherlands, where Calvinism quickly became the predominant religion, or France, where the Calvinist Huguenots were a perpetual minority, the Puritanical English Calvinists existed as a movement within the larger structure of the Church of England." Simply, only in England, Scotland, and later colonial America, first New England and then beyond, but not continental Europe, did Calvinism become or produce "Puritanism" as specifically understood within Protestantism.

[18] Weber cites the "ecclesiastic revolution of the strict Calvinists in the Netherlands during the 1580s." Also Sprunger (1982:457) specifically explores the history of English (and Scottish) Puritan churches of the Netherlands in the sixteenth to seventeenth century and defines Puritanism as the "English Calvinist dissenting movement against established Anglican religion, dedicated to simplifying and purifying the church along Reformed lines."

mostly within the preestablished Church of England or Anglicanism[19] (Klausner 1998), created Puritanism in the specific form and meaning by embracing, transferring, and radically implementing European Calvinism in the English-American polity and society.

Consequently, original Puritanism represented in essence seventeenth-century Anglo-Saxon Calvinism (McLaughlin 1996), and the early Puritans "were Calvinists" (Bremer 1995:15), more precisely, in Weber's words, "strict Calvinists" or even "stodgy Orthodox Calvinists" (Gould 1996:10), in England and America. In short, English and American Puritans' "ideological loyalties were mainly to the international Calvinist movement" (Sprunger 1982:457). Predictably, their overriding aim or outcome was to purify or sanctify (and simplify), via the vision and creation of a "holy commonwealth" or "community of saints," official English Protestantism or Anglicanism from within as well as outside the Church. Thus, Weber[20] observes that, like other religious sects, Puritanism *cum* a sect "adheres to the ideal of the *pure ecclesia* [church] (hence the name 'Puritans'), the *visible* community of saints, from whose midst the black sheep are removed so that they will not offend God's eyes." In this sense, various English Puritanisms constituted a "growing circle of discontent both within and without the Established [Anglican] Church from the 1560s onwards," sharing the Calvinist vision of "what the Church of Christ ought to be" (Kearney 1965:105), i.e., a *pure ecclesia* with no "black sheep." Notably, Calvinism as a strict, post-Lutheran theology and world view "lay at the core of New England Puritanism" (Bremer 1995:225), just as of its English original transplanted or interconnected to America (Sprunger 1982).

Significantly, Weber implies that Calvinism is at the heart of Anglo-American Puritanism as a special sect in that it "resembles the sects by virtue of its aristocratic charismatic principle of predestination" and the "degradation of office charisma." To that extent, Puritanism retrieved, realized, and intensified Calvinism's implied or potential sectarianism to become what Weber would call the staunchest or the most radical and strict type of sectarian, just as ascetic, Protestantism in England and especially, as he implies,[21] in America (Lipset 1996). Further, this specific

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In this view, the "essence of Puritanism was a balanced combination of doctrinal Calvinist theology and intense personal piety" (Sprunger 1982:457).

[19] Sprunger (1982:457) notes that "most Puritans in England before 1660 operated within the larger Church of England, hoping to reform from inside." Also Klausner (1998:155) remarks that Puritanism, just as Quakerism, derived from Anglicanism. But it did, as hinted, as a Calvinist-style rebellion or revolution seeking to radically reform the established Anglican Church, eventually fighting against in the seventeenth-century English civil war and separating from the latter, following the Puritans' defeat and the Restoration of the Monarchy.

[20] Weber adds that in Puritan sects, the individual "may be qualified as a member in various ways: by virtue of divine predestination, as in the case of the Particular Baptists, the elite troops of Cromwell's Independents; by virtue of the 'inner light' or of the pneumatic ability to experience ecstasy Quakers; by virtue of the 'struggle for penitence' and the resulting 'breakthrough' [the old Pietists]."

[21] Weber remarks that "the major domicile" of the Puritan-Protestant sects is America where the "intensity of indoctrination and the impact of exclusion are much more effective than any authoritarian ecclesiastic discipline can be."

Protestant version continued and reinforced what seems to be inherent sectarianism and asceticism in Puritanism in general, including its pre-Christian forms, as Weber suggests by identifying some puritanical sects (Donatists) in Roman Antiquity.

In sum, European Calvinism with its original asceticism and sectarianism, postulated by the dogma of predestination, theologically grounds and historically prefigures specifically Anglo-American Puritanism as the extreme or "hotter sort" of ascetic, sectarian and orthodox Protestantism (self-) distinguished from Protestant nonascetic, non-sectarian, or (in Simmel's view) liberal versions such as Lutheranism and Anglicanism. In turn, Anglo-American Puritanism far from being, as its adherents claim, new or exceptional, as indicated in America's Puritan-based supposed exceptionalism, is preceded by and in part modeled after and inspired by various Puritanical ideas, personalities (e.g., saints, virtuosi, ascetics, sects) and practices within and during, as well as outside and prior to, Christianity, from Weber's proto-Puritan Pharisees and Donatists in Antiquity to early and medieval Catholic monks. For example, Pharisees prefigure, if not inspire, the ascetic austerity, hypocrisy, and moral rigor, and Donatist sects (also) sectarianism of Anglo-American Puritans as hyper austere, moralist, and sectarian ("hotter") Protestants. Table 1.1 summarizes major historical developments, events, and personalities in Protestant Puritanism.

Pre-Protestant and Protestant Puritanism

In a sense, Weber's distinction between pre-Protestant and Protestant or Calvinist Puritanism (and asceticism) coincides with, and even in part contains within itself, that between traditional prebourgeois and modern bourgeois capitalism. This holds true, given his explicit connection of Protestantism, notably Calvinism, with modern capitalism, and conversely that of non-Protestant Christianity and non-Christian religions with its traditional types.[22] Both distinctions are in a

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[22] Weber observes that the rising bourgeoisie "not only failed to resist this unexampled tyranny of Puritanism but even developed a heroism in its defense," while noting that in Europe, notably, England, the "Puritan Revolution was successful because of the cavalry provided by the rural gentry." Also, he remarks that the French Huguenot and Scottish nobility "later stopped fighting for Calvinism, and everywhere the further development of ascetic Protestantism became the concern of the citizen middle classes" or bourgeoisie. Referring to colonial America, Weber notices the "specifically middle-class outlook of the Puritans" in New England in contrast to Southern Anglicans wanting to "live as feudal lords." Anticipating Weber, Tocqueville notices that in England the "stronghold of Puritanism continued to be in the middle classes." In turn, echoing Weber, Tawney (1962:204–210) detects the "identification" or "affinity" of business classes in the UK and the US with Puritanism as religious radicalism, commenting that the Puritan bourgeoisie "knew that against the chosen people the gates of hell could not prevail." Similarly, Walzer (1963:87) notes that Puritanism, like other radical or revolutionary movements like Jacobinism and Bolshevism, tended to come from "educated middle classes" or "professional men of all sorts." In turn, Rettig and Pasamanick (1961), invoking Sombart, hold that ascetic Protestantism, including Calvinism in the sixteenth century and Puritanism in the seventeenth century, was a movement of the "lower middle class." In particular, Foerster (1962:4) notes that the US Puritans "came from the middle and lower classes." He divides the US Puritan Pilgrims into an initial small "radical group" (founding Plymouth in 1620) of "poor and humble and

TABLE 1.1. Major historical developments, events, and personalities in Protestant (English-American) Puritanism.

Time period	Puritan development, event or effect
1510s–20s	Protestant Reformation in continental Europe begins: Luther's movement in Germany
1530s–50s	Protestant Reformation intensifies: Calvin's (reformed) movement in Geneva
1540	Calvin signes the Lutheran "Confession of Augsburg"
1550s–1620s	Spread of Calvinism to and birth/rise of Puritanism in Great Britain (England and Scotland)
1620–30s	First English Puritans (Pilgrims) emigrate to America (Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Virginia)
1630	John Winthrop (the first governor of Massachusetts) arrives at America and gives a speech aboard the *Arabella* ("a Shining City upon a Hill")
1630–40s	Puritans establish an official Congregational Church in New England ("Bible Commonwealth")
1640–42	Increasing tensions between Puritans (the Parliament) and the Crown (Anglican Church) in England
1642	English Civil War starts: Puritan Revolution against the Monarchy and Anglican Church
1645	English Civil War ends with a victory of Puritan forces (Cromwell's Parliament-army) over the King (Charles I)
1648	Cromwell establishes the "Rump" (reduced) Parliament abolishing the monarchy and the old constitution
1649	The King executed
1653	The Act of Settlement in 1653 orders forcible transportation of Irish Catholics (more than 40% killed by Cromwell's army) Cromwell's army dissolves the "Rump" Parliament and establishes the "Parliament of Puritan Saints"
1655	Cromwell dissolves the "Parliament of Saints" and rules alone with the title "Lord Protector of the Realm" (replacing "Lord General of the Army")
1658	Cromwell dies designating his son (Richard) as a successor
1650s–60s	Puritans persecute and execute Quakers in New England
1660	The Puritan Holy Commonwealth collapses and the Monarchy restored in England (under (Charles II)
1692	Puritan witchcraft persecutions, executions, and hysteria in Massachusetts (Salem)
1740s	The first Great Awakening in America begins: spread of Puritan or evangelical Protestant sects (Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian) to most colonies, including the South (dominated by the Anglican or Episcopal church)

devout" (e.g., "cobblers, tailors, feltmakers, and such-like trash" according to the bishop of London) and a subsequent "large band of conservative Puritans" (the founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630) made of "landed gentry, wealthy merchants, university graduates" (Foerster 1962:2). Also, Moore (1993: xvii–xxiii) describes the Puritan as a "bourgeois" revolution leading to the English Civil War, though Goldstone (1991:413) finds a "close-knit network of gentry with Puritan sympathies" in early seventeenth-century England. Overall, Rettig and Pasamanick (1961) find a curvilinear relationship between

TABLE 1.1. (*Continued*)

1776	Three-quarters of Americans are Puritans (the American Revolution)
1800s	The second Great Awakening in America begins: Puritan or evangelical Protestantism (Baptism, Methodism, Presbyterianism) becomes dominant in the country, especially in the South (replacing the Episcopal church)
1833	Formal disestablishment of Puritan (Congregational) Church in Massachusetts
1860s–1920s	The US South increasingly ruled by Puritan or evangelical Protestantism ("Baptist and Methodist barbarism")
1918	Puritanical Prohibition Constitutional Amendment ratified by all US states
1934	Prohibition repelled
1930s–2000s	Alcohol prohibition or restriction in the South continues ("dry" states and counties)
1980s	The legal drinking age raised from 18 to 21 by all US states US president condemns the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" the US government withdraws from UNESCO on Puritanical (moralistic) grounds
1980s–2000s	The "war on drugs" resumes, intensifies, and escalates to cover minor drug offenses
1990s–2000s	About 80% of (surveyed) Americans support "tough" anti-drug laws and more resources for drug (and vice) police around 70% of (surveyed) Americans support the death penalty for criminals, including drug offenders (traffickers)
1996	The US "Indecency Act" passed by Congress, yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
1998	US president impeached by the House of Representatives for sexual misconduct
2000–04	US president elected and reelected on a platform of "morality" and "faith" Moral–religious (social) issues also dominate congressional, state, and local elections and referenda
2001	The "war on terror" launched as a "crusade" linked with the "war on drugs" and on illegal immigration "USA Patriot Act" passed by Congress
2002	US Congress authorizes a preemptive war against Iraq on moralist-security grounds
2003	The US and the UK attack and invade Iraq as part of the "axis of evil" The US government threatens other "evil" countries with "preemptive" (including nuclear) strikes
2004	Torture and other abuses of foreign prisoners ("terrorists") by the US government revealed The US government fines television networks for public "indecency"
2005–06	Almost two-thirds of 2 million-plus US prisoners are nonviolent and minor drug offenders and other "sinners" (alcohol, prostitution, indecency, etc.) US neoconservative government allies with the Vatican Church and Islamic fundamentalists against defining "immoral" behaviors (e.g., abortion) as human rights at international conferences

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Puritanism, defined as the "rigidity" or "severity of judgment on generic moral issues," and social classes in the sense of its peaking in the lower middle class and declining in the "adjacent strata." Following Sombart and in part Weber, they comment that low-class moral rigidity "also serves the function of expressing resentment against the higher classes" (Rettig and Pasamanick 1961:22), denounced as "immoral," "corrupt," or "elitist."

way variations or reflections of Weber's dichotomy of world religions into those resigned to a passive "adaptation" or "accommodation" to the world such as pre-Protestant religious systems, including monastic[23] Catholicism, and those actively seeking a sort of total "mastery of the world," like Protestantism, notably European Calvinism and its Anglo-American derivations or escalations in Puritanism.[24] In a sense, this dichotomy encompasses or corresponds to Weber's between two ascetic religious types: first, other-worldly, medieval monastic asceticism as the means of what he calls "mere accommodation" to the world in Catholicism and most Oriental religions (e.g., Confucianism); second, "systematic worldly asceticism" as the instrument of its mastery in Protestantism, especially Calvinism. The dichotomy hence implies or parallels the distinction between pre-Protestant and Protestant types of Puritanism. Thus, the resignation or passive adaptation and mere accommodation to the world is the aim or result of other-worldly non-Protestant asceticism or "Puritanism," while what Parsons following Weber calls "a drive for active mastery over worldly things and interests" is one of its worldly Protestant type.

Weber thereby indicates and emphasizes various pertinent differences between non-Protestant and Protestant Puritanism and asceticism overall. Yet, he considers, unlike perhaps Protestant Puritans, the latter a peculiar comparative-historical, English-American and sixteenth to seventeenth century, variation on Puritanism in general defined by the ethics of virtuosi or moral saints and religious dogma of "sanctification." Following the conventional use in the Weberian sociological literature, this study adopts the specific and prevalent meaning of Protestant or Calvinist (Hudson and Coukos 2005) Puritanism as the Anglo-American derivative, transplant, substitute, or residue of European Calvinism (Stivers 1994), distinguished from its other Christian and non-Christian meanings and forms.

To avoid ethnocentric or inverse implications—depending on its evaluation as "superior" or "inferior" in its nature or political–social effects—it is to be reiterated

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[23] However, Veblen implicitly contradicts Weber's thesis of passive adaptation or mere accommodation by Catholicism and other pre-Protestantism, by observing that the members of the Catholic and other medieval orders of monks "actually labored to some useful end." In particular, Collins (1997) emphasizes the significance for the "breakthrough to capitalism" of Catholicism through its "activist monastic movements" in the Middle Ages, as well as Buddhism in medieval China and Japan, prior to Protestantism, and downplays Weber's "emphasis on the content" of the latter.

[24] Tocqueville anticipates Weber's idea of the Puritan mastery of the world by noting that the piety of the early American Puritans was not "merely speculative" but took strong "cognizance [and control] of the course of worldly affairs." Like his connection between Protestantism and capitalism, Weber's distinction between the Protestant-Puritan mastery of the material world and the non-Protestant, including Catholic, spiritual adaptation to it has been often questioned. For example, MacKinnon (1988) implictly does so by contending that, like Catholicism and even Lutheranism, in Puritanism or Calvinism the "spiritual calling leads down the path of righteousness," so the "adaptation" to the material world, rather than the "temporal calling" or "earthly toil" as an instrument of its mastery, contrary to Weber's view.

that Protestant, including American, Puritanism, is far from entirely new or exceptional[25] in this respect, viz. the ethic of moral virtuosi or saints, as its advocates as well as critics often assume. Rather, it is a particular subspecies of general religious and other Puritanism in the form of seemingly perennial Puritan ideas, forms, personages, and practices in most religions and cultures both prior and subsequent to Protestantism, Christianity, or Western civilization, as Weber implies citing Pharisees as arch-Puritans and puritanical Donatists as protosectarians predating sectarian Protestant Puritans. In this sense, Protestantism, notably Calvinism, did not, strictly speaking, invent through some sort of theological or sociological creationism but rather "embraced a high-tone Puritanism that greatly prized the control of affect" (Urdank 1991:524). Instead, Puritanism thus understood had been already and virtually always "out there," both within Christianity such as monastic ascetic Catholicism and Orthodoxy and non-Christianity, including, alongside Weber's hypocritical pre-Christian Pharisees and ancient Roman Donatists, Plato's Sparta. For instance, Spartan[26] proto-Puritanism, expressed in strict moral discipline, asceticism, simplicity, as well as brutality and cruelty, apparently was embraced by, or provided a sort of model and inspiration to, the US Puritans' (Samuel Adams') project of a "Christian Sparta" (Kloppenberg 1998:28–32), as, what master Puritan Pilgrim John Winthrop called "Shining City upon a Hill" in America. This was the case originally in New England and subsequently the entire country as the "biblical garden," notably the ante bellum and later the post-civil-war South qua the "Bible Belt" since its religious "Great Awakenings," especially the second starting in the 1800s.

In this respect, it seems as if nothing were ever new "under the sun"[27] of perpetual or recurring Puritan ideas, movements, persons, and practices generally in virtually all religions, societies, and times, since at least ancient Greece and Rome and perhaps before (e.g., Pharisees). This is what some early US sociologists

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[25] Gould (1996:37) finds Puritan exceptionalism in another respect, viz. a "consensual [hierarchical] order of politics" based on the "Puritan fears for a Bible commonwealth." In historical terms, one wonders if this is truly Puritan exceptionalism, since the blueprint or reality of a "consensual order of politics" or "Bible commonwealth" has been a constant in pre- and post-Protestant Christianity, notably official Catholicism in the Vatican church-state as the putative realization of such a order and community at least in the Middle Ages, as Weber suggests using the term "bibliocracy" as the perennial Christian ideal. So has it been *mutatis mutandis*, viz. Bible-proxies, in most pre- and non-Christian religions, perhaps most manifestly, persistently and militantly in fundamentalist Islam establishing a Koran-based commonwealth, as also Weber implies in his comparative-historical analysis of world religious systems.

[26] Sprunger (1982:460) notes that early Puritanism in America and England had a "Spartan simplicity."

[27] This is what generally Comte suggests by noting that the Protestant-Lutheran revolution "produced no innovation, in regard to discipline, ecclesiastical orders or dogma [and Luther's] success was mainly due to the ripeness of the time." In particular, he asserts that the Protestant dogma of free inquiry, emphasized both by Durkheim and Weber (though for different analytical purposes), was "a mere sanction of the pre-existing state" in most Christian nations.

suggest by describing the "whole ethic" of both Plato and English ascetic authors Ruskin and Carlyle as the "natural Puritanism of a 'pain economy' [sic!]" (Calhoun 1925:53). This makes Protestant Puritanism a sectarian and revivalist or fundamentalist religious–political movement, and early English and subsequently American Puritans sectarians and revivalists or fundamentalists (Bremer 1995:233), in the sense or virtue of attempting to restore and realize the old foundational or "natural" Puritan ideals in Christianity and beyond. Within Christianity, it represents the English-American seventeenth-century variation on various moralist, to paraphrase Weber, bibliocratic, or evangelical revivals, awakenings or restorations since its rise, by seeking to reestablish in old and especially New England and eventually America as a whole a "Bible Commonwealth" (Bremer 1995).

In view of its history, Protestant and other Puritanism can be described and predicted as being in the state of constant revival, restoration, awakening, resurrection, or a sort of permanent revolution. Thus, Weber remarks that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination "formed the battle-cry of great new awakenings" by Puritanism in England and especially America during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, just as "served as a rallying-point to countless heroes of the Church militant." His case in point is Methodism as the "aspired" revival, especially "emotional intensification," of original English Puritanism as well as the two Great mostly Puritan-inspired Awakenings in colonial and postrevolutionary America, and their various subsequent reenactments, reflexes, or proxies, including the ante bellum and post-civil-war South, up to the 1980s–2000s. In turn, its revivalism or fundamentalism in the form of evangelicalism or a "Bible Commonwealth" renders Puritanism typically militant, uncompromising and intolerant, and so radical or revolutionary, in relation to established religious–political institutions like Catholic and Anglican church-states condemned and destroyed as the impediment to the Puritan revival, restoration or "recuperation" (Gould 1996:28) of these ideals of a "Godly society" and pure Church. This was witnessed during England's seventeenth century Puritan-provoked civil war or revolution against Anglicanism and the Monarchy, as well as Puritanism's ensuing victory and brief harsh rule through Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints." In this sense, Protestant and perhaps all Puritans tend to be not only conservative, traditionalist, revivalist, orthodox or fundamentalist in respect to the "natural Puritanism of a pain economy." They are also radical, rebellious, revolutionary, heterodox or nihilist, as often described, with regard to existing non-Puritan religious and political powers and values, as diverse and often mutually hostile as Catholicism, Anglicanism and English royal absolutism, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, liberalism, pluralism, rationalism, secularism, liberal democracy and modernity. In short, Puritanism tends to be in the state both of constant revival of pure foundations and of permanent revolution or, to use Schumpeter's term, "creative destruction" against subsequent "impurities." This is another way to say what Simmel and Weber (also Tawney 1962) do respectively, viz. that Puritanism is both an orthodox–conservative and radical–revolutionary type of Protestantism, depending on specific "power constellations," viz. Puritan political dominance over non-Puritans or opposition to non-Puritan dominant powers.

Overall, the foregoing suggests that Protestantism, above all Calvinism, only continued, specified and reinforced this near-universal, anterior, and perpetual "Puritanism" or "purism" and asceticism characteristic of most pre-Protestant religions and sects, while acknowledging the various differences between Protestant–Christian and other Puritan or ascetic systems. As known, Weber detects and analyzes these differences in detail, viz. Protestant worldliness and mastery versus. non-Protestant other-worldliness and accommodation, as do other sociologists from similar or different theoretical positions, including Parsons, Tawney, and Sorokin in his pseudocyclical theory of asceticism or Puritanism as the basis of "ideational" culture systems.[28] With these differences in mind, Calvinist Puritanism or ascetic Protestantism is not "Puritanism" or "asceticism" *tout de court*, but just its special, though magnified, intensified and militant, type. Most important, this is a Puritan type with a distinct and strong affinity or connection not only with modern capitalism, as Weber and others contend, emphasize, and demonstrate, but also with contemporary political–social authoritarianism, as argued, stressed, and documented in this work.

In sum, while Calvinism or ascetic Protestantism is basically Puritan, not all "Puritanism" in the general sense, from protoascetic Sparta, Pharisees–Puritans and puritanical Donatists to monastic Catholicism and Islam to fascism (Nazism) and communism, is Calvinist or Protestant, which perhaps prompts Weber to call Puritanism "a highly ambiguous word." Hence, to better understand its origin, development, extension, and effects on contemporary authoritarianism, just as modern capitalism, this necessitates and justifies placing Protestant Puritanism within a broad comparative-historical perspective of Puritan ideas, movements, practices, and persons in pre- and post-Protestant religions, societies, and times. Having specified the meaning of Puritanism for the present purpose, specifying the "spirit of authoritarianism" is done next.

The "Spirit of Authoritarianism"

Weber, probably because of his main focus on the spirit of capitalism, does not explicitly define or develop the alternative concept of the "spirit of authoritarianism," though intimates it at some occasions by ideas and terms such as the "authoritarian principle," "authoritarian relations," "authoritarian constraint," "authoritarian power," and the like. It is advisable to retrieve or reconstruct Weber's latent sociological concept of the "spirit of authoritarianism" in relation to Puritanism. Like Puritanism, the "spirit of authoritarianism" can be understood in two meanings, general and specific. In extension, by analogy to what Weber calls the structure and spirit of capitalism, traditional and modern alike, one can adopt the expression the "spirit and structure," i.e., the idea and institutional system, of authoritarianism as

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[28] Merton (1996) comments that he, as Sorokin's research assistant, "did not subscribe to his mentor's cyclical theory of the three cycles of sociocultural systems: sensate, idealistic, and ideational."

a more complete one. In retrospect, Weber's contemporary Mannheim effectively proposes or comes most closely to the concept of the "spirit of authoritarianism" by what he describes as the "authoritarian, pre-democratic mind."

The General "Spirit of Authoritarianism"

Etymologically, the general meaning of the spirit or mind of authoritarianism is constraining, commanding, coercive, repressive, obligatory and obedient authority, power, or domination. Thus, Weber uses terms such as "hierarchical," "constraint," "power to command," "duty-relationship," "duty to obey," and the like to describe what he calls the "authoritarian principle" or authority in general defined as legitimate power or legitimized domination. In a similar vein, Mannheim[29] describes what he significantly calls the "authoritarian, pre-democratic mind" as rejecting the "idea of progress and genesis in favour of static, hierarchically ordered models of excellence." In particular, Weber and Mannheim identify and emphasize coercion, discipline, constraint, and repression as the hallmark of the "spirit of authoritarianism" or the "authoritarian, pre-democratic mind."

Weber emphasizes that authoritarian power or agency attempts to obtain results "by coercion" as well as support coercive "traditional authorities." He invokes a religious type of authoritarianism called hierocracy, as an equivalent or cognate term for theocracy, and its enforcing or supporting coercion through "authoritarian ecclesiastic discipline," including restrictions on individuals', especially workers', "anti-authoritarian freedom" of movement, while obstructing the formation of their "anti-authoritarian" group or class consciousness, and viewing with "deep distrust" their anti-authoritarian activities or means like labor organizations and strikes.[30] To wit, while not all religious authoritarianism or hierocracy/theocracy is Puritan, Puritanism is typically religiously authoritarian or hierocratic in Weber's sense, i.e., hierarchical, coercive, disciplinary, and restrictive, as argued and elaborated later. Akin to Weber, Mannheim stresses that especially religious or conservative authoritarianism uses "prolonged discipline and repression" in order to enforce and maintain quietism toward the "prevailing laws of the state" and the societal status quo overall.

In turn, conservative authoritarianism (Miliband 1969) or authoritarian conservatism (Dunn and Woodard 1996) comprises or generates fascism, including

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[29] Mannheim adds that "order and fluidity, discipline and openness are antithetical human ideals which find their embodiment in different social system of authoritarian and democratic character respectively." Also, he remarks that authoritarian cultures "seek a system of timeless truth untouched by historical changes and vicissitude."

[30] Specifically, Weber observes that hierocracy "recommends those 'welfare institutions' which restrict the workers' anti-authoritarian freedom of movement; it also furthers as much as possible the home industry, which seemingly favors family bonds and patriarchal work relations, as against the concentration of the workers in factories, which promotes anti-authoritarian class consciousness. With deep distrust [it] views an anti-authoritarian weapon such as the strike and all organizations which facilitate it; it opposes these most when they threaten to result in inter-sectarian solidarity."

Nazism and McCarthyism, as its extreme variant or creation (Dahrendorf 1979) or conservative totalitarianism (Giddens 1979), while distinguished from radical authoritarian types exemplified by communism and state socialism. Thus, some sociological studies find that modern authoritarianism, specifically fascism, has its principal "social origins" (Moore 1993) in conservatism. At this juncture, "authoritarianism" and "conservatism" can be and often are used as interchangeable or correlate terms (Dahrendorf 1979; Giddens 2000; Stevens 1989) to the extent that "conservative" ideas and institutions typically tend to be "authoritarian" in some ways, and even occasionally become "totalitarian" or fascist, as witnessed in Europe during and even prior to fascism. Thus, European conservatism was reportedly "riddled with authoritarianism before fascism" as its "hard edge"[31] (Blinkhorn 2003:4–7). In this view, the "authoritarian continuities in German history between Bismarck and Hitler" (Blinkhorn 2003:57), i.e., traditional conservatism and fascism, provide a dramatic illustration of intrinsic or prevalent conservative authoritarianism climaxing in Nazism (Manent 1998:218) during interwar times.

Generally, the "spirit of authoritarianism" or the "authoritarian mind" is, to adopt a term Weber uses in reference to capitalism, the ethos of eliminated or restricted human freedom in society. In this sense, it is the set of ideas, attitudes, and values materialized in corresponding institutions, enacted in practices and symbolized in "signs of illiberty" (Dahrendorf 1979:93). It is thus the spirit and institutional structure of an unfree society, including polity and the civic sphere or culture, constituting the antithesis or suppression of political democracy and social liberties. Adopting an early term Weber and other sociologists and political philosophers use since at least Tocqueville, the essence of authoritarianism is some form of "tyranny," either by a majority or a minority social group. Another traditional term to designate authoritarianism is what Simmel and Tönnies call despotism or absolutism, while a contemporary designation, equivalent or synonym is, as Popper (1966) and others[32] suggest, totalitarianism (Arendt 1951) or total dictatorship.

Hence, for the present purpose, authoritarianism in general is considered to be equivalent, synonymous, cognate, or correlate with tyranny, despotism, absolutism,

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[31] Blinkhorn (2003:1–8) points to "various strands of conservative authoritarianism" or "authoritarian regimes with non-fascist, essentially conservative" roots during interwar Europe in a "subjective distinction" from "radical authoritarianism" or fascist totalitarianism.

[32] Dahrendorf (1959, 1979) uses the terms "totalitarian monism" and the "authoritarian movement" interchangeably, i.e., as opposites to freedom, pluralism, and democracy. So too does Habermas (2001:44), viz. "forces of totalitarianism," "authoritarian systems," etc. (though perhaps a subtle distinction is implicit in a "fascist-authoritarian state") by virtue of having common "liberal enemies." In a similar vein, Munch (2001:269–270) suggests that totalitarianism and authoritarianism are essential identical in that they are both "against the reality of a liberal and pluralist society." Also, Kinloch (1981:20–22) adopts "authoritarian political arrangements" and "totalitarianism" as equivalent or synonymous. Similarly, Moore (1993:xvii–xxiii) explores the "social origins of authoritarianism," apparently used, by including fascism as "right-wing totalitarianism" (Giddens 1979:156), as an interchangeable term with "totalitarianism."

totalitarianism, or dictatorship, as different names for the same problematic of human illiberty or unfree society, though they can be and often are distinguished from each other. Even if this equivalence seems to be redundant, secondary, or questionable, as witnessed by the frequent distinction from "totalitarianism" in the literature, it does not affect the general and widely accepted definition of authoritarianism in terms of unfreedom and unfree or undemocratic society. Thus, contemporary sociologists like Dahrendorf (1979:98) pinpoint the so-called "conservative-authoritarian movement by way of law-and-order slogans" in Europe and America as a major "collectivist" threat (along with the "revolutionary-socialist" movement) to contemporary democratic society. In particular, others identify the US neoconservative "authoritarian welfare state" as revolving around the slogan of "obey the law and work" (Goldberg 2001:303).

The key point is authoritarianism in general, including the "conservative authoritarian path" (Stevens 1989) in particular, is to be defined, just as it often defines and presents itself, as dramatically evidenced in fascism and McCarthyism, as, to use Popper's (1966) word, an "enemy" of freedom and a free society, rather than whether and in what respects is identical to tyranny, despotism, absolutism, totalitarianism, and dictatorship, or not, as often suggested in the literature and common discourse. Particularly, within Weber's context of *the Protestant Ethnic*, it is epitomized or expressed in modern authoritarian, radical, or "unfettered" capitalism (Bourdieu 1998; Centeno 1994) or capitalist dictatorships (Habermas 2001). This needs to be qualified: like most traditional economists, otherwise skeptical Weber assumes that Protestant-based capitalism, as Adam Smith's "natural" system or a spontaneous order of economic liberty a la Hayek et al. (Buchanan 1991), and its spirit/ethos is also typically, though not invariably, non-authoritarian or democratic in sociopolitical, so nonproblematic for freedom and a free society, including liberal democracy and civic life.

Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism

Despite, to paraphrase Merton (1968), the substantive identity or functional equivalence in sociological terms between the "spirit" of authoritarianism and of totalitarianism or the authoritarian and totalitarian "mind," many sociologists as well as political scientists make various distinctions between the two. The prevalent basis or theme in these distinctions is that totalitarianism (Arendt 1951) is a more radical, extreme, severe, or comprehensive type of undemocratic government and unfree society, involving "totalistic" state control and repression to the point of exterminating "enemies" (Baehr 2002) or "witches," than is authoritarianism like traditional despotism and McCarthyism. For example, some sociologists (Cooney 1997) distinguish authoritarian from totalitarian types of political regime, in turn both (plus communism) demarcated from democracy. This is hence a difference in what can be called degrees of unfreedom or severity—for example, the higher rate of people killed by State in totalitarianism than authoritarianism—in polity and society rather than in kind or substance, as both systems are considered contrary or alien to democracy and freedom (Manent 1998). In short, to

paraphrase Mannheim, both the authoritarian and totalitarian "minds" are anti- or predemocratic.

Presumably, totalitarianism, exemplified in fascism, notably Nazism, or communism, is a special extreme case, reinforcement, or escalation of authoritarianism, with the first being total control, dictatorship, tyranny, brutal oppression, or destruction of freedom and democracy, the second ("only") hierarchy, constraint , law and order, or limitation of liberty. But the demarcation line is fluid, and if authoritarianism, old and new, is Popper's "most objectionable" or the least democratic type of polity and society, its difference from totalitarianism as exactly such a type logically evaporates or diminishes into impertinence in substantive terms. In addition, even if useful in many other respects or contexts, the distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism is irrelevant, unnecessary, and even undesirable in the respect or context of the Weberian implied problem of Puritanism and human unfreedom. If Puritanism can be shown to have affinities with political and social illiberty, i.e., an undemocratic polity and unfree civil society, then it is essentially irrelevant and indifferent to this problem and its resolution whether this Puritan tendency or outcome is called authoritarianism or totalitarianism, which thus become interchangeable terms for that purpose. And, if the latter is an extreme species of the former, this implies a sort of charitable interpretation of Puritanism in this respect, as this study does by using primarily the term authoritarianism and secondarily totalitarianism.

The "Spirit" of Political and Social Authoritarianism

With its sociological equivalence to totalitarianism in mind, the specific meaning of the "spirit of authoritarianism" or the "authoritarian mind" as understood refers to political as well as social authoritarianisms. In fact, its prevalent specific meaning in the literature is in the sense of political authoritarianism or an authoritarian government, state, and polity. In this sense, authoritarianism is the ideological spirit and institutional structure of political unfreedom, of an antithesis or subversion of democracy, as implied in Mannheim's apparent equation of the "authoritarian" and "pre-democratic" mind. In Weber's terms, political authoritarianism comprises or engenders "hierarchical" relations, "constraint," attaining ends "by coercion," "authoritarian power of command," or "duty-relationship" in polity. His case in point is what he considers to be the "basically authoritarian" principle of charismatic and traditional legitimation or political (and other) authority. Political authoritarianism hence represents or reproduces what Popper (1966:159) calls the "most objectionable" or the least democratic form of government and polity, so equivalent and synonymous with totalitarianism or dictatorship more commonly seen as precisely such an extreme form (Arendt 1951), as well as with tyranny, despotism, or absolutism, including, if religiously grounded or justified, theocracy. Thus, in interwar Europe, both conservative authoritarianism and fascist totalitarianism constituted antidemocratic and to that extent substantively, though not formally, identical or correlate political regimes (Manent 1998), as indicated

by their eventual fusion or alliance in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere (Blinkhorn 2003).

In Weber's setting of modern capitalism, the spirit and institutional structure of political authoritarianism is represented or expressed in, as even some economists admit, an authoritarian capitalist polity or dictatorship (Friedman and Friedman 1982; Pryor 2002). In short, political authoritarianism within capitalism and pre-capitalism alike is a kind of "authority without democracy" (Giddens 2000:66). Specifically, conservative political authoritarianism in precapitalist and even early capitalist societies consisted of the "authoritarian power of monarchy and the state church" (Collins 1987), of a mix of absolutist states seeking to preserve feudalism (Hodgson 1999) with theocracy.

However, the prevalent definition or specification of authoritarianism in terms of an undemocratic type of government and politics is too narrow from a broad sociological perspective that encompasses, in Durkheim–Parsons' words, the total social system, including polity as well as culture or civil society, plus economy. Hence, it needs to be broadened and complemented by the concept or meaning of what contemporary sociologists describe as social authoritarianism (Eccleshall 2000; Giddens 2000), specifically attributed to British and American Puritan-rooted neoconservatism, albeit in varying degrees, with the second, especially Reaganism, being more neo-Puritan. In short, this is the spirit and structure of social unfreedom or cultural illiberty, an antipode of a free civil society or culture. In Weber's terms, social authoritarianism contains or engenders "hierarchical" relations, "constraint," attaining goals "by coercion," authoritarian power of "command" or "duty-relationship" in civil society, in conjunction with such elements in polity. Notably, it is the spirit or ethos of moral authoritarianism understood in the sense of strict Puritan-style ethical controls, including expansive and intensive coercion and repression, aiming to protect and impose traditionalist morality and religion (Inglehart and Baker 2000), as witnessed in British and especially American neoconservatism (Giddens 2000). Hence, social authoritarianism analogously constitutes the "most objectionable" or the least free type of civil society or cultural system, thus being equivalent, synonymous, or cognate with totalitarianism, tyranny, despotism, or absolutism in the private–civic, as distinguished from the public–political, sphere, i.e., moral dictatorship or repression. Thus, social authoritarianism is observed to result in "a higher degree of state repression and the undermining of the public standards of social solidarity" (Habermas 2001:91) in contemporary societies, notably America under neoconservatism. Further, some analysts suggest that neoconservative authoritarianism in America and beyond played the functionally equivalent role during the late twentieth and the early twenty-first century as did fascist "totalitarian temptation" in interwar Europe in that both "seemed irresistible" at these historical junctures (Cohen 2003:114).

In sum, political and social authoritarianism is the spirit and structure, i.e., doctrine and institutional system of unfreedom in politics and civil society, respectively. Hence, political and social authoritarianism both belong to Popper's (1966) "enemies" of a free society, specifically the first is the "enemy" of liberal democracy or public freedoms, and the second of civil society or private liberties.

These two types of authoritarianism, an undemocratic polity and an unfree civil society, are typically intertwined and mutually reinforcing, albeit with secondary variations, viz. primarily economic individual freedom mixed with an authoritarian government and social repression, as Simmel observes for despotism. If so, then these authoritarian types are separated only for Weber's typological or analytical purposes, thus being special cases of an ideal type.

The specification of the concepts of Puritanism and authoritarianism is a preparatory step, so secondary to examining their links as the primary aim. The aim is to address the problem of an affinity or convergence, in Weber–Parsons' sense, between Puritanism and authoritarianism as usually understood, rather than redefine or rediscover their "true" nature per se. For this aim, it is sufficient adopting the meanings of Puritanism as Weber's "staunchest" ideal type of ascetic and sectarian Protestantism, specifically the Anglo-American derivative of radical Calvinism, and of authoritarianism as unfreedom, namely an undemocratic polity and unfree civil society.

Puritanism and Authoritarianism: Authoritarian Mastery of the Social World

As noted, the distinction between pre-Protestant and Calvinist Puritanism, as well as traditional and modern capitalism, reflects or parallels Weber's dichotomy between religions acquiescing with passive adaptation or mere accommodation to the world and those aiming at, ideally, total mastery of the world. Notably, Weber assumes that Puritanism or Calvinism was conducive to modern capitalism primarily owing to, as Parsons (1966:79–80) also puts it, its "drive for active mastery over worldly things and interests." Yet, like most orthodox economists, Weber and his followers, including Parsons et al., neglect or subdue the noneconomic, as compared with the economic, political, and social consequences of this overarching Puritan–Calvinist tendency. Thus, Weber downplays or underanalyzes the fact or possibility that the outcome of the Puritan realized or attempted total mastery of the physical–social world is not only modern capitalism as a market-economic, presumably beneficial and desirable, though probably unintended, effect, but also authoritarianism in polity and civil society as a sociopolitical, and typically considered adverse and undesirable, outcome.

In other words, such Calvinist–Puritan mastery of the world can involve or lead not only to, to paraphrase Saint Simon, the rational administration and coordination of inanimate things or objects, including wealth, "administered by men most fitted for it," as in the presumed case of capitalism and economy overall. It can also comprise or result in the compulsive administration and coordination of humans or "mastery over things against the life and consciousness of human beings" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:33), as in an undemocratic polity and unfree civil society, including the limiting case of master–slave relations or their proxies such as totalitarian dictatorship, theocratic, or secular. In other words, the Puritan total

mastery may generate "command over objects, goods or material phenomena" through economic or allocative resources as well as "command over persons or actors" via authoritarian means (Giddens 1984:33). Hence, this administration, coordination, and command of humans in a society, so the Puritan mastery of the social world, constitute an authoritarian process, outcome, or resource of a "fundamental sort" (Giddens 1984:260). And if, as Weber stresses, Puritanism's "distinctive goal always remains the 'conscious', methodical mastering of one's own conduct of life," then this mastery logically or eventually expands to encompass others and their lives.

Simply, Puritanism' total mastery of the world makes Puritans actual or potential totalitarian "masters of the world" or "lords" on Earth, including both nature and society, nationally and globally, and others their servants or subjects, as exemplified by Cromwell as the "Lord Protector of the Realm" in the aftermath of the temporarily triumphant Puritan Revolution (1642–1660) in England. Thus, through their Weberian-style mastery Puritans seek to become and see themselves as God-designated "masters of the world," geographically, viz. America and the globe as a whole, as well as sociologically, i.e., of all society or the total social system, including polity, culture, and economy. In brief, Puritanism "transforms the world" (Baltzell 1979) through its "totalistic" (Eisenstadt 1965) mastery into authoritarianism or totalitarianism.

Most strikingly, as noted, Weber by usually attributing anti-authoritarian tendencies to Puritanism logically rules out or evades the problem of Puritan authoritarianism. Curiously, this attribution is in some tension or internal contradiction with his other statements, notably the "unexampled tyranny of Puritanism," a moment glossed over or downplayed by most Weberians, including Parsons, though with some premonitions[33] (e.g., Bendix 1977). For instance, Weber specifically states that early English Puritanism's anti-authoritarian tendency was "dangerous to the State [King]." At this point, this statement invites two comments. First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this tendency with what he otherwise diagnoses as the "unexampled tyranny" of Puritanism and Protestantism as a whole (Bendix 1977:55), if tyranny is simply authoritarianism, unless claiming that Puritan anti-authoritarianism is actual or historical, and its tyranny metaphorical or hyperbolic. Second, assuming such anti-authoritarian tendencies, Weber apparently refers to situations and times in which Puritanism was in, as he puts it, "fanatical opposition" to existing political–religious institutions and practices, viz. against the monarchy and the Anglican Church in England before the Civil War of 1640–1642. Alternatively, this overlooks or downplays those, in his own words,

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[33] As hinted, Bendix (1977:55–57) perhaps senses this internal tension, contradiction or paradox in Weber's treatment of Puritanism, i.e., anti-authoritarian versus tyrannical, by commenting that the "purpose of 'The Protestant Ethic' was to explain this paradox [i.e. why] bourgeoisie has risen to the defense of this 'unexampled tyranny of Protestantism,'" apparently substituting Protestantism for Puritanism. In his view, Weber explained this paradox by showing "how certain types of Protestantism became a fountainhead of incentives that favored the rational pursuit of economic gain" (Bendix 1977:57).

"power constellations" in which Puritanism as the dominant power exhibited exactly opposite tendencies, as witnessed in the aftermath of the Puritan Revolution punctuated by Cromwell's authoritarian rule and in New England's Biblical Commonwealth and subsequently the Southern Bible Belt, as shown in the rest of this book.[34]

Generally, Weber seems to overlook or downplay the observed salient fact that virtually all, even the most antidemocratic or totalitarian, religious and political movements display a nominal or real anti-authoritarian tendency demanding "freedom," "democracy" and "rights" while in, as Comte puts it, official opposition, or what Simmel calls referring to Protestantism "protest" against existing sacred and secular powers—yet authoritarian dispositions destroying and denying these same values to others once become such authorities. Theoretically, that is in essence what Weber's follower Michels implies by his "iron law of oligarchy."[35] The latter, for this purpose, can be restated or reinterpreted as "who says political-religious organization, says anti-authoritarianism or even democracy when in opposition, yet authoritarianism or oligarchy when in power." Comparative-historical instances range from early anti-authoritarian Christian groups within the Roman Empire, eventually becoming the ruling authoritarian church-state exemplified by the Vatican theocracy and the Byzantine Orthodoxy, to fascists, notably the Nazis, in interwar and communists in postwar Europe using liberal democracy in order to destroy it, to "freedom-demanding" Islamic fundamentalists in Iran and Afghanistan only to eventually reestablish their totalitarian theocracies. More important to this study, Puritanism conforms to and even reinforces rather than overcomes, as usually supposed, the general historical pattern of religious–political organizations to move from oppositional anti-authoritarianism to official authoritarianism, including state terrorism (Gibbs 1989). In particular, this was dramatically witnessed in the 1640s

[34] Curiously, unlike Weber, this is what Comte intimates in his observations about Protestantism and Calvinism or Puritanism in particular. For illustration, Comte observes that the "forcible repression of religious liberty"—while in Catholicism "simply a consequence of its modern disorganization"—is "inherent in the very nature of Protestantism," including both Calvinism and Lutheranism, and "could not but manifest itself as soon as it had the power." In his view, this holds true both of "primitive Protestantism," as demonstrated by the "despotic spirit of Lutheranism," and in "more advanced [Puritan] sects from the moment [temporal] power passed into their hands, for however a short time." In general, he infers that "from the moment that Protestantism changed its natural attitude of simple opposition, it shared those [Catholic] vices (including hostility to liberty and progress) to the full," i.e. while being in "temporal power." Notably, based on this dual feature, Comte specifically divides Protestantism into the Presbyterian or Calvinist form as "best suited to opposition" and the Episcopal or Lutheran as the best for "government," with the result of "compulsive agitation" and "violent repression," respectively. This can also be plausibly interpreted to suggest that when in "opposition" both Protestant and similar groups resort to "compulsive agitation" for freedom, so are anti-authoritarian in Weber's sense, and while in "government" to the "violent repression" of religious–political liberty, thus pro-authoritarian.

[35] As Michels would acknowledge, Weber often implies or anticipates the "law" of organizational oligarchy in politics. For example, Weber states that "since a party always struggles for political control, its organization is frequently strict and authoritarian."

English Civil War's aftermath establishing the "Holy Commonwealth" through the theocratic rule of Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints," as well as New England in the shape of Winthrop's "shining city upon the hill" *cum*, as Weber suggests, repressive Puritan theocracy or ascetic "Christian Sparta."

Simply, what Weber et al. gloss over or minimize is that the Puritan total mastery of the world entails or generates not only the presumably desirable human conquest of nature—viz. the "wilderness" for early US Puritans—and so technical–economic progress as a benefit to humanity. It also does a sectarian mastery or factional in James Madison's sense domination of society, and thus political–social regression into the opposite of democracy and a free civil society, as perhaps a too high price for this progress. As economists would put, Weber and his disciples fall short of a correct and accurate "cost-benefit" analysis of Puritanism balancing its latent in Merton's sense of unrecognized, hidden, and long-term political–social or human "costs" against its manifest or recognized, assumed and short-run market-economic, or materialistic "benefits." In sum, this is a failure to fully and accurately "calculate" or envision what Weber himself calls "material and ideal" effects or interests in Puritanism, its impact on both economy and society, i.e., not only its benefits for modern capitalism but also its costs for political democracy and civil liberties.

By contrast, this book recognizes and reexamines this apparent Janus-faced nature of the Puritan putative or actual complete mastery of the world, thus redressing this salient oversight or neglect in the initial Weberian analysis and its elaborations by Parsons et al.[36] As argued and demonstrated in this book, political–social authoritarianism has been or is likely to be the aggregate societal outcome of the Puritan mastery of the world, just as has modern capitalism as its economic, albeit probably unintended, if not perverse, effect assuming that Weber, Parsons, and others are right. The principal argument is that Puritanism's original design, system, or practice of "totalistic" mastery of society intrinsically constitutes or eventually results in societal totalitarianism or authoritarianism, though the alternative result is or

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[36] A personal disclaimer is in order: this author is neither pro- nor anti-Puritan in moral–religious terms, but attempts to analyze the link of Puritanism with contemporary authoritarianism in a Weberian value-free manner as much as possible, just as Weber did the Puritan connection with modern capitalism. To address objections of anti-Puritan or even antireligious bias by contemporary Puritans like Protestant fundamentalists, this is the book that Weber would have probably written if he developed and specifically focused on his (and, for that matter, Ross') insight into the "tyranny" of Puritanism rather than on the latter's "elective affinity" with modern capitalism. In this sense, the book is a logical sequel of Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* by adopting, focusing on and developing this very insight. So, if the book reveals supposed "anti-Puritan bias," then so does Weber's specific insight and general value-free analysis of Puritanism's links with capitalism, yet a linkage most Puritans and other fundamentalist or sectarian Protestants celebrate. Simply, the present author did not discover or reveal in the sense of the proverbial "no-cloths-emperor" "tyranny" and thus authoritarianism in Puritanism but retrieves, elaborates, specifies, and further demonstrates what Weber, as well as others like US conservative sociologist Ross, had discovered or revealed, albeit not developed and specified enough, before.

may be Weberian free enterprise capitalism. In sum, this work argues and demonstrates that Puritanism inherently through its total mastery of the world represents or leads to, to paraphrase some economists (Buchanan 1991) Leviathan in Society, often combined with Hobbesian Anarchy in Economy. This is a Puritan system or project of what even Weber admits as "unexampled tyranny" in sociopolitical terms, frequently, but not invariably,[37] mixed with, in Simmel's term, "license" in economic respects, to form a sort of (to cite that distinctively un-Puritan ideal or fictional type of personality from the English home of Puritanism, Bond) "shaken and stirred" authoritarian or totalitarian "cocktail."

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[37] Tawney (1962) remarks, apparently contradicting Weber's implied view of Puritan capitalist "libertarianism" (also Friedman and Friedman 1982), that early American Puritanism in New England was constraining of and even "merciless" not only toward political and social, including religious, liberties but also to unrestrained economic freedom or "license" and to that extent unfettered capitalism that US neo-Puritans or neo-conservatives a la Reagan et al. seek to reinstitute and glorify as the "golden past" which, as the proverb goes, has never existed. This is probably one of those relatively rare points at which early Puritans and neo-conservatives in America diverge in substantive-sociological, as different from formal–legal, terms, viz. Reagan from his proto-Puritan hero Winthrop. In this sense, Winthrop's "shining city upon a hill," as a consistent proto-Puritan fusion of Leviathan in Economy and Society alike exemplified by his *mixt aristocracie* or theocracy, differs from its Reaganite neo-Puritan remake, viz. the "achieved American Dream" (Baudrillard 1999), that tends instead to an inconsistent or paradoxical mix of Hobbesian Anarchy in Economy a la unfettered capitalism with social–political repression of the population (Pryor 2002). In particular, this is the difference between seventeenth century New England's arch-Puritan Biblical Commonwealth as "merciless" to all human liberties and the twenty-first-century Southwest neo-Puritan or evangelical "Bible Belt." The latter differs in that it tends to be hostile "only" to noneconomic freedoms through its peculiar blend of market free enterprise—primarily probusiness and antilabor typically denying or violating the freedom of labor organization—with social, religiously driven, and sanctified oppression revealing theocratic syndromes or theocentric aims, as well as oligarchic exclusion ("good old boys" networks), plutocratic methods in the "madness" ("robber barons," "cowboy capitalism" a la Enronism) and cultural particularism and "blissful ignorance" (i.e., ignorant, arrogant, narrow-minded small-town, or "red-neck" or proto-fascist intolerant and violent mentality and conduct).

2
Puritanism and Political Authoritarianism: Authoritarian Mastery of Politics

Puritan Political Authoritarianism: General Considerations

Puritanism essentially constitutes or engenders a theological–religious and institutional–social system of political authoritarianism. Its political authoritarianism is primarily manifested and founded in its specific attempt at the mastery of the world of politics. Puritanism attempted or realized total mastery of politics seeks to turn Puritans into potential or real totalitarian "masters of the world" a la Cromwell cum the "Lord Protector of the Realm" following the Puritan Revolution in England, both of the domestic and global political system, and all others their servants, subjects, or instruments. Puritanism considers politics, just as nature, economy, and civil society, part of this world and thus amenable to, as Tocqueville implies, its sectarian mastery or religiously factional, in Madison's meaning,[1] domination.

In consequence, Puritanism tends to transform polity into an authoritarian political system, including religiously based totalitarian dictatorship typically in the form of theocracy as a substitute or proxy for master–slave relations. Political and other authoritarianism or totalitarianism is the intrinsic constituent or the ultimate outcome, realization, or intensification of the Puritan quest for total, absolute, perfect or "pure" mastery, domination, control, coercion, or restraint of polity and all society. Owing to and through this quest for coercive total political and social mastery, Puritanism is intrinsically authoritarian or totalitarian, notably theocratic. For instance, in early America, especially New England, Puritanism was reportedly the "most totalitarian form of Calvinism" (Stivers 1994:18–23). Also, subsequent developments in Puritanism like contemporary evangelist Protestant churches in the US South, notably dominant Southern Baptism, are observed to belong, alongside their Islamic counterparts, to a "wider family of totalitarian solutions offered

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[1] As known, Madison warned against "mischievous" factions, including those religiously based, and so sectarian political rule. Thus, he says "who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all the other sects."

TABLE 2.1. Elements of Puritan political authoritarianism.

Political antiliberalism and nondemocracy
    antiliberalism and antipluralism
    anti- and quasidemocratic tendencies
Political extremism
    radicalism and absolutism
    political intolerance
    total control, coercion, and repression
    repressive laws and Draconian sanctions
Antiegalitarianism
    economic antiegalitarianism
    political–social antiegalitarianism
Militarism, nationalism, and expansionism
    militancy and militarism
    nationalism and nativism
    expansionism and imperialism

to all those who find the burden of individual freedom excessive and unbearable" (Bauman 1997:184).

Elements of Puritan political authoritarianism or totalitarianism can be classified into these general categories: first, antiliberalism and nondemocracy; second, extremism; third, antiegalitarianism; and fourth, militarism and imperialism, with various subcategories within each (see Table 2.1).

Political Antiliberalism and Nondemocracy

Antiliberalism and Antipluralism

In political as well as moral–religious terms, Puritanism is, like Calvinism, usually considered illiberal, rigidly conservative, extremely ascetic, sectarian, orthodox, radical, and to that extent nondemocratic Protestantism, as distinguished from liberal–democratic or moderate Protestant types (Martin 2002), including Lutheranism, Episcopalism, and Quakerism. Particularly, since political and other social pluralism is a basic element of liberalism, democracy, and a free civil society, Puritanism is (deemed) antipluralist Protestantism or Protestant antipluralism, so a species of what Dahrendorf calls authoritarian or totalitarian "monism," in this respect. Notably, American Puritanism tends to be opposed to a "liberal and pluralist" polity and society as a whole (Munch 2001:269–270), and to that extent political democracy as well as a free civil sphere. Alternatively, it creates or endorses an illiberal, rigidly conservative, sectarian, and monistic polity as well as civil society, and thus political and social authoritarianism respectively. This is what Simmel suggests describing early Puritanism or Calvinism (Reformed Church) as the "orthodox party" of Protestantism, as distinguished from the "liberal" branch or Lutheranism.

By contrast, in what analysts call the "naïve assumptions about Puritanism and liberty" (Coffey 1998:962), Puritan Protestantism is liberal or "libertarian,"

individualistic, democratic, and progressive as well as ethically universal versus Catholicism and other pre-Protestant religions as illiberal, anti-individualistic, conservative, undemocratic, and particularistic. Recall, Parsons (1967:53–80) asserts that "the primary source of this individualistic cast of European thought lies in [Protestant] Christianity," invoking the "immediacy of the individual soul to God, inherent" in Puritan and other Protestantism endowed with "ethical universalism," as somewhat invidiously distinguished from particularism supposedly characteristic for pre- and non-Protestant religions. Similarly, others suggest that "we meet in the 17th century with the distinction, possible first among English Puritans, between what is done individually and what is done collectively. This was a preliminary to the further development of the concept (of the individual) which finally led in the 19th century [to] 'individualism' [vs.] 'socialism' and 'collectivism'" (Elias 2001:161–162). However, some contemporary sociologists suggest that received explanations of the roots of Western democracy or the democratic public realm in Protestant Puritanism and capitalism, particularly the English Puritan Revolution, are "inconsistent and speculative" (Zaret 1996).

The "naïve assumptions about Puritanism and liberty" are essentially contradicted by original, historical, and persisting Puritan political antiliberalism or rigid conservatism and what Weber calls Protestant sectarianism. This is especially manifest and intense in Puritanism's rejection or suspicion of liberal–democratic ideologies, institutions, and practices, from seventeenth-century Great Britain (Zaret 1989) and subsequently New England to, through its neo-Puritan derivatives in revived fundamentalist Protestantism, America, especially the (Baptist-dominated) "Bible Belt" (Bauman 2001), during 1980s–2000s. Thus, contemporary US social (Straussian) conservatives admit and celebrate Puritan antiliberalism by proposing that American religious (Christian) conservatism rejects the "liberal democratic ideal" of liberty as sanctifying the "dedication to individual freedom" over Deity, piety, and morality (Deutsch and Soffer 1987:1). Hence, their diagnosis of the alleged "crisis of liberal democracy" in modern Western societies, including America, as well as their moralistic attribution of it to a "crisis of moral foundations," reflects an insipient political antiliberalism within religious conservatism, in particular neo-Puritanism or predominant and ever-resurrecting Protestant sectarianism in American history from the seventeenth to the early twenty-first century (Lipset 1996).

Generally, political and social antiliberalism in the form of a consistent antithesis to liberal–democratic ideas, institutions, and practices is the "original sin" or supreme virtue, depending on the perspective, long-standing historical attribute and persisting tendency of Puritanism. This has been so since Puritanism's Anglo-American derivation from European Calvinism in the sixteenth to seventeenth century through its subsequent revivals like the Great Awakenings and extensions, for example from New England to the South, and modern ramifications in America. Thus, antiliberalism negatively defined and permeated early English and American Puritanism versus liberal–democratic ideas and institutions during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. For instance, a historical study identifies

and documents Puritanism's "basic incompatibility" with political and cultural liberalism and even, contrary to Weber's famous thesis, modern capitalism in early England and America (Walzer 1963). Reportedly, early English-American Puritans' "Manichean warfare against Satan and his worldly allies and a nervous lust for systematic repression and control" were deeply incompatible with liberalism (e.g., Locke's liberal philosophy), and instead "point directly to the repressive Holy Commonwealth"[2] (Walzer 1963:63). Consequently, being essentially an effort to universalize political and social repression, the Puritan original blueprint or eventual creation of a Holy Commonwealth in England ruled by Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints," colonial America epitomized by Winthrop et al.'s "Bible Community," and elsewhere (e.g., Holland), is seen as "inexplicable" once English (Locke's) liberalism, even Weber's capitalism, is "read" into Puritanism.

In particular, early American Puritanism inherited, continued and even reinforced the political and other antiliberalism of its English progenitor. For example, Winthrop and other Puritan immigrants continued and accomplished in the "new world" what Cromwell et al. had started and ultimately failed to fully accomplish in the old, namely reestablishing a "repressive Holy Commonwealth" of saints in the face of Puritans. As historical research suggests, like their English cousins, the early US Puritans "longed for a godly rather than a liberal society, and sought not the freedom of the sinner, but the freedom of God Almighty" (Coffey 1998:962). In historical terms, this initial longing of US Puritans for an essentially antiliberal and to that extent nondemocratic society and polity has persisted and even intensified and expanded ever since. This is indicated by the intensification and expansion of Puritanism from New England to all America during the eighteenth to nineteenth century, notably the South, through the Great Awakenings and other religious revivals or counter-revolutions, as well as its contemporary ressurection in the form of neo-Puritanism or fundamentalist Protestantism like Baptism in the "Southern Bible Belt" (Bauman 1997; Putnam 2000). As for the latter, the "Bible Belt" in the South and America as a whole is primarily a neo-Puritan or evangelicial, Baptist-Methodist project (Bauman 2001), just as New England's theocracy was a blueprint and creation of original Puritanism imported, literally on ships (*Arabella*), by Winthrop et al., from England where Anglicanism ultimately withstood the Puritan attack, despite Cromwell's transient victory and repressive rule.

A particular dimension of the political and other antiliberalism of English-American Puritanism and neo-Puritanism is antipluralism or monism in politics as well as civil society; alternatively, social pluralism, including multiculturalism, is considered an integral element of liberalism, i.e., of liberal democracy and culture.

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[2] Walzer (1963:65–67) adds that "the secular and genteel of liberalism is determined by the fact that [human] goodness (sociability, self-discipline, moral decency or mere respectability) is self-assured and relaxed, entirely free from the nervousness and fanaticism of Calvinist godliness. The faith of the [Puritan] saints and the tolerant reasonableness of the liberals [Locke] had very little in common."

For illustration, in New England, Puritans like Winthrop et al. held and promoted the "conservative ideal of civic and political equanimity" as against pluralism and dissent in the polity and all society (Gould 1996:206). In particular, popular participation, including voting in elections, in this supposed Puritan or evangelical heaven (Lemert 1999; Wuthnow 1998) in the sociological, as distinguished from the theological, sense of an oligarchic–theocratic dystopia a la Winthrop's "shining city" ruled by what he called a *mixt aristocratie* "was designed to choose leaders and promote consensus [and] binding the people to their government rather than ensure pluralism [or] encourage the expression of popular views" (Bremer 1995:90). Since political pluralism, dissent, and the expression of popular views are commonly considered to be preconditions or constituents of liberal democracy, the Puritan opposition or suspicion is nondemocratic in intent, character, or effect, albeit Puritans and their modern proxies avoid openly declaring this hostility.

Anti- and Quasidemocratic Tendencies

In essence, Puritanism is the antithesis of democracy, its destruction and negation at worst, or its subversion and degeneration at best. This is what even early US conservative sociologist Edward Ross probably unwittingly admits by stating that in America democracy provides "its own antidote" in the form of Puritanism, including what significantly calls "Puritan tyranny." Yet, since democracy or political freedom is perhaps the most cherished American ideal, value, and institution, this implies that it is itself the antidote of Puritanism, notably its "tyranny," rather than conversely. If so, then Ross effectively, though unintentionally, admits that Puritanism or its "tyranny" is actually a kind of poison of political democracy and liberty in America.

   The Puritan overt or tacit rejection and suspicion of what US religious conservatives contemptuously call the liberal-democratic ideal and system of individual freedom and political pluralism suggests that Puritanism, including both its proto- and neo-types, is essentially antidemocratic in nature or outcome. Like its political antiliberalism overall, its anti- or at most quasidemocratic character or effect is the "original sin" for liberals-democrats—but, for its adherents, a foremost virtue—long-standing property and persistent predisposition of Puritanism. In historical terms, this holds true of Puritanism ranging from Great Britain's "repressive Holy Commonwealth" to New England's theocratic "Biblical Community" to the Puritan-rooted Great Awakenings in America during the eighteenth to nineteenth century and what Weber would call the reemerging neo-Puritan bibliocracy or an evangelical "Bible Belt" in the South ushering in the twenty-first century. Overall, Puritanism is anti- or quasidemocratic by directly countering and attacking liberal democracy, or indirectly threatening, subverting and undermining it through establishing and defending aristocracy, plutocracy, oligarchy, rigid hierarchy, privilege, inequality, exclusion, and especially some sort and degree of theocracy or religious-based political coercion. As US religious conservatives admit with no regret, Puritanism or conservative Protestantism always stressed "respect for the established order, leadership by the favored few" (Dunn and Woodard

1996:84), and thus antiegalitarian and nondemocratic ideas, values and practices. *Prima facie*, Puritan "leadership by the favored few" is another designation for aristocracy or oligarchy, plutocracy, if the "few" are, as typically, wealthy, as the "dictatorship" of the rich (Niggle 1998), and theocracy, if these ruling groups are, as often, "godly" people or "saints."

In theological terms, Anglo-American Puritanism's non- or pseudodemocratic, like antiliberal, attributes and consequences are essentially rooted in and derived from Calvinism, as its European predecessor and progenitor. They especially originate in what Weber identifies as the Calvinist "harsh doctrines of the absolute transcendentality of God" vis-à-vis humans, as well as in Protestantism generally, perhaps with, as he implies, some qualifications for Lutheranism and Anglicanism as the "least ascetic" Protestant branches. In particular, he notices that what he calls the "religious aristocracy" of the elect, chosen through claiming God's special election and grace, "developed in every form of Calvinistic asceticism" as grounded in the "aristocratic charismatic principle of predestination," and consequently in Puritanism. In Weber's words, like Calvinism, Puritanism develops or constitutes the "aristocracy of Predestination," as the "belief of virtuosi" only capable of accepting the Divine "everlasting 'double decree,'" including also damnation, and notably extols the "pride of the aristocracy of predestined salvation." Also, Comte observes that Calvinism and even Lutheranism initially and continuously sanctioned and attempted to establish "Protestant [theocratic] and aristocratic rule" characterized by rigid "political subservence" and "servile transformation," thus providing a model for Puritanism.

Supporting Comte and Weber, some contemporary researchers also find that, mostly due to this theological doctrine called the dogma of predestination, the "original political impulse" of Calvinism, just as Lutheranism, "was not in a 'liberal' or democratic direction but rather in a more 'totalistic' [and militant] one [by] restricting autonomous activities in both the economic and the political field" (Eisenstadt 1965:671). Moreover, in this view echoing Weber's insights, "initially, the Reformation was not a 'modernizing' [or democratic] movement; it aimed to establish a 'purer' medieval socio-political and religious order" (Eisenstadt 1965:671). If this is correct, Calvinism embraced and further intensified these initially antiliberal and undemocratic aims and tendencies in Protestantism, specifically Lutheranism as the original or traditional Protestant type. In an apparent case of religious-cultural diffusion or transmission in Western culture, Calvinism subsequently diffused or transmitted these aims, in the derived form of Puritanism, from Europe to old and New England. Recall Calvinism was at the "core" of old and New England Puritanism (Bremer 1995). Notably, insofar as, as economist Seligman suggests, the Protestant Reformation resulted in the victory of Calvinism in Europe—except for Germany and Scandinavia where Lutheranism was victorious or more influential—and Puritanism, as the Calvinist transplant, in Anglo-Saxon societies, this was the triumph of a totalistic-militant and conservative-sectarian over a liberal-democratic direction. So, it was a sort of realization of orthodox Protestantism's supreme design for recreating a "purer" medieval authoritarian system.

The preceding suggests that antiliberal and nondemocratic Anglo-American Puritanism is originally grounded and dependent or "parasitic" on, so can be understood and explained in terms of, "totalistic" European Calvinism as the authoritarian, notably theocratic, variation of Protestantism, specifically Lutheranism. This is instructive to emphasize because it situates Puritanism, including its effort to reestablish an oppressive theocratic "Holy Commonwealth," in England and America in an antecedent and broad comparative-historical basis and context involving Calvinism and in part Lutheranism in Europe. This basis renders the Puritan nondemocratic and antiliberal project of a repressive, including theocratic, polity and society not or less exceptional than US Puritans and other religious conservatives claim in their promotion and celebration of American exceptionalism (Lipset 1996), including a "Bible Commonwealth" of saints, from seventeenth century New England to the twenty-first century South. But, it also does not exonerate Puritanism on the grounds of, say, the Anglo-American "seduction" by and "infection" with the "totalistic-militant" syndrome of European Calvinism and authoritarian-theocratic Protestantism overall. At this juncture, the old medieval phrase "nothing new under the sun" may describe Calvinism or Protestantism overall in respect to perennial nondemocratic projects and political antiliberalism in Christian and other religions, with Puritanism diffusing and reinforcing these Calvinist and Vatican-based properties and aims from feudal Europe to England and America.

In historical terms, a sociological study shows that early English-American Puritanism possessed "strongly authoritarian tendencies that opposed any liberalizing withdrawal of religion from the political arena," as indicated by the "authoritarianism in godly politics," and thus "only fortuitous links with democratic developments" (Zaret 1989:168–170). This suggests that original Puritanism in England and America was antidemocratic as a rule and fortuitously or pseudo-democratic at most, notably theocratic authoritarianism as the Puritan "state of nature" or sociological and eventually theological "heaven" versus democracy as a contingency, random "error", accident, Machiavellian power strategy, necessity or "evil" made into virtue or good, for example the separation of church and state. Hence, the nascent liberal-democratic ideology in England represented by Locke reportedly rejected "Puritan theology and its vision of godly politics" in which polity and religion "were inseparable," by displacing the second from the first[3] (Zaret 1989:168–170). Moreover, the English-Scottish and especially French Enlightenment, as a classical liberal-democratic ideology and movement, epitomized in the political theory and practice of modern democracy (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Habermas 1989), became a "philosophical movement totally antithetical"[4] (Bremer 1995:225) to Calvinism in Europe and consequently Puritanism

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[3] Zaret (1989:163) comments that liberal-democratic ideology, including that of Locke and other English philosophers, "was not a secular extension of Protestant [more precisely, Puritan] ideas; it developed explicitly against the application of these beliefs to politics."

[4] Bremer (1995:225) adds that, however, "in the early 18th century, in England and in the colonies, many [Puritans] were attracted to the philosophers' claim to have discovered

in old and New England. For example, this antithesis was manifested in the rise of "European Enlightenment theories about degeneracy in the New World" (Gould 1996:29), specifically Puritan-ruled New England, seen as descending into the theocratic pre-Enlightenment darkness.

In retrospect, Enlightenment liberal-democratic ideas most dramatically, completely and enduringly triumphed in France and Western Europe as a whole via the French Revolution, as well as, minus the drama, in Great Britain, including Scotland and England at least in a tense mix or compromise with Anglicanism, over Calvinism and Puritanism, respectively. By contrast, they did so to a lesser extent or not at all in colonial, revolutionary, except for Jefferson, Madison et al., and postrevolutionary America, notably Puritan-ruled New England and the evangelical South (Bauman 1997) transformed by the Puritan-inspired Great Awakenings in, to paraphrase Weber, the bibliocratic or sectarian direction. This holds true essentially and generally, though with qualifications in view of such particular exceptions as Jefferson et al.'s Enlightenment-inspired liberal-secular ideas and non-Puritan Philadelphia[5] as the "heart of the American Enlightenment" and the site of the Declaration of Independence[6] (Patell 2001:xix). Such a general historical failure or comparative weakness of the European Enlightenment and its liberal-democratic and secular ideology vis-à-vis Puritanism or Protestant sectarianism and its antiliberal, including theocratic, aims, values, institutions and practices essentially constitutes, generates and perpetuates American exceptionalism as a "double-edged sword" (Lipset 1996). Thus, in the second half of the eighteenth century, America was "awaken" by the Great Awakenings or Puritaninspired counter-Enlightenment or antiliberal revivals and movements expanding from New England to the new nation as a whole, especially the South, while by contrast Western Europe ushered in and experienced the Age of Enlightenment and its liberal-democratic ideas. As a sort of replay, while during the early twenty-first century America experiences another Puritan-rooted Great Awakening manifested in the antiliberal or counter-Enlightenment revival of religious-evangelical and political conservatism (Wuthnow 1998), most Western societies continue or reenter political-cultural liberalization, including secularism, so a new Enlightenment (Inglehart 2004).

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natural laws, their optimistic view of man, and their skepticism toward all orthodoxies." Notably, he remarks that historically in the "Anglo-American world the Enlightenment left its mark more particularly upon Anglicans" (Bremer 1995:225) than Puritans.

[5] The fact that non- or pseudo-Puritan, specifically Quaker (Baltzell 1979), Philadelphia, and not, say, Puritan Boston, was the "heart of the American Enlightenment" (Patell 2001:xix) confirms that Puritanism was antagonistic, suspicious, or at least indifferent toward the Enlightenment in general.

[6] Gelernter (2005) admits that the Declaration of Independence "treats religion in a cool, Enlightenment sort of way," but claims that it was "an ex post facto justification of American beliefs." For example, he approvingly notes that the "Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, often called the 'first written constitution of modern democracy', were inspired not by democratic Athens or republican Rome or Enlightenment philosophy but by a Puritan preacher's interpretation of a verse in the Hebrew Bible."

In addition to the old Great Britain under Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints," New England with its theocratic "Bible Commonwealth" provides a pertinent historical illustration of original Puritan antiliberal and undemocratic tendencies, practices or outcomes. Thus, a study finds that in early New England Puritanism was a politically conservative-authoritarian doctrine that "mitigated against democratic impulses,"[7] through especially creating, envisioning or defending a political society "divided between those whom God had suited for the role of rulers and those whom God had called to be ruled" (Bremer 1995:88). *Prima facie*, such a Puritan polity and society is a far cry from and even, to use Weber's word, "abomination" of liberal, secular and pluralist Western democracy. It is rather a sort of reenactment of authoritarian aristocracy, oligarchy, plutocracy, or theocracy premised on and sanctified by rulers' "Divine Rights" or "Divinely ordained" power, including the medieval despotic order as a persisting ideal and nostalgia of Puritanism as well as Protestant and Catholic fundamentalism overall.

In particular, New England's Puritan political system constituted or resulted in what Sorokin calls pure or diluted theocracy. This is indicated by the observation that in early New England the "opposition to the magistrate was opposition to God" as the ultimate source and sanctification of the rulers' authority by choosing "a few to lead the many" (Bremer 1995:89), just as, in the economic version of antiegalitarianism, providing or commanding "plenty for a few, noting for the plenty."[8] The preferred Puritan designation for New England's theocracy or what Weber calls bibliocracy was the "Bible Commonwealths," in the plural given the various colonies in the region, an apparent variation or realization of Cromwell's "repressive Holy Commonwealth" in the "new world", hence becoming as "old" as the old disdained Europe. Notably, New England's dominant Puritans, including Winthrop et al., during the colonial period reportedly "rejected the concept of democratic government [and] denied the legitimacy of popular rule" substituted with what was termed a "mixt aristocracie" in which the people's role in elections was only to "choose a ruling class" (Bremer 1995:90). Simply, the people were "free" to choose their masters within a system of proximate master-slave relations—for example, Puritan saints, virtuosi or "godly" invidiously separated the damned or reprobate—or Machiavelli's princes of theocratic authoritarianism like Winthrop and Cromwell as the "Lord Protector[s] of the Realm."

Mixed with and essentially resting on theocracy, created, embodied and enacted by the Puritan masters and saints, as the basis for recruitment and selection, New

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[7] Bremer's (1995:88) full statement is that Puritanism "mitigated against democratic impulses that [it] itself generated through religious emphasis on the priesthood of all believers and the perseverance of the saints." If the latter is correct, Puritanism produced "democratic impulses" only within and for the religious community of believers or saints, as opposed to nonbelievers or sinners, but "mitigated" and even eliminated them in political life. And this is at best exclusionary or limited "holy democracy," as another name for theocracy, which is what Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints" demonstrates, rather than modern inclusive, secular, and liberal democracy.

[8] This phrase is taken from the cynical and despondent re-definition of the American dream by the tragic hero in the movie "Assassination of Richard Nixon."

England's *mixt aristocracie* was another name for oligarchy by comprising a "relatively small number of leaders," with the same people being "chosen for high office with monotonous regularity." For instance, citizens "were expected to exercise the vote as a means of confirming their adherence to the social covenant and ratifying the right of the Winthrops to rule" (Bremer 1995:90–91). This seems a slightly modified variation and extension of the Divine Rights of kings in European and other monarchies to the "new world," though both the English and American Puritans attacked monarchy in favor of "republic" *cum* typically theocracy without a formal monarch substituted with "Lord Protectors" a la Cromwell and Winthrop. Also, recall, under Winthrop et al. New England remained officially part of the British monarchy and empire, albeit had more relative autonomy from the Crown, which somewhat neglected and often left this outpost to its own devices in the wake of the abortive Puritan revolution in Great Britain, than did the Anglican South, including Virginia.

In terms of historical *dramatis personae*, what Calvin was to "totalistic" Calvinism, plus Luther to probably less authoritarian but equally antiegalitarian Lutheranism, and Cromwell to militant English Puritanism, Winthrop was to early New England's Puritan theocracy and *mixt aristocracie*. Crucially, "Winthrop did not think much of 'democratical government'" (Gould 1996:35–211) but instead sought to establish a Puritan aristocratic and theocratic New England. Reportedly, the "Puritan migration to America was accompanied by an Old Testament theocratic legacy that makes figures such as John Winthrop [etc.] good guys whose severity resulted from their being hopelessly shackled to aristocratic assumptions of hierarchy, deference, and order"[9] (Gould 1996:213). Apparently, these "good guys" proved to be true theological and theocratic or antiliberal and undemocratic aristocratic disciples of Calvin and to a lesser extent Luther. Also, Winthrop's successors were professed political followers and admirers of Cromwell, notably a sort of "over-achievers" by establishing what European Calvinists and English Puritans could only dream of: a long-standing and even self-perpetuating "repressive Holy Commonwealth" in America in an essentially unbroken line from New England's "Biblical Community" in the seventeenth century to the Southern "Bible Belt" at the start of the twenty-first century.

Political Extremism

Puritanism in essence constitutes or reproduces political as well as moral-religious and other cultural extremism, as a particular element, factor, or result of its authoritarianism or totalitarian mastery in politics, just as civil society. Puritan political and other social extremism is revealed in the following syndromes: radicalism and absolutism, intolerance, coercive control, repression, persecution, terror and

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[9] Gould (1996:213) comments that "to the modern reader of (Winthrop's *History*) there is something almost childish in [his] insistence on public deference to his official position."

tyranny, repressive legal rules and practices, regression into a Daconian criminal justice system, and the like.

Radicalism and Absolutism

First and foremost, Puritanism constitutes or regenerates political-religious radicalism and absolutism, including revolutionary nihilism or destructive tendencies in respect to liberal democracy. For instance, this is what Comte implies characterizing Puritanism or Protestantism overall as the "first general phase" of radical or revolutionary philosophy in contemporary Western society. He adds that the Puritan-Protestant revolution "produced no innovation in regard to discipline, ecclesiastical orders or dogma" as found in traditional Catholicism, and that Calvin-Luther's success was "mainly due to the ripeness of the time." Also, Pareto remarks that the Protestant Reformation, including by implication the Puritan Revolutions in Great Britain and America, constituted what he calls the "emergence of the robber barons [and] revolutionary knighthood." Moreover, he suggests that Puritanism (Protestantism) once established in power was nondemocratic and even less-democratic than its predecessors like the Roman theocracy by observing that "as usual, the new [Puritan-Protestant] elite leaned on the poor and humble; as usual they were deceived, and the yoke weighed even heavier on their shoulders than before." So long as, as Pareto suggests, "the religion of Christ, which seemed especially made for the poor and humble, has generated the Roman theocracy," then the latter was subsequently substituted, at least in those countries dominated by Puritanism or Protestantism, with the "new" Puritan-Protestant, equally and even more harshly, theocratic elite.

Some historical studies support Comte's and Pareto's insights, by indicating that early Puritanism in England contained a "revolutionary appeal," because it was a holy crusade against perceived corruption, Catholicism and "popery," as well as an attack on all policy and culture innovations (Goldstone 1986:296; also Scott 1977). This indicates that Puritan revolutionary nihilism, just as political-religious radicalism overall, was usually and seemingly paradoxically mixed with rigid conservatism in both politics and culture. Alternatively, as an indicator of conservatism, early Puritanism in England was self-defined as a crusade or national program for the defense of traditional or "authentic" English ways, laws or "ancient constitution," and religion from "foreign treats," notably Catholic forces condemned and eventually persecuted as the "papists" (Goldstone 1991:413). This gives the English Puritan Revolution a complementary, seemingly paradoxical, attribute of a conservative, even reactionary project trying (in Marx's words) "to roll back the wheel of history," as well as of a "nationalist coup" (Gorski 2000:1453).

To that extent, the Puritan was a political and religious counter-revolution, i.e., a reaction to prior innovations in politics and culture and a restoration of the "good, old" England, thus exemplifying the tendency of conservative revolutions to be counter-revolutions or reactions to liberal revolutionary changes and restorations of a nebulous "golden past" (Bourdieu 1998). No wonder, the Puritan counter-revolutionary or reactionary crusade reportedly attracted "more conservative,

including nationalist, forces" than, for example, communal-property agrarian movements during the English Civil War (Scott 1977: 229). In particular, another study finds that English Puritanism "produced first of all a [revolutionary] political activist" like Cromwell while being in opposition, then turned into a strident and brutal conservative or reactionary once in power via the rule of his "Parliament of Saints" (Walzer 1963:84). Another designation may be a holy warrior or crusader, including a militant extremist, given that Cromwell's political campaigns to enforce "godly morality" were "religious crusades—wars against the infidels" (Gorski 2000:1453).

In general, sociological analyses suggest that feudal elites and their conflicts formed the "primary determinant" (Lachmann 1990) of the 1640 Puritan Revolution in England, just as of Florence during the Renaissance and France in the sixteenth to eighteenth century. This confirms that the primary roots or links of Puritanism were in feudalism or medievalism rather than, as usually supposed, in liberal modernity, including capitalism. In short, English Puritanism through its transient revolution was an attempt to restore "medieval England" (Kiser and Linton 2002) rather than to create a postmedieval, i.e., modern, liberal-democratic and secular society. So was in consequence early American Puritanism via its permanent revolution, since Puritan "New England" was in sociological, as distinguished from geographic or even historical, terms hardly "new" but basically old medieval England (to be) institutionally transplanted, with some minor modifications or innovations, into America. In sum, as Comte suggests and research shows, early English and consequently or subsequently American Puritanism was in essence a revolutionary nihilism aiming to destroy "impure" and "ungodly" social institutions and restore and ultimately "freeze" medievalism and its political despotism, absolutism and theocracy rather than or less to build and usher in democracy, liberalism and secularism. In this sense, it was medieval-based political radicalism when not in power, yet turned into or mixed with rigid and even reactionary conservatism once becoming politically dominant.

Like Comte, Weber identifies what he denotes as the "uncompromising radicalism" of early English Puritanism ("Independentist world of ideas") rooted in that of European Calvinism. To indicate these roots, for example, Weber cites the "radicalism" of the first Swiss and South German Calvinists like Baptists and their "Biblical way of life" or "strictest bibliocracy," as well as the "ecclesiastic revolution of the strict Calvinists in the Netherlands during the 1580s." In general, as indicated, Weber treats Puritanism as "radical Calvinism" and hence the most extreme and militant or "staunchest" ascetic-sectarian Protestantism. Elaborating on Weber, Tawney (1962:204) simply characterizes early English and in extension American Puritanism as "religious [and political] radicalism." Also, recent research indicates that an integral and salient component of the seventeenth century English Revolution was "politically radical Puritanism" (Goldstone 1986:293), though, as noted, mixed with or turned in the aftermath of its victory into rigid and reactionary conservatism. Further, historical observations suggest that Puritanism was a species of political radicalism, absolutism or extremism from its very beginning, observing that from the 1590s or after Britain's defeat of Spain the "continued

and more extreme claims of the Puritans goaded the government [that] felt that Puritan intransigence was threatening the unity within [Protestantism]" (Ashton 1965:587).

Weber and other early sociologists do not typically differentiate between the degree of political–religious radicalism and absolutism in English and American Puritanism, or even, as in Comte, the latter as a whole and Lutheranism, seemingly assuming that these degrees of unfreedom in polity and society are identical or not significantly different. In turn, contemporary sociologists suggest that in Great Britain "Puritan radicalism was tempered by the maintenance of the Anglican Church order" (Munch 2001:119). This is contrasted with America where such a tempering or countervailing factor was absent, as in early New England, or became progressively weaker and suppressed, especially in the wake of the American Revolution as well as the Great Awakenings effectively displacing Anglicanism or Episcopalism by Puritanism and its proxies, most strikingly in the South (designed) to become another "Bible Commonwealth." In this view, in a sort of Weberian scenario of the Puritan–capitalist elective affinity, British Puritanism consequently "underwent a transformation from the absolute moral rigor of its origins to become more of a buttress for the economic individualism of the responsible entrepreneur" (Munch 2001:120), while its American successor or proxy retained and even reinforced this ethical–political absolutism. Another perhaps more salient factor in tempering or countervailing British Puritanism in this respect is the "totally antithetical" Enlightenment championed by Locke and Hume with its liberalism, pluralism, and secularism that rejected Puritan radicalism, reactionary conservatism and absolutism, and historically proved and remained stronger in Great Britain, plus France and other Western Europe, than America, at least Puritan New England and the evangelical South.

Alternatively, the comparative weakness of non-Puritan moderating, countervailing, or competing social forces like Anglicanism after the Great Awakenings and the Enlightenment in America helps explain the persisting and even intensifying religious–political radicalism, rigid conservatism, and absolutism of American Puritanism and its sequels in fundamentalist and sectarian Protestantism, particularly in the South dominated by Southern Baptism, ushering in the twenty-first century as a "totalitarian" response to liberal democracy and modernity (Bauman 2001). Thus, a comparative study finds that, due to the continuing or increasing force of religious traditionalism, notably Protestant fundamentalism, America remains a "deviant case" among Western societies in respect with the global trend to "shifts away from absolute norms and values toward a syndrome of increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory values" (Inglehart and Baker 2000). If so, Puritanism's radicalism, rigid conservatism, and absolutism generate and perpetuate this remarkable instance of American exceptionalism as a "double-edged sword" especially promoted and glorified by Puritans and their descendents, from Winthrop et al. in the seventeenth century to "Bible-Belt" Protestant sectarians four century later. This indicates some kind or degree of radical, reactionary, and absolutist, so, other things equal, authoritarian path dependence in the genesis, development, persistence, and probably future of American Puritanism. The latter

evidently refuses, empowered by relatively weak mitigating and rivaling forces, to be tempered or substantially transformed in its political as well as moral–religious radicalism, reactionary conservatism, and absolutism, unlike its British progenitor, and instead further reinforces and expands geographically and sociologically these original Puritan tendencies or outcomes.

The persistent and intensifying radicalism, reactionary conservatism, and absolutism of American, as compared with British, Puritanism suggests the following observations. First, in the specific sense of the decline or relative weakness of a tempering Anglicanism as understood and other less ascetic Protestantism like Lutheranism, religious pluralism, or competition has been substantively, though not necessarily formally, weaker, as Weber notes, in America than Great Britain, contrary to the conventional wisdom or cherished American myth. Second, ideological pluralism or contestation has been weaker in substantive, as distinguished from formal, terms, as indicated by a comparatively weak Enlightenment, or its derivatives, liberalism, pluralism, and secularism as a contesting or countervailing force to Puritanism in most of America's history, especially Puritan New England and the evangelical South, up to the early twenty-first century. Third, in accordance with Acton's rule, absolute or overwhelming Puritan political, religious, and other power tended to corrupt Puritans and their successors or proxies absolutely or overwhelmingly. Speaking of *dramatis personae*, Cromwell's successors in Great Britain proved more amenable, reasonable, or readily forced, by tempering and competing social forces, to moderation and transformation in their original political and religious radicalism, reactionary conservatism, and absolutism than those of Winthrop et al. in America. In sum, while originally radical, reactionary, and absolutist Puritanism is essentially an extinct, endangered, discredited, or ignored species in contemporary Great Britain, it has persisted and even strengthened, in slightly modified forms, in modern America, most strikingly the Southern "Bible Belt" as the uniquely neo-Puritan project or persisting reality. Such differential outcomes have been primarily due to the presence and operation of strong moderating or countervailing forces such as Anglicanism and liberalism, pluralism, and secularism in Great Britain, and their absence or comparative weakness in America, notably New England's and the South's "Bible Commonwealths."

Political Intolerance

Another element or outcome of Puritan political extremism is intolerance in politics and society overall. Puritanism features or generates what Mill describes as fanatical political as well as moral–religious intolerance rooted in and expressing Puritan radicalism, reactionary conservatism, and absolutism in politics, morality, and religion. While being, like absolutist morality and religion, an original Puritan feature or effect, in contemporary societies political and other intolerance is particularly, but not solely, manifest and intense in American Puritanism mainly consequent to its persisting or reinforcing radicalism, rigid conservatism, and absolutism, as compared with its British progenitor. As a sociological study shows, "one important factor affecting this lack of tolerance in American [politics] is

Protestant puritanical morality [e.g.] the propensity to see political life in terms of all black and all white [so] Puritanism is probably one of the main sources of American intolerance" (Lipset 1955:180). In this view, Puritanism or funda-mentalist Protestantism is a source of political intolerance in America owing to "Protestant sectarian bred propensities for crusades and the sectarian stress on per-sonal morality" (Lipset 1996:176). Evidently, these "propensities for crusades" express or regenerate political–religious radicalism, extremism, or even nihilism, as well as rigid conservatism, and the "sectarian stress on personal morality" moral absolutism, in American Puritanism. Moreover, US neo-Puritans or contemporary sectarian Protestants in their political activities are observed to be "much more ag-gressive in imposing their own morality on the body politic [and civil society] than their ideological compeers elsewhere" (Lipset 1996:293). This means that what other analysts denote as the neoconservative "politics of Puritanism" (Wagner 1997:136) is more politically and morally intolerant in America than other com-parable countries, including Great Britain itself.

The above confirms that Puritan political radicalism, reactionary conservatism and absolutism, just as its moralist form, have been less tempered or transformed by moderating and countervailing religious and secular, i.e., non-Puritan and liberal–pluralist, forces in America than Great Britain and virtually everywhere else, in-cluding its former colonies Canada and Australia. It also signifies that Puritanism and its sequels or substitutes cause America to continue paying what in a "cost-benefit" sociological analysis can be described as a high political–social price for this celebrated exceptionalism in suppressed democracy and diminished civil liberties due to the aggressive imposition of Puritan moral absolutism or rigid conservatism on polity and civil society, including what Pareto diagnoses as the government's enforcing of "morality by law." Briefly, Puritanism inflicts or threat-ens America's polity and society as a whole with the admittedly "double-edged sword" (Lipset 1996) of its celebrated American exceptionalism. In sum, the Puri-tan inflicted wound or cost to America is authoritarian social control, coercion, and repression, which indicates another element of Puritanism's political extremism.

Authoritarian Control and Repression

Puritanism's political extremism also consists or results in total (Adorno 1991) or "totalistic" (Eisenstadt 1965) social control, excessive coercion, and brutal repression, including repressive laws and severe sanctions, persecution, terror, and tyranny (Coffey 1998; Walzer 1963). Within sociological theory, this is what Comte implies by noting that Puritanism like Presbyterianism or Calvinism com-mits "violent repression" and is consequently "best suited to opposition" rather than government, suitability attributed instead to Episcopalism or Lutheranism characterized by "compulsive agitation." He thus suggests that Puritanism is less suited to democratic, peaceful, or reasonable governance than to authoritarian rule, just as militant opposition, i.e., simply "unfit" for democracy, owing to its coercive and repressive propensities. In retrospect, Comte's insight seems both diagnostic and prophetic in view of the documented "unfitness" of Puritanism for democratic

governance or its remarkable "fitness" for authoritarianism, notably the aggressive and coercive imposition of rigid Puritan morality. Yet, in spite or rather because of this unfitness, Puritanism historically, from old and New England to the US South, "was always concerned with government" (Walzer 1963:85), specifically authoritarian control and repression to the point of methodical, hence the original idea of "Methodism" in, "holy terror" *cum* "sanctification."

Moreover, early conservative sociologist Edward Ross (1896:263), otherwise, like most US social conservatives, celebratory of Puritanism (recall his cited statement at the beginning of this work), warns about what he calls "Puritan tyranny." Also, his observation that in American history Puritanism and democracy "have worked together" to the effect that the latter has hence provided its own "antidote" implies that "Puritan tyranny" represents the antithesis of democratic politics or political freedom in America. To reiterate, this alternatively implies that democracy is "poisonous" to Puritanism as its "antidote," or Puritan tyranny is an antidemocratic "poison."

Notably, like Comte more implicitly, Ross therefore anticipates Weber's diagnosis and even prediction of, as he puts it, the "unexampled tyranny of Puritanism" in old and especially New England described as Puritan theocracy. The word "unexampled," cited and stressed by some Weberian sociologists (Bendix 1977), is particularly striking implying that Puritanism not just tends to establish political–moral tyranny, but also that the latter is historically unprecedented in terms of the intensity and totality of authoritarian, specifically moralist–theocratic, control, coercion, and repression. In his words, Puritanism or Calvinism was the "most absolutely unbearable form of ecclesiastical control of the individual which could possible exist." Specifically, such "absolutely unbearable" church control or "unexampled tyranny" of Puritanism[10] appropriated, constituted, or was fully realized in what he calls the "strictest bibliocracy" as a case of Puritan–Calvinist theocracies or state churches in Europe and America, notably what he describes as New England's theocracy. In particular, Weber indicates that within Christianity the religious control or "tyranny" of Puritanism was "unbearable" or "unexampled" in relation to Catholicism. This is apparently contrary to conventional wisdom, associating Puritanism and Protestantism in general with democracy and freedom, and Catholicism with authoritarianism and coercion, at his time and since, especially among Protestants as well as some Catholics. As Weberians comment, "in place of Catholic tolerance, the Protestants [more precisely, Puritans and Calvinists] had introduced a thoroughgoing regulation of private and public life; yet

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[10] Weber also refers to Puritan tyrannical or authoritarian legalism. For example, he notes that early Lutherans characterized Puritans (Calvinists) with an "unfree servitude to the law" as does Tocqueville. Overall, Weber remarks that Puritanism or Calvinism is "closely related to the hard legalism." He thus echoes Tocqueville's observation about the "servitude of thought" characteristic for Anglo-Saxon lawyers, including US Supreme-Court members defending the "conservative spirit of stability against the fickleness of the democracy." However, according to Baltzell (1979), Puritanism in New England treats legalism, just as rationalism, as a "danger," which in part contradicts his identification of the Puritan "ideal man" as a "minister-magistrate."

bourgeoisie has risen to the defense of this 'unexampled tyranny of Protestantism' [i.e. Puritanism]"[11] (Bendix 1977:55).

By definition, the political–religious "tyranny" of Puritanism comprises, generates, or eventually escalates into some degree and kind of terror or methodical ("methodism" in) war on humans to be punished for or prevented from recommitting the original sin for sacred causes such as Divine Will and godly society, hence "holly terror" or crusade against "evil." To use Clausewitz's famous definition of war, Puritans' terror or crusade against "evil" humanity and for their, viz. Cromwell's, God is a "continuation of politics by other means," i.e., an escalation of political radicalism, control, and repression via ultimate instruments and punishments such as persecution, mass imprisonment, and the death penalty in Puritanism and its sequels like US neoconservatism.

This is what a Comte implies by identifying the Puritan attribute of "violent repression," thus a totalitarian dimension in Puritanism, since the defining element of totalitarianism is terror, including mass murder of "guilty" and "innocent" alike (Arendt 1951). Specifically, he intimates that, like totalitarianism exemplified in fascism, Puritanism constitutes or engages in official or state terrorism (Gibbs 1989) when in government or political power, as during the short murderous rule of Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints" and Winthrop et al.'s long-lived "Bible Commonwealth" whose favorite pastime was persecution, murder and extermination of the "impure," "ungodly," and "evil" exemplified by witch trials (Coffey 1998). Yet, Puritanism resorts to counterstate or oppositional terrorism when in what Comte calls opposition or, as Simmel puts it, protest[12] against established social and religious structures, as well as in political marginality or "wilderness." This is shown by the early English Puritans' militancy against the Crown and Anglicanism as well as by US Puritan–fundamentalist vigilante violence to the point of "holy terror" (Smith 2000:61) and extremist ("Christian") militia up to the twenty-first century.

In this sense, like fascism and authoritarian conservatism overall, including its American version, Puritanism is not "fit" not only for democratic governance, as Comte suggests, but even for political opposition or peaceful protest in democracy—and for the same reason he identified, i.e., "violent repression," including "holy" terrorism and mass murder. In a well-known, though short-lived,

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[11] Bendix's (1977:55) citation the "unexampled tyranny of Protestantism" is curious because it apparently substitutes "Protestantism" for "Puritanism" in the original expression, as well as imprecise in view of Weber's insistence on distinguishing between various Protestant types, notably Calvinism and Lutheranism, including Anglicanism, as more and less "tyrannical," "unbearable," "repressive," or "ascetic," respectively. Further, Weber views Lutheranism as well as Anglicanism, as in many respects, including "ecclesiastical control" and asceticism, describing them as the "least ascetic churches of the Reformation," closer to Catholicism than to Calvinism, and to that extent not belonging to the "unexampled tyranny of Protestantism."

[12] Generally, Simmel comments that "since to 'protest' is necessary for it, Protestantism loses its energy or inner unity once the adversary against whom it protests gets out of range."

instance, US Puritans and other conservative groups in opposition to the foreign power condemned the British colonial sedition laws, yet enacted their own version of such rules when becoming "government" after the successful American Revolution. Thus, the "First Amendment, which protects the freedoms of speech, religion, and the press as well as the rights to assembly and to petition the government, was added to the Constitution in 1791. Yet, years later, in 1798, Congress passed the Sedition Act, which prohibited people from "criticizing the government" (Hull 1999:3). Often seen as the "first national attempt at political censorship" in America, this law was primarily (but not exclusively) a creation of Puritanism and religious–political conservatism overall, in that it was created by conservatives (e.g., the Federalists) "to suppress opposing political parties" (Hull 1999:3–46). At least, it reflected the demographic and political–religious dominance of Puritanism in revolutionary American society (recall, at the time of the 1776 Revolution two-thirds of Americans were Puritans). Admittedly, the law "clearly violated the First Amendment, and though it was later repealed, it illustrates a trend in U.S. history" (Hull 1999:3) predominated or punctuated by Puritanism or sectarian Protestantism (Lipset 1996). This trend has encompassed a myriad of such unconstitutional laws and so illegal practices up to the twentieth (Wilson's Sedition and Espionage Act[13]) and even the twenty-first century (e.g., the neoconservative Patriot Act of the early 2000s), despite the standard libertarian rhetoric of "freedom and individualism." Evidently, this is the dual trend of American Puritanism and other religious conservatism toward suppressing political freedoms and civil liberties while wielding government power, and yet to demanding them, for themselves solely, when placed in antigovernment opposition or marginality, thus validating Comte's scenario. In recent American history, the 1980s–2000s period is a case in point for the first trend, and the 1960s for the second.

Subsequent studies largely support Comte's prediction as well as Weber's diagnosis of the "most absolutely unbearable" religious control of polity and society by early English-American Puritanism, notably New England's Puritan theocracy. Some analysts note that "a shared feature of monasticism and Puritanism, already suggested by Weber, is that they both give rise to impressive forms of social control, favoring the bureaucratic regulation of the individual" (Silber 1993:122). In particular, despite its celebrated religious individualism, Puritanism in most of America's history reportedly "did not entail or imply minimizing social control" (Israel 1966:595), but the contrary. For instance, a study finds that "almost

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[13] Hull (1999:3) remarks that during WW I the conservative-Puritan "Wilson administration passed the Sedition and Espionage Acts. These acts banned 'treasonous' material from the mail and made it illegal for anyone to speak against the U.S. government, flag, or military uniform. Two thousand people, primarily war protesters, were prosecuted under these acts. In 1919, however, the Sedition Act was overturned by the courts." In turn, a British diplomat remarked about US Puritan–Presbyterian President Wilson at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference that his "spiritual arrogance which seems inseparable from the harder forms of religion had eaten deep into his soul."

all Puritans" in seventeenth century New England were advocates of what was then called the "bloudy tenent of persecution" in the belief that the "magistrate had a religioous duty to punish heresy, idolatry [and apostasy]" (Coffey 1998: 962–963).

Repressive Laws and Draconian Sanctions

In particular, Puritanism comprises, reproduces, or escalates into extremely repressive laws and severe, Draconian-style sanctions manifesting legal, notably judicial or penal, extremism, as the institutional and putatively legitimate, in Weber's sense, mechanisms of political compulsion, repression, terror, or crusade against "evil." In Durkheim's terms, the external index or visible symbol of Puritanism, especially its legal–political extremism and repression, or Puritan solidarity, is penal law with its repressive or excessively violent and harsh sanctions consisting in "suffering" inflicted on sinful, "evil," or ungodly perpetrators by a definite institutional body like an official church or state, typically jointly as seen in New England's theocracy, as distinguished from civil law and mild or restitutive sanctions enforcing only nonviolent restitution.

This Durkheimian index indicating legal, particularly judicial, extremism, and repression often includes what Americans call "dumb laws," especially prevalent and enforced in the South, to indicate unreasonable, irrational, outdated, and excessively coercive Puritan-based legal norms and sanctions derived from or inspired by moral–religious Biblical principles, criminalizing and harshly punishing a wide range of moral sins, "evils," or vices redefined as crimes. As Mannheim also implies, Puritan repressive laws and harsh violent sanctions consist of the "compulsion of an erroneously founded" set of moral–religious axioms that are transformed into legal norms, yet which human actors "cannot comply" with, so are "invalid." Hence, he infers that the unethical or illegal, usually equated in Puritanism, behaviors of the individual are not "due to his own personal transgression, but must be attributed to [its] compulsion" and legal–judicial extremism. A case in point is the extreme compulsion of Puritan "dumb laws" that most humans cannot simply comply with, and which thus become invalid, unreasonable, or "dead," though sometimes selectively enforced, in the South and elsewhere in historical and modern America. In this sense, to paraphrase a not-so-Puritanical, though nominally Baptist, US President, "it is Puritanism, not humans, dumb-stupid."

In Durkheim's context, Puritanism, owing to its penal-repressive laws and sanctions, descends into an evolutionary regression or involution into a primitive and barbarian criminal justice system defined by inflicting suffering or violent retribution in the manner of "eye-for-eye." This holds true if his assumption of an evolution to civil-restitutive or less harsh or less "dumb" laws and nonviolent sanctions in contemporary democratic, civilized, and enlightened society legally defined by judicial enlightenment is correct, as observed in Western and other democracies (Inglehart and Baker 2000, Rutherford 1994). Notably, Puritan judicial–penal

extremism, primitivism, or barbarism[14] is manifest in re-establishing an extremely harsh or Draconian criminal justice system and policy, including "tough-on-sin-and-crime" practices in America, from seventeenth century New England theocracy through the 1980s–2000s Bible Belt and beyond. The Puritan or other Draconian criminal justice system is a form of legal extremism, primitism, or barbarism due to its typical lack of proportion, balance, or fit between crime and punishment in the direction of excessive or maximal punishing severity, especially physical suffering, violent retribution, and "crual, inhuman and degrading punishment" ranging from arbitrary imprisonment to mutilation and death, an imbalance or misfit that is its defining trait. Such a Puritan judicial system constitutes or expresses penal maximalism associated with primitive, barbarian, and undemocratic societies, as opposed to judicial minimalism or an enlightened criminal–justice system observed in or predicted for their contemporary civilized and democratic types, as Durkheim and other sociologists imply (Rutherford 1994). In particular, so long as, as some analysts suggest, "abolition of the death penalty is part of the civilizing mission of modern states" (Reiman 1997:27), the Puritan-based penal system, by its widespread and cheerful use of executions of the guilty and the innocent alike for both crimes and sins, logically and empirically hardly qualifies for "civilized."

Generally, insofar as a civilized, democratic, and just society, and so legal–penal justice, is defined by, as Durkheim[15] puts it, the "rule that the punishment should fit the crime," the Puritan judicial system by inflicting maximal or excessive physical and other suffering on offenders, including both moral sinners and ordinary criminals with the first equated with the second, is uncivilized, undemocratic unjust and unenlightened. Consequently, it degenerates into, at least in its victims' experience, a criminal *in*-justice system or an ideological delusion of "justice for all" couched in or sweetened by (Beck 2000) "apple-pie authoritarianism" (Wagner 1997), in spite or perhaps because of what Weber refers to as Puritans' "legalistic morality" or "unfree servitude to the law." This is what Mannheim implies by predicting that any, including Puritan, "antiquated and inapplicable," i.e., primitive,

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[14] For example, ACLU in a report documents what it describes as "unbelievable barbarism" in the conservative, Puritan-based, Texas prison system during the 1980s–2000s. Thus, it finds that most of 107 Texas state prisons and 247 county jails violate the constitutional obligation (as per the Eighth Amendment) of providing basic health care to inmates by effectively denying such care. For illustration, incredibly, but true, less than 200 out of the 50,000 Texas prisoners infected with Hepatitis C received some medical assistance. Also, a senior UK High Court judge reportedly stated that the treatment by the US neoconservative government of Guantanamo prisoners branded "enemy combatants" during the war on terror did not "appear to coincide with that of most civilised nations." Even the UK Prime Minister, the main US ally (or, as the British love to call him, "poodle") in the war on terror, admitted that the Guantanamo prison was a penal "anomaly that sooner or later has got to be dealt with."

[15] Moreover, Durkheim states that "there is no society where it is not the rule that the punishment should fit the crime." This reveals a sort of excessive sociological–legal optimism or naiveté by overlooking the existence of primitive-barbarian and Puritan societies with Draconian legal systems where precisely this rule does not exist or hold.

unenlightened, maximalistic, and excessively harsh, legal norms, just as moral ax-ioms, "are likely to degenerate into ideologies [so] to conceal the actual meaning of conduct," notably injustice or unfairness in penal laws and sanctions. This predic-tion, diagnostic or evocative of Puritanism's legal systems in old and New England degenerating into theocratic ideologies, as exemplified by the "Holy Common-wealth," the "Parliament of Saints," "Christian Sparta," and the "shining city upon the hill," seems prophetic of the subsequent degeneration of Puritan "dumb laws" in America, particularly the South, into ideological rationalizations, viz. "Ameri-canism," American ethical and family "values," "one nation under God," "we trust in God," "silent moral majority" in the "Bible Belt," "faith," "duty," "patriotism," "morality," "decency," etc. In turn, this theocratic degeneration by early American Puritanism likely provoked those "European Enlightenment theories about degen-eracy in the New World" (Gould 1996:29), especially New England's Puritan-based legal and social system, during the eighteenth and nineteenth century and later. Recall, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century while Western Europe experienced the Age of Enlightenment, most of America was subject to Pu-ritanism and its largely anti-Enlightenment or antiliberal Great Awakenings, with this pattern essentially repeating ever since, with another climax during the early twenty-first century through American fundamentalist–conservative revival con-demning and counteracting European and global secular–liberal changes (Inglehart 2004).

In sum, in Durkheimian terms, Puritanism constitutes and generates penal ex-ceptionalism or degeneracy in the form of an exception to or degeneration from liberal-democratic society's shift away from repressive to nonviolent civil sanc-tions and laws, from an extremely harsh, maximalist, crude, and inhuman into a mild, minimalist, enlightened, and humanist legal system. Hence, Puritanism mostly explains and predicts what is usually observed and celebrated by its ad-herents as American exceptionalism in legal-political terms, including severe gov-ernment punishment to the point of mass incarceration and the death penalty[16] for both sins and crimes, sinners and criminal, typically not distinguished from each other. It simply perpetuates America a "deviant case" in terms of the "global shift" from legal–penal and moral–religious absolutism, maximalism, barbarism (harsh-ness, darkness), irrationalism and intolerance to relativism minimalism, civilizing (mildness), rationalism, enlightenment and tolerance (Inglehart 2004).

Historical–Empirical Cases of Puritan Authoritarian Control and Repression

The following more specifically documents and analyzes some historical–empirical cases of Puritan maximalist control, extreme coercion, and repression, including excessively repressive laws and sanctions, and state or counter-state

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[16] For example, America, alongside three other, totalitarian countries (China, Iran, Vietnam), accounted for 97% of all executions in the world in 2004.

"holy terror." Early England, especially the English Civil War or Puritan Revolution of the seventeenth century, provides a case in point. It is instructive to remember that the Puritan, often described as bourgeois or middle-class, Revolution essentially caused the English Civil War of 1642–1645 (Moore 1993: xvii–xxiii). For example, Puritan preachers reportedly "fueled the outbreak" of the English Civil War or Revolution with "grim warnings about" and "pessimistic assessments" of political innovation (Zaret 1996). Notably, historical research suggests that during that period if the Puritans succeeded in establishing their "Holy Commonwealth" or turning "all England into a land of the saints," this would have represented the "Puritan terror," given that various congregations had a "kind of local terrorism, maintained by the godly elders as the national discipline would have been by an elite of saints [e.g. Baxter]" (Walzer 1963:64–65). Consequently, Puritanism's achievement in England and in extension its colonies like America was not political freedom and democracy, or even capitalism,[17] as usually assumed, "but the *terror*, the effort to create a holy commonwealth and to force men to be godly" (Walzer 1963:88). Remember, Cromwell's political campaigns were religious crusades or holy wars against the "infidels" (Gorski 2000), as an indicator of what Comte identifies as Puritan "violent repression," and that early Puritans were described as the "hotter sort" of Protestants, a description of political–religious extremism. Moreover, this Puritan "Holy Commonwealth," whose harsh collective discipline and coercion constituted a sort of "Christian Sparta," was "far more repressive" than the medieval system, for the primary end of Puritanism and its warfare against Satan was repression, absolute control of "all England" and so organizing "society as a regiment" rather than harmony or love in contrast to Anglicanism or Catholicism (Walzer 1963). Other studies indicate that Puritanism and Calvinism through such compulsion and repression established and legitimated political absolutism and quietism, not only political opposition to established authority, as in conventional assumptions, in England and Europe, respectively, including Prussia and Calvin's Geneva (Billings and Scott 1994).

Another related and derived historical case of Puritan extreme coercion and repression, including persecution and terror, involves early American Puritanism purported to make New England and America as a whole what Winthrop called the "shining city upon the hill" in the form of a "godly society" or "Bible Commonwealth." Yet, during most of its history from the 1620s through the 1830s (and beyond), officially Puritan New England was far from being such a sociological (or theological) heaven in the sense of political and other freedom, democracy, and a free civil society but rather, as both Tocqueville and Weber suggest, theocracy, so a repressive theocratic dystopia. As Adam Smith remarks anticipating Tocqueville and Weber, the "English Puritans, restrained at home, fled for

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[17] Apparently contradicting Weber, Walzer (1963:89) suggests that early English Puritans were "entrepreneurs indeed, but in politics rather than in economics. They ruthlessly pursue[d] not wealth or even individual power [but] collective control of themselves, of each other, of all England." Walzer adds that such control is "not unique in history," thus suggesting that Puritanism is hardly novel in this respect.

freedom to America, and established there the four governments of New England." Smith could have added that these governments eventually became in essence no different from the old constraining England under the Monarchy and Anglican Church, as did Cromwell's transient "repressive Holy Commonwealth." This is what Smith's reluctant follower Marx suggests making the following graphic and typically sarcastic pre-Veblenian observation. In this words,

those sober [religious] virtuosi of Protestantism, the Puritans of New England, in 1703, by decrees of their assembly set a premium of £40 on every Indian scalp and every captured red-skin: in 1720 a premium of £100 on every scalp; in 1744, after Massachusetts-Bay had proclaimed a certain tribe as rebels, the following prices: for a male scalp of 12 years and upwards £100 (new currency), for a male prisoner £105, for women and children prisoners £50, for scalps of women and children £50.

No wonder, as a study reports, "particularly lucrative" for these American Puritans was the trade in slaves and, relatedly, rum (Foerster 1962:4).

In retrospect, such Puritan profitable persecution, murder, and attempted extermination of the native "inferior," "savage," "evil," and "godless" Americans shed new and perverse light on Protestant "saints" or "religious virtuosi"—claming or supposed to abide by and enforce the very Biblical commandment of "thou shall not kill"—a term that, as seen, Weber adopts in reference to Puritanism and asceticism overall. They secondarily reveal a remarkable Weberian "spirit of capitalism," though Weber curiously does not cite this example which, despite its brutality, can be placed alongside Franklin's "time is money" to support and illustrate his thesis of the Puritan–capitalist elective affinity. Notably, these practices historically follow or coincide with the documented persecution and murder by New England's Puritans of Quakers during the 1650s and similar subsequent events, including the infamous witchcraft trials, in consequence of Puritan zealotry, bigotry, and "deficiencies in reason" (Gould 1996:173). In particular, such mal-treatment of Quakers prefigured the witch-hunting where Puritan sectarian or factional violence "reached its nadir." Reportedly, the Puritan witch-hunts, as culminated in the Salem hysteria of 1692, by inciting or exploiting hysterias or "zealous passions destroyed social and political order" (Gould 1996:174), notably democracy and civil liberties. To that extent, they prefigured, if not inspired, McCarthyism and its various, including political, moralist, nationalist, and antiforeign, hysterias, and even fascism (Merton 1939) and its totalitarian terrorism. In particular, these trials were "yet another instance of the Puritan persecution of innocent victims," and thus exercises in "holy terror," given that the integral element of both state and counterstate terrorism is "mass murder of "guilty" and "innocent" alike. They thus in a sense prefigured the executions or other "cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment" of innocent people in McCarthyism and its sequel neoconservatism via "tough-on-crime" crime policies, not to mention fascism. Needless to say, except for Puritans and neoconservatives executing innocent persons through and as a sort of collateral damage of their crusades against "evil" and "get-tough" on crime or sin policies is simply a murder, thus violating what they appropriate as their *own* Biblical commandments. The above leads to detecting "a danger of zealotry

that not only crosses racial boundaries but allies Puritan backwardness [and irrationality] with presumably childlike, superstitious 'savages' [and] has no place in a modern world" (Gould 1996:191–199). No wonder, there arose those "European Enlightenment theories about degeneracy" in the New World, as especially ruled by Puritanism, from New England to the South and beyond.

Apparently following, modeled after and inspired by New England's Holy Biblical Commonwealth, the US South with its Bible Belt provides still another historical and persisting instance of Puritan repression, persecution and holy terror. This holds true, albeit, as known, this region, including Virginia, originally was mostly non-Puritan but rather Anglican or Episcopal, and fully embraced Puritanism only later, notably as a result of the Great Awakenings during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, as well as of the American Revolution. Hence, the observation that in colonial and revolutionary America extreme religious–social and economic[18] conservatism "was characteristic of the American South" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:94) holds good primarily for the period following these Puritan revivals and extensions from the New England to this region, just as after the Civil War, perhaps climaxing again or recurring during the 1980s–2000s.

As indicated, Puritanism's repression in the South and beyond is exemplified, conducted and ostensibly legitimized in Weber's sense of legal authority, via Puritan-based "dumb" laws reflecting an unreasonable or irrational, including economically inefficient or wasteful (Akerlof 2002), legal system criminalizing moral sins or human vices and applying extremely repressive sanctions or maximalist punishments for such "crimes." Just as the systematic murder and persecution of the native Americans and Quakers, witch hunts and similar practices by New England's Puritans, "dumb" laws in the South and beyond manifest Puritan "deficiencies in reason" or "irrationality" as well as bigotry and intolerance (Gould 1996). In essence, Puritan-based or inspired "dumb laws" in America are the vivid testament to the fact that "freedom is threatened both by the overreach of the law and by arbitrariness in its enforcement" (Reiman 1997:27). And to that extent that they overreach and are arbitrarily enforced through a Puritan-inspired "tough-on-crime" conservative judicial system, they are not only "dumb" in the sense of "deficiencies in reason," but also "serious" laws (Reiman 1997:27) in terms of their ominous and lethal consequences for human liberty, dignity, and life (e.g., the death penalty or life sentence for crimes or sins associated with drugs). In legalistic terms, they express, intensify or elevate to the point of absurd and "normal pathology" (Gouldner 1970) the inherent legal extremism and absolutism, including penal primitivism and maximalism, of Puritanism and its later

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[18] Billings and Scott (1994:191) notice that Eevangelical Protestantism in the US South, for example, tended to "blunt" labor organization and activism among textile workers. Overall, antilabor policy and antiunionism has been a perisisting and even reinforcing characteristic of the US South (Lipset 1955), as have most other elements of economic as well as social conservatism, e.g. laissez faire or "small" government in terms of welfare and economic activism, but "big" in the sense of a policing state (Bourdieu 1998), low public spending, antiwelfare bias, industrial protectionism and nationalism, racism, and xenophobia, etc.

extensions or variations in this region, including early Methodism, but especially and permanently Baptism.

At this juncture, suffice it to mention a few examples of Puritan "dumb" laws in the South and beyond, still in the books and partly enforced as America ushers in the twenty-first century. For example, Texas' Puritan-inspired "dumb laws" through their legal overreach reportedly produce almost 2,000 serious crimes or felonies and consequent typically Draconic penalties, mostly for sins redefined as crimes, by usual arbitrariness in their enforcement. As typical of Puritanism since old and New England, these laws arbitrarily enforce and sanctify religious belief as the necessary condition or qualification for political office, thus a sort of "godly politics": For example, "One must acknowledge a supreme being before being able to hold public office." The result is the exclusion of those lacking or failing to publicly, including hysterically and tearfully in mass hysterias, demonstrate such beliefs; simply, deists, moderate believers, agnostics "need not apply," let alone atheists condemned and socially excluded, if not exorcised, by Puritans and their neoconservative mutants as more "evil" and "un-American" than virtually any other religious, ideological, and racial out-group (Edgell et al. 2006) in American society. This law in various formulations is common to the rest of the Bible Belt (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, etc.) and beyond. Its federal equivalent or proxy is perhaps what some less known government "rules and regulations" prohibit as publicly denying the "existence of Divinity" as a blasphemy to be harshly punished or condemned in "godly" America. Such an equivalent is likely to be a proposed neoconservative Congressional law in the 2000s that will bar federal courts, including the Supreme Court, from hearing challenges to laws and any other government actions involving "acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty or government," including school prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the Pledge of Allegiance. Other state "dumb" laws enforcing "faith" or protecting church include: "It is illegal to wear a fake moustache that causes laughter in church. Dominoes may not be played on Sunday" (Alabama); "Dance halls may not operate on Sundays. No work may be done on Sunday. Musical instruments may not be sold on Sunday" (South Carolina); "No liquor may be sold on Sundays or election days" (Colorado); "All men must carry a rifle to church on Sunday" (Massachusetts)[19]; and the like.

Also, typical of Puritanism or sectarian Protestantism, exemplified by Southern Baptism, various Texan "dumb laws" coercively impose moral purity or, as Pareto

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[19] For example, in 2005 media reported that Massachusetts' attorney general launched an "investigation into several supermarkets that opened on Thanksgiving in defiance of the state's Puritan-era Blue Laws" prohibiting stores from being opened on Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's Day, though the ban on Sunday liquor sales has been repealed. Evidently, even at the start of the twenty-first century, Massachusetts and the rest of New England, while becoming and remaining less theocratic and fundamentalist, i.e., more secular and liberal than the South, still reflects its Puritan founding, history, and so "path-dependence."

stated, "enforce morality by law," including both alcohol[20] and sexual temperance. For instance, "it is illegal to take more than three sips of beer at a time while standing," "the entire Encyclopedia Britannica is banned in Texas because it contains a formula for making beer at home," "beer may not be purchased after midnight on a Sunday, but it may be purchased on Monday" (sic!), "it is illegal to drive within an arm's length of alcohol, including alcohol in someone else's blood stream," "up to a felony charge can be levied for promoting the use of, or owning more than six dildos," "you can be legally married by publicly introducing a person as your husband or wife three times," "it is illegal for both sexes to flirt or respond to flirtation using the eyes and/or hands." Historically, most of these "dumb laws" are the creation, reflex and legacy of Puritanism or its ramifications, viz. what some US observers (Mencken 1982) call ruling "Baptist and Methodist barbarism," in the South. This applies especially to the period following the second Great Awakening of the 1800s and the Revolution, resulting in the basically Puritan hegemony of Baptism and Methodism, as well as more moderate Presbyterianism, opposing and displacing Anglicanism or Episcopalism as the previously dominant, yet subsequently condemned as "foreign," congregation in the region.

In light of such Puritan-style coercive impositions of moral purity and "faith," which is precisely what makes Americans call these laws "dumb," not surprisingly, a Bible-Belt (plus "Wild-West") governor declared in the early 2000s that "one of the great myths of our time is that you can't legislate morality,"[21] suggesting "we can do it," thus reviving or evoking original Puritanism and its "American candoism" (Gould 1996:49) in this respect. Obviously, like the old, the new would-be Puritans in the Bible Belt and beyond do not take "no" for an "answer" in

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[20] In addition to a regular massive police apparatus of the magnitude and severity or brutality that looks, especially to non-Texans, like a true policing state, Texas has a special state agency controlling alcohol use called the Alcoholic Beverage Commission. Thus, effectively no less than two separate police forces monitor and restrict alcohol use as if this were the greatest threat to the "true spirit" of Texas. And in 2006 it was reported that the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission was sending "undercover agents into bars to arrest drinkers for being drunk" on proto- or neo-Puritan grounds that "being in a bar does not exempt one from the state laws against public drunkenness." Civil-rights defenders may wonder if the next step would be sending undercover agents to people's homes on similar neo-Puritan grounds.

[21] A Bible-Belt governor, united Methodist, added that "if you can't legislate morality, then you can neither lock criminals up nor let them go free. If you can't legislate morality, you can neither allow for prayer in school nor prevent it. It is a ridiculous notion to say you can't legislate morality. I say you can't NOT legislate morality [sic!]." The governor has been described by his colleagues in these words: "His walk of faith is a lifelong journey of a sinner who has accepted the grace of God." Cromwell's self-description, "I was a chief of sinners [but now] I may honor my God either by doing or suffering," indicates that not much has substantively changed in this respect from his seventeenth century theocratic–authoritarian Puritan "Parliament of Saints" to twenty-first century Bible-Belt political systems and personalities. No wonder, moderate US Methodists like the executive director of Americans United for Separation of Church and State describe this and similar actions (e.g., the governor's signing laws in a church facility) as "one of the most outrageous misuses of a house of worship for political gain."

imposing their own morality and piety on society. In comparative-historical terms, this indicates how little has substantively changed from sixteenth century Geneva and Calvin, if not the medieval Vatican theocracy and its Inquisition, from Great Britain's "Parliament of Saints" and Cromwell as a self-described sinner-turned-a-suffering-saint, notably from seventeenth century New England's theocratic "Biblical Commonwealth," Winthrop et al. and their persecutions and witch-hunts to the Southwest compound of bibliocracy ("Bible Belt") with anarchic primitivism ("Wild West"), and its politicians *cum* moral–religious crusaders, i.e., self-styled "born again" neo-Puritans in the third millennium. Original Puritanism and what Weber calls its New England theocracy may be passé, but the new Puritan strict bibliocracy qua a "Bible Belt" seems to be the present and even, judging from its advocates' "intelligent design" and intentions, the likely future of the Southwest and America as a whole. It therefore reenacts once again, after many reenactments or replicas ever since, including Reaganism in the 1980s, Winthrop's bibliocratic "shining city upon the hill." This suggests that Southern and other US Puritans not only cannot take "no" for an answer to the question of legislating morality, but also never "lose the faith" in realizing the original Puritan repressive antidemocratic design of a "community of saints" as a "godly" society.

Of course, Puritanical "dumb laws" are not an exclusively Texas specialty, but common, persisting, pervasive, and occasionally enacted[22] in the entire "Bible Belt," as exemplified by ("dry") counties with alcohol prohibition, official bans on premarital sex and adultery, and similar measures enforced by the vice police as the major part of an ever-increasing policing state, and beyond in America,[23]

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[22] In a typically grotesque example, in 2004 the Texas police arrested a woman for selling "sex toys," which makes one wonder as to what happened to celebrated Texan "free enterprise." Similar grotesque or tragic–comic instances of enforcing "dumb laws" abound in the neo-Puritanical Bible Belt and beyond in recent times, just as before.

[23] Here are some of the most Puritanical or "dumbest" of Puritan "dumb laws" in the South and elsewhere in America taken from http://www.dumblaws.com: "You may not have more than two dildos in a house" (Alabama). "Oral sex is considered to be sodomy" (Arkansas). "It is illegal to sing in a public place while attired in a swimsuit. When having sex, only the missionary position is legal. It is considered an offense to shower naked" (Florida). "All sex toys are banned" (Georgia). "Adultery or Fornication results in a fine of $500 and/or 6 months in prison"; "Unnatural intercourse, if both parties voluntarily participate, results in a maximum sentence of 10 years and $10,000"; "It is illegal to teach others what polygamy is"; "A man may not seduce a woman by lying, and claiming he will marry her" (Mississippi). "It is illegal to have oral sex" (Missouri). "All couples staying overnight in a hotel must have a room with double beds that are at least two feet apart. Making love in the space between the beds is strictly forbidden"; "While having sex, you must stay in the missionary position and have the shades pulled" (North Carolina). "Interracial marriages are illegal"; "More than 8 women may not live in the same house because that would constitute a brothel" (Tennessee). "Not only is it illegal to have sex with the lights on, one may not have sex in any position other than missionary"; "If one is not married, it is illegal for him to have sexual relations"; "You may not have oral or anal sex" (Virginia). "Unmarried couple who live together and 'lewdly associate' with one another may face up to a year in prison"; "Any person who commits adultery shall be fined at least twenty dollars" (West Virginia). "It is illegal for liquor stores to sell food or grocery stores to sell any alcohol

from the Midwest to the Northeast (New England) and to the "Wild" and Pacific West (Oklahoma, Arizona, Utah, etc.). Also, various federal equivalents, proxies, or extensions of Puritanical state "dumb laws" abound, ranging from Prohibition in the 1920s–1930s to the 21-year drinking age since the 1980s, plus ever-persisting "dry" counties and states (Merton 1968), from criminalizing adultery in the military to paranoid campaigns against "public indecency" (television, the Internet) spanning into the twenty-first century. Other federal variants include, for example: "It is illegal to give free alcohol to Indians who live on reservations"; "To be a dominatrix is illegal"; "Persons may be placed in jail for up to five years for shooting a hole in a penny"; and so on.

The above suggests that Puritanical laws and their enforcers in the South and beyond up to the federal government may be (to cite a movie title) "dumb, dumber, dumbest" or "off" by legislating and enforcing their morality and faith, and alternatively making sins or vices crimes. Yet, they are not "dead" or "out," as most Americans seem to think, as known by those sinners or deviants personally experiencing the "Draconian severity" (Patell 2001:187) of punishments for violating Puritan "dumb" and other laws resurrected and enforced by a neoconservative "tough-on-crime" penal system. Far from being what Mannheim and other analysts call the "dead hand of the past" (Harrod 1956), Puritans or their evolutionary mutants are apparently live and well, "resurrected from the dead" (Dunn and Woodard 1996), even never better in the Bible Belt and beyond (e.g., "red" states in the 2000 elections), perpetuating their legacy or species ("genes") via repressive moralist–theocratic overarching "dumb laws" seemingly reflecting "survival of the un-fittest" (irrational) or unnatural, adverse selection in America ushering in the twenty-first century.

Yet, as Mannheim and even conservative Durkheim predict, for most Americans, minus "would-be-saints" or rulers, freedom is undermined or threatened by the overreaching of these and other Puritan-conservative laws and by the typical arbitrariness in their enforcement. In particular, arbitrary or discretionary enforcement of "dumb" as well as "serious" laws by the Puritan-based neoconservative criminal justice system or the policing state "is not justified in a free society" (Reiman 1997:27). Notably, this holds true of the primitive, in Durkheim's sense of repressive law and sanction, and ever-growing and severe Puritan-rooted vice police with its exorbitant opportunity costs and low long-term effectiveness (e.g., Prohibition, "dry" counties, the war on drugs, prostitution) through deflecting societal resources from arguably more sensible and effective crime-control uses (viz. on violent crimes) to an anachronistic religious-style crusade against and Draconian

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except beer that is at most 3.2% alcohol" (Colorado). "A woman can not be on top in sexual activities"; "It is illegal to go to bed without first having a full bath" (Massachusetts). "Oral sex is a misdemeanor and is punishable by one year in jail and a $2,500 fine" (Oklahoma). "Individuals may not possess beer in containers larger than two liters unless they are a retailer"; "It is illegal *not* to drink milk"; "You're not allowed to sell beverages containing more than 3.2% alcohol" (Utah). "It is illegal for women to stand within five feet of a bar while drinking" (Wyoming), etc.

punishments of sins (or nonviolent crimes). The vice police is the most immediate and visible instrument of American Puritanism's primitive and persisting tendency to enforce, as Pareto prophetically observed, "morality by law" as a facet of state terrorism, when in government (in contrast to Puritan antigovernment, militia-style terrorism while not in political power or in opposition to non-Puritan institutions). From the perspective of liberal secular democracy the Puritan (just as Islamic) vice police is an internal contradiction or an oxymoron, since in such a political system moral sins are not criminalized but addressed through the individual freedom of choice between virtues and vices (Van Dyke 1995), or alternatively, morality is not or cannot, as Pareto and Durkheim admonish, imposed by government coercion and law.

In comparative terms, by the twenty-first century the vice police has become the exceptional anachronism and unique anomaly, just as the unrivaled resource waste or economic irrationality of Puritan-America, especially the Bible Belt, by comparison with most Western democracies. In the latter this peculiar element of a policing state is virtually nonexistent, as in Scandinavia (plus Holland, Germany, France, and Spain), threatened with extinction or degraded into irrelevance, as in other countries, including postconservative Great Britain and its former colonies (e.g., Canada). Beyond Western liberal democracy, only fundamentalist Islam equals or surpasses American neo-Puritanism in respect of a massive and repressive vice police (viz. alcohol prohibition, criminalizing of birth control and adultery, honor killings, etc.). At this juncture, for example, Islamic Iran and the evangelical Bible Belt meet and even objectively ally (e.g., joining forces against various sins like birth control at International conferences) with each other as proto-totalitarian attacks on individual freedom and choice (Bauman 1997). On a lighter note, the Puritan-rooted vice police or policing state, with its typically grotesque or tragic–comic ways and means enforcing "dumb" laws, besides providing material for many American comedians, perhaps more than anything else makes and perpetuates America, at least the South, as the "laughing-stock" (Hill 2002) of the Western world and beyond. Thus, within the Western world, the Puritan "obsession with sin and vice" enforcing moral temperance through the vice police is an "especially *American* ideology. [For example] In Sweden people laughed at these American obsessions" (Wagner 1997:5). However, for those subjected to its actions, including those 60-plus percent of the 2 million prisoners imprisoned during the 2000s (Becky and Western 2004), often for life, for committing sins or nonviolent crimes (e.g., drug and alcohol use) the vice police is hardly a laughing matter; even Prohibition, frequently portrayed (at least by Hollywood movies) as "fun" or "soft," was not so to its victims and many others. Rather, to its actual or potential victims, from Prohibition to the war drugs, it is a deadly serious Puritan-inspired war on the "evil" of individual moral liberty and choice, for Puritanism's Calvinist morbid seriousness and stodginess in its attempted total mastery and control of society cannot, as Weber suggests, be never overlooked or underestimated with impunity. Simply, reflecting its legendary lack of a sense of humor or of a propensity for amusement, Puritanism "is not joking" with its vice

police, "dumb" laws and other seemingly grotesque and irrational institutions and practices as constituents of its policing state, and authoritarian government as a whole.

Antiegalitarianism: Inequality as Divinely Ordained Destiny

Another salient and persistent element or outcome of Puritanism's political authoritarianism is antiegalitarianism, particularism, or exclusion in polity and all society, including economy. Puritan political and in part economic antiegalitarianism, particularism, or exclusion is nondemocratic in intent or effect insofar as democracy and a free society overall is defined by the opposite, i.e., egalitarianism, universalism, or inclusion in the sense of equality, justice, as well as liberty "for all," as done by America's founders and the French Revolution.

In particular, Puritan antiegalitarianism is effectively or potentially repressive and even tyrannical or, as Popper (1973:268) puts it, "just criminal" in virtue of giving a "justification of the attitude that different categories of people have different rights; that the master has the right to enslave the slave; that some men have the right to use others as their tools." In his view, antiegalitarianism in politics and all society will ultimately be used to "justify murder" and terror or tyranny overall, which seems both diagnostic and prophetic of Puritanism, from Cromwell's crusades against the "infidels," New England's Puritan persecutions and the Southern slavery to "dumb laws" and mass imprisonment and executions in the South and America as a whole up to the twenty-first century. By implication, this holds true not only of Puritan and other antiegalitarianism in politics, as Popper emphasizes, but also of its version in the economy in the form of severe and invidious, as distinguished from moderate or reasonable, economic inequalities, which he and "libertarian" economists a la Hayek tend to neglect or downplay.

This is essentially what even some contemporary economists suggest by observing that "economic institutions that lead to a very unequal distribution of income and wealth are only consistent with a similarly unequal distribution of political power, i.e., with dictatorships and other repressive regimes"[24] (Acemoglu

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[24] Acemoglu (2005:1041) remarks that "this is because a set of economic institutions, like the plantation system, that lead to a very unequal distribution of income and wealth cannot easily survive with a set of political institutions that distribute political power equally. Those with political power would be greatly tempted to use their power to redistribute income and change the economic institutions in line with their interests." As instances of "dictatorships and other repressive regimes," Acemoglu (2005:1045) cites "extreme kleptocratic regimes" in third-world countries like Congo, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Philippines, all of which, including some other such as Chile's fascist dictatorship, US religious–political conservatives incidentally or rather not supported and even installed as part of their Puritan-like crusade against what Winthrop's self-declared disciple Reagan condemned as the "evil empire" threatening the "shining-city-upon the hill."

2005:1041). For instance, they imply that the slave-plantation economy in the ante-bellum, eventually Puritan, US South, just as in the Caribbean Islands, was only possible to institute and maintain until the mid-nineteenth century by a repressive polity, in a holy alliance with theocratic or ultimately (after the Great Awakenings) sectarian–evangelical religion, and alternatively impossible "together with democratic political institutions" (Acemoglu 2005:1041). Further, some US economists (Pryor 2002:359–364) envision and warn that "ever greater" economic inequalities in America under neoconservatism are likely to result in "greater social unrest and crime" and hence, via a typical Puritan-style "tough-on-crime" reaction, the "harsher" repression by a neoconservative government or policing state of the people, especially workers and unions.

Others diagnose and predict less social, intergenerational mobility in America under Puritan-rooted neoconservatism and its antiegalitarian economic ideas and policies a la Reaganomics by comparison to other, more economically egalitarian Western societies. For instance, some studies find that America under neoconservatism—like Great Britain during Thatcherism, indicating a neoconservative pattern—has become a "less" rather than (as US neoconservatives claim and perhaps most Americans think) more mobile or open society than Sweden, Finland, and Canada (Solon 2002:66), a finding thus contradicting conventional wisdom in the literature and Puritan-based triumphalist Americanism (Gelernter 2005) epitomized by "we-are-the-best" Reaganism regenerating another nationalist paranoia evoking McCarthyism. Alternatively, these non-Puritan or economically egalitarian societies are found to be "more mobile" or open than neo-Puritan or nonegalitarian America (Solon 2002:65) on the basis of their reportedly "weaker" intergenerational wealth transmission or what Weber would call economic closure, in turn related to their lower inequalities in the economy, than in the "land of opportunity." In particular, a study finds that America's higher economic inequality and lower intergenerational mobility or social openness during neoconservatism are likely to be connected, just as Sweden's inverse values on these dimensions (Bjorkland and Janti 1997). This confirms that Puritan-based ideas, institutions, and practices in America tend to establish and perpetuate less what Popper calls an open society than a closed social system in economic and eventually, albeit more covertly, political and other terms. To that extent, Puritan-inherited conservative or "libertarian" antiegalitarian arguments and policies associating more social mobility with corresponding wealth inequalities, and conversely, in America reveal another naïve assumption or cherished myth of Puritanism and "liberty" in economy and society.

If the above link between high inequality in economy and harsh repression, including dictatorship, in polity, as well as low social mobility, is correct, then the primary point is that Puritanism, including Puritan-rooted neoconservatism in America, tends to be economically, politically, and socially antiegalitarian, closed or exclusionary. Alternatively, the seondary one is that Puritan and any other conservative antiegalitarianism, exclusion, or closure in economy is intrinsically authoritarian, repressive, or dictatorial in also polity and society as a self-evident, admitted, and noncontroversial political tendency or outcome. For instance,

analysts suggest that the "significant career of Puritanism as an ideology of exclusion"[25] (Ashton 1965:587) can be traced back to its rise in England during the 1590s, viz. after the English defeat of the Spanish Armada.

By assumption, Puritan social antiegalitarianism is grounded, derived, and rationalized in religious–theological terms by establishing and justifying inequality and exclusion in polity as well as economy and all society as a sort of Divinely Ordained Destiny. This makes Puritanism and its theological source, Calvinism, almost identical to traditional Catholicism and original Lutheranism in this respect, as Weber and others suggest. Thus, US proto-Puritan Winthrop was convinced, and tried to convince others through the "bloody tenet of persecution," that "in all times some must be rich, some poor; some high and eminent in power and dignity, others mean and in subjection," which simply means "rigid stratification" (Bremer 1995:88). This conviction was apparently derived from or inspired by the essentially identical views of Calvin and Luther and, perhaps unwittingly, emulated or resembled those of Saint Aquinas and other prominent medieval Catholic theologians, thus being an arch-typical Puritan denial that "all men are created equal" and "liberty and justice for all." As noted, Winthrop et al. acted on and ultimately realized this conviction or antiegalitarian utopia by establishing what he called a *mixt aristocracie* as a mix of plutocracy, oligarchy, and theocracy in New England, while embracing the aristocratic–theocratic medieval order, including the rigid stratification into estates or castes, as an ideal.

In retrospect, Comte remarks that Puritanism or Protestantism as a whole "has nowhere, and least of all in England shown itself averse to the spirit of caste, which it has even attempted to restore." By implying that the caste system is what Durkheim would call a total social fact, Comte suggests that Puritanism constitutes or engenders overarching or comprehensive antiegalitarianism, political, economic, and cultural alike. And this was what Winthrop effectively established by his aristocratic mix of economic ("some must be rich, some poor") and political–cultural ("some high and eminent in power and dignity, others mean and in subjection") inequality or hierarchy, typically stirred with the theocratic rule of "saints" to form an oppressive authoritarian "cocktail" and dressed and painted in democratic-republican cloths and colors, for example, "free elections" of the self-perpetuating master class, Puritan "republic." This section elaborates on Winthrop's idea and system of *mixt aristocracie* by categorizing Puritan antiegalitarianism into economic and political–cultural, considered next.

Economic Antiegalitarianism: Providential Wealth Inequality

Puritan and other religiously based economic antiegalitarianism or particularism consists in instituting, promoting, and defending wealth and income inequality as the matter and outcome of "God's providence" or "providential design" (Bendix

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[25] Ashton (1965:579) comments that for many historians Puritanism is the "ideology of exclusion, deprivation and economic decline," while for Marxism it is the ideological weapon of the "aspiring bourgeoisie."

1984:39). Thus, Weber notices that, like Lutheranism and official Catholicism, Calvinism, notably Calvin himself, and consequently Puritanism established or defended the "unjust, but equally divinely ordained, distribution of wealth." In this view, the "unequal distribution of the goods of this world was a special dispensation of Divine Providence" and consequently the work of industrious workers, including slaves or their proxies, particularly Puritans as the "industrious sort of people" (Ashton 1965:584), a "life purpose willed by God." Calvinists in Europe and early Puritans in England and America essentially adopted with some modifications Luther's antiegalitarian view that, as Weber puts it, the "individual should remain once and for all in the station and calling in which God had placed him, and should restrain his worldly activity within the limits imposed by his established station in life" in the belief that the "perseverance of the individual in the place and within the limits which God had assigned to him was a religious duty." Notably, they embraced Luther's and in extension the traditional Catholic idea of rigid economic inequality or class stratification, i.e., "differentiation of men into the classes and occupations established through historical development," as a "direct result of the divine will." In general, Puritanism, as Weber notes, "became connected with a further development of the providential interpretation of the economic order which had begun in scholasticism," viz. Thomas Aquinas's interpretation of the division of labor and occupations in society as a "direct consequence of the divine scheme of things." In particular, for Puritanism, the "providential purpose" of the social division of labor "is to be known by its fruits." For example, Weber comments that the Puritan "providential interpretation of profit-making justified the activities of the business man" as well as "legalized the exploitation of this specific willingness to work, in that it also interpreted the employer's business activity as a calling."

In short, Puritanism, from its origination in Calvinism to its establishment in old and New England, has been a "class ideology" (Folsom 1948:424) of economic inequality. If so, then Winthrop et al.'s armada of ships imported to the New World not only their accumulated material assets but, despite their claims to novelty and exceptionality, the long-standing ideas, practices, and institutions of economic and political antiegalitarianism of the old, including the medieval-Catholic, Europe. Furthermore, they and their descendants or admirers, including paleo- and neo-conservatives like Reaganites, rendered New England and subsequently America as a whole almost equally or comparably unegalitarian, exclusive, and stratified in economic and in part political terms as the feudal Europe and the monarchic Great Britain. Occasionally they even surpassed the old Europe in economic inequality and exclusion, as during the twentieth century (the 1920s, 1980s–1990s) and, with a seeming "top-heavy" climax (Wolff 2003), the early twenty-first century.

A special dimension or outcome of Puritan economic antiegalitarianism and exclusion comprises negative or suspicious attitudes and practices to the poor and charity, condemned, just as relative poverty and inequality is justified, on theological grounds of "providence," "destiny," "God's Glory," and the like. Thus, Marx identifies Puritan antipoor and anticharity tendencies by observing that Puritanism or Protestantism uses the "fatal destiny that makes misery eternal" as a "pretext for condemning the laws in virtue of which the poor possessed a right to a miserable

public relief" in contrast to, for example, the Venetian monks who viewed this fate as the "*raison d'être* of Christian charity, celibacy, monasteries and holy houses." Curiously, Marx therefore anticipates Weber who describes a historical case in point by observing that in England during the Stuarts (especially Charles I) who "systematically developed the principle of public poor relief and provision of work for the unemployed, the Puritan battle-cry was: 'Giving alms is no charity'." Weber adds that in contrast to the Anglican social ethic of the Stuarts, Puritanism took part "in the severe English Poor Relief Legislation" against beggars, for example, and at most its "care for the poor was oriented to the goal of discouraging the lazy" as "ungodly" and for "the greater glory of God."[26] He suggests that such Puritan attitudes and measures are "quite in the spirit of the old Calvinism" that the people "only work [and obey] because and so long as they are poor [weak]," which has anticharity and subsequently antiwelfare, antiegalitarian, and thus authoritarian implications. In particular, Weber cites what he calls Calvin's "much-quoted statement that only when the people [i.e.] the mass of laborers and craftsmen, were poor did they remain obedient to God," though none than his Puritan disciple Cromwell warned (to the Long British Parliament in 1650) that "if there be any one that makes many poor to make a few rich, that suits not a Commonwealth." Alternatively, Puritans regarded being or wishing to be poor as "derogatory to the glory of God," condemning begging as the "sin of slothfulness" in particular, with Weber observing that "all Puritan preachers proceeded from the assumption that the idleness of a person capable of work was inevitably his own fault." This creates, exacerbates, or perpetuates a sort of Puritan vicious circle or what economists would call an "impossibility theorem" for the poor. They should, as Calvin et al. decree, be made and remain permanently poor in order to be economically productive as well as politically obedient, yet if they are so, they become, as English and American Puritans and their neoconservative mutants condemn them, ungodly and sinful (lazy).

This is what contemporary American Puritanism or religious–political neoconservatism attempts and usually succeeds to accomplish, thus effectively implementing the "impossibility theorem" on the poor. As an economic analysis suggests, it does so by, first, generating or rationalizing the "highest proportion of workers in relatively poorly paid jobs" in America within the Western world, and second, causing most, especially low-income, Americans "work much longer hours than do most any other nations' workers"[27] (Smeeding 2006:82–85). The

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[26] Weber adds that in early Puritanism "it was felt necessary to organize charity systematically for those incapable of work, such as orphans and cripples, for the greater glory of God." For example, he cites such Puritan "striking phenomena as dressing institutionalized orphans in uniforms reminiscent of fool's clothes and parading them through the streets of Amsterdam to divine services with the greatest possible fanfare."

[27] Smeeding (2006:82–85) adds that US poor families "already work substantially more hours than their counterparts in the comparison countries, but because of their low skill level and more unequal distribution of wages in the United States, many of them cannot earn their way out of poverty-and so their children are much more likely to grow up in a household in poverty," and attributes this result to neoconservative fiscal and other economic policies.

neo-Puritan conservative product is simply the hard and long "working poor" in America, as a perhaps unique anomaly in modern Western, including historically Protestant, society, thus making for them the "American Dream" just a dream, if not nightmare (Beck 2000). If so, then Puritan-rooted conservative antiegalitarian, including antiwelfare, practices, and institutions effectively or are likely to transform the US economy into a third world-style economic system characterized with antiegalitarianism, oligarchic rule, and repression (Pryor 2002), in particular hard long, insecure work (with no or shortest paid vacation within Western society, for example) and comparatively low pay for most workers ruled or controlled by neo-Puritan masters. In other words, this transformation of America expresses what some sociologists call the "Brazilianization of the West" (Beck 2000) primarily by Puritan-inspired American neoconservatism during the 1980s–2000s. This is the brave new, essentially Orwellian world, of Puritanism's renewed "unexampled tyranny" or Leviathan over the working poor in America, yet stirred with "free enterprise" or Anarchy for the new Puritan masters, including what Keynes calls absentee owners or rentiers. This outcome or prospect confirms that Puritanism, via its antiegalitarianism, including poverty reproduction, and repression in economy and society, is intrinsically, as Comte put it, retrograde in economic as well as political and cultural terms.

At any rate, if people are economically productive and obedient to sacred and secular power only so long as they are in "misery eternal" or poor denied public relief, as Puritanism dictates, this makes the latter appear non- or post-Christian in terms of charity and compassion (e.g., alms) characteristic for traditional Christianity, including Catholicism and the Orthodox Church. Apparently, while embracing and even reinforcing the economic antiegalitarianism of official Catholicism or the Vatican church as well as of Lutheranism, Puritanism rejected or ignored conventional Christian, Orthodox, and Catholic charity and compassion toward the poor. This indicates a salient difference between Puritanism and Catholicism and a historically novel, if not revolutionary, moment in Christianity, with actual or potential authoritarian consequences via a reinforced uncompassionate ("cruel" or "mean") economic antiegalitarianism and exclusion by the Puritan condemnation of the poor and charity (at least alms). And, Puritanism or Calvinism condemns and punishes the poor, charity, and compassion on the same grounds that traditional Christianity, including Catholicism, extols them, i.e., the Divine commandment and punishment. Echoing Marx and Weber, Tawney (1962:267) remarks that early Puritanism was "disposed to regard the poor as damned in the next world, if only to justify itself for making their life a hell in this". Also, contemporary sociologist suggest that Puritanism is "devoid of the norms of *caritas* and *compassion* that are in the lineage of the welfare state" (Tiryakian 2002:1630), as well as of what Marx calls early "Christian charity." Further, in some views, Puritans' denial to "external agencies the obligation or right to intervene in the earthy life of the individual" resulted not only in antiwelfare and other antiegalitarian attitudes and practices, but also in Puritan "brutality" and "cruelty" (Birnbaum 1953:139).

Historical instances of Puritan economic antiegalitarianism and exclusion, including no or weak *caritas* and compassion for the poor, abound, ranging from old to New England and America as a whole. As hinted, perhaps the first and most manifest instance is what Weber calls the "Puritan battle-cry" against the "systematically developed principle of public poor relief and provision of work for the unemployed" under the English non-Puritan or Anglican government (Charles I) in the seventeenth century. As typical, New England or colonial America provides another instance of general economic as well as political–cultural antiegalitarianism and exclusion. A historical study shows that, trying to emulate traditional aristocracy in England and Europe, early US Puritans

accorded primacy to the wealthier and more cultivated merchants and landowners. Below them came the smaller merchants, storekeepers, farmers, artisans, mechanics, fishermen, free day laborers, and indentured servants and slaves (Indian slaves, a few Negroes). A fussy concern for social distinctions is well illustrated by the seating arrangements in church, which were based upon the class, age, and special qualifications of each person and upon the relative prestige of the seats themselves.

(Foerster 1962:4)

The above highlights Winthrop's system of *mixt aristocracie*, by indicating a mixture of Puritan economic and political–cultural antiegalitarianism, particularism, or exclusion, a kind of Weberian overarching social stratification by wealth (plutocracy), power (oligarchy), and status honor (theocracy), in New England and beyond. As a peculiar case or sign of this comprehensive antiegalitarianism, particularism, and exclusion, in early New England, for example, "dress closely corresponded to social position, and if common folk wore coarse and sober clothes, it was not from preference but in obedience to custom and law" (Foerster 1962:5). This peculiarity suggests that New England's Puritan Pilgrims like Winthrop et al. brought with their aristocratic–bourgeois clothes and manners the antiegalitarian, particularistic, exclusionary, and oppressive sumptuary laws from the old England and medieval Europe. This casts more shadow and doubt on the supposed egalitarian, universalistic, as Parsons implies, inclusive and democratic novelty and exceptionality of American Puritanism. Predictably, like their European ancestors, these US Puritans adopted and rationalized—and perhaps honestly believed in, given their, as Tocqueville remarks, austerity, rigidity, and severity in manners and dress or simply asceticism—sumptuary laws as measures "against luxury preventing 'the costliness of fashion'" (Gould 1996:32) as their manifest function or recognized effect. Thus, Puritans in Great Britain and New England alike upheld and strictly enforced sumptuary laws in that they "believed that individuals should dress appropriately to their station in life" and consequently were "dressed as befitted their social class," while rejecting "immodest" fashions (Bremer 1995:23–49). Hence, in reality these laws also functioned as instruments of economic antiegalitarianism, antiuniversalism, exclusion, and social oppression by, as even some US ultraconservative economists admit, protecting the "interests of powerful political groups" (Becker and Murphy 2000:93) as some sort of Merton's latent function

or unrecognized effect. In retrospect, these Puritan medieval-style sumptuary and related practices in America were historically peculiar and even anachronistic in light of the postmedieval "disappearance of sumptuary laws"[28] (Zukin and Maguire 2004:190) in Western societies, which once again reflects American Puritanism's historical anachronism.

Another instance or result of Puritanism' economic antiegalitarianism, particularism, or exclusion, especially its lacking or weak charity and compassion for the poor, pertains to English and particularly American welfare policies during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Thus, an analysis shows that the "harsh moral tenor" of English and American welfare policies and practices is "rooted" in Calvinist Puritanism (Hudson and Coukos 2005:5), from the late nineteenth century to the 2000s. For example, the "particular interaction" of traditional English culture and Puritan antiegalitarian and uncompassionate values "produced attitudes and policies toward the poor that were considered by many (e.g., Disraeli), even in the nineteenth century, unusually cruel" (Hudson and Coukos 2005:5). In comparative-historical terms, Puritan-based antiwelfare and antiegalitarian\attitudes and policies look like an anomaly even in Protestantism itself or by comparison with Lutheranism, let alone the Christian, including Catholic, world as a whole. Reportedly, the influence or heritage of Puritanism helps explain "why English and American hostility to public aid is not shared by other Protestant countries" (Hudson and Coukos 2005:5). Notably, this view suggests that the connection between Puritanism and neoconservative antiwelfare and antiegalitarian ideologies is "explicit," viz. Puritan Methodism with Reaganism or Thatcherism.[29]

In general, Puritanism is observed to make "Draconian" restrictions in public relief and welfare, thus becoming "unusually efficacious," under economic–political conditions such as strong labor demand and a dedicated organized movement seeking to convert the Puritan ideas against the poor and charity into a public policy, as exemplified in America's relief abolition during the nineteenth century and its welfare reform in during the 1990s (Hudson and Coukos 2005:18). No wonder, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, just as it did during original Puritanism, America under neo-Puritan conservatism continues to have the highest absolute and relative poverty rate (e.g., 17% versus the average of 10% using half of median income as the basis), with its children poverty (19%) being almost twice the average (10%), within Western society (Smeeding 2006). Analyses indicate that these exceptional outcomes are primarily due to

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[28] Zukin and Maguire (2004:190) state that "in Western Europe, changes in the dominant forms of Christianity after the Middle Ages and the postmedieval disappearance of sumptuary laws eased the way toward conspicuous consumption by all social classes." If this implies a link between the first and the second, then it did not hold true of early America like New England, where apparently "changes in the dominant forms of Christianity" or the dominance of Puritanism was not linked with the "postmedieval disappearance of sumptuary laws," at least during Winthrop's rule.

[29] Hudson and Coukos (2005:9) comment that for Wesley "Gain all you can, Save all you can, Give all you can" was a central tenet of Methodism and "Thatcher recommended it as the guiding precept of conservatism."

Puritan-rooted neoconservative economic policies, exemplified by Reaganomics and its admiration for Winthrop's antiegalitarian *mixed aristocracie* ("shining city upon the hill"), effectively reproducing and even exacerbating rather than, as those in other Western societies, reducing poverty as well as wealth inequality. Hence, they reproduce modern America as what economists identify as "an extreme outlier" in respect to the "poverty reduction effects of social programs"[30] in the sense that neoconservative comparatively low levels of welfare transfers (excluding Social Security) result in or contribute to a "very high relative poverty rate" (Smeeding 2006: 82), as well as related sharp economic inequalities, by comparison with other Western, including Protestant (e.g., Scandinavian), societies.

Hence, primarily in consequence of original Puritan ideas and practices or their vestiges in conservatism, antipoor attitudes, antiwelfare, and related antiegalitarian policies have been particularly pervasive, intensive, and persisting in America, especially among conservative political elites, perhaps reaching their climax during the 1980s–2000s (e.g., the 1996 welfare reform). Some observers remark that under neoconservatism in America the seemingly easy life "knows no pity" and poor groups "are no longer credible" or tolerated but subjected to a "must exit" logic, as the "ultimatum issued in the name of wealth and efficiency wipes them off the map" (Baudrillard 1999:111). In this view, such Puritan-rooted neoconservative "pitiless" logic has resulted in "new deserts for the new poor," where they are in increasing numbers "laid to waste" and even in part equated with criminals (Bauman 2001). In retrospect, the neoconservative implied equation of the poor with criminals in America follows or evokes their equivalent treatment in Nazism expressed in what some sociologists calls a "joke [or rather anti-joke] from Hitler's Germany": "No one must go hungry or thirsty; if anyone does, he's for the concentration camp!" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). In sum, the neoconservative near-criminalization of poverty, yet persisting and the highest among Western societies (Smeeding 2006), and welfare spending, by analogy the comparatively lowest, in America is an ultimate dimension or result of the Puritan original and persistent lack or weakness of *caritas* and compassion, just as it emulates criminalizing other sins and vices in Puritanism.

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[30] Smeeding (2006:82) finds that the result of neoconservative fiscal policy since the 1980s has been that the US poverty rates for single parents "actually rise" by more than 2%, in particular as the effect of the tax reform cutting taxes for the highest income categories while raising them for others forced into paying—e.g., families with children whose market incomes are below the poverty level—even higher taxes than their equivalents in Western countries, which dispels the "lower-taxes-than-elsewhere" American myth invented and propagated by neoconservatives or neo-Puritan evangelicals. In another, probably more perplexing, example, Smeeding (2006:82) registers that child poverty has raised by more than 10% as the by-product of neoconservative tax and antiwelfare policies, an exceptional outcome within the Western world where social programs invariably and appreciable diminish by about 45% on average, as most poor two-parent household pay "more in payroll tax than they receive in unemployment or workers compensation."

Sociopolitical Antiegalitarianism: Providential Hierarchy in Polity and Society

By analogy to its economic form, Puritan political, and cultural antiegalitarianism, particularism or exclusion tends to reproduce and defend rigid hierarchy, subjection, authority, law and order, discipline, and repression, including slavery and its substitutes or proxies, as the expression of the Divine Will. Particularly, given its original defining attribute of what Weber and contemporary US sociologists (Lipset 1996) call Protestant sectarianism in "Anglo-Saxon areas,"[31] Puritanism represents or results in the sectarian or religiously factional, in Madison's sense, "mastery" of polity and all society to the point of master–slave relations in which, as Popper (1973:268) puts it, "the master has the right to enslave the slave [i.e.] some men have the right to use others as their tools." Recall New England's class structure juxtaposed wealthy Puritan "merchants and landowners" to non-Puritan "indentured servants" and "Indian slaves, a few Negroes," as well as that "particularly lucrative" for the first was slave and rum trade (Foerster 1962:4), not to mention the Southern slavery typically defended or tolerated by Puritanism (and Anglicanism) and its extensions on Divine grounds. As known, New England's Puritans engaged in enslaving, persecuting, and in part exterminating the native Indians, thus establishing the probably first form or embryo of slavery in North America, and providing a precedent or counterpart for its Southern type in Virginia and elsewhere. If it is inaccurate or unfair to attribute the establishment of the Southern slavery to Puritanism given its initial absence or weakness in the South, most, though not all, Puritan groups and their evangelical proxies contributed (just as did Episcopalism) to its maintenance and religious sanctification, especially in the wake of the Great Awakenings. While the Puritan slavery, including "Indian slaves," is the "dead past," the long-standing tendency to some form and degree of mitigated master–slave or hierarchical, exclusionary, and repressive political and social relations seems to persist in Puritanism and its sequels. This is indicated by the persistence of rigid hierarchy, exclusion, repression, and subjection, including violations of basic political (e.g., voting) and civil liberties and rights, in the neo-Puritan, evangelical US South long after the formal abolition of slavery, up to the twenty-first century (e.g., the 2000s elections).

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[31] Weber adds that, in contrast to most of Europe (e.g., Germany and Latin countries), in "Anglo-Saxon" regions the "most serious forms of religion since Puritan times have had a sectarian rather than an institutional-authoritarian character." Yet, Weber seems to overlook or downplays what Comte implicitly predicts. These Puritan forms once institutionalized or in "government," as in old (temporarily) and New (enduringly) England, almost invariably have become "authoritarian," while remaining sectarian, thus that no necessary contradiction exists, but rather a fusion, between sectarianism and authoritarianism or conservatism in Puritanism. This is what is suggested in the observation about the historical and continuing political and cultural predominance of Puritan-rooted Protestant sectarianism in America (Lipset 1996)—i.e. initially sectarian, noninstitutional Puritanism has eventually become also "institutional-authoritarian," from old and New England in the seventeenth century to the twenty-first century Bible Belt.

In historical terms, English-American Puritanism's political–cultural, just as economic, antiegalitarianism, including subjection and exclusion, is rooted in and derived from that in Calvinism as its European progenitor. Remember Comte notes that Calvinism established and sanctioned the "political subservience that was only implicit among Catholic peoples" and thus "servile transformation" characterizing its theocratic–Protestant and aristocratic–undemocratic rule. In particular, he detects what he calls the "inherent nullity" of Calvinism or Protestantism as a whole with respect to political egalitarianism, i.e., "equality, justice and liberty for all," in the "impotence of its puny authorities to protect the lower classes." Comte's observations seem not only diagnostic of paleo-Puritanism in Great Britain and New England but also predictive of neo-Puritanism resurrecting and expanding during and since his time in all America, most strikingly the Southwest. In a sense, the "impotence of authorities to protect the lower classes," including (contrary to one-sided racial sociological theories) what Weber calls the "Southern [poor] white trash," just as black and Latino groups, has been a constitutive and persisting political attribute or outcome of the "under democratized" (Amenta and Halfmann 2000:510) South dominated by neo-Puritanism such as Baptism and Methodism from (and prior to) the postcivil war era to the 2000s. As sociologists suggest, the neo-Puritan or fundamentalist South has always been and remains an "underdemocratized" polity where "political leaders are chosen by way of elections, but in which there are great restrictions on political participation, political assembly and discussion, voting, and choices among leadership groups" (Amenta et al. 2001:226).

Empirical research supports Comte's and Weber's diagnoses and implied predictions of Puritanism's political–cultural antiegalitarianism, including rigid hierarchy, privilege, subjection, and social exclusion, in England and America. Thus, according to a study, in early England and elswhere, Puritanism and Protestantism overall "focused intently" on the problem of establishing a new rigid hierarchy, order, and discipline, displaying a "kind of horror of disorder," while upsetting the "old hierarchical notions of order [in Catholicism and Anglicanism]" (Calhoun 1991: 249). In particular, the seventeenth-century Puritan Revolution attempted to destroy these old, Anglican-Catholic notions, yet eventually created equally, if not even more, hierarchical ideas and institutions of order, hierarchy, subjection, and exclusion. The Revolution thus set a historical precedent for a sort of antiegalitarian or exclusionary and to that extent authoritarian "creative destruction" that has been characteristic of Puritanism ever since, including New England and the US South. Briefly, this dramatic event created and originally exemplified a common pattern of Puritan political and social antiegalitarianism and authoritarianism. Specifically, the pattern is that for Puritanism hierarchical law-and-order, subjection, exclusion, and blind obedience are "good" expressing Divine providence while, despite Comte's prophetic warning, being in government, yet "evil" countering "God's Will" when in opposition or, in Simmel's word, protest against non-Puritan political and religious powers. This pattern is a nonobvious or mitigated variation on Puritan state terror, as the putative instrument and enactment of "law-and-order," when Puritanism is politically dominant, and its counterstate

terrorism while being in opposition, protest, or weakness. A historical instance of English Puritanism as an ideology and system of political–social hierarchy and exclusion is what analysts describe as the "socially exclusive Presbyterian treatment of the concept of the godly householder"[32] (Ashton 1965:582).

What the English Puritan Revolution atempted and ultimately failed to totally achieve, Puritanism also tried and essentially accomplished, first, in New England and subsequently, via its extensions and revivals like the Great Awakenings, the rest of America, especially the South. This is a rigidly hierarchical and otherwise antiegalitarian, exclusionary, and oppressive political and social–economic system. For example, a comparative-historical case study (Baltzell 1979) finds that the early Puritans in Boston, as elsewhere in New England, were "hierarchical, aristocratic-patrician and patriarchal" in contrast to the Quakers in Philadelphia having opposite attributes. In this view, the Puritan mixture of political and cultural antiegalitarianism (recall Winthrop's *mixt aristocracie*) was manifest in that the Puritans imposed and defended social homogeneity, uniformity, and regimentation, while the Quakers were open to and promoted diversity in society[33] (Klausner 1998:155). Particularly, the study shows that a hierarchical–authoritarian and exclusionary community in Boston resulted from the Puritan theological ideas of Divine law and Providential election, a variation on the Calvinist dogma of predestination, and "egalitarian individualism" in Philadelphia from the Quaker centrality of individual conscience.

Overall, early American Puritanism reportedly "distrusted common opinion because it represented a clear threat to hierarchy, to cultural authority," including the "principle of the inequality" of race, ethnicity, religion, as well as economic class (Stivers 1994:110–117). Such a principle of inequality, as an unequivocal expression of Puritanism's political–cultural and economic antiegalitarianism and exclusion, helps explain the subjugation of Indian slaves, the persecution of Quakers

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[32] Ashton (1965:583–584) cites the view, imlicit in Presbyterianism and Puritanism overall, that "only the enlightened elect are capable of fighting agains the sins and corruptions of the mass of humanity. Hence it is the divine will that they shold be in a position of power over the unregenerate many." He suggests that this is in tension with the supposed Presbyterian tenet "before God, all men were equal in sin, equally deserving of damnation."

[33] Klausner (1998:155) states that "both Puritanism and Quakerism derive from Anglicanism." More precisely, his comparative analysis indicates that Puritanism is an antiegalitarian, extreme, or militant, and Quakerism egalitarian, moderate, or pacifist, derivative of Anglicanism. Also, Friedman and Friedman (1982:108) content that "Puritans and Quakers were able to migrate to the New World because they could accumulate the funds to do so in the market despite disabilities imposed on them in other aspects of their life." Yet, this identification of relatively secondary economic commonalities overlooks their primary political and cultural differences, as well as the observation that, like Quakers, the Puritans "emigrated, not for the advantage of trade, but for religion, and the enjoyment of liberty of conscience" (Gould 1996:30). Simply, as Tocqueville described them, the Puritan Pilgrims were "pious adventurers" or religious rather or less than business-market entrepreneurs. Also, Weber contradicts the economistic or rational-choice interpretation of American Puritanism by observing that the Southern States of America "were founded by large capitalists for business motives, while the New England colonies were founded by preachers and seminary graduates with the help of small citizen, craftsmen and yeomen, for religious reasons."

and other religious or secular dissenters as well as related authoritarian practices in paleo-Puritan New England, just as the slavery, segregation, and discrimination in the neo-Puritan South. As a study finds, during most of America's postrevolutionary history (e.g., the 1820s) the Puritan fathers have been seen as a "historical metaphor for an outmoded—and yet resilient—model of classical [conservative] consensus and hierarchy" (Gould 1996:27–31).

In turn, early Puritanism with its conservative politics of rigid hierarchy and compulsory deference, expressed in *inter alia* sumptuary laws promoting the "interests of powerful political groups," has been predictably regarded and, notably, approved or emulated both by US paleo- and neoconservatism as a defender of political and cultural antiegalitarianism and exclusion. For instance, an early national conservative elite found in Winthrop "an apostle for the consensual and hierarchical politics of republicanism," as its project was to "preserve the status quo," notably the "old and approved truths" against "Anarchy and Misrule," and was driven by "conservative fears of egalitarian politics"[34] (Gould 1996:34–39, 179). This holds true *mutatis mutandis* of subsequent US conservative elites, including neoconservatives like Reaganites. A case in point is Reaganites' invocation, in their vision or description of contemporary America, of Winthrop's phrase "shining city upon the hill" *cum mixt aristocracie*, i.e., a mix of oligarchy and theocracy (yet avoiding this term). This suggests that political–cultural, plus economic, antiegalitarianism, or exclusion has been a constant in the history and venerable legacy of Puritanism as the cardinal, as Tocqueville, Ross, Weber, and others imply, historical part and factor of American politics and society from the seventeenth to the twenty-first century. In turn, Winthrop's *mixt aristocracie*, with its "distinct hierarchy" of polity and society or "vertical distinctions" between rulers and people, as a substitute or proxy for feudal master–servant relations, reportedly was created from and justified by "Puritan fears for a Bible commonwealth" (Gould 1996:37–39) or what Weber calls strict bibliocracy. This confirms that Puritanism's political–social system in New England was in essence a "cocktail" (not an entirely improper metaphor given the Puritan "spirit of capitalism" blossoming in rum or whiskey trade) of aristocracy, plutocracy, and oligarchy with theocracy, as was subsequently, with minor modifications, in the South eventually transformed into a neo-Puritan, Methodist-Baptist "Bible Belt" characterized by a similar antiegalitarian mix of plutocratic–oligarchic "good old boys" and theocratic fundamentalists.

Militarism, Nationalism, and Expansionism

Another set of salient and ever-persisting components or outcomes of Puritanism's political authoritarianism encompasses militancy, militarism, nationalism,

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[34] Gould (1996:180) remarks that for New England Puritans, for example, the "rise of Jacksonian [egalitarian] politics only confirmed those fears that the French Revolution had enkindled."

expansionism, imperialism as phenomena essentially destructive or threatening of democracy and a free, peaceful society.

Militancy and Militarism

First and foremost, Puritanism contains or generates militancy and hostility in general toward the social world, manifested in militant–hostile attitudes and activities vis-à-vis non-Puritans, and justified on moralist–religious grounds like purity, righteousness, sanctity, and God's Plan. Thus, Weber observes that Puritanism or Calvinism constituted or was characterized as the "Church militant"[35] and describes its adherents as "militant defenders of the holy life" in the belief that they "were weapons in the hand of God, and executors of His providential Will." In particular, he notes that a species or derivative of Puritanism or Calvinism like Baptism sanctimoniously proclaims "first righteousness, then peace." He implies that this proclamation presupposes or generates a constant "fight against evil"; and yet if this holy crusade is never-ending, peace is, like in Orwell's antiutopia,[36] virtually never attained and retained for long, which anticipates, if not inspires, the US neo-Puritan/conservative permanent "war on terror" and the "axis of evil."

At this juncture, Weber's observation is both diagnostic of early Puritanism or Calvinism like Baptism and predictive and even prophetic of its subsequent forms, especially in America. The prediction is evidenced by the remarkable and perhaps unrivaled militancy and bellicosity of US Baptists and other neo-Puritan fundamentalists, from the Cold War and McCarthyism to the war on drugs and other culture wars to the "war on terror" and "the axis of evil," including the 2000s Iraq invasion. Puritan militancy is especially manifest and intense in that, as some analysts observe, Puritanism from Great Britain to New England and the Southern Bible Belt "saw life as a struggle, struggle as an ideal that shaped reality [and] wanted victory, not reconciliation" (Israel 1966:595). Others also notice that Puritanism tends to embark on a permanent "crusade against the evil enemy" (Baltzell 1979), which results in an Orwellian perpetual war *cum* peace, as well as "slavery as freedom" and "ignorance as virtue," since, surely, Satan "never sleeps."

The above reaffirms and reinforces Puritan political radicalism or extremism insofar as the latter involves refusal of reconciliation, compromise, or peaceful conflict resolution in politics and society in favor of a total victory, permanent war, holy terror, crusade, and ideally complete annihilation of the enemy and "evil." In

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[35] Weber's full statement is that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination "served as a rallying-point to countless heroes of the Church militant, and in both the 18th and the 19th centuries it caused schisms in the Church and formed the battle-cry of great new awakenings." The last part is in apparent reference to the Puritan revivals in England and America during these times.

[36] For example, in the early 2000s, a second most senior official in the Church of England objected, in reference to the US Guantanamo Bay prison complex containing enemy combatants captured during the war on terror, that "to hold someone for up to four years without charge clearly indicates a society that is heading towards George Orwell's 'Animal Farm'" and that by doing so the "American government is breaking international law."

turn, echoing Weber, Tawney (1962:229) identifies in Puritanism the perception of hostility of the external world in that the Puritan's life "is that of soldier in hostile territory [and] mourned for a lost Paradise and a creation sunk in sin [and] saw a bleak antithesis between the spirit and [a] hostile world." This implies or predicts some kind of psychological projection of Puritan hostility and militancy onto non-Puritans, as a special case of the general tendency for hostile, militant, violent, and otherwise authoritarian or sadistic–masochistic personalities to project such attributes on others (as suggested by Adorno et al. 1950; Arendt 1951; Fromm 1941).

In brief, Puritanism initialy was and has continued to be "militant Protestantism" (Israel 1966:597) and generally a type of the "militant religiosity of the modern age" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:14). For example, early English Puritanism harbored and engaged in "militant anti-Catholicism" (Bremer 1995:27), as did its American successor in New England and America overall (Merton 1939). And, for many Englishmen in the seventeenth century, especially those fighting against the Spanish, the "most attractive facet of Puritanism was its militant anti-Catholicism" (Bremer 1995:27), just as, as Merton (1939) implies, was for conservative Americans in the nineteenth century and later. Thus, the English Puritans reportedly "acted as a sort super-Protestant ginger-group crying out for a rigorously anti-Spanish policy in the early 1620s" (Ashton 1965:580). Generally, Puritans' hostility and militancy, including their projection onto the world or others, eventually escalates and exacerbates into physical and symbolic violence over non-Puritans, including what some analysts detect as the "sadistic intolerance to cultural otherness" (Bauman 2000:106) in historically Puritan societies like contemporary America, particularly the Bible Belt, directed primarily, though not solely against nonbelievers like atheists and agnostics or "un-Godly," joined with other religious, racial, and cultural out-groups (Edgell et al. 2006). For instance, in early American Puritanism the "sanctified individual was a soldier of the Lord," displaying "a holy violence in the performing of all duties" (Bremer 1995:22).

A salient and persisting syndrome of Puritanism's militancy and violence is militarism, including harsh military discipline, methodical (or frantic) armament, aggressive war, and mass destruction and murder. For instance, Weber notices that, as a consequence of its strict "ascetic principle of self-control," Puritanism is "one of the fathers of modern military discipline" and in this sense a Spartan revival, with its Pilgrims designing and founding America as "Christian Sparta." Counterfactually, if Weber lived through the 1950s he might have added that Puritanism was generally one of the "fathers," as intimated by Merton (1939), of the modern military–industrial complex driven and sanctified by religious nationalism (Friedland 2002) in America. This Puritan-rooted (Tiryakian 2002) military–industrial system poses, as even a conservative president warned, a potential and serious threat to political democracy and a free society in America and beyond or, at least, "with such a forbidding name, could not be small beer" (Manent 1998:225) owing to its authoritarian, not to mention violent and destructive, tendencies, or outcomes. For instance, some analysts suggest that the US and generally Western military–industrial complex is "ever more often in the role of not of pacifying

or policing force, but of a supplier of the weapons needed to conduct tribal wars in the innumerable Afghanistans [etc.] of the globe," describing this process as a "secondary barbarization" that epitomizes the "overall impact" of Puritan-based American militarism on the third world and beyond (Bauman 2001:84).

Further, elaborating on Weber, Tawney (1962:230) describes the typical early Puritan as "irresistible" in war, plus the "struggles of commerce," due to his "remorseless logic" and the "demonic energy of one who, all doubts allayed, is conscious that he is a sealed and chosen vessel" of God. Yet, cynics may comment, this "demonic energy" would rather make Puritans the vessels of Demon. Notably, Tawney (1962:226–227) suggests that, in virtue of its "iron" collectivism, "almost military discipline" and "remorseless and violent rigors" inherited and reinforced from Calvinism, Puritanism was the "very soul of authoritarian regimentation" in England and subsequently America. An early case of Puritan militarism involves what some analysts describe as useless and dangerous attacks on Catholic Spain's ships and colonies (Israel 1966:597) by the English Puritans and their sympathizers (e.g., Drake and Hawkins' sailors of the west country, cf. Bremer 1995:27) in the seventeenth century. In turn, Puritanism's militarism is linked with its nationalism and especially expansionism and imperialism, as discussed below.

Nationalism and Nativism

Another persistent case or result of Puritanism's militancy is nationalism, including militant ethnocentrism or patriotism, chauvinism, aggressive racism, and xenophobia, as a species of religious, specifically Protestant, nationalisms. At this juncture, Puritanism looks primitive or traditional also in virtue of its nationalistic attributes insofar as religious and other nationalism is what analysts call a "premodern specter" (Friedland 2001:125) in modern democratic society. In this view, early Protestant or Puritan nation-states like Great Britain and America, just as some others (e.g., Islamic, Israel), were "religious nationalisms" (Friedland 2002:413) by contrast to France, for example.

In retrospect, Weber among the first social analysts, after Tocqueville, identifies or intimates the nationalist attributes and effects of Puritanism. He observes that foreigners, specifically bankers of foreign origin, "were looked upon with ethical mistrust" by the "strict Calvinists" and to a lesser extent other Protestants, from Calvin's Geneva to the Puritan old and New England. In particular, he notes that English Puritans believed that they were "God's chosen people," as the underlying source and rationalization of their "ethical mistrust" of other, by definition, unchosen peoples. For example, he comments that "even the kindly Baxter thanked God that he was born in England, and thus in the true Church, and nowhere else" and attributed the Holy Scriptures' truth to the "wonderful difference of the godly and ungodly." This attribution suggests that even the "kindly" Baxter used the Bible to ground and sanctify Puritan nationalism and consequently subjection, persecution, torture, and extermination of the "ungodly," as did a fortiori his "hotter" counterparts in Great Britain and New England, including Cromwell and Winthrop.

Weber could add that subsequently early American Puritans like Winthrop et al. equally, if not more, fervently held the belief of being "God's chosen people," as do their descendents or followers, including Southern Protestant sectarians like Baptists and in part Methodists and neoconservatives (Reaganites) in the 1980s–2000s. In particular, he might have readily extended and attributed Baxter's invidious expression of religious nationalism, by only changing the country, to "proudly born in the USA" Puritans and their fundamentalist–conservative sequels or proxies, as sociologists imply (Friedland 2002). In a sense, he implicitly did so by re-discovering, following Tocqueville, the historical cogenesis, coexistence, convergence, or association of early American Puritanism and what he denotes as Americanism. Weber observes that the perception that the "virtues professed by Americanism are pure hypocrisy seems to have been confirmed by this striking case" of Puritanism and utilitarianism in the face of Benjamin Franklin. He thus effectively equates American Puritanism and Americanism at least in respect of their equivalence or elective affinity in "pure hypocrisy." He could generalize and propose that American Puritanism not only engendered, but *was* from its beginning Americanism[37] or what Merton (1939) calls nativism, thus a peculiar species of religious nationalism. However, conversely is not always true, so long as Americanism, nativism or jingoism can be and has been both Puritan and non-Puritan, contrary to some views equating America's civil religion or faith with Puritanism (Gelernter 2005). In turn, Comte anticipates Weber by identifying what he calls Puritan "irrational" national, specifically English, exclusiveness as one of the sources of "anti-scientific tendencies" in Puritanism and Protestantism. Comte thus implies that Puritan nationalism or ethnocentrism, starting with its early English form, is a type or expression of irrationalism and that contains or generates scientific authoritarianism, notably hostility to and suppression of science, as discussed later.

Subsequent studies confirm and amplify Comte's and Weber's observations by pointing to pervasive and intensive Puritan nationalism, including anti-Catholicism, in England and America, as well as its various derivatives like American nativism or Americanism. A historical study finds that early English Puritanism "scored heavily with those Englishmen who were intensely nationalistic, for, unlike Anglicanism, [it] was blatantly anti-Roman [i.e. anti-Catholic]" (Israel 1966:592). A sociological analysis describes Puritanism as an "amalgamation" of English Protestant nationalism and traditionalism, notably a "defense of traditional English ways," rather than a "purely religious phenomenon" (Goldstone 1986:296). In particular, during early seventeenth century England the gentry formed, to paraphrase Marx, an unholy alliance or "close-knit network" with the Puritan movement premised on a nationalist–traditionalist program of defense of "authentic" English law, for example, "ancient constitution," and religion, and symbols of "foreign treat" like Catholics or "Papists" (Goldstone 1991:413).

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[37] This is what Gelernter (2005) means by describing John Winthrop's Puritanism as "radical, God-fearing Americanism."

Similarly, other sociological studies describe Cromwell's 1640s–1650s Puritan Revolution ensuing into a transient victory as also a "nationalist coup" or the "renewal of the national covenant" which the English nation had entered with God granting to it "special favors" of affluence and liberty, thus placing a "special burden" on this "chosen" people, i.e., a national covenant[38] (Gorski 2000:1453). For instance, Cromwell's initially victorious Puritan army reportedly killed almost half of the Irish Catholics and other "Papists" in Great Britain during the 1640s–1650s and his "Parliament of Saints" ordered by the 1653 Act of Settlement forcible transportation of the rest. In retrospect, these Puritan nationalist ideas and practices had medieval origins[39] (Gorski 2000), thus reaffirming the origin and inspiration of English and even American Puritanism as a whole in medievalism. In prospect, they can be deemed an archetypical case in postmedieval Western society of what has come to be known as "ethnic cleansing" or even "genocide" on religious and ethnic grounds.

Notably, historical and other research confirms and amplifies Weber's diagnosis of the "ethical mistrust" by the "strict Calvinists" in New England. It indicates that early Puritanism in America continued and reinforced initial Puritan nationalism, including anti-Catholicism, in the derivative form of American nativism or Americanism as a sort of pseudo-Freudian, collective superiority complex merging benign patriotism ("the power of pride") and malignant racism or ethnocentrism (Anderson 1991). Thus, Merton[40] (1939:437) remarks that "American nativism, in the form of anti-Catholic and later of anti-foreign sentiment, was partly rooted in this same Puritanism." He adds that, with such Puritan "religio- and ethno-centric" patterns, American nativism further developed through the nineteenth century temporarily culminating in the "Know-Nothing Party" of the 1850s. Moreover, during these times, "although patriots everywhere applaud their country's military

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[38] Gorski (2000:1453) remarks that the Puritans warned that if the English people "should shirk this burden, they would be harshly punished, for 'God punisheth national sins with national punishments'."

[39] Gorski (2000:1428) comments that Puritan nationalist discourses and activities in England and the Netherlands had "medieval roots" and were "no less nationalistic than the nationalisms of the French Revolution."

[40] Merton could add that Puritan-rooted American nativism, including xenophobia, was not "nativism" in the proper sense, notably in relation to native Americans. Apparently, Puritan and other US nativists did and still do overlook, forget, or even deny that native Americans and some other "ungodly" or "impure" peoples (e.g., Mexicans) were historically more "native" or "American" than themselves as the self-proclaimed prophets and guardians of Americanism. But, like all ethnocentric and xenophobic groups, and as Cooley predicts in defining ethnocentrism as the "matter of a lack of knowledge," they seem blind, ignorant, or dismissive of historical facts, viz., that they and their ancestors were emigrants to America just as those attacked as "foreign" or "un-American." For example, US nativist Reaganites and other xenophobic neoconservatives "forget" that their original Puritan model or inspiration, Winthrop et al. or the Pilgrim Fathers were the first American and technically "illegal" immigrants, exiles, or "foreigners" to America. As Baudrillard (1999:90) puts it, early US Puritanism's "micro-model" ("hysteresis") is that of "exile" and utopia in a promised foreign land, subsequently "extended to the whole of America" via Puritan expansions and revivals like the Great Awakenings and others, as during the 1980s–2000s.

victories, Americans of the nineteenth century appeared to do so in a more conspicuous and emphatic way" (Stivers 1994:32). Overall, Merton's observation that anti-Catholic and antiforeign nativist movements in American history "partly overlapped with the pietistic and evangelical" (Archer 2001:281) holds true, first and foremost, of Puritanism, from paleo-Puritan New England in the seventeenth century to the neo-Puritan South and America in the twenty-first century.

As regards Puritan New England in particular, a historical study suggests that "having come to America as a promised land, the Puritans thought of themselves as a chosen people. In the Holy Commonwealth, the Bible was the constitution, only church members were citizens, and God's ministers guided the state. The more this corporate blessedness was subverted by Satan—acting through the Indians the witches, and the internal conflicts of the churches—the more passionately was it believed in and propagated" (Foerster 1962:9–10). Consequently, these Puritans presented themselves, as they were by US conservatives, as model patriots, though for others like Enlightenment-influenced liberals Puritan and subsequent revolutionary patriotism, like its correlates like racism, zealotry, and superstition, "needed to be tempered by reason"[41] (Gould 1996:172–189). Also, a comparative study of Puritan Boston indicates that Puritanism entails or generates ethnocentrism, xenophobia and to that extent racism in sharp contrast to "xenophilia" observed in Philadelphia's Quakerism (Baltzell 1979).

In general, these early and persisting tendencies support Weber's diagnosis of "ethical mistrust" by describing the origin, operation, and rationale of Puritan nationalism as well as political antiegalitarianism and aristocratic–theocratic authoritarianism, including ethnic and sectarian oppression, persecution, and destruction, in New England. In particular, they indicate a gradual shift by US Puritans of the category of a "chosen people" and "promised land" from the old English and England, not to mention other nations (e.g., Jews, Germans, French, Russians, or their nationalist groups) self-attributing the same providential destiny and mission, to the "new" American nation and world. Simply, they document the reemergence of nativism, including patriotism and racism, in America or Americanism as a religiously based creed (Lipset 1996), nationalism (Friedland 2002) or civic religion (Munch 2001) rooted or promoted in Puritanism. Thus, if Baxter "thanked God that he was born in England, and thus in the true Church," his Puritan successors in America did the same, especially during and since and even prior to the American Revolution, while only changing the place of birth in this thanksgiving expression, as do their modern variants in Protestant sectarianism and neoconservatism. As studies show, since the American Revolution a belief has persisted that the Old World of Europe "was ensnared in vice, injustice and ignorance, whereas [America] was enlightened and free of impurity [and] the eschatological hopes of Christians were transformed into a belief in the millenarian utopian possibilities of the US [i.e.] nationalistic and utopian sentiments" (Stivers 1994:31).

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[41] For example, Gould (1996:10–13) notes that Massachusetts and other "stodgy Orthodox Calvinists" demanded or endorsed "patriotic didacticism" or "nationalistic tenor" in historical fiction or novel (e.g., Scott).

As regards contemporary religious sectarianism and neoconservatism in America, recent studies indicate that most neo-Puritans, exemplified in Protestant evangelicals such as Southern Baptists, are fervent "religious nationalists," or that the Christian right is "resolutely nationalist" (Friedland 2002:387). Reportedly, they believe that America has a "special role" in the world, just as their Puritan forebears held the belief in its "manifest destiny" or "divine right" to rule and "save" other peoples like native Indians and Catholics from their "sins." Overall, Puritanism, from seventeenth century New England to twenty-first-century America, "sees the search for the "Promised Land" as the "mission of the American people as a collectivity [which] leads to an acceptance of adversity and even disasters as having religious worth and meaning [or] as divinely ordained ordeals which test, purify and regenerate the collectivity" (Tiryakian 1975:20–22). In short, what some sociologists call "American nationalism [is] religion" (Stivers 1994:38), more precisely, Puritanism in its original or Calvinist and contemporary or fundamentalist forms.

At this juncture, American Puritanism only continues and further strengthens to the point of extreme nationalism, virulent nativism, or jingoism what Weber and others identify as early English Puritans' "belief that they were God's chosen people" or the "godly." This belief is a likely source as well as a putative sanctification of the Puritan "ethnical mistrust" and consequent subjection, persecution, and extermination or "ethnic cleansing" ("salvation") of other, "ungodly" or "damned" foreign peoples, cultures and religions, viz. Irish Catholics and other Papists in Great Britain, Indians, blacks, Mexicans/Latinos in America. As analysts suggest, Puritanism harbored a "collective striving to bring the rest of the world within the pale of salvation. Paradoxically, Puritanism served to legitimate not only a universalistic democratic political system, but also to encourage a global distinction between members of the 'community of saints' [in the US] and a 'community of wretched' outside" (Holton 1987:509). Yet, so long as salvation via Puritanism often amounted to, as Pareto puts it in reference to US Puritan temperance (antialcoholics) groups thus anticipating Prohibition, a readiness "to kill" humans "only to keep [them] healthy" or, like in the Inquisition, "in order to save their souls," the word "paradoxically" can be replaced with "consequently" or "predictably." As noted, a paleo-Puritan case in point is the persecution, murder, and in part extermination of the native Indians as well as to a lesser extent Quakers and other "ungodly" people in New England; a pseudo-Puritan one is the slavery, segregation, and discrimination against ethnic minorities in the South. A neo-Puritan case is the "imprison-and-execute-to-save" formula of the neoconservative criminal justice system in America since the 1980s, as well as the "invade-occupy-destroy-torture-kill-to-free-and-rebuild" strategy of the US military[42] in its Puritan-style

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[42] American Civil Liberties Association (ACLU), an organization that most US modern Puritans and neoconservatives see as "un-American" and even a sort of voice of Satan, reports that in the neo-Puritan/conservative war on terror and "evil" during the 2000s the "torture and abuse are merely the actions of a few rogue soldiers is belied by the quantity of documents. Isolated incidents don't produce 70,000 pages of government documents

permanent holy crusade against an "evil" world. Common to all these cases is "salvation," "sanctification," "purification," or "cleansing" via Puritan repression, terror, murder, and destruction, an attempt to "save" humans from themselves (Terchek 1997:9) by "making their life a hell" on Earth (Tawney 1962:267).

Generally, American, like English, Puritanism appears as just one more historical and persistent variation on the perennial collective-religious quest for a "Promised Land" and the associated ethnic–racial claim, by virtually any ethnicity, race, or nation in history, from the smallest savage tribes to the largest empires and civilizations, to being a Divinely "chosen people" and thus with Divine Rights to rule and save other, ungodly peoples from themselves. Of course, US Puritans and other religious nationalists or supremacists overlook that this is a sort of vicious circle or zero-sum game, for if every nation claims to be God's chosen people, then no one, including America, really is (recognized as such), and the aggregate outcome is a universal Hobbesian ethnic–religious "war of everyone against everyone," as indicated by most wars in human history, as Weber, Simmel, and Pareto imply in contrast to Marx, including WW I and II. As Weber remarks, the idea of a chosen people has been and can be "claimed to an equal degree by any and every member of the mutually despising groups," since this notion lies "behind all ethnic diversities," antipathies, and antagonisms. He could cite his own Germany as an historical exemplar in that reportedly a "substantial section" of the Protestant, mostly Lutheran, partly Calvinist clergy for long, especially from its reunification in the 1870s, fervently believed in and promoted the notion that the German people was "God's chief instrument on earth" (Blinkhorn 2003:77). This clergy thus counteracted or paralleled functionally equivalent Anglo-American Puritan notions, as well as anticipated or inspired Nazi similar, albeit more extreme and less religiously based, ideas and practices. In a sense anticipating Weber, Marx sarcastically registers the common idea, in nineteenth-century Germany, of the German people as the "model nation." As another, perhaps more curious instance, Weber cites what he connotes the Southern Puritan or Protestant "poor white trash" as the "actual bearers of racial antipathy" in America, for the reason that their "social honor" depended on the "social declassement of the Negroes." Recall, Weber generally defines racial patriotism or nationalism as the "status honor of the masses," while invoking the Southern "white trash" as an exemplar.

Further, what Weber implicitly discovers and disdains as the cogenesis, coexistence, or convergence on "pure hypocrisy" between early Puritanism embodied by utilitarian Franklin and Americanism, and Merton implies and deplores by stating that American nativism is rooted in Puritanism, some contemporary US conservatives explicitly argue, restate, reinforce, and celebrate. Arguably, Americanism

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across the FBI, CIA, Departments of State and Defense." For example, ACLU cites a former US military commander participating in the 2003 Iraq invasion and occupation who said the following: "In dealing with detainees, the attitude at the top was that they are all just terrorists, beneath contempt and outside the law so they could be treated inhumanly. International obligations didn't matter nor did morality or humanity. That attitude dropped like a rock down the chain of command."

as the "set of beliefs that are thought to constitute America's essence and to set it apart; the beliefs that make Americans positive that their nation is superior to all others—morally superior, closer to God, is a Judeo-Christian (i.e. millenarian, biblical) religion [that] came from Puritanism"[43] (Gelernter 2005:141–143). Apparently, this argument treats Americanism redefined as more than a civic religion as not only the outcome but also a subsequent and contemporary equivalent of Puritanism. In this view, Puritanism "did not drop out of history [but] transformed itself into Americanism" described as the religious–nationalist creed of a "promised land, a chosen people, and a universal, divinely ordained mission." Consequently, so-called theologians of Americanism presumably understand its doctrines "not as philosophical ideas but as the word of God" or Biblical revelation, which explains the "fervor and passion with which Americans believe their creed." The argument that "Puritanism begot Americanism" is illustrated by the observation that a foremost example of these theologians like Reagan et al. "declared that America was and must always be the 'shining city upon a hill'" of Winthrop et al. In retrospect, the argument hardly adds anything original or substantial, apart from a positive evaluation in the form of a patriotic–religious celebration, to Weber's "discovery" of the cogenesis or coexistence between Puritanism and Americanism, and only completes and reinforces Merton's grounding of the second in the first.

Expansionism and Imperialism

A pertinent and persistent element or outcome of Puritanism's militancy is also expansionism or imperialism intimately linked with militarism as its precondition and effective instrument and with nationalism as its driving force and rationalization. Thus, like any other, Puritan nationalism "conjures up brutal forms of cultural [and military] imperialism" (Giddens 1981:13). American Puritanism provides a salient historical instance of this attribute by its expansionism or internal and subsequently external colonialism or imperialism, following its English progenitor and succeeding where the latter failed, given its eventual defeat by Anglicanism, in Great Britain. Thus, a study shows that in New England the Puritan ideas of the "guiding hand of Providence" fused with an "emergent ideology of Manifest Destiny

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[43] Gelernter (2005:141–143) adds that the political aim of American Puritanism "was to reach back to the pure Christianity of the New Testament—and then even farther back. Puritans spoke of themselves as God's new chosen people, living in God's new promised land." Also, he characterizes Americanism as a true religion, and identifies its "holiest" documents in the Bible and the Declaration, and its "greatest prophet" in Lincoln, viz. his description of America as God's "almost chosen people." Moreover, in this view, anti-Americanism, whose supposedly "crucial" inspiration derives from the fact that Americanism is the "successor" of Puritanism, is "closely associated with anti-Christianism and anti-Semitism" (sic!), as Anti-Americans "are still fascinated and enraged by Americans' bizarre tendency to believe in God." For example, Gelernter claims that during the eighteenth century, "anti-Americans were conservative, monarchist anti-Puritans."

positing the disappearance of Native Americans" (Gould 1996:140). And, since the latter typically dared to refuse to disappear by their own "rational choosing" and for their own "good," in order to follow the "guiding hand of Providence" and fully realize the "Manifest Destiny" of Puritan America, Puritanism had no "choice" other than a war of extermination,[44] or persecution and displacement, of native Indians and other "ungodly" and "impure," including Papist, peoples (e.g., Mexicans in the nineteenth century). Historically, this is another prototypical instance within Western society of "ethnic cleansing" and perhaps genocide on religious–ethnic grounds, through military expansionism, conquest, imperialism, or colonialism, first within a colonial and later postrevolutionary society (the nineteenth century) and beyond its boundaries (e.g., Mexican territories). If so, then for example, the nineteenth century "Wild-West" expansion and cleansing and subjugation, if not genocide, of native Indians reappears as a sort of logical and predictable outcome of "godly" Puritan ideas and practices of expansionism and disappearance, as was the Southern Bible Belt one of the Great Awakenings spreading Puritanism beyond New England. Reportedly, since US Puritans considered Divinity, as well as Nature as its supposed creation, to be the "source of moral and historical order" and thus of their political rule, this version of medieval Divine Rights gave ultimate "credibility to colonial expansion," notably "Puritan expansionism" or "rapacious implications," leading to the "rhetoric of Manifest Destiny" (Gould 1996:141–148). The supposed virtues of Puritan godliness, moral righteousness and industry defined the terms of "civilization" and so justified the war of extermination against Native Americans and other embodiments of the "wilderness." Thus, they did so by displacing and destroying the hunting grounds of "savage nations" by the "hum of civilization," as the basic story of the Wild-West expansion, albeit US Puritans claimed to overcoming the militarist, imperialist, and similar "vices of Europe"[45] (Gould 1996:142).

Other analyses suggest that the Puritan "civilizing" of the wilderness in America "not only included the mastery of nature but also the expulsion of the Indians from their lands, their oppression, and the destruction of their culture" (Munch 2001:235). In this sense, Puritanism or conservatism involves conquest and transformation of natural wilderness not into civilization, except in technological terms, as it adherents claim, but rather into, as some observers remark, social–cultural wilderness or desert (Baudrillard 1999) defined precisely by the destruction and oppression of other cultures.

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[44] In general, Simmel states, in reference to Kant, that "every war in which the belligerents do not impose some restrictions in the use of possible means upon one another [is] a war of extermination." Contemporary analysts also use the term "war of attrition" in an approximately identical or similar sense.

[45] Gould (1996:148) registers the distinction between New England's "religionists" and "reckless and gay" adventurers in the Southern regions, on which early New Englanders insisted through the expansionist or missionary "mythology" of Puritanism with its "rapacious implications."

The above indicates that Puritanism travels an essential trajectory from wild nature to wild society, from a physical to social desert. It helps explain why Puritanism in countries like America has existed and continue to exist in what to many observers looks like a permanent state of wilderness in cultural and political terms, from seventeenth to eighteenth century New England to the nineteenth century "Wild West" (including Texas, Utah, etc.) to the postcivil war Bible Belt up to the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Puritan claim to providential destiny or a "mission from God"[46] reportedly gives a "license to dominate and oppress groups, peoples and cultures that are defined by particularized interests as 'wilderness'," so putative moral legitimacy to practices ranging from the oppression of Indians to "US support of military regimes (Vietnam, Greece, Latin America) that not only fought Communism but also repressed their own people" (Munch 2001:237). Hence, such claims basically serve to legitimate oppressive expansionism, domination, and particularistic "American interests" in global terms, just as domestic paleo- and neo-Puritan or "fundamentalist Protestant" forces are "against the reality of a liberal and pluralist society" (Munch 2001:269–270). Notably, this analysis associates such tendencies of Puritanism and conservatism with the Puritan and conservative defining, using the Constitution as putative support, of American citizenship "in terms of white Protestant men of Anglo-Saxon origin" (Munch 2001:232). This implies that neo-Puritan nationalism *cum* Americanism underscores and rationalizes the expansionism, hegemony, and imperialism of Puritanism or conservatism, just as militarism with its harsh military discipline, huge army and exorbitant spending and ever-more destructive weapons of mass destruction, implements and sustains such imperialist practices.

In a sense, Puritan and other expansionism is, to use Clausewitz's famous definition of war, a "continuation" of nationalist, militant, and self-righteous policy "by other means," i.e., by military conquest, force, and oppression, thus demonstrating the historical link between official nationalism and imperialism (Anderson 1991). If so, the nationalism, militancy, and sanctimony of American Puritanism, i.e., attributes of Puritan Americanism as defined, also diagnose and predict expansionism or imperialism. In turn, Puritan nationalist and expansionist tendencies diagnose and predict American militarism, including harsh military discipline, an oversized aggressive army, continuous frantic rearmament, excessive spending of societal resources on arms and soldiers to the point of extravagance and wastefulness, use of "high-tech" weapons of mass destruction against non-American civilian populations, launching an offensive global and permanent holy war on "evil," and the like. No wonder, the above yields the inference that Puritanism has

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[46] For example, in 2003 the neo-Puritan "born-again" Methodist Christian or neoconservative US president reportedly, as reported by British Broadcasting Corporation, said he was "driven with a mission from God" in the war on terror and on the "axis of evil." Specifically, he was reported to say that "God would tell me, George, go and fight those terrorists in Afghanistan. And I did, and then God would tell me, George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq. And I did."

also a "very dark side [as] a ubiquitous and insidious codeterminant of American and British bellicose but moralistic foreign policy, including various old and new manifestations of imperialism and aggressive use of 'smart' weapons of mass destruction against demonized non-Western settings" (Tiryakian 2002:1630). This in particular holds true of what analysts observe as the neo-Puritan or neoconservative "reassertion of U.S. imperialism, political boundaries, and centralized state power" (Steinmetz 2002:210) during the 2000s.

3
Puritanism and Social Authoritarianism: Authoritarian Mastery of Civil Society

Puritan Social Authoritarianism: General Considerations

Puritanism is essentially a religious doctrine and institutional system of social–cultural, just as political, authoritarianism. Its social authoritarianism or totalitarianism is primarily expressed and grounded in its attempt at the total "mastery of the world" of civil society and/or culture. By analogy to its political rule, Puritanism achieved or purported total mastery of civil society aims to render Puritans factual or likely totalitarian "masters of the world," both of domestic and global culture, and all others their servants or tools. Puritanism does not confine its authoritarian mastery or domination to polity, as well as nature, technology, and economy, but seeks to extend it beyond these realms into civil society or cultural life in an effort to attain or approach its absolute, total, or maximal mastery of the world as a whole. Puritanism treats civil society, like polity and economy, as an element of the world to be mastered or dominated and thus subjected to its sectarian mastery or religiously factional domination, resulting in social, notably moral–religious, authoritarianism, including theocracy. In sociological terms, mastering or dominating civil society or culture is the integral part of the Puritan tendency toward the "mastery" or domination of the total social system. As Tawney (1962:198) notes evoking Weber, Puritanism in England and America "determined, not only conceptions of theology and church government, but political aspirations, business relations, family life and the minutia of personal behavior." Consequently, the Puritan "remakes not only his own character and habits and way of life, but family and church, industry and city, political institutions and social order" (Tawney 1962:199).

Moreover, Puritanism is perhaps the most authoritarian, totalitarian or extreme form of religion, theology, morality and all culture within Protestantism, Christianity in general and even beyond, with Islam probably as the main functional equivalent or rival in this respect. This is what Weber suggests by describing Puritanism or Calvinism as the "most absolutely unbearable form of ecclesiastical control of the individual which could possible exist" by its intrinsic tendency to be "excessively despotic." He notes that the "ecclesiastical supervision of the life of the individual" by early Calvinistic state churches in Europe and subsequent

Puritan theocracies in England and America "almost amounted to an inquisition" opposing or stifling the "liberation of individual powers." Most strikingly, recall Weber identifies and emphasizes what he denotes as the "unexampled tyranny of Puritanism." He implies that this "tyranny" is "unexampled" or unprecedented within Protestantism like Lutheranism and Anglicanism and antecedent Christianity represented by Catholic and Orthodox churches, and most world religions (perhaps excluding Islam). Also, remember, even his US contemporary, conservative sociologist Ross, otherwise extolling the virtues of Puritanism, admonishes about "Puritan tyranny."

Notably, Puritanism probably constitutes the most absolute and extreme form of moral authoritarianism or totalitarianism within Protestantism and Christianity overall. Thus, Weber notices that a "more intensive" form of religiously based moralist control and oppression, i.e., the "religious valuation of moral action," than Puritanism or Calvinism "has perhaps never existed." As a case in point, he cites the "extraordinarily strict" moral discipline[1] of most Puritan sects in Europe and America, including the "strict morality of the Baptists." He remarks that this moral discipline "was, in fact, far more rigorous" than that of the Catholic or any other church, which made these sects resemble a "monastic order" and even transform all society into a monastery. For example, he observes that in Puritanism "there was no place for the very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin." Also, Weber invokes the "strictest bibliocracy" of Puritans like early Baptists, thus suggesting that Puritan theocracy was even stricter or more primitive than its variants in other Protestantism, including Anglicanism, as well as Catholicism and Christian Orthodoxy. And, Weber describes Puritans' warning "against any trust in the aid of friendship of men," reflecting what he calls a "peculiar misanthropy," as the "most extreme form" of absolute or exclusive trust in God, and of mistrust and fear of humans. Also, recall Weber conceives Puritanism in general as a type of "radical Calvinism" and thus implicitly as even more extreme, absolute, or totalitarian than its Calvinist creator and ancestor.

Subsequent historical and empirical research supports and reinforces these insights. Thus, a historical study indicates that the "intensity and extent" as well as the "novelty of Puritan moralist repression[2], starting from England, "have no parallel among statesman or traditional moralists" (Walzer 1963:82). Also, another study finds that Puritanism in early New England, in virtue of imposing authoritarian moral discipline, "was the most totalitarian form of Calvinism" and in extension Protestantism (Stivers 1994:18–23), which thus specifies Weber's general idea of Puritan religion as "radical Calvinism." In this sense, Calvinist Puritanism

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[1] Weber adds that, since its moral discipline or control was conducted "exclusively in the sense of formal righteousness and methodical asceticism," Puritan honesty is "formalistic legality" and the "uprightness which the sometime Puritan people like to claim as a national virtue is something specifically different from the [non-Puritan sense]."

[2] In apparent reference to Puritan moralist repression, Mencken says "the worst government is the most moral. One composed of cynics is often very tolerant and humane. But when fanatics are on top there is no limit to oppression."

TABLE 3.1. Elements of Puritan social authoritarianism.

Moral authoritarianism
  oppressive moral discipline
  moral intolerance and imposition of morality
Religious authoritarianism
  religious intolerance
  religious radicalism and fundamentalism
  theocracy (bibliocracy)
Artistic–cultural authoritarianism
  authoritarian suppression of the arts
  antagonism to secular culture
Educational and scientific authoritarianism
  authoritarian uses of science and technology
Authoritarian antihumanism
  against secular humanism
  inhumanity
  barbarism and inhuman primitivism
  other antihumanist dimensions
  non-Christian?

constitutes or engenders the most absolute, extreme, and unprecedented type of social authoritarianism, notably moral oppression and religious tyranny or theocracy, in Protestantism and Christianity overall. In short, Puritanism is paradigmatic or salient instance of moral absolutism, authoritarianism, and extremism or radicalism. For example, US sociologist Mead (1942:973) describes Puritanism as one of the two "extremes" in moral systems and behaviors, the other being hedonism. Elements of Puritanism's "unexampled tyranny" or the "most totalitarian" type of control over civil society or culture include the following: moral authoritarianism, religious authoritarianism, other cultural authoritarianism, anti-humanism, each in turn subdivided into certain parts (see Table 3.1), and considered in this order.

Moral Authoritarianism

Puritan moral authoritarianism or absolutism denies and constrains individual liberty, autonomy and responsibility, i.e., self-determination, in the sphere of morality and private life. Puritanism, in spite or perhaps because of its extolled theological–religious individualism, reportedly "never led to respect for privacy" (Walzer 1963:64), so personal freedom, autonomy, and responsibility, or self-direction, in private life and morality. Puritan moral authoritarianism specifically involves oppressive moralist discipline, moral intolerance, and coercive imposition of morality. It does so for the sake of attaining the aim of moral purity or perfection and religious holiness or sainthood, eventually establishing a repressive "Holy Commonwealth" ruled by such purists and saints.

Oppressive Moralist Discipline

Puritan oppressive moralist discipline, control, or restraint is defining and determinative of Puritanism as a moral system, legendary in history, and persistent or residual in modern times. Thus, Weber cites the "strict and temperate discipline under which men were placed by the systematic life of holiness of the Puritan" in old and New England. This discipline is probably the most stringent and unprecedented moral constraint or control not only in Protestantism but also all Christianity and beyond, perhaps equaled or rivaled only by its Islamic counterpart. This is what Weber indicates observing that the "extraordinarily strict" moral discipline of English-American Puritan sects was "far more rigorous" than anything else before and after within Christianity and other world religions (including even Islam). So does Tawney (1962: 213–233), remarking that Puritanism "broke the [old] discipline as a step towards erecting a more rigorous discipline of its own," which by comprising "all questions of moral conduct" was absolute, total and "inquisitorial." Weber also notices that, since its deriving from and expanding to the Anglo-Saxon world Calvinism and its theological dogmas, above all the dogma of predestination in the form of election or damnation, Puritanism[3] sought to attain "domination over the sinful world by religious virtuosi belonging to the "pure church" or absolute ascetic "mastery" of the realm of "mundane affairs," including the "damned," by the "elect," "chosen', "godly," or "saints." Curiously, none than Marx anticipates Weber by invoking "those sober virtuosi of Protestantism, the Puritans of New England," who apparently attempted and eventually attained "domination over the sinful world" by enslaving or exterminating the "ungodly" and "impure" native Americans by "decrees of their assembly," all within, as US conservatives like to say, "law and order," republic and democracy.

In general, Weber identifies elements or syndromes of Puritan moral authoritarianism by observing that, while placing individuals completely on their own "responsibility in religious matters," Puritanism, following or intensifying Calvinism, denied to them such responsibilities in moral issues, thus resolving the "conflict between the individual and the ethic" or civil society. This suggests that Puritanism fuses or reconciles theological–religious individualism with moral and by implication political anti-individualism or absolutism and to that extent authoritarianism. Alternatively, it implies that Puritan and other Protestant religious–theological individualism, in the sense that everyone is one's own priest, theologian or evangelical (Bible interpreter) needing no official theology or church a la Vatican, is not a necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for moral–political individualism and liberty, contrary to sociological and lay "naïve assumptions" (Coffey 1996) about individualistic and liberal Puritanism in America (e.g., Parsons 1967).

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[3] Weber remarks that Protestantism as a whole "meant not the elimination of the Church's control over everyday life, but rather the substitution of a new form of control for the previous one [i.e.] the repudiation of a control which was very lax and formal, in favor of a regulation of the whole of conduct."

Predictably, Puritanism could and often did achieve such absolute domination or maximal mastery within and via theocracy precisely defined by the total social rule, including moralist oppression, by religious virtuosi, specifically Weber's Puritan "strict bibliocracy." Also, he cites the Calvinist Reformation commandment, "you think you have escaped from the monastery, but everyone must now be a monk throughout his life," inferring that in European Calvinism and consequently Anglo-American Puritanism "every Christian had to be a monk all his life." In particular, Weber contrasts Puritanism to Catholicism and traditional monasticism or asceticism overall, in which a monastic order, as the sacred realm, was separated from and even opposed to the secular or profane world, as indicated by what he calls the "very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release" outside the monastery. Overall, he notes that in Catholicism everyday, as distinguished from monastic, morality "sufficed as a minimum, and that this latter was not measured by such standards as Puritanism demanded." Weber infers that, due to building its ethics on the basis of Calvin's dogma of predestination as the "dogmatic background of the Puritan morality," Puritanism replaced the Catholic "spiritual aristocracy of monks outside of and above the world" with the "spiritual aristocracy of the predestined saints of God within the world,"[4] as actually or potentially even more oppressive and moralistic than the first. Similarly, Simmel contrasts the two, observing that the Puritan or all Protestant clergy "as a matter of principle is entirely enmeshed in civil life," unlike its Catholic counterpart. Generally, insofar as, as Marx[5] remarks anticipating Weber, traditional Christianity preached and practiced "monastic life" primarily *within* a monastery, Puritanism intensifies and extends that "alternative lifestyle" to all society, thus being more oppressive, radical, maximalist, or totalistic (Eisenstadt 1965).

Hence, the preceding indicates that historically Puritanism's recreation or design of society as an all-embracing monastery and its commandment that humans must ("thou shall") be permanent monks-saints, perhaps "have no parallel among statesman or traditional moralists" (Walzer 1963:82), albeit with the possible exception of Islam (and Hinduism and ancient Sparta). Hence, Weber's observation that Puritan sects tend, due to their "extraordinarily strict" moral discipline, to resemble or become a monastic order is better understood in the sense that they are not just like traditional monasteries. Rather these sects seek to transform civil society, like polity and economy, into an all-encompassing oppressive monastery or a sort of open prison for sinners typically redefined as criminals, witches, or enemies, and convert humans into life-long monks, ascetics, virtuosi, or saints as "transformative agents." Puritanism thus renders civil society what Durkheim calls a "community

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[4] Weber comments that the Puritan aristocracy of "predestined saints of God" was an aristocracy "which, with its *indelible character*, was divided from the eternally damned remainder of humanity by a more impassable and in its invisibility more terrifying gulf, than separated the monk of the Middle Ages from the rest of the world about him, a gulf which penetrated all social relations with its sharp brutality."

[5] Marx cites the monks who "wrote silly lives of Catholic saints," but, as Weber might add, would have to become, just as all humans *cum* monks, saints, or religious virtuosi themselves under Puritanism.

of saints in an exemplary and perfect monastery [in which] crime as such would be unknown but faults that appear venial to ordinary persons will arouse the same scandal as does normal crime in ordinary consciences." In short, for Puritanism the "lay monk transforms the world" (Baltzell 1979), as the expression and realization of its extreme worldly asceticism and "totalistic" mastery of society. At this point, Weber's "unexampled tyranny" or "strictest bibliocracy" of Puritanism functions and manifests itself as an overarching and strict monastic order or open prison in social, as well as political–economic, terms. And conversely: such an order can be fully realized and people shall become "born again" monks or saints only within and through Puritanism and its moral–religious tyranny or bibliocracy, viz. what Weber identifies as the Puritan "theocracy" of New England implementing radical Calvinism. Hence, the Puritan commandment that "everyone must now be a monk throughout his life" is not only a seemingly noble, compassionate, or benign attempt to "to 'save' people from their own moral mistakes" (Terchek 1997:9), but also (or rather) an oppressive theocratic decree and project.

In turn, exemplifying Puritanism's theological parentage from Calvinism, the Puritan "extraordinarily strict" moral discipline or "harshness" is rooted in what Weber describes as the Calvinist "harsh doctrines of the absolute transcendentality of God" vis-a-vis humans, notably the doctrine of predestation, according to which these are merely the "tool of the divine will." Generally, Puritan theological roots lie in what he detects as the Calvinist combination of "faith in absolutely valid norms with absolute determinism and the complete transcendentality of God," i.e., a mixture of moral absolutism and deterministic theology, normative monism, and religious predestination distinguished by Weber from predetermination and fatalism. For example, Weber notes that the "strict morality of the Baptists had turned in practice into the path prepared by the Calvinistic ethic."

Within a Protestant framework, Puritanism represents or engenders what Tawney (1962: 211) describes as "iron Protestantism" by virtue of Puritan "inquisitorial discipline" or strict moral constraint and oppression. In a sense, Weber anticipates this description by the term the "iron consistency" of Puritanism and Calvinism in such authoritarian constraint. Recollect, early English Puritans were described by Catholics and Anglicans as the "hotter sort" of Protestants and "disciplinarians" with a "pervasive hostility" (Walzer 1963:64–80) toward individual moral liberty and privacy, plus earthly things and art, thus exhibiting oppressive moralist tendencies. Also, early American Puritans, ever-more "not satisfied with a minimalistic morality" than even their English ancestors, carried such oppressive tendencies to a kind of maximum or climax, by intensifying, elevating, and expanding Puritanism to the maximal point of the "most totalitarian form of Calvinism" via "authoritarian moral discipline" (Stivers 1994:18–23).

Further, recall, analyses suggest that Puritanism, while undergoing a "transformation from the absolute moral rigor of its origins" in Great Britain, has essentially continued and even strengthened its original ethical absolutism (Munch 2001:120), including the treatment of the Bible as an absolute[6] (Means 1966:377), in America

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[6] Means (1966:377) comments that "if there was any absolute for the Puritans, that was the Bible. Yet, their emphasis on an absolute, inconceivable God made political absolutism

up to the early twenty-first century. In this view, by contrast to their modern British variants, contemporary US Puritan or evangelical moralistic movements continuously and ever-more intensively tend toward "defining concrete precepts and prohibitions in absolute terms and on an institutional level before they attempt to enforce a generally binding validity for such precepts and prohibitions even though they lack universal grounding" (Munch 2001:239). Simply, American Puritanism continues to harbor and practice moral absolutism or particularism and authoritarianism, while its British ancestor tempers, if not transcends, this original or immature tendency from the Puritan childhood or even kindergarten. This remarkable difference is, as hinted, primarily due to the fact that the Puritan Revolution in England ultimately failed against or was counteracted by non-Puritan forces like Anglicanism and the liberal-secular Enlightenment (e.g., Locke)—yet victorious, in the form of New England's conquest and theocracy, the Great Awakenings, and other evangelical revivals extending into the twenty-first century, over, or not moderated enough by, countervailing social factors given their relative weakness, notably Enlightenment-based liberalism and secularism, in most of America's history.

Moral Intolerance and Imposition of Morality

Another set of elements or outcomes of the moral authoritarianism of Puritanism involves moral intolerance and coercive imposition of morality. Extreme moral intolerance or resentment is also an original, legendary, and pervasive attribute of Puritanism since its genesis. Recall J. S. Mill identifies "the fanatical moral intolerance" of Puritans in England as well as America. In general, Puritanism everywhere is "intolerant" (Baltzell 1979) and even has become a sort of role model or symbol for moral–religious and other intolerance and resentment within Western civil society and democracy.[7] In particular, critical observers describe American Puritanism as the "haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy"[8] (Mencken 1982:624), which indicates its intolerance and resentment of human happiness within society as opposed to that in "heaven."

Puritan fanatical moral intolerance and resentment typically escalates into a coercive imposition and oppressive enforcement of morality, thus denying or constraining individual moral freedom, responsibility and privacy, while expressing and realizing ethical absolutism. Whereas being an initial and common attribute

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nothing short of a blasphemy." Hence, this denies or overlooks that Puritanism has blended or can blend religious-theological and political absolutism, absolute sacred and tyrannical secular power. This is what Weber instead suggests by his observations about the "tyranny of Puritanism," notably Puritan theocracy or bibliocracy and Calvinist state churches. In a sense, Puritan bibliocracy or Protestant-Christian theocracy overall is in essence a fusion rather than disjuncture of religious-theological and political absolutism by sanctifying both the Bible or God and the oppressive state or tyranny as absolutes.

[7] For example, MacCracken (1927:368) warns that a "Puritanism in science [is] no less intolerant than the older Puritanism of conduct."

[8] Mencken (1982:625) bluntly says "show me a Puritan and I'll show you a son-of-a-bitch."

or outcome of Puritanism, it in particular has become a distinguishing element or trademark of its derivative American version, which has essentially continued and reinforced original Puritan "absolute moral rigor" in contrast to its English parent. As noted, this is primarily consequent to the historical moment that Puritanism was largely victorious or remained crucially influential in America, first in New England with Winthrop et al.'s establishment of *mixt aristocracie*, and then the country as a whole, notably the South, through the neo-Puritan Great Awakenings of the eighteenth to nineteenth century and the Bible-Belt revival or design extending into the 2000s. By contrast, it was eventually marginalized, discredited, or neglected in favor of (and by) Anglicanism in Great Britain following the seventeenth century temporarily successful but ultimately, in Weber's word, "abortive" Puritan Revolution.

Puritan Moral Absolutism and Countervailing Forces: Great Britain Versus America

In consequence of the above, in Great Britain Puritan moral absolutism or authoritarianism, like political radicalism or repression, was "tempered by the maintenance of the Anglican Church order" (Munch 2001:119), as well as by the Enlightenment with its secularism, liberalism, and individualism epitomized by Locke and Hume. By contrast, it was largely intact, unconstrained, and even strengthened and expanded, viz. from New England to the South, in America due to the lack or weakness of these countervailing factors. Notably, if Puritan and other radical Christian ideas, as Marx[9] puts it, "succumbed" to rationalism championed by the Enlightenment, and feudalism "fought its death battle" against capitalism, in eighteenth century England and Europe, they did not, despite some heroic "enlightening" efforts by Jefferson, Madison and other early US secular liberals,[10] but rather expanded and intensified, via the Great Awakenings, in America, notably the South. Thus, the unparalleled resilience and even perpetual revival or permanent revolution of Puritanism versus the rationalist, secular, and liberal European-style Enlightenment generated, sustained, or indicated some degree of political–democratic backwardness of America, at least New England, at this historical point in terms of liberal secular democracy and civil society. Moreover, Puritanism has perpetuated and expanded this backwardness ever since, as shown by the salient case of the perennially "under-democratized" South (Amenta and

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[9] Marx suggests an intimate link between Puritanism or oppressive religion overall and feudalism by observing that "the [Protestant] parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord". Alternatively, he comments that the ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience "merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge," and thus expressed rationalism.

[10] Perhaps with Jefferson et al.'s liberal-secular countervailing efforts in mind, a *New York Times* editorial commented that a "fundamentalist Christian revival was in revolt against the traditions of the Enlightenment, on which the country is based," in reference to the 2004 elections in which neo-Puritan religious fundamentalism was victorious or instrumental in the victory of political neo-conservatism.

Halfmann 2000), reportedly threatening to place American politics and democracy under the authoritarian and moralist–fundamentalist "shadow of Dixie" (Cochran 2001). In particular, this Puritan permanent counter-revolution against liberalism, secularism, rationalism, and humanism through attacking or reversing the Enlightenment during the eighteenthand nineteenth century, exploding or punctuating in the neo-Puritan or evangelical Great Awakenings, is the likely initial source or Act 1 of the perpetual democratic backwardness of the US South, up to the early twenty-first century.

Further, the above implies that what feudalism, specifically theocratic Catholicism, was in Europe during the Dark Middle Ages and in facing early modern capitalism, Puritanism has been in America during the post-Reformation era. Like religious medievalism, Puritanism has been in essence a project and system of antiliberalism and antirationalism vehemently hostile or suspicious toward the liberal Enlightenment—and still is. Thus, contemporary US neo-Puritan fundamentalists deny or suspect that the European-style, French, and German, embodied in Voltaire and Kant respectively, Enlightenment "was a good thing" (Dombrowski 2001:x). In general, contemporary Protestant and other religious fundamentalism or evangelicalism in America and beyond has been one of a wide spectrum of irrational and "disturbed responses" (Berman 2000:129) to Enlightenment-based values and institutions as well as their abuses.

These Puritan-evangelical denials and reactions arise and persist primarily because, as US and other fundamentalists probably know and condemn, the Enlightenment "has shaken the foundations of religious life [and] religious orthodoxy [reacted] in its mindless defensive battle against [it]" (Habermas 2001:135). As Mises[11] remarks, for the postmedieval Christian Church, the Enlightenment and liberalism overall "have created all the evil which afflicts the world today" through "undermining the religious feeling of the masses." Admittedly, religious and political conservatism alike reacted by vehemently and jointly attacking the "individualistic Enlightenment" and glorifying instead social groups or collectivities, first of all, traditional family and theocratic church-state (Nisbet 1952:170). Historically, in Europe during the age of Enlightenment religious orthodoxy or conservatism comprised both official Catholicism or the Vatican church and fundamentalist Protestantism like Puritanism and Calvinism, with the "Papists" and their Puritan-Protestant enemies joining hands in their holy crusade and terror against the "evil" of secularism, liberalism, rationalism, humanism, and modernism, though with some exceptions (e.g., Scotland).[12]

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[11] Mises adds that "Liberalism is the flower of that rational enlightenment which dealt a death blow to the regime of the old Church" in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

[12] According to Delanty (2000:27), in Scotland the Enlightenment, as represented by Locke, Ferguson, Smith, and Hume, "was greatly aided by the reformed [Puritan] churches (unlike in Catholic France, where the Enlightenment emerged in opposition to religion)." However, as noted, Zaret (1989) and others (e.g., Walzer 1963) treat this Puritan aid and generally link to liberalism and democracy as historically "fortuitous". At most, the above implies that early Puritanism was less hostile to the Enlightenment than was official Catholicism. Further, this applied only or mostly to Scotland where a more moderate species of Puritanism

Evidently, American Puritanism has carried and escalated, in the generalized form of contemporary fundamentalism, this "mindless" battle against the Enlightenment from the seventeenth into the twenty-first century. For instance, showing their proudly declared Puritan parentage, some contemporary US religious conservatives condemn the fact that in the especially French, as distinguished from Scottish, Enlightenment the emphasis was on "freedom of form and spirit," while "gone were such traditional religious doctrines as man born in sin facing judgment before an omnipotent God"[13] (Dunn and Woodard 1996:27). This emphasis proves intolerable for US Puritans and other religious conservatives, just as to German fascists (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), in their shared belief in the "flawed vision" of the Enlightenment (Dunn and Woodard 1996:66). It hence provides a dual, antiliberal and antisecular, permanent, and sacred rationale for fundamentalist and neoconservative culture wars against Enlightenment-based values and institutions, including liberal and secular democracy, in America, notably the "Bible Belt," as it did in New England's "Biblical Commonwealth" earlier.

If so, functionalist sociologists (e.g., Merton 1968) may comment that Puritanism has not been an absolutely indispensable and irreplaceable social structure in this respect, because other structures, so-called functional alternatives or substitutes, including Catholicism itself, could, can, and in part do perform the same function of religious orthodoxy's war against the Enlightenment. They may add that America did and does not really need some "new" Puritanism and Protestant fundamentalism overall to fight a crusade against and triumph over the Enlightenment, as the old Catholicism with its Vatican church-state, including the Inquisition and its sequels, or simply the "Papists," including antiliberal, ultraconservative popes, would and do functionally suffice for this holy purpose and Divinely ordained mission. In this respect, American Puritanism has been and remains functionally redundant in relation to other religious orthodoxy within Christianity (Catholicism, Orthodox Church) and even Protestantism (Lutheranism, Anglicanism) itself.

Alternatively, Puritanism has been and remains a functionally indispensable and even irreplaceable social structure in terms of the intensity, persistence, and triumph of religious orthodoxy's holy war against the Enlightenment and liberalism overall, first and temporarily in Great Britain, later on and more enduringly America.

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developed and was established in the form of Presbyterianism rather than or less to England with its more extreme version in the face of Cromwell's Independents (Israel 1966). So, if the Scottish Enlightenment was, intentionally or fortuitously, "aided" by it, this was precisely because Puritanism became tempered or modified in Scotland, unlike England as well as early America, where most "reformed churches" waged an anti-liberal crusade. In comparative-historical terms, Scotland's and perhaps Holland's link between the Enlightenment and Puritanism was a fortuitous exception rather than the rule, just as was the Dutch Puritans' religious toleration within the Puritan Church (or rather, as Weber would suggest, Sect) as a whole (Sprunger 1982).

[13] For example, Dunn and Woodard (1996:74) complain that Rousseau's "freedom was a release from God, culture, authority, and any kind of restraint" and that Deity (and religion-dominated community) as the hallmark of religious conservatism, including Puritanism, was "anathema" to this and other representatives of the French Enlightenment.

Hence, this holds true, first and foremost, of American Puritanism compared to its British, especially Scottish, antecedent that was, in some views (Delanty 2000), historically less antagonistic to, even, however fortuitously (Zaret 1989) aiding, the Enlightenment in Great Britain (Scotland), as embodied in Locke, Hume, and others. The same can be *mutatis mutandis* said of US neo-Puritanism in the generalized form of religious–political neoconservatism like Reaganism during the 1980s–2000s compared to its UK version. The first is even more what Mannheim calls an "anti-Enlightenment reaction," notably to the 1960s (Habermas 1989), so antiliberal, antisecular, and antihumanist, than the second.[14]

Overall, Puritanism especially in historical and contemporary America has been more intense, persistent, and victorious in this anti-Enlightenment holy crusade than in Great Britain, and any of its actual or potential functional alternatives, allies, or rivals in Christian orthodoxy, including official Catholicism as well as other Protestantism like Lutheranism and Anglicanism. So, in respect to a total war and victory against and so destruction of the Enlightenment and its liberalism, secularism, optimism, and humanism, Puritanism had and still has no real functional alternative, substitute, or rival in America—it is simply second to none in this sense, in a typical holly alliance with authoritarian political conservatism (Dunn and Woodard 1996). Thus, more virulently, successfully, and enduringly than any of its actual or potential functional alternatives, including traditional Catholicism in Europe and Anglicanism in Great Britain, Puritanism has condemned as "un-American" and cheerfully, often sadistically, and sanctimoniously exorcised the European-style Enlightenment, thus liberalism, secularism, and humanism, from the Puritan-conservative "shining city upon the hill" or "heaven" (Wuthnow 1998) in the sociological sense of a theocratic dystopia, from New England's to the South's "Bible Commonwealths."

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[14] Eccleshall (2000) remarks that "in relentlessly pursuing a neo-liberal programme of minimal government, Thatcherites cast themselves adrift "from the larger tradition of European conservative philosophy of which British conservative thought has always been a part," and instead aligned themselves with the American right by embracing an "alien form of Enlightenment rationalism" and thus "abandoned the skepticism of their predecessors." He adds that "in demanding an 'enterprise revolution', Thatcherites were inclined to depict their project as a crusade to restore the features of a golden moment in the past [e.g. the Victorian era]." Yet, it is to be added that American and British neo-conservatism pursue "minimal government" exclusively or primarily in the economic realm rather than or just secondarily in the social sphere, thus embracing only one particular aspect or effect of Enlightenment rationalism and liberalism (i.e., market laissez-faire). Alternatively, to the extent that their "minimal government" or laissez-faire virtually stops beyond the economy and instead aggrandizes into a "big" penal state (Bourdieu 1998) in the social sphere (Giddens 2000), both neo-conservatisms remain antagonistic or suspicious toward Enlightenment rationalism and liberalism in non-economic terms. This is what the description of neo-conservatism (New Right) as an "uneasy interplay between neo-liberal individualism and neo-conservative social authoritarianism" (Eccleshall 2000) essentially means. Still, the antagonism or suspicion toward the Enlightenment holds true more of American social neo-conservatism, notably neo-Puritan fundamentalism, than of its British variant, and increasingly so during the early twenty-first century.

The above holds true essentially and generally, with the qualification that this Puritan victory over and destruction of such "un-American," "foreign" ideas and activities have never been total and irreversible even during the most intense and extensive theocratic rule, including New England's "Biblical Commonwealth" during the seventeenth to nineteenth century and the Southern "Bible Belt" in the late twentieth and the early twenty-first century. This coming short of a "total and unconditional" Puritan victory and of irreversibility, "once and for all," is indicated by the endemic presence and operation of countervailing social forces, ranging from early Philadelphia as the "heart" of the American Enlightenment and Jeffersonian liberal–secular ideas assimilated or reinforced during his Paris years, to the anti-Puritan cultural and political rebellion of the 1960s.[15] Yet, most of these countervailing and tempering forces in America, unlike Great Britain (Munch 2001), were relatively atypical, including the "(atypically) Enlightenment-influenced Jefferson" (Archer 2001: 228), whose a-typicality in this sense was primarily due to his Paris-French episode, as well as substantively secondary to or eventually subdued by Puritanism. For example, Puritanism eventually subdued or subverted most of eighteenth century Enlightenment-based, Jeffersonian secular–liberal ideas through the Great Awakenings, especially the second, at least in the South, including Jefferson's own Virginia, hence become, as the Bible Belt (Boles 1999), an extension of New England's theocracy. Also, Puritanism submerged or suppressed the 1960s anti-Puritan rebellion by neo-Puritan and neoconservative revival during the 1980s–2000s seeking and seemingly succeeding to recreate American society as an evangelical "faith-based" heaven (Wuthnow 1998) or a theocratic dystopia in the form or image of Southern bibliocracy through, for example, "Reclaiming America for Christ" (Smith 2000:19). In short, the Great Awakenings and the consequent Bible Belt as their crowning achievement were virulent anti-Enlightenment, i.e., antiliberal and antisecular, revivals, counterrevolutions, or designs.

In sum, US Puritanism tends to be functionally redundant generally in respect of religious fundamentalism's irrational and totalitarian (Bauman 1997) battle against the Enlightenment, yet indispensable and even perhaps irreplaceable particularly in the function of its intensity, persistence and success, or simply winning this antisecular crusade. This indicates both the superfluity and (as Weber implies) "unexampled" extremism of American Puritanism in the context of religious orthodoxy, including Protestant fundamentalism, and its "holy" war and terror against the liberal–secular Enlightenment and its adherents or defenders ("liberals").

Puritan-American Exceptionalism

The preceding implies still another antiliberal, antisecular, and irrational dimension of Puritan-induced American exceptionalism compared with Western Europe,

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[15] Habermas (1989:35) comments that the "changed scene" of the 1960 involved (also) an "Enlightenment tradition mobilized in its full breadth" and thus "revived everything" that religious and other (neo) conservatives "had thought dead."

a facet that most celebrants of the "exceptional nation" (Lipset 1996) are unable or unwilling to recognize as a double- or authoritarian-edged sword. This is that, while religious orthodoxy or conservatism—more its Protestant–Lutheran than its Catholic–Vatican or Papist version—has basically lost, discontinued, or been discredited by, its "mindless" war against the liberal–secular Enlightenment in modern Western Europe, it, primarily in the form of Puritanism, has won or continued and intensified this crusade in America since the seventeenth century and up to the early twenty-first century. This is indicated by American neo-Puritan fundamentalism's perennial and ever-escalating, during the 1980s–2000s, culture wars, virtually unknown[16] (Singh 2002) or irrelevant in contemporary Western Europe, against liberalism (liberal democracy), secularism (separation of church and state), secular humanism (humans as "evil"), and scientific rationalism (e.g., evolution theory) as the Enlightenment's legacies. Hence, these neo-Puritan or neoconservative culture wars in modern America cannot be fully comprehended or simply made sense of in their evidently comparative incomprehensibility and irrationality unless placing them in a historical perspective of (Catholic and Protestant) religious orthodoxy's "mindless" war against the Enlightenment's liberalism, secularism, rationalism, humanism, and modernism.

In historical terms, neo-Puritan fundamentalism causes America to usher in the twenty-first century in the almost same way Catholic and other orthodoxy caused Europe enter, say, the seventeenth or eighteenth century: waging an irrational and eventually futile crusade against Enlightenment-based liberalism, secularism, rationalism, including science, and modernism. In this regard, Puritanism has made and maintained the "first new nation" even older or more degenerated than the "old" and "degenerate" Europe, where religious orthodoxy or fundamentalism, in spite or because of the Vatican's persisting antiliberal anachronism, since these times has essentially reached the terminal condition of, to use Weber's expression, *caput mortuum* (literally the head of death) vis-a-vis Enlightenment values. Yet, it is "live and well," resurrected from the "dead" and even predominant in the generalized form of Protestant sectarianism (Lipset 1996) in America ushering in the twenty-first century. Recall, primarily in view of Puritanism's theocracy, primitivism, and irrationalism, symbolized by witch-trials, in New England, during these times there arose "European Enlightenment theories about degeneracy in the New World" (Gould 1996:137). If these theories were correct, then this Puritan-generated theocratic and other "degeneracy" in the form of a "Biblical Commonwealth" was the original source, defining attribute or Prime Act of American celebrated exceptionalism as the double, notably fundamentalist or antisecular, edged "sword" relative to the European Enlightenment and its secularism. Judging by the revival, once again, and renewed dominance of Puritan theocratic fundamentalism in America

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[16] For example, even the pro-American and "Euro-skeptical" *Economist* (from May 26, 2005) laments that, while most European politicians "would rather talk about sexually transmitted diseases than their own faith in God" and the huge European constitution even "doesn't mention Christianity," US conservative policymakers "by contrast, don't seem to talk about anything else."

since the 1980s indicating that Puritanism has perpetuated its original "degeneracy" from the seventeenth to the twentieth and twenty-first century, such theories seem prophetic in this respect. As expected, this process has been particularly pervasive and intensive in the South during the 1980s–2000s, so the fundamentalist "Bible Belt" can by analogy be described as the ultimate outcome, derivative or Final Act, for now, of Puritan-produced bibliocratic "degeneracy," with the Great Awakenings as such Intermediate Acts. Hence, even in the early twenty-first century, Puritanism continues to reproduce and make American exceptionalism appear as theocratic or fundamentalist "degeneracy in the New World" from the prism of Enlightenment secularism, rationalism, humanism, and liberalism.

In Durkheim's terms, a general syndrome of this Puritan "degeneracy" is that Puritanism degenerates or deviates from and subverts what he calls the "incontrovertibly settled" historical truth that "religion extends over an ever-diminishing area of social life,"[17] especially in Western society and primarily under the impetus of the secular Enlightenment since the eighteenth century. As noted, Puritanism does so by instead seeking to extend religion over an *ever-increasing* area of social life, as indicated by its creations or projects ranging from Great Britain's short-lived "Holy Commonwealth" and New England's long theocracy to the Great Awakenings expanding Puritan sects to the South and all America, to the neo-Puritan heaven *cum* theocratic dystopia of a "Bible Belt" up to the twenty-first century. This is an unambiguous symptom of religious "degeneracy" from the prism of the European and even American, Jefferson-Madison's Enlightenment, notably its idea of liberal–secular democracy and civil society, though apparently a supreme and holy virtue for Puritanism and its reproduced and celebrated Americanism. At this juncture, Puritanism reproduces or defines American exceptionalism in the form or sense of extending religion over an ever-increasing rather than diminishing area of social life (Lipset 1996, Munch 2001), from the secular Enlightenment to the twenty-first century, stamping the "exceptional nation" or Americanism with a dimension of religious–theocratic "degeneracy" from this prism. This extension perhaps more substantively than anything else defines—and is used by its adherents to celebrate—Puritan-reproduced American exceptionalism in religious, cultural, and political terms, even as America ushers in the twenty-first century in an invidious distinction from Western Europe with its disdained Enlightenment-based secularism. Hence, Puritan-based American exceptionalism manifests itself as a salient and celebrated degeneration, a sort of "normal pathology" (Gouldner 1970), vis-a-vis the Enlightenment, so a truly "double-edged sword" (Lipset 1996), albeit with a primary sharp fundamentalist–theocratic edge that threatens to destroy or subvert Jefferson-Madison's idea of liberal and secular democracy in America. Evidently, American Puritan-based exceptionalism appears in the dramatically different, pathological light from the stance of the Enlightenment than from that of Puritanism and other religious fundamentalism or nativism in America.

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[17] Durkheim's full statement is that "if there is one truth that history has incontrovertibly settled, it is that religion extends over an ever-diminishing area of social life."

Alternatively, the European-style Enlightenment and thus liberalism or secularism was essentially, if not reaching Weber's *caput mortuum* condition then in a sort of vegetative state from its genesis ("near-dead or disabled on birth") in America already shaped by anti- or pre-Enlightenment ideas and forces like Puritanism in New England (and Anglicanism in the old South)[18] (Archer 2001). And the Enlightenment has remained ever since more (e.g., the 1980s–2000s) or less (viz. the 1930s–1960s) in such a chronic condition, in America, albeit with some atypical, usually short and secondary historical signs of life—e.g., Philadelphia in the eighteenth century, Jefferson, Madison et al., the New Deal, the 1960s secularization and liberalization—as a sort of secular oasis or island in the fundamentalist and theocratic desert or ocean.

As indicated, this exceptionally negative fate or relative weakness of the Enlightenment in America by comparison to Western Europe, including Great Britain, was primarily, but not exclusively, the result of the dominance of Puritanism and its fundamentalist sequels, allies, or proxies. They have usually condemned and exorcised from their "heaven" in the theological and sociological sense of theocratic dystopia the Enlightenment or liberalism as, as one Reagan-type neoconservative puts it in the 1980s, "un-American," via perennial culture wars. Thus, what most "celebrants" (Tilman 2001) of Puritan-based and conservative-celebrated American exceptionalism overlook or deny is that, primarily owing to Puritanism, religious orthodoxy's "mindless defensive battle" and usual, though not total, victory against the Enlightenment in America has never ceased or weakened in intensity since its cessation or weakening in the "old" Europe during the late eighteenth century marked by the French Revolution and afterwards. Simply, proto-Puritan and neo-Puritan America, at least New England and the Southern Bible Belt respectively, is really an "exceptional nation" in respect with Puritanism's eternal culture (and violent) war and typical, albeit not complete, triumph against Enlightenment-based liberalism or secularism. And, this is hardly a reason for ethnocentric celebration, including patriotic "joy and pride," and glorification by US Puritan fundamentalists and other neoconservatives. *Prima facie*, Puritan-based antiliberal and antisecular exceptionalism is, to use Ross' word, the antidote or rather poison to liberal–secular democracy and civil society as the hallmark of Western civilization, of which America is yet considered by neo-Puritan conservatives (for example,

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[18] Archer (2001:275) suggests that America's political culture was "formed under the influence of pre-Enlightenment doctrines," first and foremost a "particular brand of Protestantism" or Puritanism. For example, he remarks that, while some key figures like Jefferson and Madison were "personally influenced" by Enlightenment ideas, their preferences were not "principally responsible for establishing what Jefferson later described as "a wall of separation between Church and State" (Archer 2001:276–277). Particularly, Jefferson was personally inspired by the French Enlightenment while living in Paris in the aftermath of the American Revolution, but he was a relatively isolated case. Counterfactually, Enlightenment ideas, values, and institutions would have probably become more relevant in American history relative to Puritanism if more US politicians, including presidents, lived for awhile or visited Paris during the late eighteenth century and perhaps later (e.g., "freedom fries" neo-conservatives in the 2000s).

advocating more "Western" *cum* American history classes in schools) an integral, even essential, or leading part.

No doubt, American Puritanism's original and ever-continuing "mindless," yet typically successful war against the Enlightenment, spanning into the twenty-first century via fundamentalist and victorious culture wars against liberalism and secularism, is a perennial holy, usually violent, and triumphant crusade of Puritan authoritarianism, notably theocratic fundamentalism or orthodoxy, on the "evil" of liberal–secular democracy and free civil society. Hence, the European-style Enlightenment with its liberalism–secularism has been a missing link or weaker countervailing force like Anglicanism since the 1800s to Puritanism in most of America's history, up to the twenty-first century, than virtually any other Western society, including proto-Puritan Great Britain, as well as Europe, notably France and Germany. And, compared with most other Western societies, this, perhaps more than anything else, constitutes or generates truly American exceptionalism, as a fundamentalist–theocratic and antiliberal rather than democratic–libertarian, as often supposed, "edged sword" (Lipset 1996) reproduced and self-destructively wielded primarily by Puritanism and its sequels in contemporary Protestant fundamentalism with its project of Bible-Belt heaven.

Hence, due to the relative or substantive, distinguished from total or formal, absence or weakness of such moderating and countervailing forces like the liberal–secular European-style Enlightenment and the Anglican Church, except for the "old" Episcopal South, American Puritanism could "afford," or had no "choice" other than, to maintain, intensify, and escalate the original Puritan absolute moral rigor, a sort of luxury that its British ancestor could and does not, precisely for opposite reasons. So, virtually nontempered, unencumbered, or "inconvenienced" by such "un-godly" forces, minus Jefferson and Madison et al., US Puritans could and do embark on Winthrop et al.'s *Arabella* (the name of their flotilla of ships) of an oppressive imposition and enforcement of its morality on society, cheerfully, and sanctimoniously, apparently enjoying themselves, often in sadistic forms, and claming their own lion share in perennial Divine Rights and God's Mission. They performed this moralist–authoritarian alchemy both geographically, by moving from New England to the South and the rest of America to be eventually placed in the "shadow of Dixie," and sociologically by intruding and ultimately dominating virtually all social life, including culture and politics, plus economy. This moral oppression was the result of the fact that Puritanism was initially, as in New England, or eventually became, as in the South and elsewhere, more powerful than these non-Puritan social forces, thus basically hegemonic, if not absolutist, during most of US history, up to the 2000s, a sort of collective-religious variation on Acton's rule "absolute power, corrupts absolutely." If not in all America, Puritanism attained more or less "absolute power," first in New England, where the Anglican Church was virtually nonexistent and Quakerism as well as Catholicism, not to mention "ungodly" non-Christian (Indian) religions, banished, and persecuted, and subsequently, though initially slightly tempered by Episcopalism, the South, as the term the fundamentalist "Bible Belt" (Bauman 1997) indicates. Recall, at the time of the American Revolution the Puritans made around three quarters of all

the citizens, as well as their contemporary descendents or proxies like evangelical Protestants have since become and remained the demographically and politically predominant religious affiliation, as illustrated by Southern Baptism, in America, notably the South, by the start of the twenty-first century.

Coercive Imposition of Morality

In light (or regardless) of the historical and contemporary sociological reasons, in particular American Puritanism has typically embraced and even excelled in the original and long-standing Puritan tendency to coercively impose or repressively enforce morality, thus implement moral absolutism, on civil society and polity. In this respect, it has not only emulated but surpassed its "tempered" English progenitor in this contest of excellence; it seems as if the US student or child proved greatly "better" or a "higher achiever" than the British teacher or father.

In particular, this is what Pareto suggests by observing that American Puritanism, through its control of or influence on a conservative government, "tries to enforce morality by law" on typically absolutist, moralist–religious grounds. For example, recall he notes that US Puritan antialcoholics groups and other, in Marx's words, temperance fanatics "are ready to kill a person only to keep him healthy [and] thus show less sense than the inquisition, which buried men in order to save their souls." Pareto effectively predicts Puritan-driven Prohibition in the 1920s–1930s, as well as Southern and other non-alcohol "dry" (Merton 1968:133) states or counties and other antialcoholic or temperance oppressive measures by the perennial conservative "politics of Puritanism" in America ever since (Wagner 1997). Notably, Pareto remarks that, in consequence to such Puritan enforcement of morality by government compulsion, in America "one notes gross abuses [of power] that are not observable in countries where there are no such restrictions." If so, then this suggests, first, that these Puritan practices have adverse consequences for political democracy and civil society in America; second, a kind of American exceptionalism in enforcing "morality by law" primarily, though not only, practiced, reproduced or defended by Puritanism. Generally, Pareto argues that "uses and abuses of power will be the greater, the more extensive the government's interference in private [morality]" and cites American Puritanism as a foremost exemplar and supporting evidence. Yet, evidently US Puritans or their functional equivalents, from New England to the Bible Belt, reject this argument or downplay its observed and predicted authoritarian outcome: recall, ushering in the twenty-first century a neo-Puritan Southern governor attacked the liberal–democratic principle against legislating morality as "one of the great myths of our time."

In theoretical sociological terms, Pareto reinforces and makes more explicit Weber's and Simmel's insights or intimations about Puritan moral–religious authoritarianism. To reiterate, Weber holds that Puritanism or Protestantism as a whole centers on the total "mastery" of the social and natural world by its saints, and other, Western and Eastern world religions, including Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism, on the passive adaptation or mere accommodation to it. So does

Simmel in his quoted remark that the Puritan-Protestant clergy "as a matter of principle is entirely enmeshed in civil life" in contrast to its Catholic counterpart. Weber and Simmel hint or envision that this mastery has metastasized or is likely to metastasize into the authoritarian "master-class" or even master-race of Puritan moral–religious crusaders, viz. what Americans call WASP (Munch 2001), so the "tyranny" of Puritanism. Still, by comparison with his analysis of its contribution and affinity to Western capitalism, Weber downplays or subdues Puritanism's links with moral–social authoritarianism in America, notably what he significantly calls New England theocracy, and elsewhere into the Puritan–capitalist elective affinities. In turn, Pareto emphasizes what is Weber's secondary concern, viz. that Puritanism's moral "tyranny" contains the embryo or recipe for what some analysts call the "apple pie of authoritarianism" (Wagner 1997), including bibliocracy in the South, not just for the "spirit" of capitalism, in historical and contemporary America. This is what Pareto does when observing that the US government tends toward enforcing, typically Puritan-based or religious, morality "by law" and predicting that such coercive practices will commit "gross abuses" of democracy and reproduce "malignant" political power. Also, his diagnosis and prediction imply what Durkheim states explicitly that "moral sensitiveness" will never be awaken through government and law, or, as Tönnies remarks, "dead morality and religion cannot be revived by coercion." Apparently, Puritanism by using precisely coercion for attaining such an aim overlooks or denies that, as Simmel puts it, ethics subjected to societal, including Puritan, constraint is "robbed of its deepest and finest content [for] this is the behavior of the individual soul in and to itself."

In historical terms, Pareto's observations and predictions, as well as those more implicit admonitions of Durkheim Tönnies and Simmel, have subsequently proven almost prescient of American Puritanism, as evidenced by his effective prediction of Prohibition, "dry" counties and similar repressive temperance practices in America. Admittedly, like their ancestors, modern US Puritans or moral–religious fundamentalists are "much more aggressive in imposing their own morality" on both civil society and polity than their ideological equivalents in other Western countries (Lipset 1996:293). As noted, US Puritans are absolutist, particularistic, and oppressive, or more so than others, in that they define their values, norms, and prohibitions in "absolute terms and on an institutional level before they attempt to enforce a generally binding validity for such precepts and prohibitions even though they lack universal grounding" (Munch 2001:239). As expected, they do so in the absolute conviction or self-delusion of their Divinely Ordained mission to save humans from themselves and their "own moral mistakes" (Terchek 1997:9), even if killing, torturing, imprisoning, and otherwise near-sadistically inflicting suffering on them—and sometimes masochistically on themselves a la Cromwell—as a sort of secondary sacrifice or collateral damage made worthwhile by the supreme end of religious sanctification and moral purification. Thus, following their New England forebears, US Puritan–moralistic, just as radical right-wing political, movements are observed to embark on a "struggle against the 'wilderness' [and evil] with a mandate from religious-moral tradition" (Munch 2001:239–240), i.e., theological determinism and moralist absolutism. Predictably, this mandate originates in

Puritanism and its claim that "Providence blesses the 'labours' [industry] that converts the wilderness into the American version of the biblical garden" (Gould 1996:10).

Instances of Moral Authoritarianism

This section probes and documents Puritan moral authoritarianism or repression by presenting and reconsidering some pertinent historical instances. Historically, this Puritan authoritarianism, expressed in oppressive discipline, intolerance of individual moral freedom and imposition of morality, was an extreme facet or radical outcome of the Protestant Reformation's disposition to what Weber describes as a "stronger ethical penetration" of society than in Catholicism and all traditional Christianity. If the Reformation, as Pareto[19] suggests, was caused by or reacted to the perceived fact that the Catholic "theocratic upper classes became skeptical, while the popes were more concerned with terrestrial than with celestial interests," Calvinism and consequently Puritanism was the most radical endeavor within Protestantism to reverse or destroy this skepticism and "terrestrial" concerns via religious–moralist repression. Initially, Calvinism in Europe and subsequently Puritanism in England and America carried and intensified that general tendency to its ultimate limits in the form of moral authoritarianism and oppressive social control, in contrast to original Protestantism or Lutheranism.

Thus, evoking Weber and Pareto, some recent sociological analyses indicate that, unlike Lutheranism as well as Catholicism, only Calvinism and its English-American derivative Puritanism established and sustained "a truly reciprocal penetration of religious ethics and the world" (Munch 1981:731). Specifically, this penetration assumed the form of the "radical elimination of any distinction between an ethics for the priests and an ethics for the laymen" as well as the "tight binding of the individual to the group by its approval," especially in American Puritanism. Evidently, this penetration mixes moral–religious absolutism and authoritarianism with social conformism or uniformity, a mix exemplified or approximated by Winthrop's *mixt aristocracie* in New England and oligarchic ("good old boys") bibliocracy in the South.

In particular, the Puritan "radical elimination" of any distinction between priest and lay ethics simply means that in Puritanism everyone, or at least every Christian, as Weber puts it, "had to be a monk all his life," notably, a "lay monk [who] transforms the world" (Baltzell 1979) according to the principle of total mastery or domination of society and nature, including the "bloody tenet of persecution." Consequently, civil society tends to become, as mentioned, an overarching monastic

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[19] Pareto suggests that the Reformation "began among the rough people of the North where Christian religion sentiment was more alive, while it made few proselytes in refined and skeptical Italy." Also, he likens the Reformation with the French Revolution of 1789 by describing both as religious reactions, with the difference that in the first the "reaction had a Christian form," and in the second that of a "social, patriotic, revolutionary and also anti-Christian religion."

order as an archetypical system of moral authoritarianism, i.e., strict moralist dis-
cipline, repression, and asceticism. Alternatively, such elimination is the extreme
form of destruction or reduction of individual liberty and agency in morality and
private life, unless such a monastic order is considered to be the "oasis" of per-
sonal freedom and its monks exemplars of morally free agents, but even Puritanism
or monastic asceticism hardly ever makes such claims. Second, the Puritan "tight
binding of the individual to the group by its approval" is a crucial (though not sole)
historical source or equivalent of what some observers call "notorious American
conformism" (Baudrillard 1999:92). In this argument, Puritan conformism is also
an indicator or proxy of moral authoritarianism and thus oppressive civil society,
as well as a non- or pseudodemocratic polity, by becoming a "sign of social and
political weakness," including primitivism. Arguably, strict conformity or unifor-
mity renders a Puritan-based society like New England and the South, if not all
America, "close to primitive societies in which it would be absurd to distinguish
oneself morally by disobeying the collective ideal" (Baudrillard 1999:92).

Following Calvinism, Puritanism's intense moralist penetration of civil soci-
ety, including the "radical elimination of any distinction" between priest and lay
morality, was first attempted and in part realized in early England through various
oppressive practices eliminating personal liberty in morality, including bastardy
and adultery laws and censorship. For instance, a study indicates that the "rise of
Puritanism was mainly responsible for the obsession with moral guilt that char-
acterized the early bastardy law" as well as for the "new censorship" in England
during the sixteenth to seventeenth century, as the Puritans (e.g., Presbyterians)
"hyphenated sex with sin" (Pinchbeck 1954:315–316). In particular, the Puritan
"bastardy law" amounted to "brutal legislation" inflicting an "unbearable cru-
elty" that in turn generated infanticide and similar children-abusing practices.
Cromwell's "Holy Commonwealth," via an act by the sanctimonious "Parliament
of Saints," also outlawed adultery as a "capital offense," thus carrying the Puritan
hyphenation of "sex with sin," i.e., the equation of sins with crimes, to its ultimate,
deadly limits.

In retrospect, these English Puritans provided precedents, archetypes, or role
models to be subsequently emulated and even surpassed and reinforced by their
American descendents in New England and all America, notably the South. This
is indicated, for example, by the historical and persisting criminalizing of adultery
to the Draconian point of "capital offense" (early times) in these regions (by the
early twenty-first century dozens of US Southern states still keep such "dumb laws"
in the books), as well as censorship of indecency, not to mention the traditional
and continuing pervasive use of the death penalty for other kinds of sins redefined
crimes (viz. drug offenses), as probably one of the legacies or vestiges of Puritanism
in America. In addition to adultery defined as a mortal sin meriting cruel death, in
some seventeenth century Puritan congregations in England, the "list of offenses
which merited excommunication" at least included crimes "for being overtaken in
beer" and "for dancing and other vanities" (Walzer 1963:64). For example, French
historian Hippolyte Taine, upon visiting Victorian England, was "shocked" by what
he described as the "vestige of former Puritanism" prohibiting the sale of liquor

and operation of taverns on Sunday (Hudson and Coukos 2005:9). These practices anticipate or inspire paleo-Puritan fanatical antialcoholic movements, Prohibition, and "dry" states or counties, plus neo-Puritan or Baptist dance prohibitions, in historical and modern America, from New England under Winthrop et al. to the South ruled by their evangelical equivalents or proxies.

Other similar authoritarian Puritan practices in early England incorporated patriarchal control and strict family discipline, mixed with and paralleled by oppressive work discipline. Thus, in preindustrial England, Puritan households established and emphasized strict patriarchal control, as expressed in the "responsibility of patriarchs for the moral righteousness of their households [and] values which supported work discipline [which explained] the support employers gave churches, chapels and Sunday schools in factory villages" (Abercrombie and Hill 1976). In short, early English Puritans "imposed a rigid discipline upon themselves and their families"[20] (Bremer 1995:23), as did equally or more their American successors. Hence, the Puritan preferred type of household was a rigidly disciplinary patriarchy as a paradigmatic case of, paraphrasing Durkheim, authoritarian-oppressive domestic society or family authoritarianism and oppression. By analogy, the early Puritan type of workplace was also a rigidly disciplinary, authoritarian, and oppressive setting, justified on high, transcendental moral–religious grounds. For instance, early industrial employers in England "adopted Puritanism with an even greater sense of purpose" than did the pre-Protestant bourgeoisie (Zukin 1977:350), i.e., as the instrument of their authoritarian disciplining, control, and oppression of workers. In turn, this authoritarian work setting was to some extent an extension of patriarchal household control, as rigid industrial hierarchy and oppression expanded and intensified domestic patriarchy as well as church control. In particular, "to build up his authority vis-à-vis the worker(s), the small-factory owner adopted a Puritan cultural model. [So] the responsibility for 'moral' discipline was decentralized from the parish priest to the patriarch armed with Geneva slogans about sloth and damnation. It was, of course, the wage-earner, not the capitalist, who was

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[20] Bremer (1995:23–49) comments that the early Puritans in England and America, contrary to conventional wisdom, "participated in lotteries, they drank alcoholic beverages, and they approached sex as more than the means of procreation. What is often dismissed today as 'puritanical' is more appropriately attributable to the Victorians the fallacy of popular conceptions that depict Puritan dress being universally drab and simple." Also, Foerster (1962:5) argues that "our conventional picture of the Puritans as grimly righteous and forbidding is scarcely adequate. They did not spend all their time avoiding pleasure and denying it to others [e.g. smoking tobacco]. The [US] Puritans were anything but 'Prohibitionists' [yet] found pleasure in beer, wine, and their favorite beverage, rum. Drunkenness was very common among all classes [even] often reached scandalous proportions on such occasions as harvestings, funerals, college commencements, and the ordination of ministers. Dancing and card-playing, while generally frowned upon by the godly, had a place in New England even in the 17th century. Fornication if eventually followed by marriage was looked upon, by all classes, as no serious sin or no sin at all." Such somewhat "non-Puritanical" interpretations of Puritanism are comparatively rare and atypical in the literature, if not contradictory (viz. by the common finding of a Puritan "rigid discipline"), revisionist, ex post and perhaps rationalizing (in Freud's sense) or apologetic.

intended to be 'abstinent" and 'work hard' ('early to bed, early to rise')" (Zukin 1977:350). In short, Puritanism thus created or anticipated what contemporary analysts term the "factory of authoritarianism" or authoritarian hierarchy, control, and oppression in work settings, just as patriarchy within the household.

Generally, Puritanism' moral authoritarianism in early England consisted in its efforts to "enforce godly morality" on the English people, as a putative crusade "to enforce the terms of the national covenant" (Gorski 2000:1453). Recall, for example, Cromwell's campaigns in this enforcement were "religious crusades" or "wars against the infidels," committing in the process various massacres and "purifications" of these "ungodly" sinners, including the "Papists" like Irish Catholics, as well as Anglicans and others. Historically, these Puritans wars constituted a sort of Puritan counterpart or equivalent of the Islamic *jihad* defined precisely in these terms, as are, in some views (Turner 2002), their subsequent variations in American Puritanism or Protestant fundamentalism, from New England's theocracy to the South's bibliocracy.

As hinted, American Puritanism in New England and beyond continued and even further escalated these initial practices of moral authoritarianism and oppression by its English ancestor. As Tocqueville, generally sympathetic toward Puritanism, observes, in New England the "zeal for regulation induces [the Puritans] to descend to the most frivolous particulars: thus a law is to be found in the same code which prohibits the use of tobacco [and alcohol]." He remarks that these "fantastic and oppressive" laws reflected the "even more austere and puritanical" customs of the community or civil society. Notably, Tocqueville admonishes that such "errors are no doubt discreditable to human reason" and by implication liberty and democracy in that Puritan penal legislation reflects a "narrow, sectarian spirit" as well as those "religious passions which had been warmed by persecution [in old England] and were still fermenting among the people." He notes that "there was scarcely a sin which was not subject to magisterial censure," invoking punishment by death as being "never more frequently prescribed by statute" than in Puritan New England. For example, he cites the Puritan laws ("ten or twelve enactments") "copied verbatim" from the Bible, punishing adultery and rape, as well as blasphemy and sorcery, with usually cruel death or other harsh punishment.[21] Hence, an apparently Draconian Puritan magistrate assumed the mantle of "God's vice-regent" (Zaret 1989:170). Such a "vice-regent" creates or prefigures the oppressive and intrusive vice police (including the persistent criminalizing and often severe punishment of adultery and prostitution), as another mechanism of institutional reproduction of crime and deviance, in America, especially the Bible Belt. This "magisterial censure" of sins by its virtual totality redefines and epitomizes moral authoritarianism

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[21] Hull (1999:47) cites the case of Abner Kneeland, editor of the *Boston Investigator*, who was in 1834 tried, convicted and imprisoned for "blasphemy by a Massachusetts court because he publicized his lack of belief in prayer, miracles, and Christ." Also, in 1834, only a year after the official "disestablishment" of the Puritan theocracy (the Congregational Church), incredibly but true, Massachusetts' Supreme Court upheld the state's blasphemy law.

or totalitarianism, just as the death penalty does penal primitivism, barbarism, and Draconian cruelty in Puritanism. The implied reason for such practices, notably death and other "cruel, inhuman and degrading" punishment for sins, was that for New England's Puritans "pleasure seemed the devil's snare (Higgs 1998:469), expressing what Tocqueville identifies as a Puritan "narrow, sectarian spirit."

Other historical research confirms and develops Tocqueville's classical insights into early Puritan moral extremism and oppression. Thus, a study finds that New England during the 1690s was replete with the "widespread denunciation" by the other priests and scholars of Puritan "dead-heartedness" that made sin, including witchcraft, or impurity and its severe "purging" the "very fabric" of the society, including the instrument of ruthless colonization and subjugation (Rossel 1970:917–919). Notably, the study suggests that the "psychological impact of increased freedom could only be disturbing to the Puritans," which confirms that Puritanism tends to suppress or fear individual liberty in morality and private life via moral authoritarianism and oppression. Another sociological study indicates that in New, just as old, England, a "coercive, intolerant politics of moral reform lay at the heart of Puritanism, which saw public enforcement of piety and social discipline [as] the way for the elect to honor its God" (Zaret 1989:170).

In retrospect, Tocqueville's and other historical observations suggest that American Puritanism basically and proudly surpassed even its English progenitor in punishing human sin, notably in prescribing capital or other cruel and inhuman punishment for such offenses. In prospect, they are prophetic of the continuing and escalating criminalizing of all kinds of sins and vices by Puritanism, as well as the persistently frequent use of the death penalty by a Puritan-based penal system, in America ushering in the twenty-first century. Thus, insofar as, as Mead (1942:973) suggests, US culture has since Puritan New England "maintained a characteristic swing between extremes [e.g.] in morals between Puritanism and hedonism,"[22] Tocqueville's observations are diagnostic or predictive of the first extreme. Contemporary analysts suggest that a reason for such swings, specifically from Puritanism to its opposite, is that Puritan temperance movements, even when hegemonic, encounter "resistance, particularly from the lower classes" (Wagner 1997:64), as witnessed during Prohibition as paradigmatic of state moral oppression.

In particular, Tocqueville's observation that New England's Puritans descended to the "most frivolous particulars" like codes prohibiting the use of alcohol and tobacco is prophetic of equivalent oppressive practices since. These range from Puritan-inspired national Prohibition in the 1920s–1930s to the "new temperance" wave driven by the "politics of Puritanism," including drastically increasing the legal age for its consumption (from 18 to 21 year) and reestablishing antialcohol "dry" "heavens" in the evangelical South, during the 1980s–2000s (Wagner 1997). At this juncture, Prohibition, sanctified, and enforced as enacting the

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[22] Further, Finney (1927:208) talks about the "swinging pendulums in history—as from Puritanism to Bohemianism and back again."

("intelligent"?) design and commandment of Providence, appears as the supreme Act ("mother") of all Puritanical[23]—i.e., irrational, disturbed extreme, oppressive, and Draconian—acts prohibiting and punishing sins and vices in postrevolutionary America and even all Western society since Tocqueville's time. To paraphrase Voltaire's remark about the existence of God, if Prohibition did not exist, it should perhaps have been invented to demonstrate and exemplify the moral extremism, irrationalism authoritarianism, and oppression of American Puritanism and its variations or proxies. The same can be said of the witch-hunts and other Puritan irrational and repressive practices as favorite pastimes in New England. So, if Taine, for example, was "shocked" by the "vestige of former Puritanism" prohibiting the sale of liquor and operation of taverns on Sunday" in Victorian England, the magnitude of his shock would have been probably greatly amplified if he visited America during its 1920s–1930s Prohibition and even Southern "dry heavens" in the 1980s–2000s. No doubt, both Prohibition and the "dry" South and in extension the Bible Belt constitute vestiges[24] of seventeenth century Puritanism in America during the twentieth and twenty-first century, respectively. And being "shocked" concerns not "prohibiting the sale of liquor and operation of taverns" per se, unless Tocqueville, Weber, Pareto, and other European visitors were personally affected, but rather suppressing, despising, or fearing as "evil" individual freedom, dignity, and responsibility in morality and privacy, an abstract "shock" even for US "temperate" analysts or politicians yet committed to a free civil society and secular democracy.

Recall, US Puritans or their vestiges, for example what Pareto identified as fanatical antialcoholic groups in America, adopted the rule that the "ends justify the means" (Simon 1976:66) in their Prohibition Amendment. The particular end apparently was temperance or moral purity, and the means Tocqueville's "magisterial censure" of the sin or vice of alcohol consumption, not to mention its production

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[23] The *Economist* describes Prohibition as "proof of an abiding fear of alcohol" by US Puritans, and comments that in modern America "Puritan instincts live on: an 18-year-old can vote, marry or die in Iraq, but cannot legally drink a glass of wine [or beer]." Apparently, such repressive neo-Puritan instincts and their neo-conservative legal enforcements are not only exceptional or aberrant within contemporary Western democracies, including Great Britain itself (the 18-year drinking age), but irrational or unreasonable defying elemental human reason and sheer common sense.

[24] That the vestiges of seventeenth century Puritanism extend and persist in America even at the start of the twenty-first century was indicated by an anecdote in the Chronicle of Higher Education (from 2005). As recounted, most US academics, even when in Europe for sabbaticals or conferences, thus not watched by the "Big Brother" of Puritanism, yet seemingly beset by the proverbial Puritan guilt, inculcated via a mix of religious–political coercion and "brain washing," for (committed or intended) sins, drink water with their meals, while their European colleagues casually have wine and other alcoholic beverages. In general, the Puritan-style drinking water at family meals, including festive occasions (e.g., Thanksgiving, Christmas), remains typical for most US households, at least in the South, even four centuries after the first Puritans emigrated from old England, and carried with them their notion of alcohol (and virtually everything human "under the sun") as a sin or vice, to America.

and sale. Yet, as subsequently witnessed, the "particular means used to attain this particular end had many consequences other than the specific end sought" (Simon 1976:66). As known, these consequences, notably escalated government oppression, just as the associated rise of criminal activities, including organized crime, were decidedly destructive of individual moral liberty and a free civil society, as well as of political democracy. The Puritan-driven Prohibition Amendment to the Constitution—using no less than constitutional law to decree what "thou shall not" drink in their own private life—(re)produced not only the mafia and Al Capone, an undemocratic outcome in itself, as a dramatic case of institutional reproduction or multiplication of crime by Puritanism. It also bred, mobilized, or encouraged the peculiar species of extreme militant crusaders for "purity" and against "sin," by enforcing moral absolutism, extremism, and oppression through holy terror, i.e., "morality by law," on all society. Simply, Prohibition was just another reenactment or symptom of Weber's "unexampled tyranny" of Puritanism, albeit the very alcohol ban was not unprecedented in Protestantism or Christianity.

In retrospect, the Prohibition episode suggests the following inferences. First, American neo-Puritanism extended the "magisterial censure" of the sin of alcohol from New (and old) England to America as a whole. Second, it confirmed and exemplified Puritan characteristic Machiavellianism in the sense that, as Pareto puts it, the "ends justify the means." Third, it suffered a dismal failure to attain its own end of temperance or purity, for its means proved extreme, irrational, and oppressive in moral and political terms, as well as generative of organized crime and other social pathologies. As US critics comment, Prohibition

reminds us, the better sorts did not hesitate to employ government coercion to promote their rehabilitation of society (and like in many other cases) shamelessly combined Puritanism, paternalism, and government power. These crusaders labored under no burden of doubt about the rectitude of their own standards of personal behavior or about their right to impose these standards on everybody else at gunpoint Higgs. (1998:471)

In short, as a Puritan creation or vestige in twentieth century America, Prohibition reminds Americans of Puritanism's moral–political extremism, irrationalism, oppression, and thus assault on a free civil society and secular democracy. Thus, even some US conservative economists admit that the "enactment and subsequent repeal of alcohol prohibition provide a highly relevant body of data on possible effects" of the decriminalization of drugs in America (Friedman 1997:194). Merton (1968:133) also suggests that "it would be peculiar to argue that prior to 1920 [Prohibition] the provision of liquor constituted an economic good, that from 1920 to 1933 [not] and that from 1934 to the present [does] once again." For example, in his view, "it would be economically (not morally) absurd to suggest that the sale of bootlegged liquor in the dry state of Kansas is less a response to a market demand that the sale of publicly manufactured liquor in the neighboring wet state of Missouri" (Merton 1968:133).

Yet, the repeal or dismal failure of Prohibition, like other Puritan witch-hunts, understood as an allegory for moral repression and persecution, does not seem to have appreciably deterred, discouraged, or demoralized modern Puritans from

embarking on or endorsing such undertakings. As noted, this is demonstrated *inter alia* by their reestablishment of "dry" states or counties in the US South and mid-West (viz. Merton's example of Kansas) and other "new temperance" measures (Wagner1997), as a part and parcel of their overarching project for bibliocracy in this region and America as a whole. It remains to be seen whether these practices will also have the same eventual destiny as Prohibition. But, it is evident that contemporary American Puritanism or Protestant sectarianism refuses to learn from the past, including that of its paleo-ancestors in England and America, specifically the ultimate failure or adverse consequences for freedom and democracy of the Puritan and other enforcing of "morality by law," from witch-hunts to alcohol Prohibition. Simply, it keeps refusing to take "No" as an answer to the question of whether, to paraphrase Durkheim, legislating or coercively imposing peculiar Puritan morality on society as a whole can awaken humans' "moral awareness" (e.g., Bible-Belt governors).

At any rate, it is to be seen if American Puritanism is condemned, if Marx is right, to repeat its own history by forgetting or ignoring it, with ever-increasing "collateral damage" inflicted on civil society and human freedom, dignity, and life (e.g., capital punishment) itself. Both Prohibition and its sequels in the evangelical South, like its precedents in New England, reaffirm that American Puritanism not only adopted and continued, but even escalated and intensified the original practices of moral absolutism, extremism, and oppression by its English parent. Further, alcohol Prohibition or the "dry" Southern "heaven" can be taken as metaphor or designation of the Puritan blueprint for an all-encompassing prohibition or totalitarian "dryness," i.e., dullness, austerity, regimentation, in civil society and human life. It means or designates what Weber a monastic-like social order in which "everyone will be a monk all his life" or an open prison where anyone is a potential prisoner and criminal by being sinner to be punished, including often executed, for sinful and "ungodly" or "un-American" ideas and activities. Thus, Prohibition may be formally the "dead hand of the past," but substantively this design is a persistently "living reality" and perhaps the impending future for America, at least the South, in the form of Weberian neo-Puritan bibliocracy, thus a déjà vu reenactment and ultimate revenge of New England's officially disestablished in the 1830s paleo-Puritan Biblical Commonwealth. If this happens, as recent trends to a neo-Puritan Bible Belt indicate, American Puritanism will be credited with a remarkable realization of the historical dictum that, in Marx's words, "history repeats itself as a farce," or a reversal of "history never repeats itself."

In sum, Tocqueville's diagnosis of the Puritan "narrow, sectarian spirit" anticipates what Weber calls Protestant sectarianism or fundamentalism, specifically evangelicalism (Wuthnow 1998) in the sense of an idea, reality, or outcome of the "Bible Commonwealth." Puritan-based or Protestant sectarianism has been a persistently powerful, even predominant (Lipset 1996) force in America's subsequent history, especially following the Great Awakenings and the Revolution, and increasingly so over recent times, notably in the South during the 1980s–2000s, as witnessed by the Bible Belt as an essentially sectarian or fundamentalist project and reality. In short, Tocqueville, Pareto, Weber, and others diagnose and

predict Puritan religious extremism and authoritarianism, as the sacred basis and theological sanctification of its moral–political forms.

Religious Authoritarianism

Puritanism also constitutes a doctrine and system of religious authoritarianism or totalitarianism. This type of Puritan authoritarianism is specifically manifest in religious intolerance, theological radicalism, and fundamentalism, theocracy, and related dimensions, considered next.

Religious Intolerance

A special dimension or effect of Puritan authoritarianism, absolutism, and extremism in religion is religious and cultural intolerance, mixed with and amplified by some others, as seen below. In retrospect, Comte among the first social theorists diagnoses or intimates this dimension by observing that in Puritanism (and all Protestantism) the right to free inquiry is "restrained within the limits" of Protestant–Christian theology and that its dogma of free inquiry was a "mere sanction of the pre-existing state" in most Christian nations. He implies that such restraining of free inquiry within the limits of Protestant theology is an actual or potential source of religious–theological and other cultural intolerance, notably of religions, theologies, and cultures outside of these narrow limits or hostility and suspicion toward out-groups and their values and institutions.

What Comte implies Simmel makes more explicit and clear in observing that Puritanism and Protestantism as a whole often shows "much greater" dogmatic and consequently religious and other cultural intolerance than does even intolerant Catholicism. Notably, he suggests that, in Durkheim's terms, an "external index" of its religious intolerance (like social solidarity) is that Protestantism, including Puritanism, has no "any real heretics"[25] in contrast to Catholicism with its Inquisition which, as Merton (1968:83) remarks, "drove a wedge into society after society." Simmel suggests that this lack of "real heretics" particularly holds of Puritanism or Calvinism in virtue of its being the illiberal or "orthodox," as distinguished from Lutheranism as the "liberal," branch of Protestantism, insofar as theological or ideological orthodoxy or dogmatic rigidity systematically tends to prevent or suppress heresy, though with varying degrees of success, as shown in medieval Catholicism. And if it does not lack them in the broad sense, Puritanism continues to condemn and punish its own version of heretics, dissenters, or renegades for

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[25] Simmel remarks that in the "confessional controversies" between Lutherans and Puritans (the Reformed Church) during the seventeenth century Protestantism "split into parties which frequently said of on another that one could more easily make peace with the Popists than" between themselves.

what Durkheim[26] describes as their "freedom and independence of thought" as systematically and severely as did Catholicism in the Dark Middle Ages through the Inquisition. Weber and Tawney may add that, in spite or because of having no "real heretics," Puritanism in early England and America "almost amounted to an inquisition" hostile to and destructive of the "liberation of individual powers" and had an "inquisitorial discipline."

One possible way to reconcile Comte-Simmel's with Weber-Tawney's observations is to treat the Puritan functional substitute or proxy for the medieval Inquisition as a mechanism of prevention, ex ante suppression and cooptation effectively, but not completely preventing, uprooting or coopting "real heretics," and its Catholic original form as (also) one of reaction to and ex post repression of theological dissent. In short, Puritanism's solution to heresy or dissent is a sort of "preemptive" or, in Spencer's word, offensive war—seemingly providing a model for US conservatism in its permanent wars on the "evil" world—and the Catholic a "war of defense," a Weberian ideal–typical distinction with many variations and shades in history and reality. And, if heretics in Puritanism are, as Comte and Simmel suggest, prevented from rising, preemptively suppressed or coopted ("bribed"), the Puritan functional equivalent of the Inquisition is less open and visible, i.e., more hypocritical, in existence and operation than the Catholic original, as Weber and Tawney imply. In sum, so long as, as Mises states, during medieval times "both paganism and heresies were eradicated with fire and sword," then this holds true primarily of late-medieval Puritanism, as indicated by its eradication of "real heretics," or more so than of, as commonly assumed, Catholicism, where these at least continued to persist.

Notably, Weber observes that religious toleration and so pluralism "was least strong" in those societies "dominated by Puritanism" like "Puritan old or New England," thus confirming and extending Comte-Simmel's diagnosis of Puritan greater theological–dogmatic intolerance. Also strikingly, otherwise sympathetic to Puritanism, Tocqueville anticipates Weber in regard to New England observing that the Puritan legislator in the new world, "entirely forgetting the great principles of religious toleration that he had himself demanded in Europe, makes attendance on divine service compulsory, and goes so far as to visit with severe punishment, and even with death, Christians who chose to worship God according to a ritual differing from his own." He cites the New England's Puritan law "Whosoever shall worship any other God than the Lord shall surely be put to death" as well as "ten or twelve enactments of the same kind, copied verbatim" from the Bible punishing blasphemy with death, alongside sorcery, adultery and rape. In turn, Weber remarks that generally Puritanism decrees that the reprobate-doomed must belong to the "true" Church and subjected to its control and discipline, "not in order thus to attain salvation, that is impossible, but because, for the glory of God, they too must

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[26] Thus, Durkheim observe that "liberal philosophy has had as its precursors heretics of all kinds whom the secular arm rightly punished [for their freedom and independence of thought] throughout the Middle Ages and has continued to do so up to the present day," including by implication Puritanism or post-Catholicism.

be forced to obey His commandments." In short, the Puritan–Calvinist doctrine commanded that the "glory of God required the Church to bring the damned under the law [and order]."[27] This in reality meant bringing non-Puritans or religious dissenters under government persecution, punishment, and execution, e.g., the "Papists" and Anglicans under Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints" in Great Britain following the Puritan Revolution, the Native Americans, Quakers and "witches" under Winthrop et al.'s *mixt aritocracie* in New England, "un-American" groups and activities under McCarthyism and its own witch-hunts, and "liberals" under theocratic evangelicalism in the US Bible Belt. Through such practices, Puritanism denied or overlooked that, as Mises (1957:339) admonishes, "nothing could be less compatible with true religion than the ruthless persecution of dissenters and the horrors of religious crusades and wars."[28] At least, Puritanism tried to establish in post-medieval New England its own "novel" anti-Catholic substitute of what Mises calls Catholic "religious uniformity in Europe of the Middle Ages."

Weber's and even Tocqueville's are, especially for most US evangelical Protestants, dubious and surprising observations. One may object that, first, even Puritan New England was always characterized by religious toleration and particularly pluralism, and second, even if that was not the case, tolerant and pluralistic religion was established or rapidly expanded in the rest of the country, including the South, with the Great Awakenings. Weber and Tocqueville would easily dispose of the first objection by citing the pervasive Puritan persecution, execution, and in part extermination of other religious groups, both non-Christian and Christian, non-Protestant and Protestant, most egregiously of the native Americans and Quakers, in New England. For example, they would cite the 1635 Puritan banishment of Roger Williams from Massachusetts for espousing "religious toleration" (Hull 1999:45). The most they could concede is that New England had a degree of formal religious pluralism or rationality in the sense of transitory and contingent coexistence of different competing religions and congregations, but not a substantive one in the form or sense of consistent and systemic institutional toleration of these differences by a dominant Puritanism. Thus, the Americans Indians, Quakers, Catholics, and others temporarily and contingently coexisted alongside the ruling Puritans, thus within a formally or fortuitously (Zaret 1989) pluralist religious environment, but were persistently and systematically persecuted, exterminated, discriminated against or otherwise not tolerated by these latter, so experienced it as a substantively nonpluralist setting, which is a kind of understatement given its inhumane and murderous character.

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[27] Weber adds that sometimes, as in the case of Cromwell's Independent movement of the seventeenth century, the "genuine Calvinist doctrine that the glory of God required the Church to bring the damned under the law, was outweighed by the conviction that it was an insult to God if an unreborn soul should be admitted to His house," resulting in the formation of Puritan sects exemplified by the "Calvinistic Baptists."

[28] Mises (1957:339) adds that "no historian ever denied that very little of the spirit of Christ was to be found in the churches of the 16th century which were criticized by the theologians of the Reformation and in those of the 18th century which the philosophers of the Enlightenment attacked."

Also, Weber and Tocqueville would readily dispose of the second objection by invoking the historical fact that the Great Awakenings were essentially attempts to generalize Puritanism and its evangelicalism, consequently its religious intolerance and low substantive pluralism, from New England to all America, notably the old non-Puritan South. Specifically, through the first Great Awakening Puritanism attempted and via the second and the American Revolution nearly fully succeeded to displace a previously dominant Anglicanism in the South (e.g., Virginia) by its various congregations like Congregational, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist in a historical sequence. It thus sought to substitute one form ("native") of monism or hegemony for another ("foreign"), rather than create religious pluralism and tolerance—except for itself only or mostly. Simply, the primary objective or the eventual outcome of the Great Awakenings was not greater religious tolerance, pluralism, or competition in Weber's substantive terms, as usually supposed. It was rather to make America, including but not limited to the South, a replica, mirror, extension, or intensification of Puritan New England as described, transiently and fortuitously tolerant and formally pluralist, yet enduringly and systematically intolerant and substantively nonpluralist, just as the neo-Puritan revival of the 1990s–2000s seeks and even succeeds to place the entire country in the evangelical and authoritarian "shadow of Dixie" (Cochran 2001).

Hence, once become politically and culturally, plus demographically, dominant, neo-Puritan, or Protestant fundamentalist groups, especially Baptists, in the South and beyond have hardly proved less intolerant of religious differences and sin, and more conducive or supportive of substantive pluralism in religion and culture than their New England ancestors. In Weber's terms, the Great Awakenings' basic story or lesson is that, first, these Puritan groups demanded and sanctimoniously advocated religious tolerance and pluralism solely or primarily in regions *not* already "dominated by Puritanism" like the Anglican South, thus virtually for themselves alone or mostly. Second, once hegemonic they immediately or gradually reverted to the "good old" ways of religious intolerance and monism in those states dominated by Puritanism. Simply, for Puritanism religious tolerance, pluralism, and competition, like democracy and liberty overall, are valuable or cherished "American values" only so long as they efficiently establish, sustain, and assure its historical predominance (Lipset 1996) in civil society and polity, thus functioning as sorts of Machiavellian strategies and instruments. And conversely: if not, they are condemned and eradicated as "evil," as witnessed by the Puritan-evangelical and conservative vehement hostility and suspicion toward multiculturalism or cultural tolerance and diversity as a value in itself to be eradicated via culture wars (re)establishing homogeneity and "unity" as "paradise lost" or the "golden past."

In other words, while in what Comte calls opposition, Simmel protest, or minority, and Weber weakness, Puritanism has preached "compulsive agitation" for religious tolerance and pluralism, as well as democracy and "liberty and justice for all," for the sake of its own survival and legitimacy. Yet when being in government and cultural domination or, as Weber suggests, a position of strength, it has practiced "violent repression" of these same values and institutions, thus endangering

the survival of and denying legitimacy to other "ungodly" an "impure" groups and "infidels." In short, Comte suggests that the Puritan opposition or protest tends to "become a dogma" when in power, implicitly citing the attack by Puritanism and Protestantism overall on Catholicism and its subsequent dominance in Northern Europe, England, and America. Some contemporary analysts support Comte observing that "Luther and Calvin were as dogmatic and intolerant as the Catholic Church had been. Pluralism itself made religious liberty possible rather than anything intended by the Catholic Church or Luther or Calvin" (Dombrowski 2001:4). A historical archetype, model, or inspiration for Puritanism in this sense is perhaps the moment "when Calvin wanted to kill Servetus" in an apparent attempt at denigrating religious and other liberty (Dombrowski 2001:4) to others once it has become powerful enough to do so.

In retrospect, in addition to the Great Awakenings, the preceding is also the essential trajectory of the temporarily victorious Puritan Revolution in England. As documented, this revolution moved from an agitation for religious tolerance and pluralism in facing a dominant Anglicanism to a "violent repression" of non-Puritans, including the Irish Catholics and other "Papists" as well as even Anglicans or Protestants, e.g., under Cromwell's repressive rule. This also holds true, as the above indicates, of the English Puritans' emigration to and colonization and governance of New England. This was in essence a remarkable journey from righteously decrying and fleeing their persecution by the ruling Anglican Church and the Crown to creating, once become such a ruling power, their own occasionally even harsher forms and methods of persecuting, exterminating, or excluding "ungodly" and "impure" peoples and religions, from the native Americans to Quakers and other non-Puritans.

Recall, sympathetic Tocqueville observes that in New England the Puritan legislator, "entirely forgetting the great principles of religious toleration that he had himself demanded in Europe" practiced extreme intolerance to the point of making church attendance "compulsory" to the point of punishing with death "Christians who chose to worship God according to a ritual differing from his own," not to mention non-Christians like the native Indians. No wonder, even some admirers of American Puritanism concede that "despite their unpleasant experiences in England, the Puritans were willing to leave the establishment and protection of the state religion to the civil authorities" (Bremer 1995:92)—i.e., to establish and protect theocracy characterized by religious intolerance, monism, and oppression. If the English Puritans emigrated to America for religious reasons in general, particularly the "enjoyment of liberty of conscience" (Gould 1996:30), then they eventually eliminated or denied this very freedom to others through their intolerance and oppression, including persecution, execution, and systematic extermination, of non-Puritans (Quakers) and non-Christians (Indians). Evidently, these observations confirm and illustrate Puritanism's essential Machiavellianism expressed in a path from demanding tolerance, pluralism and freedom in religion and politics for itself as the strategic means to attain religious–political dominance, notably oppressive theocratic rule, to denying these same liberties to other religious groups

once attaining this cardinal aim, especially Puritan theocracy however called. If so, then like the old English Puritans a la Cromwell et al., New England's Puritan religious intolerance, monism, and oppression dramatically confirm Comte's admonition and prediction that Puritanism is not "suited" or "unfit" for democratic governance and a free civil society.

Hence, Weber's following proposition holds true primarily, but not solely in view of radical Islam, of Puritanism and its generalized form, Protestant sectarianism or evangelicalism—i.e., that the "pure sect" must for its own survival advocate and demand "tolerance," "freedom of conscience," "pluralism," and "separation of church and state" when facing an official hegemonic religion and other sects, yet condemning, attacking, and suppressing these very values while being itself dominant or sufficiently powerful. That was precisely what the early English Puritans sanctimoniously preached and demanded against the official Anglican Church and the Crown, and their American successors opposing hegemonic Episcopalism, plus Catholicism, in the "old" colonial South, and yet practiced the exact opposite when each became itself dominant or strong enough, transiently in Great Britain through Cromwell's "Holy Commonwealth" and almost permanently in New England from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century and the Southern Bible Belt following the Great Awakenings, especially the second, up to the twenty-first century. In particular, they sociologically, and not only geographically by means of their flotillas of ships (*Arabella*), moved from the sanctimonious and compassionate preaching freedom of conscience against the ruling Anglican Church and the Crown while in Great Britain and opposition or protest and weakness against these sacred-secular powers to becoming nonsanctimoniously and noncompassionately "merciless" to religious and other liberty (Tawney 1962:238) in New England and an official totalitarian–theocratic power within the "Bible Commonwealth" they founded and perpetuated for at least two centuries.

In general, that was the essential sociological movement or historical trajectory of sanctimonious and "compassionate" Puritanism and religious Protestant and other conservatism overall—righteously and compassionately disposed toward *itself* and while politically weak or culturally irrelevant, merciless to others and when in power and culture wars. This is what Weber implies and even prophetically predicts by observing that "if they are strong enough, neither the Catholic nor the (old) Lutheran Church and, all the more so, the Calvinist and Baptist old church recognize freedom of conscience for *others*." In particular, Weber's observation has proven both diagnostic and prophetic for Southern Baptism as the then and ever-since predominant neo-Puritan or evangelical church or rather sect in the South (Boles 1999) and even America as a whole put under the regime and "shadow of Dixie" (Cochran 2001) via a sort of Clausewitz's like culture war (or crusade) as a continuation, escalation or metastasis of politics by "other [violent] means."

In prospect, the tendency for English and American Puritans to sanctimoniously preach and demand religious tolerance, compassion, and pluralism only in civil societies and polities *not* already "dominated by Puritanism," and conversely,

prefigures, if not inspires, that of fascist and other totalitarian groups toward de-
manding democracy and liberty, including freedom of religion, speech, and assem-
bly, solely while in opposition, protest, or weakness, and to destroy or pervert them
when conquering government, becoming "powers that be" or just "strong enough."
In this sense at least, Puritanism functions or looks as proto-fascism (as implied
in Fromm 1941; Merton 1939, a sort of fascism before modern fascism itself,
and Puritans as the first fascists preaching and demanding freedom and democ-
racy while being in opposition, protest, minority, or weakness, then destroying,
suppressing, or perverting these same values and institutions when in positions of
power, institutionalized legitimacy, majority, or sheer strength.

In turn, Weber links low religious tolerance in "Puritan old or New England," no-
tably theocracy in the second region, to what he identifies as the English-American
Puritans "ethical mistrust" of foreign religions, cultures, and peoples, including
foreign businessmen or capitalists; cynics may add, "so much for the spirit of
capitalism" associated with Puritanism or Calvinism. Weber's observation is soci-
ologically relevant in three respects. First, it dispels or casts doubt on the cherished
myth of superior American original and historical religious pluralism, competi-
tion, and tolerance, invidiously distinguished from supposed European monism,
church monopoly, and intolerance in this regard. Second, it attributes to some
extent Puritan intolerance in religion and culture to ethnocentrism, religious na-
tionalism (Friedland 2002), nativism, or Americanism in Puritanism, as discussed.
Third, it is predictive or prophetic in that it suggests the prediction that so long
as strong American ethnocentrism, nationalism, or Americanism persists, Puritan
or Protestant–sectarian intolerance will continue, though in forms different from
those in "old or New England" pervade by fanatical anti-Catholicism, and con-
sequently religious pluralism will be low or decrease in Weberian substantive,
though not formal, terms. In Merton's words, the Puritan "religio- and ethno-
centric pattern," expressed in American nativism or antiforeign, including initially
anti-Catholic, sentiment, generates, and predicts low degree of religious tolerance
and substantive pluralism in historical and modern America, notably the South and
other ("red-neck") regions ruled by neo-Puritan evangelicalism, viz. Mencken's
"Methodist-Baptist barbarism."

Weber's and Tocqueville's observation about the lack of or low religious tol-
eration, pluralism, and liberty in Puritanism has been confirmed by subsequent
historical studies. Thus, Tawney (1962:213) finds that in societies it ruled like
Great Britain transiently and New England enduringly, Puritanism "would have
been scandalized" by religious tolerance and pluralism, as well as economic in-
dividualism, and consequently established or defended little "unrestricted" lib-
erty in the "things of the spirit" or culture just as in "matters of business," but
imposed a "godly discipline" as the very Puritan "ark." Further, echoing Weber
and Tocqueville, some modern analysts identify what they denote as the mostly
Puritan-based "sadistic intolerance to cultural otherness widespread in America,"
most egregiously in the evangelical South *cum* a Bible Belt (Bauman 2000:106).
In particular, this analysis cites sexual mores as being "exploited as one of the
more important footholds" for intolerant attitudes, activities, and institutions by

Puritanism or modern evangelicalism[29] (Bauman 2000:106), in conjunction with

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[29] For instance, to demonstrate that Weber's "unexampled tyranny" of Puritanism is not yet, as he puts it, *caput mortuum* in the [new] world," the neo-Puritan, i.e., extremely religious–conservative, Texas legislature during the early 2000s criminalized sexual consensual relationships in schools (between teachers and students) by a predictably "tough" (if not, in retrospect, "dumb") law. The law not only puritanically condemns these relationships between consenting adults (e.g., 18 year and plus old students) as "moral turpitude" as the ground for teacher dismissal, but harshly punishes them by imprisoning (up to 20 years) teachers on seemingly compelling grounds of their possession and exercise of power over their students. Further, to send the message "don't mess with Texas," this neo-Puritan state actually sentenced and imprisoned a number of high-school teachers for having consensual relationships with students (including 18-year olds, yet denied the capacity of consent despite being older than the 17-year legal consenting age on grounds of teacher "power"). These grounds or justifications for such "tough" laws criminalizing even consent between adults would have been compelling if the neo-Puritan or evangelical Bible Belt and America as a whole was not virtually alone within the Western world enacting such evidently Puritan-inspired laws, and if they did not historically reenact or perpetuate well-known proto-Puritan practices, notably witch-trials (the death penalty for adultery and even premarital sex) in old and New England, for example. To that extent, these laws make America or at least the Bible Belt what some observers describe as the "only remaining primitive" (Baudrillard 1999) Western society. So, to better understand such "tough" and seemingly "dumb" or peculiar laws in modern America presupposes placing them in comparative-historical perspective, viz. the fundamentalist Bible Belt in a succession from New England's Puritan "Biblical Commonwealth" via the Great Awakenings; otherwise, they seem as incomprehensible as proto-Puritan "witch-hunts" did to non-Puritans (or the Enlightenment). In fact, these neo-conservative "tough-on-crime" laws and policies in the Bible Belt and beyond are in a sense reenactments, vestiges or functional substitutes of Puritan witch-hunts (and their variations in McCarthyism), apparently sharing the proto-Puritan belief in the existence of "witches" (Satan) exemplified in "sinful," "evil," "ungodly," and so "un-American" groups and activities, and hence the inferred necessity or even prudence of their exorcism through crusades like culture and military wars. And, judging by the above and similar instances, Bible-Belt laws incorporate into these "un-American" groups teachers and intellectuals overall condemned and punished as liberals (and for US neo-Puritan conservatism virtually nothing is, as Reagan et al. put it a la McCarthy, "un-American" than liberalism). Simply, within the Western world, only American Puritanism or religious conservatism could pass and enforce such "tough" and consequently "dumb" laws, since too harsh or Draconian crime control is as a rule ultimately irrational (Akerlof 2002), unenlightened (Rutherford 1994), or, as Durkheim implies, anachronistic in modern societies and times at the start of the twenty-first century. That is what essentially Pareto implies and even prophetically predicts by diagnosing the Puritan US government's penchant to enforce "morality by law" and its resulting "gross abuses" of power that "are not observable in countries where there are no such restrictions," thus as something exceptional or pathological within Western societies. Beyond Western societies, American Puritan-based religious conservatism is only rivaled in respect of its seemingly favorite pastime of passing and enforcing "tough-dumb" laws by radical Islam in Muslim theocracies like Iran and Saudi Arabia. In this connection, the neo-Puritan or evangelical Bible Belt, from Virginia to Texas, meets again Islamic Iran, as both belong to the proto-totalitarian solutions to the "evil" of individual liberty (Bauman 1997), notably the freedom of moral choice between "virtue" and "vice" (Van Dyke 1995), and engage in a jihad (or crusade) against "sin" and "sinners" condemned and punished as crime and criminals, just as non-American and non-Islamic "infidels" (Turner 2002). In general, these seemingly trivial (or "dumb") Texas and similar Bible-Belt laws manifest "Methodism" in the "madness" (Smith 2000) of Puritan moral-culture (and military) wars,

the intolerance to nonbelievers or atheists and agnostics condemned, excluded, and eventually attacked as nothing being more "un-American," as well as other out-groups in religious, cultural, and racial terms (Edgell et al. 2006). The above confirms that Puritan religious nontoleration tends, first, to escalate into general cultural intolerance and hostility toward pluralism or diversity in culture; second, to generate and theologically ground intolerant attitudes, practices, and institutions vis-a-vis moral freedom and privacy; and third, to harbor certain sadistic tendencies or outcomes. Notably, it suggests that moral–cultural intolerance, including neoconservatism' assault on or fear and condemnation of culture diversity or multiculturalism as "un-American" or "foreign," in America, especially in the parochial, anticosmopolitan, fundamentalist, and xenophobic South, is primarily, though not only, the act or effect of Puritanism and its revivals or proxies in modern Protestant

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i.e., a pattern or system of authoritarian repression and control, rather than being incidental, extremist deviations, or random. In particular, they reveal the following. First, Puritanism and its "unexampled tyranny" far from being a "dead man walking" is "well and alive" and even "resurrected from the dead" with vengeance, through evangelical religious and political neo-conservatism, as some US conservatives note and celebrate (Dunn and Woodard 1996). Second, the Southern Bible Belt is essentially a neo-Puritan revival of New England's proto-Puritan theocracy qua a "Biblical Commonwealth," in particular evangelical culture wars via "tough-dumb" laws and practices criminalizing "sin" (e.g., consensual sexual relationships) are replays or vestiges of Puritan witch-trials. Third, Bible-Belt neo-Puritanism tends to be as destructive of human liberty, dignity, and life (sadistic) and so eventually self-destructive (masochistic) as New England proto-Puritanism (for example, if the Texas Law criminalizing the consensual relationships and so marriage between teachers and adult students were to be applied, by some perverse "method in the madness," retroactively, then most marriages between them would be dissolved, not to mention preventing their occurrence in the future, and the first imprisoned, a nihilistic outcome of the conservative crusade for "family values"). Fourth, like original Puritanism, Bible-Belt neo-Puritanism is a kind of "Christian" functional counterpart, rival or proxy for Islam on the account of their shared the proto-totalitarian destruction of moral and other individual freedom (Bauman 1997). Fifth, Bible-Belt neo-Puritanism continues and even escalates and intensifies original Puritanism's antagonism to what Weber calls sensuous culture, including secular education, science, academic freedom, and intellectuals like scientists, artists, and teachers, condemned as "ungodly" and so "un-American" activities and groups a la McCarthyism, though this hostility is predictably sanctified as moral "purity," "faith," "tough-on-crime," and the like. Lastly, Bible-Belt and other US neo-Puritanism redesigns and evidently, via their "tough-dumb" laws and practices achieve its "intelligent design" of, America as the brave new world of renewed Puritan tyranny and Orwellian or fascist-like totalitarian control, often described as Southern "friendly fascism." This is a world where the supposedly "small" neo-Puritan or neo-conservative government functions as Orwell's Big-Brother, Bentham's Panopticon or a policing state (Bourdieu 1998) not just "watching" what humans do but issuing via "tough" laws what are claimed to be Divinely-ordained commandments of what "thou shall or shall not do" in their moral relationships through imposing, in Pareto's prophetic diagnosis, "morality by law" and punishing any, as Keynes would put it, "deviation into impiety" by a Draconian penal system defined by mass imprisonment and even death for sins and vices (e.g., alcohol and drug use, sexuality). Alternatively, when it comes to promoting human well-being (e.g., welfare, health), dignity, freedom, and life, this "big" or "tough" government suddenly becomes really "small" or "soft" and even the smallest or "softest" within contemporary Western societies, thus perpetuating Puritanism's antiegalitarianism, antiliberalism, and antihumanism, including its historical hostility toward charity, poor, moral liberty, and privacy.

fundamentalism represented in the "evangelist churches of the Bible Belt" (Bauman 1997:184). As regards the latter, recall fundamentalist US Protestants in the South and beyond admittedly "stand in the tradition of the Puritans" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:95).

Further, even some contemporary Puritan admirers explicitly or implicitly admit of Puritan moral–religious intolerance, rigidity, and imposition of conformity. Thus, according to a study, admittedly, while acting as revolutionaries and non-conformists in Great Britain, in New England, including Massachusetts, Puritans "bristled at any suggestion of nonconformity to their rigid and angular conceptions" (Foerster 1962:4). As an exemplar of religious intolerance, it is admitted that Quakers "were banished and, if they returned, executed" (Foerster 1962:5) by New England Puritans, as were *a fortiori* the native Americans. Another study also concedes that early Puritanism and Protestantism overall "did not immediately lead to a state of toleration and liberty" in religion and civil society, but produced many instances of Puritan or Protestant "intolerance and bigotry," citing the burning of Servetus by the Calvinists (Means 1966:377).

Still another, otherwise sympathetic study, also admits of Puritan religious intolerance and bigotry by pointing to the "use of government power in safeguarding the faith" by US Puritans in New England and beyond (Bremer 1995:91). Admittedly, these Puritans "believed that there was one true faith, one true way to worship according to God's wishes, and that it was possible to determine what that path of truth was [so] they felt it to be the duty of the magistrates to punish open expressions of heresy" (Bremer 1995:91–92). Notably, it is implicitly admitted that, first, such a system constituted theocracy in the sense of a fusion of church and state power, and second, that its punishment of heresy and other sins was a Puritan equivalent of the "Papist" Inquisition. The first is implicit in the observation that "like the church, the state had a responsibility to uphold the true religion lest the public heretic prove to be a threat to the stability and purity of the commonwealth," i.e., to establish or maintain a theocracy, with the result that "there was no toleration for those who publicly dissented from the New England Way." The second is implied in the observation that the US Puritans "were not exceptional in this—all European governments believed in their responsibility to do likewise," including the medieval Inquisition plus what Weber identifies as Calvinist "state churches" in the postreformation Europe. Curiously, these Puritan tendencies make American Puritanism déjà vu and self-deny its supposed exceptionalism in the sense of its historical novelty, originality, and superiority in terms of religious tolerance, competition, pluralism, and freedom, as claimed and celebrated by Puritans and their sequels or admirers like evangelical Protestants, as well as neoconservatives (Lipset 1996), in America. In particular, the study concedes the Puritans "did not come to America to espouse or establish religious liberty," as usually alleged by their descendents and assumed by most Americans, thus contradicting the "naïve assumptions" of Puritanism and freedom. Rather, it indicates that their primary goal "was to be free to institute and practice what they believed to be the one true faith," conceding that the "only freedom for others" was a sort of euthanasia and at most self-exclusion or, as US Puritans put it, "have free Liberty to keep away from us" (Bremer 1995:92).

The preceding thus admits that, first, the prime mover of the Puritans' emigration to and colonization of America was in essence instituting and practicing not religious freedom, as in conventional wisdom of the cherished myth of Puritanism, but theocracy, specifically Weber's "strictest bibliocracy," expressing and implementing the "true faith," notably the Bible. Second, it concedes that their kind of "freedom for others" was evidently unfreedom, including oppression, persecution, and extermination or "free" exclusion and self-exclusion of other religious groups. As known, US Puritans applied their freedom formula of keeping away liberty "from us" to Quakers and in part early Baptists as their eventual descendents, as to the native Indians, via their persecution or cleansing ("free to leave us alone") and, if these groups dared to practice the concept of religious pluralism by returning to the Puritan states, severe punishment, including execution. Admittedly, the Puritan "freedom for others," i.e., harshness toward nonbelievers and religious intolerance, involved or resulted in the "execution of Quakers" and others, as well as the imprisonment of early Baptists in New England[30] (Bremer1995:154).

Historically, in some views, the Dutch exiles from England, prior and subsequent to the abortive Puritan Revolution, were the first Puritans extolling religious freedom, pluralism and tolerance, yet "this view was the exception" (Sprunger 1982:460) within Puritanism as a whole. Thus, the orthodox or "true" English and American Puritans condemned and attacked religious pluralism and freedom, including the multiplicity of churches and sects within Puritanism itself, as a "catastrophe" rather than a liberal virtue (Sprunger 1982:460). This indicates that Puritanism feared or opposed religious tolerance, pluralism, and freedom even *within* itself, let alone beyond, viz. Protestantism, Christianity and religion overall. It was exemplified by Puritans' persecution of their supposed Calvinist "brothers in arms" Quakers as well as the "Papists," Anglicans and native Indians, in Great Britain (excluding the last group) and New England alike. Consequently, religious and other "liberty" in early American Puritanism, was seen by non-Puritans or liberals during much of US history as in the nineteenth century as "anachronistic" (Gould 1996:46). Now, a likely major reason why those Dutch Puritans were the exception to the Puritan rule in this regard was that they were in exile, opposition, protest, minority, or weakness and consequently, as Comte predicts, engaged in a "compulsive agitation" for religious freedom, compassion, and tolerance for

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[30] Bremer (1995:154) remarks that "if some Puritan leaders were harsh toward nonbelievers, they were no more tolerant of what they saw as their own failings [so] the Puritans' intolerance was in part at least a symptom of their own collective and personal self-doubt," as shown in the execution of Quakers and the imprisonment of Baptists. This apparently involves a bona fide effort to explain and in part rationalize such intolerant and oppressive Puritan practices by self-intolerance and self-doubt. However, such an explanation or rationalization can have the perverse implication that the external aggression or apparent sadism of these Puritans is explained and even justified by their internal aggression or masochism. The above observation thus implicitly admits of a degree of sado-masochism in Puritanism, but whether its masochism explains or even rationalizes its sadism, including the execution of Quakers and the extermination of the native Indians, is another, probably irresolvable, issue.

themselves or at most "for all Christians," which usually meant "all Protestants," excluding non-Christians and even Catholics stigmatized as the "Papists." Alternatively, if they were in home, government, majority, or sufficiently strong, they would have likely committed, as both Comte and Weber predict, "violent repression" for *others* of this very "absolute religious freedom" that Puritans had requested for them and extolled while in opposition, protest, minority, or weakness. They actually did whenever becoming religiously and politically dominant or just, in Weber's words, strong enough. Historical cases abound, ranging from Cromwell's murderous crusade (Gorski 2001) against or brutal oppression of "non-Christians," both Catholics and Anglicans, or "infidels" in Great Britain to the Puritan Pilgrims' extermination of native Indians and persecution of Quakers in New England to oppressive practices and institutions (e.g., "dumb laws") targeting a myriad of "ungodly" and "liberal," non-evangelical and secular groups by neo-Puritan fundamentalists via culture wars and "tough on crime" policies in the South, heralded by the Great Awakenings and perhaps again climaxing during the early twenty-first century.

This is in essence what a sociological study suggests by finding that when Puritanism established religious–political dominance, temporarily in Great Britain and permanently in New England, in contrast to the elect or saints, for "the great majority of *reprobates*, there was coercive discipline enforced by church and state, and God's *restraining* grace" (Zaret 1989:170). Simply, this is Puritanism's magic formula of "absolute religious freedom" for Puritan rulers a la Winthrop or Cromwell *cum* the "Lord Protector of the Realm" with self-assigned Divine Rights, and yet intolerance, restraint, and theocratic oppression and persecution for others. Reportedly, Puritanism differentiated sacred and secular realms, including church and state, solely when *not* being in political power and only to direct to and attain its "religious ends of politics: enforcing a holy commonwealth" in which, as early Puritans put it, "there may be no toleration of any other religion." Such an intolerant "holy commonwealth" in reality constituted or resulted in a Puritan theocracy, more precisely Weber's "strictest bibliocracy," as epitomized in early New England and later the evangelical South qua a Bible Belt. In Weber's terms, Puritan bibliocracy eradicated or blurred any substantive (albeit not necessarily formal) differentiation between religion and politics, though Puritans self-righteously preached and vehemently demanded such a separation of sacred and secular powers when *not* in power, as in Anglican England and the old Episcopal US South prior to the Great Awakenings.

The above suggests another Puritan variation on Comte's theme. While in opposition or weakness Puritanism embarks on the path of a "compulsive agitation" or compassionate sermon for a differentiation between religion and politics via the separation of church and state, and against non-Puritan religious monopoly or theocracy. Yet, while being in political power or attaining sufficient strength Puritanism commits "violent repression" or blurring of the same process and reestablishes its own merciless monopolistic or theocratic order, typically strict bibliocracy. In particular, this is basic sociological description or historical lesson of such early English Puritans as Winthrop's et al. embarking on *Arabella* to reach

the New World, where, as a sort of Divine miracle, they miraculously "forgot" and denied to others the very religious liberty, compassion, and tolerance they had so sanctimoniously demanded for themselves in the Old. So is it *ceteris paribus* of the Great Awakenings in America, notably the South, with the Puritan evangelicals descending from the North, once politically and demographically conquering and making this region a Bible Belt, also miraculously "forgetting" and denying to other groups, up to the early twenty-first century, what they had compassionately requested for their Southern brothers from the non-Puritan powers such as Anglicanism and Catholicism before. Hence, American Puritanism, from Winthrop's et al. to Southern evangelicals, while in political power and/or cultural strength eradicates or blurs the substantive differentiation between religious and secular life, "sacred and profane activities and objects" (Tiryakian 1975:18), including religion–church and politics–state, which implies a "remarkable blurring" of private and public domains (Jepperson 2002:70).

Apparently, the "naive assumptions" of Puritanism and freedom, including the formal separation of church and state, are "seduced" by the Puritan oppositional agitation or protestation for religious and other liberty, tolerance, and compassion "for all Christians." They overlook or downplay Puritanism's in-government repression, intolerance, and mercilessness of *also* "all Christians," let alone non-Christians, except for the self-proclaimed elect with Divine Rights to master and oppress the world, from Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints" and Winthrop's "Pilgrim Fathers" to "Bible Belt" God-chosen crusaders or missionaries. Hence, at the heart of Puritanism when in control of government and civil society was, as a sociological study finds, a "coercive, intolerant politics" of moral–religious reform through oppressive "public enforcement" of both piety and social discipline as the way for the Puritan elect to honor their God (Zaret 1989:170). Also, this study suggests that Puritanism's irrationalism and antihumanism is the underlying source of this politics in that the Puritan stress on the supposed corruption of human reason leads to religious–political "intolerance and radicalism" (Zaret 1989:173). Briefly, Puritan irrationalism and antihumanism, manifested in attacking human reason and the rationalist Enlightenment overall, helps explain Puritanism's moral–religious authoritarianism. Also, recall Comte's detection of irrational nationalist and other social exclusiveness in English Puritanism, as one of the sources of its scientific authoritarianism manifested in "anti-scientific tendencies."

In sum, Puritanism, owing to its sectarianism, irrationalism, antihumanism, and similar attributes or outcomes, has historically belonged and continues to do so, via its sequels or proxies in sectarian Protestantism, to those religious groups "prone to greater intolerance" in contrast to Quakers and other ecumenical religions as "notable exemplars of tolerance" (Brint 2001:17–18). This seems a variation or expression of the difference between Puritanism or Calvinism as, in Simmel' and Tawney's words, originally and persistently an orthodox, illiberal, iron, or "hotter" sort of Protestantism, and its "liberal" or "soft" sorts, Lutheranism, Anglicanism, or Quakerism. In retrospect, this difference helps explain, and for Puritans rationalize, their persecution and killing of the "Papists" like Irish Catholics and Anglicans in Britain and of Quakers, plus the native Indians, in New England, as well as

subsequent Protestant-sectarian actions against other more tolerant, moderate, or ecumenical religious groups like Episcopalians, Catholics, etc. in the South and beyond, during and after the Great Awakenings up to the 1980s–2000s. At this juncture, the supreme commandment of Puritanism, from Cromwell's crusades and New England's theocracy to the fundamentalist Bible Belt, boils down to those seeking and promoting religious tolerance, compassion, and pluralism "need not apply" in Puritan "heaven" either in a theological (Lemert 1999) or sociological sense of a theocratic dystopia. Apparently, this represents an anticipation and ramification, plus a metaphor, of the mistreatment by Puritanism or Protestant sectarianism of Irish Catholics and other "Papists" such as Italians in America's history, driven and rationalized, as Merton (1939) suggests, by anti-Catholic and other antiforeign sentiments.

Religious Radicalism and Fundamentalism

Another related dimension or outcome of Puritan authoritarianism is religious radicalism and fundamentalism. In essence, Puritanism originated as and has continued to be to the present a radical and fundamentalist religion and theology within Protestantism. Recall, Comte describes Puritanism or Protestantism as the "first general phase" of radical or revolutionary philosophy and Weber cites the "uncompromising radicalism" of early English Puritans, as of their Calvinist equivalents in Europe, viz. Baptists' "strictest bibliocracy." Evoking both, Tawney (1962: 204) explicitly defines Puritanism as "religious radicalism" or extremism and authoritarianism, albeit both radical and conservative religions and ideologies can be "extreme" and "authoritarian."

Moreover, even otherwise laudatory and celebratory Parsons (1966: 79–80) identifies Puritan religious radicalism and authoritarianism by recognizing that the "forcible repression" of religious liberty is "inherent in the very nature" of Puritanism and Protestantism as a whole, while in Catholicism being "simply a consequence of its modern disorganization." Notably, he comments that such coercion "could not but manifest itself as soon as" Puritanism or Protestantism "had the power" to conduct it. This again confirms Comte's diagnosis and expectation of Puritanism's "unfitness" for democratic governance and a free civil society due to its penchant for "violent repression," as well as Weber's about its denying religious freedom to *others* when it is "strong enough."

As historical cases in point, Parsons cites both "primitive" Protestantism, viz. the "despotic spirit of Lutheranism," and subsequent "more advanced" Calvinist-Puritan sects "from the moment power passed into their hands for however a short time." Reminiscent of Weber and even Conte, he thus suggests that, first, religious–political authoritarianism or despotism is inherent to initial Protestantism in the form of Lutheranism; second, derivative Calvinism and Puritanism adopted and further intensified this original attribute; third, Calvinists-Puritans sought to attain secular power by reestablishing a repressive social system, and as soon as they attained it, they did accomplish this goal apparently (and rationally) wasting no time. (Curiously, by "however a short time" Parsons implies that in doing so Puritans

effectively defined time, not only as, in Franklin's words, "money," but also, even perhaps more substantially, as authoritarian power or "forcible repression" of religious and other liberty.) In particular, by "more advanced" Calvinist–Puritan sects Parsons likely means those in early Geneva and old and New England, respectively, and by the "forcible repression" of religious liberty "from the moment power passed into their hands for however a short time," for example, Cromwell's oppressive "Holy Commonwealth" and Winthrop's theocratic *aristocracie*, just as Calvin et al.'s oppression in Switzerland and Germany. Evoking Comte, Weber, and Simmel, he implicitly attributes the Puritan–Protestant inherently "forcible repression" of religious liberty to that, just as Lutheranism and Calvinism, Puritanism was, despite "functional differentiation and specialization" as its rational component of supposed significance for Weberian capitalism, as "hostile to mental liberty [and progress] as Catholicism" (Parsons 1966: 80). If so, then Puritan religious radicalism or authoritarianism is a special case or derivative of its cultural extremism and despotism, as well as irrationalism.

In Puritanism, religious–cultural radicalism is typically interwoven with, and so almost undistinguishable from, theological fundamentalism or orthodoxy in the form of evangelicalism to form a radical-fundamentalist synthesis. Recall, Simmel describes Puritanism or Calvinism as the orthodox and hence by implication fundamentalist or evangelical branch of Protestantism in contrast to Lutheranism as the liberal or moderate. Also, recollect, Weber essentially conceives Puritanism, notably its American version establishing the "theocracy of New England," in the sense of "radical" Calvinism. While Puritan radicalism is typically (mixed with) theological fundamentalism or orthodoxy, specifically evangelicalism or (paraphrasing Weber) bibliocratic going back to the Biblical foundations, conversely is not necessarily true. Thus, fundamentalist or orthodox Puritans tend to be radical, revolutionary, or heterodox when being in opposition, protest, minority, or weak, yet stridently conservative, reactionary, or orthodox while in power, institutions, majority, or sufficient strength. To reflect this conservative–reactionary dimension, "radical" is understood in the sense of or substituted with "extreme" in "radical-fundamentalist," since strident conservatism or orthodoxy can, like radicalism or nihilist heterodoxy, also be seen as forms and degrees of "extremism." For instance, when Tawney and others define Puritanism as religious radicalism they probably mean both "radical" in the strict sense or revolutionary and heterodox when it lacks political power and "conservative," "reactionary," or "orthodox" while dominant, i.e., "extremism." They alternatively depict Puritanism as religious radicalism and rigid conservatism or fundamentalism to indicate its Janus-faced character, a Machiavellian duality historically prefiguring or shared with non- or less-religious totalitarianism like fascism, specifically German Nazism.

For illustration, while defining Puritanism as religious radicalism, Tawney notes that the "first characteristic" of its formulation in early English Puritan writer Baxter is "conservatism." Generally, rigid religious and political conservatism was characteristic of most early English Puritan writers (Ashton 1965:582). Also, like England during the seventeenth century and later on, in America stringent religious conservatism "was especially prevalent in the colonial period among the Puritans,"

just as successive and contemporary conservative or fundamentalist Protestants[31] reportedly stand in the Puritan radical tradition (Dunn and Woodard 1996:94–95). In respect with extreme conservatism, Tawney might equally describe American Puritanism or fundamentalist Protestantism overall as religious radicalism *qua* extremism. In sum, the answer to the question of whether Puritanism is religious radicalism–nihilism or rigid conservatism–fundamentalism is *both*, depending on specific social and historical conditions, viz. outside of or in political power, insufficient or sufficiently strength, thus "extremism." Simply, Puritanism is extreme because it is extremely conservative or reactionary when in power or strong enough, extremely radical, or nihilistic while not "in." Puritan religious radicalism is fundamentalist or orthodox in Simmel's sense, yet its fundamentalism (evangelicalism) or orthodoxy is typically radical, thus forming an extremist synthesis. This synthesis is precisely suggested in Simmel–Weber's designation of Puritanism as both orthodox Protestantism and radical Calvinism respectively.

In retrospect, Comte among the first social theorists identifies and emphasizes Puritan or general Protestant religious fundamentalism, notably evangelicalism, by noting that Puritans and other Protestants "longed to restore the early Christian times" or Biblical origins. He suggests that Puritanism, even Protestantism as a whole, constitutes religious primitivism, restorationism and Biblicism (Coffey 1998). However, since at this juncture Comte does not seem to distinguish Puritanism from other Protestantism, their possible differences in terms of fundamentalism or orthodoxy are not specified or sufficiently highlighted. This is what instead Simmel does by distinguishing Puritanism and Lutheranism as the orthodox–fundamentalist and liberal–moderate branches of Protestantism, respectively. Also, Weber identifies Puritan evangelicalism noting Puritanism's disposition to take the lives of the first Christians as the model, so to create a "strict bibliocracy," thus suggesting that its fundamentalism originally aims at and ultimately results in Christian theocracy, though the term is not used by most Puritans. If this is correct, theological fundamentalism or doctrinaire orthodoxy in the sense of a typically coercive "return to cultural roots" (Turner 2002:113–114) engenders and predicts theocracy in Puritanism, more specifically evangelicalism or Biblicism predicts bibliocracy, and conversely, with some rare exceptions.[32]

That Puritanism is religious fundamentalism or theological orthodoxy, specifically Biblicism or evangelicalism, holds true of both English and especially American Puritans. This is indicated by Cromwell's transient "Holy Commonwealth" in the seventeenth century and particularly Winthrope et al's long-lived "Biblical Commonwealth" or "Christian Sparta" in New England during the seventeenth to nineteenth century as well as the "Bible Belt" in the US South and beyond

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[31] Extreme conservatives can be and are often denoted as "radicals" or "revolutionaries," as indicated by the radicalism of US neo-conservatism, viz. the Reaganite and other neo-conservative (counter) "revolutions" during the 1980s–2000s.

[32] Conceivably, a theocracy may be nonfundamentalist, heterodox, or forward-looking, just as fundamentalist, orthodox, or backward-looking, but the first has been rare, or rarer than the second, in reality.

following the Great Awakenings and extending into the twenty-first century. In brief, Anglo-American Puritans' sole "authority was the Bible. Everything goes back to Scripture" (Sprunger 1982:458). Admittedly, it was Biblical fundamentalism manifested in "one's willingness to believe in and to practice the teachings of the Bible as understood in common versions of the original translations which caused the Puritans to embark on a journey to the New World in the first place" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:73). Such willingness to realize typically through coercion and oppression these teaching thus helps explain and, for its adherents sanctify, Puritanism's original and persisting theocratic projects or outcomes in America, notably bibliocracies in colonial-revolutionary New England (the "Biblical Commonwealth") and the ante and postbellum South (the "Bible Belt").

In general, Puritanism virtually everywhere and almost always reveals "radical Protestant impulses of biblicism, primitivism, and restorationism" (Coffey 1998:982–983), particularly what Marx[33] calls "old cries" of restoration, thus a sort of backwardness in social and political terms. More precisely, Biblicism self-defines Puritan evangelicalism or theological orthodoxy, and in conjunction with primitivism and restorationism its fundamentalism or reactionary religious conservatism that tries "to roll back the wheel of history." In turn, its Biblicism, primitivism, and restorationism are radical, extreme, and nihlistic in that Puritanism aims at restoring the original Christian times or Biblical roots through, as Comte predicts, violent oppression and destruction of "ungodly" and "impure" institutions, powers, and values, thus theocratic social and political authoritarianism. This amplifies and illustrates the Puritan peculiar synthesis of reactionary religious conservatism, orthodoxy, or fundamentalism (when in power or strong enough) with radicalism, heterodoxy, or nihilism (when not), making it simply "extremism." In particular, Puritan and other Protestant fundamentalism, as a return to supposed cultural roots, involves "literalism towards (biblical) texts and typically an antagonism towards [baroque] decoration [and] promotes personal asceticism against both mysticism and consumerist hedonism" (Turner 2002:113–114). Hence, primitive restorationism and backwardness overall, in particular a holy mix of Biblical "inerrancy" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997), hostility toward art and other, in Weber's words, sensuous culture, and extreme worldly asceticism, define Puritan (and other Protestant) fundamentalism, notably evangelicalism, especially in America.

For example, like during most of its history, in contemporary America "bourgeois urban Americans often distance themselves from the semi-rural Bible Belt" by pointing to the cultural backwardness of Puritan and other religious fundamentalism, viz. its "superstition," "delusion," "enthusiasm," and "bigotry" (Gould 1996:179). A recent case in point is the distancing of the liberal–secular ("blue")

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[33] Marx comments, in reference to prerevolutionary feudal France and Europe, that "even in the domain of literature, the old cries of the restoration period had become impossible." Like Comte, Marx apparently overlooks that Puritanism, just as other religious, including Catholic, and social conservatism, regards and attempts the restoration of the feudal or earlier theocratic order as far from "impossible," but rather a real possibility and eventual result sanctified as "heaven."

coastal states from the conservative–fundamentalist ("red-neck") variants in the Bible Belt and elsewhere (e.g., the Midwest) prior to and after the elections during the 2000s. This indicates a sort of inter-regional culture war, especially a latent religious conflict between neo-Puritanism or evangelicalism and its more moderate or secular rivals. In historical terms, this distancing of urban and liberal–secular America from the semirural and conservative–theocratic Bible Belt supports describing the Great Awakenings as the extension and intensification of Puritanism and its dominance from New England to the country as a whole, notably the South thereby transformed from an Episcopal to a neo-Puritan or evangelical, Presbyterian-Baptist-Methodist region. In particular, it confirms that the second Great Awakening was basically a fundamentalist–nationalist project of making the previously non-Puritan South, as the detested remnant and symbol of the British empire and its "foreign" Anglican Church, the newly Puritan-evangelical "Bible Belt," thus generalizing New England's "Biblical Commonwealth." No wonder, in America the concept of religious fundamentalism was reinvented and pursued during the 1920s by Bible-Belt "evangelical zealots, who were fighting secular humanism in all its forms (including Darwinian theories), to describe themselves" (Archer 2001:275).

Generally, observations suggest that US Puritan moralist groups "in terms of religious fundamentalism demonstrates that open access to policy-making and in this sense democracy is in itself no safeguard against the intrusion of moral absolutism in the exercising of individual rights [which] needs a strong legal system devoted to the safeguarding of individual rights as a counterbalance in order to avoid aberrations into moral absolutism" (Munch 2001:242). These observations confirms that such movements continued and intensified in the form of a sort of permanent neo-Puritan revolution of fundamentalism, notably evangelicalism or Biblicism and bibliocracy in the US South, and that is why this region is called with either pride (Boles 1999) or regret and concern (Bauman 2001) the fundamentalist "Bible Belt." In sum, this indicates American Puritanism's curious synthesis of radicalism or nihilism against Anglicanism and other non-Puritan religions, plus secularism and liberalism, and reactionary conservatism or fundamentalism in regard to early Christian times, so extremism in a double form and sense.

Theocracy: The Ideal and System of Church-State

The preceding introduces another, probably the most consummate dimension or outcome of Puritanism's religious authoritarianism: theocracy. Theocratic tendencies and outcomes are generated and predicted by Puritan radicalism, fundamentalism, and other attributes, including religious intolerance, oppression, and wars. Theocratic ideas, dispositions, and effects are manifest in the ideal, institution, and practice of Church-State and constitute the most extreme form or the highest point of Puritan religious and social authoritarianism. The original, primary and perennial "intelligent design" of Puritanism and other fundamentalist Protestantism is some kind or degree of theocracy, even when not so called, predictably what Weber

describes as strict bibliocracy. So, after many roundabout roads, implications and intimations in various contexts, it is now the time to directly enter Puritan theocracy or bibliocracy as the total, supreme, sacred, or ultimate subtype Puritanism's religious–social authoritarianism or totalitarianism.

In Arendt's (1951) terms, theocracy, or bibliocracy is simply a species or syndrome of Puritan political–social totalitarianism. When some writers (Stivers 1994) describe American Puritanism as the "most totalitarian" type of Protestantism or Calvinism, they do so primarily on the account of its theocracy or bibliocracy, as originally established in New England in the form of a "Biblical Commonwealth" and subsequently attempted, via the Great Awakenings and other perennial Puritan revivals, to generalize to all America, most successfully to the old South (to be) transformed into a "Bible Belt." Comparatively, be it, in Sorokin's division, pure as in Great Britain's (Cromwell's) and New England's (Winthrop's) bibliocracy, or diluted as in the South's Bible Belt, original or derivative, hardcore or soft, Puritan theocracy constitutes the religious archetype and functional substitute for political or secular totalitarianism like fascism, notably Nazism, which makes Puritanism a fascist prototype, as argued later.

Puritan Theocracy in the Past, Present, and Future

Historically, the Puritan theocratic ideal and reality has been in a sense the "best kept secret" for, by, and of Puritans typically reserving, especially when not in political power or strongly enough, the term "theocracy" for their adversaries or predecessors within Protestantism (Anglicanism, Lutheranism) and Christianity as a whole (Catholicism or "Papists"), just as for other religions (especially Islam), while refusing with self-righteous indignation to use it as a description of their own religious ideas, practices, and institutions. For example, early English Puritans, while being in minority, opposition, position of weakness, or protest against the established religious–political powers, vehemently condemned, and attacked the "theocracy" or "persecution" by the Anglican Church, plus the Vatican and its "Papists," and the "oppression" by the Monarchy, as a putative rationale for their subsequent, temporarily successful, and eventually abortive revolution. Yet, they refused to adopt "theocracy," "persecution," and "oppression" to describe their postrevolutionary, victorious repressive "Holy Commonwealth," including Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints" and crusades against and mass murders of the "infidels," including the Irish Catholics and other "Papists," Anglicans and various other supposed "enemies of God."

The same pattern can be, as expected, observed among the early US Puritans. They thus vehemently condemned and attacked (and ultimately left) the Anglican Church and Monarchy as "theocracy," "persecution," and "oppression," but their functionally equivalent practices in New England, including Winthrop's "Biblical Commonwealth" and its persecuting and murdering the native Indians and Quakers, were supposedly the exact opposite and even God-decreed projects. Also, their Southern descendents or proxies, while being in minority, opposition, or simply weak, behaved in the same sanctimonious and nihilistic fashion toward the official

Episcopal Church in the South, but they refused, and still do, to acknowledge their own equally theocratic projects or oppressive practices of a "Bible Belt" as theocracy and oppression when in majority, power, or sufficiently strong, as in the wake of the second Great Awakening, from the 1800s up to the twenty-first century. Simply, Puritans have historically refused, and continue to do so, to see and say that the Puritan "emperor has no cloths" of free religion, society, and democracy, but instead of theocracy as a religious species of authoritarianism or totalitarianism functionally equivalent of fascism.

By contrast, the Puritan ideal and reality of theocracy *cum* bibliocracy has been the "worst kept secret" for non-Puritans, including the other, less "hotter sorts" of Protestants like Anglicans, Lutherans, and Quakers, as well as most social analysts. Comte is among the first social thinkers to discover and say that the Puritan "emperor has no cloths" of a free religious and civil society, just as democracy, but rather of theocracy or sacred social–political totalitarianism. Thus, he rediscovers what his precursors in the French and English Enlightenment or liberalism (e.g., Voltaire, Locke, Hume) have prediscovered or suspected (Zaret 1989). This is that Puritanism or Protestantism overall, since its genesis has showed what he calls "injurious enthusiasm for the Hebrew theocracy" from the old Testament and "dreamed about [its] restoration." If so, then this reaffirms that in Puritanism and other evangelical Protestantism, fundamentalism, manifest in this Puritan dream of restoration, generates and predicts theocracy, specifically bibliocracy. Also, Comte finds that Puritanism reproduced the "old Greek [Spartan] notion of a kind of metaphysical theocracy under the form, in Protestant minds, of a reign of Saints." This suggests that Puritan primitivism reached even farther back in time than the early Christian times to form the ideal of a "Christian Sparta," as more or less fulfilled by the early English Puritans through Cromwell's commonwealth of "Saints," and more completely by their American descendents via Winthrop et al.'s equivalent theocratic creations in New England and the South. Hence, the above makes Puritan theocracy, and to that extent Puritanism, a sort of historical déjà vu or passé in the sense of reenacting and reviving what Mannheim calls the dead past of both Judeo-Christian and other religious primeval history. Alternatively, what looks new or original in Puritanism in this respect is that it only reinforces and expands the old and long-standing theocratic ideas, practices, and institutions of its predecessors within Christianity and other world religions, for or if Puritan theocracy was simply more intense, total, and extreme than any or most others in history. If so, the supposed novelty or originality of Puritan theocracy compared with other, Christian or non-Christian, theocracies has been and remains a secondary difference in "degrees of un-freedom" or religious oppression rather than of substance, contrary to especially American Puritanism's claims to superior-freedom "exceptionalism."

This secondary difference is particularly manifest when situating Puritan theocracy in the context of Christianity, specifically if compared with other prior or contemporaneous Christian, including Catholic, theocracies. In particular, Puritanism only reproduced, though with a further intensity and extension reaching a proto-totalitarian point, what Comte would call the ancient Christian, notably Catholic-medieval, ideal of a "metaphysical theocracy" in the self-righteous face,

in Puritan minds, of a total religious and political "reign of Saints." Christian medieval theocracy has become perpetuated as a sort of déjà vu, i.e., reenacted, reinforced and expanded, in Puritanism, despite its other religious–theological differences from prior Christianity, including Catholicism.

Other prominent sociologists also diagnose or predict the Puritan project, practice, and institution of theocracy. Notably, Tocqueville observes that Puritanism in both old and New England "was almost as much a political theory as a religious doctrine" and consequently involved an effort to integrate and reconcile politics and religion ultimately through establishing theocracy or the integration of state and church power. In Puritan terms, the theocratic design and creation of a holy commonwealth, based on the total "reign of Saints," is rooted in and by Puritans justified by this dual, religious–political character of Puritanism. In modern political terms, this character helps explain and rationalize Puritans' substantive, though not necessarily formal, opposition to or blurring (Tiryakian 1975) of the differentiation between religion and politics, including the separation of church and state, and their open or tacit endorsing of the integration or association between the two as the defining mark of theocracy. Tocqueville's observation yields the prediction or expectation that so long as Puritanism continues and claims to be "as much a political theory as a religious doctrine," it will tend to establishing theocracy as a practical realization of its theoretical-doctrinaire duality or "cocktail" of politics and religion. At this point, Puritan theocracy is simply the result of blending Calvinist theology with authoritarian political theory. Alternatively, this suggests that Calvinist theology, including the dogma of predestination and the God-assigned calling, is a necessary but perhaps not a sufficient condition of theocracy, while its blend with authoritarian political theory providing such sufficiency.

Overall, theology, including even dogmatic orthodoxy, in itself may not be a sufficient condition for theocracy and so social authoritarianism so long as it remains confined to "spiritual matters" and the other-world, but avoids, withdraws from or merely adapts to the social world, including politics, as in the case of mysticism, monasticism and other-worldly asceticism in pre-Protestant Christianity, including medieval Catholicism, and other traditional religions. To use Weber's dichotomy, theology, or religion is insufficient for theocracy insofar as it only aims at "passive adaptation" or "mere accommodation" to the social world, including politics and civil society, as observed or assumed for traditional Christianity and Oriental religions, but sufficient if it seeks its total "mastery," as actually or presumably done by Protestantism, most notably Calvinism. If so, then in order to attain such "mastery" of the world, including both polity and civil society, Calvinism or Puritanism attempts to fuse and reconcile its theology or metaphysic with politics or secular power, thus creating a kind of "metaphysical theocracy." In this sense, Puritan-Calvinist theocracy is a totalitarian and extreme form of the total mastery of the social world, i.e., civil society and polity, by Protestantism. Weber's premise of societal mastery helps explain and predict the mix of religious doctrine with political theory identified by Tocqueville and hence its implementation via theocracies in Puritanism, albeit not those in other supposedly adaptation or accommodation

religions, including the Christian Orthodox Church, Catholicism, and Islam.[34] In Puritanism, social mastery, with its masters–saints a la Cromwell and Winthrop qua the "Lord Protector of the Realm," causes and predicts theocracy, so an unfree society and authoritarian polity, though Catholic or other "adaptation," with its passive mystics or monks, does not necessarily rule it out, as medieval and later history shows. At any rate, the Puritan ideal and system of theocracy can be better understood by considering Tocqueville's description of Puritanism as "as much a political theory as a religious doctrine." In particular, this mixture of theology and politics helps explain and justify, in Puritan minds, the total "reign of Saints" in all social life, including civil society and polity, as well as economy.

Specifying and echoing Tocqueville, Weber identifies and emphasizes Puritan theocratic ideas, institutions and outcomes observing that for Puritanism all "social life shall be organized according to [God's] commandments," to be revealed and enforced by its "religious virtuosi." This is just another way for Puritans to say that both civil society and polity ("thou") shall be organized in accordance with institutional theocracy embodied by sanctimonious saints and their total reign. As cases in point, Weber cites Calvinistic theocracies or "State Churches" in Europe and America, notably what he calls the Puritan "theocracy of New England." Resulting from societal organization according to Divine commandments, state churches thus define Calvinist theocracy in Europe and their Puritan derivatives or

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[34] One way out of this Weberian conundrum is to simply relax, if not abandon, his dichotomy between religions of "passive adaptation" or "mere accommodation" to the world (or spiritual-monastic asceticism generally) and those of active "mastery of the world" (or worldly asceticism overall). One can instead propose that most great religious systems attempt in different ways and degrees such mastery and control (i.e., more or less feature worldly asceticism), thus constitute and create theocracies (just as also they to some extent variously try adaptation or accommodation and so stop short of theocracy). Alternatively, the incidence and salience of theocracy or its proxies in virtually all world religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, indicate or exemplify this near-universal and perennial, varying in means/degrees, religious mastery, or control of society (i.e., some extent of worldly asceticism in general). In short, the pervasive reality of theocracy as an extreme attempt at total social domination or involvement dissolves Weber's distinction between "adaptation" and "mastery" religions (and even spiritual and worldly asceticism). To be sure, Weber's dichotomy is a characteristic ideal-typical typology, with those methodological advantages he attributes to ideal types, but these virtues are counterbalanced, if not outweighed, by its apparent inability to help account for the historical fact of theocracies, including bibliocracies, other than Calvinist-Puritan ones. Thus, if it were valid, no theocracies would have existed in Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism as well as Islam, Hinduism, Judaism and Confucianism as religions defined by "adaptation" or "accommodation" to the world, but they evidently did and do exist. Primarily, Weber's concept of "mastery of the world" helps explain and predict Calvinist-Puritan pure or diluted theocracies; secondarily, its extension or relaxation in the above sense does so of their counterparts in "adaptation" or "accommodation" religions. Simply, to say that medieval Catholicism "adapted" or contemporary radical Islam "accommodates" to the external social world in the specific form of theocracy obviously makes no substantive sense, as the latter was or is their creation, thus expressing in a sense the Catholic or Islamic attempted "mastery" of this world, akin (though perhaps not identical) to that of Calvinism and other Protestantism.

extensions in England and America. Recall, Weber observes that Calvinist-Puritan theocracies practiced the "ecclesiastical supervision of the life of the individual," another implied definition of theocracy, which "almost amounted to an inquisition" and consequently obstructed and suppressed the "liberation of individual powers."

As indicated, Weber identifies and characterizes Puritan theocracy as bibliocracy defined "in the sense of taking the life of the first generations of Christians as a model" or simply the "Biblical way of life," particularly "a life modeled directly on that of the Apostles." In a sense, this is also an implicit definition of fundamentalism, specifically evangelicalism or Biblicism, in Puritanism, which confirms the fundamentalist–theocratic link or synthesis. Weber emphasizes what he calls the "strict bibliocracy" of the early Calvinists and Puritans in Europe and America, resting on the "moral precepts of the Old Testament," which reaffirms that Puritan theocracy is founded in and predicted and sanctified by religious fundamentalism, specifically Biblicism. He cites early Puritans like the "first Baptist communities" as creating or resulting in the "strictest bibliocracy" in the above sense, thus expressing or implementing their Biblical fundamentalism, joined with "a strict avoidance of the world, in the sense of all not strictly necessary intercourse with worldly people." For example, he remarks that the first Swiss and German Baptists, as Calvinist emanations following the "path prepared by the Calvinistic ethic," conceived the "Biblical way of life" with such radicalism to make a "sharp break with all the enjoyment of life, a life modeled directly on that of the Apostles." In particular, he invokes early Baptist leaders as being "ruthlessly radical in their rejection of worldliness." Overall, Weber infers that "impulsive enjoyment of life, which leads away both from work in a calling and from religion, was as such the enemy" of Puritanism as a sort of hyperrational—and so irrational (Elster 1989)—asceticism.

These observations invite more consideration because they are pertinent and topical in light of the subsequent historical development and contemporary salience, even predominance (Lipset 1996) of the neo-Puritan or evangelical–sectarian ideal, system, or outcome of bibliocracy in America. Moreover, they are in a sense prescient or prophetic of neo- or post-Puritan Baptism expanding from Calvinist Europe (Switzerland, Germany) to England and especially America to become increasingly powerful and even predominant in the South since the Great Awakenings up to the early twenty-first century. Strikingly, they predict the Southern "Bible Belt" as the essential project, creation, or outcome of American Baptism, though in a holy alliance with other Puritan forms or revivals, including at some points like the Great Awakenings first Presbyterianism and later Methodism. In this sense, the postcolonial and contemporary "Bible Belt" of Southern Baptism is in essence a transplant and reenactment of the first Baptist communities' "strictest bibliocracy" in Europe, so déjà vu, a moment that typically nationalist–militant Baptists and other evangelicals (Friedland 2002) deny or overlook in their standard claims to novelty and American exceptionalism. In retrospect, this indicates that early or proto-Puritan Baptism was not only an applied radical or strict Calvinism, albeit theologically simplified or less dogmatic, viz. minus what Weber calls the

basic Calvinist dogma or doctrine of predestination[35] and, as he puts it, "not as a Church, but as a sect,";ecall his remark about Baptists' strict morality followed in practice the "path prepared by the Calvinistic ethic." Baptism also displayed a remarkable continuity and intensity in its Calvinist-derived bibliocratic ideal and practice, grounded in its equally persisting and intense evangelicalism or Biblical fundamentalism and Puritan-Protestant sectarianism whose exemplar and symbol it has usually been in America and beyond, from the Great Awakenings and before to the start of the twenty-first century.

The above also indicates a sort of irrational tenacity or extreme persistence in this regard, given the eventual demise or dilution of most theocracies, including bibliocracies, in Western, including American, history and societies, from the Inquisition in Catholicism to the English "Holy Commonwealth" to New England's "Biblical Community" within Puritanism. However, Baptists and other Protestant sectarians or evangelicals neglect or deny this fact and instead claim that their bibliocracy will, perhaps for the first time, be able to avoid the likely historical destiny and endure in infinity or at least, in accordance with Puritan millennialism (Kloppenberg 1998:28–32), a thousand years commencing in, say, 2000 AD through 3000 AD and beyond, prefiguring or reminiscent of the Nazi less-theocratic millennial state. Evidently, the above also comprises or reflects irrationalism and extremism in light of the destructive impact of the Baptist "strictest bibliocracy" or any theocracy on a free civil society and liberal–secular democracy. This is indicated by what various analysts observe as the persistently authoritarian, oppressive, and sadistically intolerant (Bauman 2001) or "under-democratized" (Amenta and Halfmann 2000) US South dominated by Baptism and other Protestant sectarianism or evangelicalism. Predictably, this does not seem to be a major consideration or concern for the latter, as it was not for Calvinism and original Puritanism, thus indicating a near-perfect continuity and consistency in eliminating or limiting social and political freedoms via theocratic projects, institutions, and practices, especially between early European and American Baptism. In sum, by locating early Baptist sects' "strictest bibliocracy" in Europe, Weber would not be surprised by the equally or comparably strict "Bible Belt" or sectarianism of contemporary "all-American" Baptism.

Developing Weber's insights, Tawney (1962:215) finds that, first, Calvinism and then Puritanism perpetuated "with a new intensity the medieval idea of a Church-civilization [of] not only doctrinal purity but of social righteousness [i.e.] a society which was to be Church and State in one." Puritanism thereby simply perpetuated theocracy precisely defined by a sort of osmosis between sacred and secular power, i.e., altar and throne (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). This highlights and confirms Comte's implied proposition that, despite its pretensions to

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[35] Weber remarks that the doctrine of predestination, as the "belief of virtuosi," as "continued to flow into the routine of everyday living and into the religion of the masses, its gloomy severeness became more and more intolerable." In consequence, he observes that the doctrine of predestination was "rejected" by Baptism in particular. Still, Weber concludes that predestination "was never completely eliminated from Calvinism; it only altered its form."

newness and exceptionalism, Puritanism merely continued and further intensified the old medieval and earlier Christian ideal and system of theocracy. In this sense, the difference between Calvinist-Puritan and Catholic-Christian theocracies reappears not as the matter of substance but of "degrees of un-freedom" and totalitarian oppression. Notably, Tawney (1962: 218) notices that historically the Puritan attempt to "crystallize social morality in an objective discipline was possible only in a theocracy." This confirms that theocracy is intrinsically rooted and generated in Puritanism, notably an outcome, just as an instrument, of its attempted total mastery of society through the absolute "reign of saints." Simply, only if and when these saints or religious virtuosi become real masters of the social world or theocrats will they be able to accomplish the Puritan alchemy of converting morality into an external discipline, and so replace individual moral freedom by state-church oppression. Also, Tawney (1962:219) suggests an historical sequence of theocracy within radical and fundamentalist Protestantism. This is that, first, European Calvinism continued and intensified the medieval Christian-Catholic "idea of a moral code enforced by Church," and then English-American Puritanism embarked, and often literally, as with Winthrop's flotilla of ships sailing to the New World to be remade in the image of a theocratic heaven, on this Calvinist path to also stipulate that "every department of life falls beneath the same all-encompassing arch of religion." Thus, he cites Baxter's Puritanism and its primary element of rigid conservatism as indicating no or little change in the "presentation of social ethics of the Christian faith," for example, from the medieval Scholastics to the Puritans of the seventeenth and eighteenth century (Tawney 1962: 224–225). In general, Tawney concludes that Puritanism, like Catholicism before, "accepted without demur the view which set all human interests and activities within the compass of religion," and hence the ideal of Christian theocracy in the form of renewed bibliocracy.

Contemporary research largely confirms and further develops and specifies these early observations and predictions about Puritan theocracy in old and New England. A historical study of early English and American Puritanism finds that Puritan theocracy in the form of "godly magistracy" constituted a "bold effort to seize control of society," just as sainthood was one to "control and organize self," and by entwining these two controls produced revolutionaries, thus historically prefiguring, if not inspiring, fascism and communism (Walzer 1963:86). Other historical research particularly identifies and points out the "restraint and authoritarianism of Puritan theocracies in both Geneva and New England" (Ashton 1965:582). This suggests that Puritanism, due to its original design and practice of theocracy *cum* "godly magistracy," constitutes the extant religious prototype or functional substitute of totalitarianism, including fascism, as elaborated later.

Notably, a sociological analysis suggests that early Puritanism in initially England and subsequently America "involved sectarian attempts to apply Protestant tenets to politics, to build a holy commonwealth" (Zaret 1989:165), as a venerable Puritan self-description of theocracy. Evidently, these attempts manifested Puritan religious–political extremism or radicalism that, once this sacred aim fully attained, predictably becomes reactionary conservatism or Biblical

fundamentalism as its complement. Such a theocratic project is indicated by the observation that "in the Puritan vision of godly politics principles of consent and tolerance apply only to a spiritual elite; for the rest of the political community there is a coercive theocracy" (Zaret 1989:170). The above reaffirms what has been commonly observed in Puritan history, from Cromwell and Winthrop et al. to their "Bible Belt" descendents. This is that Puritanism tends to preach, demand, and practice religious and other tolerance and freedom only for its adherents or, more precisely, its leaders, virtuosi, or saints, thus prefiguring in a sense the fascist *fürer* principle as well as the communist cult of personality, while, once become dominant or sufficiently strong, "forgetting," denying or constraining them for, as Weber stresses, *others*, especially "infidels," "ungodly," and "impure," from the Papists in Great Britain to the native Indians in New England and to "liberals," including especially atheists as supremely "evil" and "un-American" (Edgell et al., 2006) in Puritan-conservative definitions, in the US South and beyond, up to the twenty-first century.

In retrospect, the duality of religious freedom and tolerance for the theological–political elite and of coercive theocracy and oppression for the rest of civil society and polity helps to explain and rationalize the sanctimony and absolute reign of Puritan "Saints" a la Cromwell, Winthrop et al., and their Bible Belt mutants or proxies. Further, it accounts for and rationalizes Puritans' oppression, persecution, and execution of various religious groups, including the Irish Catholics and other "Papists" and Anglicans in Great Britain, as well as the native Americans, Quakers (and even briefly early Baptists) in New England. It also does in respect with similar neo-Puritan practices against (at least intolerance of) Episcopalians and other non-Puritan or nonfundamentalist ("liberal") Protestants and Catholics in the South and, through a sort of escalation or metastasis, beyond to "save" America through the theocratic or evangelical "shadow of Dixie" (Cochran 2001). In sum, to better comprehend these long-standing, persisting and, from the prism of a liberal–secular civil society and polity, seemingly incomprehensible theocratic ideas, institutions, and practices of Puritanism requires considering its original and persisting design and system of oppressive theocracy, stirred with absolute freedom, "democracy," and "Divine Rights" to oppress for its saints-turned-theocrats. In short, this is a mix of Leviathan or tyranny for the majority of civil society and polity with Anarchy or what Simmel would call license for Puritan oligarchic rulers or aristocrats a la Winthrop's mixt *aritocracie*. This mixture hence epitomizes or prefigures totalitarianism, notably fascism, precisely characterized by such a duality between tyrannical, albeit not necessarily theocratic as in Nazism, subjugation and oppression of the "masses" and the "license to kill" for the leaders.

Alternatively, the abovementioned sociological analysis indicates that Puritan "social radicalism developed as a charismatic revolt" against those existing, institutions, both secular (law, state, universities) and religious (church), perceived as "impediments to the creation of a holy commonwealth" (Zaret 1989:171). This suggests that destroying or undermining "ungodly" antitheocratic institutions by radical actions like revolutions and civil wars against the "infidels" and "ungodly" was the necessary condition for recreating a Puritan theocratic society.

This is the basic story and lesson of early Puritanism in England: the Puritan revolutionary–charismatic (e.g., Cromwell's) revolt against the Anglican Church, Monarchy, and related social institutions, and the ensuing creation and repressive rule of the theocratic "Parliament of Saints." It is also, with some secondary differences, one of Puritanism in early New England, as witnessed by Winthrop et al.'s "charismatic revolt" against and destruction of native Indian and Quaker religious and other arrangements, and the eventual recreation of a holy commonwealth. This Puritan pattern continued in the US South, as indicated by the Great Awakenings' Puritan or fundamentalist revolt against and eventually destroying "ungodly" and "foreign" Anglican church and state institutions, and subsequently creating or preaching bibliocracy through a Southern Bible Belt.

Alternatively, the creation of a holy commonwealth or theocracy has been and remains imperative for completely destroying non-Puritan institutions, as Puritanism once creating such a civil or rather "uncivil" society typically destroys or subverts beyond recognition these "ungodly" nontheocratic or generally secular–liberal institutional arrangements. Historically, Puritanism has accomplished this mixture of creationism and full institutional destruction—i.e., a sort of Schumpeterian creative destruction or destructive creation—only in America. It has done initially and most completely in early New England, subsequently and less fully, a kind of "unfinished business" yet in the South, in light of the Puritan founding and ruling of the first region and the neo-Puritan or evangelical–sectarian, notably Baptist expansion and hegemony, via the Great Awakenings, in the second. This unique success is in contrast with Great Britain and its other former colonies, where Puritanism eventually failed to perform such a holy destructive creation, given its being displaced, discredited, or ignored, as the result of the ultimately failed Puritan Revolution and the reestablishment, with modifications and cooptation, and reasserted prevalence of cardinal pre-Puritan institutions like the Anglican Church and the Monarchy.

In sum, both sociological and historical research reaffirm that, first, Puritanism comprises nihilism manifested in its destruction of pre- and post-Puritan institutions, thus constituting or prefiguring nihilistic totalitarianism like fascism. Second, it is radical or revolutionary when in opposition, protest, or minority through its "charismatic revolt" against and being destructive of preexisting, antitheocratic secular and religious arrangements to create an oppressive theocracy. Third, it is rigid and reactionary conservative when in power, institutionalized, majority, or strong enough by reproducing theocracy and seeking to restore a nebulous primeval state without "sin" and "ungodliness" or "golden," including medieval, past as "paradise lost and found." Fourth, its American derivative has proved more extreme and ultimately more successful alike, so really "exceptional," in these respects than the English original. In particular, the last point reaffirms that American Puritanism's celebrated "exceptionalism" consists elsewhere than usually claimed by its adherents and celebrants—religious freedom and pluralism, democracy—namely, in an enduring and even obstinate project, system, or syndrome of oppressive pure or diluted theocracy, from proto-Puritan New England's Biblical Commonwealth to the South evangelical Bible Belt. In terms of a free secular civil society and liberal–democratic polity, this theocratic Puritan-rooted exceptionalism is another

"double-edged sword" (Lipset 1996), which suggests a major reason *less* for its typical ethnocentric promotion and celebration in the guise of Americanism.

New England's and Southern "Biblical Commonwealths" Reconsidered

In particular, the aforesaid suggests and warrants reconsidering in more detail early American, specifically New England's theocratic Biblical Commonwealth from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century as a sort of "best kept" authoritarian–totalitarian secret in America's history thanks to its denials like "not a real theocracy" and mystifications a la a "Holy Community of Saints" or a "shining city upon a hill" by Puritans and their sequels or would-be heirs. By analogy, the Southern version of a Puritan Biblical Commonwealth termed a "Bible Belt" is probably the best kept authoritarian–theocratic secret by and perhaps for neo-Puritan Protestant fundamentalists, yet the worst kept for others, in contemporary America at the threshold of the twenty-first century.

In retrospect, while generally sympathetic to American Puritanism, Tocqueville identifies or intimates a Puritan theocracy, while not using the term, in colonial and postrevolutionary America. First, remember he describes the Pilgrims as belonging to "that English sect the austerity of whose principles had acquired for them the name of Puritans." Also, Tocqueville comments that "persecuted by the government of the mother country, and disgusted by the habits of a society which the rigor of their own principles condemned, the Puritans went forth to seek some rude and unfrequented part of the world where they could live according to their own opinions and worship God in freedom." Hence, they were what he calls "pious adventurers" rather than business undertakers, as US libertarian economists simplistically suppose (e.g., Friedman and Friedman 1982) in what Veblen would call their "trained incapacity" for acknowledging and even simply seeing what Weber calls ideal, as distinguished from material, values, or interests, thus displaying, to use Parsons' word, a convergence with their putative deadly enemies, Marxists.

These comments serve to prepare the background for Tocqueville's implicit but unequivocal diagnosis of theocratic aims or outcomes in early American Puritanism at several occasions. For example, he observes that "no sooner had the immigrants landed on the barren coast than it was their first care to constitute a society, by subscribing IN THE NAME OF GOD AMEN. The religious and political passion which ravaged the British Empire during the whole reign of Charles I drove fresh crowds of sectarians every year to the shores of America." Apparently, this observation identifies, predicts, or intimates what Sorokin calls diluted, or diffuse and general, theocracy defined by constituting society through following and glorifying the Divine Will ("in the name of God"), as well as, in Weber's words, Protestant sectarianism characterized by inherently theocratic aims and effects, i.e., narrow and oppressive political rule by sectarians or religious factions as understood by Madison. In particular, Tocqueville invokes the Puritan "legislators of Connecticut," commenting that they "begin with the penal laws, and, strange to say,

they borrow their provisions from the text of Holy Writ," and concluding that the "legislation of a rude and half-civilized people was thus applied to an enlightened and moral community." One can add that his phrase "strange to say" is somewhat naïve and would be even amusing if the last statement of "rude and half-civilized" legislation was missing. It suggests that Tocqueville saw it unusual, abnormal, or unnatural to "borrow" penal laws from religious books, which curiously indicates some degree of historical negligence of such original practices of Puritanism in England, not to mention ancient Christian and other theocracies. Simply, to do so is not "strange" at all for US and other Puritans and their proxies, but normal, natural, or usual, though a kind of normalized pathology or regularized–generalized anomaly in non-Puritan terms.

In particular, Tocqueville's last observation is a strikingly unequivocal diagnosis of Sorokin's pure, or concentrated and specific or legal theocracy. The later is precisely defined by strictly deriving penal and other laws and sanctions from religious sources, and consequently law enforcement from religion, enforcers or rulers from priests or theologians, and so ultimately state from church, viz. the neoconservative "vice police" in America from the reign of neo-Puritan or evangelical "saints." More precisely, it diagnoses and defines Weber's bibliocracy in terms of deriving such laws and sanctions from "Holy Writ," with corresponding consequences on law enforcement and the state or polity as a whole. Particularly, Tocqueville's observations are striking, because they suggest that theocracy, pure or diluted, was the original aim and intended consequence (Merton's manifest function) of Puritanism in America, i.e., the prime mover of its moving from the Old to the New World, rather than an unintended or perverse outcome and side-effect (latent function), as usually supposed. They also so for suggesting that the early American Puritans expanded their totalitarian theocracy from Massachusetts as the original or main point of destination to some adjacent states (Connecticut), thus anticipating its subsequent expansion to more distant lands in the "land of freedom," notably the South, via the Great Awakenings and other neo-Puritan or fundamentalist revivals. In addition, they are pertinent for indicating and reaffirming that Puritanism, due to its penal theocracy, is fundamentalist, primitive, near-barbarian, backward, or unusual ("rude," "half-civilized," "strange") in criminal–justice terms within modern liberal civil society and secular democracy ("enlightened and moral community").

Echoing Tocqueville, his contemporary Mill also identifies the Puritan theocratic vision and practice. Mill observes that Puritanism dictates that "all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the early settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to theirs should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground." He could have added that New England Puritans' "idea of a Christian commonwealth" was equivalent or conducive to the ideal and system of bibliocracy and thus theocracy, if he knew Weber's term. As mentioned, Weber also identifies Puritan theocratic projects and outcomes[36] in

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[36] Weber adds that during Massachusetts' theocracy the church congregation "indeed determined admission or non-admission to political citizenship status [so] according to whether or not the person had proved his religious qualification through conduct [as characteristic

early America by registering the "theocracy of New England." For example, he notices that the product of Puritanism, specifically its (Independents') alliance with political power in New England, was "an aristocratic rule by the ecclesiastically qualified" or the exclusive reign by religious virtuosi *qua* the godly elect, as the defining trait of theocracy. This theocratic rule replicates or reinforces that in early English Puritanism, specifically what he denotes the "abortive rule by Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints" as the "greatest" experiment in the Puritan (or sectarian) alliance with political power or state, so in theocracy, including the "socially exclusive Presbyterian treatment of the concept of the godly householder" (Ashton 1965:582). In particular, Weber remarks that in New England "full citizenship status in the church congregation was the precondition for full citizenship in the state." This redefines Puritan theocracy in terms of church or religious overdetermination of the state or politics and indicates that Puritanism instituted in and transplanted to New England one of those, in Weber's words, "Calvinistic state churches" or theocracies from the Old Europe. Early American Puritanism thus again revealed its crucial theocratic derivation from, just as theological parasitism, excluding in part Baptism due to its rejection or neglect of the dogma of predestination, on, Calvinism and lack of historical novelty in this respect. Further, Tawney (1962:238) explicitly describes Puritan Massachusetts as theocracy that was "merciless alike to religious liberty and to economic license."

Subsequent historical studies confirm, elaborate, and make more explicit these implicit or explicit diagnoses of a Puritan theocracy in New England and elsewhere in America. Moreover, a historical study indicates that "the civil and religious straight-jacket that the Massachusetts theocrats applied to dissenters in their midst was more rigorous than any that had been forced on the Puritans in England" (Merrill 1945:766). This confirms that New England's derived Puritan theocracy was even more oppressive and totalitarian than its English original of Cromwell et al. Thus, in this "brave new" Puritan world, people "were sometimes severely punished for offenses not defined by any law" and "even penalized for petty offenses committed years previously in old England" (Merrill 1945:767). These severe and arbitrary punishments highlight the typically Draconian nature of American Puritanism and its penal system, and so prefigure "tough-on-crime" neoconservative policies in America during the 1980s–2000s, in addition to giving a perverse or hypocritical meaning to the Puritan–conservative "rule of law and order." Recall, for example, crimes punishable by death in New England's Puritan theocratic "Body of Liberties" (sic!) included idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, adultery, stealing, treason, and others. This indicated a "more sanguinary catalogue" of such crimes and punishments than that of English law, with the courts even ordering "brutalizing" mutilations of offenders (Merrill 1945:768–769), an archetypical

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for] all Puritan sects." Further, he notes that the "question of religious affiliation was almost always posed" in every aspect of life, so excommunication from a Puritan sect "for moral offenses has meant, economically, loss of credit and, socially, being declassed," with membership being a "certificate of moral qualification and especially of business morals for the individual."

case of Puritan exercises in sadistic torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment overall persisting up to the twenty-first century (e.g., the neoconservative war on terror, the war on drugs, etc.). The study also cites Winthrop's attack on the criticism of the government or magistrates as the "workings of Satan to ruin the colonies and Churches of Christ in New England," consequently to be severely punished and even executed for committing a "capital offense," a sort of blasphemy of God's Puritan representatives and saints. This is perhaps an original form or prime source of the Puritan-fundamentalist and conservative intense hostility to and severe punishment of dissent, as witnessed during McCarthyism and its Puritan-like witch-hunts during the Cold War against "un-American" values and activities and its generalized mutant neoconservatism with its permanent preemptive crusade on "evil," climaxing during the 2000s. The above study concludes that New England's theocracy was the "Puritan Babel tower" containing the "germs of its own destruction," citing the "reign of terror," fear, martyrdom, and executions of the innocent during the "deplorable witchcraft delusion at Salem."

Further, even some US celebratory analysts admit that the "kind of government that the 17th century Puritans wanted was a theocracy: a Holy Commonwealth governed by God or God's representatives [i.e.] Church and state being closely united, the clergy guided the magistrates" (Foerster 1962:3). One may add that their would-be successors or mutants still do, as suggested by the Great Awakenings and the consequent "Bible Belt" as primarily Puritan–evangelical theocratic undertakings or outcomes. This can be deemed a sort of self-incriminating historical evidence or reluctant admission of the existence and salience of repressive theocracy within supposedly nontheocratic or even liberal–secular American Puritanism. For example, admittedly the Puritans "who came to Massachusetts during the 1630s hoped to do more than merely escape from persecution: they wished to strike a blow for the true faith by erecting a model Christian community [and overcoming] civil and religious dissent" (Bremer 1995:55). This simply admits that Winthrop et al. embarked on their ships to Massachusetts by bringing with them not only their material possessions, the Bible and other sacred objects and symbols, just as did their Anglican counterparts instead emigrating to Virginia, for example. These New England colonists also "carried their religious opinions with them" (Kearney 1965:107), notably the primeval–medieval ideal of Christian theocracy as an authoritarian "Holy Commonwealth" of saints, in which civil-religious dissent is exorcised via the "bloody tenet" and practice of oppression and persecution of dissenters, including the "Papists," native Indians and Quakers, not to mention atheists, agnostics, and even deists condemned and exorcised as "evil" and "un-American," a venerable tradition continued by contemporary religious conservatism in America (Edgell et al. 2006). In particular, contrary to their and so America's supposed antimedievalism, admittedly US Puritans' "world view was predominantly medieval" in the image of the Dark Middle Ages, particularly "a reflection of their English heritage" (Bremer 1995:87).

Other historical research reports that in early America such as Puritan-founded and ruled New England the "local church exercised as much moral control over the individual as had the centralized Roman church [so] genuine freedom of the

individual was nonexistent" (Stivers 1994:18–19). Reportedly, early Puritan America was a "self-conscious religious experiment" comparable to that of "Christendom in the Middle Ages," with US Puritans moreover seeking to recreate a "new Jerusalem" in the face of a "living community of saints." This highlights and supports Comte's diagnosis of Puritanism's "injurious enthusiasm for the Hebrew theocracy" and dreams about its restoration. Crucially, the study infers that "if the principle of freedom was used by Puritans to criticize the [Roman] centralization of power [yet] it could be directed against their efforts, for the local [Puritan] congregations stifled the expression of individual freedom" (Stivers 1994:31). Moreover, this Puritan stifling of individual freedom was found to be so authoritarian, total, and oppressive that American Puritanism became, as noted, the "most totalitarian form of Calvinism" and so Protestantism, thus surpassing its own English progenitor. Apparently, New England's Puritan saints–theocrats surpassed even Cromwell et al.'s brutal wars against and executions of the "infidels" in terms of theocracy and its totalitarian power, control, and punishment, as did and do their mutants and proxies, Bible Belt fundamentalists or sectarians like Southern Baptists. This reaffirms that the "new" and celebrated American Puritanism, from New England to the South, was not essentially different from the old despised Catholicism, so its "saints" from the detested "Papists," in respect of theocratic social oppression, thus casting more doubt on its claims to Puritan and so America's exceptionalism *cum* superiority this sense.

Other historical studies indicate that in early America, Puritanism attempted to realize the ideal of a "Christian Sparta," citing "Puritan millennialism in the North," particularly New England (Kloppenberg 1998:28–32). For instance, Samuel Adams' vision of America as a new "Christian Sparta" evoked and mixed with John Winthrop's blueprint for a biblical "Shining City on a Hill" (Bremer 1995:233). Hence, the Puritan original vision and subsequent reality of America, starting with New England and expanding to the rest of the nation, was a curious, if not paradoxical, mix of reenacted Spartan theocracy with bibliocracy. It was simply a mixture of prebiblical ascetic oppression and the "American version of the biblical garden" (Gould 1996:10). These findings suggest that American Puritanism was historically déjà vu even in respect to the pre-Christian, "pagan" world of Sparta whose authoritarianism and oppression, e.g., extreme asceticism, harsh military-style discipline, brutality, and cruelty, apparently became an ideal or model to be reproduced, reimplemented, and emulated by US Puritans. In particular, it confirms Comte's diagnosis of Puritanism's reproduction and implementation of the old Greek–Spartan ideal of "metaphysical theocracy" through a putative or self-delusionary "reign of Saints" as Puritan equivalents of Sparta's ascetics.

In particular, a sociological analysis suggests that early Puritans' "inability to impose a coercive moral regime in England led them to try to establish it elsewhere" (Zaret 1989:170; 1996), such as America, first New England and then its other regions. As hinted, they did so with a greater, even unprecedented or unrivalled determination, persistence, and intensity of theocratic imposition, coercion, and brutality, if not, as the British did or would put it, bloody savagery. For example, Thomas More, the author of *Utopia*, observed that the "external effects" of

religion are "bloody massacres," as well as "most savage tortures" and "extirpating and dispossession of whole nations, as it has happened in America" (quoted in Zaret 1989:174). Further, this observation is not only a diagnosis of a preexisting, pre-Puritan state of affairs, but also a prediction or prophetic warning of the subsequent functionally equivalent "external effects" of American Puritanism, in apparent anticipation of Winthrop et al.'s theocratic "Biblical Commonwealth." These precisely include "most savage tortures" and "extirpating and dispossession of whole nations," ranging from the native Indians and Quakers to the "Papists," including Irish Catholics, Italians, and Mexicans, and other "ungodly" peoples and "infidels." In addition, by his contention or prediction that "it were far better that there were no such [extreme] religious propensities in mankind" as in Puritan America, more effectively anticipates or implies what Comte states explicitly later. This is, to reiterate, that Puritanism, owing to such propensities and their translation into and imposition as a "coercive moral regime," is unfit for democratic, specifically nontheocratic, governance, and a free secular civil society. Such a Puritan "coercive moral regime" was in essence an oppressive theocratic system, so early New England was under "such a strong religious leadership that it can be called a theocracy" (Munch 2001:225), with Winthrop et al.'s rule as an exemplar. In particular, as Tocqueville suggests by noting the "strange" borrowing of Puritan penal laws from the "Holy Writ," American Puritanism aimed to "establish legal theocracy," by defining much of its criminal code "almost word for word from the Old Testament" (Stivers 1994:31). In particular, analysts imply that New England's Puritan "Bible Commonwealth," while officially termed a republic and even a "Body of Liberties," constituted, or resembled a patriarchal theocracy by being "modeled on the Old Testament patriarchs" (Gould 1996:40). This supports or highlights Weber's insight that in early Puritanism or Calvinism "especially by comparing the condition of one's own soul with that of the elect, for instance the patriarchs, according to the Bible, could the state of one's own grace be known."

Further, other research suggests that seventeenth century officially Congregational New England was a "paradigmatic case" of the institutionalization of sectarian or ascetic Puritanism (Seligman 1990), so of Puritan theocracy. This is another way to describe early US Puritans as the "most totalitarian" Calvinists and hence Protestants and Christians overall. The study finds that the efforts and problems of New England's communities of "visible saints" to build a civil society and polity resting on sainthood and holiness, i.e., a Holy Bible Commonwealth, result from the "particular contradictions inherent to Puritan ideas of grace as a charismatic [theocratic] model for social and political organization" (Seligman 1990:537).

No wonder, even some otherwise sympathetic studies admit that New England's Puritan theocracy by its pure or totalitarian character was a sort of anomaly or exception even within Anglo–Saxon societies and so global Puritanism, for long, except perhaps for Great Britain in the 1650s subjected to the short-lived theocratic rule of Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints." In this view, New England's Bible Commonwealths "had structured a society unique in the English-speaking world" (Bremer 1995:86). For example, an important political element and symptom of Puritan theocracy or sectarianism was that the right to vote or franchise

was admittedly "limited to church members in Massachusetts and New Haven" (Bremer 1995:86). This element specifies and confirms Weber's observation that in New England congregation membership was the precondition for state citizenship. It thus makes this Puritan society functionally equivalent or comparable to, as Merton (1968:84) remarks, primitive societies in which typically "there is but one prevailing religious system so that, apart from individual deviants, the membership of the total society and the membership of the religious community are virtually co-extensive." It also prefigures various subsequent and persisting egregious denials of civil and political rights and liberties to "ungodly" religious– ethnic and poor groups in the US South and beyond, up to the presidential elections in the twenty-first century. And, given its moral authoritarianism, Puritanism rationalized New England's theocracy by the moralistic-coercive argument that the "controls of government were necessary to curb the sinful impulses of the individual" and that Puritan-ruled society "had been ordained by God" (Bremer 1995:87). The first suggests that in Puritanism moral authoritarianism inherently generates and predicts religious totalitarianism or theocracy manifested in fusing church control with state controls, and prefigures what Pareto diagnoses as the US government's venerable and ever-expanding tendency to "enforce morality by law" driven and rationalized by Puritanical moralism. The second purports to transform a Puritan-ruled theocratic civil society and polity into Providential (to use a favorite neo-Puritan concept) "intelligent design" and destiny, and consequently to grant Divine Rights to Puritans, notably their visible saints or religious virtuosi as God-assigned masters of the world, both geographically, in America and the entire globe, and sociologically or the total social system. *Prima facie*, this functions or appears as a Puritan continuation or variation of the old theological justification of medieval Catholic and other theocracies. Thus, like their English ancestors, the US Puritans "saw themselves as also being engaged in a national covenant with God. They had been chosen by God to assist him in the redemption of the world by their complete obedience to his will" (Bremer 1995:89). This thus reaffirms Puritan nationalism or ethnocentrism grounded in and sanctified by Divine Choice, and prefigures what Merton (1939) calls American nativism, and others narcissistic or triumphant Americanism (Bell 2002).

And, Tawney (1962: 218) suggests that the Puritans' fulfillment of his "national covenant with God" and assistance in his "redemption" of the world through totally obeying his will "was possible only in a theocracy." The outcome of these Puritan ideas and practices in seventeenth century New England was a civil society and polity in which, at least in the experience or picture of non-Puritans such as Quakers and political liberals, reportedly the "narrow forces of theocracy struggled in vain to suppress the gradually triumphant forces of democracy" (Bremer 1995:90). One can add that these forces of theocracy facing such countervailing and ultimately triumphant or balancing democratic–liberal factors in New England— fro example, the disestablishing of state religion in the 1830s—moved beyond to the rest of America, especially the South, where they became, through the Great Awakenings and other revivals, eventually victorious and hegemonic to the point of transforming an initially Anglican region into a neo-Puritan or fundamentalist

heaven cum a theocratic dystopia. Recall, the formal abolition of theocracy or religious disestablishment by Jefferson, Madison, and other Enlightenment-influenced US liberals historically "began in Virginia in 1786" to end in its "final eradication in Massachusetts in 1833" (Gould 1996:9–10). Liberal–secular and democratic Jefferson, Madison, and their followers attempted or endorsed the "separation of religion and politics for fear that religion would corrupt politics," a view rooted in the European (French) Enlightenment and sharply contrasting with the Puritans' or evangelicals' opposite fears of the second corrupting the first (Archer 2001:278). In retrospect, while Massachusetts' forma "eradication" of theocracy may have proved permanent, in a charitable nontheocratic interpretation of post-1833 New England, the process has not been completed in the initially Anglican Virginia or even been reversed by the subsequent Puritan-evangelical theocratic "intelligent design" for a Biblical Commonwealth in the South, including notably Jefferson's home state as a sort of vanguard or leader in this involution, persisting up to the twenty-first century. At any rate, to admit that the US Puritans "believed in a strong and active government [with] the responsibility of the state to oversee the conduct of the citizens, seeing to it that they adhered to the path of righteousness or were punished for wandering from it (i.e., regulated with) a sharp eye and a heavy hand" (Bremer 1995:91)—is admitting they did believe in theocracy, as do their modern derivatives. Reportedly, American Puritanism's primary aim was "a godly society, and legislation was designed to support that goal," including oppression, persecution, execution, and torture as "acceptable by standards of the day" and punctuated by the "witchcraft hysteria"[37] (Bremer 1995:93, 183).

In turn, a Puritan "godly society" could be instituted and maintained only by, in and as a theocracy, precisely characterized by legislation and coercion in support to that holy end, for example what Pareto identifies as the US government typical enforcement of piety and morality "by law." As mentioned, this is more precisely bibliocracy, spanning from New England's "Biblical Garden" and before Great Britain's Holy Commonwealth to the South's "Bible Belt." Alternatively, for US Puritanism the holy end of a "godly society" grounds and sanctifies its project and system of oppressive theocracy in New England originally and the South and all America subsequently. Thus, a sociological analysis suggests that, as an element or symptom of coercive theocracy, near-total social control in Puritan New England focused not on government punishment independent of its sacred equivalent or sanctification as in nontheocratic or secular societies, but on religious or church sanctions (Wagner 1997:60) mixed with, applied through, or sanctifying such, typically cruel, inhuman, and degrading, punishments, including executions for sins *cum* crimes like adultery, blasphemy, and witchcraft. This implies that Puritanism made secular punishment by government dependent on, blended with,

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[37] Bremer (1995:93) comments that in New England "while the clergy did not rule, [most] magistrates (Winthrop et al.) were dedicated Puritan laymen equally committed to the establishment of God's way in the North American wilderness." This implies that Puritan New England was, if not pure theocracy expressed by the "rule of the clergy," a diluted legal one manifested in a theocentric or religiously-based judicial system.

and sanctified by sacred sanctions from religion—i.e., state in relation to church—thus becoming constituted as a theocratic form of social control. For instance, in early Boston, Puritan theological–theocratic conceptions "became social norms" (Klausner 1998:155), so an institutionalized societal theocracy characterized by such a transformation of religious ideas or theologies into coercive rules, sanctions, and institutions. As a case in point, the Calvinist ideas of divine law, predestination, and election or damnation were transformed into a "hierarchical community" in the form of Puritan theocratic aristocracy exemplified by Winthrop's own *mixt aristocracie* and manifested in what Weber detects as the "aristocratic rule" by religious virtuosi. This confirms that Calvinism as a theology, doctrine, or ideology is the original root and model of Puritanism as a theocracy or religious totalitarianism. Specifically, this applies to what Weber describes as the Calvinist harsh dogma of predestination and absolute transcendence of God in relation to the Puritan "reign of saints" and oppression of "sinners" and "infidels," including Winthrop et al.'s persecutions and executions of "ungodly," as well as their evangelical followers' adoption and even escalation of these "godly" or "faith-based" practices. Alternatively, Winthrop and other Pilgrim Fathers reportedly "had absolutely no intention of establishing a community in which individuals would be free to behave according to the dictates of their own consciences. The Puritans had already seen the light, and by God they intended to use all necessary means to ensure that everybody comply with Puritan standards. Far from free, their 'City upon a Hill' was a hard-handed theocracy" (Higgs 1998:469).

If not a hardcore, totalitarian, pure or manifest, then a soft, authoritarian, diluted, latent, or disguised theocracy was the original aim and the eventual reality of Puritanism in New England and all America in the form, in Puritans' own minds, of a "godly" and morally "righteous" civil society subjected to the "holy" reign and terror of Puritan saints as Divinely ordained masters. Thus, a comparative-historical study shows that the Puritans "who established the northern colonies of New England in the 1630s were religious radicals, who, when they seemed unable to prevail in England itself, sought to establish a new, model, righteous society in America, based firmly on the principles of Puritan Protestantism" (Archer 2001:276). Reportedly, Protestant Puritanism "was in no way conducive to secularism, or even to the tolerance of religious dissent" and instead the Puritan state in New England and beyond was a narrow or minority "dictatorship of the holy" or totalitarian theocracy. In particular, the study finds that, contrary to conventional wisdom and dispelling a cherished myth in Puritan–Protestant America, the idea of separation of church and state was "completely alien" to early American Puritanism, and instead the "unity" of religion and politics was "axiomatic" and "central to the very rationale for founding these new societies" (Archer 2001:276). Consequently, the US Puritan states for centuries—e.g., from the 1630s through the 1830s and beyond—actually "reduced" rather than increased, as usually supposed, the "small amount of religious freedom that was then available in England" (Archer 2001:277) under Anglicanism and even Cromwell, and in extension Europe under Lutheranism and Calvinism plus Catholicism and Christian Orthodoxy. If so, this is an indicator or symptom that New England's "dictatorship of the holy" constituted the most

oppressive, authoritarian, or totalitarian form of theocracy in Protestantism, and even Puritanism–Calvinism in particular.

In sum, what Weber and other identify as New England's Puritan theocracy may well be the "best kept secret," or the most permanent denial and democratic self-delusion, of and for US Puritans, with some exceptions, but is evidently the "worst kept" one for others, including most social analysts and historians. This also holds true of the theocratic "Bible Belt" in respect with neo-Puritans evangelicals and their secular–liberal counterparts, respectively, in contemporary America. Crucially, both arch-Puritan New England and the neo-Puritan South demonstrate that US Puritanism is in essence the blueprint, system, and syndrome of theocracy or religiously based and sanctified totalitarianism, and so an unfree civil society and undemocratic polity.

4
Puritanism and Social Authoritarianism Continued

Artistic–Cultural Authoritarianism

In addition to and conjunction with its moral–religious forms, Puritan social authoritarianism comprises artistic–cultural and educational–scientific authoritarianisms, including authoritarian uses of knowledge, science, and art. Antiartistic or anticultural authoritarianism is an eminent attribute or outcome of Puritanism, grounded in and conjoined by its authoritarian morality and religion. By assumption, its moral and religious authoritarianisms tends to extend into and predict its antiartistic authoritarianism, i.e., the Puritan elimination or suppression of liberty in morality and religion into eliminating or suppressing freedom in the arts and other culture, just as the second reinforces via feedback effects the first. Puritan antiartistic authoritarianism has essentially moral–religious sources and rationalizations, as the suppression or restriction of personal freedom and creativity in the arts or aesthetic culture is induced and sanctified by the quest for Puritanical morality and godliness through purifying artists into saints, "godly" or monks in the service of the ultimately theocratic or totalitarian design of Puritanism. In turn, this anti artistic and anticultural, as well as moral–religious, authoritarianism leads to or reinforces, just as it reflects, Puritan authoritarian antihumanism or what Weber calls inhuman "inner-worldly asceticism" in general.

Authoritarian Suppression of the Arts

A specific expression of Puritanism's antiartistic or anticultural authoritarianism is its hostility to, fear, suspicion, and suppression of art and all aesthetic culture. This is an original, venerable and persisting attribute, tendency, or outcome of Puritanism, celebrated as a supreme virtue by Puritans, deplored as a barbaric regression by others. Thus, Comte notes that in many European countries after the Protestant Reformation national "aesthetic tendencies were already checked" by Puritanism and Protestantism overall, in consequence of its "unfavorableness to Art." By implication, this strong negativity toward the arts or aesthetics is grounded in and sanctified by Puritan moral–religious authoritarianism, specifically what Comte identifies as the restraining and "violent repression" of individual freedom

in both morality and religion by Puritanism. In particular, Simmel's identification of Puritanism' "much greater" dogmatic–religious intolerance than even Catholicism helps explain its "unfavorableness to Art" and obstructing "aesthetic tendencies."

Mill seems to agree with and specifies Comte's Puritan antiartistic diagnosis. Thus, Mill remarks that "wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently powerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time of the [Holy] Commonwealth, they have endeavored, with considerable success, to put down all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music, dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the theatre." Notably, he states that such Puritan antiartistic practices have been driven, so the arts and amusement governed, by the "religious and moral sentiments of the stricter" Puritans, exemplified by "Calvinists and Methodists," and described as "intrusively pious members" of society. This is to state that moral–religious authoritarianism, including intrusion and oppression, grounds, induces, and rationalizes artistic–cultural authoritarianism in Puritanism. Crucially, Mill suggests, referring to Puritanism, that a sort of mind your own business "is precisely what should be said to every government and every public, who have the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong." This indicates that Mill treats, while being somewhat irritated by, as was even more Shakespeare, Puritan antiartistic and related ideas and practices as intrusive, oppressive and so undemocratic. So does his successor, economist Marshall in observing that Puritans' "absorbing passion" for endowing their moral–religious creed with absolute rigor and precision was "hostile to all lighter thoughts and lighter amusements" and consequently they "took little joy in society," as they "shunned public amusements" and held attitudes "hostile to art."[1] His observation confirms that moral–religious authoritarianism or theological–ethical absolutism grounds, engenders, and so predicts Puritan authoritarian antiartistic or counterascetic, if not sadistic–masochistic ("little joy"), attitudes and actions. Like Mill's diagnosis of Puritan fanatical moral intolerance, Weber registers the "fanatical opposition of the Puritans to the ordinances of the King, permitting certain popular amusements on Sunday outside of Church hours

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[1] Marshall almost implies, by detecting Puritans' hostility to art, that it is more likely that, as the proverb goes, a "monkey" would type, just as a government could print, as he puts it, a "good edition" of Shakespeare's collected works than would a Puritan read or appreciate them. This is also what Weber intimates by registering the Puritan town government closing of Stratford-on-Avon's theatre precisely when Shakespeare resided there. This also holds true of New England Puritans given their intense hostility to theater and other art, as well as of US neo-Puritan evangelicals, as indicated by the 1996 peculiar episode in which some schools in New Hampshire removed "Shakespeare's play *Twelfth Night* from the curriculum" (Hull 1999:55). These seemingly tragic–comic events far from being random or accidents reflect the general pattern, system, or method in the antiartistic and antiemotional "madness" of Puritanism or Calvinism since, in Weber's view, Calvin's attack on and devaluation of artistic and all human emotions as diverting from humans, as Cromwell put it, honoring and sacrificing themselves (and others) to Divine providence and glory on the grounds that they exist "for the sake of God", not conversely (Bendix 1977).

by law," this fanaticism being driven by their "resentment against the intentional diversion from the ordered life of the saint."

As a particular antiartistic curiosity, the hostility to and suppression of the theatre has perhaps been the most legendary and persistent element of Puritan antiartistic authoritarianism since early English Puritanism. For example, Weber cites the case of a Puritan town government that "closed the theatre at Stratford-on-Avon while Shakespeare was still alive and residing there in his last years" and adds that "Shakespeare's hatred and contempt of the Puritans appear on every occasion." In another example, he notices that "as late as 1777 the City of Birmingham [England] refused to license a theatre because it was conducive to slothfulness" and related moral and economic sins. Also, Tocqueville identifies such an intense hostility to the theatre in early American Puritanism by observing that the "Puritans who founded the American republics not only were enemies to amusements, but they professed an especial abhorrence for the stage [considered] an abominable pastime." Evidently, the early US Puritans loaded their ships (e.g., Winthrop's *Arabella*) not only with their material assets and sacred books, but also with English Puritanism's original enmity toward the arts and amusements, including the theatre. In turn, Weber could add that, like old English towns Stratford-on-Avon and Birmingham, in Puritan New England and beyond, through the Great Awakenings, Shakespeare et al. "need not apply." Reportedly, the "Puritan hostility to the theatre" (Israel 1966:595) was as manifest and intense in Winthrop's New England as in Shakespeare's England, which indicates that the "shunning of stage plays" (Sprunger 1982:458) was common to Puritanism in all places and times.

Weber identifies another, related curious element of the Puritan antiartistic suppression or suspicion by citing Baxter's admonition that "novels and the like should not be read [as] 'wastetimes'," while adding that "in the pictorial arts Puritanism perhaps did not find very much to suppress." In particular, he suggests that Puritanism almost absolutely suppressed or regressed English-American musical art, by observing that "very striking is the decline from what seemed to be a promising musical beginning (England's part in the history of music was by no means unimportant) to that absolute musical vacuum which we find typical of the Anglo-Saxon peoples later, and even to-day." As the competent author of *Rational Foundations of Music* Weber hence implies that Puritanism suppressed what he calls the rationalization of music and other arts in these societies, thus exhibiting both antiartistic authoritarianism and irrationalism. So, upon visiting America he observes that "except for the negro churches, and the professional singers whom the Churches now engage as attractions (Trinity Church in Boston in 1904 for $8,000 annually), in America one also hears as community singing in general only a noise which is intolerable to German ears." Overall, he infers that, as the result of such suppression of virtually all the arts by English Puritanism, "the decline of Lyric poetry and folk-music, as well as the drama, after the Elizabethan age in England is well known."

As still another antiartistic curiosity, Puritans have been well-known for their hostility to or suspicion of decoration in the arts as well as religion and life in favor of simple, usually black or dark colors, and, for that matter, austere food.

Thus, Weber notices that the Puritan favoring of "sober utility" as against any artistic tendencies was particularly pronounced "in the case of decoration of the person, for instance clothing." As also economist Edgeworth puts it, "'Thank God it's black'—a puritanical old dame is reported to have ejaculated, as the new clergyman ascended the pulpit in a Geneva gown, regarded by a certain sect as more suitable than the surplice for a preacher." In particular, Puritans, like other fundamentalist Protestants, reveal a strong antagonism to or distaste for baroque art and decoration (Turner 2002).

Predictably, the aggregate and ultimate outcome of Puritanism's hostility to and ascetic–authoritarian suppression of the arts and "amusements," including the theatre and decoration, has been artistic regression, involution, or stagnation, just as destroying or diminishing Marshall's "joy in society" overall in favor of joyless "inner worldly" asceticism seeking to convert social life, as Weber and Pareto suggest, in an overarching monastic order and "purify" humans into monks for life. Pareto detects symptoms of such antiartistic regression or stagnation observing that the proartistic, antiascetic, humanistic and liberal Renaissance "too soon was halted" by the Protestant Reformation, the Calvinist–Puritan Revolution in particular against it. This also confirms what has been noted before: revolutions in Puritanism and other religious conservatism are typically counterrevolutions or reactions against a prior liberal-secular revolution or social change, viz. the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, New Deal, the cultural liberalization of the 1960s, etc. Generally, religious, both Catholic and Protestant, conservatism mounted a hostile "reaction to the idealism of the Renaissance" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:65).

One may add that the Renaissance artistic spirit and creativity "too soon" and more was "halted" by the Reformation in those societies where Calvinist Puritanism was temporally or ultimately victorious such as Great Britain and New England than in others, be they Protestant or not, like Catholic Italy and France, or Lutheran Germany. Hence, Puritanism primarily (though not solely) explains the remarkable regression, involution, stagnation, inferiority, or suppression of the arts, including the theatre, music, and painting, in most Puritan countries like Great Britain, at least temporally, as during Shakespeare's last years, and subsequently and *a fortiori America*, from New England to the South, mainly owing to the Great Awakenings. This is especially manifest and valid when these countries are compared to others in the West and beyond, either Protestant (Germany), Catholic (Italy, France), or Christian Orthodox (Russia), as well as to previous times (e.g., Great Britain). Pareto could add that Puritanism's temporary (England) or permanent (America) halting of the Renaissance was just an historical, though remarkable, instance of its original and persistent hostility to and suppression of artistic work, creativity, and freedom, thus what Weber calls "liberation of individual powers" in the arts and all secular culture. At most, Parsons (1967:57) suggests that the "Puritans and the men of the humanistic Renaissance could agree" only on a few points,;nd these did not include artistic creativity and freedom, as well as secular humanism, promoted by the second and opposed or substituted by the first with inhuman asceticism, but the "negative valuation of ritual," for example.

Antagonism to Secular Culture

Puritan antiartistic attitudes, institutions, and practices usually escalate or reflect what Weber would term generalized cultural antagonism, in particular an antagonistic attitude toward nonreligious, nonascetic, and aesthetic forms and elements of culture. He observes that Puritanism shows a "fundamental antagonism to sensuous" and aesthetic cultures in that it is "hostile to the aspects of culture without any immediate religious value," including secular, nonascetic art, especially the "arts for the sake of the arts," or aesthetics, as well as education, philosophy, science, and technology unless used for Puritan authoritarian and militarist purposes. Since, as sociologists stress, the "general quality of Puritanism was anti-sensuous and anti-spontaneous in the extreme" (Birnbaum 1953:139), this indicates its overall cultural extremism. For example, the "pervasive hostility" to earthly or worldly things like dances, love-play, and theater "was a key to Puritanism" (Walzer 1963:80) in early England and subsequently colonial America. Further, Puritanism dictated that not only aesthetic or artistic works, including books, and amusements, but "even intercourse with friends must be cast aside" (Tawney 1962: 200). This indicates that Puritanism is antagonistic not just to the arts but to all human culture and interpersonal relations with no "immediate religious value," thus revealing its cultural antagonism and antihumanism, as compared with the "humanistic" Renaissance and later the Enlightenment.

Puritan cultural antagonism and antihumanism, if does not condemn or destroy culture as such, transforms it, including art, science, and education, into the servant or (to use Sorokin's word) "handmaid," appendix or extension of religion and theology, just as did Catholicism through the Vatican theocracy during medieval times. Hence, Puritanism historically only continues, though with an increasing scope, tenacity, and ferocity, an essential religious practice of the Dark Middle Ages precisely defined in terms of a servile status of secular culture and all social life in relation to religion, coercively enforced via the Inquisition and other means, so does *not* really reform or transcend its Catholic ("Papist") and non-Christian (Islamic and other) predecessors in this respect, contrary to what its advocates claim. This is what Weber signifies by observing that Puritanism "almost amounted to an inquisition" by being antagonistic to the "liberation of individual powers" in the arts, science, and all nonreligious culture through the "most absolutely unbearable form of ecclesiastical control" of individuals. This anticultural antagonism accounts for what Pareto identifies as the Protestant–Puritan halting of the Renaissance condemned and attacked as an "ungodly" attempt at individual liberation in art and all secular culture. As regards its treatment of secular–aesthetic culture relative to religion, church, and theology, Puritanism tenaciously remains in and seeks to revive the Dark Middle Ages or medievalism as its perennial ideal, despite its claims to historical novelty and exceptionality, as epitomized by Puritan-American exceptionalism.

Simply, for Puritanism "there is no such thing" as secular culture (as "no free lunch" for its modern mutants, US conservative economists), ranging from art and philosophy to education, science, and even technology, with no "immediate

religious value," thus independent of religion, church, theology, and eventually theocracy, so of authoritarian politics. For example, historically "art as a separate sphere was always possible only" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) in a liberal–secular or bourgeois, as distinguished from a conservative-fundamentalist, including Puritan, society. In particular, the art and all culture-*cum*-religion outcome is exactly what is likely to result from Puritan theocracy, including its religious intolerance and moralist oppression.

Notably, Weber suggests that Puritanism's "fundamental antagonism" to nonreligious culture, while seemingly or ideally neutral and inconsequential in respect of individual freedom, has authoritarian aims or consequences. He observes that Puritans' "powerful tendency" to social uniformity and intolerance of cultural, including artistic and moral–religious, differences has "ideal foundations" in the "entirely negative attitude of Puritanism to all the sensuous and emotional elements in culture." In his words, the tendency is founded in what he calls the Puritan "repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh" theologically justified by the Calvinist "harsh doctrines of the absolute transcendentality of God" and the "corruption of everything pertaining to the flesh." Hence, Puritan holy and moralist anticultural antagonism constitutes or leads to cultural authoritarianism, including oppressive moral conformity and intolerance, as well as regression, involution, stagnation, or ascetic freezing in culture and all human life transformed into a sort of frozen monastic order and lifestyle, akin to what Mises calls "peace of the cemetery," as the perennial, perversely "pacifist" ideal and outcome of Puritanism, a model of antipacifism or militancy. This is what Weber signifies in observing that, owing to its oppressive anticulture antagonism and inhuman asceticism that tend to condemn, destroy, and punish "spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment" as "idolatry of the flesh," Puritanism "descended like a frost on the life of 'Merrie old England'," citing the Puritan closure of Shakespeare's theatre as a case in point. In short, he characterizes the early English-American and Dutch Puritans by the "exact opposite of the joy of living." Generally, Weber suggests that Protestantism as a whole or the Reformation "must not be understood, as there is a tendency to do, as joy of living nor in any other sense as connected with the Enlightenment."[2]

In retrospect, what Weber observed about the "Merrie old England" under Puritanism's temporary rule holds true *a fortiori* of Puritan New England and later on America as a whole, especially the South. Ever-more intensively and enduringly than their English ancestors, New England's Puritans provide a paradigmatic historical example of transforming human culture, including art, into the

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[2] Seemingly in contradiction to Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno (1993:22) propose that both Protestantism and the Enlightenment judge that "those who entrust themselves directly to life, without any rational reference to self-preservation, revert to the realm of prehistory." However, Weber would add that "life" has a radically different meaning or content in Protestantism, at least Puritanism, and the Enlightenment–i.e., ascetic restraint and suffering to "honor God" a la Cromwell and Winthrop's versus secular (worldly) "joy of living" respectively. In terms of ancient Greek alternative societies or lifestyles, human life in Puritanism is a sort of, as the early US Puritans put it, "Christian Sparta", and in the Enlightenment Epicureanism or at least Athens.

servant or appendage of religion, church, theology, and theocracy, and so of authoritarian politics, almost reenacting or evoking the Dark Middle Ages in Europe. Admittedly, New England's Puritans "had scant time or inclination to direct their creative imagination" to artistic–cultural or humanistic pursuits, because as self-proclaimed "builders of a Christian commonwealth, they were absorbed in the tremendous task of subduing the wilderness without and the old Adam within" (Foerster 1962:6). As a particular but not surprising curiosity, "scriptural evidence accompanied poetry and love letters" (Foerster 1962:9), which gives a déjà vu taste of the old medieval peculiarities and eccentricities in the new world. In another curious example, Massachusetts and other New England Puritans or "stodgy Orthodox Calvinists" viewed reading novels and other literature "suspiciously," excepting historical fiction (e.g., Scott)[3] saturated with "patriotic didacticism" and "nationalistic tenor" (Gould 1996:10–13). This confirms Puritan religious nationalism (Friedland 2002) at the origin or heart of what Weber and others (Bell 2002; Lipset 1996) call triumphant Americanism, and Merton American nativism.

Beyond and subsequent to Puritan New England, the US South is probably the best qualified candidate within America for applying and amplifying Weber's diagnosis. Namely, Puritanism literally from the North "descended like a frost on the life of the Merrie old South," as the basic Southern story since the mid eighteenth century. Recall, through its Great Awakenings, especially the second during the 1800s, Puritanism transformed what was seen as the "good old" worldly and sensuous Anglican South into a Puritan-evangelical or fundamentalist ascetic and more oppressive "heaven" (Wuthnow 1998). In this "new" Puritan South all secular culture and human life once again have become the servant of religion, church, theology, and theocracy, so authoritarian politics, which thus inherits and perpetuates the legacy of New England and in extension Europe's Dark Middle Ages. In particular, remember New England's "religionists" or saints, driven by Puritanism's missionary and "rapacious" mythology, disdained and eventually displaced from political power and social life those early "gay" and "joy" Southern adventurers (Gould 1996:148) via the Puritan Awakenings and their effects. As mentioned, these effects include Puritan-based "dumb laws" in the South and elsewhere, which hence reappear as the outcomes, symptoms, or means of this Puritan freezing and suppression of nonreligious, sensual, or aesthetic art, culture, and life in a pre-Puritan region.

Within this region, Weber's diagnosis particularly holds true of Virginia, in which Puritanism's descending from the North was perhaps most intensively experienced "like a frost on the life of the good old South," given its being the first or the most important non-Puritan or Anglican colony in the new world. For example, Puritanism descended to and eventually "froze" the old non-Puritan South by extending its three denominations from New England into initially Virginia and subsequently the other Southern colonies during and especially after the first Great

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[3] Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) remark that "when mortally sick, Beethoven hurled away a novel by Sir Walter Scott with the cry: 'Why, the fellow writes for money.'"

Awakening (the 1740), Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist, in chronological order (Boles 1999).

Generally, the "peace of the cemetery" or "graveyard stillness" of Puritanism and its tyranny has destroyed the "gayest" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) aspects of the pre-Puritan era in the US South since the 1740s and especially the 1800s. Notably, Weber effectively diagnoses or predicts the transformation of the worldly Episcopal South, including Virginia, into a region ruled by what critics (Mencken) call Baptist and Methodist "barbarism" in the sense of theocratic or inhuman asceticism and authoritarian oppression. Recall, he observes that early Baptist leaders in Europe and America were "ruthlessly radical in their rejection of worldliness" and that the "strict morality of the Baptists had turned in practice into the path prepared by the Calvinistic ethic." Further, the following observation has proven almost prophetic of the "new" South as an ascetic, inhuman, and theocratic "heaven" or "God's Kingdom on Earth" mostly dominated or influenced by Baptism and other Puritan-based Protestant evangelicalism (Wuthnow 1998) for two centuries, since the second Great Awakening of the 1800s. Weber observes that "a strict avoidance of the world, in the sense of all not strictly necessary intercourse with worldly people, together with the strictest bibliocracy in the sense of taking the life of the first generations of Christians as a model, were the results for the first Baptist communities." In short, Baptism's moral–religious extremism, antihumanism, primitivism, and theocratic ideal generate and predict the dramatic anticultural mutation of the "gold old" South into a Baptist-ruled "heaven" (Lemert 1999) for its adherents or "hell" for most others in sociological terms of a theocratic dystopia. In sum, Puritanism's ascetic–theocratic freezing of the once "merry-land," joyful US South into a merry-less, joyless "Bible Belt" continues and surpasses, spanning from the mid eighteenth to the twenty-first century, in duration, completeness and intensity its temporary and partial frosting of the "Merrie old England" in the seventeenth century.

Educational and Scientific Authoritarianism

Another dimension or outcome of Puritan social authoritarianism is educational and scientific authoritarianism. Puritan antieducational and antiscientific authoritarianism is linked with antiartistic attitudes and general anticulture antagonism, just as it is grounded in and sanctified by its moral–religious version. In particular, Puritanism's vigorous antagonism to secular culture, including education and science, with no "immediate religious value," produces and predicts its educational and scientific authoritarianism. Puritan educational–scientific authoritarianism thus comprises or leads to the hostility to, suspicion, fear, and suppression of education, science, and technology that lack a strong religious dimension, sanction, or aim. It is simply hostile to, fearful, and suppressive of secular education, science, and technology, including academic freedom, opposed, and dissolved to their religious forms.

In retrospect, as hinted, Comte identifies Puritan educational–scientific authoritarianism by detecting "anti-scientific tendencies" in Puritanism and Protestantism overall. He attributes these tendencies to factors like, first, the "incorporation" of Puritanism or Protestantism with oppressive government; second, the "repugnance of theology" to the promotion of science; third, "irrational" national, concretely English, exclusiveness; and fourth, the Puritan and other Protestant "dangerous inertia." He thus suggests that scientific authoritarianism in Puritanism is founded in and sanctified by its moral–religious forms, notably its theocratic ideal and practice by government "incorporation," its theological hostility toward secular science and education, its nationalist–ethnocentric irrationalism, and its conservatism, i.e., status-quo bias, "dangerous inertia" or "hysteresis" (Baudrillard 1994:115–116) once in power. Generally, Comte argues that the "development of the sciences, of industry, and even of the fine arts was historically the principal, though latent, cause of the irretrievable decline of the theological and military [feudal] system," and that this contradiction is the "real character" of contemporary "social antagonism." This implies that the battle between Puritan antiscientific as well as antiartistic authoritarian tendencies, grounded in and justified by theological antipathy and theocratic authoritarianism, and scientific–technological and artistic progress and freedom is the essential social antagonism in modern secular Western society. Moreover, he predicts that Puritan scientific, like artistic and theocratic, authoritarianism is predestined to be "un-elected" in light of the predicted further "development of the sciences, of industry, and even of the fine arts" and consequently the "irretrievable decline" of the theological–military system, a sort of unexpected or perverse validation of the Calvinist dogma of predestination-election for Calvinism or Puritanism itself.

While Comte, in detecting such antiscientific tendencies, only implicitly differs English Puritanism from Protestantism's other types, Weber explicitly points out Puritan educational–scientific authoritarianism expressed in the theological condemnation and theocratic suppression of secular education and science. He specifically finds that early Baptism or some Baptist sects typically "maintained its condemnation of education," especially those secular–humanist forms lacking a direct religious value. By assumption, Weber attributes this condemnation of secular–humanist education to Baptist moral–religious authoritarianism, fundamentalism, and theocracy, viz. early Baptists' "strict" morality and "strictest bibliocracy" or "Biblical way of life," as well as militancy and intolerance, exemplified in "first righteousness, then peace." Further, like Baptism's moral–religious authoritarianism and militancy, Weber's finding of the Baptist original and continuing "condemnation of education" has proven almost prophetic, especially for America and its Southern region. Should he observed Southern Baptism and other Protestant fundamentalism in the 1980s–2000s Weber would have certainly concluded that, like its original form, it "has to this day maintained its condemnation" of nonreligious education and science due to its reportedly maintaining that "no schooling is better than secular schooling [sic!]" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997). In consequence, neo-Puritan fundamentalism or conservatism, resorting to private-religious and home schooling, is found to have "significant and substantial negative

influences on educational attainment" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997) in modern America, particularly Biblical literalism to be "negatively correlated with education"[4] (Smith 2000:9).

In general, what Comte and Weber imply is that Puritanism, both in its original and derivative forms, tends to, if not really destroy, then to make education, science, and philosophy, knowledge and in extension technology, like art and other sensual culture, the servant, appendix, or instrument of Puritan religion, theology, and theocracy, and so authoritarianism. In short, like medieval Catholicism, Puritanism seeks and succeeds to restrict science and knowledge "to make room for faith, not art" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:14). Hence, by its treatment of education, science, and technology, as well as art, Puritanism again perpetuates and extends from Europe to America the Dark Middle Ages precisely characterized ("darkness") by a religious–theological overdetermination and subjugation of these and all secular forms of culture and human life overall, contrary to the Puritan claims to newness and American exceptionalism in this regard.

One may object that not only Puritanism but all Christian and other religions, including Catholicism and Islam, seek to turn secular culture, including education, science and technology, as well as art, into the servant or instrument of their religious doctrine or theology and political practice or theocracy. Even if this is true, at least Puritanism or perhaps Protestantism overall, as Comte, Weber, and Pareto suggest, is evidently no exception in this respect, which contradicts its supposed and celebrated, especially by its US adherents or admirers, exceptionalism or novelty compared to other religions, including traditional Catholicism and radical Islam. In particular, insofar as what Comte detects as theology's repugnance to spreading secular science, knowledge, and education is common to virtually all Christian and other theologies, religions, churches, and theocracies, from Orthodox Christianity and official Catholicism to Islam and Hinduism (perhaps minus Confucianism), Puritanism or Protestantism overall, far from being different, exceptional, or new, only continues, though with an increasing scope, intensity, and persistence, this theological antagonism. In Comte's terms, exceptional or not, Puritanism aims and often succeeds to transform science, knowledge, education, and technology into the medieval-like servant of its antiscience theology and the effective Machiavellian instrument of its theocracy ("incorporation" with government), nationalist irrationalism ("irrational" national exclusiveness), and rigid conservatism ("dangerous inertia"). For instance, a historical study suggests that the widespread or naïve view of the "Puritan origins of science is open to criticism" (Kearney 1965:109) in respect to early England and Europe as well as America. The study finds, for example, that such early European Puritans or Calvinists as French Hugenots and Jansenists "made no mark scientifically" and

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[4] However, Smith (2000:9) claims that US evangelicals in general, as distinguished from "biblical literalists" in particular, "are among the best-educated Americans and have enjoyed the greatest intergenerational educational mobility among all major American religious traditions."

"did not encourage science"[5] that, for example Cartesianism, in fact "came under heavy fire from both Church and State" in Puritan countries like Holland.

If anything, historically Puritanism has near-completely and enduringly succeeded in attaining its aim of subjugating science, education, and technology, in light of its ultimate triumph and persisting influence, in America, first New England and subsequently the South, though only partially and temporarily, given its eventual failure and discredit, in Great Britain. For instance, New England's Puritans arguing that the entire Bible was universally "true" and so compulsory, aimed at and ultimately succeeded in "extending scripture to cover the whole of life" (Foerster 1962:9). Admittedly, as a result of this "literal and legalistic interpretation, scriptural evidence accompanied well-nigh everything that was written [as] Bible chapter-and-verse buttressed every proposition in books of theology, science, politics, morals" (Foerster 1962:9), just as in the arts and other sensual culture. To admit this is admitting that New England Puritanism made science, knowledge, and education, just as politics, morals, and art, and their representatives the docile servants of the old masters like Biblical theology and theologians, and eventually the effective Machiavellian instruments of bibliocracy or the "Bible Commonwealth" and its theocrats–saints, thus eliminating or suppressing intellectual, including academic, and other freedom in society. This implies that Puritanism constitutes the original source or historical precedent of that, as some analysts observe, "in America genuine academic freedom has never been the rule, and [scientists] were the principal victims of attacks" (Coats 1967:724).

Predictably, these attacks, exemplified, culminated, or rehearsed in the persisting and ever-escalating attack on biological evolution theory in America, have been and continue to be undertaken and instigated mostly by Puritans and their proxies like Protestant fundamentalists via a wide range of authoritarian measures, including government censorship often escalating into symbolic and physical violence and "holy terror." Thus, a historical study shows that, in spite of an emphasis on or rather rhetoric of "freedom and individualism" in America, mostly Puritan–conservative "censors have continually tried—with some measure of success—to prohibit types of behavior and speech" (Hull 1999:3). Moreover, it suggests that "at the dawn of the 21st century, the issue of censorship appears to be with [Americans] as much today as in the past" (Hull 1999:38), primarily owing to neo-Puritan evangelicalism and neoconservatism. So, reportedly, Puritan-conservative censorship "is still occurring" in American public education, with various "indecent" and "un-American" books being "removed from school classrooms and library shelves," just as artistic freedom "is also being challenged" by neo-Puritan evangelicals or religious conservatives. A recent indicative example in this regard is the 1996 neo-Puritan Communications Decency Act promulgated by a conservative-dominated Congress and declared unconstitutional due its "unproven benefit of censorship" by the Supreme Court. Relatedly, recall that also Puritanism is often identified as

[5] Kearney (1965:109) adds that Calvinist Jansenism "did not encourage science; Pascal was very much of the lone wolf who gave up his scientific research as an idle pastime after his conversion."

a major source of political and other intolerance and bigotry in America's history, especially in predominant Protestant sectarianism (Lipset 1996).

What Puritanism started and accomplished in New England subsequently continued and perhaps surpassed, via its revivals or extensions within Protestant fundamentalism (especially Baptism), in the South and beyond, following its Great Awakenings and eventual predominance in the region and country as a whole. To recollect, the most famous, but not isolated, historical case of the attempted theological–theocratic subjugation of secular science, knowledge, and education by Southern Puritanism or Protestant fundamentalism is probably the 1925 Tennessee "Monkey Trial" of a biology teacher (John Scopes) accused and convicted for teaching evolution theory as a perennial and persisting Puritan-fundamentalist target in the US South and beyond.

Overall, in this region and America overall, the Puritan or fundamentalist "furor over teaching Darwin's theory of evolution in public schools was raised early in the 20th century" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997), with the "Monkey Trial" as a sort of legal and grotesque[6] pandemonium of this "Bible Belt" mass hysteria, indicated by Tennessee's 1925 Anti-Evolution Act outlawing the "teaching of Darwinian theory" (Hull 1999:48). Hence, if "scientific evidence in contradiction [evolution] with the literal account of creation in Genesis created a potential problem for Christians of many types in the late 19th century" (Martin 2002:872), then this primarily, albeit not only, applied to Puritans and other Protestant fundamentalists in the South and all America.

In retrospect, the "Monkey Trial," as a visible symptom of the normalized pathology and mixed tragedy–comedy of the evangelical "Bible Belt," dramatically or grotesquely confirms Comte's diagnosis of Puritan and other theology's repugnance to the promotion, diffusion, and application of secular science, knowledge, and education, including biology. Generally, it also reaffirms Weber's detection of Puritanism's "fundamental antagonism" to all human culture and life without "immediate religious value." So, to reiterate and paraphrase Voltaire, if the "Monkey Trial," just as Tennessee's Anti-Evolution Act, did not actually exist, it should

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[6] The term the "Monkey Trial" used by US scientists and especially ordinary Americans to describe this episode of Tennessee's Puritan-evangelical attack on evolution theory is particularly intriguing, revealing, and even "funny," just as is the expression "Dumb Laws." Late-night "politically incorrect" US comedians may joke–in contrast to Puritan's legendary near-deadly seriousness, Calvinist stodginess or lack of humor and "fun"–that in so doing Bible-Belt antiscientific neo-Puritans actually proved that they, even "more" than non-Puritan humans, descended from "monkeys" ("no pun intended" to the latter, which in turn may be a sort of insult to this prehuman species, as hinted at by the example of Shakespeare's works), thus unwittingly validating "evil" evolution theory. Of course, the "fun" or joking potential of Puritan-evangelical "Dumb Laws" in the Bible Belt and beyond is self-evident (with comedians perhaps comparing them with movie "dumb, dumber, dumbest"). And these are just two of a myriad of instances whereby Puritanism's (unwittingly) grotesque and (inherently Calvinist) tragic syndrome reproduces America as what even many Americans themselves call, with a mixture of amusement and despair, a perennial "laughing stock" (Hill 2002) of the Western world and beyond. To describe and even classify these instances would require another book with a working title, say, "Puritanism and America's comedy-tragedy."

perhaps have been invented to demonstrate how Puritanism or its fundamentalist substitute destroys or suppresses secular science, knowledge, and education, if Puritan holy warriors or crusaders are not countered or restrained in their culture wars or crusades by countervailing or moderating social forces. This has been the basic story of Puritanism versus science and education (and art) in the "new" South as another, after early New England, "Biblical garden" since the Great Awakenings through the twentieth century up to the twenty-first century. In particular, Southern Puritan fundamentalists, through their favorites pastimes like "Monkey Trials" as their seeming contribution to perennial Puritan witch-trials, would make proud their New England's ancestors by almost implementing their original and never-relinquished aim of "extending scripture to cover the whole of life" via a Salem-style society inhabited "with witches" (Putnam 2000) simultaneously reproduced and exterminated by Puritanism.

In prospect, the Tennessee 1925 "Monkey Trial" not only followed on and punctuated a prior Puritan antiscientific hysteria, but also anticipates and even "mathematically" predicts identical or similar subsequent and future events in the rest of the "Bible Belt" and beyond. This is indicated by contemporary Southern and other US Puritans' persisting, even escalating and intensifying attacks on biological evolution theory in an evident attempt to restore creationism or its disguised variations like "intelligent design"[7] during the 1980s–2000s. The tragic–comic "Monkey Trial," far from being the end, rare anomaly, mere grotesque, anachronism, or what contemporary Southern evangelicals downplay as an "embarrassing episode" (Boles 1999), is a sort of official beginning and declaration of a new permanent Puritan war on the "evil" of secular science, not only biology, in the evangelical South and beyond (e.g., Kansas), thus a process and persisting symptom of Puritanism' normalized and generalized antiscientific pathology. In short, it was not just "embarrassing," but destructive or intimidating to science and education, and not only an "episode," but also a pattern, long-term trend, or "method in the madness" (Smith 2000).

Generally, Puritan and generally fundamentalist–Protestant skepticism and hostility toward the "value and propriety of scientific investigation has continued unabated ever since" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997), and consequently toward academic freedom, in America, most strikingly, as expected, in the neo-Puritan South.

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[7] It may seem paradoxical or contradictory that US neo-Puritan evangelicals and neo-conservatives should propose or defend an "intelligent design" doctrine as a neo or postcreationist alternative to that of evolution, given their observed and proudly self-professed antiintellectualism and irrationalism overall. On the other hand, this may not be paradoxical, since their "intelligent design" is in principle Divine or super-human, thus consistent with Puritanism's antiintellectualism, irrationalism, and antihumanism, notably its condemnation or suspicion of *human* reason, rationality and intelligence as potentially or actually dangerous to God's Rational Plan and Will. By contrast, even the Vatican's chief astronomer stated in the 2000s that "intelligent design" was not science, but camouflaged creationism or ideology, so with no place in education, and the Vatican newspaper published an article complaining that some American "creationists" returned the debate, "polluted by political positions," on evolution theory to the "dogmatic" 1800s.

Such attitudes and practices are evidently both an original trait and enduring heritage of American Puritanism. This remarkable continuity helps explain and predict the continuous and even intensifying, as during the 1980s–2000s, Puritan–fundamentalist assaults and restrictions on academic and other intellectual liberties and rights—e.g., independence, tenure, union, organization—in America, predictably, most egregiously the South, with scientists, from biology to sociology, economics, and other social science, just as artists and other intellectuals, remaining the "principal victims of attacks."

A salient dimension or consequence of Puritan educational and scientific authoritarianism involves the hostility and suspicion toward social progress and other antirationalism, including antiintellectualism. In retrospect, contrary to conventional wisdom, Puritanism continues, and even intensifies the hostility to social progress and irrationalism characteristic of Catholicism, plus Orthodox Christianity, as well other Weber's adaptation-to-the world religions prior and posterior to Protestantism. Thus, Comte notices that Puritanism and all Protestantism, including both Lutheranism and Calvinism, "is yet even more hostile to progress" than was Catholicism and moreover has been "instituted from the beginning for perpetual subjection." The term "perpetual subjection" indicates that the Puritan hostility to social progress is not only irrational but rigidly conservative and authoritarian, some sort of recipe and rationalization for a permanent theocratic tyranny, in its aim, form, or effect. Comte also remarks that since changing its "natural attitude of simple opposition" to "violent repression" when in government, Puritan Protestantism has shared and reinforced those Catholic-conservative "vices to the full," including the hostility to social progress. He infers that Puritanism or Protestantism overall was destined to become "retrograde," i.e., reactionary-conservative, irrational, and authoritarian, like, or even more than, Catholicism, elevating its theocratic "subjection," or link to temporal state power, into principle. This suggests that Puritanism's theocratic principles and practices generate and predict its retrograde conservatism and hence its hostility to progress, irrationalism, so its educational–scientific authoritarianism. Also, recall Comte specifically identifies Puritan irrationalism by pointing to irrational national exclusiveness as a characteristic of English Puritanism. Overall, Puritanism's hostility to social progress is a special facet or symptom of its irrationalism, as are its antiscientific tendencies.

Evoking and confirming Comte, Pareto implies that Puritanism is antiprogressive by classifying the Protestant Reformation, including by implication the Puritan Revolution in Great Britain and America, into revolutions against "economic and social progress" or change, along with, curiously, the founding of the Roman Empire. In other words, Pareto places Puritanism or Protestantism overall into those "movements tending to restore to the ruling classes" their social dominance or cohesion ("residues of group-persistence") superseded or weakened by counterforces "for change, for economic and social progress." In particular, he cites the Renaissance, in virtue of being "only too soon was halted by the Protestant Reformation," notably the Puritan Revolution, as the prime culture and in part political casualty of Puritanism or Protestantism and its apparent revolutionary antagonism

to social, including artistic–cultural, progress, and freedom. Generally, he suggests that Puritanism is a mixture of reactionary conservatism and radicalism, a sort of restorationism through revolutionary nihilism (rather than reformism or ameliorative gradualism), or extremism in extremist conservative and radical forms or meanings, thus a functional equivalent, proxy, or precursor of fascism precisely defined by this mixture as well.

Also, akin to both Comte and Pareto, Weber admonishes, in light of prevalent opposite opinions, that Puritanism and early Protestantism in general "had precious little to do with what is today called progress" and to that extent with its, especially Calvinist, supposed political and economic rationalism,[8] including what he calls Puritans' "ostensible intellectualism."[9] Moreover, he says that "to the whole aspect of modern life, it was directly hostile" in favor of tradition, thus contradicting the received "naïve assumptions" linking Puritanism or Protestantism to modernity, progress, rationality (Merton 1984, Parsons 1966; ;lso Ashton 1965), as well as to liberal–secular democracy and freedom. Also, stating that the "ability to free oneself" from sacred or common religious and other tradition is a "sort of liberal [and rationalist] enlightenment," Weber implies that Puritanism has been unable to reach, just as it opposes, the latter in the sense of a Western program or movement of liberalism, rationalism, and secularism. Such hostility to modernity or inability to free itself from sacred tradition reveals Puritan antimodernism or traditionalism, so antirationalism and antiliberalism, including antisecularism. Evidently, this locates

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[8] Weber refers to the "political and economic rationalism of Calvinism," but if the latter has "precious little" to do with social progress and is overall "hostile" to Western modernity, it is *non*rational in this sense of the Enlightenment. Or, this political–economic "rationalism" is better interpreted as the respective capitalist and authoritarian (rather than democratic as one might think) efficiency of Calvinism, which suggests that the latter is at least substantively irrational or inefficient in respect of liberal secular democracy as well as a free civil society.

[9] Weber, commenting on Samuel Butler's poem mocking the Puritans for their "ostensible philosophical intellectualism," suggests that "what gave the Puritans, and above all the Baptist sects, their insuperable power of resistance was not the intellectualism of the privileged but the intellectualism of the plebeian and occasionally even pariah people, for Baptist Protestantism was in its first period a movement carried by wandering crafts-persons or missionaries." He adds that "there was no distinctive intellectual stratum characterized by their specific conduct of life among these Protestant sects, but after the close of a brief period of missionary activity by their wandering preachers, it was the middle class that became suffused with their intellectualism." Yet, Weber finds that "in contrast to the situations in Holland, parts of Scotland, and the American colonies, this mass religious intellectualism soon dwindled in England after the Puritans gained and established their power through the religious wars." These observations thus suggest that Puritanism's putative intellectualism was, first, partial rather than complete, second, religious–theological rather than secular–scientific (and artistic) as usually understood, and third, instrumental, in the function of attaining political power, rather than intrinsic, as a value in itself. Notably, the last observation indicates that, as Comte would expect, Puritanism only promoted or preached mass intellectualism, just as liberty and democracy, when in opposition or religious and culture wars against existing non-Puritan powers, yet became antiintellectual, as well as illiberal (reactionary), and antidemocratic, when in government or powerful. Hence, Puritan intellectualism turns out essentially to be antiintellectualism (or just "ostensible") in liberal–secular, including scientific, as well as democratic terms.

Puritanism at the opposite pole from liberal–democratic ideology, particularly the Enlightenment, including its British variant (Zaret 1989). The Puritan hostility or suspicion toward social progress and modernity and irrationalism are grounded in and driven by the fear of and attack on human reason and so antihumanism, characteristic of Puritanism and its theological source Calvinism.

For instance, the early US Puritans admittedly "were not rationalists, because they found human reason, unaided, an inadequate guide," just as no romanticists as they "deeply distrusted emotional desire and private intuition" (Foerster 1962:7). This observation suggests that the mistrust and fear of human reason grounded and rationalized the irrationalism and thus scientific authoritarianism of early and subsequent American Puritanism, as the deep distrust of "emotional desire and private intuition" did its hostility to sensual culture, including the arts, so its cultural antagonism and antiartistic authoritarian practices. Thus, the early US Puritans held that "in the Fall, man became entirely incapable of virtue save through the operation of divine grace. Owing to the corruption of his reason, of his will, of all his faculties, notably the imagination and the affections, man lay open to the perversions of sin" (Foerster 1962:8). They hence adopted the Calvinist dogma of predestination that makes supposedly sinful, and corrupt and evil humans mere tools of Divine Glory, as the ultimate theological basis and rationale for their irrationalism and scientific authoritarianism, and cultural antagonism and authoritarian antiartistic practices. This reaffirms that early American Puritanism was no more than an almost exact replica or spin-off of European, notably (and perhaps ironically) French, Calvinism. Thus, "in the fundamentals of their faith they usually found themselves in large agreement with the teachings of John Calvin, the French Protestant reformer of Geneva"[10] (Foerster 1962:9).

In addition to Calvinism as a theological basis, most early US Puritans continued and reinforced the emphasis of their English ancestors on the supposed "corruption" and "evil" of human reason, an irrational belief or manifest syndrome of irrationalism as the source and rationale of Puritan political, religious, and other "intolerance and radicalism" (Zaret 1989:173). Alternatively, such irrationalism, notably the attack on human reason, is, as Popper (1973:236–238) suggests, inherent to political–religious radicalism or extremism, as essentially irrational or unreasonable in character or effect, in American Puritanism and similar religions or ideologies.

Evidently, the above creates and perpetuates an infinite circle or system of reciprocal reproduction and reinforcement of Puritan irrationalism and extremism. Thus, the theological condemnation of human reason and humans as such became a sort

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[10] Given the anti-French mass hysteria in America during the 2000s (and before), incited and sustained mostly by a "holy" alliance of Protestant fundamentalists and political conservatives, US neo-Puritans would likely drop "French" and even substitute it with "American" from "John Calvin, the French Protestant reformer of Geneva," in a typical Puritan–conservative nationalist reconstruction or reinterpretation ad even erasing of history to suit their present needs and future projects (e.g., the "French to freedom fries" formula in US Congress).

of *perpetuum mobile* in early and later American Puritanism, a prime mover and ultimate sanctification of political–religious extremism or theocracy as well as comprehensive irrationalism and antiscientific oppression. In turn, such condemnation of human reason and glorification of irrationalism were intrinsic or foundational to Puritanism with its political–religious extremism as basically an irrational or unreasonable attribute from the rationalist Enlightenment's prism. A prototypical instance or manifest symptom of the early US Puritans' irrationalism involved their violent witch-hunts in New England as those at Salem, apparently expressing and acting on irrational and primitive beliefs in the existence of "witches" and similar emanations of "evil" (Satan), so in the "corruption" and "evilness" of human reason and humans overall. At this juncture, "Salem with witches" (Putnam 2000:355) has become the supreme proof or allegory of early American Puritanism's irrationalism and authoritarianism, including theocracy, as well as subsequently and consequently those of neo-Puritan fundamentalism, just as of fascism, especially Nazism, and McCarthyism as its "proudly made in America" conservative creation or proxy. Other manifest or latent instances of Puritan irrationalism and authoritarianism comprise the persecution, execution, and occasional extermination of native Indians, Quakers, and other "ungodly," "impure," and "un-American" cultures, groups, and activities, as practices also expressive of an essentially irrational, primitive, simplistic, and absolutist or Manichean, "good-versus-evil" view of the world. Additional cases or symptoms are what some analysts describe as the "hysterical agonies" of the Puritan–evangelical revivals or Great Awakenings to which New England's witch-hunts were a "prelude" (Rossel 1970:918). A cited case is the "loss of reason" during the Second Awakening of the 1800s (Gould 1996:180) that established the predominance of Puritanism or evangelicalism in the South (Boles 1999) through the nineteenth century and perhaps America as a whole, as evidenced by steadily dominant Baptism, by the early twenty-first century.

These Puritan irrational practices in New England and their subsequent and contemporary revivals, extensions, equivalents, or proxies especially in the South dramatically highlight the warning that, due to its intolerance, most irrationalism generates "criminality" and is immanent to political radicalism or extremism, while rationalism contains the "recognition of the claim of tolerance" (Popper 1973:236–238). If this is correct, then the point is not to so much to argue and demonstrate that Puritan and other fundamentalist irrationalism in America and elsewhere is intolerant, violent, oppressive, and ultimately authoritarian as that Puritanism is fundamentally irrational and inhuman in the sense or virtue of its condemning and fearing human reason and humans. Simply, Puritan antirationalism or antihumanism predicts its antiscientific, as well as political, authoritarianism.

In general, American and other Puritanism condemns rationalism, notably the rationalist Enlightenment (Zaret 1989), as a supreme "danger" (Baltzell 1979), a dangerous exercise and application of supposedly corrupt human reason as the ultimate evil, enemy, or target to be eradicated. Consequently, Puritanism descends and indulges into the most primitive, absolute, and violent irrationalism seeking to exorcise via theocratic oppression human reason from its Holy Commonwealth,

starting with New England's community of saints, moving to the South's Bible Belt, expanding to other faith-based ("red") states, and perhaps eventuating into America's neo-Puritan, evangelical sociological "heaven" in the sense, and form of a theocratic dystopia.

Puritan irrationalism and so antiscientific authoritarianism is also manifested in localism, parochialism, and rigid conformism as essentially irrational attitudes or behaviors. As hinted, Puritan nationalism and ethnocentrism, including racism and xenophobia, typically comprise or lead to localism and parochialism, with all these particular dimensions (in factor-analysis terms) "loading" on the generic attribute of what Parsons calls particularism as opposed to universalism or cosmopolitanism, including, as Merton emphasizes, that of science and education. At this juncture, in virtue of its provincialism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and moral particularism in general Puritanism is either overtly or indirectly hostile to the universalism or cosmopolitanism, a word US Puritans or fundamentalists especially loath, of science and education, as well as of art and other sensual culture. Puritan localism and parochialism, like nationalism and nativism, are fundamentally irrational attitudes and behavior in that they represent, as Colley states in reference to ethnocentrism, the matter of a lack of knowledge, as does particularism generally. Notably, they are authoritarian, including oppressive and criminal, not only because they are intrinsically irrational, if Popper (1973) is correct in his cited views. They are also so because lack of knowledge as the dimension, sign, or cause of irrationalism may generate the absence of tolerance, i.e., ignorance can lead to cultural–political intolerance and arrogance—and conversely—while rationalism recognizes and promotes tolerant attitudes and actions in culture and politics. Simply, Puritan localism and parochialism, like nationalism and ethnocentrism, tend to eventuate into scientific and other authoritarianism due both to their irrationalism and political radicalism, the infinite circle of irrational and radical. For instance, while "pilgrims-through-life," Weber's Puritans in England and America "hardly ever looked beyond the border of their home town" (Bauman 1997:93). This exhibits a narrow small-town mentality as a case or symptom of parochialism, so latent irrationalism and authoritarianism, including ignorance *cum* Biblical bliss or secular knowledge as the "forbidden apple," and intolerance and spiritual arrogance[11] as holiness.

In addition, as noted, the "tight binding of the individual to the group by its approval" (Munch 1981:731) contains or produces strict social uniformity or conformism in Puritanism, especially its American type. Recall, Mill notes that American Puritanism commands that "all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the early settlers in New England." Also, remember that the Puritans in Massachusetts and the rest of New England admittedly "bristled at any suggestion of nonconformity to their rigid and angular conceptions" (Foerster 1962:4), while, as Comte would expect, acting or

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[11] Recall, the British diplomat's description of US Puritan-Presbyterian President Wilson at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference by words like as "spiritual arrogance" and the "harder forms of religion."

describing themselves as nonconformists or revolutionaries when in opposition in Great Britain. Now, if democracy in Great Britain "owes more to Nonconformity than to any other single movement" (Tawney 1962: 272), this Puritan antipathy to and suppression of nonconformity in both thought and action was undemocratic, thus leading to political and cultural, including antiscientific, authoritarianism. Moreover, inverting the aforesaid one can say that irrationalism and cultural authoritarianism in New England and beyond, notably the South, "owe more to Puritanism than to any other single factor." In particular, this holds true of what observers call "notorious" American conformism as an element of "primitivism" (Baudrillard 1999:92), as well as "small-town parochialism"[12] (Singh 2002:226), mostly (though not solely) due to Puritanism, so exemplifying its self-perpetuating legacies or vestiges in contemporary America ushering the twenty-first century, as discussed later.

Authoritarian Uses of Science and Technology

A specific and salient dimension or outcome of Puritanism's antiscientific as well as antiartistic authoritarianism is its adoption and use of science, knowledge, technology, and even the arts for essentially authoritarian and inhuman purposes. These aims range from domestic political and moral–religious authoritarian control and oppression, including totalitarian theocracy, to global expansionism, imperialism, domination, militarism, and permanent war on "evil." Puritanism reduces science, education, knowledge, technology, the arts and virtually all secular culture to effective Machiavellian means of its authoritarian, notably theocratic–militarist, ends, which confirms its typical, though somewhat hidden, Machiavellianism. Hence, Puritan political–social authoritarianism generates and predicts the authoritarian use or Machiavellian manipulation and exploitation of secular science, knowledge, education, technology, and art, inherent to Puritanism.

In light of the above, Comte's detection of antiscientific and antiartistic tendencies in Puritanism and Protestantism overall is to be qualified in the sense that it is hostile to secular science, knowledge, technology, and the arts *unless* and to the extent that they can serve its primarily authoritarian, notably theocratic and militarist, purposes and practices. Hence, his specification of the "real character of our social antagonism" as the struggle between the theological–military, Protestant—Catholic, and the scientific spirit is to be understood as one between theocratic–authoritarian and democratic–secular uses of science, knowledge, technology, and the arts. Similarly, Weber's admonition that Puritanism and scientific and other progress "must not at all be unquestioningly identified" is subject to qualification—i.e., except if and to the extent that this progress can be harnessed in the service of Puritan theocratic–military and other authoritarian aims. This is

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[12] As an apparent illustration of Puritan-American parochialism in academic settings, Smeeding (2006:69) notes that "most examinations of U.S. domestic antipoverty policy are inherently parochial, for they are based on the experiences of only our nation in isolation from the others."

what he implies noticing that, like the Catholic church, Puritan sects "have also been disposed to have nothing with science, except in a situation where material requirements of everyday life were involved," with these being essentially demands for theocratic oppression and/or military conquest.

For example, elaborating on or evoking Weber, Merton (1968:628–629) shows that in early English Puritanism, the "deep-rooted religious interests of the day" demanded or stimulated the "systematic, rational, and empirical study of Nature" in the service of the "control of the corrupt world" as well as the "glorification of God." Merton therefore suggests that for early Puritanism the cultivation of natural and social science made sense, and still does for its sequels and proxies, only or primarily as the efficient means of its end of political–social authoritarianism ("control of the corrupt world"), notably some kind of theocracy ("glorification of God"). As he puts it, the seventeenth century Puritans held the "belief that scientific understanding of the world serves to manifest the glory of God."[13] Only taking into consideration such theological–theocratic beliefs and aims can one understand, explain, or simply make sense of what Merton depicts as early Puritanism's encouragement of and even contribution to the rise of modern English science. Hence, Merton's findings should not surprise but are in a sense expected by Weber, who would understand them as the results of Calvinist theology epitomized by the dogma of predestination and instruments of Puritan bibliocracy, and by Comte, who might explain them as the means of the theological–military system to perpetuate or revive itself.

Subsequent studies reinforce or revise Merton's findings, especially the Puritan use of science for the sake of "control of the corrupt world" and "glorification of God," and especially corroborate Weber's and Comte's insights. Reportedly, early English Puritanism was receptive of science and its technological applications only "when placed in the service" of religion, God, and theocracy *cum* "good works," but "stood in sharp opposition to the institutional norms of science which were regarded as inviting irreligiosity and Deism" (Becker 1984), as well as disobedience to secular power. No doubt, "good works" meant mostly theocratic moral–political

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[13] According to Merton (1984), these elements of early Puritanism encouraged and contributed to the rise of modern English science: a strong emphasis on everyday utilitarianism, intramundane interests, and actions (inner-worldly asceticism), the belief that scientific understanding of the world serves to manifest the glory of God, the right and duty to challenge various forms of authority, a strong streak of antitraditionalism, empiricism, and rationality. However, following Weber, he usually finds that the "belief that scientific understanding of the world serves to manifest the glory of God" was the primary element or the necessary condition in this respect, without which the others could not operate effectively. For example, what Merton, like Parsons (1966), sees as "rationality" in Puritanism could only operate as an effective factor, and even be fully understood as such, given this fundamental theological belief, i.e., as the means or process to "manifest the glory of God." Hence, Puritan "rationality" was in essence irrationality in nontheological or secular, notably Enlightenment, terms, at most "substantive rationality" in Weber's sense of a pursuit of ultimate or transcendental, mostly irrational, values, as Parsons also suggests. In this regard, Parsons-Merton's assumption or finding of Puritan "rationality" does not contradict but rather confirms Comte's original diagnosis of the essential irrationalism of Puritanism.

control and oppression in the face of the total self-righteous reign of Puritan saints or lord-protectors a la Cromwell and Winthrop. In turn, the Puritan opposition to scientific norms on the ground of "irreligiosity" confirms Comte's diagnosis of antiscientific tendencies in Puritanism and suggests that for its adherents science was legitimate only insofar as it was harnessed in the nonscientific and authoritarian service of theology and theocracy, i.e., as non- or pseudoscience in the proper sense. In short, in Puritanism science is, in Sorokin's words, "degraded to the role of a mere handmaid," when not condemned and destroyed as blasphemy (e.g., evolution theory), of religion, church, or sect in Weber's sense, theology, theocracy, so of authoritarianism.

What Merton and other sociologists find for early English and other European Puritanism or Calvinism like German Pietism holds true *mutatis mutandis* for its early and subsequent American successor. For instance, New England Puritanism adopted and used education, instruction, and science, plus art, to "get people accept a high standard of moral discipline" (Israel1966:594), thus eventually authoritarian control and theocratic oppression in morality as a sort of freely chosen Puritan tyranny or slavery through such indoctrination. For example, both "learning and music were encouraged insofar as they contributed toward attaining religio-political goals, but they were condemned as wasteful if carried further for their own sake" (Israel 1966:594). This means that early American Puritanism treated science and knowledge, just as the arts, as "good" only to the extent that they were put in the holy service or servility of religion and theocratic government, yet as "evil" when falling to perform that function and became autonomous or secular, and thus reenacted their treatment as the servants of theology and theocracy during the Dark Middle Ages. Consequently, Puritanism, and hence Puritan-dominated America, primarily used technology and progress for its authoritarian purposes or, as some analysts put it, in the "image of itself"[14] (Stivers 1994:40). In brief, for early US Puritanism, science or knowledge "without emotional faith had no value" (Bremer 1995:17). Hence, for New England's Puritans there was no such thing as "science for the sake of science," like the "art for the sake of the art," independent of religion, church-sect, theology, and theocratic government. This also essentially holds true of their predecessors in England, not to mention the Dark Middle Ages, as well as their successors in America, notably Bible Belt fundamentalists, from the mid eighteenth century Great Awakenings to the early twenty-first century.

In general functionalist terms, the sole or main social function of science, education, and technology, just as art and all secular culture, in Puritanism has always been and remain, to use Parsons' words, to "demonstrate the goodness of God"

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[14] Stivers (1994:40) comments that, largely due to Puritanism, America "represents an Enlightenment experiment [seeing] in technology and progress an image of itself–practical reason." This essentially implies that Puritanism makes America use technology and progress for the sake of attaining its "Manifest Destiny of a political Messiah" (Stivers 1994:32), including military victories and world domination, and thus substantively abuse and exploit what critical theorists like Adorno et al. describe as the dialectic of the Enlightenment for authoritarian and nonpeaceful purposes.

and reveal, increase and perpetuate the "glory of Divinity," so to support theology and create or sustain theocracy as bibliocracy. Hence, they become the servant or appendage of rigid theology and oppressive theocracy in Puritanism almost as they, as Comte and Weber imply, did in Catholicism during the Dark Middle Ages. Alternatively, if science, education, and technology, as well as art, fail in performing this sacred, theological–theocratic function, they are condemned and attacked as "ungodly," incarnations of "evil" or Satan, so alien to and exorcised via witch-hunts literally or allegorically from the Puritan "heaven" both in theological and sociological terms of paradise and theocratic dystopia respectively.

As hinted, American Puritanism's sanctimonious and vehement condemnation and exorcism of biological evolution theory provide a dramatic testimony to this pattern and historically a functional substitute for the identical fate of astronomical heliocentric theory in Catholicism during the Dark Middle Ages and their Inquisition. In short, what Copernicus' heliocentric theory was in official medieval Catholicism or the Vatican theocracy, Darwin's evolutionism became in American Puritanism, particularly Southern fundamentalism such as Baptism—i.e., the "work of Satan." Further, the aforesaid of natural science also holds true of social science, especially liberal, secular, and critical societal theories, equally and sometimes even more harshly condemned, attacked, and banished in Puritanism, just as Catholicism before, in the proportion of their failing to serve the holy social function of theocratic authoritarianism. Overall, Puritanism, especially its American type, condemns, attacks, and eliminates biological evolutionism and liberal social science, as well as the arts, derived from or inspired by the Enlightenment, including what Mises calls critical sociology and economics, as "evil" on the account of their failure or reluctance to become the servants of Puritan theology and theocracy. In sum, Puritanism makes science, education, technology, and even the arts the "basis of social control" (Kinloch 1981:35) in general, theocratic oppression and military conquest in particular.

Authoritarian Antihumanism

Another element or result of the social authoritarianism of Puritanism is authoritarian antihumanism, intertwined with its other elements, especially moral–religious authoritarianism. Puritan authoritarian antihumanism manifests itself in dimensions or outcomes ranging from the theological condemnation of secular humanism to sheer theocratic inhumanity and barbarism.

Against Secular Humanism

First and foremost, Puritanism theologically condemns and attacks secular humanism, as a manifest or latent dimension and symptom of its antihumanism. It stigmatizes, assaults, and counters both "secular" and "humanism," but especially and most manifestly or intensively the first. Particularly, American Puritanism or evangelicalism strongly prefers and pursues non- or antihumanism over secular

humanism condemned and attacked as an "insidious force" (Smith 2000:131) in education, science, and culture overall. This is as indicated or intimated by the research finding that for contemporary US Puritans or fundamentalists "no schooling is better than secular schooling" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997). At this juncture, what economists would call Puritan–fundamentalist "revealed preferences" for and practices of "no schooling" over "secular schooling" ground, engender and predict, just as they rationalize and epitomize, preferring, and practicing nonhumanism to secular humanism, and conversely. US Puritans and their substitutes may admit that nonhumanism, like no or home religious schooling might not be the ideal or "best thing" to do, yet claim that it is a "lesser evil" or less repugnant than secular humanism and education as the greater sin (the "work of Satan") and stronger cause for repugnance, to be theologically condemned and oppressively banished from their Holy Bible Commonwealth.

In retrospect, Comte identifies the Puritan condemnation of and repugnance to secular humanism, suggesting that Puritanism or Protestantism overall has even surpassed Catholicism in this respect. He observes that, due to its authoritarian political power when in government and its reactionary conservatism, "all emancipation of the human mind became more repugnant" to established Puritanism ("official Protestantism"), just as its oppositional sects, than to the "most degenerate" (sic!) Catholicism. Comte suggests that the Puritan repugnance to the "emancipation of the human mind," so secular humanism overall, is unprecedented in intensity or extent within Christianity itself, and is perhaps a theological source and rationale for what Weber identifies as the "unexampled tyranny" or theocracy of Puritanism. In a sense, this theological or doctrinaire repugnance to and condemnation of secular humanism could, can, and will solely be realized, i.e., transformed into official social institutions and policy, in a Puritan theocracy. Hence, in order to fully understand, explain, or just make sense of the seemingly incomprehensible "unexampled tyranny" of Puritanism and its theocracy requires taking into consideration Comte's diagnosis of Puritan theology's unprecedented repugnance to "all emancipation of the human mind" and secular humanism overall. For example, Comte observes that in countries where Puritanism or Protestantism politically triumphed as in England, Holland, and Germany, the triumph "neutralized its tendency to philosophical emancipation by connecting with the conservative system the kind of organization that Protestantism would admit of." So, by adopting rigid political conservatism when in power or majority and its perennial ideal and system of theocratic social organization, Puritanism counteracted such forms of human–spiritual emancipation or secular humanism. Also, Comte's contemporary Spencer intimates the Puritan repugnance and opposition toward secular humanism by noting that Puritans or all Protestants, "in substituting the conception of a God so comparatively unlike themselves as not to be influenced" by humane methods like forgiveness (but instead by condemnation and punishment], look "hard and cold," so essentially nonhuman.

Weber also hints at Comte's diagnosis by observing that most Puritan reformers or revolutionaries, including Methodist John Wesley, "were not the founders of societies for ethical culture nor the proponents of humanitarian projects for social

reform or cultural ideals [as] the salvation of the soul and that alone [so God] was the centre of their life and work." At most, Puritanism stipulates that brotherly love, as he puts it, "may only be practiced for the glory of God and not in the service of the flesh," which thus virtually excludes or sacrifices humans in favor of Divinity from its realm of exercise, and consequently "assumes a peculiarly objective and impersonal character." He adds that in Puritanism, following Calvinism, anything human, or "everything of the flesh is separated from God by an unbridgeable gulf and deserves of Him only eternal death, in so far as He has not decreed otherwise for the glorification of His Majesty." For instance, Weber notices that the modesty of secular or non-Puritan capitalistic entrepreneurs is "essentially more honest than the reserve which Franklin so shrewdly recommends" in his Puritan-Calvinist[15] profession of honesty or rather the "appearance of honesty" as the "best policy" and generally the "utility of virtue," i.e., more human and less hypocritical. As noted, Weber remarks that honesty and other human virtues "professed" by American Puritanism are "pure hypocrisy," so Puritan humanism or what Parsons (1967:80) calls ethical universalism is hypocritical or Machiavellian–utilitarian at most. Also, Weber adds that Franklin "ascribes his recognition of the utility of virtue to a divine revelation which was intended to lead him in the path of righteousness." This suggests that Franklin et al.'s hypocrisy and Machiavellianism or utilitarianism as a Machiavellian generalized variation are rooted in Puritan theology and so intrinsic to Puritanism. In Comte's words, Puritanism's repugnance to secular humanism, by its "divine revelation" dictating the "path of righteousness" to humans, produces and predicts Franklin et al.'s "pure hypocrisy" and Machiavellianism or utilitarianism. Hence, Comte would comment that American Puritanism is "more repugnant" to secular humanism than the "most degenerate" Catholicism, but it does not say that openly and instead couches this repugnance in humanistic phrases about human virtues, including Franklin's "honesty." As such, Puritan "pure hypocrisy" constitutes, to cite the proverb, the "homage that vice pays to virtue," in this case Puritanism to secular humanism, couching its repugnance to the latter in praise. Moreover, hypocrisy in itself may represent an element, effect, or correlate of Puritan or other antihumanism, i.e., if being hypocritical is not a human or family value or virtue, as Weber implies and discussed below. If so, then Weber's detection of "pure hypocrisy" in Puritanism identifies an observable or manifest Durkhemian index of unobservable or latent Puritan antihumanism.

Further, elaborating on Weber, Parsons implicitly admits that Puritanism blends its antagonism to secular humanism with Machiavellianism in the sense of considering humans to be effective means or steps to attaining one's own ends or interests (Bowles et al. 2001). Admittedly, an effect of the individual's immediacy to God in Protestantism, including Puritanism, was the "corresponding devaluation of his

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[15] Weber comments that Benjamin Franklin, though a "colorless deist", had a "strict Calvinistic father [who] drummed into him again and again in his youth" the Bible or at least some sections of its (e.g. "Seest thou a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before kings.") In turn, Merton cites Franklin's claim that God "wants us to tipple" as an illustration of Christian theology "devoted to the argument from design."

attachment to his fellows, above all the tendency to reduce them to impersonal, unsentimental terms and to consider others not so much from the point of their value in themselves as of their usefulness, ultimately to the purposes of God, more immediately to his own ends" (Parsons 1967:54–55). Parsons thus suggests that since to consider humans from the "point of their value in themselves" constitutes secular humanism, considering them in terms of their usefulness "ultimately to the purposes of God" and "more immediately to [one's] own ends" is the antithesis of such humanism and so Machiavellianism, respectively. Notably, he implies that antihumanism may be inherent to Puritanism in that the devaluation of an individual's attachment to others, including the penchant to "reduce them to impersonal" terms, is intrinsic to and rationalized by the Puritan theological immediacy and subordination of humans to God. Also, Machiavellianism or considering people for one's own ends is by implication inherent to this theological treatment of humans, thus evoking Weber's link of Franklin's Machiavellian–utilitarian hypocrisy ("utility of virtue") with Puritan theology ("divine revelation") and command ("path of righteousness"). In this light, Parsons could add that Puritan theological antihumanism, blended with pseudosecular Machiavellianism, was in apparent tension or contradiction with what he otherwise considers to be ethical universalism in Puritanism or ascetic Protestantism. Moreover, Puritanism appears as a species of Parsons' opposite category ("pattern-variable") of ethical particularism on the account of its open or covert (hypocritical) antithesis to secular humanism, as well as Machiavellianism. This is what Parsons (1967:57) intimates stating that Puritanism and the humanistic–universalistic Renaissance could agree only on a few relatively minor points (e.g., rejection of ritual), and alternatively disagreed on, more precisely, Puritans rejected, first and foremost, the latter's secular humanism and thus its ethical universalism. This also holds true of Puritanism in relation to the Enlightenment as in essence the rationalist successor, climax, or sequel of the artistic Renaissance. Historically, since the eighteenth century Puritanism and other religious fundamentalism has, as noted, waged what some analysts describe as the "mindless" war (Habermas 2001:135) against the Enlightenment because of the latter's condemned secular or "rationalistic humanism" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:74), ethical universalism in Kant' sense (the categorical imperative) and related values and ideas such as liberalism, secularism, and modernism. And it still does at the start of the twenty-first century, as indicated by neo-Puritan fundamentalist and neoconservative culture wars in America against the modern Enlightenment attacked as (creating) a "civilization with strong humanistic values" (Berman 2000:176). In short, for Puritanism, the Enlightenment, the Renaissance, and liberalism overall are its "evil" enemies because they are humanistic in secular terms, as well as rationalist, individualistic, libertarian (not in the sense of economic "libertarianism" *cum* conservatism), and modern.

In particular, the Puritan repugnance and opposition to secular humanism are manifest and intense in defining humans as secondary, subordinate, or instrumental and condemning them a "evil," "sinful," or "corrupt" in relation to God. Thus, Weber notices that following Calvinism, Puritanism treats humans as what Calvin et al. regard as the powerless and obedient "tool of the divine will," contrasting this

treatment with that in Lutheranism (the "vessel of the Holy Spirit"). Consequently, the Puritan–Calvinist interest is, as he states, "solely in God, not in man; God does not exist for men, but men for the sake of God." This is a prototypical and categorical theological statement of antihumanism, including the repugnance to secular humanism, within Puritanism and Protestantism as a whole. As Weber elaborates, within Puritanism, "all creation, including the fact that only a small proportion of men are chosen for eternal grace, can have any meaning only as means to the glory and majesty of God. The world exists to serve the glorification of God and for that purpose alone. The elected Christian is in the world only to increase this glory of God by fulfilling His commandments." This suggests that Puritanism blends antihumanism with the obverse of Parsons' supposed Protestant ethical universalism or with moral particularism embodied in a spiritual aristocracy of saints or the "elected" "chosen for eternal grace." Further, Weber implies that Puritanism harbors or generates the most intense, total, or extreme type of antihumanism not only within Protestantism but even in Christianity and other world religions. Thus, he states that the "most extreme form" of humans' absolute or exclusive trust in God was found in Puritanism, specifically its warning "against any trust in the aid of friendship of men," which further confirms and specifies its general extremism. Weber comments that this warning made humans "doomed by an inexorable fate" in which "friendly and human comforts did not exist," and characterizes such Puritan attitudes and behaviors as a "peculiar misanthropy" seen as a facet, symptom, or predictor of antihumanism and inhumanity. In brief, Weber's Puritans are the most extreme misanthropes and the purest hypocrites alike, couching their misanthropy, or inhumanity into human "virtues," including moral "purity" and honesty as the "best policy."

Further, Puritanism not only defines humans as the mere "tool of the divine will," but theologically condemns and theocratically punishes them as "evil," "bad," "vicious," "wicked," "corrupt," and even, as Cromwell et al. put it, in "enmity against God." For Puritanism, humans are not just subservient "super-Machiavellian" Divine instruments, but also rebellious, dangerous, and inimical-to-God sinners, consequently, potential or actual criminals, driven by, as claimed by Cromwell et al., "monstrous iniquity and wickedness." Hence, humans must be constantly and totally controlled, harshly disciplined, and severely punished, including executed, for their deadly and other sins and vices or transgressions of holiness, piety, and virtue, redefined as crimes, often more serious, as with blasphemy or heresy and adultery, than even murder and other physical violence. Puritanism hence adopts and even intensifies the Calvinist (and Lutheran) theological "emphasis on the fundamental evilness and powerlessness of men" (McLaughlin 1996:248).

No doubt, Puritanism, like Calvinism, is not exceptional and original in Protestantism and Christianity overall by evidently following a long-standing tradition in this sense traced to the "original sin" or the "fall of man." Yet, perhaps it is in terms of reinforcing and carrying the tradition to its ultimate, extremely inhuman, consequences, thus revealing its extremism as its perhaps principal comparative-historical exceptionality and novelty. Simply, Puritanism, including Cromwell and Winthrop et al., did not invent humans as "sinners," "impure," or "ungodly" but

only innovated in condemning and punishing them more inhumanly than its counterparts in Protestantism and Christianity overall. This is what Weber implies by noting that Puritanism replaced the "Father in heaven of the New Testament, so human and understanding, who rejoices over the repentance of a sinner as a woman over the lost piece of silver she has found" with a "transcendental being, beyond the reach of human understanding, who with His quite incomprehensible decrees has decided the fate of every individual and regulated the tiniest details of the cosmos from eternity." In short, Puritanism substituted Christian or other humanism with its opposite, specifically the human with the inhuman treatment of sinners on the grounds of what Weber describes as the "corruption of everything pertaining to the flesh." Also Weber might add that Puritanism hence carried to its extreme, inhuman limits what Marx identifies as "mortification of the flesh" in Christianity, including Catholicism, thus revealing its unprecedented or unparalleled extremism.

The above indicates a sort of Puritan theological innovation and intensification within or even deviation from Christianity, including Catholicism, and Protestantism itself. In respect with Catholicism, Puritanism innovated or deviated through displacing what Weber describes as the Catholic Church's tenet of "punishing the heretic, but indulgent to the sinner"—and, as Mises[16] implies, most were sinners as "there were few people in medieval Europe who lived according to the precepts of the Gospels"—with the rule by Calvinism as the "absolutely unbearable form of ecclesiastical control of the individual."

In respect with Protestantism, specifically Lutheranism, Puritanism was innovative or deviating in that, as Weber puts it, "in the place of the humble sinners to whom Luther promises grace if they trust themselves to God in penitent faith are bred those self-confident saints."[17] This raises, for its members, the vexing question of whether or to what extent Puritanism is really Christian or even Protestant, at least in respect of treating human sinners, as addressed below. In turn, Weber implies that the Puritan inhuman or harsh, if not "un-Christian" treatment of human sins and transgressors is theologically grounded in, driven and rationalized by Calvinist theology, viz. Calvin's dogma that the "dividing-line between saints and sinners must ever remain hidden from human knowledge," though saintliness must somehow "appear on the surface." In particular, this dogma helps explain what Weber notices as the transfer[18] of the abstract hatred of sin, expressed in the view, citing a Cromwell's disciple, that the "carnal mind is enmity against God,"

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[16] In particular, Mises adds that the "values that determined the actions of the ruling classes were entirely different from those that the [Catholic] Church preached" in medieval times.

[17] Weber adds that the "Lutheran emphasis on penitent grief is foreign to the spirit of ascetic Calvinism, not in theory, but definitely in practice. For it is of no ethical value to the Calvinist; it does not help the damned, while for those certain of their election, their own sin, so far as they admit it to themselves, is a symptom of backwardness in development. Instead of repenting of it they hate it and attempt to overcome it by activity for the glory of God."

[18] Weber cites a letter to Calvin by the Duchess Renata d'Este speaking of the "hatred which she would feel toward her father and husband if she became convinced they belonged to the damned," i.e., sinners and "ungodly."

to hating concrete human sinners or any persons in early Calvinism and consequently English-American Puritanism. In Weber's view, in Puritanism, due to the Calvinist dogma of predestination, the "consciousness of divine grace of the elect and holy was accompanied by an attitude to ward the sin of one's neighbour, not of sympathetic understanding based on consciousness of one's own weakness, but of hatred and contempt for him as an enemy of God bearing the signs of eternal damnation."

Evoking and elaborating on Weber, Tawney (1962: 200) suggests that Puritanism regards humans as sinners who "must not only contemplate God but glorify him by their work in a world given over to the powers of darkness." This means that the Calvinist–Puritan dogmatic reduction and theocratic sacrifice or subordination of humans to the effective, subservient "tool of the divine will" is a sort of permanent providential punishment for their inherent and irremediable sinful nature, so a perennial sanction and expiation of the "original sin" and the "fall of man." Alternatively, Puritans reportedly show an "arrogant contempt for those who, either through weakness of character or economic helplessness, were less resolute, less vigorous and masterful" (Tawney 1962: 202). In turn, this "arrogant contempt" for moral sinners and economic failures is a variation or manifestation on what Weber identifies as Puritans' "peculiar misanthropy" and antihumanism overall. This antihumanism is also incipient in that the "moral self-sufficiency of the Puritan nerved his will, but corroded his sense of social solidarity [and humanity]. For, if each individual's destiny hands on a private transaction between himself and his Maker, what room its left for human intervention?" (Tawney 1962: 229). Such moralistic corrosion of social solidarity also, as Durkheim may suggest, entails corroding basic humanity, and the theological elimination of the room for human intervention means eliminating (the need or rationale for) secular humanism, too, in Puritanism. This suggests that Puritan antihumanism has its ethical sources in moral absolutism or authoritarianism and reaffirms its theological origins in Calvinism and the dogma of predestination by a "transcendental" God.

Subsequent studies support and specify these insights into Puritanism's antihumanism, particularly its antithesis to secular humanism. Some contemporary sociologists elaborate on Weber suggesting that Puritanism "anathematizes *all* activities that turn men away from God," including the "sentiments of love and friendship that encroach upon the service that the believer owes to God," just as art is "suspect because it appeals to man's sensuality," and consequently "exacts a high price in demanding an atrophy of natural feeling in men's cultural and personal life" (Bendix 1965:179). This means that secular humanism, exemplified in the "sentiments of love and friendship" and other "natural feeling," has become an anathema, nonentity, casualty, or collateral damage in Puritanism, a result generated and predicted by its Calvinist theology, notably the dogma of predestination. Recall, according to this dogma "men exist for the sake of God" and his glory, and in consequence Calvinism "eliminated all marginal means for attaining salvation" (Bendix 1977:58-9-60) in that, as Weber says, "God's grace is as impossible for those to whom He granted it to lose as it is unattainable for those to whom He denied it."

Historical research indicates that the aforesaid about Puritan antihumanism holds true of early English and American Puritanism alike. For instance, for seventeenth century English Puritanism, following Calvinism, the "most fundamental consideration was the emphasis on the sinfulness of all mankind, of whom a portion, irrespective of wordly considerations, was redeemed solely by the operation of divine grace" (Ashton 1965:584). Also, for early American Puritanism, "in the Fall, man became entirely incapable of virtue save through the operation of divine grace. Owing to the corruption of his reason, of his will, of all his faculties, notably the imagination and the affections, man lay open to the perversions of sin. [So] God or Providence, not erring man, is the final measure" (Foerster 1962:8). Such findings confirm that, continuing Calvinist original antihumanism, American Puritanism, like religious fundamentalism or conservatism overall, simply abhors secular humanism (Van Dyke 1995:89). In particular, New England's Puritanism finds "Sources of Evil" in "Sinful Man" and so is "pessimistic about man" while "optimistic about institutions" (Baltzell 1979), thus continuing and reinforcing, via the Puritan "gloom" (Gould 1996:184), "pessimistic assessments" in its English progenitor (Zaret 1996:1540) as well as in Calvinism described by Weber as a "gloomy doctrine." New England's Puritans were both "scripturally," through the Calvinist theology or Biblical interpretation, and "experientially," by their encounters with the "sinful," "impure," and "ungodly," convinced that most humans (minus themselves) were "fundamentally depraved and deserving of damnation," seeing everywhere "evil" and "sin" (Bremer 1995:17). Hence, they believed that "not all would be saved," such as "notorious sinners" deserving no "judgment of charity" and all those whose way of life "was subjected to Puritan attack [by] the saints" (Gould 1996:23). The antihumanism of New England Puritanism consists in that its gloom and doom had inhuman or "malignant" meanings and consequences, just as its zealotry and fanaticism, exemplified in the "dark side [of] the values of the Mayflower Compact and Winthrop's speech aboard the *Arabella*" (Gould 1996:206–610).

Inhumanity

Puritan authoritarian antihumanism typically, though not invariably, escalates, metastasizes, and intensifies from the theological condemnation of secular humanism to religious or theocratic inhumanity, including barbarism and primitivism. In particular, Weber identifies what he calls the "extreme inhumanity" of Puritanism and Calvinism, especially the doctrine of predestination, concretely damnation as the inhuman alternative to salvation or election, and the resulting religious or theocratic practices. In his view, this inhumanity had the major facet or effect in "a feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness" and helplessness of individuals, since Puritanism or Calvinism tended to "tear the individual away from the closed ties with which he is bound to this world" and to make the world "serve the glorification of God and for that purpose alone." First, note the word "unprecedented," which indicates that Puritanism was more extreme in this respect or inhuman than most previous Christian and other religions. Weber intimates that "unprecedented"

individual loneliness and helplessness are some of those elements making the tyranny of Puritanism "unexampled" in Protestantism, Christianity, and beyond. Alternatively, the tyranny or theological–theocratic extremism of Puritanism is "unexampled" at least on the account of this "unprecedented" loneliness and helplessness of individual humans.

Such inhuman loneliness and helplessness in Puritanism were manifested in various ways and degrees. One was that the individual in seeking, as Weber states, the "most important thing in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path alone to meet a destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity. No one could help him." For example, no priest could help him, because the chosen "can understand the word of God only in his own heart"; neither could sacraments, as these are seen as "not a means to the attainment of grace, but only the subjective *supplement* of faith," nor church since the "membership of the external Church included the doomed"[19] just as the elected. Weber stresses that even the Puritan Church or rather Sect would not help individuals, because they, as the doctrine of predestination dictates, "should belong to it and be subjected to its discipline, not in order thus to attain salvation, that is impossible, but because, for the glory of God, they too must be forced to obey His commandments." In his view, historically, such complete elimination of salvation through Church, sacraments, and priests and by implication extreme inhumanity in this respect marks the "absolutely decisive difference" of Puritanism and Calvinism from Catholicism. Consequently, under the theological impetus of Calvinism, Puritanism disposed of the "very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin," thus revealing a high degree of Puritan inhumanity compared with Catholicism and traditional Christianity overall. In turn, for Weber, the extreme isolation of individuals, mixed with the "harsh" doctrines of God's absolute transcendence and humans' "corruption" is the "reason for the entirely negative attitude of Puritanism to all the sensuous and emotional elements in culture." If so, extreme inhumanity, expressed or eventuated in individual loneliness and helplessness, helps explain and predict Puritanism's antagonism to nonreligious culture, including antiartistic authoritarianism, just as its "unexampled" tyranny.

As hinted, Weber identifies another dimension, effect, or symptom of Puritan extreme inhumanity in what he calls Puritans' "peculiar misanthropy," notably their intense hatred of sinners. Specifically, he cites some early Puritan theologians (e.g., Bailey) recommending "every morning before going out among people to imagine oneself going into a wild forest full of dangers, and to pray God for the 'cloak of foresight and righteousness'" and emphasizing (viz. Spangenberg) the commandment, or its inhuman interpretation, "cursed is the man who trusteth in man." Weber suggests that "to grasp the peculiar misanthropy" of these attitudes one should compare some non-Puritan (e.g., Hoornbeek's) ideas on the "duty to love one's enemy." As still another, perhaps milder, indicator, symptom, or effect

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[19] Weber adds that in Puritanism "even no God [could help the individual]. For even Christ had died only for the elect, for whose benefit God had decreed His martyrdom from eternity."

of the inhumanity of Puritanism, Weber pinpoints what he calls the "deep melancholy and moroseness" of early Puritans in England and America, in consequence of their "breaking down the spontaneity of the status *naturalis*" in the belief in the "corruption of everything pertaining to the flesh." He also detects a seemingly more severe syndrome of such inhumanity in noting that the Puritan harsh penalties and degradations of humans "served the glory of God precisely to the extent that all personal and human feelings were necessarily insulted by [them]," thus a sort of sadistic–masochistic symptoms or tendencies in Puritanism. These severe punishments and degradations were applied in virtually all social institutions and contexts, from family and church to state and economy. As an instance of such Puritan punishments or humiliations Weber cites Holland's mostly English émigré Puritans "dressing institutionalized orphans in uniforms reminiscent of fool's clothes and parading them through the streets of Amsterdam to divine services with the greatest possible fanfare." Also, a more recent historical study indicates that the early Puritan patriarchal family in England and America was an "institution for disciplining and repressing naturally wicked" (Walzer 1963:85).

In retrospect, Comte anticipates Weber's diagnosis of Puritan extreme inhumanity by observing that Puritan Protestantism "leaves entire impunity to private oppression," except for a "few temporal rules generally framed and always applied by the oppressors themselves." As a case in point, Comte cites the "excuse for slavery" couched in the rhetoric of "civilizing the enslaved" by Puritanism, in apparent reference to the subjugation of the native Americans (the "wilderness") and other "uncivilized" groups by early New England and Southern Puritans. Further, this observation is not only diagnostic of the distant past, but also prophetic of the future of American Puritanism in light of its subsequent, continuing, and ever-expanding attempts at "civilizing the enslaved" not only in America but the world as a whole through expansionism and militarism driven and self-sanctified by Puritan-rooted Americanism (Gelernter 2005).

As hinted, the probably most extreme or inhuman dimension, effect, and syndrome of the inhumanity of Puritanism involves sadistic and masochistic tendencies and symptoms. This is what Weber intimates by noting that Puritan severe punishments and degradations of humans "necessarily" insulted and attacked all "human feelings" and yet only to that extent "served the glory of God." If so, then this is a diagnosis of Puritan sadistic–masochistic tendencies, insofar as the systematic and deliberate insult of and attack on "all human feelings" defines sadism (those of others) or masochism (one's own). Further, Weber implies that these tendencies are intrinsic to Puritanism, specifically rooted in and rationalized by what he names as the Puritan–Calvinist harsh dogmas of absolute transcendence of God (predestination) and humans' corruption. In particular, the dogma of the "corruption" of the human body, like the "original sin" or "fall of man" overall, grounds and sanctifies sadistic–masochistic punishments and degradations of humans, both others and selves, as innately corrupt and sinful, while that of absolute transcendence dictates that the glory of God will be served only in the degree of this sado-masochism. Simply, the joyful suffering, degradation, and humiliation

of corrupt humans or sadism and even oneself or masochism become the Puritan primary, though not sole, way to serve God's glory.

One can object that some degree of sadism and masochism thus understood is inherent, as Weber and Pareto imply, to all religious and other asceticism, including monasticism, not only to Puritanism. This is probably a valid objection, yet it supports the argument that Puritanism is not, contrary to what its adherents claim, quite exceptional, original, or novel, particularly in terms of inflicting harsh punishments and degradations on "sinful," "impure," and "ungodly" humans as the means and path to serving the glory of God, compared to other ascetic religions. If anything, its exceptionality or novelty in this and other respects consists in its extremism by extending and intensifying this old and persistent tendency or, as Pareto describes it, "insanity" in asceticism and monasticism, including ascetic Christianity like monastic Catholicism. In short, Puritanism tends to be inherently and extremely sadistic and masochistic alike, even though not all sadism or masochism is necessarily Puritan.

That sado-masochism is an original and persisting attribute, tendency, or outcome of Puritanism is not just something dubiously or maliciously imputed by "evil" non-Puritans but also admitted, recommended, and even celebrated by Puritans themselves, especially Puritan saints. This is what precisely proto-Puritan saint Cromwell does by saying "I was a chief of sinners [but now] I may honor my God either by doing or suffering." The latter comprised "doing" or inflicting "suffering" both on other humans or sadism and on oneself or masochism, thus Cromwell seemingly making sado-masochism the optimal way and the most efficient means to honor his God. In prospect, in so saying and doing Cromwell theologically generated and politically prefigured "born-again" neo-Puritans or fundamentalists, including presidents and other politicians, in America, notably the Bible Belt. This applies to their self-declared mutation from sinners (including drunkards and drug users) to self-righteous saints joyfully inflicting suffering on themselves and especially others, viz. by Pareto-Marx's "temperance fanatics" and via their temperance wars (Wagner 1997) or "tough-on-crime" policies like the war on drugs.

What Weber intimates and Cromwell confesses of his own "doing or suffering" as a path to salvation, Pareto generalizes to Puritanism as a whole (and asceticism or monasticism overall). Notably, he notes that, like monks and other ascetic predecessors, Puritans "experience great delight in tormenting themselves and others," thus masochism and sadism, respectively. In turn, he states that Puritans' and other moralists' "bitter hatred" of "less ascetic" humans originates in "religious and sectarian sentiment" and in the envy that the "non-enjoyer resents in the enjoyer or the eunuch in the virile man." Pareto thus traces Puritans' sado-masochism not only to theological–religious grounds but also to psychological or psycho-pathological sources and traits, notably what his contemporary Max Scheller would call their resentment of non- or quasi-Puritans, including even those within Protestantism such as Anglicans, Lutherans, and Quakers. As an early case in point, Pareto cites the Scotch Presbyterian clergy's code stipulating that "all the natural affections, all the pleasures of society, all the pastimes, all the guy instincts of the human heart

were so many sins." At this juncture, he remarks that "long before, the monks had carried this kind of insanity" or sado-masochism to the "utmost limit" so that pleasure and crime "were synonyms" in monasticism and Puritanism, and for the same "religious and sectarian" and psychological sentiments, as are to modern ascetics or moralists.[20] In this respect, the "new" Puritanism was but a continuation or intensification of the old, including medieval, monasticism, and asceticism rather than a novel path to honor the glory of God through holy suffering a la Cromwell. For example, Puritanism performs or results in the essentially identical sadistic calculus performed by medieval Christian theologians, viz. determining "the degree of the torment to be suffered by the damned in accordance with" Divine commandments (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993).

Pareto finds another subsequent and seemingly perennial example in US antialcoholic or temperance Puritan groups described as "ready to kill a person only to keep him healthy" (sober), thus displaying "less sense than the inquisition, which buried men in order to save their souls." As noted, Pareto hence effectively predicts or anticipates Prohibition and related Puritan-driven measures such as Southern "dry" states or counties and the increased legal drinking age in America since his time during the 1900s. He also does so by observing that the ideal of US and other Puritan moralists is a "population of ascetics who [for example] drink no wine." This anticipates both these measures and other subsequent continuing and even intensifying, as during the 1980s–2000s, temperance wars (e.g., the war on drugs) in America. Strikingly, Pareto suggests, like Weber, that Puritanism by its readiness to kill humans to keep them "pure" is more extreme in its sadism and so inhumanity than medieval Catholicism with its Inquisition, which confirms its "unexampled" extremism or tyranny within Christianity. This reaffirms that, while not all sadism–masochism or extreme inhumanity is Puritan, Puritanism is intrinsically sadistic–masochistic or inhuman, and more extremely so than its Christian predecessors, thus that authoritarian extremism or extreme authoritarianism remains its principal historical exceptionality and novelty.

Following Cromwell's original sado-masochistic confession and salvation, even some US Puritans or their sympathizers similarly confess and recommend Puritan sadism–masochism, i.e., suffering or pain of others and themselves, as the formula to honor God and receive grace. For example, Pareto's American conservative contemporaries describe the "whole ethic" of some Puritan writers (e.g., Ruskin, Carlyle), like ancient ascetic authoritarians exemplified by Plato and his Spartan ideal state, as the "natural Puritanism of a 'pain economy'" (Calhoun 1925:53). This simply means that Protestant, like other, Puritanism is naturally defined by "pain" cheerfully inflicted on and endured by other humans and oneself alike, thus a mixture of sadism and masochism. At least it signifies that its Protestant–Calvinist version is not a relevant exception to the inherent tendency of

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[20] Reportedly, some contemporary US Catholic priests wonder "Violence or pleasures of the flesh. What is the greater of two evils?" Arguably, the answer is "violence" for Catholicism, and "pleasures of the flesh," including drinking wine and other alcohol, for Puritanism or modern Protestant fundamentalism (especially) in America.

Puritanism or asceticism overall to represent or create a "natural" sado-masochistic "economy of pain" rather than one of pleasure in Bentham's sense. If anything, Calvinist Puritanism innovated in carrying this tendency to its ultimate limits, via what Weber and Pareto call extreme inhumanity and sadistic–masochistic insanity, within Christianity and beyond. In particular, some analysts identify in Puritanism what they call the "masochistic ecstasy of pain" or "moral masochism" shared with "ascetic cults," Stoicism and, notably, modern Fascism (Woodard 1938). And Cromwell's prescription of self-inflicted and self-endured suffering, as half of his dual formula to honor his God and attain salvation, is the archetype of this Puritan "masochistic ecstasy of pain" or "moral masochism." So is alternatively his complementary prescription of inflicting suffering on others a prototype of what can analogously be termed the Puritan "sadistic ecstasy of pain" or "moral sadism." The latter is manifested in that contemporary American Puritanism is characterized by what critics call the "haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy" (Mencken 1982:624–625). In aggregate, American Puritanism adopts, implements, and further expands Cromwell's sadistic–masochistic formula of universal human suffering for honoring God and receiving grace. Thus, through its search for the Promised Land as the American people's providential "mission," it reportedly results in an "acceptance of adversity and even disasters as having religious worth and meaning [or] as divinely ordained ordeals which test, purify and regenerate the collectivity" (Tiryakian 1975:22)—i.e., simply sadism and masochism in the sacred service of, and through "holy terror" for, God's glory.

In sociopsychological terms, Puritans represent or generate instances of what social psychologists call the "sado-masochistic" character structure (Fromm 1941) as the defining and constitutive element of an authoritarian personality (Adorno 1950), just as do fascists, notably Nazis. This view identifies the following major characteristics of the Puritan and fascist sado-masochistic character: first, "symbiotic dependence," second, the "utmost" subordination or sacrifice of humans to "something higher," third, an emphasis on "difference in power," fourth, rejection of claims to "inherent and inalienable rights," and fifth, the "readiness to submit and to endure suffering" (Fromm 1941). Apparently, the second and fifth characteristics in particular reflect a masochistic character, the third and fourth the sadistic, and the first both. In this view, original Puritan–Calvinist and other Protestant or Lutheran doctrines and ideas became "powerful forces" for their adherents as well as adversaries, because they "appealed to needs and anxieties that were present in the character structure of the people to whom they were addressed" (Fromm 1941), by generating or reinforcing its sado-masochistic characteristics.[21]

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[21] Fromm (1941) comments that from the "pseudo-Marxian viewpoint, one might try to explain Protestantism as no more than the answer to certain economic needs of the bourgeoisie," and sees this explanation as incorrect. Weber perhaps adumbrates Fromm's identification of a "sado-masochistic character" in Calvinism and Lutheranism by describing Luther's Augsburg Confession, signed also by Calvin in 1540, as "dark and dangerous teaching."

The above can be deemed a sort of genesis of the sado-masochistic character structure, i.e., the original stage of sadism-masochism, in Puritanism, specifically European Calvinism. The second phase or early sequel was probably Cromwell's English Puritan formula of inflicting universal suffering on humans and oneself for "something higher." The third stage was perhaps the adoption and generalization of Cromwell's formula by the early US Puritans to New England through instituting a Biblical Commonwealth, and later to the South and elsewhere via the Great Awakenings, which hence reappear as attempts, eventually successful, to generalize the Puritan "sado-masochistic" character structure to all America. Thus, a mix of sadistic and masochistic characteristics in early American Puritanism is manifest in the observation that New England's Puritan leaders were both "harsh toward nonbelievers" and "no more tolerant of what they saw as their own failings" (Bremer 1995:154). Further, its sadism derived from and was rationalized by its masochism in that the Puritans' extreme intolerance and inhumanity, exemplified in the sadistic persecution and execution of Quakers as well as the native Indians, "was in part at least a symptom of their own collective and personal self-doubt" (Bremer 1995:154) and by implication masochistic characteristics like joyous self-suffering. In prospect, such Puritan intolerant practices and exercises in sadism prefigure and perhaps inspire what some observers identify as the "sadistic intolerance to cultural otherness" (Bauman 2000), ranging from the nonbeliever or agnostic Other condemned, excluded, and exorcised as supremely "un-American" (Edgell et al. 2006) to different religious, ideological, cultural, and racial out-groups, in contemporary America, most visibly the neo-Puritan or evangelical South. Hence, this recent condition can be deemed the fourth or latest stage in the historical saga, i.e., development and expansion, of the Puritan sadistic–masochistic character structure. In sum, the sado-masochistic character has been remarkably continuous, persistent, and intense in Puritanism, uniting Calvin and Cromwell with Winthrop et al. and Bible Belt evangelicals, within apparently an "unhappy big family"—unless sadists and masochists are deemed exemplars of happiness—and all them with fascists, including Nazis, as seen later.

What Weber identifies as Puritan extreme inhumanity, including the sado-masochistic character structure, also assumes forms of brutality, cruelty, barbarism, and inhuman primitivism. As its inhumanity overall, the ruthlessness, brutality, and cruelty of Puritanism are theologically rooted in and rationalized by the Calvinist dogma of predestination, which divides humans into the few chosen or elected and the damned or reprobates so meriting a brutal, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and of the "corruption" of the human body, similarly dividing them into saints and sinners (and masters and servants) with the latter deserving such punishments. As a sociological study shows, the anxiety produced by this dogma, viz. whether one is of the elect or the damned, "forced the development of Calvinism after Calvin in a Puritan direction" in that, following the Calvinist dismissal of feelings as "chimerical," Puritanism "turned outward" (Birnbaum 1953:138). Specifically, Puritans' pride of being of the elect, "which denied to external agencies the obligation or right to intervene in the earthy life of the individual combined with the concept of the inner isolation of the believer to produce a Puritan independence and

brutality" (Birnbaum 1953:139). As noted, the denying to social institutions the "obligation or right to intervene in the earthy life of the individual" also produced antiwelfare attitudes and policies, as a sort of milder, latent, or institutionalized form of such brutality and inhumanity. In turn, the "inner isolation of the believer" evokes Weber's observation of the "unprecedented" loneliness and helplessness of individuals, as an expression of Puritan extreme inhumanity, plus the "reason for the entirely negative attitude of Puritanism to all the sensuous and emotional elements in culture." In this view, Puritans "were organized as personalities to function in a methodical, ruthless way" (Birnbaum 1953:140), as epitomized or symbolized by Methodism originally seeking to intensify and expand Puritanism by creating a "method" in this "madness" (Smith 2000:11) of antihumanism or Paretian insanity in extreme asceticism. This suggests that Puritanism constitutes one of the major sources of ruthlessness and brutality in contemporary society, including, as Weber notes, modern military discipline. The above yields the conclusion that the "brutality of the Puritans reminds us of Freud [i.e.] the harshness of the psychological discipline imposed by western culture" (Birnbaum 1953:141), specifically by ascetic and militant forms of Protestantism or Christianity, primarily Puritanism.

Barbarism and Inhuman Primitivism

Ruthlessness, brutality, and cruelty are particular dimensions, effects, or symptoms of Puritan barbarism or inhuman primitivism in spite, or perhaps because, of the claims of especially American Puritanism to, as Comte sarcastically remarks, "civilizing the enslaved" as the "excuse for slavery" or the crusade against the "wilderness" (Munch 2001; Tiryakian 1975). Recall, the early US Puritans' "civilizing" of the wilderness not only incorporated the supposedly rational mastery of nature but the "expulsion of the Indians from their lands, their oppression, and the destruction of their culture" (Munch 2001:235), as barbarian, uncivilized, or inhuman practices and outcomes. In general, the Puritan-American sense of Divine mission or manifest destiny "provides a license to dominate and oppress groups, peoples and cultures that are defined by particularized interests as 'wilderness'" (Munch 2001:235). This indicates what Weber identifies, Merton deplores and many US neoconservatives celebrate (Gelernter 2005; also Lipset 1996) as the historical cogenesis, coexistence, convergence (e.g., on "pure hypocrisy), or persisting continuity of early Puritanism and Americanism, in this context Puritan "civilizing" barbarism and American-conservative militarism, expansionism, and imperialism.

To be sure, American Puritanism originally intended and attempted to overcome or leave behind, through its civilizing mission, barbarism, wilderness, and inhumanity attributed to the old religion and world of Europe represented by Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Paganism, though not primitivism as such or fundamentalism. Yet, in spite or perhaps because of these "good" intentions or noble aims, Puritanism gradually, eventually, and inexorably descended and succumbed to equally, if not perhaps more, barbaric, "wild," and inhuman attitudes and practices.

Hence, non-Puritan Christian theologians may add that it embarked on the road or, more historically accurate, ships (e.g., Winthrop's *Arabella*), to "hell" paved by "good" intentions rather than heaven as it claimed. Thus, in the beginning the US Puritans "perceived wilderness as behind them" in the shape of the "corrupt Old world civilization from whose stiffling and oppressive structures they were fleeing" (Tiryakian 1975:20). Yet, they were, presumably predestined in a Calvinist sense, to ultimately create and sustain equally or perhaps more oppressive structures, by conquering and subjugating "wild" nature and peoples alike in the service of their search for the Promised Land as their God-decreed collective mission or destiny.

In essence, the Puritan struggle against and civilizing of the "wilderness," notably "wild" peoples and their cultures, has provided a religious–moralist source and rationale for American and to a lesser extent English Puritanism's observed or perceived elements or signs of barbarism and inhuman primitivism. At least, reportedly the "very ambiguity of the Puritan search for the meaning in the wilderness imparts a Sisyphus aspect" (Tiryakian 1975:31), so a restless and radical–revolutionary, perhaps eventually ruthless, barbarian, or inhuman, dimension and effect to American Puritanism and all society, expressed in the observed "elusiveness" of its moral and social counterrevolution. Thus, this revolutionary elusiveness, restlessness, or incompleteness has potential or actual barbarian and inhuman tendencies and outcomes, so long as the Puritan moral–social revolution proved, from Great Britain to New England and the US South, to be just one, perhaps the first (Walzer 1963), case of revolutions "eating their children," not to mention other "ungodly," "impure," and "wild" humans, from the Irish "Papists" to the native Indians and Quakers. In spite or rather because of its "elusiveness," the Puritan moral–social revolution, so barbarism or inhuman primitivism *cum* "civilizing" wild humans, must be made permanent, a forever "living process," if it is to enduringly and absolutely succeed, as attempted originally in New England and subsequently the US South. If so, then this revolution's radicalism, including religious fundamentalism, mixed with Puritanism's totalitarianism or absolutism, generated in the past, as in old and New England, and predict for the future, as in the South and America as a whole, Puritan barbarism and inhuman primitivism.

In general, among the first social theorists Comte diagnoses serious symptoms of Puritan barbarism and inhuman primitivism by observing that Puritanism or Protestantism overall not only is "recurring to the period of the primitive Church but also offering for popular guidance the most barbarous and dangerous part of the Scriptures," viz. the Hebrew antiquity, though this description may be controversial and sensitive. If so, then extremist Puritanism descends not only into Biblical primitivism and fundamentalism generally, but into its barbarian or inhuman form. As Comte puts it, Puritanism or Protestantism displays the "exclusive predilection" both for the primitive church" and the theological–military system or theocracy as the exemplar and remnant of primeval barbarism and inhuman primitivism. In his view, Puritans and other Protestants not only "longed to restore the early Christian times" and so expressed evangelical primitivism, but the theological–military order protracting the barbaric ("infantile") and inhuman stage of society, thus displaying and perpetuating symptoms of primeval barbarism and

primitive antihumanism. Barbarism and inhuman primitism appear as at least half of the Puritan equation, the other half being Christian nonbarbarous, humanist fundamentalism, or traditionalism as a sort of reactionary yet "compassionate" conservatism, in a humanistic interpretation of the "primitive Church."

Paleo- and neo-Puritan primeval barbarism or inhuman primitivism can be identified and distinguished as two historical or ideal types. Comte apparently identifies the first type observed in early English and American Puritanism, for example, Cromwell's and Winthrop's holy "Bible Commonwealths" as attempts at reinstituting the "primitive Church" and the "most barbarous and dangerous part of the Scriptures," so Biblical primitivism and barbarism, respectively. In particular, following and even reinforcing their English ancestors' "exclusive predilection for the primitive church," the early Puritans in New England displayed strong "impulses" of primitivism (Coffey 1998:982–983) and to that extent primeval barbarism in Comte's sense. If New England's Puritans like Winthrop et al. embodied the old or original barbarism and inhuman primitivism of Puritanism, so do their fundamentalist descendents and proxies elsewhere in America, notably the South, the "new" or derived type. Historically, while the original type was the result of the early Puritans' conquest and rule of what was to become New England through their subjugation and partial extermination of native Americans, the derived was essentially the outcome or symptom of the Puritan later expansion and eventual dominance beyond, especially the Anglican South through the Great Awakenings. These hence reappear as revivals and expansions in, as Comte would suggest, religious primitivism and barbarism. As hinted, some critics suggest that an epitomy of the neo-Puritan barbarian type is what is described as "Baptist and Methodist barbarism" seen as ruling and defining the US South as a "Bible Belt" (Mencken 1982), which implies that Baptism and Methodism are modern revivals, equivalents, or proxies of Puritanism. Some sociologists also imply that American Protestant sectarianism in general, in virtue of its "propensities for crusades" as well as "absolute standards" (Lipset 1996), is a form or first approximation of neo-Puritan primitivism or barbarism. This confirms that Puritan barbarism has been generated in history and predicted for the future by Puritanism's political radicalism and moral absolutism. Insofar as Baptism, though to a lesser and decreasing extent Methodism, has conventionally been and increasingly is considered an exemplar of Protestant sectarianism in America, Baptist "barbarism" usually denied or inhuman primitivism, admitted only as evangelicalism or Biblicism, epitomizes the neo-Puritan barbarian–primitive type.

Sociologically, Puritan barbarism and inhuman primitivism tend to encompass all society, just as the entire world geographically. Puritan barbarism's sociological scope is, predictably, total or comprehensive. It ranges from politics (totalitarianism, militarism, imperialism) and law (repressive Draconian penal codes and sanctions, including their "dumb laws" semi-grotesque version) to morality (individual oppression) and religion (theocracy) to the arts (suppression), science, and technology (authoritarian abuses) and all secular culture (cultural antagonism) to the economy (e.g., slavery, denials of labor liberties and rights). Briefly, Puritanism extends its barbarism and inhuman primitivism to what Pareto calls

the total "sociological system," not, as often supposed, only religion or theology. This yields corresponding sociological ideal types: political–legal, moral–religious, artistic–scientific, culture, economic, and other Puritan barbarism and inhuman primitivism, typically intertwined with and reinforcing each other.

Paleo- and neo-Puritan barbarism and inhuman primitivism have displayed a remarkable historical equivalence, continuity, or convergence in respect of all these sociological types or societal opportunities for their exercise and expression. For illustration, Baptist or Protestant-sectarian "neo-barbarism" and primitivism in the US South are usually found to be equally, and sometimes even more, politically authoritarian, globally nationalistic, militarist and imperialist, legally repressive or irrational (e.g., "dumb laws"), morally intrusive and oppressive, religiously coercive or theocratic ("Bible Belt"), as well as antiartistic, antieducational, and antagonistic to all secular culture as Puritan paleo-barbarism in New and old England. In terms of *dramatis personae*, Baptists and other Protestant sectarians have evidently proved to be worthy successors, disciples, or later-day equivalents of Winthrop and other early Puritans in respect with such all-encompassing societal barbarism and primitivism. In sum, Puritanism's blueprint or outcome is in essence a barbarian, primitive, and inhuman society, including economy, polity, and culture, rooted in, induced, and sanctified by evangelicalism and realized in a theocratic "Holy Bible Commonwealth."

Other Nonhumanist Dimensions

Some other seemingly milder or less barbarian and inhuman dimensions and effects of Puritan nonhumanism include hypocrisy, coolness, antispontaneity, and asceticism. As known perhaps by many readers and agreed by most social analysts, including Weber, as well as novelists like. Dickens, Puritan hypocrisy is legendary in history and ever-persistent. To be sure, Weber and even Dickens would admit that not every or most intense[22] hypocrisy is Puritan and not all hypocrites are Puritans, but add that Puritanism has historically showed to be typically and to an important extent hypocritical. Of course, Weber is not the first social analyst to discern and stress what he calls "pure hypocrisy" in Puritanism, specifically its ramification in Americanism.

For example, sociologists Comte and Spencer, and even economist Adam Smith, among others, not to mention Dickens, precede and anticipate Weber in this respect. Comte remarks that Puritanism or Protestantism overall shared many previous, condemned Catholic "vices," including hypocrisy, to the "full," thus suggesting that, if anything, Puritans are no different from the "hypocritical" Catholics persecuted as the "Papists" on this account. Spencer provides a vivid example of Puritan or at least general Protestant hypocrisy by citing "Colonel D'Oyley, the first governor

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[22] Weber remarks that hypocrisy and conventional opportunism in social, including religious, matters "were hardly stronger developed in America than in Germany" and ads that "only the direction in which conventional 'hypocrisy' moved differed: official careers in Germany, business opportunities in the United States."

of Jamaica, that within a few days after having issued an order 'for the distribution to the army of 1,701 Bibles'," he signed another order for the payment of "the summe of twenty pound sterling, out of the impost money, to pay for fifteen dogs brought by john Hoy, for the hunting of the Negroes."[23] Notably, Spencer observes that the "holding of slaves" by Southern Protestant, including both Puritan and non-Puritan, religious ministers in America is a "parallel fact" of hypocrisy and antihumanism generally.[24] Smith antedates Comte and Spencer by connecting the Puritan or other "severity of manners" with "cant, cunning, hypocrisy, and low manners."

These examples anticipate Weber's invocation of Benjamin Franklin as the "striking case" confirming the "impression" of "many Germans" about the "pure hypocrisy" of the "virtues professed" by American Puritanism *cum* Americanism. For Weber, this hypocrisy consists in that honesty is useful as Franklin's best policy solely or mostly because "it assures credit," as are "punctuality, industry, frugality," concluding that this usefulness is the only or main "reason they are virtues." Hence, he infers that a "logical deduction from this would be that where, for instance, the appearance of honesty serves the same purpose, that would suffice, and an unnecessary surplus of this virtue would evidently appear to Franklin's eyes as unproductive waste." Simply, via their utilitarian and/or Machiavellian appearance and manipulation, honesty and virtually all human virtues become pure or mere

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[23] Perhaps it is inaccurate or unfair to impute this extreme hypocrisy to Puritanism, as this governor was likely an Anglican. Yet, Spencer, not to mention Dickens, might suggest that a Puritan governor would have done precisely the same, as expected by similar, and if not more, inhumane treatment of the native Indians by New England's Puritans. Spencer could also cite Cromwell as providing a classic case of what Weber would call "pure" political hypocrisy. As known, Cromwell rebelled against and temporarily (1645–1660) dethroned the English hereditary monarchy (by executing King Charles I in 1649) to establish a "Republic" and himself as the master ("Lord Protector of the Realm"), yet designated (in 1658) his son (Richard) to be his successor–master of this Puritan creation. Generally, this remarkable political hypocrisy invalidates or preempts the conservative defense of Cromwell's, as well as Winthrop et al. "Holy Commonwealth" as a "Republic" rather than a monarchy or theocracy, so as "democratic", compared with Anglican and Catholic supported authoritarian monarchies. It simply means that Cromwell's was not really a republic, or at least not a democratic one, but a sort of "hereditary republic" that is an oxymoron, a monarchy (theocracy) without a formal monarch (theocrats). Comparatively, the above defense of the Puritan theocracies in old and New England as "Republics" is as unconvincing as, for example, defending Iran's theocracy on the grounds that it is officially an (Islamic) "Republic" (not a monarchy also abolished). In general, the above illustrates what social scientists know for long, viz. that republics are not necessarily and always democracies, and conversely, nonrepublican types of government, including monarchies, not antidemocratic, as exemplified by the British and other forms of a constitutional monarchy in Europe.

[24] Of course, if this observation applies to the Anglican South prior to the Great Awakenings, it would exclude and absolve Puritan ministers from such inhuman hypocrisy as holding slaves. However, if it, as it seems, encompasses the entire ante-bellum history of the South, including the period (the 1740s–1860s) following the Great Awakenings, especially the second (the 1800s), it would not, for also many Southern Puritan and other evangelical ministers held slaves or at least defended the slavery as a sort of Divinely ordained destiny.

hypocrisies in early Puritans like Franklin. As Weber comments, "according to Franklin, those virtues, like all others, are only in so far virtues as they are actually useful to the individual, and the surrogate of mere appearance is always sufficient when it accomplishes the end in view." This indicates an archetypical instance and exercise of hypocrisy and Machiavellianism or reckless amoral utilitarianism in American Puritanism. In turn, Weber's description of the pre-Christian Pharisees as "Puritans" may also be interpreted as describing Puritanism as Pharisaism and its adherents as having a "pharisaically good, conscience." This is what his colleague Sombart explicitly suggests by citing a German author's (Heine's) identification of the "pharisaistic cant" of the British Puritans (e.g., Scottish Presbyterians). At this juncture, Puritanism appears as just one more, Protestant or Christian, stage in the long and continuous development and expansion of Pharisaism, even reinforcing and extending the latter's hypocrisy ever further, and Puritans as "later-day saints" *cum* Pharisees since the seventeenth century. If so, then this implies that hypocrisy in the sense of pharisaistic behavior is inherent to and defining of Puritanism as Protestant Pharisaism, from Cromwell and Winthrop et al. to Franklin and their "Bible Belt" mutants. While Puritanism is not the historically first and only system of intrinsic hypocrisy or Pharisaism, it is the most extreme, elaborate, advanced, or simply methodical (as the idea of "Methodism" suggests) within Protestantism and Christianity, displaying another facet of Puritan extremism.

In historical terms, Weber's virtuous, pseudo-Puritan Benjamin Franklin and his "spirit of capitalism" only exemplified and embodied what was commonly observed and deplored as "vigorous hypocrisy" (Bremer 1995:215) in early American as well as English Puritanism. Thus, in early England, the Puritan "pervasive hostility" to earthly things was regarded as hypocritical, and what the Puritans "feared greatly was rather in themselves than in the society about them" (Walzer 1963:80–82), which indicates an archetypical case of what psychologists call projection of one's own inhuman, including "sinful," propensities and traits onto others. And Winthrop et al. apparently shipped on *Arabella* and exported to the New World Puritanism's manifest hostility to and latent hypocrisy about worldly pleasures alike, i.e., their weaknesses and sins ("demons"), yet hypocritically denied and projected or imputed to others and all society. Such is the remarkable historical and persisting asymmetry or alchemy of Puritan hypocritical moral rhetoric (Heckathorn 1990) in America,[25] from New England's to the South's "Biblical Commonwealths" and beyond. In a sense, Weber's rediscovery of "pure hypocrisy" in American Puritanism makes redundant and repetitive any elaborate argument about and demonstration in this regard, as do Dickens' novels depicting sanctimonious English and US

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[25] For instance, Adorno (2001:220–221) remarks, in apparent reference to American Puritanism, that "scandal stories, mostly fictitious, particularly of sexual excesses and atrocities are constantly told; the indignation at filth and cruelty is but a very thin, purposely transparent rationalization of the pleasure these stories convey to the listener." This simply reveals Puritan hypocrisy mixed with sado-masochism.

Puritans' hypocritical and inhuman workings. What both suggest is that Puritan "pure hypocrisy" constitutes a special, albeit mild or "invisible," dimension, effect, or symptom of nonhumanism in Puritanism.

Other dimensions of Puritan nonhumanism are coolness, reserve, antispontaneity, and asceticism overall, as perhaps equally, if not more, famous attributes of Puritanism as hypocrisy. If anything, they are definitely more recognized, admitted, and even celebrated by Puritans than hypocrisy, though equally suspected and rejected as indicators of their antihumanism by others. For instance, early French social historian Taine deciphers these Puritan attributes. He observes that the Puritan and the Quaker "remodeled even in his inward substance, exposes, through the smallest details of his conduct and exterior, the dominance of the all-powerful principle which refashions his being and the inflexible logic which controls his thoughts." Taine likens Anglo-American Puritans with the "revolutionary Frenchman," thus suggesting that Puritanism is the prototypical case of what Comte calls revolutionary ideology or political radicalism, as later historical studies also show (Walzer 1963). However, this comparison may blur, as Taine's (Enlightenment) colleagues in France would object, the crucial difference between the theocratic Puritan Revolution in Great Britain (and colonization of New England) and the antireligious French Revolution (Moore 1993), generally between conservative-religious counterrevolutions or reactionary restorations and liberal–secular revolutions or progressive social changes. In turn, Taine's Scottish contemporary, Smith observes that, for example, during the reign of Charles II executed for his "sins" by Cromwell's Puritans in the wake of their victory in the Civil War, in England a "degree of licentiousness," including generosity, sincerity, and magnanimity, "was deemed the characteristic of a liberal education and proved that the person who acted in this manner, was a gentleman, and not a puritan." By contrast, Smith remarks that the opposite, Puritan "severity of manners, and regularity of conduct were altogether unfashionable" and associated with "cant, cunning, hypocrisy, and low manners."

Weber follows on or echoes Taine and Smith by observing that "active self-control," as the "end of the rational monastic virtues everywhere," became "also the most important practical ideal of Puritanism." Weber points out the "cool reserve" of the early US Puritans like Franklin who "so shrewdly recommends" it, and their "destruction of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment," as efforts to realize this ideal. Historically, he notices that many studies find the origin and fullest development of the "ideal of reserve" in Puritanism. Also, Weber detects and emphasizes Puritan antispontaneity and worldly asceticism consisting in that Puritanism aimed at and ultimately succeeded in "breaking down the spontaneity" of humans as natural, physical or bodily creatures (*status naturalis*) in the old ascetic or monastic belief in the inherent "corruption" or sinfulness of the human body and flesh. On this account, he sharply contrasts English-American Puritanism with German Lutheranism, in which, as he puts it, the "antipathy of every spontaneous child of nature to everything ascetic is expressed." Curiously, British economist John M. Keynes echoes Weber's observation about the Puritan "destruction of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment" by observing that early Puritanism, due to its

ascetic withdrawal from the world,[26] "neglected" the arts of production and enjoyment alike. Strikingly, Keynes implies that especially American Puritanism tends to be "dangerous"[27] in its political activity, including international relations, which seems almost prophetic in light of the neo-Puritan holy war against "evil" and "terror," including inhuman treatments like torture and mass killings of "evil-doers," during the 2000s.

Non-Christian?

The aforesaid about Puritan authoritarian antihumanism raises for many Christians and perhaps some Puritans themselves, the question of whether Puritanism is really Christian in this respect. Moreover, while Puritans define themselves as the only, true, pure, and humanistic[28] Christians, non-Puritans would describe

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[26] Keynes, by suggesting that early Puritanism has withdrawn from the secular world, apparently contradicts or neglects Weber's assumption of the Puritan–Calvinist mastery of the world. Needless to say, if Puritanism sought such mastery, it would or could not have withdrawn from the world. One Weberian way to reconcile this tension is to say that this withdrawal was only temporary, partial, or exceptional, as, for example, during Cromwell's brutal rule during the 1640s-1650s, but not permanent, complete, or typical for Puritanism, especially its post-Cromwell and American versions (Munch 2001).

[27] Keynes, observing the behavior of US President Woodrow Wilson at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference remarked that his Puritan ("theological or Presbyterian") "temperament became dangerous." Also, a British diplomat described Wilson as the "descendant of Covenanters, the inheritor of a more immediate Presbyterian tradition. That spiritual arrogance which seems inseparable from the harder forms of religion had eaten deep into his soul." In turn, Gelernter(2005), denouncing such descriptions, comments that the "same type of accusation would be directed at Ronald Reagan."

[28] For example, Gelernter (2005) talks about John Winthrop's "humanitarian decency," mixed with "his radical, God-fearing Americanism." This makes one wonder how to integrate or reconcile this humanitarianism with radicalism or extremism as (or if) typically antihumanitarian, specifically opposed to secular humanism. Also, contemporary US Southern Baptists reserve the designation "true Christian" only for themselves and perhaps other Protestant evangelical sects, while either explicitly condemning or implicitly considering "Catholics" and other traditional pre-Protestant (e.g., Orthodox Christian) as "non-Christian." In retrospect, in so doing, Baptists prove to be at least true Puritans and Calvinists by continuing, for example, Cromwell's crusades against and persecutions of "Catholics" or the "Papists" during the short and bloody (or "not-so-sweet") rule by his "Parliament of Saints" in Great Britain (Gorski 2000), as well as Winthrop et al.'s corresponding practices (e.g., witch-hunts) in New England further expanding the scope of the "ungodly" or "un-Christian ("witches") to include even other Protestant sects (Quakers), not to mention non-Christians (native Americans). In turn, Calvin with his manifest or latent "true and only Christian" dogmatic intransigence and intolerance (as Weber emphasizes), climaxing in political repression and persecution (Dombrowski 2001) in Geneva and beyond (e.g., Holland), anticipated with an almost mathematical precision and engendered in a sociological sense both Cromwell and Winthrop, i.e., English and American Puritans, including Baptists, which once again confirms that Puritanism was no more than European Calvinism transplanted to (and minimally transformed in) England and America. Recall, Weber describes Baptism and Baptist bibliocracy as the result or particular form of Calvinism and its theocracies ("state churches"). In sum, contemporary Baptism's claim to be the only and

Puritanism as non- or anti-Christian precisely on the account of its antihumanism, especially what Weber identifies as its extreme inhumanity, so long as original or traditional Christianity is essentially characterized by humanism, including understanding, compassion, and forgiveness, in a humanistic interpretation. He implies this description by stating that in Puritanism, following Calvinism, the Christian

Father in heaven of the New Testament, so human and understanding, who rejoices over the repentance of a sinner as a woman over the lost piece of silver she has found, is gone. His place has been taken by a transcendental being, beyond the reach of human understanding, who with His quite incomprehensible decrees has decided the fate of every individual and regulated the tiniest details of the cosmos from eternity.

Thus, this Puritan replacement of early Christian humanism with the inhuman or harsh Calvinist dogma of predestination and God's absolute transcendence makes one wonder if Puritanism, like Calvinism, is not basically anti- or non-Christian. As Weber comments, Puritan "God's grace is, since His decrees cannot change, as impossible for those to whom He has granted it to lose as it is unattainable for those to whom He has denied it." If so, this is a far cry and aberration from the "human and understanding" Christian Father in heaven, including what even Marx recognizes as preaching charity and poverty in early Christianity. Hence, traditional Christian humanism in the form of what Weber describes as a "real penetration of the human soul by the divine was made impossible by the absolute transcendentality of God compared to the flesh" in Puritanism.

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true Christian religion is a déjà vu within Puritanism, Calvinism, Protestantism, and even Christianity as a whole, as virtually all Puritan, Calvinist, Protestant, and Christian groups in history have made such claims from 1 AD to the 2000s AD and likely after (as have pre-, post- and non-Christian religions), claims operating as the ultimate cause of religious wars within Christianity (and beyond) in its history. By contrast, from the prism of pre-Baptist, pre-Puritan, and generally pre-Protestant Christianity, the opposite designation may apply, as Catholics and orthodox Christians contend or imply. From this prism, Baptism, as well as Puritanism and Protestantism overall, was non- or at least post-Christian in virtue of what Simmel calls its protest, rebellion, or revolution, through the Protestant Reformation, against original or traditional Christianity, as represented by Catholicism as well as the Orthodox Church. In particular, for most traditional or orthodox Catholics, the Protestant Reformation, notably Calvinism, so Puritanism and its Baptist version (and to a lesser or diminishing extent Lutheranism and Anglicanism), was and remained an attack on "true" Christianity and to that extent "anti-Christian." At least from their stance, Baptists and other Puritans, if not most Protestants, resort to a convoluted logic or Orwellian double-thinking that what replaces, succeeds, or assaults original Christianity is "truer" than the latter, one of those perennial variations on the theme of being "bigger Christian (Catholic) than the Pope." But these are essentially theological claims or dogmatic intra-religious disputes as old as Christianity and religion in general, so sociologically irrelevant for the present purpose.

What Weber, Marx and others imply,[29] Tawney and more recent writers explicitly state that Puritanism is to some extent the opposite or reversal of original Christianity, especially its humanist values like compassion and reconciliation. Tawney (1962:230) remarks that Puritanism created a "scale of ethical values in which the traditional scheme of Christian virtues was almost exactly reversed." As a case in point, he notes that the Puritan was moved "less by compassion for his erring brethren," in sharp contrast to the early Christians, than by "impatient" indignation, distrust, and condemnation for them, [i.e.] those who "sinned their mercies." For example, recall sympathetic Weber finds that "even the amiable" English Puritan Baxter "counsels deep distrust of even one's closest friend," let alone "sinners," "evil-doers," "witches," and "enemies." This indicates that even naturally friendly, spontaneous, and human personalities were hardened and dehumanized by Puritanism through destroying or suppressing the humanist spontaneity of the *status naturalis*. Reportedly, even such amiable and good-intentioned human fellows as Baxter attempted to essentially submerge or subordinate Christian hope for reconciliation into "more stereotypical Puritan emphases on punishment, civil order, and justice" (as Puritans understand it), which yet tended to counterbalance the "modern emphasis on individual rights" (Davis 2001:283). In respect of this attempt and especially its ultimately inhuman effects like harsh punishment, the "amiable" Baxter resembled the "less amiable," brutal, and cruel or sadomasochistic warlord Cromwell. If so, then the difference between the most and the least humane personalities in early English and other Puritanism was substantively insignificant, with all these gradually, inexorably, and substantially dehumanized or barbarized by its inhuman theology and its eventual totalitarian theocracy.

Also, a historical study of its American version suggests that the Puritan persecution and execution of "innocent victims" (Gould 1996), including the native Indians, Quakers, "Papists," and "witches," made New England's Puritanism look non-Christian in terms of original Christian compassion and reconciliation. Notably, recall New England Puritans' persecution and in part extermination of the native Indians on the grounds of what Comte ironically calls "civilizing the enslaved" probably qualifying as one of the first cases of "ethnic cleansing," if not genocide in modern (postmedieval) Western history, thus prefiguring and perhaps inspiring corresponding fascist and other totalitarian inhuman and barbarian practices. Consequently, New England's Puritan "Biblical Commonwealth" was essentially an anti-Biblical one in respect of the Bible's own core values and commandments, including what Weber calls the "ethic of brotherhood" and Sorokin "Christian love" illustrated by "love your neighbor." Also, its Southern extension, the neo-Puritan or evangelical "Bible Belt" turns out upon inspection to be actually

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[29] Echoing Weber, Mises comments that "very little of the spirit of Christ was to be found in the churches of the 16th century which were criticized by the theologians of the Reformation and in those of the 18th century which the philosophers of the Enlightenment attacked." Apparently, Mises refers to both late medieval Catholicism and radical Protestantism like Puritanism.

an "anti-Bible" one owing to its gross violation or perversion of these very Biblical values and commandments through various practices, ranging from "general intolerance toward out-groups" (Smith 2000:4) to the exclusion of, discrimination, and brutal violence against nonevangelicals as well as non-Americans, plus "un-American" agnostics and nonbelievers. While Puritans and their evangelical descendents designate their creations or projects as "Biblical" or "Christian" induced by "good" intentions paving their road to heaven, mixed with self-delusions of a Divinely ordained mission to rule ("save") America and the entire world, other Christians experience or perceive this designation as an "insult to injury" and blatant hypocrisy, and such a path as one towards "hell." For these, especially moderate nonevangelical, Christians, both New England's "Biblical Commonwealth" and the Southern "Bible Belt" constitute what Weber calls the abomination of the Christian or primeval "ethic of brotherhood love," and their Puritan–evangelical rulers deceive others and themselves by such holy "words" that hardly ever correspond to their unholy "deeds," i.e., simply "commit a misdeed and then lie about it." In short, these holy "Biblical" communities are anti-Biblical both in the sense of an "injury" to the Bible and a hypocritical "insult" to such injuries.

Other analyses suggest that Puritanism is at most partially, semi- or quasi-Christian in virtue of its combining non- or pseudo-Christian elements with those of original Christianity. In this view, the "essence of Puritanism was a balanced combination of doctrinal Calvinist theology and intense personal piety [inspired by] the piety of St. Augustine" (Sprunger 1982:457). This means that in Puritanism, Calvinist theology is a non- or pseudo-Christian element in the sense of original or traditional Christianity, which is what Weber suggests detecting the replacement by Calvinism of the "human and understanding" Christian Father with an inhuman transcendental entity or Calvin's harsh doctrine of God's absolute transcendence and predestination. Hence, to say that Puritanism "carried forward a venerable Christian tradition" (Sprunger 1982:458) does not holds true of the "human and understanding" God of early Christianity, but instead of "intense personal piety" and other respects.[30] Further, by typically carrying forward this tradition to its extreme, inhuman limits, Puritanism admittedly represents "radical" (Gelernter[31]

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[30] Sprunger (1982:458) mentions the following other respects in which Puritanism "carried forward a venerable Christian tradition." First, Puritans "desire a purified church"; second, "strive for personal and public righteousness, or a reform of manners and morals" (e.g., Sabbath observance, prayers, good conversation, and the shunning of stage plays, swearing, drunkenness, masking, dicing, and all sorts of reveling); and third, their "authority was the Bible. Everything goes back to Scripture." In particular, he states that conversion, piety, and simplicity of worship were the "Puritan message." Generally, Sprunger suggests that Puritanism in essence carried forward the Christian tradition of piety, moralism, and fundamentalism, yet "purified" from humanism, which at least makes it appear un-Christian.

[31] Gelernter (2005), in an evidently apologetic and celebratory mood, proclaims "John Winthrop was a founder of this [American] nation; we are his heirs; and we ought to thank God that we have inherited his humanitarian decency [sic!] along with his radical, God-fearing Americanism [Puritanism]."

2005) Christianity, thus a deviation from and reversal of the original or "normal" Christian religion.

One may wonder "so what" if Puritanism or Calvinism is non- or pseudo-Christian, as strictly speaking a theological, and hence sociologically insignificant, issue. This has indirect sociological relevance in that insofar as Puritanism is non-Christian, in the sense of creating a "scale of ethical values in which the traditional scheme of Christian virtues was almost exactly reversed," viz. human compassion and forgiveness by indignation and condemnation, it indicates its inherent nonhumanism, so its social, particularly moral–religious, authoritarianism.

Puritanism and Non-Christian Religions

In addition, Puritanism can be considered or demonstrated to be non-Christian not only by its reversal of traditional Christian values, but also in virtue of its continuity or similarity with many non-Christian, especially nonhumanistic, authoritarian, and theocratic, religions. In Weber–Parsons' terms, this can be described as the affinity or convergence between Puritanism and certain non-Christian religions, from Pharisaism to Islam, on nonhumanism, authoritarianism, and theocracy. For example, Weber implies, by describing the Pharisees as the first Puritans—and conversely—that Puritanism is non-Christian due to its affinity in terms of intrinsic systematic hypocrisy with Pharisaism which original Christianity strongly condemned and detested. So does Sombart by citing and emphasizing (Heine's) "pharisaistic cant" and so by implication the non-Christian attribute of some early British-American Puritans such as Scottish Presbyterians.

Beyond pre-Christian Pharisaism, such an affinity, convergence, or resemblance in terms of nonhumanism, authoritarianism, and theocracy has particularly been manifest and intense between, though denied or minimized by both, Puritanism and post-Christian Islam. Thus, Taine remarks that seventeenth century Puritanism in England and America resembled Islam during the seventh century, suggesting that Cromwell, Winthrop, and other early Puritans were not quite dissimilar to Mohammed et al., though separated by 10 centuries. Notably, what Taine does not say but intimates is that Puritan or previous Christian crusades against "evil" and "godlessness" since the seventeenth century are essentially, to use Parsons-Merton's terms, functional equivalents, alternatives, counterparts, substitutes, or proxies to the Islamic jihad as a holy war against the "infidels" starting from the seventh century and continuing and expanding since then, up to the twenty-first century. To recall, Cromwell's political campaigns to impose "godly morality" were actually "religious crusades—wars against the infidels" (Gorski 2000:1453), so functionally equivalent or proximate to Mohammed et al.'s jihads, though modeled after, derived from or inspired by their Christian–Catholic medieval forms. Both Puritan crusades and Islamic jihads targeted, punished, and murdered the same general category of "unbelievers," though differing in the particulars, i.e., non-Puritans like Catholics or Papists, and non-Muslims, Christians, and others, respectively.

This is what Weber implies in his comparative analyses of Islam and Puritanism and Christianity as a whole, including Islamic jihad-militancy and Puritan and other Christian equivalents or proxies. For example, he defines Islam in terms of "political and military type of prophecy," including a jihad defined as the "religious commandment of a holy war for the conquest of the world" and so the militant practical realization or imposition of Islamic religion on the "infidels," thus authoritarianism, including theocracy, militarism, and expansionism. He thus implies Islam's affinity with Puritanism also defined by essentially identical elements, viz. authoritarian–theocratic tendencies, militancy, and imperialism, notably religious crusades.

Further, Weber often explicitly discovers and emphasizes such affinities between Islam and Puritanism or Calvinism. Thus, he finds that in Islam "religion makes obligatory the violent propagation of the true prophecy which consciously eschews universal conversion and enjoins the subjugation of unbelievers under the dominion of a ruling order dedicated to the religious war as one of the basic postulates of its faith," and consequently no conflicts "exist between religion and politics." Weber thereby suggests that Islam, first, primarily relies on violence and force, including like Puritanism, state, and oppositional "terror" (Gibbs 1989), to propagate or realize its "true prophecy," which creates objective conditions for the jihad as a sociological, military, and geographic escalation in this respect. At this juncture, Weber implies that the jihad becomes or operates as Clausewitz-style war of religion: the continuation of the Islamic politics of "true prophecy" by "other means," including military force against "infidel" groups and societies, just as do Puritan crusades or religious wars. In particular, he observes that "discipline in the faith during wars of religion was the source of the unconquerableness of both the Islamic and Cromwellian [Puritan] cavalries."

Second, as a corollary, Weber suggests that Islam rejects ethical–religious universalism in the sociological sense of Parsons as well as Kant's categorical imperative (Habermas 2001). Third, Weber implies that historically "Islam begins as a theocracy' (Collins 2000) defined by the "subjugation" or conversion of unbelievers and believers alike by a ruling religious–political group. Fourth and consequently, Weber infers that a religious war or jihad, including military expansion, empire-building, conquest, subjugation, and ultimately extermination of non-Islamic societies[32] (Kuran 2004), is almost inherent to the Islamic theocracy or elite as one of its "basic postulates." For example, Weber's disciple Mises remarks that "Christians of the East [e.g. the Byzantine conquered by the Ottoman-Islamic empire] were forced to accept the creed of Mohammed," just as "pagans in Europe and America were forced to accept the Christian faith." Alternatively, Weber and Mises would add that Islam, or at least its radical version, forbids and punishes with death conversion into non-Islamic religions, including Christianity, or

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[32] For example, Islamic scholar Kuran (2004:76) remarks that "when the Turkish Sultan Mehmet II conquered the last remnants of Byzantium in 1453 and declared Istanbul the new capital of his expanding empire, he had the largest, best-supplied and technologically most sophisticated army in Europe."

apostasy. Fifth and generally, Weber stresses that Islam makes politics, culture, and all society, including economy, property, and markets (Kuran 2004), as well as economic equality or justice (Davis and Robinson 2006) assimilated into or dominated by religion, theocracy in particular.

Notably, Weber infers that Islam "is obviously no universalistic salvation religion" (in the sense of traditional Christianity or Catholicism) and suggests that neither is Puritanism or Calvinism. For illustration, Weber states that Puritanism or "radical Calvinism," as a species of extreme social-worldly asceticism, has attained a "similar solution"[33] to that in Islam through representing "as God's will the domination over the sinful world by religious virtuosi belonging to the 'pure' church." Prima facie, this is simply a theocratic or theocentric solution common to Puritanism and Islam. Weber suggests that such religious virtuosi, from Cromwell and Winthrop to "Bible Belt" evangelicals, are Puritan counterparts or alternatives to Islamic "true" prophets, starting with Mohammed et al. and ending with modern Iranian and other fundamentalists. As a remarkable commonality or coincidence, both proto-Puritans like Cromwell and Winthrop and Islamic radicals in Iran abolished or detested monarchy and proclaimed their alternative creations "Republics," as just a different name for theocracies, minus monarchs, plus saints, as masters. Hence, what makes both Puritan and Islamic ruling groups comparable, if not identical, is their inhuman theocratic rule and domination, including permanent religious wars against the "infidels" or "ungodly," the "jihad" in one case, "crusade" in the other, permeated alike by persecution, extermination, military conquest, and imperialism. Both Puritan and Islamic godly virtuosi and saints seek and often succeed to become God-designated "masters" of society, both sociologically or of the total social system and geographically via military expansion and empire-building or of the entire world, and make other groups and societies, by definition, "ungodly" and sinners, their "servants," when not exterminating them. In short, this makes Puritanism and Islam what analysts call, in reference to medieval Christianity, an "expansionist religion of conversion" (Dombrowski 2001:3) through some variants of aggressive wars of religion, i.e., crusades and jihads (Turner 2002), respectively.

The preceding indicates that Islam and Puritanism share the aim and practice— thus both represent religions—of total, specifically theocratic, "mastery of the world," an attribute that Weber uses to differentiate Calvinism or Protestantism overall from other Oriental as well as Catholic religious systems defined by passive adaptation or "mere" accommodation. At this juncture, Puritanism confirms, yet by being also "Puritan" or "Calvinist" in terms of totalitarian mastery of society fundamentalist Islam disconfirms or casts doubt on, this famous and for non-Western critics, somewhat ethnocentric distinction between Western and Oriental religions on this basis. At least, Weber considers Puritanism and Islam to be religions of extreme "restraint" (Bell 1977:431) of humans defined alike as sinners by holy saints

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[33] Weber identifies another similarity between Islam and Puritanism or "Protestant Christianity" in that among the great religions they only, together with Judaism, succeeded in developing a "workday mass religion."

and true prophets, respectively, consequently of extremism, authoritarianism, and nonhumanism. In this sense, he implies that both religions are intrinsically types of theological–religious as well as political–social radicalism, viz. Puritanism as (equated with) "radical Calvinism" and Islam as "radical" Oriental theology.[34] This is what also Weber's US contemporary Thomas (1912) suggests, stating that Puritanism and "Mohammedanism," plus "Hebraism," are both cases of religion as the "excellent carrier" of political suggestion or manipulation, and as "associated" with rigid, authoritarian conservatism.

Some contemporary analysts refer to and reinforce Weber's implied affinities between Islam and Puritanism in terms of militancy, including "crusades" or "jihads" as what he calls shared offensive wars of religion. Thus, critical social theorists categorize both Puritanism, even Luther's original Protestantism, and Mohammed's Islam under the "militant religiosity of the modern age" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993:14). Further, recent analyses suggest that neo-Puritan or Protestant evangelicalism in contemporary America, most intensively the South, "produces jihadic politics in the form of radical Christian fundamentalism and violent militia men [i.e.] American Jihad" (Turner 2002:111). At this point, neo-Puritanism strikingly resembles or converges with Islam, otherwise defined and condemned by US fundamentalists as a political adversary and theological opposite. If so, then Puritan "jihadic politics" assumes two forms: first, political extremism and social authoritarianism (Davis and Robinson 2006), including totalitarian theocracy; second, domestic and global terrorism. The latter indicates a degree of affinity or convergence of Puritanism and Islam, i.e., Protestant and Islamic fundamentalism, on terrorism. Thus, US fundamentalists and violent militia-men act or look like Christian functional equivalents of Islamic terrorist networks, almost as sort of "brothers in arms" (e.g., McVeigh et al. and Bin Laden's Al Qaeda) in the proverbial sense of extremes attracting or understanding, almost in Weber's sense of *Verstehen*, each other. The observation that contemporary terrorism rests on "absolutist, either-or, good-and-evil world views" (Smelser and Mitchell 2002:11–15) undoubtedly

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[34] Hence, Weber implies that the distinction between "moderate" and "radical" Puritanism or Islam is illogical and spurious insofar as both inherently represent religious as well as political radicalism. Of course, this is open to criticism and rejected by "moderate" Puritan (e.g., originally Presbyterian and later on Methodist) and Muslim theologians and believers alike. Weber's answer would be that the above "distinction" is essentially identical to that between "radical" and "moderate" Puritan or Islamic (and other) fundamentalism and so extremism, which is also apparently illogical and spurious. Thus, if in general Puritanism and Islam intrinsically, as at least Weber suggests, constitute religions fundamentalism or orthodoxy, the term "moderate" (even in respect to original Presbyterian and subsequent Methodism) is a contradiction in term or oxymoron, just as "radical" is tautological or superfluous, in respect to both systems. For example, Davis and Robinson (2006:170) suggest that in the sense of their treatment of the Koran as "divinely revealed, inerrant and to be taken literally," "(nearly) all Muslims are 'orthodox'" and to that extent radical or fundamentalist. The same hold true ceteris paribus of original Puritanism and contemporary Protestant evangelicalism with its equivalent treatment of the Bible (Biblical Inerrancy and Literalism): on this account, also (almost all) Puritans or evangelicals are "orthodox" and to that extent radical or fundamentalist.

holds true of both terrorist groups, as these Manichean views are common to Islam with its claim to "true prophecy" and Puritanism with its moral absolutism. Generally, these analyses suggest that some other affinities between American Puritanism and Islamic fundamentalism consists in their common attack on or critique of modernity (Turner2002), including liberalization, secularization, and modernization overall. Alternatively, they both involve "efforts to restore an often-imagined indigenous culture, especially its religion, to a pure and unadulterated form" (Smelser and Mitchell 2002:25).

Some sociological studies indicate that historically both Puritanism and Islam, like other religions and ideologies, including fascism and other conservatism, communism, etc., have proven "adaptable to providing symbols" for and even played a "leading role" in revolutions (Goldstone 1986:203; 1991:412). If so, then from Cromwell's short and "not-so-sweet" revolutionary rule in England to Winthrop et al.'s long-lived theocratic mastery of the world and legacy in New England to the triumphant Great Awakenings in the South and its modern bibliocratic revival, most Puritan Revolutions have more in common with their Islamic adversaries (e.g., prophet Mohammed et al. to Khomeini[35] and Talibans) than both hostile groups would ever like to admit. Moreover, in a view, the Puritan founders of New England's colonies "were the Ayatollah Khomeinis of the early 17th century" (Archer 2001:276). Reportedly, they shared those kinds of ideas—viz. "what mere mortal should be permitted to voice doubts about the wisdom of God or to oppose the will of God?"—that eventuated into the "burning of Joan of Arc, the Salem witch trials, and Ayatollah Khomeini" (Van Dyke 1995:188).

Other sociological analyses detect and emphasize the commonalities between Iranian Islamic and contemporary American Puritan or Protestant fundamentalism

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[35] For example, Gelernter(2005) cites and vehemently attacks the accusation by some US journalists of Ronald Reagan as descending "to the level of Ayatollah Khomeini." Also, he quotes a former Vice President's comments that the 2000s US neo-Puritan ("born-again" Methodist) President's faith is the "American version of the same fundamentalist impulse that we see in Saudi Arabia, in Kashmir, and in many religions around the world" and calls them "offensive and false." Overall, Gelernter claims that contemporary radical Islam "is a religion of death, a religion that rejoices in slaughter, while the radical Christianity known as Puritanism insisted on choosing life [just as does Americanism]." Such claims apparently deny or overlook the convergence of radical Islam and Puritanism on terrorism, for example, the commonality and even sheer coexistence of US fundamentalist terrorist crusaders like McVeigh et al. with Islamic "jihaders" a la Bin Laden. Also, the claim that Puritanism and its "child" Americanism insist on "choosing life" negates or ignores the mostly Puritan-based-and-justified widespread use of the death penalty in contemporary America, not to mention the execution and extermination of the "ungodly" (e.g., the Indians, Quakers) by New England's Puritans, as well as torture, inhuman, and cruel treatment and mass killings of "enemies" during the neo-Puritan "all-American" war on "terror" and "evil" during the 2000s. In passing, when reminded of their usual support and use of the death penalty, contemporary US Puritans or fundamentalists invoke their "pro-life" ideas and policies, i.e., their condemnation of birth control (abortion) even if this often involves attacks on and murders of those guilty of and associated with this sin *cum* crime, including both patients and physicians.

in that in Iran and America its "themes" are common[36] (Friedland 2002:400–401). This is exemplified by religious nationalism, including xenophobia, primarily shared and championed by both Islamic and Puritan fundamentalists in their respective societies. In this view, what is common to Islam and Puritanism is that both tend to generate and politically exploit religious nationalism, including xenophobia, as historically happened in Iran (and Turkey) and America alike. Arguably, these are societies with an essentially theocratic or "civil religious" tradition in the sense of Islamic and Puritan religions being "historically integral to the legitimization of the state and vice versa" (Friedland 2002:390). This is to say that religious nationalism and eventually militarism and expansionism, including "jihadic politics," are inherent to or deeply rooted in Islamic and Puritan theocracy or fundamentalism. Further, some analyses point out that contemporary American Puritanism or fundamentalism, represented in the "evangelist churches of the Bible Belt," and the "Islamic integrisme of ayatollahs" in Iran and elsewhere both "belong to a wider family of [proto] totalitarian solutions offered to all those who find the burden of individual freedom excessive and unbearable" (Bauman 1997:184).

This preceding reaffirms that contemporary Puritanism and Islam display a commonality or convergence not only on religious nationalism as seemingly a latent authoritarian attribute, but also on manifest authoritarianism or totalitarianism, and so antihumanism. At this juncture, anti-Islamic Puritanism acts or looks more as "Islamic" or "jihadic" than "Christian" or "human and understanding," and to that extent non-Christian in relation to traditional Christianity, and conversely: anti-Puritan Islam more "Puritan" or "Calvinist" in Weber's sense of mastery of the world than adaptive or merely accommodating to it. Notably, the observed revival of American Puritanism in the form of evangelical Protestantism in America over the 1980s–2000s (Wuthnow 1998) parallels or coincides with the concomitant resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in many Muslim societies. At this juncture, the neo-Puritan "resurgence of evangelical Christianity in the United States [and] the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East" (Iannaccone 1998:1466) act or appear as just two, though different and hostile, sides of the same process of revival of authoritarian or theocratic religion. Generally, data from the World Values Survey for various societies during the late twentieth and twenty-first century indicate that countries with both Islamic and Puritan cultural heritages "are particularly likely to attach great importance to religion"—for example, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Algeria, and Bangladesh on one hand and America on the other "rank highest in the importance

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[36] Friedland (2002:401) comments that "while religious nationalists do not have a consistent economic policy [e.g.] the Iranian Shiite movement, the American Protestant right [etc.] have all been concerned with who controls the nation's money." In turn, Scott (1977:229) reports that, for example, sects or millennial movements in Java rejected Islam through the form of "either a competing Puritanism or of a contrasting permissiveness and licentiousness."

they place on religion" within the underdeveloped (Third) and developed (First) world, respectively[37] (Inglehart 2004:4). If so, then Puritanism and Islam converge on making or maintaining contemporary societies highly and increasingly religious or nonsecular in outlooks and values, including those about procreation[38] (Hout, Greeley, and Wilde 2001), and more so than do other world religions.

In sum, the aforesaid indicates that, at least in some respects, Puritanism is some sort or degree of Christian Islam, and conversely, Islam one of non-Christian Puritanism. Historically, Protestant Puritanism has acted or appeared objectively as a latent, subjectively unrecognized, or denied, endeavor to, *inter alia*, create a Christian functional equivalent, counterpart, or proxy for Islam, notably Islamic moral purism or "asceticism," religious fundamentalism and repressive theocracy. Alternatively, Islam, with these proto-Puritanical and authoritarian traits and effects, has been a latent, unacknowledged, or secret non-Christian historical archetype or predecessor, if not a model and inspiration, of Puritanism as its putative successor or rival within Christianity. This revealed mutual preference, functional equivalence, or substantive identity in sociological, as distinguished from theological, terms between putative enemies or opposites Puritanism and Islam may be distressing or offending to, even denied and condemned as blasphemous by, both, especially US neo-Puritan, Bible-Belt fundamentalists, but is not thereby, as they try or wish, exorcised, albeit disguised by stressing the differences or oppositions between these religions.

Also, some contemporary analysts have identified and emphasized certain affinities or commonalities between Puritanism and Judaism, as well as in part

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[37] Inglehart (2004:4) reports that the six most religious countries (Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Algeria, and Bangladesh) in the world are mostly or partly (Nigeria) Islamic, while America is the "leader" in this sense within Western societies. Thus, neo-Puritan America is reportedly more religious than even Catholic Ireland, Italy, and Poland, as well as Anglican Great Britain and its former colonies, plus Protestant North-Central Europe. Overall, Inglehart (2004:14) estimates that America has the lowest index (factor score) of secular–rational or the highest one of traditional–religious values within Western societies (e.g., -0.5 indicating the dominance of religion and traditionalism over secularism and rationalism), a figure that is roughly equal to those of Poland and India.

[38] Hout et al. (2001:471) find that contemporary Puritan or evangelical denominations in America continue to have the highest fertility rates among Protestant denominations. In retrospect, this finding would not surprise Weber who in a sense anticipates it by commenting that for Puritanism "it is a divinely prescribed vocation of humans 'to soberly produce children' (as the Puritans expressed it) within marriage." In general, he comments that "every inner-worldly asceticism, above all Puritanism, limits the legitimation of sexual life to the rational purpose of reproduction," as does *ceteris paribus* typically (with some variations) ascetic Islam. Since, like Puritans in America's history and present, Islamic groups within a (non-Islamic) society and Muslim societies in the world both tend to have the highest fertility rates within their respective contexts, this indicates what Weber may call an elective affinity between Puritanism and Islam on high rates of reproduction or procreation, including a shared hostility to birth control (notably abortion), with the resulting bizarre spectacle of US evangelicals and radical Islamists becoming allies jointly fighting against such measures or rights at various international conferences over recent years.

Hinduism[39] (Archer 2001, Friedland 2002) and Buddhism[40] (Stark 1999). In retrospect, this is what Weber and Sombart argue. Recall Weber suggests that the so-called workday mass religion or monotheism[41] developed only in Judaism and Puritanism or "Protestant Christianity," as well as Islam. He detects another affinity in that, by contrast to "all" other religions and religious ethics, only Judaism and Puritanism or Protestantism overall did not "reintroduce cults of saints, heroes or functional gods in order to accommodate themselves to the needs of the masses." Weber would add this holds good, in spite of or perhaps in tension with what he cites as Cromwell's "Parliament of Saints," Comte sarcastically calls the reign of Puritan Saints, as well as Marx describes as the "virtuosi of Protestantism" referring to New England's Puritans. For Weber, still another affinity or continuity between Judaism and Puritanism or ascetic Protestantism, plus "ancient Christianity," consists in their "marked rejection of all aesthetic devices." This rejection is, as he puts

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[39] According to Archer (2001:275), mostly due to Puritanism, in America, like India, a "formally secular state presides over a deeply religious society: a society from which religious issues continually emerge and seek to force themselves into the political arena," citing prohibitionist struggles, antiabortion crusades since the 1960s, etc. As hinted, he also compares the early US with Iran by describing New England's Puritans as "the Ayatollah Khomeneis" of the seventeenth century. Archer (2001:279) points out that a "similar hierarchy" to Hinduism is posited and instituted by Puritanism and that both religions hold a "totalizing" worldview which "penetrates all partial and fragmentary worlds in which men participate" and in which "the unity of religion and politics was so axiomatic that very few men would even have grasped the idea that church and state could be distinct." For instance, social issues generating the "most passionate disputes" are similar or common in the Puritan US and India, e.g., alcohol prohibitions, hostility to the spread of foreign languages, sexual morality, the use of religious texts in public schools, and the like. Archer (2001:283–285) concludes that "if religious activism in politics is seen as evidence that secularism has failed in India, then secularism must also be judged to have failed in the US" in consequence of Puritanism, as in both countries antisecularism (Hindu and Puritan) "seeks to subvert the religious neutrality of the state." In turn, Friedland (2002:386) observes that "it is this pervasive religiosity that joins India and the US," mostly due to Puritanism and Hinduism, respectively. For example, data presented in Inglehart (2004:4–14) show that India and the US are exactly equally religious (e.g., 57% of people in both countries say religion is "very important" in their lives) and overall rank virtually the same on the scale of traditional–religious versus secular–rational values (e.g., both countries have a factor score of around -0.5 indicating the dominance of the first over the second values). In retrospect, Weber anticipates these observations about Puritanism and Hinduism by observing that the Hindu and Puritan (or Christian) "forms of the sole or supreme deity are theological concealments" of an impediment, i.e., "salvation through the incarnation of a divinity," to "strict monotheism." However, in respect of being what he calls the "strongest conceivable religious basis" for economic and other traditionalism, Weber describes the Hindu ethic as "the most completely consistent antithesis" of that of Puritanism and its supposed affinity with the "spirit of modern capitalism."

[40] Stark (1999:76) observes that "like Weber's (Protestant) puritans, many Burmese keep a merit account book in which all expenditures on merit production are entered, and the units of merit thus achieved can be compared with the units of demerit attendant upon violation of the Buddhist precepts."

[41] However, Weber adds that "only Judaism and Islam are strictly monotheistic" religions, while in Hinduism and Christianity an "important and unique religious interest, namely salvation through the incarnation of a divinity, stands in the way of strict monotheism."

it, "either a symptom or an instrument of religion's increasingly rational influence upon the conduct of life," including by implication theocratic rule. In his view, within both Judaism and Puritanism any "real inner compromise" between religious and aesthetic elements becomes "increasingly difficult," just as does, to add, that between religion and politics or civil society, for the first eventually prevail to, as Weber implies, the point of theocracy. What he implies in the sense of a theocratic affinity between the two religions, Comte suggests explicitly by observing that Puritanism persistently exhibits an "injurious enthusiasm" for the ancient Hebrew theocracy and "dreamed" of its restoration. If so, Puritans' rejection of aesthetic and all sensual culture, like secular politics and civil society, appears to be "either a symptom or an instrument" of the authoritarian–theocratic mastery of the "sinful" social world by Puritanism, with its enthusiastic inspiration from and continuation of its precedents in Judaism despite the latter's "absence of systematic asceticism."

In addition, Weber implies an affinity or continuity between the two in stating that Judaism "transmitted"—and only to that extent became of "notable significance" for modern rational, distinguished from "pariah," capitalism—to Puritanism and Christianity overall the latter's hostility to magic and pure ritual. Following Weber, this is what Parsons (1967:57) also suggests by noting that their "negative valuation of ritual is one of the few points on which the Puritans and the men of the humanistic Renaissance could agree," though he does not stress the transmission of this opposition from Judaism to Puritanism. Another Weberian example of an affinity between Judaism and Puritanism in terms of religious ethics complements and relates to that in esthetics. Weber remarks that "some fundamental traits of Puritan morality are certainly related to" Judaism, especially its Talmudic version, stating that the ethics of Puritanism "would accept" ("in essentials") the Talmud's principle that, as he puts it, "loveless fulfillment of duty stands higher ethically than sentimental philanthropy." And, recall Judaism and Puritanism both entailed and promoted the belief that their adherents were, as Weber comments, "God's chosen people," as another affinity, if not identity, in this respect. In general, Weber concludes that Puritanism, from England to America (plus Holland), maintained what he calls the "sense of an inner relationship" to Judaism, while being "fully conscious of its differences from Hebrew ethics in practical affairs." In particular, he implies that such relations were especially manifest or intense in, as Comte suggests, the Puritan dream of and attempt at restoring the Hebrew theocracy in an oppressive inhuman or "super-human" form of the reign of Saints, while these differences mainly consisted in "economic ethics,"[42] so secondary for the purpose at hand.

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[42] As known, Weber argues, contrary to Sombart, for example, that Judaism resulted in "pariah capitalism, not rational capitalism" instead linked with Puritanism. Thus, he states that the Jews "stood on the side of the politically and speculatively oriented adventurous capitalism; their ethos was, in a word, that of pariah-capitalism. But Puritanism carried the ethos of the rational organization of capital and labor. It took over from the Jewish ethic only what was adapted to this purpose." At most, Weber argues that Judaism "was of notable significance" for modern capitalism only in the respect of or to the extent of transmitting to Puritanism the "hostility to magic" and religious ritual.

Next, even more explicitly and categorically than Weber, his critical colleague Sombart argues that Puritanism is closely related and even identical to Judaism. First, Sombart acknowledges that "only recently Max Weber demonstrated the connexion between Puritanism and Capitalism [but] that which is called Puritanism is in reality Judaism [i.e.] the dominating ideas of Puritanism which were so powerful in capitalism were more perfectly developed in Judaism, and were also of course of much earlier date." However, Sombart contends that there exists an "almost unique identity of view between Judaism and Puritanism." In his view, this identity is manifest in, first, the "preponderance of religious interests," second, the "idea of divine rewards and punishments," third, "asceticism *within* the world," so contrary to Weber, fourth, the "close relationship" of religion and economy, fifth, the "arithmetical conception" of sin, and, sixth, the "rationalization of life."[43] If so, then at least in some respects—e.g., "asceticism *within* the world," the "arithmetical conception" of sin, and the "close relationship" between religion and economy—Puritanism, like Judaism, deviates from or reverses what Tawney calls "the traditional scheme of Christian virtues." Generally, Sombart asserts that "Puritanism *is* Judaism" and thus by implication not Christianity in the strict sense. In particular, he remarks that Oliver Cromwell "dreamed" about a "confederation between the Chosen People of God [Jews] and the Puritan English." And for Sombart, this dream only demonstrates the "close connexion between Judaism and Calvinism [which is only Puritanism]."

While Sombart's and even Weber's comments may be controversial and sensitive, if not biased,[44] they are not alone in arguing and demonstrating the link or affinity between Puritanism and Judaism. Thus, some US religious conservatives approvingly state that the early American Puritans "traced their roots not to England, but to Moses. Old Testament Israel was the source of inspiration for the 'New Jerusalem' in Massachusetts" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:84). Moreover, others celebrate these roots by arguing that the US Puritans "spoke of themselves

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[43] Sombart suggests "take the attitude of Judaism and Puritanism to the problem of sex" and recounts his American experience "In one of the best hotels of Philadelphia I found a notice in my room to this effect: 'Visitors who may have to transact business with ladies are respectfully requested to leave the door of their room open while the lady is with them.'" At this point, he might add that Puritans had descended from Boston to Quakers' Philadelphia (as described in Baltzell 1979). He comments that "what is this but the old dictum of the Talmud, 'Hast thou business with women? See to it that thou art not with them alone'?" As another example, Sombart asks "is not the English [Puritan] Sunday the Jewish Sabbath?" Also, he approvingly cites Heine's question "Are not the Protestant Scots [Presbyterians] Hebrews, with their Biblical names, their Jerusalem, pharisaistic cant? And is not their religion a Judaism which allows you to eat pork?"

[44] Specifically, Sombart's and in part Weber's analyses of the relations between Judaism and Puritanism (and capitalism) often have been, perceived, or construed as anti-Semitic, which perhaps they are reflecting the conservative–nationalist and racist cultural climate in imperial Germany, thus preparing or heralding the stage for fascism, in an apparent continuity from Bismarck to Hitler. Still, at least Weber can hardly be described as anti-Semitic given his well-documented support, defense, and appreciation of Simmel, a Jewish sociologist in Germany.

as God's new chosen people, living in God's new promised land—in short, as God's new Israel"[45] (Gelernter 2005). Arguably, "you cannot really understand the Pilgrims, or Puritans in general, unless you know the Hebrew Bible and classical Jewish history" (Gelernter 2005). Consequently, the Puritan vision presumably creating the American nation is described as the "vision ultimately of the Hebrew Bible and the Jewish people." An alternative argument is that historical and contemporary anti-Puritanism, supposedly expressed as anti-Americanism, is "closely associated" with anti-Semitism. Thus, what Weber and Sombart in a largely value-free manner identified as the "close connexion" of Puritanism with Judaism, many US religious conservatives would glorify and seek to perpetuate as the Puritan original virtue.

Finally, Puritanism can be deemed or demonstrated to be non-Christian not only by its reversal of traditional humanist Christian values and its affinities with non-Christian authoritarian–theocratic religions like radical Islam. It can also be owing to its affinities or similarities with contemporary totalitarianism, notably fascism, as elaborated later.

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[45] Gelernter (2005) claims that "the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, often called the 'first written constitution of modern democracy', were inspired not by democratic Athens or republican Rome or Enlightenment philosophy but by a Puritan preacher's interpretation of a verse in the Hebrew Bible."

5
Neo-Puritanism and Authoritarianism

From Paleo-Puritanism to Neo-Puritanism

Puritanism Déjà Vu

The preceding chapters mostly focus on English and American paleo- or proto-Puritanism creating Great Britain's and New England's Holy Commonwealths respectively, and its affinity and convergence with authoritarianism or totalitarianism. This chapter focuses on subsequent and contemporary American or neo-Puritanism, as a variation of what Weber describes as "Neo-Calvinism," insofar as Puritanism or Calvinism in Great Britain has almost vanished as a major player on the social stage or been relegated into discredit, oblivion, and irrelevance by tempering or competing forces like Anglicanism and liberalism (Munch 2001).

"The old Puritanism is dead, long live the new Puritanism"—that is how America can be in essence described from the Great Awakenings during the eighteenth and nineteenth century to the formal disestablishment of New England's Puritan theocracy in the 1830s and to the early twenty-first century.[1] In short, to paraphrase Mark

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[1] In a sense, Puritanism is just about everywhere, including politics (and economy) and civil society or culture alike, in modern America, North and South, East and West, "red" (more) and "blue" (less) states, at the start of the twenty-first century, just as has been before, since the seventeenth century. As expected, this particularly holds true of the South or former Confederacy, where Puritanism in its various old and new forms, names, stripes, and colors not only continues but even expands and reinforces its presence, salience, and dominance. Puritanism is virtually ever-present and dominant in Southern civil society or culture, including the most private life, not to mention politics. For example, paleo-Puritan (e.g., Presbyterian) and neo-Puritan (Baptist, Methodist) institutions, like private schools, universities, media, including television stations, hospitals, etc., are ubiquitous and ever-more powerful or influential, pervading and controlling nearly every part and aspect of modern life in the South and beyond (e.g., the "Wild West"). As a case in point, the Dallas area alone has three major private Puritan- or evangelical-based (Baptist and Methodist) universities, two main hospitals (Baptist and Presbyterian), several large radio–television stations, and dozens of smaller such institutions, not to mention hundreds of religious elementary and high schools. Hence, Puritan institutions as well as policies and ideas represent, to paraphrase Weber, the "most fateful," if not fatal, authoritarian force or the new "fate" of Southerners and other Americans (e.g., the "red" states) in the early

Twain, the diagnoses, news, or rumors of the death of Puritanism (e.g., Foerster 1962) in America are premature or "greatly exaggerated." Moreover, Puritanism continues to be what Weber would call the "most fateful force" in America's modern life, from politics or government and economy to civil society or culture. Puritanism is "dead" as a term, name, or description in contemporary America and elsewhere, for or if virtually no major modern US and other religious groups describe themselves as "Puritan," though some do as "Calvinist,"[2] starting with the 1830s, which perhaps indicates the degree of discredit or out-of-date of the label even in American history and society. Yet, Puritanism as a concept, vision, and practice is "live and well," constantly resurrected from what Mannheim calls the "dead past" through permanent awakenings, even becoming again salient and predominant in contemporary America, notably the South dominated, as critical observers (Mencken 1982) stress, by Baptism and Methodism as later-day names, variations, or proxies of neo-Puritanism. Moreover, in a sense Puritanism was never totally "dead," "gone," or "out," though occasionally and temporarily "down" (the 1960s) in America, even following New England Puritan theocracy's (Congregational Church's) legal disestablishment in the 1830s. Generally, the above implies that the formal disestablishment or legal separation of Puritanism from state did not become a sufficient condition for its substantive, in Weber's sense, demise, and disestablishing, or its sociological differentiation from politics and secular society. This thus reaffirms that the legal or constitutional separation of church and state is different from and not enough in itself for the sociological or societal differentiation between religion and politics, plus civil society, in America (Archer 2001; Munch 2001).

Rather, Puritanism has only changed its name, cloths, or colors, especially in the US South following the triumphant Great Awakenings that expanded, intensified, and perpetuated its mastery or dominance up to the twenty-first century. Thus, Puritanism changed its name and cloths into, first and foremost, Baptism and to a

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twenty-first century, just as were the old theocratic genesis and destiny for New Englanders during the seventeenth to nineteenth century.

[2] Some contemporary extreme or fringe Protestant groups in America and elsewhere (e.g., Holland) still call themselves "Calvinist," viz. the "Dutch Reformed Calvinists" (Smith 2000:13); curiously there is "Calvin College" in Michigan. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 2004 presidential and congressional elections dominated by neo-Puritans evangelicals or neo-conservatives, the *Economist* commented that "now, it seems, the conservative rural red-neck Calvinist vote has captured America," while the *New York Times* lamented that a "fundamentalist Christian revival was in revolt against the traditions of the Enlightenment, on which the country is based." Also, the Geneva-based "World Alliance of Reformed Churches," self-described as a fellowship of almost 80 million "Reformed Christians" in more than 200 churches located in more than 100 countries, apparently has its roots in sixteenth century Calvinism. For example, its leader stated (during a visit to the Pope at the Vatican in early 2006) that these are "churches shaped by the Protestant Reformation and its values," apparently referring to Switzerland's own version in the face of John Calvin and his ideas. In retrospect, Weber also identifies what he calls (Dutch) Neo-Calvinism (e.g., of Kuyper) that "no longer dared to maintain the pure doctrine of predestined grace" by contrast to original Calvinism.

lesser or diminishing extent Methodism in the South after the Puritan Great Awak-
enings, particularly, the second enfolding during the 1800s. Further, Puritanism
has become generalized or renamed into what Weber calls Protestant sectarianism
(also Lipset 1996) or fundamentalism typically, but not invariably, in the form
of evangelicalism (Wuthnow 1998) or Biblicism in America after and prior to
the 1830s, including the 1920s[3] (Smith 2000) as symbolized by the admittedly
"embarrassing episode" of the evangelical "Monkey Trial" (Boles 1999).

In general, it is more accurate to say that, though under new names and cloths,
Puritanism in substantive terms has continued to represent an epitome, as de-
scribed by its adherents and its opponents alike, of Protestant sectarianism or
fundamentalism, notably evangelicalism, even in the long aftermath of its formal
disestablishment or separation from state in New England. While certainly not all
historical and contemporary Protestant sectarianism or fundamentalism has been
"Puritan" in the strict sense, Puritanism represents intrinsically and vigorously a
sectarian, as Weber emphasizes, or fundamentalist, in Comte's description, type
of Protestantism. Strikingly, most later-day US sectarian and fundamentalist or
evangelical Protestant groups, particularly Baptists and Methodists, are rooted in,
derived from, or inspired by original Puritanism in New and Old, as in the case
of Methodism especially, England, so in that sense they epitomize or approxi-
mate neo-Puritanism. Hence, in contemporary America, above all the South and
other ultraconservative ("red" or "red-neck") regions, neo-Puritanism is basically
generalized, identified, revealed, or approximated in and through Protestant sectar-
ianism or evangelicalism, exemplified by Baptism and partly and early Methodism.
Notably, if one wonders what the "proof" or symptom is that contemporary Pu-
ritanism remains present, salient, and predominant, the primary candidate is the
"Bible Belt" as the neo-Puritan—i.e., evangelical[4] (Bauman 1997; Boles 1999;

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[3] According to Smith (2000:12), American religious fundamentalism "emerged through
a split with the modernist movement in American Protestantism in the 1920s" accentuat-
ing biblical literalism, doctrinal purity, and separation from the social world. Curiously,
he distinguishes fundamentalism from evangelicalism described as an "attempt by some
moderate fundamentalists in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s to break away from the more separatist,
defensive, and anti-intellectual tendencies of the fundamentalist movement in which they
were raised" and emphasizing "theological orthodoxy, personal evangelism, and the exer-
tion of a 'redemptive' influence on the culture around them" (Smith 2000:12). Moreover,
Smith argues that during the 1940s–1970s US Protestant fundamentalists and evangelicals
"constructed their identities to a large degree in opposition to each other." Still, he admits
that these fundamentalist, evangelical, and other neo-Puritan groups form an "extended
family" of conservative Protestantism making about a third of the American, and the vast
majority of the US Southern, population at the start of the twenty-first century. Actually,
Smith implies that fundamentalism is specifically evangelicalism, viz. "biblical literalism,"
and conversely, evangelicalism is Christian fundamentalism in the sense of "theological
orthodoxy."

[4] Boles (1999) states that the "roots of the Southern Bible Belt lie in the mid-18th-century
South, a slaveholding region with a nominal established (state-supported) religious insti-
tution, the Anglican Church." Specifically, he suggests that the "Southern Bible Belt" was
created by Puritanism in opposition to the Anglican Church through the "effective introduc-
tion" into Virginia of such Puritan ("activist") denominations as "in order of appearance, the

Smith 2000) or fundamentalist (Gould 1996)—project, system or outcome in contemporary America from the mid eighteenth to the early twenty-first century. In essence, what was New England's proto-Puritan theocracy in the seventeenth to nineteenth century has become since, primarily owing to the Great Awakenings and their sequels, the Southern Bible Belt as a pure or diluted case of Weberian bibliocracy created and/or dominated by neo-Puritanism, viz. what its adherents calls "evangelical Protestantism"[5] (Boles 1999) and critics "Methodist and Baptist Barbarism" (Mencken 1982). If so, then this indicates a movement from New England paleo-Puritanism to Southern neo-Puritanism, albeit with changed names, dress, and colors like "fundamentalism," "evangelicalism," "Methodism," "Baptism," or "neoconservatism," so an unbroken and strong historical continuity within American Puritanism since the seventeenth century, up to the twenty-first century.

In essence, most contemporary sectarian or evangelical Protestantism in America, notably the South, can be deemed a sort, degree, or proxy of neo-Puritanism and in extension what Weber calls neo-Calvinism, i.e., the same old "wine" of paleo-Puritanism in a "new bottle," though not the best metaphor given, as Pareto notices, the Puritan persisting fanatical and oppressive antialcohol obsession. The above preempts possible objections that "there is no such thing" as Puritanism in contemporary America and elsewhere, and consequently that the entire endeavor in this chapter is a pointless or straw-man exercise. Simply, if US sectarian and evangelical Protestant groups like Baptists and others in the South and beyond no longer formally designate themselves as "Puritans," as seemingly a discredited, outdated, pretended, or ridiculous designation, it means in no way that they are not substantially Puritan, and that neo-Puritanism is a nonentity, on the contrary. To reiterate, in New England, after more than two centuries of its "mastery of the world," Puritanism or Congregationalism was formally–legally disestablished as an official religion or state-church in 1833, but what Weber may call its substantive societal impact and "rationality" has continued and often intensified in America as a whole, as during the 1980s–2000s, ever since. Recall the bizarre episode that exactly a year after (1834) this official disestablishment of the Puritan religion in Massachusetts, its Supreme Court upheld the state's blasphemy law and another court tried, convicted, and imprisoned for blasphemy some dissenters (e.g., the

Presbyterians, the Baptists, and the Methodists" during and following 1740 (the first Great Awakening). Also, Boles (1999) recalls that "I later came to realize that I had grown up in the Bible Belt, but it never occurred to me then that my religious situation was different from that in other regions," notably that "my religious background was at least to a degree out of the national mainstream."

[5] Boles (1999) makes the following revealing recollections: "As a boy growing up in the rural South in the 1950's, I took absolutely for granted the cultural primacy of religion (meaning, of course, evangelical Protestantism). While there were a variety of Protestant churches in my community, they all represented the evangelical wing of Protestantism: there were no Catholics, no Jews, no Episcopalians, not even Presbyterians, but there was every type of Baptist imaginable, with a sprinkling of Methodists, and assorted independent Bible churches, holiness churches, and Pentecostals. Mine was a situation common to much of the South, though older regions, and more affluent areas, would have Presbyterian and Episcopal churches."

Boston Investigator editor) because of publicly expressing a "lack of belief in prayer, miracles, and Christ" (Hull 1999:46).

Moreover, Puritanism has typically been in the state of a sort of permanent revolution, revival, expansion, and transformation in this sense, perhaps going through Pareto-like religious cycles of upswings, as during the 1740s–1800s and the 1980s–2000s, and downswings, as in the 1960s, but almost never vanishing from ("out"), becoming completely irrelevant ("down") and "forgotten" in America, from seventeenth century New England theocracy to Southern bibliocracy at the threshold of the twenty-first century. To paraphrase Shakespeare, Puritan actors, from Winthrop et al. to Bible-Belt Protestant evangelicals, may have come and gone and often forgotten playing various parts, but Puritanism remained "well and alive," undeterred, steadfast and powerful as the perennial major player (Munch 2001) on America's social–political stage hence essentially recreated in its image. As known, a historical exemplar of this Puritan permanent revolution, revival, and expansion in America entails the Great Awakenings of the eighteenth and nineteenth century and their later reenactments. They are not the only one, as shown by many perpetual Puritan revivals or counterrevolutions, ranging from what Pareto described as fanatical temperance (e.g., antialcoholic) movements in the late nineteenth century, resulting in and symbolized by Prohibition, to their contemporary versions (Wagner 1997) engineering another evangelical revival or counterrevolution during the 1980s–2000s. At this juncture, American neo-Puritanism appears as the historical outcome or survival of this Puritan permanent (counter) revolution, notably the revolutionary expansion of proto-Puritanism from New England to the South and beyond in America, up to the early twenty-first century.

Observations suggest that Puritanism, consequently its authoritarianism, is far from being passé or a just historical point of origin and venerable (or deplorable for non-Puritans, including secular liberals) legacy, but not a destination or modern "spirit," of America, as often supposed. Thus, some observers register that "a New Age of Puritanism" has been "already displacing" (Noble 1982) permissive non-Puritan life styles and values, almost taken for granted following the 1960s liberal revolution, in America, especially since the 1980s, in vehement counterrevolution against this liberalization. In a sense, the observed "resurgence of evangelical Christianity" (Iannaccone 1998:1466), especially Protestantism, in America, corresponding or contending with that of Islamic fundamentalism in Muslim countries, during the 1980s–2000s can be taken as a functional equivalent or substantive indicator of this "New Age of Puritanism."

Other analyses also identify a continuity or movement from old-style Puritanism to neo-Puritanism, expressed in the resurgence of Protestant evangelicalism and exemplified in what is described as the "new temperance" wave in America since the 1980s and extending into the early 2000s. For instance, reportedly the new-temperance rationale of "public exhortation summed up in the phrase 'just say no' is basically the wisdom that developed in Massachusetts with Puritans. And it has failed" (Wagner 1997:174). This historical failure and discredit perhaps help explain why the contemporary descendents or admirers of Massachusetts' Puritans have come to refrain from designating themselves as such, yet evidently continue

to adopt, even extend and intensify their original ideas and practices, updated with new names, cloths and colors probably in light (or darkness) of such failures, from proto-Puritan witch-hunts to Prohibition and its neo-Puritan sequels and survivals such as Bible-Belt "alcohol-free" zones. So, US neo-Puritans' apparent, to use Veblen's phrase, "trained incapacity" or unwillingness to learn from the failures, mistakes and dangers, if ever admitted, of their progenitors and role models confirms that oppressive irrationalism constitutes and remains an essential attribute of American Puritanism.

For example, Southern and other US neo-Puritan evangelicals like Baptists and others display a remarkable and perhaps unprecedented or unparalleled, within America, not to mention secular Western societies, resistance to learn or accept the lessons of Prohibition.[6] They do so through persistent, as Pareto predicts, and ever-more fanatical antialcohol crusades, ranging from local prohibitions— viz. what Merton (1968) calls "dry" states or counties—to the exceptionally high national–legal drinking age limit, by far the highest in the Western world, to harsh Draconian punishments for violations of this new Puritan code of temperance. They thereby reaffirm and perpetuate what Weber identifies as the "unexampled tyranny" of Puritanism in the South and ultimately, in their vision, all America.

In a related, probably more dramatic or visible example, Puritan antidrug warriors, as even some US conservatives (Friedman 1997) admonish, also refuse to learn from the admittedly dismal failure of Prohibition, including the rise of organized crime or criminal organizations (e.g., the Mafia), perhaps for the first time in contemporary America. Reportedly, like to most nonconservatives, for the vast majority of (excepting conservative-religious US) economists, like its precedent alcohol Prohibition, Puritan-rooted drug prohibition in the guise of a "tough-on-crime" policy, is "fundamentally implausible" (Reuter 2005:1075) in virtue of reflecting or generating a Draconian penal system. Admittedly, like its infamously failed, albeit perhaps less Draconian precedent, the neo-Puritan prohibition of and war on drugs "generates overly harsh punishment" (Reuter 2005:1076), as a defining element of a Draconian, what Durkheim calls repressive and primitive or barbarian and to that extent inhuman, distinguished from "restitutive" and modern or civilized and humane, criminal-justice system.[7] In comparative terms, that the Puritan-American "way" in this respect is not, as US ruling neoconservatives claim and consequently via their massive and "high-tech" apparatus of brain-washing persuade perhaps most Americans to believe, the only, final, or best solution to this problem is indicated by the observation that other Western societies "have managed more humane implementation of prohibition, indeed none have managed to

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[6] For example, Harvard University Chaplain Peter Gomes warns that the rise of neo-Puritan evangelicalism in contemporary America, as a "self-consciously religious political movement with savvy and clout is the same nightmare that brought us Prohibition and sustained racial segregation" (cited in Smith 2000:4).

[7] Reuter (2005:1076) comments that the "political activism of the California prison guards in fighting for retention of long prison sentences is indicative of how that might occur" in the "war on drugs" and others neo-Puritan "tough-on-crime" policies.

create a regime as harsh as that in the United States" (Reuter 2005:1076) under Puritanical neoconservatism.

Generally, contemporary American Puritanism in the South and beyond, via its perennial culture wars on individual moral and other civil liberties and political freedom, seems far from being discouraged and "depressed," let alone deterred, from the past failures of its ancestor and role models since New England's theocracy. Like their ancestors exorcising "witches" from the "biblical garden," "we-can-do-it" US neo-Puritans or Bible Belt (and Wild-West) "gun-toting fundamentalists"[8] (Wuthnow 1998:11), plus their neoconservative political allies, exorcise "failure" in theocratic oppression, and authoritarianism *cum* moral purity and religious salvation, let alone learning from it, as "no option" from their vocabulary. This is the probably sole, authoritarian, distinguished from disdained democratic–liberal (Lemert 1999), form of optimism and "hope" in American Puritanism. In short, to paraphrase Merton, in the dictionary of American Puritanism "there is no such word as 'fail'" in respect of its systematic–methodical and persistent attempts to establish and impose Puritan authoritarianism, including theocracy. In this sense, in Puritanism, including its modern generalized form of Protestant evangelicalism, admittedly "there is some method, or at least intelligibility, to the madness"[9] (Smith 2000:11) of theocratic authoritarianism. This is incidentally intimated by the idea or term of "Methodism" aiming at, as Mill and Weber stress, a further methodical Puritan revival and intensification, and discussed later.

Neo-Puritanism and New Puritan Authoritarianism

That Puritanism in the generalized form of Protestant fundamentalism or sectarianism resurrects from the "dead," persists and strengthens in contemporary America is a secondary argument or concern in itself. In turn, it is pertinent in relation to or in function of the primary argument that, as the actual or potential effect of this resurrection, Puritan authoritarian theological dispositions and theocratic practices continue, revive, and even intensify, thus that neo-Puritanism suppresses or threatens political democracy and a free civil society through its renewed authoritarianism. So, to better understand and explain the new Puritan authoritarianism, it is instructive to reexamine the evolution of American and other proto-Puritanism into neo-Puritanism, including Methodism and Baptism, via perennial Puritan revivals or permanent revolutions, more precisely counterrevolutions against Puritan

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[8] Actually, Wuthnow (1998:3) complains that "journalists write about wiccans [sic!] and gun-toting fundamentalists, but acknowledge privately that they are missing the bigger picture," viz. a "major transformation" in American spirituality or religion since the 1980s.
[9] As an instance of this method to madness, Smith (2000:11) cites contemporary US evangelicals who affirm at the same time that "Christian morals should be common for all Americans and that Americans should be free to live as they wish, even to follow non-Christian lifestyles."

"enemies," from Catholicism and Anglicanism to the Enlightenment and secular liberalism overall.

Notably, this evolution through perpetual counterrevolutions can be fully understood by taking into due consideration proto-Puritanism's radical project and practice of expanding and reinforcing its old authoritarianism from its source to virtually all destinations and realms, and at an ever-greater intensity, thus becoming neo-Puritanism with its "new" authoritarianism. A case in point comprises the US Great Awakenings that may defy complete sociological understanding unless they are also understood as proto-Puritans' radical attempts to expand and intensify their theocratic social system from New England to the South and all America. Namely, they are to be reconsidered as counterrevolutionary movements for instituting what Weber calls a (Southern) bibliocracy and fanatical crusades against its perceived enemies ranging from Anglicans, Catholics, and Quakers to secular liberals, thus turning proto- into neo-Puritans under varying names, cloths, and colors ("evangelicals," "Baptists," "Methodists"). An earlier similar example perhaps providing a model, precedent or inspiration for this Puritan "going down South" involved US paleo-Puritans since Winthrop et al., whose movement to and brutal "civilizing" of the new world, including their "creative destruction" of the native Indians and other "ungodly" and "impure" groups, is better understood if considering their vision and creation of a theocratic Bible Commonwealth in spite or rather because of their failure to permanently institute such theocracy in the Old World, including England under Anglicanism and the monarchy. In short, both Puritanism's historical transformation from "English" into "American" and the later from "paleo" into "neo" tended to be in essence an authoritarian–theocratic (counter) revolution, expansion, or revival.

In particular, neo-Puritanism intrinsically constitutes or results in the new Puritan authoritarianism, including theocracy, exemplified by Baptism and in part early Methodism often described (e.g., Mencken 1982) as subsequent or contemporary authoritarian–theocratic or fundamentalist revivals in America, notably the South via God's supposed "intelligent design" and the neoconservative political practice of a novel Southern bibliocracy. Thus, some analysts observe that in America the neo-Puritan fundamentalist "allure is the promise put paid to the agony of individual choice by abolishing the choice itself" (Bauman 2001:70). In this view, in particular, predictably, the "evangelist churches of the Bible Belt," as epitomized by Baptist sects (Boles 1999), represent, like their Islamic counterparts, "proto-totalitarian solutions offered to all those who find the burden of individual freedom excessive and unbearable" (Bauman 1997:184).

Puritan Revivals and Perpetuation of Theocratic Authoritarianism

The foregoing suggests that perennial Puritan revivals, expansions, and revolutions are not only counterrevolutions against or "creative destructions" of non-Puritan ungodly or liberal social changes as well as reactionary restorations of a "pure"

golden or nebulous past, which has never existed except in, as Comte implies, Puritans' dreams, or "paradise lost." They are also radical or extreme, including fanatical and violent crusade-style, efforts to perpetuate, even expand and intensify a Puritan social–political authoritarian system, notably theocracy, thus transforming the old into the new authoritarianism, as the prime aim, essence, or outcome of a sort of evolution via permanent revolutions from paleo- to neo-Puritanism. Alongside what Tocqueville and Weber identify as New England's proto-Puritan theocracy and the Great Awakenings, historical cases of perpetual Puritan revivals, expansions, or counterrevolutions (reactions and restorations) abound, from seventeenth century Great Britain to the twenty-first century US South. Of these instances, two have proven particularly relevant for both historical and contemporary America, especially, to use Weber's word, fateful, if not fatal, in terms of liberal–secular political democracy and a free civil society for the US South. These are, first, the rise and extension of Methodism as a revivalist movement within early English Puritanism; second, the ever-growing expansion and predominance of Southern Baptism[10] during recent times and before, as since the Great Awakenings. These historical developments are germane and crucial to what is observed as the subsequent, persisting and ever-expanding-and-intensifying authoritarian mastery of the US South by Methodism, yet in a somewhat decelerating "rate" of dominance, and notably Baptism at an accelerating rate.

In particular, given the increasing dominance or influence of neo- and proto-Puritan theocratic or fundamentalist Baptism, the second development appears as even more fateful or fatal for the "agony of individual choice" and, alternatively, more determinative or salient in respect of authoritarianism. For example, by the 2000s Southern Baptism has become the largest Protestant and thus evangelical and Christian group with more than 16 million members not only in the South, but America as a whole, so a highly qualified candidate for what Weber calls, referring to capitalism, the "most fateful force" in modern American, let alone Southern, life. Hence, Southern Baptism, in virtue of its professed and pursued evangelicalism or Biblicism, looks as the most manifest type, radical indicator, or proxy of contemporary Puritanism in the sense of Protestant fundamentalism,[11]

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[10] For example, the Southern Baptist Convention at its 2004 annual meeting condemned what it described as "the cultural drift in [America] toward secularism." In particular, the Convention passed a resolution commending those neo-Puritans evangelicals initiating Southern Baptism's "conservative resurgence" in the 1980s, expressing "pride and strong support for our American military" and proposing to "amend the U.S. Constitution to bar gay marriage."

[11] While formally not a Puritan group and even dismissed (like Catholicism) by many Protestants and other Christians as "non-Christian," US Mormons can also be substantially in Weber's sense considered neo-Puritans, equally, or comparably radical as Southern Baptists and similar groups in terms of theological doctrines and theocratic practices. Moreover, the first may have proven even more radical or successful at least on the account that the region they almost absolutely control (Utah) is closer to an official or pure theocracy than is even that (the South) controlled by the second, though the differences between these neo-Puritan, sectarian, or radical religions are the matter of "degrees of un-freedom," oppression, and extremism rather than of nature and substance. For example, Baudrillard

with Presbyterianism, Methodism, and similar "mainline" denominations as latent or moderate cases in modern Protestantism. To reiterate, what was official Puritanism (Congregational Church) in New England until the 1830s has become subsequently and remains essentially Baptism, in part Methodism and Presbyterianism, in the South, and Protestant fundamentalism overall in America. At least, this is the main thesis of this chapter. For instance, what was New England's Puritan theocratic "Biblical Commonwealth" has historically been and remained the South's predominantly or increasingly Baptist "Bible Belt."

If the treatment or view of Baptism as principal or exemplary neo-Puritanism or Weber's "Neo-Calvinism" and so the new Puritan authoritarianism or Mencken's "barbarism" is cogent and relatively common in the sociological literature and American society, this seems less so in respect with Methodism and Presbyterianism, in light of their observed or supposed subsequent developments or effects in the direction of relative theological, moral, and political moderation and "liberalization." This is implied in the prevailing view, perception, or description of Southern Baptism as the principal and growing species of Protestant fundamentalism or evangelicalism, sectarianism, or reactionary conservatism, and of Methodism, alongside Presbyterianism as well as Episcopalism and Lutheranism, as the major though relatively declining subtype of moderate, mainstream, or "liberal" Protestantism in America. This indicates a remarkable divergence rather than convergence in the historical trajectory of Methodism and Presbyterianism before, as compared with that of Baptism in America since the late eighteenth century, for both initially were, as Weber and Mill suggest, almost equally radical, moralistic, intolerant, militant, or evangelical.

Variations of Puritanism. Particularly, both early Baptism and Methodism were what Weber calls intensifications, rather than mitigations, of original English Puritanism, thus in extension of early European Calvinism, consequently neo-Puritanism and neo-Calvinism.

First, in early Baptism, this intensification of Puritanism was particularly manifested and realized in a dual moralist–theocratic direction. To indicate Baptism's moralist intensification of Puritanism, early Baptists, as Weber remarks, sought a "complete conquest of the power of sin" and condemned the "godlessness" of humans as the creatures of the body and flesh "even more harshly"[12] than original English Puritans or European Calvinists themselves. Hence, he infers, as

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(1999:2) observes that "Puritan obsessiveness or funereal Puritanism" includes "evangelical marketing in the heart of the Utah desert," just as in the Baptist-dominated South and elsewhere. Also, Pentecostalism, by arising within the "Holiness-Methodist wing of American evangelicalism in the 1910s" (Smith 2000:12), can be included into neo-Puritan fundamentalism or contemporary Protestant conservatism.

[12] Weber adds that the President of the Baptist Union of Great Britain "emphatically" stated (in the 1900s) that "the best men on the roll of our Puritan Churches were men of affairs, who believed that religion should permeate the whole of life." This statement specifies Baptism's Puritan moralist intensification or revival as well as Weber's observation that the English and other bourgeoisie "not only failed to resist this unexampled tyranny of Puritanism but even developed a heroism in its defense."

noted, that the "strict morality of the Baptists had turned in practice into the path prepared by the Calvinistic ethic." As an indication of Baptism's theocratic intensification of Puritanism and Calvinism, recall Weber identifies what he calls the "strictest bibliocracy" of the earliest Baptist groups in England, which apparently further intensified the Calvinist–Puritan already "strict" theocracy. In his view, at the beginning of their historical development Puritanism or Calvinism and Baptism were "sharply opposed to each other," but later came in "close contact" through the formation and expansion of Baptist sects in England and America during the late seventeenth century. Moreover, some analysts register that this contact and cooperation had happened even before, for example, in England "during the 1640s and thereafter, most Congregational Puritans cooperated with Baptists who accepted all other beliefs of mainstream Puritanism" (Bremer 1995:158).

And a sort of Baptism's implied emotional intensification of Puritanism interlaced with these moralist–theocratic reinforcements. Such an intensification was manifest or potential in what Weber describes as "hysterical" tendencies or conditions in Baptism, due to its "idea of expectant waiting for the Spirit to descend," individual revelation and true rebirth symbolized by being baptized as an alternative to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination rejected or neglected. In short, Baptism originally was a sectarian movement aiming at a further moralist–theocratic and emotional intensification or radicalization of an otherwise intense or radical Puritanism—and, one can add, subsequently and always remained so, especially in America by the twenty-first century. Thus, if judging by its subsequent and persisting design and practice of a "Bible society" in America, Baptism has not changed substantially (as different from formally) in this respect. Rather, it has generalized and intensified its original strict moralism, hysterical emotionalism, and "strictest bibliocracy," by first importing them to the new world, then expanding them, via the Great Awakenings, from the North to the South, later solidifying and perpetuating them in this region, and ultimately trying to extend and perpetuate them to the entire America, thus completing a full circle. If the "more things have formally changed, the more they have stayed substantively the same" in American Baptism, the historical story seems somewhat different for its initial Puritan ally and subsequent rival, Methodism, plus Presbyterianism. This is so judging by the evolving and prevailing view on Methodism as mainstream and moderate rather than fundamentalist and radical Protestantism in contemporary America.

Initially, almost like Baptism, Methodism was basically the moralist radicalization or intensification rather than moderation or tempering of original English Puritanism already more radical or intense than any other types of Protestantism like Lutheranism and Anglicanism, and even, as Weber implies, of Calvinism itself. Yet, even this, in Weber's description, "unexampled" Puritan radicalism, intensity, or tyranny was apparently not radical, intense, systematic, methodical, or simply tyrannical "enough" for these early Methodists, just as their Baptist brothers. Specifically, Weber defines Methodism as the "emotional intensification" and "last

great revival"[13] of original English Puritanism through seeking "sinless perfection" such that "the self-confidence of the righteous man reached untold heights." The latter apparently complements or parallels the early Baptists' "complete conquest of the power of sin." Notably, Weber notices that Methodism has developed a "strongly emotional character, especially in America" where what he calls the "most terrible ecstasies" frequently occurred at public places and meetings, thus transmitting, via a sort of geographic–social contagion, to the new world Methodist ecstatic "religious eccentricities" or pathologies of which old England "had seen many" already.

In turn, Weber remarks that this ultraemotional religion of Methodism made a "peculiar alliance" with the "ascetic ethics" of Puritanism, as indicated by the Methodist, John Wesley's doctrine of "sanctification." Thus, this doctrine mixed an "emphasis on feeling," in contrast to original Puritanism or Calvinism, with the dogma that, in Weber's words, those reborn "can, by virtue of the divine grace already working in [them], even in this life attain sanctification, the consciousness of perfection in the sense of freedom from sin." He points out that for Methodists the attainment of this end "finally guarantees the *certainty of salvation* and substitutes a serene confidence for the sullen worry of the Calvinist." This indicates that in consequence of such sanctification expected and claimed to transform them into saints versus sinners, so methodical "masters of the world" and others their servants, Methodists became even more self-confident and sanctimonious, so potentially more intolerant, oppressive, or tyrannical in moral terms, than original Puritans or Calvinists. Hence, like Baptists, these Methodists tried to become or present themselves as more perfect, systematic, and methodical or simply purer and truer Puritans and Calvinists, minus emotion, than Cromwell or Calvin himself, thus resembling, as the old saying goes, those Catholic believers and theologians trying and pretending to be "Bigger Catholics than the Pope." In particular, they sought or pretended to be "bigger," more methodical and eccentric saints–masters than original Puritan virtuosi themselves, as sanctification doctrine indicates.

In retrospect, Methodism as the moralist–emotional revival and methodical intensification of Puritanism is, with Baptism, one of the first Puritan revivals and revolutions in history, setting the historical pattern, precedent, or inspiration for most others, including the mostly Methodist–Baptist Great Awakenings in America, especially the South. Hence, the birth of Methodism as a neo-Puritan or revivalist movement within early English Puritanism and its transmission to the new world is historically crucial particularly to the South, as is the importation and expansion of Baptism from continental Europe and New England to the region. Notably, to make full sense of the observed rule of the South by what critics denounce as Methodist–Baptist "barbarism" or authoritarianism presupposes revisiting and specifying the original aim or nature of Methodism.

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[13] Weber notes and generally subscribes to the view that Methodism "is distinguished from other ascetic movements in that it came after the English Enlightenment."

As hinted, in virtue of its original aims and attributes early Methodism was in essence just one of the first species or precursors of neo-Puritanism, alongside Baptism, due to similar elements, viz. strict morality, hysterical emotionalism, and a neo-Puritan "strictest theocracy." This is what Mill suggests by including the early Methodists into English Puritans or Calvinists, as well as Weber by defining the original aim of Methodism as the purported revival, notably emotional intensification, of Puritanism via "sinless perfection." Thus, Methodism was simply neo-Puritanism in trying to be, or appear as, "purer" and more "methodical"— thus having more "method" to the oppressive "madness" (Smith 2000:11)—as well as emotional in moral life than Puritanism itself and even any Protestantism. In this as well as other respects such as the treatment of wealth, Weber compares the "great revival of Methodism" with a "monastic reform." As noted, Methodism was of English origins, founded or popularized by John Wesley in England and subsequently expanded to America, notably the South, eventually replacing, jointly with Baptism and Presbyterianism, Anglicanism, or Episcopalism as the official congregation via various revivals and counterrevolutions. As Weber notes, Wesley particularly sought "only to revive the old Puritan doctrine that works are not the cause, but only the means of knowing one's state of grace, and even this only when they are performed solely for the glory of God."

Generally, like Baptism with its "complete conquest of the power of sin," Methodism, by its pursuit of "sinless perfection," apparently aimed to be the purest, the most perfect, absolute, methodical, primitive, or extreme form of Puritanism, in which, as Cromwell implies describing himself, "sinners" or "sins" are not fully and always absent, yet must be "reborn" and expiated through, as he put it, honoring God "either by doing or suffering." Thus, by trying to be purer, more primitivist and methodical as well as hyperemotional or psychologically eccentric in moral and other social terms than virtually anyone in prior Protestantism (and beyond), early English-American Methodists starting with Wesley sought to be or appear more "puritan" than Puritans themselves in England and America, epitomized in Cromwell's saints and Winthrop et al. In spite or perhaps because of these initially absolute and extreme aims and practices, Methodism has subsequently abandoned or moderated its original pursuit of "sinless perfection" in favor of recognizing and expiating sins or impurities through the original Puritan honoring of God "by doing or suffering" a la Cromwell. This is exemplified by the ever-increasing quantities of "born again" US Methodists from their acknowledged previous state of sin or impurity, including drug and alcohol use, in recent times, especially in the South. In this respect, Methodism has failed to fully attain its initial purist end of becoming a sort of super-(non) human, hypermethodical type of Puritanism and even, in usual descriptions or perceptions, become a moderate, mainstream, or "liberal" Protestantism in America, including the South, and in that sense non- or pseudo-Puritan in moral and other terms. This is in sharp contrast with its initial "brother in arm" and later main rival or occasional ally for bibliocratic hegemony in the South and America, Baptism, usually described or perceived as extreme, fundamentalist, and conservative, so a sort of consummate type of neo-Puritanism or neo-Calvinism. And this Methodist historical trajectory of paleo- to neo-Puritan

moderation is perhaps even more manifest and stronger in Presbyterianism, often seen as an already morally and politically moderate and Scottish species of British Puritanism.

At least in historical terms, i.e., its initial, occasional, or residual perfectionist, absolutist, primitivist, as implied by the noncomplimentary expression "Methodist barbarism," and extremely emotionalist forms, effects, or intentions, Methodism constitutes an early form or precursor of neo-Puritanism or neo-Calvinism in the strict sense and so Puritan authoritarianism, in contrast to Presbyterianism as a moderate kind of proto-Puritanism,[14] and in similarity, if not identity, to Baptism. As regards the latter, some analysts note that original Wesleyan Methodism and Baptism both represented forms of evangelicalism linked to "emotional religion, often appealing to a ruder class than the middling sort" favored by early modern Puritans (Urdank 1991:524–525). To illustrate this common mass-emotional element, recall Weber identifies "hysterical conditions" in Baptism and cites the "most terrible" public ecstasies in American Methodism. More doubtful is whether and to what degree, Methodism, like Presbyterianism, can, given the trajectory of self-mitigation, be seen as a later and modern type of neo-Puritanism, notably the new Puritan authoritarianism, in the same right, sense, or extent as Baptism and other fundamentalist Protestantism in America and elsewhere. In sum, if Mill and Weber are right, then Methodism initially tried and occasionally succeeded to be even more "puritan," radical, and methodically authoritarian than Puritanism itself, yet only to subsequently evolve in a different direction and eventually become regarded as an exemplar of moderation or "liberalism" in Protestantism, in striking contrast to its initial ally and later rival Baptism. Hence, when talking of American neo-Puritanism or the new Puritan authoritarianism, Methodism, while not entirely, as Mill and Weber would suggest, exonerated, excluded, or overlooked in this respect, will be a secondary point of reference or case, and Baptism and its evangelical variations the primary.

In sum, originally both European Baptism and English Methodism were intensifications and extensions, rather than moderations and limitations, as often supposed, in moral, religious, and emotional terms, of Puritanism and hence its social–political authoritarianism, including theocracy, especially in the Baptist case. Subsequently, American Baptism has continued and even accelerated this intensification and extension at "full speed" to become considered the exemplar and dominant species of neo-Puritanism or evangelicalism and so of neo-Puritan or evangelical authoritarianism. By contrast, American Methodism somewhat stalled or "slowed down" this process to reinvent itself as a moderate, mainstream and even "liberal" type of Protestantism, similar to Presbyterianism, as well as Lutheranism and Anglicanism.

In historical terms, as hinted, the contrast is that European-American Baptism antedated, while English-American Methodism postdated, the Enlightenment or

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[14] Kearney (1965:106–107) comments that Presbyterianism "rose from below the waves in 1640 [so] it led submerged existence in England before that date."

modern liberalism defined and attacked by both as their, as Mannheim implies in reference to religious conservatism, joint and principal antagonist. Specifically, while the Enlightenment was implicitly a movement to supersede theocratic or evangelical Baptism via its superseding of Puritanism, Calvinism, and religious conservatism overall, including both conservative Catholicism and Protestantism, originally Methodism was at least in part a counter-Enlightenment reaction and project seeking to reverse liberal–secular ideas and institutions by recreating a sort of purest or most methodical Puritanism in Great Britain and America (though later becoming more "enlightened" or moderate than evangelical neo-Baptism). These historical differences hence indicate what is sociologically common to Baptism as a kind of pre-Enlightenment and Methodism as a counter-Enlightenment. Both were originally and have remained by the twenty-first century, notably neo-Baptist evangelicalism opposed, albeit in varying degrees or ways—i.e., a Baptist counterrevolutionary acceleration and a Methodist gradual deceleration of the Puritan antagonism—to the Enlightenment, especially its secularism and liberalism.

In general, that Puritanism has always tended to be in the state of some perennial revival, expansion, intensification, and pursuit of authoritarian, notably theocratic, mastery was manifest and intense since its original Calvinist phase or derivation in Europe during the sixteenth century. As known, Calvinism expanded from Geneva to the European Continent eastward and then to England and subsequently America westward among English-speaking peoples (Sprunger 1982:458) to become transformed into, or just redesignated as, Puritanism. Thus, Calvinism was reportedly transformed in a Puritan direction by embracing a "high-tone Puritanism that greatly prized the control of affect"[15] (Urdank 1991:524), though the converse is perhaps historically more accurate or precise, viz. English Puritans embraced and applied European Calvinist ideas. For example, these Calvinist extensions ranged from Scotland in the form of Presbyterianism and Holland, for in both countries Calvinism "quickly became the predominant religion," to England in which the "Puritanical English Calvinists existed as a movement within the larger structure" of the Anglican Church, to France where their counterparts such as Calvinist Huguenots formed a "perpetual minority" (Sprunger 1982:458). This seems the first or original wave of Puritanism's expansion and revival in the form of Calvinism, setting the stage for and followed by many other waves in a series of seemingly perennial revivals and expansions, including the Puritan intercontinental migration from old to New England, Methodist English revivalism, the two Great Awakenings in America, and Baptism's counterrevolutionary expansion and dominance in the South and beyond.

In turn, in Great Britain, especially England, and subsequently early America, Puritans, while originally united in their opposition to the Anglican Church and Catholicism, subsequently split into various more or less radical groups. For

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[15] Urdank (1991:524) adds that, alongside early modern Calvinism, post-1670 Quakerism also "generally embraced a high-tone Puritanism that greatly prized the control of affect." In turn, Baltzell (1979) sharply contrasts American Quakerism (e.g., in Philadelphia) with Puritanism (Boston).

instance, these groups involved Presbyterians, Separatists, or Independents, non-Separatists, as well as Congregationalists, Anabaptists, Baptists, Quakers, and others,[16] including Methodists later. However, recall that the orthodox English and American Puritans condemned these divisions as a "catastrophe" rather than, as often naively supposed, praising, or tolerating them as liberal virtues, viz. religious pluralism, competition, and freedom at least within Puritanism. For example, within early British Puritanism the political moderates were Scotish Presbytarians and the political extremists English Independents like Cromwell and his followers (Israel 1966:592). Thus, early Puritanism represented a "parent" to diverse groups and so a "term broad enough to cover the wide variety of churches and sects emerging out of the anti-Anglican ferment" as well as from the Anglican Church itself, as most Puritans in England before 1660 "operated within the larger Church of England, hoping to reform from inside" (Sprunger 1982:457–459). To indicate that Puritanism was basically an English extension or variation of European Calvinism, reportedly Puritans' theological–ideological commitments "were mainly to the international Calvinist movement"[17] (Sprunger 1982:457), while sharing the opposition to Anglicanism, though experiencing internal fragmentation.

If English Puritanism comprised a wide spectrum of diverse Puritan sects, so did its American successor from the establishing to the disestablishment of New England's Puritan theocracy or Winthrop's *mixt aristocracie* in the form of an official Congregational Church from the 1620s–1630s to 1830s (Table 5.1). This also holds true of American neo-Puritanism or Protestant fundamentalism and sectarianism in the sense of a wide assortment of radical and evangelical churches or more precisely, as Weber suggests, sects, Baptist, and others, and cults moving to and emerging or resurrecting in the South and beyond, from, first, the "anti-Anglican ferment" via the Great Awakenings and then antiliberal and antisecular sentiments, as during the 1980s–2000s. The following reconsiders the Great Awakenings as the historical exemplar or model of the Puritan permanent counterrevolution, perrenial revival, and continuous expansion in America.

America's Perrenial Puritan Revival—The Great Awakenings Reconsidered

The two religious Great Awakenings were mostly (though not exclusively) and substantively, as different from formally, Puritan-based and inspired authoritarian revivals or counterrevolutions, notably crusade-like expansions of Puritanism and its theocratic authoritarianism from New England to beyond and against non-Puritan forces. Initially, this expansion proceeded to all the British colonies via the

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[16] Sprunger (1982:ix) remarks that Puritanism in the broadest sense also contained the origin of English Anabaptism and Quakerism, in addition to incorporating Congregationalists and Baptists.

[17] Sprunger (1982:457) comments that, in theological terms, negatively these diverse "Puritanisms shared the opposition" to Anglican religion, but positively "not necessarily one set of doctrinal propositions."

TABLE 5.1. Types and instances of Puritanism.

Early European (pre) Puritanism (Calvinism)
    Swiss and German Calvinists (including early Baptists)
    French Calvinist Huguenots

Original English Puritanism
    Independents/Separatists (Cromwell et al.)
    non-Separatists
    Congregationalists
    Presbyterians
    Baptists
    Anabaptists
    Quakers
    Methodists
    Others

Early American Puritanism (New England)
    Congregationalists
    Presbyterians
    Baptists
    Quakers (in part)
    Methodists
    Others

Later American Puritanism (the South and beyond)
    Presbyterians
    Baptists
    Methodists
    Quakers (in part)
    Other Protestant evangelical groups

Contemporary American Puritanism (neo-Puritanism), especially in the South
    Southern Baptism
    Other Protestant evangelicalism, Christian fundamentalism, and radicalism
      overall (e.g., Mormonism)
    Various "new" fundamentalist sects and cults
    Methodism (in part)
    Presbyterianism (in part)

first Awakening, notably those under Anglicanism such as the officially Episcopal South, and subsequently to virtually all US regions through the second, especially the Soutern targeting its older Anglican roots or influences. Hence, the Great Awakenings in America were in a sense geographic transmissions and social contagions, reenactments, and "spillovers," of the Puritan revival and counterrevolution against Anglicanism and the monarchy in Great Britain. Yet, the difference was that the first were successful, while the second was, as Weber put it, eventually "abortive" at least in formal terms, as indicated by the persistence of Anglicanism as the official church and the restoration of the monarchy since the 1660s. This especially holds true of the first Great Awakening of the 1740s taking place in colonial America and thus formally, including New England's Puritan theocracy, within the frontiers of imperial Britain, in which Puritanism was politically defeated or stigmatized

but still remained socially influential and in persisting tension and opposition with the official Anglican church as well as "Papist" Catholicism.

In a sense, the eventual defeat of an initially victorious Puritanism embodied and led by Cromwell et al., the subsequent reestablishment of the monarchy and the reaffirmation of the Anglican Church's dominant position in England not only immediately provoked the emigration of most English proto-Puritans to America and elsewhere like Holland. They also ultimately or indirectly led to, inspired, or augured the first Great Awakening in America during the 1740s, joined with the Puritans' success in New England and their desire to spread their "holy" terror and authoritarian ideas, practices, and institutions to the rest of colonial America, notably the Anglican South, first in Virginia. In this sense, the first Great Awakening in America, especially the South, was the geographic transmission, social contagion, i.e., the sequel, derivative, or simply Act 2, though somewhat delayed and roundabout, of the original Puritan Revolution in England. Thus, primarily as the result of the first Great Awakening, in 1776 three-quarters of US citizens were Puritans (Dunn and Woodard 1996; Gelernter 2005), making other Protestant or Christian denominations like Anglican, Lutheran, and Catholic ones minorities, even in the old non-Puritan South, including initially Virginia, where Puritanism had before been a minority or even nonentity compared to the Church of England as the established religious institution. As hinted, Puritanism expanded or, as Weber would put it, descended to the South through the "effective introduction" of its three "activist" denominations into initially Virginia and then elsewhere during and after the first Great Awakening, starting with the Presbyterian, followed by the Baptist and later on the Methodist[18] (Boles 1999).

By analogy, the second Great Awakening during the 1800s–1830s might be described as Act 3 in this respect, albeit a more accurate description is the sequel, completion, or climax of the first, by trying to complete the latter's "unfinished business" in a new, non- and anti-British postrevolutionary context. In light of this context, the second Awakening can be considered a moral–religious authoritarian equivalent, expression, or completion of the American political revolution against the British empire and monarchy. This specifically proceeded in the form of attempts by (now already) native Puritanism originating and promoting American nativism (Merton 1939) or Americanism (Gelernter 2005) to reassert, expand, and reinforce its theocratic hegemony and authoritarianism overall from New England to America as a whole, including the South, by attacking and displacing imperial and "foreign" Anglicanism renamed as the Episcopal Churh as well as Catholicism as the regular target. As such, the second Great Awakening was a paradigmatic case of the Puritan permanent counterrevolution as the adverse and nihilistic reaction to

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[18] However, Boles (1999) suggests that "measured either in terms of intensity or the numbers of people involved, the three separate waves of religious activity in Virginia never reached the threshold of any meaningful definition of 'great' awakening. Instead, here were the necessary foundation stones for the later Great Revival that, as a South-wide religious quickening in the decade after 1800, may accurately be described as the South's 'First Great Awakening'—some 60 years after the Northern and more famous First Great Awakening."

non-Puritan religious ideas, institutions, and practices, including liberal–secular changes or influences such as those ushered in by the European Enlightenment and its ultimately weak American version.

And, while the first Awakening expanded and made prominent New England Puritanism, and its theocratic authoritarianism through various Puritan or evangelical Protestant sects, notably Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists, to the rest of British America, including the South, the second accomplished even more. That higher accomplishment was expanding the authoritarian "mastery of the world" by Puritanism or evangelical Protestantism from New England to most of an independent and postrevolutionary America, including the South. Thus, in the South, Episcopalism, as the Puritan archenemy, alongside Catholicism, additionally discredited, disdained, or suspected as the official church, symbol, or survival of the British empire, was eventually and often violently displaced by militant Baptism and Methodism, along with Presbyterianism, almost during the ante-bellum and fully over the post civil-war era. For example, the second revivalist movements "occurred from Massachusetts to Georgia, and by 1800 crossed the mountains into Kentucky and Tennessee. They throve especially among the lower classes and at the frontier. In the early nineteenth century, Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, and others had assured the "establishment of Protestant evangelism as the dominant religion of America" (Foerster 1962:26). In particular, by that time and extending into the entire twentieth and early twenty-first century, the old, once Episcopal South, including its first colony-state Virginia was dominated by Mencken's "Baptists and Methodist barbarism," as another code for neo-Puritan authoritarianism, just as had been New England, notably Massachusetts, since the 1620s–1630s.

To indicate the radical and even dramatic nature and magnitude of these revivalist and counterrevolutionary developments in America, while by the 1830s Massachusetts formally disestablished its proto-Puritan theocracy, the old South was substantively reestablishing its own neo-Puritan theocratic social system in the form of an evangelical, Baptist–Methodist mastery and society, later called both by fundamentalists and their critics (e.g., Mencken) a "Bible Belt." Hence, the observation about the failure of the second Awakening in that the "whole Calvinistic [theocratic] structure was finally doomed"[19] (Foerster 1962:9) holds true only or mostly of New England's official collapse of its theocracy, but not or less of the South and the rest of America where neo-Puritanism or Protestant evangelicalism

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[19] Foerster (1962:9–20) says that during the nineteenth century, following the failure or rather incomplete triumph of the second Great Awakening, Puritanism "was not disproved; it was merely abandoned" and became a "lost cause," as the modern age "was moving, however gradually, away from the concept of a strictly God-centered world toward the man-centered world [i.e. a rising secular spirit] of the 18th century." He adds that "today, we feel less comfortable in the Puritan age than in the age of reason that followed, less at home with Winthrop [et al.] than with Franklin and Jefferson" (Foerster 1962:10). Such diagnoses of the "death" of Puritanism were common during the 1960s in America, but subsequent developments, notably the resurgence of neo-Puritanism in the form of Protestant evangelicalism since the 1980s and climaxing perhaps in the 2000s suggest that they may been inaccurate, premature or exaggerated.

established itself as the dominant religion. In turn, in common with the first, in the second revivalist movement, religious feeling "revolted against worldliness and skepticism [through] the emotional explosions of revivals, with their visions and trances, their weeping and swooning" (Foerster 1962:26). This indicates that, like the first, the second Puritan revival was an irrational and illiberal movement to the extreme, thus indicating American Puritanism's antirationalism and antiliberalism. These antirational and antiliberal attributes or syndromes are also revealed by the observation about the "loss of reason," as perceived by US non-Puritans, especially religious liberals, in the "spate of evangelical revivals that turn-of-century America witnessed during the Second Great Awakening" (Gould 1996:180). In short, if the first Great Awakening projected or heralded, the second created or ushered in Southern theocracy *cum* a bibliocracy or Bible Belt as a primarily Puritan or evangelical authoritarian project or entity. In general, reportedly via a "more extreme" religion, this Puritan-based revivalism, especially the Second Awakening, both intensified or solidified a "religious morality geared toward establishing the Kingdom of God" and further expanded the "expanding ontology" (by Republican conservatism) of nationalism (Thomas 1989). To that extent, the Great Awakenings essentially represented or amounted to Puritan revivals and expansions of religious extremism, theocracy, and nationalism or Americanism, from New England to the rest of America.

The aforesaid yields at least two relevant inferences. First, the two Great Awakenings in America in many respects transmitted via a geographic–social contagion to, so reenacted, "spilled over" or mirrored the original Puritan Revolution against Anglicanism and the monarchy in England on, the American soil, notably the South, by attacking or discrediting the Episcopal Church and its proxies, just as Catholicism. They were thus essentially attempts to reassert and expand Puritanism and so its theocracy and overall authoritarianism, including some sort of witch-hunting, in and through various forms and movements, notably, Baptist and Methodist, from New England's basis to the rest of colonial, via the first Awakening, and then through the second, independent America, including the Anglican South. For example, the legendary Puritan witch hunts in New England were a "prelude to the hysterical agonies of the Great Awakening" (Rossel 1970:918), which reaffirms US Puritanism's oppressiveness and irrationalism.

Second, these Awakenings accomplished what the English Puritan Revolution never completely or enduringly had done. This was to make Puritanism a hegemonic political and social force virtually in the entire country, notably to, first, displace "foreign" Anglicanism, just as Catholicism, and, then, reestablish and perpetuate Puritans' mastery of the word in a typically authoritarian–theocratic manner in the formerly Anglican South ever since. Hence, the Great Awakenings' probably single most remarkable and enduring authoritarian achievement or legacy is transforming the old, initially Anglican and in part Catholic ante bellum South into a new, eventually Puritan–evangelical, concretely Baptist–Methodist theocratic or underdemocratized (Amenta and Halfmann 2000) sociological "heaven" or achieved dystopia in about a century. Predicted in a sense by Weber's diagnosis of the early Baptist "strictest bibliocracy," this bibliocratic–authoritarian outcome

or ideal, persisting even as America enters into the twenty-first century, is perhaps more astonishing than anything Puritanism has accomplished in its history since the late sixteenth century Europe. It surpasses or overshadows, for example, such historical achievements of Puritanism as its temporary victory in the English Civil War and its ensuing "short but not sweet" totalitarian political control through Cromwell's rule, and even its New England theocracy, where Winthrop et al. did not face serious Anglican or Catholic religious–political rivals, while others like the native Indians and Quakers were defeated or persecuted. Overall, the two Great Awakenings were mass Protestant "revival movements in which highly emotional waves of religious frenzy swept through the country. The new [evangelicalism] carried forward the Puritan idea that the Bible revealed the will of God, and that government should act to reorganize society in accordance with that will [which] remained a central element of American culture to this day"[20] (Archer 2001:277).

At most, the Great Awakenings admittedly gave "inadvertent aid" to religious pluralism and freedom (Bremer 1995:233) via proliferations or divisions of various Puritan or evangelical groups as the unintended effect of the expansion of original Puritanism and its authoritarianism and theocracy to the entire country. Recall, most early American-English Puritans viewed such proliferations and divisions within Puritanism as catastrophic rather than an element of religious liberty and pluralism, instead extolling and enforcing uniformity or harmony in this respect. For example, the US orthodox Puritans insisted on "equating religious uniformity with a virtuous republic" in the belief that "only a 'harmonious compound' of church and state in contemporary New England could prevent 'the scoffs and the sophistry of libertinism'" (Gould 1996:39). In essence, the Great Awakenings were precisely efforts, including "holy terror," by these Puritans and their followers to reapply and extend this monistic equation and theocratic "harmonious compound" from New England to the rest of America, and alternatively prevent "libertinism," including religious pluralism and liberty. Hence, as expected from their precedents in Great Britain, these Puritan revivals unintentionally helped religious pluralism, liberalization, and freedom solely or primarily *within* Puritanism or Protestant evangelicalism, but not or less so outside its confines, such as moderate Protestantism and Christianity as a whole, let alone all religion. In this regard, the religious and other "liberty" that Puritanism established in New England and tried to generalize to other regions through its revivals and revolutions was experienced by US liberals and others as "anachronistic" (Gould 1996:46). Thus, most US religious liberals during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, regarded orthodox Puritans as "Calvinist adversaries" (Gould 1996:39) of liberty in religion and society, just as their contemporary successors view neo-Puritans or Bible-Belt evangelicals in the late twentieth and the early twenty-first century.

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[20] Archer (2001:277) comments that the Great Awakenings were "conducive to democracy" but not to secularism. If so, it is more accurately to say that they were not conducive to secular or liberal but rather to a sort of religious democracy which verges on theocracy and/or aristocracy in the manner of Winthrop's *mixt aristocracie* or theocratic "republic."

In sum, the 1740s–1830s Great Awakenings in America were Puritan authoritarian revivals and counterrevolutions whose outcome, if not the intent, was expanding and making Puritanism and its theocratic authoritarianism dominant in the entire "new nation," including the Anglican South. They did so by attacking, displacing, discrediting, or persecuting other religions, including Anglicanism, Quakerism, Catholicism, and native Indian cults, and even some Puritans "seduced by Satan" and purified or saved through witch-trials, rather or less than, as usually assumed, increasing religious freedom, pluralism, and tolerance. By virtue of its theocratic consequences or legacies reviving or evoking Pareto's Catholic theocracy or Weber's Calvinistic theocracies, Puritanism through the Great Awakenings rendered the "first new nation" substantively or sociologically, beneath the formal and theological simulations or substitutes of "separation" of church and state, as old as the older, despised Europe, including England. Like all conservative reactions or restorations, these Puritan counterrevolutions or revivals turned the clock back in time, specifically to the medieval times of theocratic darkness or "light," for US neo-Puritans and fundamentalists, as the venerable and persisting model or ideal for Puritanism, just as to official Catholicism.

New Puritanism, Old Authoritarian Habits

The previous chapters unambiguously suggest and document that authoritarianism, including totalitarian theocracy, has been inherent, become a habit, "acquired taste," so a sort of second nature, to English-American Puritanism ever since its genesis or derivation from theologically authoritarian–theocractic European Calvinism as its acknowledged ancestor. Thus, theologically, albeit with "all-American" nationalist disguises, committed to its European ancestor, Puritanism *cum* Calvinism transplanted into America, like England before, despite its claims to newness and American exceptionalism, basically retains or retrieves and even expands and reinforces, the Calvinist and English-Puritan inherent and long-standing tendencies or "instincts," habits and preferences for theocratic authoritarianism. Particularly, neo-Puritanism or neo-Calvinism like American Baptism continues, revives, and occasionally intensifies Puritan–Calvinist traditional moral, religiously grounded and sanctified, authoritarianism, including the coercive imposition of morality on civil society and polity.

As hinted, the preceding holds true, first and foremost, of American neo-Puritanism or contemporary Protestant fundamentalism as the descendent, guardian, or proxy of original New England Puritanism. Thus, Protestant fundamentalism, while nominally accepting the formal separation of church and state, reportedly "remained committed to the task of moral regeneration and of establishing a Godly society in America [and] rallied together to force the government to use its authority to uphold their notion of righteousness, and to enforce what they deemed to be a Godly way of life" (Archer 2001:281). In this view, neo-Puritan social movements constantly request and enforce "government intervention to uphold the cultural norms of particular religious and ethnic groups," specifically "to end a wide range of sinful practices," thus drawing the state into "pietistic

moral crusades" (Archer 2001:281–282). Instances, indicators or symptoms of neo-Puritan or evangelical moral–religious authoritarianism in America abound and pervade all the society, from the polity[21] and mass media to the most private life, so it would require a separate chapter only to classify, let alone analyze,

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[21] Kann (1994) observes that what he terms a "disturbing strain of Puritanism" is present in the American media, manifest in their "playing moral scolds and scourges—in effect, prosecuting public and not so public figures for lapses in their private lives that have little, if any, relevance to public performance, and little relevance to readers beyond the purely prurient." He suggests that the role of the media "is not to be moral arbiters" of society, but apparently US neo-Puritans hold the opposite view. In turn, the *Economist* (1/4/1997) laments that what it calls "a new Puritanism" in US Congress "has damaged a time-honoured way of reducing friction between people from different political sides, in the bar room." Also, the *Economist* (6/7/2001) in an editorial entitled "Burning on the pyre of American puritanism," referring to a US president's daughter arrested for illegally drinking alcohol, comments that "as transport secretary in the early 1980s, [Elizabeth] Dole hit on the idea of linking federal highway grants to raising the legal drinking age to 21. Sadly, even states that are supposed to take freedom particularly seriously, such as New Hampshire (motto: 'Live free or die') decided to take the cash." For example, it points out that this president's daughter "is not just the victim of the bossiness of a transport secretary [and failed presidential candidate]. She is also swimming against the currents [of] petty puritanism in American life." Notably, the *Economist* generalizes that "again and again, these days, puritanism seems to be trumping freedom" in contemporary America, through such currents. In particular, it poses the following question "if raising the drinking age to 21 makes the roads so much safer, why not (say) ban alcohol altogether?" and sarcastically answers: "After all, it worked so well in the 1920s. There is no sillier use of the police's time than trying to criminalise a substance that has lubricated student life since universities were invented. And there is no simpler way of advancing liberty in America than to bring its drinking (and other) laws into line with common sense." Most strikingly, even the usually conservative *Economist* becomes a sort of revolutionary by urging "let America rise up in revolt against all the petty princelings of puritanism, before every aspect of social life is criminalised, pathologised, regulated or legislated out of existence." In another similar editorial the *Economist* (3/29/2003) observes that America "has turned, once again, to Puritanism." And in still another one, in the wake of a television "indecency" scandal provoking a moralist outcry and vehement calls for government punishment from US neo-Puritans, the *Economist* (2/7/2004) compares America with contemporary Britain commenting that "secular Britons are no longer shockable, while Americans have clung to their religion and associated Puritanism." This confirms that original Puritanism has largely vanished in modern secular–liberal British society in sharp contrast to its recent and perennial revival and dominance in an increasingly nonsecular and nonliberal America. Alternatively, it is neo-Puritanism that mostly (though not solely) makes contemporary America less secular–liberal than Great Britain as the original home or creator of Puritanism—such are apparently the ironies or perversities of the Puritan long authoritarian march in history, from old to New England and beyond. If the analogy is permitted, US neo-Puritans apparently have become and remained "bigger Catholics (Puritans) than the Pope (e.g., Cromwell) himself." Further, the *Economist* (7/31/2004) comments that in contemporary Massachusetts, often assumed to have moved in a secular-liberal direction since the formal disestablishment of theocracy in the 1830s, "New England Puritanism, rather than liberalism, seems to influence social choices." Examples: "Boston accepts gay marriages but not bathhouses. Casinos are banned. Sin taxes are high, and above-average numbers of policemen are on the streets." The *Economist* concludes that "in so far as Massachusetts is liberal, it displays features that other states might envy, not disdain (e.g., open-mindedness) all based on those bastions of liberalism, its universities."

these fundamentalist attempts to "enforce a new era of moral righteousness [plus economic severity], with a vengeance" (Diamond 1995). No wonder, many Americans, including nonevangelical Protestants, regard neo-Puritan evangelicals "with deep suspicion, as enemies of freedom and liberal democracy" through their theocratic agenda or "dreams of theocracy" (e.g., public prayer, creationism in schools, elimination of birth control or abortion rights, etc.) as well as "general intolerance toward out-groups"[22] (Smith 2000:3–4).

If the above is correct, then not much has changed in substantive terms from paleo- to neo-Puritanism—and so from Calvinism to neo-Calvinism—in respect of authoritarianism, viz. from Cromwell's wars against the "infidels" in seventeenth century England to fundamentalist moral–religious crusades ushering America in the twenty-first century. This indicates what Weber would call, within Protestantism or Christianity and beyond, the unprecedented Puritan continuity, tenacity, or consistency in moral–religious authoritarianism, including totalitarian theocracy with its hallmark of coercive imposition of "proper" morality, religion, education,

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If so, the answer to the question "whither New England Puritanism?" is simply no or at least not yet.

[22] Smith (2000:6) objects that contemporary US religious conservatives or "theologically conservative Christians" hold views "as diverse as pro-American conservativism, traditional liberalism, peace-and-justice activism, and theonomic reconstructionism." Still, he finds that among Protestant conservatives, fundamentalists, more precisely (distinguished from) evangelicals are "the most religiously orthodox and committed, the most alienated from secular American institutions and movements, and the most dedicated to seeing Christian morality and values influence American culture" and to see or use political activism as an "appropriate way to change American society to better reflect God's will" (Smith 2000:17). Smith concludes that US neo-Puritan evangelicals "are neither angels nor demons" on the ground that they "are much too diverse, complex, ambivalent, and inconsistent for that." No doubt, not all US neo-Puritan evangelicals are exactly the same, but neither were their proto-Puritan ancestors nor, for that matter, fascists, including Nazis. So, to conclude or argue that not all US neo-Puritan evangelicals (e.g., "self-appointed" conservative leaders versus the rank-and-file) are the same is as substantively impertinent as saying (as many sociologists and historians do) that not all fascists, including Nazis, were exactly identical (viz. the leadership versus the masses "just following orders"). The substantive point is that most (though not all) US neo-Puritans are essentially fundamentalist and to that extent theocratic and undemocratic, just as were New England's proto-Puritans, as well as that most (again not all) fascists were illiberal and totalitarian. Statistically, it is thus the law of large numbers, not (though relating to) the supposedly small "sample size" of US neo-Puritan evangelicals investigated by previous sociological studies (as objected). This objection makes one wonder if sociologists really need a large statistical sample to find out that neo-Puritan evangelicals are theocratic, and fascists totalitarian. Hence, to infer that US evangelicals are "neither angels nor demons" is almost the same as inferring that fascists were not either "good" or "bad" guys, both representing unfounded descriptions and unwittingly justifications of what is destructive and so unjustifiable from the angle of liberal-secular democracy and civil society, i.e., of theocratic evangelicalism and totalitarian fascism, respectively. Not surprisingly, as Smith (2000:194) wonders with regret: "Who among the well-educated is going to speak well of evangelicals? It's like standing up for the Crusades." The same question can asked in respect to fascists, including US neo-fascist groups like neo-Nazi evangelical militia ("Dragons of God").

science, and politics. Puritanism has been so tenacious and consistent in this respect in spite or perhaps because of its various failures, imperfections, or setbacks in the perennial process, including New England's witch-hunts, Prohibition, the war on drugs and others; yet, apparently theocratic–authoritarian "failure" and "imperfection" are exorcised as "evil," "cowardice," "no option," or "non entity" from the discourse of neo-Puritan evangelicals. If so, American neo-Puritanism perpetuates what Weber diagnosed as the "unexampled tyranny" of original Puritanism, yet with an ever-increasing persistence, zealotry, scope, and intensity.

The increasing persistence and scope are indicated by that neo-Puritan fundamentalists, allied with political neoconservatives, persistently attempt to extend their moral–religious and political authoritarianism to all American society and even the world as a whole, viz. through an "holly" alliance of evangelical missionaries with military aggressions and occupations (e.g., Iraq in the 2000s). The growing intensity in this respect is indicated by an ever-more Puritan-based Draconian legal or criminal justice system, including dramatic increases in imprisonment and executions and other extremely harsh, degrading, and inhuman punishments for sins *cum* crimes (e.g., drug and alcohol use) since the 1980s. For example, as an indicator of the increasing scope of neo-Puritan or neoconservative authoritarianism, analysts observe that American democracy and civil society is "going South" and placed under the authoritarian, including theocratic or evangelical, "shadow of Dixie" (Cochran 2001). This movement is primarily a consequence or reflection of the ever-continuing resurgence and dominance of neo-Puritanism in the form of Protestant evangelicalism, notably Southern Baptism, or religious conservatism, seeking to remake America into its own image of a later-day diluted kind of primitive bibliocracy, as the "Bible Belt" signifies. Hence, neo-Puritanism aims to force contemporary America usher in the twenty-first century in the almost same way New England ushered in, say, the eighteenth century (the "Bible Commonwealth") as well as Europe in the Dark Middle Ages (the Catholic theocracy). In this respect, the diagnosis or news, by its opponents occasionally or its adherents usually, of the "death" of Puritanism and consequently its "unexampled tyranny" in America at the start of the twenty-first century is really incorrect, premature or "grossly exaggerated."

Puritanism and Contemporary Authoritarianism

Puritanism and Fascism

Puritanism has been substantively, though not always formally, a historical prototype, equivalent or precursor of contemporary authoritarianism or totalitarianism, used as interchangeable terms, and political–social radicalism or extremism overall (Walzer 1963). First and foremost, recall that Puritanism originally and persistently had authoritarian and even totalitarian tendencies in that its "original political impulse was 'totalistic'" (Eisenstadt 1965:671), and to that extent constituted an early or proto-totalitarianism. Notably, Puritanism has constituted or appeared as a sort of

TABLE 5.2. Common authoritarian attributes and
effects of Puritanism and Fascism.

Irrationalism
Charismatic authority
Aggressive nationalism
Expansionism and imperialism
Moral–political repression and extreme asceticism
Sadism–masochism
Persecutions and mass murder ("witch-hunts")
Totalitarian indoctrination and propaganda
Others (e.g., nihilism, apocalyptic myths)

protofascism, fascism before modern fascism, i.e., the religious–theocratic fascist archetype, substitute, or ancestor, as well as a kind of communism. Alternatively, fascism has functioned or seemed as a subtype of neo-Puritanism, "Puritanism," though less or not religious after the official end of paleo-Puritanism, e.g., the disestablishment of New England theocracy in the 1830s, just as has, in part, communism. If so, then the following can be seen as a consideration of neo-Puritanism in its, first, fascist usually less religious–theocratic, and then its communist antireligious forms.

Specifically, Puritanism has been or can be considered to be protofascism in virtue of a number of Puritan authoritarian attributes and effects. These comprise irrationalism, charismatic authority, aggressive nationalism, expansionism and imperialism, moral–political repression and extreme asceticism, sadism, and masochism, systematic persecutions and mass murder ("witch-hunts"), totalitarian indoctrination, and propaganda (see Table 5.2). As fascism, notably Nazism, inherits these attributes from or shares them with paleo-Puritanism, to that extent it represents or approximates neo-Puritanism as understood. In Weber-Parsons' terms, Puritanism and fascism, notably Nazism, essentially share these authoritarian attributes and effects, thus exhibiting a manifest or latent elective affinity in and convergence on authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Simply, Puritanism has been or can be protofascism, and conversely, fascism neo-Puritanism, by being all of the above—i.e., irrational, charismatically authoritarian, aggressively nationalist, expansionist and imperialist, morally–politically repressive and extremely ascetic, sadistic, and masochist, persecutional—and perhaps even more in terms of authoritarianism or totalitarianism. In historical terms, paleo-Puritanism, exemplified by original English and transmitted American Puritanism, "has been," and neo-Puritanism, as epitomized, generalized, or approximated in Protestant evangelicalism such as Baptism in America, "is" or "can be" in relation to fascism. Moreover, neo-Puritanism, by expanding and intensifying such Puritan authoritarian attributes and effects, often reveals even more manifest and intense affinities or convergences with fascism than did paleo-Puritanism. In particular, neo-Puritanism in America constitutes the moralist–religious, including theocratic, "all-American" substitute or proxy for neo-fascism in Europe.

First, neo-, like paleo-, Puritanism, corresponds to or resembles fascism on the account of irrationalism or antirationalism, as both share, promote, and even celebrate this actually or potentially authoritarian attribute and outcome. Moreover, Puritan irrationalism historically prefigures and in part inspires its fascist form, and at least in this respect Puritanism operates or appears as protofascism before modern fascism. Alternatively, fascism has fully embraced, though minus the religious source and rationale, and reinforced the original irrationalism of paleo-Puritanism, as has neo-Puritanism while retaining or reviving the theological basis, which indicates a neofascist/neo-Puritan affinity or convergence in this respect. Consequently, like Puritanism, fascism defines itself by what Mannheim describes as the "irrationalism of the deed." He remarks that the "irrationality of the fascist apotheosis of the deed" is exemplified in fascism's "profound skepticism toward science" that evidently shares this authoritarian attribute with Puritanism characterized, as seen, by the deep-seated suspicion or hostility in this regard. Like general irrationalism, since the Puritan suspicion or hostility to science prefigures the fascist skepticism, Puritanism functions or looks like as protofascism before fascism at least in this particular case. Hence, Puritanism exhibits an original, historical, paleo-Puritan, and continuing, neo-Puritan affinity with fascism on a negative attitude or suspicion toward science, especially the social sciences. That fascist, like Puritan, irrationalism has authoritarian or radical tendencies and outcome is indicated by that the fascist irrational "apotheosis of the deed" renders fascists, as Mannheim puts it, "explosive irrational elements" in the form of totalitarian, including terrorist and criminal, forces. Simply, Puritans and fascists are both what Durkheim calls the "slaves of irrational prejudices" in a war against the anti-Puritan liberal–rational and antifascist "plea for freedom" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) in science and society overall.

As noted, the irrationalism of Puritanism essentially has made paleo-Puritans (Walzer 1963) in old and New England and continues to make neo-Puritans or Protestant sectarians (Lipset 1996) in the US South and beyond also such explosive, authoritarian–radical elements. Hence, if Popper (1973:236–238) is correct in arguing that "irrationalism engender[s] criminality" and is "inherent" to radicalism or extremism, this holds true both of Puritanism and fascism as eminently irrational, radical and authoritarian or totalitarian ideological–social systems. At least, paleo-Puritanism prefigures or inspires fascism, and neo-Puritanism corresponds or is similar to neofascism in respect of irrationalism, including the hostility and suspicion toward science. For example, if Nazism was capable of reviving and mobilizing irrational "fundamentalist" feelings like cherished traditional sentiments and commitments (Baehr 2002:820), so has been *a fortiori* Puritanism as a species of irrationalism and religious–cultural fundamentalism par excellence. Hence, Puritanism and Nazism correspond in terms of irrationalism primarily, though not solely due to their shared fundamentalism or traditionalism, albeit the latter is predictably more of a religious and theocratic character in the first than the second, in contrast to Italian, Spanish, and other fascisms mixing or allying "Christian" religion and theocracy with political dictatorship, exemplified by Mussolini et al.'s alliance or flirt with the Vatican.

Second, paleo- and neo-Puritanism corresponds to or resembles fascism in terms of what Weber calls charismatic authority. In general, recall his suggestion that such an ideal type of authority or legitimate domination tends to eventuate into, or even intrinsically constitutes, a sort of authoritarianism in virtue of what he describes as the "basically authoritarian principle of charismatic legitimation." In particular, this is precisely what has happened in both Puritanism and fascism, during or at least after the initial stage of the rise and legitimation of a charismatic leader through counterrevolution, election, or otherwise. This has been demonstrated by a wide spectrum of instances, ranging from Cromwell's revolutionary repression and Winthrop et al.'s theocratic oppression to Bible-Belt masters' "barbarism" to Hitler's totalitarian rule and terror. Hence, to claim, as paleo- and neo-Puritans would, that charismatic authority constitutes or reflects an authoritarian principle or authoritarianism only in fascism as well as communism but not in Puritanism is historically and empirically unfounded, just as logically absurd. Generally, one may argue that charismatic authority does not necessarily entail an authoritarian principle and cite various counterexamples from Jesus Christ to Napoleon and J. F. Kennedy, but Weber would reply that these are exceptions to a historical pattern, generalized rule, or common trend from charisma to authoritarianism. Still, this is an impertinent issue, because even if such a qualifying general argument is valid it does not affect or invalidate what Weber assumes or observes as the authoritarian nature of charismatic authority or mastery *specifically* in Puritanism and fascism.

In historical terms, Weber observes that both charismatic and traditional authority and hence their shared authoritarian principles have been "present at one time or another in all of the older religiously based social formations [including those with bases in] Puritanism, Catholicism, ancient Judaism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam" (Lenski 1994), which casts doubt on Puritan exceptionalism in this respect, just as are *ceteris paribus* in fascism. Alternatively, to the extent that, as Weber suggests, legal–rational authority "is dominant only in modern secular societies" (Lenski 1994) or liberal democracies, then both theocratic Puritanism and totalitarian fascism operate as the antithesis of liberalism, secularism, and democracy. At least, contrary to Puritan–exceptionalism claims, Puritanism is not an exception to the apparent historical pattern that religiously based social systems, including those with bases in Catholicism and Islam, tend to substitute legal–rational with charismatic and traditional authority, and to that extent to be authoritarian or illiberal. The same *mutatis mutandis* can be said of fascism in relation to such social systems, notably those based on Puritanism, just as conversely: modern religiously based, including neo-Puritan, social systems are no exceptions to or not incongruent with the equivalent fascist pattern of favoring charismatic and traditional to legal–rational authority.

Historically, via its charismatic (usually combined with traditional) authority and the rule of theocratic–aristocratic saints–masters, exemplified by Cromwell as the self-assigned "Lord Protector of the Realm" and Winthrop et al. as God-designated rulers, Puritanism prefigures and indirectly provides a protomodel for the fascist leadership, including the Nazi *Führer*, principle. Alternatively, fascism has essentially embraced, though with adaptations or modifications—e.g., minus theocracy

and in part aristocracy declaratively in Nazism—the original Puritan model of charismatic authority and authoritarianism. As some sociologists comments, the "metaphysical charisma of the Führer invented by the sociology of religion has finally turned out to be no more than the omnipresence of his speeches on the radio, which are a demoniacal parody of the omnipresence of the divine spirit" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) in Puritanism or religious fundamentalism. Since neo-Puritanism has continued the proto-Puritan model of charismatic authority and authoritarianism, while retaining or reviving the theocratic–aristocratic ingredient, this indicates another neo-Puritan/neofascist affinity, convergence, or resemblance.

At this point, paleo-Puritanism constitutes or resembles protofascism, and neo-Puritanism neofascism in virtue of the shared authoritarian principle of charismatic authority. This is what is suggested by the observation that Puritanism, owing to its ideas of Divine Grace for the elect few, including notably its theocratic rulers' Divine Rights, constitutes a charismatic–authoritarian and so protofascist "model for social and political organization" (Seligman 1990:537). In particular, this was the model for a theocratic and aristocratic social–political system, since charismatic authority was the authoritarian principle of legitimation of theocracy *cum* "godly" politics and society, mixed with aristocracy. Recall, in the original Puritan model of "godly politics principles of consent and tolerance apply only to a spiritual elite; for the rest of the political community there is a coercive theocracy" (Zaret 1989:170).

In this connection, the paleo-Puritan spiritual master–elite is a religious–theocratic model or archetype for the fascist leadership, including the Nazi *Führer*, just as its neo-Puritan variations exemplified in Bible-Belt moralistic, intolerant, and oppressive elites are functional substitutes or proxies for neo-Nazi would-be masters. For example, remember for precisely two centuries, starting with Winthrop in the early seventeenth century and formally ending in the 1830s, Puritan New England was under "such a strong religious leadership that it can be called a theocracy" (Munch 2001:225). In this sense, American paleo-Puritanism constitutes a theocratic prototype, substitute, or precursor of fascism and so totalitarianism, insofar as oppressively strong political leadership defines a fascist and other totalitarian society, as indicated and culminated by the Nazi *Führer* principle. This indirectly reaffirms that historically salient authoritarian continuities, affinities, or similarities exist between US and other paleo-Puritans like Winthrop et al., Cromwell, and even Calvin on one hand and fascists, including Mussolini and Hitler on the other, despite their other sharp differences in religion, nationality, ideology, institutions, and practice. In short, both groups claim to be a sort of "master race" on religious (mostly Puritans) and racial grounds (fascists as well as Puritans). A case in point is what social psychologists identify as the historical compatibility or similarity between these groups in terms of a "sado-masochistic character" (Fromm 1941). Another one is that both Puritan and fascist, including the *Führer*, proclamations are, as sociologists put it, "lies anyway" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), false commandments or hypocrisies, especially in the case of US paleo- and neo-Puritans.

In turn, in virtue of retaining or reviving the paleo-Puritan repressively strong religious leadership or charismatic authority a la Winthrop, American

neo-Puritanism or neoconservatism functions or appears as the theocratic functional substitute or proxy for neofascism and modern totalitarianism overall, just as the latter maintains its original fascist–totalitarian, though mostly nonreligious, version, viz. the *Führer* principle. Recall US neo-Puritans, notably Bible-Belt evangelicals and their political allies like Reagan et al., exhibit open and intense admiration for Winthrop and his strong "leadership" or charismatic authority in creating a "shining city upon the hill" *cum* theocratic–aristocratic rule based on self-proclaimed Divine Rights.

Also recollect, contemporary American Puritanism reportedly constitute or tends to produce both "radical Christian fundamentalism and violent militia men" (Turner 2002:111), which makes fundamentalists appear as sorts of "born-again fascists" (cited in Smith 2000:91–92) just as Puritans. Notably, what arguably demonstrates the compatibility, affinity, or resemblance between American neo-Puritanism and neofascism is the frequent alliance or flirting between the "extreme Christian Right and militia movements" (Pichardo 1997:413), as US emanations or approximations of neofascists, notably neo-Nazis, against their common enemies ("liberals" in the pejorative sense) in contemporary America, climaxing during the 1980s–2000s. This is vividly or deadly illustrated by proto- and neofascist US groups, ranging from the "Ku Klux Klan to congeries of individuals (e.g., Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, and sundry antigovernment rightists responsible for the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing) sharing Christian identity or some other extremist worldview" (Turk 2004:277). Typically (though not always), this "Christian identity" of US neo- and protofascists or Nazi-supremacists and terrorists (viz. "Christian Identity Movement"[23]), as self-described "Dragons of God" (e.g., McVeigh), is precisely extreme fundamentalism, thus some kind or degree of neo-Puritanism as defined.

In retrospect, these "Dragons of God" thus infuse a neo-Puritan or evangelical and otherwise religious injection into American neofascism. The latter consequently becomes more theocratic or theological than European fascism, in which religion and so theocracy was usually declared secondary as in Nazism[24] as

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[23] For example, the "racist Atlanta Olympics and antiabortion bomber" (Turk 2004:277), or neofascist extremist implicated in a series of abortion-clinics bombings during the late 1990s, Eric Rudolph, was a member of the "Christian Identity Movement," as a sort of evangelical or theological variant of "white supremacy," along with Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, and other terrorists linked with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Like these terrorist "Dragons of God," for Rudolph his deadly bombings of the Atlanta Olympics and clinics was a sacred Christian duty, so a holy crusade against the "big" secular government, notably its permissiveness in regard of abortion, plus against the Olympic Games themselves accused of promoting "global socialism" or cosmopolitanism condemned in favor of nationalist parochialism expressing Puritan-style nativism and xenophobia, viz. the Southern evangelical small-town, racist, and xenophobic mentality.

[24] Still, some Nazi members have been Puritans or Calvinists, especially German Baptists. For example, a Nazi doctor arrested (in the 2000s) for helping Pinochet's neo-fascist dictatorship in Chile torturing children in a secretive religious colony he had established after fleeing Germany in 1961, was a Baptist preacher. Apparently, this colony fused neo-Puritan Baptism with fascism.

compared to a primarily secular totalitarianism, or mixed, as with Italian[25] and Spanish fascisms, and allied with and rationalized the latter as divinely ordained. In short, American neo-Puritanism verges on or allies with neofascism, so becomes grounded in, infused, and rationalized by religious fundamentalism. The latter consequently makes American neofascism, embodied in violent "Christian" militia, totalitarian in additional, religious terms or theocratic, thus perhaps even more "totalistic" than European fascism, including Nazism, as pseudosecular political totalitarianism rather than theocracy in the strict sense. Due to these actual or likely effects, American neo-Puritanism tends to surpass even fascism in what Bible-Belt evangelicals seem to regard as a sort of Olympic discipline or favorite pastime of theocratic–totalitarian control and oppression.

In sum, original Puritanism represents or resembles protofascism due to its charismatic authority or radical religious–political leadership a la total mastery of the world by saints that tends to convert democracy and civil society into authoritarianism or totalitarianism, i.e., social freedoms into coercion and oppression. On the account of inheriting this authoritarian tendency from its ancestor, this also holds true of contemporary Puritanism, especially its American and perhaps the only modern pertinent form relative to neofascism. Alternatively, even if fascism, especially Nazism, does not continue, or mitigates, dresses and paints Puritan coercive theocracy in different ways, cloths, and colors, as with Italian, Spanish, and other European interwar fascists, it has proven or appeared as the nontheocratic substitute for Puritanism. When it does, as in the case of American neofascism infused by neo-Puritanism or evangelicalism, then it becomes both a totalitarian in the secular political sense and theocratic Puritan counterpart, thus more total or absolute in this sense.

Puritanism also resembles, corresponds, or leads to fascism in respect of nationalism, as another constitutive fascist attribute and practice. In particular, in US paleo- and neo-Puritanism Puritan nationalism, patriotism, and ethnocentrism overall assume or yield the specific form of American nativism or Americanism. Further, historical observations, like Weber's about the Puritan "ethical mistrust" and hostility toward foreigners, suggest that, owing to its intolerant, distrustful, and aggressive nationalism, American Puritanism was a sort of protofascism before, or an extant historical analogue of, fascism. This is what Merton (1939: 437) also implies in observing that the early US Puritan "religio- and ethno-centric pattern significantly resembled" fascist or nativist developments in interwar Europe. For example, he cites the Puritan *New England Primer* as finding its "analogue

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[25] For example, during the 1920s Mussolini's fascist government passed a law dictating the "obligatory display of crucifixes" in Italian courtrooms and state schools. And, 80 years later, in the 2000s the Berlusconi's neoconservative government was reported to revive and enforce the fascist-era law. Not surprisingly, during the 2006 elections the Berlusconi's conservative coalition officially allied with Mussolini's granddaughter's neofascist party (plus the Vatican theocracy), formalizing their unofficial (secret) alliance, which reenacts in the early twenty-first century the brotherhood of traditional Italian (and other European) conservatism and fascism during interwar Italy (and Europe).

in the various Nazi primers" (sic!). Specifically, Merton finds such analogues of early American Puritanism in Nazism as the "displacement of aggression against a convenient out-group," especially in times of economic crisis, then the "impugning" of out-group immorality, and other "myths and tactics" of nationalist or nativist movements before and since fascism. If so, for example, the persecution and execution of the Native Indians and Quakers as well as the "witches" in New England on the ground of their moral "impurity" and "ungodliness" provide the Puritan prototype or precedent for Nazi and other fascist equivalent practices against "inferior" nations and races in Europe. In particular, such Puritan actions against the "impure" and "ungodly" Indians probably represent the prototypical form of "Nazi primers" like genocide and ethnic cleansing. Hence, proto-Puritan[26] fanatical moral–religious and political intolerance furnishes a model for and finds an analogue in fascism, notably Nazism.[27]

Evoking Weber and Merton, some contemporary US sociologists suggest that, in virtue of its nativism or Americanism, American Puritanism corresponds or is analogous to fascism. Admittedly, Americanism is "a political creed much like" fascism as well as Communism (Lipset 1955:182), and so is hence American Puritanism as its historical religious source. Recall also that contemporary US religious conservatives argue and celebrate the fact that Puritanism is the original source and creator of, and even has actually become, Americanism (Gelernter 2005). In turn, the fascist–Nazi analogue of Puritan-based Americanism is the idea of the German nation as what a non-Puritan "liberal" US President dismissively and sarcastically called the "fantastic notion of a master race" as an aggressive, racist escalation of the old conservative nationalistic Bismarck et al.'s idea of Germans as the "chosen people." However, the aforesaid suggests that American Puritanism, from its paleo- to its neo-types, precisely proclaims, wants, and attempts to remake America the world's "master race" in the ethnocentric–cultural and jingoistic–military sense of "superior" values and institutions rather than the narrowly racial meaning. Predictably, US neo-Puritan fundamentalists and neoconservatives deny this notion of a new "master race," embodied by themselves with self-proclaimed Divine Rights to be world masters, in view of the devastating consequences of German and other "superiority complexes" or supremacy claims in history, notably WW I and II. If admitting at all, neo-Puritans and neoconservatives deny such consequences in the sanctimonious belief or self-delusion that, as the new "chosen nation" with a Divinely ordained "manifest destiny" of total mastery of the world (geographically as well as sociologically), they establish, supposedly for the first time in history, global domination, or an empire "for good," a conviction, claim,

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[26] Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) comment that the "blind and rapidly spreading repetition of words with special designations links [commercial and political] advertising with the totalitarian watchword." In particular, they suggest that "every word shows how far it has been debased by the Fascist pseudo-folk community," just as in extension by the Puritan "Holly Commonwealth."

[27] Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) cite the Nazis' decision to launch the word "intolerable," with the immediate effect of the entire nation repeating the term.

and activity at the core of Puritan Americanism. In this sense, US paleo-Puritans proclaimed that "good" or "true" human history commenced with them in the seventeenth century (the "shining city upon the hill") and their descendents that it ends with them and their neoconservative allies in the twenty-first century, viz. the domestic "Bible Belt," the world "empire of liberty," etc.

If Puritanism is at the root and "heart and soul" of Americanism in Merton's sense of nativism, the sociological, nationalistic distance from Winthrop et al. to Bismarck and to Hitler, let alone US neo-Nazi supremacists and jingoists, is perhaps shorter than it seems at first glance and usually supposed. At least in respect of their self-declared and celebrated radical nativism, Winthrop et al. appear as protoanalogues of Bismarck's conservative nationalism and Hitler's totalitarian racism,[28] not to mention patriotic US neofascists. For instance, some analysts state that Nazism's nationalist "semiotic print matches" that of US Puritans or religious nationalists (Friedland 2002:419). In sum, American Puritanism represents an archetype or analogue of modern fascism in respect of Puritan nationalism, including nativism, jingoism, and xenophobia.

The preceding also indicates that Puritanism corresponds or leads to fascism owing to expansionism, including imperialism, based in, driven and rationalized by nationalism, notably the idea of a God-chosen nation and its manifest destiny of world salvation via total mastery and domination. In view of the latter, Puritan and fascist expansionism, including military conquests and aggressive wars, represent, to use Clausewitz's famous definition of war, the continuation of nationalist politics "by other means," thus predicted by nationalism in Puritanism and fascism alike. And, if fascism, notably Nazism, is a preeminent expansionist–imperialist social system, Puritanism provides a sort of early model, analogue, or precedent for these fascist attributes and practices. Alternatively, Puritan original expansionism, like nationalism, finds its derivation, imitation as the "best form" of imperialist compliment or sequel in those of fascism, especially Nazism.

In particular, as a sort of predictable intensification, escalation, or metastasis of its nationalism or nativism, American Puritanism's expansionism, including imperialism, finds what Merton would call its analogues in the various fascists, including Nazi, expansionist, and imperialist "primers." As hinted, New England's Puritan "primer" of the forcible expansion into the new world, via subjugating, persecuting, and exterminating the native Indians and other "ungodly," "impure," and "sinful" peoples, finds an analogue and proxy, just as it provides a model and precedent, for the Nazi brutal conquest, subjugation, and destruction of Europe during WW II. In particular, what these Puritans called, and viewed as their God-given mission and destiny, "subduing the wilderness" and "civilizing the enslaved" and mastery of

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[28] Blinkhorn (2003:13–64) remarks that in interwar Germany and Europe the "uneasy coupling" of fascism and conservatism, including conservative Protestantism and its conservative project of Protestant *Mittelstand*, "spawned a new kind of political regime." He comments that "a substantial section" of Germany's Protestant clergy believed in the idea that the German nation was "God's chief instrument on earth," thus prefiguring or resembling the Nazis.

the world by territorial expansion or internal and later external colonialism seems analogous to the Nazis' aims at transmitting "superior" German civilization to "inferior" races by expanding the national territory through military–imperialist conquest. In a sense, American Puritanism's perennial expansionism prefigures or corresponds to German fascism's also perpetual expansionist drive. They share the pathological obsession with and militant struggle for national "space," a sort of collective, nationalist claustrophobia, with its well-known destructive effects for human freedom and life itself, from the Puritan expulsion and near-extermination of the "ungodly" Indians to the Nazi conquest and genocide of "inferior" races. In sum, especially paleo-American Puritanism was a sort of archetype or analogue of fascism in respect of its initial expansionist, including imperialist, and militarist tendencies. In turn, neo-US Puritanism or religious neoconservatism corresponds to neofascism by continuing or reinforcing these old Puritan "virtues" through new permanent holy wars or crusades against the evil world, geographically (the war on "terror" and the "axis of evil") and sociologically ("un-American" values, groups and activities, plus drugs, "indecency"). This at least holds true of McCarthyism as an "all-American" conservative version or proxy of European fascism.

Another attribute by which Puritanism resembles, corresponds, or potentially leads to fascism consists of moral repression, absolutism, and extreme asceticism overall. In a sense, Puritanism and fascism both can be deemed systems of harsh moral, just as political, repression, absolutism, and extreme asceticism through negations and suppressions of individual liberty in morality and private life, though these repressive–ascetic practices tend to be more religiously grounded and sanctified in the first case than the second, particularly Nazism. Like before, as the supremely radical system of moral repression, absolutism, and extreme asceticism within Protestantism and even Christianity, original Puritanism provides a prototype or precedent for equivalent or comparable practices in fascism and neofascism, as in American neo-Puritanism. Thus, analysts suggest that the Puritan prototypical repression of intimacy (sexual asceticism) has its equivalent or analogue in fascist, especially Nazi, repressive–ascetic practices in this regard; for example, reportedly the Nazis' "attitude toward sex is a mixture of Puritanism, glorification of vital forces and a vague desire to reconcile a moralist attitude toward illegitimacy with exigencies of population politics" (Kirkpatrick 1937:652). In another instance, recall others imply that the Nazi ascetic semiotics of moralism and nationalism "matches" the symbols of moral oppression, absolutism, and extreme asceticism in US Puritanism and other religious nationalism (Friedland 2002:419). If so, then such instances confirm and illustrate the historical authoritarian continuity between paleo-Puritanism and fascism in terms of moral repression, absolutism, and extreme asceticism. In other words, Puritanism is protofascism to the extent that, as critical sociologists put it, the Puritan and other conservative "miracle of integration, the permanent act of grace by the authority who receives the defenseless person, once he has swallowed his rebelliousness, signifies Fascism" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993).

Also, in America neo-Puritanism or contemporary fundamentalism is observed to sympathize and ally with neofascism in terms of moral repression, absolutism,

and asceticism. This is indicated by the mutual sympathies and alliances between US religious fundamentalists and neo-Nazi militia against personal freedom in morality and privacy (e.g., birth control, drugs, alcohol, minorities, immigrants, foreigners). Some analysts observe that US neo-Puritanical moralistic movements are particularistic, absolute, and coercive, with their neofascist or radical right-wing counterparts, exemplified by violent militia, being "still more extreme" in moral repression, absolutism, or particularism (Munch 2001:239). If so, this reaffirms the manifest or secret authoritarian mutual affinity or empathy between American neo-Puritanism and neofascism, embodied in religious fundamentalists and neo-Nazi militia respectively, in moral terms. Both US neo-Puritans and neofascists reportedly "engage in a struggle against the 'wilderness' with a mandate from religious–moral tradition" (Munch 2001:240) that is rooted in Puritanism or evangelicalism. In turn, as noted, this struggle against the "wilderness" essentially represents or eventually escalates into a joint or parallel Puritan–fascist war against individual moral and other liberty and privacy. The preceding identifies the authoritarian continuities between, for example, Winthrop-Cromwell's moralist holy crusades and neo-Nazi/neo-Puritan murderous campaigns against immorality (e.g., birth control) in America further intensifying during the 2000s. For instance, the paleo-Puritan witch-hunts and executions for moral and religious sins (adultery, blasphemy, etc.), as exercises in the struggle against the "wilderness," in New England prefigure and likely inspire their functional substitutes or proxies in both neofascist (Nazi-militia) and neo-Puritan evangelical practices in America. The repertoire of these practices is remarkably wide, ranging from regional alcohol prohibitions ("dry" states or counties) and similar restrictions (the 21-year legal drinking age) to the war on drugs and murderous attacks on abortion clinics and personnel. Notably, witch-hunts in a metaphorical sense of moralist–religious and political crusades and even literally have never ceased to be a sort of favorite past time for American Puritanism, from seventeenth century New England to the twenty-first century South. Rather, they continued and perpetuated themselves in both neo-Puritanism and neofascism, including McCarthyism self-defined by a war or campaign against "un-American" activities and groups as "witches" or enemies in politics and beyond.

In sum, Puritanism seems proto- or pseudofascism before fascism owing to its moral oppression, absolutism, and extreme asceticism. Conversely, fascism appears as Puritanism by or if embracing these Puritan attributes, though severed or diluted from their religious sources and rationale and submerged or subordinated to political repression and totalitarianism, as done by Nazism. Further, since Puritanism, as Weber implies by diagnosing its "unexampled" tyranny, is the harshest and most total project and system of moral, religiously premised and rationalized, mastery, oppression, and extreme asceticism—it appears as more "totalistic" or "fascist" in this respect than even fascism, including Nazism, itself as the modern totalitarian climax. And, since Puritanism typically fuses moralist with political repression and authoritarianism through a repressive theocratic polity and society (the "Holy Commonwealth"), it attains the "best of both Puritan and fascist worlds," and thus is more "synthetic" or "totalistic" in general than even Nazism and other

fascism in which at least moral oppression and asceticism are not sanctified by a Puritan theocracy (the "Community of Saints").

In sociopsychological terms, Puritanism resembles, corresponds, or leads to fascism due to sadism–masochism manifest or implicit in Puritan moral oppression, aggressive nationalism, expansionism, imperialism, and other authoritarian elements. Puritanism and fascism both share sadism–masochism as a sociopsychological or psychoanalytical and psychiatric attribute and effect; and though they are not the only sado-masochistic projects and systems in social history and reality, they are probably the most "systematic," "methodical," "advanced," or "intense." So, some observers notice that American Puritanism shares with pleasure the "masochistic ecstasy of pain" or "moral masochism" with contemporary European fascism (Woodard 1938), just as sadistic cruelty[29] or moralist sadism. This implies a sharing or continuing in sadism–masochism between, for example, Cromwell's inflicting suffering on himself and others, Winthrop et al.'s harshness toward both themselves and nonbelievers (Bremer 1995), their Bible-Belt mutants' "sadistic intolerance" (Bauman 2001) to cultural, including, first and foremost, nonbelieving "un-American," and then religious, life-style and racial, otherness, and difference (Edgell et al. 2006), and Nazis' sado-masochistic cruelty over the non-German Other.

In historical terms, Puritanism furnishes a prototype and precedent, if not inspiration, for the sadism–masochism of fascism, including Nazism, and, alternatively, original Puritan sado-masochistic dispositions and practices have ramifications, traces, or analogues in fascist forms. This is what some social psychologists suggest observing that the "emotional roots" of both early Puritanism or Protestantism overall and contemporary authoritarianism like fascism consist of the "sado-masochistic character" (Fromm 1941). Consequently, given its historical precedence, Puritanism directly or indirectly transmitted its original "sado-masochistic character" to fascism, so the latter inherited sadism–masochism as a sort of Puritan psychological–authoritarian legacy, just as neofascism, not to mention neo-Puritanism, has continued and perpetuated that heritage. In this view, Puritanism and fascism alike developed or reinforced and solidified the "sado-masochistic character." Thus, early Puritan or Calvinist and Lutheran doctrines "intensified and stabilized" such psychological changes in the middle class, in the aftermath of what it perceived as the threatening collapse of medieval society, as feelings of "powerless isolation and doubt" and "sadistic and masochistic strivings." Reportedly, these sadistic and masochistic character traits as developed or reinforced by Puritanism subsequently "became productive forces" in the historical development of capitalism, notably modern authoritarianism or fascism, so

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[29] Adorno (2001:220–221) adds that in American, Puritan-based, "fascist propaganda," "scandal stories, mostly fictitious, particularly of sexual excesses and atrocities are constantly told; the indignation at filth and cruelty is but a very thin, purposely transparent rationalization of the pleasure these stories convey to the listener." No doubt, the pleasure derived from "filth and cruelty" is a defining element of sadism or sado-masochism, while such indignation or rationalization reflecting hypocrisy.

counterproductive factors in terms of liberal–secular political democracy and a free civil society. This argument proposes that the "same principle of explanation" applies to Nazism as to Puritanism. Thus, Germany's lower middle class

reacted to certain economic changes, such as the growing power of monopolies and postwar inflation, with an intensification of certain character traits, namely sadistic and masochistic strivings; the Nazi ideology appealed to and intensified these traits; and the new character traits then became effective forces in supporting the expansion of German imperialism. (Fromm 1941)

For example, other sociologists comment that both the "Fuhrer's gesticulations before the masses" and their submission to the Nazi leader "assume specifically masochistic traits" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993).

If the above is correct, to fully understand Nazi sadism–masochism, so authoritarianism, including imperialism and militarism, requires taking into account their prototypes, if not origins or inspirations, in early Puritanism. Notably, this holds true of modern fascists' sado-masochistic dictate that the "aim of life is to be sacrificed for 'higher' powers, for the leader or the racial community" in light of that reportedly Calvinism or Puritanism, "served the same sociological function for Anglo-Saxon countries" (McLaughlin 1996:249). Alternatively, understanding how proto-Puritan sadistic and masochistic character traits became efficient or contributing factors in the development of contemporary authoritarianism, as of capitalism, demands considering their contributions, or links to fascism, including Nazism. Notably, due to such authoritarian attributes, Puritanism or Protestantism overall was not only or mostly, as usually claimed, "linked with political freedoms and economic progress [but also] to Nazism"[30] (McLaughlin 1996:249). In a sense, Weber's ideal–typical Puritan was, as critical sociologists put it, "already virtually a Nazi, replete both with enthusiasm and abuse" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), i.e., masochism and sadism alike.

For example, a link from Puritanism to Nazism likely involves what some analysts call "irrational, sadistic" torture, including "blind bestiality," in the Nazi concentration camps (as well as the Gestapo's cellars), in which sado-masochistic "perversion was artificially produced in otherwise normal men" (Arendt 1951). If such a link seems dubious or even preposterous, recall Cromwell's army massacre and expulsion of the Irish Catholics and other "Papists," Winthrop et al.'s "bloody massacres," "most savage tortures," and "extirpating and dispossession of whole nations" like the native Indians and others, as anticipated by Thomas More, as well as persecuting and executing Quakers, witch-hunts and other "irrational, sadistic," if not bestial, practices in New England and America as a whole.

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[30] McLaughlin (1996:248) comments that, according to Fromm, the "Weberian theoretical tradition ignores Luther's and Calvin's 'emphasis on the fundamental evilness and powerlessness of men'." He cites Fromm's statement that, like Calvin's "Luther's stress on the worthlessness and insignificance of human action 'paved the way for a development in which [humans were] to obey secular authorities [plus] subordinate life to [economic ends]'."

Notably, if Nazism finds the "rationality" or usefulness of its extermination camps and other instruments or venues of sadism in their "capacity both to exterminate 'objective enemies' and fabricate the 'model citizen' of the totalitarian regime"[31] (Baehr 2002:810), Puritanism provides a model or precedent for these Nazi aims and practices via various activities and means. Thus, Puritan sadistic moralist–religious crusades in the manner of Cromwell and Winthrop et al. against the "infidels," "evil," "impure," "sinful," "ungodly," "wild," and "inferior" were precisely driven and rationalized by, and often attained, the dual aim of exterminating "enemies" and recreating the "model citizen" of totalitarianism.

First, early English and American Puritans' attempted and often successful extermination of the "infidels" like the "Papists" and the native Indians and Quakers respectively represent Puritan prototypes or functional substitutes for the Nazi exterminating of "objective enemies." This also holds good of the venerable Puritan witch-hunts in the sense and form of systematic persecutions and mass executions of domestic and foreign enemies or "witches" of the "Holy Commonwealth" in New England, as well as their forms or vestiges in McCarthyism as the conservative-produced variant or vestige of both Puritanism and fascism in Cold War America. Puritanism and Nazism alike define and, by devising a "method in the madness," methodically reproduce witches or enemies as embodiments of "evil" to be exorcised or exterminated, which apparently drives and rationalizes their sadistic actions, from Puritan "bloody massacres" and persecutions to Nazi extermination camps and genocides. In short, due to this "method in the madness," Puritanism and fascism are both a sort of "methodism" in the paranoid and sadistic medieval-style alchemy and irrational astrology of witch-hunting. Hence, "witches" become a sort of shared allegory, proof or syndrome of Puritan and fascist irrationalism, sadism, barbarism and authoritarianism, exemplified, and conducted by holy crusades and extermination camps. And, as noted, if Nazism decrees that "no one must go hungry or thirsty; if anyone does, he's for the concentration camp!" Puritanism is prototypical in this respect by its criminalizing of or hostility to the poor, just as American neoconservatism continues this Puritan–fascist tendency through antiwelfare and "tough-on-crime" policies (Bauman 2001) that are not only inhuman but also, especially the penal system, economically irrational in the long run[32] (Akerlof 2002). Thus, while in liberalism the poor were regarded

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[31] Referring to Arendt's definition, Baehr (2002:811) comments that totalitarianism "is a term—not a metaphor—that describes a type of regime that, no longer satisfied with the limited aims of classical despotisms and dictatorships, demands continual mobilization of its subjects and never allows the society to settle down into a durable hierarchical order. In addition [it] offers an all-encompassing ideological framework that abridges the complexity of life in a single, axiomatic, reality-resistant postulate that allows no cognitive dissonance; and is predicated on an experience of mass superfluity." If so, by its ideal and system of totalitarian theocracy, Puritanism constitutes a prototype or precedent for totalitarianism as defined, notably fascism like Nazism.

[32] According to Nobel laureate in economics Akerlof (2002:426), despite neoconservative Puritan-driven "tough-on-crime" policies relying on deterrence via Draconian punishments, US prisons "are full and crime has not stopped," and infers that "large negative externalities

as "lazy," under both fascism and American neo-Puritanism or neoconservatism "they are automatically objects of suspicion. Anybody who is not provided for outside should be in a concentration camp, or at any rate in the hell of the most degrading work and the slums"[33] (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993).

Second, the Puritan attempt to transform humans into religious virtuosi, saints or monks as the heart and soul of totalitarian theocracy *cum* a "Holy Commonwealth" seems equivalent or analogous to the Nazi recreation of the "model citizen" of totalitarianism. Simply, some sort or degree of "saint" or "purist" is the "model citizen" of Puritan theocratic and Nazi quasisecular totalitarianism alike, though by assumption more of a methodical religious virtuoso in the first. This induces and justifies not only sadism or converting others into "saints" but also masochism or transforming one's own life into sainthood via Cromwell's and Goebbels' style self-inflicted suffering, including suicide and murdering one's own family for a "higher cause" in the second case, as well as systematic misrepresentation and propaganda.[34]

In addition, Puritanism may represent or resemble protofascism in virtue of anticipating, corresponding to or resembling McCarthyism as the American-conservative rendition or proxy of fascism in many respects, including witch-hunts or enemy-persecution and burning "liberal" books.[35] Recall, Puritanism particularly anticipates, resembles, or corresponds to McCarthyism in respect to witch-hunts or "methodical" persecutions, torture, and mass murder or "exorcism" of "witches," either literally driven by irrationalism manifested in beliefs in their existence or metaphorically as the reproduction and extermination of enemies, a kind of favorite pastime shared by both, just as fascism, notably Nazism. Thus, Puritan sadistic witch-hunts anticipated and likely inspired, McCarthyism (Gould 1996:174) as the neofascist or conservative system of methodical—i.e., "method-in the madness" of—fabrication and elimination of enemies succeeding "witches" from paleo-Puritanism, through political–social repression, including indoctrination or propaganda similar to that in fascism (Adorno 2001). In this respect, like fascism generally, McCarthyism appears as post-Puritan "methodism" in the irrational, medieval-like, holy art of witch-hunts.

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from incarceration may offset the short-run gains from deterring criminal activity through tougher incarceration policies."

[33] Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) add that both fascist and US neo-Puritan or conservative national leaders "finally decree the abolition of sympathy and think they can prevent any recurrence when the last invalid has been exterminated."

[34] Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) comment that in contemporary, especially American, society commercial and in extension political advertising "becomes art and nothing else, just as Goebbels, with foresight combines them: l'art pour l'art, advertising for its own sake, a pure representation of social power."

[35] Hull (1999: 49–50) remarks that in the 1930s Nazi officials in Germany conducted "mass book-burnings in an attempt to destroy the work of Jewish and liberal thinkers and writers" and that similarly during McCarthyism "books suspected of containing communist propaganda are burned in U.S. information libraries abroad, and many of these libraries are closed."

Further, for Puritanism and McCarthyism, plus European fascism, alike, to paraphrase Voltaire, if witches did not exist, they would have to be reinvented through the recreation and multiplication of "objective enemies" of the "Holy Commonwealth" and "American values" and the German nation, which is precisely the manifest or latent function of their respective systems of indoctrination and propaganda. Consequently, this explains why there has virtually never been the scarcity of "witches" *cum* enemies in Puritanism and McCarthyism or its neoconservative sequels, just as in fascism. In economic terms, witches have never been "scarce" or "dead" in Puritanism and McCarthyism or fascism overall precisely because their "marginal utility" or usefulness has always been high, stable, and even increasing, rather than conversely, scarcity determines utility, as economists think (and contrary to the marginalist law of diminishing final utility). For example, the high "marginal utility," usefulness or instrumentality—exterminating enemies and constructing model citizens of totalitarianism—of Nazi concentration camps and their Puritan antecedents or analogues in the form of slavery, persecution, and crusades helps explain, apart from the irrational medieval-like belief in their real existence, why "witches" have always been and are likely to continue to be present in both fascism, including McCarthyism, and Puritanism. In functionalist terms, "witches" are functional to McCarthyism or fascism and Puritanism, and hence need to be invented, even if they did not exist in Voltaire's rationalist sense, reproduced and multiplied, thus becoming ever-present in, yet ever-threatening to and ever-exorcised from, the conservative-fascist "harmony, law and order" and Puritan–evangelical theocratic heaven like the US "Bible Belt" (Wuthnow 1998).

In this respect, "witches," enemies, ungodly, or infidels become the "life blood" or *raison d'être* rather than the Satanic menace or even nuisances to Puritanism and McCarthyism and other fascism, because without them they could not exist, survive, expand or perhaps originate. Recall, "infidels" like the "Papists" (e.g., Irish Catholics), Anglicans and others gave a sort of life support and rationale to the early English Puritans' moralist–religious crusades against enemies, the "ungodly" Indians, Quakers, and other "witches" to those of their American disciples from Winthrop et al. in New England to Bible-Belt fundamentalists, just as did "un-American" values, groups, and activities to McCarthyism and its version of witch-hunts. In this sense, like fascists, Puritans, and their mutants in McCarthyism and neoconservatism, including neo-Puritan fundamentalism, really (as per the Biblical commandment) "love" their enemies so much that they cannot simply live without them, thus permanently recreate, multiply and nurture "witches" as the precondition for their own existence and rationale. Hence, while proto-Puritanism reinvented, continuing the tradition of the Dark Middle Ages, McCarthyism and American neoconservatism, like fascism, embraced, or "revived" witches (i.e., evil or Satan) as the syndrome or allegory of their shared irrationalism, authoritarianism, and barbarism or primitivism justified as evangelicalism.

Hence, by witch-hunt-style persecutions, mass executions (e.g., the death penalty for sins and crimes alike) and related repressive practices, including fascistlike indoctrination and propaganda (Adorno 2001), McCarthyism and its extension or disguise into neoconservatism or the New Right appear as the, albeit

less religious[36] or theocratic, form of neo-Puritanism, just as paleo-Puritanism resembled McCarthy et al.'s "fascism" before modern fascism. Thus, some analysts observe that in contemporary America "it is the extreme Right that has co-opted" both the discourse and practice of Puritanism, notably its radicalism or permanent revolution in the form of "revolutionary republicanism" (Gould 1996:210). As the above suggests, this is another way to state that neofascism in America, exemplified in McCarthyism as well as militia-style extremism, embraces, extends, and consolidates original Puritan theocratic authoritarianism, epitomized and symbolized in methodical persecutions, crusades, and mass executions ("bloody massacres") rationalized as witch-hunts, just as does its religious–theocratic ally, neo-Puritanism or fundamentalism. Hence, to better understand McCarthyism and other neofascism, at least its metaphorical witch-hunts as the fabrication and punishment of enemies and its authoritarian propaganda, requires reconsidering American paleo-Puritanism, notably its literal persecutions and executions of and medieval-based beliefs in "witches." In turn, grasping and identifying the historical trajectories or contemporary political legacies of Puritanism, including its witch-hunts or persecutions, in America involves taking account of McCarthyism and other neofascism, notably its witch-hunting, as mostly, but not only, a Puritan legacy which US Puritans apparently inherited from the Dark Middle Ages.

As hinted by the previous, another respect in which Puritanism resembles, anticipates, corresponds, or leads to fascism consists of totalitarian indoctrination, agitation, and propaganda. This especially applies to American Puritanism in relation to European fascism as well as to McCarthyism and neofascism in America. For instance, Myrdal (1953:205) observes that during the 1920s "as we would expect, the two dictatorships, Russia and Italy, were the first to learn the lesson of conscious indoctrination" and that "next" to these totalitarian countries—and, a fortiori Nazi Germany in the 1930s—Puritan–evangelical America "practices most consciously political indoctrination." He adds that

as a result of this, there is hardly another nation in the world, with the exception of Russia and Italy [and Germany], where, in spite of great differences of cultural heritage and of large geographical distances and social gulfs, the young grow up with more uniform and standardized convictions and attitudes. At the same time adult opinion is also worked upon. The development of advertising techniques and the need to maintain domestic morale in the war have led to the refinement of propaganda (Myrdal 1953:205)

As expected and observed, such systematic political indoctrination, standardization, and propaganda primarily indoctrinate and standardize into and propagate Americanism in the sense of the American creed or civil religion (Lipset 1996) and thus Puritanism as its religious source (Merton 1939) or equivalent (Gelernter 2005). Hence, at least indirectly or implicitly Puritanism corresponds to fascism,

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[36] McCarthyism is less religious or theocratic than original Puritanism at least on the account of its founder's occasional not-so-Puritanical habits and behaviors, including a strong penchant for alcohol. In turn, this does not apply to the US New Right or neoconservatism, as in essence a political form or dimension of neo-Puritanism and religious fundamentalism overall.

including Nazism, in terms of authoritarian political indoctrination and propaganda.[37]

Other analyses suggest even more direct and manifest connections or commonalities in this and other respects between Puritanism and fascism in contemporary America. Thus, an analysis observes that in what is called "American fascist propaganda its agitators present themselves as lone wolves, as healthy, sound American citizens [and] take a warm human interest in the small daily worries of their listeners, whom they depict as poor but honest, commonsense but nonintellectual, native Christians" (Adorno 2001:219). Notably, these agitators reportedly "often refer to themselves as mere messengers of [God] who is to come—a trick already familiar in Hitler's speeches" (Adorno 2001:219). If these observations are correct, they indicate that, first, neo-Puritan evangelical God's "messengers" adopt similar methods of authoritarian propaganda and agitation as the Nazis, and, second, consequently neo-Puritanism tends to assert[38] itself in and fuse with neofascism in this sense. Thus, in this fusion "fascist propaganda" in America is also neo-Puritan evangelical political indoctrination, by appealing to and celebrating Puritan irrationalism and nativism ("non-intellectual, native Christians"), and conversely, the latter boils down to or resembles a Nazi-style agitation.

In particular, nativist patriotism is observed to drive, inspire, and justify, in the form of triumphant Americanism (Bell 2002), neofascist propaganda and neo-Puritan indoctrination alike in America, just as, in that of German nationalism, Nazi agitation. For example, US neofascist, like neo-Puritan evangelical, agitators claim a "general American revival they hope to bring about" and seek to, in their own words, "demonstrate to the world that there are patriots, God-fearing Christian men and women who are yet willing to give their lives to the cause of God, home and native land" (Adorno 2001:219–220). Hence, these neofascists and neo-Puritans adopt or evoke fascists', notably the Nazis', demands for such human sacrifice to higher causes, perhaps minus God in Nazism, so their sado-masochism,

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[37] For example, Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) comment that "in America it collects no fees from the public, and so has acquired the illusory form of disinterested, unbiased authority which suits Fascism admirably. The radio becomes the universal mouthpiece of the Fuhrer [and the Nazis] knew that the wireless gave shape to their cause just as the printing press did to the Reformation." They add that contemporary Fascism in America "hopes to use the training the culture industry has given [the masses], in order to organize them into its own forced battalions."

[38] Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) also remark that in America Puritanism "still asserts itself in the form of women's organizations." If so, it not only asserts in, or fuses and allies with, neo-fascism and neoconservatism overall, but also militant feminism, which implies that in this respect US evangelicals and other neoconservatives act as allies ("bed-fellows") with their mutually proclaimed enemies condemned as "femi-Nazis." Berman (2000:51) provides an instance of neo-Puritanism in militant feminism commenting that "when feminists [e.g. Susan McClary] can say that Beethoven's Ninth Symphony is filled with 'the throttling, murderous rage of a rapist incapable of attaining release', we see how nakedly sick the [feminist] deconstructive enterprise finally is. This is not merely intellectual failure; it is moral failure as well." This implies that militant feminism carries Puritanism's otherwise intense hostility toward art, including, as Weber notices, music, to a further pathological climax of "sick" hatred of its ("male") creators.

though "very few American agitators would dare openly to profess fascist and anti-democratic goals" (Adorno 2001:221). In this view, the above indicates the "important role played by the religious element," primarily by neo-Puritanism or evangelicalism, genuine, or hypocritical,[39] in this fascist propaganda in America. Reportedly, "religious language and religious forms are utilized in order to lend the impression of a sanctioned ritual that is performed again and again by some 'community'" (Adorno 2001:229). Notably, American neo-Puritanism plays such a role in this neofascist propaganda or agitation through its radicalism and nihilism, including its sado-masochistic form, evidently shared with both US neofascism and original European fascism. Specifically, in neo-Puritanism the "actual shedding of blood is advocated as necessary because the world has supposedly been redeemed by the shedding of Christ's blood," thus advocating and engaging in destructiveness as the "psychological basis of the fascist spirit" (Adorno 2001:229).

Historically, the neo-Puritan advocacy of and practice of blood shedding as the means or path of redemption follows what Thomas More recorded and predicted as "bloody massacres," "most savage tortures," and "extirpating and dispossession of whole nations" both preached and committed by American paleo-Puritanism, as the instrument or road of salvation and holiness in the theocratic "Holy Commonwealth." Comparatively, these Puritan nihilistic or apocalyptical tendencies are compatible or similar to those in fascism, given that, like Puritans, "all fascist agitators dwell upon the imminence of catastrophes of some kind," as particularly seen during the "first years of Hitlerism in Germany"[40] (Adorno 2001:230).

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[39] Adorno (2001:227) adds that "many persons with a fake religious attitude are found among the fascist agitators" in America, as psychologically the "carry-overs of by-gone religion, neutralized and void of any specific dogmatic content, are put to the service of the fascist ritualistic attitude." This only reaffirms and specifies the characteristic hypocrisy of Puritanism and other religious fundamentalism. As noted, he also hints at hypocrisy as well as sado-masochism by pointing to the Puritan "very thin" indignation at "filth and cruelty" in US media "scandal stories." Adorno infers that in consequence of a "fake" religion the "specific religious content as well as the political" is replaced by the *cult of the existent* related to "identification with a *status quo*."

[40] Adorno (2001:230) cites one of what he calls US fascist agitators or demagogues: "Can you not see that unless we exalt the holiness of our God, that unless we proclaim the justice of God in this world of ours, unless we proclaim the fact of a heaven and of a hell, unless we proclaim the fact that without the remission, *without the shedding of blood*, there is no remission of sin? Cannot you see that only Christ and God are dominant and that revolution will ultimately take this nation of ours?" He also quotes another one stating "I want to say that you men and women, you and I are living in the most fearful time of the history of the world. We are living also in the most gracious and most wonderful time." Adorno comments that "this is the agitator's dream, a union of the horrible and the wonderful, a delirium of annihilation masked as salvation (thus) pointing out its self-destructive implications." He also mentions that "one of the most successful and dangerous West Coast agitators again and again encouraged his listeners to indulge in all sorts of emotions, to give way to their feelings, to shout and to shed tears, persistently attacking the behavior pattern of rigid self-control" (Adorno 2001:226), thus perhaps belonging to Methodism or Baptism, as what Weber calls the emotional intensification of original Puritanism or Calvinism (with its devaluation of feelings).

Arguably, these attitudes and actions have a "deep archaic basis" especially in Puritanism (or perhaps Christianity as a whole), which reaffirms Puritan and fascist fundamentalism or traditionalism as the facet of their shared irrationalism. Thus, Sorel (an Italian sociologist) remarks that "apocalyptic myths" serve to maintain the "religious exaltation" of Puritan and other Protestant sects in America and England.

To summarize, Puritanism anticipates, resembles, or corresponds to fascism in terms of irrationalism, charismatic authority, aggressive nationalism, expansionism and imperialism, moral and political repression, sadism–masochism, witch-hunts, repressive indoctrination and propaganda, and other authoritarian attributes or effects. Thus, paleo-Puritanism qualifies for protofascism, and alternatively fascism for neo- Puritanism, in that both are basically irrational, charismatically authoritarian, aggressively nationalist and expansionist, morally and politically repressive, sadistic–masochistic, engage in persecutions, practice repressive propaganda, etc.

Puritanism and Communism

In some respects, Puritanism is also similar, comparable, or analogous to communism, as another form of contemporary authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Alternatively, communism or authoritarian (as distinguished from democratic) socialism manifests itself as a particular nonreligious or secular variation of Puritanism. For example, an early French economist (Frederic Bastiat) refers to the "puritans of socialism" and some contemporary analysts compare in detail Puritanism and communism (Meyer 1967:4–7). Puritanism and communism are comparable or analogous in at least two respects: first, radicalism and nihilism; second, asceticism and moral–political repression.

First, Puritanism and communism alike are radical or revolutionary and nihilistic or destructive. This is what Ross indicates in observing that both Puritanism and communism seek elimination of the "unfit," viz. the "morally unfit" in the first case and the "physically unfit" in the second, through revolution and other political–social radicalism. Also, some contemporary historians suggest that the comparison or analogy of Puritanism with communism (especially its Russian version Bolshevism), is "worth pursuing" (Walzer 1963:86). In this view, like early Puritanism, the "first triumph" of Bolshevism was "over the impulse of disorganization" as well as the "impulses toward freedom" in its own framework and beyond. Thus, just as Puritanism "vigorously attacked Renaissance experimentation in dress and in all the arts of self-decoration, Lenin was "preaching with all the energy of a secular Calvinist against free love [as] 'bourgeois' [and] 'decay'" (Walzer 1963:86). In this sense, early Puritans act or appear as kinds of proto-Bolsheviks or paleocommunists, and these latter as secular (or atheist) neo-Puritans. Some sociological analyses identify what is described as a "persistent affinity" of Puritanism and revolution, so communism as a revolutionary doctrine and system. Reportedly, this affinity is a "phenomenon observable in a wide range of political revolutions," ranging the English Puritan Revolution of the seventeenth century to the Chinese, Cuban, and Russian communist revolutions over the twentieth century (Tiryakian

1981:1049). This implies that while the first was a paleo-Puritan revolution, the latter were neo-Puritan revolutions grounded in and driven by a sort of secular Puritanism, including communist asceticism and moralism, which redefines modern communism in proto-Puritan terms. Other sociological studies indicate that "in those revolutions that had been planned, organized and involved long military struggle, revolutionary Puritanism usually became an important element of discipline" (Wallerstein and Zukin 1989:436), with the Chinese Communist Party and Revolution as a case in point.

Second, both Puritanism and communism are intensely ascetic and morally, just as politically, repressive. As the above Leninist–Calvinist analogy implies, communist, especially Bolshevik, asceticism, moralism, and moral repression are almost as famous and intense, as well as often hypocritical, as those in Puritanism. Thus, a study finds that communists in Russia "conspicuously emphasize" Puritan moral values, albeit with no "credit acknowledgment to Puritanism or a Protestant ethic" (Faris 1961:4). Another study indicates that what is identified as the "Puritanism of the [communist] hero is not unlike the Western conceptions of the Puritan" (Hollander 1966:357). For instance, like the Puritan moralist virtuoso or saint, the communist hero is "intensely concerned with spiritual values, minimizing the importance of self in humility to a super-personal case, constantly on guard against violations of his moral code, impatient with those violating it [and also] toward himself [as] the main psychological source of self-denial" (Hollander 1966:357–358). Hence, communist heroes and Puritan saints are similar or comparable in terms of, first, asceticism and irrationalism expressed in a concern with spiritual, religious, and ideological, respectively, values; second, antihumanism manifested in minimizing humans' importance in relation to superhuman, transcendental, or secular causes; third, moral intolerance and oppression reflected in guarding against or punishing immoral behaviors; and fourth, sado-masochism in the form of a mix of denial of others and self-denial. Predictably, the study finds that communist heroes' Puritanism, notably their lack of freedom, is expressed in their sexual and other emotional relations, as they see sex as "potentially dangerous, disruptive force" in accordance with "rigidity, regimentation and discipline" in other spheres of society (Hollander 1966:358). The study concludes that the Puritanism of the communist (especially Stalinist) hero constitutes a set or special case of "totalitarian values and controls."

In particular, as one might expect, it is American Puritanism and Soviet communism that are comparable or analogous in terms of absolutist moralism and moral repression. Thus, some observers remark that "emphatic condemnations, in the Yankee mode, of private immorality [come] from the [Soviet] authorities. Though Puritanism is not ordinarily termed a Russian trait, the politics of virtue is pervasive, like the desire for order and authority. It is not simply the attribute of the right-wing [as in America]" (Kelley 1984:701). As such, the communist "politics of virtue" is in essence functionally equivalent or comparable to the conservative "politics of Puritanism" (Wagner 1997) in historical and contemporary America. Hence, the above indicates that, like its paleo-ancestor, American neo-Puritanism, as the attribute of neoconservatism is analogous or similar, though not identical,

to Soviet and other, including Chinese, communism in respect of condemning and oppressing private immorality via some kinds of temperance wars.

A historical exemplar of this Puritan–communist commonality in severe moralist condemnations, repressions, or temperance wars is alcohol Prohibition in American Puritanism and Soviet communism. Not only American Puritanism, but also, yet less known or ignored by US neo-Puritans and neoconservatives to exorcise any "ghost" of commonality with an "evil empire," Soviet communism enacted Prohibition in the late 1980s, seemingly modeled after or inspired by America's during the 1920s–1930s as well as corresponding to similar contemporaneous Puritan–conservative trends (e.g., Bible-Belt "dry" counties, the drastically raised national legal drinking age). The Soviet enactment was to some degree a communist historical equivalent or proxy for paleo-Puritan Prohibition and a contemporary counterpart or emulation of neo-Puritan antialcohol campaigns in America. As known, American and Soviet Prohibitions, as respective Puritan or conservative and communist cases of temperance wars, both ended in an evidently dismal failure, including the rise of organized (Mafia) and other crime. This makes American Puritanism and communism moralist–authoritarian failures in this respect, though neo-Puritan temperance crusaders deny or overlook this, as indicated by their fanatically persisting attempts at reimposing some degree or form of such and other prohibition exemplified in perennial Bible-Belt "dry" states or counties perplexing or intriguing US sociologists like Merton (1968).

In sum, Puritanism, while vehemently anticommunistic in various other respects (e.g., antisecularism, antimodernism, antiprogressive), is "communism" in terms of first, radicalism and nihilism and, second, asceticism and moral repression. Alternatively, though strongly anti-Puritan in the sense of strictly antireligious or secular, communism is "Puritanism" in these same terms. Simply, most communists are "Puritans," i.e., radical, revolutionary and nihilistic as well as intensely ascetic, moralist, and morally repressive, just as Puritan saints provide a model, inspiration, or precedent for such communist "heroes." Perhaps, the observed "persisting affinity" between Puritan saints and communist heroes, especially American Puritanism and Soviet and Chinese communism, is one of those special cases of authoritarian "extremes attracting each other" in the form of religious and secular authoritarianism, including theocratic and antireligious dictatorships, respectively. As hinted, the "fatal attraction" between such totalitarian extremes holds true a fortiori of Puritanism and fascism, if the latter, notably Nazism, is, like communism, considered secular totalitarianism or nonreligious dictatorship.

6
Authoritarian Legacy of Puritanism in Contemporary Society

The Puritan Authoritarian Legacy: General Considerations

Even if Puritanism actually and completely ended (as many think), for example, with the defeat of the English Puritan Revolution in the 1660s and, in particular, the official disestablishment of New England's theocracy by the Congregational Church in the 1830s, its legacy, vestige, or influence has been persisting, strong, and even crucial, primarily in America and secondarily Great Britain. In particular, the official disestablishment of New England's Puritan theocracy after exactly two long centuries of its existence (e.g., 1620s–30s to 1833) meant, to use Weber's terms, only the formal but not the substantive end of the overwhelming presence and salience of Puritanism in America. On the contrary. this is especially evident in the South that has, as seen, experienced a sort of neo-Puritan evangelical, specifically Baptist–Methodist renaissance during and in the wake of the Great Awakenings. In a sense, Puritanism has been both, to paraphrase Durkheim, the genesis and historical evolution, if not the future "manifest destiny," of America. Notably, by its enduring and cardinal legacy or influence, Puritanism remains Weber's "most fateful" cultural force with, like capitalism, nearly "absolute power" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993)—predictably, corrupting Puritans and their proxies "absolutely"—and blended with political conservatism, in America, above all its Southern and other ultraconservative ("red-neck") states during the early twenty-first century.

Crucially, this legacy, vestige, or impact of Puritanism, from Great Britain to America and its other colonies, has been primarily and systematically authoritarian by virtue of constituting or generating political and social authoritarianism, including oppressive theocracy, only secondarily and fortuitously (Zaret 1989) democratic. This holds true especially of its legacy and influence in America where, to recall, Puritanism's authoritarian, including theocratic, dispositions, practices, institutions, and outcomes were not or less moderated and counterbalanced by competing or countervailing social forces such as Anglicanism and the secular–liberal Enlightenment more present and salient in Great Britain (Munch 2001) and Europe (Calvinism). Alternatively, these religious and secular forces help explain why the legacy of Puritanism in Great Britain and, in the original form of Calvinism, Europe was less authoritarian as well as generally weaker and less

enduring than in America. Hence, on the account of its persistent authoritarian, including theocratic, legacy, and influence, Puritanism continues to be not only Weber's "most fateful," but even the most *fatal* cultural, force, typically merged or allied with rigid, reactionary political–economic conservatism, in America's modern life, at least its "Bible Belt" evangelical heaven (Wuthnow 1998) *qua* a theocratic dystopia or proto-totalitarian solution (Bauman 1997).

If so, then Puritanism was not only (the source of) the birth, pride, and joy of America, but has been or is likely to become (the cause of) the historical or future (paraphrasing Theodore Dreiser's apparently "politically incorrect" novel) American sociological tragedy in the sense of persisting and ever-intensifying political—social authoritarianism, including antiegalitarianism, fundamentalism, totalitarian theocracy, nationalism, and militarism. This is a sociological tragedy in at least two respects, first, by contradicting or subverting America's liberal, egalitarian, and secular ideals of social liberty, justice, and equality "for all," including the differentiation between religion and politics; second, by sharply deviating from the global political—cultural trend toward egalitarianism, liberalization, democratization, and secularization, especially in, but not limited to, Western societies, during the late twentieth and early twenty-first century (Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and Baker 2000). Thus, to observe that political democracy in America has been "going South" and placed in the ultraconservative or traditionalist "shadow of Dixie" (Cochran 2001) since the 1980s is to diagnose symptoms of an enfolding or impending neo-Puritan- or fundamentalist-induced "American tragedy" in the form of undemocratic, including antiegalitarian, theocratic, and militarist, processes conflicting with or subverting its democratic, egalitarian, and secular ideals, at least in Jefferson–Madison's rendition and tradition.

Also, to find that, primarily due a dominant traditionalistic, fundamentalist, and theocratic religion epitomized in Protestant sectarianism, America has historically been and remains at the start of the twenty-first century a salient exception or deviation from this global process of cultural and political liberalization, especially religious modernization or secularization, is to identify or predict a neo-Puritan-induced American sociological tragedy already playing or in the making. As its adherents stress and advocate, it is neo-Puritanism in the generalized form of Protestant evangelicalism (Wuthnow 1998), exemplified by dominant, as in the South, or increasingly powerful, as in America overall, Baptism, and merged or allied with political neoconservatism, represented by the New Right and neofascist militia, that is mainly, though not solely instrumental in and responsible for generating and perpetuating this antisecular exception, just as American exceptionalism overall. In this sense, Puritanism's induced and celebrated American exceptionalism, notably theocratic fundamentalism, is not only a double-edged, as usual (Lipset 1996), but perhaps a tragic, self-destructive sword. The latter can be considered or predicted to be a perverse, and yet logical, metastasis, of Puritan nihilism and sado-masochism into authoritarian indiscriminate nihilism, self-destruction, or vegetative pseudoexistence defined by what Mises calls the "peace of the cemetery" and others "graveyard stillness" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) as a defining trait of the "Community of Saints" in Puritanism as well as extreme

asceticism or monasticism overall, just as of fascist–Nazi dictatorship. Mises could add that, if not knowing what the "peace of the cemetery," just as authoritarian self-destructiveness or sado-masochism, in a paleo- and neo-Puritan "Community of Saints" looks like and does, one should revisit oppressive Cromwell's and Winthrop's "Holy Commonwealths" in old and New England. So should one visit the Southwestern "Bible Belt," with its sleepy, desert-, or deadlike Puritan-rooted small towns, just as big cities as the centers of neo-Puritanism and political conservatism (e.g., Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, Nashville). These Southern small towns and big cities alike are culturally empty inhabited by "dead men walking" and pervaded by a mix of Puritan and protofascist ("red-neck") mentality with its trademark "sadistic intolerance" (Bauman 2001) of the religious, cultural, political, racial, and, first of all, nonbelieving, "un-American" other and different (Edgell et al. 2006), as well as "mass of gloomy houses and business premises in grimy, spiritless cities" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) during the 2000s and before.

Hence, the letter or name of Puritanism may be a case of what neoclassical economist Jevons calls (in reference to the labor-cost theory of economic value) "bygones are forever bygones." Yet, its authoritarian legacy or spirit ("ghost") remains "well and alive" in America at the beginning of the twenty-first century and likely to be perpetuated into an indefinite future,[1] in accordance with Puritan–evangelical millenarianism inspired, like medieval Europe's Christian millenarian movements, by the "phantasy of a salvation" (Giddens 1984:204). Hence, Puritanism continues or promises to be some a sort or degree of authoritarian, including theocratic, present and future, just as it was such a historical genesis and evolution, of America, in contrast to Great Britain and continental Europe (e.g., Holland, Switzerland) where, if not vanished, it receded into the underground world of anachronism, extremism, authoritarianism, theocracy, and militarism.

The latter suggests a supreme historical irony or perversion in America compared with other historically Puritan societies. Due to, within contemporary

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[1] Formally, American neo-Puritanism's commencement and perhaps duration of its thousand-year Kingdom of God is definite (e.g., beginning in 2000 AD through 3000 AD). But its duration is substantively infinite, as its adherents simply will not stop at the end of its first millennium (e.g., 3000 AD) but seek to extend it into the next and so on, barring the judgment-day scenario, just as did not their millennial predecessors in European medieval Christianity at year 1000 AD. And, like medieval Christian millenarians in Europe, US neo-Puritans or evangelicals are driven by the "phantasy of a salvation" (Giddens 1984:204), thus again substantively perpetuating, with some "all-American" embellishments, the old world's fantasies and resulting practices (e.g., the belief in the existence of witches or Satan and witch-trials or their variations a la McCarthyism). This reaffirms that, like its original Puritanism, American neo-Puritan evangelicalism continues, albeit with various disguises, living in the "dead past" (Mannheim's phrase) of European Christian medievalism and its millenarian (and other) fantasies rather than being, as its adherents claim, new or exceptional. At least, this holds true of US neo- (and paleo-) Puritanism in relation to its European parent, Calvinism as essentially medievalist, including millenarian, by seeking, as Eisenstadt (1965) stresses, to recreate a "purer" medieval society rather than to replace it.

Western societies, the unrivaled legacy and influence of Puritanism and other Protestant evangelicalism America has become and remained more Puritan or Calvinist than even the paleo-Puritan England and the proto-Calvinistic Europe, thus, as the new-world derivative, surpassing and so sociologically becoming even older, i.e., more religious, fundamentalist, morally repressive, or theocratic, than the old increasingly irrelevant European original—i.e., simply "a bigger Calvinist than Calvin himself." It seems that US neo-Puritans refuse to accept, or overlook the fact that Puritanism or Calvinism, so its theocratic authoritarianism, is virtually everywhere in the Western world in the state of, to use Weber's Latin expression, *caput mortuum* or a terminal condition, including its original home, England and Europe, and instead try to resurrect it, like religious and other conservatism overall (Dunn and Woodard 1996), from the "dead."

In sum, Puritan-based American exceptionalism's double-edged or tragic "sword" is perhaps nowhere more manifest, intense, and dangerous for human freedom and even life than in the exceptional and unparalleled authoritarian–theocratic legacy and influence of Puritanism and other Protestant evangelicalism in America compared with other Western societies, including the proto-Puritan Great Britain. Simply, it is not just the legacy of Puritanism itself as largely non-controversial to and even celebrated by many, especially conservative, Americans, but that of its authoritarianism, including antiliberalism, antiegalitarianism, moralist repression, totalitarian theocracy, nationalism, and militarism, that makes America an exception or deviation within Western society and history as a whole.[2] The remainder of this chapter argues and demonstrates that Puritanism's legacy or influence in America has been and remains primarily authoritarian, notably

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[2] In view of this exception or deviation of America, primarily thanks to Puritanism, from most Western societies and their histories, including Great Britain, it is curious and even perplexing that US neo-Puritan fundamentalists and political neo-conservatives insist so much on teaching "Western history" in schools as a counterpart to what they see as "anti-Western" bias imputed to liberal multiculturalism. For instance, they seem to overlook that, precisely owing to the dominance of antiliberal and antisecular Puritanism, America largely avoided, missed, or diluted (despite Jefferson–Madison's countervailing heroic, yet atypical efforts) the European-style Enlightenment (just as the earlier Renaissance), with its liberalism, humanism, and secularism, as a seminal, if not the critical, point in modern Western history, notably by superseding both the Catholic Dark Middle Ages *and* the Protestant Reformation and their theocratic projects and practices. Alternatively, what US fundamentalists mean by "Western history" is likely, first, ethnocentric American-Puritan history, and second, the religious history of Christianity or Protestantism, notably the Protestant Reformation, in the West. Alternatively, they in both cases signify "Western history" minus that of liberalism and secularism, including the European (especially French) Enlightenment, excluded and condemned as "un-American" or "foreign" and "ungodly" or "heresy," respectively. Also, American and Western modernity, e.g., at the threshold of the third millennium, appear as hardly identical, and even as substantially different, if not opposed, in many respects. As hinted, this is suggested by some studies (Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and Baker 2000) finding that America continues to be, as has historically been, a "deviant case" within the Western world in terms of cultural modernization and liberalization, including secularization, and instead a "leader" in traditionalism and fundamentalist religion, primarily owing to its Puritan-Protestant heritage and path-dependence.

antiliberal, oppressive, theocratic, nationalist, and militarist, rather than democratic, liberal, and secular as assumed in the "naïve assumptions" (Coffey 1998) about Puritan liberty.

Rediscovering the Puritan Authoritarian Legacy in American Society

In retrospect, Tocqueville is among the first social thinkers to rediscover and stress the general, including by implication authoritarian–theocratic, legacy, or influence of Puritanism in America, even after the formal abolition of New England's Puritan theocracy just a few years before his celebrated, by especially US religious and other conservatives, visit in the 1830s. Generally, he describes Americans as "at the same time a puritanical people and a commercial nation," thus as both moralist–religious and materialistic, holy "saints" and secular capitalists in Weber's sense. Tocqueville suggests that "to know and to judge the Anglo-Americans of the present day, it is therefore necessary to distinguish what is of Puritanical and what of English origin," presumably Calvinist Puritanism and Anglicanism originally founding and dominating New England and the Southern colonies (e.g., Virginia), respectively.

Moreover, Tocqueville states that America's "destiny" is "embodied in the first Puritan." This seems prophetic in light of the subsequent expansion and domination of Puritanism in the country as a whole, including the South, as well as its contemporary legacy and impact in the generalized form of Protestant evangelicalism, perhaps climaxing during the 2000s. Though it may be interpreted, as do US religious conservatives, as the destiny of freedom and democracy, Tocqueville therefore implies or anticipates the evolution of Puritanism into Weber's "most fateful" or fatal authoritarian force. Notably, he intimates a fundamentalist–theocratic "fate," of historical and modern America, first and foremost, the South, even after the official end of New England's theocracy as well as the 1960s liberalization, democratization, and secularization, which propelled neo-Puritanism or religious fundamentalism into vehement antidemocratic and antiliberal reaction or counterrevolution during the 1980s–2000s. Thus, Tocqueville remarks that Americans' "strictly Puritanical" origins, merged with some other traits, "divert their minds from the pursuit of science, literature, and the arts" and Europe's proximity "allows them to neglect these pursuits without relapsing into barbarism." However, he implies that these origins do cause relapsing into antirationalism, including anti-intellectualism, and antihumanism characterized by such neglect of science and art respectively, and to that extent into authoritarianism, including protofascism.

Recall modern authoritarianism, notably fascism, displays, as Mannheim puts it, "profound" skepticism and hostility toward science as well as art, with these original Puritan antiscientific and antiartistic tendencies providing an historical prototype, analogue, or precedent. Alternatively, by noting that Puritanical and related attributes "concurred to fix the mind of the American upon purely

practical objects" Tocqueville implies that Puritanism contributed to creating a sort of prototype or analogue for what Mannheim calls the "irrationality of the fascist apotheosis of the deed." In this sense, the direct or indirect outcome and legacy of American Puritanism is the "irrationalism of the deed" or pure practice and consequently some degree of authoritarianism and radicalism. Simply, by making Puritans Durkheim's "slaves of irrational prejudices" neglecting, opposing, or suspecting science and art, Puritanism makes them Mannheim's "explosive irrational elements" like authoritarian radicals or totalitarian extremists, just as does fascism its adherents, with its "irrationality" of the "apotheosis of the deed."

More explicitly, Tocqueville identifies some sort or degree of authoritarian legacy of American Puritanism by observing that "these opinions of the first fathers of the colonies have left very deep traces on the minds of their descendants." He cites as a case in point what he calls the "extreme regularity of habits and the great strictness of morals that are observable in the US." *Prima facie*, this case can be considered to be the Puritan legacy of authoritarian traditionalism, conformism and extremism ("extreme regularity of habits") and moral rigidity and repression ("great strictness of morals"). In sum, Tocqueville intimates or predicts that Puritanism's legacy in American democracy and society may not be fully and unequivocally democratic or libertarian but authoritarian or illiberal in the sense of irrationalism, extremism, and moral repression.

The same can be said of conservative US sociologist Ross (1897:243) starkly warning against "Puritan tyranny" in America described as a "lineal descendent" of Puritanism. Also, he implicitly describes Puritanism as the "antidote" of democracy, in spite or rather because of that, in his view, they "have worked together" in America. This unwittingly admits that the two may not be fully or substantially compatible but only had to work formally "together" or cooperate; alternatively, if they were, Puritanism would not act as the "antidote" of democracy (hence) as its "poison." Conversely, as noted, this effectively implies that, insofar as democracy is a foremost American or universal value in Parsons' sense of a "conception of the desirable," it is itself the "antidote" of Puritanism and the latter its "poison" in their working "together" or coexistence.

Ross' historical proof could be the working "together" or coexistence of Puritanism or even, as he implies, Puritan tyranny and democracy in America after the official abolition of New England's theocracy or *mixt aristocracie*. This then limits the process of cooperation to the officially posttheocratic period from the 1830s and only to certain parts of America, excluding the South ever since the Great Awakenings and up to the 2000s. Also, as the Puritan "antidote" suggests, even this working "together" has typically been and continue to be a kind of reluctant collaboration, reconciliation, or strategic compromise, underpinned with various frictions and tensions, between Puritanism and secular democracy, rather than their intrinsic compatibility, affinity, or convergence. Thus, for Puritanism the formal separation of religion and politics in America has always been only a strategic or tactical reconciliation and compromise at a certain historical point (the 1770s) with secular democracy (e.g., Jefferson, Madison et al.) both working "together," notably against a foreign and Anglican-based empire, rather than

a theological tenet or institutional practice, as indicated by Puritan original and persisting theocratic dispositions, institutions, and actions. Simply, in this and most other cases, Puritanism has worked "together" with secular democracy in accordance with the old Machiavellian rule that the enemy's—e.g., Anglicanism's or the British Empire's—enemies such as US democratic anticolonial forces become "friends." Overall, even when working "together" with it, Puritanism has been and remains, in the generalized form of Protestant evangelicalism, Ross' "antidote" to liberal–secular democracy in America, to the point of eventuating into or projecting a theocratic "tyranny," from New England's paleo-Puritan theocracy to Southern neo-Puritan bibliocracy. In this respect, Ross' warning of a theocratic Puritan "tyranny" in America is diagnostic of the past (Winthrop's *mixt aristocracie*) and predictive of subsequent developments and the future (the "Bible Belt").

Like Ross, later US religious conservatives explicitly or implicitly admit that the legacy or outcome of Puritanism has been to some extent nondemocratic, including what some call authoritarian conservatism (Dunn and Woodard 1996), in early and modern America. In general, most of them agree and celebrate that the Puritans of the seventeenth century, as a "Puritan Age," "more than any other early colonists, affected deeply the national character in later times" (Foerster 1962:2), specifically American conservative values. Thus, some US neoconservatives, noting that Puritanism "was the dominant political and intellectual force" in America during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, approvingly state that John Winthrop and other early Puritans "stamped the nation with a set of conservative values which emphasized respect for the established order, leadership by the favored few, the importance of community, and a preference for gradual change"[3] (Dunn and Woodard 1996:84). They thus suggest that Puritanism "stamped" America with the legacy of authoritarian conservatism (exemplified by Alexander Hamilton's "brand"), including rigid traditionalism and conformity ("respect for the established order"), hierarchy, oligarchy, or aristocracy ("leadership by the favored few"), so antiegalitarianism and the like. Moreover, this link is described as a "direct parentage" between the American religious tradition of Puritanism and the political legacy of conservatism and authoritarianism (Dunn and Woodard 1996:120). Overall, US conservatives admit or celebrate the fact that American institutions and values "were influenced by Calvinism more than Deism, by the Reformation more than the Enlightenment, and by the [Puritan] revolution in England more than the revolution in France" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:84). In particular, the observation that

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[3] Dunn and Woodard (1996:84) claim that the "Puritans also gave the nation institutions like a written constitution, regular elections, and the secret ballot, and principles like the work ethic, the federalist principle, and the separation of church and state." This claim, first, contradicts their statement that Puritanism "stamped" America basically with authoritarian conservatism, including hierarchy and oligarchy. Second, it is historically questionable in view of Puritanism's "fortuitous" (Zaret 1989) links with democracy and liberalism in both old and New England, and instead its typical affinities with its authoritarian, theocratic and illiberal adversaries (Walzer 1963).

the Enlightenment became a "philosophical movement totally antithetical to the Calvinist world view that lay at the core of [old and] New England Puritanism" (Bremer 1995:225) consequently holds true less of early America than of Europe, including Great Britain (Zaret 1989).

If so, then the legacy of Puritan fundamentalism, radicalism, and theocracy, as well as antirationalism, antihumanism, and antiegalitarianism—briefly, actual or potential authoritarianism—has been stronger and more expansive and enduring in America's history than that of Western agnosticism, rationalism, humanism, democratic liberalism, secularism, and egalitarianism as promulgated by the Enlightenment and at least in part implemented by the French Revolution. Simply, Puritanism made and continues to remake American society more fundamentalist and religious (Lipset 1996), radical, and theocratic, just as more irrational, inhumane, antiegalitarian, nationalist ("patriotic") or ethnocentric,[4] and militarist (a supreme cause for celebration for US conservatives) than most Western societies, including Great Britain, where it has been less influential and even discredited. For example, some analysts observe that non or less Puritan Western societies, including Great Britain, "have managed more humane implementation of [drug] prohibition, indeed none have managed to create a regime as harsh as that in the United States" (Reuter 2005:1076). This outcome is as essentially the legacy or symptom of Puritan inhumanity and harshness, via the neoconservative "war on drugs" and other Draconian "tough-on-crime" laws and practices as part of neo-Puritan crusades against "sin" or ever-recurring culture-temperance wars (Wagner 1997).

Generally, recall, Puritanism plunged America during the late eighteenth into the evangelical Great Awakenings as antiliberal or counter-Enlightenment movements from New England to the rest of the country, while at the same time Western Europe ushering in and experiencing the age of liberalism, secularism, and Enlightenment. Further, in a historical déjà vu, at the start of the twenty-first century neo-Puritanism submerges America into another Great Awakening in the form of an evangelical antiliberal or counter-Enlightenment revival and neoconservative counterrevolution, while most Western societies, including Great Britain itself, instead are in the midst of further cultural–political liberalization, including secularization, so a new Enlightenment (Inglehart 2004). In this sense, through its perennial revivals Puritanism has placed America under the authoritarian regime of a sort of permanent or recurring, with some resistance or atypical interruptions like Paris-inspired Jefferson and his disciples, the New Deal, the 1960s, counter-Enlightenment and antiliberalism, while most Western societies ushering in and

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[4] Solnick and Hemenway (2005) imply that some expenditures in the US government budget are ethnocentric and triumphant a la the Reaganite "we are the best," if not nationalist, or prestige-seeking in comparative terms (i.e., positional). For example, they cite surveys indicating that "three-fourths of Americans said they thought it was important for the United States to be the leading country in the world in the exploration of space," while as regards military ("defense") spending, about "80 percent said that 'strengthening the U.S. military' was an important or a top priority" (Solnick and Hemenway 2005:150).

continuing the Enlightenment and liberalism, from the seventeenth and eighteenth to the twentieth and twenty-first century.

In particular, some analysts suggest that the Puritan authoritarian–conservative legacy in America is manifest in that Puritanism has been made or intruded "into virtually *any* kind of cultural problem plaguing American culture" (Gould 1996:216), notably moral–religious issues. This is another way to say that Puritanism, through its perennial moral–religious crusades against "sin" and "infidels," has produced a legacy of culture wars, contradictions, or conflicts raging and ever-intensifying in America's history and present, including Prohibition, the war on drugs, anti-birth-control (antiabortion) struggles, antialcohol, and other temperance campaigns, and the like. Reportedly, the main source and rationale of these wars on moral freedom consist in that the Manichaean spirit of American Puritanism, manifested in its "propensity to see political life in terms of all black and all white" (Lipset 1955:180), "laid the groundwork for a 'culture of contradictions' meant to distinguish America from its European counterparts subject to class struggles and the dialectic of history" (Gould 1996:216). This indicates that, first, culture wars are inherent, not incidental, to American Puritanism, so its immanent legacy, and second, they are Puritan ethnocentric functional substitutes or deflections of "un-American" class struggles in America. In general, "moderns," including liberals, secularists, humanists, and rationalists from Jefferson and Madison to their contemporary followers, are observed to find an "essential emptiness" in US Puritan roots[5] (Gould 1996:216). Further, this cultural emptiness is made even emptier, or filled in a perverse militant and violent manner, with permanent culture wars as "conflicts over issues that are rooted in nonnegotiable conceptions of cultural and moral order" (Mouw and Sobel 2001:915). Such essential emptiness, further emptied (or filled) with Puritan culture wars, epitomizes what some analysts call the "cultural legacy" of colonial Puritanism in American society (Hudson and Coukos 2005).

Notably, sociological analyses suggest that a salient form of Puritanism's authoritarian legacy incorporates religious fundamentalism and radicalism, including theocratic tendencies, manifested in a weak or even lacking societal differentiation between religion and politics, or a sociological separation of church and state, which grounds and rationalizes moral absolutism and oppression. As observed, religion and polity in America "are not purely differentiated," notably politics is not yet released from "religious tutelage," even while ushering in the twenty-first century, and instead a "normative ideal rooted" in Puritanism or Protestant sectarianism remains a "generally binding goal" of American society as a whole (Munch 2001:228–229). Consequently, it is original Puritanism that has been primarily instrumental in and responsible for this, to use Weber's terms, substantive, or sociological *de*-differentiation between politics and religion in society,

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[5] Gould (1996:216) further comments that "yet Marxists themselves can find in Puritanism, via Max Weber, a nation of Protestant capitalists. Those opposed to patriarchy can locate in Puritan authority the roots of the Vietnam War. Or Puritan patriarchy can be reconstructed to stand for all of our contemporary fiscal, social, and military ills."

in spite or perhaps because of the formal—constitutional separation of church and state, in contemporary America. Hence, due to Puritanism, while having a formally secular state in respect of its official separation from church, contemporary America reportedly still lacks a "secularized society" (Archer 2001) in the sense of an essential differentiation between politics and religion in social life, more than two centuries after the presumably secular Revolution and four since its founding or New England's theocracy. Recall, observers find that in America "a formally secular state presides over a deeply religious society: a society from which religious issues continually emerge and seek to force themselves into the political arena," including prohibitionist struggles and anti-birth-control (abortion) crusades since the 1960s (Archer 2001:275). For example, contrary to the Enlightenment-based expectations or liberal perceptions of a secularized society in America, US conservative economists celebrate the fact that "American rates of church membership have actually risen throughout the past two centuries" (Iannaccone 1998:1466).

The above simply means that the legacy of Puritanism is that American society lacks a substantive or sociological, as distinguished from formal or legal, separation between religion or church and politics or state. Alternatively, it signifies that the formal separation between the two through a formally secular state in America is not a necessary and sufficient condition for their substantive differentiation or a secularized society, as the crucial achievement and legacy of the Enlightenment with its secularism and liberalism counteracting Puritanism, with neo-Puritanism condemning and attacking the former, as exemplified by Baptism, plus early Methodism rising in a counter-Enlightenment reaction. In this sense, the legacy of a sociological *de*-differentiation of politics and religion reflects or signals Puritanism's and other Protestant and Catholic conservatism's historical battles against and seeming victory over the Enlightenment and liberalism overall in American society. The battle seems to continue between theocratic Puritanism and its liberal adversaries in modern America, notably the South, in the form of a "recurring struggle between the inheritors of a Puritan Protestant tradition, which seeks to ensure that the state uses its authority to make the US a 'Godly' society, and a 'secular' coalition" (Archer 2001:275). The neo-Puritan or evangelical ideal of a Bible Belt, expanded from the new South to all America hence placed in the theocratic "shadow of Dixie" (Cochran 2001), provide a case in point perpetuated and even reinforced and expanded up to the twenty-first century.

The preceding confirms that Puritanism's heritage or influence in contemporary America is essentially theocratic and so undemocratic in terms of liberal–secular democracy an a free civil sphere of which the polar opposite and negation is precisely a "Godly," evangelical polity and society. It reaffirms not only that the formal separation of church and state by constitutional law in America is not equivalent to or enough for the substantive differentiation between religion and politics in society, contrary to prevailing opinions. It also suggests that the formal separation, just as any formality, may serve the function of what Simmel calls a compensatory substitute, as well as a simulacrum (Baudrillard 1999), safety

valve, deflection, "second best," or "consolation prize" for the substantive differ-
entiation or substance between religion and democratic politics. At this juncture,
remember that Massachusetts' Supreme Court in 1834 upheld the state's blas-
phemy law, while a lower convicted and imprisoned for publicizing a "lack of
belief in prayer, miracles, and Christ" (Hull 1999:46) some nonbelievers (e.g.,
the *Boston Investigator* editor), even though the Puritan religion had been for-
mally "disestablished" a year earlier. In another more recent and (in) famous case,
"Tennessee's anti-evolution act of 1925 outlawed the teaching of Darwinian the-
ory" (Hull 1999:48) leading to the "Monkey Trial," albeit church and state were
formally separated in the Bible Belt, including Jefferson's Virginia, from the time
of the American Revolution.

Further, as expected from its patterns of action in the past, ranging from theo-
cratic New England to the bibliocratic South, contemporary American Puritanism
attempts to abolish or subvert even the formal separation that it has never com-
pletely or wholeheartedly embraced, or if it has, mostly for strategic Machiavellian
reasons, notably the fear and disgust of non-Puritan, including Catholic and Angli-
can, theocracy or domination while being in opposition or, as to paraphrase Weber,
not strong enough. It particularly does so by its efforts to "ensure that the state
uses its authority to make the US a 'Godly' society" (Archer 2001:275). When
a formally secular state does precisely this, it effectively ceases to be "secular"
or neutral even in formal, let alone substantive, terms, but blends or allies itself
with "sacred" power, so results in theocracy. If so, then reflecting its distinctively
Puritan heritage, contemporary America may well lack not only a secularized so-
ciety, but even a formally secular state, as demonstrated at least by the Bible Belt
and its "Monkey" and other tragic–comic trials, rules and institutions (e.g., "dumb
laws," a special vice-police force on a crusade against sins like alcohol, drugs, etc.).
This demonstrates that its contemporary heirs, advocates, or guardians inherit and
perpetuate American Puritanism's "essential emptiness" emptying liberal–secular
democracy and free culture alike of their content.

While the aforesaid demonstrates a consistent historical pattern or outcome of
American Puritanism in favor of theocracy *cum* Godly" society and a crusade-
style attack against liberal–secular democracy and a free civil sphere, this Puritan
antisecular legacy in America is a sort of unique anomaly or pathology in compar-
ative terms. Observers find that even at the beginning of the twenty-first century
American social institutions are "more thoroughly penetrated by such a generally
binding morality, rooted in Puritanism yet generalized beyond it, than is [Europe]"
(Munch 2001:231), including Great Britain as the original Puritan sanctuary, just
as were in the seventeenth to eighteenth century in New England and the nine-
teenth century in the South after the Great Awakenings. Such findings confirm
that, first, not much substantively has changed in America in this respect from the
seventeenth to twenty-first century; second, the "first new nation" has become and
remained more Puritan, so actually fundamentalist and potentially theocratic, than
even the "old" decadent world of Europe that created and transmitted Puritanism
through Calvinism as the product of a French religious reformer from Geneva. This
is a typical historical case of Puritans as derivatives or disciples (e.g., Winthrop

et al.) becoming ever purer, more extreme, and authoritarian than their originals or theological teachers like Calvin.

In general, reportedly "in no other country did Puritanism attain significance comparable to [that] in the [US] as the carrier of modern normative culture" (Munch 2001:224). More precisely, as the above suggests, Puritanism has been and remains the theocratic–fundamentalist or antisecular and so authoritarian "carrier of modern normative culture" in America. In this role, American Puritanism has essentially dissolved, or threatened to do so, all secular culture into the servant or appendage of religion and God as the supreme master, including science (e.g., biology) to theology (creationism, intelligent design), just as did its enemy Catholicism during the Dark Middle Ages. If these times are precisely defined by such a religious–theological dissolution or destruction of secular culture, including science, education, philosophy, and art, contemporary Puritanism aims at and often succeeds in returning America to the Dark Middle Ages. Or rather, it aims and apparently succeeds to keep permanently the "new nation" in the "old" medieval times, since the latter have virtually never been "gone with the wind" or transcended primarily thanks to Puritanism's theocratic predominance (Lipset 1996) and the corresponding weakness of secularism and liberalism, including the Enlightenment, in America's history, up to, via neo-Puritan evangelicalism, the twenty-first century. Thus, due to Puritanism as the theocratic or antisecular "carrier of modern normative culture" in America ushering in the twenty-first century, it is observed that "whatever the scope of secular justifications, a strong belief in the sacred character of the [founding] principles has survived; American civil religion might have changed in its interpretation but has not dissolved and has not been replaced by a purely secular justification of social order" (Munch 2001:232). This is to restate that Americanism as a kind of American civil religion or pseudoreligious creed (Lipset 1996) has remained tied to Puritanism as its original source (Merton 1939) or even its purely religious equivalent (Gelernter 2005). It means that if Americanism, including nativism or nationalism, has been and remains a sort of religion or ideology akin to fascism and communism (Lipset 1955), and alternatively, it is not replaced or mitigated by secularism and liberalism, including pacifism, branded (for example, by McCarthyism and its disguised or mitigated sequel Reaganism) as "un-American," then this is primarily Puritanism's original effect and enduring legacy.

Hence, primarily owing to Puritanism, historically secularization "did not proceed in America to the same extent as in Europe although the Constitution [allowed] religious freedom and the separation between church and state" (Munch 2001:268–269). This especially holds true of what some sociologists describe as the "historical neutralization of religion" in Western Europe since the Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). Instead of such neutralization or secularization overall, in the wake of the American Revolution, a "peculiar civil religion emerged, which linked the generalized religious belief with the belief in the Constitution" (Munch 2001:269). Since this religious belief was and remained since in essence Puritan, originally in New England and then generalized beyond via the first Great Awakening, it was a link of Protestant Puritanism as a "pure," and Americanism as,

a "civil" religion, thus of antisecularism with ethnocentrism ("patriotism") to yield nativism (Merton 1939) or religious nationalism (Friedland 2002). To remember, in 1776, the very year of the American Revolution, no less than three-quarters of the American colonists were of "Puritan extraction" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:84; also Gelernter2005). At this juncture, among the first social analysts Comte describes the American revolution as "purely" Puritan-Protestant, specifically, in its origins, a "reproduction" of the Dutch revolution, in its "final realization" of the English which "it realizes as far as Protestantism [i.e. Puritanism] will allow." He thus implies that, first, the Dutch and English revolutions were Puritan (anti-Anglican in the second case) or generally Protestant and anti-Catholic; second, consequently, the American Revolution was a historical novelty neither in origin nor effect, or at least new in the latter sense owing to and to the extent of Puritanism's extremism ("as far as").

And, if secularization historically did not proceed in America to the same degree as in other Western societies, it, as comparative studies (Inglehart and Baker 2000) indicate, still does not and even has been in part reversed by various neo-Puritan trends to religious traditionalism or fundamentalism during the 1980s–2000s. So, contemporary Puritanism continues to "proudly" make and keep America an exceptional or "deviant case, having a much more traditional [religious] value system than any other advanced industrial society"[6] (Inglehart 2004:15), thus an exception or deviation from global secularization and liberalization, or secular and liberal democracy in the world, especially Western societies. Hence, to comprehend this seemingly incomprehensible and perennial American exceptionalism or backwardness in cultural–political secularization, notably America's actual or impending theocratic exception, exemplified by the "Bible Belt" deviation, from liberal–secular democracy and civil society, requires considering Puritanism and its antisecular and antiliberal legacy, influence, or reflex.

Sociological analyses also identify and stress such legacies and vestiges of Puritanism in especially contemporary America as political intolerance, aggressiveness, and extremism. Recall, some US sociologists (Lipset 1955) pinpoint Puritanism or "Protestant puritanical morality" with its Manichaean propensity as a major source of "American intolerance" in political and all social life. In this view, the legacy or vestige of this morality involves "sectarian bred propensities for crusades and the sectarian stress on personal morality" (Lipset 1996:176) by US contemporary moral–religious and other conservatives, thus continuing and reenacting proto-Puritan practices, e.g., Winthrop's and Cromwell's "holy" wars against the "sinful" and "infidels." Remember also the observation that US neoconservative politicians are "much more aggressive in imposing their own morality on

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[6] Inglehart (2004:5) finds that while data for most Western societies "support" the secularization theory, two "striking deviant cases" are neo-Puritan America and Catholic Ireland in virtue of "showing a much more religious outlook than their economic levels would predict." In particular, he infers that America "is not a prototype of cultural modernization for other societies to follow, as some postwar modernization writers assumed" (Inglehart 2004:15).

the body politic [and civil society] than their ideological compeers elsewhere" (Lipset 1996:293), just as have their Puritan ancestors in New England and beyond. This means that they are simply more rigid, extreme, and authoritarian or oppressive than others in Western societies, if not the world as a whole, perhaps minus their counterparts in countries like Islamic Iran and communist China ruled by their own brand of *non*-Calvinist Puritanism. For instance, some analysts place prominent political neoconservatives in America (Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich), as self-declared neo-Puritans (recall Reagan's admiration for Winthrop and his theocratic "shinning city upon a hill") or evangelicals with anachronistic Manichaean "black and white" worldviews and politics, into the "rigid category" of recent US politicians "notorious for being uncompromising" (Blomberg and Harrington 2000:605), and to that extent extremist.

Other analyses suggest that ethnocentrism, nationalism, bellicosity, imperialism, and militarism, including xenophobia, aggressive wars, and mass destruction, constitute instances of the authoritarian and nonhumanist legacy or influence of Puritanism in contemporary America as well as in part Great Britain. In this view, with its ethics "devoid of the norms of *caritas* and *compassion* that are in the lineage of the welfare state," Puritanism exhibits a "very dark side [as] a ubiquitous and insidious codeterminant of American and British bellicose but moralistic foreign policy, including various old and new manifestations of imperialism and aggressive use of 'smart' weapons of mass destruction against demonized non-Western settings" (Tiryakian 2002:1630). If so, this means that Puritanism continues to operate as a source of Americanism, including ethnocentrism and nativism, and even, despite its decline or discredit in Great Britain, of its earlier English equivalent claiming England to be a "chosen nation" (Gorski 2000:1453), and thus of religious nationalism as the prime mover and rationale for imperialism in both cases.

As even some US neoconservatives admit, if Americans are but "should not be ethnocentric" and think the American "way is better than others"[7] (Bloom

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[7] Bloom (1988:36) suggests that Americans, especially students, should "recognize that there are other ways of thinking and that Western ways are not better." While recognizing and admonishing against ethnocentrism, this suggestion commits a typical conservative conflation between "American" and "Western" European as if they were completely identical and interchangeable. Specifically, it overlooks that "American" is more defined by Puritanism and social conservatism (Dunn and Woodard 1996), and "Western" by secularism and liberalism, notably by the Enlightenment as the key differentiating factor in this respect. At best, overlooked is that "American" is just a special case of "Western" (or West-European, if one wishes). Also, Bloom (1988:34) remarks that "young Americans have less and less knowledge of and interest in foreign places [which] means we do not need others. No longer is there a hope that there are great wise men in other places and times who reveal the truth about life." Yet, this fails or refuses to associate these ethnocentric tendencies to neo-Puritan fundamentalism or social conservatism overall and instead blames "liberalism" for them! Overall, most US conservatives overlook or even celebrate the fact that Puritanism or Protestant conservatism has made Americans probably the most ethnocentric or nationalistic ("patriotic") among Western societies, as indicated by comparative analyses (Friedland 2001; Inglehart 2004; Lipset 1996). So do they, perhaps in accordance with the

1988:30), this is primarily (but not solely) the legacy of Puritanism as the historical source or religious equivalent of Americanism, including nativism and ethnocentrism, as Merton and others suggest. In particular, contemporary Puritans or evangelicals such as Southern Baptists are reportedly ardent "religious nationalists," "resolutely nationalist" (Friedland 2002:387) in the belief that America has a God-given "special role" in the world and so Divine Rights to global mastery, domination ("empire of liberty"), and permanent war on "evil," just as were their ancestors in old and New England. In this view, in consequence of the transient or permanent domination of Puritanism respectively, both Cromwell's England and Winthrop et al.'s America were founded or driven by "religious nationalisms" (Friedland 2002:413) by contrast to most non-Puritan counties like France. Hence, Puritan nationalism makes a national society an abomination or "parody of the human society" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). In comparative terms, primarily as the legacy of Puritanism, at the start of the twenty-first century America remains with a sort of vengeance or defiance both the most traditionally religious or nonsecular and nationalist or "patriotic" society among Western societies, thus resembling more underdeveloped than developed societies. Hence, this religion-based traditionalism and nationalism, rather than, as US conservatives ethnocentrically claim, "liberty" or "democracy," defines and perpetuates the "phenomenon of American Exceptionalism"[8] (Inglehart 2004).

Generally, these analyses suggest that fully understanding contemporary ethnocentrism, nationalism, militancy, imperialism, and militarism in America under neoconservatism and to a lesser extent Great Britain requires taking into consideration the historical and modern impact of Puritanism in these countries, so incorporating these tendencies in the Puritan authoritarian and nonhumanist legacy.

ignorance-bliss conservative equation, the fact that it has transformed American students (and adults) into the probably most ignorant—and perhaps consequently arrogant—within the West and even beyond, as also indicated by international student test scores and casual observations. Reportedly, US students are "at the bottom of all international comparisons of education" (from mathematics and geometry to geography and cultural studies) despite or rather because of Puritan-style "chauvinistic reassurances" (Lamm 1993:60). Moreover, according to some comparative surveys (e.g., International Adult Literacy Survey), 50% of Americans posses low literacy skills (compared with, for example, 25% of Swedes). In particular, American students' (and many adults') sheer ignorance of or disdain for other cultures, societies, or countries is proverbial or legendary, extraordinary, and unrivaled within Western societies and beyond, primarily due to Puritanism and its conservative legacy and influence in the US educational system. If Colley is right in stating that ethnocentrism is the matter of a lack of knowledge, then this amounts to a sort of Puritan-conservative "virtuous" circle of ethnocentrism or nationalism and ignorance. Namely, the Puritan-conservative induced and celebrated ignorance of the world beyond America—i.e., anything non or un-American—breeds ethnocentrism as a nationalist and aggressive version of the Freudian complex of superiority or collective orgy of arrogance a la Reagan's slogan "we are the best," then religious nationalism or arrogant nativism reinforces and sustains the ignorance-cum-bliss heaven, and so on.

[8] Inglehart (2004:15) finds that on secularism and rationalism, America "ranks far below other rich societies, with levels of religiosity and national pride comparable to those found in some developing societies."

Alternatively, they implicitly predict that so long as Puritanism continues to exert such an influence, these and related authoritarian tendencies will result in and display various manifestations and intensities. An expected case in point is neoconservative nationalism or triumphant Americanism (Bell 2002) with self-assigned Divine Rights to the total mastery of the world and another "American century," as well as its British counterparts, as evidenced by the joint war on terror and the "axis of evil" (e.g., the invasion of Iraq) during the 2000s. As other observers imply, neo-Puritanism via Americanism and neoconservatism generates and predicts America's hegemony, imperialism, and triumphal illusionism (Baudrillard 1999); alternatively, the "end of the American [neo-conservative] empire" (Baudrillard 1994:50) is not to be expected without the demise or discredit, like in Great Britain, of Puritanism and its legacy in social ideas, values, and institutions. The reminder of the chapter identifies and analyzes some other pertinent elements of Puritanism's authoritarian legacy in contemporary, especially American, society.

Elements of the Puritan Authoritarian Legacy

Most salient elements or dimensions of Puritanism's, especially sociocultural, authoritarian legacy can be classified into the following: moral and political repression, religious and political extremism, cultural repression and regression, and antihumanism (see Table 6.1.).

Moral and Political Repression

Perhaps the most manifest, intense, and best known particular element or dimension of the authoritarian legacy of Puritanism in contemporary, especially American, society is moral as well as political repression as a facet of its social authoritarianism. Consequently or alternatively, reportedly the "rebellion against Puritan repression is still part of our own experience" (Walzer 1963:79). In particular, Puritan repression, just as the rebellion against it, still is part and parcel of American society, notably its Southern "Bible Belt," at the start of the twenty-first century, just as has been historically since New England Puritanism through the evangelical Great Awakenings and to Puritanical Prohibition and beyond.

Thus, some analyses find that "controversial social issues" in contemporary, just as in historical, America "are rooted in a cultural genealogy of Puritanism"

TABLE 6.1. Elements of Puritanism's authoritarian legacy in contemporary Western society.

Moral and political repression
Religious and political extremism
Culture repression and regression
Pervasive antihumanism
Others: traditionalism, antimodernism, etc.

(Gould 1996:215), as are bellicose foreign policy, nationalism, xenophobia,[9] and militarism, including exorbitant military spending. Alternatively, contemporary American Puritanism or evangelicalism emphasizes and forces such controversial and divisive social issues into the political arena and civil society. For instance, the US presidential and congressional elections during the 2000s (e.g., 2000 and 2004) mostly revolved around and were decided by the candidates' rigid puritanical positions on divisive social matters, including "decency and morality," religion and God, "family values," and the like, evidently "rooted in a cultural genealogy" of American Puritanism. In fact, the latter in the generalized form of Protestant evangelicalism essentially selected and forced these moral–social problems into the (especially presidential) elections and politics overall. This indicates that Puritanism continues to pervade and even dominate contemporary American politics ushering in the twenty-first century, in particular, remaining a virtually "winning card" in elections. For instance, a puritanical stance on the "war on drugs," not mention the "war on terror" and the "axis of evil," and other temperance or culture wars[10] (e.g., abortion, alcohol, religion in schools, the traditional family), disguised as "tough-on-crime" conservative policies, almost invariably has greater chances for success in elections and US politics overall than the opposite moderate, secular, or liberal views. At this juncture, Puritanism remains not only America's cultural genealogy but a critical factor and legacy in contemporary US politics and civil society. As expected, a particular element or vestige of its cultural genealogy in America is what some analysts describe as "sexual and psychological repression," suggesting that "Americans could actually enjoy themselves and live healthier lives if it were not for the bane of their New England heritage" (Gould 1996:215).

In comparative terms, "sexual and psychological," like general Puritan, repression has usually been and remains more manifest and intense in America than other Western or European societies, including Great Britain. Predictably, this

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[9] Even the pro-American *Economist* (February 23, 2006) laments that "xenophobia [and protectionism] seems to be creeping into American politics" dominated by neo-conservatism, including neo-Puritan religious fundamentalism. Specifically, the *Economist* comments that "last year [2005], Congress saw off the yellow peril from China, whose CNOOC oil company dared to bid for America's Unocal (though most of Unocal's oil and gas reserves happened to be outside America). Now it is the Arabs—for which read terrorists—who are threatening to imperil America's national security by taking over some of its ports. [Yet] The employees will continue to be unionised (and presumably patriotic) American citizens." The *Economist* concludes that "alas, America's politicians seem to be in no mood to discuss this issue rationally." This especially holds true of xenophobic US conservatives or neo-Puritan religious fundamentalists, as distinguished from Catholics as well as mainstream, liberal Protestanst like Episcopals, Presbyterians and (many) Methodists, as less prone to xenophobia or hostile nativism.

[10] The proconservative *Economist* (May 26, 2005) comments that in America during the 2000s the "polarisation of politics along religious lines is deepening by the day." Further, it predicts that America's "wars of religion" between neo-Puritan (and other Christian) conservatives and secularists "are only going to intensify" and "will get a lot nastier before any long-lasting peace can be declared—if ever." In particular, the *Economist* suggests "just wait for the next Supreme Court ruling on abortion."

difference is the particular consequence of the comparatively greater historical and persisting influence and legacy of Puritanism in the "new" than in the "old" world, though the latter was its creator via Calvinism. Admittedly, US Puritan history or legacy determines American's "cultural shame, our inability to fulfill a Continental European freedom about which we fantasize most vocally over drinks at cocktail parties when the subject turns mellifluously to what's wrong with America today" (Gould 1996:215). This confirms that the cultural genealogy or social–political legacy of Puritanism in America is not or less individual freedom and democracy, as often naively supposed, but rather or more moral and other repression, thus religiously sanctified or near-theocratic authoritarianism—i.e., the morally most repressive, coercive, and intolerant society at least within the Western world.

This theocratic authoritarianism consequently generates a sort of endemic anti-Puritan rebellion, as happened during the 1960s, which seems to be the stronger, the more intense and extensive Puritan repression is (perhaps a variation on the "forbidden apple" Biblical theme) in America. For example, observers remark that in New York and elsewhere in America during the 1960s-1970s Puritanism was "under attack" due to its feature and legacy of "social oppression" (Goldfarb 1980:631). This anti-Puritan rebellion or liberalization indicates that at least some Americans want to "actually enjoy themselves" rather than live like ascetic monks in a holy "community of saints" defined by Mises' "peace of the cemetery," as exemplified by Southern sleepy and deadlike towns and cities as cultural deserts or wastelands (Baudrillard 1999). This holds true in general, despite the "blind persistence" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) and salience of what other observes call the American "Puritan national imaginary not yet willing to relinquish its Oedipal taboos against pleasure and disobedience" (King and Murphet 2002:199). Conversely, the stronger anti-Puritan rebellion or liberalization is, Puritan repression tends to be ever-more intense and extensive in typical and vehement counterreaction to social liberal changes from the Renaissance and the Enlightenment to recent times. This is indicated by the neo-Puritan or neoconservative virulent reaction to and reversal of the perceived nonpuritanical or liberal–secular "permissive" and "ungodly" 1960s in America, which forms a seemingly unending circle of actions, reactions, and counteractions.

The above helps explain why both opposite types of behavior (e.g., drug use, drinking binge and sexual license, just as their Puritan suppressions) are typically more extreme, including violent, in America than other Western societies, including Great Britain, with no or weakened cultural genealogy of Puritanism. This redefines Puritanism's comparatively paradoxical or ambiguous cultural genealogy and legacy in modern America: both Puritan moral and other repression and anti-Puritan rebellion or liberation are more extensive and intense than in other non- or less-Puritanical societies like Europe and Great Britain, which identifies a salient though overlooked facet of American exceptionalism. Thus, some sociologists observe that repressive–permissive and religious–secular "ambiguities" in America, including their mutual reactions or reinforcements, "are related to those intrinsic to American Puritan culture" (Tiryakian 1975:31).

Yet, Puritan moral repression as a crusade-style war on the "evil" of individual freedom in morality has typically (but not always) been and continues to be victorious over anti-Puritan rebellion or liberation in America, or more so than in other comparable countries like Great Britain. Consequently, the "rebellion against Puritan repression is still part" of modern American life, a sort of "unfinished business" or uncompleted and always reversible revolution, despite the revolutionary liberalization of the 1960s, in America. By contrast, this rebellion appears to be largely victorious, completed, and irreversible in Great Britain and Europe by the 2000s, as indicated by the decline or discredit of Puritanism in these societies. This yields the prediction: the more neo-Puritan repression in America expands and intensifies, the more anti-Puritan rebellion or liberalization will also be extensive and intense, and conversely, these reactions will reintensify repressive reactions trying to reverse such a liberal revolution and social change. By contrast, in other Western societies the opposite scenario is likely and in part already realized. Puritan repression will become (is) progressively weaker and narrower, so will (is) anti-Puritan rebellion, as the latter will have (has) virtually no (Europe) or marginalized Puritanism (Great Britain) to rebel against, as indicated or predicted by recent studies (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Overall, both Puritan moral repression and anti-Puritan rebellion or liberation (will) continue and mutually reinforce in America at the present or future, while weakening and perhaps eventually vanishing in comparable societies with a weaker cultural genealogy of Puritanism like Great Britain and Europe. This confirms that the legacy of Puritanism is more repressive, so coercive and authoritarian, in America than any other "Puritan" society, including Great Britain, not to mention Europe. As some American analysts bluntly put it, "search the Western world and you will find no other nation similarly obsessed [with moral repression]. Europeans often view the US as a nation of lunatics" (Higgs 1998:473).

No wonder, these analysts pose the question "Why do so many Americans favor the use of coercive sanctions to enforce repression?," and suggest that the "answer lies" in Puritanism (Higgs 1998:470), mixed with various other related authoritarian factors in US history. Here, repressive Puritanism includes both the early New England Puritans or the glorified Pilgrim Fathers and their counterparts and successors like Quakers, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists or a "whole range of evangelical Protestants."[11] In this view, given these Puritans' dispositions for repression and coercion, "it is unfortunate that they exerted an immense and lasting influence on American social and political affairs (such that) even today, ghosts of the Pilgrim Fathers haunt the land" (Higgs 1998:470). Of course, what was Puritanism in New England during the seventeenth to nineteenth century is in America, notably the Bible Belt, in the twenty-first century "evangelical Protestantism," including Baptism and in part Methodism, apparently trying to resurrect

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[11] Higgs (1998:470) remarks that Puritanism's "central themes recur in the related religious communities of Quakers, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, and a whole range of evangelical Protestants," and it "established what was arguably the central strand of American cultural life" until the twentieth century.

and immortalize the "ghosts" of the early Puritans. Arguably, "no matter how horrible the consequences, the desire to butt into other people's personal affairs, employing the police and even the military as agents, is deeply ingrained in the American national character" (Higgs 1998:470). In turn, this desire is primarily the outcome or legacy of Puritanism or Calvinism with its "apple pie authoritarianism" (Wagner 1997) manifest in repression that is sugar-coated as "all-American" versus "foreign" or wrapped up as America's "superior" and "universal" values and institutions.

In retrospect, reportedly "notwithstanding its changing forms and temporal fluctuations, the penchant for acting as self-righteous busybodies has animated the bourgeoisie of this country ever since the Pilgrims set foot on Plymouth Rock in 1620" (Higgs 1998:473). This long-standing history confirms that, contrary to the conventional wisdom or beloved myth of Pilgrim-Puritanism as "libertarian," that the English Pilgrims did not intend or succeed to establish religious liberty and political democracy in America, as commonly and naively assumed, but repression and theocracy masked as a free "Biblical commonwealth" and "republic," not the "land of freedom, justice and opportunity," but of tyranny by either the majority or the minority, inequality, and exclusion, with Winthrop's oligarchic–theocratic *mixed aristocracie* as a prototype or model to be emulated ever since.

In prospect, the history of Puritan moral–political repression since the Pilgrims is predicted to repeat itself virtually endlessly, thus perpetuating the authoritarian genesis or legacy of Puritanism in America. Namely, "because it provides an irresistible opportunity for politicians to promote their own interests at public expense, one must expect that we Americans are doomed to an endless procession of costly, futile, and destructive crusades" (Higgs 1998:473). For example, this includes what analysts identify as "moral censoring" of American television[12]

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[12] "Moral censoring," the "strain of Puritanism," and the "practice of despotism" overall are observed in American television as a whole, but especially its network system. For example, during the 2000s *Fox* has probably become a leader or prominent new-comer in this regard, closely followed and emulated by NBC as a sort of perennial champion or contender for the crown of Puritan moralism and authoritarianism, including nationalism, militarism, and imperialism. In particular, NBC Puritan-inspired nationalism *cum* Americanism has been its defining fixture for long periodically culminating perhaps in benign or grotesque form during the Olympic games and in a more sinister shape in the war on terror and the "axis of evil" (e.g., the invasion of Iraq). As a seemingly trivial, yet potentially sinister, symptom of obsessive Americanism, for example NBC refused to show an incident during the traditional Thanksgiving parade in New York in the seeming belief that such incidents or imperfections (e.g., falling balloons injuring some spectators) are "un-American" and their broadcast "unpatriotic." Such are apparently the tragic–comic perversities of the assumed mantle of NBC and other network television (with the partial and occasional exception of CBS) as the voice of Puritan-based moralism and authoritarianism, notably nationalism or Americanism, militarism and imperialism, as dramatically witnessed by the US media playing joyful cheer-leaders during the war on terror and "evil" (especially prior to and the first stage of the invasion of Iraq). An aspect of this nationalism is that, as Smelser (1997:61) suggests, the US media, by being "culturally homogenizing," tend to suppress or "tame" cultural and ideological–political diversity, and to that extent serve as the instrument of

(Singh 2002:221) with its typical "strain of Puritanism" (Kann 1994) and the general "practice of despotism" (Baudrillard 1999:204).

If the preceding is correct, then theologically, Puritanism has "doomed" Americans to destructive crusades probably or indirectly in virtue of its Calvinist dogma of predestination, albeit formally rejected by Baptism, that humans are "tools of the Divine Will" and so destined to a sort of moral–religious "holy" war and terror for, as Cromwell put it, God's glory and against "sin," "evil," and "infidels." Politically, it has so by persisting in its original vision of a pure or diluted theocracy in the form of a repressive "Holy Commonwealth," "Community of Saints," or "Bible Belt," in which self-destructive, sado-masochistic crusades or culture wars are Puritan preferred and enjoyed pastimes. These enduring tendencies reaffirm how little, if anything, has changed substantively from Cromwell–Winthrop's proto-Puritan holy wars and terror against "sin," "evil," "Satan," "infidels" and "witches" in seventeenth century old and New England to neo-Puritan evangelical or neoconservative moralist–political and military–imperialist crusades, including the war on drugs, terror, and the "axis of evil," in America at the start of the twenty-first century—simply almost "nothing under the authoritarian sun" of American Puritanism.

Thus, some analysts observe that during the 1980s–2000s religious and other social US movements like the Christian Right and violent militias are "unique" neo-Puritan evangelical or neoconservative reactions to what they perceive as the "alienating effects" of modern society (Pichardo 1997:413). Notably, these neo-Puritan movements, just as their paleo-Puritan or old-conservative precedents during of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, can be considered "attempts by religious groups to coerce the state to enforce behavioral and moral codes consistent with their beliefs"[13] (Pichardo 1997:426–427). They hence simply continue and extend Puritan moral—political repression, thus perpetuating the authoritarian legacy of

neo-Puritanism or neoconservatism with its hostility toward multiculturalism, and consequently as the "practice of despotism."

[13] Pichardo (1997:426) states that contemporary fundamentalist or conservative mobilizations in America "are also reacting to the actions of governments to control the civic sphere [i.e.] the process of government intrusion into the civic sphere. The religious values that underpin the ideological structure of many conservative movements must be seen as an additional source of friction that has always resided in and traditionally dominated the civic sphere." One can add that these reactions apply only to the actions of a liberal and secular, as opposed to conservative and theocentric, government, including a welfare-state, i.e., when religious fundamentalists or political conservatives are in opposition or marginal, but not in the opposite case. Alternatively, as Comte implies and expects, when instead in power or dominant, these groups typically try to "control the civic sphere" through "government intrusion," including "violent repression." Hence, they are better described as fundamentalist–conservative reactions and oppositions to liberal–secular government's increasingly reduced control or intrusion of civil society, thus to the formal separation of church and state, demanding and practicing instead its increase and reinforcement. Simply, US neo-Puritans and political neoconservatives are against such government control or intrusion solely when they themselves do not exercise it, but rather their secular and liberal adversaries condemned as embodiments of "evil" and "un-American" values.

Puritanism, in America into the twenty-first century and perhaps beyond. Such repressive tendencies confirm that both the old and new American Puritanism tend to openly or covertly oppose, subvert, or undermine the formal–constitutional separation, let alone the substantive–sociological differentiation, between religion and politics. If with the constitutional separation of church and state in the late eighteenth century America's Puritan and other religious groups "lost their state-sanctioned privileged position within the civic sphere" (Pichardo 1997:426), its ever-continuing attempts at government repression indicate that Puritanism has not fully or wholeheartedly but partially, reluctantly, or tactically embraced and reconciled with this act and thus secular–liberal democracy.

Another particular element or form of Puritan moral repression is a repressive and otherwise authoritarian family structure. A repressive family structure is typically, though not only, observed in those societies or regions where Puritanism has been and remained strong or dominant, or more so than in others, and to that extent can be deemed its authoritarian effect, legacy or vestige. In general, as Weber observes, in early Puritanism and Calvinism religious grace or salvation could be determined "especially by comparing the condition of one's own soul with that of the elect, for instance the patriarchs." In particular, recollect the salience of the "socially exclusive" Puritan (e.g., Presbyterian) concept of the "godly householder" in early England and America (Ashton 1965). Also, recall in both old and New England the early Puritan patriarchal family constituted an "institution for disciplining and repressing naturally wicked" (Walzer 1963:85), especially children, as the masters–patriarchs "imposed a rigid discipline upon themselves and their families" (Bremer 1995:23). Further, some studies find that even in the mid-twentieth century American family structure or ideology remained "predominantly Puritan" (Folsom 1948:424), specifically traditionalist and patriarchal, and consequently more or less repressive and authoritarian. And within America itself, this is particularly observed in the South where Protestant Puritanism "remained strong in rural communities" (Vance 1948:426), as well as the agricultural Middle West also painted with the "strong motif of Puritanism," just as was in New England before (Elliott 1944:188). As for the latter, for example, early New England's Puritan families had "often ten or twelve, sometimes over twenty" children (Foerster 1962:5), as almost have their contemporary evangelical descendents or proxies (e.g., Southern Baptists, Mormons) featuring the highest fertility rates among Protestant denominations in America—just as, for that mater, their Islamic counterparts in both Moslim and non-Moslim countries—thus exhibiting a traditionalist, usually patriarchal, and authoritarian family structure.

Overall, data (Hout et al. 2001) indicate that contemporary Puritan or evangelical families in America have significantly higher birth rates and population growth, attributes also shared with traditional and modern Islam, and so to that extent are more traditionalist or patriarchal and authoritarian than others. As Weber comments, early Puritans regarded reproduction and so the family as the "means willed by God to the increase of His glory according to the commandment, 'Be fruitful and multiply'," citing Baxter's idea of the "sober procreation of children," just as did traditional and do modern Muslim prophets and families. In turn, the

typical Puritan repressive master–patriarch is a family equivalent, basis or complement of the Puritan theocrat–aristocrat a la Winthrop et al.; recall New England's Bible Commonwealth was a patriarchal theocracy or theocratic patriarchy "modeled on the Old Testament patriarchs" (Gould 1996:40). In this sense, Puritan familial patriarchy and societal theocracy effectively complement, reinforce, and even presuppose each other. If so, then Puritanism's legacy has been, aside from comparatively, within Protestantism, the highest birthrates and population growth, what Durkheim would call domestic repression and authoritarianism, grounding or complementing a repressive authoritarian society, as indicated by the intimate link of Puritan patriarchy and theocracy.

In comparative terms, repressive family and social structures or institutions are usually more prevalent in those societies where Puritanism has been and continues to be dominant than others, for example, more in America than Europe, including Great Britain. Thus, some analysts find that America has been and remained in the last quarter of the twentieth century an "exceedingly puritanical society," and as a result of this legacy "compared with, say, Sweden and England, has lagged very much in nonpunitive attitudes towards atypical sexual practices" (Miller 1975:27). This means that, alternatively, Puritanism's legacy is America as a sort of "leader," "vanguard," or "outlier" in coercive attitudes and policies toward such and related private behaviors, so in coercion and moral repression within contemporary Western societies. In this view, while US cultural, including familial, practices during much of the twentieth century (1925–1975) have been "catching up" with their rapid change in most Western countries, when the American "situation of 1975 is compared with the Swedish situation of 1960, the changes are much smaller" (Miller 1975:27). They have probably become progressively smaller, given the US neo-Puritan and neoconservative vehement backlash or counterrevolution against and even eventual reversal of the cultural and political liberalization of the 1960s, when comparing America in this respect during the 2000s with Sweden as well as Great Britain and Europe overall in the same period or before like the 1980s–1990s. This neo-Puritan repressive backlash and reversal confirms that in America, by contrast to most Western societies, the liberal "shift toward greater permissiveness is reversible [with] swings in the mass public acceptability of countercultural practices" (Miller 1975:27), as has historically been, owing crucially to the irrational, almost "blind persistence" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) of Puritanism.

Hence, to suggest that the "anachronisms of Puritanism have been overwhelmed" (Miller 1975:27) in contemporary Western societies since the 1960s holds true primarily, enduringly, or irreversibly of Europe, including even Great Britain, only secondarily, temporarily, and reversibly of America due to its stronger institutional Puritan legacy and counteraction *cum* permanent revolution (e.g., the US fundamentalist–conservative counterrevolution during the 1980s–2000s). This is another way to say that anti-Puritan rebellion or liberal revolution seeking to overwhelm or neutralize these Puritan anachronisms has been successful, nearly complete, and irreversible in Western and most Eastern European societies, with some minor exceptions or nuisances (e.g., Catholic Ireland and

Poland), but partial, incomplete, and reversible in America in consequence of this comparatively exceptional Puritan inheritance and resistance. This yields the inference that the "principal source of irrationality and authoritarianism" in America during the late twentieth century and even the early twenty-first century still "springs" (Miller 1975:27) from Puritan attitudes, feelings, and practices, including moral repression, anti-intellectual, and xenophobic prejudices.

The above suggests that to better understand and explain this persisting and even ever-intensifying, as since the 1980s, social authoritarianism and irrationality in modern American society presupposes considering the unparalleled "blind persistence" and intensification of Puritanism's "anachronisms" in America's values, institutions, and policies compared with other Western countries. Particularly, understanding persistent and ever-more intense moral repression and coercion in America, including the reversal of the shift toward greater individual freedom denounced as "permissiveness" in morality and all private life, demands taking account of that, as analysts note, "from the underlying cultural system of Puritanism [American] institutional life and values have emerged" and hence that the "depth" of Puritan legacy permeating America is impressive and even unprecedented and unrivaled by any other country (Tiryakian 1975:30).

In this view, generally, Puritanism is of the "utmost importance" for sociological analyses of America's modernization and modernity, which has many common elements with Western Europe yet also a "specificity" primarily consisting in or derived from the "distinct, paramount cultural system" of American Puritanism (Tiryakian 1975:30). As hinted, such a specificity consists in that modernization or modernity in America has been and remains, primarily owing to the influence or legacy of the cultural system of Puritanism, less "modern" or liberal, rationalist and secular, and more traditionalist or conservative, irrational, and religious than that in Western societies where it was relatively weaker, superseded, and overwhelmed as in Europe (notably France) or counterbalanced, as in Great Britain, by its liberal–secular and rationalist opposite in the form of the Enlightenment. This is precisely what recent studies (Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and Baker 2000; suggest by finding that at the end of the twentieth and the start of the twenty-first century America continues to be, largely due to its Puritan–Protestant heritage or path-dependence, a "deviant" in cultural modernization, liberalization, rationalization, and secularization, and alternatively a sort of model and leader in traditionalism, conservatism, irrationalism, and religiosity, within modern Western society, as has usually been in the past. Such a historical and continuing specifity or deviation of America compared with the West as a whole means that "American" and "Western" history and modernity are not substantively identical or that the first is only a special case of the second—contrary to neoconservatives' penchant to equate or ethnocentrically reduce "Western" to "American"—precisely as an effect of Puritanism's differential cultural importance or legacy compared to the secular Enlightenment in these societies. In short, these societies are different at least because Puritanism has historically been and remains stronger, and the Enlightenment or secularism weaker, in America than Western Europe, including the once-Puritan Great Britain. If, as Weber suggests, the "ability to free oneself from

the common tradition [is] a sort of liberal enlightenment," by virtue of making or keeping America a Western model and "leader" in religious and all cultural traditionalism Puritanism effectively precludes or counteracts such enlightening in the "new" and "most modern" nation compared to the disdained "old," "traditional," and "decadent" world of Europe.

And if Puritanism has historically been more powerful and extreme in America due to the absence or weakness of tempering and counterbalancing forces like Anglicanism after the US Revolution, and the Enlightenment in Great Britain and Europe, the same can *mutatis mutandis* be said of the stronger and more radical Puritan heritage or influence in American than in other Western societies. Thus if the authoritarian–irrational "anachronisms of Puritanism have been overwhelmed" in Europe by the 2000s, but not, or only partly and reversibly, in America, then this is primarily consequent to nonexistent or weak countervailing anti-Puritan forces, notably Enlightenment-based liberal, rationalist, intellectual, and secular values, in the latter. This is what is suggested by the observation that "highly repressive" attitudes and practices or ambiguities in this regard historically found and persisting in America are rooted in or correspond to "American Puritan culture" (Tiryakian 1975:31). In sum, so long as Puritan repressive, authoritarian and other anachronisms are not yet "overwhelmed" but sustained, even resurrected and reinforced from the "dead" like "born-again" evangelicals in America, this is because Puritanism, in the absence or weakness of liberalism and secularism, "remains— even if only marginally visible—the cultural roots of American society" (Tiryakian 1975:31). No wonder, US fundamentalists claim a sort of "custodial relationship"[14] (Smith 2000:131) of Puritanism or evangelicalism as a whole to American culture and society.

The preceding yields the prediction that so long as Puritanism persists as the primary cultural root or legacy of American society, Puritan moral–political repression will continue, as will in consequence anti-Puritan rebellion eliciting in turn further repressive actions, in a circle of Veblenian cumulative causation and reciprocal reinforcement of oppression and liberation or "permission" condemned by US religious neoconservatives. In short, this is the expectation of more evangelical– secular, conservative–liberal crusades or culture wars, characterized precisely by this mutually reinforcing pattern of Puritan repression and anti-Puritan rebellion, in America in the future. Notably, it predicts that Puritan repression will continue to be paramount, enduring, and irreversible, alternatively anti-Puritan rebellion subsidiary, transient, and reversible, so long as Puritanism retains its predominant place and heritage in American society, including culture and politics, plus economy. In particular, this expects that US evangelicals–conservatives will keep prevailing in initiative, warriors and weapons like resources and media, and outcomes, or being victorious, over their secular–liberal opponents in America's never-ending culture wars for the foreseeable future.

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[14] Smith (2000:131) adds that neo-Puritan evangelicals "think that the presence of Christians in public institutions in itself provides a preserving effect ('salt and light,' in evangelical code) on American culture and society."

At this juncture, the legacy of Puritanism is making the future of America in the twenty-first century a mere replica of the past, viz. New England of the seventeenth to nineteenth century, so the lives of Americans the reenactment or replay of those of the dead Puritan saints (e.g., Winthrop et al.), in respect of moral repression via perennial culture wars as Puritan-inspired crusades against "sin," evil," and "infidels." In short, the news, rumors, or expectation of the end of Puritan oppression in America, and consequently anti-Puritan rebellion, are and will remain "grossly exaggerated" or premature so long as are those of the "death" of Puritanism during the 2000s. Alternatively, the observed or envisioned "terminal condition" of Puritanism and its originator Calvinism in most Western societies, including Great Britain, not to mention Europe (e.g., Holland, Switzerland), results in and predicts the end or tempering of both Puritan oppression and anti-Puritan rebellion in these countries. In comparative terms, Puritanism evidently continues and will likely continue to make America a truly "exceptional nation" within Western societies in respect with the persistence and intensity of Puritan moral–political oppression as well as its consequent anti-Puritan rebellion. It seems as if ever-more exciting times lie ahead for US neo-Puritan or neoconservative moral–religious crusaders, and in consequence for anti-Puritan rebels and dissenters, as Puritanism's repressive anachronisms are both reenacted and opposed via a circle of pro- and counter-Puritan revolutions at the exceptional stage of American society in the early twenty-first century.

Religious and Political Extremism

As hinted, another salient element of Puritanism's authoritarian legacy or vestige in modern, especially American, society consists of religious–political extremism and authoritarianism. This extremism in turn incorporates extreme or authoritarian conservatism, intolerance, coercion, and "holy" wars in the sphere of religion, moralist–religious obsession, theocracy, and the like.

First, Puritanism's heritage just as original attribute has been extreme or authoritarian religious–moral and other cultural conservatism, especially in America from colonial to modern times. Thus, some US neoconservatives remark that in America "religious conservatism was especially prevalent in the colonial period among the Puritans" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:94) in New England and elsewhere, just as has been subsequently and persisting among neo-Puritan evangelicals in the South and beyond. In particular, they note that contemporary US conservative Protestants "stand in the tradition of the Puritans" (Dunn and Woodard 1996:95), which confirms that Protestant extreme religious conservatism or fundamentalism in America, notably the South, tends to continue and revive Puritanism. Further, they imply that an essential attribute or legacy of American Puritanism is what they call authoritarian social–political conservatism, citing that of Alexander Hamilton as an instance, as distinguished from its nonauthoritarian or traditional variant, in America.

At least, Puritanism helps better understand and predict US authoritarian conservatism, including neoconservatism, as indicated by Winthrop's "Godly society,"

"Biblical garden," or "shining city upon the hill" serving as the model and inspiration for Reagan's and his followers' vision of a "faith-based" America, including the Southern "Bible Belt." Notably, Puritanism's typical social–political authoritarianism helps to explain that of this (Hamilton's) "brand" of American conservatism in history and even to predict that of neoconservatism like Reaganism or "compassionate" (cowboy) conservatism in the future. Alternatively, it is often difficult to understand and even pinpoint the authoritarian legacy or vestige of Puritanism in contemporary America without considering the salience and dominance of religious, notably Protestant, and political conservatism, including neoconservatism, in recent times, especially during the 1980s–2000s. Simply, if one wants to comprehend and discover how, why and when Puritanism regenerates and transmits authoritarianism as its cardinal heritage in America, one should look at authoritarian religious and political conservatism as its offspring. If Puritanism is "only marginally visible" in modern American society, then Durkheim's external index of its legacy of authoritarianism or extremism is authoritarian or extreme social conservatism, epitomized by persisting "dumb" laws, a policing state, including the ever-aggrandizing and brutalizing vice police, and Draconian punishments in the South and elsewhere, as the manifest, salient, and even Weber's "fateful" force in the early twenty-first century and before. Some analysts identify a persisting and mutually reinforcing link between American electoral neoconservatism and the "politics of Puritanism" (Wagner 1997:136), notably temperance or culture wars since the 1980s through the 2000s. This means that Puritanism remains, as has usually been, the most efficient electoral–political, Machiavellian strategy for US conservatives, even a sort of neoconservative alchemic formula (e.g., "tough on crime" neo-Puritan policies like the war on drugs) in elections[15] (Levitt 1997) and politics overall, who thus inherit and perpetuate a long-standing Puritan–conservative tradition of manifest or hidden Machiavellianism. Also, it suggests that American Puritanism continues to represent, result in or simply "feel" like "fish in the water" within authoritarian conservatism rather than liberalism or secular democracy.

Second, Puritanism's heritage consists of religious intolerance, coercion, and "holy" wars, both literally and metaphorically, as its original attributes and effects. As expected, this Puritan heritage is especially strong in America where moralist or temperance movements, characterized by moral indignation, conversion, coercion, and culture wars reaching "holy terror" (e.g., terrorist "Christian" militia) are observed to "reflect evangelical roots," specifically the "strong cultural traditions of Puritanism" (Wagner 1997:62–136). In particular, the US new temperance wave or culture war during the 1980s–2000s is described as a neo-Puritan

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[15] Levitt (1997) observes that in America neoconservative increases in the police force enforcing their "get-tough" crime policies like the war on drugs are "disproportionally concentrated" in election (mayoral and gubernatorial) years. As a specific syndrome of this neoconservative electoral Machiavellianism, the numbers of police officers increase, primarily by neoconservative governments, 2% during election years, but are "flat" in nonelection times.

"political strategy," the "politics of Puritanism" consisting of a "personal politics" of moral–religious intolerance, coercion, and repression (Wagner 1997:135). In this view, instances or outcomes of Puritanism's conservative–authoritarian politics are wide ranging, from the war on drugs, indecency, and alcohol to anti-birth-control campaigns to mandating school prayer, but what is common to all of them is that they express and enforce religious–cultural intolerance and coercion. At this juncture, neo-Puritan pseudoreligious temperance and other "holy" culture wars in America seem as, to paraphrase Clausewitz's definition of war, continuations and escalations of the intolerant politics of Puritanism by "other means," i.e., aggression and coercion, just as did proto-Puritan crusades by Cromwell and Winthrop et al. against "sin," "impure," and "infidels." Alternatively, Puritanism's legacy of moral–religious intolerance reproduces and predicts its heritage of intolerant politics and consequently "holy" wars and terror (e.g., terrorist "Christian" militia a la "Dragons of God") in America and beyond. Recall the observation that each of these wars, including Prohibition and anti-birth-control crusades, is an expression of a "recurring struggle between the inheritors of a Puritan Protestant tradition, which seeks to ensure that the state uses its authority to make the US a 'Godly' society, and a 'secular' coalition" (Archer 2001:275).

In particular, what some observers identify as the Puritan-inherited "sadistic intolerance to cultural otherness widespread in America" (Bauman 2000:106) is generative and predictive of sado-masochistic "holy" wars or "tough" policies and terror against "sin," "evil," "lack of faith," and "crime" (e.g., drugs, alcohol, atheism, secularism, birth control) by neo-Puritanism or neoconservatism. These wars include condemnations, excommunications, and Draconian punishments by neo-Puritans to the point of "holy terror" through mass executions of "sinners," "un-American" activities and "witches," "evil-doers," and "criminals," including even drug-offenders (e.g., over 1000 persons have been executed in America under neoconservatism from 1977 to 2006). If so, then one can hardly fully grasp or make sense of these perplexing "holy" conservative culture wars and official terror (Gibbs 1989) in America without taking into account this Puritan original attribute and derived heritage of the "sadistic intolerance to cultural otherness," such as, aside from nonbelievers or atheists as a supreme "evil" and more "un-American" than anything else (Edgell et al. 2006), other religions, peoples, races, and cultures (e.g., "Papists," native Indians, Quakers, Mexicans). Thus, observers remark that neo-Puritan morality–religiosity (in biological terms) in America, by resting on a certain kind of selective preservation of the elect, in apparent accordance with the Calvinist doctrine of election, "is profoundly racial in nature" (Baudrillard 1999:7–8), just was early Puritanism with its methodical emphasis–in the sense of a "method in the madness" (Smith 2000)—on and pursuit of "ethno-religious interests" (Archer 2001:284).

Another, related heritage or product of American Puritanism is some kind of obsessive, intolerant and, at least subtly, coercive religiosity as well as moralism, in particular, neo-Puritan fundamentalism usually considered as the supreme exemplar of religious–moralist obsession, intolerance, and coercion in America, notably the South. Thus, some observers suggest that the legacy or expression of

what is called Puritan moralist–religious obsessiveness or hysteresis ("funereal Puritanism") in America is the pervasive American fundamentalist slogan "Try Jesus" (Baudrillard 1998:80), including "evangelical marketing" observed not only in the "Bible Belt" but even in the "heart of the Utah desert" (Baudrillard 1999:2). In general, American Puritanism is observed to be instrumental in creating or integral to a "world completely rotten with wealth, power, senility, indifference" as well as "poverty and waste, technological futility and aimless violence" (Baudrillard 1999:23). Other analysts notice that, in direct or indirect consequence of this Puritan moralist–religious obsessiveness, reportedly "religion is apparent in everyday life in America" (Munch 2001:230). In this view, instances abound such as the "obligatory Bible in every hotel room," the "in God we trust" insignia on the currency, pervasive, and aggressive evangelical telemarketing (i.e., promoting evangelicalism on television) and others, including the "one nation under God" Pledge of Allegiance. For example, it is curious, yet expected given the origin of Americanism or nativism in Puritanism, that the "one nation under God" clause in the superpatriotic Pledge of Allegiance was inserted by an ultraconservative Congress during the postwar Puritan–fundamentalist and conservative, as Weber would expect, hysterical revival and the associated Cold War hysteria, creating, punctuated, or paralleled by McCarthyism (despite the founder's observed strong non-Puritan penchant for excessive alcohol consumption) in the 1950s. In another instance, the Puritan-grounded "in God we trust" dollar proclamations have a functional equivalent and historical precedent, if not mysterious or unrecognized inspiration, in the "in the name of God, Most Beneficent, Most merciful" insignia on Arab gold during the Islamic Middle Ages (Moisseroon 2002:146). Similarly, this also holds true of the apparent Puritan-based austerity, ascetic appearance and aesthetic emptiness, not to mention the low technical quality inviting counterfeiting, of the US currency[16] (the dollar notes), especially when compared to its

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[16] Even the pro-American *Economist* declared the US dollar notes as the "worst" in the world due to their comparatively low technical quality that, despite some recent improvements, encourages, and makes counterfeiting easier than that of others. This is also due by implication to their Puritan-looking austerity, ascetic dullness, and lack of aesthetic elements, senses, or proportions (e.g., the same color and size for all denominations, from 1 to 1000 dollars) in contrast to most European currencies where Puritanism was absent or weaker (e.g., the Euro, Swiss frank, and even British pound). So, the remarkable aesthetic emptiness or destructiveness (though perhaps not the poor technical quality) of the US currency compared with those in non-Puritan countries is perhaps a peculiar dimension of the antiartistic legacy and character of Puritanism in the American monetary and economic system. So what? If the nondecorated greenbacks perform their monetary function and "everyone" keeps and wants them, as US neo-Puritans or neoconservatives claim. First, it is more likely that Americans themselves and others be given, especially when abroad, counterfeited (notably, $100) dollar notes than any other currencies (including the euro), simply because the currency is easier to counterfeit than most others, mainly due to its poor technical quality, not or just secondarily to its value (viz. steadily deteriorating versus the Euro during the 2000s) and demand (as US neo-conservatives delude themselves). Thus, even in America, let alone abroad, not many keep and use dollar notes in denominations greater than at most $20 (unlike in Europe where greater Euro amounts, up to 200, 500, and even 1000, are routinely held and used), which indicates the lost or diminished trust

European counterparts (including the Euro, Swiss frank and even British pound), thus resembling the equivalent properties of those in societies dominated by Islam and other extreme religious asceticism.

The above indicates another peculiar commonality of the putative "enemies," American neo-Puritan evangelicalism and Islam in terms of an obsessive, intolerant, coercive, expansive, and ultimately theocratic religiosity. Both thus involve attempts to expand and penetrate their respective religion and so religiously based morality into virtually every sector of society and human life, including the monetary–economic system just as politics, thus leaving almost nothing (currencies included) outside of their control or influence, which precisely defines a theocracy. No wonder, even some US moderate theologians and priests warn that the rise of neo-Puritan evangelicalism since the 1980s as a "self-consciously religious political movement with savvy and clout is the same nightmare that brought us Prohibition and sustained racial segregation, and now promises an Islamic-like revolution of the fundamentalists" (cited in Smith 2000:4).

In light of these and other instances of the heritage or continuing influence of American Puritanism, some observers infer that contemporary America "kept intact the utopian and moral perspective of the Puritan sects" of the seventeenth century, transplanted and kept alive (Baudrillard 1999:90). In this view, Puritans' sectarian micromodel of moral–religious "hysteresis" or obsessiveness "has extended to the whole of America," given that they "played a major role" in the evangelical–conservative movement to, and even lived on the idea of, a sort of realized utopia by striving to establish the "Kingdom of God on Earth" (Baudrillard 1999:90). This Puritan extension and major role were historically attained and performed through the Great Awakenings and their subsequent variations, including neo-Puritan evangelical revivals since the 1980s. Alternatively, the above confirms that the Great Awakenings were primarily Puritan revivals and counterrevolutions by extending Puritanism's sectarian model of moral–religious intolerance, obsession, coercion, and "holy" war and terror to the "whole of America," most triumphantly the South. Notably, Puritanism has been the leading force in the theocratic movement to reenacting and generalizing its "Kingdom of God on Earth" from New England to America as a whole by aiming at creating a bibliocracy in the South tuned into a "Bible Belt" and ultimately the entire "land of freedom," from the 1800s, with the second Awakening, to the early twenty-first century.

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in the currency owing to the widespread practice or fear of counterfeiting. This effective disappearance of dollar notes greater than $20 from monetary transactions (in "cash") represent a sort of perverse operation of what Weber and early economists call Gresham's law according to which only the "worst" or least valuable money will remain in circulation. Second, Americans and others are more likely to make various more or less costly mistakes in practically differentiating various dollar notes (e.g., 1 from 100) than those of other currencies, because of the same size and color "fits all" anti-aesthetic Puritan legacy. In sum, if the US dollar notes are the "worst" in technical–artistic quality and in the sense of Gresham's law, due to their Puritan antiesthetical austerity, this legacy of Puritanism can potentially diminish the material as well as cultural–aesthetic quality of life in America, so be self-defeating on its own monetary terms.

And to observe that the supreme achievement or legacy of ever-expansive American Puritanism is a realized utopia in the form of a "Kingdom of God on Earth" is to find that it leads to the heaven or dystopia of theocracy and thus authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Alternatively, to better comprehend or just make sense of what is incomprehensible or nonsensical for secular Western observers and many nonfundamentalist Americans, the ideal and practice of a "Biblical Garden" even at the start of twenty-first century and before, demands reconsidering this legacy. This is to consider that Puritanism has essentially never relinquished, but disguised or adapted—for example, to the formal separation of church and state—its perennial theocratic ideal or dream of a "Kingdom of God on Earth" in America. In historical terms, American Puritanism and consequently, given its enduring legacy or influence, America, especially the South, ushers in the third millennium with the virtually same ideal, dream or aim as did ancient Catholicism and orthodox Christianity and medieval Europe the second during the Dark Middle Ages. This is essentially theocracy, albeit disguised or "sweetened" (Beck 2001) as the all-American "apple-pie of authoritarianism" (Wagner 1997). No wonder, when critics (Bauman 2001; Berman 2000) warn about the coming of the "New Dark Ages," as a reality or metaphor, to modern America, they usually attribute this tendency or prospect to neo-Puritan evangelicalism and its theocratic creations, legacies, or projects like the theocratic "Bible Belt" and a "faith-based" society as a proto-totalitarian alternative to condemned liberalism and secularism as supreme "evil."

Historically, some analysts suggest that Puritanism with its moral–religious, including ethnocentric, obsession has shaped or influenced the US political system virtually in its own image, viz. in the direction of obsessive–coercive religiosity, moralism, and ethnocentrism. For example, in the nineteenth century, under the decisive impact or legacy of Puritanism, the US party system "undermined the prospect for class politics, by weakening the salience of economic interests and of distributive justice" through instead "reinforcing the salience of ethno-religious interests" (Archer 2001:284). In this view, the latter represents "one of the main reasons, why the [US] failed to produce an electorally important labor or socialist party [and] why, to this day, it] has weak unions, insecure workers, negligible interest in redistributive policies and no real welfare state" (Archer 2001:284). This confirms that, owing to its long and persistent obsession with moralist–religious and other social, including "patriotic," issues, Puritanism, is a major source of the lack of or weak substantive, as different from formal, political, including party, pluralism and tolerance, and the consequent weakness of liberal–secular democracy, in particular the welfare state, so of monistic and authoritarian, notably theocratic, tendencies, in America. In turn, to understand these comparatively exceptional nonpluralist and authoritarian, including antiwelfare, tendencies requires taking account of the almost "blind persistence" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) and influence of Puritanism in American politics and society as compared to other societies, including Great Britain.

For example, to understand nonpluralist and authoritarian processes in America at the threshold of the twenty-first century one should remember that in the early

twentieth century, "when labor and socialist parties became major contenders for government in every advanced capitalist society, in the quintessentially capitalist US political controversy was focused on issues like the prohibition of alcohol, and on whether to teach Biblical or Darwinian science in schools" (Archer 2001:284). Evidently, this controversy almost blindly persists in focusing on moralist issues a century later, as has been since. This is witnessed by the seemingly blind persisting or recurring attempts at prohibition or restriction of alcohol[17] (e.g., the 21-year drinking age, Southern "dry" states and counties), as well as evolution theory[18] (in favor of "intelligent design" and even creationism), and birth control ("pro-life" measures), "tough-on-crime" neoconservative policies and Draconian, including multiple,[19] inhuman, degrading, and cruel punishments for other sins = crimes, and similar neo-Puritan "holy" culture wars and terror for the "soul and heart" (as a US extreme conservative put it) of America. Thus, in another series of déjà vu spectacles, exemplifying Puritan perennial revivals or reassertions, in during late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries "ethno-religious issues had reasserted

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[17] A Puritan legacy or reflex in contemporary America is the legal treating, championed by Bible-Belt religious fundamentalists, of minor offenders (16–18-year olds) as adult criminals (e.g., juvenile sex offenders and murderers) and adults (19–20 years) as minors in other respects, notably alcohol consumption. As for the latter, the *Economist* (September 08, 2005) comments that "even though America is now the world's fourth-largest wine producer (after Italy, France and Spain), Americans tend to feel uncomfortable with wine. Puritan instincts live on: an 18-year-old can vote, marry or die in Iraq, but cannot legally drink a glass of wine. Prohibition [is] proof of an abiding fear of alcohol."

[18] The *Economist* (10/06/05) reports that even during the 2000s "half of all Americans either don't know or don't believe that living creatures evolved [and] 65% of people think that creationism and evolution should be taught side by side." As expected, this remarkable ignorance of or disbelief in evolution theory and support for creationism, including the "intelligent design" doctrine, is primarily the legacy or achievement of Puritanism and other Protestant fundamentalism in America, including the 1925 Tennessee evangelical "Monkey Trial" and similar grotesque or tragic–comic Puritan episodes and practices making and keeping the country the world's "laughing stock" (Hill 2002).

[19] A case in point is the US Puritan-inspired and conservative-enforced national registry of sexual offenders (but not of murderers) subject to multiple and even perpetual punishments for the same crimes or sins upon being freed from imprisonment. These practices confirm that American Puritanism tends to grossly violate what Durkheim considers to be the rule in civilized society—i.e., that punishment should fit crime—thus evincing penal barbarism. In particular, they reaffirm that it punishes more harshly sexual crimes or sins than even murders and other violent crimes. Recall thanks to Puritan-based "dumb laws," adultery is still a punishable crime in much of the Bible Belt. Further, as reported, some murderers of their adulterous wives in the Southwest (e.g., Texas) have been effectively acquitted by courts on apparently Puritan grounds that murder is a justifiable "emotional" reaction to and punishment for adultery, thus condemned as a more mortal crime than even killing itself. This is one of those cases that makes many Christians, including Catholics and mainline Protestants, wonder if American neo-Puritanism or evangelicalism is not "anti-Christian" at least on the account of violating and contradicting the "though shall not kill" commandment, not to mention traditional Christian compassion and forgiveness for sins (e.g., "who has not sinned . . . ") and certain crimes or enmities ("love your enemy").

themselves" (Archer 2001:285) in US politics, especially in neoconservatism,[20] including presidential and other elections, as dramatically witnessed during the 2000s. In particular, the observation that American politics has been placed in the "shadow of Dixie" or "going South" (Cochran 2001) from the 1980s to the 2000s indicates this reassertion and continuing expansion of Southern neo-Puritan evangelicalism like Baptism into the entire country, with the effect of democracy reverted into or undermined by the Bible Belt's oligarchic—theocratic mixed obsession with "ethno-religious" ("race and faith") and other cultural matters.

In comparative terms, these "holy" culture wars or "on-going battles over cultural values" by Puritanism or traditionalist Americanism against liberalism or modern secularism reportedly distinguish America from, so make it less democratic, secular, or rationalist than, other Western democracies, including Great Britain and its former colonies (Singh 2002:213). If these wars, either metaphorically or literally, make America unusual or exceptional in relation to other Western societies, this confirms that the legacy of Puritanism is a sort of nondemocratic rather than, as usually supposed, democratic exceptionalism. Such nondemocratic exceptionalism is expressed in what analysts identify as America's comparative "backwardness"[21] (Amenta et al. 2001) in secular liberal democracy, including "stinginess" in progressive social policy or the welfare state that is "anathematized by using taboo terms," e.g., "bureaucrats," "elitist liberals," "intellectuals" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), by neo-Puritans and neoconservative allies. Admittedly, a Puritan-based "underdemocratized" political system helps account for "American backwardness" or exceptionalism in democratic policies, including social policy, during the twentieth century, "two thirds of which was characterized by restricted voting rights in a substantial part of the polity" (Amenta et al. 2001:227), as well as by denied internationally recognized labor rights and freedoms, including freedom of association[22] (Brown 2001).

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[20] Archer (2001:285) adds that, for example, the South-based neo-Puritan or evangelical "Christian Coalition" is "now more important to the Republican Party than union activists are to the Democrats, and issues like abortion [etc.] dominate political space."

[21] Amenta et al. (2001:215) comment that "American social policy is one of stinginess and backwardness. The US has spent less effort on social policy than major capitalist democracies in the postwar era." Notably, they suggest that a "central obstacle to social spending policy is an underdemocratized polity" like the US South (Amenta et al. 2001:226). For example, in this view, the "fact that a Southern Democratic and Republican coalition [during the New Deal] was able to end prevailing wages suggests that the underdemocratized state of the US polity has a key effect on the course of US social policy" (Amenta and Halfmann 2000:524).

[22] As Brown (2001) suggests, the conservative US government, virtually alone among Western states, has not ratified most "Core Conventions" of International Labor Organization (ILO) since 1930s as supposedly "un-American." For example, these nonratified "un-American" conventions include Suppression of Forced Labor (ratified by 157 countries), Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (ratified by 130 countries), The Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize (ratified by 146 countries), Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (ratified by 143 countries), Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (ratified by

Predictably, a case in point is the historically, continuously and ever-increasingly since the 1980s, "under-democratized South" both culturally and politically dominated by Puritanism in the generalized form of Bible-Belt evangelicalism for two centuries during the 1800s–2000s, by comparison with most other US ("blue") regions. Specifically, the evangelical US South is defined by an "underdemocratized" polity in which "political leaders are chosen by way of elections, but in which there are great restrictions on political participation, political assembly and discussion, voting, and choices among leadership groups" (Amenta et al. 2001:226). Further, this polity tends to expand beyond the ultraconservative South to encompass America's similar regions where Puritan evangelicalism has been and remains dominant or salient (the Midwest, the "Wild West" and other "red-neck" states from the 2000s elections). Thus, during most (especially the first half) of the twentieth century, half of the US states "harbored underdemocratized political institutions (characterized by restrictions on voting and party competition) or dominant patronage-oriented political parties" (Amenta and Halfmann 2000:509). As expected, such underdemocratized institutions and practices were most prominent in the South and other evangelical–conservative regions. Thus, Puritanism makes the South and these regions a sort of undemocratic aberration or abomination within America just as renders the latter as a whole an exceptional or deviant case in liberal–secular democracy and cultural liberalization in Western democracies, thus exhibiting the Puritan supremely authoritarian and antiliberal legacy.

Puritanism's another, probably most radical legacy or outcome, just as its original and persisting vision and attribute, consists of the idea and practice of theocracy as the consummate instance of religious—political extremism and authoritarianism, or what some non-Puritan US theologians (Swomley 2001) describe as the "greatest danger to democracy in any nation." In a sense, theocracy is an eventual outcome, escalation, or intensification of Puritanism's previous legacies, patterns of action and attributes, especially religious intolerance, coercion, and "holy" wars and terror, as well as cultural conservatism and obsessive religiosity and moralism. This especially holds true of American Puritanism whose primary legacy or outcome, just as historical achievement and perennial ideal, is a sort and degree of pure or diluted theocracy, specifically what Weber calls bibliocracy. This is indicated by the persisting and even ever-intensifying and expanding the Divine "intelligent" design and system of a neo-Puritan "Bible Community" in the South and all America over the early twenty-first century, in an attempt to resurrect New England's proto-Puritan "Biblical Commonwealth" from the "dead" or golden past of the seventeenth century.

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147 countries), and Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (ratified by 93 countries) (Brown 2001:94). This unparalleled, within Western society, deviation from—driven and rationalized by nationalist fear of and contempt for—international labor and political freedoms and rights again exemplifies the "double-edged sword" of Puritan-based and conservative-sustained American exceptionalism.

In general, resurrecting, recreating, or perpetuating a "Kingdom of God on Earth" or "Godly society," with neo-Puritans as its masters or lords a la Winthrop or Cromwell *cum* the "Lord Protector of the Realm," and others as their servants, in America is the theocratic heritage or outcome of Puritanism. As expected, this heritage is manifested, expanded, and perpetuated in neo-Puritan evangelicalism and other religious and political conservatism through a permanent project and even realized utopia or rather sociological, as different from theological, heaven of "godly," "faith-based" society as an Orwellian dystopia epitomized in the "Bible Community." This is basically a theocratic social system eliminating or blurring the primary and substantive differentiation between religion and civil society, theological and secular, in spite or because of a secondary, formal separation of church and state.

Thus, a special facet of the Puritan theocratic legacy or vestige in America is that neo-Puritan evangelicalism and other religious–cultural conservatism continues to oppose, suspect, or blur the societal differentiation between religious and secular life, including, though less openly, the legal separation of church and state. As some sociologists observe, in contemporary America Puritanism "is not easily recognizable as a religious cultural mold [as it] leads to a blurring of the differentiation" between religion and secular society, sacred and profane activities and objects, thus perpetuating a "cardinal" theocentric Puritan or Protestant feature (Tiryakian 1975:18). Others suggest that, while political and religious, i.e., public and private, spheres have historically been "closely intertwined," mostly due to the impact of Puritanism, in both Great Britain and America, the latter "has shown a remarkable blurring of the two, in comparative perspective" (Jepperson 2002:70). As expected, this religious–political blurring has been and remains more remarkable in America than in other Western societies primarily because the historical legacy or triumph of Puritanism has been more complete, extreme, and enduring, so more theocratic, in the first than in the second. Ironically, these societies include Puritanism's own native land England, yet where the Puritan Revolution ultimately proved, as Weber puts it, "abortive" in contrast to its "total and unconditional" victory and pervasive (though often contested) influence, first, in New England and later on, via the Great Awakenings, the South and beyond.

The Puritan blurring of the differentiation between religion and politics or secular society overall is probably the initial step or latent process toward creating, just as a general sociological effect and symptom of, a theocratic "Kingdom of God on Earth." In turn, such a Puritan "godly" society not only leads to blurring this substantive differentiation, but tends to eventually abolish the formal separation of church and state, as the final and manifest move to, as well as the legal outcome and indicator of, theocracy. This is indicated, by way of a sort of replica or restoration of proto-Puritan New England theocracy, by neo-Puritan Southern bibliocracy, in which the substantive differentiation between religious and secular life, including theological and scientific or artistic (e.g., creationism[23] and

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[23] To indicate the magnitude of the antiscientific legacy or influence of Puritanism and evangelicalism overall in contemporary America, for example, as ACLU notes, "public opinion

evolution theory) spheres, is typically blurred and often erased, despite the formal separation, also subject to renewed and virulent evangelical open or tacit attacks, of church and state. Hence, what makes the South and other cognate US ("red-neck") states theocratic in the sense of diluted theocracy at least, in the early twenty-first century, so persistently "under-democratized" within America, let alone Western democracies, is this neo-Puritan blurring or erasing of the substantive sociological differentiation of religion and secular society, perhaps eventually, as the Puritan—evangelical ultimate ideal or dream, of the formal separation of church and state.[24]

Historically, the twenty-first century Southern Bible Belt is best understood as the contemporary replica, proxy, revival, or extension of seventeenth century New England's "Biblical Commonwealth" via permanent Puritan counterrevolutions or revivals, so as a mix of Puritanism's theocratic and moralistic anachronisms in the midst of modern America and Western high or post modernity. Simply, it is, as even moderate US theologians suggest, just "another theocracy" (Swomley 2001). As an indicator, symptom, or proxy of theocracy, primarily inherited or inspired by Puritanism, recall Texas and other Bible-Belt states like Alabama and Tennessee ushering in the twenty-first century still have the law in the books requiring that candidates "must acknowledge a supreme being before being able to hold public office," and similar theocratic or "damn" moralist laws. Thus, at least the Southern Bible Belt, due its lacking or blurred substantive differentiation between religious and secular life, confirms that the anachronistic and theocratic legacy of American Puritanism is persistent and salient even four centuries after the creation of New England's Puritan theocracy during the 1620s–1630s and nearly two centuries since its official disestablishment in the 1830s. Moreover, some analysts suggest that this holds true not only of the evangelical South as a sort of theocratic or evangelical anachronism, but also of America as a whole. In this view, the new

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polls consistently show that a majority of Americans believe that both creationism and evolution should be taught in public schools" on grounds of "equal time" for secular–scientific and religious views. In comparative terms, Americans are probably the only ones (perhaps alongside the Polish subjected to Catholic pseudo-theocracy) who hold this belief within contemporary Western societies, including Great Britain. In this sense, the widespread, Puritan-based belief in giving "equal time" to both creationism, including its version of "intelligent design," and evolution in public schools is truly "American exceptionalism" as double or more precisely antiscientific-edged "sword" (Lipset 1996) compared with other societies. No wonder, ACLU predicts that if the issue of creationism versus evolution is (as done by US neo-Puritans) framed in terms of a battle of "science" and "religion," then science will likely lose with the "American public" and possibly in supposedly secular courts. Further, the Gallup polls indicate that in the early 2000s the majority of Americans favored church involvement in politics, and in the 1960s opposed this involvement. This indicates a curious involution or regression in the public opinion about the substantive differentiation between the two, so the formal separation of church and state, primarily owing to the latest revival of neo-Puritan evangelicalism in America during the 1980s–2000s.

[24] For example, even the pro-conservative *Economist* (May 26, 2005) comments with discomfort that at the start of the twenty-first-century US neo-Puritan evangelicals "want to redefine the boundaries of church and state to make more room for public displays of religiosity and for faith-based social policy, and to put the 'culture of life' [read abortion prohibition] back at the heart of the American [Puritan] experiment."

evangelicalism "carried forward the Puritan idea that the Bible revealed the will of God, and that government should act to reorganize society in accordance with that will [which] remained a central element of American culture to this day" (Archer 2001:277).

The Puritan theocratic legacy of dispensing with or blurring the differentiation between religion and secular society is also expressed in what can be described as theocentric or purely religious approaches to social problems by cultural and political conservatism in America. As some analysts observe, historically in America (especially) cultural–political conservatives have advocated and adopted "individualist religious or quasi-religious" rather than collective secular solutions to most social problems (Jepperson 2002:70), increasingly so during the 1980s– 2000s. A salient instance involves neoconservative "faith-based initiatives" as putatively best solutions to social problems like poverty and welfare, thus expressions of "compassionate" religious–cultural conservatism. Secular critics[25] object that these policies are a religious–conservative or theocratic "drive for power" in America during the 2000s, by intruding into a wide range of secular issues, including public spending, laws, judges, constitutional amendments, and education. Generally, these and related tendencies at the start of the twenty-first century reflect the theocratic or fundamentalist legacy of Puritanism in that they, as a proposed Congress law decrees, rest on "acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty or government," just as were their original forms in seventeenth century New England's Puritan theocracy. This reaffirms that the latter bequeathed an enduring heritage, model or inspiration to neo-Puritan fundamentalism and neoconservatism.

Culture Repression and Regression

Puritanism's corollary, general element of the authoritarian legacy in contemporary, especially American, society comprises culture repression and regression. In a sense, culture repression and regression are the generalized dimension or outcome of Puritan moral repression and religious extremism, i.e., authoritarianism in morality and religion, notably moralist crusades by "saints" against "sinners" and theocracy created by "godly" masters versus "evil" and "infidels." Anticultural repression and regression are typically intertwined and mutually reinforcing, with the first, via Puritan holy wars and terror, eventually resulting in the second, and conversely, culture-decline feeding back on these repressive practices. In this

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[25] The American Civil Liberties Union directs attention to an impending Congress law preventing all federal courts, including the Supreme Court, from hearing challenges to laws involving school prayer, the Ten Commandments, the Pledge of Allegiance and generally any government action involving "acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty or government." ACLU also cites the conservative conference "Remedies to Judicial Tyranny" (held in Washington in April 2005) at which some participants stated that a Supreme Court judge's (Anthony Kennedy's) opinion against capital punishment for juveniles "is a good ground for impeachment."

regard, Puritanism regenerates and predicts the regression of culture, including art, education, and science, through its anticultural repression and wars, just as the latter's persistence, expansion, or reinforcement by such decline. In consequence, the regression of all secular culture is essentially "imposed" (Adorno 1991) by Puritanism through its anticultural repression. Recall that Weber identifies an instance of this Puritan culture–art repression and regression in what he calls the "absolute musical vacuum which we find typical of the Anglo-Saxon peoples later, and even to-day," as a consequence of Puritanism's suppression of this and other arts, so its heritage in these societies. In particular, as an indicator of this vacuum he notes that "in America one also hears as community singing in general only a noise which is intolerable to German ears." Consequently, he suggests that the cultural legacy of Puritanism in America and to a lesser extent other "Anglo-Saxon peoples" is the lack of or weak, to cite the title of his own book, "rational foundations" or rationalization of music and related arts, so musical–artistic irrationalism and authoritarianism, and to that extent culture regression and repression alike.

Also, some contemporary analysts observe that historically, as at least experienced and perceived by non-Puritans, "from the time of the English Reformation the 'seed' of Puritanism was deprived of any true spiritual and cultural 'flowering'" (Gould 1996:214). In consequence, deprived of cultural, notably artistic, flowering—in an Enlightenment rather than anthropological sense—were those societies or regions in which Puritanism became dominant or salient. This particularly holds true of America, where the "seed" of Puritanism was implanted more deeply and endured longer in growing its meager spiritual–cultural flowers than in any other society, including England and continental Europe. For example, colonial and Puritan New England was usually described (e.g., during the nineteenth century) as culturally "empty" and "small," consisting of a 'lowly people' so deluded in their own 'dreams' and 'fairy tales' of providential mission that they cannot recognize the 'earthly pride' impelling their base, mean-spirited existence" (Gould 1996:214). By implication, this characterization applies *ceteris paribus* to America's other parts, notably the South, where Puritanism attempted and succeeded to expand and transplant its New England theocracy by its revolutions or revivals like the Great Awakenings and their sequels. In particular, what was New England in anticultural terms during colonial times has become the Bible Belt in the aftermath and consequence of this Southward transmission of Puritanism via the second Awakening and remains or is experienced so at the beginning of the twenty-first century, i.e., culturally "empty" and "small" or provincial, ruled by theocratic fundamentalist "masters" driven by the self-delusion of a Divinely ordained mission evoking Winthrop or Cromwell *cum* the "Lord Protector of the Realm."

Hence, to fully grasp the seemingly incomprehensible and probably unparalleled, within Western societies, cultural, including artistic and intellectual, emptiness, regression, and even destructiveness, notably anti-intellectualism, of the US South requires reconsidering Puritanism and its remarkable transformation of this region, via its Great Awakenings and their later variations as during the 1980s–2000s, into a sort of neo-Puritan bibliocracy after the model of New England's

theocracy. Simply, even in the early twenty-first century the South appears as culturally empty and self-destructive, just as underdemocratized and theocratic, primarily because it has become and remained a neo-Puritan, evangelical "Bible Belt," as did New England in the seventeenth century owing to Puritanism. As critical observers put it, the new South, through the Great Awakenings, is under the "clutches" of robber-baron plutocrats and Puritan "barbarians" and "almost as sterile artistically, as the Sahara Desert" (Mencken cited in Foerster 1962:149), contrary to its ante-bellum life permeated with non-Puritanism such as official Episcopalism.

More precisely, the Southern legacy, survival, or outcome of Puritanism is that the South has become and remains "empty" of culture in the sense of the secular—liberal Enlightenment or the Renaissance. Yet it is saturated with and dominated by that in a religious sense and form, like New England before, as the expected Puritan dual heritage or effect. Like Catholic Europe during the Dark Middle Ages, culture has become dissolved into religion, for example, science (evolution theory) into theology (creationism, "intelligent design"), and to that extent emptied or even eradicated, in the South transformed into the neo-Puritan "Bible Belt" modeled after the image of New England's "Biblical Commonwealth." This is precisely what US religious conservatives admit by stating and celebrating that in the history of America, notably proto-Puritan and neo-Puritan regions like New England and the South, the "Bible was the only common culture" (Bloom 1988:58). Such a statement confirms and evokes Weber's observation that seventeenth century English and American Puritans possessed the "unparalleled diffusion of knowledge about the Bible and interest in extremely abstruse and scholastic dogmatic controversies." Notably, it admits that both the original attribute and enduring legacy of Puritanism in America is only religious or generally anthropological "culture," including "Christian" art, science, philosophy, and education, not to mention theology and theocracy, just as of Catholicism in medieval times and Islam during most of its history.

Alternatively, Puritanism's heritage consists in emptying and destroying culture in the humanist–secular meaning of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. In particular, Southern anticultural emptiness in this sense is necessary and expected, given Puritanism's intrinsic contradiction and vehement hostility to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, so humanism, secularism, rationalism, and liberalism overall. In short, like New England in the seventeenth century, the twenty-first century South has an anthropological culture in the sense of the "invention of mores and a way of life" (Baudrillard 1999:100), but its name and content is neo-Puritan religion or theology, including the Bible. After all, the very "Bible Belt" implies that secular culture and democracy in the South and eventually all America has been or is likely to be emptied and subjugated by the Puritan master religion or theology and theocracy to become its servant, appendix, or "collateral damage" like in the Catholic Dark Middle Ages and radical Islam. In consequence, humans, believers and infidels alike, are reduced to servants of neo-Puritan evangelical masters or lords in the image of and inspiration from Winthrop and Cromwell.

Of course, the observation that New England and the Bible Belt are culturally "empty" and "small" is to be understood in a relative rather than absolute sense, i.e., by comparison with America's other parts where Puritanism was relatively less salient or enduring (e.g., Quaker's Pennsylvania) and in view of some tempering, however weak, forces in these Puritan regions, such as Quakerism, Anglicanism, secularism, and liberalism. The same can be said of the also frequent observation about America's cultural, especially artistic, emptiness, regression, and parochialism. This is relative to other Western societies, including Great Britain, where Puritanism has been comparatively weaker or less enduring, and in light of the presence and operation of such moderating and countervailing factors at the national level, including moderate Protestantism or religion overall, secularism, humanism, and liberalism, as originally embodied by Jefferson and Madison, preventing this regression from becoming the kind of total darkness or emptiness as in the Dark Middle Ages that Puritans always sought to resurrect in some form. In general, the proto-Puritan New England and the neo-Puritan Bible Belt yield the inference or perception that in both early and contemporary America Puritanism's "cultural legacy has bred 'an atavism that thwarts and destroys'" (Gould 1996:214).

In particular, some observers imply that the legacy or result of American Puritanism is the destruction or "death" of aesthetic culture or art by transforming contemporary American society into some kind of anticultural desert emptied of relevant cultural–artistic contents in a secular Enlightenment meaning. In this view, Puritanism results in the "mental desert form" or the "purified form of social desertification," thus an "ecstatic" critique and destruction of culture, notably art (Baudrillard 1999:7). Arguably, that America remains a society of Puritanism and its "real asceticism" is indicated by that culture, including art, like politics, is "seen exclusively in terms of the desert" even in big cities, with its "status of a primal scene" (Baudrillard 1999:28). The above means that Puritanism turns the physical wilderness that it claims to "civilize," technologically and sociologically (the native Indians, Mexicans), into the model for society as a "system of non-culture" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), i.e., an anticultural desert, wasteland, wildness, or emptiness, as observed in Utah, Texas and other Wild-West (e.g., in part California[26]) neo-Puritan regions. Hence, it seeks to transform all American society into a sort of "Wild West" (e.g., the physical and social desert of Utah, Texas, and California), in the sense of an anticultural wilderness as well as a political rule of the strongest, exemplified by Enron-style "cowboy" capitalists merged or allied with oligarchic politicians ("good old boys"), with the biggest and most lethal weapons, seemingly according to the primal "law of the jungle" or the Hobbesian state of nature and Acton–Michels' law of absolute power/corruption and oligarchy. Thus, sociologists warn that a society reenacting or evoking the

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[26] Moreover, Baudrillard (1999:126) states than nowhere else in America than in California "does there exist such a stunning fusion of a radical lack of culture and natural beauty, of the wonder of beauty and the absolute simulacrum [where] culture itself is a desert," implicitly attributing this to the legacy or reflex of Puritanism in this supposedly non-Puritan and liberal state.

"Wild West," where everyone "believes he can police other's actions on his behalf by relying on the firepower on his own weapons is in danger of destroying its liberties, because everybody has to fear everybody else [and] is close to Hobbes's state of nature" (Munch 1994:69).

For example, according to these observations in most neo-Puritan America, notably the "Wild West" and the "Bible Belt," the "only element" of secular culture is the car and there is "no cultural center" (Baudrillard 1999:63) like those commonly found even in Europe's smallest towns. If so, taking into account the above conservative celebratory statement, the only two elements of "culture" in America are, first, the Bible as the religious–theological element, and second, the car as the secular–technological. And that, mixed with largely puritanical (Kann1994) and despotic or "brain-washing" (Baudrillard 1999) television and the like, is precisely what everyday cultural life represents for most Americans, especially those in neo-Puritan evangelical bastions like the "Bible Belt," the "Wild West," and similar ("red-neck") regions. In general, Puritanism reportedly achieved in modern America what is described as a cultural "anti-utopia" in the "most radical" form or way of the "anti-utopia of unreason" or the "death of culture" through "anti-culture, the subversion of meaning, the destruction of reason, and the end of representation" (Baudrillard 1999:97). In this view, consequently, the "whole of America is a desert" where human culture, including art, exists only in a "wild" and religious state, with the effect that "all intellect, all aesthetics" are sacrificed in the process to wilderness or the "real" and religion or the "sacred"[27] (Baudrillard 1999:99), which redefines the "Wild West" and the "Bible Belt," respectively or rather jointly.

The first sacrifice reflects Puritanism's legacy and attribute of anti-intellectualism, viz. a fascistlike apotheosis of practice and "practical people" over intellectuals, including theorists and scientists, condemned or disdained by "popular hate campaigns" (Adorno 1991), including the "demand for ruthless clarity from expression itself now banished"[28] (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), or, as US neoconservative politicians or presidents like to put it, "plain talk." The second sacrifice mirrors the Puritan legacy of a strong hostility to and suppression of secular culture, including art and science.[29] The aggregate outcome of these

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[27] Baudrillard (1999:99) comments that "perhaps the Americans who believed they had destroyed these Indians merely disseminated their virulence [as] by some mysterious interaction their towns and cities have taken on the structure and color of the desert."

[28] Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) identify another symptom of anti-intellectualism in contemporary America by noting that a "welfare state is anathematized by using taboo terms" like "intellectuals" (plus "bureaucrats"). Evidently, this, typically conservative, anathema expresses Puritanism's hostility to the welfare state and anti-intellectualism.

[29] During the 2000s leading American scientists repeatedly complained about the suppression and distortion by US religious fundamentalists and political conservatives in the government of various scientific findings countering their views and policies. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a report that these government officials by censoring or misrepresenting the findings of federal agencies suppressed or manipulated scientific research on a wide range of matters, including sexual health, cancer, environment,

Puritan-induced sacrifices is that, as observed, in modern America "there is no culture here, no cultural discourse. No ministries, no commissions, no subsidies [etc.]. The idea of a cultivated culture does not exist" but instead an anthropological one equivalent to or grounded in religion and theology (Baudrillard 1999:100). The above confirms that American Puritanism has almost destroyed or emptied culture in the humanist–secular meaning of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment—i.e., in which art, literature, and science, rather than just, or along with, religion and theology, "play a central role" in human lives (Berman 2000:175)—while replacing it with or subduing it into its religious–theological or anthropological cultural form. These observations yield the conclusion that, while esthetic culture is a Puritan casualty to the point of the "end of aesthetics" in America, "it is not just the aesthetics of décor that vanishes into thin air, but [that] of bodies and language, of everything that forms [Europe's] social habitus [i.e.] the whole aesthetic or rhetorical system of seduction, taste, charm, theater, but also of contradictions" (Baudrillard 1999:124–125).

A particular indicator or symptom, as well as a contributing factor, of the "near-death" or terminal condition of aesthetic culture in America is the remarkably low public spending on the arts compared to all other Western countries. For example, in 1987 US government spending on the arts[30] as a percent of GNP was, virtually

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global warming, and air quality. A case implicated high-ranking officials who "suppressed and sough to manipulate" the Environmental Protection Agency's study furnishing "strong evidence in direct contradiction" to their neoconservative policies (e.g., "reducing regulation of coal-fired power plants"). Other cases involved government religious–political conservatives' systematic attempts at manipulating the nominally independent scientific advisory system in order "to prevent the appearance of advice that might run counter to the administration's political agenda." Another, almost grotesque yet predictable instance was appointing (to the US Food and Drug Administration's Reproductive Health Advisory Committee) an obstetrician–gynecologist with "highly partisan political views," whose supreme scientific achievement was coauthoring a book which recommended a certain Bible reading as the effective treatment of gynecological syndromes (e.g., premenstrual syndrome). UCS president commented that these attempts are "akin to the White House directing the National Weather Service to alter a hurricane forecast because they want everyone to think we have clear skies ahead." In general, according to the above report, in that they "repeatedly allowed political considerations to trump scientific qualifications," during the 2000s US government religious–political neoconservatives manipulated scientific research to an unprecedented degree even by Puritan-fundamentalist sky-high (or rather bottom-low) standards. In another related example, in the 1980s, a neo-Puritanical (in the substantive rather than formal sense) or neoconservative British Prime Minister (Margaret Thatcher) removed "science" from the name of a government agency providing funds for research in social science, including economics itself otherwise celebrated by neoconservatism. And if not knowing the exact (American-British fundamentalists or neoconservative) context, one may equally think that the above describes the well-known fascist, including Nazi, suppression, and manipulation of science, which confirms that Puritanism is the religious–theocratic substitute or proxy for fascism in this as well as other respects.

[30] Even though the US public spending on the arts has been regularly the lowest among Western societies, during the 1980s–2000s many religious conservatives (e.g., Senator Jesse Helms) attacked the National Endowment for the Arts (a federal agency) on the ground of funding "obscene art" (Hull 1999:53).

without any competition, the lowest (0.02) among Western countries (e.g., UK 0.14, Canada 0.18; Germany 0.21; France 0.22). Further, as a proportion of total public expenditure, compared with these countries, US art spending (0.05) was between 7–8 (e.g., UK 0.41, Canada 0.34) and 10 or more times lower (Germany 0.79; France 0.77) (Throsby 1994:21). Overall, total public spending on the arts per capita ($3.3) in America is reportedly between 5 and 10 times lower than in other Western societies (e.g., UK $16, Canada $28.3, Germany $39.1, France $35).

Notably, an economic analysis suggests that such comparatively unrivalled or even approximated low (especially) public spending on the arts in America is to be attributed to a "society and its Puritan attitude" (Scitovsky 1972:64), and thus explained by sociological and historical factors. In this view, the Puritan founding fathers

did not want to abolish the leisure class to which most of them belonged, but they did change its attitudes and aspirations. They wanted man to get his earthly satisfaction from work, while consumption provides merely the necessities and comforts of life. We smile condescendingly over the prejudices of 18th century America, which morally disapproved of the theatre and frowned on wasting time and money on sports and the arts. But this is no smiling matter, because our behavior is still governed by those prejudices[31]

(Scitovsky 1972:64)

Strikingly, Americans are reportedly forced into trade-offs between quality of life and safety by "restrictions our authorities impose, supposedly to protect people from their own folly and with never a thought of the pleasure they force people sacrifice for what often are insignificant increments of safety" (Scitovsky 1972:66). The analysis infers that the US typically rigid conservative—moralist government's "cheerful sacrifice of the citizens' access to nature for the sake of illusory or insignificant increments of safety is part of the same philosophy that lies behind the neglect of the arts"[32] (Scitovsky 1972:68)—i.e., simply Puritanism. Namely, Americans' "very modest enjoyment of the arts is part and parcel of [their]

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[31] Scitovsky (1972:66) comments that "it seems a strange irony of fate that our Puritanal rejection of pleasure as the ultimate aim of life should have led to a preference system in which the making of money is the main challenge and effortless, pleasureless comfort the main reward."

[32] Scitovsky (1972:68) adds that in respect of vacations "when the US is compared to Europe, we rank among the poorest European countries, with Portugal and Italy—as though our high standard of comfort and safety were an irreducible minimum, absorbing so s such of our income that, measured by what's let over fro the enjoyment of life, we seem worse off than many others poorer than we are." For example, he suggests that in America "less good vacation amenities [are] partly explained" by US conservative–moralist authorities' less tolerance for citizens' "taking risks for pleasure." This Puritan-rooted intolerance of pleasure or leisure is, joined with capital's superior structural power or institutionalized violence (also promoted, permitted or sanctified by Puritanism, as Weber notes), over labor, is probably the crucial reason why America ranks by far the lowest among Western societies in respect of paid annual vacation, with the average time for most Americans being only half or third (about 15 days) of that of other Western countries (30 or more days). Also, Scitovsky (1972:63–64) remarks that the fear of "Americanization," in the sense of "uneducated tastes are followed the world over, is well founded."

modest enjoyment of life; [plus] government's miserly attitude toward the arts is [the] integral part of a larger [Puritan] collective preference system" (Scitovsky 1972:68).

Other analysts also imply that Puritanism or religious conservatism overall is crucially implicated in this antiartistic regression and destruction observing that in America high art "is destroyed in speculation about its efficacy" and low art by the "constraints imposed on the rebellious resistance inherent within it as long as social control was not yet total" (Adorno 1991). Thus, it is observed that the US culture industry's basis or ontology consists in a "scaffolding of rigidly conservative basic categories," primarily rooted in Puritanism and its rigid conservatism.

As mentioned, the Puritan legacy of culture repression, regression, and even destruction in America is manifest and intense in that it turns human culture, including art, education, science, and knowledge into the servant or appendage of religion and theology as the master, so sinful humans into servants of Puritan saints–masters. This confirms that American Puritanism, despite its claims to exceptionality and novelty relative to the old and decadent Europe, seeks to revive, in this and other respects, the theocratic Dark Middle Ages, as its perennial (though disguised) ideal from the "dead hand of the past" (Harrod 1956). Thus, if during most of America's own history the "Bible was the only common culture" (Bloom 1988:58), this implies that the latter was dissolved, subordinated, or sacrificed to religion or theology, especially its Puritan or fundamentalist version or interpretation. This continues to hold true of contemporary America, notably the South's Bible Belt defined precisely by such subordination or sacrifice of secular culture or intellectual life to the "Holy Writ" and neo-Puritan fundamentalism, and so humans to evangelical would-be-masters or lords. For example, observers note that mainly consequent to the heritage or influence of Puritanism, modern America "lacks the kind of intellectual scene that France [and most of Europe] enjoys" (Munch 2001:226).

In particular, Puritanism's salient legacy or achievement is transforming science and education into the servant or appendix of (especially fundamentalist) religion and theology. To recall, in America's history the opposition of Puritanism and other Protestant evangelicalism to secular science and education "has always been high," and this hostility or skepticism toward the "value and propriety of scientific investigation has continued unabated" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997) during the 1980s–2000s. A historical and perennial or ever-recurring case in point is the Puritan–fundamentalist opposition to and destruction of scientific biology, specifically evolution theory, via religious creationism and its newer variations like more or less both scientifically and judicially (e.g., even by some ostensibly conservative federal judges in the 2000s) discredited "intelligent design." As known, the fundamentalist "furor over teaching Darwin's theory of evolution in public schools" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997) was pervasive and intense in America during the 1900s, culminating in the 1925 infamous or, from a time distance, grotesque Tennessee "Monkey Trial" and continuing since and even intensifying during the 2000s. At least, the "Monkey Trial" singularly demonstrates that Puritanism's legacy, accomplishment, or project in the Bible Belt and beyond has been to make

science, education, and all secular culture subservient, dissolved and sacrificed to religion, and so to effectively destroy or subvert them. This holds true of the various fundamentalist reenacts or vestiges of the "Monkey Trial" since the 1920s, for example, the rejection or designation of evolution as "just a theory," renewed attempts at imposing creationism either in its original form or more subtly as "intelligent design"[33] in the South and elsewhere during 1980s–2000s. Generally, studies find that contemporary American religious fundamentalism continues to condemn and even, if possible, destroy, subvert, or subjugate liberal education, knowledge, and science (plus technology) on the "holy" conservative grounds of their tending to "undermine both secular and divine authority by promoting 'humanism' and denigrating faith" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997).

Since traditional Puritanism in New England and elsewhere did the same, this indicates that its antiscientific and antieducational legacy in America, especially religious and cultural conservatism, has been of a remarkable and even unrivaled duration, tenacity and intensity up to the 2000s. Contemporary US fundamentalists in the South and the country as a whole reportedly "find fault with the scientific method," being particularly "critical of higher education" to the point that the "only type of college that might be of value is a 'Christian' college, meaning a fundamentalist college or a Bible school" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997). If so, then they display essentially identical attitudes and behaviors to secular education and science as their admired Puritan ancestors, thus perpetuating the original attribute of Puritanism into its enduring heritage. This reaffirms the substantive or sociological, if not formal–legal continuity between New England and Southern bibliocracy ("Biblical Commonwealths") in this and most other respects. Moreover, recollect, for contemporary US fundamentalists "no schooling is better than secular schooling" (Darnell and Sherkat 1997), thus explicitly formulating the old Puritan implied equation of "ignorance-bliss."

The above indicates that Puritanism's antieducation and antiscience legacy or impact in contemporary America, notably religious fundamentalism, ultimately reaches such an intensity, extremism and irrationalism that defies not only human reason in the Enlightenment sense (e.g., Jefferson et al.'s advocacy of public or mass education[34] as the condition of liberal democracy), but even what US neoconservatives like to glorify as "common sense." In extension, for modern religious fundamentalists, just as their Puritan fathers, it seems that "no science and art

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[33] Overall, the American Civil Liberties Union in its report "science under siege" documents renewed attacks by contemporary US religious conservatives on scientific research and method, including biological evolution theory condemned in favor of creationism or its modified version in the "intelligent design" doctrine (promoted through religious books with "scientific" titles like "On Pandas and People"). For example, the report states that during the 2000s the neoconservative administration "has sought to impose growing restrictions on the free flow of scientific information, unreasonable barriers on the use of scientific materials and increased monitoring of and restrictions on foreign university students on 'homeland-security' and 'war on terror' grounds."

[34] Darnell and Sherkat (1997) find that religious fundamentalism in America has "negative influences on educational attainment," regardless of social-background variables.

are better than secular ones." The following event seems particularly revealing or symptomatic of the neo-Puritan suppression and destruction of secular art or aesthetic culture in America, in this case the supposedly post-Puritan or liberal New England: in 1996 "claiming it violated the school board's decision not to teach children about alternative lifestyles, schools in Merrimack, New Hampshire, remove[d] Shakespeare's play *Twelfth Night* from the curriculum"[35] (Hull 1999:55). Alternatively, in liberal–secular American places like New York and elsewhere since the 1960s Puritanism has been "under attack" by artists due to its continuously repressive attitudes and policies to theater and other arts (Goldfarb 1980). At this juncture, remember that, as Weber remarks, in the seventeenth century the Puritan town government "closed the theatre at Stratford-on-Avon while Shakespeare was still alive and residing there in his last years" and that his "hatred and contempt of the Puritans appear on every occasion." This confirms that even at the close of the twentieth century the Puritan antiartistic legacy or disposition, consequently counter-Puritan rebellion by artists and others, remained intense in America, and how little Puritanism and even New England, despite its supposed liberalization, has changed in this respect from Shakespeare's England to modern times.

Now, if the "Bible was the only common culture" in historical, and perhaps remains in contemporary, America, and generally "no schooling is better than secular schooling" both for proto- and neo-Puritanism, then no wonder, as some US conservatives state with approval, young Americans' school lives are "spiritually empty" and they look like "natural savages" compared with Europeans (Bloom 1988:48–51). Admittedly, this culture emptiness and natural "savagery" are, as sorts of virtues to be perpetuated, celebrated, and expanded, rather than potential problems to be addressed, to be primarily attributed to US religious and cultural conservatism opposed to "secularism" and "liberalism" seen as reigning in higher education, so accused of spoiling this conservative-produced nirvana or rather Mises' "peace of the cemetery" of "purity" and "innocence" of precollege Americans. In this view, American "intellectual obtuseness" looks "horrifying and barbarous, a stunting of full humanity, an incapacity to experience the beautiful, an utter lack of engagement in the civilization's ongoing discourse [though] the impression of natural savagery [of] Americans (is) only relative to the impression made by the Europeans" (Bloom 1988:48–51).

While US cultural conservatives rationalize and celebrate this anticultural outcome or impression, they confirm that the persistent legacy, attainment, even ideal and dream of Puritan-based religious conservatism in America is precisely destroying or dissolving secular culture, including education, science, and art, into

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[35] Hull (1999:55) cites another, related case from 1997 when "after one scene in the film *Tin Drum* [was] declared obscene by an Oklahoma judge, police in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, confiscate[d] copies of the film from video store owners, libraries, and a citizen's home." Also, during the 1990 conservative-dominated Congress passed the Communications Decency Act, yet to be eventually declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, with a judging stating that "the interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship."

religion and theology, notably the Bible (plus mere "rubbish," cf. Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), through anti-intellectualism, antihumanism, antisecularism, and irrationalism. Simply, they admit the fact that Puritan and other religious conservatism generates, so leaves as a heritage, "intellectual obtuseness," "barbarous" practices and "natural savagery" in America; and, for most of them, this is not even "embarrassing" as was admittedly the "Monkey Trial" (Boles 1999), but rather a virtue to be ethnocentrically proud of, especially when compared to "intellectualist," "civilized," and "liberal" Europeans.[36] Also, recall interwar European fascists, notably the Nazis, appropriated and celebrated the substantively same attributes or results, viz. anti-intellectualism, barbarism, and savagery by celebrating "natural man." In sum, neo-Puritanism, in that it "contributes directly to the decay of education and the progress of barbaric meaninglessness" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), continues to share and expand the "irrationality the fascist apotheosis of the deed."

Also, if the above is correct—i.e., in American Puritanism the "Bible was the only common culture" and "no schooling is better than secular schooling"— then it is no surprise that reportedly "in America genuine academic freedom has

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[36] Perhaps a peculiar, though relatively trivial, dimension of America Puritanism's legacy of "barbarous" practices and "natural savagery" or at least cultural nonsophistication, specifically its predilection for austere–ascetic and low-quality food, is the lack or weakness of what can be described as "chocolate culture" in America, especially when compared with most of Europe. This is suggested both by the number of companies producing such products and the data on their consumption in contemporary societies. At least, that is the impression of most Europeans when visiting or residing in America, where just one major domestic company makes traditional chocolate products and in most stores it is almost impossible to find other than these few home-produced, and typically of lower-quality than imported, goods. In turn, most Americans are said to be experiencing a sort of cultural shock by the extent and pervasiveness of "chocolate culture" in most of Europe, from the moment they arrive at European airports to visiting stores and other objects and "socializing" with their hosts. In particular, a comparison of the number, quality, and artistic properties of traditional chocolate products at US and European airports would indicate and confirm the dramatic gap in this respect: a few (or not at all), poor-quality, artistically empty, or dull brands in the first, hundreds, high-quality, and esthetically conscious ones in the second. Generally, the austerity and low quality of food, including beverages (e.g., serving water as the beverage at meals, and prohibiting alcohol and even caffeine nonalcoholic drinks, is a symptom of such asceticism), observed in most neo-Puritan fundamentalist and other Protestant groups (e.g., Baptists, Methodists, Mormons) in America is remarkable, even striking to most Europeans, especially those from Lutheran and Catholic Europe (Germany, France, Italy). To be sure, the lack of "chocolate culture," just as the prevalence of austere–ascetic and low-quality food and beverages, in America is a relatively trivial legacy or effect of Puritanism, but is still sociologically pertinent by indicating and confirming that the latter generates and leaves as its heritage or instinct a diminished cultural quality and diversity of life in which "delight is austere" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), or even a kind of forbidden apple. In retrospect, both neo-Puritan America and the communist Soviet Union shared this property. It seemed as if neither was able or willing to produce a decent brand of chocolate, or even a reliable and good-looking car, as well as more than austere–ascetic and low-quality food, unlike "high-tech" weapons of mass destruction and space stations, which reaffirms the authoritarian and antihumanist commonality between Puritanism and communism.

never been the rule, and [scientists] were the principal victims of attacks" (Coats 1967:724), mostly by Puritan-inspired fundamentalists and their political allies. Hence, these continuing, even recently, as in the 1980s–2000s, escalating and intensifying attacks and constrains on academic and other intellectual freedom, exemplified and culminated in those on evolution theory as well as "liberal" or critical social theories, represent a particular dimension of the Puritan legacy of anticultural repression and regression, including of science and art through censorship just as their and technology abuse for authoritarian, or theocratic and imperialist aims, viz. creation of a "Bible Belt" in America and an "empire of liberty" in the world. The above predicts that so long as the legacy or influence of Puritanism persists and further strengthens via religious fundamentalism and neoconservatism, these attacks and constrains will continue and intensify, and consequently the repression and regression of science, art, and all culture in modern America. By contrast, the weaker theocratic legacy or impact of Puritanism relative to, notably, liberalism and secularism epitomized by the Enlightenment in Europe and even Great Britain is an important, though not the only, factor in explaining and predicting the substantial decrease in the number and intensity of religiously driven attacks and restraints on science and academic freedom, just as further cultural modernization, liberalization, and secularization (Inglehart and Baker 2000), in these societies.

Pervasive Antihumanism

A corollary, salient dimension of the Puritan authoritarian legacy in contemporary society is antihumanism, notably abhorrence of secular humanism, redefining Puritanism, as noted, as a nonhuman and even, for some non-Puritan Christians, non-Christian religion, and social system. This legacy or outcome—and a "curse" from the prism traditional Christian humanism, not to mention liberal–humanistic democracy and civil society—consists in what can be described as the "death" or decline of spontaneity, humanity, optimism, and joyful experience, and to that extent the "loss of happiness" (Lane 2000) or quality in social life in favor of pervasive cool reserve, inhumanity, pessimism, and hypocrisy in those societies historically dominated or pervaded by Puritanism. For example, Mill suggests that the Puritan legacy in this respects consists of diminished joy, quality and diversity in human life by observing that the "extreme incapacity [sic!] of the people for personal enjoyment is a characteristic of countries over which Puritanism has passed [making them] puritanically rigorous," seemingly referring to Great Britain and America. He implies that, to paraphrase Veblen, Puritans possess an extreme "trained incapacity" for personal enjoyment—or a superior acquired *capacity* and taste for nonenjoyment, including perhaps what Bentham would call pain or self-inflicted suffering a la Cromwell, or unhappiness—which dispenses with or reduces individual spontaneity, happiness (in the utilitarian sense of pleasure), and ultimately human life and liberty. Also, recall Weber remarks that early Puritans in England and America (plus Holland) "were characterized by the exact opposite of the joy of living," as well as that the Puritan "cool reserve" or "quiet self-control" is what

that "still distinguishes the best type of English or American gentleman today." Generally, he identifies Puritanism as "one of the roots of that disillusioned and pessimistically inclined individualism which can even today be identified in the national characters and the institutions of the peoples with a Puritan past."

In turn, Mill as well as Bentham and Spencer would specify Weber by implying that Puritan individualism, far from being libertarian, as usually supposed, in virtue of its "extreme incapacity" for enjoyment or pleasure, is inherently incapable of enjoying, let alone permitting individual liberty in a sense defined in these terms, viz. the "pursuit of happiness." Namely, "disillusioned and pessimistically inclined" Puritans are discontented, unhappy, and to that extent, either themselves or making others through self- and other-suffering respectively, unfree in the terms of secular democracy. As a curiosity, Weber comments that the "typical German quality often called good nature or naturalness contrasts strongly, even in the facial expressions of people, with the effects of that thorough destruction of the spontaneity of the *natural status* in the Anglo-American atmosphere, which Germans are accustomed to judge unfavorably as narrowness, unfreeness, and inner constraint." In particular, remember his remark that many Germans have the impression that the "virtues professed" by American Puritanism or its Americanism are "pure hypocrisy." In turn, Weber emphasizes that these differences in attitude and behavior are "very striking," adding that they "have clearly originated in the lesser degree of ascetic penetration of life in Lutheranism as distinguished from Calvinism," and consequently in Germany and other Lutheran Europe (e.g., Scandinavia), as compared with Puritan England and especially America.

Some contemporary sociologists echo Weber's observations observing that to Europeans "America is a cynical power and its morality a hypocritical ideology"[37] (Baudrillard 1999:91), primarily in consequence of the "blind" persistence and salience of Puritanism in American politics and culture. A peculiar instance of this Puritan-grounded and conservative-sustained hypocritical ideology in modern America is that, as some sociologists put it, the "treasure of armies is revealed, but prostitution is not allowed inside the country" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993).

Overall, sociologists attribute to persisting Puritanism what is termed the "hellish tedium of the everyday life in the US" (Baudrillard 1999:86), seemingly emptied of virtually any human spontaneity, humanity and culture, minus the car and puritanical television, during the 1980s–2000s. In this view, contemporary America has been again, after New England and the South, reconverted into a sort of neo-Puritan "living hell" inhabited by human creatures who are, within "slavelike jobs"

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[37] For example, Baudrillard (1999:49), noting that Americans smile or laugh more but less sincerely than Europeans, describes this nonsincere ("toothpaste") smiling or laughter in the manner of Reagan as the "sarcastic exhilaration of a puritan culture." Earlier, in apparent reference to contemporary America, Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) observe what they call "false laughter" and that "in the false society laughter is a disease which has attacked happiness." They add consequently in contemporary America "personality scarcely signifies anything more than shining white teeth and freedom from body odor and emotions"; recall the Puritan-Calvinist devaluation of emotion.

(Wacquant 2002:1518–1519) or settings, forced to "overwork themselves if not exactly to death, at least to a degree where there is not much point in continuing to live" (Manent 1998:220), while living in a hypermonastery and subjected to the mastery by neo-Puritan evangelical saints–masters (e.g., persisting alcohol, gambling and other vice prohibitions in the Bible Belt). This then makes both economy and society function or look as an open prison of "new slaves," sinners or ascetic monks for whom "delight is austere"[38] (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993) or even prohibited, as the "proverbial apple" of knowledge, by these Puritan saints—masters purporting to "save" sinful and evil humans from themselves. Hence, if contemporary America has become what some analysts describe as a "sick society"[39] (Lane 2000:319), while attributing this mostly to materialism or

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[38] Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) comment that, according to monasticism, "not asceticism but the sexual act denotes the renunciation of attainable bliss," which apparently also holds true of American and other Puritanism. They add that in American films "it is more strictly forbidden for an illegitimate relationship to be admitted without the parties being punished than for a millionaire's future son-in-law to be active in the labor movement" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). This is at least in part a Puritan legacy, though they remark that "what is decisive today is no longer Puritanism," still asserting itself in women's organizations but economic and political factors trying to dispel the "suspicion that resistance is possible."

[39] Lane (2000: 134–137) also remarks that in the US during the 1980s–2000s the "market's victims created a religious survival," as a putative corrective to or escape from excessive materialism ("hedonic treadmill") and consequently a "sick society." Yet, given the typically undemocratic, including fundamentalist and theocratic, character of such mostly neo-Puritan evangelical revivals in contemporary and historical America, notably the South, they generate or perpetuate such a "sick" society at least in the noneconomic sense of perverting secular democracy and civil liberties, thus part of the problem, not its solution (or just an illusionary one). This is what an editorial in US weekly magazine *Time* precisely suggests by pointing out the common "tendency to blame Puritanism for the supposed repressiveness of American society." Notably, it comments "chief among the many ills exacerbating our sick spirit is bogus Puritanism. Ill-minded men wed to this pernicious folly inhibit us from ordaining reasonable policies regarding sex, drugs, violent crime, taxes, the military and foreign policy." As for the latter, some US libertarians wonder, in reference to the neo-Puritan and neoconservative war on "evil" and terror, "if all this is freedom, what exactly is dictatorship" (Hornberger 2003), which can be rephrased as "if this is a free and sane society, what is an unfree and sick society"? In turn, only Southern Protestant and other fundamentalists would claim that, say, "materialistic" and liberal–secular California or New York is a "sick" society, and the "spiritualist" and conservative–evangelical Bible Belt a paragon of the opposite, so a model for the entire country in the twenty-first century, as was New England's "Biblical Commonwealth" for the Puritans during the seventeenth to eighteenth century. Alternatively, from the prism of liberal–secular democracy and a free civil society, just as New England's "Biblical Commonwealth," the Bible Belt, like any theocratic system or project, is a "sick" society in terms of secular democracy and civil society, not in spite but because of its perennial "religious survival," from the Great Awakenings to the fundamentalist counterrevolution of the 1980s–2000s. For example, the witch-hunts or persecutions and extermination of the "ungodly" by New England's Puritans and their sequels and proxies (e.g., temperance wars, the death penalty for sins as crimes) in the evangelical Bible Belt, plus McCarthyism, and beyond are unambiguous symptoms of a "sick society." Similarly, if, as Berman (2000:51) remarks utilitarianism is the "real, and pervasive (if invisible) philosophy of American society, a society in which very little has value in and of itself," the same can be said of Puritanism as its theology, in addition to or

the materialistic side of the "American dream" and utilitarianism overall (Berman 2000), Puritanism has been equally, if not more, as well as jointly instrumental in this outcome. This is not only or mainly because of its supposed Weberian connection with capitalism and so materialism or utilitarianism, but, more substantively, because of its observed political–social authoritarianism, repression, and antihumanism. Alternatively, primarily owing to Puritan antihumanism, notably its vehement condemnation or deep-seated abhorrence of secular humanism, contemporary America is far from being, as often the "theologians of Americanism" (Gelernter 2005) claim, a "civilization with strong humanistic values" (Berman 2000:176).

Further, contemporary analysts like Arendt imply that the Puritan "thorough destruction" of human spontaneity may have authoritarian or totalitarian attributes and consequences, given that totalitarianism, especially fascism, tries precisely to destroy spontaneous human conduct. In this view, "those who aspire to total domination must liquidate all spontaneity [because] any spontaneously given friendship [and neutrality] is from the standpoint of totalitarian domination just as dangerous as open hostility, precisely because spontaneity as such, with its incalculability, is the greatest of all obstacles to total domination over man. Total power can be achieved and safeguarded only in a world of conditioned reflexes, of marionettes without the slightest trace of spontaneity" (Arendt 1951:36). Even if this liquidation of spontaneity and ultimately freedom by Nazism and its sadism–masochism cannot be exclusively or directly linked to Puritanism or Calvinism and its sado-masochistic character and destruction of the spontaneous (albeit this link is what is suggested by Fromm 1941), it confirms that the latter has been a sort of protofascism before modern fascism in this respect. To that extent, fascist nihilism operates or appears as an indirect, special case, analogue, or vestige of Puritanism's totalitarian legacy in modern society.

Another manifest and pertinent dimension of the Puritan heritage of antihumanism, especially the hostility to secular humanism, encompasses inhuman primitivism and conformism that Puritanism typically generates or promotes in all social, including political and cultural, life. This represents in particular the legacy of Puritanism in contemporary America observed to be permeated by cultural primitivism and social conformism, or more so than other non- and less-Puritan societies like Europe and Great Britain, respectively. Moreover, some observers describe America during the 1980s–2000s as being "deep down" what is described as the "*only remaining primitive society*" within the Western world or the "primitive society of the future" in cultural–social terms, in spite or perhaps because of its "technological refinement" and its "bluff good conscience" (Baudrillard 1999:7–8). Arguably, this comparatively unmatched cultural, as distinguished from technical, primitivism, or barbarism, including what other analysts term stylized or aesthetic "barbarity"

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conjunction with materialism or economism. This conjunction can be deemed the legacy of Franklin, who was, in Weber's portrayal, a "walking contradiction" merging utilitarianism ("honesty is best policy") and Puritanism (the "path of righteousness"), supposedly blended in the spirit of capitalism ("time is money").

(Horkheimer and Adorno 1993), are primarily the legacy or achievement of Puritanism, as are "technological refinement" and "bluff good conscience." As for the latter, recall that Puritanism tends to commit authoritarian abuse of modern technologies, merged with self-righteousness, of which a salient legacy is that in contemporary American society ruled by conservatism "nature and technology are mobilized against all opposition"[40] (Horkheimer and Adorno 1993). In turn, Puritan-rooted cultural primitivism is observed to have turned into the "hyperbolic, inhuman character of a universe that is beyond us, that far outstrips its own moral, social, or ecological rationale. Only Puritans could have invented and developed this ecological and biological morality based on preservation which is profoundly racial in nature" (Baudrillard 1999:7–8). Reportedly, thanks to these Puritans and their descendents in America at the close of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century "everything here bears the marks of a primitive society," with, for example, technologies, the media, and total biosocial simulation "developing in a wild state" (Baudrillard 1999:63). Thus, if "dependence and servitude"[41] (Adorno 1991) exist in American culture and politics, "everything human is artificial" and society descends into "barbarism," with Americans perceived as modern "barbarians" (Baudrillard 1999:66–67), this is primarily, though not solely, Puritanism's heritage, with its original and persisting antihumanism and barbarism or inhuman primitivism.

A particular element of Puritan-rooted primitivism in America is found in what observers describe as "notorious American conformism"[42] manifested in that in this society "there is no honor in breaking laws, nor prestige in transgression or being exceptional," and considered "a sign of social and political weakness"

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[40] Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) imply that in contemporary American politics, like the economy, the "insistent demand for effectiveness makes technology into psycho-technology, into a procedure for manipulating men."

[41] Adorno (1991) comments that "human dependence and servitude, the vanishing point of the culture industry, could scarcely be more faithfully described than by the American interviewee who was of the opinion that the dilemmas of the contemporary epoch would end if people would simply follow the lead of prominent personalities." He concludes that Puritan-based American culture "impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves," as the "precondition for a democratic society."

[42] A relatively trivial but indicative instance of Puritan-grounded "notorious American conformism" relates to eating practices and conventions in contemporary America. For example, reminiscent of an Orwellian world, precisely at noon most Americans, as if conforming to a command by the Big Brother, have lunch (of course, no alcohol, even wine, as the forbidden apple at least at this time of the day), and alternatively, conveying the impression that failing to do so would be (mildly) deviant "un-American" behavior. While this practice is striking to non-Americans on the account of its remarkable conformism and its unusually early timing, it can be fully understood only in terms of the legacies or ramifications of Puritanism, viz. the vestige of a rural or industrial Puritan "get up early, go to bed early" lifestyle (Cohen 2003; Zukin 1977). In comparative terms, such strict conformism with respect to eating conventions is unparalleled within contemporary Western societies, and is only matched, as expected, given Puritan—Islamic affinities, by that in Muslim countries (e.g., exact times of nonfasting, strict alcohol prohibitions, etc.).

(Baudrillard 1999:92). Alternatively, "nonconformists are punished with Draconian severity" (Patell 2001:186–187) by a Puritan-based neoconservative "tough-on-crime" penal system. It does so through mass incarceration, embodied by more than two million prisoners of whom the vast majority are nonviolent drug users in the 2000s, and executions of, alongside many innocent, violent criminal and moral sinners alike such as drug traders apparently, as Merton (1968) would suggest, seeking to attain the "American Dream" by actually practicing, yet in a prohibited business field, "free enterprise" celebrated, propagated, and inculcated into their minds virtually from kindergarten, just as do those other entrepreneurial Americans also marketing "forbidden apples" (e.g., the lady imprisoned for selling too many sex toys in Texas), and did their proto-Mafia precursors during Prohibition. This is a penal system of such harshness and magnitude that are unknown in modern Western society and only unrivalled by theocratic Islamic and secular neocommunist dictatorships like Iran and China, respectively.

This implies that contemporary America remains the "only remaining primitive society" in cultural terms within the Western world at least on the account of this extraordinary, even comparatively unparalleled (Munch 2001) Puritan-inherited social conformism and moralist repression to the point of Draconian punishments for nonconformity, and such related attributes as uniformity, hypocrisy, lack of spontaneity, rigidity, "extreme incapacity" for enjoyment. In turn, conformist and repressive neo-Puritanism both provokes and counteracts an anti-Puritan rebellion and its own excesses or perversions (e.g., like rebellious and even self-destructive alcohol and drug use). Arguably, what are observed as "shamelessly conformist"[43] (Adorno 1991) behaviors in culture and politics, to the level of conformity replacing consciousness "developed retrogressively,"[44] make America "close to primitive societies in which it would be absurd to distinguish oneself morally by disobeying the collective ideal" (Baudrillard 1999:92) rather than to modern Western secular democracies characterized precisely by the opposite.[45] As observers comment, in America at the threshold of the twenty-first century, Puritan-inherited Americanism, with its "professed," and not necessarily libertarian, individualism, continues to generate a "powerful conformism" as well as "small-town parochialism," with the result of the world or despised "foreign lands" becoming the "source of curiosity and trepidation for a citizenry firmly located in a particular community, for whom travel narrows rather than broadens an American mind" (Singh 2002:226).

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[43] Adorno (1991) remarks that US Puritan-based culture (and politics) proclaims: "you shall conform, without instruction as to what; conform to that which exists anyway, and to that which everyone thinks anyway as a reflex of its power and omnipresence." In his view, these are "exhortations to toe the line behind which stand the most powerful interests."

[44] As a case of such retrogressive consciousness, Adorno (1991) notes that "it is no coincidence that cynical American film producers are heard to say that their pictures must take into consideration the level of eleven-year-olds. In doing so they would very much like to make adults into eleven-year-olds."

[45] Also, Horkheimer and Adorno (1993) identify an economic legacy or reflex of Puritan conformity by observing that in the US economy the "conformism of the buyers and the effrontery of the producers who supply them prevail."

The above yields the conclusion that what is new in neo-Puritan America during the 1980s–2000s, compared with older primitive societies, is only the clash of "primitive and wild" with the "absolute simulacrum" (Baudrillard 1999:104–108) in the form of modern "technological refinement," as in the mass media, and a "bluff good conscience." The latter is, for example, identified in the proto-Puritan idea of America as the "achieved utopia of goodness" versus that of "Evil" or Communism, or in "a triumphal illusionism," including the "triumphantism" of neo-Puritan evangelicalism (the Christian Right) (Smith 2000:194). Historically, the above clash is inherited from, and perhaps intrinsic to, American Puritanism due to its paradoxical mixture of cultural primitivism, including conformism, with the authoritarian apotheosis and use of modern technology as well as with self-righteousness, hypocrisy, and antispontaneity. To that extent, the clash between cultural primitivism and social simulation, embodied by modern technology, and a good conscience functions or seems as a sort of fusion or juxtaposition of conformism and Americanism—i.e., the creed and goal of technological–military and institutional superiority—as American Puritanism's crucial heritage and attribute.

In sum, as its remarkable legacy or achievement, Puritanism has made and sustained America as the last primitive or backward society within the West in a myriad of respects. These include the following: cultural, especially artistic, regression, and repression unprecedented, except in feudalism, fascism and communism, or unparalleled among Western societies; rigid conformism and uniformity as well as parochialism and anticosmopolitanism; economic inequality and exclusion, labor oppression, and antiwelfare policy; political repression, discrimination, and exclusion, including hierarchy, oligarchy, and party duopoly dispensing with or subverting free competition and dissent in politics just as in economy[46]; a repressive legal code, manifested in a Draconian "tough-on-crime" criminal–justice system criminalizing moral impurities, thus committing injustice in Durkheim's sense of a misfit between crime and punishment. Others include the pervasive use of violence and force in society, epitomized, and reproduced by a pervasive gun culture ("Wild-West" mentality) as well as cowboy or mafia capitalism; general traditionalism or backwardness in culture as well as politics; traditionalist morality, moral coercion, imposition, and intolerance, making Puritan America or US

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[46] In a sense, despite opposite ethnocentric claims by conservative US economists (e.g., Friedman and Friedman 1982) and others, the destruction, subversion, or restriction of free competition in both economy and polity has been as Puritan-American as the "apple pie" (Wagner 1997) during most of America's history, from New England's Puritan suppression of economic and political liberties alike through the "robber barons" monopolies or oligopolies to GM's practice/slogan of "what is good . . . " to the process of monopolization and concentration of wealth and power during the 1980–2000s. In short, the typical outcome or tendency of American Puritanism and religious conservatism overall has been oligopoly, if not monopoly, in economy and oligarchy, including party duopoly, in polity, i.e., an oligarchic political–economic system (Pryor 2001). In this sense, Puritanism has perpetuated and extended into America as a whole, with some modifications, Winthrop's *mixed aristocracie* as its crucial legacy or residue in the US polity and economy.

conservatives the most repressive, aggressive and intolerant society or group within modern Western societies. Still others are traditionalist, premodern religiosity, reduction, and subordination of secular culture to religion, including superstition (beliefs in Satan and witches, exorcism, brutal witch-hunts and crusades against "evil," including other societies as the "axis of evil"); religious fundamentalism and theocratic outcomes or tendencies, from New England to the Bible Belt; and global militarism, bellicosity, and aggression directed against other "un-godly" or "evil" societies. Naturally, all these processes, outcomes, and tendencies are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Thus, Puritan or conservative domestic moral repressiveness, intolerance, and aggressiveness in America (Lipset 1996) both generates and is regenerated or reinforced by global repression, aggression, and militarism or imperialism characterizing American Puritanism or its modern proxies like Bible-Belt evangelicalism (Munch 2001).

On this account, Puritanism created or bequeathed a kind of monster or "iron," "hotter sort" of society, i.e., what some US economists (Friedman and Friedman 1982) call, in reference to "big" government, societal or governmental Frankenstein, and Hobbes termed Leviathan. If so, then in retrospect, the Puritan Pilgrims did not really have to "bother" to embark on their celebrated and ultimately "bloody" pilgrimage to the new "promised land" and to establish their claimed God's heaven on earth or the "shining city upon a hill." Simply, they could find, while in opposition to non-Puritan powers, and eventually when reaching power as in Cromwell's saga, build the same type of society in the old despised Europe, including their home country England. This holds true from the angle of the ideal, values, and reality of a modern free, open, or liberal–pluralist society (Munch 2001) of which Puritanism turned out to be an adversary rather than support in America and beyond, especially the Western world (Inglehart 2004).

The Authoritarian Legacy of Puritanism in Global Perspective

In global or comparative terms, contemporary American society typically reveals itself as what sociologists call "unusually," by comparison with other Western societies, including Great Britain, "politically molded, communally structured, religiously determined" and consequently "conformist," just as "simultaneously" economic and individualistic, primarily as the historical legacy or continuing outcome of Puritanism (Munch 2001:223). Notably, in this view, America is more "politically molded, communally structured, religiously determined" and conformist than other Western societies because of Puritanism's historical and persisting cultural and political predominance, or predominant Protestant sectarianism (Lipset 1996), in relation to non-Puritan tempering and countervailing forces like Anglicanism and the secular Enlightenment that have usually been and remain less salient than in England and Europe, respectively. This is another way to observe that, by its political, collectivist, and religious determination, Puritanism has historically bequeathed, just as originally created, a society more uniform, rigid, and intolerant

(Bauman 2001), thus more repressive, politically and culturally, plus economically, including theocentric, than virtually any other within the Western world. It is to restate that Puritanism's bequest or imprint consists in reproducing America as the "only remaining primitive society" in social–cultural terms, notably a remarkable deviation in culture modernization, liberalization, and secularization, within modern, liberal, and secular Western civilization.

As research suggests, the Puritan–Protestant "broad cultural heritage" of America is so persistent, pervasive, and intensive that it perpetually remakes the country what is described as a "deviant case" (Inglehart and Baker 2000) in terms of culture modernization or secularism in the Western world even at the threshold of the third millennium. For example, during the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, emphasis on religion increased—albeit slightly yet from an already very high level of religiosity, the highest in the West—in neo-Puritan evangelical America hence placed in the company of most third-world or Islamic countries also experiencing such an increase (e.g., Bangladesh, India, Mexico, Nigeria), while declining in most developed societies, including Great Britain and Canada (Inglehart 2004). On this account, the heritage of Puritanism is to effectively render and perpetuate America as a sort of third-world rather than Western country, notably a Christian—Protestant counterpart or proxy of Islamic society,[47] in religious and consequently moral–cultural terms.

While generally research finds that "broad cultural heritage" of a modern society, such as Protestant, Roman Catholic, Christian Orthodox, Confucian, Islamic, or communist, marks an "imprint on values that endures despite modernization" (Inglehart and Baker 2000), in particular Puritanism elevates and reinforces this endurance to the extreme point of deviation within the Western world, notably America and to a lesser extent other historically or transiently "Puritan" or "Anglo-Saxon" societies like Great Britain and its former colonies[48] Canada and Australia. At first glance, this may appear as a just difference in degree rather than of substance between Puritanism and other types of cultural legacy. Even so, it is the difference of, to use Durkheim's terms, the "normal" endurance or coexistence of religion and other traditional values alongside modernization, including secularization and liberalization, from religious traditionalism's "pathological," "morbid," or extreme hostility to and deviation from modernism, liberalism, and secularism, i.e., between moderation and extremism in this respect. The diagnosis of America as such a "deviant case" primarily as the result of its Puritan cultural heritage implies precisely

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[47] This is what Inglehart (2004:4) implies reporting that, first, the "publics of the poorest societies tend to place the greatest emphasis on religion," and, second, that "societies with an Islamic cultural heritage are particularly likely to attach great importance to religion," as is a historically Puritan America.

[48] Inglehart and Baker (2000) find that historically Puritan or Anglo-Saxon societies in general continue to hold traditional–religious values, along with Catholic (plus Islamic countries), and their non-Puritan (mostly Lutheran) counterparts secular–rational ones. In their terms, the "English-speaking zone" (just as the "Latin-American zone") has a negative coefficient for the "secular-rational" dimension indicating traditional-religious values, in sharp contrast to the "Protestant Europe zone."

this pathology, anomaly, or extremism of Puritanism as distinguished from the "normal," "natural," or "moderate" persistence of other religious traditionalism, including non-Puritan Protestantism, such as Lutheranism in Europe, Anglicanism in Great Britain and its former colonies, in Western societies. Simply, while these other religious types of Western cultural heritage, including non-Puritan or moderate Protestantism itself, at most slow down or mitigate cultural modernization, liberalization, and secularization, Puritanism instead persistently deviates from and systematically counteracts or prevents it, thus rendering its societies "deviants" or "outliers." This is not only a formal but a substantive difference between what US fundamentalists dismiss as a "liberal—secular" Europe, including Great Britain, and celebrate as a "faith-based" America, at least the South, during the 2000s.

In this respect, Puritanism remains uniquely anomalous and extreme within modern Western culture, while its main non-Western equivalent, counterpart, or rival in this respect is probably Islam, and perhaps Hinduism, also observed to make its societies, especially Islamic theocracies like Iran and others, deviant cases, just as America, in cultural modernization and liberalization.[49] No wonder, many observers (Bauman 2001; Friedland 2002; Turner 2002) find that two of the most manifest, intense, and persistent deviant or "outlier" countries in terms of culture modernization, notably liberalization and secularization, during the late twentieth and the early twenty-first century are precisely neo-Puritan America, especially the evangelical South, and Islamic Iran, which strongly exemplifies and reaffirms the Weberian affinity between Puritanism and Islam. Hence, the difference or opposition in cultural modernization and liberalization between Puritanism as "iron" and other moderate Protestantism is comparable or analogous, though not identical, to that between the latter and Islam, specifically secular Europe and theocratic Iran, in these terms, thus not only a matter of degree or form but also of kind or substance.

Great Britain versus America

To summarize, the above indicates that Puritanism's cultural, political, and sociopsychological heritage in contemporary Western societies has been typically authoritarian, including repression and regression in culture and theocratic projects or practices. It also suggests that this legacy has varied according to the "degree of Puritan freedom" or character of a particular society, more in America than in continental Europe and even Great Britain. In particular, while contemporary America remains or reevolves into, due to the enduring and strong Puritan cultural heritage, a deviation from Western cultural liberalization and secularization, Great Britain, the very "home of Puritanism," has become increasingly non-Puritan or liberal, secular, and modernist in cultural terms during recent times. An

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[49] For example, Wallerstein and Zukin (1989:436) note that the "relaxation of puritanical sexual mores has been a steady linear development throughout the 20th century worldwide," which has made Puritanism uniquely anachronistic, extreme, and repressive.

instance of these liberal changes in Great Britain involves the manifest and intense generational conflicts in the system of values[50] (Szakolczai and Fustos 1998), with the new generation evidently prevailing over the old. This is indicated or anticipated by the grave crisis and discredit, including the electoral defeats, of British social conservatism widely regarded as "stodgy" and "out of touch" with modern liberal Britain to the point of reaching what some analysts call a "terminal condition" (Eccleshall 2000) in the 1990s–2000s.

In retrospect, Weber anticipated these conflicts and perhaps their eventual outcome by observing that "through the whole of English society in the time since the 17th century goes the conflict between the squirearchy, the representatives of 'merrie old England' [and Puritanism]. Both elements, that of an unspoiled naive joy of life, and of a strictly regulated, reserved self-control, and conventional ethical conduct are even today combined to form the English national character." In other words, that is the conflict between the English pre-Puritan way of life and the Calvinist–Puritan original "exuberant program of purified church and commonwealth," including the "victory of public and private righteousness" and the militant "smashing of Babylonish wickedness" (Sprunger 1982:460).

As known, Puritanism has been at some historical points, as during the 1550s–1800s, victorious and predominant, enduringly in America and temporarily, due to the abortive Puritan Revolution, in Great Britain, especially experiencing "moments of power" and glory in New England under Winthrop and his successors' long mastery during the 1620s–1830s and in Great Britain under Cromwell's short-lived rule of the 1640s–60s. However, after the Restoration of the Monarchy and the Anglican Church in 1660, Puritanism in Great Britain reportedly "retreated to the side lines of English life, existing but chastened [with] the narrowing and hardening of the Puritan vision" (Sprunger 1982:460). In a sense, the anti-Puritan Restoration and its aftermath was Act I of the decline or retreat of Puritanism and its cultural heritage in Great Britain, just as, in the original form of Calvinism, in Europe, thus prefiguring or adumbrating its further, perhaps final, defeat in the British generational conflicts during the 1990s–2000s. Hence, one can hazard the guess that if Weber visited Great Britain during the 2000s he would have probably diagnosed at least the temporary triumph of "merrie old England" over Calvinist Puritanism, i.e., the "joy of life" over strict self-control, repression and ascetic morality. This is an outcome which Mill also effectively predicted or observed and seemingly wanted by pointing out with apparent regret the Puritan-based people's "extreme incapacity" for individual enjoyment, plus "rigorousness," just as did his contemporary Comte predict or observe what he called the "industrial superiority of Protestant nations."

Moreover, Comte anticipated such an outcome in Great Britain and even the West as a whole, perhaps minus America reflecting its persisting exceptionalism

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[50] Generally, Szakolczai and Fustos (1998:226) find that in contemporary Europe, the main cultural and political differences are "due to the marks left by Protestantism and Communism," as well as the "persistence of the Catholic-Protestant dividing-line" and the "survival of Enlightenment rationalism and the impact of social democracy."

in respect with Puritan-based religious traditionalism, fundamentalism, and overall religiosity (Lipset 1996). He does so by stating that a theological–military or feudal system "that could not hold its ground before the natural progress of intelligence and of society can never again serve as a basis for social order," as social changes moved to the "complete elimination" of this regime which "could never be more than provisional" according to what he calls the "fundamental law" of social evolution. Hence, Comte implies that what was the theological–military age, specifically feudalism or medievalism[51] (Nisbet 1966) in Europe during the Dark Middle Ages, has since essentially become or renamed as the rule of "Puritanism" and religious conservatism overall, first and transiently in Great Britain, then and more enduringly in America. If so, what he identifies as the struggle between theological–military or feudal and positive–rational or liberal social systems, which the latter was observed or predicted to win in early modern Europe, has continued and been reenacted in the form of the "mindless battle" (Habermas 2001) of Puritan-rooted religious orthodoxy or Protestant fundamentalism against liberalism and secularism in especially America since the seventeenth through to the twenty-first century.

In retrospect, Comte was apparently correct in diagnosing or predicting the eventual defeat of the theological–military by the positive–rational system, notably feudalism, including what Weber calls patrimonialism or traditionalism overall, by Enlightenment-based liberalism, secularism, and modernism, in Europe, but not or less so in America. In the latter, instead, the theological–military system in the new form or disguise of Puritanism or religious conservatism generally has been mostly triumphant over these countervailing liberal–secular forces during most of American history, from New England's Puritan theocracy in the seventeenth century to Southern bibliocracy in the early twenty-first century. It is this exceptional and apparently enduring triumph of Puritan-based religious conservatism, as America's functional substitute, survival, or proxy of European theocratic feudalism and generally traditionalism, epitomized by official Catholicism, over liberalism and secularism that essentially defines Puritan-based American exceptionalism, notably its authoritarian-edged sword (Lipset 1996), in relation to most Western societies,

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[51] This is what US sociologist Nisbet (1966) precisely admits for European but not, somewhat predictably, for American conservatism. Thus, he states that the "first and lasting significance" of the "rediscovery of medievalism" in reaction to the Enlightenment was to "European conservatism, forming the model of the conservative image of the good society" (Nisbet 1966:14). Curiously, Nisbet (1966:14) claims that "conservative ideas never really took root in America" precisely because the country was "lacking the persisting reality of a medieval institutional past." From the vantage point of America in the 1980s–2000s dominated by neoconservatism, including religious conservatism, just as New England's Puritan theocracy during the seventeenth to nineteenth century, the first part of the claim is evidently incorrect or premature, while the second is a sort of conventional wisdom. In spite or rather because of this lack of a "medieval institutional past" what was "feudalism" or "medievalism," including theocratic Catholicism, in Europe has functionally become or renamed as "Puritanism" and religious (and other) "conservatism" overall in America since the seventeenth century and New England's theocracy.

including Great Britain itself. In particular, this triumph is Act 1 or the origin of the observed "triumphal illusionism" or "triumphalist banner" (Bell 2002:462) of Americanism, including its recent semigrotesque and anti-intellectual version in "we-are-the-best" Reaganism, as the civic religion rooted in or equivalent to Puritanism (Munch 2001).

However, even in America the triumph of Puritanism or religious conservatism has not been total, absolutely permanent and unchallenged, but sometimes mitigated, challenged, and in part reversed by moderating and countervailing liberal–secular social forces, however relatively weak and transient, from Jefferson, Madison and other Enlightenment-influenced figures to the disestablishment of New England theocracy to the anti-Puritan rebellion, liberalization, and secularization of the 1960s. Hence, while virtually ended or weakened and diluted in most of Western Europe—with some nuisances or exceptions like Catholic dominated Poland and Ireland, not to mention the Vatican theocracy—with the defeat or dilution of medieval theocracy, theology, and feudalism by Enlightenment-based rationalism, liberalism, and secularism, the battle seems to continue between Comte's theological–military and secular–liberal systems in America at the start of the twenty-first century. To be sure, the battle has assumed new, "all-American" forms, notably the form of culture wars or crusade-style attacks by neo-Puritan fundamentalism, typically entwined or allied with political neoconservatism, against secularism and liberalism. But what most US neo-Puritan fundamentalists and political conservatives deny or overlook is that these recurring fundamentalist antisecular and antiliberal wars in the "new nation" are in essence continuations or reenactments of those Comte identifies between theocratic feudalism and democratic liberalism or rationalism in the "old" Europe; at least that is what he implies and predicts. Alternatively, they would probably never acknowledge that Puritanism is basically the Protestant functional substitute, counterpart, or proxy for medieval theocratic Catholicism first in England and then America, and that religious–political conservatism overall is another revival and designation of feudalism or medievalism and Comte's theological–military system or traditionalism in general. In terms of Clausewitz's definition of war, fundamentalist culture wars or crusade-like attacks against liberal–secular "non-believers," "sinners," "witches," "enemies," and other "un-American" activities, like Cromwell-Winthrop's prototypes, are the continuation of the conservative–authoritarian "politics of Puritanism" in America by "other means," such as both symbolic and physical violence, domestic and global oppression, or destruction alike.

Hence, contrary to Comte's and other sociological, for example Spencer's, rational expectations, the battle between his opposite ideological–social systems, notably theocratic feudalism and democratic liberalism, unlike in Western Europe, actually never ended or even weakened in substantive or sociological, as distinguished from formal or nominal, terms in America by the twenty-first century, in spite or perhaps because of the historical and continuing, though not total or invariable, triumph of Puritan-rooted religious conservatism over its liberal–secular rivals. In this sense, America may have, as usually claimed, no "feudal past" (Lipset 1996) in economic terms, including an aristocracy or "masters and servants," albeit

even this claim is doubtful if not invalidated, in view of Winthrop's medieval-style *mixt aristocracie*. Yet, a sort of religious–political "neo-feudalism," including "new patrimonial capitalism" (Cohen 2003), and American-style traditionalism overall in the sense or form of Puritan fundamentalism, theocracy, and so authoritarianism, has been its essential genesis, prevalent history, and perhaps "manifest destiny." For example, Puritan-rooted evangelical millenarianism in historical and contemporary America through the early twenty-first century has been driven by the very "phantasy of a salvation" (Giddens 1984:204) that exactly inspired Catholic and other Christian millenarian movements in Europe during feudalism or medieval times.

The preceding indicates that primarily in consequence of the fact that "Puritanism has been one of the most enduring forces in American life"[52] (Sprunger 1982:461), or more so than in Great Britain and continental Europe, the "first new" nation has become and remained ever-more puritanical—i.e., illiberal or conservative, religious, traditional, and so anachronistic—than even the "old" English home of Puritanism and cultural traditionalism. As a curious instance of this remarkable traditionalism directly or indirectly linked with Puritanism, America is the only country in the world that still uses the old British system of measures that Great Britain itself has mostly discarded in favor of the metric system, as another seeming bizarre or amusing variation or analogy of the "Greater or more extreme Calvinist than Calvin himself" theme. Admittedly, America persists with using the nonmetric system "though the rest of the world mainly uses the much more efficient metric system, because Americans are habituated to this absurd system of weights and measures" (Becker and Murphy 2000:16–17). If so, then this implies that such persistence is to be attributed to Puritanism and its original and persisting Americanism, i.e., nativism (Merton 1939), religious nationalism (Friedland 2002), and traditionalism or the "Anglo" ingredient (Munch 2001). At least, in virtue of its irrationalism, traditionalism, nationalism, and ethnocentrism Puritanism is potentially conducive to and even predictive of Americans'[53] apparently irrational habituation to an "absurd system" abandoned even by the British creator.

Hence, to reiterate, the difference between these two, in varying degrees, historically Puritan societies is that ushering in the third millennium America still is "not a secularized society" (Archer 2001:274) primarily owing to the persisting strength of Puritanism versus secularism and liberalism. This is in sharp contrast with Great Britain as a secular society due alternatively to Puritanism's

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[52] Sprunger (1982:461) adds that "in America Puritan settlers appropriated a wilderness for their own uses and there established a Puritan commonwealth. What had been theoretically formulated in the homeland of England could be put into action in America. The results were not always as expected nor attractive; nevertheless, Puritanism has been one of the most enduring forces in American life."

[53] Also, Reinhardt (2000:82) suggests that if fundamentalist or neoconservative Americans "could set aside their innate pride in matters of health care, they might on this point learn a useful lesson or two from the experience of other nations."

weakness and discredit as well as the operation of such tempering and countervailing forces as Anglicanism and Enlightenment-based liberalism. This is another way to say and confirm that the historical legacy, like the original attribute, of Puritanism in America has been the lack of or blurred substantive differentiation between religion and society, including politics, in spite or perhaps because of the formal separation of church and state as the putative equivalent to or secondary compensation for this primary difference. The case of America and its unofficial, yet socially and politically predominant, Puritanism confirms that this formal–constitutional separation through a supposedly secular state is not a necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for a substantive–sociological differentiation, thus a secularized society. So, the curious continuing combination and coexistence of a nonsecularized society with a secular state in contemporary America means no or blurred sociological differentiation between religion and politics combining and coexisting with their legal separation. This appears as a sort of Machiavellian formula or "lesser evil" that Puritanism has strategically or adaptively tolerated since the American Revolution, notably the official disestablishing of New England's theocracy in the 1830s, under the pressure by or in tactical compromise with countervailing and tempering nontheocratic, yet atypical forces like Jefferson et al.

Alternatively, the case of Great Britain and its official Anglicanism confirms that the lack of a formal separation of church and state, or the existence of a secular government, is not a necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for the substantive differentiation between religion and politics, so for a secularized society. Conversely, the missing legal "form" does not necessarily preclude or even appreciably weaken the present sociological "substance" in differentiating the two, a differentiation actually or potentially independent of official, including constitutional, formulations, at least in Great Britain. Hence, unlike Great Britain due to its moderating factors like Anglicanism and liberalism, if America is "not a secularized society" yet, even in the early twenty-first century, primarily owing to Puritanism or its perpetuation and generalization through and in fundamentalism, this indicates that the Puritan heritage has been substantively theocratic, and so authoritarian, rather than or just formally democratic, or more so than in the first case of England and the Anglican Church. No doubt, a lacking secular state and secularized society both can be used to characterize theocracy. Still, the second characterization is more foundational or sociological expressing the substantive differentiation between religion and secular social life, including politics, than the first reflecting instead the auxiliary or formal separation of church and state. For illustration, not many analysts would describe Great Britain as well as Denmark and Sweden, in spite of lacking a secular state due to the official Anglican and Lutheran church, as theocracy in the substantive, sociological sense of a theocratic society or total social–cultural system rather than merely government. Yet, many would do so with regard to "faith-based" America during the 2000s, especially the evangelical and proto-totalitarian Bible Belt (Bauman 1997), even though characterized, charitably interpreted, by their formal separation. At least, a neo-Puritan nonsecularized society in America, notably the South, seems closer or more like a

theocracy in a substantive sense than an Anglican or Lutheran nonsecular state in Great Britain, its other former colonies Canada and Australia, and Scandinavian countries.

In sum, the above confirms that the cultural heritage of Puritanism in contemporary Western societies has been essentially authoritarian, including theocratic, or more so than that of more moderate Protestantism like Anglicanism and Lutheranism. And the intensity of this legacy has been in exact proportion to the degree of Puritanism's historical presence, persistence, and salience in these societies, namely, Europe, Great Britain, and America in an ascending order.

Conclusion

What Weber calls Puritanism's "anti-authoritarian" tendency, and so its presumed historical connection with political democracy and a free civil society, is a sort of cherished mythology, analogous to the "beloved myth" (Delacroix and Nielsen 2001) of the Puritan-Calvinist "elective affinity" with modern capitalism within Western Protestant societies. This is in particular holds true of those societies with a Puritan history and heritage like Anglo-Saxon countries, first and foremost America and to a lesser extent Great Britain and its other former colonies. The Puritan supposed democratic and libertarian tendency is a cherished myth or "sweet lie" because it is premised on fallacious or "naïve assumptions about Puritanism and liberty" (Coffey 1998), including its "liberal mythology" (Gould 1996). A specific variation of this cherished myth is that the Puritan Pilgrims moved to and founded America (New England) in the search of "freedom of religion" they were supposedly denied in the old Europe (England) rather than to establish their own version of aristocratic theocracy (*mixt aristocracie*) they failed to fully create at home, especially after the eventual failure of the English Puritan Revolution. This variation is the most beloved part of the myth of Puritanism and liberty, or perhaps the most cherished piece of mythology in its own right in American history and society, up to the early twenty-first century.

Moreover, given its nearly common acceptance and persistence in Protestant and other Western countries, this is in sense even a more cherished and widespread myth than that about Puritanism or Calvinism and Protestantism overall and capitalism, as probably less commonly accepted or persisting in the literature as the result of various sociological and economic critiques or revisions since Weber's contemporary Sombart, for example. Like its capitalist version, this Puritan democratic–liberal mythology has especially persisted and been cultivated by Puritans and their proxies in America since and before, and in part owing to, Weber's original premise of antiauthoritarian tendencies in Puritanism. One likely reason for this remarkable persistence is that even in hardcore capitalist societies with a Puritan genesis, evolution and heritage such as America, democracy, liberty, and free society appear higher ranked and more general and widely embraced "American" values and institutions than capitalism and free markets and enterprise as their special, economic cases, albeit most US orthodox economists, tend to reduce the

general category of human freedom to its particulars of economic freedoms. Thus, the myth of a link of Puritanism to democracy–freedom appeals to and reaffirms both the Puritan origin/legacy of America, as well as in part Great Britain, and American or generally Anglo-Saxon values believed and claimed to be "universal" (Munch 2001). This helps to explain the creation and persistence of the myth even in the face of disconfirming or inconclusive evidence, in American society, especially among religious conservatives, as well as the scientific community, including sociologists and economists. In this sense, the myth of Puritan-American democracy and liberty is a paradigmatic case to be analyzed and explained in terms of the sociology of knowledge in Mannheim's sense, viz. by a complex of economic, political, religious, sociopsychological, ethnic or ethnocentric, and other social factors.

Whatever its social and other sources, the myth linking Puritanism with democracy and freedom perhaps qualifies as one of the most cherished, enduring, and widely held collective self-deceptions in historically Puritan-based societies, especially America, even more so than the pure economic mythology connecting the "Protestant ethic" with modern capitalism. In general, this reveals and confirms the persisting force and diffusion of political, cultural, and economic myths, collective misrepresentations or false social definitions and constructions of societal reality, even in contemporary capitalist and democratic societies, including their scientific communities, not only in traditional, precapitalist, and undemocratic contexts and times. If the power of social myths in contemporary Western societies, for example, "has been especially evident in the [neo-conservative] restructuring of advanced capitalist and transitional economies since the 1980s" (Slater and Tonkiss 2001:9), the same *ceteris paribus* be said of the myth of Puritanism and liberty during most of America's history, from the seventeenth to the early twenty-first century. Against this background, this study has purported and attempted to contribute toward demystifying or at least reconsidering the "cherished myth" of Puritanism as the root of "liberty, equality and justice for all," including secular democracy, in America primarily and other less Puritan societies like Great Britain secondarily.

Puritanism *is* essentially authoritarianism or totalitarianism. It is not just that Protestant or Calvinist Puritanism is connected with—as in the case of Weber's "spirit and structure of modern capitalism"—but it constitutes the very "spirit and system" of authoritarianism or totalitarianism. While hardly anyone, including Weber himself, can argue that Puritanism is in itself—but rather relates or leads to—capitalism, one may plausibly infer that it *is* in essence political and social authoritarianism. Substantively, Puritanism inherently consists of an authoritarian ideal and system of a repressive, specifically theocratic, government, and oppressive or oppressed civil society and culture as a whole. Hence, Puritanism functions or appears as one of Popper's strongest, most persisting, vehement and, as Mill and Pareto imply, fanatical "enemies" of a free open society and human freedom and even life. While certainly not every political and social authoritarianism or totalitarianism is Puritan in origin and character, virtually all Puritanism, within Protestantism and beyond and before and after, since its genesis has been politically and socially authoritarian or totalitarian either in its design of theocracy or

its outcome of "totalistic" control and repression of society. That is what Weber himself, in some tension with his other statements about its "anti-authoritarian" tendencies, suggests by diagnosing, and even US conservative sociologist Ross warns about, Puritanism's "unexampled tyranny" though not fully elaborating on this crucial diagnosis of implied Puritan "elective affinities" with the spirit and system of contemporary authoritarianism, just as of traditional despotism. This makes Puritanism what Ross describes as the "antidote" of democracy and freedom as, implicitly, its "poison" in America and elsewhere. Inverting Ross' description, Puritanism has proven to be the "poison" of liberal–secular political democracy and a free civil society, and conversely, the latter its "antidote."

In retrospect, Puritanism initially warned and fought against "a world given over to over to the powers of darkness" (Tawney 1962:200), yet ultimately became precisely such a power in virtue of its social–political authoritarianism. So, to say that Puritanism is "iron" and militant Protestantism, notably the "most totalitarian" species of Calvinism, is to describe it as Protestant authoritarianism and Calvinist totalitarianism[1] typically in the form of totalitarian theocracy sanctified as a "Holy Biblical Commonwealth," from Great Britain to New England and the US South or Bible Belt. Hence, "liberty, equality and justice for all" and Tocqueville's liberal democracy in America, as well as other historically less Puritan societies like Great Britain, have emerged and existed essentially *not* because but precisely in spite of Puritanism and its "iron" Protestantism and "totalitarian" Calvinism. In terms of *dramatis personae*, if America has been a free, egalitarian, and democratic society in spite of the legacies or actions of arch- and neo-Puritan personalities or "rigid extremists" (Blomberg and Harrington 2000) from Winthrop et al. to Reagan and "neo-cons," and exactly because of those of their non-Puritan counterparts or "flexible moderates" in a line from Jefferson and Madison to their contemporary disciples. Simply, it is not Puritanism and its system or historical "direct parentage" (Dunn and Woodard 1996) of moral–religious and political conservatism, but rather non-Puritanism and Protestant or secular nonconservatism overall ("liberalism"?) that is truly "American" in virtue of recreating or designing America as a "liberal and pluralist" society (Munch 2001) of freedom, justice, and equality. Moreover, Puritanism and its "child" or generalized "brother in arms," American conservatism, from its point of origin in the seventeenth to its fundamentalist destination in the early twenty-first century, has attacked and waged innumerable culture and violent wars against the emerging, since the Enlightenment and the Revolution, notably their Jefferson–Madison's rendition, and reestablished, as during and after the 1960s, "reality of a liberal and pluralist society" (Munch 2001) in America and, via a global Divinely ordained war on "evil," the world as a whole.

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[1] One direction for future analysis includes exploring more fully the apparent or hidden links of Protestant Puritanism with American authoritarian conservatism, including neo-conservatism. Another direction is examining the apparently universally negative effects of Puritanism in general—i.e., Protestant and non-Protestant, Christian and non Christian, religious, and secular—on human freedom and democracy.

Alternatively, if Puritanism, either in its original type or in its evangelical gener-alizations, always had its way in its attempted total mastery of American society, America would have remained what the Puritan Pilgrims designed as a "Christian Sparta," as did New England up until the nineteenth century, or would become in the present and future a "Christian Iran," specifically a Protestant equivalent of Islamic theocracy a la the Southern Bible Belt, rather than a Western liberal–secular democracy. And when, as during the seventeenth to nineteenth century and the 1980s–2000s, and where, as in New England and the post-Episcopal South, at least transiently it did, Puritanism made and still remakes America as the morally most repressive, coercive, intolerant, or traditionalist society within Western civ-ilization (Inglehart 2004) and even beyond, alongside Islamic theocracies and other third-world dictatorships. No wonder, at the threshold of the twenty-first century, primarily, though not solely, owing to resurgent neo-Puritan evangeli-calism and theocratic Islam respectively, often mutually hostile but sharing the proto-totalitarian elimination of individual freedom and private choice (Bauman 1997), the world's two most repressive *major* societies in moral terms are typically identified to be America and Iran, along with China under communist–capitalist dictatorship, and perhaps Poland under postcommunist Catholic semitheocratic dominance. All these societies are characterized, for example, with Draconian "tough-on-crime" and sin legal systems and policies, including massive incarcer-ation and the widespread and arbitrary use of the death penalty both for violent crimes and nonviolent sins (e.g., drug and alcohol offenses, adultery, etc. in Amer-ica, China, and Iran).

In sociological terms, this remarkable and often unsuspected—and by US neo-Puritans disguised or even denied—convergence on moral and political repression and Draconian punishment of these historically or presently Puritan, Islamic, and communist countries vividly and even dramatically reaffirms what Weber and other sociologists identify as the affinities or commonalities of American and other Puri-tanism with Islam, as well as communism and fascism, in terms of authoritarianism, including theocracy, militarism, and religious-style offensive wars, i.e., crusades and jihads, respectively. At the start of the twenty-first century American Puri-tanism hence essentially remains what it was in the early seventeenth century—a sort of Christian Spartanism or Islamism, plus protocommunism and arch-fascism. It consequently threatens to freeze or restore America still under its predominance (Lipset 1996), as a "Christian Sparta," or to recreate it, at least the Southern Bible Belt, in the image of a "Protestant-evangelical Iran" (Bauman 1997). And this moralistic freezing of the "new nation" a la ancient Sparta or Islamic Iran is more than anything else that defines the supreme achievement or legacy of Puritanism, as a sort of perennial overachiever in moral repression and theocratic coercion within Protestantism and all Christianity, to American society. It thus reproduces with pride and joy American exceptionalism in the form of persisting traditionalism, nonsecularism, or cultural backwardness (Inglehart and Baker 2000). In conse-quence, America is effectively caused, by neo-Puritan evangelicalism, to usher in the twenty-first century in the nearly identical or similar way it was forced by proto-Puritanism to enter into the seventeenth or eighteenth century. This is "American

way" of the "heaven" of a "Holy Commonwealth," in a historical succession from New England's "Biblical Commonwealths" to, via the Great Awakenings, the South's "Bible Belt." For only Puritanism could or would make and perpetuate the "new nation" as the most morally oppressive ("pure") or moralistic (Lipset 1996) society in the West, a sort of Western version or proxy of ancient Sparta or Islamic Iran, thus even "older" and more backward in this respect than what Puritans and their mutants disdain as the "old" Europe. In this sense, to use Weber's phrase, Puritanism has "descended like a frost" on or frozen in cultural–political terms America during most of its history, up until the early twenty-first century, into the seventeenth century, as indicated by the remarkable continuity between New England's Biblical Commonwealth and the Southern Bible Belt.

The aforesaid suggests that any attempts to understand and explain the genesis, evolution, and extension of freedom, including liberal–secular democracy and civil society, in America and comparable societies in terms of Puritanism as the original cause or prime mover are destined to lead to an analytical blind alley. Alternatively, the attempts to historically understand and explain contemporary authoritarianism or totalitarianism, including fascism and communism, should not disregard Puritanism as substantively an authoritarian or extreme brand of Protestantism, notably of totalitarian Calvinism. In particular, they should reconsider that Puritanism has been originally a sort of religious–theocratic protofascism before modern fascism itself, and conversely, the latter a kind of nonreligious neo-Puritanism in many respects, including moral and political repression. Puritanism remained more or less so ever since throughout the early twenty-first century, as indicated by the near-identity, alliance, or sympathy of neo-Puritanism in the generalized form of contemporary fundamentalism with neofascism, as indicated by the mix of the extreme political and religious Right, violent racist militia, "Christian" terrorists, in America.

Puritanism may have changed its name, dress, colors, and even rhetoric such as Protestant evangelicalism, "faith-based" democracy and free society since its failed attempt at theocratic dominance in Great Britain during the 1640s–1660s and the official disestablishment of its theocracy in postrevolutionary America in the 1830s. But, it has not, like the proverbial wolf from the fable, evidently changed or forgotten its authoritarian–totalitarian nature and habits, including protofascist dispositions and practices. As a term or formally Puritanism may be what Weber calls *caput mortuum* ("dead") within contemporary Western societies, including historically and persistently Puritan America itself. Yet, as a set of ideas, beliefs, institutions, and practices or substantively, Puritanism continues its original and long-standing "holy" war and terror or crusadelike attack against the "evil" of human freedom, notably individual moral liberty and liberal–secular democracy and civil society, in America, as the only remaining Puritan and to that extent last "primitive society" (Baudrillard 1999) within the West ushering in the twenty-first century. In this respect, neo-Puritanism, and consequently most of contemporary America, specifically the South and similar ("red" or "red-neck") regions, ushers in the twenty-first century in the essentially same authoritarian manner that the early US Puritans and consequently New England entered the eighteenth century—i.e.,

with the ideal and practice of proto-totalitarian theocracy *cum* the "Holy Biblical Commonwealth."

In broader historical terms, American Puritanism in its extended or modernized form of Protestant evangelicalism hence enters the third millennium in the almost same manner European Catholicism ushered in the second, thus effectively causing or forcing contemporary America to reenter, reenact, or replay Europe's theocratic Dark Middle Ages of "God's Kingdom on Earth." This suggests that in sociological–functional terms Puritanism has since the seventeenth century regularly been in America, while temporarily in Great Britain, what official Catholicism was in medieval Europe, by performing the essentially same societal function of theocratic control and repression, and even, as Weber suggests, more efficiently, pervasively, and methodically a la "Methodism" than the Catholic Church has ever done; and this inefficiency of Catholicism in respect with total moral–religious controls was, as he notes, the prime mover of the Protestant Reformation.

The above also implies that neo-Puritanism essentially remains so, because or if its transmitted, perpetuated, generalized, or adapted variant in the form of Protestant religious conservatism or evangelicalism as well as political neoconservatism plays the substantively identical social role in America at the start of the twenty-first century that feudalism, medievalism, and generally traditionalism played during the Dark Middle Ages and early modern times. This is simply a culture–military "holy" domestic and global permanent war against liberty and liberal–secular democracy and civil society, theologically condemned and theocratically or politically attacked, even eliminated, as "evil" or "Godless" liberalism, secularism, and humanism. Hence, neo-Puritan—i.e., fundamentalist and neoconservative—culture wars against non-Puritan, secular, and liberal adversaries in the "new nation" of America at the threshold of the third millennium are functional substitutes, sequels, and reenactments—so cannot be fully comprehended in their seeming incomprehensibility without taking account—of those of feudalism, medievalism, or traditionalism, including official Catholicism or the Vatican Church, in the old "decadent" Europe on early liberalism, secularism, and rationalism, notably the Enlightenment. In particular, recall that the "new" American Puritan and other evangelical millenarianism, from the seventeenth to the early twenty-first century, has been functionally equivalent to feudal or medieval Christian, Catholic and Orthodox, millenarian movements, both being inspired by the "phantasy of a salvation" (Giddens 1984:204). In short, Europe's old battle between medievalism and the secular Enlightenment continues and even intensifies in America through the twenty-first century via culture wars by neo-Puritanism, intermingled or allied with neoconservatism, against secularism and liberalism.

To realize that what was theocratic Catholicism and authoritarian feudalism or generally oppressive traditionalism in Europe during the Middle Ages have since become in functionalist terms first proto-Puritanism in old and New England and then neo-Puritanism in the expanded or adapted form of evangelicalism in America is to put the problem of Puritan authoritarianism in proper historical perspective and thus to help explain and understand it within the framework of Western or Christian

history and societies. What this framework indicates is that, as medieval Christian scholastics would put it, there has in essence been and is "nothing new under the sun" of Puritanism, from seventeenth century old and New England to the twenty-first century US South, as this has been and remains the "sunbelt," sociological "heaven," or dystopia of authoritarianism in general, and theocracy in particular. Alternatively, the medieval Catholic–Puritan functional theocratic or generally authoritarian equivalence is a particular variation, and so can better be understood by taking account, of the general feudal-conservative equation or linkage. Thus, what was despotic feudalism, medievalism, or traditionalism overall in the old Europe, including Great Britain, has functionally become, so been perpetuated, renamed, and disguised, as political and social, plus economic, "conservatism" in America as the "first new nation." In particular, American religious "conservatism" tends to perform the substantively same function European feudalism performed: authoritarian control and culture and military wars against the "evil" of liberalism, secularism, and modernism.

In historical terms, Puritanism has essentially perpetuated, though in different forms, feudal despotism, including medieval Catholic theocracy, as well as prefigured or generated subsequent and modern authoritarian conservatism in America, in an evidently shared feudal-Puritan-conservative "holy" war against human liberty and life, especially moral freedom and liberal–secular democracy and civil society. In consequence, Puritanism has been identical or cognate to despotic–theocratic feudalism with respect to the Dark Middle Ages past as well as conservative authoritarianism, including fascism, rather than liberalism and liberal democracy, with regard to the New Dark Ages future, spanning into twenty-first-century America. This is what "Puritanism *is* authoritarianism" essentially means in comparative-historical terms.

In terms of its historical and contemporary achievement or legacy in the "new nation" it, as Tocqueville suggests, founded or designed, Puritanism originally rendered and subsequently ever-perpetuated America as even "older" in substantive sociological terms than was the old Europe, including Great Britain, it condemned, despised, and left in search for the promised land. Specifically, Puritanism has primarily, though not solely, made and remade the "promised land" of America a society that is, as US Puritan-religious nationalists like to say, the "Best" or "Number 1" among contemporary Western societies in the following ten respects at least.

The first crowning achievement or legacy of American Puritanism is the most morally, legally repressive and perhaps inhumane—plus the most hypocritical—society within the West to the point of severe Draconian punishments, including the death penalty, for sins and vices typically condemned as deadly or serious crimes (drug and alcohol use, sexuality). In particular, the neoconservative "war on drugs" provides a paradigmatic case of Puritan-rooted inhumanity and harshness (Reuter 2005), as well as politically coercive or controlling (viz. suppression of political dissent, "high-tech" government secretive and illegal surveillance reminiscent of Orwell's Big Brother).

The second, and perhaps as a corollary of Puritan repression, is the most violent, crime-prone, and generally Machiavellian society in the sense that, as Merton

(1968) implies, the sacrosanct end of fulfilling the "American Dream" sanctifies virtually any means whatsoever, including fraud, violence, terror, and murder committed by individuals, groups, and government alike ("whatever it takes," "everything goes").

The third is a society that is the most economically antiegalitarian due to the greatest wealth and income inequalities and the highest poverty rate, and noncompassionate or "anti-welfare," as well as in part noneconomically, as indicated by various violations of voting and other basic political and civil rights to large categories, from minorities to former inmates to legal immigrants.

The fourth is a society that is the most religious, fundamentalist, theocentric ("one nation under God," "in God we trust"), if not virtually theocratic (the "Bible Belt"), and generally traditionalistic in religion and morality. Consequently, this is the most irrational Western society in the sense of the Enlightenment, including antiscientific (viz. antievolutionism) and even superstitious (lingering beliefs in "witches" or Satan). In particular, it is virtually the only society in the West still plagued by medieval-like witch-hunts in the form of, aside from McCarthyism's version of witch-like trials of "un-American" activities, neoconservative culture wars or crusades against liberal–secular and other modern values, practices, and institutions.

The fifth is a Western society that is the most uneducated and disdainful of the world beyond the proto-Puritan "shinning city upon a hill" or sociological heaven. This often reaches the level of blissful ignorance and consequent triumphant arrogance feeding upon each other vis-a-vis anything "un-American" in seeming accordance with the Puritan or evangelical "ignorance-bliss" or "knowledge-forbidden apple" equation.

The sixth is the most backward Western society in terms of aesthetic culture in the Enlightenment's sense and societal or public investment and interest in the arts reduced to some kind of luxury or superfluity that the wealthiest people on the earth both cannot "afford" and "can live" without. It is thereby a society descending into a state of new or semibarbarism and preartistic primitivism in the meaning of European "high" art or Enlightenment culture.

The seventh is the most monotonous and tedious ("working to death") Western society in terms of everyday social life reduced to a sort of medieval-like monastic order emptied of virtually any non-Puritan pursuits like pleasure, spontaneity, even humanity (despite superficial distant "niceness" and "tooth-paste" smiles) exorcised as what Weber calls "temptations of the flesh" or "evil," and humans converted into monks or saints for life. Alternatively, the outcome is a society in which the venerable "pursuit of happiness" degenerates into the forced pursuing of Puritan-type values, including moral rigor, austerity, and intolerant piety, typically fused with all too obvious hypocrisy in morality and religion, not to mention economy and politics.

The eighth achievement or legacy of American Puritanism, probably as a corollary of all the above, the most or notoriously conformist, regimented, and hence primitive Western society in cultural and in part political respects, while presumably being the most advanced, innovative, and sophisticated in

technological–economic and military terms. Such a Puritan-rooted society hence fuses conformism, regression, and primitivism in culture with innovation, progress, and modernity in technology and economy exploited for mostly authoritarian and inhumane purposes of domestic repression through a policing state and "world domination via nuclear weapons" (Swomley 2003).

The ninth is the most nationalistic ("patriotic"), jingoistic, and ethnocentric in general, if not xenophobic or antiforeigner, Western society, mixing nativist in-group pride and joy, self-love and sacrifice with foreign out-group hostility, hatred, exclusion, and disdain, reaching the Freudian pathological threshold of the narcissistic complex of national superiority and so triumphant supremacy.

The tenth achievement or legacy of American Puritanism is the most bellicose, militaristic, aggressive, and expansionist or imperialist Western society via the neo-Puritan formula of an actually or potentially antidemocratic military–industrial complex. This includes virtually unlimited spending of precious societal resources ("taxpayers' money") on an oversized, often dysfunctional, military force and "high-tech" weapons of mass destruction (e.g., "nukes") routinely and with "good" Puritan-style conscience used or threatened to use against foreign "enemies" reproduced in the way Puritanism and McCarthyism fabricated "witches," in global, permanent and offensive, "preemptive" wars. These are Puritan-style holy wars or crusades on the "evil," "sinful," and "ungodly" world, especially following WW II and climaxing in the early twenty-first century, to be "saved" from itself by perhaps ultimately destroying it in a fundamentalist nihilistic judgment-day scenario, as America's Divinely ordained "mission" and "manifest destiny."

And perhaps only, to paraphrase Sen (1977), antiliberal and antisecular "irrational fools"—i.e., US evangelicals, political neoconservatives, and neofascists—can be "proud to be Americans" of these "top ten" Puritan achievements and legacies or Puritanism's regenerated and reinforced American exceptionalism. For example, Reaganites and other neoconservatives tend to exhibit great pride and joy that their neo-Puritan rendition of America is the "Leader," "Number 1" or, as their leader almost daily repeated to their "fellow Americans," "we-are-the best" in these respects due to Puritanism's authoritarian, antiegalitarian, antihumanistic, and militant nature and legacy. Alternative, they successfully force or condition via brain-washing others also into exhibiting such feelings, through an indoctrination–propaganda apparatus of such a magnitude, intensity and "high-tech" efficiency that probably equal, if not surpass, what Parsons calls "Nazi methods of control of opinion" and would make even Goebbels curious, if not envious of its ever-more advanced technology, scope, and effectiveness. (A case in point involves neo-Puritan "true lies" about Iraq's never-found weapons of mass destruction that most Americans patriotically believed or were happy to conform to, again demonstrating Puritan-based "notorious conformism.") By contrast, their liberal–secular counterparts, from Jefferson and Madison to their contemporary followers, deplore or admonish that this Puritan-based American exceptionalism is a double-, even single-edged, authoritarian–theocratic, sword (Lipset 1996). However, these liberal personalities and groups have evidently been unable or not

powerful and typical enough to prevent this ever-persisting tendency or outcome in most of America's history, up to the early twenty-first century. Not surprisingly, Reaganites and other Puritan neoconservatives love to hate and exorcise them as "un-American" or "evil," thus proving remarkably good disciples (e.g., Goldwater, Reagan) of their unrecognized or disguised sociological parent McCarthyism and its witch-hunts reenacted as conservative culture wars, and in extension Puritanism and its archetypical production and exorcism of a myriad of "witches."

In retrospect, at least in light of the yet another Puritan awakening and predominance through the revival of Protestant evangelicalism and/or neoconservatism and neo-fascism reigniting and triumphant in antiliberal culture wars in America during the 1980s–2000s, Puritanism has been mostly, though not totally, victorious in its never-ending "holy" war and terror against Jefferson–Madison's Enlightenment or liberalism and secularism. Alternatively, despite their atypical and heroic attempts and occasional successes, Jefferson and Madison's Enlightenment-based liberal–secular ideas, institutions, and practices, plus moderate, non-Puritan Protestantism like Anglicanism, Lutheranism, and Quakerism, have proven to be not sufficiently strong tempering or countervailing social powers, in sharp contrast to Great Britain where Puritanism has been tempered, tamed, civilized, or even displaced and discredited by them (Munch 2001). At this juncture, the European "foreign" Enlightenment's relative weakness or secondary relevance compared with Puritanism operates or appears as the "curse" for modern liberalism and secularism or liberal–secular democracy and civil society, yet as a God-decreed "blessing" for neo-Puritan fundamentalism and neoconservatism, in America.

In short, Puritanism or its survival in the form of Protestant evangelicalism reproduces with "pride and joy" America as the only surviving Puritan, so primitive society, in modern Western civilization and democracy (Munch 2001). Puritanism recreates a sort of Orwellian repressive sociological dystopia mixed with elements of Huxley's *Brave New World* of technological advance, including "high-tech" pervasive and omnipresent surveillance or secret spying accomplishing what Bentham with his *Panopticon* and Orwell's *Big Brother* could only dream of, and relative material prosperity, inhabited by kinds of "happy slaves" in terms of ("soma") consumption. Yet, recall what happened or could happen to those "go-happy-lucky" creatures when exhibiting even the slightest degree of dissent or doubt about this Puritan-inspired New American World or Century.

In comparative-historical terms, communism and fascism may have attempted, as Orwell and others observed and predicted, to create such an Orwellian world but they eventually failed in this project and mostly evaporated as significant social forces, while Puritanism or evangelicalism can alone claim to have achieved a complete, long-term success in this respect, thus reaffirming itself as the most fateful or fatal force in America's history and present. In Orwellian–totalitarian terms, American Puritanism, the original or derivative, has been a kind of overachiever in Western civilization's *long durée* by comparison to European fascism and communism by succeeding fully or enduringly in what they have failed abysmally, dreamed about, or only succeeded temporarily, through its recreating an Orwell-style world induced and rationalized by "native" versus foreign values and institutions and

couched or sweetened (Beck 2000) in the "all-American" apple-pie of authoritarianism (Wagner 1997). In other words, the Puritan or evangelical proto-totalitarian product, legacy, or solution is a sort of "all-American" and "Christian" functional equivalent or proxy, as witnessed by the Southern Bible Belt, of an Islamic theocratic society like Iran rather than of what US religious fundamentalists condemn and disdain as the modern liberal–secular Europe. Such equivalence is indicated, for example, by US neoconservative and Iranian presidents' shared hostility toward liberalism and secularism, including liberal–secular democracy, and their joint dream for, as Iran's president put it in his peculiar letter to his American "born-again-Puritan" antiliberal "brother-in-arm" and enemy alike, the "shattering and fall of the ideology and thoughts of the liberal democratic systems" as well as their belief in "the divine promise of the rule of the righteous on Earth."

The above presents a supreme historical irony or American sociological tragedy, for Puritanism came to America precisely from the old Europe in which it originated as Calvinism via Great Britain where the latter expanded and was simply rechristened into the former. (Recall Calvinism was named and consequently Protestant Puritanism designed after a French religious reformer in Geneva, a moment that US fundamentalists and neoconservatives try to erase or "forget" due to their recurring anti-French and generally antiforeign paranoia, in their typical Orwellian erasing, double-thinking, or "forgetting" of history to suit their current repressive and militarist aims.) In this sense, what Puritanism tends to reproduce and its modern descendents celebrate as American religious, political, and other social "exceptionalism," in an invidious triumphant distinction from the "old" Europe, is not really something exceptional in both historical and sociological terms. It is rather the outcome of European Calvinism moving from Calvin's Geneva or old Europe to and becoming ever-more totalitarian or theocratic—i.e., "gone mad" or turned "wild"—in the "new" America, after trying, and ultimately failing, the same repressive theocratic formula in Great Britain and elsewhere like Holland.

Alternatively, this can be considered American "exceptionalism" only in the sense or form that Puritanism succeeded to more fully and enduringly accomplish in New and only temporarily old England and then the "Awakened" South what Calvinism had eventually failed or only in part accomplished in Geneva and the rest of Europe—to establish a pure or diluted totalitarian theocracy. In this respect, American Puritanism became a sort of Calvinist theocratic, just as protofascist and protocommunist Orwellian, overachiever. In essence, Puritanism created and continues to recreate America in its own authoritarian–theocratic image after failing to do so fully and enduringly in Calvin's old Europe and even Great Britain. To that extent, the "first new" nation has been "blessed" or "cursed," made a happy offspring or a hapless victim—depending on Puritan versus non-Puritan perspectives or valuations—by Puritanism following what Weber would call its abortive crusades aiming to make the "old" Europe even older, i.e., more repressive, theocratic, antiegalitarian, or medievalist, than it already was. In this sense, to paraphrase Shakespeare, "something" was simply "rotten," "defective," or just "wrong" in what Tocqueville would describe as America's Puritan manifest

destiny and subsequent evolution, a kind of genetic defect or systemic error origi-
nating in and committed by a mix of religious fervor and historical ignorance and
arrogance, inherited and reinforced from Europe's Dark Middle Ages, and even
perpetuated, via its misrecognition, disguise, or head-in-sand negligence due to the
"beloved myth" of Puritanism and liberty, ever since, up to the early twenty-first
century.

And this Europe-rooted Puritan genetic "defect" or systemic "error" as Amer-
ica's genesis and destiny has continued to "bless" or "curse," make "happy" or
"victimize"—again depending on perspective or valuation—most people in the
"new" nation from the seventeenth century through the Great Awakenings and the
American Revolution to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. As sociological
analyses suggest, this "genetics" rendered and has sustained Puritan America an
even "older," i.e., more religious, fundamentalist, theocentric, traditionalist, and,
especially economically, nonegalitarian, society in this respect even at the start of
the twenty-first century (Inglehart 2004; Lipset and Marks 2000; Munch 2001)
than the old world of Western Europe. The latter has become instead "newer" or
more modern since, viz. more secular, liberal, modern, and egalitarian in economic
terms, as US neoconservatives complain and denounce. Hence, the "old" Europe
has escaped or transcended, yet the "new" America has chosen or succumbed to
the seemingly "iron"—recall early Puritans were described as the "iron" or "hot-
ter sort" of Protestants—path-dependence or manifest destiny of Puritanism. For
Puritanism is in a sense the "oldest," i.e., late medievalist or traditionalist, ant-
iegalitarian, antihumanist, repressive, theocratic, and fundamentalist, European
creation through Geneva's Calvinism during modern times. Concretely, this en-
compasses the period since the Renaissance, counteracted or interrupted, as Pareto
suggests, by the Puritan–Protestant Revolution, or at least the Enlightenment, as
indicated by English-American Methodism as partial or moderate, and resurgent
Calvinist Baptism as total or extreme neo-Puritan anti-Enlightenment, reactions.
Such are evidently what Merton would call the theocratic and other authoritar-
ian "perversities" of Puritanism's historical journey and sociological "logic" or
mastery of society, from Europe-born Calvinism to its pilgrimage to and found-
ing and mastering of America, via its British extension and ultimately failed
revolution.

In sum, what Calvinism dismally failed to accomplish in the old Europe and
Great Britain because of the action of countervailing social forces such as pri-
marily Enlightenment-based liberalism and secularism, plus Anglicanism in the
second case, it triumphantly accomplished *cum* "all-American" Puritanism in the
"new nation" of America for the opposite reason of their comparative absence
or weakness. This original and enduring triumph of Weber's radical or extreme
Calvinism "made in Europe" in an initially non-Calvinist and non-European re-
gion defines perhaps more than anything else true Puritan-rooted and celebrated
American exceptionalism, and provides the probably most remarkable historical
puzzle or irony and sociological "perversity" or experiment in modern Western so-
ciety. The puzzle or perversity is simply that European Calvinism only triumphed

via Puritanism in America as the distant land rather than in its home, except for its temporary victories in Geneva, Holland, and Great Britain. This book contributes toward identifying and helping to understand and explain this puzzling or perverse Calvinist societal outcome, designated as originally, historically, and even persistently Puritan America, that conventional wisdom, plus the lay public, fails to recognize or tends to obscure via the "naïve assumptions" (Coffey 1998) of "all-American" Puritanism and its putative links to liberty and democracy. The books instead shows that Puritanism was originally European Calvinism turned triumphant and theocratic ("gone mad") in America, so historically anything but "American" in the sense of Americanism and sociologically anything but "liberty and democracy" in the form or meaning of modern liberal–democratic society and ideology. Alternatively, in both respects, Calvinist and illiberal or antidemocratic, Puritanism is, to use the favorite Puritan-rooted conservative condemnation, exclusion, and sanction of the different Other (Bauman 2001) a la McCarthyism, "un-American." This holds true especially from the prism of the American liberal–democratic tradition of Paris-influenced Jefferson as well as Madison, rooted in or inspired by the European, so denounced by Puritans and their mutants as "foreign," Enlightenment. Simply, if America is the reality, project, or utopia of "liberty, equality and justice for all," then probably nothing is more "un-American" than illiberal, antiegalitarian, and antihumanistic Geneva-made Calvinism transplanted to and disguised and renamed in the new nation as "Puritanism." And conversely: "nothing is more American" than anti-Puritan liberation or rebellion, egalitarianism, and humanism. At any rate, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fully comprehend and explain the typically authoritarian workings and effects of American Puritanism, and hence its creation or legacy of a Puritan America, without considering its, often obscured, disguised, or denied by its adherents and others, European point of origin in radical, theocratic, and medievalist Calvinism.

Most important, without considering American Puritanism and its inner authoritarianism, notably moral–political repression and totalitarian theocracy, whether or not it is historically rooted in European Calvinism, understanding and explaining various admittedly (Lipset 1996) authoritarian, including theocratic, tendencies, in America's history and society is not complete or possible. Recall these tendencies range from New England's "witch-hunts" in the seventeenth century to in the Bible Belt's "sadistic intolerance to cultural otherness" (Bauman 2001), including notably the nonbelieving other condemned and excluded from society as being more "un-American" than any other out-group (Edgell et al. 2006), in the twentieth and twenty-first century. In essence, the primary sociological problem in this work has been whether and to what extent American and other Puritanism is, as argued and demonstrated, authoritarianism, and the secondary its historical origins, as identified and documented, in European Calvinism. Hence, even if one could argue and "prove," as its adherents claim and perhaps most Americans think, that Puritanism is really as "American" as the "apple pie" or non-Calvinist and so non-European, this does not affect the primary sociological problem and its attempted solution in

this work. Even in this scenario, Puritanism constitutes, functions as, or generates authoritarianism, including moral–political repression and totalitarian theocracy, in America, albeit embellished and sweetened as the "apple-pie" (Wagner 1997) of a myriad of authoritarian ideas, institutions, and practices. In short, even if "divorced" from Calvinism after a seemingly long secret "marriage," Puritanism in America remains "all-American," as opposed to "foreign," authoritarianism.

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