People of the City

Jews and the Urban Challenge

Edited by Ezra Mendelsohn

STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY JEWRY

Institute of Contemporary Jewry
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Preface

The famous love song addressed to New York City, which starts with the words "We'll have Manhattan," was written (in 1925) by two Americans of Jewish origin, Richard Rodgers and Lorenz Hart. You don't have to be Jewish to like cities, of course, and Richard Rodgers wrote no less famous music for musicals celebrating such nonurban sites as Oklahoma and the South Pacific. Alfred Stieglitz, another American of Jewish origin, is renowned for his beautiful photographs of New York's skyscrapers, but Jewish photographers were hardly the only ones to celebrate this dramatic feature of urban life. Nonetheless, the Jewish romance with big-city life, and the close identification of modern Jewry with the metropolis, cannot be denied.

Demographic patterns provide the most obvious evidence. By the end of the nineteenth century, most Jews in Western and Central Europe and in the United States were concentrated in large urban areas—Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna and New York come to mind as the most obvious examples. In economically backward Eastern Europe the pace of urbanization was slower, but even there we encounter the same phenomenon, as can be observed in the case of the capital of Russian Poland, Warsaw, but also in other centers, such as Lodz, Odessa and Lwów (Lemberg). Not only economic backwardness but also the antisemitic policies of the Russian empire were responsible for the lesser degree of urbanization of the so-called *Ostjuden*, but when the Pale of Settlement was finally abolished in 1917 Russian Jews flocked in great numbers to the once nearly forbidden capital cities of St. Petersburg (Leningrad) and Moscow.

Who can imagine the modern history and culture of the Jews without taking into account their dramatic presence in the urban centers of Europe and America? The remarkable Jewish contributions to modern science, scholarship, literature, music and the visual arts would never have taken place if Jews in overwhelming numbers had not left their villages and small towns for the big city. Sigmund Freud, we may safely assume, would not have established his new school of psychoanalysis if his family had not joined the Jewish stream of emigration from the small towns of Galicia and Moravia to the capital of the Habsburg empire. The remarkable economic success story of modern Western Jewry is conceivable only within the framework of massive urbanization. Modern Jewish politics, from secular nationalism of the Zionist variety to socialism and Agudat Israel, was largely the product of the city. The Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah) movement, and the processes of acculturation and assimilation that it induced, were urban phenomena. Modern Orthodoxy along with the many varieties of Reform Judaism took shape in Frankfurt, Budapest, Vienna and New York. Even Jewish romantic notions of an escape from the corrupt and corrupting city and of a "return to the soil," to healthy village life—a hallmark of the Zionist movement—were dreamed up and debated in the conference halls and cafes of Vilna, Cracow, Moscow and Bucharest.

Moreover, relations between Jews and non-Jews were also vitally affected by Jewish urbanism. The antiurban biases of such ideologies as German Volkism,

American Populism and certain varieties of fascism incorporated anti-Jewish themes. National movements of the "native peoples" of Eastern Europe often called for the "polonization," "lithuanianization" or "romanization" of their cities, which, so they believed, had been taken over by foreign elements—Germans, Armenians, Greeks and especially Jews. Modern antisemitism, including its most virulent manifestation in the form of Nazism, cannot be understood without taking into account the urban status of the modern Jews. Yet it is also the case that modern doctrines of liberalism and toleration, which laid the ideological framework for Jewish emancipation, were the result of the urban experience.

All this is self-evident, and surely no justification is required for making the urban theme the subject of the symposium of volume XV of our journal. Loyal readers will take note of this volume's relatively modest length, which can be attributed to the usual (in this case, perhaps more than usual) number of mishaps that occur in the planning and execution of our symposium and essay sections. Nonetheless, the seven essays that constitute the symposium, while making no pretense to cover the entire area, do relate to a number of vital historical problems. How have Jews who wish to maintain the traditional Orthodox way of life managed to do so within the boundaries of the pluralistic metropolis? What was the impact of urbanization on nineteenth-century German Jewry? What sort of community did the wealthy Jews of pre–First World War St. Petersburg, a tiny and privileged section of vast Russian Jewry, wish to create? What is unique about the New York experience? How are urbanism and antisemitism linked? How have various urban spaces served as an environment for the preservation—albeit in ever-changing forms—of the remarkable Jewish cultural artifact known as klezmer music? Finally, what were the competing and conflicting visions of the "Jewish city" in Zionist thought, and how did they affect the development of the first "Hebrew city," Tel-Aviv?

In closing, let me express my thanks to my fellow editors and my special appreciation to my colleague Steven Aschheim, who read and critiqued a number of the essays submitted to this volume and played an important role in its evolution. It is always a pleasure to acknowledge the work of our wonderful managing editors, Laurie Fialkoff and Hannah Levinsky-Koevary. Just last year they received an important and richly deserved award from the Hebrew University for their work on this journal. It is likewise my pleasant duty to thank, in the name of all four editors of our journal, the Stroum Foundation for its continued financial support, without which the publication of *Studies* would be impossible. We also wish to thank the Littauer Foundation of New York and the Federman Fund of the Institute of Jewish Studies at the Hebrew University for their much-valued grants.

E. M.

The editors note, with deep regret, the death of the eminent historian of Germany and of German Jewry, George Mosse. Professor Mosse was a member of our international editorial board and was generous with his advice and support. He also contributed a number of reviews to our journal, the last of which appears in this issue. He shall be sorely missed.

We also note with sadness the death of Geoffrey Wigoder—scholar, editor, journalist and prime mover in the efforts to improve relations between Jewry and various Christian churches. Dr. Wigoder was for many years the head of the division of oral history at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry and a member of the institute editorial board of our journal.

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Symposium

People of the City:
Jews and the Urban Challenge

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Antisemitism and the City: A Beginner's Guide

Hillel J. Kieval
(washington university, st. louis)

Toward the end of the fifteenth century, in the aftermath of the judicial proceedings against the Jews of Trent for the alleged ritual murder of Simon Unferdorben, the burghers of the imperial city of Frankfurt am Main commissioned a painting. It was to depict the "martyrdom" of the boy Simon and was to be executed on the wall under the archway of one of the city's main gates, the Brückenturm.[1] For the next several centuries, one of the first images that visitors to Frankfurt would see upon entering the city would be the gruesome portrait of a naked boy nailed to a board with wounds inflicted by awls up and down his body. A cautionary tale? A warning to all those venturing to enter that all was not well, that urban space was contaminated and the social fabric threatened? R. Po-Chia Hsia argues that the Brückenturm painting was designed to evince a sense of revulsion against Jews, "just as paintings and sculptures of Christ, Mary, and the saints filled Christians with grace and hope for eternal salvation":

> Thus for late medieval Christians, both types of artistic representations—Christian sacrifice and Christian triumph—fortified a feeling of piety, deepened an awareness of Christian boundary, and heightened a sense of danger, for the display of salvation and the display of damnation were but two episodes in the same story.[2]

As the Jewish community of Frankfurt grew in size and influence over the course of the sixteenth century, it found the Brückenturm artwork to be increasingly intolerable and, in fact, a threat to its sense of well-being. The community petitioned the city magistrates to remove the offending painting in 1609, explaining that Jews suffered random taunts and injuries from passersby, both residents and visitors, and that, in any event, many were falling victim to fear and anxiety. There was a real threat of attack from the "common rabble," as the letter to the city council put it, who might well assume "from such a daring painting" that Jews, in fact, require the blood of Christian children for their ceremonies and are liable to kidnap and murder them for this purpose:

> And since this is such a cruel and repulsive vengeance, it would be unchristian and unfair that a single Jew should be left alive; rather, one should attack them, torture and kill them like inhumans [*unmenschen*] and slaughter them with less mercy than one would slaughter dogs.[3]

Moreover, the petition ventured, the "common crowd" inevitably would conclude that the Brückenturm painting represented the judgment of the city fathers themselves concerning the guilt of the Jews and the permissibility of harming them. The Jewish elders made note of the fact that the "inhuman event" depicted in the painting was not even supposed to have occurred in Frankfurt. It could have taken place "in Vienna or in Weissenburg," as far as anyone could tell. If it were to be removed, the "fury of the mob" would subside, and the Jews "could live securely without fear of bodily danger to themselves."[4]

The city fathers refused the request. To them, as Hsia suggests, "the ritual murder at Trent was a historical event just as real and as irrefutable as the innocence of the Frankfurt Jews."[5] Their rejection of the petition, however, goes beyond the issue of the "historicity" of the martyrdom in Trent: it attests to something that the Frankfurt magistrates recognized as being integral to their civic identity. It was, in other words, as much a statement about social relations and societal ideals in Frankfurt as it was an act of long-distance piety. The image of the murdered—and tortured—child alluded to themes of Christian sacrifice and community but also to their opposites, to cupidity and broken solidarity with the larger community. The painting's fundamental ambiguity, the fact that it partook of both the sacred and the scatological, was acknowledged three years later when, again at the behest of representatives from the Jewish community, the city fathers agreed to cover it over during a gathering of electors of the empire. When the election ended, the image of Simon returned to public view. The painting was renovated in 1678; it finally was removed about a century later.

I introduce this story to provide a counterpoint to the view, often found in studies of modern antisemitism, that Jews have occupied a central role in the evolution of the modern city, that their presence and stake in urban culture has been so high as to render them the symbolic equivalent of the city itself. Sander Gilman, in his work on the cultural meanings that have been attached to the "Jew's body," isolates a number of the components that have gone into this equation of Jews and the modern city. For the Viennese psychiatrist Richard Krafft-Ebing, the Jew constituted the "ultimate 'city person' whose sensibilities are dulled." Henry James, on a visit to New York—the locus of his childhood—observed that "this city of Jews . . . is the deathbed of the English language." Adolf Hitler, in *Mein Kampf*, linked the Jews of the Austrian capital to sexual and psychological disease when he fused images of syphilis, prostitution, hysteria, Jews and capitalism.[6] Even defenders of the Jewish position, such as the Berlin orthopedist Gustav Muskat, who wondered whether flat feet were a "racial marker" of the Jews, admitted to the underlying unity of "Jewish" experience and "urban" existence. Muskat's resolution of the problem was to paint the Jews as *victims* of modern civilization "and its impact on the otherwise 'natural' body." As Gilman explains,

> The Jew is, for the medical literature of the nineteenth century, the ultimate example of the effect of civilization (i.e., the city and "modern life") on the individual. And civilization in the form of the Jewish-dominated city, "is the real center for the degeneration of the race and the reduction of military readiness." . . . The Jew is both the city dweller par excellence as well as the most evident victim of the city.[7]

If one proceeds from the assumption that Jews have been among the major beneficiaries (as well as victims) of the social organization of the modern city, indeed that

the terms "Jew," "city" and "modernity" are virtually interchangeable, it is easy to arrive at the conclusion that antisemitism in the modern world comprises to a greater or lesser extent a critique of this set of identities. George Mosse has located the anti-Jewish component of modern *völkisch* ideology in Germany precisely in its romantic antiurbanism. Völkisch thought, he writes, advocated a "retreat into rural nostalgia" as a response to the challenges posed by urbanization and industrialization. "Not within the city, but in the landscape, the countryside native to him, was man fated to merge with and become rooted in nature and the Volk."[8] According to this view, rural "rootedness" served as a contrast to "urban dislocation" or "uprootedness" and, at the same time, offered a criterion for the exclusion of groups such as Jews from the *Volk*.

Völkisch nationalism's core ideology, then, was both antimodern and antiurban. "It used an amplified romanticism," Mosse suggests, "to provide an alternative to modernity, to the developing industrial and urban civilization which seemed to rob man of his individual, creative self while cutting him loose from a social order that was seemingly exhausted and lacking vitality."[9] The *antisemitic* strand within this type of thought simply identified the modern, debased city with the Jews, who were understood to embody all of the negative characteristics of urban life while benefiting from its conditions of "modernity."[10]

There are a number of problems with this interpretation of modern antisemitism. For one thing, it accepts at face value this movement's self-perception as a "rural," external critique of the city. Second, it does not pay sufficient attention to the actual social structures and institutions that produce antisemitic discourse and, as a result, treats both the city and the countryside—not to mention the Jews—as abstractions. Mosse thereby recapitulates the rhetorical strategies and metaphorical language of this very discourse. In my view, a critical distinction is to be made between interpretation and paraphrase, a difference that emerges in the first instance from contextualization. As soon as one begins to ask questions such as: Who is speaking? What is the nature of his or her social experience? What function does his or her speech play in the relations among individuals, groups, and institutions? one is forced to question and, I believe, ultimately discard the view that modern antisemitism is best understood as a discursive critique of the "modernity" and "urbanity" of the Jew.

Since the late Middle Ages, anti-Jewish systems of knowledge have been a more or less continuous feature of city life, in fact the cultural products of urban environments. One might say that antisemitic orderings of reality, in which Jewish and non-Jewish moral spheres and physical realms are carefully demarcated, have constituted one of the crucial ways in which urban societies in the past have created a sense of civic identity. One would like to know, certainly, whether the direction and the purpose of this message have varied from setting to setting or shifted over time. And it remains to be seen whether one legitimately can link the exclusionary antisemitism of the later Middle Ages with the discursive structures of the late nineteenth century, a period of unprecedented urban growth and one in which Jews (perhaps for the first time) appeared to occupy a permanent, even commanding, presence in the urban landscape.

Why Jews should have been "written out" of late medieval and early modern no-

tions of *civitas* is itself not obvious; such reimaginings of urban community involved, in the first instance, a repudiation of historical precedent. Lester K. Little explains the turnabout as a psychological response to Christian doubts concerning their participation in the new money economy that marked the beginning of the commercial revolution. "Christians hated Jews," he explains, "because they saw in Jews the same calculating for profit in which they themselves were deeply and, in their own view, unjustifiably involved. It was above all the guilt for this involvement that they projected on to the Jews."[11] In Kenneth Stow's view, Jews became aliens in their own cities and towns as the result of a reformulation of the social ideal of *Christianitas* as a model for communal organization. This, Stow contends—the equation of polity and Christian piety—represented a transposition to the social plane of Paul's irreconcilable confrontation, at the level of the individual, between Christian faith and Jewish unbelief.[12] The question remains, however, why it was that the internal *moral* struggle for all who would call themselves Christians—which sufficed for Paul—now had to be played out at the level of *community*. But both Stow and Little appear to be in agreement over the fact that the late medieval transformation of cities into economic engines of commercial expansion and autonomous centers of political authority occurred in conjunction with efforts to achieve "Christian" reform.

The series of urban expulsions that took place in the western parts of the Holy Roman Empire in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century emerged as a major consequence of this shift in the self-perception of city dwellers. "Being free of Jews," Hsia writes, "symbolized the achievement of communal political autonomy, for the Jews had been forced on the communities by their Habsburg rulers, had been protected by noble lords, and represented an alien economic and religious minority in their midst. Freedom from Jews amounted to a fundamental civic right."[13] The fact that these cities and towns frequently chose to inscribe the practice of expulsion within narratives of Jewish ritual murder indicates the degree to which the exercise of newly found economic and political power took place within a context of traditional religious and mythical idioms.

The danger that Jews posed to the well-being of Community resonated in the urban rhetoric of this period. It is also a theme that emerges from the investigation and trial records of Jews accused of the ritual killing of children. Giovanni Mattia Tiberino, the physician appointed by the court in Trent to examine the body of the boy Simon, saw in Simon's murder evidence of the Jewish propensity for violence and cruelty, and proof of the need for Christian society to rid itself of this threat. He gave voice to his fears in a long letter that he composed for the city council (technically, the Senate) of Brescia, his home town; it was published in its original Latin version in Rome in 1475, subsequently reprinted many times, translated into German, and distributed throughout Central and Western Europe:[14]

> I write to you, magnificent rectors and most famous citizens, of a great thing that occurred a few days ago, which has never been heard of before, since the passion of Our Lord to our own age, which Jesus Christ our Lord, as much out of pity for the human species as the horrible crime that has to be stomached, has nonetheless brought forth to light, in order that our Catholic faith, if it is weak in part, may create a tower of fortitude, and that the ancient infestation of the Jews may be wiped out from the Christian orbit and the living memory of them may completely disappear from the earth.[15]

Tiberino carefully describes how Trent officials found the clothed corpse of Simon in a ditch three days after his disappearance, how the body was drawn from the water, the wounds examined, and how it was then passed through throngs of "wailing people" to the Basilica of St. Peter. In its resting spot, the body of Simon miraculously grew more and more "glorified." At this point, Tiberino appears to interrupt his narrative in order to address his audience directly:

> See here, my fellow Christian, how once again Jesus is crucified between two thieves. See what the Jews would do if they had power over Christians. The glorious, innocent martyr, Simon, hardly weaned from the mother's breast and not yet able to speak, has been crucified by the Jews as an insult to our faith. Listen, you who allow so cruel a race [*eine so grausame Menschenrasse*] to be tolerated in your cities, how daily they curse the holy Eucharist and the saintly Virgin Mary, uttering scandalous, sinful words, which they follow with expressions of open contempt for the Roman Church.[16]

With this aside, Tiberino has captured the social message of the ritual murder accusation as it was elaborated at the close of the Middle Ages. "You who allow so cruel a race to be tolerated in your cities." The words seem anachronistically modern; in fact I have taken them from the German translation made by Josef Deckert, a Viennese priest, in his 1893 booklet on Trent—which itself was inspired by an 1892 case that took place in the Rhineland city of Xanten. And Deckert clearly means them to apply to his own time as well. At any event, warnings such as these of the deleterious effects of Jewish presence on the fabric of urban life, and interpretations of the "event" of ritual murder as a consequence of (or punishment for) misguided policies of toleration, were heeded by town councils throughout the empire.

One city's local tradition of Jewish ritual murder often would find its way to the historical record—and collective memory—of another. Thus, for example, the trial records and forced confessions of the Endingen case (1470) were transferred verbatim into the *Kopialbuch* (a legal-historical compendium) of the city council of Freiburg, thereby serving as both legal precedent and historical memory when the city's magistrates got around to investigating and trying their "own" case of Jewish ritual murder in 1504.[17] And, as we have seen, the reality and immediacy of the Trent ritual murder trial (1475) was literally inscribed on the city gates of Frankfurt. The Freiburg example is particularly revealing of the lengths to which town fathers might go in order to insure the presence of a concrete case of Jewish perfidy against which to establish local identity. At the time, Jews did not even enjoy the right of residence in the city; the "crime" in question was said to have occurred in the nearby village of Waldkirch. Nevertheless, the 1504 trial and interrogations were conducted in the city of Freiburg and supervised by magistrates affiliated with the university. The confessions obtained, the executions performed, together with the historical documentation already consigned to the *Kopialbuch* of the city council, confirmed and elaborated upon a conception of community that was predicated on the principle of freedom from "Jewish danger." To be a member of the *civitas* meant to live free of Jews, and the "knowledge" of Jewish criminality that was at the heart of Freiburg's identity confirmed and justified this right.

The expulsion of the Jews from the Bavarian city of Rothenburg, long advocated and, apparently, meticulously planned by the city council, had to wait for the death

of the emperor Maximilian in 1519 to be put into effect. At this point the council agreed to execute the recommendations of Johannes Teuschlein, a preacher and early advocate of the Reformation, who argued for the removal of the Jews as a means of "cleansing" society. It even obtained the services of a lawyer to help the Jews liquidate their businesses. By February 1520, the last remaining Jews had left the city, but not before they had stated in writing that they had not been forced to leave and had no outstanding claims.[18] Residents of Rothenburg marked the occasion with the printing and distribution of a broadsheet, "A New Song of the City of Rothenburg on the Tauber and of the Expulsion of the Jews therefrom. . . ." The sheet is dominated in the upper left corner by a woodcut engraving of Mary sitting on a throne, wearing a crown, holding a scepter in her right hand with the baby Jesus nestled in her left arm. At her feet are what appear to be the seal and coat of arms of the city. The song that follows comprises ten stanzas of rhyming verse. After introducing the theme of Jewish "usury" and "cunning," it explains that the expulsion of the Jews, urged by "Dr. Theuschel," represented a "special obligation from the Holy Virgin Mary. . . . It is God's will / Mary, who is their enemy":

She does not do it unjustly
Her child suffers great distress
From that which he did willingly
Even up to bitter death.
On this every heart should ponder
Did it not bring
Mary a great pain?

And if we, pious Christians all
Do not doubt
The great wonders without number
That every day occur
In her churches far and wide,
Let us with devotion entreat
Mary, the Holy Virgin.

Now that they have driven out the Jews
The men and also the women
The residents of Rothenburg
Have begun to build a chapel
In honor of the good and holy Mary
Who, with the help of her child,
There performs great signs.

Thus, for example, a young, blind lad, who five years earlier had drowned in a hole, is seen alive, his sight as good as new. And a young maiden who four years earlier had been stricken with "St. Valentine's disease" has regained her health (and her attractiveness to men).[19]

I think it is important to bear in mind that this poem about an urban cleansing is meant to accompany a public celebration; hence the lighthearted, almost playful tone. True, a successful expulsion, like the positive resolution to a ritual murder, consti-

tutes a miraculous event, which is marked with signs of divine approbation. But it is no less joyful for this heavenly intervention. And it is this combination of solemnity and celebration that may help to explain why the burghers of Frankfurt should have chosen to "adorn" (certainly, "mar" would not be the right word) the city gates with what on its own terms is clearly a gruesome picture. The lessons of Simon's martyrdom were to have been incorporated into the civic conscience, but these lessons operated on a number of levels. They reminded one of the Christian model of sacrifice and of its role in salvation. They referred to the perfidy and danger of those who would perform rites of violence on the bodies of the innocent. But they also contained the reassuring message of the ultimate triumph of "good" over "evil," and, finally, they confirmed that the moral foundations of the society were in place. Ritual murder did not occur in Frankfurt, because the Jews, too, were "in their (proper) place." The painting of Simon, then, announced and confirmed the underlying social order of the city. At the same time, it was something of a joke—the city fathers having fun at the Jews' expense; the Jews, in turn, suffering the indignity of being the butt of someone else's enjoyment.

The renovation of the painting in 1678 occasioned even more laughter on the part of Frankfurt's Gentile residents, as they read, distributed and reproduced a commemorative broadsheet of their own composed of scatological images and doggerel verse. A large illustration, divided roughly into three sections, dominates the work. At the top lies the familiar image of Simon stretched horizontally on a wooden plank, his nude body pierced with countless holes. Below this icon and to the right can be found a representation of the Brückenturm with the tiny figure of a man wearing a coat and broad hat standing within the gate and observing the wall to his right (which, presumably, displays the famous painting). By far the largest image, however, consists of a recreation of the venerable *Judensau* motif.[20] In this scene a well-dressed and, to all appearances, dignified rabbi is sitting backwards on a sow and raising its tail. Another Jew has his mouth to the sow's hindquarters, while a third, younger, male figure nurses from its teats. The sow, mea8nwhile, is busy consuming what appear to be feces on the ground. In back of the riding rabbi stands a women with her arm around a horned goat. Facing the rabbi stands a male figure, with horns sprouting from his own head, sporting a Jewish "circle" or "badge" on his clothing. Above the picture a caption reads: "Ow, vey, Rabbi Anschel, ow, ow. Mauschi [Moshe?], Ow vey, ow, ow." Below it are thirty-two lines of scurrilous verse—purportedly spoken by the rabbi (now identified as "Schilo")—in which ridicule, scatology and pornographic allusion combine. The rabbi, who has toiled long and hard for the salvation of his people, offers them to drink from this "goblet." "I lift up the tail," he says, using the term *Schwanz* that can also refer to the penis, "Perhaps the devil would like to hold it."[21]

There clearly was a market for Judensau caricatures in the early modern world, as flyers, broadsheets and inexpensive prints sold briskly and went through many printings. And it appears that both subtle and not-so-subtle changes could be introduced from one edition to the next. An early eighteenth-century print, designed it seems for the foreign market, based itself on the 1678 broadsheet and included French captions along with the German. In this version, references to Frankfurt's local memory and civic identity have been obscured (the drawing of the Brückenturm, for example, has

been erased), and the Judensau scene—which now takes up about three quarters of the space—has a lake and mountains in the background! Simon's body on the plank is, if anything, *more* visible, his wounds more clearly delineated, and his alert face now turned to the viewer. Rabbi Schilo's poem has been omitted, perhaps to make room for the considerably enlarged figures in the Judensau scene itself. In its place stands a longer caption in German and French, which relishes the debased predicament of the Jewish figures. It concludes with the words: "Drink, Mauschi, drink the milk. Rabbi, eat the shit. It has always been your favorite dish!" The earlier broadsheet showed a woman wearing a hat and ruffled collar standing beside a goat; the later version has her holding the goat by the horns. The pig's tail and excrement are quite a bit larger and more distinct in the eighteenth-century print, the sow's teats more engorged. The devil, on the other hand, looks more like one of the tribe than an unearthly figure. He even sports the same pince-nez eyeglasses as the two rabbi figures. We know who he is, though; a German caption informs the viewer: "This one is the Jews' devil." In the last line of the poster, the Frankfurt printshop that produced the work announces that additional copies are available for sale.[22]

Beyond the obvious allusions to the satanic, which do not strike one as being particularly threatening, what truly stands out in the Judensau caricatures of the period is the juxtaposition of bourgeois appearances and filth. And this, I think, is precisely their point. The Jewish figures in the early modern drawings and prints are nearly indistinguishable in bearing and in dress from other, respectable residents of the city—with the exception of the badges on their outer garments and the beards on the males. It is in their carousing with swine that the Jewish "burghers" are rendered *dishonorable* as well as ridiculous, socially out of bounds and politically harmless. Doubtless what makes this shaming satire sweeter still is its underlying joke, in which the Jew is shown to have intimate contact with the very animal that he considers to be intrinsically unclean (but which, in fact, is part of the daily diet of German Christians).

I would suggest that from the late seventeenth to the late eighteenth century, the cities and towns of Central Europe strove to promote urban institutions and communal identities that had taken shape over the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and to defend these against the progressive encroachment of state and territorial interests. For many municipalities this entailed an insistence, in the aftermath of the demographic upheavals brought about by the Thirty Years War, of their ancient rights of *non tolerandis Judaeorum*. Vienna, as is well known, succeeded in expelling its entire Jewish community in 1670. In Bohemia and Moravia, frequent agitation from the estates after 1650 induced the imperial government to set up a special *Judenreduktionskommission* and, eventually, to issue the highly restrictive Familiants Laws in 1726, whose objective was to set an arbitrary cap on Jewish population and whose effect was to reduce further the percentage of Jews living in towns and cities in favor either of rural dispersion or emigration. In the Prussian kingdom, a revision of Jewry laws in 1730 reduced the quotas of tolerated Jews that were to be allowed in specific localities, and reinforced guild privileges that excluded Jews from the crafts. Officials in Berlin viewed with alarm the steady flow of Jewish migration that had taken place since 1670. By the early eighteenth century, the Jewish population in the city stood

at well over one thousand. In 1737, the Berlin government summarily expelled some four hundred poorer Jews, but the problem did not go away.[23]

Ultimately, the struggle of the early modern city to maintain its autonomy and local prerogatives in the face of the growing encroachments of the territorial state would fail. But this tug-of-war had its ebbs and flows. Periods of usurpation of local power by central authorities often were followed by the city's reassertion of its "historic" rights. A case in point comes from the response of the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Lübeck to the withdrawal of French forces in the aftermath of Napoleon's defeat. Both localities had pursued for centuries a policy of allowing no Jewish settlement within their boundaries. This situation changed for Bremen in 1803, when it accepted eight "tolerated" families from territories that formerly had been part of Hanover. With the French occupation of 1810, Jews were able to settle in Bremen as long as they could produce exit permits from their previous places of residence and registered their names with the *Bürgerlist*, an act that usually required a security deposit. Approximately forty families took advantage of this new opportunity.[24] When the French occupation came to an end, the city sought to recapture its former rights of nontoleration. Representatives from Bremen to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 argued for a policy of expulsion and, in fact, began to expel their Jews while the deliberations in Vienna were still in progress. Members of the Jewish community, in turn, appealed to the Bremen Senate to acknowledge their *Bürgerrecht*, their status as citizens, which guaranteed occupational and commercial freedom, the right to own real property, and the right to practice their religion.[25]

To investigate these claims, the Bremen Senate established a "Jewish Commission" under the chairmanship of its mayor Smidt. It returned with the recommendation that the Jews who "recently" had settled in the city be expelled after a grace period of six years. Despite entreaties from the Jewish community, as well as diplomatic interventions from Prussia, Austria and Russia, the Commission on the Jews rejected a bid to extend Jewish residency beyond August 13, 1820. A year earlier, the Bremen citizenry had rendered "constitutional" the principle "under no circumstances" to accept the presence of Jews.[26] Still, the Jews did not leave the city voluntarily, and a number of Bremen landlords continued to rent property to them. Mayor Smidt proclaimed "the complete removal of the Children of Israel from our republic" to be ever increasingly a matter of "state concern." Monetary fines, prohibitions against trade and other police actions managed to remove some of the Jews, but not the majority. It seems that many simply did not have the means to leave, prompting the Senate to offer money to those willing to emigrate to North America.[27]

Lübeck had lost its municipal autonomy when it was incorporated into the French empire in 1811; henceforth, French citizenship was extended to all residents. Again, with the withdrawal of French troops, the Lübeck Senate abrogated all French laws and reinstituted the city's preexisting constitution. As far as the city fathers were concerned, the Jews possessed no legal rights in—or claim to—the city; but exactly what to do with them was another matter. The city council appeared ready to allow the Jews to exist in a state of "civic limbo," but town corporations urged no compromise. The Jews were to be expelled and their businesses shut down.[28]

In the meantime, at the Congress of Vienna and the subsequent Assembly of the German Confederation in Frankfurt, the Free Cities worked to prevent any binding

legislation that would inhibit their autonomy and, in particular, their efforts to "turn back the clock" on Jewish settlement. Smidt effected a major coup for his constituency when he succeeded in pushing through what appeared to be only a minor change in the wording of Article 16 of the Articles of Confederation, which entailed the substitution in one sentence of the word *von* for the word *in*. The article in question dealt with the eventual regulation of Jewish political status, and maintained that the Federal Assembly, or Bundestag, would take under advisement "in the most unanimously agreed to manner" how best to accomplish the improvement of their civic status (*die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden zu bewirken*). A critical phrase, however, now read: "Until that time, all of the rights that the Jews have been granted *by* the Federal States [rather than *in* the states] are to remain in force." With this slight of hand, those Jews who had achieved civic rights in cities and states that had come under French influence were now in danger of losing those rights. Lübeck prepared to go ahead with its planned expulsion and informed its Jewish residents that they would have to leave the city within four weeks after the Easter holiday. Again, true to their roles as agents of centralization, both Prussia and Austria intervened diplomatically to prevent full implementation of the order. The city was not deterred, however, from engaging in a series of "border skirmishes" with its Jewish population. In November 1815, eleven Jewish families were escorted out of Lübeck by the police. A propa-ganda campaign followed, aimed at influencing the delegates to the Confederation Assembly in Frankfurt. One pamphlet questioned rhetorically: Should it be the Jews or the Christians who should be asked to leave the city? To whom did the city belong?[29]

Questions about the nature of urban community and identity continued to be raised in Central Europe throughout the nineteenth century. They did not end with emancipation; rather, they bracketed it. The state of Baden addressed the question of community in the 1830s by issuing a local government ordinance that made it easier for almost all segments of the urban, male population to acquire municipal citizenship, while it rendered Jewish status more anomalous than it had been in the past. The *Gemeindeordnung* of 1831 removed the prevailing distinctions among *Ortsbürger, Gemeindebürger,* and *Vollbürger* but retained the category of *Schutzbürger* (protected or tolerated resident) into which most Jews fell. Thus, while some eighty thousand Gentile Badeners suddenly became full citizens, Jews—virtually alone among urban residents—remained a "tolerated" presence.[30] This was, in a sense, a disenfranchisement of Jewish city dwellers, exacerbated by a provision in the communal order according to which "electability to the office of mayor or into the town council was now explicitly tied to the Christian statement of faith." Thus, even those Jews who had managed to achieve the status of "local citizen" were barred by this ordinance from participating in the self-government of the community.[31]

In the 1850s and 1860s, writers of fiction and criticism in Germany produced narrative visions of a reformed urban space, which juxtaposed Jewish and Christian "experience" in the worlds of commerce and art. Works such as Gustav Freytag's *Soll und Haben* (*Debit and Credit*) (1855) and Richard Wagner's "Das Judentum in der Musik" (1850) not only rendered the presence of Jews in the modern city problematic but sought to mask the city's inherently disruptive social effects by equating these

with "foreign," "non-organic" structures and forms of behavior. In *Soll und Haben*, for example, two merchant apprentices, one Jewish and the other Christian, go out into the world to establish themselves. The two young men employ radically different methods to exploit their opportunities, and although both, ultimately, are disappointed by what the city has to offer, they come to very different ends. The Christian, Anton Wohlfahrt, finds peace and personal enrichment in his stable, if unambitious, existence in a provincial merchant house. As his name implies, he ends up the better for his journey. Veitel Itzig, the Jewish protagonist, constantly strives to satisfy his appetite for riches but ends up living in physical squalor and spiritual deprivation. In his lack of sensibility and feeling, his incapacity for a life of the spirit, the young Jewish merchant is prevented from occupying the same moral space as his Christian counterpart; he is incapable of participating in community. In this sense, he is not so much a product of the city as a danger to it.[32]

Richard Wagner's cultural criticism of the same period leveled a similar accusation against Jews: that they lacked aesthetic and moral sensibilities, that they "debased" culture through its commodification, through the failure to distinguish between artistic creation and commercial exchange. The Jew, for Wagner, embodied traits that represented the opposite of Greek (and, hence, "German") aesthetic ideals: "avarice, egotism, lovelessness, immorality, a carnal nature, and an ability to mimic (though imperfectly) the society in and from which they lived."[33] In "Das Judentum in der Musik," he railed against what he called "the be-Jewing" of modern art. The Jew, he wrote, "is innately incapable of announcing himself to us artistically through either his outward appearance or his speech, and least of all through his singing." Nevertheless, he continued, the Jew was able to establish himself as arbiter of "public taste."[34]

The rhetorical image of the Jew as the "creator" of the modern city appears for the first time, I think, in this context. The question is, what does Wagner mean by "modernity" (*das Moderne*)? In "Das Judentum in der Musik," he writes:

> From that turning point in our social evolution where Money, with less and less disguise, was raised to the virtual patent of nobility, the Jews—to whom money-making without actual labor, that is, Usury, had been left as their only trade—the Jews not merely could no longer be denied the diploma of a new society that needed naught but gold, but they brought it with them in their pockets.[35]

Culture in these circumstances has "sunk into a venal article of luxury." And the modern, "cultured" Jew pursues this commodity in a vain effort to establish a place for himself in the urban community. This zeal, however, has only led to his "utter isolation," to rendering him "the most heartless of all human beings":

> He stands in correlation with none but those who need his money: and never yet has money thriven to the point of knitting a goodly bond 'twixt man and man. Alien and apathetic stands the educated Jew in the midst of a society he does not understand, with whose tastes and aspirations he does not sympathize, whose history and evolution have always been indifferent to him.[36]

Modernity, then, is commerce, the money economy, which has defined the city since at least the sixteenth century, but whose integration into the self-consciousness

of urban elites has never been free of conflict. In this respect, Wagner's complaint has an archaic quality about it. *Das Moderne* simply refers to "that which is" juxtaposed to the harmonies of an idealized past. It has, in fact, nothing to do with the twentieth-century concepts of "modernism" or the avant-garde in literature and the arts, nor is its point of reference the mass-based, industrial city of the turn of the century. Wagner's cultural criticism takes as its point of departure the commercial centers of mid-century, which it wishes to see transformed into preindustrial communities, with closely monitored social boundaries, in which the integrity of "art" would be protected against the vagaries of the marketplace. It was one of the tasks of the *Gesamtkunstwerk*, Wagner's Total Work of Art, according to Marc Weiner, to define the borders of this community.[37]

My point here is not to argue for the underlying continuity between premodern and modern forms of antisemitism. To the contrary, I believe that the distinction developed by Reinhard Rürup between the anti-Jewish mobilizations and discourses of the 1870s and 1880s and those of previous eras is essentially correct. "Modern antisemitism," he explains, "is not only chronologically, but also as a matter of fact, a post-emancipatory phenomenon. It takes the establishment of legal equality as a given and directs itself against emancipated Jewry. Its 'Jewish question' is no longer the question concerning the emancipation of the Jews but rather, as it is expressed in many formulations, the demand for emancipation from the Jews."[38] What I mean to suggest is that the predicament of "traditional" urban interests in the face of the overwhelming reality of Jewish emancipation bore a phenomenological resemblance to earlier urban challenges and predicaments. The equality of legal status for Jews, their freedom of movement and of settlement, equal access to education and (in theory, at least) occupations constituted an apparently irreversible defeat for one significant model of urban development. It is this sense of finality, I think, that accounts for the hyperbolic imagery of much of the anti-Jewish writing of the postemancipation years, in which the emancipation itself is portrayed as an "endgame" of history: not the beginning of a process, but its final point.

Wilhelm Marr understood how to exploit this doomsday imagery to perfection. The very title of his best-selling 1879 pamphlet, "The Victory of Jewry over Germandom," announced the end of civilization. Claiming to speak "without a shred of irony," Marr proclaimed "the world-historical triumph of Jewry, the news of a lost battle, the victory of the enemy without a single excuse for the stricken army." The walls of the city had crumbled.[39] Again, it was Wagner who had made the first extensive use of the trope of Jewish mastery and power to characterize the cultural condition of the city under the structures of commercial capitalism. In "Das Judentum in der Musik," he countered Jewish calls for "emancipation" with the claim—possibly borrowed from Marx—that "according to the present constitution of this world, the Jew in truth is already more than emancipated: he rules, and will rule, so long as Money remains the power before which all our doings and our dealings lose their force."[40] Marr's purpose, of course, like Wagner's, was not to lay down his arms but to organize a counteroffensive. His own protestations notwithstanding, Marr's deployment of the language of defeat was indeed a rhetorical device laced with irony. As discourse,

antisemitism had the function of organizing knowledge in order to identify the Jewish danger to culture and society; as political mobilization, it aimed to take back the city.

The flurry of publications and speeches that occupied preachers, academics and politicians in Berlin in the fall and winter of 1879–1880—the so-called *Antisemitismusstreit*—centered on the fate of the modern city in the liberal state and under the conditions of Jewish emancipation.[41] Adolf Stöcker, chaplain to the Imperial Court, demanded that Berlin be purged of its "foreign spirit," which he identified with "modern Jewry," and by which he wished to indicate a social presence that was distinct from both Orthodox and Reform Judaism. This turns out to mean for Stöcker what it had meant for Wagner: commercial capitalism, though with a view to social relations rather than artistic exchange.[42] Similarly, the Berlin historian Heinrich von Treitschke complained of the Jews' blatant promotion of business, "with its dishonesty and bold cupidity." "It cannot be denied," he wrote in his series of essays on the Jews in 1879 and 1880, ". . . that they share heavily in the guilt for the contemptible materialism of our age that regards every kind of work only as business and threatens to suffocate the old simple pride and joy the German felt in his work."[43] Both men deployed in their speeches and writings the typical rhetorical devices of the "burgher siege mentality": the prospect of imminent military defeat, the transposition of a social minority to a position of political, cultural and economic dominance, and the projection of the doubts of urban elites concerning their own implication in the "culture of money" onto social outcasts.

In terms of the rhetorical structure of this discourse, as well as its underlying psychological complex, the antisemitic mobilizations of the 1870s and 1880s bear a striking resemblance to previous forms of urban defense. What has changed dramatically in the intervening years is the social point of reference: the Jews themselves and the position that they occupy in the life of the city. At the close of the Middle Ages and in early modern Europe, urban discourses of antisemitism performed what can be described as a *radical* function: to circumscribe and remove Jews from their traditional places in the communal life of the city. They constituted the "narrative bracketings" of political acts of social demotion and of expulsion. In the transition to modernity, urban elites resorted to these moral constructions in order to reestablish past social arrangements that had been broken as the result of war, military occupation and the encroachments of the rising territorial states. After the 1860s, with the collapse of the social rules of the preemancipation era, these same discursive structures and narrative elements were deployed more or less defensively, if somewhat aimlessly: to beat back a rising social tide, to divert and vaguely redirect the movement of Jewish integration into the fabric of urban life. "The Jews," Treitschke warned, ". . . are streaming more and more into the big cities."[44]

In this respect, there is a certain poignancy to Stöcker's observation that "Jews and Christians must try to establish a proper relationship with each other," or to his plea for "a little more modesty, please!"[45] Neither Stöcker nor Treitschke were prepared to demand the formal reversal of emancipation; the most that they could insist upon was the maintenance of some form of "social decency" in the form of boundaries and limits. It would be left to the National Socialists to recover antisemitism's radical potential.

Notes

1. On the case of Simon of Trent, see R. Po-Chia Hsia, *The Myth of Ritual Murder: Jews and Magic in Reformation Germany* (New Haven: 1988), 43–50; and *idem, Trent 1475: Stories of a Ritual Murder Trial* (New Haven: 1992). On the Brückenturm painting, see *idem, Myth of Ritual Murder*, 61–62 and 211–214.
2. Hsia, *Myth of Ritual Murder*, 62.
3. Letter of the *Baumeister* and *Zehender* of the *Judischeit* to the city council of Frankfurt, 21 Nov. 1609; quoted in *ibid*., 211.
4. *Ibid*., 212.
5. *Ibid*., 211.
6. Sander Gilman, *The Jew's Body* (New York: 1991), 24, 32, 97 and 129–131. Concerning Jews and sexually transmitted diseases, Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*: "This Jewification of our spiritual life and mammonization of our mating instinct will sooner or later destroy our entire offspring" (American ed. [Boston: 1943], 247).
7. Gilman, *Jew's Body*, 48–49. Muskat's studies were published as "Ist der Plattfuss eine Rasseneigentümlichkeit," in the periodical *Im deutschen Reich* (1909), 354–358, and "Die Kosmetik des Fusses," in *Handbuch der Kosmetik*, ed. Max Joseph (Leipzig: 1912), 646–664.
8. George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York: 1964), 15.
9. *Ibid*., 16–17.
10. *Ibid*., 22–23.
11. Lester K. Little, *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca: 1978), 54–55.
12. Kenneth Stow, *Alienated Minority: The Jews of Medieval Latin Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1992), 232–233.
13. Hsia, *Myth of Ritual Murder*, 88–89.
14. Giovanni Tiberino, *Passio beati Simonis pueri Tridentini*; quoted at some length by Hsia in *Trent 1475*, 53–56, and in German translation by Josef Deckert in his anti-Jewish account, *Ein Ritualmord: Aktenmässig nachgewiesen* (Dresden: 1893). This and all other translations, unless otherwise indicated, are mine.
15. Hsia, *Trent 1475*, 53.
16. This section is quoted in Deckert, *Ein Ritualmord* 35.
17. Hsia, *Myth of Ritual Murder*, 41, where he writes of the *Kopialbuch* that "it served as a record of the civic privileges, laws and customs, and more important business transactions, and was, in sum, a duplicate of the original diplomatics (*Urkunden*), which may be damaged or lost through time. It served as both a legal compendium and a historical reference for the practice of government. When the confessions of the Endingen Jews passed into the Kopialbuch, the trial of 1470 became incontestable history, the ritual murder a fact."
18. *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (Jerusalem: 1972), 14: 332–333.
19. *Ein new Lied von der stat Rottenburg . . .* reproduced in Eduard Fuchs, *Die Juden in der Karikatur: Ein Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte* (Munich: 1921), 11.
20. The image of the *Judensau* enjoyed a long career in Germany as a motif in building iconography and popular art. It was chiseled onto the cathedral exteriors in Regensburg and Magdeburg in the thirteenth centuries and was widely distributed in a variety of media in subsequent centuries. For descriptions of this satirical art form, see *ibid*., 114–123, and Isaiah Schachar, *The Judensau: A Medieval Anti-Jewish Motif and Its History* (London: 1974).
21. A copy of the 1678 broadsheet, from the Frankfort Historisches Museum, is reproduced in Hsia, *Myth of Ritual Murder*, 215.
22. *Satirischer Einblattdruck*. Frankfurt, early eighteenth century; reproduced in Fuchs, *Juden in der Karikatur*, 31.
23. On the post-1648 "backlash" in Central Europe, see Jonathan Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550–1750*, 3rd ed. (London: 1998), 119–134 and 195–209. On the efforts to rein in the Jewish population in Bohemia and Moravia, see Anna Drabek, "Die Juden in den böhmischen Ländern zur Zeit des landesfürstlichen Absolutismus," in *Die Juden in den*

böhmischen Ländern (Munich: 1983), 123–143, and J. Prokeš, "Antisemitismus der Behörden und das Prager Ghetto in machweissenbergischer Zeit," *Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft für Geschichte der Juden in der Čechoslovakischen Republik* 1 (1929): 49–110.

24. Rainer Erb and Werner Bergmann, *Die Nachtseite der Judenemanzipation: Der Widerstand gegen die Integration der Juden in Deutschland, 1780–1860* (Berlin: 1989), 97–98.

25. *Ibid*., 98.

26. *Ibid*., 98–99.

27. *Ibid*., 100.

28. *Ibid*., 100–101.

29. *Ibid*., 102–104; the pamphlet appeared as *Die Juden von Lübeck* (Frankfurt: 1816).

30. Dagmar Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion: Religious Politics in Pre-Revolutionary Baden* (Princeton: 1996), 54. Herzog quotes the pro-emancipationist Lorenz Brentano as remarking that the *Gemeindeordnung* constituted a "snub which did not exist earlier." Jews now found themselves "in a disadvantaged position" (p. 189, n. 4).

31. Lorenz Brentano, in *Verhandlungen der Stände-Versammlung des Grossherzogthums Baden* (lower chamber), 7 Aug. 1846; quoted in Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 189, n. 4.

32. On this point I disagree with Mosse, who insists on viewing the novels of Freytag and Raabe as antiurban statements of a rural utopia. There is, in fact, nothing "rural" about them. They constitute a perspective critical of industrial society, to be sure, but an *urban* voice nonetheless.

33. Marc A. Weiner, *Richard Wagner and the Anti-Semitic Imagination* (Lincoln: 1997), 52. See also Richard Wagner, *Die Kunst und die Revolution. Das Judentum in der Musik. Was ist deutsch?* ed. Tibor Kneif (Munich: 1975).

34. Richard Wagner, "Das Judentum in der Musik," in *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, 2nd ed. (New York: 1995), 328, 329 (from *Richard Wagner's Prose Works*, ed. and trans. W. A. Ellis [London: 1897]).

35. *Ibid*., 329.

36. *Ibid*.

37. According to Weiner, in *Richard Wagner and the Anti-Semitic Imagination*,

> The artwork does not simply reflect the image of the community . . . but also does so by physiological distinction, and this it achieves through the assessment of physical appearance. Thus, when the future German audience beholds its image in the aesthetic representations of the Total Work of Art, that work will metaphorically constitute a body reflecting the bodily presence of those who view it. . . . The difference between their bodies and those of the world it rejects will be perceived as real, as grounded in verifiable physiology. The work as metaphor will itself be based on vision as the guarantor of social demarcation vouchsafed by the distinctive iconography of the body (p. 59).

38. Reinhard Rürup, "Die 'Judenfrage' der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und die Entstehung des modernen Antisemitismus," in his *Emanzipation und Antisemitismus: Studien zur 'Judenfrage' der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt: 1987), 114.

39. Wilhelm Marr, *Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum: Vom nicht confessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet* (Bern: 1879), translated and reprinted in *Antisemitism in the Modern World: An Anthology of Texts*, ed. Richard S. Levy (Lexington: 1991), 76–77.

40. Wagner, "Das Judentum in der Musik," in Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz (eds.), *The Jew in the Modern World*, 328. Marx used a similar formulation in his *On the Jewish Question* (*Zur Judenfrage*) (1844). Objecting to Bruno Bauer's proposal that the Jews could not be emancipated by the state until the state had emancipated itself from religion, Marx suggests that it is the individual who needs to be freed, not from religion, but from its secularized form as economic structure. In this context, he issued his famous formulation: "In its final meaning, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of humanity from Judaism" (a selection from this work is found in *ibid*., 326).

41. Considerable literature exists on the subject. See, inter alia, Walter Boehlich (ed.), *Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit* (Frankfurt: 1965; 2nd ed., 1988); Michael A. Meyer, "Heinrich

Graetz and Heinrich von Treitschke: A Comparison of Their Historical Images of the Modern Jew," *Modern Judaism* 6 (1986), 1–11; Norbert Kampe, "Akademisierung der Juden und Beginn eines studentischen Antisemitismus: Die Berliner Universität unter dem Rektorat Hofmann 1880–81," in *Jüdisches Leben*, ed. Wolfgang Dressen (Berlin: 1985), 10–23; and Georg Geismann, "Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit und die Abdankung der rechtlich-praktischen Vernunft," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 34, no. 1 (1993), 3–16.

42. Adolf Stöcker, "What We Demand of Modern Jewry"—speech delivered at a Christian Social Workers' party rally, 19 Sept. 1879; abridged and reprinted in Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz (eds.), *The Jew in the Modern World*, 340–342. According to Stöcker,

> It is true, Israel had an enlightened economic legislation, social forms of property ownership, the prohibition of usury, and the greatest charity toward the poor. But we have only to mention these things to realize the fearful chasm between the Old Testament and modern Jewry. It was German law alone that protected the concept of common property, the Christian church alone that decreed the prohibition of usury; it is precisely here that the faults and sins of modern Jewry are plainly revealed (p. 341).

43. Heinrich von Treitschke, "Ein Wort über unser Judentum," *Preussische Jahrbücher* (1879–1880), reprinted and translated in Treitschke, *A Word About Our Jewry*, ed. Ellis Rivkin, trans. Helen Lederer (Cincinnati, n.d.), 4.

44. *Ibid*., 11.

45. Stöcker, "What We Demand of Modern Jewry," in Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz (eds.), *The Jew in the Modern World*, 341.

Orthodox Jews, the City and the Suburb

Samuel C. Heilman
(city university of new york)

In contrast to the historical experience of Jews in Europe and the Islamic world, where areas of Jewish settlement were often legally restricted, Jews in America—at least according to the letter of the law—were always able to live wherever they chose. Attached to the goal of mobility and the breaching of new frontiers, a "don't-fence-me-in" America was ambivalent about ordinances that ran counter to these ideals. Accordingly, such barriers as did exist to Jewish residency were rarely if ever explicitly stated in law, but were instead to be found in vaguely worded restrictive covenants attached to deeds that were enforceable in local and state courts or, more commonly, were the products of informal economic or social initiatives.Thus, certain regions or neighborhoods came to be known as too exclusive, too expensive or otherwise inhospitable to Jews. In time, however, Jews in America found ways to move wherever they chose, and the place they chose during most of the twentieth century was the city and its surrounding metropolitan region. This was particularly true of Orthodox Jews, who often lived at first in the least desirable sections of the inner city, which their less observant kin had abandoned in favor of more exclusive and expensive locales elsewhere in the city or on the suburban frontier.

In part, this continuing residence in the city can be summarily explained as the result of at least four factors. First is the fact that the Orthodox were (and remain to this day) the least economically endowed of Jews and as such could not afford to move up and out of the inner city. Second, there is the related fact that, being the most ideologically committed to their traditional religious practices, many Orthodox Jews were reluctant to leave the culturally rich Jewish world of Europe for what they perceived as the Jewish wasteland of America. When at last they did come—often as refugees and Holocaust survivors—they were forced by circumstance to live in places that had been vacated by others higher up the socioeconomic ladder.

Third, even when they entertained possibilities of moving out of the inner city, Orthodox Jews were more likely than others to experience the brunt of existing anti-Jewish restrictions, since their difference from the Christian majority was more obvious and explicit. Thus, the haredim, or ultra-Orthodox, whose traditions and appearance put them most at odds with surrounding America, were naturally inclined to remain in those inner-city areas where the resistance to them was least organized. Indeed, among these most visibly distinct Orthodox Jews, the Jewish urban ghetto be-

came in time a preferred location. "I would rather be surrounded by my own," one resident of an Orthodox Jewish community explained to a *New York Times* reporter, who went on to note that "many in the community say they derive a clear, almost palpable comfort from living in the absence of malice—or stares. One resident spoke of shedding her self-consciousness as if it had been a cloak."[1]

Finally, Orthodox Jewish practices and religious commitments were more easily satisfied in a geographically contained urban environment. Because of their adherence to strict Sabbath observance, for example, Orthodox Jews need to have synagogues within walking distance of their homes. They insist on their own schools. They demand places where kosher food can be obtained, along with holy books and other ritual articles. Neighborhoods that concentrate large numbers of Orthodox Jews in a relatively small territory can more easily sustain such schools and establishments and, in so doing, create a powerful sense of attachment among their residents.[2] Put differently, Orthodox Jews cannot easily live as isolated individuals scattered throughout a region. To this day, when personal circumstances lead them to move either to the periphery of Jewish districts or out of them altogether, they often bring other Orthodox Jews in their wake, or at the very least promote greater religious and ethnic participation in their new areas of residence.[3]

The relationship between Orthodox American Jews, the city and the suburbs is a dynamic one, and where Orthodox Jews choose to live continues to be a reflection of who they are and how they express their religious identities. Moreover, Orthodox Jews—unlike other of their co-religionists—have been able to make areas of Jewish scarcity, even in the most unlikely areas, flourish: increasingly, they have changed the communities in which they have settled rather than being themselves changed.

Migration to the City and Suburbs

While Jews who could be characterized as Orthodox came to America during the great waves of immigration of the late nineteenth century and up to the First World War, many if not most of those who today call themselves Orthodox actually trace their American origins to the years immediately preceding and following the Second World War. In part this was because many of those who embraced Orthodoxy in Europe were convinced that America was, as some called it, a *treyfe medine*, a contaminated state, where Jews as individuals might survive but where Judaism as a way of life would not. They therefore preferred, and their religious leaders encouraged them, to stay in what, as already noted, they considered to be the secure heartland of a thousand years' worth of traditional Judaism—Europe. Only when the ominous shadow of Nazism began to sweep across that continent did many of the Orthodox realize that at last they had to leave.

Treyfe medine or not, America offered a haven (albeit one that was difficult to enter during the interwar years). Especially in New York City, a number of important Orthodox institutions had already been established by those who had come earlier. These institutions were invigorated by the refugees who fled Nazism, and later, by Orthodox survivors of the Holocaust. New institutions were also founded during this time—indeed, most of the major yeshivas and other religious institutions of

Orthodoxy, practically all hasidic courts of any significant size and a plethora of today's active Orthodox synagogues trace their origins to the 1940s and thereafter.

Prior to the Second World War, American Orthodox Jewry had been hobbled by the large-scale abandonment of Jewish tradition that had occurred during the first half of the twentieth century. The enormous destruction of the Holocaust further diminished its ranks. Traumatized by these two blows, Orthodoxy socially reconstructed itself in the process of its survival in America. The Orthodox Jews of the postwar U.S. were animated both by survivor guilt and the consequent determination to deny a posthumous victory to the enemy. As such, they became far more resolutely determined than their predecessors in America to affirm and maintain a traditional Jewish life in the United States that would be loyal to the strictures of Orthodoxy and not eroded by American contemporary culture.

Although some believed that this goal would be best attained by creating isolated Orthodox enclaves far from the city and its profane attractions—such was the strategy of those who in 1943 established the Beth Midrash Govoha Yeshiva in Lakewood, in what was then rural southern New Jersey—most newly arrived Orthodox Jews gravitated to the cities, and most prominently to New York, where the largest number of Jews was already residing. Here, within a multicultural metropolitan region, they would succeed over time in creating an Orthodox Jewish enclave culture that would surround them with a web of invisible but effective boundaries.[4]

Precisely at the moment in history that these Orthodox Jews came to the American cities, American residential patterns were about to change significantly. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States had been transformed from a predominantly rural society to an overwhelmingly urban one by the dual forces of rapid industrialization and migration. Now, by the middle of the twentieth century, it was about to make its dominant residential form a kind of neoruralism that came to be known as suburbanization. As sociologist Morton Keller has argued, "If the Old American culture was rooted in small towns and the countryside, and the New in the cities of the East, the third culture has its prototypical home in the suburbs."[5] On the periphery of the cities, people were building a new way of living. New roads (including the efficient and high-speed interstate highway system) and affordable automobiles, along with plentiful and still cheap gasoline—no longer subject to wartime rationing—helped make life in these suburban peripheries conceivable. People began to speak of living within a suburban "commuting distance" from the city, and a new style of American life blossomed. In the decade between 1948 and 1958, some twelve million Americans relocated to the suburbs, and between 1950 and 1955, suburbs grew seven times as fast as America's central cities.[6]

Orthodox Jews did not immediately embrace the suburban way of life. For one thing, many of them did not have the financial wherewithal to buy even the relatively inexpensive tract houses that were going up in places such as Levittown, NY. (Levittown's first residents were mostly U.S. Army veterans benefiting from inexpensive mortgages sponsored by the G.I. bill, and not too many of the Orthodox immigrants qualified.) Additionally, there was the problem of how to create the necessary Jewish institutions, primarily synagogues and religious schools, in what was for them a suburban wilderness. At this point, the Orthodox were not yet sufficiently organized as a movement to initiate large-scale projects of this sort, and as individuals,

they did not seek to be pioneers leading the way to the Jewish periphery. Their continued habitation in the city was also influenced by the conviction that like-minded Jews would not be quick to follow them to suburbia. Thus, they continued, at least at first, the pattern begun in Europe of remaining in what was considered to be a more traditional Jewish heartland.

The Orthodox Move to Suburbia

To be sure, Orthodox Jews were not all alike, and neither were their residential choices. In the course of its emergence in America, Orthodoxy evolved into roughly three broad groups. One may be called the "nominally Orthodox": those who choose to call themselves Orthodox but whose practices bond them in only the most minimal way to Orthodoxy.[7] In many ways, the nominally Orthodox constituted the majority of those Jews who established the earliest Orthodoxy in America. Fundamentally acculturative in orientation, they remained sentimentally attached to Orthodoxy but sought whenever possible to accommodate themselves to the cultural demands of America and its open—and increasingly appealing—society. In the now classic expression of their Jewish orientation, these Jews maintained membership in an Orthodox synagogue they did *not* regularly attend.

Nominally Orthodox Jews were the first to join their less observant brethren in the suburbs. Some of them chose to touch base from time to time with "the city" and its traditional Orthodox institutions; others joined new suburban Conservative Jewish congregations and gradually made the transition to a more permissive movement that, among other things, tolerated a drive to the synagogue on the Sabbath. Yet there were also those who established Jewish institutions that mirrored their own tenuous Orthodox attachments: primarily synagogues and Hebrew schools that, while nominally Orthodox, were relatively lax in their Jewish demands. A not uncommon situation was that the synagogues would be packed during the High Holidays but would have a meagerly attended Sabbath service and no regular quorum of ten men for weekday prayers, whereas the schools drew their students mainly from non-Orthodox families. In an effort to maintain their religious orientation, some of these first suburban Orthodox establishments formally affiliated themselves with national Orthodox institutions such as the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, which saw in them an important foothold on the emergent suburban frontier. Others, however, broke away from formal Orthodox affiliation once their membership had become increasingly non-Orthodox.

A second group of Orthodox Jews likewise embraced the acculturative ideal while attempting to avoid compromises in Jewish observance. In the words of the preamble to the constitution of the National Council of Young Israel, a synagogue network that came in large measure to represent them, the aim was to "foster and maintain a program of spiritual, cultural, social and communal activity towards the advancement and perpetuation of traditional Torah-true Judaism . . . and demonstrate the compatibility of the ancient faith of Israel with good Americanism." Calling themselves "modern Orthodox" (and more recently, "centrist"), these Jews, like the less observant Jews who preceded them, were also attracted to the emerging American ideal of

a private house surrounded by a patch of greenery, within commuting distance of the city. Like everyone else in suburbia, they reinvented themselves.

During the late 1960s, about a decade after their less observant predecessors, they too began to move to the suburbs. In a sense the nominally Orthodox had blazed the suburban trail for the "centrists"—yet it was sometimes the case that the nominally Orthodox founders of synagogues and schools were eventually replaced in the very institutions they had established by these newer, more observant members of the community. While the move of centrist Orthodox Jews to suburbia enabled some of the nominally Orthodox to become more committed to Orthodox life patterns, more often than not it led them to a realization that, compared to these suburban newcomers, they could no longer really call themselves Orthodox.[8]

Orthodox Jews who relocated to suburbia had to deal with the fundamental reality of lower housing density and greater geographic dispersion. This meant that in any given suburban neighborhood there were fewer like-minded individuals available to build and support Jewish institutions. Consequently, those few Orthodox institutions that were established rested on a relatively narrow economic base, while the paucity of such institutions led to a weaker sense of local Jewish community. Unlike urban ghettoes, moreover, where cultural life spilled out onto the streets, suburbia hid its cultural life within the home and nuclear family. As a result, there were fewer informal or spontaneous occasions during which Jews could experience being part of a Jewish community. Instead, the public schools and their affiliated parent organizations often became the single most important suburban neighborhood institutions—and these, of course, were not at all Jewish in their ambiance, even if a majority of the student body was Jewish. This, too, was a factor in diminishing and in some cases undermining the initial centrist Orthodox hopes of controlling the acculturative remaking of Jewish life in suburbia. Thus, at the outset, Orthodox Jewish suburban "pioneers" felt ambivalent at best, and anxious at worst, about their move away from the urban centers of Jewish life.

Not surprisingly, therefore, when the more religiously committed centrist Orthodox did choose to move away from the inner city, they were drawn to those areas, at the city's borders or just beyond them, that were in the process of becoming heavily Jewish. Such areas often had a relatively dense residential pattern of multi-family or row houses, or contained private houses built on relatively small lots; they were less expensive as a result, and the local population also included working-class whites and members of minority groups. In metropolitan New York (where most of America's Orthodox still live), the neighborhoods preferred initially were in the "outer boroughs" of Queens, Staten Island and parts of the Bronx and later, just over the border in neighboring Nassau County, northern Bronx (including, ultimately, Riverdale), neighboring towns in southern Westchester County, and nearby New Jersey communities along the west bank of the Hudson. In Philadelphia, neighborhoods along the city line such as Overbrook Park and Wynnefield were first selected, followed by Bala Cynwyd and Lower Merion just over the border. In Boston, similar patterns led to Orthodox communities being founded in Brookline and Newton.

The second, centrist wave of Orthodox Jews to suburbia embraced the goal of building and sending their children to Jewish day schools and yeshivas, even when the local public schools were of a high educational caliber. Suburban living, as noted,

provided little in the way of a Jewish "street" where traditional Jewish life could be acquired by osmosis and mimesis. Thus, the Jewish day school, where children were immersed in a totally Orthodox environment for most of their waking hours, became a vitally important component of modern Orthodox life. There was a pragmatic advantage as well to the long school day, given the fact that the second generation of modern Orthodox mothers and fathers began, like their non-Orthodox peers, to pursue dual professional careers (many of the new schools developed thriving preschool programs). The very act of organizing and founding schools and synagogues—also an essential element of the centrist Orthodox suburban agenda—helped foster a sense of community among the new arrivals, and as the community grew, the financial base of Orthodox institutions became more solid.[9]

By the 1990s, both the nominally and centrist modern Orthodox had made suburban America their residence of choice, concentrating themselves in a number of suburbs that became magnet communities. Their move from the city to the suburbs, albeit occurring later than the suburban migration of the non-Orthodox, had taken barely a generation.

Haredim and the City

Suburbanization has largely bypassed American haredim, those most traditionalist of Orthodox Jews who considered the American culture they were *in* but not *of* as a contaminating civilization. Numbering some two hundred thousand people in 1990—about 42 percent of the total American Jewish Orthodox population[10]—the haredim have resolutely maintained their presence in the city. In part, their reason for avoiding the suburbs is ideological. Although living within American society, the haredim reject most values of American culture. Priding themselves on living a life apart, they disparage those aspects of the acculturating "American dream" that have motivated many of their nominal and centrist Orthodox counterparts to seek a life in suburbia.[11]

Over the course of the last fifty years, American haredim have predominantly concentrated themselves in several neighborhoods in Brooklyn—notably Borough Park, Williamsburg, Crown Heights and parts of Flatbush.[12] Even before the Second World War, Brooklyn had begun to replace Manhattan as the stronghold of haredi Jewry. Thus, it was natural that a number of hasidic rebbes who had survived the Holocaust chose to settle in these neighborhoods, thereby establishing a cultural enclave in which traditional East European Jewish life could be socially reconstructed and where a culture and recipe for negotiating the realities of American life could be articulated by the entire group.

Economics as well as ideology keeps the haredim within the city. By and large, the ultra-Orthodox constitute the poorest segment of American Jewry. The reasons for this are multifold. Haredim tend to have larger families than most other Jews, with all the attendant expenses. They are unlikely to make use of free public schools for their numerous children and are therefore forced to pay significant tuition for their private education. Furthermore, they increasingly cling to an ethic that encourages long years of Torah study for males and discourages their pursuit of higher education in the university (and the improved earning power that comes with it).[13] While women are not

expected to spend long years in a yeshiva, the early onset of their marriage and childbearing, as mandated by haredi norms, effectively makes it difficult if not impossible for them to engage in paid labor outside the home—to say nothing of their staying in school long enough to acquire marketable skills. Additionally, while they live in those parts of cities where many of the housing costs are relatively lower, the geographic regions in which haredim reside tend to be those where the cost of living is among the highest in the United States. Their scrupulous attachment to restrictive standards of kashruth often leads to their paying more for their food than most others pay. All of these factors combine to create a situation in which haredi families often find themselves driven to subsist on external aid and subsidies, sometimes from the community and even more often from a variety of government programs, including welfare, food stamps and an assortment of other kinds of aid to families with dependent children.

According to figures based on the 1990 census, the annual household income of 27 percent of the residents of the predominantly haredi precincts of Borough Park falls below the poverty level. Comparable figures for haredi precincts in Crown Heights and in Williamsburg are 25 and 56 percent, respectively.[14] By way of comparison, the figures for selected centrist Orthodox strongholds in Nassau County (Long Island), Bergen County (New Jersey) or the neighborhood of Kew Gardens Hills (Queens) range between three and six percent.[15] At the same time, the costs of living in haredi areas of the city are lower than the median, making them more attractive and reducing the incentive to move away.

According to the 1990 U.S. census, the median value of owner-occupied housing in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, where Satmar hasidim concentrate, is $161,730. In Crown Heights, where Lubavitcher hasidim live, it rises to $195,700, while in Borough Park, the Brooklyn neighborhood with the largest number of haredi residents, the median value rises to $234,000. These numbers, moreover, reflect a large number of multifamily units in these city neighborhoods. In contrast, the median value in West Hempstead, Long Island—containing a large centrist Orthodox community with mostly single-family homes—is $197,100; while in New Rochelle, in northern Westchester county, where modern Orthodox Jews are part of a new and growing community, the figure rises to $377,000. And in Lawrence, Long Island, an even more upscale and heavily populated modern Orthodox suburb of single-family houses, it is a whopping $419,800. Even in Kew Gardens, a modern Orthodox enclave in the city, where the property plots are relatively small, the median owner-occupied house is valued at $217,000.

There are also cultural reasons for staying in the urban milieu. Because haredim, even more than other Orthodox Jews, are part of tightly knit communities of like-minded people and a network of extended families, even those economically able to leave the city are reluctant to detach themselves from the community to which they are culturally, religiously and socially bound. The appeal of living in a suburb, where the living arrangement emphasizes individuals in nuclear families rather than community attachments, is lost upon them. Haredim continue to prefer living within easy walking distance of a yeshiva or a variety of synagogues to looking out from their windows on a bucolic suburban vista of lush lawns (in fact, when they do live in suburbia, their lawns are often quite neglected). This is true for those connected to yeshiva commu-

nities. And it is also the case with hasidim, who in America make up the large majority of haredim. The latter are not only bonded to other hasidim but also to the charismatic rebbe who leads them. Since few rebbes have so far chosen to make the move to suburbia, their hasidic followers have been reluctant to do so on their own, realizing that such a move would be taken as a symbolic indication of their choosing to distance themselves not only from the rebbe but from the hasidic way of life. The idea of a hasid and his family making such a move for personal reasons is unthinkable, except in those cases in which the rebbe has sent followers out as emissaries—as with Lubavitcher hasidim, who are often found engaging in Jewish outreach efforts in far-flung suburban locales—or else where the rebbe has established a branch of his court elsewhere, the notable examples being Kiryas Joel, the Satmar enclave in suburban Orange County, and the Wizniz (Vizhnitz) outpost in nearby Monsey, north of New York City.[16] As for the famous Beth Midrash Govoha, when this premier Lithuanian-style yeshiva in America did establish itself in rural southern New Jersey in the city of Lakewood, it did so in part to insure that its students would be insulated from the contaminating effects of American cultural life, which at the time were most prominent in the city. Most other haredi yeshivas, however, eschewed this sort of location and established themselves in urban haredi districts.

In some neighborhoods, most prominently the Brownsville, Williamsburg and Crown Heights sections of Brooklyn, the local population, while heavily Jewish, began to change its composition during the 1960s. During that period, many Jews from these neighborhoods moved elsewhere while other ethnic minorities—blacks, Hispanics and Caribbean immigrants—moved in. Many of the Jews took the suburban route, while others relocated in other parts of the borough, primarily Flatbush and Borough Park, or else settled in neighboring Queens. It was at this point that two haredi groups—mostly Satmar hasidim in Williamsburg and Lubavitchers in Crown Heights—actively resisted the migration and stayed where they were. The Satmars stayed primarily for social and economic reasons, although they would ultimately relocate a significant number of their community (by 1990, about 30 percent) to Kiryas Joel, where housing was cheaper. The approximately 8,800 Lubavitchers who stayed in Crown Heights articulated their decision to remain in ideological terms. Their leader, Rabbi Menahem Mendel Schneerson, saw his refusal to "flee" Crown Heights as a symbolic expression of an unwillingness to repeat the historical pattern of a "hasidism on the run"—a pattern established in his group's European experience. Moreover, the refusal to move was a symbolic demonstration of an ideological unwillingness either to make changes or to embrace the cultural mode of what constituted the American dream. Surviving in Crown Heights "against all odds" would bespeak the renewed vigor of a transplanted hasidism.[17] (In time, however, they too would shift the focus of their concern to the emissaries they sent out to spread the word of Chabad throughout the world.)

Schneerson and his supporters also reasoned that the integrity of their haredi enclave culture would be enhanced by its being surrounded by a non-Jewish population that had little or nothing about it that would be attractive to young hasidim. Precisely because the surrounding neighborhood was perceived as hostile and dangerous, the Lubavitchers (and the Satmars no less), like other haredim who remained in the inner city, could feel confident that there would be few cultural and social forces to pull

their followers away. The dangers of their neighborhoods might be physical, but as they saw it, the assimilative dangers of the suburban milieus were religious and cultural. The former risks seemed to them small in comparison with the latter. Those inside the haredi enclave in largely African American and Hispanic areas could often feel as if they were protected by a wall of Jewish virtues, as if they were clearly a people set apart and chosen for higher moral rewards. More and more, therefore, the city neighborhoods where the surrounding population was most unwelcoming seemed the preferred locale for haredi life.

In contrast, for those who lived in a more pluralistic neighborhood in suburbia, with many options regarding how to behave as a Jew, who felt increasingly at home and hard-pressed to remember they were in a Jewish exile, such barriers to change and assimilation were not as powerful. With its leveling of all differences and its fresh start mentality, where assimilation and cultural contamination would be far more likely even for those who tried to remain modern Orthodox, suburbia was not a place haredim saw as an acceptable residential option.

The aversion to suburban living was particularly strong in the case of haredi women, for whom the family, home and community was the dominant arena of existence and personal expression. Unlike adult men and children, who were "protected" inside schools and yeshivas or in a job that often connected them to a Jewish domain beyond the home, haredi women, in a traditional division of labor, were expected to build their lives around home and shopping. The suburban milieu was far from ideal for women who were saddled with babies and toddlers, and with husbands otherwise engaged. They needed a large support system and peers they could meet on the street while pushing their strollers about: this was *their* protective environment. The station wagon (and later the van), which became the tool of suburban women—including the non-haredi Orthodox—represented an independence and mobility that haredi women were not expected to embrace. To this day, relatively few haredi women are drivers. The city, therefore, was both practically and ideologically a more appropriate place for haredi women. Accordingly, as was not the case with many of their non-haredi peers, these women did not encourage a move to suburbia. Instead, they cultivated an ideal of providing their inner-city homes with all the luxuries their suburban counterparts might have, within a similarly spacious area. For those who could afford it, this led to huge houses in Borough Park or Williamsburg—homes whose size, to be sure, was determined to a great extent by the large size of haredi families and the emphasis on intracommunal sociability.

In haredi neighborhoods, households of seven or more persons are far more common than elsewhere. The proportion in Borough Park, for example, is almost four times greater than in New York City or Nassau County, while in Williamsburg it is almost eight times greater. According to the *New York Times*, since 1990, the New York City Building Department has issued more than eight hundred permits for private construction projects (both new homes and additions to existing homes) in Borough Park—more than in any other residential neighborhood in Brooklyn. The area's birthrate in 1990 was slightly more than twice that of New York City as a whole.[18]

By the late 1990s, as haredi Orthodoxy managed to establish secure roots in America and acquire more self-assurance, the efforts to stake out an increasingly autonomous urban enclave became ever more pronounced. Haredim became adept at

local politics, both at the city and state level. Since they invariably voted as a bloc, their political clout was considerable. They also became literally more visible, as politicians increasingly sought photo opportunities with these symbolic icons of Jewry. Gradually, haredim—and other Orthodox Jews—also actively sought office. In New York, a number of Orthodox Jews were elected to the state senate and assembly; others became political appointees in the mayor and governor's offices. In 1994, Sheldon Silver, an Orthodox Jew, became speaker of the New York Assembly and arguably the most powerful Democrat in the state. Such enhanced political power aided the haredim and other Orthodox in maintaining the cultural integrity of their neighborhoods. This, in turn, made it easier for them to resist leaving the city.

Among the particular accomplishments of the haredim was their attaining separate ethnic minority status for hasidim, which enabled them to qualify for a variety of government programs on both the individual and community level. No less important, the demands and expectations of Orthodoxy became a dominant social and economic reality within the haredi enclaves. A wave of Sabbath store closings swept the commercial district. Small synagogues, yeshivas and Jewish study halls became ubiquitous, whereas public schools closed their doors for lack of students. When a branch of the Jewish-sponsored Touro College opened in the Brooklyn neighborhood of Midwood, it followed, in the words of its dean, "an undergraduate model of separating into a women's and men's college to accommodate religious sensibilities."[19] Meanwhile, saloons, video stores and non-kosher eating facilities disappeared. Indeed, one observer described "a commercial area that has become like a giant kosher superstore (complete with fancy wig salons, black hat shops and twenty-four-hour nosherias)."[20]

Simultaneously, efforts were made to keep any "invasion" of the outside world to a minimum. A striking example of such efforts occurred in 1997, when the city made plans to route a citywide bicycle path through the haredi neighborhoods of Brooklyn. Local Orthodox leaders argued that such a path would bring scantily clad cyclists into their enclave, thus threatening community standards of modesty. The path was rerouted. It is hard to conceive of modern Orthodox Jews voicing such complaints; in their neighborhoods, integration is far more normative, and bikers, runners and all manner of people are constantly making their way across the invisible boundaries behind which the modern Orthodox live.

Shifting Realities: Haredi Suburban Communities

Whereas the discussion so far has centered on the reasons underlying the continued—even growing—haredi presence in inner-city neighborhoods, that very growth has led to severe demographic and accompanying economic pressures. According to the 1990 census, for instance, there were approximately twenty-five thousand haredim, mostly Satmar hasidim, living in Williamsburg. Census projections raise this figure to about thirty thousand by 1997,[21] of whom a towering 42 percent are under the age of thirteen (the comparable figure for the Borough Park haredi population is 28 percent under the age of thirteen—itself more than twice the proportion among whites in New York City). As a consequence, the overall standard of living among haredi families is lower than average. In the haredi precincts of Borough Park, the median family in-

come in 1989 was $26,422; in comparable areas in Williamsburg, it was $20,401—as noted, 25 and 56 percent of the haredi population in these two neighborhoods were living below the poverty line as of 1990.[22]

Economic pressures cause many haredi families to seek external aid and subsidies, sometimes provided from within the community but more often from a variety of government programs, including welfare and food stamps. Others, however, have chosen to move out of the city to one of several haredi enclaves in suburbia. A closer look at two of these enclaves, Kiryas Joel and New Square, shows that the move has not led to a significant easing of economic hardship.

As of 1990, there were approximately 7,100 people (almost entirely Satmar hasidim) residing in Kiryas Joel. The parents among them have indeed been fruitful and have multiplied: approximately 50 percent of the population is aged thirteen or under, and the projected population for 1997 was 10,000—a growth rate of 40 percent. Forty-seven percent of Kiryas Joel's residents live in households numbering seven or more individuals, and 95 percent of the school-age population attend private schools. Although the median house value in Kiryas Joel in 1990 was approximately the same as in Williamsburg ($165,400, compared with $161,730), the average household income in Kiryas Joel was lower ($14,702, compared with $20,401 in Williamsburg or $39,198 for all of Orange County, where Kiryas Joel is located). In 1990, fully 63 percent of the population was living below the poverty line.

The story in New Square is much the same. This suburban haredi village numbers approximately 2,700, about 49 percent of whom are aged thirteen or younger. Some 41 percent live in households numbering seven or more individuals. With a median income of $13,488 (even lower than that of Kiryas Joel, though the median house value is somewhat higher), about 56 percent of the population is living below the poverty level. In nearby Monsey, which has a large Orthodox population, the median house value is about 30 percent higher, and the median household income is $49,833—just a bit lower than the countywide median household income of $52,731.

In short, as this look at Kiryas Joel and New Square demonstrates, those haredim who have tried to reconstitute their lives in suburbia—even a suburbia that is a shtetl-like Jewish village—are finding it to be no solution to economic pressures. Thus, when urban haredim look at their suburban haredi cousins, they may well wonder whether such a move is feasible. It therefore appears that the harsh economic realities of haredi life do not evaporate with a change in location.

Developments Among the Centrist Orthodox

While the ideological differences that accounted for the divisions between those Orthodox Jews who chose the city and those who went to the suburbs were real, a blurring that began to occur displayed itself in the ways these areas developed by century's end. Not only were places like Kiryas Joel and New Square, located in the suburban periphery of New York, becoming more like their Orthodox urban enclaves and less like the rest of suburbia. Much the same thing was happening in those localities in which the centrist Orthodox had concentrated themselves. They too were becoming Orthodox Jewish cultural enclaves.

Many have argued that this transformation is a reflection of a move to the religious right by centrist Orthodoxy. As more Orthodox young were educated in schools whose religious teaching staff came from among those who embraced haredi norms, or at least respected them, they too absorbed many of these norms and ideals. Sent to yeshivas from their preprimary years until well after high school, they often articulated their adolescent separation from their parents and expressed their emergent personal Jewish identities in terms that were closer to their teachers' world. Indeed, in a study of Orthodox Jewry conducted by Steven M. Cohen and me in the late 1980s, we discovered that those aged thirty-four or younger were about 34 percent more ritually observant than those between the ages of thirty-five and fifty-four, and about 69 percent more so than those aged fifty-five and older. Religious beliefs showed a similar intensification as one moved downwards from the older to the younger people.[23]

For the young who grew up in suburbia, religious change often expressed itself in a rejection of the acculturative norms of suburban Jewish life. For some, this meant choosing to live in the haredi urban enclaves rather than in the Jewish suburbs of their childhood. For others who did make their way back to suburbia (or to quasi-suburban neighborhoods such as Kew Gardens Hills in Queens), an effort was expended to make these places more like the existing Orthodox (haredi) enclaves. This meant creating a variety of institutions that to some extent transformed the suburb into a modern-day shtetl.

Critical to these developments was the emphasis on building an *'eruv*, a Jewish legal device that allows for carrying various objects within the public domain on the Sabbath. Beginning in the 1970s, Orthodox suburban communities began to construct these symbolic fences around their neighborhoods—a procedure that required the symbolic purchase and "fencing in" (commonly, by means of a combination of wires and poles) of the entire neighborhood and all the private properties within it. Suburban neighborhoods with an 'eruv became magnet communities for a growing number of young Orthodox.

This tendency was threatening to many of the non-Orthodox. They saw the 'eruv not as a ritual device meant to make it possible for the Orthodox to carry or to wheel baby carriages to the synagogue or to each other's homes on the Sabbath—which is what the Orthodox claimed it was. Rather, they saw the 'eruv as a symbolic expression of an Orthodox desire to create a separatist enclave that would attract yet more Orthodox and would relentlessly exclude all those who did not share their way of life. For many of those who opposed the 'eruv, the political activity that was necessary for convincing the local authorities to permit it was perceived as a stalking horse for the Orthodox acquisition of even greater political power.

To some extent, these anxieties had a basis in fact. The construction of an 'eruv often did presage the more rapid growth of local Orthodox suburban communities, and also reflected enhanced political power and confidence. Local politicians increasingly recognized the fact that, in suburbia, the Orthodox—as was true of the city neighborhoods in which they were dominant—had all the characteristics of a political bloc that voted (as indeed all Jews did) in large proportions. Any candidate who ignored their interests did so at great political peril.

As Orthodox Jewish residence concentrated itself increasingly in a limited number of suburban magnet communities, these indeed took on many of the characteristics

of an enclave culture. Most prominent was the impressive growth of formal and informal Orthodox institutions. Communities that might once have had only one Orthodox synagogue to serve as the locus of most—even all—religious, social and educational activity now established a variety of synagogues, day schools and other religious institutions (most prominently mikvehs, or ritual baths), alongside various centers of communal or social activity. Similarly, where a suburban community initially may not have had many businesses dependent upon the Orthodox economy, it now catered to a wide variety of Orthodox needs, especially those that were food-related. One could now find everything from kosher butchers, supermarkets and restaurants (particularly of the fast-food variety), to bakeries and kosher caterers. Along the suburban commercial strips, kosher pizza, Chinese and even sushi outlets might coexist with Dunkin' Donuts, Domino's Pizza and Carvel ice cream. Increasingly, these suburbs also supported Jewish bookstores (where ritual items as well as religious books could be acquired) and women's clothing shops that carried garments conforming to the dress code of Jewish law. Even some non-Jewish businesses became transformed. Local franchises such as the above-mentioned Carvel and Dunkin' Donuts acquired kosher certification—sometimes a matter, when the ingredients were essentially kosher to begin with, of closing their doors on the Sabbath. Other businesses sometimes followed suit. Thus, for example, a taxi company or a gas station might advertise the fact that it was closed for business on the Sabbath. Normally, such a claim would be fatal for business, but in an Orthodox enclave, it signaled a special relationship with the local population.

Perhaps the most striking example of a transformed suburban Orthodox community is Monsey (in Rockland County, New York), whose population of 52,300 is virtually all Orthodox. Monsey is so Jewishly developed that it has become a desirable community for haredim as well.

But Monsey was not alone. Even in the Long Island suburb of Woodmere, one of a collection of adjacent hamlets known collectively as the "Five Towns," a high-status suburban area that some have called "the fastest growing Orthodox community in the metropolitan area," this kind of shtetlization was happening. With a bit more than fifteen thousand residents, Woodmere (the most populous of the five), where the median home value is $325,700 and median annual income is more than $85,000, and where Orthodox Jews have been moving in for more than a decade, has, as a reporter for the *New York Times* put it in her community profile, "the feel of a small country town, with its four-block shopping area and its neighborhoods of winding lanes, some without sidewalks."[24] With an 'eruv and three synagogues serving more than eight hundred families, Woodmere and other places like it have become upscale Orthodox shtetls.

At present, though the differences between haredi urban enclaves and Orthodox suburban neighborhoods continue to be real, these distinctions are becoming a matter less of character than of scale. Centrist Orthodox suburban communities are becoming more like haredi enclaves, in part because their residents are themselves becoming more like their haredi counterparts. Unlike their parents and predecessors who fled the city for the "better" life of the suburbs, many young Orthodox look back at the urban haredi enclaves with a kind of longing, seeing in them a Jewish vitality and institutional richness lacking in the suburbs of their youth. Accordingly, in many

ways they are transforming the suburban Orthodox communities into something more and more like these enclaves.

Like those in the haredi enclaves, the centrists in the suburban Orthodox communities increasingly try to provide for as many of their residents' daily needs as possible, in part by cultivating political power. Unlike political efforts in the haredi sector, there is no attempt to prevent "contamination" from the outside world. Rather, the focus is on measures that will ensure the community's continued growth, such as zoning abatements to allow for an 'eruv, or for synagogues to be built or expanded in predominantly residential areas; or the right to open private religious schools, which will in some measure compete with the local public schools. The "thickening" of Orthodox Jewish communities in suburbia, with all the concomitant changes, has naturally encountered resistance on the part of both non-Jews and non-Orthodox Jews. To some extent, such resistance can be attributed to anti-Orthodox prejudice. Beyond this, however, there are real concerns, ranging from the fear of a decline in public school standards (since, with lowered local enrollment, the schools must draw proportionately larger numbers of students from among disadvantaged minority groups living in nearby communities) to the more general fear that a given community will gradually be transformed into an exclusivist zone or ghetto.

Ultimately, what probably distinguishes centrist Orthodox suburban communities from haredi enclaves is their higher socioeconomic profile and smaller family size. Woodmere, as noted, has an annual median income exceeding $85,000, while in the less affluent Kew Gardens Hills, the Orthodox population of some twenty thousand has a median annual income of $40,000—twice as high as the figure for the haredi sections of Williamsburg and significantly above the figures of $14,702 for Kiryas Joel and $13,488 for New Square. Whether these economic differences will remain constant as the entire Orthodox population moves closer in orientation to the haredim—by having more children; by having males spend more time in the yeshiva world, eschewing a college education; by embracing cultural separatism as an ideal—remains to be seen. An equally open question is whether the haredi way of life can be sustained, given the serious economic pressures borne by its population.

In any event, there is increasing interaction between these two major modes of Orthodox American Jewry. While it is unlikely that centrist Orthodox suburbia will become quite the same sort of residential milieu as is found in the urban haredi enclaves, more and more haredim are finding ways into the suburban landscape—whether as providers of various religious stores and services, emissaries seeking financial contributions (Orthodox congregations in suburbia are visited continually by such emissaries) or even, on occasion, as the founders of religiocultural haredi outposts in the form of a yeshiva or other institutional offshoots. Centrist Orthodox Jews, for their part, have growing links to the haredim, whether through family ties, connections to a haredi educational institution—or even electronic interaction, via the internet, or through special telephone services featuring such items as daily Talmud classes. Haredi neighborhoods, moreover, remain the cultural and consumer heartland for traditional Jews seeking everything from a Torah scroll to a new black fedora. Yet more and more, Orthodox Jews in suburbia seek the convenience of having their needs satisfied locally. Hence, they are testing the limits of what the suburb can provide for those still wedded to traditional Judaism.

Conclusion

As one contemplates the situation of contemporary urban and suburban American Orthodox Jews, one must conclude that they have demonstrated a capacity to do something that few of their co-religionists have been able to do in an open and culturally beckoning America. Rather than being completely assimilated into the urban and suburban cultural milieus in which they find themselves (as so many of their non-Orthodox predecessors were), they have instead gradually and single-mindedly transformed these environments so that they are in tune with their own cultural needs. As such, they have refashioned their city neighborhoods and increasingly even their suburban communities into recognizably Orthodox Jewish enclaves. While this ghettoization of metropolitan neighborhoods was part of general patterns of American urban ethnic adaptation, the success that the Orthodox have had more recently in remaking suburbia in their own image is particularly striking. Their success in creating Orthodox enclaves in suburbia, where the dominant design is the creation of a bland sameness, where even formerly unmeltable ethnics have culturally melted and pasteurized, reflects a growing Orthodox self-assurance in America and a willful—some would argue, stubborn—refusal to disappear. Moreover, it also displays the staying power of what was once considered a form of Judaism most culturally endangered and dissonant with American culture: traditionalist, insular Orthodoxy.

At the beginning of this century, when most of them were living far from America's shores, traditionally Orthodox Jews were warned by their religious leaders not to come to an unholy America, the treyfe medine, where they were advised that Jews might survive but Judaism would not. Most accepted that advice until it was too late to leave. But those who survived the firestorm of antisemitism in Europe, and later the expulsions from the Muslim world, and by century's end have settled in America, discovered that those religious leaders were wrong. At least within the urban and suburban precincts of Orthodoxy, Jews, Judaism and Jewish life—even in its most traditional forms—thrives.

Notes

1. Deborah Sontag, "Orthodox Neighborhood Reshapes Itself," *New York Times*, 7 Jan. 1998.
2. Cf. Leanne G. Rivlin, "Group Membership and Place Meanings in an Urban Neighborhood," *Journal of Social Issues* 38, no. 3 (1982), 75–93, esp. 89.
3. See C. Jaret, "The Impact of Geographical Mobility on Jewish Community Participation: Disruptive or Supportive," *Contemporary Jewry* 4 (Spring/Summer 1978), 9–20.
4. Cf. Emmanuel Sivan, "The Enclave Culture," in *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, ed. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: 1995), 11–68.
5. See Morton Keller, "Jews and the Character of American Life Since 1930," in *Jews in the Mind of America*, ed. Charles Stember, et al (New York: 1966), 270.
6. See Albert I. Gordon, *Jews in Suburbia* (Boston: 1959), 1; *U.S. News and World Report*, 10 Aug. 1956.
7. See Samuel C. Heilman and Steven M. Cohen, *Cosmopolitans and Parochials: Modern Orthodox Jews in America* (Chicago: 1989).
8. This phenomenon may partially account for the drop in the Orthodox population in the

1990 National Jewish Population Survey, as compared with figures from the previous survey of 1970.

9. *New York Times*, 19 and 20 Jan. 1950; see also Egon Mayer, *From Suburb to Shtetl* (Philadelphia: 1979), 3–19.

10. The source for this number is an estimate based on the 1990 U.S. Census—which lists 213,064 speakers of Yiddish at home—combined with other data that will be more fully discussed later. A majority of these Yiddish-speakers live in New York; it is likely that almost all of them are haredim, for whom Yiddish is the common language. This would make them about 43 percent of all American Orthodox Jewry in 1997. I would like to thank my research assistant, Susan G. Weber, for help in assembling this data.

11. For an interesting exposition of this theme, see the recent film documentary, *A Life Apart* (1997), produced and directed by Menachem Daum and Oren Rudavsky.

12. See, for example, Mayer, *From Suburb to Shtetl*.

13. For a discussion of this ideal and the implications arising from it, see Hayim Soloveitchik, "The Migration of Texts," in *Accounting for Fundamentalisms:The Dynamic Character of Movements*, ed. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: 1994).

14. The U.S. Census classifies people by race but not by religion—and certainly does not identify them by their levels of orthodoxy. Nonetheless, it is possible to analyze the figures for certain neighborhood blocks in order to make some informed guesses about the Jewish population. Since in many cases (for example, Williamsburg and Crown Heights), haredim live in neighborhoods where their non-haredi neighbors are almost exclusively black or Hispanic, the census figures for the "white, non-Hispanic" population provide a fairly good estimate of the number of haredim. In areas such as Borough Park, various blocks are inhabited virtually exclusively by haredim; hence the figures for that neighborhood are drawn from data pertaining to those blocks.

15. The poverty rate for whites in Monsey is a bit higher—9.5 percent. What probably accounts for this higher rate is the presence of a poorer haredi population in some of the districts alongside the centrist Orthodox areas.

16. There are those as well who go to Israel, mostly to Jerusalem and Bnai Brak.

17. See Menachem Friedman, "Habad as Messianic Fundamentalism," in Marty and Appleby (eds.), *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, esp. 341–345.

18. *New York Times*, 7 Jan. 1998.

19. Janice Fioravante, "Midwood: A Rich Ethnic Mix in Mid-Brooklyn," *New York Times*, 21 July 1996.

20. *Ibid.*, 7 Jan. 1998.

21. Based on 1997 Wessix, Inc. and U.S. census data and estimates.

22. U.S. Census figures for zip code 11219 (Borough Park).

23. See Heilman and Cohen, *Cosmopolitans and Parochials*, 198.

24. Vivien Kellerman, "A Rural Ambiance Close to Queens," *New York Times*, 11 Aug. 1996; for a profile of a similar kind of community, see Jerry Cheslow, "Fair Lawn: A Jersey Suburb with Some Surprises," *ibid.*, 8 Jan. 1995.

Searching for the Klezmer City

Mark Slobin
(wesleyan university)

Even before a klezmer was a "klezmer," still a *spielmann* (professional instrumentalist) deep in the German lands hundreds of years ago, at the beginning of what we know about professional Ashkenazic instrumental musicians, our evidence is all about cities. Competition between Jewish and Christian entertainers, and among Jewish bands—this is what town records talk about across the miles and centuries. Bands were local and fierce, and seemed to need constant patrolling by the burgher-bureaucrats bent on propriety and fair business practices.

When the Jews get noticeable in the Russian empire, the musicians turn up in the tax records as part of the organization of urban life. Moshe Beregovski (1892–1961), the pioneering ethnomusicologist who contributed immeasurably more to our knowledge of klezmer life and music than anyone else, actually collected some hard data. It seems that in 1794–1795, there were two klezmorim in the Belorussian town of Smilovichi, inhabited by fifty-three Jewish families, whereas there was only one in Pogost, home to eighty-two Jewish men and 133 Jewish women. In 1811, Bragin (Rezhitsa district) could boast of two klezmorim among 259 Jews, and Kletsk (Slutsk district), of three professional musicians among 662 Jews. Well, concludes Beregovski, projecting these kinds of figures across the vast geography and demography of the Pale of Settlement, there must have been thousands of klezmorim in a continuous chain of overlapping musical and familial links in a widely dispersed system of town-based musical professionalism.[1]

These urban entertainers came from tight hereditary circles and spoke their own argot. Their portraits in famous works of fiction such as Sholom Aleichem's novel *Stempenyu* (1888) paint a picture of heartthrob violinists and workmanlike backup bands. Although literary critics and even some in the klezmer movement look at *Stempenyu* nowadays as something of a romantic exaggeration, its author did spend considerable time with a klezmer family and he provides telling ethnographic detail. Anyone who takes the trouble to footnote the musicians' vocabulary cannot be completely unreliable as a witness to the klezmer lifestyle.

By 1900, Beregovski tells us, the music bug had become contagious, with amateur musicians studying with local klezmer-teachers, learning the violin or, less frequently, the clarinet or flute.[2] These enthusiasts—almost always men except among the middle classes in the big cities—played solo or accompanied family singing. Upward

mobility struck the klezmorim themselves; they wrote away for classical études to gentrify their fiddling. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, their sons moved into the emerging Russian conservatories as soon as Jews were allowed access to higher musical aspirations. Before long, people like Mischa Elman—who came from a long line of klezmorim—became international virtuosos and recording artists. But even as early as the 1830s, Mikhail Guzikov had toured Europe as an Eastern klezmer star. In his short life, Guzikov impressed no less a listener than Felix Mendelssohn, who wrote an enthusiastic letter to his sister about the klezmer's uncanny musicianship.[3] Klezmorim, in short, were city-minded musical ambassadors, carrying tunes and styles across a vast network of Jewish culture that stretched from the Ottoman borderlands to the bourgeois bulwarks of Central Europe. They combined the restlessness and spiritual spark of a dybbuk with the cozy, gossipy communality of traditional small-town and emerging big-city Jewish life.

This system of town-based musicians transferred to the United States as part of the construction of a transatlantic East European Jewish community life during the great wave of immigration of the 1880s to the 1920s. Until very recently, our view of a locally situated American klezmer history has been blocked by a musical mountain range, the repertoire recorded on seventy-eight rpm discs, which has kept us from seeing many different landmarks and landscapes. While the bulk of the Jewish population and most of the recording industry was indeed centered in New York City, klezmer flourished everywhere in what the Jews of the time called "the provinces," not only on the Eastern seaboard, but in smaller, faraway places like Milwaukee. Current dissertation research underway by Hankus Netsky, a seminal modern bandleader who is also an ethnomusicologist, will do much to put things in focus. We will learn the most about Netsky's hometown, Philadelphia—so near yet so far from New York—where a tightly organized, durable klezmer scene closely mirrored the European world Beregovski sought to reclaim, and during the same time period; Netsky has manuscript tune books from as far back as 1910.

In Philadelphia, klezmer families ruled the roost and kept their ties to their cities of origin through the *landsmanshaftn*, those societies of immigrants who stayed true to the cities they had left behind by gathering periodically and offering social support. This direct carryover of musical taste is a surprising finding for the supposedly homogenizing world of American immigrants, and strengthens our sense of the cultural character of Philadelphia's ex-Teplekers, Kriovozerites, Kievans, Kishenevers and Briskites. As in Europe, family ties were strong, but so were ties to non-Jewish colleagues. While in southeastern Europe local klezmorim were rivals or partners of Roma ("Gypsy") musicians, in Philadelphia, Italians filtered into the klezmer scene. Also European was the drive toward upward mobility, meaning that a klezmer like Jacob (Jakie) Hoffman could fulfill his musical ambitions by working with prestigious organizations like the orchestra of the Ballets Russes and the Philadelphia Orchestra, while another Philadelphian, Harry Kandel, could find well-regarded parallel jobs such as that of assistant band director for the greatest American bandmaster, John Phillip Sousa.

The Philadelphia repertoire was striking. Local klezmorim could not use the standard tune book of New York musicians, even at the short distance involved, despite the overwhelming power of New York's Jewish presence. Local custom, a very Jewish concept, prevailed. Items as basic to the sense of what it meant to be at a Jewish

wedding as the required *patsh-tants* or the requisite "good night waltz" at the end of the long night's celebration differed from city to city. This was also true for Boston and Milwaukee, according to Netsky, in terms of both the site-specific nature of the repertoire and the sociomusical power that resided in just a few families or individuals from specific European places.[4]

In Jewish American communities during the first half of the twentieth century, celebrations tended to be centralized in the catering hall. In Philadelphia, Uhr's was such a prominent locus of activity that the streetcar would halt in front of the hall, rather than at its regular stop. In Newark, New Jersey—a smaller settlement—the Lipschitz family had something of a monopoly on local festivities. Melvin Strauss, later to become an eminent orchestral conductor, spent the years of his youth (1947–1960) playing both for the Lipschitz family and in the Catskills during the summer. In a 1998 interview, Strauss reflected on the scene:

> The Schary Family Manor was sold to the family I worked for and I think that must have happened about the early forties, maybe the late thirties, and the name was changed to Clinton Manor. The place became rather posh, sort of pseudo-Hollywood in decor, and very active. The mother ran the place . . . the sons, one became the caterer, another became the florist. I worked for the one who was in my estimation a true klezmer, Herbie Lipschitz.
>
> Herbie Lipschitz had enough sense to know his name had to be changed to get enough business outside of the Manor, and so he became known as Herb Larson and his band; it was a small band, usually four or five of us. Herbie was the clarinet and alto sax player, I was the pianist, we had a bass player who also played the violin a little bit, and the trumpet player and the drummer. These people all had full-time jobs in order to support themselves during the day; I was a full-time student. The bass player was a full-time exterminator of rodents and bugs . . . the trumpet player was a pot and pan seller. He was the only non-Jew, an Italian, and he worked very hard to support his large family. The drummer was a pharmaceutical supply salesman who thought he was Frank Sinatra; he not only played the drums, but sang pop tunes.[5]

The infiltration of Italians noted for Philadelphia holds true for Newark and presumably much of the northeastern United States, as does the tight family business control. Clinton Manor might have made a special contribution to American culture, as it is probably the basis for the catering hall in Philip Roth's novella *Goodbye, Columbus* (1959), which takes place in Roth's native Newark. Strauss thinks that the 1969 film version of the book might even have modeled the wedding scene on Clinton Manor, since it so closely matches his memory of the place.

Strauss' description of events and repertoire offers an accurate, if perhaps jaundiced, view by a future classical musician of the Newark scene of his day:

> I played in Clinton Manor every weekend, with at least one affair Saturday evening; sometimes there were simultaneous affairs, two or three weddings or parties going on in the same building, and always Sunday [there was] an afternoon and an evening wedding. All of this was handled with the greatest efficiency by the Lipschitz family, but not always with the greatest honesty [for example, they reused flowers for a second event and billed both customers].
>
> The repertoire we played was a combination of so-to-speak Jewish music—Jewish Russian, Jewish Polish, that is—and American pop, with a tiny invasion of Latin

> American. The Jewish music consisted of Russian *shers* and *freylekhs* [the basic Jewish wedding dances, standard fare in Europe as well]. It was entirely improvised, and Herbie Lipschitz was very good at this and very, very loud, putting the bell of his clarinet next to the microphone as close as was humanly possible and blasting everyone out of the place to the point where the people who attended the parties could not talk to each other. But they did not seem to mind; everybody had a good time and the high level of musical volume seemed to contribute to that.[6]

Philip Roth's account, while spare in describing the music-making at the posh Newark wedding he so lovingly details in *Goodbye, Columbus*, corroborates Strauss' and Netsky's description on several points. For example, Neil Klugman, the narrator, notes that "the band was playing between courses." We know that caterers ruled the roost and absolutely forbade musicians to play while food was being served. Indeed, Neil notes that "Brenda and I danced closely, and we only sat down when the waiters began to circulate with the main course." Three other small descriptive passages offer more of Roth's ethnography of the Newark catering hall: 1) "Up on the stage, Harry Winters (*née* Weinberg) was leading his band in a medley from *My Fair Lady*; on the floor, all ages, all sizes, all shapes were dancing"; 2) "Rose and Pearl did the Charleston with one another (while their husbands examined woodwork and chandeliers)"; 3) "Near the end of the evening, Brenda . . . did a Rita Hayworth tango with herself."[7]

The Weinberg to Winters name change rings true, of course. So does the mini-catalogue of repertoire: a brief survey of American styles—Broadway musical, vintage dances for the older folks—and the "Latin invasion" mentioned by Strauss and all subsequent sources on the Jewish wedding. Brenda seems to be inspired by what Strauss calls the catering hall's "posh, neo-Hollywood" decor to come up with her own movie-inspired moves. The "all ages, all sizes, all shapes" line confirms Strauss' view from the piano bench that everybody had a good time at Clinton Manor.

Conspicuously absent in Roth's account are the *sher* and the *freylekhs*, the basic dance tunes of the East European Jewish wedding. One suspects this omission is due to the novella's strong interest in setting off Brenda Patimkin's wealthy, suburban and Americanized family from Neil's lower middle-class, inner-city and Yiddish-inflected home. Thus, by the 1950s, we no longer have the unitary American klezmer city, but rather a set of musical generational choices and fashion statements that complicate the local scene. By the time of the 1969 film version of *Goodbye, Columbus*, a further layer of subtle observation was added to Roth's accurate description: in the movie, the wedding band throws in two Israeli-identified numbers. No East European items match the Israeli and American tunes the musicians play for the eager and animated guests.

So far I have been offering up the "real" klezmer city connection, to the extent that available scholarly and fictional ethnographies help us to understand the urban setting in which professional musicians operated. But cities are not just geographic locations, particularly when communities fracture more intensively and extensively than the Newark of the 1950s. Thoroughgoing Americanization is the most benign version of a pattern of radical disjuncture that includes the extremes of Stalinism and Nazism. Though it may seem strange to link suburbanization/assimilation with cul-

tural repression and outright genocide, these were indeed the main historical factors that converged in the reshaping of the klezmer-city linkage in the 1940s. Even in the comfort of Netsky's Philadelphia, the hereditary klezmer families simply edged out of the business, leaving their memories literally in the attic. His own immediate family members had refused point-blank to surround him with a music beneath his potential level of musicianship, from their point of view. Tellingly, his mother pointed to Johnny Carson's *Tonight Show* band as a possible role model, rather than appealing to the classical virtuoso, which earlier generations had seen as an alternative to klezmerhood. The phantom city of the TV set superseded the real-life community that a musician might animate.

Few Europeans who survived Stalin and Hitler were in a position to offer cultural continuity to those around them who might want to use music-making to restore the broken links of community life. In the Soviet Union, new forms of collective music-making emerged, especially *estrada*, variety-show entertainment that became the setting for acceptable ethnic forms. This leaning toward pop formats has continued even in post-Soviet times and among Russian American immigrant communities, for whom songs have always been more significant than instrumental tunes.

Thus, when we try to reestablish the klezmer-city connection in "our times," from the 1970s to 2000, we have to appeal to theoretical models other than classic ethnography, and consider more complex contexts. I have found Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of *chronotope* useful in this regard. Although it was developed for discussing literary genres, by analogy, chronotope offers a possibility of crystallizing the very diverse and contested ways in which "klezmer" has become reinserted or has infiltrated not only into Jewish, but also non-Jewish life in recent decades over a wide geographic range.

Bakhtin tells us that "a chronotope specifies a *fused* sense of time and space," and that to the chronotope "belongs the meaning that shapes narrative." In short, to suggest a chronotope means specifying a time-place nexus that helps us understand how people make sense (or narratives) of the multiple contexts they embody and experience. As Bakhtin points out, "local folklore interprets and saturates space with time, and draws it into history."[8] Nothing could be more true about the way in which klezmer has been domesticated into numerous ways of life in hundreds of cities of the contemporary Euro-American world (with expected offshoots in places such as Australia). For while the omnipresent proliferation of recordings has meant that eventually everyone can hear each other, local understandings of what "klezmer" might be, and how it might fit into established community patterns, dictate the way the music is heard, played and understood.

Any occurrence of klezmer creates a chronotope, a sense of place and time, fused to create cultural affects that might be contested or cherished, but which tend to assimilate the immediate moment to larger patterns of local knowledge. Chronotopes can also be universal, the obvious case here being *Fiddler on the Roof*. Its standardized "shtetl" portrait relies heavily on the atmosphere of music, especially its notion of "tradition" as linked to the "fiddler." This off-the-shelf chronotope, seemingly available in every society's household, is as dependable as a kitchen appliance in the process of domesticating the "klezmer" concept. Its heavily Americanized working parts have made it the ideal ideological piece of equipment, since it offers both

Americans and Europeans something they can recognize. In the transition from popular images of musical *yidishkeyt* (that indispensable and now overused term for the essence of East European Jewish culture) to community-based cultural production, the "shtetl" continues to play its part, being just as foreign to New Yorkers as to Berliners and the Viennese.

While a product like *Fiddler* presents a simple chronotope, today's klezmer world offers many varieties of space-time-sound fusions that almost beg for an extra term—sonochronotope? Some examples might help suggest the scope of possible future analysis, including both the American and European contexts in which klezmer now operates as a significant marker of meaning. I will begin with two very different American klezmer chronotopes, one nomadic, one sedentary.

1997: I am sitting at the Knitting Factory in New York, a very chic club that specializes in avant-garde jazz, world music and performance art. I am listening to the Klezmatics, a major American band that tours Europe and is currently influential in Italy. To my right sits a lady in her seventies, a native Yiddish speaker, who ignores the more culturally radical, contemporary aspects of the club and the band's political attitudes. She likes their fluency with the Yiddish language and with what she remembers as the sound of East European Jewish music. Part of the Klezmatics' chronotope links up with hers, and she is uninterested in noticing her lack of fit with the group's orientation, for example, their suggestion of homosexuality and drug use as possible ingredients of a postmodern klezmerism.

To my left sits a six-year-old boy who is very excited about hearing the Klezmatics live. I ask him what he likes best, and he says "their first album." For someone born in 1990, it is the marketed chronotope, a group embodied and distributed as a set of processed sound-objects in the definite but indeterminate space-time of the studio, that he has come to experience in heightened form.

The band itself inhabits a multiple chronotope when it plays. They are "here," but their music-making draws on countless musical space-time frameworks: teenage metal band rehearsals, recitals at conservatories, Latin jazz gigs in New York clubs, busking on the streets of Paris with Greek musicians . . . the collective number of memory-moments that shapes their performance is staggering. "Klezmer" here and now offers an overlap, a meeting point among the band members and with the audience that helps shape a space-time nexus located temporarily—ephemerally—in the Knitting Factory.

What do the Klezmatics have to say about the band's collective chronotope? Alicia Svigals, a founding member, violinist and an articulate spokesperson for the group, tells me this in a 1998 interview:

> I think what we do is a very New York City music aesthetic . . . it's clangy, it's noisy, it's postindustrial, related to what they call the downtown music scene, you know, the Lower East Side music mafia that kind of centers around the Knitting Factory, the new music scene. . . .
>
> I guess even though . . . music gets out there everywhere, we all still live in a place, and musicians who play together cluster in groups and come up with a style, and that's sort of what happens here.
>
> So there is a sound, this noise sound, this downtown New York noise sound that people think—and I would agree—reflects the ambience here in the streets.

> We live here, and we make music here, both in the sense of the jackhammers outside my window; also here in the sense that we're part of a musical school. Not to mention the uptown hiphop, everything that's happening in contemporary music, and then it goes everywhere. We live here, we make the music here, we are New Yorkers, and then it goes everywhere, whether it's via our recordings or via our touring, it's the same.
>
> [*MS: So you're carrying the city with you, the city is kind of portable.*]
>
> Yeah, yeah. Earlier on in our career we would play differently for different audiences than we do now. In particular, we had some far-out noisy stuff we would not play for predominantly older audiences. . . . We did a week in Century Village, it was clear that we should not do our most radical music there, and we did trad stuff we wouldn't have bunched together in one program. But now we've sort of come to a point where we really do the same program everywhere in terms of the actual numbers that are on the set list, but how we play them can vary.[9]

Of course, when pressed, Svigals did come up with examples of more than casual differences among gigs, but she is absolutely right about the overall sensibility at work. Staid Germans and novice Italians pick up on it as much as knowing, gay San Franciscans: the Klezmatics have a profile that does say "New York City with attitude," a chronotope that combines that place with this time, the 1990s. Sometimes bands outlive or outwear these time-space packages, or they can be extended in any number of ways by listeners. For example, I was told in Germany in 1997 that two American independent films shot in Brooklyn (*Smoke* and *Blue in the Face*) were understood by certain hip young Germans to mark the chronotope of the Klezmatics, and that when some of them actually went to Brooklyn in search of this nexus, they were disappointed.

What I mean to say here is that when people are gathered in a public space or around their loudspeakers at home, they are certainly *here*, but that *here* is an overlay of chronotopes: in the living room but also in the shtetl, or in the Knitting Factory but also in New Jersey fifty years ago. This sense of movable chronotopes is accentuated by a band like the Klezmatics, which both tours and records very successfully. They also spin off chronotopes at will, referencing multiple worlds in a single piece, as with their version of Naftule Brandwine's 1926 "Fun tashlikh" that starts off with raucous Balkan–Middle Easternisms (including Arabic ululations) and shifts into Jewish dance-tune gear, moving listeners from one time-space frame to another; to cite Bakhtin one last time: "Chronotopes are mutually inclusive, they coexist, they may be interwoven with, replace or oppose one another, contradict one another or find themselves in ever more complex interrelationships."[10] The klezmer world offers rich possibilities for this sort of animated play of meanings and identifications.

With the Klezmatics example, I have tried to illustrate the notion of a *nomadic* klezmer city (with all the Deleuzian, postmodernist overtones of the word), one model of klezmer urbanity. The opposite might be any attempt to build a *sedentary* klezmer city. The oldest and most durable such settlement, called KlezKamp, has been in existence since 1985. This annual five-day workshop held at a rundown hotel in the Catskills Mountains has anchored the notion of klezmer community by actually creating one, and similar operations have been proliferating from Canada to St. Petersburg ever since. Henry Sapoznik, KlezKamp's founder and still its director, gives some background:

> The prototype was the fact that I had taught at camps that were teaching Appalachian music, I had gone to Balkan camp, and the thing that was a little disconcerting is that it was run by people who were not members of the community. It was mostly Jews who ran it . . . so they treated that culture as a sort of smorgasbord. Okay, we're going to take out the music and the songs and the dance, and that's pretty much it, and the rest of the culture doesn't interest us. Which I felt was sort of disingenuous, because the stuff isn't out of context. You can't do the songs without the language, the literature, reduce all these poetic images and stuff, just teach people to mouth the words.
>
> I was concerned that people get on stage and even if they can play a tune they end up offering this weird context for their audiences. People come away less enlightened than they think they are. . . . [I aim at] recontexualization—try as much as possible to present people with a high degree of cultural literacy, to bring the context into the tune.[11]

Sapoznik is suggesting a notion of comprehensive community that goes beyond the other American heritage-music models—Appalachian, Balkan—he had been involved in, and it is in this sense that KlezKamp seems particularly urban: not just one artistic-cultural ghetto, but a set of neighborhoods. Sapoznik was particularly pleased when middle-aged and elderly people joined in:

> What started to happen was, when you had musicians coming, concentric circles started slowly moving out. The next group of people to show up were basically people who were like an older constituency. The average age of the KlezKamp population at first was in their thirties. It was a mirror of ourselves as sort of the cultural avant-garde, and as older people started hearing about it . . . they also brought . . . the social context the music existed in. They would offer feedback to the younger players of the context [of] the music and the song and the dance that they experienced [while] growing up. So suddenly there was this other dimension . . . people would say "I remember when this was done."

As the concentric circles have widened to include families and Europeans, as well as gay/lesbian and Orthodox Jewish circles, the klezmer city has become not exactly a utopia—since the factions quarrel, as in all Jewish towns—but certainly a highly viable urban enclave that recreates and reshapes itself each Christmastime in the Catskills. For musicians like the Klezmatics (one of whom is the assistant director, while others teach), KlezKamp is a kind of place where you come "home," a metaphor I am using for the power of this arbitrary, sedentary city to anchor a whole transcontinental scene. There are now several spin-off camps that look like emerging klezmer cities. They bridge the possibly uneasy gap between a cultural/spiritual home and a nexus in a marketing network:

> There's a kind of continuity in the infrastructure of KlezKamp. What started as this group-specific, just us kids—hey kids, let's put on a camp; I've got a violin, I've got a room. Now, as one person put it (a major band), we want to come to KlezKamp because it's the Jewish music world's trade show. Where you're seen, where you get gigs—oh, the Jewish community center of Moot Point, Michigan, we need a klezmer band—It's an imprimatur in a way."[12]

KlezKamp is no Baudrillardian simulacrum—it's the real thing, making a measurable difference in the crystallization of a type of community—but its absolute arbitrariness, combined with its accommodating changeability, suggest the postmodern anyway. Since the "community" itself never convenes except at the camp, we need a

term that specifies not just the sedentary nature of this klezmer city, but also suggests the type of improvisatory yet stable collective represented here. Perhaps *kaleidoscopic* might work, in the sense that the pieces—fragments of Yiddish culture—stay the same, but time turns them round and round into different patterns at KlezKamp.

While KlezKamp is kaleidoscopic, the Wholesale Klezmer Band of western Massachusetts is fixed in a milieu and committed to supplying the glue for local celebrations week in and week out or, to put it more substantively, to year-round community building. Joe Kurland, a founding member, Yiddish songwriter and spokesperson, eloquently describes the mission of the band:

> There was a need. From the very first, when we first started performing—did we have anything to teach people? Basically all we had was mostly my memory of what weddings were like [in Brooklyn]. We saw at weddings people had no idea what to dance—I'd go out and help them dance. When people would call up and ask, "what kind of dance do you do to this?" I'd start explaining. As time went on, I learned from other sources besides my memory, so I knew more and more I could explain, and people asked more and more questions, so it became something I do. At one point, as I was doing a brochure, I decided, "I'll write it down," and then they can think of different questions to ask. . . .
>
> When you hire the Wholesale Klezmer Band, you're also hiring someone who's going to teach you how to do a traditional wedding. Not the *khupe* part, necessarily, that's the rabbi's job, but everything else. People have called and said, "we'd like to have Jewish music, but we'd also like to have a pop band for dancing." [I say], "I'll show you how to dance. You'll be so occupied with Jewish dancing you won't have time for other kinds of dancing. You don't need a partner, and you don't have to know what to do. . . ."
>
> There's one dance in particular . . . it's where we weave people. You have the *khosn*'s family in a line and the *kale*'s family in a line and weave them in and out and in and out until they don't know who's who and they're all one. People really like the symbolic quality of that. . . . It makes people feel really included when we do that. [13]

The Wholesale Klezmer Band is what I would call a "territory band," in the tradition of jazz historians. All across the United States, local ensembles play a vital role in their immediate social environment. They tend not to tour much, and while they produce an album or two, their recordings tend to work more as promotional devices than as income- or tour-producing products. Kurland's group takes this role exceptionally seriously. In addition to Jewish celebratory events, they play for a variety of socially oriented benefits, such as Bosnian/Rwandan relief or a joint event with an African American group at an interracial community center in Boston.

Kurland is strongly drawn to the didactic bent of Yiddish folklore and folklife, so evident in the roles of the *badkhn*, the moralizing wedding entertainer of Eastern Europe, or the *magid*, the itinerant preacher. The band has placed a guide to the Jewish wedding on its website. As Kurland explains, if it promotes business in their territory that's fine, but if it helps someone in faraway California, that's nice too. By teaching its clients, the band builds the very community that sustains it. The principle can be extended to an extraordinary range of venues. Once, for example, the Wholesale Klezmer Band played at a ski resort, mostly for Jewish skiers: if the mountain won't come to the band, the band can travel to the mountain. Relentlessly tracking community contexts, the group moves on many pathways in its musical mission of mix-

ing education, pleasure and business. We might call this situation the *self-constructed* klezmer city, one link in a site-specific, yet loosely linked, network of chronotope cousins that stretches across the U.S. landscape.

To round out this survey of klezmer cities, I would like to introduce some European examples, as they existed in 1997. By that time, the American approach to klezmer had been available to Europeans for about a decade. Rippling out yet again in ever-widening circles from early festival events in a number of countries, the effect of American recordings and touring groups intensified throughout the 1990s, with accelerated expansion of klezmer bands in Italy succeeding earlier waves of interest in Germany, Scandinavia and Holland. City by city, the profile of Jewish music-making depended heavily on local histories, personalities and opportunities. Although serious survey lies well beyond the present article, I will highlight a couple of 1997 examples from Cracow, Vienna and Bologna.

To find klezmer in Cracow, Poland, you go to the old Jewish neighborhood called Kazimierz, a fourteenth-century suburb created by the king for the Jews, which became a proletarian neighborhood in the nineteenth century. Kazimierz contains the only substantial complex of Jewish buildings and cemetery to have survived the Second World War. This allows the neighborhood to embody the thousand years of Jewish history in Poland, where in 1939 the Jewish share of the population was 10 percent nationally and 25 percent locally. This shell of a place has become a pilgrimage site—practically a theme park—for a motley mix of German tourists, Jews from outside Poland and Israeli school groups. All of these people literally rub shoulders as they try to inhale memory and manufacture meaning from Kazimierz's gravestones and synagogues, drawing on the evocative power of its market square or even of Steven Spielberg's film *Schindler's List*, which was shot here. The proximity to Auschwitz has made Kazimierz a steady stop listed on the "Jewish tour" of Orbis, Poland's national tourist agency, in a brochure available in every hotel.

In the almost total absence of a local Jewish population, the musicians who play in the Jewish-theme restaurants of Kazimierz create a *phantom* klezmer city, where the authenticity of the site overrides any questioning of the provenance of the performers or even of their musical offerings. I am using the term "phantom" here to signal overlapping chronotopes: 1) the imaginary time that visitors fuse with the space, and 2) the presumed authenticity of the music, which melds a number of fantasies shared by audiences with a wide variety of musicians in today's current space-time of heritage presentations. "Entertainment" actually suits the situation better than presentation, but seems as odd a word as one might find in connection with describing how people pass their "time" in a haunted square centered on a disappeared population. In one week in October 1997, a partial list of musicians and groups includes the following:

Kroke. A quasi-klezmer band of Cracowians, two of whose members have discovered, while working up their somewhat-Jewish repertoire, that their families were actually Jewish. These musicians grew up playing jazz, rock and folk music together and switched to a new format around 1992. They avoid an American klezmer sound, trying instead to universalize the eerie resonance of Kazimierz through interjecting techniques such as primal chanting sounds, while gesturing toward Jewishness

melodically and in their outfits. As of 1997, they had just signed on with WOMAD, the influential British world-music management organization, giving them access to international venues and a record in the Real Music series of cross-cultural musics.

Olga. Having grown up in Switzerland, this young, vivacious native Cracowian heard American klezmer cassettes her father played. She decided to sing Yiddish songs in Kazimierz when she came home for college. She says that Schweitzerdeutsch is close to Yiddish, facilitating her crossover into Jewish territory.

Russian Gypsy band. These young, non-Jewish expatriates from the East, trained in classical music, have found that they can offer the old Russian "Gypsy"-style cabaret repertoire in Kazimierz cafes.

Irina Urbanska and Ladislaw Leitz. This duo appears in Kazimierz and abroad—from Germany to Canada—as representatives of "Polish Jewish" music. The two Poles, about seventy years old, are retired musicians of the classical, operetta and jazz scene in Cracow. Irina, a soprano, has learned to sing in the Yiddish language and style fairly convincingly. She has even specialized in the songs of Mordecai Gebirtig, the Cracow Yiddish poet-songwriter killed in the Holocaust. His work was among the earliest to be revived in postwar Germany and more recently in Italy. Ladislaw, Irina's performing partner, has adopted Jewish stylistic features on his clarinet and electric piano, and appears onstage with a yarmulke on his head. They explain that their attachment to Jewish performance arises naturally from their origins in Przemyśl, a Polish Jewish town of prewar fame.

A couple of years earlier, a film crew captured Itzhak Perlman and his all-star klezmer backup bands as they traveled to Kazimierz. Perlman had only recently entered the klezmer scene from his permanent perch atop the classical virtuoso world. In the resulting film, *In the Fiddler's House*, the violinist makes some pointed moves to legitimize his crossover from classical to klezmer music. The first narrative scene of the film shows Perlman looking in from outside the gates of a Renaissance Jewish synagogue. He tells us that Poland is where the music started. Inside, representing the dead Yiddish culture of the city, is the American klezmer band Brave Old World, with guest violinist Deborah Strauss. The band is playing a very non-Polish-origin style of Jewish music, the Romanian *doina*, the signature piece of the modern klezmer movement's quest for authenticity. Strauss has mostly learned klezmer style from Kurt Bjorling, the brilliant clarinetist-cymbalist of Brave Old World. (The multiple ironies and chronotopic overlays this scene represents could be unpacked at some length, but I prefer the reader to do the work here.)

Europe also boasts live, developing klezmer cities, in an ever-expanding number. I will cite just two of these to round out my typology: Vienna and Bologna. Vienna is home today to very few ensembles regularly playing Jewish instrumental music. A bit of context might help. Vienna was never a klezmer city, even when its prewar population was 12 percent Jewish, since East European Jewry did not set the tone for the local modernizing, perhaps assimilating, culture. Today, with Vienna nearly 20 percent "foreign" in population, including a small but hardy Jewish community of very mixed origins, it is as a modern *multicultural* city that Vienna experiences the *ostjüdisch* music it formerly did not miss. In this sense, Vienna is similar to Berlin, the most active European site of new Jewish music-making.

To explain what I mean by multicultural, let me make a comparative move and in-

troduce evidence about—of all things—"black" music in Vienna. In an excellent recent anthology on musical "diversity" in contemporary societies produced by the Institut für Volksmusikforschung,[14] Filip Lamasisi, a musician and ethnomusicologist from Papua New Guinea, describes the history of a band he formed with a Nigerian immigrant:

> After our inaugural gig at a cultural function in one of the cultural centers in Vienna, we were able to extend our appointments further to night clubs, private functions including birthday parties and wedding ceremonies. . . . Gradually we felt a need to generate more sound . . . and this was achieved as an Austrian friend and keyboarder joined us to form a Trio.
>
> We tried to bring to public awareness, i.e., the audience, some basic musical elements that perhaps were foreign to them, while at the same time creating an entertainment . . . atmosphere, which the music presumably represented and reflected. . . . In general, the experiences we gained in our encounters, both during performance and beyond, encompassed positive and negative ones.[15]

Let us compare Lamasisi's experience to that of Leon Pollak, one of the principal performers of Jewish music in Vienna. Pollak is an immigrant from Poland via Israel. In an interview, he explained how he began to be a klezmer musician: by being asked to play at a birthday party and a wedding, then branching out to small clubs and community events. As to how the music is received, he too reports both positive and negative feedback from audiences responding to musical elements that surprised them. The other members of his trio are a Bulgarian Roma musician well-versed in "Eastern" sounds and an Austrian bass player, fluent in Viennese and theater music styles.

The alert reader will have noticed substantial overlaps in the accounts of these two "ethnic" bandleaders from Vienna. Of course, the differences are more glaring, given the particular historical status of the Jews in Vienna, as opposed to the non-historical status of "blacks" as a category. Especially important as a factor of difference is the Jewish community's active engagement with Pollak's work, as opposed to the basically touristic mission of the "black" band. But common to both is their positioning as heritage musics in a large metropolitan music system in a multicultural society. Lamasisi's band is constantly aware of transnational trends that are not native to either performer—the whole range of "black" music, such as reggae and calypso—that they must integrate into their performance. Pollak, who grew up without much Jewish music background either in Poland or in Israel, has subsumed American klezmer and European klezmer archival sources into his repertoire to appear as a comprehensive representative of his tradition.

This tiny example can stand in for a wide range of micromusical moments in progress across Europe. Recognized "minority" or "ethnic" communities have recently been finding ways to represent themselves both to themselves and to the larger society, a phenomenon that has long been studied in places like Stockholm, where ethnomusicologists became aware of the nuanced play of multimusical chronotopes earlier than in other European societies, which edged toward a multicultural sensibility only in the 1990s.[16]

Europe offers other models; alongside the aforementioned *phantom* sites, there are also a number of *phoenix* klezmer cities in Russia and Ukraine—places like Kishinev, Chernovtsy or Vinnitsa, which once rang to the sound of klezmorim—where Jews (and sometimes non-Jews) are now bringing back that tradition, with some awareness or even direct help from American sources. Finally, I might cite the opposite phenomenon, the *coincidental* klezmer city built by young Italian newcomer bands playing for uninitiated Italian audiences. The Bologna band Dire-Gelt might be said to form such a city when they play in southern Italy; older women dressed in black dance the tarantella to a Yiddish *freylekhs*. In a country where not only was there never a klezmer tradition, but where even today there is no Jewish population to support it, the possibility that a band might create some kind of community through the overlap of local traditions with a residue of *yidishkeyt* seems a wonderful coincidence, a special chronotope of the moment that is beyond even the term "phantom."

I have been trying to put some order into the exuberant variety of European communal chronotopes by offering a tentative typology, but of course many contexts are so individualized and localized as to defy easy categorization. Perhaps the umbrella term "klezmer" that I, along with bands and audiences, have been using has been opened so far that its ribs are bursting at the seams. For many European contexts, the word is extremely loosely applied, or not at all: unlike the countless American combo names with the prefix "klez" (Klezmatics, Klezmaydlakh . . .) it is rarely part of a band name in Europe except in unusual cases such as Leon Pollak's "Ensemble Klesmer." A frequent move in naming a band is to co-opt a Yiddish or Hebrew phrase—"kol simcha," "zol zayn freylekh"—or an imaginary but Hebrew-sounding word that one young Berlin band coined, "La'om." Often understood simply as a "world music" trend, European "klezmer" has and will continue to have a strong relationship to cities. This involves a very tangential tie to community life, beyond the need for cultural tourism, in places like Prague and Cracow, or it might develop a more solid base as part of the demand for local culture in phoenix cities like Budapest, Vienna and, potentially, Warsaw. The most recent heritage project there is the reconstruction of a half block of Jewish tenement houses on Ulica Prosna that managed to survive the annihilation of the ghetto by virtue of its being a few meters away from the wall. We will probably see a klezmer guidebook in the near future.

Further study, of course, could move in some empirical ways. A much-needed direction would be the analysis of musical style, and of the Yiddish-language song, as crystallizers of commonality across city and national lines. There is a grid, a map of style and repertoire, that overlays the klezmer cities. Electronic linkages provide an ever more stable network of relationships as well. Yet ultimately, the sense of space and implied time—the catalogue of chronotopes—created by klezmer-related modes of performance remains intensely local. Musicians and audience alike are caught in a net of notes, words, sighs and the familiarity of expected genres. We would need extensive study of the music's consumers to understand how they integrate the notion of "klezmer" into their map of personal culture. We have only just begun to sense the magnetic field around that chronotopal *experience*, the core of attraction that informs any search for the klezmer city.

Notes

1. Moshe Beregovski, *Jewish Folk Instrumental Music*, ed. Mark Slobin, Robert Rothstein and Michael Alpert (Syracuse: 1999).
2. *Ibid*.
3. *Ibid*.
4. Interviews with Hankus Netsky, 1997–1998.
5. Interview with Melvin Strauss, March 1997.
6. *Ibid*.
7. Philip Roth, *Goodbye,Columbus* (Boston: 1959), 109–110.
8. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, *Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics* (Stanford: 1990), 368, 371.
9. Interview with Alicia Svigals, Jan. 1998.
10. Morson and Emerson, *Mikhail Bakhtin*, 426.
11. Interview with Henry Sapoznik, March 1995.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Interview with Joe Kurland, Feb. 1998.
14. See Ursula Hemetek (ed.), *Echo der Vielfalt/Echoes of Diversity* (Vienna: 1996).
15. Filip Lamasisi, "Musical Intercultural Encounters in Vienna: A Reflection on the Experience Associated with Performance of Ethnic Music of the Black Minority," in *ibid.*, 85–100.
16. See Owe Ronstrom, *Att Gestalta ett Ursprung: En musiketnologisk studie av dansande och muscerand bland jugoslavear i Stockholm* (Stockholm: 1992).

New York City, the Jews, and "The Urban Experience"

Eli Lederhendler
(the hebrew university)

Even when one writes a local history—with the requisite narrative of a particular sequence of events, the biographies of individuals and families, and the rise of homegrown organizations and institutions—it is difficult to identify those qualities that set apart the Jewish experience in one given locality from that of Jews in other, similar places. Indeed, local histories, with their singular focus, often avoid comparative analysis, offering instead vague references to broadly distinguishing local characteristics. We rarely are able to assess what it is that fosters the rise of local identities and stereotypes such as those perpetuated in literature and common parlance.

Much as social historians may try to base themselves on empirical information, it is all too easy to move from a description of life in one place—a given town, let us say—to an ideal-typical or composite image of life in towns in general. Often enough we read of "Jewish life in *the shtetl*," for example, as if the collective singular noun "shtetl" contained all the information required to describe an entire class or range of Jewish communities, spread across many provinces and political boundary lines. Local loyalties and social networks, however, have been known to be extremely persistent, as studies of *landsmanshaftn* (organizations of immigrant fellow-townsmen) demonstrate.[1] This tends to undercut the assumed interchangeability of small Jewish communities, even if similar patterns are observed to be replicated.

Much the same may be said to apply to cities, for it is not unusual to speak of Jews and "the urban experience" in a generalized sense, even though scholars over the past several decades have produced some first-rate social histories of individual urban Jewish communities as well as studies that focus upon the provinces as counterurban social realms.[2]

I pair "the shtetl" and "the urban experience" consciously and deliberately, not only because each has served as a cultural icon in modern discourse, but also because both images were products of the urbanization of Jewish society and, moreover, were created to serve as counterfoils for one another. Empirical, plural *shtetlekh* were turned into the emblematic and singular *shtetl* when modern Hebrew and Yiddish writers (sitting in cities like Warsaw or Odessa) needed to construct an image of a Jewish realm unto itself (a realm, as Isaac Bashevis Singer once put it, of "physical and spiritual

poverty")[3]—the typical Jewish town being projected as the polar opposite of the progressive orientation and "otherness" of modern city life.[4]

These twinned images then acquired currency beyond the world of belles-lettres and became common coin. Taken as a matched pair of opposing metaphors, shtetl and city very aptly symbolized, respectively, "tradition" and "modernity," as well as a host of associated concepts and qualities: the parochial and the cosmopolitan; "community" and "society"; rootedness and rootlessness; on the one hand, the collective and, on the other, both the individual (radically alone) and "the masses"(the potential source of a new, urban collectivity). Here, for instance, we find the paradigmatic juxtaposition reflected in the words of a Jewish immigrant writing to the editor of the New York Yiddish daily *Der Forverts* (*Forward*):

> My heart pounded with joy when I saw New York in the distance. It was like coming out of the darkness when I left my town. I came to the Big City where I sensed the freedom and became a proletarian.[5]

Yet despite the mutual negation intended by this categorical juxtaposition, it can be argued that the shtetl metaphor has survived virtually intact within its urban counterpart, judging by what has been written about "the Jewish urban experience." Much of the fiction as well as the sociological, social historical and memoir literature on Jews in large cities (such as New York and Chicago) tends to focus on residential neighborhoods—ostensibly insular spaces of social intimacy and ethnic integrity. Such accounts illuminate the crucial role of the big city's patchwork neighborhoods in defining a Jewish urban space, rather than engaging the wider range of issues posed by urban life, as Jews have experienced them.[6]

(Among the notable exceptions are such books as Moses Rischin's classic study of the Jews in New York, *The Promised City*, which transcends its focus on the Lower East Side by examining the connections between the lives of the immigrants and the politics, economics and culture of the city. In urban fiction, Saul Bellow's *Mr. Sammler's Planet* also breaks with the dominant neighborhood motif, partly by placing the main action on Manhattan's Upper West Side—neither an outer-borough enclave nor the historical sanctum sanctorum of the Lower East Side—and partly by denying the characters a supportive set of positive, extended-family relationships inside the bounds of a safe, familiar territory.)[7]

Neighborhood clearly and easily takes the iconic place of the shtetl for many of the same reasons that initially motivated Hebrew and Yiddish writers to conjure up the small Jewish provincial town: given the city-based realities of rapid cultural shifts and massive social dislocation, a definably Jewish narrative could not be easily imagined in a large, undifferentiated urban space. Isaac Bashevis Singer may have exaggerated somewhat in describing Yiddish literature as a genre stuck in its small-town origins (particularly if we consider that, unlike prose, modern Yiddish poetry did indeed develop an urban sensibility), but he was not completely wrong when he said:

> Mendele, Sholom Aleichem, Raisin, Bergelson, Fuchs, indeed almost all the Yiddish writers, wrote for the *shtetl* and about the *shtetl*, even though the majority of Jews lived in large cities. For some strange reason Yiddish literature has shied away from the metropolis. There is very little in Yiddish about Petersburg, Kiev . . . Chicago, Detroit, New York and Philadelphia. . . . Jewish life is one vast astounding adventure occurring all over the

> globe, particularly in the metropolis, yet both Hebrew and Yiddish literatures have penned themselves up in a ghetto.[8]

By analogy, much of what we have read about "the Jewish urban experience" gravitates toward the realm most easily identifiable as Jewish: those urban enclaves that presented a visually and palpably Jewish face. Judging the ethnic neighborhood to function within the larger urban landscape the way that the shtetl once functioned in its provincial, rural setting, writers, scholars and memoirists have given us an evocative image of immigrant-generation and second-generation Jewish "turf." This defined space held urban chaos at bay but also caused its denizens to chafe at the limits it imposed. The juxtaposition here is no longer between tradition and modernity, but it does still rely on the inner space/outer space dichotomy.

Irving Howe referred to this analogous continuity most explicitly when he suggested that,

> if our contemporary experience winds back into the Lower East Side, . . . then the experience of the Lower East Side winds back into the world of the Russian and Polish Jews, finding there its premise of survival. . . . The Lower East Side was a fulfillment of energies from the immediate Jewish past; it was Kamenetz-Podolsk revived, Berdichev released.[9]

The focus on neighborhoods as the venue for the particularistic urban experience of minorities goes beyond mere nostalgia, however. Like the shtetl before it, the urban neighborhood could sometimes be described in wholly negative terms, without losing any of its familiar character. Alfred Kazin, for example, who had enshrined the Brownsville streets of his boyhood in *A Walker in the City*, could equally turn the neighborhood motif around to point to the sheer, gnawing awfulness that could gather in particular corners of the city, corners that seemed to contrast with the otherwise grand city, and whose character was partly defined by "Jewish" qualities:

> The upper West Side had presented to me a face strained, shadowed, overcrowded . . . and hanging over the street too many colossal apartment houses into which the sun did not shine, too great a show of garbage pails in front of every door. . . . The West Side as a whole was ethnic territory, foreign, "Jew land," the cheaper side of town, and the last stand of all exiles, refugees, proscribed and displaced persons . . . so many old European habits, hungers, complaints; so much Jewishness, blackness, clownishness, vulgarity, old age, amazement, ugliness, anxiety.[10]

Whether positive or negative, the apartness of neighborhood and those who peopled it somehow remained the dominant idea. By the same token, for the most part it is *only* the Jewish neighborhood that has been cast in the Jewish imagination as an urban Jewish space, as if not much about the urban experience is pertinent to Jewish social history once we have stepped outside the residential or occupational ethnic niche. With one partial exception, to which the bulk of this essay is devoted, no city as a whole has been imagined as a Jewish space: a "home," in the way that a shtetl or neighborhood is conceived as a home. The fact that urban space as such is not "worthy" of historicizing or folklorizing in the modern Jewish imagination is reflected in the virtual lack of Jewish monuments in American cities, a matter to which we will return at the end of our discussion.

The City Entire

The exception to which I have referred is New York City, which, for a time (especially in the immediate post–Second World War decades), was repeatedly portrayed by Jews and non-Jews alike as a city animated and transformed by its Jewish presence. In popular culture, this notion was most famously stated by comic Lenny Bruce, who flatly pronounced all New Yorkers "Jewish," whereas if you were from Montana—even if you were Jewish—you were nonetheless "goyish."

But this was just the tip of a postwar conceptual iceberg. New York reminded Isaac Bashevis Singer of Warsaw, because of all the Jews there.[11] Writer and social critic David Bazelon, who came to New York in 1943 at age twenty, later recalled: "To the kid from Chicago, New York was an astoundingly bright new world, filled with Jews of marvellous variety: like a supermarket kind of candy store, with versions of heritage."[12]

Sociologist Daniel Bell credited the Jewish presence for the large middle-class entrepreneurial class in New York—"probably the largest middle-class aggregate in any urban center of this country"—and went on to explain the ramifications of this presence:

> Unlike the traditional, small-town, Protestant middle class, [this one was] sharp, shrewd, and like as not, cynical. And yet, because so many of these businessmen were Jewish, it was a middle class that hungered for culture and self-improvement. The chief contribution of the Jews to the City of New York . . . has been in their role as "consumers of culture." The large symphony orchestras, theaters, trade-book publishing, the avant-garde magazines, the market for drawings and paintings—all have, as their principal audience and consumer, the Jewish middle class. And this was made possible largely by the entrepreneurial wealth of small-unit firms.[13]

Political scientist Hans Morgenthau, putting it more broadly, felt that "there is so much that is specifically Jewish here. You expect to run into Jews continuously: you always expect to be touched by the emanations of Jewish life. How else could it be in a city one of whose main ethnic characteristics is Jewishness?"[14]

Journalist Midge Decter, originally from St. Paul, who had come to New York as a college student and settled there, working at such publications as *Harper's*, *Midstream* and *Commentary*, was able to make the following comparison:

> If I had been living in St. Paul . . . , I would certainly have sent [my children] to a Talmud Torah [Hebrew school]. I would have had no choice. Living in New York meant living in a Jewish culture anyway [where her children could grow up believing that] everyone was Jewish . . . , that they were members of the majority culture.[15]

"New York is a Jewish city," one visitor from Britain stated baldly. "It is loud and bright and un-Anglo-Saxon (compare it with Boston, for example), it is the wrong part of home, . . . Golders Green or the Whitechapel Road when you expected . . . Regent Street."[16]

Yiddish poet Judd Teller, turning the city literally into Jewish space, likened New York's "big-city streets . . . gaping solemnly" to a traditional Jewish home, "waiting for men's return from holiday prayers," with "a cantor's liturgy" in the wind.[17] Somehow it is difficult to imagine such a statement about Philadelphia, Boston or Los

Angeles, to say nothing of Chicago ("Hog Butcher for the world," in the words of the most famous poetic rendering of that city—not very fitting for a "Jewish" city).[18]

Martin Shefter, noted scholar of urban politics, observed that Jews had made themselves particularly at home in the regnant ideology and power structure of postwar New York:

> WASP and Jewish New Yorkers acted together—in the political and economic realms as well as in cultural affairs—in the decades following World War II. . . . The doctrines associated with the postwar national and world orders—internationalism, liberalism, modernism—can be regarded as the ideology of this WASP-Jewish coalition. . . . In the name of those doctrines, the members of the WASP-Jewish coalition came to exercise a remarkable measure of influence in American political, economic, and cultural life.[19]

By the same token, New York became the model upon which many postwar urban Jewish writers based their image of "the city." "I had no desire to get to Jerusalem," reminisced Lionel Abel, "no expectation of living in Athens, little interest in Rome. . . . What did I know then of Paris? My whole aim was to live in New York. . . . It was a city. It was The City."[20]

Identifying themselves fully with the gritty, abrasive, brittle unquietness of it, they also imagined that "Jewishness" (*not* Judaism) and urban-ness were inherently overlapping qualities, thus doing for the Big Apple what their Yiddish and Hebrew predecessors had done for the shtetl.

"The life of New York," wrote critic Robert Warshow somewhat hyperbolically, "can be said . . . to embody the common experience of American Jews."[21] Note that the premise here is not that *Jewish life* (for example, ethnic neighborhoods) *in New York* has been typical of the American Jewish experience—though perhaps that, too, is implied; more, the argument is that "the life of New York"—urgent, mobile, metropolitan, crammed-in, achievement-programmed—has given Jews their most typical American experiences and endowed them with a group character.

It is conceivable that one reason why Jews (especially in the world of arts and letters) so predictably projected an image of themselves as "homo urbanicus," is that non-Jewish observers had picked up on this image and Jews found it complimentary or somehow appealing. Sociologist Robert Park had equated "the marginal man, the first cosmopolite" with "the emancipated Jew."[22] "As no other city is, New York is their home," declared *Fortune* magazine: "And surely it can be said that Jewish *élan* has contributed mightily to the city's dramatic character—its excitement, its originality, its stridency, its unexpectedness."[23] Anatole Broyard, the New Orleans-born, Brooklyn-reared writer, evoked the following picture of the Jewish-identified, urban, verbal and intellectual intensity that he encountered in his boyhood school days in Brooklyn:

> The [Jewish boys] had another advantage: While I was essentially cheerful, filled with a distracting sociability, there was a brooding sadness in the most brilliant of the Jewish boys that turned them inward and made them thoughtful. I saw them as Martians, creatures from a more advanced planet. Next to them I would always be a southerner, a barbarian. They were at home in the city in a way I wasn't. Their racing minds were part of its teeming.[24]

To put this all into the proper perspective, however, we need to take two things into account. First, it was usually only after 1940 that one hears the refrain of New York's

Jewishness. As a rule, reflections on the years that preceded the Second World War took note of the great *distance* (social, cultural and psychological distance) that Jews—young, native New Yorkers, not immigrants—had to travel in order to make it out of the ethnic backwater and into "their" (not "our") city: Manhattan.[25] The smart, cosmopolitan, *un*-Jewish culture of Manhattan's East Side and its bohemian correlate in the Village were far removed indeed from the suffocatingly ethnic, blue-collar and lower middle-class experience of the Jewish neighborhoods (which is why, of course, they were so alluring). Manhattan's un-Jewish pleasures and qualities are fully attested to in the memoirs of non-Jewish writers, but the irony here is that non-Jews *also* tended to find Manhattan a dramatic and exotic revelation—though for opposite reasons. As journalist Mary Cantwell would recall:

> What I wanted to do, more than anything, was find the Ilium that presented itself whenever one drove down the West Side Highway at dusk and saw the lights going on in the skyscrapers and the sun dropping into the Hudson. What I found, however, was infinitely more interesting: all Europe, a bit of Asia, some of Africa, and three centuries dropped indiscriminately on one small island.[26]

Although some observers have pointed to much earlier examples of symbolic Jewish "claims" upon the city as a whole (citing, for instance, the massive public funeral for Sholem Aleichem in 1916, during which the procession marched through thronged streets from the Bronx through Manhattan and into Brooklyn),[27] this ought not to be taken as paradigmatic. The repeated assertions we have read that, stepping out of the Bronx or Brooklyn, one was venturing onto alien ground—apparently the typical experience of second-generation New York Jews—ought to caution us not to infer too much from isolated early incidents.

Second, the conceit of laying symbolic claim to the city as a Jewish space was never meant literally. The mechanism involved in making this *metaphorical* assertion was one of deliberate selectivity, almost identical to the artful, trompe l'oeil devices that turned the typical East European shtetl—complete with church spires, Gentile inhabitants, local government officials and other evidence of the non-Jewish world—into an exclusively Jewish pastorale of the imagination.

Even allowing for this sort of poetic license, however, the Jewish "colonization" of New York could only be a very partial rendering of reality. Much of this perception depended on the eye of the beholder. Thus, the "Jewishness" of New York and the "New Yorkishness" of the Jews are images that are limited by a specific time frame (the first postwar decades) and by a "reality check" that tells us that such characterizations stand somewhat closer to the frivolous than to the profound. Still, the intriguing question here is: Why did New York alone merit this sort of attachment? Why, once they had "arrived" in the postwar city, did Jews find it so congenial as to suggest "home" to them? Why did Jews of the second generation choose to identify themselves with the city as a whole, and what, precisely, were they identifying with?

The empirical reality underlying any answer to these questions is, undoubtedly, the sheer number of Jewish inhabitants in New York (about 2.1 million at the end of the 1950s, or more than one-third of all the Jews in the United States), and the relatively high proportion they comprised of the city's total population (about 27 percent).[28] No other city in history, ever, anywhere in the world, had ever contained a Jewish com-

munity of this magnitude. Moreover, between 1920 and 1960, Jews represented the single largest ethnoreligious group in New York. Thus, while Jews were not numerically dominant, they were proportionally so significant as to lend at least some weight to the "majority culture" argument.

Jews constituted a large presence in certain neighborhoods and boroughs: 36 percent of the Bronx population in 1950; 34 percent of Brooklyn's inhabitants in the same year; 17 and 14 percent respectively in Manhattan and Queens.[29] But their presence throughout the city rested not only on residential statistics. Workday concentrations in places of employment and certain sectors of commerce and manufacturing must be included as well. In 1957–1958, comparisons of the occupations of heads of families, sorted according to religious preference, showed that in New York City, where Jews comprised only 30 percent of the pool as compared with 46 percent for Catholics, only 6 percent of the Catholic heads-of-household were owners, managers and officials, whereas Jews accounted for 23 percent. (An additional 18 percent of the Jews were engaged in clerical and sales work, compared to 10 percent among Catholics). At the end of the 1960s, it has been claimed, Jews still owned about 80 percent of the small business and manufacturing firms in the city.[30]

In addition, this "presence" was tangibly felt in political clubs, the public school system, the university campuses, the judiciary, the arts, as well as the media, entertainment and publishing world. The ubiquitous presence of Jews in certain parts of city life made it possible for Dan Wakefield, a young journalist fresh out of Columbia in 1955, to assume (erroneously) that his new lady friend who worked in publishing was Jewish—"based on the fact that she had dark hair and was highly intelligent."[31] It was not an unreasonable assumption for Wakefield to have made in New York, though it might not have occurred to him in his native Indianapolis.

Numbers and "presence" assured that Jews would have a major stake in city affairs. The question might be raised as to whether their Jewishness counted at all with regard to their involvement in economic, political and cultural activities, when compared with their functional presence as employees and employers, residents, taxpayers, PTA members, students and theater-goers. But this question is more or less beside the point here. What, if not the untrammeled opportunity to function in any given capacity, was the gift that the immigrants and their children sought from the city? And was not this goal itself a product of their collective history and social experience?

The point, rather, is that their massive numbers and wide (but also concentrated) distribution throughout the city allowed Jews to embrace a vision of the city as a whole, without at the same time losing a sense of themselves as a defined group. A perfect example is the closure of New York City public schools for the Jewish High Holidays, a practice that went into effect in 1960. At that time, Jewish pupils constituted 33 percent of total school enrollment, Jewish teachers accounted for 45 percent of the faculty, and Jews were a majority among school principals.[32] Thus, though they were acting in "non-Jewish" capacities, this ostensibly nonethnic civic presence went hand in hand with group recognition.

In sum, the tendency to draw attention to the "ethnic experience" of Jews as something pertaining mainly to residential clustering on familiar streets is too narrowly drawn to adequately assess the urban Jewish lifestyle. The Jews themselves, in calling postwar New York home (even, or especially, when they exaggerated the case),

were calling attention to their ability and desire not to be limited to an ethnic niche or ghetto. The life of the city as such was pertinent to the life that Jews developed and sought to maintain. At the same time, it must be recognized that if this applies generally to Jews in cities, the greatest optimal conditions for this embrace of the urban life existed in New York.

With the Depression and the war behind them, Jews found that New York afforded them the chance to seek two urban utopias: the one being a cosmopolitan democracy, with full, unhindered participation in the life of a world-city, regardless of one's descent and the disadvantages of past discriminations; the other being an "ingathering," an unprecedented establishment of a Jewish community so massive as to offer the Jewish people a potential "world capital." Some combination of the cosmopolitan ethos, favoring civic integration, and the parochial one, favoring tribal fealty, exists in every Jewish community; but only in New York could both elements come *simultaneously* to the kind of fruition that appeared to be evident in the affluent postwar years, a time when New York attained a new level of worldwide cultural prestige and commercial dominance.

Both of these Jewish urban utopias were germinating for decades before the postwar period, and it is this lengthy preliminary period that might explain the intensity of the embrace once it appeared to be consummated. I find these utopian elements eloquently captured in two poems by immigrant writers from the first half of the twentieth century: the first, "Nyu-york" ("New York"), by Hebrew poet Shimon Ginsburg, and the second, "Do voynt dos yidishe folk" ("Here lives the Jewish People"), by the prominent Yiddish writer and poet, H. Leyvik (Leyvik Halpern).

Ginsburg's poem opens with verses describing the overpowering immensity of the city, threatening in its very scale, but it goes on to develop themes alluding to the city as the site for human redemption, with clear implications for the individual who joins his fate with that of the city. The following passages are drawn from the poem's conclusion:

> The night train carries me across Williamsburg Bridge . . .
> Strands of flickering lights beckon and call to one another.
> In that instant, my soul, too, plunges into the night, seeking
> its sisters,
> the flames, kindled like itself, to light the night world . . .
> And all that night long a new song welled up within me,
> the burden of New York passed and became a hymn of faith . . .
> Upon returning next day to the city . . .
> I turn and behold yet another giant bridge,
> stretched out frozen on its harpstring limbs . . .
> like the strings of God's own lyre,
> waiting in latent, confident expectancy
> for that Unseen One to come and play
> the great song of the future.[33]

Here the harps that the exiled Jews once hung by the rivers of Babylon, destined to remain silent in bondage and lamentation, are reincarnated in the form of the Brooklyn Bridge, its "strings" taut with expectancy, power and divine benediction. If

Babylon symbolized the beginning of exile, this rendering of New York as the instrument ("God's own lyre") of redemption signals a reversal of exile in a universalist, humanistic future.

H. Leyvik alluded to a different but equally vivid sign of redemption: the vision of a Jewish ingathering. Walking the immigrant district of lower Manhattan, in his mind's eye he saw:

> Fantastic gates, soaring columns,
> rising from all the dilapidated stands
> upward to the far and empty New York sky.
> Gates—on all their cornices
> glowing, sparkling signs, inscribed:
> Here lives the Jewish People.[34]

Such grand visions, while perhaps intended only poetically, nonetheless help us to fathom the view adopted in later years that, for the Jews who lived there, New York was the best that one could hope for on God's earth. Their fate, their culture, their lifestyle were joined to those of the city, both through civic integration and through the overwhelming geographical concentration of members of the Jewish people.

But this perception, seemingly sanctioned by frequent assertion, in fact should alert us to the unstated, conditional aspects of the claimed linkage. Jews are a fickle people (if the Bible is any judge) and a footloose bunch (if history is any measure). *As long as* social and economic conditions promoted a widely defined civic integration, and *as long as* the Jewish numerical presence remained high, New York could remain a Jewish space. When both conditions were brought into question, the linkage between Jews and the city was brought into question, too. This would indeed occur starting in the 1960s, when Jews increasingly moved out of the city (either to the suburbs or away from the metropolitan area altogether), when New York began to feel the effects of the urban crisis, and when strained intergroup relations threatened to offset the positive image of New York as a city historically open to all comers.

The Weakened Embrace

In 1959, three reports were published that raised serious questions about the quality of life in New York. The New York Metropolitan Region Study, a nine-volume report, contained predictions of a loss of population and a loss of jobs in both trade and manufacturing. *Newsweek* followed this up with a report on what it called "Metropolis in a Mess," and *The Nation* published an issue on "The Shame of New York." "New York," it began, "is a sprawling, voracious monster of a city. It covers 315 square miles; it is crammed with some 8 million people. At least a million . . . live in packed squalor, six and ten to a room. . . . Symbolically, perhaps, there are in New York more rats than people—an estimated 9 million of them."[35]

The Jews of New York, no less susceptible to quality-of-life concerns than other citizens—and possessing the affluence to consider other options—were on the verge of a long-term numerical slide, a trend that would accelerate over the coming decades. From 2.1 million in the city in 1958 (and some 2.6 million all told in the eight-county

metropolitan area—the five boroughs plus Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk), the Jewish population fell by 1990 to just over one million in the five boroughs (with half a million less in the wider metropolitan area than before)—and this included an influx of more than 100,000 newcomers from Israel and the former Soviet Union.[36]

A people with so much invested in the urban experience and in New York City in particular could not sustain that investment once the interweaving of its particularist ethos and its civic ethos began to unravel.

In the decades that followed 1950, the population of New York City remained fairly stable in total size, but changed dramatically in composition. The steady and large-scale influx of Puerto Rican and black inhabitants (which was followed by a further influx of immigrants from the Caribbean, Latin America and Asia) was more than offset by a steady outflow of white residents, mainly from the middle class.[37]

In his study of the population history of New York City, Ira Rosenwaike found that non-Hispanic whites began leaving the city in significant numbers (almost half a million) during the 1940s, but this trend accelerated in the 1950s, when net outmigration of this group reached 1.24 million. Over that same period, the suburbs closest to New York City—northern New Jersey and Nassau and Suffolk counties (Long Island)—*gained* an equivalent number of residents (1.25 million). From 1960 to 1970, another million left the city, and while only 40 percent of the out-migrants resettled in the immediate environs, the suburban population (including northern New Jersey) grew by 763,000.

The process by which more affluent and longer-resident groups moved steadily from the central parts of the city toward its periphery, and then beyond, into the suburbs, was not necessarily causally related to racial issues, since the pattern was well established before the 1950s and the same pattern soon also began, in turn, among black, Puerto Rican and Asian New Yorkers. Nevertheless, it was the exit of so many middle-class white residents and an accelerating in-migration of non-whites, mostly from lower economic strata, that prompted the colloquial expression, "white flight."

Moreover, not only were residential patterns in and outside the city seen to perpetuate class and status distinctions, but it became clear that ethnic and racial distinctions (group clustering in separate areas) were similarly perpetuated. In the 1940s, we read in one report, only 7.5 percent of African Americans in Brooklyn lived in areas where they constituted more than 80 percent of the population. Between 1940 and 1950, Brooklyn's black population almost doubled and the number of white residents slightly declined; but five times as many black people lived in segregated communities in 1950 as had been the case during the previous decade. Nathan Kantrowitz's study of New York's residential segregation patterns found that at the beginning of the 1950s, blacks moving into white areas were generally middle-class people entering high-status white neighborhoods, but by 1960, neighborhoods where black people resided had few white residents and no high-status whites.[38]

Although Kantrowitz argued that segregation by social class and ethnic or racial group was natural or at least inevitable (richer Jews segregated themselves residentially from poor Jews, richer blacks from poorer, Italians from Irish, and white-black segregation was no different in kind than these other patterns), others did not agree. One scholar, who voiced a common view, noted, "The growth of the suburbs was more than simply a measure of the failure of the big city as a place to live. It was also

a dangerous example of the continuation of racial segregation and racial antipathy in America."[39] On the conservative side, Irving Kristol voiced his apprehension over the social consequences (for whites) entailed in their wholesale abandonment of America's cities.[40]

In all of this, Jews were participants as well as partial exceptions to the common pattern. The Jewish population of the city continued to grow in the 1950s (due to both in-migration and natural increase), whereas the rest of the white, non-Hispanic population was already declining. By the end of the 1950s, however, Jewish population trends began to follow non-Jewish trends. The figures in Table 1 summarize and compare the decline of white non-Hispanic population in New York City and the parallel decline of the city's Jewish population.

Jewish population in the city declined rather steeply from 1957 to 1970, showing a loss of almost 900,000, or about 42 percent. Some (though clearly not all) of this decline may be accounted for by a shift from the city to the three suburban counties of Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk, where the Jewish population rose during those years from 465,000 to 770,000.

After 1970, the decline of the Jewish population began to slow down (partly due to an influx of Jews from the Soviet Union); the rest of the white population, on the other hand, continued to diminish rapidly. In all, the size of the Jewish population by 1991 was 51.5 percent of its size forty years earlier; the non-Hispanic white population ended the same forty-year period with only 46 percent of what it had started with (see Table 1).

It was suggested at the time that Jews were among those white New Yorkers who were particularly prone to leave changing neighborhoods. Jews, for one thing, tended to be renters, not homeowners, and thus were less prepared to "fight" for their homes; moreover, they "reacted to blacks moving into their neighborhoods much less violently than did other white communities . . . [and simply] moved out."[41] Sociologist Marshall Sklare criticized Jews for their lack of rootedness in their urban neighborhoods, arguing that their rapid disappearance from former ethnic strongholds was tantamount to being the cause of their own urban crisis.[42]

Table 1. Non-Hispanic White and Jewish Population of New York City, 1950–1991 (millions)

Year	Non-Hispanic white	Jewish
1950	6.87	2.00
1957	6.03	2.14
1970	5.24	1.23
1981	3.70	1.14
1991	3.16	1.03

Sources: Ira Rosenwaike, *Population History of New York City* (Syracuse: 1972), 131–139, 155, 198–199; Morris Horowitz and Lawrence J. Kaplan, *The Jewish Population of the New York Area, 1900–1975* (New York: 1959), 15–17; Fred Massarik, "Basic Characteristics of the Greater New York Jewish Populaiton," *American Jewish Year Book* 76 (1976), 239; Bethamie Horowitz, *The 1991 New York Jewish Population Study* (New York: 1993), xiii–xiv, 10–11.

The participation of Jews from the city in "white flight," by all accounts, was significant and the Jewish presence in the suburbs burgeoned. But the figures in Table 1 suggest the possibility that the impact of suburbanization on the Jewish community in the city was not as great as it was on the white population in general. It would appear, too, that Jews did not lead the way into the suburbs, but rather followed other city residents after a lag of almost a decade.

Data from the 1958 New York Jewish Population Study tend to confirm this pattern. Jews increased their share of the total city population and of the white population from 1940 through 1957. If we compare the citywide figures to those in several key neighborhoods, we find similar results. In neighborhoods like East Flatbush-Brownsville, in Brooklyn, where the Jewish population fell significantly after 1950, the Jewish share of the white population fell more slowly. In areas like Manhattan's Upper West Side, where there was no loss, or in places where the loss of Jewish population was slow, such as Tremont in the Bronx, Jews actually increased their share of the white population from 1950 to 1957.[43]

Thus, it is clear that Jews did not lead the trend toward suburbanization, but rather followed the trend. Finally, among Jews—but not among non-Jews—the main wave of redistribution to the suburbs was largely "spent" by 1970, after which the pattern continued more moderately, and was somewhat blunted by in-migration.

Looking at the eight-county metropolitan area, from 1950 to 1970, the non-Hispanic white population of the metropolitan area went from being 78 percent urban to only 38 percent urban. At that point, the Jews, at their lowest urban ebb (61.5 percent), were still mostly concentrated in the city, at a rate over one-and-a-half times that of whites in general.

Some of the reasons for the relatively delayed Jewish suburbanization in the 1950s may be traceable to the high concentration of "Jewish" jobs in Manhattan and in the city generally, rather than to any subjective affinity for the city (bearing in mind that most people continued to live within short commuting distance from their place of employment).[44] The same line of reasoning would also help to illuminate the relative stabilization of the New York Jewish population after the mid-1970s. Once the city began to recover from the fiscal crisis of those years, certain developing economic sectors, in which Jewish New Yorkers were prominently represented, began to grow. These sectors included financial and corporate services; communications, media and advertising; education and research; and health and social services.[45]

In terms of other, less tangible ramifications of Jewish urbanism, one might entertain two interrelated hypotheses:

1. The *relatively high urban profile* among Jews in the New York area would tend to involve Jews more personally and directly in any events or developments taking place in New York City, even if these did not happen to involve them as Jews, per se. This might be expected to apply both to urban affairs taken broadly and to mutual frictions that built up between groups in the city.

2. The *delay in Jewish suburbanization* may have tended to expose them, more than other non-Hispanic whites, to the atmosphere of crisis that developed in the city during the 1960s. This matter of timing would seem to apply, for example, to questions of neighborhood "succession." The higher the share of the white population accounted for by Jews—and that share went up as other white residents left the city—

the more we can expect to find Jews present in city neighborhoods undergoing changes in racial composition. Jews, once they did begin to participate in the so-called "white flight," did so at a stage when the process was already well advanced, and this might explain, for instance, why their numbers fell rather precipitously. (Recall that the Jewish population of the city dropped by a massive 42 percent in just twelve years.)

In 1969, pollster Louis Harris conducted a survey in New York in order to determine the state of relations between Jews, blacks and other groups in the city. Among the results that are of relevance to the present discussion are the following:

Jews (far more than blacks, for example) reported positive feelings about their place in the city, expressing their rootedness and their sense of acceptance in the city landscape. They felt they were represented in city government, getting ahead in their jobs, and receiving goodwill and respect from other people. But positive assessments like these changed to negative ones when the questions turned to quality-of-life issues: safety on the streets, the tax burden on the individual citizen, the prospects for one's children's education, and the relative "decency" of the atmosphere in the city with regard to raising children. Most important, Jews—more than non-Jewish whites—were apt to complain that "racial tension" was to blame for such quality of life problems.[46]

The cumulative effects on the Jewish–New York nexus were negative, despite the fact that the majority of New York area Jews remained attached to the city throughout the 1950s–1970s. Compare, for example, the following two statements about New York. Each reflects no small degree of alienation and frustration, yet the distinction between them is caused by the differences between the 1930s, the 1960s and the 1980s. Here, first, is Irving Howe (in the 1960s), recalling his sense of the city in the late 1930s as a place of formidable barriers between "us" and "them," not yet the "city entire," yet nonetheless a place that could seem the "only" possible place to live:

> New York did not really exist for us as a city, a defined place we felt to be our own. Too many barriers intervened, too many kinds of anxiety. . . . New York was not merely the vital metropolis, brimming with politics and contention, that has since become a sentimental legend; it was also brutal, ugly, frightening . . . the embodiment of that alien world which every boy raised in a Jewish immigrant home had been taught . . . to look upon with suspicion. It was "their" city. . . . [Yet] if someone had asked me in 1939 what I thought of New York, I would have been puzzled . . . quite as if I had been asked what I thought about my family. . . . I no more imagined that I would ever live—or be able to live—anywhere but in New York than I could find myself a more fashionable set of parents.[47]

Note the contrasting lament about the impossible character of life in the city in the following passage by writer Marshall Berman (who in the 1980s coined the term "urbicide" to describe the devastation of New York's worst neighborhoods). Berman, who still found New York a "thrilling" place, felt that the power exerted by images of the past made it difficult to imagine a "new social contract" with the city:

> The experience of looking back to New York in the summer of 1961 is a little like Philip Larkin's poem about pictures of England in August 1914. The poet's refrain, "Never such innocence again." Those of us who lived through the 1960s and 1970s in New York often felt like soldiers in that Great War: under fire for years, assaulted from more direc-

> tions than we could keep track of, pinned down in positions from which we couldn't seem to move. These were years when violence, and violent death, became everyday facets of city life. . . . [A]ll the tensions that have been seething throughout American society—tensions between races, classes, sexes, generations—have boiled over instantly on the sidewalks of New York.[48]

Or, to cite another example, this was the stark prediction of Brooklyn journalist Jim Sleeper:

> New Yorkers seem to sense that on the other side of the current upheavals, the city's once-vibrant, predominantly white ethnic and proletarian political culture—progenitor of the New Deal, the 1939 World's Fair, Hollywood, the interracial Brooklyn Dodgers, municipal unions, myriad bohemias, and even the early Levittowns . . . will lie dead or dying.[49]

Once again, it should be stressed that imagining New York as a Jewish-friendly space was always a selective reading of the truth and, as we have seen, it was not typical of the pre–Second World War period (despite some early signs of this embrace). At the other end of the chronological parenthesis, by the 1970s, the nexus between Jews and New York had already waned: this, despite the fact that Jews still made New York their home in disproportion to other white ethnics, and despite the fact it was in the 1970s that New York finally elected Jews as mayors (Abraham Beame in 1973, and Ed Koch in 1977). Amid the glitter of Broadway and the clamor and din of Wall Street, Jewish talent and Jewish dealmakers seemed to ride the storm. But the community that had produced them was already in decline, its passion for civic culture blunted, its self-assertiveness more strident because more defensive. Ascendancy in politics accompanied a sense of transiency in reality. This paradox is also reflected in the physical symbolism of the city, to which we turn in conclusion.

A City With a Jewish Shrine

The possibility of perceiving an entire city as a "Jewish space," a place that could send utopian shivers through poets' souls—even if the concept shaped only one generation—hinges in part on physical representations of the Jewish presence. As I hinted earlier, this is primarily a symbolic matter and is related to the question of monuments or landmarks. For the most part, American ethnic groups are well represented by such physical symbols (although that is not the case for Jews, by and large):

> In New York City parks there are statues of Beethoven, Simon Bolivar, Robert Burns, Columbus, Garibaldi, Goethe, Dante, Don Quixote, Albert Bertel Thorvaldsen (the Danish sculptor), Verdi and Giovanni da Verrazano. . . . Virtually every city has similar statues, each a small monument to the efforts of immigrant communities to achieve recognition.[50]

One of the signs that New York could occupy a special place in the Jewish imagination is that, like very few places in the world, New York offered its Jewish inhabitants a local "sacred" spot. This in itself would place New York in a select category of Jewish places. (One thinks immediately of Jerusalem, of course; Uman in Ukraine, site of pilgrimage to the grave of Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav, comes to mind as well.)

New York Jews may not have a Western Wall, but they do have the Statue of Liberty. This shrine is not theirs alone, but it is definitely theirs, if only because they have no other American shrine.

John Higham, in an elegant essay, once described the process by which this monument, originally dedicated to American independence and the republican ideal, was adopted and transformed by the immigrant masses of America into a shrine memorializing their own saga.[51] Even Ellis Island, restored in recent years and reopened as a national park and museum of American immigration, has done little to detract from Miss Liberty's central symbolic role as the visual emodiment of "the golden door."

The Statue is indeed the possession of all Americans, but I wish to extend Higham's argument by noting the special affection for the "mother of exiles" that exists in the Jewish community. It was, after all, a Jewish poet whose words were chosen to grace the monument in New York harbor (years after they were written, and long forgotten, as Higham has reminded us), because those words best articulated the creed of an immigrant-built America. In the customary "American way," Jews are proud to have their "share" of the Statue become a part of the sacred common symbolism of the United States.

Apart from this "family" link between Jews and Miss Liberty, via Emma Lazarus, the Sephardic poet, the Statue functions for the Jews of New York (and by extension, the Jews of America) in a way that no other monument on American soil does. It is the Jews' only physical anchor in the history of their country. No Jewish associations are summoned up by Bunker Hill, the Alamo or the fields of Gettysburg. New York's Catholics have St. Patrick's Cathedral; Jews in New York have no central synagogue. (Temple Emanu-El never functioned for New York Jewry as that kind of symbol, its Fifth Avenue location notwithstanding, because it has always been only a sectarian, Reform Jewish congregation—one among many—not a common Jewish "cathedral.") New York's Chinese, though so many live in Queens today, still have Chinatown; the Jews no longer "have" the Lower East Side in quite the same way.

If Jews turn to any site as a symbolic confirmation of their city's role in the American Jewish saga, it is certainly to the crowned statue in the harbor, lifting its torch and facing the Manhattan skyline. Unrivalled in the Jewish American imagination, therefore, Miss Liberty alone stands in Jewish minds for what America has been for Jews and what Jews have become in America.

It is typical that in 1961, when Yeshiva University celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary, the special advertising supplement published in honor of the event in the *New York Times Magazine* was entitled "Yearning to Breathe Free," the phrase, of course, drawn from the Lazarus inscription. The magazine cover bore a page-length photograph of the Statue of Liberty, while smaller illustrations compared "huddled masses" in steerage with their proud descendants: college graduates at a commencement exercise. The Orthodox university's Jewish studies school (the Etz Chaim Yeshiva) and Miss Liberty were both inaugurated in 1886. By 1961, the university, with its various undergraduate and graduate divisions and its five thousand students, was, according to the commemorative supplement, an "example of the ultimate realization of [the] dream" represented by "the great Lady."[52]

More recently, the point was clearly not lost, either, on the designers of the new Museum of Jewish Heritage—A Living Memorial to the Holocaust, located in

Battery Park City, just across the harbor from Liberty Island. One enters the museum on the ground floor, where the exhibits illustrate Jewish life in Europe before the Holocaust. Proceeding up to the second floor, one encounters the display cases and accompanying documentation that summarize the destruction of European Jewry. One then continues up to the third floor, where the reconstruction of Jewish life after the war is showcased—the main emphasis being given to the State of Israel and American Jewry.

At this point, having reached the end of the exhibit area, one is confronted with a symbolic, culminating sight: From the small foyer on the third floor where one awaits the elevator to leave the museum, the visitor looks through windows (the only windows thus far encountered) directly at the Statue of Liberty, as if it, too, were in a glass display case, epitomizing the Jewish rebirth. It becomes, in this way, the coda for the entire epic and, in this sense, once again, the Statue is identified as a symbol with specific Jewish resonance.

The distinction ought to be noted, however, between the shrine that Jews identify with and the sort of site that other groups possess. St. Patrick's, for example, expresses the power and the glory of God and the Roman Catholic Church; but it surely also represents the in-dwelling presence of the Church's faithful within the city. The cathedral is the seat of a great archdiocese, its arms and institutions reaching into every corner of the city. It is, therefore, a powerful statement of "here-ness": we are here, this is what we have built.

The Jews have identified, instead, with a symbol that captures the moment of their arrival at the gates of the city. It is not inside the city but only its threshhold. In effect, Jews are fated to celebrate (and commend to others' notice) merely the fact of their coming, rather than any concrete act, achievement or ongoing presence. Caught, as it were forever, in the act of immigration, the Jews have no other tangible connection to the city that became their undisputed world center, other than themselves. If they leave, they leave very little trace behind them. Their arrivals are full of hope and imagination—a moment to be remembered and celebrated—but their presence in the city is conveyed in more ambivalent tones. It is conditional and transient: an "urban experience" that can be passed over in retrospective regret almost as much as it can be affirmed in positive terms.

This, perhaps, is a fitting testament to the vulnerability of the urban utopias that animated the Jews in their moments of greatest identification with their city.

Notes

This essay is based on various parts of my forthcoming book *New York Jews, 1950–1970*, to be published by Syracuse University Press.

1. See esp. Daniel Soyer, *Jewish Immigrant Associations and American Identity in New York, 1880–1939* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1997); Hannah Kliger (ed.), *Jewish Hometown Associations and Family Circles in New York: The W.P.A. Yiddish Writers' Group Study* (Bloomington: 1992); Michael Weisser, *A Brotherhood of Memory: Jewish Landsmanshaftn in the New World* (New York: 1985).

2. See Steven J. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History, 1794–1881* (Stanford: 1985); David E. Fishman, *Russia's First Modern Jews: The Jews of Shklov* (New

York and London: 1995); Gershon David Hundert, *The Jews in a Polish Private Town: The Case of Opatów in the Eighteenth Century* (Baltimore: 1992); Marsha Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867–1914: Assimilation and Identity* (Albany: 1983); Paula E. Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace: Acculturation and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven: 1991); Ewa Morawska, *Insecure Prosperity: Small-Town Jews in Industrial America, 1890–1940* (Princeton: 1996); Deborah Dash Moore, *At Home in America: Second Generation New York Jews* (New York: 1981); *idem*, *To the Golden Cities: Pursuing the American Jewish Dream in Miami and L.A.* (New York: 1994); Steven Hertzberg, *Strangers Within the Gate City: The Jews of Atlanta, 1845–1915* (Philadelphia: 1978).

3. Isaac Bashevis Singer, quoted in *Jewish Existence in an Open Society*, ed. Baruch Cohon (Los Angeles: 1970), 93.

4. On the selectivity that operated in the construction of the image of the Jewish shtetl, see Dan Miron, *Der imazh fun shtetl: dray literarishe shtudyes* (Tel-Aviv: 1981), 21–138.

5. Isaac Metzker (ed.), *A Bintel Brief* (New York: 1972), 129.

6. A partial list would include Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism* (Chicago: 1957), 116–117; Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto* (Chicago: 1928); Irving Howe, *A Margin of Hope: An Intellectual Autobiography* (New York: 1982); Norman Podhoretz, *Making It* (New York: 1967); Henry Roth, *Call It Sleep* (New York: 1934); Kate Simon, *Bronx Primitive: Portraits in a Childhood* (New York: 1982); Alfred Kazin, *A Walker in the City* (New York: 1951); Gerald Sorin, *The Nurturing Neighborhood: The Brownsville Boys Club and Jewish Community in Urban America, 1940–1990* (New York: 1990); Alter Landesman, *Brownsville: The Birth, Development, and Passing of a Jewish Neighborhood in New York* (New York: 1969); Ira Berkow, *Maxwell Street* (Garden City: 1977); Egon Mayer, *From Suburb to Shtetl: The Jews of Boro Park* (Philadelphia: 1979); E.L. Doctorow, *World's Fair* (New York: 1985); Deborah Dash Moore, *At Home in America*; Milton Hindus, *The Old East Side* (Philadelphia: 1969).

7. Moses Rischin, *The Promised City: New York's Jews, 1870–1914* (New York: 1962; rpt. 1970).

8. Singer, in Cohon (ed.), *Jewish Existence in an Open Society*, 92–93.

9. Irving Howe, "The Lower East Side, Symbol and Fact," in *The Lower East Side: Portal to American Life (1870–1924)*, ed. Allon Schoener (New York: 1966), 12–13.

10. Alfred Kazin, *New York Jew* (New York:1978), 280–282..

11. Isaac Bashevis Singer, quoted in *Creators and Disturbers*, ed. Bernard Rosenberg and Ernest Goldstein (New York: 1982), 29.

12. David T. Bazelon, "A Writer Between Generations," *Commentary* (Feb. 1969), 43–44.

13. Daniel Bell, "The Three Faces of New York," *Dissent* (Summer 1961), 226.

14. Hans Morgenthau, quoted in Rosenberg and Goldstein (eds.), *Creators and Disturbers*, 82.

15. Midge Decter, quoted in *ibid*., 351, 359.

16. Michael Wood, "What Did You Want From the Jews?" *New Society*, 12 May 1966, 9.

17. Judd Teller, "Nyu-york durkhn yidishn gemit" ("New York in a Jewish Mood"), in *American Yiddish Poetry*, ed. and trans. Benjamin Harshav and Barbara Harshav (Berkeley: 1986), 587. © 1986 by the Regents of the University of California. Reprinted by permission of University of California Press.

18. Carl Sandburg, "Chicago," in his *Complete Poems* (New York: 1950).

19. Martin Shefter, "New York's National and International Influence," in his *Capital of the American Century* (New York: 1993), 17.

20. Lionel Abel, "New York City: A Remembrance," *Dissent* (Summer 1961), 251.

21. Robert Warshow, "Poet of the Jewish Middle Class," *Commentary*, May 1946, 17–18.

22. Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," in *Classic Essays on the Culture of Cities*, ed. Richard Sennett (Englewood Cliffs: 1969), 141; reprinted from the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 33 (1928).

23. Sam Welles, "The Jewish *Élan*," *Fortune Magazine* (Feb. 1960), 134.

24. Anatole Broyard, *Kafka Was the Rage: A Greenwich Village Memoir* (New York: 1993), 94–95.

25. Kazin, *A Walker in the City*; *idem*, *New York Jew*; Howe, *Margin of Hope*; Podhoretz, *Making It*.

26. Mary Cantwell, *Manhattan, When I Was Young* (Boston: 1995), 58.

27. Ellen Kellman, "Sholem Aleichem's Funeral (New York, 1916): The Making of a National Pageant," *YIVO Annual*, vol. 20 (1991), 289–290; and Arthur Aryeh Goren, "Pageants of Sorrow, Celebration and Protest: The Public Culture of American Jews," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 12, *Literary Strategies: Jewish Texts and Contexts*, ed. Ezra Mendelsohn (New York: 1996), 202–218.

28. Morris Horowitz and Lawrence J. Kaplan, *The Jewish Population of the New York Area, 1900–1975* (New York: 1959), 14–16.

29. *Ibid*., 22.

30. Bernard Lazerwitz, "Jews In and Out of New York City," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 3, no. 2 (1961), 257; Harry Golden, *The Greatest Jewish City in the World*, 38, 153.

31. Dan Wakefield, *New York in the Fifties* (Boston: 1992), 197.

32. See Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge: 1963), 146; Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) *Daily News Bulletin*, vol. 27 (1960), 13 Jan. (p. 4), 26 April (p. 3), 2 May (p. 4).

33. Shimon Ginsburg, "Nyu-york," in *Antologiah shel hashirah ha'ivrit beamerikah*, ed. Menahem Ribalow (New York: 1938), 163–166. Translation by E.L.

34. H. Leyvik, "Do voynt dos yidishe folk," *Ale verk*, vol. 1, *Lider* (New York: 1940); translated in Harshav and Harshav, *American Yiddish Poetry*, 697. Reprinted by permission of University of California Press.

35. Fred J. Cook and Gene Gleason, "The Shame of New York," *The Nation* (special issue) 31 Oct. 1959 (p. 261); cf. Leonard Wallock, "New York City: Capital of the Twentieth Century," in *New York: Culture Capital of the World* ed. Leonard Wallock (New York: 1988), 40–42; *New York Times*, 1 June 1959 (pp. 1, 16) and 19 Oct. (pp. 1, 24); *Newsweek* 27 July 1959 (pp. 29–31).

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37. Raymond Vernon, *Metropolis 1985* (Cambridge: 1960), 88ff, 135, and ch. 9 generally; Carl N. Degler, *Affluence and Anxiety: 1945–Present* (Glenview, IL: 1968), 186. For the detailed report of the research on which the Vernon book is based, see also Edgar M. Hoover and Raymond Vernon, *Anatomy of a Metropolis: The Changing Distribution of People and Jobs Within the New York Metropolitan Region* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1959); John Charles Boger and Judith Welch Wegner (eds.), *Race, Poverty, and American Cities* (Chapel Hill: 1996), 104.

38. Harold X. Connolly, *A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn* (New York: 1977), 129–130; Kantrowitz, *Ethnic and Racial Segregation*, esp. chap. 1, chap. 5; data cited on 65ff.

39. Degler, *Affluence and Anxiety*, 191.

40. Irving Kristol (1966), quoted in Peter K. Eisinger, *The Politics of Displacement: Racial and Ethnic Transition in Three American Cities* (New York: 1980), 11.

41. Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 57; Seymour Martin Lipset, quoted in American Jewish Committee, *Group Life in America* (New York: 1972), 52.

42. Marshall Sklare, "Jews, Ethnics, and the American City," *Commentary* (April 1972), 70–77; reprinted in *idem*, *Observing America's Jews* (Hanover, New Hampshire and London: 1993), 131–137.

43. Horowitz and Kaplan, *The Jewish Population of the New York Area*, 108–109, 154–155, 184–185, 238–239.

44. Hoover and Vernon, *Anatomy of a Metropolis*, 13, 84. In the 1950s, more than 80 percent of workers lived inside the same "zone" of the metropolitan area in which they worked (the five boroughs constitute one zone, followed by the "inner ring" of suburbs and finally an "outer ring").

45. John Hull Mollenkopf, "The Postindustrial Transformation of the Political Order in New York City," in *Power, Culture, and Place: Essays on New York City*, ed. John Hull Mollenkopf (New York: 1988), 228, 235–236, 255–256.

46. Louis Harris and Bert E. Swanson, *Black-Jewish Relations in New York City* (New York: 1970), 21, 25.
47. Irving Howe, "New York in the Thirties: Some Fragments of Memory," *Dissent* (Summer 1961), 241–242.
48. Marshall Berman, "Ruins and Reforms: New York Yesterday and Today," *Dissent* (Fall 1987), 423.
49. Jim Sleeper, "Boodling, Bigotry, and Cosmopolitanism: The Transformation of a Civic Culture," *ibid.*, 413.
50. R. A. Burchell and Eric Homburger, "The Immigrant Experience," in *Introduction to American Studies*, 2nd ed., ed. Malcolm Bradbury and Howard Temperley (London: 1989), 166.
51. See John Higham, "The Transformation of the Statue of Liberty," in his *Send These To Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America* (New York: 1975), 78–87.
52. The *New York Times*, 10 Sept., 1961, Section 11 (cover and p. 5).

East or West? Tel-Aviv in the 1920s and 1930s

Anat Helman
(the hebrew university)

In 1934, the municipality of Tel-Aviv sponsored a "Levant" industrial fair. Among the participants was the Federation of British Industry, one of whose members sent back a highly complimentary report of the event. "The crowds on the whole were intelligent," he noted with approval, and went on to praise the generally splendid organization of the fair. Its success, he concluded, might well lie in the "definitely Western atmosphere of Tel-Aviv, through which the East is just apparent as a faint palimpsest."[1]

Was this true? Was Tel-Aviv, the "first Hebrew city," also, by 1934, a Western city? Not entirely. The British observer was undoubtedly influenced by the setting of an industrial fair, a thoroughly Western undertaking.[2] Other accounts of the time, however, offer a different perspective. For instance, Meir Dizengoff, Tel-Aviv's mayor, noted in the same year that "the public in Tel-Aviv is composed of different people, each bringing their country's education, and we need some time for all these elements to adjust and blend in our melting pot."[3] At about the same time, a member of the opposing Labor faction warned that Tel-Aviv was in danger of deteriorating into a city "with a glimmering facade of pseudo-Europeanism, yet hollow and corrupt in its sociocultural interior."[4]

Tel-Aviv of 1934 was still a city in flux, one that had evolved considerably from its founders' vision of a serene garden suburb adjoining the noisy and overcrowded Jaffa. Most of its population was European in origin—but were East Europeans to be considered "Western"? And what of Tel-Aviv's location in the heart of the Middle East—was this indeed felt only as a "faint palimpsest"? It may be more accurate to say that Tel-Aviv in the formative years of its growth was influenced by three different urban models, Western, East European and Levantine. During the 1920s and 1930s, these models coexisted and competed with each other, as the one-time suburb grew and was gradually transformed into a real city.

Tel-Aviv traces its official founding to 1909, when sixty parcels of land northeast of Jaffa, known as "Ahuzat Bayit," were assigned by lottery for the purpose of constructing one-story houses. Most of the founders of Ahuzat Bayit were East European Jews,

a majority of them newcomers and some of them longtime residents of Jaffa. Their goal was the creation of an exclusively Jewish settlement adjoining the predominantly Arab city, which in 1906 had a Jewish population of eight thousand out of a total population of forty-seven thousand. Ahuzat Bayit was modeled along the lines of the "garden city" concept, which envisioned a strict separation of industrial and residential areas and wide swatches of open spaces. It was to have no commercial operations; instead, it was conceived as a Jewish bedroom community for those who worked in Jaffa.[5]

Renamed Tel-Aviv in 1910 (the title of Nahum Sokolov's translation of Herzl's *Altneuland*), the original neighborhood gradually expanded. In 1921—its population swelled by immigrants of the Third Aliyah—Tel-Aviv lifted its ban on commercial establishments. That same year, it was granted town council status, allowing for a measure of administrative and judicial autonomy, and its first commercial center was opened, symbolizing a radical departure from the original garden city ideal.[6] In the years that followed, Tel-Aviv became a thriving commercial town. Whereas in 1919 there were about two thousand residents in Tel-Aviv, by 1925, its population had increased to thirty-four thousand, and by 1939 the population had leaped to one hundred sixty thousand, far outstripping that of Jaffa.[7]

Although proudly dubbed the "first Hebrew city," Tel-Aviv's development was never given priority on the Zionist agenda. Zionist ideology instead stressed the importance of agricultural settlements, which were considered crucial both for the creation of a Jewish territorial basis in the land and as a means of transforming the Jewish people into "normal" manual workers.[8] Notwithstanding, most Jews chose to live in towns and to work in commerce or manufacturing. During the 1920s and 1930s, about four-fifths of the Jewish population in Palestine lived in urban settlements.[9] Despite the continuing ideological dominance of the rural sector, the reality in Palestine—as in Europe—was that Jews were overwhelmingly urban.[10] Thus, while Zionist organizations tended to ignore urban and related planning issues, private investors were active in the development of Tel-Aviv and other urban settlements in the Yishuv.

True, an urban Zionist ideology did exist, mostly formulated by members of nonlabor factions such as the General Zionists, but it was overshadowed by the continuing stress on rural development. Like other aspects of Zionist ideology, it too contained elements of the utopian. In the case of Tel-Aviv, the dream was to create a modern, self-sufficient city, as far removed as possible from the "Old Country" of Eastern Europe. The key word—in a negative sense—was *galut*, the culture of the diaspora. Specifically, galut referred not to diaspora culture in general, but to the Jewish lifestyle of Eastern Europe. The shtetl was galut, characterized by noise, disorder, ugliness, provinciality and old-fashioned Orthodoxy. Tel-Aviv was to represent the new Jewish ideal, which in turn was based on a concept of modernity that was clearly *West* European in nature. Thus, the equation "galut = East European culture = backwardness" was to be replaced by "Europe = Western and Central Europe (and, by extension, America) = modernity." The matter, however, was a bit more complicated, even beyond the fact that such equations were clearly based on simplification and stereotypes. For there was a third important element—Middle Eastern—to consider.

Zionist attitudes toward the "Levant" were ambivalent. That Palestine was in the East was a basic fact that could not be ignored. Moreover, unlike the British rulers of Mandatory Palestine, the Jews had chosen Palestine—the birthplace of the Jewish

people—as a home, not merely as a place to govern. Yet reality soon intruded. The East, like Eastern Europe, was denounced for its noise and squalor, disorder, technological backwardness, indolence and negligence—and condemned as well for what was perceived to be its inherent corruption and lack of civilization. With some minor exceptions, to be later described, the East was considered to be a negative influence on Tel-Aviv's development.

As the suburb turned into a town and the town into a city, Tel-Aviv's leaders and citizens most often expressed a desire for a Western city, one that would be beautiful, orderly, clean, civilized and wealthy. Moreover, Tel-Aviv was to spearhead the introduction of "modernity" into the region. A municipal memorandum of 1932, for example, describes Tel-Aviv as "the only European city among all the desolated Asian cities of our homeland."[11] An enthusiastic account of the 1920s speaks of Tel-Aviv as being "all flooded with lights"; its automobiles "rush along the roads," whereas "beyond the gates of Tel-Aviv, a dark night embraces the land of ancient Araby. . . ."[12] Aharon Zeev Ben-Yishai, who frequently served as a spokesperson for the municipality, praised the city's beauty in 1921, claiming that "there is a basis even to the saying that this Tel-Aviv will become . . . Asia's Paris."[13]

Such colonial pretensions were only rarely moderated by a critique of the less appealing traits of the West, such as its excessive permissiveness. For there were limits: immodest swimming suits were regarded as a negative, unpleasant Western fashion inflicted on "thousands of women."[14] Nor was the sea shore the only site of immodesty. One irate citizen wrote to Mayor Dizengoff that he had been to many European cities, but had never seen such a thing—"A girl strolling in shorts and with a cigarette in her mouth."[15] In this matter, Tel-Aviv seemed to have gone beyond the permissiveness even of "European cities."

The idealized view of Western modernity also suffered a blow with the arrival of flesh and blood Westerners—namely, the German and Austrian Jews who comprised about 20 percent of the Fifth Aliyah of the 1930s.[16] Their cultural absorption into the Yishuv was not easy. Many of their Western traits were slighted and even attacked, particularly those that did not fit in with the positive Western model. The celebration of Christmas and "Sylvester" (New Year's Eve), for example, was roundly condemned as "apes' mimicry of their former neighbors."[17] Even desirable traits such as politeness, order and aesthetic precision could be resented by the veterans. The *yekes*, as the German-speakers were known, did not conform to the standard role of humble, timid newcomers; many viewed themselves as culturally superior and were not overjoyed by the prospect of assimilating into an East European/Middle Eastern milieu.[18] As Hugo Hermann, who came to Palestine from Austria during the Third Aliyah, explained, "even when they are helpless and weak, they behave like confident rulers and demand that others adjust to their habits."[19]

Admiration of the West, it seems, was easier at a distance. Faced with "real" Westerners, the East Europeans often reacted harshly, even though their own ideology depicted the West as a preferred alternative to "galut" culture. One explanation for this seeming contradiction is that East European Jews tended to define themselves as "European," meaning modern and progressive. They drew a distinction between the shtetl (which they repudiated) and the wider cultural context of the homeland they had left behind.[20]

Following a visit to Tel-Aviv in 1932, a resident of Haifa sent some comments to the Tel-Aviv municipality. Although Tel-Aviv had pretensions of being ultramodern, he wrote, its provinciality was felt in every corner. The stores, for instance, looked exactly like those of a typical shtetl, having "no European form or taste."[21] This is exactly what Tel-Aviv's leaders dreaded to hear. In a letter of 1930 written to the head of the mail and telephone office in Jerusalem, Dizengoff demanded that nightly telephone and telegraph service be made available in Tel-Aviv's main post office. "I believe the time is past," he wrote indignantly, "for Tel-Aviv to be regarded as a shtetl whose residents go to sleep at 8 o'clock in the evening and take no interest in the external world."[22]

Notwithstanding the desire to create a Hebrew city totally divorced from the galut, the fact was that most Tel-Aviv residents were East European in origin. In 1925, about 69 percent of the population had come from Russia and 28 percent had come from Poland.[23] Immigrants of the Fourth Aliyah (1924–1928)—half of whom settled in Tel-Aviv—came overwhelmingly from Poland and Russia (50 percent and 20 percent, respectively).[24] Even newcomers of the Fifth Aliyah, with its large component of Germans and Central Europeans, were mostly from Eastern Europe (60 percent).[25] No wonder there was a clash between the lofty goals of Tel-Aviv's leaders and the economic and cultural facts being created on its streets. As early as 1924, an article in the left-wing *Hapoel haẓa'ir* decried Tel-Aviv's growing commercialization, its "exact reflection of the livelihoods held by our people in Russia and other East European countries." Artisans and peddlers ("the lofty occupations of the diaspora," as the writer sarcastically termed them) were increasing in numbers, and the city originally planned to be a garden community was now packed with shops.[26]

In later years, it became common practice to blame Polish immigrants of the Fourth Aliyah—some twenty thousand of whom had settled in Tel-Aviv—for Tel-Aviv's increasingly "galut" character. Hugo Hermann, for example, wrote in exasperation: "If only they had brought with them the fashion of Rue de la Paix or Regent Street or even the German coffee houses . . . but instead they brought Dzika and Nalewski streets. . . ."[27] The hierarchy posed here is a kind of European tour from west to east: from Western Europe (worthy) to Central Europe (bearable) to Eastern Europe (galut).

The old country was not always viewed negatively, however. For some, those very traits of Tel-Aviv that resembled galut served as a kind of link between old and new, a "bridge connecting European Jewry with the Jewry of Eretz Israel," a maintaining of the city's Jewish character.[28] Known as a center of secularism, Tel-Aviv nonetheless had many traditionally observant residents. Moreover, when Yom Kippur came around, synagogues were packed (on an average Sabbath, only about 70–80 percent of the seats were taken) and prayer services were held in every available hall.[29] "Those who sing the Internationale all year," as one religious commentator noted, were among those who were drawn to the synagogue at least once a year.[30]

In his highly complementary article of 1921, Ben-Yishai wrote: "Some say: Tel-Aviv's goal is to put the beauty of Europe into the Asian tent. And some say: its goal is to glorify the Oriental civilization and to properly formulate the abandoned Oriental beauty. . . ."[31] From his article, it is clear that it was the European immigrants who were to "properly formulate" Tel-Aviv's Oriental charm.

As previously noted, the Jewish immigrants had brought with them a European image of the magical East, which seldom fit the reality in Palestine. In this romantic view, the Arab was regarded as the link between the present and the ancient Jew of Eretz Israel. In the work of Jewish artists during the 1920s, Palestine's landscapes and its Arab population were a dominant theme, and paintings depicted these "exotic" subjects in a naive, primitivistic style.[32] Nonetheless, whereas the charms of the Orient were considered good enough as decoration, no one seriously considered adopting the Arab way of life or the Arab standards of living. This distinction is nicely reflected in the world of fashion: only a few bohemians "went native" and occasionally wore Arab garments, and when Jewish fashion designers of the 1930s attempted to create an original local dress, they used a simple Western-style pattern merely decorated on the hem with Eastern embroidery.[33]

Even this aesthetic fascination wore off during the 1930s, as relations with the Arabs deteriorated. The violent clashes of 1929 and the Arab revolt of 1936–1939 may have contributed to the already growing influence of Western modernism. During this time, more and more artists went to study in Paris, and a new style emerged as a reaction to the primitive style of the early 1920s. German Expressionism was introduced by German immigrants, while French Expressionism reigned among such Tel-Aviv artists as Arie Aroch and Yisrael Paldi. The modern artistic trends that began to be felt in the mid-1920s gathered strength during the following decade.[34] The change was lamented in an article written in 1935. A few years before, Eliyahu Newman wrote, he had been favorably impressed by a group of artists who were capturing the local landscape in their primitive paintings; but now, after visiting Paris, they had abandoned their local colors and were filling their canvases with gray Parisian gloom.[35]

A common means of praising Tel-Aviv's modernity was to compare it to neighboring Jaffa: "One emerges from the poverty and dirt of the old city into what seems like a metropolis—this city of fine buildings, long straight streets, beautiful gardens and well-dressed, prosperous and happy people. . . ."[36] Certainly, when Tel-Aviv was founded near Jaffa, it emphasized the new, the young and the dynamic, and its look and lifestyle contrasted with those of Jaffa and other older cities of Palestine.[37] The description of Tel-Aviv as "a small and single corner of 'Europe' in the Asian city of filthy Jaffa"[38] was meant both to establish an aesthetic colonial hierarchy and further legitimize Zionist settlement of the Arab-populated country.

Indeed, as the political relationship with the Arabs deteriorated and as the modern style grew more dominant, the "Levantine city" emerged as the ultimate negative model. Hayim Nahman Bialik, for example, warned that Tel-Aviv's geographical position alongside Jaffa posed the threat of its turning into a typical Levantine city.[39] Dizengoff complained in 1935 that as the city grew it became ever wilder, its virtues as a modest and quiet town being overpowered by the flaws of a "typical Levantine city." Dizengoff was not speaking merely in aesthetic terms. He was also attacking the cultural patterns of a young and reckless generation who lacked discipline and respect for leaders: "Even those from the former generation, students of European culture, sometimes feel as if in this new homeland they are exempt from basic interpersonal behavior, about which they were so pedantic while living in the diaspora among Gentiles."[40] The "Wild East," in other words, was even worse than the diaspora.

So far, the "Levant" has been identified with the Arab population. But what of the

Oriental Jews—Yemenites, immigrants from Asian and African countries and the Sephardim of the Old Yishuv?

Generally speaking, European Jews also regarded Oriental Jews as part of the inferior surrounding culture, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree. During the 1920s and 1930s, the minority of Oriental Jews in Tel-Aviv lived mainly in the old Jewish neighborhoods in the south, which had been built on Jaffa's borders and incorporated into the township during the early 1920s. The majority of European Jews lived in the city's center and in the new neighborhoods spreading north and eastward. The south was a twilight zone, a sometimes violent border between Tel-Aviv and Jaffa. When Oriental Jews began to move northwards in the late 1930s, mainly because of the threat of Arab violence, they were not always welcomed by their European co-religionists; the smell of *shashlik* (skewered meat) gave the Europeans headaches, Oriental songs sounded like "coarse screams" and Eastern coffeehouses, with their Arabic-speaking clients and games of chance, "ruined their streets."[41]

Only rarely was the spirit of the East conjured as a positive example, as in the context of deploring Western permissiveness. Traditions of the Orient were often invoked as worthy of consideration when people were asked to dress or behave modestly.[42] In sum, however, the East (after the Europeans' short flirt with Oriental exoticism) mainly stood for undesired urban traits, although the influence of non-European Jews was nonetheless felt in such areas as food, artifacts and especially music, where Oriental motifs were often introduced into folk songs and classical works.[43] Eastern influences on Tel-Aviv—and on Israel generally—increased in importance only in the 1950s, with the large-scale immigration of Jews from Asia and North Africa.

Let us turn to the issue of Tel-Aviv's physical structures and overall appearance.

Like it or not, Tel-Aviv was located in the Middle East—a geographical fact that dictated its basic colors and textures: its sea, yellow sands, strong light and bright blue sky. Tel-Aviv's climate (hot, humid summers and mild winters) was also un-European. As a brand-new city, its physical structures lacked the lived-in look of European buildings. Even the most dedicated efforts could not have transformed Tel-Aviv into a totally European-looking city.

During the course of the 1920s and 1930s, Tel-Aviv's appearance changed not only as a result of growth, but also through the influence of varying architectural styles. During the 1920s, the "eclectic" style predominated. This style, popular in Europe during the nineteenth century and through the beginning of the twentieth, translated into a collection of historic styles. In the case of Tel-Aviv, eclectic architecture can be seen as a search for a national style. There were two main variants: Eastern and European. Those adopting a more "Eastern" look used Islamic or "biblical" elements such as pointed arches, horseshoe shapes, small towers and ceramic ornamentation. The Herzliyah Gymnasium, Tel-Aviv's first public building, is a striking early example of this style; Hayim Nahman Bialik's home, designed by Yosef Manor and built in 1924, is another. This style became less popular in the late 1920s when a more Western form of eclecticism took over, featuring neo-classical, East European, Renaissance and Baroque elements. Many of the prominent architects of the 1920s—Yehuda Medidovitch, Yosef Berlin, Alexander Levi—were Jews who had been born and educated in Eastern Europe.[44]

Tel-Aviv's architecture changed radically in the 1930s, when the eclectic style lost

ground to the modernistic "international" style, characterized by a lack of ornamentation, functionalism, smooth surfaces, straight lines and angles. Many architects who went to study in Central or Western Europe, such as Aryeh Sharon and Zeev Rechter, either immigrated or returned to Palestine in the early 1930s, most settling in Tel-Aviv.[45] These architects brought back firsthand reports of the famed Le Corbusier, who advocated a stark geometric style to depict the spirit of modernity.[46] Adapted to Palestine's climate in various ways (for example, balconies were added), the international style swept Tel-Aviv at a time when its population was swelling and the city was experiencing an economic and building boom, aided by considerable improvements in construction technologies and standards.

Whereas the Eastern variant of eclecticism attempted to incorporate elements of the Orient into Tel-Aviv's buildings, many of the structures built during the 1930s were unequivocally European in style. However, some of the Arab elite in Jaffa and elsewhere were influenced by the international style, which in "its flatness seems to fit in with the Arab architecture of the countryside."[47] Indeed, the square shapes of the international style, its straight roofs and functional simplicity, are similar to parallel elements in Arab architecture, albeit stemming from a different ideology. Ironically, the international style was closer in style to authentic Arab buildings than was the pseudo-Eastern architecture of the Jews.

The plurality of elements that was characteristic of the eclectic style was the focus of criticism even in the 1920s. Two German-born reporters, for example, describe Tel-Aviv as a tasteless modern city: "One or two streets are architecturally flawless, but some streets are unbearably ugly. The new houses, shining in their freshness, look as if they have just descended and settled here before getting to know each other."[48] A major aim of the international style was to provide order and unity. Whereas houses built in Tel-Aviv during the 1920s were red, pink, ochre, green and blue, those built in the 1930s were mostly white.[49] Such uniformity also led to criticism. Among the written reports of the period are those of a British visitor, who remarked that the modern, white buildings gave "the impression of great monotony and flatness," even though they were undoubtedly in keeping with Tel-Aviv's geography and hot climate.[50] Another visitor approved of the new style, since it had stabilized itself "on European lines of modern simplicity with no intentions of embodying some Eastern traits."[51] A third writer was less complimentary. Was it really necessary, he asked, for Tel-Aviv to "imitate graceless modern Europe in the midst of this glorious Palestinian landscape?"[52] Finally, a British tourist visiting the city during this time noted that, except for their balconies, the buildings reminded him of Chicago rather than Paris. But all in all, he wrote, Tel-Aviv put him most in mind of the futuristic city depicted in Fritz Lang's *Metropolis*.[53]

The advent of the international style did not, of course, mean the elimination of eclectic-style buildings (although many of the former were gradually demolished). In 1933, a tourist observed that Tel-Aviv was a combination of different elements, reflecting the fact that Jews had come there from all over the world. But the outcome, he wrote, was not successful: "a muddle of shapes and towers and balconies and doors and colors, such as has never been brought together in one place before. Aesthetically, Tel-Aviv is a sad blunder."[54]

Contributing to the overall feeling of disorder was the fact that the city was grow-

ing rapidly. Originally intended to be a garden suburb, Tel-Aviv lacked an initial city plan. The township developed in an ad hoc manner, and when it finally began to formulate plans in the mid-1920s, these had to take into account the previous mistakes that had been made. Moreover, city plans were sometimes rendered obsolete by a sudden wave of immigration, and architectural ideals were inevitably tempered by demographic conditions and economic limitations.[55] Overcrowded housing was a problem in Tel-Aviv, as was unplanned additions to existing buildings.

Another conspicuous feature on the Tel-Aviv landscape was its numerous stores. "As if the commercial center does not suffice, all of Tel-Aviv's houses are turning into shops," a writer in *Hapoel haẓa'ir* complained in 1922.[56] During the 1920s and 1930s, Tel-Aviv became the most important hub of commerce in the Yishuv. Moving to Palestine, many immigrants transferred their commercial occupations or businesses to Tel-Aviv; others, who had failed in agriculture, came to Tel-Aviv to try their luck at commerce. As a result, by the late 1930s, retail commerce increased at a higher rate than the city's population.[57]

Municipal leaders were hard pressed to control the phenomenon. Every few years they broadened Tel-Aviv's commercial zones until all of the city's main streets were included. They also made an attempt to impose some kind of order on shop windows and signs. The art of storefront window design was introduced by immigrants from Germany in the 1930s, but even then a unified look was not achieved and the municipality continued to receive complaints about ugly signs.[58] In addition to stores, there were scores of kiosks and countless peddlers.[59] The overall effect was that of untidy diversity: a street of strictly white international-style buildings inevitably looked less modernistic once the first floor of each building turned into a bustling shop.

Tel-Aviv's vigorous and colorful trade was un-Western not only in appearance, but also in practice. Quite a few letters of complaint were sent to the municipality concerning ruthless business tactics, cheating and exploitation. Interestingly, these complaints came mainly from German Jewish immigrants and Western tourists.[60] What seemed the normal way of doing business—according to East European or Middle Eastern standards—seemed reprehensible to the Westerners.

As a result of planning problems and the ever-rising price of land, Tel-Aviv had a dearth of open spaces and parks (an irony, considering the original intentions of its founders). In addition, there was the problem of maintenance. Accounts in the city archives attest to efforts by the municipal gardener and his staff to plant trees and flower beds on an inadequate budget. According to one report prepared by the gardener, Tel-Aviv spent much less per capita on flora than did such European cities as Berlin or Vienna.[61]

An interesting dispute, with symbolic overtones, concerned a grove of sycamore trees growing on two of Tel-Aviv's main streets. The gardener wanted to uproot them and plant different trees in their stead. Agreeing with him were many shopkeepers and residents who were bothered by the dirt and by the smell of the trees' fruit (some of these people suffered from allergies). Others, however, regarded the sycamores as historically valuable relics predating the city's establishment and organized petitions in an attempt to save them. The gardener had no patience with such nostalgia: "None of the people who signed these petitions wants to live in Arab hut, but rather in a com-

fortable house. They don't ride camels; they drive cars. They don't send their wives to bring water from a well, but demand a modern water system." Eventually, a special municipal committee including physicians, agronomists, engineers and artists decided to uproot all but eight of the sycamores. In 1935, several years after the sycamore incident, this same gardener planted date trees, "which emphasize the special landscape of the East" and "may remind the residents and tourists that Tel-Aviv is not a northern city."[62] Here again, the desirable East was not necessarily the real one, but what conformed with the romantic European image.

Tel-Aviv was bustling, and it was also noisy. In part, this was a distinguishing feature of its modernity: by the end of 1934, when some 10,000 vehicles were registered in Palestine, about a third of them were to be found on Tel-Aviv's streets.[63] The transition from carts and coaches to automobiles and buses, which began in the early 1920s, was rapid, although older forms of transport (including bicycles and even camels) also continued to be used.[64] Apart from the danger of accidents and the rudeness of bus drivers (a frequent subject of complaint), motorized vehicles were an additional source of noise, compounding the cacophony produced by radios, megaphones, peddlers, newspaper and shoeshine boys, and sellers of ice-cream, soft drinks, hot dogs and corn-on-the-cob. "The shouts of the children who sell newspapers are turning the city into hell," wrote Eliezer Hoofien, director-general of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, to city leaders in 1936, urging that steps be taken so that "in the street named after Herzl in the civilized city of this land" there would no longer be "such wild screams as would have shamed the residents of Timbuktu. . . ."[65]

Finally, Tel-Aviv was notorious for its dirt. In a letter sent to the municipality, one resident observed that "an immigrant, tourist or visitor to Palestine, comparing between Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Haifa, decides that Tel-Aviv is indeed the liveliest, yet the least clean city."[66] In 1935, the municipality published new by-laws that intended to enhance the city's cleanliness. The list of "do nots" in these laws tells us much about what was actually being done: garbage and sewage were dumped in the streets; pillows and carpets were beaten; posters and handouts were distributed, hung on walls and thrown about; horses and donkeys were left tethered outside of public places; people spit on the streets and sidewalks; and factories and workshops neglected basic sanitary procedures.[67] Political graffiti, some of it vituperative, also became more common during the 1930s.[68] During the hot and humid summers, the sanitary conditions became especially problematic. For many Westerners in particular, used to immaculate streets in cities such as Vienna and Berlin, the dirt was hard to endure.

According to Hector Bolitho, an Englishman who toured Palestine in the 1930s, the different elements of Tel-Aviv "are hurled together, to make the ugliest and yet, perhaps, the most vital city I have ever seen."[69] The mixture of a Mediterranean climate, European architecture (and in the 1930s, a particularly Western style), and East European and Eastern ways of living indeed made Tel-Aviv a unique place, "both Western and Eastern city, both Jewish and cosmopolitan, both modern and primitive."[70]

Some of the contradictions of Tel-Aviv parallel those of Zionism itself. Zionism and the national revival of the Jews was based on the idea of gathering the Jewish people from all corners of the earth into Eretz Israel. A new identity was meant to

emerge, unifying the assorted cultures. The case of Tel-Aviv indicates, however, that the new creation was expected to be *Western* in character, different from the East European shtetl, and merely decorated with a few "Eastern" elements chosen selectively and approved by a European elite. The very existence of diversity, perhaps inevitable in the reality of Jewish Palestine, was viewed unfavorably as a threat that could turn the city into a "Babel" instead of being an "earthly Jerusalem."[71]

Zionism failed in its aim of turning Jews into farmers. Most Jewish immigrants instead found themselves moving or gravitating to the cities, and mainly into Tel-Aviv. Dizengoff, for his part, used to describe his city as "Zionism fulfilled."[72] Yet, like Zionism, Tel-Aviv could not possibly realize all of the utopian dreams of its founders. Real facts—demographic, geographic, economic and political—marred its "perfection." Nevertheless, like Zionism, Tel-Aviv's blend of Western aspirations, East European dominance and Levantine surroundings and influences made it a new phenomenon in Jewish history. For better or worse, this hybrid of a city was an existing fact on the shore of the Mediterranean.

Notes

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4. Y. Loffbine, "Tel-Aviv," in *Tel-Aviv veha'iriyah, behoẓaatah shel si'at hapo'alim be Tel-Aviv* (Tel-Aviv: 1935), 6.
5. See Stephen V. Ward, "The Garden City Introduced," in *The Garden City: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Steven V. Ward (London: 1992), 1–27.
6. *Haaretz*, 22 June 1921; *Yediot Tel-Aviv* 4 (1922), 19.
7. See Aryeh Yodfat, *Shishim shenot hitpaṯutah shel Tel-Aviv* (Tel-Aviv: 1969), 8–16, 43; "Tel-Aviv," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 15 (Jerusalem: 1972), 919–922.
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9. See Jacob Metzer and Oded Kaplan, *Meshek yehudi umeshek 'aravi beereẓ yisrael: toẓar, ta'asukah uẓemiḥah bitkufat hamandat* (Jerusalem: 1990), 102, 160; Ilan Troen, "Ḥamifneh betikhnun hamediniyut haẓiyonit—mehityashvut kafrit lema'arekhet 'ironit," *Yahadut zemaneinu*, vol. 5 [Jerusalem: 1989), 218–219, 221.
10. See Baruch Ben-Avram and Henry Nir, *'lyunim ba'aliyah hashelishit: dimuy umeẓiyut* (Jerusalem: 1995), 47, 51, 60–61, 67.
11. TAA, 4/3562 (1932).

12. A. Wisotzky, "Lehavah yerukah," in *'Ir hapelaot*, ed. A. Vardi (Tel-Aviv: 1929), 74.
13. Aharon Zeev Ben-Yishai, "Filiton: Tel-Aviv (shirah begeografiyah)," *Haaretz*, 10 Oct. 1921.
14. TAA, 4/3735 (1937).
15. *Ibid.*, 4/3564 (1934).
16. See Yoav Gelber, *Moledet ḥadashah: 'aliyat yehudei merkaz eiropah ukelitatam, 1933–1948* (Jerusalem: 1990), 56.
17. *'Iton meyuḥad* (2nd year), no. 61 (1938), 3.
18. See Gelber, *Moledet ḥadashah*, 610.
19. Hugo Hermann, *Ereẓ yisrael hayom: orot uẓelalim* (Tel-Aviv: 1936), 107.
20. See, for example, M.Y. Sasson in *Ha'oleh: bitonah shel hitaḥdut 'olei polin beereẓ yisrael*, nos. 1–2 (1935); Dr. J. Klausner, "Tel-Aviv: ha'iriyah," *Haaretz*, 15 April 1921; Avigdor Hameiri, "Habimah: hatḥalah ḥadasha," *Hamaḥar* 11 (1928), 15–18; *Haagudah hamusikalit beyafo: kuntres* 5, no. 2 (1922), 27; Meir Dizengoff, "'Inyanei ha'ir," *Yediyot 'ireyat Tel-Aviv* 1 (1934–1935), 5.
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23. Tel-Aviv Municipality, *Tel-Aviv leor hamisparim* (Tel-Aviv: 1926), 76–79.
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25. See Moshe Sikron, *Ha'aliyah leyisrael, 1948–1953.* (Jerusalem: 1957), 6–7.
26. *Hapo'el haẓa'ir*, 15 Aug. 1924, 6–7.
27. Hermann, *Ereẓ yisrael hayom*, 36–37.
28. See the article by A. Krolnik in Vardy (ed.), *'Ir hapelaot*, 69–70.
29. *Haẓofeh*, 24 Jan. 1938; TAA, 2/76a; *Tesha' ba'erev*, no. 84, 13 Oct. 1938.
30. *Hahed* 4/9 (1929), 6–7.
31. Ben-Yishai, *Haaretz*, 10 Aug. 1921.
32. See Binyamin Tammuz, Dorit Levitt and Gideon Ofrat, *Sipurah shel omanut yisrael* (Giv'atayim: 1980), 33–47; and Milly Heyd, "The Uses of Primitivism: Reuven Ruben in Palestine," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 6, *Art and Its Uses: The Visual Image and Modern Jewish Society*, ed. Ezra Mendelsohn and Richard I. Cohen (New York and Oxford: 1990), 43–70.
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34. See Tammuz, Levitt and Ofrat, *Sipurah shel omanut yisrael*, 53–127.
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36. E. M. Newman, *Seeing Egypt and the Holy Land* (New York: 1928), 278.
37. See Aharon Kellerman, "Cultural and Economic Characteristics of Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv," in his *Society and Settlement: Jewish Land of Israel in the Twentieth Century* (Albany: 1993), 148.
38. Boris Shatz, "Benamal Tel-Aviv," in Vardy (ed.), *'Ir hapelaot*, 57.
39. Agudat Shoḥarei Hauniversitah Ha'ivrit Beereẓ Yisrael, *Divrei Bialik 'al hauniversitah ha'ivrit* (Jerusalem: 1935), 42–43.
40. *Yediyot 'iriat Tel-Aviv*, no. 6/1 (1935), 9.
41. See complaints sent to the municipality during 1938 and 1939, TAA, 4/3642.
42. See, for example, a resident's letter to the mayor in 1936 (*ibid.*, 4/3734); and a municipal notice from 1932 (manuscript collections of the National Library, Jerusalem, file V-2128/3.
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45. *Ibid.*, 21–22.

46. See Stuart Ewen, *All Consuming Images: The Politics of Style in Contemporary Culture* (New York: 1988), 137–139.
47. Elizabeth Montgomery, *A Land Divided* (London: 1938), 87.
48. See Artur Rudent and Richard A. Berman's articles in Vardy (ed.), *'Ir hapelaot*, 66.
49. Batya Donner, "From Gymnasium to Tower," *Ariel* 77–78 (1989), 87.
50. Montgomery, *A Land Divided*, 87.
51. M. J. Landa, *Palestine as It Is* (New York: 1933), 129.
52. Edmond Fleg, *The Land of Promise* (New York: 1933), 129.
53. John Gibbons, *The Road to Nazareth* (London: 1936), 82.
54. Hector Bolitho, *Beside Galilee: A Diary in Palestine* (London: 1933), 101.
55. TAA, 9/2 (1935).
56. *Hapo'el haẓa'ir*, 22 Dec. 1922, 5.
57. See Yodfat, *Shishim shenot hitpaṯutah shel Tel-Aviv*, 45–46.
58. TAA, 4/2674 (1933, 1939).
59. *Ibid.*, 4/344–347.
60. See Gelber, *Moledet ḥadashah*, 417–418; Miriam Getter, "Ha'aliyah megermaniyah bashanim 1933–1939; klitah ḥevratit-kalkalit mul klitah ḥevratit-ḥevrutit," *Cathedra* 12 (1979), 125–147; TAA 4/3540 (1934).
61. See the gardener's letter of 19 May 1935 (TAA, 4/2645) and *ibid.*, 4/2644b.
62. On the sycamore trees, TAA 4/2654,; on the date trees, *ibid.*, 4/2645.
63. See A.B. Ben-Yishai, *Tel-Aviv* (Jerusalem: 1936).
64. Bicycles were convenient, since the land in Tel-Aviv was level. Camels, often spotted walking on the sea shore or on the roads during the 1920s, were occasionally seen in the 1930s, and horses and donkeys were still used at times.
65. On the rudeness of bus drivers, see *Haaretz*, 20 July 1934; on complaints about radios and the like, see TAA, 4/2862 (1932) and 3642 (1937); on peddlers, see *ibid.*, 2/89–91 and 4/344–347; and on cries that would shame the residents of Timbuktu, see *ibid.*, 4/335c (1936).
66. *Ibid.*, 4/1345 (1933).
67. Tel-Aviv municipality, *Ḥukei 'ezer lishmirat hanikayon* (Tel-Aviv: 1935), 7–12.
68. TAA, 4/336.
69. Bolitho, *Beside Galilee*, 101.
70. Leon Simon, "Palestine Impressions," in Vardy (ed.), *'Ir hapelaot*.
71. *Hapo'el haẓair*, 11 May 1934, 7; TAA, 4/3176 (1929).
72. TAA, 4/3220 (1933). Also see the honorary citizenship card awarded to Nahum Sokolov on 23 April 1934, Central Zionist Archives (CZA), A 18/63.

Was Urbanization Harmful to Jewish Tradition and Identity in Germany?

Steven M. Lowenstein
(university of judaism)

German Jewry has often been depicted in terms of the contrast between a core area of traditional Jewishness in small towns and an urban Jewish population that was culturally creative and prosperous but weak in Jewish identity and commitment. According to this scenario, urbanization was an important element in the overall process of "modernization" that led away from tradition and toward secularization and eventual assimilation. This picture of urbanization as a move away from Judaism was not only widespread among German Jews; it has also found favor among scholars dedicated to the study of German Jewry. The "rediscovery of rural Jewry" by historians of the German Jews of the postwar generations has reinforced the view of the village Jew as one of the prime pillars of Jewish tradition in Germany.[1]

The negative image of the urbanization process found its most pointed expression in the works of the pioneers of the sociology of German Jewry in the years just before the First World War. Both the 1911 edition of Arthur Ruppin's *Die Juden der Gegenwart* (*The Jews of Today*) and Felix Theilhaber's *Der Untergang der deutschen Juden* (*The Decline and Fall of German Jewry*), of the same year, painted a pessimistic picture of rampant and growing assimilation. The sociological process of increased secular education, prosperity and urbanization were leading to a kind of Jewish "race suicide." Ruppin, and even more so Theilhaber, viewed with alarm the increased rates of intermarriage and baptism, the decline in family size, the rise in suicide rates, the postponement of marriage and other biological damage to Jewish viability brought about by these processes. Theilhaber's book is filled with images contrasting the healthier life of the village Jews with the dangers of urbanization:

> They [rural Jewry] represent an indestructible capital of biological health and fertility, besides the fact that the village Jew carries a deeply rooted Jewishness in him and that only he is animated by Jewish spirit, Jewish customs and commandments. Mixed marriage, conversion and assimilation are things that do not touch his heart and that cannot find a place in Jewish village communities.

On the other hand, "in the cities there is a more favorable climate [for intermarriage]. Here there is greater tolerance, and devout belief is not present in the same degree as

in the countryside," because "the rural milieu gives no sustenance for conversion whereas the large city encourages assimilation."[2]

The views of Ruppin, Theilhaber and many of their colleagues had their roots in a number of factors. In many ways they reflect the influence of *völkisch* ideas in German culture that emphasized biological health and the authenticity of the countryside, while viewing urban culture with suspicion. Although such views generally did not degenerate into the doctrines of racial superiority held by some of their non-Jewish colleagues, the Jewish sociologists certainly shared some of their biological thinking and their antiurban bias. Ruppin was not only a pioneer sociologist but also a leading Zionist thinker. The celebration of the authentic and healthy rural type as against the "abnormal" and unhealthy Jewish city dweller was a frequent image of Zionist ideology in Ruppin's day as well. Ideological presuppositions about the dangers of urbanism were mixed with a careful analysis of statistical evidence in the works of Ruppin and Theilhaber to project an image of danger to Jewish survival caused by the urbanization process.

This image of Jewish tradition in Germany as rural and assimilation as urban was different from what was perceived to be true about many other Jewish communities. In many periods of Jewish history and in many countries, Judaism has been seen as a way of life peculiarly suited to urban life. The Jews were often a more urbanized population than their non-Jewish contemporaries. Cities were often centers of Jewish learning and culture to which village Jews would look for guidance. Throughout the ages, great urban centers such as Alexandria, Baghdad, Vilna, Salonica and Cairo were called by the respectful title of " 'ir vaem beyisrael" ("mother city in Israel").

In twentieth-century America, too, the great urban centers, especially New York, are seen as the focal point of traditionalism, and the smaller cities and towns away from the great centers are viewed as centers of assimilation. This image is found throughout Jewish popular culture and in much of the scholarly literature. American Jewish life, at least since the great immigration wave of 1880–1924, has often been depicted in terms of the gradual migration from the "world of our fathers," represented by the Lower East Side and similar immigrant neighborhoods, toward less dense Jewish settlements ever further from the urban core. In America, it is the move *away* from the urban centers that seems to bring with it the danger of assimilation.

It is clear that the image of urbanization held by many observers of German Jewry is different from that of many other national Jewish communities. The question to be considered here is whether there is a basis in fact for the view of urbanization in German Jewry as a move toward assimilation, in contrast with the forces in the United States and other countries. Were Ruppin and Theilhaber correct in their interpretation of the data they collected, or were they merely influenced by ideological preconceptions? Was the rural/urban contrast of a different nature in Germany than in other countries?

How Great was the Contrast Between Urban and Rural Jewry?

Whereas the increasing interest in rural German Jewry that began in the 1970s has helped to sustain the picture of a sharp dichotomy between a traditional countryside

and a more assimilated large city community, some recent studies have begun to modify the sharpness of the contrast. On the one hand, these newer accounts have shown that many small-town communities that were culturally conservative in the twentieth century had been far less traditional a century earlier. Both religious reform and political radicalism were strong forces in at least some rural Jewish communities in the 1840s, for example.[3] It was the abolition of settlement restrictions and the ensuing urbanization process that caused "progressive" individuals to leave the villages for the cities, leaving behind the more traditional population. Consequently, a number of towns that had had Liberal rabbis in the nineteenth century became bastions of Orthodoxy in the twentieth.[4]

Not only was the relative conservatism of rural Jewry less evident in earlier times than it was in the twentieth century. Recent scholarship also shows that, even in the twentieth century, not all of rural Jewry was traditional. In fact, there were wide regional differences. Small-town Jews in Lower Franconia, East Friesland and parts of Hesse were indeed deeply traditional, but religious practice in small towns in the Rhineland and Westphalia was much more rudimentary. Jacob Borut's recent study shows that many rural Jews there observed the High Holidays and life-cycle events, but no longer closed their shops on the Sabbath or kept strictly kosher homes.[5]

Until now the modification of the urban/rural dichotomy has come from a reevaluation of the rural community. The other side of the equation must also be examined. As will appear evident from the various types of data to be presented, Jewish life in urban communities was at least as heterogeneous as life in the villages. There were very wide differences in levels of intermarriage, conversion, immigration and religious observance among various Jewish communities in the large cities. Some of these differences varied regionally in ways parallel to the variation in village Jewish life. Moreover, Jewish life within each individual city was also anything but uniform. There were often great contrasts between the degree of Jewishness of residents of different urban neighborhoods or between German-born Jews and East European immigrants in the same city. Often there was only minimal contact between the members of different Jewish circles within the city. This contrasts with the more uniform nature of small-town communities, in which everyone knew everyone else.

Most of the available information on Jewish communities of various size in Germany relies on a three-fold differentiation between large cities (more than one hundred thousand inhabitants), medium-sized cities (ten thousand to one hundred thousand) and small towns (under ten thousand). In 1933, there were thirty-five cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in Prussia and perhaps fifty to sixty in all of Germany. By contemporary American standards, this classifies many cities as large that might otherwise be labeled "mid-sized." The "large cities" varied greatly in size. Of those in Prussia, seventeen had from 100,000 to 200,000 inhabitants, twelve had 200,000 to half a million and six had more than 500,000 inhabitants in 1933. Berlin, the largest city, had more than four million people.

The Jewish population of the German large cities varied even more drastically than the general population. In 1933, almost 71 percent of German Jewry lived in cities of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants, compared with a mere 30 percent of the general population.[6] Almost half of these urban Jews lived in Berlin, where the Jewish population reached its high point in 1925 (172,672). The next largest community,

Frankfurt am Main, had barely one-sixth the Jewish population of Berlin (29,385 in 1925). Frankfurt and three other Jewish communities of roughly comparable size (Breslau, Hamburg and Cologne) had a total of 88,622 Jewish inhabitants in 1925, more than the total number in the next fifteen communities! Only seven German cities (all with a population of more than half a million) had more than ten thousand Jews and only twelve had more than five thousand (see Appendix 1, Table A-1).[7] Other cities that fell into the statistical category of "large cities" were really not at all comparable to these very large communities. Some were relatively small cities with relatively large Jewish populations (such as Würzburg [2,145 out of about one hundred thousand in 1933] and Beuthen [3,148 out of 100,584]). Others were bigger cities but had tiny Jewish populations (for instance, Kiel with 522 Jews in a city of 218,335).[8] Both types of city were likely to have very different styles of Jewish life than Berlin.

There were many ways in which Jewish life differed between one German city and another apart from the variation in population size. The relative resistance of individual communities to the forces of conversion and intermarriage varied greatly. The composition of the Jewish population of the various cities also fluctuated. Urban Jewish communities contained diverse groupings: recent immigrants from Eastern Europe, native Orthodox Jews, committed Liberal Jews, Zionists, recent migrants from the countryside, old city families, Jews who were indifferent to religion, and families that were intermarried. The proportion of each group varied from place to place. There were also diverse patterns of residential cohesion in different cities, ranging from a single concentration in a rather limited geographical area to considerably more scattering. The relationship between the various factors that combined to form urban Jewish life was complex and sometimes paradoxical. A city with great residential cohesion and many Orthodox Jews could nevertheless have a very high intermarriage rate, for example.

The Jewishness of a community or its degree of assimilation is, of course, impossible to measure, but there are various ways to get an approximation of its order of magnitude. One index that is frequently used, and for which much data is available, is the proportion of defections from the community. Because membership in a religious community was compulsory and registered with the government, we have exact numbers for the size of the Jewish communities and for the number leaving them by resignation and conversion. There are also reliable figures available on intermarriage.[9]

An analysis of official statistics on intermarriage and conversion reveals a very complex pattern, but one that can be analyzed into various categories. For the early twentieth century, there is a clear and sharp distinction between urban Jewry, with a high rate of intermarriage and conversion, and small-town Jewry with a much lower rate. In 1904, for example, Jewish men in Berlin had an intermarriage rate of 19.5 percent and women had a rate of 13.3 percent. This far exceeds the rates of 3.4 percent for males and 2.5 percent for females in the largely rural Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt. In absolute numbers, there were 248 intermarriages in Berlin and only twelve in Hesse-Darmstadt.[10] The distinction did not remain so sharp, however. Both the rural and the urban rates climbed steadily over time. By the 1920s, the intermarriage rate in Hesse-Darmstadt had climbed to more than three times its earlier rate. It was still much lower than the Berlin rate, which had climbed about 50 percent, but the gap was greatly reduced (see Table A-2).

Besides the lessening of the gap over time, there were clear internal regional differences in intermarriage and conversion rates within both the urban and the rural realms. To a considerable extent, these regional patterns seem to hold throughout the period for which data is available. In 1904, intermarriage rates were particularly high in the northern and central parts of Prussia and its neighboring states, and low in the south and the west as well as in the extreme east of Germany. As late as 1939, these general regional patterns of mixed marriage were reflected in the statistics for persons of mixed ancestry in Germany (see Table A-3). Although there were a few changes in the relative rankings of the various provinces, most of the overall patterns still held.

The variation in urban rates of assimilation and conversion was almost as great as the variation in regional rates overall, and it generally paralleled the regional pattern. Most analysts who write about the overwhelming role of urbanization in furthering assimilation focus on Berlin, the mecca of the largest portion of the urbanizing population. Theilhaber stated that "Berlin is a parasite on Prussian Jewry."[11] With its vibrant and fast-moving atmosphere, the German capital attracted far more Jews than any other city. In absolute numbers, Berlin had the largest number of mixed marriages and conversions. In 1904, Berlin and its suburbs in the province of Brandenburg produced 320 (42.8 percent) of the 748 intermarriages in Germany and 185 (37.2 percent) of the 497 Protestant conversions, but only 821 (20.5 percent) of the marriages in which both partners were Jewish.

Nevertheless, Berlin was not the city with the highest *rate* of intermarriage. The port of Hamburg had a consistently higher intermarriage rate than Berlin, as did a number of smaller north-central German cities. This is noted for every year in which there are parallel statistics. The Hamburg rate ranged from 9 to 35 percent higher than that of Berlin (see Table A-4). In the smaller city of Magdeburg between 1925 and 1927, there were more intermarriages than in-marriages.[12] There were also cities whose intermarriage rate was considerably lower than that of Berlin. This is true of Frankfurt and Breslau, the second- and third-largest Jewish communities in Germany. Here the intermarriage rates were closer to one-half the rate for Berlin (see Table A-5).

All in all, there was a very wide range in the intermarriage and conversion rates in Germany's major cities. This is made clear in the May 1939 census, for which we have the most complete data. Although there are many methodological questions raised about the use of the Nazi census for that year, the statistics are quite reliable if corrected properly (see Appendix 2).

Looking at corrected statistics for 1939, we see a substantial range in intermarriage and conversion rates among German cities. A selection of the entire list is shown in Table 1. The cities at the top of the scale had indications of conversion and intermarriage rates five to ten times as high as those at the bottom. Breslau, near the middle of the scale, had approximately the same rates as Germany as a whole. Hamburg had a rate of about double the conversions and persons of mixed ancestry as did Berlin. Frankfurt and Breslau generally had between 60 and 70 percent of the rates of Berlin while Würzburg and Nuremberg had rates that were generally less than half of those of Frankfurt and Breslau. The difference between the various cities was greater than the overall difference between city and countryside.

Cities were characterized by patterns of defections from Judaism, but they also demonstrated signs of Jewish cohesion. In these patterns, too, there were wide dif-

Table 1. Urban Conversion and Intermarriage Rates as Calculated from the German Census of 1939 (see Appendix 3)

	Jewish base population (1933)[b]	Converted full Jews (1939)	Descendants of intermarriage[a] (1939)	
			Half Jews	Quarter Jews
Hamburg	16,855	1,768 (10.5%)	4,187 (24.8%)	3,143 (18.6%)
Magdeburg	1,973	89 (4.5)	330 (16.7)	233 (11.8)
Hanover	4,839	243 (5.0)	709 (14.7)	480 (9.9)
Düsseldorf	5,053	298 (5.9)	731 (14.5)	421 (8.3)
Stuttgart	3,961	231 (5.8)	519 (13.1)	271 (6.8)
Munich	9,005	533 (5.9)	1,175 (13.0)	520 (5.8)
Berlin	160,564	7,113 (4.4)	18,145 (11.3)	8,971 (5.6)
Cologne	14,816	588 (4.0)	1,541 (10.4)	819 (5.5)
Breslau	20,202	539 (2.7)	1,743 (8.6)	764 (3.8)
Leipzig	11,564	337 (3.1)	900 (7.8)	435 (3.8)
Frankfurt	26,158	683 (2.6)	1,866 (7.1)	821 (3.1)
Mannheim	6,401	154 (2.4)	339 (5.3)	156 (2.4)
Nuremberg	7,502	101 (1.3)	415 (5.5)	239 (3.2)
Würzburg	2,145	15 (0.7)	58 (2.7)	59 (2.8)

[a]The number of half Jews and quarter Jews is an indication of the number of intermarriages which had taken place in earlier generations.
[b]Jews by religion (*Glaubensjuden*) in 1933.

ferences between individual communities but certain overall trends noticeable for all German cities. Patterns of cohesion and patterns of defection were not necessarily strongly correlated to each other. Sometimes the same city could have both high rates of intermarriage and strong signs of Jewish cohesion. We will see below that Hamburg was a prime example of such a pattern.

Patterns of Jewish Density in Urban Neighborhoods

In every German city for which we have data, Jews demonstrated a noticeable tendency to congregate in certain sections of the municipality. The patterns vary from town to town in terms of both degree and whether there was one or more than one Jewish neighborhood, but all showed some cohesion. Two cities that had relatively tight residential clustering of their Jewish populations were Leipzig and Hamburg, though for contrasting reasons.

Hamburg was a city with a relatively stable Jewish population and a very small percentage of immigrants from Eastern Europe.[13] Between 1885 and 1925, the majority of Hamburg Jews migrated from the old Jewish neighborhood in the Neustadt area of downtown Hamburg to a new Jewish neighborhood a mile or two further north. This new neighborhood, centered in Rotherbaum and Harvestehude on the west side of the wide Alster River, had 53 percent of the Jewish population of Hamburg in 1925, as against only 5.6 percent of the overall population of the city. Jews accounted for more than 15 percent of the population of the two districts, compared with 1.7 percent in

the city as a whole.[14] Within these districts, there was an even greater concentration in the area called the Grindel, which surrounded the great Orthodox synagogue on Bornplatz. As early as 1900, 40 percent of Hamburg's Jews lived on just fifteen streets in the neighborhood.[15]

Leipzig's Jews were at least as tightly concentrated, but for different reasons. Unlike most German cities, the Jewish population of Leipzig was made up overwhelmingly of recent immigrants from Galicia and Russia. The percentage of foreigners among the Jews of Leipzig rose from 10 percent in 1880 to 67 percent by 1910 and about 80 percent after the First World War.[16] Jews in Leipzig remained concentrated near the original Jewish neighborhood in the center of the city, near the main railroad station. As the inner city became overwhelmingly nonresidential, the Jewish population became concentrated in the immediately bordering areas to the north and west (Innere Nord Vorstadt and Innere West Vorstadt). In 1935, about half the Jews of Leipzig lived in those two neighborhoods, as against 5.6 percent of the general population. In the Innere Nord Vorstadt, the main area of concentration of recent arrivals, Jews made up 31.7 percent of the population, compared with a mere 1.7 percent in the city as a whole. Twelve percent of Jews listed in the address book of the Leipzig Jewish community lived on just four streets, and 29 percent lived on sixteen streets.[17] The main concentration of Jews in the Innere Nord Vorstadt covered a radius of less than half a kilometer.[18]

The Innere West Vorstadt and Innere Nord Vorstadt were geographically close to each other, connected by a number of common streets and separated only in part by the large Rosenthal park. But their social composition was different. The inner west area was a prosperous neighborhood where the native Jews and the more affluent immigrants lived.[19] Although it also had a far higher percentage of Jews than the city as a whole (10.3 percent), it was not as densely Jewish as the Innere Nord area. Jews were also disproportionately represented in a number of other parts of central Leipzig adjacent to the two districts already mentioned. This expanded area accounted for more than three-quarters of those Leipzig Jews whose address is known, but only 11 percent of the city's total population.[20]

Jewish residential concentration was also quite noticeable in Frankfurt and Berlin, although it was less compact than in Hamburg and Leipzig. The Jews of Frankfurt, who had lived on a single ghetto street at the northern end of the city until the end of the eighteenth century, were largely to be found in two main areas of the city. The Ostend, just east of the old ghetto, was the largest Jewish area in 1900. By 1925, it was overtaken in terms of Jewish density by the Westend area to the northwest of the central city. Compared with Hamburg and Leipzig, Frankfurt Jews were found in a wider section of the city. Living in the lower-middle-class Ostend were 36 percent of the Jewish population in 1900 (31 percent in 1925), compared with about 11 percent of the overall population. In the wealthier Westend lived 19 percent of the Jews in 1900 (25 percent in 1925), as compared with seven percent of the general population of the city. These two neighborhoods were about two kilometers apart but were joined by an area of northern Frankfurt in which Jews were present in proportions above the city average.

In 1900, 83 percent of all Jews—but only 44 percent of the non-Jews—lived in seven of the city's seventeen districts (83 percent, compared with 36 percent in

1925).[21] Although the dispersion of Frankfurt Jews was greater than that of Leipzig and Hamburg, this was offset by the fact that Jews made up a much larger percentage of the overall Frankfurt population (7.6 percent in 1900 and 6.3 percent in 1925). There were sections of Frankfurt that had much higher Jewish density than Hamburg's most Jewish areas. In 1900, the Ostend areas were just above one-fourth Jewish and the Westend was about one-sixth Jewish. In 1925, the Ostend had decreased to between 16 and 20 percent Jewish, and the Westend had risen to more than 22 percent Jewish. In one sub-district of the Ostend (district 14), Jews accounted for more than 40 percent of the population in 1900.[22]

The pattern of Jewish density was different in Berlin because of the city's huge size and population. Out of the twenty very large districts into which post-1920 Greater Berlin was divided, Jews were concentrated in six—two in north-central Berlin (Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg), three in the former western suburbs (Charlottenburg, Schöneberg and Wilmersdorf) and one in the west-central section (Tiergarten) connecting the other two areas. In 1933, these six districts had 77.6 percent of the Jewish population of Berlin and 37.5 percent of the general population, a distribution slightly more scattered than Frankfurt (see Table A-6). The district with the densest Jewish population, Wilmersdorf, had a lower percentage of Jews (13.5 percent at its peak) than the most Jewish neighborhood in any of the three previously mentioned cities.

In Berlin, as in most other cities, the central neighborhoods over time became non-residential business areas. Although the north-central concentration seemed to be connected directly to the western area of Jewish settlement through the districts of Mitte and Tiergarten , a closer analysis within these two districts shows a large gap in Jewish settlement around 1930. In the Tiergarten district, Jews were most heavily concentrated in the Hansaviertel area (postal area NW 87) at the northwestern end of the huge Tiergarten park, and to a lesser extent along the southern end of the Tiergarten. In the Mitte district, most of the Jewish residents lived in the northeastern section, which immediately bordered Prenzlauer Berg. Few Jews lived south of the River Spree in central Berlin (see Table A-7). There was thus an area of several miles in central Berlin separating the western Berlin Jewish concentration from that in north-central Berlin. There is much evidence that the lives of the Jews in the two parts of the city differed widely in terms of religious practice, ideological loyalties, prosperity and percentage of foreign-born. There is good reason to believe that Jews from one part of the city rarely visited the typical Jewish neighborhoods in the other part.

Although all four cities had a noticeable concentration of Jewish population, this differed greatly in degree. We can use the index of dissimilarity (the portion of the minority population that would have to move in order to duplicate the majority pattern) as a statistical way of measuring minority concentration. This index shows Leipzig as having by far the highest degree of Jewish concentration (.672). Hamburg followed at a considerable distance (.496), then Frankfurt (.437) and finally Berlin (.389).

Though the statistics show Berlin Jewry as the least concentrated, this may not be totally accurate, given the very large size of the Berlin districts. Using smaller districts might have increased the Berlin figures. Jews of Berlin are known to have concentrated in certain smaller areas within specific districts. Among the best known were: the northern section of Mitte and the southern part of Prenzlauer Berg where

East European immigrants were concentrated, the Hansaviertel (in Tiergarten district), the Bayrischer Viertel (in Schöneberg on the border with Wilmersdorf) and the area just north and south of the Kurfürstendamm (in Charlottenberg and Wilmersdorf). Some of these areas undoubtedly had higher concentrations of Jews than the 13.5 percent recorded for the most densely Jewish of the twenty official districts. Unfortunately, there are no official statistics to prove this. It would seem that the concentration of Jews in some other cities was lower than in the four examined here, though statistics are more sparse. Smaller cities, which could be traversed on foot, generally seem to have had less overt Jewish concentrations in particular neighborhoods.[23]

Immigrant, Orthodox, Zionist and Liberal Sub-Groups

Jewish populations in large cities tended to be much more heterogeneous than those of smaller towns. The pattern found in many smaller cities and towns of a clearly Liberal or Orthodox atmosphere was absent in the large cities. Instead, each group within the city lived a life quite separate from those who differed from them. In the large cities we can discern—alongside a prosperous and Liberal majority—three types of population that tended toward a more intense Jewish life. In some towns these three circles (Orthodox, East European immigrants and Zionists) tended to overlap, and in others they were separate from each other. The percentage and influence of each group varied from one town to another.

The presence of East European immigrants in a community almost always strengthened the forces of tradition and inhibited assimilation. They were the only important anti-assimilatory force in Germany that was much stronger in the large cities than in the smaller towns and countryside. In the Hessian area, for instance, 79.4 percent of the noncitizen Jewish population lived in cities of more than one hundred thousand, as compared with only 48.1 percent of the overall Jewish population.[24]

Hamburg had by far the smallest proportion of immigrants (5.6 percent in 1910), followed by Frankfurt (20.2 percent noncitizens; 13.3 percent foreign-born in 1933).[25] Berlin had a more substantial immigrant population of about 25 percent of its total. In Leipzig, the immigrants were in the majority throughout the early twentieth century.

The East European Jews of Berlin were to be found in all parts of the city, but they were far more numerous in the poor neighborhoods of the north-central city than they were in the wealthier west. Grenadierstrasse, with its dozen synagogues, its hasidic groups, Yiddish signs, and open-air selling had a pronounced East European Jewish atmosphere, especially after the First World War. A similar atmosphere prevailed on the streets surrounding it, in the neighborhood known as the Scheunenviertel. But the Scheunenviertel was also a disreputable and poor neighborhood with many prostitutes and considerable black-market activity. Many of the native Jews were ashamed of the area and its inhabitants and had little contact with them.

In Leipzig, where most Jews were immigrants or the children of immigrants, East European culture pervaded most of the Jewish community. Notwithstanding, the native-born elite of Leipzig Jewish society did not grant noncitizens voting rights in the

Leipzig community before 1923, and even then allowed them only one-third of the seats on the communal council. The official main synagogue was Liberal, although all the other synagogues (well over a dozen) were Orthodox. Only one of the Orthodox synagogues had the formal atmosphere generally typical of German Orthodoxy.

The presence of East European Jews in a community had an important influence on internal politics. While most native urban Jews supported the Liberal ideology both with regard to religion and to Jewish nationalism, the bulk of the immigrants tended to be pro-Zionist. Even those who were not Orthodox were rarely attracted to decorous Liberal synagogues and to German Reform Judaism.

The link between Zionism and East European Jews was especially clear. Leipzig, with its immigrant majority, had the second largest Zionist movement in Germany, although it ranked only sixth in Jewish population.[26] The Liberals always won the communal elections because the immigrants were restricted in their number of seats, but the noncitizens voted overwhelmingly for the opposition. In 1928, 77.7 percent of the citizens—but only 5.4 percent of the immigrants—voted for the Liberal candidates.[27] A similar link was obvious in Berlin. In three polling places in heavily immigrant north-central Berlin in 1925, the pro-Zionist Jüdische Volkspartei received two thirds of the votes and the Liberals only 7.8 percent. At the same time, three polling places in the affluent west gave only 13.6 percent to the Volkspartei and 68 percent to the Liberals. The difference between the two neighborhoods was overwhelming.[28] In general, the Volkspartei did especially well in communities with many immigrants and poorly where they were few. In Hamburg, for instance, the Volkspartei consistently got fewer votes than the combined Orthodox voting lists.[29]

The correlation between Orthodox and immigrant populations was less close. Urban Orthodoxy in Germany was divided into three main social and ideological groups—the separatist Orthodox, the communal Orthodox and the immigrants. (The separatist and communal Orthodox were divided on the issue of whether it was religiously permissible to participate in communities and organizations dominated by Reform Jews; the separatists considered it forbidden and the communal Orthodox allowed it.) Generally the separatists were anti-Zionists, while the communal and immigrant Orthodox were much more sympathetic to religious Zionism. Except in small cities such as Würzburg, Halberstadt and Fulda, where the Orthodox dominated the community, the influence of urban Orthodox groups did not generally affect those outside their own group. The urban Orthodox formed a closed circle with which the non-Orthodox often had little contact; their presence does not seem to have had a great effect on the overall assimilation of the Jewish community.

Both Hamburg and Frankfurt, despite their small immigrant populations, had large and influential Orthodox minorities. In Frankfurt, the center of the separatist Orthodox movement, the division within the Orthodox community was particularly noticeable. The separatists were organized in the Israelitische Religionsgesellschaft (IRG), many of whose members had withdrawn from the overall Frankfurt Jewish community (Israelitische Gemeinde). The IRG had approximately one-eighth as many paying members as the Israelitische Gemeinde.[30] The communal Orthodox Jews of Frankfurt were not members of the IRG and did not withdraw from the Gemeinde. They worshipped at the thirteen-hundred-seat Börneplatz synagogue and at smaller prayer houses. It is reasonable to assume that the nonseparatist Orthodox

were at least equal in number to the membership of the IRG. If we add the numbers of separatist and nonseparatist Orthodox in Frankfurt together, we arrive at a figure showing approximately 25 percent of the Jews of Frankfurt as Orthodox.[31]

There were a number of other cities in Germany, especially in Prussia, in which Orthodoxy was split between separatists and communal Orthodox, but in almost all of them the separatists were a much smaller group than in Frankfurt. In Cologne, the separatist Adass Jeschurun had a maximum of 250 paying male members, and in Berlin, the separatist Adass Jissroel had five hundred paying members in 1913. In smaller cities, the separatists were an even smaller group. In 1913, there were seventy-six paying members of the separatist community in Wiesbaden, fifteen in Elberfeld, twenty in Stuttgart, 120 in Karlsruhe and 110 in Nuremberg.[32] During the Weimar period, many of the separatist communities established schools that were attended by a large number of children from nonseparatist families.[33] East European Jews rarely joined the separatist Austrittsgemeinden. They joined the overall community, but generally worshipped in small synagogues that followed their own Polish rite. In a few cities such as Munich and Leipzig, East European groups also founded large synagogues of their own.

In most cities, the distinction between separatists and nonseparatists was not nearly as sharp as in Frankfurt. In Berlin, for instance, many members of both trends worshipped together in private synagogue societies and worked together in welfare and educational organizations.

In Hamburg (and Breslau), arrangements were made which obviated the need for the Orthodox to secede. Membership in the overall community was a separate matter from membership in a religious association. Within the Hamburg Jewish community there were three such associations—the Orthodox Synagogenverband, the Reform Tempelverband and the intermediate Neue Dammtor Synagoge. The prestige of the Orthodox group was increased by the fact that only its head bore the proud title of chief rabbi. The majority of Hamburg Jews who belonged to the Jewish community (65 percent) did not belong to any of the three religious associations. Of those who did join, the majority (1,579 paying members, representing about five thousand family members) belonged to the Orthodox group. The Tempelverband had 453 members, representing 1,135 individuals and the Neue Dammtor Synagoge had 398, representing about 1,130 people.[34] In the mid-1920s, 20.6 percent of Hamburg Jewish couples (984) were living in an intermarriage; of the inmarried couples (3,782), approximately 30 percent had had no religious marriage ceremony, 32 percent had had an Orthodox marriage, 20 percent had been married by the Tempelverband and 18 percent by the Neue Dammtor Synagoge.[35] All of these figures would seem to divide Hamburg Jewry into four groups: assimilated (the intermarried), secular (only civilly married), Orthodox and religiously Liberal. These four groups would seem to have been of roughly equal numbers.[36] Hamburg, like Frankfurt, had an Orthodox minority far greater than the 10–15 percent usually estimated for German Jewry.[37]

The Orthodox group in Leipzig also seems to have been quite large, although its numbers are impossible to calculate. Certainly not all immigrants were Orthodox, though the vast majority of synagogues and synagogue-goers certainly were. In Cologne, where 25 percent of the Jewish population were noncitizens, it is claimed that about the same percentage of the Jews were sympathetic to Orthodoxy.[38] In many

German cities, however, it would seem that there were few Orthodox Jews outside immigrant circles.

The Urban Institutional Framework

Besides the Orthodox minorities and the East European immigrants, there were other aspects of urban Jewish life that tended to strengthen Jewish identity and culture. The cities had a much more developed network of Jewish institutions than did the small towns. They were also the center of most Jewish education in Germany beyond the elementary level and were the site of almost all those phenomena usually associated with the "Jewish cultural renaissance" of the early twentieth century. The countryside may have harbored a more traditional atmosphere, but they certainly were characterized by a lower level of Jewish education than the cities. In Orthodox circles, the level of Jewish knowledge (though not necessarily of observance) was much higher in large cities.

There can be no doubt that the Jewish institutional network was far better developed in the large urban communities than in villages and small towns. Every major urban community in twentieth-century Germany had a Jewish hospital, orphanages, old-age homes and institutions dealing with various types of social problems. Organizations combining sociability and benevolence abounded in the cities, most notably the B'nai B'rith lodges and the Jüdische Frauenbund. In Berlin there was also a whole network of *Landsmannschaften* of migrants from various towns in the province of Posen. Jewish political and ideological groups (with the possible exception of Orthodoxy) were overwhelmingly centered in the large cities. This was especially true of Zionism and the Central Verein.

Berlin's national and local Jewish organizations were a visible part of the Jewish life of the city. The main building of the Jewish community in central Berlin was so complicated that a guide to it took up an entire page, listing such departments as: personal records, finances, kashruth, synagogues and music, real estate, education, taxes, accounting, communal board, communal newspaper, marriages, sale of synagogue seats, statistical bureau, library and art collection. The welfare department had offices in more than twenty locations in the city. No fewer than forty-eight Jewish periodicals (mostly monthlies) were published in Berlin in 1930.[39]

In western Berlin within a radius of about six blocks were located the offices of the national Central Verein (Emserstrasse 42), the Zionist organization (Meineckestrasse 10) and the Prussian Association of Jewish Communities (Kantstrasse 158).[40] These buildings often had a host of Jewish organizations sharing them. At Meineckestrasse was the Palästina-Amt (for immigration to Palestine), the Zionist sports organization and the newspaper *Jüdische Rundschau*. After the Nazis came to power, Kantstrasse 158 housed not only the Prussian Association of Jewish Communities, but also the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden, the Jüdische Frauenbund, Youth Aliyah, and the Central Welfare Organization for German Jewry.[41]

Many of the small towns were little touched by the ideological ferment of the large cities. Their institutional framework remained rudimentary. Besides the Jewish communal body, which ran the synagogue and which was responsible for religious in-

struction and the cemetery, small-town communities usually had only a few *khevres* (religious confraternities) dedicated to burial of the dead, visiting the sick or helping the poor. Only in a few exceptionally large village communities were there also Jewish organizations dedicated to leisure-time activities, such as glee clubs, soccer teams, theater groups or Jewish taverns.[42]

Jewish cultural institutions were almost exclusively urban. By the twentieth century there were virtually no Jewish institutions of learning above the elementary level outside the large cities. Even the one-room Jewish elementary school, once a feature of much of rural German Jewry, went into steep decline after 1900. By way of contrast, most of the urban centers had more substantial Jewish elementary and secondary schools, either dating back to the early nineteenth century or newly founded in the 1920s.[43] Germany's three rabbinical seminaries were all in the large cities, as were most of its institutions for training Jewish teachers. It was in the cities that new types of Jewish cultural activities became noticeable in the twentieth century. The Frankfurt Lehrhaus was only the most famous of a group of efforts at Jewish adult education during the Weimar Republic. Jewish museums were founded in a number of cities. The influential thinkers of German Jewry were concentrated in Berlin, Frankfurt, Breslau and other large cities, and the immigrant Hebrew and Yiddish writers made Berlin an important cultural center in the 1920s, whereas they had little impact in the countryside. Even when a thinker of the rank of Martin Buber lived in rural Heppenheim near Frankfurt, he had virtually no contact with the local Jewish community.

It should be noted, however, that the much more developed Jewish organizational network in the cities does not necessarily prove the greater Jewish intensity of urban communities. It is more of an indicator of the different nature of rural and urban communities. In the small towns, relationships between community members were personal and direct. Where enough of a Jewish community remained in a small town, it created a Jewish atmosphere that did not require an institutional framework to keep it alive. In the large cities, lacking the atmospheric Judaism of the village community and amid the anonymity of urban life, formal organizations, meeting places, clubs and welfare institutions took the place of the primary face-to-face Jewishness of the small town. Some urban organizations (such as the immigrant synagogue, the lodge and the Landsmannschaft) tried to recreate the intimate atmosphere of a tightly knit social group. Others were content to take care of social needs in a relatively impersonal and professional manner.

Certain overall social and communal characteristics seem to indicate that urban Jewry remained different from rural Jewry even in the 1920s and later. First, the Jews of the big city seem to have been much wealthier than their rural counterparts. This is especially true for Berlin, where, in 1931, the average income tax paid was 2.3 times that of the rest of Prussian Jewry. Other cities above the Prussian average were Frankfurt (1.21), Breslau (1.33), Cologne (1.06), Hanover (1.22) and Königsberg (1.34). Many rural areas showed much lower than average tax assessments, especially in the centers of tradition of Hesse-Kassel and Ostfriesland.[44]

When it came to participation in Jewish affairs, the rural Jews seem to have been more active than urbanites. This is especially clear from statistics on communal elections. In voting for the first congress of the Prussian Association of Jewish Commu-

nities in 1925, the voting turnout was considerably lower in the large cities of Berlin (36.7 percent), Frankfurt (36.1 percent) and Cologne (42.2 percent) than was the average for Prussia (46.3 percent). Breslau was the only major city with a higher than average turnout (59.3 percent). In the nonurban provincial districts with contested elections, the average turnout was more than 70 percent.[45] Even greater discrepancies are noted in other Jewish communal elections. In tiny communities such as Burgpreppach, voting turnout reached as high as 93 percent. In particularly contested elections, voting turnout was quite high even in urban communities (78 percent in Munich in 1921, 82 percent in Dresden in 1929 and 60 percent in Berlin in 1930), but even then it was below rural turnouts.[46] This might be one indicator that even in the 1920s, Jewish cohesiveness in the cities was weaker than in smaller towns.

Conclusion

When we try to bring together all the evidence concerning the differences between urban and rural Jewry in Germany, the results are as follows. Up until the 1910s, there seems to have been substantially more assimilation in urban Germany than in the rural areas, but even then there were regional differences. Germany's four largest Jewish communities had almost half of all intermarriages in Germany in the first decade of the twentieth century, even though they comprised less than one quarter of the Jewish population of the country. Although the largest communities continued to have a higher intermarriage rate in the 1920s than did smaller communities, the differences were much reduced. Even though the four largest communities now accounted for more than 35 percent of the Jewish population of Germany, they still had only 45 percent of all intermarriages. Intermarriage had gone up everywhere, but it was rising quicker in the smaller and medium-sized communities than in the largest ones (see Table A-8). These trends seem to have continued in the 1930s.[47] Whereas the differences between large communities and small ones had decreased, the regional differences remained very substantial. In many areas of Germany, intermarriage in the countryside had become as common as in the cities. In other areas, rates of intermarriage and conversion remained low both in the city and in the countryside. The general trend seems to have been that the countryside was more extreme than the cities. In areas where tradition was weak, the small towns showed even less Jewish tradition and more intermarriage than the large cities. In more traditional areas, it was the rural settlements where tradition was strongest (see Table A-9).This was evident not only in intermarriage rates but also in the presence or absence of traditional institutions such as ritual slaughter and ritual baths.[48]

The rates of intermarriage and conversion varied widely from one urban community to another. In searching for variables to explain the wide differences, we find that some seemingly obvious factors are not very important, while others that seem less clear are more significant. This can be seen, for instance, with regard to the influence of Orthodoxy. The presence of a large and prestigious Orthodox minority in Hamburg did not prevent the city from having one of the highest intermarriage rates in Germany—higher than Frankfurt (where the percentage of Orthodox was similar) and higher than Berlin, where Orthodoxy was probably weaker. While a substantial

Orthodox minority seems to have had no influence, Orthodox control of a community does seem to have an important effect. Thus in the district (Regierungsbezirk) of Magdeburg, an area with substantial intermarriage, the Orthodox-dominated community of Halberstadt had a percentage of "half-Jews" far below that of nearby Magdeburg.[49]

In general, the rate of intermarriage in large cities seemed to vary in a way parallel to the intermarriage rates in small cities and villages in the same district. Intermarriage rates were low in most districts near the Polish border as well as in most of west and south Germany, with the exception of the Ruhr and "Old Bavaria." They were highest in the districts immediately east and west of the Elbe River in north-central Germany, as well as in provincial Austria. In general, the areas of lower intermarriage were the areas of old Jewish settlement and relatively high density of Jewish population. Areas of high intermarriage were areas of low Jewish density and relatively recent Jewish settlement. This helps explain the high rates of intermarriage in Hamburg and Magdeburg and the lower rates in Frankfurt, Breslau and Mannheim. The presence of old and relatively dense Jewish rural settlement in the areas around the last-named cities seems to have been an important factor. Even in the twentieth century, the tie between the urban Jews and their "rural roots" does not seem to have been totally broken. At least in part, they continued the regional traditions of their area and may have made marriage alliances with rural Jews from the towns in which their ancestors were buried. The urban population in such areas had not moved too far from where it had been in the premodern age—in the urban or rural ghetto.

In areas of sparse Jewish population such as the area around Magdeburg, the situation was different. The urban community was relatively isolated from other Jewish communities. Few rural communities were nearby, and even the nearest urban communities were far away. To a certain degree, the same is true for Hamburg. Although the city itself had a large Jewish population, it had little hinterland. There were few rural communities and not many urban ones in the vicinity.

The main exception to this pattern is Berlin. Although not surrounded by substantial Jewish population either urban or rural, its intermarriage rate was much lower than that of the surrounding provinces. (A similar pattern is noticeable for Vienna and its sparsely populated surrounding provinces.) Here there are several factors mitigating the geographic isolation of the community. First was the huge size of the community and its relatively high percentage of the city's population. This meant that there was a large pool of potential Jewish spouses. Second, the city had a relatively large percentage of East European immigrants who were less likely to intermarry than were native Jews.

The presence of large immigrant populations was a factor in reducing intermarriage and conversion rates. Unlike the old-line German Jewish population, whose roots were generally in the villages of South Germany or in the small towns of the formerly Polish provinces of Posen and West Prussia, the East European immigrants began their lives in Germany as an overwhelmingly urban population. Their patterns of Jewish life in Germany bore a great resemblance to the patterns of East European immigrants in the United States, though on a smaller scale. They created urban enclaves of intensely Jewish life in their areas of first settlement. For them, just as for twentieth-century American Jews, the Jewish neighborhood in the city was the cen-

ter of Jewishness, and moving away to the countryside was a move away from Jewishness (the exact opposite of the native German Jewish pattern). In heavily immigrant Saxony, the cities had far lower intermarriage rates than did the countryside with its small Jewish population.

Other plausible factors that one might expect would correlate with rates of intermarriage were less important than expected. The size of the city had relatively little effect on the rates, with Hamburg outranking larger Berlin. Hamburg patterns also show that the degree of Jewish concentration within the city was not an important factor. Despite a highly concentrated Jewish residence pattern, the city had a very high rate of intermarriage. Although it is known that Catholics were less likely to marry Jews than were Protestants, the percentage of Protestants correlates only very slightly with the rate of intermarriage. The percentage of Jews in the city population seems to have had more of an effect, but still less than the presence of nearby rural communities or a large immigrant population.

It would seem from these considerations that it was not urbanization itself that was causing the weakening of Jewish ties in Germany. For the differences between urban and rural Jews were becoming less significant in the course of the early twentieth century. As the density of rural Jewish communities declined in many parts of Germany, intermarriage there became far more common than before. What seems instead to have been the chief factor in explaining varying intermarriage rates is the distance from the original center of Jewish life.

Two types of settlement patterns seem to have had a retarding effect on intermarriage and conversion—the old rural communities and the new immigrant centers in the cities. Despite the many differences between these two types of community, they had a number of important features in common. They were areas in which the Jews began as a relatively unacculturated group. Traditional Jewish religion and culture were powerful influences that gave the community a strongly Jewish atmosphere. The Jewish population lived in rather modest economic circumstances (sometimes in poverty). The percentage of Jews in the general population in many small-town communities and in immigrant neighborhoods such as Berlin's Scheunenviertel and Leipzig's Inner North was often very high,[50] much higher than the Jewish density in urban nonimmigrant communities.

Functionally, the German village and urban immigrant neighborhood were similar—they were the "ghetto" from which the acculturating Jews went forth to enter non-Jewish society. Every move away from these "areas of first settlement" was a move away from tradition and toward assimilation. The more ties were retained with the old neighborhood or hometown, the more resistant a community seemed to be to intermarriage and conversion. In areas where Jewish population had been sparse before the nineteenth century, there were no hometown communities to cement ties to the past. The Jews who settled in such areas were isolated from other communities and surrounded by an overwhelmingly Christian community. Only when there were large groups of immigrants settling in compact urban neighborhoods was there a nucleus for Jewish cohesion in such provinces.

Although it seemed to the Jewish sociologists of the early twentieth century that urbanization spelled disaster for German Jewry, they mistook a symptom of transformation for the transformation itself. Whether a community was urban or rural was

not the key factor. What was most important was where the community was in terms of the move from tradition to modernity. The more ties it had to its preemancipation roots, the more cohesive it would be. The more it was on the move away from those ties, both geographically and culturally, the more susceptible it was to the forces of assimilation and the loss of Jewish identity. It was the tie to the area of first settlement, not whether it was urban or rural, which was most significant.

Appendix 1

Table A-1. Population of Twenty Largest Jewish Communities in Germany in 1925

1. Berlin	172,672
2. Frankfurt	29,385
3. Breslau	23,240
4. Hamburg	19,904
5. Cologne	16,093
6. Leipzig	12,540
7. Munich	10,068
8. Nuremberg	8,603
9. Mannheim	6,972
10. Hanover	5,523
11. Düsseldorf	5,204
12. Dresden	5,120
13. Stuttgart	4,548
14. Essen	4,504
15. Dortmund	4,424
16. Königsberg	4,061
17. Wiesbaden	3,463
18. Karlsruhe	3,386
19. Beuthen	3,357
20. Wuppertal	3,102

The total number of Jews in cities 2–5 was 88,622; the total number in cities 6–20 was 84,875.

Sources: Herbert Lepper, *Von der Emanzipation zum Holocaust. Die israelitische Synagogengemeinde zu Aachen, 1801–1942* (Aachen: 1994), 1370–1373; Monika Richarz, *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: 1982), 17; Baruch Zvi Ophir (ed.), *Pinkas hakehilot: Germaniyah, Württemberg, Hohenzollern, Baden* (Jerusalem: 1985), 41, 444; *Jüdisches Lexikon*, vol. 2 (Berlin: 1928), 195.

Table A-2. Changes in Annual Urban and Rural Intermarriage Rates Over Time (percent)

	Urban Berlin		Rural Hesse-Darmstadt	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
1904	19.5	13.3	3.4	2.5
1924–26	29.2[a]	18.6[a]	12.3	8.3

Sources: "Eheschliessungen im Jahre 1904," *Zeitschrift fur Demographie und Statistik der Juden*, vol. 2 (Berlin: 1906), 158–159; Arthur Ruppin, *Soziologie der Juden*, vol. 1 (Berlin: 1930).

[a]Berlin figures are for 1926 only.

Table A-3. Regional Variations in Intermarriage Rates Over Time (selected areas)

	1904 Combined male and female intermarriage rates		1939 Persons of mixed ancestry (*Mischlinge*) as percentage of total population of Jewish origin	
	%	N[a]	%	N[a]
North and Central Germany				
Schleswig-Holstein	31.9	47	56.7	1,742
Bremen	22.2	18	46.9	1,359
Hamburg	20.0	255	42.4	17,273
Berlin (city)	16.5	1,504	24.7	109,573
Brandenburg (except Berlin)	15.7	458	42.2	6,946
Hanover	15.2	224	31.4	8,436
Saxony (kingdom)	12.6	119	22.0	11,653
Prussian Saxony	12.0	100	46.9	5,129
Southern and Western Germany				
Rhineland	10.3	796	26.0	33,779
Westphalia	6.9	318	28.9	11,197
Hesse-Nassau	5.3	718	17.4	25,845
Baden	4.2	428	15.5	11,012
Bavaria	3.9	926	21.8	21,825
Hesse-Darmstadt	3.0	404	18.0	7,402
Württemberg	2.7	189	22.7	6,098
Alsace-Lorraine	2.6	464		
Extreme Eastern Germany				
Silesia	5.3	684	18.4	28,158
West Prussia	2.1	192		
Posen	1.1	475		

Source: "Eheschliessungen im Jahre 1904," 158–159; *Die Bevölkerung des Deutschen Reichs nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung, 1939. Die Juden und Jüdischen Mischlinge im Deutschen Reich, Statistik des Deutschen Reichs,* vol. 552, no. 4 (pp. 6–9).

[a]In the 1904 statistics, N = the number of Jews marrying in that year in the particular area. In the 1939 statistics, it is the total number of persons of Jewish ancestry counted in the area.

Table A-4. Comparative Intermarriage Rates in Berlin and Hamburg (percent)

	Berlin			Hamburg		
	Men	Women	Combined	Men	Women	Combined
1901–1905			15.7			21.2
1906			17.7			24.2
1921–1924			21.4			26.4
1925	30.5	17.9	24.8	31.8	24.5	28.8
1926	29.2	18.6	24.5	30.6	31.7	31.2
1927			27.4			30.3
1928			27.4			33.6

Sources: Uriah Zevi Engelman, "Intermarriage among Jews in Germany, USSR and Switzerland," *Jewish Social Studies* 2 (1940), 163–164; Aron Tänzer, *Die Mischehe in Religion. Geschichte und Statistik der Jeden* (Berlin: 1913), 31; Ina Lorenz, *Identität und Assimilation. Hamburgs Juden in der Weimarer Republik* (Hamburg: 1989), lviii; Ruppin, *Soziologie der Juden,* vol. 1, (p. 211); *Jüdisches Lexikon,* vol. 4 (p. 218).

Table A-5. Intermarriage Rates in Frankfurt and Breslau (percent)

	Frankfurt	Breslau
1901–1905	10.2	6.2
1906–1910	10.9	10.1
1921–1924	13.3	13.5

Source: Engelman, "Intermarriage Among Jews in Germany, USSR and Switzerland," 164–165.

Table A-6. Changing Degree of Jewish Neighborhood Concentration in Twentieth-Century Berlin (percent)

	1910	1925	1933
Jewish Population			
Six districts with most Jews[a]	114,164 (79.3)	138,381 (80.1)	124,643 (77.6)
Rest of the city	29,879 (20.7)	34,291 (19.9)	35,921 (22.4)
General Population			
Six districts with most Jews			1,589,322 (37.5)
Rest of the city			2,653,179 (62.5)

[a]Mitte, Prenzlauer Berg, Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, Schöneberg, Wilmersdorf.

Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin (1924), 31; *Ibid.* (1927), 6–7, quoted in Steven Lowenstein, "Jewish Residential Concentration in Post-Emancipation Germany," *Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute* 28 (1938), 491; *Grüner Post*, 14 April 1935, quoted in H.G. Sellenthin, *Geschichte der Juden in Berlin und des Gebäudes Fasanenstrasse 79/80* (Berlin: 1959), 72.

Table A-7. Jewish Concentration in Postal Areas within Tiergarten and Mitte Districts of Berlin

	N
Tiergarten	
NW 87 (Hansaviertel)	147
NW 21/NW 40 (Moabit)	87
W 57/ W 9/W 10/W 62 (south of park)	126
Total	360
Mitte	
N 54 (Scheunenviertel on border with Prenzlauer Berg)	196
N 24/C 25 bordering Scheunenviertel on south and west	126
NO 43/O 27 bordering Scheunenviertel on east (on border of Prenzlauer Berg and Friedrichshain)	128
Western parts of the district north of the Spree (NW 6/ N 4)	33
C 2 (Central Berlin north of the Spree or on Köllin Island)	25
South of the Spree in central Berlin (S 12/ W 8/SW 19/SO 16)	103
Total	611

Source: Based on names beginning with A and D in *Jüdisches Adressbuch für Gross-Berlin. Ausgabe 1931* (Berlin: 1994, rpt.)

Only the southern parts of Tiergarten and the parts of Mitte south of the Spree (with a total of 229 out of the 971 in the sample) could be considered as linking the north-central and western Jewish neighborhoods. The vast majority of the Jews in the two districts were concentrated in the north.

Table A-8. Changes in Intermarriage Rates in Large Cities and Elsewhere

	Homogeneous Jewish marriages	Percent of all in Germany	Mixed marriages	Percent of all in Germany
1901–1905				
All Germany	19,540		3,522	
Berlin	3,086	15.8	1,138	32.3
Hamburg	490	2.5	263	7.5
Frankfurt	703	3.6	173	5.0
Breslau	685	3.5	90	2.6
All other	14,576	74.6	1,855	52.7
1906–1910				
All Germany	19,792		4,699	
Berlin	2,992	15.1	1,426	30.3
Hamburg	506	2.6	323	6.9
Frankfurt	787	4.0	192	4.1
Breslau	688	3.5	155	3.3
All other	14,819	74.9	2,603	55.4
1921–1924				
All Germany	18,785		7,483	
Berlin	4,132	22.9	2,247	30.0
Hamburg	672	3.6	481	6.5
Frankfurt	1,085	5.8	333	4.5
Breslau	862	4.6	269	3.6
All other	12,034	64.1	4,153	55.5

Sources: Engelman, "Intermarriage Among Jews in Germany, USSR and Switzerland," 161, 163–165; Stephen Behr, *Die Bevolkerungsruckgang der deutschen Juden* (Frankfurt: 1932), 111.

Table A-9. Rural Jews as More Extreme Examples of Regional Patterns of Mixed Marriage (Percentage of mixed ancestry among all those of Jewish descent in 1939 census)

Province	Overall rate (%)	Cities of more than 100,000 (%)	Less than 100,000 (%)	Less than 10,000 (%)
South Germany (areas of generally low rates of mixed ancestry)				
Kassel	17.2	24.1	13.7	11.9
Unterfranken	9.9	9.6	10.0	8.0
Schwaben	16.2	18.4	14.6	10.9
Ober- and Mittelfranken	19.7	19.8	19.5	31.5[a]
Koblenz	15.4	—	15.4	12.1
Trier	12.6	—	12.6	11.1
Mannheim	13.9	13.9	13.9	8.2
Karlsruhe	16.6	14.9	18.6	17.3
Württemberg	22.7	24.8	20.4	17.2
Central and North Germany (areas of generally high rates of mixed ancestry)				
Magdeburg	42.0	43.7	40.0	54.0
Merseburg	59.8	55.5	63.1	62.6
Schleswig-Holstein	56.7	47.7	60.6	64.9
Lüneburg	58.7	—	58.7	62.7
Chemnitz	40.8	33.9	59.8	69.6
Dresden-Bautzen	44.6	38.2	69.0	73.8
Leipzig	26.3	23.0	56.5	73.5
Zwickau	51.6	—	51.6	70.5

[a]Oberfranken-Mittelfranken had a much higher rate of mixed ancestry in the countryside because of the expulsion, after Kristallnacht, of virtually all members of the Jewish community from the small towns of Mittelfranken.

Source: Calculated from *Die Bevölkerung des Deutschen Reichs nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung 1939. Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, vol. 552, no. 4 (pp. 10–39).

Appendix 2

The 1939 census has often been viewed with suspicion, which is not surprising considering the auspices under which it was carried out. Nevertheless, an analysis of the data itself shows that its degree of reliability is considerable, if we make the proper corrections based on additional knowledge.

Many observers have been surprised by the relatively low number of persons of mixed ancestry and converts counted by the census (71,126 "half-Jews" [*Mischlinge 1. Grades*], 41,456 "quarter-Jews" [*Mischlinge 2. Grades*] and 33,132 "full-Jews" who were not members of the Jewish community, as against 297,407 members of the Jewish community). They have assumed that the number of persons of mixed ancestry has been seriously underestimated, and that many persons of such backgrounds avoided registering their ancestry in order to protect themselves.

Although undoubtedly there were some individuals who did hide their partial Jewish ancestry from the census-takers, there are many reasons to believe that they were not too numerous, and that, in fact, the census overestimates the percentage of the pre-Hitler Jewish population that was of mixed ancestry. The introduction to the census claims that the questions on ancestry were asked in such a way as to protect the anonymity of the respondent. The answers were placed in a sealed envelope to be opened only at the census offices. Whether these precautions were actually adhered to and whether respondents trusted them is a question that cannot be answered.

What we can determine from the census result is a considerable differential in the emigration of full-Jews and Mischlinge. The profile of the full Jews in the census indicates a severe dislocation of earlier patterns. The full Jews were an extremely aged population. Only 37,714 members (12.7 percent) of the Jewish community who were "racial full Jews" were twenty years of age or younger, whereas 96,589 (32.5 percent) were sixty years old or more; and 57.7 percent of the membership of the Jewish community was female. This would indicate the results of the emigration of a considerable portion of the younger population. Since men seemed in greater danger, more men than women had emigrated. The total Jewish population of Germany (including Austria and the Sudetenland) was only 44 percent of its 1933 numbers. There was also a tendency for Jews to leave the smaller towns for the bigger cities. Only 53,699 Jews by religion (18.1 percent) lived in cities of under one hundred thousand inhabitants, barely half of the proportion of 1933.

The "partial Jews" did not display the same characteristics. Of the half-Jews, 29,516 (41.5 percent) were aged twenty or below and only 5,104 (7.2 percent) were sixty or above. Among the quarter-Jews, 20,018 (48.3 percent) were aged twenty and under, and 2,635 (6.4 percent), sixty or above. Converted full Jews (33,132 in number) resembled their unconverted brethren more than they resembled partial Jews. Of the converts, 2,150 (6.5 percent) were aged twenty or less, compared to 10,003 (30.2 percent) who were sixty years old or more. This would indicate that half-Jews and quarter-Jews did not feel themselves under the same danger as full Jews, and they therefore were much less likely to emigrate. This assumption is reinforced by the fact that the proportion of partial Jews to full Jews is especially high in regions where the full Jewish population moved out in very large numbers. It would seem that the partial Jews were much less likely to migrate. The partial Jews also do not seem to have been included in the regional expulsion of

Jews from the countryside in Mittelfranken and other areas. In some of the rural counties of Mittelfranken (areas not known for high rates of intermarriage before 1933), half- and quarter-Jews were almost the only "non- Aryans" counted in the census.

It would thus seem that the best way to use the 1939 census is to correct it for the displacements of the 1933–1939 period. Numbers of half- and quarter-Jews should not be divided by the number of full Jews present in 1939, but rather by the numbers who had lived there in 1933.

There are a few other peculiarities of the 1939 census that must be noted in order not to fall into a trap. In the returns of the state of Thuringia, for instance, more than 35 percent of the Jews are reported as living in the city of Weimar, not a place previously known as a large Jewish community. Further investigation easily explains the anomaly. Of the 722 full Jews in Weimar, 695 are males. It turns out that virtually all of them were inmates of the notorious Buchenwald concentration camp on the outskirts of Weimar.

Appendix 3

This table is ranked by the combined percentage of converted full Jews and of all half- and quarter-Jews.

The uncorrected raw data from the 1939 census show the following numbers and rankings. The percentages are of total number of persons of Jewish ancestry listed for the city. Though there are some changes in ranking between these figures and the corrected percentages given in Table 1 in the text, the only substantial difference is in the figures for Nuremberg, for which the uncorrected figures give an unduly high rate of converted and mixed ancestry individuals. This is because Nuremberg experienced a much higher rate of out-migration than most German cities.

"Full Jews," "Half-Jews" and "Quarter-Jews" (by race)

	Full Jews	Half-Jews	Quarter-Jews
Magdeburg	726 (56.3%)	330 (25.6%)	233 (18.1%)
Hamburg	9,943 (57.6)	4,187 (24.2)	3,143 (18.2)
Düsseldorf	2,072 (64.3)	731 (22.7)	421 (13.1)
Hanover	2,457 (67.4)	709 (19.4)	480 (13.2)
Munich	4,940 (74.5)	1,175 (17.7)	520 (7.8)
Berlin	82,457 (75.3)	18,145 (16.6)	8,971 (8.2)
Stuttgart	2,413 (75.9)	507 (15.9)	260 (8.2)
Leipzig	4,470 (77.0)	900 (15.5)	435 (7.5)
Cologne	8,406 (78.1)	1,541 (14.3)	819 (7.6)
Nuremberg	2,645 (80.2)	415 (12.6)	239 (7.2)
Breslau	10,848 (81.2)	1,743 (13.1)	764 (5.7)
Frankfurt	14,191 (84.1)	1,866 (11.1)	821 (4.9)
Mannheim	3,054 (86.1)	339 (9.6)	156 (4.4)
Würzberg	1,096 (90.4)	58 (4.8)	59 (4.9)

Notes

1. Among the works most associated with this rediscovery of rural Jewry are Utz Jeggle's *Judendörfer in Württemberg* (Tübingen: 1969) and Werner Cahnman's "Village and Small-Town Jews in Germany," *Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Insitute* 20 (1974), 107–130.

2. "Sie repräsentieren ein unverwüstliches Kapital völkischer Gesundheit und Fruchtbarkeit, ganz abgesehen davon, dass der Dorfjude ein festwurzelndes Judentum in sich trägt, dass nur er belebt ist von jüdischem Geist, jüdischer Sitte und Gebot. Mischehe, Taufe, Assimilation sind Dinge, die nicht an sein Herz platzgreifen können." "In den Städten ist ein günstiger Boden. Hier ist die Toleranz eine grössere und die Strenggläubigkeit nicht in dem Masse vorhanden wie auf dem Lande." ". . . das ländliche Milieu der Taufe keinen Boden abgibt, während die städtischen Verhältnisse die Assimilation fördern." Felix Theilhaber, *Der Untergang der deutschen Juden. Eine volkswirtschaftliche Studie* (Munich: 1911), 122–123, 112, 97. The second of the three citations is Theilhaber's favorable quotation from a sociological work by Dr. Segall.

3. See Steven Lowenstein, "The Rural Community and the Urbanization of German Jewry," *Central European History* 13, no. 3 (Sept. 1980), 218–236; and *idem*, "The 1840s and the Creation of the German-Jewish Religious Reform Movement," in *Revolution and Evolution: 1848 in German-Jewish History*, ed. Werner E. Mosse, Arnold Paucker and Reinhard Rürup (Tübingen: 1982), 255–297; Lisa Harries-Schumann, "Between Orthodoxy and Reform, Revolution and Reaction: The Jewish Community in Ichenhausen, 1813–1861," *Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute* 42 (1997), 29–48.

4. Lowenstein, "The Rural Community and the Urbanization of German Jewry"; *idem*, "The 1840s and the Creation of the German-Jewish Religious Reform Movement."

5. See Steven Lowenstein, "Jüdisches Leben in deutschen Dörfern. Regionale Unterschiede im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert," in *Jüdisches Leben auf dem Lande. Studien zur deutsch-jüdischen Geschichte*, ed. Monika Richarz and Reinhard Rürup (Tübingen: 1997), 219–229; Jacob Borut, "Religiöses Leben der Landjuden im westlichen Deutschland während der Weimarer Republik," in *ibid*., 231–248.

6. Esra Bennathan, "Die demographische und wirtschaftliche Struktur der Juden," in *Entscheidungsjahr 1932. Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik*, ed. Werner E. Mosse and Arnold Paucker (Tübingen: 1965), 99.

7. See Herbert Lepper (ed.), *Von der Emanzipation zum Holocaust. Die Israelitische Synagogengemeinde zu Aachen, 1801–1942* (Aachen: 1994), 1370–1373 (for Jewish populations of Berlin, Frankfurt and Breslau); Ina Lorenz, *Identität und Assimilation. Hamburgs Juden in der Weimarer Republik* (Hamburg: 1989), xlii.

8. See the table on Jewish population in Prussian cities in Lepper (ed.), *Von der Emanzipation zum Holocaust*, 1370–1373.

9. Most of this data relies on religious categories to identify who is a Jew. The 1939 census, however, based on Nazi "racial" categories, gives us an insight into some of the characteristics of those who left the Jewish community or were the children of intermarriage.

10. These figures are based on the report "Eheschliessungen im Jahre 1904," in *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden* 2 (1906), 158–159. All data for intermarriage rates in this article have been calculated as a percentage of Jews marrying rather than by intermarriages as a percentage of inmarriages. The latter method would result in a much higher figure. (For example, if there were fifty pure Jewish marriages and twenty-five intermarriages, this would mean 125 Jews married, since each Jewish inmarriage involves two Jews and each intermarriage only one. The resulting rate would be calculated at 20 percent [twenty-five divided by 125]. If the other method were used we would arrive at a figure of 50 percent [twenty-five divided by 50].)

Wherever I have come across percentage rates calculated on the basis of intermarriages as a percentage of inmarriages, I have recalculated them from the raw figures to ensure that all rates are comparable. The method giving the lower figure is the standard form of calculation in contemporary American publications, but older German figures often use the other method, which results in an artificially high calculation for intermarriage rates.

11. Theilhaber, *Der Untergang der deutschen Juden*, 44: "Berlin schmarotzert an der preussischen Judenheit."

12. In Magdeburg between 1925 and 1927, there were twenty-one inmarriages and twenty-six intermarriages (for an intermarriage rate of 38.2 percent).

13. In 1910, more than 52 percent of Hamburg Jews were natives of the city and only slightly more than 5 percent had been born in the Austro-Hungarian or Russian empires. The restrictive policies of the Hamburg state government caused many East European immigrants to settle in Altona, just across the Prussian border, albeit within the greater Hamburg metropolitan area (see Lorenz, *Identität und Assimilation*, xliii).

14. If one adds the neighboring Eppendorf area to which Jews were moving by the early twentieth century, this part of Hamburg had 70 percent of the Jewish population of Hamburg proper and 13.6 percent of the overall population.

15. Lorenz, *Identität und Assimilation*, lxvii–lxviii.

16. Francis Nicosia, "Der Zionismus in Leipzig im Dritten Reich," in *Judaica Lipsiensia, zur Geschichte der Juden in Leipzig*, ed. Manfred Unger (Leipzig: 1994), 168.

17. Fred Grubel and Frank Mecklenburg, "Leipzig: Profile of a Jewish Community during the First Years of Nazi Germany," *Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute* 42 (1997), 170–171; Thomas Kubler, "Zur Demographie der jüdisch verfolgten Bürger Leipzigs 1933–1945. Methodik und Ergebnisse," in *Judaica Lipsiensia*, 152.

18. Grubel and Mecklenburg, "Leipzig," 186.

19. In 1935, when 42 percent of Leipzig's Jews had German citizenship (an increase from earlier years), 43 percent of the Jews in the inner west area had German citizenship as against only 27 percent in the inner north neighborhood. German citizens were a majority of the Jews only in a few wealthy areas far from the center of Jewish population: Vordergohlis (55 percent), outer south area (72 percent), Musikviertel (76 percent) and Kroch-Siedlung (71 percent). The total Jewish population of the neighborhoods in which most Jews had German citizenship was only about two thousand, fewer than the number of Jews in the inner north area alone.

20. Besides Innere Nord Vorstadt and Innere West Vorstadt, the adjacent areas include Vordergohlis, Aeussere Nord Vorstadt, Zentrum and Nordost Vorstadt. Together this area had a Jewish population of 8,471 and a general population of 79,624. The area covered approximately the northern half of central Leipzig.

21. Usiel Oscar Schmelz, *Die jüdische Bevölkerung Hessens. Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 1933* (Tübingen: 1996), 337–339, 399. The seven districts were Oestliche Neustadt and Oestliche Aussenstadt (together the Ostend), Westliche Aussenstadt and Nordwestliche Aussenstadt (together the Westend), plus the connecting Nordöstliche Aussenstadt, Nördliche Aussenstadt and Nördliche Neustadt.

22. Steven Lowenstein, "Jewish Residential Concentration in Post-emancipation Germany," *Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute* 28 (1983), 485—based on the census of 1900.

23. In Cologne, for instance, where Jews were 2.3 percent of the population, their percentage in the district with the most Jews was only 8.4 percent Jewish and accounted for only 23 percent of the Cologne Jewish population (see Richard F. Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* [Princeton: 1982], 138, and Bennathan, "Die demographische und wirtschaftliche Struktur," 91–92). In the much smaller city of Heidelberg, the index of residential segregation in 1933 works out to only .259. The city was 1.3 percent Jewish and the most Jewish of its ten districts was only 3.3 percent Jewish (Arno Weckbecker, *Die Judenverfolgung in Heidelberg, 1933–1945* [Heidelberg: 1985], 31).

24. Schmelz, *Die jüdische Bevölkerung Hessens*, 183, 186.

25. *Ibid*., 181, 187; Lorenz, *Identität und Assimilation*, xliii.

26. Nicosia, "Zionismus in Leipzig," 171, quotes police reports that there were 23,355 active Zionists in Germany in March 1936. The largest chapter was in Berlin (Gruppenverband Brandenburg-Grenzmark), with 6,285 members, followed by Leipzig (Gruppenverband Mitteldeutschland) with 1,367. Stephen Poppel, *Zionism in Germany: 1897–1933. The Shaping of a Jewish Identity* (Philadelphia: 1977), provides a table on membership of the Zionist movement (sales of shekalim) in German cities between 1921 and 1927 (p. 178, Table 4). The number in Leipzig was more than one thousand in all years excluding 1926, where the

figures were extremely incomplete. In 1921 and 1923, Leipzig ranks second, in 1925, third and in 1927, fourth. The figures for 1923 are twelve thousand shekalim in all, of which 5,500 were sold in Berlin and 2,328 in Leipzig.

27. The Liberals received 891 German votes and seventy-four non-German votes, whereas the opposition received 256 German and 1,289 non-German votes. (Andre Bach, "Die jüdischen sozialen Vereine Leipzigs 1928–1938/39," *Judaica Lipsiensia*, 142 [n. 18]). Michael Brenner discusses an election in Leipzig in 1929 in which the German Jews gave 74.4 percent of their vote to the Liberals, but the foreign Jews gave only 3.9 percent (Michael Brenner, "The Jüdische Volkspartei," *Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute* 35 [1990], 240).

28. Brenner, "Jüdische Volkspartei," 241. The three north-central Berlin voting places at Grenadierstrasse, Alte Schönhauserstrasse and Religionsverein Norden gave 1,421 votes to the Volkspartei, 154 to the socialist Zionist Poalei Zion, 166 to the Liberals and 394 to either the Orthodox or the "religious middle party." At the three western polling places on Lützowstrasse, Lützowufer and Geisbergstrasse, the Volkspartei garnered only 341 votes, Poalei Zion a mere thirty, and the two religious parties 434, whereas the Liberals received 1,707 votes. Interestingly, there was no substantial difference in the vote for the (non-Liberal) religious parties between the two areas.

29. For a comparison of Volkspartei votes with the percentage of Ostjuden, see Brenner, "Judische Volkspartei," 241, table II. In Hamburg, the Zionists' maximum vote came in 1930, when they polled 20 percent, still fewer than the combined vote of the two Orthodox lists, Achduth (13.5 percent) and Unpolitische Konservative (15.8 percent). See Lorenz, *Identität und Assimilation*, lxxxii–lxxxiii.

30. In 1911, the IRG claimed one thousand members; in 1913, 1,100, and in 1932, it had 1,600 *Zensiten* (members on the tax list). See *Handbuch der jüdischen Gemeindeverwaltung und Wohlfahrtspflege* 20 (1911), 95–100; i*bid*. 21 (1913), 107–114. In 1913, the Israelitische Gemeinde of Frankfurt listed eight thousand *Zensiten.*

31. Paul Arnsberg, *Die Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden seit der Französischen Revolution* (Frankfurt: 1992), 897. In the 1925 elections to the Prussian association of Jewish communities, the Liberals received 5,537 votes (61.8 percent) in Frankfurt, and the conservatives (= Orthodox) in coalition with the Zionists received 3,424 (38.2 percent). It is not clear whether the votes included members of the IRG, but this is unlikely since they adhered to a separate association of Prussian Orthodox congregations (Hälberstadter Verband). *Ibid*., 896–897.

32. *Handbuch der jüdischen Gemeindeverwaltung und Wohlfahrtspflege* (1911), 129; *ibid*. (1913), 33, 106, 120, 168, 178; Zvi Asaria, *Die Juden in Köln von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart* (Cologne:1959), 245; Max Sinasohn (ed.), *Adass Jissroel Berlin: Entstehung, Entfaltung, Entwurzelung, 1869–1939* (Jerusalem: 1966), 27.

These small numbers do not give a totally accurate picture of the influence of the separatist Orthodox communities. In Berlin, they only included members who had formally withdrawn from the official Berlin community. In many cities, the synagogues of the separatists were used by many nonmembers, and many who were not separatists relied on their kashruth supervision. In most German territories except Prussia and Hesse, official secession from the Jewish community was illegal unless one renounced Judaism (see the discussion in Sinasohn, *Adass Jissroel Berlin* and Asaria, *Die Juden in Köln*).

Despite these caveats, it is clear that those affiliated exclusively with the separatist communities were relatively few in number outside of Frankfurt and surrounding Hessian areas. The number of participants in their activities was certainly much greater, but outside of Hesse, they were usually a minority of the traditional Jews in their locality.

33. The Adass Jissroel school in Berlin, for instance, had 587 students in 1927 and 789 in 1931. In Nuremberg, there were 260 in the separatist-run religious school in 1913.

34. See the calculations in Lorenz, *Identität und Assimilation*, xciii–xciv. The dates of the figures were 1925 for the Orthodox, 1918–1920 for the Tempelverband and 1927 for the Neue Dammtor Synagoge.

35. *Ibid*., lviii, lxxvii.

36. It is not clear whether those married in the Neue Dammtor Synagoge should be counted as Orthodox or Liberal. The exact figures belonging to each group are not easy to calculate.

37. Arthur Ruppin, *Die Juden der Gegenwart*, 133.

38. Asaria, *Die Juden in Köln*, 245.

39. *Wegweiser durch das jüdische Berlin* (Berlin: 1987), 224–227, quoting *Jüdisches Lexikon*, vol. 1, ed. Georg Herlitz and Bruno Kirschner.

40. *Wegweiser durch das jüdische Berlin*, 51; *Jüdisches Adressbuch für Gross-Berlin. Ausgabe 1931* (Berlin: 1994 [rpt.]), 21–26, 31–32, 34–38.

41. *Ibid*., 230–241 and map at end of book.

42. Such villages with large Jewish populations included Gailingen, Ichenhausen, Rhina and Rexingen. See Steven Lowenstein, "Decline and Survival of Rural Jewish Communities," in *In Search of Jewish Community: Jewish Identities in Germany and Austria, 1918–1933*, ed. Michael Brenner and Derek J. Penslar (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 1998), 234–235.

43. The number of Jewish elementary schools in Germany declined from 492 in 1898 to 247 in 1913, and to only 141 in 1932. At the same time, new Jewish high schools opened in Cologne, Leipzig and Breslau between 1913 and 1921. See Michael Brenner, *The Renaissance of Jewish Culture in Weimar Germany* (New Haven and London: 1996), 59–62.

44. Max P. Birnbaum, "Die jüdische Bevölkerung in Preussen. Verteilung und wirtschaftliche Struktur im Jahre 1931," in *Gegenwart im Rückblick. Festgabe für die Jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin 25 Jahre nach dem Neubeginn*, ed. Herbert A. Strauss and Kurt R. Grossmann (Heidelberg: 1970), 123–128. Birnbaum's Table 5 shows Berlin as having 46 percent of the Prussian Jewish population and paying 66 percent of the income tax paid by Jews. At the same time, the "provinces" (outside Berlin, Frankfurt, Breslau and Cologne) had 35 percent of the Prussian Jewish population, who paid only 20 percent of the taxes.

45. Max P. Birnbaum, *Staat und Synagoge 1918–1938* (Tübingen: 1981), 273.

46. Brenner, "The Jüdische Volkspartei," 233. The high turnout in the Berlin election of 1930, in which the Liberals returned to power after a brief period of Zionist control, can be attributed to the mobilization of Liberal and assimilated voters who ordinarily would not have voted in communal elections, but who were determined to oust the Zionist-Orthodox coalition.

47. The 1939 census shows a somewhat higher percentage of persons of mixed ancestry in towns of under one hundred thousand than in larger cities. This figure is partly a result of the continued growth of intermarriage in smaller towns at a more rapid rate than in the cities, but it is also the outcome of the massive dislocation of rural Jewry during the Nazi period. In many areas, Jews found life in small towns unbearable and moved to the city. Half- and quarter-Jews, in contrast, seem to have remained in their rural homes to a much greater extent. Therefore the figures for 1939 artificially inflate the percentage of mixed ancestry among all people of Jewish descent, especially in the smaller towns.

48. In traditional areas of South Germany, most village communities still had ritual baths even during the Weimar republic (in Regierungsbezirk Kassel, eighty-five communities had ritual baths [mikvehs] and forty-six did not; in Unterfranken seventy-two had mikvehs and twenty did not; and in Mittelfranken, twenty-five had mikvehs and thirteen did not.)

In areas where ritual baths were rare, the few that did exist were mainly in the big cities. (In Regierungsbezirk Dortmund, the only mikveh was in the city of Dortmund; in Prussian Saxony, the only two mikvehs were in Halberstadt and Magdeburg; and in Schleswig-Holstein, the three mikvehs were located in Altona, Friedrichstadt and Kiel.)

49. In 1939, the city of Magdeburg had 330 half-Jews as against 726 full Jews and 637 full Jews who were members of the Jewish community. The latter were only 49.4 percent of all persons of Jewish origin counted, whereas the half-Jews were 25.6 percent. In nearby (smaller) Halberstadt, there were only twenty-seven half-Jews (9.4 percent) as against 245 full Jews and 235 full Jews who were members of the Jewish community (82.2 percent).

The small city of Fulda, one of the strongholds of Orthodoxy, had 415 members of the Jewish community in 1939. There were only three converted full Jews and only ten half-Jews and four quarter-Jews in the city. Members of the Jewish community were 96.1 percent of all those of Jewish origin in Fulda.

The evidence is a little less clear in Franconia, where smaller non-Orthodox communities like Bamberg had virtually the same rate of people of mixed origin as larger Orthodox Würzburg. Both cities, however, had very low rates of half- and quarter-Jews.

50. In 1861, there were nineteen localities in Hesse in which Jews made up at least 20 percent of the total population. All of these towns had total populations of fewer than fifteen hundred inhabitants. By 1925, there was only one Hessian town with such a large proportion of Jews (Rhina, with 225 Jews out of a total of 528 inhabitants) and eleven other towns that were more than 10 percent Jewish. See Schmelz, *Die jüdische Bevölkerung Hessens*, 384–385.

Mythologies and Realities of Jewish Life in Prerevolutionary St. Petersburg

Benjamin Nathans
(university of pennsylvania)

One of the distinguishing features of the "Jewish question" in imperial Russia was its territorial dimension. From the reign of Catherine the Great, who unintentionally acquired some half a million Jewish subjects by extending her empire's borders into Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, until the collapse of the Romanov dynasty in February 1917, Jewish residence was legally restricted to the empire's western and southwestern peripheries, a territory that came to be known as the Pale of Permanent Jewish Settlement. As a result, the "Jewish question" in Russia revolved largely around the issue of whether, or to what extent, to allow Jews to settle and work in the empire's vast interior, and in particular in its Great Russian provinces.

Despite the absence in imperial Russia of a European-style Jewish emancipation, a significant breach in the wall barring Jews from the Russian interior did occur during the so-called Era of Great Reforms. Intent on putting an end to the Jews' quasi-autonomous position and eager to harness their economic and social utility, the tsarist regime under Alexander II granted to certain groups within the Jewish population the rights and privileges of their non-Jewish counterparts according to social estate, including, where applicable, the right to reside outside the Pale. Thus, in 1859, Jewish merchants of the first guild were granted legal equality with their Russian counterparts in the merchant *soslovie*. During the next two decades, the strategy of merging Jews into the various levels of the Russian social hierarchy was cautiously extended to further groups within the Jewish population. In 1861, Jewish graduates of Russian universities were declared legally equal to their Russian peers; in 1865 the same policy was applied to Jewish artisans, in 1867 to retired Jewish soldiers who had served the full twenty-five year term under Nicholas I, and finally, in 1879, to Jewish graduates of all institutions of higher education.[1] Thereafter, the autocracy lost its enthusiasm for Jewish reform, as for reform in general. Yet in spite of the imposition of new anti-Jewish restrictions in the 1880s and 1890s, the privileges granted to merchants and other "useful" groups within the Jewish population remained in effect until 1917.

This carefully contained experiment with what I have elsewhere called "selective emancipation" gave rise for the first time to Jewish communities in Russia proper,

and indeed to what could properly be called "Russian Jews."[2] The 1897 census counted some 314,000 Jews (out of the empire's total Jewish population of just over five million) living outside the Pale and the Kingdom of Poland.[3] The largest Jewish community in the empire's interior gathered in the capital, St. Petersburg, the country's most populous, modern and industrialized city. From roughly seven thousand in 1869 (the year of the first reasonably reliable municipal census), the city's legal Jewish population grew to some thirty-five thousand in 1910. Contemporary sources suggest that an equal or greater number of Jews resided in St. Petersburg illegally.[4] Because the mechanisms of selective emancipation ensured a relatively high concentration of wealth and (secular) education among the capital's Jews, and because of the immediate proximity of the tsarist political elite, the St. Petersburg Jewish community quickly assumed a leading role as spokesman for Russian Jewry as a whole.

This article analyzes the development of St. Petersburg Jewry as a community on the front line of the encounter with Russians and the tsarist state. Beginning with an analysis of the origins and settlement patterns of Jewish immigrants to the Russian capital, I attempt to place the Jews within the city's distinctive urban topography, and to reconstruct their experience of both rapid acculturation and abiding separateness. I then turn to the struggle over the formation of Jewish communal institutions, in which social and religious tensions already present within Jewish life in the Pale rapidly came to the fore, and were compounded by city and imperial authorities intent on restricting what to them appeared to be excessive Jewish solidarity. The history of Jews in late nineteenth-century St. Petersburg promises to broaden our view of the role of ethnic and religious difference in the imperial metropolis, of the evolving structure of Russian Jewish society, and of the autocracy's attempt to confront the "Jewish question" in its own backyard.[5]

A Window on Russia

The granting of residential privileges alone cannot explain why significant numbers of Jews chose to migrate to St. Petersburg, far from the towns and villages of the Pale where, in many cases, their ancestors had lived for centuries. The lawyer Genrikh Borisovich Sliozberg, whose family had lived near Vilna, in his words, "since time immemorial," recalled his decision to take up university studies in St. Petersburg in the 1880s: "How attractive the capital seemed to me—the center of the country's intellectual life where, so I thought, one could meet writers, where life was in full swing, and enlightenment poured forth in broad streams, drawing all to culture and progress."[6] Chaim Aronson, an enterprising watchmaker, moved there in order to market his inventions to a wider public.[7] So alluring was the imperial capital that many Jews settled there who lacked the legal right to reside outside the Pale, and who therefore faced the constant threat of forcible expulsion by the city's police. One such person was Gershon ben Gershon, the protagonist of Gershon Lifshits' autobiographical novella *Confession of a Criminal* (1881), who at the moment of his expulsion declares:

> What a pity to abandon Petersburg! A good job at the office, a circle of close friends, the public library right around the corner, every day a fresh newspaper, good theater, and in

> general, all the blessings of civilization. I am forced to leave and abandon all this—and the main question is: where to go? To Moscow, Kiev, Orel', Khar'kov? But the "Nota-Bene" in my passport [limiting residence to the Pale] rules out these cities. To Warsaw? But I am Russian and don't know Polish. . . . To "us"? To Vilna, Kovna, Grodno, Minsk, Berdichev?—Brrr!! Smelly streets, musty traditions—the whole place is caught in a quagmire.[8]

For virtually all Jewish immigrants, St. Petersburg was the first "Russian" city they had ever experienced; for them, the northern capital served not as a "window on Europe" (the image immortalized in Pushkin's *Bronze Horseman*), but as a window on Russia itself. In the Pale, Jews lived for the most part among Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians and Poles; in many small towns, moreover, Jews were the single largest group. Even in major cities within the Pale such as Kiev and Odessa, ethnic Russians comprised just half the total population.[9] "In my native town I had hardly known any non-Jews," wrote the Zionist Mordechai ben Hillel Hacohen of his childhood near Mogilev in the 1860s. "I had known some government officials, whose relations with the Jews were those of the rulers to the ruled. In Petersburg our entire business was with pure Russians, and relations were natural and human."[10]

In St. Petersburg, native speakers of Russian constituted more than 80 percent of the population throughout the late imperial period.[11] To be sure, Russian literature and Slavophile ideology had bestowed upon the imperial capital the aura of an alien city dominated by European influence.[12] But in Jewish memoirs, one finds a rather different impression. Nevsky Prospect, easily the most cosmopolitan, European boulevard in the entire city, appeared to Pauline Wengeroff, the wife of a successful tax-farmer, as the quintessential site for "Russian street life, in which all of Russian nature was reflected." The Bundist Vladimir Medem found St. Petersburg "an amazing city, deep and withdrawn, like the Russian soul."[13]

Although there are no data on the precise geographical origins of Jewish immigrants to the capital, the mere fact that they came from the Pale—that is, from a relatively distant, non-Russian region of the empire—distinguished them from the vast majority of St. Petersburg's inhabitants.[14] As the ethnographer N.V. Iukhneva has shown, among the various provinces of the empire, per capita levels of migration to St. Petersburg were inversely related to the distance between the point of origin and the capital. Immigration was also less pronounced from areas with significant non-Russian populations. In other words, the farther away or less ethnically Russian a given province, the less likely the inhabitants were to abandon their native surroundings for those of St. Petersburg.[15]

Compared with the majority of immigrants to St. Petersburg—and by the end of the nineteenth century, immigrants accounted for more than two-thirds of the capital's population—Jews who settled there were much more likely to have come from what the official censuses described as towns or cities, as opposed to rural areas. According to the first reliable empire-wide census, conducted in 1897, there was a far higher proportion of urban dwellers among the empire's Jews—49 percent—than in any other sizable ethnic group. Germans and Armenians followed at 23 percent, Poles at 18 percent, and Russians and Latvians at 16 percent.[16] However, since the 1897 census followed the longstanding official Russian practice of defining "urban" settings not by size of population or level of industry or trade but by administrative func-

tion, legally defined "cities or towns" included settlements of as few as a thousand people. Thus, many of the settings from which Jews emigrated to St. Petersburg were likely to have been little more than large villages, hardly comparable to the Russian capital. To the watchmaker Chaim Aronson, in the course of his journey in the 1860s from the Belorussian shtetl of Serednik to St. Petersburg, even Vilna—with a population one-tenth that of St. Petersburg—appeared as "a vast city."[17] The narrator of Lev Osipovich Levanda's *Confession of a Wheeler-Dealer* (1880), arriving for the first time in St. Petersburg from his home town of Bobruisk in Belorussia, was at a loss for words:

> My head began to spin, I was dazzled by the huge, multistory buildings extending in long, even rows on both sides of the street, and by the noise and hubbub of the gaily colored crowd surging backwards and forwards, in which I was unable to recognize even a single familiar physiognomy. . . .[18]

And in Viktor Nikitin's short story "Seeker of Happiness" (1875), Abram Khaimovich arrives in St. Petersburg together with his fellow Jewish immigrants from a small town in the Pale, only to be nearly arrested for loitering in the street outside the train station as they nervously discuss where to spend their first night in the capital. "We looked around in wonder: where we came from, all sorts of private matters were discussed and decided in the middle of the street. . . . Here they won't let you stand for a minute."[19] The process of adjustment to St. Petersburg's distinctly metropolitan rhythms, therefore, was often scarcely less dramatic for newly arrived Jews than it was for their fellow immigrants from the villages of central Russia.[20]

The Jews who settled by the thousands in the Russian imperial capital beginning in the 1860s found a city with no collective Jewish past and virtually no Jewish presence. The legacy of Jews in St. Petersburg during the century and a half following its founding in 1703 offered only a haze of anecdotes and legends concerning sojourns by individual Jews or crypto-Jews, rumored influence in high places, and unceremonious expulsions. In 1714, Peter the Great brought back with him from Amsterdam a new court jester, Jan D'Akosta—said to be a descendant of Portuguese Marranos. Another alleged Marrano, Anton Manuilovich de Vier (also from Holland), became St. Petersburg's first chief of police.[21] Tsar Alexander I's reforming minister, Mikhail M. Speranskii, was once rebuked for secretly meeting in the capital with the wealthy tax-farmer Abram Perets, while the founder of the hasidic Habad movement, Rabbi Shneur Zalman ben Baruch, was reportedly held prisoner in St. Petersburg's notorious Peter-and-Paul fortress.[22] The young German rabbi Max Lilienthal, on a visit to the Russian capital in 1841, was informed by a Jewish convert there that, upon ascending to the Russian throne, Nicholas I had presented the city's temporary Jewish residents with two choices: conversion or expulsion.[23]

Out of these and similar stories there formed among St. Petersburg Jews in the post-Reform period a certain mythology of the capital's allure and the difficulty of Jewish existence there. In the Pale of Settlement, Jewish folklore had long assigned distinct personalities and reputations to various towns and regions. Vilna was the "Jerusalem of Lithuania," famous as a center of rabbinic learning and Hebrew publishing. Odessa, that southern bastion of hedonism and assimilation, was said to be encircled seven times by the fires of hell ("zibn mol arum Odes brent der gehenem"). Chelm

was mocked in countless Jewish folktales for its residents' pseudo-wisdom. And the Jewish name for Poland—"Polin"—was creatively read to mean "here abide" ("po lin"), suggesting a divine sanction for Jewish settlement there.

In St. Petersburg, by contrast, neither the pious nor the assimilated were imagined to have felt fully at home. To be sure, Russians had their own tropes for the artificial quality of existence in the northern capital, centering upon the city's unnatural origins and inhospitable climate. To Jews, the city seemed unnatural in a different way: according to the mid-eighteenth-century rabbi, Arieh Leib Epstein, Providence itself had ordained that Jews should not live in the imperial capital, since during the "white nights" in June the sun never sets, making it impossible to determine the correct time for morning and evening prayers.[24] Insofar as this remark came at a time when Jews were still banned from St. Petersburg, one might well interpret Epstein's words as seeking to make a virtue of necessity.

Even a century later, after the ban had been partially lifted, the sense of being out of place persisted, if in a more secular vein. The theme of the Jewish presence in the capital as itself a potential crime, quite apart from actual behavior, appeared in an array of fictional works, beginning with Lifshits' *Confession of a Criminal*. A particularly memorable version of the St. Petersburg Jew as involuntary outlaw appeared in Iakov Shteinberg's poem "The Criminals," published in 1881. Borrowing at times word for word from Pushkin's celebrated "The Bronze Horseman" (1833), Shteinberg substitutes for Pushkin's poor clerk Evgenii a young Jew who has come to the imperial capital "thirsting for knowledge," only to find himself hunted like an animal because he lacks the proper residence papers. Following in Evgenii's footsteps, the anonymous Jew turns in desperation to the statue of Peter the Great, the city's founder and namesake:

> Centuries of slavery have crumbled,
> Your people [i.e., the serfs] has been liberated
> And recognizes its calling
> As citizen of the world.
> But there is here one unhappy tribe,
> A stepson of Russia,
> And from it alone has the yoke not been lifted,
> Only to it has freedom not been granted!
> Great Peter, I stand before you,
> I am not a criminal, I am a Jew,
> Yet I am hunted down;
> I cannot live among my fellow human beings!
> Why should sons of Russia
> Be denied a fatherland and freedom![25]

Despite the poem's Pushkinian references, Shteinberg's Peter diverges tellingly from Pushkin's: he is a sympathetic listener, "as if touched by [the Jew's] tears," and the poem ends with the statue representing not official persecution, but implicit endorsement of Jewish equality by an enlightened monarch.

If, however, one judges by sheer frequency of telling and retelling, then the defining story of the Jewish predicament in St. Petersburg came from a letter written by

Catherine the Great in 1773. Responding to an inquiry from her admirer Denis Diderot about whether there were any Jews in Russia, Catherine wrote that the newly conquered Polish territories were "swarming with Jews." In addition, she noted: "There are three or four [Jews] in St. Petersburg. For eight or nine years I have had a confessor with whom they have been lodging; they are tolerated in spite of the law. One pretends not to notice that they are here."[26] A century later, this episode became an obligatory reference for virtually every Russian Jewish writer who touched upon the life of Jews in the imperial capital.[27] Its allegorical resonance, at least among secularly educated Jews, provides an important clue about Russian Jewish self-understanding and the ambiguities of the Jews' relation to St. Petersburg's imperial authorities. In Catherine's letter, the Jewish guests, despite their illegal presence in the capital, appeared to have gained a remarkable if precarious proximity to the autocracy's inner sanctum: they are, after all, lodged with a court priest. Equally significant, however, is the fact that what Catherine chose to ignore was not that the visitors were Jews, but that they existed at all ("on fait semblant d'ignorer qu'ils y sont"). To overlook their Jewishness was inconceivable.

Ethnicity and Urban Space

Until the 1860s, there was hardly a major city in the Pale that did not contain certain streets or neighborhoods in which Jewish residence was either restricted or banned altogether. It is true that the Russian empire, with the exception of the Kingdom of Poland, had never known the Jewish ghetto in its classic European form of a contained space inhabited exclusively by Jews.[28] But in many cities of the Pale, legal restrictions on Jewish residence—often dating from the period of Polish rule—had created easily identifiable Jewish districts, a fact that took on great significance during pogroms. As late as 1860, cities such as Vilna, Kovno and Zhitomir, where Jews made up half or nearly half the population, contained areas in which Jewish residences and businesses were officially prohibited.[29]

Prior to the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, cities in Russia proper had had no need for such restrictions, as Jews were not permitted to reside in the empire. But the principle of residential segregation according to nationality or religion was by no means unknown in the Russian interior. In earlier centuries, many Russian cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, had relied on designated settlement areas, known as *slobody*, to house French, German, Tatar and other groups. Certain occupational groups were residentially segregated as well.[30] Many cities in early modern Europe engaged in similar practices. But by the middle of the nineteenth century, settlements for foreigners in St. Petersburg had largely disappeared, their residents dispersed throughout the city, leaving only vestigial names such as the "English Embankment," the "Tatar Market" or "German Street."[31]

During the first half of the nineteenth century, a trickle of Jewish merchants and traders—no more than a few hundred—began to appear in the Russian interior as temporary visitors on commercial or financial missions. In contrast to Moscow, where visiting Jews were required to stay at a designated inn near the Kremlin, in St. Petersburg they were allowed to rent private rooms throughout the city. In 1838, this

arrangement became the subject of a brief controversy involving the head of the infamous "Third Section" (the political police), Count A.K. Benckendorff. Ostensibly concerned about the lack of police control over visiting Jews, and citing the example of Moscow, Benckendorff argued that Jews in St. Petersburg should be restricted to a certain district within the city. The Council of Ministers, however, flatly rejected the idea, noting that a Jewish quarter in the imperial capital, where foreign embassies and foreign guests would surely notice it, would be "inappropriate" and an embarrassment for the government.[32] As the poet Yehuda Leib Gordon later commented in a different context, "through the window on Europe that we carved out [that is, St. Petersburg], we are being watched by Europe as well."[33]

When the policy of selective emancipation made possible a limited Jewish presence in the Russian interior, the tsarist government, in the form of the Jewish Committee (established in 1840), reaffirmed the practice of open settlement within St. Petersburg by qualified Jews. St. Petersburg, moreover, was henceforth to serve as a standard for other cities throughout the empire. Condemning the practice of enforced residential segregation as "medieval" and "not corresponding to the spirit of the times," the Jewish Committee cast it as one of the chief obstacles to the goal of "merging" the Jews with the surrounding population.[34] The "spirit of the times," it should be noted, was primarily that of utility: again and again, the committee reminded recalcitrant local officials that restrictions on Jewish residence lowered property values in the affected areas (by reducing demand) and in general stifled Jewish investment in local economies.

In the absence of both legal restrictions on residence and traditional Jewish neighborhoods, what form did Jewish settlement take in St. Petersburg? This question requires us to briefly review the city's social geography. Despite the leading role St. Petersburg played in the industrialization of the empire, the geography of the city throughout the late imperial period remained a mixture of typically preindustrial and industrial formations. On the one hand, as James Bater has argued, census data suggest that St. Petersburg was residentially less segregated by class or social status than European cities. Neighborhoods in the Russian capital tended to be socially and economically heterogeneous, and the limited spatial segregation that did occur was more likely to be vertical—for example, a ground-floor apartment as opposed to a cellar or attic garret—rather than horizontal, by street or neighborhood.[35]

On the other hand, to a much greater extent than statistical evidence would suggest, different areas within the city had pronounced and enduring reputations based on class and estate.[36] As is often the case, the vernacular, everyday experience of the city did not always correspond to the printed page of the census. Thus the Admiralteiskaia borough, along the left bank of the Neva (which encompassed the Winter Palace and many government ministries), was regarded as an exclusive enclave of largely noble inhabitants, whereas beyond the Fontanka canal, those boroughs at the city's periphery, as well as Vyborg to the north, had a pronounced working-class reputation.

The 1869 census reveals that the roughly seven thousand Jews then present had settled in all twelve of St. Petersburg's boroughs. At the same time, settlement was highly uneven. The majority of Jews (63 percent) resided in a cluster of six adjacent wards centered in and around the Pod"iacheskii neighborhood, several blocks south

of Nevsky Prospect.[37] Several of the wards in this neighborhood featured the highest population densities and number of inhabitants per apartment in the entire city (and would continue to do so throughout the late imperial period), the highest concentration of prostitutes and brothels, and the highest mortality rates.[38] It was, in other words, a slum. Equally important, however, it was an area known for its petty markets, small shops and artisan workshops selling goods retail, rather than by contract. For the city's poorer inhabitants, Pod"iacheskii and its environs were what Nevsky was for the well-to-do: the central commercial district.[39]

Thus, in the absence of any legal restrictions on residence within the city, St. Petersburg Jews—the majority of whom were artisans and petty traders[40]—settled largely in an area where their trades were already well established. When the watchmaker Chaim Aronson came to St. Petersburg with his family in 1868, he rented rooms near the corner of Sadovaia and Voznesenskaia streets, in the heart of what one contemporary novella somewhat misleadingly called "the main ghetto of Petersburg Jews."[41] According to a number of contemporary accounts, there were entire apartment buildings in the area known to be inhabited, legally or illegally, by Jews.[42] One contemporary journalist reported that cabbies would approach newly arriving Jews (often distinguishable by their attire) at train stations and, without prompting, begin barking out names of guest houses in Pod"iacheskii. Another writer portrayed Jewish immigrants being duped by eager landlords into believing that they were forbidden to live elsewhere in the city.[43] Indeed, this area was so identifiably "Jewish"—at least for Jews—that a retired kantonist (soldier) contrasted the St. Petersburg he had seen under Nicholas I to that of the 1870s with the memorable remark, "What was Petersburg then—a desert! But now—it's like Berdichev!"[44] By the 1880s, in fact, the Pod"iacheskii neighborhood had been jokingly nicknamed "the Petersburg Berdichev."[45]

The humor in these expressions derived precisely from the juxtaposition of two starkly contrasting images, the crowded, unwashed provincial shtetl in the midst of the resplendent imperial metropolis. Both images, however, were highly selective refractions of reality. Late nineteenth-century St. Petersburg was an astonishingly diseased city, demographically dominated by impoverished peasant workers, and Pod"iacheskii, for its part, bore little resemblance to a shtetl or a ghetto, where Jews were often in the majority.[46] According to census data, even in the area of highest identifiable Jewish concentration within Pod"iacheskii—the fourth ward of the Spasskaia borough—Jews never comprised more than eight percent of the population.

Although the portion of the city's Jews who lived in Pod"iacheskii declined steadily during the late imperial period, the neighborhood's reputation as a Jewish enclave persisted.[47] In fact, compared to most other ethnic groups in St. Petersburg, Jews continued to live in a relatively segregated fashion. The index of residential segregation, which designates the percentage of a given group that would have to relocate in order to be dispersed throughout the city to the same degree as a control group (in this case, those of the Russian Orthodox faith), has been calculated for the years 1869 and 1910 (see Table 1). Leaving aside the Muslim and Armenian-Gregorian groups, who in 1910 each numbered fewer than thirty-five hundred, as against roughly thirty-five thousand Jews, the latter were not only, as Bater puts it, "the only

Table 1. Indices of Residential Segregation by Ward (percent)

	Index	
Religious group	1869	1910
Catholic-Uniate	20.6	13.5
Protestant	20.8	20.0
Schismatics	38.1	29.6
Armenian-Georgian	41.7	37.6
Jewish	40.7	52.0
Muslim	39.9	56.1

Source: Bater, *St Petersburg*, 200 and 377.

sizable minority concentrated to any considerable degree," but also the only sizable minority whose degree of segregation had increased over the course of four decades.[48] In 1910, Jews in St. Petersburg were considerably more segregated spatially than their counterparts in Vienna, despite the legacy of its ghetto.[49]

Language and Acculturation

The available data for St. Petersburg do not allow one to reconstruct spatial segregation within Jewish society according to social class. But the highly detailed census of 1897 reveals that, just as among the city's population as a whole, Jewish literacy (in any language) varied little from one borough to the next. What *did* vary considerably was declared native language. In this respect, the linguistic map of Jewish St. Petersburg closely followed the social reputations of the city's neighborhoods: from the elite Admiralteiskaia borough, where the language spoken in Jewish homes was more likely to be Russian (49 percent) than Yiddish (43 percent), to the mixed but largely working-class outlying areas of Aleksandro-Nevskaia, Rozhdestvenskaia and Vyborg, where Yiddish was spoken in roughly 85 percent of Jewish homes.[50]

Linguistic practices, in fact, reveal some of the most striking signs of acculturation among St. Petersburg Jews. Between 1869 and 1910, the declared native language of nearly half the city's Jews shifted from Yiddish to Russian—notably, at nearly identical rates for men and women (see Table 2).[51]

Table 2. Native Tongue Reported by Jews in St. Petersburg (percent)

	1869	1881	1890	1900	1910
Yiddish	97	84	67	61	54
Men/Women	n.a.	83/86	67/68	n.a.	54/54
Russian	2	12	29	37	42
Men/Women	n.a.	n.a.	29/28	n.a.	42/42

Sources: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik S.-Peterburga. 1892 g. (Petersburg: 1894), 67; *S.-Peterburg po perepisi 15 dekabria 1890 goda*, part 1, vol. 1, section 2 (p. 79); Iukhneva, *Etnicheskii sostav*, 208.

Although it is impossible to reconstruct precise equivalent data for other ethnic groups (because of the absence of exclusive markers for both language and religion), it appears that no other group in St. Petersburg displayed anything close to this level of linguistic adaptation. Iukhneva's estimates of language use show that, on the contrary, groups such as Poles and Estonians actually grew less inclined to declare Russian their native language during the same period (see Table 3). The adoption by Jews of Russian as a native language, moreover, was consistently associated with a rise in literacy. To be sure, in census data the category of "literate" often indicated merely an affirmative answer to the question "Can you read?" and therefore cannot be taken as a completely reliable index of actual literacy skills, whether in reading or writing.[52] The meaning of literacy statistics with respect to Yiddish is perhaps even more ambiguous, since Jews and non-Jews alike were wont to question the status of Yiddish as a language, let alone a print language. Nonetheless, the basic pattern of a rise in literacy accompanying the acquisition of Russian is unmistakable: in 1890, literacy in Yiddish among its native speakers (of all ages) was reported as 52 percent, while among Jewish native speakers of Russian, 78 percent were literate. In 1897, these figures were 67 percent and 83 percent, respectively.[53]

In one sense, of course, the declaration of Russian as one's native language was a powerful indicator of acculturation, a trait that would in all probability be passed on to one's children as well as being highly significant in everyday life. Paradoxically, however, Jews who acquired Russian were in another sense becoming less like the surrounding population, insofar as their level of literacy, already higher to begin with, only advanced further beyond that of the population as a whole. This divergence holds even when one excludes the considerable number of peasants residing in the imperial capital. Thus, the simple equation of the acquisition of Russian with "acculturation" or "assimilation"—in the sense of becoming more like the surrounding population—is misleading.

The acquisition of Russian by Jews was associated with a second, related transformation that bears both on the Jewish world and its relationship to the surrounding society. As suggested above (see Table 2), Jewish men and women in St. Petersburg shifted from Yiddish to Russian at nearly the same pace throughout the late imperial period. The unusually detailed data on language in the 1897 census make it possible to trace the transformation in literacy for men and women that occurred with the acquisition of Russian (see Table 4).

As Jewish men and women entered the Russian-speaking world, not only did their ability to manipulate the printed word grow; the gap between their respective levels of literacy shrank, thereby challenging the traditionally privileged position of men in

Table 3. Native Speakers of Their Own National Language in St. Petersburg (percent)

	1869	1881	1890	1900	1910
Jews/Yiddish	97	84	67	61	54
Poles/Polish	78	82	81	90	94
Finns/Finnish	93	94	88	87	85
Estonians/Estonian	75	63	74	86	86

Source: Adapted from Iukhneva, *Etnicheskii sostav*, 24, and *Statisticheskii ezhegodnik S.-Peterburga. 1892 g.*, 67.

Table 4. Literacy Among Jews, 1897 (percent)

	Males	Females	Gender gap
In Yiddish, among native speakers of Yiddish	74	59	15
In Russian, among native speakers of Yiddish	59	48	11
In Russian, among native speakers of Russian	86	80	6

Source: Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g., vol. 37, part 2 (pp. 88–119).

the world of print culture. This transformation, moreover, again made the Jews less like the surrounding population of St. Petersburg, in which large discrepancies between male and female literacy (in 1897, 61 percent as against 41 percent; in 1910, 76 percent as against 57 percent) persisted down to the end of the tsarist regime.[54]

The New Jews

In a remarkably short period of time, St. Petersburg Jewry gave rise in Russia to a new image of the Jew as modern, cosmopolitan and strikingly successful in urban professions (such as banking, law and journalism) that were emerging in the wake of the Great Reforms. This new profile did not supplant, but rather coexisted uneasily with the enduring figure of the Russian Jew as backward, fanatically separatist and frequently impoverished.

Despite the numerical predominance of artisans and petty traders among the city's Jewish population, it was (not surprisingly) the merchants, bankers and financiers who caught the public eye. In no other Jewish community in Russia was there such extraordinary and visible affluence. St. Petersburg quickly became the address of choice for the Russian Jewish plutocracy, many of whom played a major role in the burgeoning fields of private banking, speculation and railroads. A Jewish resident of the capital was perhaps only slightly exaggerating when she wrote of the 1860s and 1870s that "never before or since did the Jews in Petersburg live so richly, for the institutions of finance lay to a large extent in their hands."[55]

During the heyday of private banking in Russia, roughly from the 1860s to the reestablishment of the state credit system in the 1880s, Russian Jewish bankers played a role in imperial finances comparable to that of Gerson Bleichröder in Germany and the Rothschilds in France.[56] The 1860s witnessed what one Jewish newspaper in St. Petersburg called "a feverish decade of 'Gründungen'" (enterprise-building).[57] In the words of a former employee of the Gintsburg bank,

> A complete metamorphosis could be observed in those who left the Pale of Settlement. The tax-farmer was transformed into a banker, the contractor into a high-flying entrepreneur, and their employees into Petersburg dandies. A lot of crows got dressed up in peacock feathers. Big-shots from Balta and Konotop quickly came to consider themselves "aristocrats" and would laugh at the "provincials."[58]

Beneath its mocking tone, this passage encapsulates the evolving role of the Jewish financial elite as Russia moved from a serf economy toward a largely state-directed

form of capitalism. Whether as "feudal" tax-farmers or as "capitalist" investment bankers, Jewish financiers (at least those in St. Petersburg) continued to make their fortunes largely in state-sponsored undertakings, and to cultivate close ties to government officials.

The House of Gintsburg was the most prominent example. Building on their role as liquor tax-farmers and suppliers of goods and clothing to the Russian army during the Crimean war, Evzel Gintsburg and his son Horace established their bank in St. Petersburg in 1859 and subsequently floated enormous loans for many government projects, including the war against the Ottoman empire in 1877–1878.[59] The Poliakov brothers (Samuel, Iakov and Lazar) were instrumental in financing the construction of railroads, and as a result were elevated by Alexander II to the Russian hereditary nobility, an extremely rare achievement for Jews. In 1871, Abram Isaakovich Zak, a former employee of the Gintsburgs, became director of the Petersburg Discount Lending Bank, one of the largest banks in the empire, whose owner was a fellow Jew, Leopold Kronenberg.[60] Indeed, the Jewish railroad contractor loomed large enough in the Jewish popular imagination to become known as a "shemindefernik."[61]

The meteoric rise of such Jews inspired predictable outbursts against upstart philistines. In one of his deservedly lesser-known works, the populist poet Nikolai A. Nekrasov, then eking out a living in St. Petersburg, intoned in the poem "Balet" (1866):

> One has only to glance at the box-seats,
> Where the bankers' wives are seated,
> Hundreds of thousands of rubles on their bosom. . . .
> Valor, youth, and strength captured
> A woman's heart in days gone by.
> Our girls are more practical, cleverer;
> Their ideal is the golden calf,
> Embodied in the gray-haired Jew,
> Whose filthy hand causes these bosoms
> To quiver with gold. . . .[62]

A German resident, for whom the city's poorer Jews were similarly invisible, reported in 1881 that the only Jews to be found in St. Petersburg were "a few hundred 'protected' families. . . . The proletariat of government bureaucrats, owing to their miserable salaries, are forced to cultivate relations with financiers of Mosaic origin . . . , speculators in construction and railroads."[63]

St. Petersburg's Jewish intellectuals, too, were often critical of the newly emerged plutocracy, though less out of fear of their influence than from anger at their apparent aloofness from less prosperous Jews. The intellectuals' ire was only intensified by the fact that many of them (or the newspapers and journals that employed them) were at various times financially dependent on the wealthy elite. Uri Kovner, a struggling journalist and writer, published his short story "Around the Golden Calf" as an indictment of the banker A.I. Zak, his former employer.[64] Zak's personal secretary, Grigorii Isaakovich Bogrov, left to become co-editor of the St. Petersburg Jewish weekly *Razsvet* (1879–1883), which offered numerous editorials critical of the communal role of the rich. Later generations of writers expanded these criticisms to the

point of vilification, as in Sholem Ash's novel *Peterburg* (1929), which depicts the Jewish plutocracy in the prerevolutionary capital wallowing in decadence, gluttony and, in one case, near incest.[65]

Levanda's *Confession*

By far the most highly developed portrayal of the St. Petersburg Jewish financial elite appeared in Levanda's *Confession of a Wheeler-Dealer*, a rags-to-riches-to-rags story that received wide attention in the contemporary press.[66] The novel was part of a small but growing body of fiction dealing with the lives of Jews who lived among Russians.[67] As the leading Jewish writer in Russian of his time, Levanda (1835–1888) published fiction and nonfiction in nearly every contemporary Russian Jewish periodical, as well as in non-Jewish newspapers such as *Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti* and *Novoe Vremia*. Employed since 1860 as an "expert Jew" (*uchenyi evrei*) in the offices of the governor of Vilna province, Levanda was an ardent integrationist and Russophile until the wave of pogroms in 1881–1882 induced a crisis of confidence and a late flirtation with the idea of emigration to Palestine.[68]

The narrator of *Confession* is one Mordechai Shmalts, who during the era of the Great Reforms leaves his native shtetl in the Pale determined to become a millionaire in St. Petersburg—in his words, "the bubbling center of the broadest and most diverse empire in the world." He is part of a stream of young, ambitious Jewish immigrants (women as well as men), leading Shmalts' former rabbi to exclaim, "Everyone is running off to Petersburg these days, whether on business or not! As if manna from heaven fell on everyone there!"[69] Once in St. Petersburg (without the necessary permit, one might note), Shmalts finds himself caught up in ruthless competition with other seekers of a fast ruble, including the russified Polish aristocrat Bliznevich, the Baltic German Baron von Werner, and a host of Jewish would-be millionaires. Shmalts is instantly successful at the stock exchange and in various commercial deals of questionable legality; he buys a palace in a fashionable St. Petersburg neighborhood and adopts all the trappings of aristocratic life. But his wealth, like that of so many characters in the novel, proves highly transient, and at the conclusion of the story he is a broken man, his wife in a state of nervous collapse, and his children utterly estranged (in one case to the point of apostasy).

The St. Petersburg newspaper *Russkii Evrei* singled out Levanda's *Confession* for its "highly realistic" portrayal of Jewish life in the capital.[70] While the portions of Levanda's narrative that concern shtetl life derive largely from the well-worn repertoire of Haskalah satire, the story as a whole is notably free of typical maskilic heroes, whether enlightened Jews or benevolent Gentiles. On the contrary, it is Shmalts' father, a quintessential shtetl Jew, who is made to prophecy his worldly son's downfall:

> "I know, my son, that you are rich, very rich . . . , but—you won't get angry?—I have little faith in your wealth."
>
> "Why?"
>
> "Because it was acquired in a strange way, and that which has not been acquired through labor, is not secure. A divine curse lies on it."

> "Father, I do not understand what you are saying."
>
> "This is what I want to say: in my time people also got rich—from what? From trade, commerce. A person would trade in, say, grain, or timber or manufactured goods . . . , would travel around to fairs, work hard, and God would bless his labor and he would become a wealthy merchant. . . . From what have you gotten rich, my son? I have asked everywhere, and no one can explain to me clearly what you trade in. They spoke about some sort of "shares," "companies," "stock exchange," and I wrote down all these mysterious words and again asked: What is that—timber? No, they say. Grain? No. Hemp? No again. So what is it? What is there to get rich from?"[71]

If the sudden rise of the St. Petersburg Jewish elite was a mystery to Jews in the Pale, it often appeared both mysterious and menacing to non-Jews. Much of Levanda's *Confession* is designed to combat the popular impression of Jewish clannishness by illustrating again and again how Jews compete mercilessly with each other, as well as with everyone else. "They tried to ruin me," Shmalts laments of his fellow Jewish financiers, "and I them, at every convenient opportunity and with particular pleasure. There's our vaunted solidarity for you."[72] Where non-Jews were prepared to see the *kahal*—the executive agency in each Jewish community, responsible for taxation and administration—at work in every Jewish success, Shmalts insists that Jewish commercial ascendancy resulted from "our temperament, our asceticism, our intensive and inexhaustible activity":

> While wheeler-dealers of other nationalities are more often than not people with human passions and desires, epicureans easily distracted from business by music, or painting, or women, or horses, dogs, hunting, sports, card games—we Jewish wheeler-dealers are neither fascinated nor distracted by anything not directly related to business.[73]

The contrast of restless Jewish ascetic and Gentile (usually Russian) epicurean functioned as a remarkably consistent boundary marker for assimilated Jews, for whom older, starker forms of everyday differentiation from non-Jews (language, dress, dietary rules) no longer applied. At the conclusion of Levanda's earlier novel, *Hot Times*, the protagonist Sarin had confronted the limits of Jewish assimilation by observing that "we will be Russians, but for us Russian idleness, Russian lightheartedness, dissolution, impassivity, and that which is called the broad Russian nature, will forever remain foreign."[74]

Traces of this contrast are found far beyond the works of Levanda. It is practically a cliché in contemporary Jewish sources that Jews tended to gesticulate and appear anxious more than Russians. One memoirist notes that, after his family moved from a peasant village to a largely Jewish town, "I became more and more of a Jew. . . . I gestured more, and I was livelier."[75] In Jewish sources, there is a strikingly consistent tendency to highlight the unusual "energy" of individual Jews, in implicit contrast to the aura of Oblomovian languor surrounding their Russian counterparts.[76] The cultivation of sensual pleasures (especially regarding nature and food) is a staple of Russianness in contemporary Jewish fiction.

From the standpoint of St. Petersburg Jews on the frontline of acculturation, the ascetic/epicurean contrast elaborated a self-understanding of the Jews as a spiritual people, distinguished from the worldly physicality of non-Jews.[77] The pioneering

ethnographer, writer and St. Petersburg resident Ansky (Solomon Rapoport, 1863–1920), himself creator and exemplar of an emerging secular Jewish identity in an East European setting, went so far as to argue that "in works of Jewish folk art we find nearly all the basic elements of the folklore of other peoples. But [these works] have all been transformed from a material to a spiritual level, imbued with the biblical-talmudic spirit, and colored by a powerful religious temperament."[78]

Remarkably, the basic elements of contrast between restless ascetic and broad-natured epicurean inform the depiction of Jews in many Russian sources as well, albeit with a dramatically different moral valence. The stereotypically energetic, gesticulating Jew could be seen as a being in perpetual motion—a symbol of Jewish rootlessness, preference for talk over physical labor, and exploitation of the ostensibly generous and tolerant Russian peasantry. Whether in openly antisemitic diatribes such as Dostoevsky's *Diary of a Writer* and *Novoe Vremia's* influential 1880 article "The Kike is Coming!" or in the widespread belief among ruling elites that gullible Russian peasants required protection from the Jews' overly developed entrepreneurial spirit, the culturally coded contrast between indefatigable Jew and easygoing Russian shaped contemporary attitudes toward ethnic difference.[79]

A Russian version of the ascetic/epicurean opposition was unexpectedly thrust upon Levanda in the form of a critical response to his *Confession*. The author of this critique was none other than Levanda's literary patron, Mikhail Fedorovich De-Pulé (1822–1885), the editor of *Vilenskii Vestnik*, an official government newspaper to which Levanda was a frequent contributor. De-Pulé had high hopes for Jews such as Levanda. When official russification in the western provinces began, he noted, "there was no more satisfactory ground for our activities, no more ardent accomplices, than educated Jews."[80] In a letter of 1879 dripping with condescension, De-Pulé congratulated Levanda for finally setting a novel beyond the confines of the Jewish Pale. "It is time," De-Pulé announced, "to emerge from the sphere of Jewry and to take part in the broader horizons of a Russian writer." *Confession of a Wheeler-Dealer* represented an important step in this direction, but fell short in its treatment of Russian life:

> Be bold! Be bold! The Russian loves to swear, and loves when others swear at him. Instead of Jews, Poles, Armenians, Germans, you should have taken up all sorts of Russians—swindlers, thieves, rogues, nihilists, socialists, etc. The plot unfolds in Petersburg—but there is not a single Russian woman, Russian bureaucrat, bribe-taker, stockbroker. . . . The novel smells of Petersburg, but the life is Jewish: Jews, Jews and more Jews. This will not entirely please the Russian reader.[81]

Whatever the prejudices of De-Pulé's letter, the virtual absence of Russian characters—epicurean or otherwise—in a novel set in St. Petersburg and written by one of the period's most ardent Jewish integrationists is indeed striking. It suggests a counterpart in the realm of literary imagination and, I would argue, of lived experience as well to the Jews' abiding physical segregation in the Russian capital. If Jews were prone to regard the imperial capital as a "window on Russia," they remained largely spectators at that window. Apart from the pursuit of their livelihood, many Jews who lived in St. Petersburg appear to have had little social contact with the city's predominantly Russian population.

The Struggle for Communal Leadership: I

Despite Levanda's attempt to dispel popular notions of Jewish solidarity, non-Jews were wont to take such intramural cohesion for granted, and more often than not to regard it as a serious problem. Government officials such as P.A. Gresser (St. Petersburg city governor, 1882–1892) and I.N. Durnovo (minister of the interior, 1889–1895) were convinced that Horace Gintsburg and other wealthy Jewish financiers held sway over Jewish students at St. Petersburg University, who in turn were considered responsible for the widespread "nihilist" disorders there. More than once Gintsburg was threatened with expulsion from the city if the disorders did not stop.[82] Yehudah Leib Gordon, well acquainted with the internal workings of St. Petersburg Jewry from both personal experience and service as secretary of the communal governing board, lamented that the Russian government was "haunted by the specter of the kahal."[83] Nowhere was the inaccuracy of the government's view more evident than in the communal history of St. Petersburg Jews, which reveals in heightened form many of the intramural tensions that were to be found within Russian Jewry as a whole.

Like their counterparts in Odessa, Jewish immigrants to St. Petersburg were confronted with the challenge, and opportunity, of building communal institutions virtually from scratch, far removed from the centuries of tradition that lay behind age-old Jewish centers such as Vilna, Berdichev or Kremenchug.[84] In St. Petersburg, however, the filling in of this tabula rasa (as one Jewish newspaper called it)[85] began in the 1860s, several decades later than in Odessa, therefore at a more advanced stage in the internal differentiation of Russian Jewry. Moreover, like everything else in the capital, Jewish communal institutions there came under especially intense official scrutiny, not only by local administrators but by the highest organs of the tsarist government. Indeed, Jews and non-Jews alike regarded the St. Petersburg community as a potential model for Russian Jewry, a yardstick by which the policy of selective Jewish emancipation would be measured.

The Jewish elites who began to gather in St. Petersburg in the 1860s were determined to fashion institutions of Jewish life equal to those of their counterparts in Berlin and Paris.[86] To this end, a group of roughly one hundred prominent Jewish residents of the capital met in July 1863 to elect delegates to a governing board charged with organizing communal affairs. Of the fifteen delegates selected, two thirds were merchants (with Evzel and Horace Gintsburg heading the list), the rest physicians and dentists, members of the "diploma intelligentsia."[87]

The board's first act was to hire Dr. Abram Neiman (1809–1875), a German-born follower of Reform Judaism, to become the first—and because of official restrictions, the sole—rabbi of the St. Petersburg community. Barely able to speak Russian or Yiddish, Neiman conducted services in German and Hebrew to a congregation of merchant notables in a temporary prayer house in the heart of Pod"iacheskii, the area of densest Jewish population. With his combination of yeshiva and university training, Neiman presided over what one observer termed the city's first "orderly congregation, at least in the intellectual sense."[88]

For the more traditionally religious among St. Petersburg Jewry, Neiman's arrival and his status as the sole officially sanctioned rabbi were hardly welcome. But even

among those sympathetic to religious reform, there was considerable dissatisfaction. Six years after Neiman's appointment, the journalist (and future publishing giant) A.E. Landau publicly criticized Neiman's lack of initiative: apart from lending a certain "enlightened" decorum to Jewish ritual, Neiman had accomplished remarkably little in the way of building communal institutions in the capital.[89] For the younger generation of educated Jews, eager to be regarded as citizens of the newly reformed Russia, Neiman's inability to speak the language of state was an uncomfortable reminder of the Haskalah's lingering cultural orientation toward Berlin.[90] Equally disturbing, Neiman had been chosen by a self-selected governing board rather than by representatives of the community as a whole, in contrast to traditional Jewish practice in the Pale.[91]

It was this latter issue that became the subject of a protracted series of skirmishes among various Jewish factions in the capital. In a report of 1867 to the governor of St. Petersburg province, Neiman candidly discussed the problem. Characterizing the city's rapidly expanding Jewish community as plagued by "disorders and stagnation," he noted that members of the governing board were frequently away from St. Petersburg for business purposes and hence unable to attend to communal affairs. In an effort to add greater legitimacy to the governing board—and, by extension, to his own position—Neiman urged that new elections be held in which "all estates within the Jewish community" (artisans, soldiers, merchants and intellectuals) would separately elect representatives.[92] The governor turned for advice to Horace Gintsburg, whom he characterized as "a person, on the one hand, familiar with the communal affairs of the Jews but, on the other hand, neutral, standing to the side of petty local squabbles." Gintsburg, similarly interested in putting an end to intramural conflicts, endorsed Neiman's proposal.[93]

Had it become formalized, the division of St. Petersburg Jews into voting blocs according to estate would have introduced an entirely new and decidedly Russian hierarchy into the structure of the Jewish community. But imperial authorities were wary of anything resembling autonomous, quasi-representative institutions for the capital's Jews.[94] In any event, the first communal elections by estate, held in 1868, were also the last, owing to widespread charges of corruption and string-pulling. As Horace Gintsburg (then in Paris) learned in a letter from his secretary Emmanuel Levin, a minority of "progressives" had scored "a complete victory over the conservatives," but only through a series of intrigues.[95] Though sympathetic to the "progressives," Levin was forced to concede that

> the mass of Jews here is disturbed by the results of the election, and one can't help but admit that Neiman and his party committed a blunder by exclusively promoting the opposition. This has aroused great anger against them. I have kept my distance from all the various intrigues and parties and sincerely wish only one thing: that there not be mutual slander and complaints to officials, which could greatly damage us in the opinion of the supreme authorities.[96]

Levin's fears were only too accurate. Complaints by Jews against their communal authorities began to flood the desks of various government officials. Many petitioners confirmed Neiman's observation that members of the governing board spent long periods of time abroad and were usually too busy with commercial affairs to devote

significant energy to the needs of the community.[97] In 1868, Shaul Katsenelenbogen, a "certified translator," requested in a petition to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that the results of the recent election be nullified. Jewish artisans and retired soldiers, he argued, had been wholly excluded from the decision-making process, despite the fact that they constituted the overwhelming majority of the capital's "native Jewish population."[98]

At this point, the issue of representation was joined by the equally potent matter of communal taxation. As Katsenelenbogen and others emphasized, it was precisely the lower ranks of Jews who, as consumers, paid the lion's share of the tax on the slaughter and sale of kosher meat (the *korobka*) and thereby financed the community's budget:

> Communal revenues come primarily from artisans . . . , who observe the rituals of their faith. With very few exceptions, the merchants and the educated—bowing to the progress of the times—reject such rituals, and differ from Christians neither in their diet nor in any other way. The artisan estate is hard-pressed and driven nearly to starvation by the merciless price of [kosher] meat—up to 40 kopeks per pound![99]

In effect, the wealthy, self-elected members of the board were using communal funds from the pockets of the poor in an attempt to finance "reformed" Jewish institutions alien to the religious practices of their brethren. The resulting tensions at times even led to violence, as when a group of artisans, furious at the high price of kosher meat, scuffled with the elite congregants at Neiman's prayer house over what one Jewish journalist called the "exploitation of the poor folk by Jewish kulak-butchers."[100]

Social and Religious Fault Lines

Already by the mid-nineteenth century, Russian Jews had acquired a reputation among government officials as being, among other things, a litigious people.[101] Internecine conflicts (chiefly, but not exclusively, between hasidim and their opponents), the elaborate maze and arbitrary application of discriminatory legislation, combined with relatively high rates of literacy and a culture imbued with legal norms, led to extraordinary numbers of formal appeals by various Jewish groups and individuals for state intervention on their behalf.[102] One well-placed observer describes a campaign among Orthodox Jews that culminated in "thousands of petitions, each with hundreds of signatures, pouring down on the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment."[103] Even against this background, Jews in the capital stood out. Scarcely a decade after the policy of selective emancipation made it possible for Jews to settle in St. Petersburg, the minister of internal affairs complained of "the constant disagreements among the Jews here, mutual incriminations, and complaints to city authorities."[104] The newspaper *Razsvet* similarly bemoaned the "endless intrigues" among the capital's Jews.[105]

This was a far cry, one might note, from the specter of Jewish solidarity. Landau, in his usual partisan way, was one of many who commented upon the extraordinary contrasts among the capital's Jews:

> The diversity of the Jewish population of Petersburg is truly remarkable. Among the Jews here you will find . . . people from all classes of society, in terms of both material status

> and moral development, from extreme conservatives to ardent reformers, from unregenerate fanatics and sanctimonious hypocrites to those who are genuinely religious but at the same time enlightened and tolerant.[106]

Until late in the nineteenth century, when significant numbers of Russian Jewish intellectuals began to cultivate a specifically Jewish form of populism (many of them having already passed through its Russian counterpart), openly critical remarks about popular Jewish practices were a staple of maskilic commentary. Reporting in 1864, for example, on a wedding he had witnessed involving two Jewish soldiers' families in St. Petersburg, Landau ridiculed the "yelling, noise, bustle and disorder," the "wild" mixture of languages, the faulty reading of the prayer book. He was particularly incensed that the bride was forbidden to eat the entire day and had to have her hair plucked out by the guests, her head smeared with sugar and honey (for good luck) and covered with a heavy wig. Normally, Landau assured his readers, one would find such "ignorance and religious superstition only in the most remote, backward, Lithuanian shtetls." Neiman's excessively long sermon at the wedding, in German no less, only added to the incongruity of such events taking place in the Russian capital.[107]

Similarly, the editors of *Razsvet*, reviewing a visit to St. Petersburg by Adolphe Crémieux, the head of the Paris-based Alliance Israélite Universelle, worried aloud:

> Imagine if Monsieur Crémieux . . . had taken it into his head to ask our notables to show him their house of worship, and instead of magnificent Parisian-style synagogues, with their well-ordered, harmonious services, they had had to show him our dark, dirty, stinking kennels, ruled by noise and uproar and other similar attributes of our quasi-Orthodox prayer houses.[108]

Nor were foreign Jewish dignitaries the only potentially important audience for St. Petersburg's Jews.[109] According to a memorandum circulated among the communal governing board, the Russian political elites who were concentrated in the imperial capital would also draw certain conclusions from what they witnessed of Jewish life there:

> One must not forget that the life of Petersburg Jews unfolds before the eyes of those upon whom depends the fate of all Jews in Russia, the granting to the Jews of the right to life [*sic*], labor and education. If Petersburg Jews, even in their lower ranks, will demonstrate by their example a capacity for productive labor, good manners and good morals—all this will produce the appropriate impression and will serve to uproot the reigning prejudices among influential circles of Russian society in the capital.[110]

At first glance, religious tensions among St. Petersburg Jews appeared to match lines of social division, dividing traditionally observant soldiers and artisans from "progressive" (or indifferent) merchants and intellectuals. One should not, however, be misled by Neiman's proposal to hold separate elections according to social estate, or by petitions in the name of "artisans" or "soldiers" or "merchants," into seeing the fault lines as simply following the categories of estate. To begin with, such categories, while crucial for a Jew's legal status, were in practice often fictitious.[111] Moreover, according to an 1878 report by the city governor, in at least three of St. Petersburg's eight prayer houses, one could find Jews of different estates worshipping side by side.[112]

The limited available evidence concerning religious practices among St. Petersburg Jews suggests that disaffection with Orthodoxy occurred in varying degrees at all social levels of the city's Jewish population. But whereas among the well-to-do and educated such dissatisfaction often led to a search for something resembling Reform Judaism, among poor and uneducated Jews it seems to have translated into a departure from organized religion altogether.[113] Religious conflicts within St. Petersburg Jewry were less a matter of competing theologies than of everyday practices and forms of community: the orderliness and severity of the synagogue service, decorum, dress, the use of choral singing and of non-Jewish languages, and the turn to new and large-scale forms of philanthropy as the defining communal activity. St. Petersburg Jewish elites rapidly adopted modes of fund-raising from the surrounding society, including charitable balls, ladies' committees, bazaars and limited-edition publications. The range of beneficiaries of all this activity expanded, too, reflecting a new set of social concerns: funds were earmarked for vocational and agricultural training, inexpensive housing, and aid to poor women, students and artists, among others. Philanthropies in the capital, moreover, were more likely to target Jews in the Pale than those living in St. Petersburg itself.

Moreover, the confusion of contemporary terms for the opposing camps suggests that categories were difficult to define by the second half of the nineteenth century, and they were certainly less coherent than our received notions of "Hasidism," "mitnagdism," "Orthodoxy," "musar" and others would suggest.[114] Landau, noting that in St. Petersburg within the same Jewish family one could often find those who prayed thrice daily and thrice yearly, vaguely pitted "reformers" and "the enlightened" against "conservatives" and "fanatics." Gintsburg's secretary Emmanuel Levin preferred "progressives" and "conservatives," while *Razsvet* referred to "Reform" and "Orthodox." Decades later, the historian Shaul Ginzburg (who came to St. Petersburg in 1886 as a student) cast the struggle as between the governing board and the "frum" camp, which, according to him, brought together mitnagdim and their erstwhile hasidic enemies. Gordon, tracing much the same religious landscape, depicted a governing board guided by "rational, modern principles" and its opponents as "inspired by the familiar charms and routines that they had left in Shklov and Berdichev."[115]

As one of the few surviving accounts of St. Petersburg Jewry that makes no secret of its preference for the "charms of Berdichev," the memoirs of Pauline Wengeroff offer a useful contrast to the views of Landau, Levin, Gordon and other would-be reformers. Upon arriving in St. Petersburg in the 1870s with her merchant husband, Wengeroff was shocked to find that among the wealthy elite, certain families would observe only Passover, Yom Kippur and—Christmas (ostensibly for the benefit of the servants). Sabbath worshipers would travel to the prayer house by carriage rather than by foot, and would eat during intermissions of the Yom Kippur service. The Passover seder was drastically abridged, and as often as not was celebrated in remembrance of the Exodus not from Egypt, but from the Pale; conversation during dinner would move quickly to the latest headlines and trends in the stock market.[116] But Wengeroff was careful to note that among the Jewish financial elite were also families who followed traditional forms of observance. The high degree of diversity within St. Petersburg Jewry was often blamed for its relative lack of internal cohesion.[117] "We have communal representatives, a communal rabbi, and . . . some ten prayer houses,"

Landau lamented in 1869, "but you will search in vain for a Jewish community here."[118] Aside from a single orphanage for the children of Jewish soldiers and a single elementary school for some seventy-five children of the poor, there were as yet few of the traditional institutions that made Judaism in Eastern Europe a social order as well as a religion: burial and mutual-aid societies, subsidized kosher cafeterias, hospitals, interest-free lending agencies, a *talmud torah* or, for that matter, a proper synagogue.[119] Indeed, beginning in 1869, the lone Jewish orphanage found itself threatened by a rival orphanage, sponsored by the Imperial Society of Lovers of Mankind, expressly for "Jewish children baptized or entering baptism into the Russian Orthodox faith."[120]

The self-styled reformers who complained of communal discord nonetheless insisted that, because of its representative function, St. Petersburg Jewry could not afford to split formally into separate camps, as had Jews in Vilna, Odessa and other cities in the Pale. Particularly in centralized countries such as Russia or France, argued the editors of *Razsvet*, the capital was the natural center of cultural and political activity, no less for Jews than for other groups. Not only among Jews in the Pale, but in Russian society and the government, "it is desired and expected that we serve as models for our provincial brothers. . . . And let us admit that we are not averse to regarding ourselves as the leaders and architects of the fate of Russian Jewry." But *Razsvet* was forced to concede that the exemplary Jews in West European capitals were themselves already divided into separate Reform and Orthodox communities. Insisting rather obscurely that such an arrangement would be "premature" in St. Petersburg, *Razsvet* could only note that "our Jewish Orthodoxy does not at all correspond to the meaning of the term in Western Europe."[121]

The Struggle for Communal Leadership: II

St. Petersburg Jewry brought to full boil the intramural tensions simmering throughout the Pale. Because of St. Petersburg's special political and cultural role, and because of the absence of a Jewish past there, Jewish institutions in the capital were fashioned within the context of a particularly fierce struggle for exclusive communal authority and recognition from the tsarist government.

One year after the failed 1868 elections to the governing board, new elections were held in which, by private agreement between Horace Gintsburg and city authorities, only registered merchants and graduates of institutions of higher education took part. Composed entirely of merchants and financiers, and with Gintsburg again at its head, the newly elected board quickly took a number of decisive steps. First, with official approval, it limited the right to vote in future elections to those—of whatever estate—who contributed at least twenty-five rubles to the communal treasury, a sum beyond the reach of most St. Petersburg Jews.[122] Despite frequent protests in subsequent years against the voting fee, these guidelines remained unchanged until the upheavals of 1917, thereby assuring at least the formal ascendancy of the "reformers."[123] Second, the board put its own financial dealings in greater order, and in 1873 began publishing annual (or nearly annual) reports on its budget and activities. No other Jewish community in the Russian empire made itself available for public scrutiny in this way.

Finally, in response to the many charges of fiscal abuse and again with official approval, the board eliminated the kosher meat tax as a source of communal revenue.[124] This measure put the St. Petersburg community on a dramatically different fiscal footing than that of Jewish communities in the Pale. As a community-wide, more or less mandatory consumption tax specifically linked to religious practice, the korobka was the last significant vestige of the Jews' right to govern themselves as a corporate entity. The abandonment of internal taxation meant a loss of control by communal authorities over the community of practicing Jews, and the transformation of the latter into a strictly voluntary collectivity. As it turned out, the number of St. Petersburg Jews who volunteered, or were able, to pay the twenty-five ruble voting fee never exceeded 350.[125] Revenue from the fee consistently proved too meager to finance the board's projects and, as before, the communal budget depended largely upon individual donations.[126] The board's annual reports invariably included a jeremiad against the paucity of donors and the resulting budgetary constraints.

After the reorganization of the governing board in 1869, virtually all aspects of official Jewish communal life in the capital (leaving aside the now largely separate and rarely visible activities of the more traditional groups) were dependent on the voluntary contributions of a handful of extraordinarily wealthy families. At the head of the community, the Barons Gintsburg—first Evzel, then his son Horace, followed by his son David—formed a quasi-dynastic leadership with access to high tsarist officials and considerable fame throughout the Pale as philanthropists and intercessors. Something of the family's standing can be gleaned from the fact that in private, St. Petersburg Jews referred to Horace Gintsburg simply as "papasha" ("papa").[127] On their periodic visits to their sprawling estate in Podolia (a province in the Pale), the Gintsburgs were often besieged by crowds of poor Jews begging for assistance or intercession of various kinds.[128] In the popular Jewish imagination, hungry for all-powerful protectors, various prominent St. Petersburg Jews who happened to bear the name Ginsberg, Ginsburg, Ginzburg, or Gunzburg were merged into a single "Baron Gintsburg," to whom all good deeds were attributed.[129]

Despite the appearance of orderliness that the new arrangement gave to the capital's Jews, intramural conflict did not disappear entirely. Though financially separate from the elites, the city's Orthodox and hasidic Jews were often dependent on the governing board to procure residence permits for their clandestine rabbis, who were often formally registered as "assistants" to Neiman and his successor as "official" rabbi, Avram Drabkin.[130] Nor did the new order please the small but vocal minority of Jewish intellectuals with populist leanings. For them it was as if the nouveaux riches depicted in Levanda's *Confession* had come to life and taken control of Russian Jewry's flagship community. In a direct challenge to the Gintsburgs and the Jewish plutocracy, the editors of *Razsvet* wrote in 1880:

> We Jews are still unable to shake off that sad, centuries-old legacy, thrust upon us from without by our . . . historical past, we are still utterly unable to liberate ourselves from that regrettable conviction, unfortunately based on sad experience, that everything can be achieved only through money. Money, and money alone, saved us from expulsion, from bonfires; money secured us, and in some states even today secures us, respect and a privileged position. Why then, it is asked, shouldn't our communal affairs be resolved as needed by money, and money alone? This, however, turns out to be impossible. *Within*

> Jewry, different levers, different moving forces are required as well. . . . We are not, incidentally, opposed to the involvement of our well-known financiers in communal affairs. . . . We are merely against their exclusive participation at the expense of everyone else. Only those communal undertakings that are the business not of isolated individuals, but of the people as a whole, can be truly successful.[131]

Relations With City and State Authorities

The struggle among different groups within the Jewish population proved to be only part of the story. For no sooner had the "reformers" won the upper hand (in the wake of the 1869 elections) than they found themselves confronted with unexpected interventions by the state, which had its own visions of St. Petersburg Jewry as a tabula rasa. Official policy, in fact, played nearly as great a role in the shaping of communal institutions in the capital as did the struggles between various Jewish factions.

A bewildering array of tsarist bureaucratic offices had a hand in regulating the communal affairs of St. Petersburg Jewry.[132] Over time, and depending on the personalities involved, the constraints and pressures applied to Jewish communal life varied, but as with official Jewish policy as a whole, certain broad contours are discernible. In essence, these amounted to an attempt to strip Jewish life in the capital of all elements not directly related to religious ritual.

In 1870, the newly reconstituted governing board submitted a charter to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, detailing the proposed legal rights and responsibilities of the city's Jewish community.[133] This charter reiterated the board's longstanding desire to construct a grand synagogue in the imperial capital, as well as an array of related charitable and religious institutions. All the proposed institutions were typical components of Jewish life in the Pale. In its response to the charter, however, the ministry announced that Jewish communal life in St. Petersburg was to be organized differently from that within the Pale. A burial society, for example, could not be financed or controlled by the governing board, for that "would resemble the structure of the kahal," which had been formally banned by Russian law in 1844. Similarly, philanthropic institutions would have to be wholly independent of the board, lest they promote an "artificial centralization" of authority within the community. Indeed, the ministry declared that, with the exception of the planned synagogue, the board lacked the right to own property in its own name.[134] At the very least, each communal organization would have to apply separately for permission to carry out its activities.

The governing board, already beleaguered by its opponents within the Jewish community, was stunned by the drastic limitations imposed on its authority by the government. At a time when the board was struggling to shed its reputation among the city (and the empire's) Jews as an instrument of the wealthy elite, the government's policy required that all communal capital, buildings (other than the planned synagogue) and land be registered as the property of individuals rather than of the community as a whole, thereby strengthening the appearance, if not the reality, of corruption.[135] Moreover, official resistance to Jewish communal organizations in St. Petersburg only increased with time, even as the size of the Jewish population and its needs grew. By the late 1870s, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was questioning

whether specifically Jewish philanthropic and educational institutions were necessary in St. Petersburg at all, since they strengthened the Jews' status as "a distinct corporation."[136] In its published annual report for 1882, the board explained its relatively meager accomplishments by noting tersely that it had "not exceeded the program drawn up for it by the government."[137]

The policy of curtailing the activities of Jewish communal institutions was certainly not unique to St. Petersburg. The kahal had been formally abolished in 1844, and since the 1860s, the tsarist government had sought to eliminate Jewish burial societies in the Pale. But these efforts were notably unsuccessful.[138] What distinguished the experience of Jews in St. Petersburg was the vigor with which the government pursued its aim there.

The government's highly restrictive approach to all Jewish institutions not immediately connected to religious ritual (narrowly understood), first applied in St. Petersburg, became the explicit model for official policy toward Jewish communities everywhere outside the Pale.[139] In this sense, the attempt to reduce Jewish communal life in the Russian interior to purely religious and strictly voluntary functions can be seen as extending the logic of selective emancipation, according to which residence outside the Pale was conditional upon integration (however formal) into certain social groups. Having joined those groups, Jews in theory were no longer supposed to require the array of services provided by specifically Jewish organizations, from health care to interest-free loans. As an official report by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the Jews of St. Petersburg argued in 1877, "the concept of a distinct 'Jewish community' [*osoboe 'evreiskoe obshchestvo'*], apart from membership by Jews in the existing estates—merchants, urban dwellers, artisans—has lost its meaning."[140]

The Synagogue Controversy

Perhaps in no other arena were relations between the communal governing board and the tsarist government so tangled—and so symbolically laden—as in the construction of St. Petersburg's first synagogue.[141] For the "reformers," this project took precedence over all others: a synagogue in the political and cultural center of the empire would serve as a glorious statement, impressing the Jews' worthiness upon Russian society, the government and the Jews themselves. Jewish newspapers, in St. Petersburg as well as in other cities, kept their readers regularly informed of developments in the synagogue's planning and construction. As Landau put it,

> A Jewish temple in Petersburg—this is a matter of utmost importance. Everyone understands and agrees with this. And every Jew, no matter where he lives, whether in Petersburg, or in Odessa, in the foothills of the Caucasus, or the cold snows of Siberia—each will make his full contribution to this great cause . . . , this temple, in which Russian society will become acquainted with the most profound side of Jewish existence: with the Jewish religion![142]

Perhaps unintentionally, Landau's imagery suggests the extent to which the St. Petersburg Jewish elite, taking a cue from its Russian counterpart, had begun to see the world through an imperial lens, with itself at the center, surrounded by far-flung

and diverse peripheries. This vision is particularly striking given that all but a sliver of the Russian empire's expansive territory was in fact off-limits to the majority of the Jewish population. But the perceived audience for a national synagogue extended even beyond the empire. "The future synagogue in St. Petersburg," argued Gordon, "must not be inferior in any way to the synagogues of other countries and capitals."[143] After all, the Russian empire had by far the world's largest Jewish population, more than all of Europe combined. The frequency with which St. Petersburg Jews (again like their Russian neighbors) compared themselves and their planned synagogue to their counterparts in West European capitals lends credence to the claim that it was in part concern over Western Jewish opinion, and in particular Crémieux's visit to Russia in 1869, that sparked plans for the synagogue's construction.[144]

In a rather different way, comparisons with the West also inspired one of the preeminent Russian art historians and liberal critics of the time, V.V. Stasov (a non-Jew), to launch a public discussion of the future synagogue. Writing in the St. Petersburg "thick journal" *Evreiskaia Biblioteka* (*The Jewish Library*) in 1872, Stasov noted that "it is somehow embarrassing, right next door to Europe," that Jews in St. Petersburg should not have their own synagogue in which to worship freely and openly. A grand synagogue in the capital would add to Russia's "honor and glory, because it would once again prove that we are increasingly putting an end to our former shameful prejudices [and that] we do not want to lag behind the rest of Europe in the brightness and breadth of [our] attitudes."[145] Indeed, with its kaleidoscopic range of ethnic and religious groups, the Russian empire had the potential to far outstrip European countries as a showcase of tolerance, human diversity and universalist aspirations. For Stasov, a synagogue in St. Petersburg—alongside the already existing Russian-Orthodox, Catholic, Lutheran, Protestant, Armenian and other churches, as well as a mosque—would reinforce the image of a broad and generous Russian national character.

As one might expect from an art historian, Stasov also had certain ideas about the proposed synagogue's appearance. To highlight the empire's diversity, it would necessarily have to look distinctively and recognizably Jewish. Much of Stasov's argument, in fact, took the form of a polemic against Richard Wagner's recently published antisemitic diatribe, "Das Judentum in der Musik," defending the idea that the Jews had their own aesthetic styles to draw upon and were not mere parasites of other traditions. For Stasov, an authentically Jewish synagogue would look "Oriental" and "Eastern," built in the "Arabic-Moorish" style of synagogues in medieval Spain and, more recently, Germany.[146]

However welcome Stasov's sentiments may have been to many of the capital's Jews—and within the context of Russian public discourse in the 1870s, his remarks were unusually sympathetic—they nevertheless provoked strong opposition from several prominent Jewish voices. In a private letter to Stasov, the well-known sculptor of Jewish origin, Mark Antokol'skii, endorsed the call for an authentically Jewish design for the St. Petersburg synagogue, but questioned whether a Moorish style would meet this goal. "I am concerned," he wrote, "that it not be an imitation of the Berlin synagogue, which was designed in imitation of a Protestant church, which in turn is an imitation of a Catholic church." To follow such a pattern would be "to imitate precisely that which we should least of all be imitating."[147]

Yehudah Leib Gordon took nearly the opposite view. In his published response to Stasov, Gordon denied that the Jews had their own distinct architectural style, arguing instead that throughout their history, "the Jews borrowed the style of the dominant nation at any given time and place."[148] Consistent with his well-known slogan—"Be a man in the streets and a Jew at home"—Gordon argued that only the internal aspect of Jewish ritual had ever mattered to the Jews, who were "completely indifferent to the external appearance of their houses of worship . . . as long as it did not contain anything shocking, tendentious or anti-Jewish."[149] If Jews had once built synagogues in an Arabic style, this was only because they had lived among Arabs. To reproduce such a style in St. Petersburg made no more sense than for the Jews to speak Arabic there, rather than Russian.

Instead, he argued, a synagogue in the Russian capital ought to follow the style of Russian Orthodox churches, while excluding all explicitly Christian symbols.[150] Nor should a Star of David be placed on the synagogue's cupola, since, according to Gordon, Jewish teaching rejects visual representation altogether, and in any case the Star of David was a product of "popular superstition" inspired by the kabbalah. In essence, Gordon's response sought to remove all appearances of "Oriental" qualities in Jewish religious practice. Except for the fact that they pray toward the East, Gordon maintained, Jews were not intrinsically an "Eastern" people.

By implication, then, the St. Petersburg synagogue was supposed to illustrate the notion that Judaism was fully compatible with Western norms and traditions. Of course, Gordon's position took for granted that copying the architecture of a Russian Orthodox church would advance this goal, and he thus avoided the complex problem of Russia's own shifting identity between East and West. But more important for our purposes, beneath the surface of a scholarly debate about architectural history, Stasov and Gordon had staked out unexpectedly opposed positions on the Jews' proper role in the Russian empire. Gordon's insistence on complete external assimilation directly undermined Stasov's hope that Russia's glory would reside in its diversity, whereas Stasov's call for the Jews to emphasize their distinctiveness could only work against Gordon's dream of Jewish integration and acceptance.

While the debate over architectural style was being carried out, another was being waged over the synagogue's location. Where could one find a suitable setting for a synagogue with representational ambitions within St. Petersburg's already symbolically laden urban landscape, with its grand imperial facades, foreign luxury stores, grimy factories and crowded tenements? And, one should add, its churches: prerevolutionary St. Petersburg was a city filled with imposing churches, a fact that considerably complicated the placement of a synagogue. An imperial *ukaz* dating from the reign of Nicholas I decreed that no synagogue in the empire be built closer to a Russian Orthodox church than one hundred *sazhen* (approximately two hundred meters) if on the same street, or fifty sazhen if on a different street.[151] Stasov was sufficiently concerned about this restriction to recommend to city authorities that it be dropped as archaic; it was not.[152]

The search for a site began in 1869 and lasted more than a decade. The seemingly endless delays only fueled accusations within the Jewish community of absenteeism and lethargy on the part of the governing board.[153] In reality, the board's many proposals were invariably taken up and chewed on at length by various branches of the

city and imperial bureaucracies, only to be rejected. The first proposal targeted a fashionable site at the intersection of the Fontanka Canal and Gorokhovaia Street, one of the three radial boulevards (including Nevsky Prospect) that gave the downtown area its distinctive layout. The neighborhood with the greatest Jewish settlement, Pod"iacheskii, as well as a temporary "merchant prayer house," were nearby. But General F.F. Trepov, the St. Petersburg police commandant (1866–1878) and city governor (1873–1878), vetoed the plan, citing the fact that important government officials often traveled along Gorokhovaia on their way to the Tsarsko-Selskoe train station, and that "it would not be good if masses of Jews were to gather there on Saturdays and Jewish holidays."[154] Instead, Trepov proposed a site on the outskirts of the city, in the northeastern corner of the Vyborg district, in an area where very few Jews, or anyone else for that matter, lived. The board in turn rejected this idea since it was several miles from Pod"iacheskii, thus making it impossible for congregants to walk to synagogue on the Sabbath and other holy days.[155]

The board rebounded with a new proposal for a different spot near Pod"iacheskii, on Bol'shaia Masterskaia street (currently Lermontovskii Prospect). This time Trepov's objections were more explicit: "A Jewish synagogue should not be permitted to be built in a populated part of the city, in order to avoid the gathering there of unruly crowds and the associated filth."[156] This position appeared to place the issue of walking distance in jeopardy; appeals by the board to higher authorities, including Tsar Alexander II, were of no avail.

Trepov's resignation in the wake of his near assassination by the populist Vera Zasulich in 1878 inspired a new round of proposals. Gordon, for one, again addressed himself in public to the issue of the synagogue:

> The masses of the Russian people are like a good-natured, trusting child who listens to what his elders say. Their "way of thinking" depends on the direction given them from above. Place a Jewish synagogue on Nevsky Prospect and the common Russian, passing by, will take off his hat and cross himself: "Must be, well, holy, if they put it here." But hide it beyond the Narvsky Gates [at the southwestern edge of the city], and he will not only regard the banished synagogue as something foul, but will infer that it is pleasing to God and the authorities to throw out all the yids.[157]

This passage is remarkable in several respects. It graphically illustrates the enduring maskilic habit of looking to the state as both potential ally of the Jews and all-powerful shaper of popular Russian attitudes and behavior.[158] In Gordon's view, moreover, the state's power of persuasion expresses itself not just in the form of St. Petersburg, the imposing metropolis created by Peter the Great, but of Nevsky Prospect in particular. Granted, by anyone's definition Nevsky was charged with symbolic significance, but in Gordon's telling (mis)reading, it is supposed to be perceived by Russians as a sacred space, in contrast to its more typical reputation as an arena of Western commercial influence, of mixing among disparate social groups, and increasingly, of political demonstrations—in a word, of an uncertain modernity.[159]

In any event, as a site for the synagogue, Nevsky never came under serious consideration. Trepov's resignation did, however, ease matters, and in 1880 the lot on Bol'shaia Masterskaia was by all the necessary city and imperial authorities. In the meantime, a pledge campaign among the Jewish financial elite had already secured

more than one hundred twenty-five thousand rubles in funding (as against a projected cost of some eight hundred thousand rubles), with Horace Gintsburg topping the list at seventy thousand.[160] The governing board convened a jury to review submissions for the synagogue's design, and in the spirit of integration included a non-Jew, none other than V.V. Stasov.

Stasov's wide reputation, in fact, gave him far greater authority than his three fellow jurors, and thus the chance to carry out the ideas he had promoted in his exchanges with Gordon and Antokol'skii. One submission, for example, Stasov rejected out of hand precisely because of its resemblance to a church. More importantly, he singled out the winning entry, by Leon I. Bakhman (the first Jew to graduate from the Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg) and I.I. Shaposhnikov (a Russian professor at the academy), "not only for its Arabic style, but in general for its Eastern character. . . . In its cumulative effect the building resembles neither a church . . . nor a mosque."[161]

This was not the end of the matter, however. When the governing board submitted Bakhman and Shaposhnikov's design to Alexander II for final approval, it was unexpectedly returned with the tsar's terse comment: "Redo the project in more modest dimensions."[162] Even Gordon, who opposed the winning design, was dumbstruck by what he understood this remark to mean: "Jews ought not to assume that they are already full-fledged residents, rather than mere guests." Struggling to maintain his optimism, he could only shake his head at such "inexplicable mistrust."[163]

The synagogue opened its doors in 1893. It is difficult to know how much smaller it was than originally planned, but the cost of construction was just over half the original estimate.[164] With a reduced seating capacity of twelve hundred, it was still large by contemporary standards, but smaller than the two grand synagogues of Odessa (the Brody and the Glavnaia), as well as the imposing Oranienburg synagogue of Berlin. A dozen pseudo-minarets and various ornamental details gave the building the desired "Eastern" flavor (see Figure 1). Inside, services followed the pattern set by German Reform synagogues, with named seats for wealthy donors and choral singing (but no organ). Known officially as the "choral synagogue" (as it is today), for a time the building also carried the more informal name of the "Baron Gintsburg synagogue."[165]

Conclusion

It is a measure of the complexity of the process of acculturation—or *sliianie*, to use the contemporary Russian term—that St. Petersburg Jews exhibited both remarkable adaptation to their new surroundings and abiding separateness. The most striking example of this contrast is to be found in the simultaneous movement toward unparalleled linguistic assimilation, on the one hand, and continued, even intensified, residential segregation, on the other. Neither of these phenomena was the direct result of regulation by the tsarist state, notwithstanding the latter's well-known penchant for social control. Rather, they reflected the largely unregulated encounter of Jews with the dynamic, turbulent world of the imperial capital.

That world, whatever its reputation among Russian intellectuals, was for its Jewish inhabitants the paramount symbol of Russia itself, the imperial "center," and thus of



Синагога въ Петербургѣ.

The “national” synagogue in St. Petersburg, c. 1900.
Source: Evreiskaia entsiklopediia. Svod znanii o evreistve i ego kul’ture v proshlom i nastoiashchem, vol. 13 (St. Petersburg: 1906), opp. p. 944.

escape from the peripheral confines of the Pale. But the sense of having "arrived" was nonetheless conspicuously absent from the lives of St. Petersburg Jews, who displayed persistent signs of an uncertain status in the capital. Although Jews in fin-de-siècle Paris or Berlin may have had doubts about their acceptance as full-fledged Frenchmen or Germans, they were by and large secure in their role as Parisians or Berliners. St. Petersburg, by contrast, appears not to have performed such a mediating function between the individual Jew and Russian society. Even at the pinnacle of St. Petersburg Jewry, Horace Gintsburg was repeatedly denied admission into the ranks of the Russian hereditary nobility, and as a result of the Urban Statute of 1892 (which inter alia barred Jews from holding many local elected offices), he was stripped of his seat on the St. Petersburg city council. As if in response, following Gintsburg's death in St. Petersburg in 1909, the body of the man who more than any other stood for Russian Jewry and its struggle for integration into Russian society was taken for burial, at his prior request, to Paris.[166]

The chronic Russian assumption of Jewish solidarity notwithstanding, the history of Jews in St. Petersburg reveals tremendous centrifugal pressures within the Jewish community. Indeed, the fissures among Jews in the areas of religious observance, language use and social status all but force one to speak of Jewish *communities* within one and the same city. In this respect, St. Petersburg Jews gave heightened expression to trends already underway in the Pale, and foreshadowed the extraordinarily splintered state of Russian Jewry after 1917.

But it was not only internal pressures that hindered the formation of the traditional network of Jewish communal institutions. In the Russian capital, the full consequences of the government's experiment with selective emancipation came into view. Having nominally bestowed upon select groups of Jews the rights of their non-Jewish counterparts according to social estate, the tsarist regime expected—and did its best to insure—that such privileged Jews themselves would no longer constitute a distinct estate, and that Jewish communal life outside the Pale would lose its social dimension.[167]

Notes

A different version of this essay appeared in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44, no. 2 (1996), 178–215. I would like to thank Richard Brody, Eli Nathans, Alexander Orbach, Shaul Stampfer, Robert Weinberg and Reginald Zelnik for their comments and criticisms. The Social Science Research Council, the International Research & Exchanges Board, the U.S. Department of Education (Fulbright-Hays Fellowship Program), and the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture provided generous financial support while this essay was being prepared.

1. Iu. I. Gessen, *Istoriia evreiskogo naroda v Rossii*, vol. 2 (Leningrad: 1927), 155–159, 208. A recent and detailed description of government debates leading up to the 1859 legislation on Jewish merchants can be found in V. Nakhmanovich, "Proryv za Chertu (Istoriia priniatiia zakona o prave povsemestnogo zhitel'stva evreev-kuptsov 1-i gil'dii), *Vestnik evreiskogo universiteta v Moskve* 1, no. 14 (1997), 16–40.

2. Despite its current broad usage in the West—a reflection, perhaps, of the tendency to subsume everything in the Russian empire (and later the Soviet Union) under the general rubric of "Russian"—the term "Russian Jew" made its first tentative appearance in Russian discourse only in the 1850s, that is, three quarters of a century after the Jews' incorporation into the em-

pire. The earliest usage of the term that I have been able to find occurred in an 1856 petition to the government from Evzel Gintsburg and other Jewish merchants; see Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGIA), f. 1269, op. 1, d. 61, l. 4. For an extended discussion of the concept of "selective emancipation," see Benjamin Nathans, *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia* (forthcoming: University of California Press), ch. 1.

3. *Evreiskoe naselenie Rossii po dannym perepisi 1897 goda i po noveishim istochnikam* (Petrograd: 1917), ix. For a useful survey of Jewish communities outside the Pale, see Semyon Kreiz, "Toldot hayehudim beeizorim shemiḥuẓ leteḥum hamoshav" (Master's thesis, University of Haifa, 1984).

4. *Sanktpeterburg po perepisi 10 dekabria 1869 goda*, vol. 1, section 2 (St. Petersburg: 1872), 25, 38, 49, 59; *Petrograd po perepisi naseleniia 15 dekabria 1910 goda*, part one, section one (Petrograd: n.d.), 5. The 1869 census did not include the four suburban *uchastki*, and therefore the actual legal Jewish population in 1869 was probably slightly higher. On the large number of illegal Jewish residents, see the 1878 letter from the St. Petersburg city governor to the minister of internal affairs in RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, l. 125. For similar impressions from Jewish sources, see Shaul M. Ginzburg, *Amolike Peterburg* (New York: 1944), 22, and Vladimir Grossman, *Amol un haynt* (Paris: 1955), 15.

5. Aside from a handful of articles and chapters and Mikhail Beizer's published version of his walking tours of Jewish historical sights in St. Petersburg, there have been no studies of prerevolutionary St. Petersburg Jewry. See Beizer, *The Jews of St. Petersburg: Excursions Through a Noble Past* (Philadelphia: 1989), which is translated and expanded from his *Evrei v Peterburge* (Jerusalem: 1989). See also the following works by N.V. Iukhneva: *Etnicheskii sostav i etnosotsial'naia struktura naseleniia Peterburga, vtoraia polovina XIX—nachalo XX veka: statisticheskii analiz* (Leningrad: 1984), 207–215; "Peterburg kak tsentr natsional'no-kul'turnykh dvizhenii narodov rossii," *Etnografiia Peterburga-Leningrada* 1 (1987), 4–12; and "Evrei Peterburga v period reform 1860-kh godov: sotsial'no-demograficheskaia kharakteristika," in *Peterburg i guberniia. Istoriko-etnograficheskie issledovaniia*, ed. N.V. Iukhneva (Leningrad: 1989), 81–112. See also Alexander Orbach, "The Russian-Jewish Leadership and the Pogroms of 1881–82: The Response From St. Petersburg," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 308 (1984); Michael Stanislawski, *For Whom Do I Toil? Judah Leib Gordon and the Crisis of Russian Jewry* (New York: 1988), 106–128; and Iu. P. Vartanov, "Nekotorye dannye o byte peterburgskikh evreev v 70-e gody na stranitsakh gazety 'Hamelitz'," *Etnografiia Peterburga-Leningrada* 1 (1987), 30–36.

6. G.B. Sliozberg, *Dela minuvshikh dnei. Zapiski russkogo evreia*, vol. 1 (Paris: 1933), 111. Similar sentiments on the part of other Jewish residents of the capital appear in Jacob Teitel, *Aus meiner Lebensarbeit. Errinerungen eines jüdischen Richters im alten Russland* (Frankfurt: 1929), 19; Ginzburg, *Amolike Peterburg*, 20; and Pauline Wengeroff, *Memoiren einer Grossmutter. Bilder aus der Kulturgeschichte der Juden Russlands im 19. Jahrhundert*, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Berlin: 1922), 169.

7. Chaim Aronson, *A Jewish Life Under the Tsars: The Autobiography of Chaim Aronson, 1825–1888*, trans. (from Hebrew) by Norman Marsden (Totowa, New Jersey: 1983), 203–278. To my knowledge, this work is the only published memoir by a Jewish artisan who lived in St. Petersburg.

8. Gershon Lifshits, *Ispoved' prestupnika. Iumoristicheskii rasskaz iz zhizni peterburgskikh evreev* (Petersburg: 1881), 12. Lifshits was a staff writer for the Petersburg Jewish newspaper *Razsvet*.

9. Andreas Kappeler, *Russland als Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich: 1992), 327.

10. Mordechai ben Hillel Hacohen, *'Olam*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: 1927), 81.

11. Most cities in the Great Russian provinces were ethnically even more homogeneously Russian than St. Petersburg. See N.V. Iukhneva, "Materialy k etnicheskomu raionirovaniiu gorodskogo naseleniia evropeiskoi Rossii (po dannym perepisi 1897 g.)," in *Etnicheskie gruppy v gorodakh evropeiskoi chasti SSSR (formirovanie, rasselenie, dinamika kul'tury)*, ed. I.I. Krupnik (Moscow: 1987), 112–126.

12. Demographically, foreigners—that is, citizens of foreign countries—were a marginal element; at their peak, around 1800, they constituted between seven and nine percent of the city's inhabitants. By 1850, foreigners in St. Petersburg were beginning to be outnumbered by non-Russian subjects of the empire such as Finns, Poles and Baltic Germans, immigrants from territories conquered by the Romanovs over the previous 150 years. See N.V. Iukhneva, *Etnicheskii sostav*, 20–23. For a review of secondary literature on non-Russians in prerevolutionary Petersburg, see Klaus Zernack, "Im Sog der Ostseemetropole: St. Petersburg und seine Ausländer," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 35, no. 2 (1987), 232ff., and more recently, Max Engman, "The Finns in St. Petersburg," in *Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850–1940*, vol. 8, *Ethnic Identity in Urban Europe*, ed. Max Engman (New York: 1992), 99–119; Ludwik Bazylow, *Polacy w Petersburgu* (Wrocław: 1984); Anders Henriksson, "Nationalism, Assimilation and Identity in Late Imperial Russia: The St. Petersburg Germans, 1906–1914," *The Russian Review* 52 (July 1993), 341–353; *idem*, "Deutsche in St. Petersburg und Moskau," *Nordost-Archiv* 1 (June 1994).

13. Wengeroff, *Memoiren einer Grossmutter*, vol. 2, 169; Vladimir Medem, *The Life and Soul of a Legendary Jewish Socialist*, trans. (from Yiddish) Samuel Portnoy (New York: 1979), 452.

14. Anecdotal evidence suggests that even after Jews arrived in St. Petersburg, regional affinities in the form of *landsmanshaftn* or *zemliachestva* continued to play an important part in their social and professional lives. See, for example, Markus Kagan [Mordechai ben Hillel Hacohen], "K istorii natsional'nogo samopoznaniia russko-evreiskogo obshchestva. Po lichnym vospominaniiam," *Perezhitoe* 3 (1911), 145, and L.O. Levanda, *Ispoved' del'tsa* (St. Petersburg: 1880), 83–84.

15. Iukhneva, *Etnicheskii sostav*, 82–97. A similar point is made in James H. Bater, *St Petersburg: Industrialization and Change* (London: 1976), 146–147.

16. . "Sizable" here means more than two hundred thousand total members of a given ethnic group. I have also omitted two significantly urbanized groups from the non-European part of the empire: Tadjiks (29 percent) and Sarts (21 percent). See Henning Bauer, Andreas Kappeler and Brigitte Roth (eds.), *Die Nationalitäten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: 1991), 69–74. Using the far more extensive data regarding Jewish migration in the Austro-Hungarian empire during roughly the same period and from a similar East European milieu, Marsha Rozenblit reports that the larger the town in which a Jew lived, and the larger the Jewish community there, the more likely he or she was to move to Vienna. See Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867–1914: Assimilation and Identity* (Albany: 1983), 37.

17. The profound effect of exposure to urban settings is apparent in Aronson's subsequent comment: "When I returned from the big city of Vilna I realized how poorly we had lived—although before I had ever left my father's home I had always considered it a veritable paradise." See Aronson, *A Jewish Life Under the Tsars*, 69, 99.

18. Levanda, *Ispoved' del'tsa*, 79.

19. V. Nikitin, "Iskatel' schast'ia (iz rasskazov otverzhennogo)," *Evreiskaia Biblioteka* 5 (1875), 89.

20. For an analysis of urban experience through peasant eyes, see Barbara Alpern Engel, "Russian Peasant Views of City Life," *Slavic Review* 52, no. 3 (Fall 1993), 446–459.

21. *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia. Svod znanii o evreistve i ego kul'ture v proshlom i nastoiashchem*, vol. 1 (Petersburg: 1906), 652–653, and vol. 7 (p. 164); Ginzburg, *Amolike Peterburg*, 13–14.

22. Y.L. Gordon, "K istorii poseleniia evreev v Peterburge," *Voskhod*, no. 2 (Feb. 1881), 29; *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 16 (pp. 55–60).

23. David Philipson, *Max Lilienthal, American Rabbi: Life and Writings* (New York: 1915), 176. For an account of an expulsion of Jews from St. Petersburg under Nicholas I, see S. Beilin, "Posledstviia poseshcheniia stolitsy dlia dvukh evreev," *Evreiskaia Starina* 3, no. 3 (1911), 418–419.

24. Iu. I. Gessen, "Sankt-Peterburg," *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 13 (p. 939); Ginzburg, *Amolike Peterburg*, 16.

25. Shteinberg, "Prestupniki," *Voskhod*, no. 4 (1881), 161. A later example of the St.

Petersburg Jew as outlaw can be found in the poem by David Shimonovich (Shimoni), "Sfinksy" ("The Sphinxes"), composed in Hebrew in 1910 and published in Russian translation in *Evreiskaia Antologiia. Sbornik molodoi evreiskoi poezii*, ed. V.F. Khodasevich and L.B. Iaffe (Moscow: n.d.), 145–148.

26. Diderot and Catherine's letters, in French with a Russian translation, were reproduced in *Russkii Arkhiv* 3 (1880), 2–3.

27. See, for example, I. G. Orshanskii, *Evrei v Rossii: ocherki ekonomicheskogo i obshchestvennogo byta russkikh evreev* (St. Petersburg: 1877), 234; Gordon, "K istorii poseleniia evreev v Peterburge," 122; Gessen, "Sankt-Peterburg," *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 13 (p. 939); M.B. Epshtein, "K istorii evreiskoi kolonii v Peterburge," *Evreiskaia Letopis'*, vol. 2 (1923), 104; and Ginzburg, *Amolike Peterburg*, 16. Some of these authors may have borrowed from others, but this does not weaken my argument that the incident resonated widely.

28. See Iu. I. Gessen, "Geto v Rossii," *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 6 (pp. 449–457).

29. RGIA, f. 1269, op. 1, d. 136 ll. 59–62, 98–105, and 254.

30. See John Armstrong, "Mobilized Diaspora in Tsarist Russia: The Case of the Baltic Germans," in *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices*, ed. Jeremy Azrael (New York: 1978), 64. Armstrong cites a nineteenth-century historian, A. Bruckner, as comparing the *slobody* to the "Jewish quarters" of cities in Western Europe. See also Iukhneva, *Etnicheskii sostav*, 107.

31. Iukhneva, *Etnicheskii sostav*, 107ff.

32. RGIA, f. 1269, op. 1, d. 136, ll. 98–100. See also Shaul M. Ginzburg, "Idishe getos in amoligen rusland," in his *Historishe verk*, vol. 3 (New York: 1937), 343–347.

33. L.O. Gordon, "K istorii poseleniia evreev v Peterburge," *Voskhod* 1 (1881), 121.

34. RGIA f. 1269, op. 1, d. 136, ll. 59ff; d. 137, l. 1; d. 138, l. 63. In many cases (for example, Vilna, Kiev and Kamenets), restrictions on Jewish residence did indeed go back to the medieval period, when much of the Pale had been under the control of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. The Jewish Committee repeatedly noted that the "ancient privileges" (*de non tolerandis judaeis*) were of Polish, not Russian, origin.

35. Bater, *St Petersburg*, 196–198. Bater further develops the notion of vertical segregation in "Between Old and New: St. Petersburg in the Late Imperial Era," in *The City in Late Imperial Russia*, ed. Michael F. Hamm (Bloomington: 1986), 43–78.

36. Bater acknowledges this in *ibid*., 66.

37. *Sanktpeterburg po perepisi 10 dekabria 1869 goda*, vol. 1, section 2, 25. The six wards were Spasskaia 3 and 4, Kolomenskaia 1, Narvskaia 1 and 2, Moskovskaia 4. One must assume that census data pertaining to Jews in St. Petersburg relate primarily to legal residents; it is virtually impossible to generalize about illegal residents.

38. See Bater, *St Petersburg*, 167, 204, 319 and 345–350.

39. Iukhneva, *Peterburg i guberniia*, 108–109.

40. The census of 1869 reported the two largest estates within St. Petersburg's Jewish population as *meshchane* (34 percent), who included both artisans and petty traders, and retired soldiers (38 percent), who in their civilian trades often were indistinguishable from meshchane. By 1897, those classified as meshchane accounted for 87 percent of the city's Jewish population. However, as has frequently been noted, estate categories tell us relatively little about actual occupation or social status. This applies in particular to Jews, who were known to adopt fictitious professional and/or estate identities in order to secure the legal right to live and work outside the Pale. See *Sanktpeterburg po perepisi 10 dekabria 1869 goda*, vol. 1, section 2, 110–111 and 124–127; *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii, 1897 g. Gorod S.*-Peterburg, vol. 37, part 2 (Petersburg: 1903), 232–247; Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, ch. 3.

41. Aronson, *A Jewish Life Under the Tsars*, 206–219; Lifshits, *Ispoved' prestupnika*, 15.

42. Ginzburg, *Amolike Peterburg*, 22; L. Kliachko, "Za chertoiu: v Peterburge," *Evreiskaia Letopis'* 2 (1923), 120; A.E. Landau, "Pis'ma ob evreiakh: peterburgskie evrei," *Biblioteka dlia Chteniia* 187, no. 2 (1864), 4.

43. Landau, "Pis'ma ob evreiakh," 3–4; Nikitin, *Iskatel' schast'ia*, 90.

44. Quoted in N.N., "Iz vpechatlenii minuvshago veka: vospominaniia srednogo cheloveka," *Evreiskaia Starina* 6, no. 3 (1914), 430. In Jewish folklore, Berdichev often figured as an archetypal Jewish town. According to the 1897 census, among towns with more than fifteen

thousand inhabitants, Berchidev featured a higher proportion of Jews (forty-two thousand out of a total population of fifty-three thousand, or just under four-fifths) than any other town or city in the Pale. See *Evreiskoe naselenie Rossii po dannym perepisi 1897 goda*, 29.

45. S. Gruzenberg, "Evreiskoe naselenie Peterburga v sotsial'nom i sanitarnom otnoshenii," *Voskhod* 1 (Jan. 1891), 6.

46. Bater, *St. Petersburg*, 188–190.

47. If we define Pod"iacheskii as comprising the six precincts described in n. 37, the neighborhood's share of the city's Jewish inhabitants declined as follows: 1869 (63 percent), 1881 (52 percent), 1890 (43 percent) 1910 (30 percent). Whereas in 1869, Jews constituted eight percent of the inhabitants of the designated area, by 1910 their share had fallen to four percent. See *Sanktpeterburg po perepisi 10 dekabria 1869 goda*, vol. 1, section 2 (p. 25); Gruzenberg, "Evreiskoe naselenie Peterburga v sotsial'nom i sanitarnom otnoshenii," 7; *S.-Peterburg po perepisi 15 dekabria 1890 goda*, part 1, section 1 (St. Petersburg: 1891), 46–47; *Petrograd po perepisi naseleniia 15 dekabria 1910 goda*, part 1, section 1 (p. 5).

48. Commenting on the anomaly of Jewish residential patterns, Bater suggests that "in view of the pogroms occurring in the Pale it is not at all surprising that some measure of residential segregation occurred" (*St Petersburg*, 377–378). But it was precisely their highly visible segregation within the towns and cities of the Pale that made Jews more vulnerable to pogroms. This point was understood by St. Petersburg Jews, as evidenced in a letter written by the poet Yehuda Leib Gordon during the wave of pogroms that swept the Pale in 1881: "There is truly no reason to fear such outbreaks in [St. Petersburg], where the Jews live dispersed throughout the city and not concentrated in any one area, as in the provincial towns. . . ." Quoted in Stanislawski, *For Whom Do I Toil?*, 160. A similar point is made in S. Grinberg, *Jewish Life in St. Petersburg: A Paper Read Before the Cambridge Branch of the Anglo-Jewish Association on Friday, February 13, 1914* (Cambridge: 1914), 3.

49. Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna*, 225, n. 26, gives the index of residential segregation for Viennese Jews in 1910 as 44.2.

50. The census of 1897 included particularly detailed data on literacy and language use in each of St. Petersburg's boroughs. Jewish literacy rates ranged from a low of 63 percent (in the outlying Rozhdestvenskaia borough) to a high of 78 percent (in the central Admiralteiskaia borough). Among the population as a whole, literacy ranged from 46 percent (Vyborg and Aleksandro-Nevskaia) to 54 percent (Admiralteiskaia). See *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii, 1897 g.*, vol. 37, part 2, 56–87.

51. Part of the statistical decline in the declaration of Yiddish as native language reflects census-takers' changing definition of what constituted native language. Prior to the census of 1890, native language appears to have been understood as the language of one's childhood, whereas in 1890 and thereafter it was redefined as the language currently spoken at home. This shift in definition may account for the unusually steep drop in Yiddish's status as a native language between 1881 and 1890, but not for its overall decline between 1869 and 1910. In all the St. Petersburg censuses, a very small number of Jews—never more than four percent—declared their native tongue to be German or Polish. Among other major cities, only Moscow showed higher levels of Jewish linguistic assimilation (see Table N-1).

52. See the cautionary note in Bater, *St Petersburg*, 441, and the detailed discussion of the category of literacy in Russian censuses in Bauer, et al. (eds.), *Die Nationalitäten*, vol. 1 (pp. 360–370).

53. *S.-Peterburg po perepisi 15 dekabria 1890 goda*, part 1, vypusk 1, section 2 (p. 80); *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g.*, vol. 37, part 2 (pp. 56–87). According to the 1897 census, among Jews of all ages throughout the empire, 39 percent were literate in any language. See Bauer, et al. (eds.) *Die Nationalitäten*, vol. 2 (p. 94), and Shaul Stampfer, "Yediyat kero ukhtov ezel yehudei mizraḥ eiropa batekufa haḥadasha," in *Temurot behistoriyah hayehudit haḥadashah*, ed. Shmuel Almog, et al. (Jerusalem: 1988), 459–483. Outside of St. Petersburg and a handful of other major cities, the 1897 census did not distinguish literacy levels among Jews claiming different native languages.

54. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g.*, 91; *Petrograd po perepisi naseleniia 15 dekabria 1910 goda*, part one, section 2 (p. 269).

Table N-1. Native Tongue Reported by Those of the Jewish Faith, 1897 (percent)

	Yiddish	Russian	Other
Moscow	60	39	1
St. Petersburg	70	27	3
Warsaw	84	14 (Polish)	2
Odessa	89	7	4
Vilna	96	3	1

Sources: Mark S. Kupovetskii, "Evreiskoe naselenie Moskvy (XV-XX vv.)," in *Etnicheskie gruppy v gorodakh evropeiskoi chasti SSSR (formirovanie, rasselenie, dinamika kul'tury)*, ed. I.I. Krupnik (Moscow: 1987), 66; *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii, 1897 g.*, vol. 37, part 2, 56–87; Stephen D. Corrsin, "Language Use in Cultural and Political Change in Pre-1914 Warsaw: Poles, Jews, and Russification," *Slavic and East European Review* 68, no. 1 (1990), 73; *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 5 (p. 591) and vol. 12 (p. 59).

55. Wengeroff, *Memoiren einer Grossmutter*, vol. 2 (p. 135). Wengeroff goes on to report that

> Jewish banking houses were founded, as were joint-stock companies led by Jews. The stock exchange and banking took on unexpected dimensions. At the stock exchange the Jew felt in his element; there people often became rich overnight, but others were toppled just as quickly. This sort of occupation was something new in Russia. But it was taken up in a positively brilliant manner by the Jews, even by those whose only training had been in Talmud (*ibid*.).

56. B.V. Anan'ich, *Bankirskie doma v Rossii, 1860–1914 gg. Ocherki istorii chastnogo predprinimatel'stva* (Leningrad: 1991), 4.

57. *Razsvet*, no. 24 (12 June 1880), 921.

58. N.N., "Iz vpechatlenii minuvshago veka," 431.

59. Anan'ich, *Bankirskie doma*, 43. In 1878, the Gintsburg bank provided the government with a loan of ten million rubles, more than any private bank had hitherto lent the tsarist regime. The Polish Jewish banker Ippolit Vavel'berg lent an additional two million in the same year.

60. Other prominent Jewish financiers in Petersburg included Leon Rozental, Ippolit Vavel'berg, Lev Fridland and Abram Moiseevich Varshavskii. See Anan'ich, *Bankirskie doma*; Alfred Rieber, "The Formation of 'La Grande Societé des Chemins de Fer Russes," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 21 (1973), 375–391; N.N., "Iz vpechatlenii minuvshago veka," 434–436; and individual entries on these figures in *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*.

61. That is, *chemin-de-fer-nik* ("railroad man"). See Wengeroff, *Memoiren einer Grossmutter*, vol. 2 (p. 137), and Gershon Badenes, "Zapiski otshchepentsa," *Voskhod*, no. 3 (1884), 23–25 (the latter cited in Yehuda Slutsky, *Ha'itonut hayehudit-rusit bameah hatsha'esrei* [Jerusalem: 1970], 20).

62. Quoted in Beizer, *Evrei v Peterburge*, 69 (translation mine). For the original text in full, see N.A. Nekrasov, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, vol. 2 (Leningrad: 1981), 235–236. In this poem, Nekrasov wavers between, on the one hand, lashing out at commercially adept minorities in the Russian capital (not only Jews, but Greeks and Germans) and, on the other, bitterly (and inaccurately) noting that "there is no Russian merchantry (has the bitter cold/Frightened them away, perhaps?)"

63. Julius Eckardt [presumed author], *Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft* (Leipzig: 1881), 44. The municipal census of the same year counted more than sixteen thousand Jews in the city.

64. See I.S. Tsinberg, "Arkadii Kovner: Pisarevshchina v evreiskoi literature," *Perezhitoe*

2 (1910), 130ff. On Kovner generally, see L.P. Grossman, *Ispoved' odnogo evreia* (Moscow: 1924) and Max Weinreich, *Fun bayde zaytn ployt: dos shturemdike lebn fun Uri Kovner, dem nihilist* (Buenos-Aires: 1955).

65. Sholem Ash, *Peterburg* [vol. 1 of the trilogy *Forn mabul*] (Warsaw: 1929). An English translation of the trilogy appeared as *Three Cities* (New York: 1933).

66. See the reviews cited in *Sistematicheskii ukazatel' literatury o evreiakh na russkom iazyke s vremeni vvedeniia grazhdanskogo shrifta (1708 g.) po dekabr' 1889* (Petersburg: 1892), 369, item no. 6522.

67. In addition to Levanda's novel and other works cited in this article, there are a number of rich and suggestive fictional representations of Jewish life in late imperial St. Petersburg: V.N. Nikitin, "Vek prozhit'—ne pole pereiti (iz razskazov otstavnogo soldata)," *Evreiskaia Biblioteka* 4 (1874), 300–358; Y.L. Gordon, *Raḥamei em*, reprinted in *Kitvei Yehudah Leib Gordon: prozah* (Tel-Aviv: 1960), 99–104; M—khin [M. Khin], "Ne ko dvoru," *ibid*., nos. 8–12 (1886); S. Iaroshevskii, "Potselui," *ibid*., nos. 7–10 (1888); N. Pruzhanskii, "Katorzhnik," *ibid*., no. 7 (1903), 69–81; P. Smolenskin, *Gemul yesharim* (Warsaw: 1905); See also the following collection of bittersweet jokes set largely in Petersburg: "Anekdoty o evreiskom bezpravii," *Evreiskaia Starina* 1, no. 4 (1909), 269–281.

68. On Levanda, see *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 10 (pp. 59–63); N.A. Bukhbinder, Literaturnye etiudy (russko-evreiskie pisateli) (Leningrad: 1927); B.A. Gol'dberg, *L. O. Levanda kak publitsist. Po sluchaiu 40 letnogo iubeleia vozniknoveniia russko-evreiskoi pechati* (Vilna: 1900). See also the historian Simon Dubnov's description of his encounter with a broken Levanda, one year before the latter's death, in Dubnov, *Kniga zhizni*, vol. 1 (Riga: 1934), 203–205.

69. Levanda, *Ispoved' del'tsa*, 56–58.

70. L. Kantor, "Chem my sdelalis' v poslednie dvatsat' piat' let?," *Russkii Evrei* 13 (1879), 485–488.

71. Levanda, *Ispoved' del'tsa*, 294.

72. *Ibid*., 232. The novel abounds with further such examples; see pp. 104, 152, 179–180, 195, 300. The reality of severe competition among Jews is confirmed in many contemporary sources, Jewish as well as Russian.

73. *Ibid*., 233–234.

74. L. O. Levanda, *Goriachee vremia* (St. Petersburg: 1875), 327.

75. Carole Malkin (ed.), *The Journeys of David Toback* (New York: 1981), 13. Further examples of the Jewish propensity to gesticulate are to be found in I.V. Gessen, *V dvukh vekakh: zhiznennyi otchet* (Berlin: 1937), 12; Sliozberg, *Dela minuvshikh dnei*, vol. 1 (p. 30); Lifshits, *Ispoved' prestupnika*, 14.

76. Oblomov was a lethargic character who snored his way to fame in a popular novel by Ivan Goncharov. The Russian Jewish historian Ilia Orshanskii contrasted the "persistence" and "energy" of the Jews to the Russians' "age-old Oblomovism," which he described as "somewhere between easy-goingness and indifference." See Orshanskii, *Evrei v Rossii*, 180, 194, 233. For similar characterizations see Ginzburg, *Amolike Peterburg*, 47; Wengeroff, *Memoiren einer Grossmutter*, vol. 2 (pp. 133, 174); S.L. Tsitron, *Shtadlonim* (Warsaw: 1926), 343.

77. Elements of this contrast appear in Yiddish folk sayings such as "Az der yid iz hungerik—zingt er; der poyer—shlogt dos vayb." "Apikoyres" (Epicurean) was a standard Yiddish epithet for an irreligious person. The idea of the Jews as a "spiritual nation" lies at the heart of Simon Dubnov's philosophy of Jewish history; see Dubnov, *Ob izuchenii istorii russkikh evreev i ob uchrezhdenii russko-evreiskogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* (St. Petersburg: 1891), 5–8.

78. S. A. An-skii, "Evreiskoe narodnoe tvorchestvo," *Perezhitoe* 1 (1909), 278.

79. "Zhid idet!," *Novoe Vremia*, no. 1461 (23 March 1880). On Dostoevsky, see David Goldstein, *Dostoevsky and the Jews* (New York: 1981); and more generally, Felix Dreizin, *The Russian Soul and the Jew: Essays in Ethno-Literary Criticism* (Philadelphia: 1990). For attitudes among political elites, see Hans Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Berkeley: 1986), 110, 170–173.

80. *Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti*, no. 331 (1868), quoted in Grigorii Vol'tke, "Russkie liudi po voprosu ob obrazovanii evreev," *Sbornik v pol'zu evreiskikh shkol* (St. Petersburg: 1896), 510.

81. "Iz perepiski L.O. Levandy," *Evreiskaia Starina* 5, no. 2 (1913), 280–281.

82. See the account of a conversation with Gresser in W.T. Stead, *The Truth about Russia* (London: 1888), 247; Durnovo's position is recounted in *Dnevnik gosudarstvennogo sekretaria A. A. Polovtsova*, vol. 2 (Moscow: 1966), 433. As the moving force behind the Society for the Spread of Enlightenment Among Russian Jews, Gintsburg did indeed help supervise the distribution of stipends to Jewish students at Russian universities, including that of St. Petersburg. But he and the society were loyal to the tsarist regime and had no sympathy whatever for radicals.

83. L.O. Gordon, "K istorii poseleniia evreev v Peterburge," *Voskhod*, no. 2 (1881), 45. The charge of Jewish solidarity must have struck Gordon as particularly ironic in the wake of what he believed was a hasidic conspiracy against him. See Stanislawski, *For Whom Do I Toil?*, 136 and the sources cited there.

84. On communal institutions in Odessa see Steven J. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History, 1794–1871* (Stanford: 1986), esp. 9–40.

85. "Zadachi peterburgskikh evreev," *Razsvet*, no. 22 (29 May 1880), 843.

86. Comparisons to Jewish communities in West European capitals were common and explicit: see, for example, remarks by Yehudah Leib Gordon in the records of the Petersburg synagogue board, in Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv goroda S.-Peterburg (TsGIA-SPb), f. 422, op. 1, d. 157, l. 84 (I am indebted to V.A. Levin for bringing Gordon's remarks to my attention); also "Zadachi peterburgskikh evreev," *Razsvet*, no. 22 (29 May 1880) and no. 26 (26 June 1880).

87. RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, ll. 7–9. The term "diploma intelligentsia" was commonly used to distinguish the younger generation of secularly educated Jews from older *maskilim*, whose formal education tended to be strictly Jewish.

88. *Razsvet*, no. 20 (15 May 1880), 763.

89. A.E. Landau ["Gamabbit"] "Peterburgskie pis'ma," *Den'*, no. 43 (1870), 765; for similar views of Neiman's lack of initiative, see *Razsvet*, no. 22 (29 May 1880), 843–845. Landau quoted an unidentified fellow Jew as asking, "For whom is the rabbi necessary: for the Jews or for the Christians?" In one sense Neiman was indeed a rabbi "for the Christians." His appointment had been carefully supervised by the imperial authorities, and by 1864 he was being referred to in official government correspondence as "functionary [*chinovnik*] for special assignments in Jewish affairs" in the office of the governor of St. Petersburg province. In this capacity, and not unlike the "expert Jews" employed by numerous government offices, Neiman occasionally submitted reports to state officials on developments within St. Petersburg Jewry, together with suggestions for reform. This practice was in accord with the official policy of seeking to use the clergy—of whatever religion—as sources of information about various segments of the population. See RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 16, ll. 1–10; d. 24, ll. 33–35; dd. 400, 417, 427.

90. See n. 130.

91. The tsarist government itself took seriously the right of Jewish communities in the Pale to elect their own rabbis, and occasionally blocked plans by Jewish reformers to restrict or do away with such elections. See RGIA, f. 1269, op. 1, d. 138, ll. 125–128, 167–168, and d. 139, ll. 141–155. See also Azriel Shochat, *Mosad "harabanut mita'am" berusiyah* (Haifa: 1975).

92. RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, ll. 33–34.

93. *Ibid*., ll. 35 and 53–58.

94. *Ibid.*, ll. 35, 48.

95. Rossiiskaia Natsional'naia Biblioteka, Otdel Rukopisei (RNB), f. 183, op. 1014, d. 1746, ll. 3–4. The intrigues included announcing the time and place of the balloting for artisans in one newspaper only, the Russian-language *Golos*, which few Jewish artisans were likely to read. See also RGIA f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, l. 37 and *Razsvet*, no. 22 (1880), 844.

96. RNB, f. 183, op. 1014, d. 1746, ll. 4–5.

97. See, for example, RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, ll. 33, 45, 120. This charge was reiterated by Landau in *Den'*, no. 22 (1869), 347, and by the editors of *Razsvet*, no. 24 (12 June 1880), who noted that members of the governing board frequently missed meetings, with the result that the board first met weekly, then monthly, then only irregularly. One petition (in 1873) complained that of eleven current board members, six (listed by name, including Horace Gintsburg) spent significant parts of the year abroad, and three others were completely absorbed with business affairs. See RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, l. 120.

98. *Ibid*., ll. 37–38.

99. *Ibid*., l. 37. Pinkhus Khaimovich Rozenberg, variously described as a tailor and a merchant of the first guild (he may well have been both), submitted a similar petition in 1869; see *ibid*., ll. 45–46, and RNB, f. 183, op. 1014, d. 1746, ll. 3–4. A.E. Landau echoed Katsenelenbogen a year later in *Den'*, no. 12 (1870), 201: "In Petersburg—entre nous, dear reader—one rarely finds a kosher kitchen in the home of the wealthy. Their Jewish patriotism notwithstanding, the wealthy quietly eat *treyf* like the 'simple goys' and thus the entire weight of the kosher meat tax falls exclusively on the poor."

100. Gershon Lifshits ("Gershon ben-Gershon"), "Kartinki iz zhizni peterburgskikh evreev," *Razsvet*, no. 3 (1879), 85–87. Looking back on communal life in the 1860s, *Razsvet* noted that "whoever so desired could name himself and be a representative; whoever so desired could have access to communal funds." See *ibid*., no. 22 (29 May 1880), 843.

An official at the Ministry of Internal Affairs charged in 1877 that "the poor majority [of St. Petersburg Jews] are deprived of active participation [in communal affairs] and are subject to exploitation by the wealthy minority. This is a phenomenon generally noticed in the areas of permanent Jewish settlement." RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, l. 78. Empirewide commissions in 1844, 1858, 1881, and 1888 made similar charges, citing in particular the misuse of revenues from the kosher meat tax on the part of the elites. See Iu. I. Gessen, "Korobochnyi sbor," in *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 9 (pp. 759–767). Jewish maskilic writers were known to scathingly satirize the workings of the korobka, as, for example, in the play *Di takse* (*The Tax*), published in 1869 by S.Y. Abramovich (Mendele Mokher Sforim).

101. Early examples of this reputation are to be found in the annual *Vsepoddanneishie otchety* of the provincial governors of Podolia (1832) and Mogilev (1843); see G.M. Deych [Deich] (comp.), and Benjamin Nathans (ed.), *Arkhivnye dokumenty po istorii evreev v Rossii v XIX—nachale XX vv.: Putevoditel'* (Moscow: 1994), 68 and 72. For similar attitudes expressed by the Jewish Committee in 1863 and Minister of the Interior Ignat'ev in 1882, see RGIA f. 1268, op. 1, d. 139, l. 175, and Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 730, op. 1, d. 1623, l. 1. For a later period, see I.V. Gessen and V. Fridshtein, *Sbornik zakonov o evreiakh s ras"iasneniiami po opredeleniiam Pravitel'stvuiushchago Senata i tsirkuliaram Ministerstv* (Petersburg: 1904), vii.

102. On the government's role in hasidic controversies, see G.M. Deych [Deich], *Tsarskoe pravitel'stvo i khasidskoe dvizhenie v Rossii. Arkhivnye dokumenty* (New York: 1994). By the final quarter of the nineteenth century, as one contemporary noted, Russian legislation specifically regarding Jews "exceed[ed] in volume the Code Napoléon, which constitutes the complete legal code of an entire country." *Vestnik Evropy* (Jan. 1885), 461.

103. Sliozberg, *Dela minuvshikh dnei*, vol. 1 (p. 293).

104. RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, ll. 49–50. If anything, the volume of complaints only increased as the capital's Jewish population grew, especially after the government sought to shut down many of the prayer houses that had sprung up throughout the city. See *ibid*., d. 164, l. 117.

105. *Razsvet*, no. 22 (29 May 1880), 843.

106. Landau, "Peterburgskie pis'ma," *Den'*, no. 5 (30 June 1869), 72.

107. Landau, "Pis'ma ob evreiakh," *Biblioteka dlia Chteniia* 187, no. 12 (1864), 8.

108. *Razsvet*, no. 23 (5 June 1880), 884.

109. When the time came to attend Sabbath worship during his first visit to Petersburg in 1846, Sir Moses Montefiore had had to settle for a visit to the Jewish soldiers' barracks; there was not a single prayer house, let alone synagogue, in the entire city. In the absence of a rabbi, a soldier was assigned the task of leading the service and, with characteristic restraint, Sir

Moses observed that the congregants "appeared very devout, and joined loudly in the prayers." See Louis Loewe (ed.), *The Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore*, vol. 1 (London: 1983 [facsimile of the original 1890 edition]), 335.

110. TsGIA-SPb, f. 422, op. 1, d. 64, ll. 76–77. Quoted in V.A. Levin "Ocherk istorii evreiskogo shkol'nogo obrazovaniia v dorevoliutsionnom Peterburge," *Evreiskaia Shkola* (Petersburg: 1993), 74.

111. See n. 40.

112. RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, ll. 127–128. The number of legal prayer houses in Petersburg varied considerably over time. The census of 1869 reported ten (see *Sanktpeterburg po perepisi 10 dekabria 1869 goda*, vol. 2 [128ff]); *Razsvet*, no. 23 (5 June 1880) reported twenty. Of the eight listed in the city governor's report, three were described as having congregants of various estates; one was singled out for its "predominantly educated" congregation and "more proper external appearance, choral singing and less severe ritual practices"; another was referred to as the "merchant prayer house," and yet another as the "artisan prayer house."

113. I have found only a handful of descriptions by poor and uneducated Jews of religious disaffection. In the portion of his memoirs dealing with his life in Petersburg in the 1870s and 1880s, the artisan Chaim Aronson, appalled at the superstition of traditional Jews, makes no mention whatsoever of Jewish religious life in the capital; the same holds for V.N. Nikitin's autobiographical vignettes. By contrast, secularized Jewish intellectuals in St. Petersburg such as Dubnov, Sliozberg, Gordon and Landau exhibited considerable interest in the synthesis of Judaism and modernity. Of course, considerable numbers of Russian Jewish intellectuals remained aloof from all forms of organized religion.

114. This was in contrast to Germany, where the terms "Reform" and "Orthodox" had crystallized in Jewish discourse as early as the 1840s.

115. Landau, "Pis'ma o evreiakh," *Biblioteka dlia chteniia* 187, no. 12 (1864), 4; *idem*, "Peterburgskie pis'ma," *Den'*, no. 5 (1869), 72–73; E.B. Levin, letter of 21 March 1868 to Horace Gintsburg in RNB, f. 183, op. 1014, d. 1746, ll. 3–4; *Razsvet*, no. 22 (29 May 1880), 845; Ginzburg, *Historishe verk*, vol. 1 (p. 128) (Ginzburg appears moreover to use the terms "Orthodox" and "hasidic" interchangably); Gordon, "K istorii poseleniia evreev v Peterburge," part 2 (p. 47).

116. Wengeroff, *Memoiren einer Grossmutter*, vol. 2 (pp. 172–173). The trope of St. Petersburg as the Promised Land and the Pale as Egypt also appears in Orshanskii, *Russkoe zakonodatel'stvo*, 10, as well as in a humorous Passover scene in Levanda, *Ispoved' del'tsa*, 120–121.

117. Landau, "Peterburgskie pis'ma," *Den'*, no. 5 (30 June 1869), 72; *Razsvet*, no. 26 (26 June 1880), 1003.

118. *Ibid*., no. 22 (1869), 346. Similar remarks may be found in *ibid*., no. 24 (12 June 1880), 924.

119. *Otchet pravleniia S.-Peterburgskoi evreiskoi obshchiny za vremia s 10 Aprelia 1870 goda po 1 Ianvaria 1873 goda* (St. Petersburg: 1873), 10.

120. TsGIA-SPb, f. 542, op. 1, d. 1. In 1886, the orphanage was renamed "Mariinsko-Sergievskii priiut dlia kreshchaemykh i kreshchenykh v pravoslavnuiu veru evreiskikh detei."

121. *Razsvet*, no. 20 (15 May 1880), 761–763 and no. 26 (26 June 1880), 1004–1005.

122. Iu. I. Gessen asserts that the twenty-five ruble fee was imposed on the governing board by city authorities (see *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 13 [p. 939]). Archival sources, however, suggest that Horace Gintsburg first proposed the idea in a petition of 1869. See RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, ll. 53.

123. For a summary of debates regarding the voting fee, see the minutes of the governing board for 1911 in TsGIA-SPb, f. 422, op. 1, d. 266, ll. 1–3; see also *Nedel'naia Khronika Voskhoda*, no. 36 (2 Sept. 1895), 987, and Kagan, "K istorii natsional'nogo samopoznaniia russko-evreiskogo obshchestva," 141.

124. The board's stated reasons for the abolition of the korobka were that other religious groups did not levy such internal taxes, and that the burden of the tax fell disproportionately on the poor. See *Otchet pravleniia S.-Peterburgskoi evreiskoi obshchiny za vremia s 10 Aprelia*

1870 goda po 1 Ianvaria 1873 goda, 3. But in petitions to various branches of the government, Gintsburg and other notables had indicated as early as 1863 that the korobka was "unreliable" as a source of revenue. See RGIA, f. 1269, op. 1, d. 139, l. 212, and f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, l. 53.

125. A list of voting members of the St. Petersburg community in 1876 gives 185 names; see RGIA f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, ll. 70–72. The published annual report of the governing board for 1881 gives the number of voters as 304; see *Otchet pravleniia S.-Peterburgskoi evreiskoi obshchiny za 1881 goda* (St. Petersburg: 1882), 6. Iu. I. Gessen reports the number in 1911 as approximately three hundred, at a time when the city's official Jewish population was roughly thirty-five thousand. See *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 13 (p. 948).

126. Before it was abolished, the korobka had generated approximately thirteen thousand rubles annually, at a time when annual communal expenses averaged around thirty thousand rubles. See *Otchet pravleniia S.-Peterburgskoi evreiskoi obshchiny za vremia s 10 Aprelia 1870 goda po 1 Ianvaria 1873 goda*, 3–4. In 1876, seven years after the abolition of the korobka, the 185 voting members of the community generated only 4,625 rubles in dues. But an additional 14,489 rubles appeared in the form of donations, of which more than two thirds came from just six individuals, with Horace Gintsburg topping the list at 4,740 rubles. See RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, ll. 70–72.

To appreciate the abiding importance of the korobka for Jewish communities in the Pale, one has only to take the example of Odessa, where at the beginning of the twentieth century the tax produced annual revenues of well over three hundred thousand rubles, which were used to finance communal institutions as well as to pay mandatory fees to the city administration. See *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 12 (p. 63).

127. The term appears in several private letters from the turn of the century. The author of one such letter that had been intercepted by the St. Petersburg police, when asked to explain who "papasha" was, responded that "'papasha' is how Jews refer to Goratsii [Horace] Osipovich Gintsburg." See GARF, f. 102, deloproizvodstvo 3, 1891, op. 89, d. 445, l. 86. For another example of the term, see RNB, f. 183, op. 1014, d. 1160, l. 15.

128. See the account by David Gintsburg's daughter, Sophie Gintsburg, "David avi," *He'avar*, no. 6 (1958), 159.

129. Beizer, *Evrei v Peterburge*, 131. Additional testimony concerning the near-mythic status of the Gintsburg family in popular Jewish lore can be found in Tsitron, *Shtadlonim*, 334–376, especially 335, and Shaul Ginzburg (no relation) "Di familye Baron Gintsburg: drei doyres shtadlones, tsedoke un haskole" in his *Historishe verk* vol. 2 (New York: 1937), 117–159.

130. *Ibid*., vol. 1 (pp. 125–129). In contrast to Neiman, Drabkin was a native of the Russian empire (Mogilev), although his training included a period of study with Heinrich Graetz and Zacharias Frankel at the Breslau rabbinical seminary. See *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 7 (p. 316).

131. *Razsvet*, no. 24 (12 June 1880), 923 (emphasis in original).

132. The city police, the city governor, the governor of St. Petersburg province, and, within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the administrative department and the department of "spiritual affairs of foreign faiths" were all regularly involved in overseeing the affairs of the city's Jews. Individual episodes led to sporadic involvement by the Senate and the secret police as well.

133. A copy of the charter is in RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, ll. 63–69.

134. *Ibid*., 78–83, and d. 164, l. 193.

135. *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 13 (p. 949).

136. RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, l. 82.

137. *Otchet pravleniia S.-Peterburgskoi evreiskoi obshchiny za 1882 goda* (St. Petersburg: 1884), 5.

138. On burial societies, see John Klier, "Russkaia voina protiv 'Ḥevrah kadishah'," in *Istoriia evreev v Rossii: Problemy istochnikovedeniia i istoriografii*, ed. D.A. El'iashevich (St. Petersburg: 1993), 109–114. On the continued existence of the kahal more generally after 1844, see A. Shochat, "Hahanhaga bekehilot rusiyah 'im bitul hakahal," *Zion* 42, no. 3–4 (1977), 143–233.

139. The distinction between communities within and those outside the Pale, and St.

Petersburg's role as a model for the latter, are mentioned explicitly in official documents; see, for example, RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 24, l. 35, and d. 164, l. 193.

140. *Ibid*., l. 82.

141. In the following discussion of the synagogue controversy, apart from my own research, I have benefited from previous treatments of certain aspects of this issue by Stanislawski, *For Whom Do I Toil?*, 131, and V.A. Levin, "Peterburgskaia khoral'naia sinagoga," an unpublished paper kindly provided to me by the author.

142. Landau, "Peterburgskie pis'ma," *Den'* (20 Dec. 1869), 10–11.

143. TsGIA-SPb, f. 422, op. 1, d. 157, l. 84, quoted in Levin, "Peterburgskaia khoral'naia sinagoga." For similar views, see Landau, "Peterburgskie pis'ma," *Den'*, no. 24 (1869), 379.

144. This argument first appeared in *Razsvet*, no. 23 (5 June 1880), 882–884. Crémieux, as head of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, had visited Russia in 1869, in part because of reports of widespread famine in the western provinces, where the Jewish population was at its densest. This alone, according to *Razsvet*, was a source of embarrassment to Russian Jewish notables, who were concerned lest they be seen as incapable of tending to their own flock. But Crémieux went further: after a particularly unceremonious expulsion (during his visit) of a group of St. Petersburg Jews lacking the proper residence permits, he submitted a formal letter of protest to the Russian government. Several Russian newspapers reacted with indignant cries against foreign interference in domestic affairs, and a leading Jewish newspaper of the time concurred. See *Den'*, no. 1 (16 May 1869).

145. Stasov, "Po povodu postroiki sinagogi v S.-Peterburge," *Evreiskaia Biblioteka* 2 (1872), 435–436.

146. On the use of Moorish styles in synagogues in Germany, see Stefan Koppelkamm, *Der imaginäre Orient: exotische Bauten des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts in Europa* (Berlin: 1987), 98–103, and Hannelore Kunzl, *Islamische Stilelemente im Synagogenbau des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt: 1984).

147. V.V. Stasov (ed.), *M. M. Antokol'skii. Ego zhizn', tvorzheniia, pis'ma, i stat'i* (St. Petersburg: 1905), 386–87. I am grateful to Musya Glants for bringing Antokol'skii's letter to my attention.

148. L.O. Gordon, "V kakom stile dolzhna byt' postroena sinagoga v Peterburge?" *Razsvet*, no. 5 (11 Oct. 1879), 190. In his rejoinder to Gordon (the last public episode in this debate), Stasov condemned this notion as "a bizarre slander on the Jewish people." See Stasov, "Otvet g. L. Gordonu," *Razsvet*, no. 10 (15 Nov. 1879), 384.

149. Gordon, "V kakom stile," 190.

150. It is worth noting that a decade after Gordon's article appeared, the Moscow Jewish community was ordered by city authorities to replace the immense cupola of its synagogue, apparently in order to reduce its resemblance to a Russian Orthodox church, which, it was feared, might confuse Christian passersby. See A. Katsnel'son, "Iz martirologa Moskovskoi obshchiny (Moskovskaia sinagoga v 1891–1906 gg.)," *Evreiskaia Starina* 1, no. 2 (1909), 175.

151. *Ukaz ego imperatorskogo Velichestva kasatel'no togo, v kakom razstoianii ot pravoslavnykh tserkvei dolzhny byt' ustraivaemy evreiskie sinagogi i molitvennyia shkoly* (St. Petersburg: 1844). The decree pertains only to Russian Orthodox churches, and does not mention churches of other denominations. No reasons for the restrictions are given.

152. Stasov, "Po povodu postroiki sinagogi," 436–437.

153. See, for example, charges against the board leveled in *Razsvet*, no. 24 (12 June 1880), 925, and Landau's fear that continued delays would cause "our provincial brothers to laugh at us and completely lose faith," in *Den'* (20 Dec. 1870), 705.

154. The quotation is Landau's rendering of Trepov's position, in *Den'*, no. 31 (1 Aug. 1870), 527.

155. TsGIA-SPb, f. 422, op. 1, d. 250, l. 1.

156. As quoted in the minutes of the communal governing board, *ibid*., d. 157, l. 83.

157. Gordon, "K istorii poseleniia evreev v Peterburge," 118.

158. In the same essay (p. 119), Gordon lamented that if only Peter the Great had included tolerance of Jews among the values he imported from the West, "there would not now be a 'Jewish Question'" in Russia.

159. Nevsky's importance in Gordon's mental map of St. Petersburg emerged again in a letter to the Yiddish writer Sholem Aleichem, in which Gordon argued that to raise one's children in Yiddish (instead of Russian) "would be like forcing them to promenade down Nevsky Prospect in tattered rags and worn-out shoes." Paraphrased in Stanislawski, *For Whom Do I Toil?*, 226. For an imaginative look at the representation of Nevsky Prospect in Russian literature, see Marshal Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: 1988), 173–286.

160. *Otchet pravleniia S.-Peterburgskoi evreiskoi obshchiny za vremia s 10 Aprelia 1870 goda po 1 Ianvaria 1873 goda*, 17. As several commentators noted, the Orthodox and hasidic camps within St. Petersburg Jewry showed no interest in a grand synagogue, especially one designed to conform to "Reformed" ritual practices. See *Den'*, no. 5 (30 June 1869), 73.

161. TsGIA-SPb, f. 422, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 1–4; *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia* vol. 13 (p. 946).

162. TsGIA-SPb, f. 422, op. 1, d. 7., l. 43.

163. Gordon, "K istorii poseleniia evreev v Peterburge," 46.

164. *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 13 (p. 946).

165. Beizer, *The Jews of St. Petersburg*, 106.

166. *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 6 (pp. 525–531). By the time of the census of 1897, 196 Jews out of a total Jewish population of just over five million had entered the ranks of the Russian hereditary nobility, a lower proportion than in any other major ethnic group. See Bauer et al. (eds.), *Die Nationalitäten*, vol. 2 (pp. 197–198). The Gintsburg family had been ennobled in 1871 by the Duke of Hessen-Darmstadt, whose interests they had represented at the court of the tsars.

167. Under the extraordinarily elastic estate system in tsarist Russia, Jews in the Pale were commonly referred to as a *soslovie*, at the same time that they were classified as members of other *sosloviia* in the traditional sense of merchantry, *meshchanstvo*, nobility, and the like. On the overlapping classification of religious, ethnic and social groups, see *ibid*., vol. 1 (pp. 377–388 and 418).

Essay

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A New Rite from Israel: Reflections on *Siddur Va'ani Tefillati* of the Masorati (Conservative) Movement

David Ellenson
(hebrew union college, los angeles)

The siddur and the ritual performance that has accompanied its communal recitation have long occupied a central role in Jewish life. As the classical repository of Jewish memory and faith, the siddur is in a profound sense a conservative document. For nearly two millennia, the basic form and content of Jewish prayer has remained remarkably consistent.

At the same time, the Jewish prayer *book* has hardly remained static. Flexibility and freedom have always marked its texts. Throughout the centuries, the variegated nuances and emphases of ongoing Jewish life and faith have found diverse liturgical expressions. Different customs (*minhagim*) and countless textual variants (*nusḥaot*) have recorded the broad range of beliefs and teachings, aspirations and historical milestones that have molded the Jewish people. The authorship of new Jewish prayer texts has not been limited to the modern era.

Nevertheless, with the advent of modern Jewish religious denominationalism in nineteenth-century Germany, the production of new *siddurim* exploded. Reform Judaism first made its mark with the Hamburg Temple *Gebetbuch* in 1819, and in subsequent decades a constant stream of new prayer books emerged as rabbis of every denominational stripe on both sides of the Atlantic employed the siddur as a major vehicle for making their own doctrinal statements. The impulse to utilize the siddur for such programmatic expression has continued unabated throughout the twentieth century, and Hebrew liturgical creativity has flourished until the present moment.

The Orthodox, Reform, Conservative and Reconstructionist movements have all produced siddurim in recent decades. In the United States alone, the *Art Scroll Prayer Book*, *Gates of Prayer*, *Siddur Sim Shalom* and *Kol Haneshamah* have all been published since 1975. In addition, the Jewish renewal movment has come out with its own text, *Or Chadash*, and the noted Jewish feminist Marcia Falk published her celebrated liturgy, *The Book of Blessings*, in 1996. Each prayer book bears the impress of those who authored it, and each projects a distinct approach to Judaism—its history and beliefs.

Nor has such modern prayer book authorship been limited to North America. Non-

Orthodox movements in Great Britain and on the continent have published siddurim in recent years, and the Israeli Progressive (Reform) movement produced its own liturgy, *Ha'avodah shebalev,* in 1982. Now the *masorati* movement has followed suit with the 1998 publication of its long-awaited prayer book, *Va'ani Tefillati*, the first Conservative siddur written in Israel.

The sensibility that marks the pages of *Va'ani Tefillati* is unmistakably Conservative. Like *Sim Shalom* and other Conservative prayer books written earlier in the century, *Va'ani Tefillati* decisively affirms tradition. At the same time, it countenances change in a manner that has marked other Conservative siddurim. Thus, an analysis of the contents and form that mark *Va'ani Tefillati* grants insight into the nature of Conservative Judaism as a distinct Jewish denomination.

Even among Conservative prayer books, the *Va'ani Tefillati* liturgy is singular, for its Israeli context informs its substance and shapes its message in a manner that distinguishes it from a rite produced in the diaspora. Indeed, *Va'ani Tefillati* reflects the particularistic commitments and aspirations of a community located in Zion, presenting a unique statement of group identity and belief. Hence, this essay documents many of the specific directions and commitments that mark the still nascent masorati movement, and charts one dimension of the path on which Judaism has embarked as it seeks old-new expressions in its ancient home.

The principles and considerations that guide *Va'ani Tefillati* are articulated at the very outset of the volume. Rabbi Michael Graetz, chair of the siddur commission that produced the work, as well as Rabbi Simcha Roth, its editor and principal architect, provide complementary introductory statements that capture the book's defining characteristics.

In his introduction, Graetz displays an appreciation for the continuity that marks Jewish prayer. There is, he states, a template (*matbea' tefilah*) that constitutes the compulsory framework for Jewish worship. This framework authenticates the communal formulation of Jewish identity, and it sustains the religious meanings that have been at the heart of Jewish faith for two thousand years. *Va'ani Tefillati* strives to display fidelity to this framework.

At the same time, Graetz is aware that Jewish liturgy has never been frozen. Throughout history, the liturgy of *'am yisrael* has been altered as Jews have responded to ever-changing environments. Moreover, the talmudic sages who established the earliest canons of Jewish prayer claimed that intentionality (*kavanah*) as well as permanence (*keva'*) were a hallmark of Jewish prayer. The sages desired that Jews be fully present at the moment they prayed. Therefore, the Jerusalem Talmud (in Brakhot 4:3) stated, regarding prayer, that "it is necessary that something novel mark it every day." Jewish prayer must always contain an element of flexibility, for every age bears witness to an inescapable tension—the need, on the one hand, to speak to God out of a tradition, and the obligation, on the other, to address Him out of a felt truth. Conscious of this ongoing challenge, Graetz contends that while the requirement to address God via the tradition is absolute, the obligation that prayer express the promptings of the mind and heart cannot be voided. Therefore, writes Graetz, "our sages said that one should not express in prayer anything which one does not take to be a truth."[1]

The warrant for this position, as Graetz views it, is found in the Talmud, in tractate Yoma. There it states that both Jeremiah and Daniel changed one of the elements of the *gevurot* benediction of the 'Amidah prayer. The original wording extolling God's powers is attributed by tradition to Moses. Nevertheless, each man—because of personal doubts—refused to praise God with the precise words that Moses had prescribed. For the talmudic sages, this posed a major problem: after all, Moses was assigned a position of unsurpassed authority in Jewish tradition. Some argued that Jeremiah and Daniel had no right to alter the prayer Moses had composed. The ruling opinion, however, was an emphatic assertion that Jeremiah and Daniel "knew that the Holy One, Blessed be He, is truthful. Thus, they did not lie to Him." Basing himself on this text, Graetz concludes, "God does not tolerate false statements by people. We must express the true beliefs of our heart."[2]

Roth echoes this conclusion. At the very beginning of his preface, he cites Midrash Mishlei 12, which, quoting the words of Proverbs 12:21 ("But the wicked are filled with evil") asserts: "This refers to one who says one thing, but means another." Jewish prayer must display integrity: "When the prayer that we utter does not conform to the truth that is in our heart it is considered an 'abomination' and the worshipers are considered as 'wicked'—according to the Midrash."[3]

Va'ani Tefillati seeks to prevent this. The very name of the siddur, taken from Psalms 69:14, expresses the hope, as Roth puts it, that "my prayer and I are one. I do not say one thing while meaning another. What my heart prompts is what determines the prayer that I utter."[4] As a result, this Israeli rite proclaims its warrant to alter the manifest content of traditional Jewish prayer. The demands of the past are not absolute, nor is Jewish liturgical tradition frozen. The claims and sensibilities of the present are vital as well.

Roth delineates the four characteristics defining the prayer book he has edited as "masorati" (Conservative); "Israeli-Zionist"; "pluralistic"; and "innovative."[5] Though the demands posited by each of these elements are at times divergent, Roth devotes considerable attention to an explanation of how *Va'ani Tefillati* goes about balancing the claims of the past against those of the present. Furthermore, he will not concede that adaptations, when they are made, constitute deviations from Jewish tradition. This is because, as Roth phrases it, "the text of the prayers offered in this siddur is that which we have inherited from our forebears." *Va'ani Tefillati* does not countenance deviation from the classical template for Jewish worship, nor does it depart "from the accepted order and contents of the benedictions and the prayers."[6] Having said this, he is equally aware that textual variants have always been present in Jewish worship. Indeed, Roth cites a responsum of Ovadyah Yosef, former chief Sephardic rabbi of Israel and a leading halakhic authority, to maintain that Jewish law itself sanctions Jewish liturgical variety. In his responsum, Yosef asserts that each one of Israel's tribes had its own unique liturgy. This was so, he writes, because "the order of service of each tribe must be appropriate to the ethos of its soul."[7] Roth draws the conclusion from this responsum that pluralism characterizes Jewish worship, that Jewish prayer, as Yosef suggests, *must* be tailored so that it expresses the specific ethos of the group that employs it.[8] The Jewish prayer book tradition seeks unity. At the same time, it promotes diversity. All liturgists must negotiate between these two poles as they compose their services.

Va'ani Tefillati, as Roth views it, is therefore consonant with Jewish tradition. The elements that mark it transcend denominational boundaries. They are features of Judaism itself. Indeed, this allows him to contend that *Va'ani Tefillati* is both an authentic book of Jewish prayer and the siddur of a movement, one that articulates an ethos for masorati Judaism.

As mentioned above, *Va'ani Tefillati* maintains the traditional order and affirms most of the content of classical Jewish prayer. As a glance at the table of contents indicates, all of the classical Jewish services for weekday, Sabbath, New Moon and holiday prayer are preserved. Traditional additions to the service—for instance, the saying of Hallel psalms for the New Moon and holidays, the prayer for rain (*geshem*) on Simhat Torah and the prayer for dew (*tal*) on Passover—are included, as are Torah readings for Mondays, Thursdays and holidays.

Other features of the classical siddur find expression in *Va'ani Tefillati*. Like most traditional Jewish prayer books, it offers home prayers and rites—notably the blessings for the lighting of candles on Sabbaths and holidays (and for Hanukah); kiddush and songs for the Sabbath and holiday table; and the concluding havdalah prayer. The grace after meals is included, as are other blessings for food and for various occasions (*birkhot hanehanin*). Ceremonial texts are also to be found—for instance, that of the circumcision ceremony (*brit milah*); the priestly redemption of the firstborn son (*pidyon haben*); the betrothal and wedding ceremony (*kiddushin* and *nisuin*); and even the symbolic welcoming of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, Aaron and King David into the sukkah (*ushpizin*).[9] *Va'ani Tefillati* also contains the prayer for creating an *'eruv tavshilin*[10] and the service for the searching for and destroying of leaven before Passover (*bedikat uvi'ur ḥameẓ*). As a Conservative liturgical work, the traditional character of *Va'ani Tefillati* is consistent with the movement that has spawned it.

Indeed, Conservative prayer books have been marked by a strong tendency to preserve the manifest content of the Hebrew texts of the classical Ashkenazic siddur. Even when elements of the received text have offended modern sensibilities, Conservative authors have been reluctant to alter the Hebrew versions of Jewish prayer. In such instances, they have often employed translation as a tool to mute the meanings of the Hebrew—a practice that stands in sharp contrast to the siddurim produced by Reform and Reconstructionist writers, who have felt a greater liberty to transform the Hebrew itself.[11]

For example, as Jakob Petuchowski pointed out, Liberal Jews for the last two centuries have generally found the notion of bodily resurrection (*teḥiyat hameitim*) disturbing, and they have typically not acknowledged this classical Jewish dogma. Having had little difficulty with the idea that the soul is immortal, however, many have stressed "the idea of Immortality . . . at the expense of the belief in Resurrection."[12] Reform and Reconstructionist prayer books have commonly removed such passages as *meḥayei metim beraḥamim rabim* ("Who in great mercy resurrects the dead") from the gevurot benediction of the 'Amidah, substituting phrases such as *meḥayei kol ḥai* (which is translated as "Who gives and renews life") in their stead.[13] In contrast, all American Conservative prayer books have retained the classical Hebrew wording in this benediction. However, some Conservative liturgists

have displayed a similar theological objection to the doctrine. Thus, the *Sabbath and Festival Prayer Book* (1946) maintained the Hebrew conclusion of the gevurot benediction, yet used a nuanced translation ("Who callest the dead to life everlasting") to assert the doctrine of spiritual immortality rather than bodily resurrection.

Va'ani Tefillati displays this Conservative penchant for maintaining the classical Hebrew versions of most prayers while expressing certain modernist sensibilities regarding the manifest content of selected texts. Obviously, it cannot resolve these issues in the same manner as its North American counterparts; translation is not an available option for a native Hebrew-speaking populace. Instead, *Va'ani Tefillati* selects another alternative—commentary. Two examples will suffice as illustrations of how this siddur utilizes commentary to address textual areas deemed problematic.

In the gevurot benediction of the 'Amidah, the classical Hebrew text remains untouched. Yet the commentary indicates that *Va'ani Tefillati*, no less than other non-Orthodox siddurim, distances itself from the notion of teḥiyat hametim. The commentary states that this benediction contains two ideas—that of eternal life (*ḥayei neẓaḥ*) as well as bodily resurrection. It then observes that Maimonides considered it difficult to accept the latter doctrine literally, teaching instead that bodily resurrection was at best a temporary state and that only the soul, not the body, would ultimately enjoy eternal life. Immediately after citing this warrant from the tradition, *Va'ani Tefillati* quotes a paragraph penned by Milton Steinberg, an American Conservative-Reconstructionist rabbi. In his own commentary on this benediction, Steinberg emphasized that the prayer's real message was that life is of infinite worth, and that it must therefore be embraced with open arms. "With the help of these thoughts," concludes the commentary in *Va'ani Tefillati*, "we are able to recite the second benediction much more easily."[14] Thus, the Hebrew text of the benediction is preserved while the commentary has, at the very least, attenuated its classical meaning.

An identical approach can be seen in the treatment accorded to the biblical passage constituting the second paragraph of the Shema prayer (from Deut. 11: 13–21). As the Reconstructionist *Kol Haneshamah* siddur puts it: "Its detailed description of the devastating consequences of Israel's collective relationship to the *mitzvot* . . . offers a supernatural theology that many contemporary Jews find difficult."[15] Simply put, this passage presents a doctrine of reward and punishment that many Liberal Jews have found disturbing. It is absent altogether in certain Reform siddurim, such as *Gates of Prayer* (1975); whereas others, such as *Kol Haneshamah* and the Israeli Progressive (Reform) *Ha'avodah shebalev*, have provided alternate readings.

As a Conservative prayer book, *Va'ani Tefillati* has not followed suit. It has retained the Hebrew text in its entirety. Nevertheless, it has voiced a similar objection to the contents. In its commentary, *Va'ani Tefillati* points out that one central idea contained in this paragraph is that of free will (*beḥirah ḥofshit*). Contemporary Jewish thought has no difficulty with this idea, the commentary notes: "However, it does have difficulty with the notion of 'reward and punishment' as it finds expression in the second paragraph of the Sh'ma." The editors go on to suggest that the sentences contained in the passage be redivided so that a new meaning emerges, one in which an emphasis is placed upon the idea that even should God "bless you with economic abundance and all that is good, you must still be exceedingly careful to avoid idolatry. . . . Especially in an abundant society, idolatry poses a danger."[16] What this com-

mentary essentially does is detach the text from reward and punishment. Obviating this meaning of the text, the commentary stresses instead its moral warning. In this way, it resolves the theological difficulties embedded in a text deemed offensive to *modern* sensibilities, and uses commentary to play the role occupied by translation in English-language siddurim.

The examples cited thus far demonstrate a Conservative reluctance to alter received Hebrew texts of Jewish worship even where there are perceived difficulties in the manifest content of certain prayers. However, while generally adverse to such change, the movement's opposition is not absolute. Indeed, in certain instances, Conservative prayer is characterized by the same impulse toward textual emendation that marks the Reform and Reconstructionist movements. Chief among the texts prone to be changed are those dealing with sacrifices (*korbanot*) or with petitions for the restoration of the sacrificial cult in a rebuilt Temple in Jerusalem.

Discomfort with the sacrificial cult has been expressed in varying ways in North American Conservative siddurim. For example, biblical and talmudic passages in the opening *birkhot hashaḥar* section of the daily service relating to sacrifice, as well as comparable passages in various holiday and Sabbath rites, are absent from Conservative prayer books such as *Sim Shalom*, replaced either by passages such as Leviticus 19 or else by quotes from rabbinic literature that convey the ethical teachings of Judaism. In addition, *Sim Shalom* (and others) have excised the passage at the end of the 'Amidah that calls for the Temple to be rebuilt so that "the *minḥah* offering of Judah and Jerusalem will reach God as in the ancient days and the earliest of years."

Even more prominently, the *Festival Prayer Book* of 1927 and all subsequent Conservative liturgies (including the 1946 *Sabbath and Festival Prayer Book* and *Sim Shalom*) have transformed the passage in the Musaf service, which calls for the restoration of animal sacrifice in a rebuilt Temple in Jerusalem, into a prayer of "recollection." In the traditional Ashkenazic rite, the text reads as follows:

> Thou hast commanded *us*, O Lord, our God, to bring thereon the additional offering of the Sabbath in due form. . . . May it be Thy will, O Lord, our God, . . . to lead us in joy into our land . . . , where *we* will prepare unto thee *our* sacrifices of obligation . . . and the additional offering of this Sabbath day *we will* prepare and offer up unto You in love . . . [17]

In the 1946 *Sabbath and Festival Prayer Book*, it appears in this form:

> Thou didst ordain, O Lord our God, that *they* [our forefathers] bring the additional Sabbath offering as set forth in the Torah. . . . May it be Thy will, O Lord our God, . . . to lead us joyfully back to our land, . . . where *our forefathers prepared* the daily offerings and the additional Sabbath offerings . . . [18]

In Conservative liturgy, mention of the sacrificial cult no longer possesses a petitionary character. Rather than "petition" (*bakashah*), as Orthodox prayer would have it, it is presented as "remembrance" (*zekhirah*). As Jules Harlow, editor of *Sim Shalom* explains, "Conservative liturgy continues to pray for the restoration of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel and for the experience of worship there, particularly in Jerusalem, but the liturgy merely recalls with reverence the sacrificial ritual of our ancestors; it does not petition for its restoration."[19]

The attitude toward sacrifice, and the manner in which this approach has found practical expression in North American Conservative siddurim, is echoed in *Va'ani Tefillati*. In two lengthy sections of commentary, the Israeli rite articulates the masorati position on the matter of the sacrificial cult and the Temple, stating forthrightly that "few members of the masorati movement hope for the restoration of sacrificial worship."[20] In line with this thinking, *Va'ani Tefillati* has introduced many of the same innovations to be found in North American Conservative prayer books. In birkhot hashaḥar as well as at the end of the Sabbath evening service, the biblical and talmudic passages relating to sacrifice have been replaced by readings from biblical and rabbinic sources that express Judaism's religious concerns and moral commitments. The final paragraph of the 'Amidah calling for the restoration of sacrificial worship in the Temple has likewise been excised.

In "Ein kelohenu" sung near the completion of the Sabbath and holiday services, the final line of the traditional Ashkenazic text speaks of the incense offerings of the Temple ("You are He before Whose countenance our fathers burned the spices of incense"). According to the commentary in *Va'ani Tefillati*, a description of worship as it took place in the Temple is introduced at this concluding point of the service because "prayers were a type of substitute for the Temple worship itself." Indeed, additional readings concerning sacrificial worship in the ancient Temple are added at this point in Orthodox services, being linked logically to the preceding prayers through the insertion of this line. However, as these readings are removed from *Va'ani Tefillati* because of its opposition to the worship that took place in the Temple, the final line of "Ein kelohenu" is also omitted. Instead, following Sephardic tradition, a verse from Psalms 102 ("You will surely arise and take pity on Zion, for it is time to be gracious to her; the appointed hour has come") is substituted.[21]

Similarly, in the first of the final three benedictions of the 'Amidah, the classical siddur states, "Restore *the sacrificial* worship (*ha'avodah*) to Your sanctuary, and accept Israel's fire-offerings (*veishei yisrael*) . . . ." This prayer has troubled non-Orthodox liturgists for more than a century and a half, and Conservative prayer books such as *Sim Shalom* have routinely omitted the phrase "veishei yisrael."[22] *Va'ani Tefillati* follows suit—but it also omits the definite article prior to the word "worship" (changing "ha'avodah" to "'avodah"). With the omission of this article, the entire meaning of the sentence is changed. "Ha'avodah" is a specific reference to sacrificial worship, whereas "'avodah" refers more generally to worship. Hence, the altered prayer, while asking for God to rebuild the Temple, does not request that the sacrificial cult be restored.

This last alteration in the classical liturgy of the synagogue can be understood in light of the explicit position *Va'ani Tefillati* has adopted toward the content of the Musaf prayer for Sabbaths and holidays. In its commentaries upon this prayer, *Va'ani Tefillati* indicates that the Conservative movement has adopted two approaches toward the issues of a rebuilt Temple and a restored sacrificial rite. One approach asserts that masorati Judaism looks favorably upon those prayers that call for the rebuilding of the Temple while at the same time rejecting the notion that sacrificial worship be restored. After all, the desire that a Third Temple be constructed merely "symbolizes the yearning for the renewed unity of the Jewish people and the realization of the values of peace and universal tolerance contained in the vision of the

prophets for the end of days."[23] However, this desire in no way bespeaks the hope that animal sacrifices will once again be offered. Indeed, the Israeli Conservative rite claims that the future mode of prayer will be completely different from that of the ancient cult, although the exact nature of that prayer is yet unknown. This view, as *Va'ani Tefillati* sees it, has precedent in the visions that informed the ancient prophets as well as in the teachings put forth by Maimonides in his *Guide for the Perplexed*.

The second approach, identified as the dominant one for masorati Jews, does not oppose the first. In fact, it complements it. It states that sacrificial worship represents a historical stage in the development of the people Israel. Thus, there is no need to deny it. It constitutes an important historical memory, and it cannot simply be excised from Jewish consciousness. However, sacrificial worship must not be the object of future hope. Therefore, *Va'ani Tefillati* only employs the past tense when referring to this mode of worship.[24]

This second approach finds practical liturgical application in the treatment *Va'ani Tefillati* accords the Musaf services for the Sabbath, New Moon and festivals. For each of these services, the prayer book essentially adopts the formula employed in the siddurim of the American Conservative movement. Hence, in the New Moon service, *Va'ani Tefillati* speaks of the place "where our ancestors offered their obligatory sacrifices before You," and it indicates, several lines later, that they did so "in love." The Sabbath Musaf service repeats precisely the same phrases, as does the festival rite.[25] Conservative prayer books display an absolute consistency on this point, and *Va'ani Tefillati* here explicitly reveals its identity as a Conservative liturgy.

In highlighting the Conservative character of this Israeli siddur, one further quality must be emphasized. As is well known, Conservative Judaism is the ideological offspring of the nineteenth-century German historical school of Zacharias Frankel. From the moment of its inception, Conservative Judaism has avowed the developmental character of Judaism, and it has embraced critical-historical methods as a means to arrive at truth. Indeed, this approach is so integral a part of Conservative thought that it is even incorporated into the movement's stance on matters of Jewish law.[26] Thus, it is hardly surprising that historical explanations concerning the origins and development of Jewish prayer abound in *Va'ani Tefillati*, and that academic research regarding specific prayers is cited. Commentaries accompany texts such as "Avinu malkeinu," kaddish, Torah readings and the blessing for the New Moon.[27] In a particularly telling note on the Friday evening hymn, "Ana bekhoah," *Va'ani Tefillati* asserts that while the authorship of this poem is ascribed by Jewish mystical tradition to a first-century mishnaic sage, "such attribution is not accepted by modern academic scholars."[28] As a Conservative prayer book, the Israeli rite embraces such critical scholarship.

As both Roth and Graetz have pointed out, *Va'ani Tefillati* is also marked by an affirmation of textual pluralism. One section of the prayer book is entitled "Eilu veeilu" ("These and These"). This phrase, drawn from the Talmud, champions pluralism as a basic principle of Judaism; hence, in this section of the prayer book, alternative formulations for various prayers are given. In the case of kaddish and "Kiddushat hashem," texts principally derived from the Sephardic tradition are offered. These options are hardly controversial, especially in a Jewish world as ethnically diverse as

the contemporary state of Israel. If anything, they bespeak the efforts being made by the masorati movement to attract Jews of non-Ashkenazic origins to its synagogues.

In addition, in the last of the middle benedictions of the daily 'Amidah prayer, the siddur, like its Reform Israeli counterpart, *Ha'avodah shebalev*, has substituted the phrase "the prayer of every mouth" (*tefilat kol peh*)—as in the Sephardic liturgy—in place of "the prayer of Your People Israel" (*tefilat 'amkha yisrael*) as the penultimate words of the blessing. In so doing, *Va'ani Tefillati* has adopted a precedent well embedded in Jewish liturgical tradition as a warrant for its own text. At the same time, it should be noted that the Israeli Conservative siddur selected this substitution precisely because it allowed the authors to shape a liturgy whose content is more in keeping with the universalistic sentiments that mark masorati Judaism. This alternative formulation, like those described in the previous paragraph, has venerable Jewish sanction. Yet it also bespeaks a distinct ideological affirmation of the modernist ethos promoted by *Va'ani Tefillati* and the masorati movement.

The 'Aleinu prayer that marks the end of all daily services also comes under scrutiny. As Jakob Petuchowski once noted, "while the prayer, as a whole, kept the balance between 'particularism' and 'universalism,' the form in which 'particularism' was expressed has generally been found to be disturbing by the liturgists of Liberal and Reform Judaism." For the past two centuries, non-Orthodox liturgists have struggled with this prayer, seeking a textual solution to those phrases that promote what Petuchowski termed an "invidious comparison" between Israel and the nations.[29] On this score, *Va'ani Tefillati* once more reveals itself to be a Liberal prayer book. While the traditional 'Aleinu text is placed in the main body of the prayer book, a substitute formulation is provided in the "Eilu veeilu" section where, for instance, the phrase "He did not let our portion be like theirs, nor our lot like that of all their multitude" is purged from the text, replaced by a sentence adopted from the Reconstructionist rite ("Who gave us teachings of truth and planted eternal life within us").[30]

Textual variant also manifests itself in the choice of blessings *Va'ani Tefillati* provides for the parents to recite on the occasion of the bar/bat mitzvah of their sons and daughters. Classically, the father alone recites the words "Blessed is the One Who has released me from the punishment of this one" after his son is called up to the Torah.[31] *Va'ani Tefillati* retains this text as one option. However, for those who might consider the sentiments expressed in this line inappropriate at such a joyous moment, three alternatives are also provided. One is the traditional *sheheḥeyanu* blessing recited on happy occasions. Another text reads, "Blessed is the One Who has made my son/daughter worthy of mitzvot," and the third makes use of the traditional blessing made on the occasion of glad tidings, "Blessed are You, O Lord our God, Who is good and grants goodness." By providing these options, the editors of *Va'ani Tefillati* celebrate liturgical pluralism, expanding the choices placed before their congregants beyond those contained in the tradition.

In other instances, *Va'ani Tefillati*'s modernist ideological proclivity results in the rejection of a traditional prayer text even when multiple options can be provided. For example, by the Middle Ages, Jewish liturgical tradition (as evidenced in the writings of several *geonim*)[32] had determined that the Jewish male was obligated to recite three daily blessings that praised God, "Who did not make me a Gentile, . . . a slave . . . [or] a woman." The Israeli rite will not even countenance the possibility of such wording.

In taking this stance, *Va'ani Tefillati* contends that there are traditional grounds for such objections.[33] It is equally obvious, however, that the masorati rite has aligned itself with a modern Liberal prayer book tradition that has condemned such wording as negative, xenophobic and sexist.

Numerous Liberal siddurim have struggled to reformulate these blessings. *Sim Shalom*, as well as the Israeli Reform prayer book, have done so by transforming the blessings into positive statements. In each of these siddurim, the phrase "Who has not made me a Gentile" has been changed to "Who has made me a Jew," while "Who has not made me a woman" has been reworded as "Who has made me in His image" and "Who has not made me a slave" has been reformulated as "Who has made me free." Other non-Orthodox siddurim, such as Isaac Mayer Wise's *Minhag America* (1857), omitted these three blessings altogether and placed in their stead the single benediction "Who has made me a Jew" (*she'asani yisrael*).

Va'ani Tefillati has sanctioned both these options, though it prefers the latter. Thus, the editors place the positively worded variants of these blessings as a prayer option for masorati Jews in the "Eilu veeilu" section. In the birkhot hashaḥar section, however, *Va'ani Tefillati* includes only one blessing, "Who has made me a Jew," in lieu of three. As the editors state, they have selected this as the preferred option because they do not wish to write new blessings; moreover, this single blessing, in their opinion, includes the meanings found in the other two.[34]

The approach *Va'ani Tefillati* adopts toward women and their status is a critical element of the movement's broad commitment to pluralism. In their introductions to the prayer book, both Graetz and Roth contend that *Va'ani Tefillati* will affirm the central role that women have played in transmitting Jewish faith throughout the generations.[35] This commitment is given liturgical expression at numerous points.

The masorati rite does not permit the phrase "our patriarchs" (*avoteinu*) to stand alone. Virtually everywhere "our patriarchs" appears, the word "our matriarchs" (*imoteinu*) is placed alongside it in brackets. While Roth acknowledges that "avoteinu" is an inclusive term in Hebrew, he recognizes that many people desire to give clear expression to the presence of women in Jewish prayer. By placing the word "imoteinu" in brackets, all Conservative Jews are able to choose for themselves how they will approach this issue.[36]

Va'ani Tefillati allows for both gender-inclusive and male-only imagery in a number of other places as well. At the end of the *pesukei dezimrah* section of the morning service, the Sephardic rite is offered as a prayer option, and masorati congregants are thus able to recall that Miriam as well as Moses led the people in song and celebration after the crossing of the Red Sea. Similarly, for the grace after meals, *Va'ani Tefillati*, following the path adopted by other gender-sensitive modern liturgies, permits the recitation of the phrase "For the covenant that You *have planted in our hearts" ('al britkhah shena'tata belibeinu*) in place of the reference to male circumcision, "that You *have sealed in our flesh* (*sheḥatamtah bivsareinu*).[37]

More noticeably, *Va'ani Tefillati*, like *Ha'avodah shebalev*, provides two options for the *avot* benediction of the 'Amidah. Every time this blessing appears, the page is divided and two textual variants appear. One text maintains the traditional wording of the prayer and speaks only of the patriarchs of the Jewish people. In contrast, the

second includes "our mothers" as well as "our fathers," and names the matriarchs Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel and Leah, along with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, in the prayer's formula. Most noteworthy is that this textual variant concludes, "Blessed are You, Shield of Abraham and Sarah."

Roth is aware that such changes in a well-known prayer text are hardly uncontroversial. In his introduction, he indicates that the gender-inclusive text of this benediction was the subject of heated debate among members of the halakhah committee of the Israeli Rabbinical Assembly. However, he claims that it was only the issue of the paragraph's "eulogy," or conclusion (*ḥatimah*) that elicited controversy, as alterations in the conclusion present a greater halakhic difficulty than changes elsewhere in the text.[38] Aware that some congregants might feel uneasy about a change in the ḥatimah, Roth suggests that they opt to use the body of the prayer, which includes the matriarchs, but to conclude the section in the traditional manner. [39]

While *Va'ani Tefillati*, here as in other examples, provides both a traditional as well as an egalitarian option, the commentary that precedes the benediction bespeaks the editors' strong sympathy for the gender-inclusive choice. Thus, the commentary notes that the concept of "merit of the fathers" (*zekhut avot*), which finds expression in this benediction, refers to the "deeds of lovingkindness performed by our father Abraham *and our mother Sarah*." Furthermore, the commentary continues, "the first patriarchs *and matriarchs* bequeathed their faith in Judaism to subsequent generations . . . , and thus it is in every generation."[40] The feminist ethos and egalitarian sensibility that inform *Va'ani Tefillati* are here obvious, and there is an unmistakable tone of gender equality that marks the prayer book as a whole.

Ceremonies such as naming a baby girl (*zeved bat*), as well as the bat mitzvah for adolescent young women, are presented as normative in *Va'ani Tefillati*, and the mother, together with the father, offers her blessing to her child on the occasion of a bar/bat mitzvah. Similarly, in the Ushpizin text, matriarchs are welcomed each day into the sukkah along with patriarchs. For the grace after meals, the text of *Va'ani Tefillati* makes the request—not in brackets—that divine blessing descend upon the company that has just dined together, "*just as our matriarchs, Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel and Leah, and* our patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, were blessed." [41]

Gender inclusion is also evident in the circumcision ceremony. As Lawrence Hoffman has pointed out, the two figures who have traditionally played the central role in this ceremony, apart from the baby boy himself, are "the mohel and the father, the two men who share the ritual responsibility." While women did participate in this ritual during medieval times, brit milah was ultimately "transformed from a family event with father, mother, and child at the center into a male-only ritual. . . . That mothers had once brought their children, held them during the rite, . . . would soon be forgotten." Most significantly, at the key moment in the ceremony, occurring when a blessing is recited that confirms the entry of the baby into the covenant of Abraham, the father alone has been charged with the responsibility and privilege of uttering the benediction.[42]

Va'ani Tefillati reverses a near-millennium of Jewish practice by restoring the mother to a major role in the brit milah ceremony. According to its instructions, the baby is to be given to the mother, and at the beginning of the ceremony both parents, or either the father *or mother*, thank God "for this most precious gift of new life."

Immediately prior to the circumcision, the blessing affirming that God has commanded that this boy be entered "into the covenant of Abraham our father" is labeled "the parents' blessing" (*birkat hahorim*), and not, as Jewish law has come to demand, the "father's blessing" (*birkat haav*).[43] In this rite of social birth, the child-rearing shared by mother and father is acknowledged ritually.

The move toward gender-inclusivity that marks the ethos of *Va'ani Tefillati* is most fully and obviously expressed in a picture at the front of the book. In a section devoted to instructions on how to put on tefillin, there are several pictures illustrating the written directions. Prominently featured among these photographs is one that shows a woman (with a kippah on her head), wearing the head tefillin.[44]

This picture delivers a powerful statement. It indicates that the masorati movement has internalized the feminist critique contending that patriarchal cultures posit the male as normative. Such a stance, it is argued, consigns the female to the status of "other." Rather than the prayer book's presenting a lengthy verbal statement arguing these positions, it features an icon that clearly refutes the woman's being "other." From the standpoint of semiotics, this is the single most powerful example of innovation contained in the siddur. It presents a new, even radical, representation of reality. The icon presents the gestalt of the prayer book as egalitarian. The clear message of the Israeli rite, affirmations of pluralism notwithstanding, is remarkably unambivalent on the issue of gender equality.

As mentioned at the outset of this article, an Israeli-Zionist character is one of the most outstanding features distinguishing *Va'ani Tefillati*. Quite naturally, this Israel-based work views the state of Israel as a boon, and takes cognizance of the Jewish state in sundry ways. Old prayers are reworded to reflect the reality of renewed Jewish independence, and new prayers have been composed that acknowledge the blessings wrought by the state's establishment. Nor does *Va'ani Tefillati* shrink from confronting the trials and obligations imposed by a reborn Jewish commonwealth.

In taking this stance, *Va'ani Tefillati* once again reveals its lineage as a Conservative rite. Conservative Judaism has always been linked strongly to Zionism,[45] and since the 1950s, liturgical renewal in the Conservative movement has been marked by a conscious effort to affirm the significance of the state of Israel (*medinat yisrael)* in Conservative prayer. As Harlow has put it, "for centuries Jews have prayed for the restoration of Jerusalem and for the reestablishment of a Jewish State in the Land of Israel. Those prayers have been answered, thank God, and the liturgy should not remain unaltered, as if nothing has changed in this regard."[46]

North American Conservative prayer has insisted that Israel is of the utmost religious importance, and it has given liturgical expression to this importance in several ways.[47] At the same time, in characteristic American fashion, this liturgy refuses to concede that Jewish life outside of Israel ought to be regarded as exile (*galut*). For example, *Sim Shalom* bestows religious meaning upon the state of Israel. However, it will not affirm territorial centralization as the precondition for the existence of the Jewish nation, and it rejects a Zionist vision that would place Israel as the exclusive center of Jewish life.

This approach to the state of Israel in American Conservative prayer is found most clearly in the alterations *Sim Shalom* has introduced in the traditional text of the

Musaf service for Sabbaths and holidays. While Orthodox siddurim make no mention of the state of Israel in this prayer, asking only that God "replant" the Jewish people at some future date in the Land so that the sacrificial order can be renewed, *Sim Shalom* gives thanks to God, "Who restores His children to their Land" (*hameishiv banim ligvulam*). Inclusion of this phrase into the Musaf service reflects the Conservative conviction that "the re-establishment of the Jewish State in the Land of Israel" represents a divine answer to the millennial-old prayers of the Jewish people. The state of Israel bears metaphysical import, and that import demands acknowledgment and recognition in the prayers of the Jewish people.[48]

At the same time, each of the Musaf services includes the sentence "accept with compassion the prayer of your people Israel, *wherever they dwell"* (*utekabel beraḥamim et tefilat 'amkhah yisrael bekhol mekomot moshvoteihem*).[49] These last three words have ample biblical precedent. However, their inclusion represents a noticeable departure from the traditional content of the liturgy. The text is no longer exclusively centered on Israel. The Jewish people dwell in the diaspora as well, and this presence in the lands of dispersion is not an evil from which the Jewish people must seek release. Whereas the state of Israel has a sanctified status, this does not obviate the diaspora as an equally fit venue for Jewish life.

Just as *Sim Shalom* reflects an American Zionist sensibility, so *Va'ani Tefillati* displays a distinctive Israeli character. In the same Musaf services discussed above, the Israeli Conservative siddur adopts a different stance than its American Conservative counterpart. The text in one part of this service reads: "May they willingly come up to the land that is the beloved of our dispersed" (*sheleyisrael ḥemdat nefuẓoteinu miraẓon ya'alu*), while in another paragraph it is boldly petitioned: "May our dispersed come up in joy to our land, and may You plant them within our border" (*sheta'aleh nefuẓoteinu besimḥah learẓenu vetita'em bigvulenu*).[50] In either case, the centrality of Eretz Israel in Jewish prayer is asserted. Not surprisingly, such an approach to the concept of the ingathering of the exiles (*kibuẓ galuyot*) reflects a position closer to that contained in the Israeli Progressive *Ha'avodah shebalev* rather than that evidenced in *Sim Shalom*. The power of place in shaping thought is apparent, and a common sensibility shaped by a shared Israeli context manifests itself in these two Israeli works.[51]

Va'ani Tefillati reveals its Israeli roots in other ways. In the paragraph before the Shema, the traditional phrase "and cause us to walk upright into our land" is reworded to read, "in our land." Likewise, the word "to our land" (*learẓeinu*) is added to the tenth benediction of the daily 'Amidah, so that when the petition for kibuẓ galuyot is recited, there is a recognition that masorati Jews are offering this prayer in the land wherein they dwell.[52]

Prayers that contain references to the destruction of Jerusalem have been changed to reflect the contemporary reality of Jerusalem restored. Thus, in the afternoon service for Tisha B'av, *Va'ani Tefillati* refuses, as Orthodox liturgy has it, to simply mourn an ancient Jerusalem destroyed. Instead, the Israeli Conservative rite also recognizes that there exists a contemporary Jerusalem, one that "has been rebuilt from her destruction," and "restored from her desolation," and a hope is expressed that God will grant peace to Israel.[53] Similarly, *Va'ani Tefillati* accords canonical status to Israel Independence Day, and it contains a prayer of gratitude—introduced by the

"'Al hanisim" benediction—which is based on the traditional formula employed on Purim and Hanukah.[54] Like *Sim Shalom*, it "follows the text of Rav Amram Gaon's *'Al ha-nissim*, amending the introductory formula which expresses gratitude for miracles 'in other times, at this season,' to read 'in other times and in our day."[55]

The state of Israel is celebrated in *Va'ani Tefillati*. However, the wars that have ravaged the state since its inception, and the ongoing need for defense, are deeply etched in its pages and find expression in many ways. In the grace after meals, the "All-Merciful One" is asked to bless the soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces as well as all those who labor on behalf of the state's defense. "Hazkarat nishamot," in the Yizkor funeral service, contains a separate *El male raḥamim* prayer on behalf of those who have fallen in defense of Israel; and a special petition for well-being (*misheberakh*) is devoted to the state and the IDF forces.[56]

An entire section of the prayer book, "Ereẓ, ereẓ, ereẓ," contains services that reflect the rationales for and the rhythm of Jewish life in the state of Israel. Here the pain of the Holocaust is recalled. A lengthy service is devoted to Holocaust Day, and a special paragraph is inserted in the daily 'Amidah, reflecting that day's pains and concerns. In both of these liturgical expressions, the horror of those years and the annihilation of so many are appropriately mentioned. At the same time, there is a reminder that the Jewish people still live and that the state of Israel reverses the situation of powerlessness that marked Jewish life in exile.[57] There are also moving services, combining traditional and modern elements, for Israel Independence Day, Memorial Day and Jerusalem Day,[58] as well as a service whose title—"I Will Fear No Evil" ("Lo ira ra'")—is taken from the Psalms 23. This last service is reserved for "difficult hours" (*sha'ot kashot*)—presumably including times of war, the aftermath of terrorist attacks, accidents, and the like. Prayers for rain during times of drought and the counting of the *'omer* take on new meaning now that the Jewish people have been returned to their land.[59] Finally, for all those familiar with the carnage and destruction that so often mark the Israeli highway, a special prayer composed for this siddur, "The Driver's Prayer" ("tefilat hanahag") merits special attention.[60]

Aware of how ignorant most secular Israelis are of Jewish religious praxis, *Va'ani Tefillati* also provides detailed explanations on Jewish ritual prayer practice. For example, there are explicit instructions on proper ritual conduct when one is called to recite the blessings over the Torah; worshippers are also told how to place tefillin, and how to wave a lulav on Sukkot.[61] Graphically, the text of the siddur is divided and printed in a way that makes the prayer book Hebrew more accessible to the average Israeli.

Manifest in *Va'ani Tefillati* is a sense of gratitude for what is regarded as the miracle of Israel's existence. The state of Israel embodies a religious hope. At the same time, it is embedded in sometimes mundane, sometimes daunting, sometimes inspiring realities. *Va'ani Tefillati* attempts to do justice to all these elements, and its pages reflect the attempts of its editors to give religious voice to the rhythms as well as the hopes for Jewish life as it has been experienced and could one day be lived in the reborn Jewish state.

As the study of Jewish liturgy shows, Jews for more than a millennium have felt the need to give ever more precise expression to their yearning for the divine. They have done so while being rooted in the narratives and memories of a received liturgical tra-

dition. At the same time, they have lived in a present that makes novel demands. Consequently, every siddur can be seen as reflecting an effort to navigate between the pull of tradition and the push of its own time and place. *Va'ani Tefillati* is part of this prayer book tradition.

As a masorati rite, *Va'ani Tefillati* evinces a keen awareness of the struggle this tradition demands. The Israeli Conservative rite strives for fidelity to the past while acknowledging the urgency of the present. Like other modern Liberal prayer books, *Va'ani Tefillati* self-consciously attempts to adjust the language and experience of Jewish prayer to the realities and rhythms of its contemporary milieu. It will undoubtedly have its critics, for no prayer book can calibrate the claims of the past and the demands of the present in a fashion that will be pleasing to everyone. Some will surely see *Va'ani Tefillati* as too far-reaching in its changes, while others will criticize the masorati rite for not being bold enough. Such claims can seldom be adjudicated objectively. Nevertheless, by self-consciously insisting upon its right to give expression to its own voice, *Va'ani Tefillati* affirms that the present generation, like past ones, possesses the privilege of participation in an ongoing Jewish liturgical conversation.

The first chief Ashkenazic rabbi of Eretz Israel, Avraham Yitzhak Kook, once observed that in the Jewish state, "the old should be renewed, and the new should be made holy." Through its prayers, the masorati rite has sought to give expression to this directive. Mindful of the past, attentive to the present, concerned for the future, *Va'ani Tefillati* bears witness to the aspirations that direct Israeli Conservative Judaism as it evolves and seeks a legitimate place in Israeli society.

Notes

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1. *Va'ani Tefillati* (New York: 1998), vi.
2. *Ibid*., vi. The talmudic quote is found in Yoma 69b.
3. *Ibid*., ix.
4. *Ibid*.
5. *Ibid*., ix–xiii.
6. *Ibid*., x.
7. 'Ovadyah Yosef, *Yabi'a omer* 6, *Oraḥ ḥayim* 10, quoted in *ibid*.
8. Of course, from the standpoint of logic, one can observe that the Yosef responsum, in speaking of "each tribe," refers to a community of descent. The masorati movement, in contrast, constitutes a *voluntaristic community* created by individuals who confirm the principles and practices of Conservative Judaism. Consequently, a critic might contend that the Yosef responsum does not provide an apt justification for alterations in modern Jewish prayer books produced by specific religious denominations. This point notwithstanding, it is clear that Roth employs the responsum in order to legitimate his claim that Jewish tradition countenances liturgical variety.
9. The *ushpizin* text, however, contains an addition, as will later be described.
10. An *'eruv tavshilin* is a legal fiction that permits food to be cooked for the Sabbath on a holiday, whenever one of the days of Sukkot, Passover, Shavuoth or Rosh Hashana fall on a

Friday. Normally, one is not allowed to perform any labor on a festival that is meant for the following day.

11. On this point, see David Ellenson, "How the Modern Prayer Book Evolved," in *Minhag Ami: Traditional Prayers, Modern Commentaries*, vols. 1 and 2 (Woodstock: 1997, 1998), passim.

12. Jakob Petuchowski, "Modern Misunderstandings of an Ancient Benediction," in *Studies in Aggadah, Targum, and Jewish Liturgy in Memory of Joseph Heinemann* , ed. Jakob J. Petuchowski and Ezra Fleisher (Jerusalem: 1981), 45–46.

13. This example is taken from *Kol Haneshamah: shabbat veḥagim* (Wyncote, PA: 1995).

14. *Va'ani Tefillati*, 67.

15. *Kol Haneshamah*, 279.

16. *Va'ani Tefillati*, 301.

17. Cf. Joseph H. Hertz (ed.), *The Authorized Daily Prayer Book* (New York: 1948), 533.

18. *Sabbath and Festival Prayer Book* (New York: 1946), 140–141, emphasis added.

19. Jules Harlow, "Revising the Liturgy for Conservative Jews," in *The Changing Face of Jewish and Christian Worship in North America*, ed. Paul F. Bradshaw and Lawrence A. Hoffman (Notre Dame: 1991), 126.

20. *Va'ani Tefillati*, 382.

21. *Ibid.*, 397.

22. On this particular passage and the manner in which non-Orthodox liturgies have regarded it, see the relevant sections of David Ellenson's "How the Modern Prayer Book Evolved"; *idem*, "The *Israelitische Gebetbuecher* of Abraham Geiger and Manuel Joel: A Study in Nineteenth-Century German-Jewish Liturgy and Religion," in *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 44 (1999).

23. *Va'ani Tefillati*, 383.

24. *Ibid*., 518; also see Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed* 3:32.

25. Cf. *Va'ani Tefillati*, 119, 387 and 523.

26. On this issue, see David Ellenson, "Conservative Halakhah in Israel," *Modern Judaism* 13 (1993), 191–204.

27. *Va'ani Tefillati*, 84, 114, 359 and 374.

28. *Ibid*., 286.

29. Jakob P. Petuchowski, *Prayer Book Reform in Europe* (New York: 1968), 298ff.

30. *Kol Haneshamah*, 445.

31. The traditional notion is that a father is responsible for the sins of his son while the son remains a minor. At the age of bar mitzvah, the son assumes responsibility for his own actions.

32. These responsa are delineated and discussed in Yoel H. Kahn's "The Three Morning Blessings, '. . .Who Did Not Make Me . . .' : An Historical Study of a Jewish Liturgical Text" (Ph.D. thesis, The Graduate Theological Union, 1999).

33. *Va'ani Tefillati*, 16–17.

34. *Ibid*., 17. While the editors do not say so, it may also be the case that, given their penchant for talmudic precedent, they favor this particular formulation because it is found, in the name of Rabbi Meir, in Menahot 43b. Moreover, Rabbi Avraham Gombiner, in his authoritative and influential commentary, *Magen Avraham*, *oraḥ ḥayim* 46:4, notes explicitly, as does the masorati commentary, that this single blessing contains the meanings of the other two. Undoubtedly, the masorati rite depends upon this ruling as the basis for its preferred liturgical practice at this point in the service.

35. *Ibid*., vi, xii.

36. *Ibid*., xii.

37. *Ibid*., 231, emphasis added. Cf. *Siddur Lev Chadash* (London: 1995), 554.

38. As this article has consistently pointed out, Jewish prayers have long been marked by diverse wordings. Notwithstanding, by the Middle Ages, a number of principles had been developed. Two of the principles regarding alterations or additions in the traditional text are that such changes should be 1) placed in the body of a benediction, not at its conclusion; and 2) in thematic harmony with the content of the benediction. As Ruth Langer points out (see her *To Worship God Properly: Tensions Between Liturgical Custom and Halakhah in*

Judaism [Cincinnati: 1998], 27), in both the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, rabbinic authorities held that "the concluding blessing (eulogy) of the prayer must be correct." This view was reinforced by medieval halakhic authorities. My point here is not to enter into discussion of this complex matter, which extends far beyond the parameters of this article, but simply to note the particularly thorny nature of the problem faced by Roth and members of the Israeli halakhah committee when they debated whether to alter the conclusion of a benediction.

39. *Va'ani Tefilati*, xii. Rabbi David Golinkin, chair of the halakhah committee of the masorati movement, told me that the Israeli committee actually issued no decision on this benediction, and that another change of text in the gender-inclusive version—the changing of the word "redeemer" (*goel*) to "redemption" (*geulah*)—also elicited heated debate. Be that as it may, the Conservative permission (*heter*) for these gender changes to the prayer was written by Rabbi Joel Rembaum of Temple Beth Am in Los Angeles. The Rembaum responsum was adopted by the committee on Jewish law and standards of the Rabbinical Assembly in the U.S. by a vote of 9–6, with several abstentions. Interestingly, this responsum does not address the halakhically thorny question of the *ḥatimah* itself, but only the notion of textual variation in Jewish prayer. I am grateful to David Golinkin for sharing this responsum with me.

40. *Ibid*., 303.

41. *Ibid*., 259ff (*zeved bat*); 364 and 368 (bat mitzvah); 220–221 (*ushpizin*); 237 (grace after meals).

42. See Lawrence A. Hoffman, *Covenant of Blood: Circumcision and Gender in Rabbinic Judaism* (Chicago: 1996), 74, 193ff, 204 and 180.

43. *Va'ani Tefillati* 254–256.

44. *Ibid*., 10.

45. The literature on this linkage is voluminous. For representative and comprehensive articles, see Naomi G. Cohen, "'Diaspora Plus Palestine, Religion Plus Nationality': The Seminary and Zionism, 1902–1948," in *Tradition Renewed: A History of the Jewish Theological Seminary*, vol. 2, ed. Jack Wertheimer (New York: 1997), 115–176; Eli Lederhendler, "The Ongoing Dialogue: The Seminary and the Challenge of Israel," in *ibid*., 179–270; and Arthur A. Goren, "Spiritual Zionists and Jewish Sovereignty," in *The Americanization of the Jews*, ed. Norman Cohen and Robert Seltzer (New York: 1995), 165–192.

46. Harlow, "Revising the Liturgy for Conservative Jews," 131.

47. For a full description of how American Jewish liturgy has dealt with the state of Israel, see David Ellenson, "Envisioning Israel in the Liturgies of North American Liberal Judaism," in *Envisioning Israel*, ed. Allon Gal (Jerusalem and Detroit: 1996), 127–138.

48. *Sim Shalom*, 434.

49. *Ibid*., emphasis added.

50. *Va'ani Tefillati*, 387- 388, emphasis added.

51. For example, in the prayer prior to the Shema, *Ha'avodah shebalev* asserts: "Gather our exiles from the four corners of the earth, and cause *them* to walk upright into our land (p. 36, emphasis added). For the treatment this prayer book accords the notion of *kibuẓ galuyot*, see Eric L. Friedland, *Were Our Mouths Filled with Song: Studies in Liberal Jewish Liturgy* (Cincinnati: 1997), 260.

52. *Va'ani Tefillati* 61, 137; also see xi.

53. *Ibid*., 139.

54. *Ibid*., 169, 170–171. Of course, in granting such status to Israel Independence Day, the masorati rite echoes the approach adopted by Israeli Orthodox and Progressive siddurim. For example, *Siddur rinat yisrael, nusaḥ sepharad* (Jerusalem: 1995), 441–447, has a special service that marks Israel Independence Day, as well as prayers for the welfare of the state and for the memory of soldiers who have fallen in its defense (pp. 281, 395). Similarly, *Ha'avodah shebalev* has a service for Israel Independence Day (pp. 220–225) and prayers for the welfare of the state and in memory of its fallen soldiers (pp. 129, 218).

55. This quotation, taken from Jules Harlow, is cited in Ellenson, "Envisioning Israel in the Liturgies of North American Liberal Judaism," 136.

56. *Va'ani Tefillati*, 236 (grace after meals); 510 (Yizkor service) ; 373 (*misheberakh* for IDF soldiers).
57. *Ibid*., 547–584 ("Ereẓ, ereẓ, ereẓ") 559–570, 74 (Holocaust Memorial Day).
58. *Ibid*., 576–584 (Israel Independence Day); 571–575 (Memorial Day); 556–559 (Jerusalem Day).
59. *Ibid*., 554–555 ("Sha'ot kashot") 551–553 (prayer for rain); 178ff (counting of the *'omer)*. The counting of the 'omer is recited during the seven weeks between the second day of Passover and Shavuot. This period marks the time between the planting and the harvesting of the season's first grains (an 'omer is a measure of grain); in talmudic times, it also became a period of semi-mourning, commemorating the death of thousands of students during the time of Rabbi Akiva.
60. *Ibid*., 275–276.
61. *Ibid*., 362–363 (blessing for the Torah); 8–11 (tefillin); 499, 502–503 (Sukkot).

Review Essays

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The Megashtetl/Cosmopolis: New York Jewish History Comes of Age

Steven Cassedy, *To the Other Shore: The Russian Jewish Intellectuals Who Came to America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. xxii + 197 pp.

Milton Hindus (ed.), *The Jewish East Side 1881–1924*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996. xxii + 301 pp.

Daniel Soyer, *Jewish Immigrant Associations and American Identity in New York, 1880–1939*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. viii + 291 pp.

Beth S. Wenger, *New York Jews and the Great Depression: Uncertain Promise*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996. xiv + 269 pp.

In the last half of the twentieth century, the New York Jewish community has emerged as the most avidly researched metropolis in modern, and indeed, in all of Jewish history. Ineluctably, no other urban complex has been so pivotal to the trans-Jewish, trans-American, trans-European and transworld experience of twentieth-century Jews as that megashtetl on the Hudson—not incidentally, as Kenneth T. Jackson has reminded us, "the capital of capitalism, the capital of the twentieth century and the capital of the world."[1] So much of the New York Jewish story, like the tale of the megacity itself, remains ever so compellingly contemporary and transient and yet so resiliently enduring that at last, in the past half century, the twin Jewish and New York sagas have released reserves of learning, energy, perception and scholarly acumen that only so massive, venerable and refulgent a cosmopolis has had the depth and range of resources to generate. It would almost seem that the needs of all the world's peoples and, some would say, the city's providential "thereness" for Jews since 1654, destined New York to become the hub of the modern Jewish universe, even as the founding of the ancient new nation of Israel infused all of Jewish life, and much of humanity, with a crucial new élan vital.

In the past few decades, an auspicious era in American and American Jewish historical scholarship has followed in the wake of what Lucy Dawidowicz and Arthur Goren have referred to as a golden epoch in American Jewish life. Predictably, the elucidation of the multistoried New York Jewish experience has attained a maturity, candor and bounteousness that promises ever more. The works of Arthur Goren and Deborah Dash Moore; of Jeffrey Gurock, Ronald Bayor, Melvyn Dubofsky and Thomas Kessner; of Ruth Wisse, Norma Pratt, Jenna Weissman Joselit, Mel Scult, Susan F. Glenn and Andrew Heinze; of Selma Berrol, Sydney Weinberg, Steven Lowenstein, Gerald Sorin, Stephan Brumberg, Ron Chernow, Stanley Nadel and others—no less than their historically minded counterparts in cognate disciplines—have recast the parameters of our historical intelligence. Topped by Irving Howe's literary

epic of Jewish New York in the age of the great Jewish migration and beyond, these works have illumined the city's Jewish worlds in their making, growth, dissolution and remaking. At the same time, the counterpointing of the everyday humanity of Jewish life "beyond New York" with the Jewish ways of the metropolis, most notably by Ewa Morawska and Marc Raphael, has further enhanced our capacity for understanding the New York colossus.

The diverse recent works under review illustrate both the rewards and the hazards of scholarship that focuses on what may be called heroic or presumptively heroic chapters in the New York Jewish story. Especially admirable are the ground-breaking studies by Beth Wenger and Daniel Soyer that explore, respectively, Jewish communal, quasicommunal and grass-roots associational initiatives against the backdrop of the Great Depression, and the First World War crisis and its aftermath. Significant but more problematic are the late Milton Hindus' *The Jewish East Side 1881–1924* anthology and Steven Cassedy's oblique effort, also dealing with that era, to lay bare the components of identity of that special cohort of Russian Jewish intellectuals who disseminated their Russian revolutionary articles of faith from the Lower East Side's Nevsky Prospect—East Broadway.

Beth Wenger's ingeniously designed and researched study of the New York Jewish communal response to the Great Depression on its own turf opens with a portentous line from *Fortune* magazine of February 1936: "The apprehensiveness of American Jews has become one of the most important influences in the social life of our time." In its efforts to allay the anxieties of America's Jews in its "Jews in America" issue, the words of the nation's elegant new business monthly seemed especially directed at the predicament of second-generation Jewish youth, Wenger's prime dramatis personae. Just coming of age, they "stood at a crossroads," emphasizes the historian, "between the vibrant immigrant world of their parents and the search for a new American way of life forged against the backdrop of New York's landscape" (p. 54). In the midst of the nation's faltering economy, these young people knew themselves to be acutely vulnerable to ever more intractable institutional barriers that could thwart their expectant entry into middle-class America, if not quite onto the fair courts of American life. Just two years earlier, closer to the trough of the Great Depression, Mordecai M. Kaplan, for nearly a generation the Reconstructionist voice apparent of the putative folk religion of America's Jews, underscored the psychological tensions enervating Jewish youth. In "The Present Crisis in Judaism," the opening chapter of his masterpiece, *Judaism as a Civilization* (1934), Kaplan grimly singled out not only antisemitism, but also the even more vicious virus of Jewish self-hate that drove so many college students to camouflage, shun or disavow all Jewish ties. "How to Combat Anti-Semitism Among Jewish Children," the title of the first chapter of a book on the American Jewish experience, was cited by Kaplan as dismaying evidence of the hapless therapeutic response to the pandemic. Privately, as he recorded in his diary, Kaplan himself was not immune to a continual struggle to put out of mind "the apprehension of the almost certain demise of Judaism in this country" (quoted in Wenger, p. 183).

At every level, the Great Depression tested the world's all-time greatest Jewish community to the limits of its imagination and resources. In eight tightly packed chapters, Wenger succinctly describes and analyzes the key features of that community,

no less than its social indices. Pithily conceived and executed, the chapters on the economy, the family, the second generation and the community's human geography are deftly enlivened with firsthand accounts by "just plain Jews." A superb map of New York's 105 neighborhoods in 1932, sixteen of them registering Jewish population densities that exceeded 50 percent, helps explain young Irving Howe's assured sense of his New York identity: "Our life was shaped by the fact that in New York, Jews still found a genuine community reaching into a dozen neighborhoods" (quoted in Wenger, p. 81). The chapter titled "From Neighborhood to New Deal" focuses on the transformation of politics, as neighborhood and nation joined to marshal New York Jewish majorities for Franklin Roosevelt that were unmatched by any other ethnic group—rising from 70 percent in 1932 to 90 percent in 1940. But in 1932, a poll taken at both Columbia and City College of New York registered a distinctively different political profile for New York Jewish college youth. In that poll, the Socialist candidate, Norman Thomas, who appeared on the front cover of *Time*, received nearly twice the number of votes given to Roosevelt. Perceived by young pacifists to be the heir of Woodrow Wilson, who had betrayed his ideals and theirs by leading the nation into the First World War, Roosevelt ran a decided third behind President Herbert Hoover. No one was more deeply disturbed than an old Columbia alumnus: Benjamin Cardozo, newly appointed by Hoover to the Supreme Court to succeed Oliver Wendell Holmes. Cardozo confided that were he a young man, he too would be a Socialist. In fact, while at college in the 1880s, Cardozo had been noted for his anti-Socialist views. In 1932, Jewish voters bred to socialism gave a final political tribute to Morris Hillquit, the dying national chairman and grand old veteran survivor of the American Socialist party, by voting for him for mayor. Hillquit garnered nearly 250,000 votes—more than twice the number Norman Thomas received, and the largest vote ever received by a Socialist candidate for office anywhere in America. The genial reception that was given at the White House for these two losing Socialist candidates signaled the coming reconfiguration that in 1936 would lead to the formation of the American Labor party, "the permanent New Deal party of our country," as one of its founders called it, which enabled both old-line and second-generation Socialists to pull the lever for Roosevelt without voting Democratic, in this way giving the president almost as many mostly Jewish votes as Hillquit had received four years earlier. With this development, the synchronization of the nascent national welfare state with the political commitments of New York's Jews had been sealed.

Subsequent chapters, "Private Jewish Philanthropy in the Welfare State," "The Spiritual Depression" and "American Jews and the American Dream" round out and solidify Wenger's portrayal of these heroic crisis years. New York Jews showed themselves able not only to weather the storm but also to adapt virtually every communal institution to the short- and long-term exigencies accentuated by the Great Depression.

Not surprisingly, like Deborah Dash Moore (whose *At Home in America: Second Generation New York Jews* [1981]) serves as a companion volume, Wenger finds in Mordecai Kaplan a religious personification of the triumph of a new American way that was to become normative in postwar New York and America. A virtual second-generation American, certainly by education if not by birth, Kaplan vividly exemplified, both in his extended apprenticeship and throughout his not so quietly heroic "spiritual Depression" years, his readiness for the spiritually prosperous time that was to

follow. Though Wenger does not indulge in such speculation, she would surely agree that only the boundless diversity of Depression-era Jewish New York could have hosted Kaplan's cosmopolitan vision of an American folk Judaism qua civilization.

Daniel Soyer's contribution to the deepening of the New York Jewish story is of a different order. In studies of the Great New York Ghetto, better known more recently as the Lower East Side and its satellites, major attention has been given to the labor movement, to the Yiddish press, literature and theater, and to Jewish politics, religion, education and community building. Yet, contends Soyer, in his intricately crafted volume, the relatively inaudible and invisible *landsmanshaftn* played a more inclusive role than did any other single institution in integrating Jewish immigrants into American society and in granting to them a more adhesive and personal sense of American Jewish identity. In their heyday in New York, landsmanshaftn numbered more than three thousand, and had half a million members. And there were many more affiliated collaterally, particularly following the passage of the women's suffrage amendment, which emboldened women's auxiliaries to take an active role. The landsmanshaftn's presence was pervasive. Contrary to the view of earlier scholars, who denigrated them as passive and parochial, landsmanshaftn, Soyer persuasively argues, "formed a crucial reservoir of mass support for a range of communal undertakings—from the Kehillah to the labor movement and HIAS," (p. 141) no less than for virtually all kinds of religious, charitable, cultural and social undertakings and causes, including the building of the Lower East Side's most impressive synagogues.

In what Soyer calls their "Heroic Period," the decade of the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the Russian civil war, the Russo-Polish war and the closing of the gates to immigration, untold energies and resources were mobilized by the landsmanshaftn and their federations in order to aid stricken hometowns in the battle-torn East European no-man's-land. At the same time, the newly established Joint Distribution Committee, inspired by the professional social outlook of the Progressive era, would both incorporate the landsmanshaftn into its well-organized structure and marginalize their role so that with the passing of the immigrant generation they would become virtually moribund. But in their era of greatest influence, which persisted even after the Second World War, the landsmanshaftn were sui generis. In helping their members maintain an equilibrium between the Old World and the New, they provided a direct personal identification with American democratic usages and rewards while undergirding the immigrants' fraying emotional ties with the shtetls of their birth and thus sustaining their sense of integrity. A last and final spurt in the growth of the landsmanshaftn would come between 1945 and 1952, when younger new Jewish immigrants would engulf the old-timers and swiftly take control. Beginning in 1943, with the first *yizkor* (memorial) volume devoted to memorializing the Jews of the Lodz ghetto (second in population only to that of Warsaw), more than one thousand such publications were printed. Ranging from pamphlets to massive tomes, they would provide the landsmanshaftn with their final grim mission and bring virtual closure to that long-lived and vital institution, to which Soyer has now done justice.

As Soyer demonstrates, the Lower East Side in our time has become the cynosure of Jewish New York's collective memory. With 542,000 inhabitants at its peak some four

score years ago and more, it constituted the densest and most visibly volatile critical mass of immigrants in the nation's history. Clearly, no quarter in New York or any other city—excepting, of course, Jerusalem—has generated so impelling a mystique of Jewish place as has the Lower East Side. Yet, curiously, Milton Hindus' *The Jewish East Side 1881–1924*, titled *The Old East Side* at the time of its first publication in 1969, continues to be the only anthology to document the force of the most sensitive alembic of all, the written word, in conveying an adequate grasp of that mythic place.

Chosen from the genres of fiction, autobiography, memoir, letters, travel literature and investigative and human interest reporting, the selections reflect the tastes and sensibilities of a distinguished man of letters, an authority on Proust and Céline, Whitman and Fitzgerald, and a scholar with a fine command of Yiddish and of Yiddish literature. In Hindus' anthology, a general introduction is followed by nineteen selections from the readily accessible works of sixteen authors, each of whom is allotted a one- to five-page headnote. Among the legendary figures represented are Jacob Riis, the crusading tenement house reformer; Morris Raphael Cohen, the City College Socrates; and Lillian Wald of the Henry Street Settlement. Hindus is at his best in his assessment of men and women of letters—most notably Abraham Cahan, but also William Dean Howells (a hero of Hindus, though it is not quite clear why), Hutchins Hapgood and Lincoln Steffens. These last three were all members, in their fashion, of the literary circle that crystallized in 1897 around Cahan, who, after quitting as editor of the newly founded *Forward*, joined the moribund *New York Commercial Advertiser* and helped transform the city's oldest newspaper into a paragon of American high journalism. Selections from their writings are followed by excerpts from Henry Roth's *Call It Sleep*, Anzia Yezierska's *Red Ribbon on a White Horse*, Henry James' *The American Scene* and Jacob Epstein's *Autobiography* (the last two are the only native-born New Yorkers represented). The puzzling final selection from James Huneker's *The New Cosmopolis* is so "eccentrically individualistic," as Hindus apologetically concedes, that it puts into question Hindus' capacity to order and fully conceptualize a volume so rich and provocative in its contents and yet so desultory in its form.

In short, at no point does the editor provide a sufficiently coherent explanation or rationale for his selections or their relationship to one another, or for the order in which they appear in the text. Most disconcerting of all are the selection titles. Almost invariably they are the original book titles, leaving the reader at a loss to guess their precise theme or focus. Strikingly illustrating this serious shortcoming is the longest selection, a classic *ḥeder* episode unflinchingly portraying a sadistic *melamed*, which is drawn from *Call It Sleep*. Faulting Roth elsewhere for resorting to "caricature in place of character," Hindus never accounts for its inclusion.

In the opening and closing passages of his introduction, Hindus promises to document the heroic age of Lower East Side Jewry, framed by its "monumental outlines" extending from 1881 to 1924. Had he pursued that theme with more rigor, less restraint and greater fidelity to his own best instincts, this anthology would have fulfilled its purpose. The "trauma," as he calls it, of the older generation of immigrants as they were plummeted from medieval shtetl into modern metropolis, their inner life on the way to disfigurement, the "chasms between generations [. . .] abysmal," (p. xviii) the wrenching conflicts between parents and children without compare in Jewish annals—all of these clamor for a Yiddish-speaking voice in poem or prose.

Yet Hindus was apparently so closely attuned in temperament and culture to "the heroic age of Lower East Side Jewry" that he forbade himself the freedom to render a single Yiddish passage into English, on the familiar aesthetic grounds that to do so would breach the rules of "stylistic felicity" and cultural equivalency. Had he accepted that critical challenge, there is no reason to believe that his objective of demonstrating the imprint of the East Side upon American literature and culture would have been diminished. It is a pity that Hindus could not transcend this limitation in favor of the profounder authenticity to which he was so committed. Nonetheless, despite its flaws, Hindus' knowing collective testament to "the heroic age of Lower East Side Jewry" remains a useful compendium, even if it disappointingly fails to approach the standards that the editor set in his major literary studies.

The hypersensitive Hindus may have been too close to the Jewish East Side and its thick culture to dare to trespass linguistic barriers and literary proprieties. A younger literary scholar from California, Steven Cassedy, shows no such inhibitions in his attempt to study the part that Russian culture and politics played in shaping the character of the Lower East Side's Russian Jewish intellectuals. The result, *To the Other Shore*, is a confounding, loose-jointed, mixed genre—not quite history, not quite literature—that loiters at the borders of each. In his melodramatic, haphazard conceptualization, indeterminate methodology, leapfrog organization and trilingual prose, Cassedy at times resorts to bizarre feats to illustrate the seeming cultural, linguistic and identity dilemmas of his sketchily presented characters. Alongside Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, Morris Hillquit, Philip Kranz and Abraham Cahan, Cassedy includes, in his cohort of intellectuals, Morris Winchevsky, Michael Zametkin, Abraham Liessin, Louis Boudin and Chaim Zhitlowsky. All of them emerged as members of a soon-to-be-familiar secular rabbinate in response to the leadership vacuum created by the massive erosion of traditional Jewish life in the era of the great Jewish migration, with Emma Goldman, the first secular woman rabbi, attaining the greatest renown and notoriety of them all. That modernizing Russian-Yiddish-American culture with which they were associated has persisted at least symbolically into our own time, as witness the current discrete English, Yiddish and Russian weekly editions of what was once the greatest of all Jewish newspapers, Cahan's *Jewish Daily Forward*.

An avowed novice and apparent stranger to Jewish, no less than to American and Russian historical scholarship, Cassedy, a student of modern Russian literature and literary theory, has vested an emergent Russian-Yiddish-American literary and intellectual culture with an outsized Chernyshevskian mystique. Enshrined in Nikolay Chernyshevsky's radical utopian *What is To Be Done?*, one of the most influential novels of nineteenth-century Russia, this mystique was further sanctified in Lenin's canonic Marxist pamphlet of the same name. Reflexively, Cassedy resorts to this cliche to give a false sense of coherence to an essentially thinly researched and shallow study. He has sampled the short-lived minor New York Russian press and Yiddish and American socialist newspapers and periodicals in search of tracings that can document the trifurcated and frequently overlapping trajectories pursued by members of the Russian Jewish intellectual elite as they assumed a mediating role for themselves in bridging the New World and the Old, the Yiddish Lower East Side and the modern world.

Cassedy considers their modus operandi unacceptable, lacking in good faith and basically heretical. This group, he writes, "outwardly directed its energies toward goals other than such 'Jewish' ones as fostering ethnic solidarity, encouraging worship and observance, and discouraging intermarriage," and "when it was not expressing open hostility to Jewish ritual attempted as much as possible to ignore it"; its "Jewishness" or "Jewish identity" was dubious, even contemptible (p. xxiii). But such a jaundiced view robs the past of its context and its truth. In the 1880s in Russia, the preferred language of thinking young Jews—including among them the great historian and Yiddish diaspora ideologue, Simon Dubnow; the nascent Yiddish laureate, Sholem Aleichem; and the future editor of the world's greatest Yiddish daily, Abraham Cahan—was Russian. During these years, both in Russia and in New York, even Jewish workmen aspired to learn Russian because there appeared to be no alternative language of freedom to which they could turn. Furthermore, the pogroms of 1881–1882, sparking the emigration of students disenchanted with "Mother Russia," had cleansed the Narodnik movement of its anti-Jewish sentiments and attracted to its ranks more Jewish students. These had a heightened sense of Jewish self-awareness and solidarity, adhering as they did ever more closely to the revolutionary movement as the best means to achieve Jewish social and political emancipation.

In this era, Erich Haberer has reminded us, unconscious Jewishness among Jewish "narodniks" reached new intensity,[2] as it certainly did among their counterparts in New York, wedded as they were to Russian as the first sacred language of their potentially free new civic selves—no less than as the language of the matchless Russian idealists and oracles of Russian literature who were reshaping the parameters of the Russian heart and mind. In free America, émigré newcomers were spurred to redefine themselves in terms that would allow them to fulfill their profoundest *spiritual* needs. To this dimension, Cassedy is stone deaf. He assumes that there was something totally disingenuous about the Russian Jewish intellectuals in New York who identified themselves as Russians in the Russian press and virtually ignored all matters Jewish, although nearly all of them were themselves Jews. Cassedy also faults the Russian elite's attention to Russian revolutionary and labor news in the Yiddish and American press. Glitzy chapter titles, such as "We Are Russian Workers and Besides" (for the Russian press), "'We are Jews'—At Least You Are" (for the Yiddish press) and "We Are Americans" (for the English-language press) render parodic and even dismissive an ardent process of acculturation that demanded the best from its practitioners. The hard road pursued, though not in any prescribed or patented straight line, from Russian, to Yiddish, to English, the ultimate language of American ambassadorship, is best personified in the cultural virtuoso, Cahan, whom the author cites even more frequently than Chernyshevsky, and who, it must be granted, like Chernyshevsky, favored the Russian language to his last day. But what kind of Jew or American he was remains outside Cassedy's ken, as he has failed from the outset to ask the right questions.

Cassedy's work trails off with an awkward, almost pro-forma gesture in which he elliptically identifies the New York intellectuals of the middle decades of the twentieth century as the knowing or unknowing heirs of the Russian immigrant intellectuals, on the grounds that both took "inspiration from the same tradition that served as a legacy for the Yiddish-speaking émigrés" (p. 153). Put more simply by Alfred

Kazin, the staunchest Americanist among them, his generation was still "spinning in the Russian turbulence," as have all of us and our progenitors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As one of us, *New Yorker* editor David Remnick, reminded the world in *Lenin's Tomb* (1993), the tale of the relationship between the Russian Jewish immigrants and their descendants and their kin remaining behind has yet to be told. It is a big story, one of accumulating poignancy. Regrettably, Cassedy, in his pursuit of a narrow-gauged narcissistic track, has done little to advance that big Russian-Jewish-American epic tale. One need not take seriously Saul Bellow's quip about New York, which he claimed "dreamed of leaving America" in the 1930s and "merging with Soviet Russia" to appreciate the underlying pathos that once gripped New York's Jewish inhabitants.[3]

So vast and variegated a Jewish cosmopolis must attract and beguile imaginative younger historians who are prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to acquire the frame of mind that will enable them to identify the difference between the real and the spurious, the consequential and the trivial. With the opening in New York of the mammoth new Center for Jewish History, New York's Jewish history is entering a new phase. The consolidation of the magnificent collections of the American Jewish Historical Society, the Leo Baeck Institute, the Yeshiva University Art Museum and the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research will at last make available the resources for historical study that will further enhance the capacity of historians to write New York Jewish history with the range, grandeur and sensitivity that so prodigious an engagement merits.

Moses Rischin
San Francisco State University

Notes

1. Kenneth T. Jackson, "100 Years of Being Really Big," *New York Times*, 28 Dec. 1997, section 4 (p. 9).
2. See Eric Haberer, *Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: 1995), xi, 222.
3. Alfred Kazin and Saul Bellow, cited in Moses Rischin, "When the New York Savants Go Marching In," *Reviews in American History* 17 (June 1989), 297, 299.

A Tale of Three German Cities

Anthony Kauders, *German Politics and the Jews: Düsseldorf and Nuremberg, 1910–1933.* Oxford: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 1996. 214 pp.

Martin Liepach, *Das Wahlverhalten der jüdischen Bevölkerung in der Weimarer Republik.* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1996. 333 pp.

Shulamit S. Magnus, *Jewish Emancipation in a German City: Cologne, 1798–1871.* Stanford Studies in Jewish History and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. xii + 336 pp.

Would it be an exaggeration to say that the German Jewish community, more than any other, is enjoying a historical boom? Could one not rightly claim that this historiographical flowering is largely due to the shadow of Hitler and National Socialism? Another question should also be raised: Have the fifty years of historical research on German Jewry from the end of the 1940s until the present taught us anything new about the history of this community in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth?

From the many works written both then and now, we obtain the picture of a tranquil and self-confident community that, out of a desire to be part of German society, created for itself patterns of behavior that were unique among European Jewry. This was the celebrated Jewish-German symbiosis, which many sought to maintain even after the First World War. Perhaps the least investigated feature of this celebrated symbiosis is the political aspect—not politics in the traditional sense of voting patterns, parties, platforms, parliamentarianism or the like, but in the broader sense of a *culture* of politics, comprising the use of language, social and cultural codes, the function of gender in political expression and, in short, the whole complex of social behavior in the political context. The three books discussed here deal with the politics of the Jewish-German symbiosis, and two of them make a genuine contribution, at least from the methodological perspective, to the available literature.

The studies by Anthony Kauders and Shulamit Magnus are not so much concerned with the social aspect of the special Jewish-German relationship as with this relationship as a cultural phenomenon. Kauders' book, based on his Oxford University dissertation of 1994, is one of the very few existing works on the subject of Weimar antisemitism. It is surprising that this important topic has such a marginal position in the historiography of Weimar, in contrast to the vast literature that exists on antisemitism in the period before 1914 and again after 1933. Kauders' argument is that there existed a middle-class taboo against certain forms of antisemitism in the period prior to the First World War, but that the war and post-1918 conditions undermined this taboo. He uses two German cities as case studies: Düsseldorf, a predominantly

Roman Catholic commercial center in Prussia; and Nuremberg, a bastion of revivalist Protestantism in Catholic Bavaria and the home of the famous radical antisemite, Julius Streicher.

Although these two cities are at the center of the book, this is not a comparative local study. Kauders has little to say about the significance of antisemitism for specific classes or social groups, nor does he attempt to locate antisemitism in various associations and parties. Kauders does study the local economic and social infrastructure, but he argues that these factors tell us little about the rise of antisemitism as a political and social force. (He notes, for instance, that the role of Jewish cattle dealers in Middle Franconia cannot in itself explain the deep hatred against the Jews there, since the same social conditions prevailed in the Cologne and Stuttgart regions where there is no evidence of deep-rooted antisemitism.) Kauders' main concern is with antisemitism in political language and discourse—and here he makes a real methodological contribution.

By studying the political language in both cities, mainly through local newspapers, Kauders demonstrates how the post-1918 period saw the widespread infiltration of antisemitic language and arguments into the political discourse. Apart from the German Democratic Party, which was opposed to antisemitic trends, all other groups employed antisemitic language in order both to mobilize old and new supporters and to undermine political rivals. The Protestant and Catholic churches played an important role in this process. Moreover, it was above all the period of the so-called "golden twenties" that witnessed the gradual acceptance of antisemitic rhetoric. Kauders explains that the German notion of the *Volk* underwent a gradual change after 1918 and especially after 1923. In the course of this transformation, there was also a revision of the significance and importance of antisemitism. More important, many people for whom antisemitism was never a way of life now joined the antisemitic camp. What came into being, in short, was an alliance between racism and respectability.

In an interesting chapter, Kauders argues that the growing success of the Nazi party (especially in Nuremberg and particularly after 1930) drove many groups to modify or abandon antisemitic rhetoric in order to demonstrate their own unique identity. Here anti-antisemitism served as a political (though not a cultural or social) alternative. Kauders studies the question of which groups were basically antisemitic after 1930. Using political language as his criterion, he finds that it was mainly the Protestant bourgeoisie in both cities (with the exception of supporters of the Democratic Party) that remained firmly in the *völkisch* camp, although it rejected extreme antisemitism. In contrast, the Catholics (who constituted the majority in Düsseldorf and the minority in Nuremberg) rejected radical and völkisch antisemitism.

It is not Kauders' arguments that so much distinguish his study from others (though his is indeed a pioneering work), but rather his methodological tools, which are strongly influenced by Clifford Geertz, the distinguished anthropologist. The comparative element in Kauders' book is quite important. Using a single type of source (newspapers) and a single analytical tool (language), he succeeds in shifting our attention from the sociopolitical context in the two cities to the language and argumentation of political discourse. Indeed, he sometimes makes us forget that we are studying two different cities. Nuremberg and Düsseldorf do not have much in common, but Kauders' methodological tools create one environment, one antisemitic location.

It is here, however, regarding the regional perspective, that I have some objections. I am not convinced that Düsseldorf and Nuremberg were the most appropriate communities to examine. Kauders' argument that both cities had a special historical reputation is not convincing, as other alternatives are no less attractive: Protestant Berlin and Hamburg, for example, or Catholic Munich and Cologne. It is true that the Jews in Düsseldorf lived in relative tranquillity, whereas they faced growing resentment in Nuremberg (one can again make the Berlin-Munich comparison), but would it not be simpler and more convincing to study small communities, where newspapers could be supplemented by the minutes of associations (*Vereine*), the protocols of council meetings and many other forms of social and political discourse? Such sources, no less than newspapers, indicate the cultural climate of a given community.

My second objection concerns Kauders' treatment of German antisemitism. I am not sure that the "Jewish question" was the main concern of the majority of people in Düsseldorf and Nuremberg. Other worries such as inflation, the social upheavals of the 1930s and the horrific news emanating from Soviet Russia (to name only a few) were also important, perhaps more so than hatred of the Jews. Overly concentrating on antisemitism, one is apt to forget the other collective preoccupations of Germans after the First World War. The violent atmosphere in the Weimar streets, especially in Nuremberg, for example, overshadowed antisemitism, but Kauders pays little attentionto this major factor, even though it helps to explain why, in Kauders' words, "the Jews . . . disappeared from the German moral community" (p. 191).

Kauders has suggested that "in the period before the First World War, the taboo against certain forms of anti-Semitism was embedded in a context which precluded certain forms of victory . . ." (p. 30). Shulamit Magnus' book, based on her dissertation of 1988, tries to place this taboo in its historical context—the period from the 1790s to the 1870s—when the Jewish population experienced emancipation as a process of dynamic, mutual accommodation between Jews and non-Jews. "Experience" is a key word for understanding Magnus' impressive study. In its concentration on cultural methods, "history from below" and situations of everyday life, it is one of the first modern studies of Jewish life in the period of the emancipation, taking its place alongside such pioneering works as Dagmar Herzog's study of Baden.[1]

The book focuses on Cologne. Magnus points out that a study of emancipation as an experience requires an intense focus on a single location, and unlike Kauders, she supports her methodological (regional) choice by arguing that "while it would be impossible to write a local case study representative of German-Jewish emancipation, I hope to have written one characteristic of it . . . " (p. 7). Another methodological merit of this study is the historical context of the research. Magnus examines Jewish emancipation as a chapter in German history, and the German context is treated as an integral part of the Jewish story.[2]

Although the book's periodization ranges from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century, its main focus is on the first half of the nineteenth century. Only a few pages deal with the period of the 1860s, so that Magnus barely touches on the results and consequences of emancipation, which are essentially part of her story. However, by examining the cultural aspects of the administrative, political and economic changes between 1808 (the date of the Napoleonic legislation, which promised the

Jews equality) and the Revolution of 1848, she demonstrates that emancipation took place in a very modernizing atmosphere. The rise of Liberalism as part of the rise of the capitalist system in the western parts of Germany transformed the political and cultural climate; according to Magnus, this fateful period is the one most relevant to the study of emancipation.

The conventional version of Jewish emancipation tells us that the process was conferred from above. Magnus gives us a different story. One of her methodological innovations is her argument that the process occurred as part of a general social transformation involving the efforts and initiatives of ordinary Jews alongside more influential figures. Magnus, as mentioned above, sees the key to emancipation in the economic and social transformation that occurred in Cologne in the 1840s. In those years, Cologne society developed a broad perception of the civic entity, which included Jews. Although emancipation was created by the German and Jewish bourgeoisie for bourgeois Jews, religious considerations were also present. The Cologne Catholics, who were a political minority in the city (albeit a majority in the city's population) supported the Jews' efforts to gain equal rights, since this policy also justified their religious claims. Thus, from different angles, Liberals and non-Liberals, and Catholics and Protestants shared a similar outlook concerning the Jews at this particular juncture.

It is unfortunate, and inexplicable, that the events of 1848–1849 are omitted in Magnus' study. Whether because she considers the revolution an unimportant event for Cologne Jewry or because she could not find enough material on that year, we do not hear much about this event—even though, according to Jacob Toury, it deeply influenced Jewish aspirations and the attitude of German Liberals toward them.[3] Magnus does deal with the following decade, however, arguing against its reactionary-conservative tag. In her view, "Cologne's communal leadership in those years was characterized not by apathy but by an extraordinary dynamism" (p. 197). During this period, a transformation took place in both Jewish and non-Jewish life in Cologne. Magnus ascribes this process to the community leaders, who "saw an opportunity in the important law of 1847 and insisted on its fullest realization, even beyond the letter of the Law" (p. 205). Here again, one thinks of the Catholics in the Rhineland, who were quite successful during this period in pursuing their own political goals.

Given the fact that Catholics were the majority in Cologne, I was surprised to discover that Magnus hardly mentions them. She treats the Catholic church as an institution, but there are not many Catholic individuals in her story. One might think that they barely played a role in their city, although their activity is well documented in other studies. Magnus omits any reference to Thomas Mergel's groundbreaking study on the Catholic bourgeoisie in Cologne, for instance, and similarly overlooks other important studies on Catholic-Jewish relations in the Rhineland.[4]

If we accept Magnus' interpretation of emancipation as a cultural and social process involving both Jewish and non-Jewish activity in a period of profound social and political transformation, we must wonder how it is that some important social and political issues are missing from her book. It cannot be that events in this "New Area" (the early 1860s)—the wars of unification or the constitutional conflict of the 1860s—had no influence on the Jewish/non-Jewish discourse. Since the in-

volvement of the Cologne and Rhineland society in these political events was crucial, I can hardly believe that Jews did not take up a position on the Liberal side of the conflict.

The book's main strength is the attention it pays to the surrounding context. In contrast to other studies that deal mainly with the internal affairs of the Jewish community, Magnus integrates Jewish with non-Jewish history, and in consequence makes an important methodological contribution to the study of both German and Jewish history.

There is no doubt that the Weimar Republic represented the most liberal period for the Jews in German history. One can trace a direct line from the last chapter in Magnus' book to the Weimar period. Yet Weimar also represented the end of a Jewish renaissance that started in the middle of the nineteenth century. The economic, social and political upheavals that destroyed so many features of German society affected Jewish society as well, although not to the point of total transformation. Both societies, however, reached 1933 in a deplorable condition—a fact that explains many subsequent events.

One of the factors that contradict the thesis of the full integration of Jews in German society during the Weimar period concerns their electoral behavior: Jews did not take part in the radicalization process that characterized German society. The growing support of substantial numbers of non-Jewish Germans for Hitler was part of the steady erosion of German Liberalism. German Jews, of course, could not be part of that process. And thus the paradox: while the Jews were ever more assimilated culturally, they followed their own political path.

Martin Liepach's new three hundred-page book could have been an important contribution to the political history of Weimar Germany. Although it is the first comprehensive, quantitative study of all aspects of Jewish voting behavior during Weimar, he says nothing new, and we do not need three hundred pages to come to the conclusion that most Jews voted Liberal, and especially for the Democratic party. In 1985, Ernest Hamburger and Peter Pulzer published a sixty-five-page article on the Jews as voters in the Weimar period.[5] Fifteen years later, Liepach has nothing new to add. He examines the elections to the Reichstag between 1924 and 1932 and the "Landtag" elections in southern Germany. There is no doubt that Liepach is trying to duplicate the research done by Jürgen Falter on the voters who supported Hitler.[6] As in the case of Falter, Liepach provides hundreds of tables and statistics to support his conclusions.

Some of his observations are interesting. Liepach does not ignore the Jews who voted for the conservative Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP), and he refuses to accept the traditional periodization in Weimar history (1918–1923, 1924–1929, 1930–1933) as relevant to Jewish political behavior. Whereas the ordinary non-Jewish German citizen had already moved to the radical right in 1924, the Jews remained in the center, voting mainly for the Democratic Party and, after 1928, also for the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the Catholic Zentrum. Liepach relates some minor but fascinating facts: for example, that in the *Israelitischen Krankenhaus* in St. Pauli, a neighborhood in Hamburg, ten Jewish patients voted for the Nazi party and fifty-eight for the Communists in the elections of 1932. Another interesting case is the village of Rhina in Hessen. Half of the population there

were Jews. In the Reichstag elections of July 1932, the Nazi party received the second-largest number of votes (after the SPD). Since the Liberals were the smallest group in the village, we can assume that many Jews voted for the National Socialists or the SPD.

The Jewish newspapers are Liepach's main sources, and I think that he relies too much on them. He does not make any use of police reports, opinions expressed in non-Jewish newspapers, or memoirs. Newspapers reveal how determined the Jews were in their opposition to the radical right—but I wonder why Liepach does not also stress their determination to fight the radical left. Methodologically, Richard Hamilton's study of 1982, *Who Voted for Hitler?* seems to have influenced the author. Hamilton, however, also attempted to determine why people voted for the Nazis. Here lies the great flaw in Liepach's study: he has researched the political aspects of Jewish behavior without paying enough attention to their motivations and political culture.

The three studies reviewed here are a representative sample of the many works written in recent years about German Jews and their relationship with non-Jewish Germans. Despite the obligatory denials, the shadow of the Third Reich hangs over most of these studies, including those I have discussed here. There are demographic and political reasons for the historiographic boom in this subject in Germany today, and the controversy over Daniel J. Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (1996) is likely to ensure an increased number of studies in the future. From the methodological point of view, the works of Kauders and Magnus are an example of how the history of German Jews and of antisemitism can be written from a modern historical perspective. Despite the stream of new research, however, it is difficult to draw any new conclusions about German-Jewish relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Oded Heilbronner
The Hebrew University

Notes

1. See Dagmar Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion: Religious Politics in Pre-Revolutionary Baden* (Princeton: 1996).
2. Cf. Moshe Zimmerman, *Hamburgischer Patriotismus und deutscher Nationalismus. Die Emanzipation der Juden in Hamburg, 1830–1865* (Hamburg: 1979). Zimmerman also studies the process of emancipation from a regional perspective; unlike Magnus, whose focus is on social and economic structures, Zimmerman stresses German nationalism as a major influence on the process.
3. See Jacob Toury, *Die politische Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland* (Tübingen: 1966).
4. See Thomas Mergel, *Zwischen Klasse und Konfession. Katholisches Bürgentum in Rheinland 1790–1914* (Köln: 1994); also see B. Carola Padtberg, *Rheinischer Liberalismus in Köln während der politischen Reaktion in Pruessen nach 1848/49* (Köln: 1984).
5. See Ernest Hamburger and Peter Pulzer, "Jews as Voters in the Weimar Republic," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 30 (1991), 3–66.
6. See Jürgen Falter, *Hitlers Wähler* (Munich: 1993).

Let My People Go: Three Studies on Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union

Petrus Buwalda, *They Did Not Dwell Alone: Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union, 1967–1990*. Washington, D.C. and Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 297 pp.

Clive Jones, *Soviet Jewish Aliyah 1989–92: Impact and Implications for Israel and the Middle East*. London: Frank Cass, 1996. 244 pp.

Noah Lewin-Epstein, Yaacov Ro'i and Paul Ritterband (eds.), *Russian Jews on Three Continents: Migration and Resettlement*. London: Frank Cass, 1997. 557 pp.

On Christmas Eve 1970, a TASS news flash from Leningrad announced that two Soviet Jews, Eduard Kuznetsov and Mark Dymshits, had been sentenced to death for organizing an abortive airline hijacking. The announcement triggered massive international demonstrations, with huge crowds of Jews and non-Jews alike taking to the streets in major cities of Western Europe, Australia, North and South America. Government leaders and ambassadors appealed to Moscow to commute the sentences, as did the pope, heads of other religious bodies, editorial writers, labor union leaders and representatives of socialist and even Communist parties. Responding to the pressure, the Kremlin took the unprecedented step of commuting the death sentences and lowering the sentences imposed upon the others involved in the alleged hijacking.

Strikingly, none of the three books under review make reference to this remarkable episode, which set in motion the series of developments that were to lead to the "miracle" of the Soviet Jewish exodus, the unexpected and continuing emigration of some million and a quarter Jews from the Soviet Union and its successor states. Nor do they provide anything more than a passing reference to the world conference on Soviet Jewry convened shortly thereafter in Brussels, a huge gathering of organized Jewry representing virtually every country in which Jews lived and were free to travel. Yet it was the Brussels conference that brought about a change in the Kremlin's adamant refusal to allow any more than an annual range of several hundred to a couple of thousand Jewish emigrants. As Yaacov Ro'i notes in his article in *Russian Jews on Three Continents*, Soviet policy was "based on ideology that rejected a priori the opting out of Soviet citizens from socialist society" (p. 6). Notwithstanding, a mere week after the Brussels conference, Moscow opened the door slightly but significantly, allowing thirteen thousand to leave for the balance of 1971 and thirty-two thousand during the following year. It was the beginning of a movement that never ceased.

The theme of freedom for Soviet Jews, particularly freedom to emigrate, was re-

peatedly sounded in the following years. Guiltily conscious of its relative silence prior to and during the Holocaust years, world Jewry now strove to rescue and redeem its Soviet Jewish brethren. If an intensive effort did not begin earlier, it was because the Soviet Jews themselves were relatively silent until the late 1960s. Beginning in August 1967, however, the Kremlin launched a massive, centrally orchestrated and ferocious antisemitic campaign in the mass media. Undoubtedly designed to intimidate Soviet Jews, who had been profoundly moved by the vicissitudes and victorious outcome of the Six-Day War, this campaign masqueraded as anti-Zionism but drew most of its ingredients from the notorious "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." Soviet propaganda became even more vituperative in the late summer and fall of 1968, when the reformist movement in Communist Czechoslovakia and Poland challenged the Kremlin's monopoly in Eastern Europe. Kremlin ideologues now claimed that "Zionism" was somehow responsible for this reformist challenge. The demonization of Zionism was employed to legitimize the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and it ultimately led to the Kremlin's foisting upon the United Nations the infamous resolution defining Zionism as a form of racism.

In the meantime, the government tightened restrictions on higher education for Soviet Jews. Notwithstanding discrimination in employment, particularly in security-related fields, Soviet Jews were prominent in many professional spheres; despite quotas in major universities, they were also overrepresented in post-secondary school institutions. Beginning with the academic year 1968–1969, the rate of admission for Jews was reduced by 40 percent. As it continued to be lowered in subsequent years, Soviet Jews' very future as scientists and professionals—and more fundamentally, their personal integrity—became threatened.

Desperation to emigrate inevitably grew. In a major samizdat publication, the famed Marxist dissenter Roy Medvedev argued that the Kremlin's anti-Zionist policy was producing a Zionist upsurge. Regrettably, there is little in *Russian Jews on Three Continents* that deals with the Kremlin's antisemitic campaign. Only in Eli Weinerman's excellent essay can readers find a social analysis indirectly explaining why Jews were motivated to emigrate in the past as well as in the present.

In the wake of the growing Soviet Jewish desire to emigrate, Jewish organizations in the West began to play a more active role. Leading the effort was the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ), a U.S.-based umbrella group linking the major national Jewish organizations with numerous local Federation and communal bodies. Maintaining continuous contact with Soviet Jewish activists and refuseniks, the NCSJ was in a position to communicate with power centers and media in the U.S., transmitting the concerns and anxieties of Soviet Jews to an ever-growing public.

As far back as 1960, B'nai B'rith had prepared a report for the UN Subcomission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The UN study, conducted by José Inglés and published in the face of Soviet threats in 1963, criticized the Kremlin's violations of the right to emigrate. Over the years, Soviet Jews sent hundreds of appeals to the UN secretary general, to U.S. presidents and to other Western leaders, in which this UN report and the earlier Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 13b) were cited. Sadly, *Russian Jews on Three Continents* contains nothing about Inglés' seminal report and the use made of it by Soviet Jews. How a particular civil right became identified with the Soviet Jewish movement

ought to have merited attention, if only to illumine the origin and character of the movement.

Russian Jews on Three Continents is also more than disappointing in its treatment of the historic Jackson-Vanik amendment. The background to the amendment is the infamous "dipoma" tax quietly imposed by the Kremlin in August 1972 in an effort to curb the escalating number of applications for exit visas. The tax was exorbitant, and the higher the degree, the more one had to pay. Families headed by the holders of an advanced doctoral degree, for example, were required to pay a tax of forty thousand rubles—about twenty times their annual income.

Outraged by news of the tax, the Academic Committee of Soviet Jewry, headed by Hans Morgenthau and administered by B'nai B'rith, organized petitions on more than a hundred campuses. The NCSJ met in emergency session in September, and responded enthusiastically to Senator Henry M. Jackson's call for trade sanctions against the Soviet Union. It then set about mobilizing grassroots support for the measure. Missing in *Russian Jews on Three Continents* is any sense of the massive and unrelenting campaign conducted by the Jewish constituency and its allies among religious bodies, civil rights groups, trade unions, and particularly academics and scientists. Virtually every synagogue and Jewish communal institution took part in gathering petitions, sending telegrams to legislators, publishing newspaper ads, organizing marches and demonstrations. Nothing of this scale had been seen in the U.S. since the days of the civil rights struggle and the protest against the Vietnam War.

The Jackson-Vanik amendment, attached to the trade reform bill that was introduced in the House of Representatives in January 1973 and in the Senate two months later, proposed to link the granting of most favored nation tariff treatment (MFN), as well as credits by the U.S. Export/Import Bank (Eximbank), to an easing of emigration restrictions. The amendment was opposed by President Richard M. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, who had jointly worked out a breakthrough trade agreement with Moscow in October 1972. Also opposing it was the powerful National Association of Manufacturers, (eager to open up trade with the Soviet Union), which had scheduled a meeting with top-level Soviet government and trade officials for February 1973. Congress, however, responded to the massive public support for the amendment, and the bill was eventually co-sponsored by 285 congressmen and seventy-five senators. A week after the amendment was introduced in the Senate, the Kremlin—in another unprecedented step—canceled the diploma tax.

Jackson-Vanik had implications for other countries as well. In Romania, a similar education tax was imposed in 1982. Learning of the tax, Washington officials warned that Romania would be jeopardizing its MFN status (granted in 1978) if the tax were not rescinded. Romania complied with the U.S. demand the following year, providing further proof of the effectiveness of this legislation.

Astonishingly, *Russian Jews on Three Continents* carries no reference to either the Soviet or the Romanian reversal. An essay by Laurie Salitan makes the claim that the amendment "had little, if any impact on emigration" and that it proved to be a poor "vehicle" for applying pressure on the Soviet Union (p. 21). In her analysis, emigration was far less a reflection of Soviet-U.S. relations (of which American Jewish activism was a component, though Salitan fails to note this) than it was of domestic

pressures within the Soviet Union. Zvi Gitelman challenges such mechanistic interpretations, which make domestic considerations "dominant and determining," as failing to provide convincing evidence (p. 27). He similarly regards as flawed another essay in the volume by Robert Brym, who seeks to show by statistical analysis that no correlation exists between U.S.-Soviet relations and emigration.

Of course the relationship exists, and it is precisely in the context of this relationship that the grassroots Soviet Jewry movement in the United States played a decisive role, with Jackson-Vanik providing the powerful lever. A Twentieth Century Fund study published by Yale University Press in 1987 called the amendment "the single most effective step the United States has ever taken against the new serfdom" of restrictions on emigration.[1] Most arguments against the amendment's effectiveness rest on the severe drop in emigration in 1974, when the figures fell from thirty-five thousand emigrants in the previous year to twenty thousand. Emigration rates were also low in the years 1975–1977. Overlooked in the first instance is the fact that, whereas the emigration drop started at the beginning of the year, the Jackson-Vanik amendment became law only at the end of 1974. Moreover, in the wake of the Yom Kippur War and the Arab oil embargo, oil prices had soared that year and the Soviet Union, an exporter of oil, had profited to the extent of showing its first favorable trade balance. The probability is that during 1974, obtaining Eximbank credits was not a major concern.

From 1975, Jewish emigration steadily increased, reaching a figure of twenty-eight thousand in 1978 and fifty-one thousand in the following year. No doubt, Soviet actions were largely motivated by the desire to reach agreement with the United States on SALT II, the strategic arms limitations treaty. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and discussions concerning both its MFN status and SALT II were broken off. The frigid relations between the two superpowers was paralleled by a steep drop in Jewish emigration, which hit rock bottom in 1986.

Earlier on, the Nixon administration had sought to split the Jewish ranks, attempting to convince them that Jackson-Vanik was a serious threat to détente. Soon after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, for example, Kissinger had sought to persuade Jewish leaders that Israel's security might be jeopardized in the event that Moscow became alienated from détente. The NCSJ, however, held firm in its support, bolstered both by its grassroots activists and by refuseniks in the Soviet Union, who remained unyielding champions of Jackson-Vanik.

The extraordinary intervention of Soviet Jewish activists into the American Jewish political scene is another vital matter that is left unexplored in *Russian Jews on Three Continents.* Through the NCSJ and its various constituent bodies, as well as the Union of Councils (a more militant group organized in several cities), the organized American Jewish community essentially worked in tandem with Soviet Jewish activists, with whom they were in frequent contact, both via direct visits and through phone calls and other means of communication. Appeals from Soviet Jews were immediately publicized, as was the case with this first appeal, signed by more than a hundred refuseniks, of April 1973: "Remember, the history of our people has known many terrible mistakes. Do not give in to soothing deceit. Remember, your smallest hesitation may cause irreparable tragic results. Remember, your firmness and steadfastness are our only hope. Now as never before our fate depends on you." The im-

agery of such appeals was patently intended to stir memories of the Holocaust; American Jews' sense of guilt about their earlier powerlessness could not fail to be reinforced.

The Jackson-Vanik amendment remains in force to this day. Although Russia was granted MFN status in 1991, it needed to undergo annual review by the administration and by Congress to ascertain its full compliance. On a visit to Washington in June 1994, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin met with leaders of the NCSJ and called for repeal of the amendment. Charles Vanik, who attended the meeting, responded that the amendment was "as firm as concrete" both in U.S. law and in the U.S. psyche. The NCSJ, for its part, pointed to a solution to the problem of the annual review: whereas emigration figures were sufficiently high, more than a hundred refuseniks (who had worked in security-related fields) still remained in Russia. Once their number was significantly lowered, the NCSJ would—and did—support suspension of the annual review, although it continued to insist that Russia be bound by the provisions of the amendment. Despite heavy pressure from U.S. administration officials, the NCSJ felt that the maintenance of an instrument to assure emigration rights was too important to compromise, especially given Russia's political and economic instability and its deep-rooted antisemitism. The same principle applied to Ukraine and other successor states of the Soviet Union.

By itself, the Jackson-Vanik amendment could not move the Kremlin to reverse its fundamentally restrictive policy on emigration. Another factor was what became known as the Helsinki process, triggered by the 1975 "Final Act," which called for the "reunion of families" and which was then greatly expanded by a number of international forums in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna. Such forums were a serious embarrassment to the Soviets. Among other things, the Helsinki process served as a kind of international Jackson-Vanik, although the leverage it exerted was mainly psychological and diplomatic, rather than economic.

One of the outcomes of the initial Helsinki Final Act was the creation of the U.S. Commission of Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission. The commission, most of whose members were congressional legislators, came into being as a result of a bill sponsored by U.S. Representative Millicent Fenwick and Senator Clifford Case. Later research (conducted by Madeleine Albright and Alfred Friendly, Jr.) revealed the extent of NCSJ lobbying for the bill; in fact, an NCSJ staff member, Meg Donovan, moved over to the commission and handled much of its case work. One of the commission's first projects was the interviewing of Soviet emigrants in Israel, who told of the enormous difficulties they had faced in order to obtain exit visas. Such documentation was an invaluable source for Soviet activists, and was also used as the basis for U.S. declarations at subsequent Helsinki forums.

Russian Jews on Three Continents provides a wealth of information, especially on the economic and cultural aspects of the absorption of Soviet Jews. But it is structured in a haphazard manner, with no unifying theme tying together some two dozen essays (although Noah Lewin-Epstein makes a creative attempt in his introduction to impose some cohesion on the volume's widely disparate sections). The essayists range widely in academic disciplines; some of them are not academics at all but rather U.S. or Israeli government officials or former activists. Arguments advanced by some of the authors negate the themes of others.

Viewed as a kind of encyclopedia, this compendium offers very useful background information and analyses in a number of areas, particularly those concerning absorption. But the structural hodgepodge cries out for simplicity and unity. Some subjects cannot easily be meshed. Emigration, for example, falls into a quite different category than absorption.

Petrus Buwalda's book, *They Did Not Dwell Alone*, has the advantage of being clearly focused on a single unifying topic, and indeed devotes considerable attention to both Jackson-Vanik (which it calls, somewhat mystifyingly, "an amazing spectacle") and, especially, the Helsinki process. Buwalda served as the Dutch ambassador to the Soviet Union in the years 1990–1994—at the height of the mass exodus—and it is thus hardly surprising that he is able to offer an accurate account of the important role played by the Dutch government in representing Israeli interests in Moscow.

As the book's title indicates, the Soviet Jewish emigration movement was heavily dependent upon outside pressure, which was inherent in both the Jackson-Vanik struggle and the later Helsinki process. Regrettably, Buwalda's analysis is shallow, and his work is shot through with so many factual errors that, except for its treatment of the Dutch role, its usefulness is open to serious question. Among the more egregious errors are the following:

After mentioning the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement of October 1972, Buwalda notes that it was to be "implemented on a basis of the Trade Reform Bill pending before Congress" (p. 90). The bill, however, was not introduced until April 1973; the agreement could hardly be implemented by an as-yet nonexistent congressional bill. Further, there was no relationship between the agreement and the trade reform bill until the Jackson-Vanik forces chose to attach their amendment to it.

After observing that Jackson first introduced his amendment in the Senate in October 1972, Buwalda notes that Vanik submitted a similar amendment to the House a week later, on October 10 (p. 96). In fact, Vanik did not submit his amendment until January 1973, at the beginning of a new congressional session. Two months later, Jackson reintroduced his earlier legislation.

Buwalda repeatedly states that the well-known letter of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in which Gromyko denied having given specific "elucidations" on Jewish emigration (Kissinger suppressed the letter, but its contents were publicly disclosed by TASS in December 1974) was prepared and delivered on October 28, 1974 (p. 105). In fact, the date was two days earlier.

According to Buwalda, the Helsinki Final Act provided for a follow-up meeting every three years (p. 119). In fact, only one follow-up meeting was specified, to be held in Belgrade in October 1977 (which remained in session until March 1978). In Belgrade, Western leaders insisted on setting up another follow-up meeting in Madrid (in November 1980) before agreeing to adjournment. Three-year intervals thus came about at a later stage as a result of Western pressure.

Particularly egregious is Buwalda's description concerning the announcement of the establishment of the Helsinki Watch Group of Moscow: "Professor Andrei Sakharov called a press conference to announce the formation of the first [Helsinki] group in Moscow on May 12, 1975" (pp. 119–120). This date is fully one year off. The Helsinki Final Act had not been signed until August 1, 1975, and a Helsinki ad-

vocacy group obviously could not have come into existence before this date. Moreover, the announcement of the group's formation was made not by Sakharov, who specifically rejected any overt involvement with the group, but by Yuri Orlov. (Sakharov, by the way, did not hold the academic title of professor.)

Buwalda believes that the American Jewish establishment remained on the sidelines until the early 1970s, when the NCSJ was "set up and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment supported" (p. 39). This is totally wrong. The American Jewish community had been very much involved since 1964, when the American Conference on Soviet Jewry (Buwalda refers to it as the American "Council") was created.

Buwalda's English construction is often awkward, as in the phrase above. He writes of "the evolution up and down in the number of exit permits" (p. 218). Even international agreements are awkwardly modified, as with the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" being transformed into the "Universal Declaration *on* Human Rights." Numerous other errors characterize the book, including such spelling errors as "totalitarism" (p. 42), "half-casts" (p. 61), "Vysovs" (p. 39, instead of "Vyzovs"), "Schulz" (p. 97, instead of "Shultz"; in the same paragraph, he also spells it correctly). Why the editors at the Wilson Center and at Johns Hopkins University Press allowed these numerous spelling, grammatical and stylistic errors to be printed is puzzling, to say the least.

The title of Clive Jones' *Soviet Aliyah 1989–92* is misleading. Only a quarter of the book is given over to that subject, while the balance, and therefore the principal subject, is largely about the political impact of the Soviet Jewish aliyah on Israel (as indicated in the subtitle). The book's focus is not surprising since Jones is a lecturer on Middle Eastern politics at the Institute for International Studies at the University of Leeds. Jones is not a Russian specialist, nor does he pretend to be one. Still, his short presentation of the exodus is carefully structured, well documented and much more accurate than that of Buwalda.

A major theme of Jones' work is that the exodus had a significant impact on internal Israeli politics—sometimes in unexpected ways. He cites Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's speech before the Knesset, formally presenting his government on June 11, 1990, in which he stressed that the absorption of Soviet Jewry would be a main priority. Two obstacles soon arose. One was the unexpected and unpredictable size of the emigration; the other grew out of Likud ideology, with its adamant commitment to the so-called Greater Israel idea.

No one had anticipated the huge outpouring of Soviet Jews to Israel. In 1990–1991 alone, a staggering three hundred fifty thousand arrived. When, in 1986, Israel's Ministry of Absorption had produced a strategic plan for the eventual mass absorption of Soviet emigrants, its premise was that at most fifty thousand annually would arrive. Subsequently, the government repeatedly raised its estimates. Clearly, massive aliyah would enormously tax the Jewish state's financial burden, especially with respect to housing and education.

Given the nature of the financial problem, adjustments would have to have been made in the Likud's historic but costly settlement priorities. They were not, and in Jones' view, the maintenance and strengthening of the occupied territories could not but cause insuperable difficulties, especially when the U.S. administration threatened

to—and indeed did—cut off financial assistance to the absorption program for Soviet Jewry. The Bush administration strongly objected to the increased settlement program and reduced the absorption aid correspondingly. What inevitably remained unresolved, Jones concludes, was the relationship between the Likud's ideology and the needs of Israeli society.

Many Soviet Jews felt that they had been sacrificed on the altar of Likud ideology; and in the June 1992 elections, 60 percent voted for Yitzhak Rabin's Labor party and its partner, Meretz. Only 18 percent supported the Likud. At the same time, Israel's Oriental community also spurned Shamir for failing to address socioeconomic problems that were a direct outcome of the burdensome Soviet Jewish aliyah. Although Jones finds that Soviet emigrants played a crucial role in Labor's victory in 1992, he was careful—writing in 1996—to avoid the conclusion that they would continue to do so in future electoral contests. In the 1996 elections, Soviet Jews cast their votes largely for their own ethnic party under the leadership of Natan Sharansky, which then helped the Likud party, under Benjamin Netanyahu, to return to power.

Soviet Jews now constitute Israel's single largest ethnic community. As such, they will continue to play a critical role in determining the country's politics. Let us keep in mind, in conclusion, that the emigration process is ongoing. For this reason, among others, only the foolhardy would venture a guess as to the exact nature of this political impact in the future.

William Korey
New York

Note

1. See Alan Dowty, *Closed Borders* (New Haven: 1987), 231.

African Americans, Jewish Americans

Katya Gibel Azoulay, *Black, Jewish, and Interracial: It's Not the Color of Your Skin, but the Race of Your Kin, and Other Myths of Identity*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. 219 pp.

Jane Lazarre, *Beyond the Whiteness of Whiteness: Memoir of a White Mother of Black Sons*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1996. 140 pp.

James McBride, *The Color of Water: A Black Man's Tribute to His White Mother*. New York: Riverhead Books, 1996. 291 pp.

Some twenty years ago, when I was a young teacher of American literature, a student came up to me to complain, very gently, concerning the content of one of my courses. My introductory survey, she suggested, did not contain enough texts by African American writers. I am embarrassed to say that, while I did at least have the presence of mind to thank her for her comment, I responded in a way that was all too typical in academic studies in the 1970s. I defended the classic canon against the need to revise it along more race-friendly (or, for that matter, gender-friendly) terms. I also pleaded my own lack of expertise in the area of black studies.

Fortunately for all of us, the transformation of the American literary canon did not wait for folks like me to fall into line. And now, I myself not only teach black-authored texts in almost every one of my courses, but I have even written in the field. It was, therefore, with great joy that I discovered Katya Gibel Azoulay's *Black, Jewish, and Interracial* among three recent studies of black-Jewish relations that I had been asked to review. I welcomed the opportunity to become reacquainted with the very student who had first set me thinking about my own conceptions of race and the literary canon.

All of the books reviewed here deal with what Azoulay designates as black, Jewish and interracial families (Jewishness, Azoulay points out, is not necessarily identical with white racial difference; hence the three terms in her study). In each of these families, the mother is white and Jewish, the father black. *The Color of Water* is told from the perspective of the son; *Beyond the Whiteness of Whiteness*, from the viewpoint of the mother, and Azoulay's book from the complex position of the daughter of a Jewish mother and a black father, who is now herself the black and Jewish mother in a family that is interracial, albeit not interfaith, and international as well (Azoulay married an Israeli). All three of these books provide fascinating insights into questions of race and religion in American life; and each is, in its own way, an affecting personal memoir concerning individual experience in a world still not freed from institutional and private racism.

Of the three books, James McBride's is the most accessible, as attested to by the high accolades it received when it was first published (many of which grace the cov-

ers of the paperback edition). The story it tells is highly reminiscent of many a typical immigrant narrative: twelve children barely subsisting above the poverty line, experiencing not only economic hardship but a significant measure of social ostracism and discrimination, yet nourished by the love and warmth of family relations, and in particular sustained by the determination of the mother. In almost prototypical fashion, the mother sacrifices and schemes in order to provide for her children a first-class education, with the result that each and every one of the children becomes successful in such fields as medicine, law and journalism.

Of course, the story has a twist to it: this is a native-born, black family, not an immigrant family, and even though the mother's story is of an actual immigrant family in America, that story is anything but inspirational. Indeed, McBride's own story is set against that of his mother Ruth, who is the daughter of a dysfunctional Jewish family in which the father abuses both his wife and his daughter and is himself an archracist, a hypocrite and a miser. For this reason alone, and in contrast to the virtually ecstatic quality of much of the text, *The Color of Water* is also a painful work, in particular for the Jewish reader.

Yet there is another reason to feel uncomfortable with this book and, despite its verve, perhaps even to object to it, from the Jewish point of view. Ostensibly, this "tribute" is addressed not only to his own mother but to "her mother, and mothers everywhere." And yet, as the author's "Thanks and Acknowledgments" makes clear, there is another object of the text's dedication, and that is the God who is, McBride suggests, the "color of water": "My mother and I," McBride writes, "would like to thank the Lord Jesus Christ for His love and faithfulness to all generations" (p. 287).

The Color of Water, in other words, is not simply a story about a black family's triumph over white racism, including Jewish racism. It is a story of conversion and salvation, in which the Jewish dimension of the text functions as more than cultural context. As the text moves between McBride's own narrative, in his own voice, concerning his growing up black in America, and his mother's narrative, in his rendition of her voice, concerning growing up Jewish, what emerges is a recognizable, traditional story of Christian supersessionism. Feeling guilty over her abandonment of her mother and mourning her death, Ruth turns not only to the black man, Dennis (the narrator's father), who will become her husband, but toward the church and its assurance that "*God will forgive you":*

> *That's when I started going to Metropolitan Church in Harlem with Dennis to hear Rev. Brown preach. It helped me to hear the Christian way, because I needed help, I needed to let Mameh go, and that's when I started to become a Christian and the Jew in me began to die. The Jew in me was dying anyway, but it truly died when my mother died.* [So] *in 1942, a few months after my mother died, I told Dennis, 'I want to accept Jesus Christ into my life and join the church. . . . A few Sundays later . . . the spirit filled me and when Rev. Abner Brown asked if anyone wanted to join Metropolitan in Christian fellowship I stepped into the aisle and walked to the front of the church. . . . I accepted Jesus that day and He has never let me down from that day to this* (pp. 217–218; 235).

Even when Dennis dies and Ruth remarries, it is again to a black man:

> *When Jews say kaddish they're not responsible for you anymore. You're dead to them. Saying kaddish and sitting shiva, that absolves them of any responsibility for you. I was*

> *on my own then, but I wasn't alone, because like Dennis said, God the Father watched over me, and sent me your stepfather, who took over and he saved us and did many many things for us* (p. 246).

Stories of personal suffering and private triumph, with or without religious means and political agendas, are, of course, not to be disputed or dismissed out of hand or in accordance with the reader's perhaps different sensitivities and agendas. McBride has written a passionate and affecting text; his admiration for his mother (who by his account is truly extraordinary) and his religious faith are quite compelling. Still, in a text so full of tolerance and sympathy, one wonders what prejudices may nonetheless inform it and work against its expansive, culturally inclusive designs. "Tribute" or not, the major voice in this text is that of a black Christian man, possessed of a truth both Christian and (despite his praise of mothers everywhere) masculine: this is a *black man* writing, not about a woman, white or black or Jewish, but about his *mother*—an identity defined, not by her own subjectivity, but by his positioning of her. The Jewish dimension of her personality, I suggest, is similarly employed by the text.

For McBride, Jewishness, like blackness, is a racial marker. It is not a culture or a consciousness or a commitment. Therefore, its insistence on being a substance in its own right, as opposed to being like God—the color of water—is part of what necessitates its being superseded by something else, Christianity, for example. (The Jewish God is apparently *not* the color of water, at least not from the Jewish perspective, as McBride understands it.) What is interesting about all three books under review, which as much as anything else reveals something about the race/religion intersection in American life, is that none of them takes Judaism seriously as content, as religion or practice. Jane Lazarre's *Beyond the Whiteness of Whiteness* makes the very important point, more important, I think, than anything else said in any of these books, that no one but a black person (not even a Jew) can comprehend the extensiveness and pervasiveness of racism against blacks as a feature of American life. Yet Lazarre, who comes from an already assimilated Jewish family, does not consider that, whereas the Jewish experience in America may be totally unlike that of the African American, the Jewish experience in *Europe* exposed Jews to exactly what her own sons have experienced as blacks; and that Jews who maintain religious identity in the United States might still feel themselves different from and excluded by other Americans, albeit not oppressed in the same way. Thus, Lazarre can quote the following, very affecting letter by one of her sons, without commenting on the definition of Jewishness implicit in it:

> Notwithstanding my multi-cultural consciousness, my racial identity is simply that of a Black man as any other Black man of any combination. I am related to and I relate to others as a Black man. Sometimes, I identify with Jewish culture because of you and my Jewish family, but it is never without the footnote of knowing that I am perceived as a Black man who "does a good Jew" instead of a Jew celebrating his own culture. Over the years of growing up, that phenomenon has pulled me further and further from a comfortable, natural identification with Jewish culture. I still retain some, but I am conscious of a different perspective on that part of me now as my age increases and my innocence decreases. When I am in a group of people who are white, Jewish or not, I am a Black man. When I am in a group of people who are Black, I am a Black man. I feel no dif-

> ference in my identity because my mother is white and Jewish. I only feel, perhaps, a greater familiarity with white people than Blacks who have not been exposed to white family and friends. But that familiarity, or comfort, is not related to a sense of identity (p. 63).

Lazarre presents a powerful portrait of the experience of most of us in relation to the issue of race: how little we comprehend it, how we persist in not taking in the full measure of its consequences within daily American life. "You don't have to be Black," she writes, "to realize that African and African American thought and experience is essential for all people to learn if we want to understand the truth of what happened to this world over the last few centuries, truths which landed us in the violent and truly alarming times in which we find ourselves today" (pp. 134–135). Yet she does not imagine that there may be Jews who wish to preserve their Jewishness as visibly marking them and their community; in other words, that there may be Jews who, in a sense, long for what blacks have: an indelible mark of their cultural difference. For these Jews, the very success of Jewish assimilation and the disappearance of the category *Jew* within the categories *white* and *black*, as in the above passage, might constitute a source of pain as powerful as what Lazarre's children experience. The Jewish experience might also serve, and equally as well, to explain the violence of the world in which we now live.

For the question of identity, which is the central preoccupation of Azoulay's book, is not only a matter of how individuals constitute a self but how societies tolerate such self-constitutions and how this further affects processes of identity formation and group consciousness. *Black, Jewish, and Interracial* is the most academic of these three studies; it provides a broad historical, sociological and psychological perspective, without sacrificing the immediacy of the author's own experience of interfaith interraciality or that of the various individuals whose testimony comprises the evidentiary base of her study. If McBride's book will most appeal to the reader interested in a good read, and Lazarre's to the reader concerned with his or her own soul-searching (an activity recommended for all of us), Azoulay's study will be more important to the sociologist or anthropologist examining the construction of race and identity than to the ordinary, casual reader. This is not to say that the personal tone of the work isn't affecting. Still, the academic drive of the book tips it in a very recognizable scholarly direction, as evidenced by its very careful and intelligent formulation of its "central theme," that

> the idea of an identity named . . . as Black and Jewish—explicitly limited by and linked to intermarriage through the logic of coupling—is thinkable as a collective being-in-the-world *only* and *on condition that* they are brought into contact with preexisting American ideas about race. By calling disinterest into question and bracketing "weighted" words, Foucault's concept of "discursive formations" encourages an examination of an entire field in which knowledge is produced and a given discourse is possible *on the basis of specific conditions of possibility* (pp. 179–180).

In other words, in order to understand an American identity in which the racial category *black* plays a role, one must have full comprehension of the history and function of anti-black racism in the United States. Like Lazarre, Azoulay recognizes and gives voice to the uniqueness of the African American experience even, or especially,

in the contemporary period. Whether the category *Jew* has a similar uniqueness, in America or elsewhere, is a question that gnaws disturbingly against the grain of all three of these books.

Emily Miller Budick
The Hebrew University

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Book Reviews

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Antisemitism, Holocaust and Genocide

Götz Aly, Peter Chroust and Christian Pross, *Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. xvii + 296 pp.

Racism as an ideology has been neglected by historians, even while its deadly consequences have been analyzed, instrumentalized and its root cause almost taken for granted. This book also instrumentalizes racism, and one might well ask what is the point of yet another book on the Nazi euthanasia program. The authors are aware of this problem, but believe that what counts is precisely the detail in the implementation of racist policies. Their book does provide important details about the process of euthanasia. Beyond this, through the diary of one doctor, Hermann Voss, and through the letters to his wife written by another doctor, Friedrich Mennecke, it also provides a certain insight into the minds of the perpetrators.

Götz Aly is responsible for the bulk of the book, while Christian Pross wrote the introduction and Peter Chroust edited selected letters of Dr. Mennecke. Michael Kater, one of the foremost authorities on Nazi medicine, wrote the foreword, giving a summary of some of the background of the medical profession's murderous collaboration with euthanasia.

The book gives a good short account (sometimes accompanied by long footnotes) of how mass murder was transformed into an almost routine occurrence, emphasizing the key role that doctors played in this process. The context of the Second World War is very much present: the need to free beds in mental hospitals for wounded soldiers, or for those bombed out, necessitated the "disappearance" of men and women deemed unable to perform productive work. The authors do not deal at length with the fact that the extermination process was facilitated by doctors who believed they were front-line soldiers helping to preserve the racial state. No explanation is offered, whereas Robert Lifton's belief (as expressed in his book, *The Nazi Doctors*), that these men possessed a split personality that enabled them to alternate between healing and killing, is harshly criticized as an apology for the doctors' actions.[1]

However, Lifton's analysis does not seem so strange when we read in Hermann Voss' diary that, even as he saw two wagons full of Polish ashes taken away, he noticed how the flowering bush outside was in beautiful bloom—or when, in a different context, the commandant of Auschwitz watches men, women and children go to their deaths while thinking about his family and beloved dog. Such a split personality does seem a part of normalcy. Lifton is accused of having presented Auschwitz

doctors as blinded idealists, but such an accusation ignores the possible role of nationalism and racism in the doctors' actions.

The authors' explanation of the success of the Nazi euthanasia program focuses on the connection between destruction and modernization. Auschwitz, in other words, cannot be understood without considering the newly invented Volkswagen, nor can the cruelty of the SS without considering Nazi Germany's health, social security and recreation programs. Some of the leading psychiatrists engaged in euthanasia were indeed avid reformers within their professions; they believed in the newest treatments such as shock therapy and modernized mental hospitals. In the minds of these perpetrators, experimentation on humans was a genuine attempt to advance scientific research.

It is useful to be reminded that the Nazis were also modernizers: the very tidying up of society, making it more efficient through the elimination of so-called unproductive elements, does have a modern, even radical, ring to it. But to say that the connection between destruction and modernization explains Nazi success ignores the ideological factors. Many men and women saw their true faith in modern nationalism and racism—one that had to be preserved and defended at all costs. Though the Nazis were also modernizers, the construction of a racial state had pride of place for them and their followers. Nazi euthanasia provided one building block for that state. Apart from presenting the diary and letters, the authors make no real attempt to get inside the minds of the perpetrators.

The book also lacks a certain context, that of the contribution of so-called normal society to the extermination process (though Aly does mention that sociological concepts were used in designating the victims). In fact, these doctors merely drove the social prejudices with which they had been reared to their logical conclusions—they were engaged in constructing a social utopia, an essential fact that should have been emphasized. Those who were eliminated through euthanasia belonged to precisely those groups with which normal society had always been ill at ease: the handicapped (the first victims); the old and infirm; and people unable to do productive work. They were the vanguard of the racial victims to follow. The fact that all victims were designated as people for whom life in a community was not possible, a fact that Aly mentions, should demonstrate the all-important connection between euthanasia (as well as the Holocaust) and the maintenance of modern society.

Writing in his diary, Hermann Voss shows an indifference to the death of Poles, which he explains as the outcome of the supposed fact that Poles must be looked at biologically; "we" must exterminate "them," or "they" will exterminate "us." The Poles were becoming impudent and, as he viewed newly installed crematoria, Voss mused that "it would be nice if we could drive the whole pack through such ovens" (p. 130). Racism and neo-Darwinism mingle, and war is looked upon as necessary for a proper racial cleansing. But at the same time, out of sentimentality or, better, the upholding of respectability, Voss expresses the hope that the antagonists in war would agree among themselves not to kill women and children. All of this is familiar, but the book takes its story into the postwar world in which Voss becomes a much-decorated and respected physician in Communist East Germany, and finally dies peacefully at the age of ninety. Mennecke, in contrast, was convicted after the war and died shortly afterwards in state custody.

Mennecke shared Voss' cocktail of beliefs, and is even more frank in his racial

stereotyping. The Russians are animals, and many of the Poles are "concentration camp types." Moreover, the link between the extermination process and the construction of a social utopia is especially clear in his letters. Above all, however, they demonstrate the banal, day-to-day aspects of these doctors' lives. Mennecke complains constantly that he is drowned in paperwork, and this fact may well have contributed to his dulled sensibilities.

Cleansing the Fatherland is not the usual scholarly monograph, but a book with a message. Whenever possible, the authors point out the survival of these doctors, with their reputations intact, in both West and East Germany, and this is a welcome reminder of the power and mythology surrounding the medical profession. However, beyond individual careers, the more basic connections between pre- and postwar medicine in this context are only implied. What is it about the medical profession in particular that made it so open to racism and right-wing causes? It cannot be due merely to professional jealousy of the doctors' Jewish colleagues, but rather must have had some roots in their heady social status, the fanatical devotion of some to medical progress regardless of the cost, and—last but not least—the national pride and political faith that they shared with so many other Germans. The lost First World War always looms in the background.

The book, within its mostly scholarly but partially polemical framework, contains many building blocks for a larger analysis. As Pross notes, the perpetrators were indeed average, run-of-the-mill doctors, but it does not follow, as he goes on to state, that they were supported by the anticipatory consent of the intelligentsia and the people. Such a remark seems close to unwarranted generalizing; that some mothers volunteered their deformed and handicapped children for euthanasia hardly proves the point. (Here it is well to remember that the English terms "euthanasia" and "mercy killing" do not have the reassurance of the German *Gnadenstoss*, with its soothing association of putting someone out of his misery.) Moreover, the connection between euthanasia and the Holocaust is addressed only briefly, and Aly's contention that the most important connection was the discovery that "the German people in general were willing to accept such a procedure" (p. 92) points in the same unhelpful direction as Pross' earlier remark.

This book is meant to educate Germans about the evils of euthanasia, itself a praiseworthy goal, which, however, does encourage such unconvincing stereotyping. Why, if there was such widespread support for Nazi euthanasia among the people, did Adolf Hitler, once the process became too public, put an ostensible stop to it and carry it out as secretly as possible? Typical of the book's approach to the German context of Nazi murder is Aly's statement that, when dealing with Nazi Germany, we must not ask how much the Germans knew but rather why they did not want to know. Posing the question in this fashion, it is easy to overlook the fact that, when the German euthanasia program began, sterilization was a respectable medical procedure that had even been used at times in the Weimar Republic, as well as in two dozen American states. Racism transformed eugenics into euthanasia. But the very phrase "the Germans" should have been banished from a historian's vocabulary by the progress of historical scholarship. Does it include those who helped and sheltered Jews? Those who worked underground? It seems hardly worthwhile to try and deconstruct such a stereotype. Using it does not get us nearer to the historical truth.

This book tells the story of the doctors' role in racial euthanasia clearly, adding some interesting detail about the medical implementation of that process. The authors' analysis of its context, however, reveals their polemical agenda. They certainly underestimate the doctors' ideological commitment. A much better understanding of the motivation of these doctors, and the larger context within which they worked, might have led to a more complex view of their actions and inhumanity. But inasmuch as the authors have made it easier to gain access to the process of euthanasia, they have performed the educational service that was their goal.

George L. Mosse
The University of Wisconsin—Madison
The Hebrew University

Note

1. See Robert Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors, Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York: 1986).

David Cesarani (ed.), *Genocide and Rescue: The Holocaust in Hungary.* London and New York: Berg, 1997. 220 pp.

The deportation and murder of 435,000 Hungarian Jews during the last months of the Second World War is the most painful chapter in the history of Hungarian Jewry. The purpose of this book is to investigate the motivations and morality of various actions taken by different actors in this drama. If events of the Hungarian Holocaust constitute a kind of moral drama, the same is true of the historical narrative, which also has its heroes, villains and neutral figures, and whose narrator, as Hayden White puts it, recounts the story with the "author's moral authority."[1]

Traditional Holocaust historiography focuses on moral dilemmas related to the imperative of saving one or several lives while sacrificing others. The eleven essays in this volume, by Hungarian, American and Israeli scholars, raise a different issue: under what circumstances Hungarian Jewry could have avoided the Final Solution once German military power was on the wane.[2] Who should have done more? Should more people have been rescued? Why did Hungarian Jews not do more to resist? Why did the Allies not bomb the gas chambers at Auschwitz? And why did the Allies sabotage various schemes to save the Jews?

The main actors in the drama are, of course, the Hungarian Jewish community; the Fascist Hungarian government headed by Miklós Horthy; the Allies; and the Germans. In general, the book presents a global perspective (although certain important aspects of the drama are not discussed, notably the Soviet connection, for which there remains much inaccessible material in the Soviet archives). Tony Kushner compares the British and American positions regarding Hungarian Jewry, while Shlomo Aronson analyzes a number of documents newly recovered from the U.S. archives that point to the noncommittal character of the Anglo-American efforts

to rescue Hungarian Jewry—regarded by them as a "side issue" (p. 99). It should be noted that, of necessity, the global perspective simplifies certain issues and terminology. "Germans," for example, become identified with the Nazis, whereas the term "American" is used without any attempt to distinguish between the views of various U.S. administrations.

Mass-scale rescue of Hungarian Jewry faced several major obstacles. First was the divided nature of Hungarian Jewry, which is portrayed in Yehuda Don's article on the economic impact of anti-Jewish legislation (such legislation, he explains, increased the social distance between wealthier Jews and their co-religionists). Second, Hungarian Jewry was quite assimilated—a fact that largely accounts for the lack of a strong Zionist movement in Hungary. As David Cesarani points out in his introduction, "their assimilation ideology disarmed them" (p. 12) and prevented them from standing up for their political rights. A related factor was the Jews' loyalty to the Hungarian state. According to Randolph Braham, such loyalty was based on the Interessengemeinschaft (community of interests) of 1867—even though this compact had essentially been dismantled by the end of the First World War with the rise of the antisemitic Hungarian right (p. 29). Finally, there is the question of the gap between evidence of genocide and Hungarian Jewry's seeming inability to grasp just how serious was the Nazi threat.

The gap between evidence and knowledge is examined by a number of authors in this volume. According to Yehuda Bauer: "The problem was that people refused to listen, refused to believe" (p. 197). Was this a question of individual psychology? A difficulty in determining the authenticity of information that was being reported at the time? Or are these questions themselves out of line, given the fact that Hungarian Jews—even if they believed in the threat—were largely powerless to act against it?

In his chapter on resistance, Asher Cohen points out that the Jews largely ignored reports they had heard concerning the massacre of Polish Jewry (the major exception being Hungarian Zionists, whose contacts outside Hungary authenticated the reports). Moreover, "nowhere before was so great a number of Jews deported from so many dispersed locations at such a great speed" (p. 127). Jewish armed resistance was also forestalled as a result of the forced labor service, which removed from the scene many Jewish young men. Finally, as opposed to France, where (as Stanley Hoffmann notes in an article published elsewhere)[3] there was a certain "state resistance" or half-hearted cooperation against Nazi war aims, Hungary had no national resistance movement of its own.

Hungarian antisemitism and postwar Holocaust historiography in Hungary is analyzed by Attila Pók, who stresses the importance of "coming to terms with the past" (p. 153). This reference to Theodor Adorno's famous statement implies that there is one unified and standardized past. In this volume, however, it is made manifestly clear just how various are the voices and interpretations of the past. What is missing in this collection, as is often the case, is an account of individual survival strategies. Whereas the secret negotiations concerning the rescue of Hungarian Jews are a well-documented narrative, the everyday reality of struggle is too often neglected, both in the research and in official commemorative practices.

This volume synthesizes the current research on Hungarian genocide and rescue. A chronology and biographies of the most prominent personalities would have added

to its usefulness for the wider public. The editor, moreover, should have paid more careful attention to Hungarian spelling.

Andrea Petö
Central European University, Budapest

Notes

1. Hayden White, *The Content of the Form* (Baltimore: 1987), 25.
2. For a fuller discussion of the historiography of the Holocaust in Hungary, see Randolph Braham and Attila Pók (eds.), *The Holocaust in Hungary: Fifty Years Later* (New York: 1997).
3. See Stanley Hoffman, "Collaborationism in France During World War II," *The Journal of Modern History* 40, no. 3 (Sept. 1968), 375–395.

Kate Cohen, *The Neppi Modona Diaries: Reading Jewish Survival through My Italian Family*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1997. 274 pp.

Despite its title, *The Neppi Modona Diaries* is much more than just a memoir. In addition to presenting two separate accounts written by an Italian Jewish father and son (distant relatives of the author), Kate Cohen has interviewed the mother and daughter, added excerpts from other survivor testimonies, provided some historical background and analyzed the psychological effects of identity-changing and hiding. She concludes with her own personal meditations on what it means to be a Jew. While sometimes uneven, the result is enlightening and provocative. Cohen does not shy away from the negative or the controversial.

Aldo Neppi Modona was a conservative Florentine Jew, a former army officer justifiably proud of his First World War service record, and a dedicated teacher and scholar. Though strictly observant, he was far more fervently devoted to his country than to his religion. In a declaration that exemplifies the profound, unquestioning nationalism not only of Italian Jews but of Europeans generally during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, he told his future bride in 1929 that "before everyone, before my mother, before my wife, comes the Fatherland" (p. 18). As his daughter remembered years later, he and his wife Rachel accepted Mussolini without suspicion. Their comfortable middle-class life was shattered not by the rise of Fascism in 1922 but by the racial laws in 1938, so unexpected and so thoroughly enforced. Exemptions designed to apply to Jews who had demonstrated special merit or service to the nation and to Fascism were in fact rarely granted. Aldo Neppi Modona experienced the humiliation of being denied exemption status and losing his job, while his children Lionella and Leo were denied the right to study in public schools.

The disaster of the racial laws was quickly followed by the war in 1940 and the German occupation in 1943. Cohen captures beautifully the lack of comprehension of an unworldly family—their inability to function in a world turned brutal and grotesque. They were maddeningly slow to hide when the Germans and their Italian

Fascist cronies began arresting and deporting Jews in September 1943. They were not good at deceit. Aldo was reluctant to accept the false papers that provided them with their only chance of survival. He and Rachel chose absurd names as replacements for their real ones, and taught their children only a portion of the Catholic prayers they would need to know if they were to attend mass in the village where they finally took refuge. Throughout the occupation they remained amateurs rather than professionals in the art of hiding.

Through memoirs and interviews, Cohen conveys the intense emotions of the period—the popular euphoria at the time of Mussolini's fall on July 25, 1943; the exhilaration with which Italians greeted the announcement of their new government's armistice with the Allies on September 8; and the fear and uncertainty that followed soon thereafter. She is also able to show that such intensity did not continue on a daily basis—that some days were simply boring, lived in tiny rooms, the family nourished by inadequate and unsatisfying meals, relieved by occasional walks and visits, and tormented by mundane problems of securing food and medical treatment. They changed residences frequently, with increasing despair and humiliation. They were forced to beg for a shabby room, or to walk the streets for hours because they could not return to an apartment during the day. Yet despite this, liberation brought depression rather than joy. Cohen's insight into the agonies of readjustment to a postwar world is perhaps the most valuable contribution of her book.

The weaknesses of this work detract only slightly from its intrinsic merit. Some of the son's writing seems annoyingly ethereal and childish—as indeed it should be, since the precocious Leo was only about ten years old. The interviews, transcribed as they are almost word for word, occasionally ramble and confuse. The author sometimes does not explain her characters' behavior, or explains it only later. Why did Rachel become depressed after liberation? Why did Leo behave so strangely? Also, footnotes might have explained references in the text to prominent personalities, the Italian educational system, or even the geography of the region around Florence. A map would have enabled readers to understand exactly where the family was wandering. Overall, however, the book is a pleasure to read and an invitation to further meditation. Does suffering caused by the personal experience of persecution leave individuals less inclined to racism and more sympathetic to the suffering of others? If it does not, as Cohen implies in this study of a family, is there any hope that human beings will ever treat each other better in the future?

Susan Zuccotti
New York City

Albert S. Lindemann, *Esau's Tears: Modern Antisemitism and the Rise of the Jews*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. xxi + 568 pp.

Albert Lindemann's ambitious account of modern antisemitism aspires to be a significant revisionist analysis of a phenomenon that runs like a blood-red thread through the tapestry of modern European history. He incisively insists that antisemitism should not be understood in terms of an irreversible development that climaxes in the

Nazi destruction of European Jewry, and that contemporary historians must work against the distorting lens of the Shoah in evaluating its history. Instead, he aspires toward a nuanced contextualization of antisemitism within a broad history of the role of Jews and Judaism in modern Europe and America, purporting "to offer a more penetrating and sophisticated analysis of the emergence of antisemitism in modern times" (p. xiii). The strength of this work is the breadth of his treatment and his comparative approach, which seeks to demonstrate that modern antisemitism was more ambiguous and less pervasive in the lives of both Jews and non-Jews than is commonly presented. He divides his text into five parts that explore "the long range background," "the appearance of modern antisemitism," "the belle epoch," the "decade of war and revolution" and "the fascist era," with an epilogue that constitutes a defense of the functionalist interpretation of the Holocaust.

Lindemann's basic thesis, encapsulated in the subtitle of the book, elaborates on his first work on antisemitism, *The Jew Accused* (1991): "antisemitism and the relationships of Jews and non-Jews more generally, cannot be understood without an appreciation of what will hereafter be referred to as the 'rise of the Jews' in Europe and America," which he defines as "the rapid transformation of the condition of the Jews—in absolute and relative numbers, in wealth, in fame, in power, and in influence."[1] Stated categorically in *Esau's Tears*, Lindemann argues that without "this ever more impressive rise, there would not have been a specifically modern antisemitism" (p. 21).

While Lindemann urges an interactive understanding of Jewish-Gentile relations, his analysis consistently views the dynamic from the dominant (non-Jewish) perspective, insisting that Jews were a threat because they clung to what he characterizes as Jewish chauvinism and narrow separatism. "So long as most Jews retain an identity with a substantial connection to Jewish tradition, and so long as the rest of the world has some sense of that identity and its related history," then "the potential for new explosions of hatred will remain, sparked by 'bad times'" (p. 532). Since he adopts the predominant European cultural perspective, his book inherits and duplicates rhetorical, epistemological, methodological, hermeneutic and ethicopolitical assumptions that enable the perpetuation of antisemitism.

Lindemann's rhetorical appeal depends upon blurring the lines between the popular press and scholarly studies. While he castigates work on the history of antisemitism written "with a crusading, polemical purpose," (p. 462) his book is a polemic against popular conceptions of the history of antisemitism, which also, he insinuates, runs rife through most scholarly studies. Ironically, his own thesis depends upon the reiteration of one of the most nefarious popular notions about Jews: he conflates Jewish concentration in certain socioeconomic sectors, principally in banking, medicine, law and the press (that is, Jewish *visibility* and *influence*) with real political and economic *power.* Furthermore, Lindemann evinces little scholarly understanding of Jewish tradition, reading the Hebrew Bible and the Talmud ahistorically as the genesis of the deadly mix of "religious exclusiveness meshed with 'racial' exclusiveness" (p. 72).

Lindemann claims that his work is a "dispassionate study" that achieves "scholarly balance" and is narrated as a "neutral" view of the problem; he claims his only interest is the desire to understand. Yet in his inheritance of this modern, "objective" epis-

temological vocabulary, Lindemann both fails to historicize the categories he employs and masks his own contradictions. He appeals to a series of presumptions about what is "normal," "natural," "plausible," "typical" or what "most people thought" about historical events or ethnic, religious and political conflicts. For example, he claims that "in the nineteeth century . . . it was almost universally assumed, by both Jews and non-Jews, that Jewish behavior was the all-too-obvious cause of the appearance of modern antisemitism" (p. xviii), even though he asserts on the previous page "that purported unanimous agreement . . . does not exist and never has" (p. xvii). He often imputes contentious allegations to anonymous "Jewish leaders," "Jewish observers" and "Jewish spokemen" in seeking to establish the veracity of his arguments. The strategy to turn contentious claims into facts is further reinforced by Lindemann's appeal to "reason" and "logic" in evaluating historical events. In addition, he systematically disavows an accusation and then makes it anyway; uses rhetorical questions rather than statements to intimate a controversial position; fails adequately to distinguish his own views from his paraphrases of antisemitic positions; and uses antisemitic language, like "jewification," without adequately problematizing it. While seemingly aware of the presumptuousness of objective analysis (p. xiii), he fails to appreciate its epistemological and psychological illusions and does not pay enough attention to what Dominick LaCapra has highlighted as the need to deal with "transference" issues in writing the history of traumatic experiences. Hence, while the text is unequivocally written in clear prose, Lindemann is often too clear where matters are quite murky and lacks clarity where it is crucial to take an unambiguous critical stance.

Perhaps the gravest problem with Lindemann's effort to write a revisionist history is his methodology. He shows no indication of archival research and relies almost exclusively on secondary sources. His account is thus dependent on a selective reading of classic scholarly texts on the subject to confirm his thesis that the "rise of the Jews" is the prime mover of antisemitism. Given his dependence on secondary material, his omission of the most significant recent studies in the field is glaring. Sander Gilman's important contributions on the intersection between race, gender and pathology is not discussed or included. George Mosse's most recent work on nationalism and sexuality is also absent, as is the slew of current work coming out under the rubric of Jewish cultural studies.

In his hermeneutic approach, Lindemann's admirable effort to pay attention to ambiguity and ambivalence is itself rather equivocal. He tries to be as sympathetic to antisemitism and antisemites as possible, in order to understand why they thought the way they did, and he makes every effort to make antisemitic positions rational, grounded and consistent with real historical problems. This effort at a judicious reading of antisemitic texts is rarely extended to the Jewish versions of the same events or phenomena, which are often denigrated or challenged as mendacious or exaggerated. It is not only that the scale is tilted in his interpretation of antisemitism; the very way he reads prefigures this bias. Texts are treated as mere epiphenomena of their contexts. He thus states that "politics, the economy, social change, and the way with which they blend and alter mythic imagery will be my main concerns" (p. xvii). This partly accounts for why Lindemann treats almost the entire genealogy of antisemitic literature as if it had little impact on Nazi ideology—in his view, it is the interwar

context alone that explains the Nazi weltanschauung rather than a historically evolving matrix of antisemitic images that were reconfigured after the First World War.

Finally, Lindemann's own ethicopolitical affinities overdetermine how he assesses modern antisemitism, since how he defines the "modern" is constitutive of how he understands antisemitism. Lindemann is aware that *modernity* meant new techniques of production, expansion of material wealth, rapid population increase, urbanization, and the instrumentalization of economic, social and political life (p. 97), which were often directly interpreted in racial and antisemitic ways (recall how he defines the "rise of the Jews"). However, the *modern* throughout Lindemann's text is "close to the generic notion of liberalism, deriving from the Enlightenment and, more distantly, from the Protestant Reformation and having to do with the establishment of personal liberty . . . a belief in the powers of unaided reason, in progress, and in secular values . . . and it stands in sharp contrast to the premodern world of faith, corporate communities, ecclesiastical authority, and tradition" (p. 97). Since "an underlying premise of this work, too, has been liberal" (545), Lindemann ends up reiterating the double binds of the Enlightenment model of emancipation where Jews who successfully integrate and succeed socially and economically provide the best evidence of the shrewdness of Jewish self-interest, exploitation, parasiticism and manipulation.

Lindemann's effort to revise the historiography of antisemitism thus falters on the very assumptions that animate his study. His basic thesis about the "rise of the Jews" is either banal or insidious, since obviously for antisemites the "rise of the Jews" was the threat that needed to be confronted, opposed and somehow eliminated. The question for the historian of antisemitism is *why* this was seen as a danger whose solutions required ever more radical reactions. In the end, Lindemann's text is a remarkable document, not for its insights about modern antisemitism, but rather as a case study of a critique—whose intentions are clearly to assess and to thwart antisemitism—but which ends up perpetuating the phenomenon because he does not question the assumptions that undergird it. While aware of the multiplicities of Jewish identity, including the "traditional Jew, reform Jew, cultural Jew, half-Jew, non-Jewish Jew, self-hating Jew, Karaite, [etc.]" (p. 433), Lindemann fails to show the historical constructedness of the antisemitic image of "the Jew" and to definitively and systematically work through his analysis to undermine it. He remains caught in the binaries of the discourse that he fails to analyze: Gentile/Jew, universal/particular, European/primitive, race/nation, and most significantly, reality/fantasy. These problems highlight the significance of the epigraph from the Zohar that opens Lindemann's text: "The Messiah will not come until the tears of Esau have been exhausted."

Jonathan Judaken
The University of Memphis

Note

1. Albert Lindemann, *The Jew Accused: Three Anti-Semitic Affairs (Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank) 1894–1915* (Cambridge, 1991), 10.

Odette Meyers, *Doors to Madame Marie*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997. xii + 464 pp.

This is a personal chronicle of survival, both physical and moral. Not unlike *The Diary of Anne Frank* in its depiction of a single family's fate during the Holocaust, it has a totally different focus—the continuation of life through and after the war, and the costs of survival. In addition, the volume is a memorial to "those who did not return," the aunts and cousins and friends who populated Odette's childhood world. Engulfed by the Holocaust, they were reduced to fading photographs in family albums and on mantels; their apartments, their tenement courtyards in Paris, and even whole neighborhoods rendered foreign by new occupants and postwar renovation.

This volume sets forth three interwoven themes: the decent few, who by large or small deeds redeemed humanity from an all-encompassing brand of Cain; the struggle for identity, common to thousands of Jewish children whose physical being was preserved by their being hidden in non-Jewish environments throughout the war; and finally, preservation of the memories of a human world destroyed—not only the physical beings, but the cultural and psychological structures that vanished with whole families in the inferno of the Holocaust.

Odette Melspajz was born in Paris in 1934 to immigrant parents newly arrived from Poland. Her first memories are of working-class immigrant life in prewar France, in a close-knit community of relatives and friends, and of a warm and nurturing school environment. This world crumbles with the war and the German occupation of Paris. We share the eight-year-old child's sense of vulnerability, humiliation and physical fear when she must wear the yellow star on her way to school and on errands for her mother—often witnessing the cruelty meted out to other Jews accosted by German soldiers—and when she herself is physically attacked by her schoolmates.

Odette is sustained by three people. The "Madame Marie" of the title is, in fact, two people: first and foremost, Marie Chotel, the concierge who rented an apartment to Odette's parents, despite Mrs. Melspajz's pregnancy, and then served as babysitter and moral preceptor to the infant Odette. Early in Odette's childhood, Madame Marie teaches her that "the heart is like an apartment. If it is clean and cheerful . . . then people will come and stay. . . . If it is extra nice, God himself comes in and does something to make it even nicer" (p. 35). Madame Marie and her consort, Monsieur Henri, fill the roles of the grandparents Odette never knew.

It is Madame Marie who warns Odette and her mother that the French police are searching for Jews from house to house, then hides them in a cupboard and calmly pours wine for the searchers to toast a Jew-free future for France. Tasked (somewhat ungraciously) by Odette's mother with the contrast between the Vatican's silence in the face of anti-Jewish propaganda and violence and her own active intervention to save Jews, Madame Marie answers: "This is between myself and God. If He thinks I have done something wrong, He will let me know" (p. 93). That same morning, while Odette's mother joins the Maquis underground, Monsieur Henri spirits Odette away to a railway station. After the liberation of Paris in 1944, he meets Odette and her mother at the Metro station, and carries their meagre belongings back to their safe-

guarded apartment, even though they had returned two days later than scheduled. It is he, too, who nurtures the continuing communication between the families after Odette's emigration to America.

From the railway station, Odette and several other little Jewish girls are convoyed to the village home of the second Madame Marie—Moisette Marie Raffin—by whom they are sternly impressed with the need for total secrecy as to their origins, are taught the elements of Catholicism, and are introduced to convent school education before being scattered to villages in the region. An ordinary French village woman, she and her husband unhesitatingly endanger themselves to save a group of helpless Jewish children. Forty-four years later, confronted by a strange woman who announces: "I come from far in time and space . . . . I come from California and lived here during the war" (p. 401) Marie Raffin unhesitatingly identifies Odette and again welcomes her into her home and her family.

These three righteous human beings are supported by a number of lesser characters: the mayor of St. Fulgent who vouches for Odette and her mother as Catholics when they are suspected by the villagers of being Jewish; the librarian in Paris who allows three tired little girls wearing the yellow star to rest in a corner of the library and amuse themselves with picture books until it is time to return home. In such deeds, small and large, Odette chronicles the saving graces of a humanity largely gone mad.

In the village, a new life opens up to Odette. She is accepted as a Catholic war orphan from Paris, taken into the convent school, and begins to find security and peace in the ritual of prayer and belief that informs the lives of the villagers. The eight-year-old Odette, bereft of parents, familiar surroundings, friends and family, embraces her new environment with fervor. The Virgin Mary becomes mother and grandmother and confidante. With considerable subtlety and skill, Meyers portrays the little girl's embarrassed reaction to her mother's awkwardness and skepticism when, as an agnostic Jew, she joins Odette in the village, learning out of necessity the externalities of ritual while rejecting the essence of Catholicism.

The serpent in this rural idyll is the village priest, who spews tirades against the Jews who, infiltrating Christian society, vitiate the prayers of the baptized and bring in their shadow illness and death. Odette is plagued by guilt at her deceptions, and traumatized by a murderous attack by her schoolmates who suspect her identity. The internal conflict triggers a series of hysterical attacks lasting to this day—the price of physical survival through spiritual camouflage. This is a price paid by a whole generation of children of survivors, haunted by their own and their families' experiences. Even after the father returns from a prisoner-of-war camp and the family is reunited in their old apartment, Odette's struggle goes on, and only her parents' awareness and support save her from running away to become a nun (with the urging and encouragement of a priest).

Meyers' style is graceful and poetic, dramatic without being sentimental. The adult's recollection and rendition of a child's feelings are, in my opinion, extraordinary in their sensitivity and clarity. One is tempted to think that she may have absorbed something of her late husband's milieu of lyric poetry—Bert Meyers was a poet of considerable literary stature—but the reader will discover that poetry and books played a major role throughout the child Odette's life. Indeed, it was her mother's sensitive utilization of poetry alongside family love that led the child out of

her first attack of hysterical muteness. In postwar Paris, literature and poetry provide the foundation that lends stability and direction to the adolescent Odette's life. The formation of the young woman, so intimately intertwined with the ambience of postwar Paris, is rendered beautifully and with great insight. For Odette, it is a living, pulsing period that stands out brightly against the dark leitmotif of the Holocaust-decimated Jewish community searching frantically for old acquaintances and new connections to the present.

The appendix that Meyers attaches to the book may puzzle some readers. It appears to have little connection either to the autobiography that is the core of the volume or to the story of the righteous Madame(s) Marie. Yet without this somewhat dry and factual history of the maternal branch of her family, the Melczaks, whose only survivors were Odette herself, Odette's mother, and four of her mother's brothers who emigrated to Argentina in the 1920s and were therefore spared the Holocaust, the volume would indeed be incomplete. The appendix is Meyers' "Yad vashem"—a memorial and a name—for her aunts, uncles and cousins; a personal record of those who died fighting in the ranks of the Resistance, those betrayed and killed, and those listed in the endless convoy lists of deportation from Pithviers to Drancy and ultimately Auschwitz.

In focus, this volume is an intimate and personal account. Without ignoring the scale and historical setting of the Holocaust, Meyers brings a single, starkly rendered story, deftly weaving it into the tapestry of history without losing the directness and specificity of her own life and that of her family. What was initially conceived as a tribute to her rescuers emerges as a chronicle of the predominance of prejudice over humanity at mid-century. Nevertheless, Meyers does not leave us without hope. On the last evening of her 1985 pilgrimage back to St. Fulgent, she reveals to her former schoolmate the secret of her Jewish identity. Her hosts tell her that there were other Jewish children hidden in the area, and that they too have revisited the townlet. Then they add: " But you know, St. Fulgent has changed a great deal in forty years, and people are sorry for the anti-Semitism of those days." Asked what it was that so changed them, her hosts reply that it was television: "We saw those grim documentaries on concentration camps, and also a televised production of Anne Frank's Diary. . . . We didn't know THEN that what we said against the Jews could lead to THAT!" (p. 416).

Theodore H. Friedgut
The Hebrew University

Lore Shelly (ed. and trans.), *The Union Kommando in Auschwitz: The Auschwitz Munitions Factory through the Eyes of Its Former Slave Laborers* (*Studies in the Shoah*, Vol. 13). Latham: University Press of America, 1996. 421 pp.

Some historians are wont to proclaim that they do not rely upon oral history but rather on contemporaneous documentation. The recollections of survivors are seemingly unreliable: they are not the stuff of history, certainly not of serious historians. Lore Shelly's disciplined efforts to compile the testimonies of scores of workers who

worked in the munitions factory at Auschwitz shows us the possibilities and the difficulties of oral history. Shelly also demonstrates how indispensable oral history is for understanding the Holocaust.

The larger part of the story of the Auschwitz munitions factory is well known. On October 7, 1944, the *Sonderkommando,* the corps of prisoners assigned to empty the gas chambers and stoke the ovens, blew up one of Birkenau's four crematoria. An elaborate underground network had been set up to smuggle dynamite to the Sonderkommando. The explosion was followed by the mass escape of six hundred prisoners. Four young women accused of supplying the dynamite were hung in the presence of the remaining inmates. One of them, Roza Robota, shouted "ḥazak veemaẓ" ("be strong, have courage") as the trap door was opened.

This bare outline did not suffice for Lore Shelly, who was imprisoned in Auschwitz during the 1943–1944 period and who later served as a journalist covering the Auschwitz trials. Painstakingly, she brought together interview after interview, statement after statement and affidavit after affidavit from survivors who worked in the munitions factory, some of whom were part of the resistance. Without much interpretation, she lets the statements stand on their own, allowing them to provide insight into how each individual was recruited into the resistance efforts, what led them to their fateful decision and what they have done in the years since liberation. Thirty-five testimonies are united into a tapestry that reveals the inner dynamics of what happened at Auschwitz and why.

For historians grappling with the phenomenon of resistance even in the shadow of death, this collection of material will be invaluable. With these testimonies, moreover, Roza Robota need not stand as the lone heroine. She was hung along with three other previously unknown women, Ala Gartner, Esther Weissblum and Regina Sapirstein. The survivors tell of those who cooperated with these women in supplying and passing along the explosives. We come to see, in great detail, the event as it evolved. By no means do all the accounts agree. There are differences of understanding and interpretation. Some witnesses were privy to more information, some are more insightful, more eloquent and have a greater understanding of the larger picture. But for the historian, these testimonies, as with other oral history recollections, are the real stuff of history, ripe for interpretation and absolutely essential.

Frankly, despite the fascination of the incident, some testimonies are essentially uninteresting—or so they can seem. Sometimes, however, a rare insight emerges from the painful detail, and a particular experience can illumine the whole. Anyone interested in understanding the munitions factory will perforce read this book and despite, or perhaps because of the tedium of so many accounts, will glimpse an important understanding of the inner chamber of hell.

Michael Berenbaum
Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation

History and the Social Sciences

Gershon C. Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland, 1916–1939.* Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1996. 331 pp.

Students of interwar Polish Jewry, modern Jewish politics and Orthodoxy will welcome Gershon Bacon's expansion of his authoritative dissertation on Agudat Israel. The present study is a comprehensive investigation of the origins and diverse fields of activity of Agudat Israel in Poland. In addition, the author has provided an epilogue that chronicles Aguda activity during the Holocaust, as well as its activities in the state of Israel.

The author points out that although the vast majority of East European Jews continued to observe Jewish law, most historiographic treatments of Polish Jewry focus on those modernist movements, such as Zionism, that dissented from the traditional way of life. The present study is meant to correct the historiographic imbalance. As most Jewish community records were destroyed in the Holocaust and Polish records are full of lacunae, this study rests largely on contemporary journalistic sources, often written by Aguda members.

Like other Jewish political parties, Agudat Israel offered its adherents a comprehensive set of services and institutions, such as schools, youth movements, labor affiliates and women's organizations, in addition to the usual modern modalities of political representation. The author traces the organizational activities of Agudat Israel in each of these spheres. The treatment of each topic is consistently as thorough as the available documentation will allow.

While providing a comprehensive account of Aguda's ideology, leading personalities, strategy, successes and failures, the book also offers something else: a portrayal of the dilemma of traditionalists in a modernizing world. Every step of Aguda's development embroiled it in contradictions. Its reason for being was to defend the way of life of the most traditional Jews. To do so, however, it had to adopt modern methods such as mass organizing, propaganda and coalition politics. All of these challenged its assertion of continuity with the timeless, exilic past and occasionally undermined its legitimacy among some traditionalists (although, as the author points out, some groups dissented from supporting Aguda not because of its compromised traditionality but because of their opposition to the predominance within the party of the Gerer rebbe). In the name of defending the traditional *ḥeder*, for example, Aguda had to stave off aggressive attempts by the Polish state to modernize the curriculum and introduce Polish subjects. The resultant compromise preserved much of the traditional character of the ḥeder, but also had to cede some territory to state-sponsored

modernization. Despite considerable reluctance, these political realities drew Aguda and its constituency into the process of modernization.

A minor theme of the book is the relationship between the modern German Orthodox rabbis and laymen who first conceived the idea of Agudat Israel and the Polish leaders who cooperated with them. The German "rabbi-doctors" who came to Poland with the occupation authorities during the First World War introduced Polish Orthodoxy to some of the basic concerns of the emerging Aguda, particularly in the areas of political organization and communication. Although the author discusses the interaction between German Jews and Polish Jews in connection with the earliest phases of the movement, the issue is not subsequently considered. This interaction requires further study.

All in all, we have here a thorough and informative portrait of organized traditional Jewry's communal life in independent Poland between the two world wars. Bacon's volume provides essential background not only on its period of study but on the subsequent course of ultra-Orthodox politics in the state of Israel.

Alan Mittleman
Muhlenberg College

Daniel Blatman, *Lema'an ḥerutenu veḥerutkhem: habund bepolin 1939–1949* (*For Our Freedom and Yours: The Jewish Labor Bund in Poland 1939–1949*). Jerusalem: Yad Vashem and the Avraham Harmen Institute of Contemporary Jewry, 1996. xx + 410 pp.

Interest in the Bund is alive and well half a century after its effective demise. Between 1994–1996, at least four new monographs were published that deal with significant periods in the history of this Jewish socialist party.[1] A research institute dedicated to the study of the Bund has been opened at the University of Haifa. Judging from the vigorous debates that animated the recent conference in Warsaw that honored the centennial of the party's founding, some prominent features of the Bundist program continue to excite the children and grandchildren of the men and women who made the Bund a significant force in Jewish political life for almost fifty years.

Such attention to a movement of which only vestiges remain, and whose long-range impact upon Jewish history appears minimal, fits in well with the current academic penchant for recovering the voices of those relegated to the periphery of historical consciousness by hegemonic narratives of the past. Indeed, much present discussion of the Bund is inseparable from the discussions about Zionism, once the Bund's major competitor for hegemony in the Jewish street, today the apparent victor. Some scholars and public figures—mainly those who, out of cultural or ideological affinity, regret the Bund's disappearance—allege that the Zionist movement and the state of Israel deliberately obliterated the memory of the past and its heroes. Other attribute the same phenomenon to different factors but insist nonetheless that Zionist and Israeli historiography, largely for ideological reasons, have not given the Bund its due.

Daniel Blatman's pioneering study of the Bund during the Second World War and afterwards places its author squarely within the latter camp. In Blatman's words, "the Bund's struggle during the Holocaust to survive, on the one hand, as a movement

bearing a particular ideological legacy and, on the other, to integrate itself into the [overall] Jewish struggle for survival represents an additional aspect of the manner in which Jews coped with the burden of that time" (pp. 359–360)—an aspect worth studying because it embodied "a fundamentally different perception" of the threat facing Polish Jewry "than that of the Zionist youth movements and parties" whose perspective "has been adopted without dissent by historians and scholars in Israel" (pp. 23). The Bund, Blatman suggests, saw German killing of Jews as part of a larger Nazi campaign against all nonracially based political doctrines; hence, although its leaders "knew what fate awaited the Jews . . . , the question of the Jewish fate and its unique character was not what they were thinking about" when they set their party's course (p. 3). Instead, he argues, the Bund leadership concerned itself primarily with solidifying the party's ties with the Polish Socialist party and through it with the Polish underground as a whole, eschewing at the same time alliances with nonsocialist Jewish groups, especially Zionists.

To be sure, that approach was challenged from within the party, largely by members of the Bundist youth movement, Tsukunft, following the onset of systematic killing of Polish Jewry. But ultimately, according to Blatman, both dissatisfaction with the response of their Polish comrades to their overtures and specific local exigencies, more than a fundamental change in perception, led some Bundist youth to join unified Jewish armed resistance organizations in Bialystok, Vilna and Warsaw. Thus, he concludes, "the Bund viewed the [ghetto] revolt as a stage on the road to freedom for a socialist and democratic Poland in which Jews would be equal citizens and as a stage in the struggle of freedom-loving peoples against the yoke of fascism" (p. 197). In other words, what we learn from incorporating Bundist voices into the story of how Polish Jews lived and died under Nazi occupation is that knowledge of the nature of Nazi designs upon all Jews may have heightened internal solidarity among Polish Jews, but it did not inexorably drive them to Jewish nationalism.

This finding, which revises a common Israeli notion, is plausible and probably true, although the documentation Blatman provides is not overwhelming and some of it might well be interpreted differently. This may not be Blatman's fault; as he notes correctly, "an underground movement . . . does not leave much written material behind" (pp. 4–5). Lack of documentation also prevents unhesitating acceptance of another of Blatman's theses, that the Bund did not display a significant presence as such in the Polish ghettos. Here, too, Blatman may be correct, but to substantiate his claim he might have looked more for traces of involvement by Bundists in nonpolitical communal activities. These reservations notwithstanding, Blatman has produced a careful, sober, subtle and innovative study of a subject that, if only for its corrective value, deserves the attention he gave it. He has made a strong case for the importance of his research.

David Engel
New York University

Note

1. In addition to the volume under review, see Tsvi Barzilai, *Tenu'at habund bepolin bein shtei milḥamot ha'olam* (Jerusalem: 1994); Arye Gelband, *Sofo shelo keteḥilato: kiẓo shel*

ha"Bund" harusi (Tel Aviv: 1995), Henri Minczeles, *Histoire générale du Bund: un mouvement révolutionnaire juif* (Paris: 1995). A Hebrew translation of Yoav Peled, *Class and Ethnicity in the Pale: The Political Economy of Jewish Workers' Nationalism in Late Imperial Russia* (New York: 1989) was published in 1997.

Henry L. Feingold, *Lest Memory Cease: Finding Meaning in the American Jewish Past*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996. x + 226 pp.

Henry Feingold is among the most fertile and perceptive American Jewish historians. His research, which originally centered on U.S. policies concerning rescue of the Jews during the Holocaust, subsequently broadened to produce a general history of American Jewry, *Zion in America* (1974) and the notable *A Time for Searching: Entering the Mainstream 1920–1945* (1992)—the fourth volume of *The Jewish People in America* series, which Feingold edited. The work under review presents Feingold's collected articles, some of which originated as lectures to Jewish organizations, and others that appeared mainly in the labor Zionist magazine, *Jewish Frontier*. One of Feingold's virtues, present here, is a skillful analysis of the contemporary American Jewish scene. He draws historical parallels with restraint, his articles and lectures are fluent and read easily—and they make points.

The most prominent of Feingold's observations is the effect of liberalism and secularization on American Jews. Secularization, as it appears here, is pervasive and virtually synonymous with acculturation. It even penetrates non-Orthodox religious movements. The secular culture of the immigrant generation, mainly in Yiddish, is gone, and Jewish secularists now languish without any "commanding voice," at a loss for a Jewish way to employ the personal autonomy that lies at the basis of their secular faith. Feingold argues that Conservative and Reform Judaism have also incorporated secularism into their principles. However, his use of the 1937 Columbus platform of Reform, and Solomon Schechter's term "Catholic Israel" to exemplify the inroads of secularism in Conservative Judaism, is unconvincing. Reform in 1937 was seeking to bring ethnicity and Zionism back into its brand of Judaism; Schechter was rendering into English the ancient term *klal yisrael*, and he did so before coming to the United States in 1902. Moreover, can there even be a secular religious movement? And can secular Judaism—Jewishness, if you prefer—truly survive against the vast power of religious Judaism?

Secular Jews need a faith, and Feingold sees liberalism as that faith. To be sure, one does not need to be secular to be liberal, but it is true that for many Jews, some of them very prominent, liberalism substitutes for religion. At the same time, the American stage on which Jewish liberalism is played out is only lightly touched on by Feingold, who seems to assume that today's benign American passivity toward any and every form of Jewish identity will not change. This assumption should be placed on the table for discussion or qualification.

This interesting and often suggestive book, despite some errors of fact, touches deftly on matters that invite extensive comment and debate.

Lloyd P. Gartner
Tel Aviv University

Kathie Friedman-Kasaba, *Memories of Migration: Gender, Ethnicity, and Work in the Lives of Jewish and Italian Women in New York, 1870–1924.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 242 pp.

Titles should not be afterthoughts; rather, they should tell the reader what to expect. Kathie Friedman-Kasaba, a sociologist, promises a good deal when she calls her book *Memories of Migration: Gender, Ethnicity, and Work in the Lives of Jewish and Italian Women in New York, 1870–1924.* From the title, it appears that we will be treated to a comparative analysis of Italian and Jewish immigrant women in a particular place, organized around the twin themes of the nature of the migration process and the structure of the work experience. By virtue of its name, this book should explore the ways in which Jewish and Italian immigrant women in New York in the latter part of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries understood and acted upon their migration experiences.

Such a book, in fact, would further greatly the contours of scholarly understanding of both immigration history and women's history. But in her introduction, Friedman-Kasaba goes on to promise even more, stating that she intends to situate her subjects in the context of transnational immigrations and international migration theory, in order to determine "how Italian and Russian Jewish immigrant women experienced and tried to negotiate both the potentially empowering and the coercive dimensions inherent in the process of international migration" (p. 9).

Few groups have been considered in tandem so frequently as Jews and Italians. Since the 1920s and the work of the Chicago School of Sociology, and particularly since the publication of *Old World Traits Transplanted* in 1921, social analysts have been interested in the migration and adaptation experiences of Jews and Italians in some kind of comparative perspective.[1] After all, in the era of the 1880s through the 1920s, these two groups dominated the consciousness of Americans as exemplars of "the new immigration" that profoundly challenged regnant definitions of who was an American. The years of East European Jewish and southern Italian migration coincided, and members of the two groups settled in roughly the same places, often living side by side. They coexisted in the garment industry and articulated a public culture that resisted fusion into some kind of American melting pot. Yet they differed enough to make comparison intellectually provocative. Jewish migration to America consisted of women and men in approximately equal numbers, whereas Italian men immigrants outnumbered women. Jews came to America with no intention of returning, while many Italians dreamed of returning to their home villages—indeed a sizable minority did so, essentially commuting between the two continents.

Comparative analysis, however, is always tricky. It assumes an equally profound knowledge of both (or all) entities under consideration. It requires the scholar to be able to account for differences and to be able to distinguish between differences in degree and differences in kind. It always carries with it the possibility of being judgmental, seeing one entity as "successful" and the other as a "failure." As such, it requires a sophisticated and nuanced engagement with the value structure of the individuals themselves and access to their own words and ideas.

All of this—Kasaba-Friedman's bold promises, the long interest in the Jewish-

Italian comparison as reflected in the previous historical scholarship in general—makes the challenge posed by this book particularly large. What will the author be able to do here that had not been done before?

Certainly, by posing the issues in terms of women and their experiences, she might indeed have made a real contribution and changed the basic analytic framework. Unfortunately, her work turns out to be flat, derivative and decontextualized. She presents, for example, a good deal of material pertaining to migrations, migration theory, and the formation of class and ethnicity, but does not draw clear connections to her main focus of analysis. Additionally, Kasaba-Friedman does not cite a single work in Yiddish or Italian, indicating that she had no access to the words of the principal subjects of her books. She bases much of her observation on the words of others—often outside observers—and she draws too heavily on the findings of other historians.

Kasaba-Friedman presents the premigration experience for women only in the context of the large economic transformations of Eastern Europe and southern Italy. While these profound changes obviously set in motion the massive migrations in which these women participated, they do not, in and of themselves, explain either the particularistic ways in which women migrated or their experiences before, during or after the migrations. Knowing little or nothing about their lives before coming to America, Kasaba-Friedman boldly concludes that "for women, global migration and being a person are two sides of the same coin" (p. 192). Does she mean by this that before leaving their homes they had no autonomy, no individual "personhood"? If so, what evidence does she present to prove this? Is Kasaba-Friedman assuming that these women—and men—left traditional, premodern homes in which the individual had to subsume herself to the demands of family and group? If so, she has missed several decades of scholarship in both Italian and Jewish history, which has pointed to upheavals in those societies that clearly predated the mass migration. Moreover, we learn nothing in this book about the cultures in which these women grew up and what elements of those cultural repertoires they chose to continue in America in reconstructed forms.

Kasaba-Friedman states not only that women migrated in order to "become persons" but also that "migration to the United States promised the fulfillment of old world dreams in a new land, or at least a degree of emancipation from old world hierarchies and greater self-determination" (p. 130). Yet what constitutes (or constituted a century ago) a "person"? Must historical subjects have the same degree of autonomy that late twentieth-century Americans demand in order to be persons? What definitions did these women themselves give concerning their ideals of personhood? The author in fact provides no convincing evidence that Jewish or Italian women sought to liberate themselves from preexisting power relations—of which we actually learn very little.

At a certain point in her conclusion, Kasaba-Friedman admits that her initial assumption was that the act of drawing a paycheck would prove to have been the key force in liberating immigrant women from older hierarchical structures. If this was really the intellectual problem that motivated her study, she should have been dissuaded at the outset: scholars of women's history and of Italian and Jewish immigration have long understood that drawing a salary never translated into automatic and total emancipation for women.

A not insignificant part of this book focuses on the words of nativists and the activities of social reformers to remake immigrant women. While this is not the place to quibble with Kasaba-Friedman's analysis of the settlement houses and the women and men who staffed them, it is the place to criticize the lack of a fuller context. How did Italian and Jewish immigrant women internalize the comments made about them? What differences, if any, did these comments make? By itself, such secondary material is irrelevant to the book's stated theme, namely, how immigrant women constructed new lives for themselves in the wake of migration, and how they later reconstructed the migration experience.

It may be that Kasaba-Friedman relies so heavily upon the words of outsiders (as well as on some Jewish women whom she calls "nominal co-ethnics"—a term whose meaning can only be presumed) because she had no access to the actual words of the immigrant women themselves. She borrows liberally from social historians who themselves had no access to the languages spoken by the immigrants, accepting their views as authoritative. She even conflates fiction with fact, taking the writings of Anzia Yezierska, for example, as historical "fact." She relies on sources that are sometimes far removed from the immigration experience, as—as when she offers insights about the meaning of migration from Kim Chernin, written in 1983, based on her mother's recollections of *her* mother's migration. Needless to say, all such statements need to be viewed with skepticism, particularly in a book whose stated purpose was to reconstruct the "memories of migration."

In summary, *Memories of Migration* promises a great deal and offers very little. A pastiche of quotes culled unsystematically from derivative sources, it does not further our understanding of Jewish and Italian migrations and the experiences of women within them. This is too bad, because the subject itself deserves insightful historical treatment.

Hasia R. Diner
New York University

Note

1. See, for example, Robert Park and W.I. Thomas, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York: 1921); and Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan's classic, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge: 1963). With the growth of ethnic and social history in the late 1960s, there was renewed interest in the comparative analysis of Italians and Jews. Two more recent studies are Thomas Kessner's *The Golden Door: Italian and Jewish Immigrant Mobility in New York City, 1880–1915* (New York: 1977); and Judith Smith's *Family Connections: A History of Italian and Jewish Immigrant Lives in Providence, Rhode Island, 1900–1914* (Albany: 1985).

Harvey Goldberg (ed.), *Sephardi and Middle Eastern Jewries: History and Culture in the Modern Era*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. xviii + 346 pp.

Based on a conference held in Israel in 1991 on the eve of the Persian Gulf War, *Sephardi and Middle Eastern Jewries* is divided into four sections: "Sephardi and

Middle Eastern Communities in the Context of Modern Jewish History"; "Varieties of Responses"; "Languages and Literature"; and "History and Memory." The contributors are leading linguists, historians, anthropologists and sociologists—Norman A. Stillman, Jacob Barnai, Esther Benbassa, Aron Rodrigue, Joseph Chetrit, Yaron Tsur, Laurence D. Loeb, Susan Gilson Miller, Yosef Tobi, David Bunis, Yoram Bilu, Isaac Guershon, Esther Schely-Newman, Daniel J. Schroeter, Zvi Zohar, Joëlle Bahloul, André Levy, Amnon Netzer and Zvi Yehuda. The book deals not only with Jews of Arab lands but also with Jews in Ottoman Turkey, the Balkans and Iran. It is not a textbook; rather, it is a compilation of multifaceted studies. Altogether there are eighteen chapters, two appendixes pertaining to population data, and a glossary.

The book begins with Goldberg's outstanding fifty-five page introduction, which focuses on modernization and deals with such topics as assimilation and reform, Moslem-Jewish relations, and Zionism. It covers Sharifian Morocco, the Middle East and North Africa in the precolonial, colonial and immediate postcolonial era, Ottoman and post-Ottoman Turkey, and Qajar and Pahlavi Iran. There are only minor flaws. Thus, when Goldberg writes that "more than one-half of Israeli Jews are now of Sephardi background" (p. 1), this may still have been the case in 1989 or 1990, prior to the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union. Today, however, Sephardim and *mizraḥim* (meaning above all, but not exclusively, Jews from North Africa) constitute approximately 45 percent of the Israeli Jewish populace. A further problem is the use of the term "Sephardi." Whereas Sephardi may apply to the majority of Balkan and Turkish Jewries, this is certainly not the case for much of the Arabic-speaking world, where most Jews were not descendants of immigrants from the Iberian peninsula.

Given the diversity of the chapters, I shall focus on the most innovative studies, several of which raise controversial issues.

Aron Rodrigue and Esther Benbassa's chapters respectively analyze the Judeo-Spanish communities of the Balkans and Asia Minor that looked to the West and were influenced by the Westernizing reforms in Ottoman and post-Ottoman Turkey and in the post-Ottoman nation-states. They emphasize the role of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the process of Gallicization of the Jews and the impact of French culture alongside the retention of Judeo-Spanish culture. Rodrigue observes that it was the Alliance and the endeavors of European Jewry, rather than the Ottoman empire and post-First World War Turkey, that laid the groundwork for the Westernization of the Jews. Westernization came at the expense of subsequent Turkicization and assimilation to the emerging Bulgarian or Greek nation-states. The external forces were more influential than local regimes in affecting Jewish life, because these regimes failed to fully integrate Jews into the new order. Benbassa shows that even in the Ottoman period, the Alliance wanted the Jews to be integrated into the societies in which they lived. However, by teaching them French and inculcating Western values, the Alliance, paradoxically, impeded their integration. Moreover, the Alliance cultivated Jewish particularism, contrary to the ideology inherent in the modernization process (p. 96). The same thing happened in Morocco, where the Alliance—inadvertently or not—guided segments of young Jewry away from Moroccan to French culture and, eventually, toward Zionism.

Yaron Tsur's chapter on the community of Mahdia in Tunisia also accentuates the role and status of the Alliance, focusing on the divisions between the Grana (Jews of

Livornese background) and Twansa (or Touansa—the veteran Jews). In the past it was customary to contend that Grana/Twansa differences were rooted in ethnic rivalries and the higher socioeconomic status of the Grana, not to mention their status as Italian nationals. Tsur demonstrates that there were also affluent Twansa. In his view, the divisions ran along cultural divides—the affinity of the Twansa to Judeo-Arabic customs and of the Grana to Judeo-Italian—and they emerged because of *different types of economic activities* (my emphasis) engaged in by each group. Yet even in the cultural sphere, Tsur's research confirms that some Grana were beginning to assimilate into Judeo-Arabic culture. Economically, the Grana were oriented toward Italy, the Twansa more toward local markets. The author further reveals that Grana/Twansa tensions were more acute in Tunis than in smaller communities such as Mahdia.

Susan Gilson Miller's "Kippur on the Amazon: Jewish Emigration from Northern Morocco in the Late Nineteenth Century" is a fine, original chapter concerning the emigration from Tangier and other northern Moroccan communities. She effectively utilizes Alliance archives and other primary sources, such as data gathered from the Tangier community archives, to highlight the essential character of Moroccan Jewish emigration. Miller correctly remarks that whereas Moroccan Jewish emigration to other lands is not really a mid-nineteenth-century phenomenon, economic developments in the New World—at a time when Morocco confronted internal crises—stimulated the emigration trend from the 1850s onwards. The Alliance schools, which inculcated a doctrine of emigration among young Jews, equipped the young for larger-scale resettlement abroad.

Yoram Bilu and André Levy's study, "Jewish-Muslim Relations in Oulad Mansour," concentrates on a small southern Moroccan semi-rural community and is based on fieldwork in addition to written sources. Few available studies are quite as interesting as this one. Bilu and Levy discuss Moslem-Jewish ties in the economic sector, the Jews' status in the context of Arabo-Berber tribal tensions, and cultural coexistence. They emphasize Jewish-Moslem partnership in agricultural pursuits, crop-sharing, animal husbandry and land cultivation. There is much to be learned here about Moslem patrons and their attitudes toward the Jews in remote communities, as well as the Jews' precarious maneuvering between the Moslem authorities and the common people. The idea that the Second World War and the rise of Vichy influence in Morocco affected the Jewish economic and social life in Oulad Mansour is both new and intriguing. Hitherto it had been assumed that only Jews of the major urban areas were affected by Vichy legislation.

Daniel J. Schroeter and Joseph Chetrit's chapter, "Transformation of the Jewish Community of Essaouira (Mogador) in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," is both valuable and original, yet not without faults. Focusing on Essaouira (a key Moroccan seaport on the Atlantic coast), yet extending the analysis to the rest of Morocco, the authors present a revisionist approach to the notion of the "modernization of the Jews." They insist (p. 100) that modernization based on the French-Western model, which aimed to produce a more secular, literate and emancipated Jewish community, was not inevitable. Their criticism of historians and sociologists who argue the point of "inevitability" is directed specifically at André Chouraqui's *Marche vers l'Occident: Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord* (1952); Doris Bensimon-

Donath's *Evolution du Judaisme marocain sous le Protectorat français, 1912–1956* (1968); and my own *The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862–1962* (1983).

Challenging the definition in the above-mentioned studies, Schroeter and Chetrit assume that their authors narrowed the definition to "modernity versus traditionalism." In fact, my own work clearly shows that Moroccan Jews, despite modernization, remained attached to their traditions. Even the occupational structure of the Jews, who had been undergoing modernization since the late nineteenth century, remained in large part traditional. I also demonstrated how the Jews of the Atlas mountains and the semi-rural communities preserved much of their traditional lifestyles. The youth frequenting the Alliance schools were dispatched by their parents to *talmudei torah* and *ḥadarim* for religious education. Further, my definition of modernization embraced the renovated communal religious schools (influenced by modernization, they offered "sacred" along with "profane" education), the work of religious schools such as the foreign Otsar ha-Torah network, the influence of the European settlers, the French Protectorate schools, and the relocation of increasing numbers of Jews from the traditional residential quarter (the *mellah*) to the European city. To some degree, Chouraqui and Bensimon-Donath have painted a similar picture. Chouraqui's *Marche vers l'Occident* does not suggest an uncontrollable rush to modernity. Both he and Bensimon-Donath speak of an evolutionary process.

There is no doubt that modernization was characterized by the battle against illiteracy, some degree of secularization among urban Jews and identification with French values. Admittedly, the corporate structure of the Moroccan communities did not undergo a severe transformation; Jews continued to cling fervently to their rabbis; and, generally, modernization did not influence Maghrebi Jews in the same way as it had French, German or Anglo-Jewry. In fact, even Algerian Jews, recipients en bloc of French citizenship, were not totally divorced from Jewish values as late as the early 1960s upon their emigration to France. Nonetheless, one cannot deny the process of Gallicization of names among Jews, including those living in remote communities such as Midelt and Beni Mellal; the growing desire to live among the European settlers and to emulate their lifestyles; and, in the wake of decolonization in 1956, the preference for French over Arabic as the language of instruction in Jewish schools.

What prevented many Moroccan Jews from further adapting to French culture and lifestyles was the break in the evolutionary *marche vers l'occident*. By 1955, as a result of emigration, aliyah and decolonization, it became apparent that communal self-liquidation was taking place. The community was reduced in size from two hundred fifty thousand in 1954 to eighty thousand in 1964. The work of the Jewish welfare and educational organizations in Morocco, among them the Alliance, ORT, and Otsar ha-Torah, reached its peak in 1954–1955. Yet even at that stage, given the scarcity of resources, the Jews' location in numerous and scattered communities and their high birth rates, these organizations were unable to extend their school network throughout the country. Aliyah from remote areas, where the Alliance either failed to penetrate or else entered the scene late, "deprived" many Jews of an evolution à la française. In other words: the inevitability of wider and deeper French acculturation came to naught for many young persons making aliyah. Those Jews who emigrated

from Morocco to France and French Canada (several tens of thousands) did continue their marche vers l'occident. In Israel, in contrast, young Moroccan emigrants became abruptly exposed to a variety of Israeli societal trends, several of which proved to be problematic in the 1960s and 1970s, causing a deep-seated identity crisis. It could well be argued that had Moroccan Jews been recipients of French citizenship, as were all their Algerian and one-third of their Tunisian co-religionists, and had the French secular public schools been open for them without restrictions, the majority would have chosen France over Israel for resettlement purposes.

I also tend to differ with the argument presented by Schroeter and Chetrit that Zionism among Moroccan Jews was integrated into a Moroccan context (p. 106). For one thing, most "ordinary" Jews *throughout* the diaspora were Zionist in a nonpolitical sense before the First World War. Just as Moroccan Jews longed for Zion, so did their counterparts elsewhere. The Zionist elites, in contrast, were politicized. Consequently, Revisionist Zionists of Morocco or Tunisia were as revisionist as any of their contemporaries in Riga or Alexandria. There was no custom-made, local Moroccan Revisionism. Moreover, Labor Zionism in Morocco and the rest of the Maghreb was in no way distinguishable from the outlook of those of the Poale Tsiyon/Mapai of France. The same is true of proponents of Mizrahi/Hapoel Hamizrahi.

This impressive volume deserves much praise for its unparalleled overview as well as for its superb editing and elegant English style. It is highly recommended for students of Middle East minorities and of Moslem-Jewish ties.

Michael M. Laskier
Ashqelon College of Bar-Ilan University
Ben-Gurion University

Jeffrey S. Gurock, *American Jewish Orthodoxy in Historical Perspective.* Hoboken: Ktav, 1996. xxv + 457 pp.

This is a collection of fifteen previously published essays by the author. They focus on the period between 1880 and 1920. Some of the material is repetitive, and there are other niggling problems. Footnote references are not always clear. The text refers to personages such as "an eminent historian" or "a downtown rabbi" or "a sociologist" without naming or footnoting them (I figured out that I am the "sociologist"). The footnotes also present difficulties. The author often provides multiple citations and the reader is not certain which of the citations actually refers to the material. The significance of the articles is overstated in the introduction. Contrary to Jeffrey Gurock's claim, none of the articles are "seminal," nor do they challenge the "historiographical tradition" established by the work of Moshe Davis, Nathan Glazer, Marshall Sklare, Will Herberg and Abraham Karp. This is the bad news. The good news is that readers who come with the proper set of expectations will find a series of essays that can be read with pleasure and profit.

The author's central points are that Orthodox Judaism, or at least a proto-Orthodox Judaism, existed in the United States as early as the second half of the nineteenth century. Orthodoxy is not only to be found among East European immigrants or among

the more established and culturally sophisticated Jews of Sephardic descent, but also among older arrivals from Central Europe.

Second, the battle lines over attitudes toward modernity, Americanization, secular education and ritual changes were not only drawn between Orthodox and Conservative but within Orthodoxy itself, and even within East European immigrant Orthodoxy. The effort to reconcile Jewish and American identities is already to be found in Orthodox synagogues founded by the first generation. Finally, contrary to what many believe, a modernized-Americanized version of Orthodoxy was able to hold its own in competition with Conservative Judaism and was able to attract and/or retain the allegiance of second-generation American Jews.

I think that the author could have exploited more usefully than he did the literature in related disciplines. He might have drawn upon the sociology of religion—for example, my article in the December 1967 issue of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, "Religion, Class, and Culture in American Jewish History," for useful analytical categories. The struggle over modernization and Americanization among Orthodox immigrant leaders (rabbis as well as lay people) could have been informed by comparing it to the battle within European Orthodoxy over the Haskalah. Finally, had Gurock sought to locate his subjects within the context of American immigrant history, he could have enriched his material and broadened the forums in which his articles appeared. But having said all that, I doubt if there is anyone who cannot learn a great deal from these essays.

Charles S. Liebman
Bar-Ilan University

Moshe Hartman and Harriet Hartman, *Gender Equality and American Jews*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 374 pp.

Gender Equality and American Jews is an important contribution to the literature on the educational attainment, labor force behavior and occupational distribution of American Jewish men and women. The main focus of the book is the extent of gender equality among Jews in these three areas, as compared with that of the overall white American population. The analysis uses data from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) for the former and governmental statistics for the latter.

The first part of the volume describes the impressive achievements of American Jewish men and women in the areas of education and occupation. The authors show that the usual gender gap with regard to years of schooling exists among Jews as well, albeit elevated to a higher level of educational attainment. The gap between men and women in the occupational distribution is smaller for Jews, a result attributed in part to the fact that Jewish women delay motherhood and restrict their fertility. Because of these behaviors and their high level of schooling, Jewish women's commitment to the labor market is generally stronger than that of their non-Jewish counterparts. Additional analyses explore spousal inequality within Jewish couples.

The second part of the volume is based on the premise that if the patterns of secular achievement by gender described above have their roots in Jewish culture and tra-

dition, then those more involved in Judaism should display such patterns more clearly. This hypothesis is explored in two ways. First, the authors perform a comparative analysis of the extent of gender inequality by religiosity, using a number of indicators of the individual's and household's level of participation in Jewish practices. Religiosity is found to be generally associated positively with secular education, and the relationship does not vary by gender. At the same time, gender differences in employment and occupational attainment are found to be more pronounced at higher levels of religious participation, a result interpreted as reflecting religious women's augmented family roles. Second, the authors compare the behavior of American and Israeli Jews. They find greater gender equality in education and labor force activity among the latter, and view this result as confirmation for the thesis that elements of Judaism lead to equality between men and women in secular roles and achievements.

An attractive feature of the book is its heavy reliance on statistical techniques that are accessible to a wide audience. The other side of this coin, however, is that lengthy cross-tabulation analyses are at times followed by regressions showing that some of the relationships are spurious. More sophisticated statistical procedures would also have provided more powerful tools of analysis for certain relationships. For example, the vast majority of women today are in the labor force, even during the early child-rearing years. Thus, much of the variability in female labor supply behavior has to do with whether the employment is on a full- or part-time basis. Yet the analyses in the book generally focus on the simple, dichotomous labor force participation variable. Where the three dimensions of labor supply are studied (full-time work, part-time work, non-employment), the research is done with ordinary least-squares regressions as opposed to models that take into account the categorical nature of the dependent variable.

For those findings that deviate from conventional wisdom, it would be useful to have sensitivity analyses (that is, results from a series of models with different specifications). For instance, the authors find that among Jewish American couples, the husband's economic status does not play an important role in the wife's labor supply behavior. Yet there is a high correlation between the spouses' characteristics, and a different conclusion might emerge from a model with a more complete set of controls for the wife's traits. Similarly, in their analysis of female labor supply in Israel, the authors conclude that women work more when their husbands have higher incomes and the family can afford substitute care. This inference is based on a cross-tabulation of the occupational distribution of husbands by their status as sole breadwinners or as members of dual-earner couples. A more complete analysis that included measures of the wives' value of time might lead to a different, more conventional interpretation: women's labor supply responds positively to their own wage rate and negatively to their husbands' earnings.

The analyses of how Jewish involvement influences education, occupation and labor force behavior are novel and rich in their consideration of many dimensions of participation in Judaism. However, the fact that commitment to Jewish activities is measured at the time of the survey is problematic—as the authors recognize—because it introduces causality running in the opposite direction (from secular behavior to participation in religious activities). Fully utilizing the limited available information on the salience of religion in the families of origin would thus be a useful complement to the analyses presented by the authors.

The NJPS also poses a limitation in that it contains no measure of the wage rate, a key variable for the study of gender equity. If a man and a woman with identical productivity characteristics earn different wages, this is a source of concern. As the authors are aware, gender differences in the educational and occupational distributions require a more careful interpretation—at least in part, they are the result of different choices that men and women make based on their expected time allocation over the life cycle.

But these are quibbles, and as richer data become available, it will be possible to address most of these concerns. As it stands, the book is a very useful resource for anyone interested in understanding the economic achievements of Jewish men and women in the United States, relative to each other, and relative to the overall white American population. The comparative analyses of American Jews by religiosity and between American and Israeli Jews contain interesting new findings. Perhaps the main contribution of the study resides in the new insights it offers on how various aspects of Jewish history and culture affect behavior in the secular arena. The book may inspire similar analyses for other religious and ethnic groups that display distinctive patterns of economic and demographic behavior.

Evelyn L. Lehrer
University of Illinois at Chicago

Oded Heilbronner (ed.), *Weimar Jewry and the Crisis of Modernization, 1918–1933*. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1994. 318 pp.

This book is a collection of essays. It has neither introduction nor conclusion, and readers are thus expected to determine for themselves the volume's raison d'être. On the back jacket, however, appear several sentences, written by an anonymous hand, that serve in place of a formal introduction. According to the back jacket copy, the editor's aim is to concentrate on the Jewish story of the Weimar Republic rather than to provide either an epilogue to the Second Reich or a prologue to the Third. Thus, the main focus of these essays is on the social, economic and cultural history of German Jewry in the given period.

With the phrase "given period" we immediately encounter a stumbling block. Although the back jacket copy speaks of the period between the years 1918 and 1933—and both dates appear in the title—most of the essays in fact deal with the economic crisis of 1927–1932. Thus, assuming that Heilbronner intended to demonstrate that the Weimar Republic was a historical epoch in and of itself, at least insofar as the Jews were concerned, he has failed to do so. Rather, this collection familiarizes the reader with last-stage problems of the republic and with the variety of means by which the Jewish community attempted to grapple with them. Although some articles contain subsections devoted to the republic's first years, these basically serve as background.

The book opens with a historical introduction by the editor and a bibliographic essay by Moshe Zimmerman, and is then divided into four major sections. Each of these deals with a different theme—culture, economics, demography and antisemitism. It

is evident that many of the essays not only follow the general German precedent of focusing on the interwar period but are also cast in the general mold of international historical scholarship. That is, if German historians study the life of the village, so too Jewish scholars will explore the life of Jewish rural communities; and if a political scientist or economist dwells on the complicated social and economic problems of the interwar years in Germany, so will the student of the Jewish past. This kind of approach is evident in the text and even more so in the bibliographies, although Zimmerman fails to call the reader's attention to this fact in his detailed bibliographic essay. There are only a few really innovative essays in the volume, notably Zeev Rosenkranz's study of Albert Einstein in the eyes of German Zionists.

Two contributions, by Gabriel Alexander and Eliezer Domke, attest to the difficult, almost hopeless economic situation of German Jewry well before the Nazis came to power. Jewish communities were gradually losing their ability to defend and assist their constituencies. By the time the Nazis ascended to power, they were impoverished and emasculated, unable to stand up to the government.

The essays in this collection contain no discussion of Jewish communal involvement in the anti-Nazi struggle. They do, however, suggest the acute shortage of means for communal activities. The money was simply not there. It seems a truism to state that the economic crisis weakened the Jews' ability to face the Nazi threat. Still, it is useful to be more fully aware of the extent to which organized German Jewry was unable to combat its enemy. Alongside Alexander's study of Berlin Jewry and Domke's discussion of the Jews in Hamburg, a similar picture emerges from the demographic study by Doron Niederland and from Claudia Prestel's essay on population policy in German Jewish society.

Prestel's piece is especially impressive, as it reaches far beyond the immediate topic to discuss the development of social thought, particularly as related to family, sex and morality—not only within German Jewry but within German society and German scholarship at large. Alongside social workers and feminists, Prestel shows, members of more traditionally conservative circles, including rabbis, contributed to the effort to develop a social policy. It would be interesting, by the way, to compare the social achievements of German Jewry—modest as they were in the given circumstances of economic crisis and political turmoil—with those of German Jewish immigrants to the Yishuv and later, the state of Israel.

While still a graduate student at the Hebrew University, I was much impressed by a remark made by a well-known, German-born American Jewish student of Nazism, who claimed that many German Jews identified with Nazi ideas even though the movement's antisemitism precluded their joining its ranks. For obvious reasons, written scholarship tends to avoid this issue; but the present volume seems to confirm the insight. The *völkisch* concept and ideas such as "racial purity" and *Blut und Boden* were apparently accepted and even popular among German Jewry, being translated into Jewish terms in order to serve Jewish needs. Time and again in the essays by Niederland, Prestel and Steven Aschheim, the reader comes across definitions that are today proscribed and denounced. Aschheim's amazing study of the *Ostjudentum* in Germany, for example, features a discussion of ideas that were common to the German—and not only German—radical right. To be fair, it was not only German Jewry who were worshipful of *Ostjuden* for their alleged superior spiritual, intellec-

tual and personal qualities. Some Czech Jews of the interwar period made pilgrimages to Sub-Carpathian Rus to meet "genuine" Jews, and Jiři Langer—the man who gave Hebrew lessons to Franz Kafka and a brother of the writer František Langer—was so enchanted by the Ostjuden that he spent years among Polish hasidim. Evidently we are dealing with a phenomenon that goes far beyond German borders and thus deserving of comparative study.

Worthy of final mention is the innovation offered by Heilbronner. Comparing his own research with works of others scholars, he has reached the conclusion that the Nazis did not make use of antisemitic propaganda in regions that lacked an anti-Jewish tradition. This conclusion suggests that the Nazis may have been more sophisticated and willing to use double standards in their quest for power than has generally been noted.

It is a pity that Heilbronner, as editor, did not see fit to include biographical details concerning the contributors. For readers less familiar with German Jewish scholarship, such details often constitute an important research tool. All in all, however, this is an interesting volume whose contributions maintain a high level of scholarship.

Yeshayahu A. Jelinek
Beersheva

Language, Literature and the Arts

Alan Cooper, *Philip Roth and the Jews*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. xiv + 319 pp.

Alan Cooper tells an engaging story in *Philip Roth and the Jews*, that of a pioneering, courageous, prophetic hero—the writer Philip Roth—doomed to be misunderstood by his readers. Whereas Cooper's admiration bordering on reverence for Roth is endearing, his analyses are occasionally marred by this defensive posture.

This book is largely a history of the reception of Roth's work, interspersed with summaries and interpretations of the novels as they enter into a dialogue with readers and critics. Its intention is clear: to vindicate Roth, to make a case for him not only as a moralist, but as a writer seriously wrestling with Jewish identity and contemporary Jewish civilization. Cooper claims that Roth's work over the last four decades is representative of the American Jewish community's evolution. His fiction mirrors a growing sense of security among American Jews, as their quest for freedom is redirected from the social constraints that marked the 1950s (in works such as *Goodbye, Columbus)* to existential constraints that are less indicative of Jewish communal life but, according to Cooper, retain Jewish moral and psychological dilemmas (in his most recent work, notably *Sabbath's Theater*).

The excellent introductory chapter locates Roth vis-à-vis his audience: "he has taken a position midway, not courting the public outside the fiction—though becoming a public persona from within the fiction—yet sometimes answering criticism that he has taken to be wrong-spirited" (p. 2). His comment on the "Philip Roth" alter ego in the novel *Operation Shylock* serves as an apt assessment of the problem in much of Roth's work, in which central characters who tease the reader with their similarity to their creator (Nathan Zuckerman, Peter Tarnopol, "Philip Roth") constitute a "perspective that defies the reader to separate out personal, tribal, national, global, and fictitious shadings of an irritating character very much their surrogate" (p. 3). According to Cooper, the central question in all of Roth's fictions is: "Why should my being Jewish keep me from sharing in the American dream?" The younger protagonists "fight off the control of Jewish parents threatening their personal independence," while the older protagonists, "largely writers, fight off the control of organized Jewry threatening their artistic independence and the guilt of having escaped the Holocaust" (p. 21).

The remaining chapters are devoted either to an individual work or to several works published in the same period and sharing certain features. Each chapter rehearses the work's reception and then discusses the book or books in light of that reception, usually in order to defend Roth against his attackers. The advantage of this approach is

that we are offered a fascinating narrative of diatribes, sermons and invectives directed against Roth's writings as well as observations about the period that could account for some aspects of this vehement opposition. The disadvantage is that Cooper limits his survey to the responses of reviewers, rabbis and communal leaders, leaving out nearly all of the academic, scholarly and intellectual writings on Roth (with the exception of statements by Irving Howe and Marie Syrkin, whose attacks provoked counterattacks by the author himself). This method raises the question of Cooper's implied audience. Despite the reference to obscure reviews and responses to Roth's work that contribute to the saga of the beleaguered and underesteemed writer, the readings themselves add little to current discussions and debates about Roth, Jewish American literature more generally, or literature and ethnicity.

As an overview or introduction to Philip Roth, however, Cooper's book does succeed in articulating the most significant features of Roth's work. For example, in the chapter on *Goodbye, Columbus*, Cooper emphasizes a point relevant to nearly all of Roth's corpus: "Many a literary hero has fallen in the heroic quest to be good—noble, grand, spiritually transcendent. It is a peculiarly Jewish burden, as Roth sees it, to have to aspire to be bad" (p. 49). In "The Alex Perplex," the strongest chapter of the book, Cooper returns to the recurring motif of his work, that "what should have been assumed, though it was not, by all critics—is that *Portnoy's Complaint* is no spontaneous ranting by its author" (p. 94). This section is particularly rich in its presentation of angry assaults on Roth, from Gershom Scholem in Jerusalem to Trude Weiss-Rosmarin in New York.

Finally, the enigmatic promise of the title of Cooper's book, *Philip Roth and the Jews*, is belied by its literal application. Although it raises some expectations about "the Jews" as a problematic category, inside and outside of narratives (historical and fictional), it actually refers only to a historical account of Roth's readership. The detailed history of Roth's reception provides valuable information, but Cooper's analyses of the works do not go beyond what has already been articulated in the existing literature about this provocative and astute writer.

Hana Wirth-Nesher
Tel Aviv University

Harley Erdman, *Staging the Jew: The Performance of an American Ethnicity, 1860–1920*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997. xiv + 221 pp.

A particularly complex and significant circumstance in the history of Jews in U.S. public culture is the overlap between the period of greatest East European Jewish immigration to America (1881–1917) and the process of (mostly German) Jewish embourgeoisement and assimilation. While Jews mixed with Gentiles socially and rose in business, their representations in popular culture grew more visibly ethnic in the context of an exotic and foreign Lower East Side. This dynamic especially informed the role of Jews in the field of commercial entertainment, where explicitly Jewish shtick became part of the American vernacular by the turn of the century, and Jewish managers and performers came to wield considerable power behind the scenes. How

this emergent Jewish cultural authority in show business shaped "the fluctuating expectations gentiles have had of Jews and Jews have had of themselves" (p. 4) is the compelling subject of Harley Erdman's *Staging the Jew: The Performance of an American Ethnicity, 1860–1920*.

In the book's first section, Erdman considers how the production and reception of conventional Jewish stage types in America reflected a broader Gentile ambivalence concerning the prospect of getting to know Jews socially. Surveying a range of popular entertainments (mostly from the last quarter of the nineteenth century), Erdman shows how Jewish characters could invite Gentile understanding and still accommodate the need to "locat[e] the Jew as something Other than oneself" (p. 27). When Gentile audiences encountered Shylock on the American stage in this period, for instance, they found him both "sympathetic" and strikingly alien-looking, at once "pathetic" in character and thoroughly exotic in body and manner. In this case, Erdman's analysis is especially rewarding and acute as he carefully reconstructs the historical performances of the period's best-known players of Shylock, Edwin Booth and Henry Irving, to illuminate the process by which Gentiles may have understood their relationship to the changing role of Jews in public. As each actor struggled to "identify" with and humanize Shylock, he could only arrive at a "characterization grounded in exteriority" (p. 27), one that understood Jewishness in terms of foreign locale, orientalist costume and grotesque stage business. Like these performers of stage Jews, Erdman explains, "well-meaning nineteenth-century gentiles tended to cloak Jewish culture as a way of making it visible" (p. 21).

In this manner, theatrical performance functions both as Erdman's subject and as the "operative metaphor" (p. 7) for a wider inquiry into how Jewish ethnicity was constructed and contested in social space. Erdman is following recent and influential anti-essentialist theories of identity formation, particularly William Boelhower's notion of "ethnic kinesis" and Judith Butler's conception of "gender performativity." Indeed, the sense that individuals "perform as both actors and audience members in daily encounters" (p. 6) lies at the core of *Staging the Jew* and is elaborated in the book's second section, which considers how *Jewish* producers, performers and audiences in these times "resisted, assimilated, or reordered images [of Jewishness] that a dominant culture constructed for them" (p. 5). As Jews themselves assumed more agency over the production and reception of Jewish characters on stage, Erdman argues, those representations became less visibly "Jewish," reflecting and helping to produce national consensus over the value of the melting pot ideology. By the 1920s, Erdman concludes, verbal wordplay had become, for popular Jewish American performers such as the Marx Brothers, "a way of accessing the Hebrew comedian's legacy without stepping into his body" (p. 155).

With confidence and clarity, Erdman elaborates many of the key social episodes and debates in this historical development—including, for example, the controversial exclusion of Jews from the exclusive Manhattan Beach club (1879) and the popularization of racialist theory in the 1910s. The book's most significant contribution, however, resides in its meticulous and often ground-breaking theater history. Drawing primarily on firsthand accounts and unpublished manuscripts, Erdman excavates and carefully reconstructs a range of long-lost Jewish performances from this period in vaudeville, burlesque and the legitimate theater—popular productions for diverse audiences com-

prised of both Gentiles and Jews. (Because he seeks, above all, to understand the Jewish-Gentile dynamic, the more localized Yiddish theater of this period is not covered in Erdman's analysis.) By studying closely the different choices Jewish actors make when performing "Jewishness" on stage (for Gentiles and Jews), Erdman illuminates how Jews may have performed themselves in similar public situations.

The actor David Warfield (born David Wohlfelt) emerges as an especially significant figure in this narrative. After earning a reputation as a leading delineator of the Lower East Side Jewish type in the field of variety entertainment, Warfield gained recognition as a serious actor only after playing a "Jewish-American business man as lovable family man and pathetic hero" (p. 110) in *The Auctioneer*, a play directed by David Belasco, then recognized as one of the legitimate theater's leading producers and himself a Jew. Through close analysis of the production, promotion and critical reception of the Broadway hit, Erdman shows how Warfield's professional "mobility" from a low cultural space to a more culturally legitimate one hinged on "finding a new body for the Jewish comedian beyond the splay-legged, baggy-clothed clown that Warfield himself had helped develop" (p. 111). After his success in *The Auctioneer*, Warfield went on to portray explicitly Gentile characters on the legitimate stage (to great notoriety and financial gain), while fashioning a public persona that disavowed his Jewish origins. In theater as well as in society, Erdman explains, "performing oneself as a Jew-without-a-beard" was "the requisite first step toward performing oneself as no-Jew-at-all" (p. 145).

Staging the Jew is at its most provocative when it asks its readers to consider the meaning of this reversal: that when Jews suppressed the cultural production of (clearly negative) Jewish stereotypes in America, they were left with few models for performing themselves as Jews in public. *Staging the Jew* not only charts the historical formation of this problematic, it proposes to redress it, offering Erdman's own public performance as a Jewish American scholar who interprets Jewish roles for an audience comprised of Gentiles and Jews (like so many of his historical subjects). "Academia is arguably another stage where Jewish women and men are plentiful," Erdman observes, "but where our objects of study have more frequently been Others rather than ourselves" (p. xii). When they attend to the forgotten performances of a David Warfield, "Jewish men in positions of culture power," Erdman hopes, "will reexamine our performances of others, and more to the point, of ourselves" (p. xii). It is this ability of Erdman to connect original research on popular performance to theoretical issues of performativity that makes *Staging the Jew* such a vital and thought-provoking text for scholars working in both U.S. theater history and contemporary Jewish studies.

Mark Hodin
Gustavus Adolphus College

Ken Frieden, *Classic Yiddish Fiction: Abramovitsh, Sholem Aleichem and Peretz.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 364 pp.

In contrast to the forgetfulness and neglect that is the lot of many Yiddish writers in the twentieth century, the classic writers of Yiddish literature of the late nineteenth

and early twentieth century enjoy (posthumously, at least), a good deal of fine scholarly attention. In *Classic Yiddish Fiction: Abramovitsh, Sholem Aleichem and Peretz*, Ken Frieden takes as his subjects these three bilingual writers, whose work symbolize a turning point in the history of Yiddish literature.

Up until 1864 (when Sholem Yankev Abramovitsh published his first Yiddish novel), Yiddish literature was a mixture of *mayse bikhlekh (*books of fairy tales), on the one hand, and maskilic, anti-hasidic satire, on the other. Abramovitsh, later lauded by Sholem Aleichem as the "grandfather of Yiddish literature," brought Yiddish literature to new heights. Himself a maskil, Abramovitsh gained access to the common Yiddish reader through his masterful use of the first-person narrator, mainly the fictional character of Mendele Moykher Sforim (Mendele the Bookseller)—the simple common Jew who acquired readers' trust with his "pseudo religious tone combined with an undercurrent of satire" (p. 37). In this guise, Abramovitsh could express his satirical disapproval of both the traditional educational system and antiquated Jewish beliefs and customs. Although he later modified his radical satiric tone, denouncing as well the repressive environment as an important factor in the Jews' wretched condition, Abramovitsh remained in principle the enlightened Jew—one whose didactic writing attempted both to uncover and to remedy the community's malaise.

Whereas Abramovitsh and his fictional mediator, Mendele the bookseller, were clearly separate entities, Sholem Rabinovitsh was fully identified with Sholem Aleichem, his fictional narrator and nom de plume. Sholem Aleichem was greatly influenced by Abramovitsh and his literary works, but this did not prevent him from creating his own style of writing. Alongside maskilic critique and satirical reference to fossilized educational traditions, social corruption and failed matchmaking, he also paid heed to the more acute issues of his time: the conflict between generations, new political trends, urbanization, immigration, and life in modern times generally. These problems appear in Sholem Aleichem's works in all their severity, albeit with a certain amount of humor and without any overt preaching. He also put strong emphasis on the aesthetic value of a literary work—hence his many pointed attacks on the popular Yiddish novels of the day, the so-called *shund romanen* (trashy novels) of Nokhem Meyer Shaykevitsh (Shomer).

As one who was deeply rooted in European literature, Y.L. Peretz can be defined as the first modernist Yiddish writer. He was a master of the short story, and he extended the boundaries of Yiddish fiction to hitherto unknown fields. Peretz was less concerned than others with portraying the Jewish community as a whole, preferring to concentrate on the psychological state of individuals. Much admired by Jewish socialists because of his involvement in Jewish radical politics—he even spent time in jail—Peretz gradually became more "interested in Jewish folklore and ethnography as expressions of linguistic and cultural nationalism" (p. 249), an interest that found its expression in the Chernowitz language conference of 1908. His evaluation of hasidism was far different from that of the *maskilim.* Peretz drew a clear line between the hasidic theories and theoreticians, on the one hand, and their interpretations by foolish and ignorant hasidim, on the other. For young Yiddish writers, he was a leader and a guide. Like a hasidic rebbe, Peretz's home in Warsaw became a gathering point for writers who sought approval of their own literary endeavors.

Classic Yiddish Fiction analyzes the most significant and characteristic works of

Abramovitsh, Sholem Aleichem and Peretz, placing them within the context of different stages of the authors' development. Ken Frieden also examines in detail the personal relations between the writers and their mutual influences. This subject is especially relevant for a better understanding of the works of Sholem Aleichem, whose openly acknowledged admiration for Abramovitsh found expression not only in the correspondence between them but also in the direct or indirect influence that can be found in some of the "grandson's" novels (ch. 5).

Peretz was less influenced by the Jewish writers of his time, and even confused Sholem Aleichem with Abramovitsh (pp. 239–240). He was aware that his style of writing was directed toward the "higher class of society," and did not in fact make any attempt to write for the "masses" (p. 240). Relations between Peretz and the other two writers were formal at best (there was one unpleasant incident in which Sholem Aleichem edited Peretz's first work in Yiddish, *Monish* [1888], without receiving prior permission). Notwithstanding the differences between them, Peretz and Sholem Aleichem were instrumental, each in his own way, in producing dramatic Yiddish material that led to the development of the Yiddish theater—a subject that, unfortunately, is left unmentioned in this book.

Frieden shows a mastery of his subject, his knowledge of both Yiddish and Hebrew providing him with access to the best and largest amount of available original literary works, private correspondence and secondary literature. Although he clearly follows Dan Miron's general line of research, Frieden's well-written work, which includes important references to historical, political and social events of the time, is a valuable contribution to the understanding of these three masters. One can only hope that it will introduce as large an audience as possible to the founders of modern Yiddish literature, and increase the interest in their successors.

Nathan Cohen
Bar-Ilan University

Sander Gilman, *Franz Kafka, the Jewish Patient.* New York and London: Routledge, 1995. x + 328 pp.

In this book, Sander Gilman seeks to place Franz Kafka's life and work in the context of prevailing notions about Jews and Jewishness in turn-of-the-century Europe. The book is not a reading of Kafka's oeuvre as such but rather "a small attempt to see what is unobscured or only partially masked" (p. 7) in Kafka's fictions as they engage and reflect three overlapping and influential contemporary discourses that defined Jewishness: race, gender and disease. Gilman believes that Kafka's ostensibly "high modern" art is an attempt to confront and efface these particular threats by rendering them "universal," and that this art is driven both by a deep-seated anxiety and, increasingly, by a recognition that his Jewishness is a kind of destiny. "The Jew" was essentially constructed as male and pathological by these discourses, whose purpose was and is to generate "difference." He was set aside from the norms of Christian or secular society physiologically, by circumcision and by body language; culturally, by Jewish laws of hygiene involving ritual bloodletting (circumcision, *sheḥitah)*; lin-

guistically, by his *Mauscheln* (the Yiddish accents of Kafka's parents); politically, by his suspect loyalty to nationhood; and biologically, by his association with "social diseases" such as neurosis, syphilis and tuberculosis. Gilman's well-documented and imaginative exploration underlines the ways in which Jewishness was ideologically constructed as pathological, implying the type of the "Jewish patient," of which Kafka, in the classical guise of the tubercular patient, was a particularly complex token.

Gilman offers a number of fascinating insights into Kafka's reading of his own physical condition "in the mirror of his culture." His dissatisfaction with his body exemplifies contemporary notions not only about psychosomatic illness (physical malady betokening spiritual malaise) but also about ethnopsychology ("you are what your ancestors were"). It is an inescapably Jewish body, marked, according to the scientific notions of the time, by centuries of separate development, and thus deviant from the norms of the predominantly Christian society to which Jews were now increasingly seeking admittance. In Kafka's case, his body is typed as that of the feminized Jewish intellectual. Gilman sets this theme against the background of the Dreyfus affair, "the event which more than any other focuses the anxiety of assimilated Jews about their physical integration into the world where they find themselves" (p. 68), finding interesting and even quite striking reverberations in *The Trial* and *In the Penal Colony* (in both of which he detects echoes of blood ritual), and in *The Metamorphosis,* in which Gregor's body, like Dreyfus', is reduced from the confident anatomy of the proud military man to the scarred and withered body of the stigmatized outcast.

Kafka's diaries and letters, and his dealings with his employers (documented in an appendix) provide evidence of the ubiquity and power of these themes for the (self-) image of the Jew. Before the diagnosis of laryngeal tuberculosis, some "pathological nervous condition" is cited in support of Kafka's enforced periods of recuperation in a health spa. His famous "Letter to His Father" of 1919 reveals a deep-seated, atavistic and decadent view of his situation—his generation is marked by decay, he is a poorer example of the species than his father, a sick mind in a sick body (p. 93). In this, Kafka was no doubt articulating his admiration for the spiritual integrity of hasidic Jews in the East, but he was also reproducing a common trope about Jews in general. Gilman believes that Kafka was also highly sensitive to other charges laid against the male Jew: (homo)sexual excess, miscegenation and ritual murder (p. 132), pointing to prominent cases such as the Beilis affair in Kiev and the Tisza-Eszlar trial (the theme of Arnold Zweig's drama of 1914, *Ritualmord in Ungarn,* which brought Kafka to tears). Gilman traces the general revulsion toward the ritual slaughter of animals in Kafka's Prague and elsewhere (pointing out, in passing, Kafka's conversion to vegetarianism) as a related component of antisemitic discourse that also fed into biological and medical analyses of the Jew. Here again, the Jew was marked as having a different relationship to disease, principally because of circumcision and the laws on the consumption of meat. Gilman offers a fascinating study of Jewish and non-Jewish readings of tuberculosis as a "test case" for the contradictory myths in the popular imagination and "scientific" literature of the time, in that Jews were alternately believed to be exceptionally susceptible to, and exceptionally immune from, this "social" disease.

Wherever Gilman seeks to make connections between Kafka's fictions and historical contexts he is generally persuasive, and often compelling. He sees Kafka's texts as "masochistic," designed as "a tool to shape those who claim to have power" over him (p. 21f), thinly concealing his profound engagement with these questions of his Jewish identity and fate. Like Karl Kraus and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilman remarks, Kafka engages "quite concretely with internalized allegations that German Jewish literature is illegitimate" (p. 29). Language was necessarily the site of this engagement and, being inherently ungendered, it was language that enabled Kafka to articulate his "feminized" discourse of illness and difference, to reflect ironically on discussions of difference in general and on his own situation in particular, perhaps most tellingly in his last story, "Josephine the singer . . . ," a parabolic autobiographical essay that exploits the linguistic and ideological homologies between *Maus*, *Mischling* and *Mauscheln.* Kafka himself memorably describes his situation as that of a little creature (a mouse?) with its hind legs stuck in the fly-trap of Jewish ancestry while its forelegs found no footing in modernity.

This book admits to being rather less than a study of Kafka's work. It is also rather more. Gilman's concern with historical contexts, and with ethnicity and gender as major underlying themes in Kafka, adds usefully to recent major studies of Kafka—those of Mark Anderson and Elizabeth Boa, for example. But he also succeeds in contributing a great deal of historical detail on perceptions of Jewishness in Europe at the turn of the century, and this will be of interest to a wider readership.

W.J. Dodd
University of Birmingham

Elaine Marks, *Marrano as Metaphor: The Jewish Presence in French Writing*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. xx + 188 pp.

Pierre Horn, *Modern Jewish Writers in France.* Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997. 178 pp.

In the wake of the bicentenary of the French Revolution and the Jewish emancipation in France, a rich and curious assortment of scholarly and critical texts has appeared, which provide fresh perspectives on Franco-Jewish identity, its historical and sociological evolution and the culture it subsequently generated. Some texts, such as *Discourses of Jewish Identity in Twentieth-Century France* (1994), a special issue of the prestigious *Yale French Studies*, have sought to demonstrate particular affinities between Franco-Jewry and its American coreligionists. In so doing, they frequently ignore salient features that characterized the development of the French Jewish community, especially throughout the course of the nineteenth century when it forged its own peculiar paradigm of Jewish identity, namely the metamorphosis from being Jews (*Juifs*) to becoming Israélites. As Simon Schwarzfuchs writes: "They [the Jews in nineteenth-century France] left their mark on that dream of universal brotherhood by adopting more and more often the appellation of Israélites, designating themselves as French, of the Israelite religion."[1]

Other recent publications have focused more closely upon the emergence of

Franco-Jewish belles-lettres and have consequently provided engaging techniques for exploring the complex issue of Jewish identity. Whether perusing the aforementioned issue of *Yale French Studies* or the collection of essays presented in *Auschwitz and After: Race, Culture and "the Jewish Question" in France* (1995), one notes that scholars have endeavored to provide meaningful images of the complex and occasionally contradictory nature of Jewish identity in France as communicated through literary discourse.

The two works to be examined here, one by Elaine Marks, the other by Pierre Horn, fall into this generic category. Both texts similarly demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses that underlie such ventures.

Elaine Marks confirmed her scholarly competence early in her career by authoring exceptional studies on Simone de Beauvoir and Colette, as well as by exploring major trends in French "feminisms." With the late George Stambolin, she edited a seminal work on homosexuality and French literature. *Marrano as Metaphor,* which focuses on discourses of Jewishness in French writing, might appear anomalous given the direction of her previous research. And yet a scrupulous reading of this occasionally quirky text reveals a profusion of connections with her earlier work: one of the principal factors constructing Franco-Jewish identity is the sense that, despite having declared themselves Israélites and acculturating to a significant degree, French Jews continue to experience their fundamental "otherness." Marks adeptly weaves a rich tapestry of analyses informed by a wide range of contemporary theoretical procedures. She succeeds in introducing the reader to the complexities harbored within her principal thesis, namely the problematical nature of "otherness" and its more profound implications—the masking and consequent sublimation of authentic identity, which can lead to bitter self-deception. Moreover, the questions raised by this book and the ideas left unexplored make it a fitting point of departure for future research in this area.

Considering this study's title and its insistence on revealing the Jewish presence in French writing, one might perceive as scholarly antecedents either Charles Lehrmann's *L'Elément juif dans la littérature française* (1960) or Juliette Hassine's *Marranisme et hébraisme dans l'oeuvre de Proust* (1994). Marks, however, rapidly demonstrates her ability to establish new parameters for her chosen topics. One of her text's more noticeable features is the rich intertextualites it lays bare. Although the central focus displays the construction and exercise of the Marrano metaphor, Marks adroitly extends her appraisal to germane side topics: discourses of antisemitism, and expressions of misogyny in French culture. By invoking these issues, Marks subsequently inserts notions of liberation—be it individual or collective. Each subsidiary thesis echoes the central theme; each lucidly propounds a succeeding aspect in the broader examination of the Jewish presence in French literature.

I believe that Marks conveys a keen example of this critical development in her reading of Marguerite Yourcenar's *Coup de Grâce*, where she notes that "it now seems to me important not only to locate and identify sexist and antisemitic discourses . . . but also to uncover and conceptualize the presence of this obsession" (p. 85). Placing her critical argument within the context of "after Auschwitz," she creatively draws upon current and past events, philosophy and contemporary critical strategies to confirm a reading in which authorial intention, together with the conscious/

unconscious text, fashion formidable connections between the metaphor of the Marrano and expressions of misogyny, and between the extermination of European Jewry and the murder of Sophie de Reval in Yourcenar's narrative. Though I initially resisted such a reading, Marks' logical arguments and meticulously constructed analyses ultimately convinced me of both the efficacy and justification for such an original interpretation of the text.

Some readers of this book may hope for a more detailed analysis of Jewish identity as presented in twentieth-century French literary culture. To that end, the reader might anticipate analyses of Jewishness espoused by the late André Neher or those promoted by Emmanuel Lévinas. One might even have wished for an assessment of such neglected figures as Armand Lunel, whose narratives share numerous themes treated by his contemporary, Albert Cohen, whom Marks does include in her discussion. But such considerations would undoubtedly diminish the crucial and universal propositions of Marks' work, a notion resumptively articulated in the epigraph selected from Julia Kristeva's *Étrangers à nous-mêmes*: "The foreigner is within me, hence we are all foreigners. If I am a foreigner, there are no foreigners" (p. v). Thus, each exploration of Jewishness leads to more pervasive reflections in which Marks demonstrates how the Marrano metaphor can and indeed must lead to radically innovative readings of texts in order to uncover the germinating seeds of messianic universalism.

Beyond considerations of discourses of Jewishness in France and those supplemental issues raised thus far, Marks boldly challenges her readers with a deeply rooted personal belief in the multifaceted and protean nature of human identity. At first subtly broached, then ever more clearly articulated, this credo supports the idea that each being possesses multiple identities fashioned by a vast array of loyalties. "Before I was consciously aware of 'being' a woman," Marks reports, "I was aware of 'being' and the possibility of 'not being.' That has remained over the years as the most constant of my experiences and of my intellectual concerns" (p. 153). Marks' assertion resounds with personal and intellectual courage and compels each reader to assume authentic responsibility to combat bigotry, fanaticism and exclusion.

Alerted to the publication of Pierre Horn's *Modern Jewish Writers in France* so soon after the appearance of Marks' book, I experienced a surge of anticipation. Following in the path of recent studies, I hoped this particular text would embark upon a critical exploration of how Jewish writers in modern France had confronted their historical situation, as well as how Franco-Jewish authors had grappled with the presence of French antisemitism and the problematical shadow of Jean-Paul Sartre's musings on authentic/inauthentic Jewish identity presented in his *Réflexions sur la question juive.* Simply stated, Pierre Horn's current volume proves a colossal failure in furthering such a critical exchange.

My first objection arises from the title, which asserts that this is a study of "writers." Even a cursory reading reveals that, for Horn, "writer" is exclusively synonymous with "novelist." True, in his introductory chapter, cursory references are made to the poetry of André Spire, to Henri Franck's biblical mock epic poem, *La Danse devant l'Arche* and to Henry Bernstein's drama, *Israel.* But nowhere else does the author consider any genre other than the novel, thereby promoting a fallacious notion

that Jewish authors have written nothing else. This curious exclusion does Horn's book and its subject an immense disservice. How can one seriously accept this as a critical study of modern Franco-Jewish writing when it ignores Claude Vigée's exquisite lyrical poetry, slights Edmund Jabès' troubling volumes of prose poems, overlooks the ironic, comically engaging theater of Jean-Claude Grumberg and Victor Haim, disregards the momentous philosophical writings of Emmanuel Lévinas and Alain Finkielkraut, and neglects the influential religious essays of André Neher and Shmuel Trigano? Such omissions are patently inexcusable in any credible study of modern Jewish "writers" in France.

The imprecision of the title consistently repeats itself throughout the book, and is frequently the result of Horn's tortured, awkward writing style. The text is replete with aimlessly rambling sentences that ultimately signify nothing. Without precise aims, the text is further encumbered by numerous superfluous quotations. Why, one wonders, does Horn place "5686 since the Creation of the World" (p. 16) in apposition to 1926, the date of the publication of Armand Lunel's *Nicolo-Peccavi ou l'Affaire Dreyfus à Carpentras*? True, within the context of Lunel's narrative, the use of the Jewish date is fundamental as it delineates an authentic Jewish approach to existence. But what possible purpose does it serve here? If Horn wishes to evidence a scholar's familiarity with the text, he falls far short of the mark. Moreover, Horn attaches vague, even dubious meanings to some words. For example, a fine distinction exists between the Yiddish terms *shlemiel* and *shlimazl*, a discrimination wholly absent in Horn's interpretation of the concepts and their various applications in certain novels.

Another major problem is this work's absolute lack of any critical or epistemological foundation. Horn never submits any evidence of formal or informal critical approaches either for the narratives or their authors. Only when focusing on novelists writing about the Holocaust can one sense the spontaneous emergence of some nebulous critical perspective. Unfortunately, what implicitly emerges is the controversial Sartrian proposition that the antisemites and/or antisemitic actions lead to the creation of the Jew. Such a negative and wholly lachrymose vision of Jewish writing might have been prevalent twenty or thirty years ago. Yet as early as 1928, Salo Baron had already inaugurated convincing challenges to this belief,[2] and numerous contemporary Franco-Jewish writers and scholars have openly expressed their disapproval of it. Had Horn simply opted to explore Alain Finkielkraut's uncomfortable arguments in *Le Juif imaginaire* (1980) or those of Shmuel Trigano in *La Nouvelle question juive*, (1979) he would have recognized this fact.

Along these same lines, I must question the total absence of any critical references published after 1982. As noted in this review's introduction, the decade since 1989 has witnessed the publication of a host of serious explorations of Franco-Jewish literature and subsequent discourses of Franco-Jewish identity. None figure even minimally in Horn's arguments. Many of his references relate to Waldamir Rabi's 1956 article "Lettres juives, domain français." I would not dispute the importance of Rabi's perspectives in his day, but much has happened in the intervening years.

Another regrettable omission can be discerned in what I must characterize as a curious proclivity not to investigate pivotal notions that particular texts unquestionably portray. Consider Horn's treatment of the work of the contemporary novelist Patrick Modiano. In his limited analytical assessment of only two Modiano novels,[3] Horn in-

timates the existence of a problematical tension inherent in modern Franco-Jewish identity. He writes: "Hence Pierre de Boisdeffre could propose the following subtitle, 'On the difficulty of being Jewish,' for Modiano's novel [*La Place de l'Étoile*], on which C.W. Nettlebeck and P. Hueston elaborated by emphasizing the dilemma of the Jew placed between French History's most scandalous period in the twentieth century and one of the greatest tragedies of all of Jewish History" (p. 134). Why does Horn refuse to explore more thoroughly the propositions hinted at in this citation? Is it because Nettlebeck and Hueston had already done so?[4] Certainly, more assiduous research in tandem with analyses of other Modiano narratives could have afforded Horn an opportunity to seize upon one of the dominant topoi in literary discourses of Franco-Jewish identity and to investigate its ultimate consequences for Franco-Jewish culture and identity. Sadly, he does not rise to this critical challenge.

Yet another troubling aspect of this book resides in the limited attention given to female authors. Horn's primary choice, Simone Signoret, dismayed me. Granted, her novel *Adieu, Volodya* proved to be a best seller, but is this popular status sufficient reason for her inclusion in a scholarly study? Moreover, by selecting Signoret, Horn seems to imply a paucity of eminent female writers in France. What about France's leading Jewish female writer, Myriam Anissimov, whose novels productively raise such contemporary themes as the problematical relationship of Jews to France, women's roles in Jewish and French societies and memories of the Shoah?

Perhaps Horn's cardinal failing lies in his relegation of Marcel Proust to a silent presence framing the whole study. For more than two decades, writers, critics and scholars such as Henri Raczymow, Juliette Hassine, Isabelle Monette Ebert and Albert Sonnenfeld have referred to an essential Jewishness inherent in Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu.* The Proustian Jewish characters emerge as emblematic of the creative tensions that for almost a century have contributed to constructions of modern paradigms of Franco-Jewish identity. The omission of Proust and what has indeed emerged as one of the first distinguished expressions of Jewish writing in modern France strikes me as imprudent. It assists in further subverting this seriously flawed book.

According to Edmond Jabès, speaking of a "foreigner," "he said that, in his books, he nearly always used the word 'Jew' to signal to his readers how much he was one, even if he did not know precisely what it means to be Jewish."[5] Edmond Jabès' poetic comment aptly reflects the psychomachy—the state of flux—of Franco-Jewry. Emerging into the twentieth century through the traumas of the final years of the Dreyfus affair, French Jewry undertook a serious reevaluation of its fundamental position within the context of the French state and French culture. Jabès notes: "When I brought up France, whose citizen he had become out of loyalty to its language and culture, out of choice deeply considered, he said: 'My first babblings were a homage, a hymn to France. So will be, no doubt, my last babblings'."[6] The Jewish presence in France has left an enduring mark on that nation and its culture. Marks' study emphasizes the fecundity of that relationship; Horn merely hints at other possibilities. One thing is certain: the ultimate word in this continuing dialogue has yet to be written.

Simon P. Sibelman
Shippensburg University

Notes

1. Simon Schwarzfuchs, *Du Juif à l'israélites: Histoire d'une mutation, 1770–1870* (Paris: 1989), 17.
2. Cf. Salo Baron, "Ghetto and Emancipation," *The Menorah Journal* 14 (1928), 526.
3. Horn focuses solely on two of Modiano's earliest works, *La Place de l'Étoile* and *Les Boulevards de ceinture.* In fact, the totality of Modiano's sizeable literary output (more than twenty-five books to date) becomes an almost baroque theme and variation on the problematics of Jewish identity and the tensions sensed by Jews living in France.
4. Cf. Colin W. Nettlebeck and Penelope Hueston, *Patrick Modiano: pièces d'identité-écrire l'entretemps* (Paris: 1986), 14–15; 17.
5. Edmon Jabès, *A Foreigner Carrying in the Crook of His Arm a Tiny Book,* trans. Rosmarie Waldrop (Hanover: 1993), 88.
6. *Ibid.*, 81.

Harold B. Segel (ed.), *Stranger in Our Midst: Images of the Jew in Polish Literature.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. xiv + 402 pp.

Harold Segel begins the introduction to this engaging volume with the sober sentence: "The centuries-old history of the Jews in Poland is at an end" (p. 1). While the "Jewish question" continues to play a role in Poland (for example, the recent controversy over crosses at Auschwitz), today's Poland is almost entirely a land without Jews.

Nonetheless, in particular in the decade since the fall of Communism, interest in Poland's Jewish past has grown both within Poland and abroad. Despite the continued existence of misunderstandings, prejudices and stereotypes, one may perceive a shift from accusation (as exemplified by Celia Heller's *On the Edge of Destruction* [1994]) to attempts at understanding and a bridging of the great divide that often separates Poles and Jews in their interpretation of the recent—and distant—historical past. This collection of poems, stories and other written documents from the sixteenth to the twentieth century may help in this process of developing a deeper appreciation of the complicated and often tragic past shared by Poles and Jews.

The volume begins with an introduction that in under thirty pages acquaints the reader with major issues in the history of Polish Jewry while at the same time providing a narrative context to the writers and works anthologized here. This essay is a tour de force that weaves together the history of Polish Jews, Polish literature, and Jewish literature written in Yiddish and Hebrew in the Polish lands. The rest of the book consists of a rich variety of texts, translated and edited by Segel, in each case preceded by a short introduction. Beginning with Jan Dantyszek's furious "Poem about Jews" (1530s) and Jan Tarnowski's "Principles of Law of the Polish Land" (1579), the book quickly proceeds to the nineteenth century, from which the bulk of the selections are taken, and carries through almost to the present day, ending with an excerpt from Jarosław Rymkiewicz's *Umschlagplatz* (1988). The texts anthologized here range from poetry (for example, an excerpt from *Pan Tadeusz,* Wiktor Gomulicki's "El mole rachmim . . . ," Czesław Miłosz's "A Poor Christian Looks at the Ghetto," Antoni Słonimski's moving "Elegy of Jewish Towns"), to stories (among others, Aleksander Świętochowski's "Chawa Rubin," Klemens Junosza-Szaniawski's "The Tailor," Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz's "Mendelssohn Quartet"), to excerpts from

novels (Józef Korzeniowski's *Collocation*, Eliza Orzeszkowa's *Meir Ezofowicz*, Bolesław Prus' *The Doll*, Andrzej Szczypiorski's *Beautiful Mrs. Seidenmann)*. Segal also includes some polemical texts on the Jewish question, such as Stanisław Staszic's "Jews," four short antisemitic pieces written from 1915 to 1929, and two anti-antisemitic pieces written in the late 1930s. The volume ends with a concise but very useful bibliography of works in English on the Jews in Poland.

In his selection of texts, Segel has clearly tried to balance pro-Jewish Polish writers (Maria Konopicka, Orzeszkowa, Miłosz) with more critical or even antisemitic voices. On the whole, he gives preference to the tolerant and even philosemitic Polish voices. One may always question the inclusion of a certain text and the exclusion of others, but Segel cannot be accused of partisanship except in the sense of wishing to emphasize the works of those Poles who sympathized with their Jewish neighbors and who indeed could not imagine a Poland without Jews.

This anthology is a delight to read. As one might expect, the selections reflect the difficult economic and social relations that dominated the lives of Polish Jews, but their love of life, community and native land also comes through clearly. *Stranger in Our Midst* provides us with an entrée into a world that no longer exists. It also reminds us that while relations between Poles and Jews were never simple or easy, neither were they consistently hostile, much less murderous. For those interested in learning about this lost world and deepening their appreciation of the bonds that tied Poles and Jews over centuries, this anthology is highly recommended.

Theodore R. Weeks
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

Efraim Sicher, *Jews in Russian Literature after the October Revolution: Writers and Artists Between Hope and Apostasy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 225 pp.

The first half of the Soviet Age was not only a time of historical cataclysm—racing, in a mere thirty-five years, from revolution and civil war to terror to war to (in Jewish terms) postwar repression—but also an age of literature. Writing flourished even as writers struggled, compromised themselves, perished. Among these writers, both the second-rank and the very greatest, were many Jews. And while the Revolution was supposed to have eliminated the "Jewish question," for these second-generation acculturated Russian Jews, that question remained a sore point.

Efraim Sicher's new book takes up the issue of Jewish consciousness among Jewish writers from the Revolution through the Second World War. He begins with a historical and thematic overview that includes some interesting observations on the Jewish appropriation of the Christ figure, and on the visual arts in general. He then moves to discreet essays on four of the greatest Russian writers of Jewish origin: Isaac Babel, Osip Mandelstam, Boris Pasternak and Ilya Ehrenburg. Following his always erudite and insightful analysis, we can see how the problem of Jewish origin was worked out for each writer, in combination with its old antipodes—Christianity and ethnic Russianness—as well as with the writer's own poetics.

Of the four writers, it is Babel, as Sicher puts it, who exhibits "an unparalleled and unself-conscious reference to Jewishness and to Judaism, as well as [to] Yiddish" (p. 84). Alone among the four, Babel did have an early Jewish education. He spoke Yiddish, had some Hebrew and, according to his sister, showed an active interest in his childhood Jewish studies. During the 1930s, he apparently inspired his second (Russian) wife to study Yiddish—a detail that surprised me, because it breaks the highly compartmentalized picture that we otherwise have of Babel's later life and loyalties. Otherwise, Sicher's analysis of Babel follows a by-now familiar paradigm of break-out and return—familiar in great measure because of Sicher's own groundbreaking essays on Babel as a Jew.

Mandelstam, Pasternak and Ehrenburg are much more marginal Jews. Sicher finds in Mandelstam and Babel a common binary opposition between bounded (Jewish, enclosed, impotent or melancholy) and unbounded (non-Jewish, open, festive) space. For Babel, however, Jewish is "one's own" (*svoi*) and the locus of culture, while for Mandelstam, Jewish is "alien" (*chuzhoi*) and culture, most significantly, is elsewhere. While Sicher considers, as others have, the possibility that toward the end of his life Mandelstam appropriated a positive vision of the Hellenized Jew, he makes the point that the appropriation of *Iudeia* as opposed to *iudaism* is itself Christian.

If Mandelstam's hostility to Judaism was rooted in his understanding of Christian esthetics, Pasternak's was religiously Christian and national. In some sense, both poets may be said to have reinvented their autobiographies, with Mandelstam choosing antecedents in the realm of Western culture, and Pasternak focusing on Russian literature and Russian ethnicity. The American scholar George Gibian has pointed to the dissonance between Pasternak's artist-Zionist father and the poet's view, even after the Holocaust, that the Jews should disappear. Sicher adds to this the piquant detail that Leonid Pasternak "was not adverse to prefiguring the son as a Pushkinian figure" (p. 152). (Pushkin's nanny was the mythical source of his "Russianness," and so was Pasternak's in the sense that—as he himself stressed—she was the one who baptized him.)

Issues of self-presentation become particularly complex with respect to Ehrenburg, the consumate politician. Part of the scene in avant-garde Paris, Ehrenburg was in turn a satirist, a Catholic, a nihilist and a Soviet loyalist. During the war, he collected information on the destruction of the Jews, as well as on Jewish participation in the Red Army, while in 1948, his article in *Pravda* signaled to Soviet Jews that the creation of the state of Israel should be a matter of indifference to them. At the time of the "thaw" (it was his novel that gave the period its name), Ehrenburg worked for liberalization and later wrote memoirs that, for many readers, represented an introduction to writers whose names had become unmentionable. But he also had to explain how it was that he survived—was it just a lottery, as he claimed, or was he more entrenched in the establishment than he would admit? Archival evidence may supply some answers. In the meantime, Sicher provides a careful reading, restoring through logic and knowledge of context those motivations that Ehrenburg may have preferred not to air.

Sicher's book was begun in the late 1970s, at a time when, indeed, very little attention had been paid to the Jewishness of Babel, not to mention that of Mandelstam, Pasternak and Ehrenburg. To some extent his text reflects an earlier state of affairs:

references to works published in the 1980s and 1990s (including his own works!) are, while present, comparatively rare. Notwithstanding, Sicher's book combines keen analysis with a wealth of corroborating detail, and should be read by anyone with an interest in matters Jewish and Russian.

Alice Nakhimovsky
Colgate University

Religion, Thought and Education

J. David Bleich, *Contemporary Halakhic Problems*, vol 4. New York: Ktav and Yeshiva University Press, 1995. xix + 410 pp.

This fourth volume of *Contemporary Halakhic Problems* is similar in its format to the previous volumes—being both a compendium of the views of leading halakhic scholars and a mouthpiece for Rabbi J. David Bleich's view on the subjects discussed. Bleich would be the first person to state unequivocally that he is not being innovative in his conclusions—everything stems from what has previously been written by the authoritative scholars he cites. This way of looking at things is not ingenuous. Bleich has not only consistently reiterated the above on many occasions, but clearly states his weltanschauung in his introduction to this latest volume. I will return to this introduction shortly.

More than half of this volume is devoted to questions of halakhah and medicine. Many ethical problems that are part of the ongoing debate in general medical and ethical circles are first analyzed in their overall context, following which Bleich brings into play his great erudition and complete mastery of the intricacies of Jewish law. I know of no one today who has a greater knowledge of the decisions of modern respondents.

The following are the medical-ethical topics examined in this volume in their Jewish perspective, following their broad analysis within the context of law and ethics: fetal tissue research; experimental procedures; utilization of scientific data obtained through immoral experimentation; in vitro fertilization; tissue donation; cerebral, respiratory and cardiac death.

From the vast literature discussed in this book, one is sometimes taken aback by some of the situations with which the rabbis had to cope. Here is a grotesque example mentioned in the context of the general question of fetal tissue research and the prohibition in Jewish law of deriving benefit from a corpse. A question was posed in the late eighteenth century to one of the leading halakhic authorities of that period concerning a woman who miscarried and yielded a grotesquely deformed fetus. The woman and her husband were in dire poverty. It occurred to the husband that he might be able to earn a few copper coins by displaying the fetus. Was this permissible, the rabbi was asked (for the reply, see p. 182).

Bleich also discusses the following important and recently debated general ethical question: May a scientist use and refer to medical conclusions based on immoral experimentation, such as Nazi experimentation on humans? After a thorough discussion of the dilemmas, Bleich concludes that there is no principle of Jewish law

or ethics that would preclude use of information gleaned as a result of unethical research.

Although the book refers to many ethical questions, the answers given to these questions, based on halakah and its dogmatic rules, do not always reflect the methods employed by ethicists. A good example occurs in Bleich's discussion of scientific data obtained through immoral means. He cites the decision of a certain rabbi who prohibited the fashioning of mezuzah cases from pipes through which gas was channeled in the murder of Jews in concentration camps. Bleich disagrees, but bases his reasoning on a purely technical halakhic way of thinking, that is, the difference between a proximate and remote cause. Gaining benefit from the gas piped into the chambers would be forbidden, since the gas is the proximate cause of the death. The pipes, however, were only containers for the gas and not the proximate cause of death; ergo, one may use the gas pipes for mezuzah cases. What ethicists would make such a differentiation and come to such a conclusion?

Thus, in spite of Bleich's great erudition, not only in matters of halakhah but in scientific matters as well, one is sometimes left with a feeling that a modern jurist and ethicist would not be completely comfortable with his conclusions. The reason for this is not hidden: it is found in clear and concise language in Bleich's introduction, in which he states that he is led to his conclusions by halakhic precedent alone, not taking into account arguments of policy. "Halakha differs from other systems of law in that it does not permit policy considerations to adjudicate between competing theories of precedents," he writes (p. xv). There's the rub. Only "immutable halakhic standards" (p. xvii) count.

Bleich's introduction, although only a few pages long, is eye-opening. It explains to the sometimes perplexed reader how a person with such vast knowledge and intellectual status can come to conclusions that do not satisfy many a modern Orthodox reader—not to mention readers less attuned to halakhah. Bleich's passionate belief in and love of halakhic Judaism as he sees it—even if others understand the halakhic process differently—permeates the book, literally from cover to cover. The quote from R. Nehemia b. ha-Kaneh's prayer upon entering the house of study (Berakhot 28b) that opens the book (and the introduction) is not only a useful artifact for an author, but exposes Bleich's true feelings: "May it be Thy will, O Lord my God, that no mishap occur through me and that I not err in a matter of Halakhah . . . that I not declare the impure pure or the pure impure."

Shmuel Shilo
The Hebrew University

David Golinkin (ed.), *Sheelot uteshuvot ma'aneh Levi*/*The Responsa of Professor Louis Ginzberg*. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary, 1996. 126 pp. (Hebrew); 352 pp. (English).

According to Sidney Schwarz, the uniting theme of the Conservative movement (at least until the publication of its *Emet VeEmunah Statement of Principles of Conservative Judaism* in 1988) was "three myths," two of which are that 1) the

Conservative movement, in contrast to the Reform movement, is guided by halakhah; and 2) it is possible to adapt halakhah to the reality of the here and now by means of new interpretations.[1] Notwithstanding such declarations, the movement long refrained from publishing actual halakhic responsa, whether those of official institutions or of individual rabbis who gave decisions of their own. Internal criticism brought about a change in policy in the 1970s, when some (but not all) of the movement's halakhic decisions began to be published.[2] This is not the place to discuss the Conservative movement's unique system of allowing local rabbis to act according to the minority opinion—the size of the minority differing over time. It suffices to point out that this concern with halakhah gave legitimacy to the claim that the movement itself was halakhic.

Until the movement's change in policy, Conservative leaders generally contented themselves with general references concerning halakhic subjects, mainly Sabbath and kashruth observance and the study of Torah. At the same time, the movement had its own characteristic practices, such as mixed seating, late Friday night services and bat mitzvah ceremonies. Until the 1950s and 1960s, there was no effort to legitimize such practices. Only insiders, or those who actually asked, received directives and explanations. Two rare exceptions to the dearth of published material—because of their widespread implications and the controversy they engendered—were the ruling of 1950 that allowed the driving of a car to synagogue on the Sabbath and holidays,[3] and *The Ordination of Women as Rabbis* (1988), edited by Simon Greenberg.

In this book, Rabbi David Golinkin attempts to fill in the lacuna in published Conservative responsa by acquainting us with the dominant halakhic leader of the period, Louis (Levi) Ginzberg (1873–1953). It is interesting to note that, aside from Ginzberg's students, most people are unaware of his role as a rabbinic arbiter *(posek)*; though he was a widely acknowledged scholar in Talmud, Ginzberg is far better known for his studies in midrash and for his *Legends of the Jews*. Here, however, we have a rich collection of Ginzberg's responsa, some of them—as befitting the unique milieu of American Conservative Judaism—on topics heretofore unknown in the classic halakhic literature.

With two exceptions (one concerning *agunot* and the other concerning the use of grape juice rather than wine for kiddush), Ginzberg's responsa remained unpublished during his lifetime. According to Golinkin, one explanation is that most of them were written in English rather than in Hebrew, and thus did not fit the classic responsa mode. Additionally, Golinkin speculates, Ginzberg may have felt slighted by the formation of the Committee on Jewish Law in 1927. It is also quite likely, as Golinkin himself notes, that Ginzberg viewed his responsa as being secondary to his scholarly work on the Talmud.

The term "responsa" is actually somewhat misleading in describing some of the material that is offered in this volume. For instance, part 1 consists of theological statements, as does much of part 6. Part 5, no. 13, discusses matters connected with the establishment of a system of *get 'al tenai* (conditional divorce), but lacks a halakhic discussion. Part 3, no. 5, addresses a student's question regarding the meaning of a liturgical text, but is not in itself a responsum. To these may be added a number of other examples.

I think that the desire to increase the number of responsa derives from the as-

sumption that a large number of responsa gives authenticity to the double myth mentioned above, that the Conservative movement is a halakhic movement that is updating halakhah. Interestingly, Ginzberg's writings show him to be more conservative (with a small "c") than the mainstream Conservative movement even of his own time. He opposed mixed seating altogether until 1947, allowing it only to prevent the breakup of the Chizuk Emuno congregation in Baltimore (p. 96). Ginzberg relied upon accepted custom as the reason to invalidate innovation even where, as he admits, there is no explicit ruling against a specific new practice. Thus, in a letter written in Hebrew (translated by Golinkin on p. 28), he confesses that "I am not one of those who likes 'new things,' and I have a special aversion to changes in the customs of the synagogue." On the subject of artificial insemination, "even though there is no proof to forbid," Ginzberg notes that "there is support" for a ruling that the child born would be considered a *mamzer* (p. 213). In a different response (part 3, no. 18), Ginzberg prohibits the use of an organ transplant because such a procedure had not been used in the past. Even more fundamental is Ginzberg's belief that only a recognized halakhic authority can sanction changes and that such authority does not exist in America because the congregants do not accept it. Moreover, in Ginzberg's view, there is no way to change halakhah in order to accommodate it only to the specific situation obtaining in the United States (part 1, nos. 1 and 4).

There are a number of inaccuracies in Ginzberg's responsa, probably a result of his having answered from memory without checking his sources. Many times he does not cite sources (see, for example, part 3, no. 7, notes 5–7, and part 6, no. 3, note 6). Other responsa, written in Hebrew, do conform to the classical framework of analysis and citation. The fact that Ginzberg did not follow this framework in his English responsa—and the fact that the English translations of the Hebrew responsa omit many of the citations—indicates that Ginzberg viewed his audience as being halakhically ignorant. Even Seminary graduates received unscholarly answers from him.

This volume is an important addition to the growing literature on the Conservative movement, the largest Jewish denomination in the United States throughout most of the twentieth century (another work is *Tradition Renewed*, edited by Jack Wertheimer, which provides a new history of the Jewish Theological Seminary). The short biography of Ginzberg with which the book opens is essential for understanding not only the man but also the movement he helped to lead. The book gives rise to a number of questions, however, the most important concerning Ginzberg's role as a posek. Given the conservative bent of many of his rulings over the course of fifty years, how is it that the movement in practice so often deviated from Ginzberg's views? And, given this, why didn't Ginzberg either protest or leave?

Avraham Slater
The Hebrew University

Notes

1. See Sydney Schwarz, "Law and Legitimacy: An Intellectual History of Conservative Judaism," (Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 1982). The third myth, according to Swartz, is that the Conservative movement—not Orthodoxy—is the continuation of normative Judaism throughout the ages.

2. See *ibid.*, 272–275; and Seymour Siegel (ed.), *Conservative Judaism and Jewish Law*

(New York: 1977). Although current halakhic problems were dealt with and published each year in *Proceedings of the Rabbinical Assembly,* they were not readily available to laypeople. A collection of these responsa has now been published; see David Golinkin (ed.), *Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Conservative Movement 1927–1970,* 3 vols. (Jerusalem: 1977).

3. See *Proceedings of the Rabbinical Assembly,* vol. 14 (New York: 1950), 112–188.

Steven T. Katz, *American Rabbi: The Life and Thought of Jacob B. Agus*. New York: New York University Press, 1997. 244 pp.

Steven T. Katz (ed.), *The Essential Agus: The Writings of Jacob B. Agus*. New York: New York University Press, 1997. 573 pp.

In these two volumes, Steven T. Katz has presented to us a significant contribution to the literature of modern Jewish thought in America. In the first book, he has gathered together a series of papers on various aspects of Jacob Agus' thought as well as some personal reminiscences. As with all such collections, there is a certain amount of overlap among the various essays, but taken as a whole they provide a concise summary of the multiple facets of Agus' astonishing accomplishments. The categories listed there—including "Modern Jewish Philosophy," "Medieval Jewish Philosophy," "Jewish-Christian Dialogue," "American Judaism," "The Concept of God," "Jewish History and Experience," "The Conservative Movement and Jewish Law"—are fleshed out in the second volume by copious excerpts from Agus' writings. The writings of Agus are in themselves quite remarkable. In addition to hundreds of scholarly and semischolarly articles, Agus published nine major books of Jewish theology and philosophy. This one volume gives the reader an excellent introduction to his oeuvre.

Jacob Agus was undoubtedly one of the major rabbinic figures on the American scene from the 1940s though the 1960s and even beyond. With his Orthodox rabbinical training, his Harvard education in Jewish thought and philosophy, his switch from Orthodox to Conservative identification in the 1940s, his leadership position in the Rabbinical Assembly and his role as rabbi of a leading congregation in Baltimore, he was a unique figure within the Conservative movement. His scholarship was beyond reproach, as was his commitment both to Jewish law and tradition and to modernity. His concerns were broad, ranging from the purely academic to Jewish law and modern Jewish politics. As a thoroughly classical rationalist who emphasized reason above mysticism and universalism above particularity, he nevertheless was the first to popularize the thought of Rabbi Avraham Yizkhak Kook, the greatest and most influential mystic of our time. Agus was also one of a group of scholar-pulpit rabbis that has almost vanished from the American scene. Like Robert Gordis, Theodore Friedman, Gershon Levi, Simon Greenberg and a few others, he was able to combine first-rate scholarship with wonderful pulpit skills and to serve both the academic world and a congregation.

European-born Agus believed in the future of the American Jewish community. He saw Israeli and American Jewry as equal partners in the Jewish future—each with a different vision of what it means to be a Jew, each faced with challenges to overcome in order to achieve a mature understanding and realization of Judaism. Agus understood that within Judaism there are many facets. Without denying the legitimacy of other viewpoints, he battled for his—the rational, ethical view of Judaism, the humanistic, universalistic message. He saw the dangers within nationalism, particular-

ism and mysticism. His understanding of God, revelation and halakhah were all within this interpretation, yet were well grounded in tradition. He rejected Kaplan's far-reaching reinterpretations that, while rational, were radically different from anything taught within Jewish sources.

How much impact has Agus actually had beyond the obvious influence that teachers have on their students? I suspect that the answer is—less than he might have had. For one thing, he was never asked to be a member of the faculty of the Jewish Theological Seminary where his personality, erudition and ideas might have given him influence over generations of rabbis. Second, his books are not given to easy reading. They do not have the verbal poetry of Heschel, nor the popular style of a Robert Gordis or a Milton Steinberg. But they do have substance and therefore should not be ignored by serious students—something we tend to do with the writings of people who did not have important academic positions. Furthermore, they have important messages for all who are concerned with the future of Judaism. His stricture against the moments when the prophets "lapsed into atavistic sentiments," or against "the dark seclusion of kabbalistic mythology" or "the gut reaction, the exhibitionist wilderness of the spirit, or anomie, the fervent exaggeration, and the general myopia that is induced by mass-enthusiasm" (*American Rabbi,* p. 169) are especially pertinent today. Both in America and in Israel—perhaps especially in Israel—we are witness to a flowering of quasi-mysticism, messianism, rabbi worship, kabbalistic magic and a general deterioration of religion into superstition that threatens the future of classical Jewish thought. We could use the guidance of an Agus. In his absence, his writings, presented in these volumes, will serve us well.

Reuven Hammer
Jerusalem

Jacqueline Rose, *States of Fantasy.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 188 pp.

Jacqueline Rose's latest and admirable book—a collection of lectures and essays, and a set of variations on a theme—ventures into new territory. While *States of Fantasy* certainly continues her engagement with fields in which she is known and published—namely, literature, psychoanalysis and feminism—its ambitions are simultaneously more far-reaching and more subtle. Though virtually all of her work is in some sense political, here Rose enters the arena of international relations proper, with the intention of reminding us of the conjunctions linking three distinct parts of the geopolitical globe: Israel/Palestine, South Africa and Britain. Noting the great changes that are afoot in the two former "pariah" regions, Rose uses a series of forays into literary criticism to illuminate not only Britain's imperialistic role in the histories of the Middle East and Southern Africa, but also the relations between those two strife-torn regions. As her title implies, however, Rose is also making the suggestion, derived from psychoanalysis, that all such political subjects might benefit by being viewed through a more inward-looking lens, and that attention ought to be paid to the unconscious fantasies (and hence desires, aversions and anxieties, pathological or otherwise) that shape sociopolitical attitudes in situations of conflict. Where politicians and political theorists alike seem sys-

tematically, and defensively, to avoid these "irrational" nether regions, Rose stresses the need to expose and deconstruct the psychic complexities beneath the manifest simplicity and machismo of political rhetoric and action.

Rose begins, aptly enough, by revealing some of the personal facts and investments animating these interests (including her own apparently rather attenuated and "contrary" Jewishness), and then goes on to challenge the currently fashionable discourse of "identity politics," proposing to "replace the terms 'culture' and 'identity' with 'states' and 'fantasy'" (p. 14). She points out that states are not only political but also psychic entities (as in "states of mind") and that political destinies are no less determined by vicissitudes of fantasy than are the fates of individuals. The book provides several object lessons in this approach to politics, literature and the psyche, and Rose's readings consistently display the requisite care, tact and timing necessary in all successful psychoanalytic interpretations.

Because she attempts to cover the intersection of so many different intellectual areas (politics, cultural studies, feminism, literature, psychoanalysis), as well as a tripartite nexus of countries and cultures, Rose must necessarily sacrifice comprehensiveness in her selection of texts. The first part of the book, which reproduces versions of her 1994 Oxford Clarendon Lectures, focuses first on Israel/Palestine, mainly via the novels of Amos Oz, but with reference to other Israeli and Palestinian writers such as David Grossman, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Anton Shammas and Rajeh Shehadeh. Rose's readings expose a more subtle and perhaps unconscious "apologia for the Jewish state" in Oz's writings that his apparently impeccable self-critical credentials both offer and obscure. She suggests that it may be this very capacity of the liberal Israeli's conscious conscience "to examine itself so brutally . . . that allows it to occupy the (moral) high ground" (p. 34).

The author then goes on to South Africa, through Rian Malan's memoir, *My Traitor's Heart*, as well as Wulf Sachs' *Black Hamlet*, an account of the psychoanalysis of a black South African diviner in the 1930s by this Lithuanian Jewish immigrant—the first and the only training analyst yet to have practiced in South Africa (Rose recently co-edited a new edition of this fascinating text). She continues with a consideration of Britain's colonial collusion in the political and cultural fates of the former two realms, with Iris Murdoch's *The Mandelbaum Gate* and Kazuo Ishiguro's *The Remains of the Day* serving as primary texts. Rose is at pains to indicate and analyze moments of significant cross-references among these literary works and their cultures. She cleverly caps this perspective at the end of the fourth and final lecture—a critical meditation on the ambiguities of the search for peace and justice in both the Middle East and South Africa—with a look at Nelson Mandela's appropriation, in an address to a group of white South African businessmen, of Shylock's famous "hath not a Jew eyes" speech from Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice.*

Perhaps so as to preserve or simulate their original spoken style, Rose tends toward a rather excessive use of parentheses in these chapters; I found the resulting "throwaway" effect and interference with the flow of thoughts unfortunate. The habit is somewhat less intrusive in the volume's second part, made up of two previously published essays on the Botswanan/South African writer Bessie Head and on Jewish themes in the work of British novelist Dorothy Richardson. As an afterword, Rose reproduces her inaugural professorial lecture at Queen Mary and Westfield College,

which borrows the title and draws on the content of Lionel Trilling's 1955 lecture, "Freud and the Culture of Our Time," while rehearsing in brief many of the themes covered in the rest of the volume.

Rose's insightful grasp of these manifold subjects is very impressive; one is grateful for her use of relatively unfamiliar psychoanalytic material, such as the work of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok on "transgenerational haunting." She is often helpfully provocative, as in her suggestion that a victim's capacity to identify with the violence and rage of an aggressor might be as crucial a therapeutic, healing measure as any other. She also has a knack for asking just the right kind of probing question: "But if faltering identity is incompetent (hamletism), and competent identity dangerous (redemption), then what are the desirable psychic components for a politically emancipated life in the modern age?" (p. 53).

There are moments, though, when Rose seems a little too sure of her own stance in these vexed debates, and the result is the odd, albeit brief, lapse in understanding and empathy. For example, early on in the book she grossly understates the matter when she makes this all-too-passing and parenthetical remark about the central issue of Freud's lifelong immigrant status: "he was a stateless person (it would be wrong to see psychoanalysis in its first generation as untouched by these historic concerns)" (p. 11). Similarly, toward the end, while in the midst of more obvious identifications and disagreements with Lionel Trilling, Rose perhaps bypasses certain other latent similarities, and longings, particularly in relation to her own Jewishness. When Rose questions Trilling's manifest attempts to escape his Jewish identity by suggesting that "Jewishness shadows Trilling's conception of selfhood . . . it provides the living, concrete history from which he himself increasingly detached it" (p. 140), one wonders how in touch she is with the possibility that the same might be said about herself. Just as psychoanalysis itself arose precisely out of Freud's ambivalent, immigrant, Jewish Enlightenment desire to gain admission to Western culture, and subsequently provided a complex vehicle toward this end for the many immigrant Jews who literally transferred his science to newer climes, so too did the example of Trilling, for all *his* ambivalence, provide the opening into the "respectable" academic arena of English studies in the United States for other Jews who could afford thereafter to identify themselves, in far less agonized fashion, *as* Jews. One wonders how different Rose's career—and that of many another British Jewish scholar—might have looked had there been an equivalent to Trilling in Britain to serve as the thin edge of the wedge for Jewish access to the university at large, and to literary study in particular.

Rael Meyerowitz
London

Jeffrey Rubin-Dorsky and Shelley Fisher Fishkin (eds.), *People of the Book: Thirty Scholars Reflect on Their Jewish Identity.* Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996. x + 507 pp.

Introducing this enterprising and creative collection, Jeffrey Rubin-Dorsky and Shelley Fisher Fishkin ask "whether the commitment and creativity that has enabled

the Jewish people to survive for five thousand years may be reconfigured anew at the end of the twentieth century" (p. 3). Their question relates to those doomsday prophecies that see acculturation and assimilation delivering a death blow to Jewish "peoplehood." At issue here is the very meaning of "Jewishness." Is it, as some claim, a question of faith and observance—or can the net of Jewishness be cast wider to incorporate other meaningful modes of Jewish identity? The editors firmly believe that the latter is possible, at least in America. Paradigms of Jewishness can be reconfigured; identity is "something one *does*, not something one *has*" (p. 6).

Reading these absorbing contributions, however, one gets a sense that Jewishness is something one never loses, however attenuated or marginal. In one way or another it influences, or is influenced by, one's academic endeavors. In some cases, research informs a sense of Jewishness; in others, being Jewish has a profound influence upon one's scholarship. Consider Alan Winkler, a notable scholar of twentieth-century American history. It was his research on America and the Second World War, including America's response to the destruction of European Jewry, that led him into his Jewishness. "My effort to grapple with the Holocaust, intellectually and emotionally, has enhanced my own sense of Jewish tradition and all it includes" (p. 332). Reading Dostoevsky had a similar impact on Michael Katz who, while abhorring the Russian author's anti-Jewish prejudice, appreciated his complexities. Dostoevsky's writings enabled Katz to "ponder the mysteries of the human personality—Dostoevsky's and my own. In one sense then, I suppose, it was reading Dostoevsky that really made me become a Jew" (p. 243).

Perhaps more interesting than those led to their Jewishness by their research are the scholars who argue that being Jewish both informed their choice of academic work and had a direct impact on it. Eunice Lipton, for example, contends that her choice of art history as a career stemmed from her Jewishness: "I now believe that I became an art historian because I happened on a picture into which I projected my deepest terrors. I hid *and* sublimated my fright in this painting. It is where I buried the Holocaust" (p. 294).

The influence of being Jewish on scholarship is even more profound in the case of Susan Gerber, a professor of English and women's studies. Her Jewish background, she maintains, has at all times shaped her feminist critiques. Gerber points out, moreover, that this is a common phenomenon among Jewish feminist scholars:

> Reading from the feminist Haggadah about the egg, hard-boiled to signify how an oppressed people harden (their resolve? their hands? their hearts?) under slavery, I began to decipher in my own commitment to feminism a response, if not to Judaism then to Jewish experience, that turned out to inform the feminist criticism of many contemporaries. While we had documented the influence of civil rights on the women's liberation movement, we never understood the impact of our own past. Despite the antagonisms between Judaism and the women's movement, Jewish history may have served as a leavening for the second wave of American feminism, especially in the academy (pp. 23–24).

In a particularly fascinating contribution, David Gerber explains how his choice of dissertation topic was a subliminal response to his own experience of living in two cultures or, as he puts it, "two-ness" (p. 126). Gerber's own family memories gave him a unique insight into battles in American historiography and informed his book,

The Making of American Pluralism. "The view of American pluralism at which I finally arrived," he notes, "does seem to at least have been overdetermined by my own identity and past" (p. 130).

One cannot discuss all the contributions in a brief review. Suffice it to note that each essay is thought-provoking and engaging. Not only do we participate in each author's social and intellectual development (always an interesting, voyeuristic process), but we are introduced to a range of disciplines that inspires further reading. We also see how Jewishness intimately informed Shelley Fisher Fishkin's reading of Mark Twain, how Seth Wolitz was influenced both by his Jewish roots and by the Yale experience, with its Yankee culture and Anglo-elite, in his reading of Proust, and how autobiography and intellectual history interact in the work of Oliver Wendel Holmes, a black Jewish historian.

It would seem that Jewishness—be it subliminal or marginal—can never simply be discounted. Memories can easily be kindled, even by research not specifically related to matters Jewish. Despite the often peripheral place of Jewishness in the lives of most of the contributors, their accounts leave one with a sense of Jewish vibrancy, sincerity and authenticity.

Can the sort of Jewishness discussed in this volume be sustained and transmitted? The essence of this debate is sensitively addressed by Rubin-Dorsky in his recounting of discussions with a "liberal" Orthodox rabbi. "Jewishness," the unnamed rabbi tells him, "is amorphous, little more than a cultural feeling that easily dissipates, whereas Judaism, the faith, belief and practices of the Fathers and Mothers [as I said, he tends toward liberalism] is granitelike, of and for the ages" (p. 470). To be sure, Jewishness may be slippery, constructed and not fixed. But it is hardly amorphous. It may indeed be sustainable, especially as we move into a new millennium, characterized by diversity, hybridity and cosmopolitanism. One certainly hopes the optimism of the editors is justified.

Milton Shain
University of Cape Town

Zionism, Israel and the Middle East

Michael N. Barnett (ed.), *Israel in Comparative Perspective: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 296 pp.

Israelis often insist on their uniqueness, as do most other nations. A belief in one's own exceptionalism, ironically, makes a society less rather than more unique. Jewish history and Israel may indeed be relatively "more unique," but this can only be judged, logically or empirically, by comparison with others. The glaring absence of such comparison, by either general comparativists or Israeli specialists, has been a gigantic lacuna in the scholarly study of Zionism and Israel.

This volume, growing out of a 1993 Jerusalem conference, "Is Israel Unique?" sponsored by the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University, was convened with this gap in mind. The ten essays included here cover a broad range of Israeli social and political issues, but with a common concern for a broader perspective provided by other national experiences and by general concepts. Given the pace of academic publication and response, there is already much that can be added to these contributions in subsequent work, but the book stands out as a pioneering enterprise and a major milestone in the field.

Since this is a first stab at systematic comparison, the findings are more suggestive than conclusive, and the strength of the comparative dimension also varies widely among the essays. In some the comparative aspect is central, and in others it is secondary. Inevitably, given the structure of the enterprise, similarities between Israel and other cases stand out more sharply than differences. In addition, some move from the case (Israel) to more generalized implications, while a few use general frameworks to shed more light on the Israeli case (which seems more promising in terms of short-term payoffs).

Michael Barnett's introductory chapter explains that Israel has been neglected in comparative studies because it does not fit into existing categories, owing to the salience of the Arab-Israel conflict, and to the sociology of Middle East studies. But outside (often hostile) forces are not the entire explanation; Barnett also stresses (though less than I might) the importance of Israeli resistance, in academia and generally, to being categorized with other societies and states.

In one of the chapters that does proceed from general framework to case, Shibley Telhami applies "realist" theory in international relations to Israeli foreign policy. The result, though employing comparison very usefully, is actually to emphasize differences by identifying the nonsecurity influences on Israeli policy. This has the virtue

of underlining clashing ideological differences toward security—a point not always appreciated by outside observers—and helping to explain the 1993 breakthrough in Israel-PLO relations, but it downplays genuine differences on security; both sides in the debate are also strongly motivated by different understandings of what "realism" dictates for Israel.

Gabriel Sheffer, whose previous work on diaspora communities has been very useful, provides a summary of similarities among such diasporas (Jewish, Chinese, Indian, Armenian—and Palestinian): preservation of ethnonational identity, social cohesion, some kind of political organization, contacts with the homeland, and the idea of return. Much of his analysis is a critical commentary on the ingrained Israeli denigration of the Jewish diaspora. Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner, in the most data-based article in the volume, focus on relations between gender and foreign policy attitudes in Israel and Egypt. Public opinion survey research in the two countries suggests a conclusion with broader implications; namely, that attitudes toward war and peace do not differ by gender, but that they do correlate with attitudes toward gender (thus feminism and dovishness are linked).

In his second contribution, Barnett points out suggestive parallels between the economies of Israel and the East Asian "tigers," especially in Israel's earlier decades, while concluding that Israel turned more to the Latin American model after the 1970s. Since the article was written before the economic upturn of the mid-1990s, it would be interesting to know if Barnett would characterize the more recent period as a turn back to the East Asian model.

Ian Lustick uses both textual analysis and polling data to establish that Israeli attitudes toward Jerusalem—including possible territorial compromise there—are much more complex than is generally thought. In particular, it is important to distinguish between the six square kilometers of Jordanian Jerusalem and the seventy square kilometers from Ramallah to Bethlehem that was annexed to Israeli Jerusalem in 1967 (a more recent survey by the Guttman Institute confirms Lustick's argument on this, while the use of the issue in the 1996 election also confirms that the issue remains, in his words, a "fetish" in Israeli politics). Given the extent of Lustick's previous work on attitudes toward territorial integration in Ireland and Algeria, the comparative dimension of this article is surprisingly undeveloped.

Joel Migdal and Rebecca Kook each offer thoughtful articles that make use of comparative concepts to put Israeli identity in better perspective. Migdal argues that Israel is similar to new Asian and African states in that the role of the state in forming society is crucial. In so doing, he draws on the important distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of society, pointing out—in a crucial insight often missing in debates over Israel as a Jewish state—that all societies, including Israel, are located somewhere on a spectrum between these two pure types. Kook places the Israeli Arab situation in the context of "national corporate identity," providing an excellent perspective on the problems posed by a national minority in a nation-state.

Like Telhami, Midgal and Kook, Gershon Shafir proceeds from a general framework, in this case models of colonialism as developed elsewhere. This provides a basis for linking economic development to Arab-Israeli issues more strongly than is usual; for example, the "pure settlement" mode of colonization, leading to development of the kibbutz, was tied directly to the need to avoid direct competition with

cheap Arab labor. Shafir's use of the term "colonialism" will raise protest, but the legitimacy of the comparison is reinforced by a careful enumeration of differences, as well as similarities, between Zionist settlement and colonization elsewhere.

In a concluding essay, Yehezkel Dror—as always, provocative and illuminating—strikes a somewhat different note by arguing forcefully for both the reality and the necessity of Israeli uniqueness. Dror goes further than any of the preceding authors in trying to define uniqueness, and in examining its relationship to important belief systems. Jewish religion and Zionist ideology, he emphasizes, tend to prefer a unique Israel, while "post-Zionism" and "the assumptions underlying most of the social sciences" tend to look for similarity (most of the essays in this book belong, presumably, to this fourth category). Given the scope of Dror's frame of reference and his frank statement of the linkage between comparison and ideological assumptions, it would have been useful to have begun the volume with his essay and have other contributors respond to his arguments for a "revitalized Zionism," as well as to his specific statement of Israel's unique features (pp. 251–252), most of which are not directly addressed in the other essays.

This is not, however, to argue that the act of comparison should necessarily be linked to the minimization of Israeli uniqueness and associated systems of belief. There is probably no more common intellectual fallacy than the tendency to see the act of comparison as a statement of similarity. As already noted, to the extent that Israel is in fact unique, *only* comparison to other cases can establish this uniqueness. The issues raised in this stimulating volume should inspire a whole range of comparative studies, representing a full spectrum of ideological and methodological perspectives.

Alan Dowty
University of Notre Dame

Michael Brown, *The Israeli-American Connection: Its Roots in the Yishuv, 1914–1945*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996. 396 pp.

Allon Gal, (ed.), *Envisioning Israel: The Changing Ideals and Images of North American Jews*. Jerusalem and Detroit: Magnes Press and Wayne State University Press, 1966. 444 pp.

These two books purport to explore the relationship between Israel and the American Jewish community, one successfully and the other far less so.

Envisioning Israel is a collection of essays that grew out of a conference held in 1993 at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, edited by the conference organizer, Allon Gal, the director of the Center for American Jewry at Ben-Gurion. As with all edited volumes, the pieces vary in style and substance, and a few seem somewhat out of place. But on the whole, the contributors stick fairly closely to the general theme of how American Jews have seen first the Yishuv and then the Jewish state in this century.

The contributors to the Gal book include a number of familiar and respected names, such as Aryeh Goren, Jonathan Sarna, Jerold Auerbach and Ilan Troen. But rather than

comment on particular pieces, it seems more salient to pick out the major themes that run through all of the essays, because I think that this book is an important contribution to the ongoing study of relations between the Jewish state and the most important diaspora community in the world.

From a period beginning shortly after the First World War, American Jews idealized the pioneers who settled in Israel. There is a constant theme that runs through Zionist propaganda in both the prestate and early poststate era, that of the brave *ḥaluẓim* who came to build the land and to be built by it, who were the epitome of the "new Jew," a proud, fearless Jew who did not run away from the Cossacks, who would fight for honor—and win.

Existing contemporaneously with this ideal of the brave and proud Jewish pioneer was a vision of a Jewish state built on the ideals not only of the prophets ("Justice, justice shalt thou pursue!") but of American Jeffersonian democracy and Progressive social justice. Americans invested the Jews of Palestine and later of Israel with all their own hopes and ideals, ignoring the realities of actual conditions. There were, after all, kibbutzim in which men and women labored in an apparent state of equality, the land was being reclaimed, *shomrim* did guard the settlements, and in the War of Independence and the 1967 Six-Day War, the Jewish soldiers proved themselves to be every bit as brave and fearless as Zionist propaganda had said they should be. In addition, Israel was the redemption for the Holocaust, and the battle cry of "Never Again!" struck a responsive chord in a community that suffered enormous guilt for being unable to save its brethren from the flames of Hitler's ovens.

Had all the contributors in the Gal book merely repeated and even expanded upon this by now familiar refrain, neither the conference nor the book would have been of much value. The merit is that many have gone further, to point out how reality began to impinge on mythology, how the Israel that had to develop in order to survive was in so many ways different from the Israel that had been envisioned. The triumph of the Likud in 1977 brought into sharp focus the conflict between American Jewry's attachment to liberalism and the ultranationalist and ultraconservative views of the Begin and Shamir governments. The Brandeisian synthesis, which converted Zionism into philanthropy and muted the call for aliyah—a synthesis that had governed relations between the two communities for more than half a century—suddenly ran head-on into an Israeli government that was not just made up of Jews but was openly Jewish, and which followed a foreign policy anathema to a majority of American Jews.

The growing assimilation of the American community also led to much soul-searching, as American Jews who felt their own sense of Jewish identity slipping away looked toward Israel as a rock on which to anchor any remnant of their sense of Jewishness. The non-Orthodox segments of American Jewry helped to make Israel not just a secular state, but part of a "civil religion," in which one participated by helping Israel through bonds and the UJA rather than by studying Torah. What this will mean in the future is not clear, although several of the authors do look at current attitudes and the change of generations, from those whose parents and grandparents immigrated to the United States and who have a clear memory of the Shoah, to the third and fourth generations, born after 1948 and even after 1967, who lack the personal memory of antisemitism as well as ties to the lost world of European Jewry.

To what extent the brave Israeli hero still exists as an icon to this generation is not

certain. Among the younger generation, those who continue to work in the federations and in Israel-related groups have a clearer idea of what Israeli society is about. While the majority still rejects Jewish criticism of the Jewish state, it is now acceptable to engage in that criticism, provided it is done from the inside and as a form of protecting the integrity and future of the American community. A good example is the storm of protest that broke out recently over the Israeli Orthodox effort to write into law its current monopoly over conversions.

If, however, American Jews, or at least those who remain interested in Israel, have a better understanding of the problems and realities of Israeli society, it is less obvious how well Israelis understand Americans. I can still remember how, on my first trip to Israel in the early 1970s, so many of the Israelis I met thought that I (an assistant professor traveling on a research grant), like all American Jews, was rich. If I hesitated in buying something I was invariably greeted with a comment on the order of "why are you being so cheap? You American Jews have loads of money."

The series of essays by Michael Brown helps to explain this attitude, at least in part, but on the whole, *The Israeli-American Connection* is a series of six essays that do not a book make. Brown's thesis is that the Israeli attitude toward Americans was created in the Yishuv period of 1914–1945, and he has written essays on Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky, Hayim Nahman Bialik, Berl Katznelson, Henrietta Szold, Golda Meir and David Ben-Gurion.

The choice is somewhat puzzling, and must rely on the unstated—and unproved—assumption that the attitudes of these six people informed and shaped those of all the members of the Yishuv. Jabotinsky and Bialik, however, had limited contacts with Americans, while the rest worked with Americans in their capacity as officials of Zionist agencies. All of them believed that the great value of American Jewry to the Yishuv was financial help, and in fact worked out a philosophy that the Yishuv was doing the American community a favor; it was helping it to survive, by allowing it to provide material resources to the Jewish settlements and undertakings in Palestine.

So Israelis in the 1970s believed that all Americans were rich because six people in the 1914–1945 period saw the American Jewish community as a cash cow! Who knows, it may be true, but one cannot tell from anything that Brown provides in his book.

On my later trips to Israel, I have found Israelis far more knowledgeable about the United States and about American Jewry, but I think there are a variety of reasons to account for this. Tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of American Jews have visited Israel, and a multitude of Israelis have visited the United States. America now has a very large Israeli-born population living here, men and women who travel back and forth to Israel, and whose families visit them here. American television, books and movies are ubiquitous in Israel, and McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken and other badges of American culture are growing ever more visible on the Israeli landscape.

In the 1914–1945 period, few Israelis (or "Palestinians," as they were then called) traveled to the United States, and not that many American Jews came in the other direction. If the Americans perceived the Palestinian settlers as heroes, we have no idea how the Yishuv perceived the American Jews. We have some idea how six people did, but they were unusual, not the man or woman on the streets of Tel-Aviv or Jerusalem.

I suspect that exploration of the relations between the American Jewish community and Israel is a growth industry. As Israeli society becomes more Westernized,

while at the same time its fundamentalist Orthodox segment grows more powerful, there are bound to be strains with the liberal, tolerant and pluralistic ideas held so dear by Americans. And as the American community becomes attenuated through assimilation, the rock of a Jewish state may be grasped at ever more eagerly and more desperately by those seeking to retain a precarious hold on their Jewish identity. With both societies in a state of change, it would not surprise me if trying to chart the relationship between them proved more elusive than ever.

Melvin I. Urofsky
Virginia Commonwealth University

Alan Dowty, *The Jewish State: A Century Later*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 337 pp.

Israel is not typical. Among the more than one hundred states that came on the scene after the Second World War, it is distinctive for the quality of its democracy and for its economic development. The record is impressive especially in light of the problems it faced in absorbing many impoverished immigrants, while at the same time dealing with several major wars plus chronic terrorism.

To be sure, Israel has had some unusual advantages as well as unusual problems and achievements. Although the state was newly born in 1948, the Jewish nation had great experience in organizing against adversity as well as in limited communal government. Much of the population acquired from other places was highly educated. The "capital" these immigrants added to the Israeli economy was acquired at the expense of other countries' outlays for schooling. This was true of Germans and other Europeans who came in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the migrants who have been coming from the former Soviet Union since the late 1980s. The financing of an impressive infrastructure was eased by feelings of kinship among well-off Jews overseas, plus reparations from Germany and latter-day largesse that has come from the United States government.

Israel's capacity to develop and maintain a democratic polity is one of the great mysteries of political science. Few of the national founders and no wave of immigrants came from countries where democracy was ingrained. The experience of economic hardships, war and terror are usually cited as reasons for postponing or suspending democracy. It is well known that Israel's democracy does not always mean equal treatment for all: Jews are favored over non-Jews and, among the Jews, those of European heritage have fared better in many ways than those of "Oriental" background. However, as Alan Dowty indicates, no democracy is free of imperfections. As in Israel's case, such imperfections are usually associated with differences of opportunity associated with race, ethnicity, religion or social class.

Dowty's book is a tour de force in its presentation of issues relevant to Israeli politics. He surveys Israel's cultural heritage from its Jewish past and traces its rough-and-tumble style of politics to a combination of Jewish culture, the British Mandate and more recent experiences. He describes Israel's management of its economic and security problems, ethnic rivalries and secular-religious tensions among Jews. He de-

votes lengthy chapters to a description, explanation and assessment of Jews' relations with non-Jews in a Jewish state, and the impact on Israeli society and polity of the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza from 1967 until the onset of the Oslo peace process.

Dowty's analysis is implicitly dynamic. His epilogue deals briefly with the national election of 1996, emphasizing continuity and departures from the recent past. This theme is also apparent in numerous other contexts, coming to the fore in a quotation from Leonard Fein, offered as a conclusion, that addresses the tension between universalism and parochialism present in Judaic doctrine and throughout Jewish history. The Israel that Dowty describes is a country like others. It is increasingly integrated with the world, but assertive in its distinctiveness and in its right to choose its own path into the future. It can be judged by the universal standards that the Israelis' ancestors helped to create, but only if the difficult experiences of modern Israel are taken into account.

The range of Dowty's sources is impressive. There hardly seems to be an important English or Hebrew source that has not left its mark on this book. It is a careful, thoughtful and sensitive integration of research specifically about Israel, with comparative analyses that are used to place Israel in the context of countries with similar experiences.

Dowty is critical of Israel's performance, but not obsessively so. This is not an example of the scholarly fashion that goes by the label of "post-Zionism," though Dowty does borrow insights from scholars in that stylish cluster as well as from others. Dowty's overall favorable assessment of Israel may be seen as an apology for the Israeli establishment. However, such a designation would be inaccurate. This is a well-crafted, apolitical, balanced account of what Dowty describes as a fascinating country. The book is an intelligent—in some instances a profound—commentary on events, opinion surveys, trends and countertrends, as well as on arguments that have raged in the Israeli public and among academics. Endemic to such an enterprise are points that will generate quarrels along with those to be applauded as insights.

My own major criticism is with the title. Dowty would be better served if his assessment of Israel's democracy appeared there prominently, or at least as a subtitle. There is little justification in the text for the present subtitle ("A Century Later"). The book only incidentally compares Israel's achievements with the aspirations of nineteenth-century Zionists. It begins with the question as to whether a Jewish state can be democratic, and presents the most thorough and sensitive assessment of Israel's democracy that I have seen.

Ira Sharkansky
The Hebrew University

Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, *Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 284 pp.

From its establishment in 1948, Israel has been an exceptional—that is to say—a different, state. Gary Jacobsohn's insightful comparative study of constitutionalism in

Israel and the United States is yet another demonstration. As he shows, Israel is a democratic polity that lacks a written constitution but nonetheless adheres to the norms of constitutionalism.

Modern constitutionalism was born in the United States. A written constitution, the framers of the American document believed, would be their lasting contribution to the science of politics. Time has proved that they were right. Since 1787, with very few exceptions, the establishment of new political regimes around the world has been accompanied by the promulgation of a written constitution. The United Nations, as of September 1993, had 185 member states; only nine had never produced formal written constitutions. Israel was one of this strikingly small group. The obvious question is: why?

The appeal of written constitutions is not simply a matter of fashion. It is grounded in historical experience. If human beings are by nature both self-serving and social animals, there is a need for an umpire—the state—to guarantee such essentials of human existence as respect for life and respect for mutual obligations. We have also come to recognize—and this is the conceptual core of constitutionalism—the need to protect against the state's becoming the chief violator of the vital concerns for which it was created. A written constitution is the most expedient way to regulate the state. It identifies the common objectives of the people and their rulers, what procedures the organs of the state (the government) may legitimately use to enact and implement policies, and what activities the government may never undertake.

With the end of the cold war, there has been a rapid democratization of governments around the world. Twenty-seven states have entered the U.N. since 1991; of these, the Freedom Forum evaluates thirteen as "free" (democratic) and seven as "partially free" (ostensibly democratic). Many older member states have also adopted more democratic regimes. All told, there are 138 democratic and ostensibly democratic nations in the world today, 75 percent of the total number of nations.

Since Israel throughout its fifty years of existence as an independent state has always been a functioning democracy, its exceptionalism becomes still more puzzling. Our puzzlement is only increased when we recognize, as Jacobsohn makes abundantly clear, that Israel's intellectual, political and legal elites have frequently utilized American ideas to debate and resolve their internal conflicts. That tendency has increased in recent years. But at the time that Jacobson was writing, Israel still lacked a written constitution, and the laws of the Knesset were the supreme law of the land.

Since Jacobsohn is concerned primarily with examining the transplantation of constitutional ideas, his study goes a long way toward explaining Israel's anomalous situation. He begins (in chapter 2) by situating constitutionalism in the United States and Israel within the broader framework of their contrasting political cultures. Israel proclaims itself as the state of the Jewish people; Israeli constitutionalism must inevitably be cast in terms of that group identification. By way of contrast, American constitutionalism is rooted in the radical individualism of classic Western liberalism; its focus is on the right of the individual. In the United States, the basic ideational tension has been how to legitimate public, communal normative limits on individualistic claims. In Israeli constitutionalism, the basic tension is created by efforts to entrench the individualistic values associated with Western democracy in a society

premised on a particularistic group solidarity. In the remainder of his book, Jacobsohn artfully illuminates and utilizes this comparison.

In chapter 3, these contrasting assumptions are examined in terms of membership in the political community. In the United States, citizenship is primarily conceived as a personal attachment to ideas embodied in the establishment of the nation. Nationality is therefore theoretically open on an *equal* basis to any individual; it is an act of volition. In Israel, the primary means of obtaining citizenship is by belonging to the Jewish people. The Law of Return guarantees automatic and immediate citizenship to virtually any Jew who desires it. And symbolically, *every Jew born in the country is considered by the Nationality Law to have acquired citizenship by "return."* Jacobsohn utilizes this contrast to telling effect in discussing the "who is a Jew" controversy. Since the Jewish people predate the establishment of the state, the prevailing Israeli approach is to answer that question in traditional terms: "Israeli Jews, both the religiously observant and the majority who are not, are connected to their Jewishness in more primordial ways than are their American counterparts" (p. 14).

Americans perceive their Jewishness as approximating membership in a voluntary association. In part, claims Jacobsohn, this difference accounts for the Israelis' more willing acceptance of Orthodox halakhic membership tests—which subordinate volitional statements to past affiliation—and the consequent strongly negative reaction of the majority of American Jewry who are non-Orthodox.

This discussion leads Jacobsohn (chapter 4) to his central argument concerning why Israel has failed to follow the pattern established by the United States in adopting a formal written constitution. He traces the contrasting constitutional patterns to the differing political cultures at the time of their establishment. In America, the constitution created the nation; in Israel, the nation created the state. The codification of its basic principles at the outset was essential for the United States because its very national identity was tied to those principles. In Israel, the preexisting Jewish nation had a long, complex history that precluded agreement about the new state's basic principles even at the abstract philosophical level. Secularists and Orthodox, for example, could not agree in 1948 about the role of Torah and halakhah in Israel, and that cleavage still prevents constitutional consensus fifty years later.

In the next two chapters (5 and 6), Jacobsohn examines the consequences for Israel and the United States of their constitutional regimes. He discusses, for example, the differing role of the supreme courts in Israel and the United States; why the "republican" revival among American constitutional theorists faces an uphill battle and is likely to fail; and the differences between Israeli and American protection of free speech and the rules governing a party's ability to participate in elections. These are important matters, as they touch upon the very quality of a nation's democracy, and Jacobsohn offers many acute comments.

The major weakness of Jacobsohn's approach is that it precludes him from discussing the more mundane social and political factors that are invariably, and sometimes critically, involved in major political controversies. His discussions of the role of Orthodox Judaism in Israeli society, for example, does not focus on the material benefits accruing to those religious communities from their state-sponsored and supported monopoly, which is zealously promoted by the religious political parties in the Knesset. But such criticism is inevitable when dealing with a work that focuses on

ideas and their impact, and in this case is not meant to detract from Jacobsohn's important contributions.

Apple of Gold makes and supports a significant point for students of comparative constitutionalism: there is more than one way to create and sustain constitutional democracy. We should be hesitant in recommending the wholesale transplantation of constitutional ideas and structures from one society to another. Yet we can learn from one another. Jacobsohn teaches us a great deal about constitutionalism in the United States and Israel.

Martin Edelman
University at Albany

Ruth Linn, *Conscience at War: The Israeli Soldier as a Moral Critic*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. 245 pp.

Ruth Linn's *Conscience at War* is an original, daring and necessary study of a major sore on the Israeli body politic: conscientious objection. The phenomenon was almost unknown prior to the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Thereafter, in 1987, followed the *intifada*, which in a somewhat different way established conscientious objection as an almost legitimate facet of Israel's moral fabric. Most of the objectors belong to the left and far left; in socioeconomic terms, the majority are urban, married professional men of Ashkenazic origin (pp. 88–89). After the beginning of the Oslo peace process, quite a few people from the right declared that they were ready to refuse military orders if the call ever came to destroy settlements or to evacuate people from the West Bank. This book, however, deals only with conscientious objectors of the left who have actually refused military orders either to serve in Lebanon or to carry out their orders during the intifada.

A great amount of material—eight out of eleven chapters—is a compilation of previously published articles that have been revised for inclusion in the book. This fact is all too obvious. A master argument runs through the whole composition, but the seams are visible and the argument is repetitive. Nonetheless, there are outstanding merits to this study, not least its valuable contribution toward compelling us to look into our conscience.

In chapter 1, we are reminded that morality is a refined art that requires careful study. One of the major sources of ethical discourse is John Rawls, whose razor-sharp definitions of moral criticism serve as an appropriate point of departure for the analysis of "separate" and "connected" moral positions: "A separate position is a hypothetical one and describes how some individuals take a stand in moral argument," regardless of their ties to a given society or the tenets of a particular culture, whereas the "connected moral critic is viewed as a person who has ties to a particular culture" (p. 19). Moreover, the decision to take a moral stance is a psychological process that differs according to personality. One of the keys to the author's analysis is Lawrence Kohlberg's extension of Jean Piaget's two-stage model of moral development, which distinguishes between a moral decision taken when punishment or reward are at stake and one taken because the right decision is defined by "respect for other people as

ends rather than as means" (p. 25). The conscientious objector is a lonely judge of right and wrong in a society with which he may otherwise identify.

Chapter 2 introduces us to another set of moral decisions: the attitude toward a particular war and toward the conduct of the war. The argument here explicitly follows that developed by Michael Walzer in his book *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977). In the Israeli case, the framework for a moral choice was laid down by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during its formative years: the individual soldier is held responsible if he or she carries out a manifestly illegal order. This rather innocuous formulation is a derivative of an untenable, all-engulfing phraseology concerning the "purity of arms," which puts an unbearable onus on the individual soldier and officer in the face of the enemy. On the one hand, soldiers and officers of the IDF are entrusted with the defense of their country, on the assumption that they are capable of interpreting and carrying out their tasks to completion; on the other, it is taken for granted that Israel fights only to defend its existence. The war in Lebanon was not generally seen to be such a defensive war: indeed, it was actually defined by Prime Minister Menahem Begin as a "war of choice." The IDF rank-and-file never had full faith in this war for the "peace of Galilee." Colonel Eli Geva's refusal to command his unit during the siege of Beirut epitomizes the moral dilemmas involved when a cognitive dissonance arises between hollow phraseology and the gruesome reality of the front (pp. 36–37).

Following this chapter is a discussion and comparison of the My Lai massacre of 1969 with the Beita and Hawara incidents of 1988, in which a group of Palestinians were arrested, bound and severely beaten on the orders of a high-ranking IDF officer (who was later court-martialed and convicted). These events, so far apart in time and place, provide a sharp profile of the dilemmas mentioned above. War gives citizens clad in uniform a license to kill; yet their oath, honor and education do not allow them to make free use of their killer instincts. There has never been a happy meeting point between a guerrilla movement whose best hiding place is among defenseless civilian populations and a conventional army on a policing job. We are still bleeding in Lebanon, and we have barely emerged from the mire of the intifada.

Chapter 6 provides an illuminating catalog of various protest movements in Israel. Most of these movements were tiny groupings—pitifully diversified, disoriented and in constant dispute over aims and means. Put together, they had little influence over the wars they protested against.

Conscientious objection in Israel is burdened by memories of the Holocaust. Many objectors cite the Holocaust, although not in the context of making silly or propagandist comparisons between the Final Solution and the end results of their own actions. Rather, they cannot avoid associating the memories of troops herding Jewish women and children with their own experience of hearing the shrieks of those abused or suffering in the Ansar or Ketziot prison camps (pp. 161–165). Service during the months of the intifada reduced the number of those among the objectors who identified military service in the IDF with the moral identity of the Israeli male. One of the proofs of this phenomenon is the fact that so many reservists living abroad rushed home to return to their units in 1967 and 1973, whereas very few came back to the first phase of the war in Lebanon and none at all in response to the outbreak of the intifada (p. 112).

Linn also deals at some length with the problem of objection out of fear or in the face of punishment. For some mysterious reason, conscientious objection on religious

grounds has been accepted, whereas conscientious objection per se has been attributed to fear alone. The discussion provided here (p. 182) does not answer the probably unanswerable question of which is more dominant: fear, which enhances the feeling that a particular war is unjust; or a deep-rooted sense that a particular war is unjust, which makes fear impossible to subdue.

Although conscientious objection has always been frowned upon by the military, it has been tacitly legitimized by many Israeli officers who have allowed their subordinates, through various arrangements, to postpone or even shirk duty altogether. Although the punishment for objection or defection in other countries is harsher than in Israel, Linn believes that the stigma and economic sanctions endured by Israeli conscientious objectors—for instance, being disqualified for certain government and civil service positions—may make their overall situation particularly difficult.

Two final remarks. The author is torn between her professional psychological inclinations and her obvious political involvement, an inner struggle that makes itself felt throughout the book and which comes to a climax in chapter 8. Although there is nothing wrong with personal involvement, let alone concerning a subject as sensitive as conscientious objection, this particular chapter appears to be somewhat superfluous. Finally, it should be noted that the classic expression "conscientious objection" is not used by the author, who prefers the term "refusal."

Amnon Sella
The Hebrew University

STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY JEWRY
XVI
Edited by Jonathan Frankel

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Elizabeth Shanks Alexander, *The Impact of Feminism on Rabbinic Studies*

Eyal Ben-Ari and Edna Levy-Schreiber, *Gender and Military Service in Israel*

Daniel Boyarin, *Women's Bodies and the Rise of the Rabbis*

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Hasia Diner, *American Jewish Women and the Politics of History*

Paula Hyman, *Jewish Women in the German and Russian Empires*

Marion Kaplan, *The Jewish Response to the Third Reich: Gender at the Grassroots*

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Tamar Ross, *Halakhah and Its Relationship to Human and Social Reality: Women's Roles in the Modern Period*

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