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

# THE POSTDIASPORA CONDITION

## Crossborder Social Protection, Transnational Schooling, and Extraterritorial Human Security

Michel S. Laguerre

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# Preface and Acknowledgments

The general trend in international immigration studies focuses on the receiving state as the locus of key aspects of the deployment of the phenomenon because it can facilitate and ease the integration, incorporation, and absorption of newcomers without impinging on the rights and daily activities of old timers. This singular vision of the practice of cross-border population dispersion has contributed to the production of a large amount of data and analyses useful for public policy makers and local municipal governments, but generates less insights on both the recombination, reconstitution, and transformation of nation, state, and immigrant communities and on the dynamics of the ensemble, including global networks that develop and derive from these cosmonational multidirectional ties. In contrast, the role of the sending state in caring for the well-being of its emigrant population has only recently been the object of sustained analytical inquiry. In this light, this book aims, on the one hand, to fill a void through an analysis of the contribution of the sending state to the social protection, educational training, and human security of its overseas citizens and, on the other, to explain the rise of the postdiaspora condition, an emancipatory metamorphosis of diaspora status.

In two prior books on diaspora parliamentary representation and on the multisite nation, I explain the transformation and enlargement of the sphere of action of a state institution—the parliament—as a result of the symbolic reunification of the homeland with its diaspora and following this same logic, the transformation of the nation into a cosmonation. Once these two public policy aspects of international immigration have been set in motion, I find it necessary to turn my gaze to the reproblematization of

the diaspora and postdiaspora question so as to bring to light a mutation process that is evolving before our eyes. This is what this volume investigates, documents, and deconstructs in an effort to unveil how states deliver crossborder services to their emigrant populations and how such mechanisms contribute to the deployment and operationalization of the postdiaspora condition.

The book pays attention to the crossborder services the state provides, transfrontier mechanisms that institutions develop, and extraterritorial forms of management and governance employed to achieve these ends. In the process, it discusses issues of global population mobility, expansive regulatory mechanisms, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and above all the rise of the postdiaspora condition. What emerges from this study is a complex crossborder arrangement and management, a multiplicity of crossborder agencies and organizations, and the promulgation of new laws that provide a legal basis to these extraterritorial undertakings by the state. The ability of emigrants to hold citizen status despite living abroad, to access the same state services as those offered to residents of the homeland, and to be able to contribute through parliamentary representation to the cogovernance of the multisite nation and expanded state, sets the cosmonational context for the performance of the postdiaspora condition.

In writing this book, I owe a debt of gratitude to many individuals who helped in the conceptualization of the problem, collection of data online and offline, or transcription of interviews with government officials; and those who offer advices and suggestions of all kinds or commented on earlier drafts. Among those who directly contributed in various ways to the completion of the book, I want to thank particularly the personnel of the Institute of Governmental Studies, including Jack Citrin, Katherine Nguyen, Nick Robinson, Paul King, and Julie Lefevre. In addition, librarians at Doe Library, Boalt Law School, City and Regional Planning, and the Institute of Governmental Studies were helpful throughout the process. Likewise, the following students from the Undergraduate Research Apprenticeship Program on campus deserve my appreciation for their multidimensional contribution to the project: Molly Hayes, Nancy Lam, Fatemeh Adlparvar, Stephanie Zhu, Kyle Shackleford, Sarah Dorfmann, Ji-Hae Lee, Weng Ao, Sheren Hotama, Young Ji Kim, Giacomo Zacchia, Yukiko Furuhata, Yanghe Liu, Calvin Tsang, Jason Vazquez, Mengqi Zhou, Maya Narumi, Kristina Bailey, Ran Xin, Tamanna Khemani, Leon Sim, Kimberley Wong, Desiree Rodarte, Azure Grant, and Reina Sasaki.

I am thankful to copyeditor Peter Dreyer for his timely interventions, corrections, and suggestions, which without doubt improve the quality of the work. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Martin A. Schain, the editor of the NYU European Studies Book Series and to the anonymous external reviewers for their generous comments and for bringing to my attention issues that needed clarification to strengthen the argument set in the book.

Segments of chapters from this book were previously discussed in my graduate seminar on "Diasporas in Comparative Perspective." Chapter 1 was presented in 2016 as part of the Lecture Series at the Institute for the Study of Social Issues at the University of California at Berkeley. Chapter 2 was delivered at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association held at Seattle in August 2016.

I was fortunate enough to work with two marvelous editors—Alexis Nelson and Kyra Saniewski—at Palgrave Macmillan, who helped me throughout the publication process. My thanks go as well to the marketing staff, to Aishwariya Ravi who supervised the production process, and to Judy Huang, Emily Colby, and Benny Chen who prepared the index.

Prepared under the auspices of the Berkeley Center for Globalization and Information Technology at the Institute of Governmental Studies of the University of California at Berkeley, this book is the last volume of a trilogy on globalization, immigration, and the transformation of the nation-state. The first volume "Parliament and Diaspora in Europe" appeared in 2013 in The New York University European Studies Series and the second "The Multisite Nation: Crossborder Organizations, Transfrontier Infrastructure, and Global Digital Public Sphere" was published in 2016 by Palgrave Macmillan. The royalty from the sale of this book is earmarked for scholarships to disadvantaged students at the Catholic and Parish schools in Lascahobas, Haiti.

Berkeley, California
November 1, 2016

Michel S. Laguerre

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CHAPTER 1

# Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, international immigration has been a key concept in the discourse of public policy in Western democracies. This phenomenon reflects a common and global reaction of government to the widespread mobility of people not only from the Global South to North America and the European Union but also to the substantive interregional exchange of population. Origin and destination countries are impacted differently by these crossborder human migrations, the former because of loss of population and the remittance dividend and the latter because of the demographic gain, which invites reactions from the citizenry because of projected competition for resources, employment, and services. No matter how one interprets the role of emigrants across the global landscape, international immigration has become a decisive factor in the transformation of societies and their remaking or metamorphosis into multisite nations and what I call "cosmonational" states.

The recognition of this momentous immigration-induced change that is reshaping both the nation and the state has led analysts to propose diverse scenarios that capture the cartography and choreography of the projected or observed outcome. In addition to the reformatting of the nation and state as a result of population movement, one must also pinpoint the role of the immigrant in this new spatial, organizational, and identitary reconfiguration of crossborder social formations. Like the



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nation that has become a cosmonation in its geographical scope, institutional organization, and demographic composition, the state has also become cosmonational as reflected in the citizenship rights and the rights to serve in the homeland parliament that it conveys onto the extraterritorial population, formally bringing emigrants under the aegis of its polity. The question of how state institutions and practices, on the one hand, and how emigrants and their descendants relate and contribute to this new development, on the other hand, is pivotal to our inquiry and understanding of the rise of the postdiaspora condition.

The thesis of this book is, first, that the diaspora status derives from emigration, which is central in the transformation of state and nation. Without the external population factor, there would be no cosmonation or cosmonational state. Second, this book posits that the diaspora status paradoxically downgrades the holder as a *subaltern other* vis-à-vis the host land and as a *subaltern extraterritorial compatriot* vis-à-vis the homeland, neither of which sits well with the demographic category under study. Finally, this book argues that the postdiaspora condition is a necessary evolution of the structure that accounts for emancipation of the self, equality of status before the law, and cosmonational stability.

For the purpose of circumscribing the postdiaspora condition, the book distinguishes the *immigrant community*, which has received much attention in the sociological literature, from the *emigrant community* that has been for the most part and for too long ignored by academic analysts and policy makers (Barry 2006; Brand 2006, Collyer 2003). They have seldom been analyzed as two sides of the same reality. These two different methodological routes complement each other and, in the process, enhance our comprehension of postdiaspora making, the transfrontier infrastructure that sustains its crossborder development, and the architecture of the condition that reflects its identity.

The book explains that the diaspora, symbolized by the existence of the extraterritorial population, has reached a new phase in its evolution. Until now, the diaspora was permanently locked into an outsider status no matter which generation the person or the community belonged to, unequal vis-à-vis the homeland because of the citizenship rights the immigrant could not use and vis-à-vis the host land because of the probationary time needed to acquire new or foreign citizenship abroad. For example, in public discourse in North America, the mainstream uses the country of residence to define its members as hegemonic citizens, while at the same time, it uses ancestral homeland as a criterion to define the first and

subsequent generations of nonwhite immigrants as subaltern citizens, that is, diasporans. No matter how long one has been a citizen of the United States, one is often asked the questions: Have you visited home recently, or, where do you come from? Such a posture insinuates that a second- or third-generation nonwhite citizen born in the United States should not claim the country as his or her homeland. In this context, to refer to oneself as member of a diaspora is to concede one's subaltern status, while at the same time justify the postdiaspora position occupied by the dominant segment of society.

Postdiaspora identity develops and is made possible through the acquisition of full citizenship rights, including the rights of parliamentary representation, through which the diaspora emancipates itself. Postdiaspora in its raw form is not a new phenomenon; it has existed in the past without formal performance because it operated on the basis of "identitary citizenship," the feeling of belonging to a distinct-homeland-territory-conscious cultural group despite foreign residence. Such a vision introduces an analytical distinction between "statutory citizenship" and "identitary citizenship" (Hassenteufel 1996: 129). The former relates to the ability to exercise citizenship rights, while the latter refers to one's personal sense of belonging to a nation concentrated in one territory or distributed over many sites. In the past, postdiaspora could not be materialized overtly beyond its symbolic manifestation because of the inability of the homeland to uphold or bestow full citizenship rights on emigrants, on the one hand, and because of the inability to exercise such rights while living abroad because of lack of transfrontier infrastructure, on the other hand. The postdiaspora condition studied here is of both the latent and the overt forms, inasmuch as the means to achieve citizenship status—while living abroad—in both the homeland and the host land are now available, accessible, and executable. The mind-set of emigrants and their descendants that has evolved to become cosmopolitan is a central marker of the postdiaspora condition.

## Database

The qualitative data used in the making of this book were collected both formally through field research in Paris, Rome, and Zagreb and informally through unscheduled conversations with members of the French diaspora in San Francisco, Casablanca, Jerusalem, Budapest, Istanbul, Prague, and Montreal. To gain a broader picture of the deployment of the postdiaspora

condition, I also examine annual reports and the official websites of government agencies that furnish information on their daily activities, documents by leaders of emigrant associations, and contributions by individuals published in online diaspora magazines, newspapers, or newsletters and official state documents, such as France's Code de la sécurité sociale (CSS), which provide a larger legal framework in which to understand past and current developments. The rationale behind the selection of documentation for the project was to understand how government bureaucracy expands transnationally in its effort to provide social and human security protection and extraterritorial schooling services to the emigrant population.

Three French agencies were selected for the collection of data and analytical scrutiny: the Caisse de sécurité sociale des Français de l'étranger (CFE), for its role in providing insurance and assistance to the emigrant population; the *Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger* (AEFE), for its role in ensuring availability and optimal functioning of French schooling abroad for the benefit of French diaspora students; and the *Centre de crise et de soutien* (CDCS), for its role in supervising overseas interventions to protect, rescue, and repatriate French emigrants who need help because of political instability or natural disasters.

Understanding how diaspora and postdiaspora figure in the state bureaucracy's extraterritorial expansion requires close analyses of field reports that cover both ordinary times and periods of crisis. Such reports provide detailed information about staff mobility, services provided, transfers of personnel, daily activities, and budgetary matters. Booklets available online on membership, provision of services, categories of insurance, and digital transactions published by the CFE, as well as its annual reports, contain significant documentation that sheds enormous light on its daily operations. In addition, while on sabbatical leave in fall 2013, I had a telephone conversation with a representative of the CFE, speaking from her office at the French consulate in Manhattan, that provided useful details, not only about how funds are collected from patrons and disbursed to eligible beneficiaries in the diaspora, but also about cases that require return migration to the homeland for additional accommodations.

Information concerning the CDCS, the principal instrument that supervises and coordinates French governmental activities in matters related to human security protection, is conveniently available on its official website. Field reports by staff on ongoing interventions that the CDCS receives, interviews and analytical reports, and the official booklet

that summarizes its activities from its inception in 2008 to the present, are all made available online. In addition to these narratives, annual reports issued by these agencies provide quantitative data on the populations they serve, government monetary subventions, and amounts distributed to various categories of recipients. In so doing, these reports show the cosmonational reach, as well as regional distribution, pertaining to places of residence of beneficiaries.

These diverse sources of data provide a kaleidoscopic view on how institutional and individual practices in the areas of social security, extraterritorial schooling, human security, and state jurisdictional expansion, correlate with crossborder citizenship to feed the postdiaspora condition. In other words, there are a physical infrastructure and empirical reality within which the postdiaspora condition deploys, and it is this larger picture that the book seeks to unveil.

## The Plan of the Book

The rise of the postdiaspora condition is the focus of this investigation, with analyses of emigrant social security, human security, extraterritorial schooling, and the transformation of the state as distinct sites of its multiform manifestation. Chapter 1 introduces and probes the rise of the postdiaspora condition, distinguishing it from the diaspora moment and the prediaspora predicament. Here, diaspora is positioned not as an end point, but as an experience that can evolve into a change of status that relocates the holder into a different position. Chapter 2 evokes a cluster of interpretations for both diaspora and postdiaspora, providing a hermeneutics of "post" in postdiaspora akin to postcoloniality and postmodernity. The chapter raises the question: if every diaspora is situated in relation to a supposedly nondiaspora mainstream, is the diaspora caught in a subaltern status that forever subjugates its position and identity? In other words, *diaspora status is, in this text, interpreted as a technology that reproduces inequality*. The chapter goes on to review the literature on postdiaspora, explaining how the concept has come into being, how it is used by immigration scholars, and the contexts in which it is applied to map its universe, deployment and significance, and unveil the light it sheds on the globalization process. Through the conceptualization of the contours of the postdiaspora condition, the chapter further identifies the continuity, re-annexation, repatriation, and postethnic models of postdiaspora, contrasting them with the cosmonational model, which is the *fil d'ariane,* or

golden thread, of the study. The last model makes explicit why it is necessary to distinguish the *immigrant community* from the *emigrant community* and why countries develop stringent policies vis-à-vis immigrants, while concocting more liberal and friendlier policies toward their own emigrants (Joppke 2003).

Chapter 3 investigates how the provision of social security by the homeland to emigrants reincorporates them in the polity of the sending state, making them insiders rather than outsiders. It shows how the crossborder social security bureaucracy developed for the extraterritorial French population is a branch of the national social security system and how the two are imbricated in each other, allowing easy transnational membership mobility and access to services. Unlike previous studies that discuss the role of the host land in providing social security to immigrants, this chapter instead focuses on social security delivered by the homeland to emigrants as a way of upholding their citizenship rights. It indicates the larger role played by benevolent societies and church relief services in caring for poor immigrants in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As the chapter explains, this situation changed drastically after World War II with the introduction and extension of social security to emigrant populations, concomitant with efforts by host lands to reach out to poor immigrants. The chapter further explains how the CFE operates administratively as a crossborder bureaucracy, a cosmonational agency, in the uneven landscape in which it navigates. Medical facilities to which the diaspora has access are not equally modern everywhere in the world. Therefore, the cost structure of services varies from country to country. In some countries, the Direction des Français à l'étranger et de l'administration consulaire (Directorate of French Nationals Abroad and Consular Administration) even finds it necessary to bypass the local hospitals and clinics with lower standards and to establish its own modern medical facilities for the residential diaspora at government expense. The chapter ends with reflections on the interface of social security with citizenship in the production of the postdiaspora condition.

Chapter 4 discusses how crossborder emigrant schooling deploys through the cosmonational bureaucracy, which sustains and accommodates residential diaspora students and students who transition from one site to another and provides employment to metropolitan and diaspora teachers. It does so through various mechanisms and routes: it explores how teachers can be transferred from one locale to another and how transnational interactions between school sites reflect the cosmonational

landscape of crossborder emigrant schooling; provides a review of the literature on transnational education and delineate the diverse forms it takes, whether the focus is on content, bureaucracy, or the mobility of students, staff, and teachers; explains the broader logic of cosmonational schooling that prepares students to be successful not only at their place of residence but also throughout the cosmonational landscape; discusses how a diaspora school site can be interpreted as a unit of a cosmonational network; demonstrates how the network operates in terms of solidarity and cooperation between nodes, reflected and materialized in the budgetary process; probes the crossborder infrastructure as an indispensable element of emigrant school operations; discusses purchase of school terrain, repair services, equipment, building, furniture, and planning for remodeling, since these activities may require approval by the central authorities in its Paris headquarters; examines how both natural and man-made crises, and school events such as workshops welcoming delegates from other schools in the system may affect the rest of the network and may require cosmonational management because of the number of units affected and because additional resources may be requested from both the headquarters and richer sites in the cosmonational network; highlights how the eurocampus adds to the interoperability of the cosmonational educational system. Intra muros cosmonational mobility is a characteristic feature of the system, facilitating internal migration and enhancing survivability of the operation. Finally, the chapter emphasizes that bringing extraterritorial schooling into the orbit of the cosmonation further contributes to the rise and sustenance of the postdiaspora condition.

Chapter 5 analyzes the bureaucracy set in place to manage the protection of emigrants' human security. It identifies and examines the CDCS as the key cosmonational agency responsible for coordinating intervention and managing local crises affecting the human security of French nationals abroad. The literature on human security, in contrast or in addition to state security, is reviewed to explain the expansion of services made available to the extraterritorial population. This literature contrasts emigrant to immigrant communities in the analysis of human security since countries have developed different policies toward foreign immigrants living in the host country and co-nationals living abroad. It examines the ways in which cosmonationalism manifests itself in the operation of the CDCS, also calling attention to the rise of cosmoeuropeanism in the area of human security. Any European state intervening in a situation of crisis is mandated to repatriate, not

only its citizens, but also citizens of all member states of the European Union. The relations of CDCS and the local embassy are assessed, along with the cosmonational contexts within which these occur. This chapter further shows the different forms that a crossborder cosmonational bureaucracy may embody and explains how they induce and sustain postdiasporization.

In Chapter 6, the deployment of the cosmonational state is studied in tandem with the rise of the postdiaspora condition, explaining how the former provides a context for the sustenance and flourishing of the latter. After reviewing literature on the interface of state and globalization, it discusses state remaking by way of the transformation of the nation-state into a cosmonational state. Then, it examines new metaphors developed, which are reflective of the cosmonational state, identifies characteristics of the cosmonation-centric state, discusses the production of cosmonational laws, and shows how voting abroad is seen as a mechanism that symbolizes the extraterritorial expansion of the state. It goes on to explain how state administrative services provided exclusively to the inhabitants of the nation-state are now extended to the extraterritorial emigrant population. Additionally, this chapter explores the complexity of the governance of the cosmonational state and compares family reunification and nation reunification with cosmonational reunification. Similarly, it explains the reconfiguration of interactions, the tension between cosmonation and state, and between cosmonational states, and the mobility of individuals within the cosmonational state. It concludes with reflections on the articulation of the postdiaspora condition with the cosmonational state.

The Conclusion discusses the postdiaspora condition in its homeland, host land, and multisite contexts and explains why it is perceived differently when viewed from the perspectives of the homeland, host land, immigrant, or cosmonation, representing different scales of analysis. It interprets diaspora as a carrier of inequality because of the subaltern status it projects in its relation to the host land. In contrast, the chapter presents postdiaspora as emancipatory because of the equality dividend it projects. It then discusses the need to denaturalize diaspora subalternity, stressing that it is not intrinsic to the natural order of things. It further compares and contrasts diaspora and postdiaspora. Finally, it addresses the communal dimension of postdiaspora, the enactment of postdiaspora identity performances, the rise of postdiaspora consciousness, and the deployment of the postdiaspora condition.

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CHAPTER 2

# The Postdiaspora Question

The concept of diaspora incorporates the idea of moving permanently to a foreign country, irrespective of how one arrives there. To make sense, it requires that there be a prediaspora context of roots in a separate homeland and a period of preparation prior to emigration. Thus, one can deconstruct diaspora as it relates to first-generation immigrants in terms of preparation, transition or liminality, and resettlement or reincorporation into a hostland (Turner 1969). In analytical terms, diaspora can be conceived of as a bundle of processes sequentially nested in the geography of mobility as it relates to social status.

While the social science literature is abundant in its discourse on diaspora integration, whether through assimilation or transnationalism, it pays less attention to the prediaspora phase. Furthermore, literature on the prediaspora situation is almost nonexistent in reference to the postdiaspora predicament. Given the crossborder status mobility experienced by immigrants, one may argue that both prediaspora and postdiaspora locate diaspora in a transformative trajectory. Put another way, the status of diaspora does not occupy an immutable or fixed position, since it evolves into different conditions. In actuality, prediaspora and postdiaspora analytically differentiate "diaspora" as a category with its own characteristics, locating it apart from nondiaspora. Yet these notions also evoke the idea of diaspora's possible metamorphosis into a de-diasporization disposition, which consolidates the postdiaspora condition.



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This introductory chapter begins by unveiling the parameters of the meaning embedded in the word "diaspora" before contrasting notions of diaspora with the postdiaspora condition, which lies at the center of inquiry. The chapter then reviews the limited extant literature on postdiaspora and explains not only the meanings of "post" in postdiaspora but also provides a sociological interpretation of the postdiaspora concept. It ends with an analysis of postdiaspora models, including the more recent *cosmonational postdiaspora model*, which is deployed as the frame of reference for the remainder of the book.

## Reproducing Inequality

Diaspora is identified and studied both as a central concept that sheds light on immigrant experiences in hostland countries and as a keyword whose meaning changes or evolves in response to specific historical contexts (Williams 1983; Boyarin and Boyarin 1993; Medam 1993). As a keyword, "diaspora" has been invoked and used as a variable in the construction and organization of modern society (Brubaker 2005: 1–19; Dufoix 2011; Sheffer 1986; Cohen 1997; Safran 1991). Its use not only distinguishes old-timers—those born in the hostland—from newcomers, that is, the foreign-born, but also provides a rationale for the dominant position of the former vis-à-vis the subaltern condition of the latter.

As a transitive concept, "diaspora" characterizes mobile populations, whereas "sedentariness" indicates immobility and characterizes nonmigrant populations (Clifford 1994; Baubock and Faist 2010; Ben-Rafael and Sternberg 2009). Historically, diaspora as a category reflected a context in which sedentariness was the norm, with crossborder mobility the exception, but the world is now experiencing a global transformation in which diaspora—crossborder mobility—has become the norm for a large segment of the world's population, with immobility as the exception (Tololyan 1991, 2005).

A contemporary definition of "diaspora" conceives of it as the condition of immigrants dispersed from their ancestral homelands (Dufoix 2011; Cohen 1997; Safran 1991), specifically people who reside permanently in a foreign country, do not exercise fundamental rights of homeland citizenship abroad, and no longer hold full and active membership in the polity of the homeland. Such a traditional view no longer holds true in the context of the cosmonation, because diasporas are among its demographic components (Laguerre 2013, 2016). Unlike keywords such as

"immigrant" or "ethnic minority," the concept of diaspora has different valences. Diaspora implies dispersion from one's homeland, relocation to a hostland, and either covert or overt attachment to the ancestral territory, people, and traditions.

The diaspora question is first and foremost an emigration issue (homeland), and then an immigration problem or opportunity (hostland). In other words, "diaspora" is understood in terms of its Greek semantic origin as dispersion from the homeland, and postdiaspora in terms of either of reconnection to or disconnection from the homeland. In either case, the reference to the homeland is central in understanding the meaning of the term: a territorially based national population has been dispersed outside its natural and legitimate borders and resettled in foreign territories and countries. In general, countries have developed emigration policies that facilitate the departure of their people to engage in international migrations, while constructing stringent immigration policies with regard to foreigners (see also Joppke 2003).

Furthermore, the emigration question is not identical to the immigration question and requires different sets of policies. In the first case, one deals with one's own population that is leaving the country, while in the other, one is called to accommodate an in-coming foreign population that seeks resettlement while pursuing avenues for legal immigrant status or citizenship. The former finds itself involved in the geographical expansion of the nation and the making of a multisite nation, or cosmonation, while the latter is entangled in newcomers' integration problems.

The use of the term "diaspora" by an immigrant community reveals three issues of importance to its well-being that define its status in society. First, it raises the *membership question,* insinuating that a nonwhite immigrant is not a member of the mainstream community, the locus of power in society, while also providing the rationale for such marginalization. Second, it raises the *identity question;* nonwhite immigrants are placed in this nonmainstream category, and there is no mechanism by which they can enter the mainstream category without being identified as a *displaced minority* within the mainstream community. Therefore, such a displacement highlights an accidental belonging, not a genuine one. Finally, in a time of crisis, diaspora identification raises the *loyalty question*: whether the immigrant is completely loyal and is willing to spy on the homeland on behalf of the hostland, for example, or a lack of loyalty, as in cases where an immigrant spies instead on the hostland on behalf of the homeland.

Each diaspora's meaning is enveloped in a genealogy referring to ancestry and roots in a separate homeland. For the non-European, such a genealogy may be nested in a community in a subordinate position, controlled by a dominant system that balkanizes groups based on race and ethnicity (Laguerre 1999). In this context, not all the diasporas are treated the same way by the majority group or the dominant system. Some are more accepted than others, as is the case with so-called "model minorities" in American society (Cheng and Yang 1996; Ng et al. 2007). What diasporas do have in common is their subordination to a mainstream group, and their structural and identitary location provides no way out of their unequal status. The pervasive use of the diaspora concept, particularly in reference to ethnic communities in the United States, has consolidated the unequal status of an entire segment of the population, largely because of the form of stratification diaspora identification engenders and sustains. Since diaspora connotes foreign origin and ancestral roots abroad, the question becomes: how many generations must immigrants endure before they can genuinely be recognized as mainstream members of the hostland, or will they always be understood in the scholarly and popular literature in reference to their past, rather than their present citizenship status and life condition? (see also Mukadam 2003: 96 and; Mukadam and Mawani 2006: 108). Diaspora may be a misnomer when applied indiscriminately to define first and subsequent generations of immigrants, therefore, providing a scriptural infrastructure and naturalized vocabulary for the reproduction of inequality.

As a keyword, "diaspora" is not a neutral concept to say the least. Indeed, diaspora retains a loaded history full of negative meanings: unwilling dispersion, immigrant, stranger, ethnic minority, refugee, or foreigner. The assumption is that being a member of a diaspora is a form of abnormality, given the traditional view that the natural order is to live in one's national territory (Ang 2005). More recently, however, the term has gained positive connotations, having come to mean an individual with an extraterritorial homeland; a mobile, transnational, or global actor, or an immigrant who contributes to the welfare of the homeland (Marienstras 1989; Dufoix 2003; Ben-Rafael and Sternberg 2009). However, the term still carries an overall negative meaning, because it locates the individual in a box different from that of the mainstream and, therefore, justifies differential social treatment, since such an imposed social position could not metamorphose into a mainstream status (see also Laguerre 1999; Zolberg and Woon 1999). With this in mind, one might argue that the hostland

mainstream community uses the diaspora concept negatively to rationalize the lower than equal status of the immigrant; the homeland uses it to justify denying emigrants access to free state services on grounds that they are no longer considered active citizens of the state and, therefore, are not equal in status to the citizens; while the diaspora community uses it in preference to the immigrant or minority concept, but in so doing, endorses the superior position of the mainstream community and, indirectly, diasporans' unequal status in society. The uncritical use of "diaspora" by immigrants has led to the transformation of the word into a supposedly neutral concept, a term of endearment capturing both the immigrant's connection to a homeland and the cosmopolitan actor status projected.

In contrast, this book argues that diaspora status as appropriated by newcomers is not a neutral category, in that it secures the inferior position of groups of people in society, including the marginalization of immigrant languages, neighborhoods, calendar systems, and political institutions. Like race, diaspora imprisons certain groups in an iron cage, in which they are trapped and unable to exit at will. Thus, referencing oneself as member of a diaspora on a permanent basis legitimizes the inferiority label or antithetic connotation that the meaning of the concept implies in the social practices of Western democracies. Here, one finds a referent that connects both place of origin and inferior status with lack of equality in the hostland. While place of origin is an objective reality, inferior status is negatively assigned and confined to a socially constructed hierarchy of positions.

The meaning of "diaspora" in such a context can be manipulated either by immigrant communities to foster equal citizenship status, as we shall see later, or by the mainstream to maintain the subalternization of racialized or ethnicized groups. In contrast, the concept is not commonly used in reference to the majority, which enhances and reproduces their dominant position in society. Diaspora has become a *terrain of contention* to obtain equality of status, the emancipation of the self, and the practice of social justice. It is so because it is inflated by and conflated with racial categories in its trajectory in any given society. The normative understanding that emphasizes citizenship as a common denominator for both the hegemonic mainstream and the subaltern immigrant provides an alternative way to frame the diaspora question because it accentuates human rights, social justice, and equality of access, instead of foreign ancestry, as its primary site of contention (Rawls 1971; Young 1990).

Considering diaspora as an excluded entity comes out of the dominant sector constructing and locating it in a subaltern position in society through the technology of state regulations, customary traditions, and social practices. Moreover, immigrants and their descendants themselves often routinely and unreflectingly follow this logic, accept this identification and categorization, and redefine themselves as such. In other words, they adopt the rationale of the dominant system and, therefore, contribute to a justification and reinforcement of their subjugated status in society.

While the word "diaspora" has always been used in reference to unwilling Jewish dispersion and their precarious life outside the land of Israel, the term has only recently, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, been applied to all immigrant groups (Tololyan 1996; Brubaker 2005). How and why the meaning of the term has been appropriated by other groups is not the focus and object of this study, though it is important to bring to light the evolution of the reality that diaspora signifies.

Diaspora has a long genealogy that runs parallel with other concepts, but its meaning has only recently merged with other keywords that have been in usage (Dufoix 2011). In relation to the category of the native or mainstream, "diaspora" has always implied the dichotomy of native versus foreigner, and the term "postdiaspora" has perpetuated that genealogy. Additionally, diaspora has a location in the history of the relations between the natives and the immigrants. Different concepts have been used to demarcate the relationship between these two groups, each of which is emblematic of the forms of society in existence, the political and legal structure of whose polity they reflect.

Historically, terms such as "barbarian," "stranger," "minority," "immigrant," "ethnic," and "diaspora" have been precursors to "postdiaspora." The majority of these concepts were imposed by the dominant system for the purpose of subjugating the "other" (Laguerre 1999). Therefore, to understand the reality these terms symbolize, one must revisit such categories and see them as "stigmatizing labels" (Oboler 1995). What's common is the belief that the other is a permanent outsider, despite his or her formal and legal incorporation into the hostland.

The negative connotations implicit in such labels have not gone totally unnoticed. For example, Anjoom Mukadam and Sharmina Mawani (2006: 109) remark, "These labels are unacceptable as they are simply a means of reinforcing difference and go against the vision of full participation and acceptance of all individuals in society irrespective of their ancestry." Moreover, they place the blame on the academic community, which

contributes to the misidentification of this category of persons, thereby undermining their struggle for equality. They note that, "by positioning them as members of a diasporic community, academics are in fact jeopardizing their full integration into their only homeland, the one in which they were born" (Mukadam and Mawani 2006: 109).

The diaspora concept, a social identifier rather than a legal one, is currently applied to all immigrants, reflecting a shift from categorization by the state to self-categorization. In this sense, diaspora is different from the other concepts, which do not imply self-identification. While diaspora is a self-imposed categorization of one's status, the other terms are imposed from above by the state and by customary practices of civil society at large. Unlike all the others, diaspora implies dispersal beyond one's homeland. Postdiaspora is the latest phase in the evolution of the status of immigrants and their descendants, reflecting still another shift from *self-identification* and its accompanying appropriation of diaspora to *self-emancipation*.

As a keyword, "diaspora" is a vector of inequality, that is why the mainstream does not use it as its main form of self-identification. However, in employing the term as a form of self-identification, immigrants locate themselves, not in the mainstream, but in a side stream of society that stands in opposition to the mainstream. The issue becomes, not one of side-streaming the main-streamers, but rather of main-streaming the side-streamers. The following section explains aspects of the trajectory of this subalternized journey.

## Background Literature

Postdiaspora, as a sociological concept, has not yet been adequately considered in any sustained academic debate about its meaning, the circumscribed universe it covers, its operationalization, or to unveil its usefulness as an heuristic device. However, throughout the literature, the word has been used sporadically with different connotations. What remains ambiguous is the significance of "post" preceding the diaspora concept. This book attempts to clarify this based on its use in the literature, as well as the new meaning attributed to it in this analysis.

Christopher Lee (2009) speaks of an "emergent postdiasporic political order" and uses the concept more to frame a question than to provide an answer. He conceives of postdiaspora as encompassing a dialectic between the past and the projected future. In addition, he circumscribes its

meaning to the realm of politics, and therefore understands it in a "specific political sense." Postdiaspora thus refers to the relocation of political concerns from the "transnational black social movements" in the Atlantic world to postcolonial independence politics in Africa. In other worlds, postdiaspora corresponds to a shift in black politics from Atlantic capital cities such as Paris, New York, Kingston, and Fort-de-France to capital cities in Africa such as Accra, Pretoria, and Nairobi (Lee 2009: 144). Postdiaspora is conceived of as a new political order rooted in past colonial experiences—recovered, transformed, relocated, and shaped by the new experiences and necessities of the post independence reality. Lee does not negate the existence of the diaspora, but he relocates its role from center to periphery in the construction of this new postdiaspora political order. Used in this context, postdiaspora is seen as a bridge between the past and the present.

Evelyn Hu-Dehart (2005: 428–439), on the other hand, sees postdiaspora from the perspective of the subject and remarks that it is lived and performed differently by various ethnic groups. In the United States, African Americans "are more invested in dismantling anti-black racism and fighting for citizenship and civil and equal rights in the post emancipation, postcolonial diaspora," while "the Asian-American movement intrinsically rejects a diaspora subjectivity by emphasizing the American in the hyphen" (430, 436). She observes various ethnic groups "easing effortlessly into the post-diasporic moment," which "opens up one more horizon for diaspora studies in a post-diasporic moment" (437). In her view, the African American community has become emblematic of postdiaspora both as a site of protest against racism and subjugation, its members being unable to return to their putative homelands in Africa, as well as a site of empowerment, where they affirm their citizenship rights and challenge the minority status imposed on them. Thus, these individuals fight to be identified by their citizenship status and not simply by their ancestry or ethnic heritage.

David Chapman follows a more restricted meaning of postdiaspora to emphasize location and generation, contrasting the "diasporic first generation" with the "postdiasporic second- and third-generation," characterized by its weakened or nonexistent attachment to the homeland (Chapman 2004: 32, 34). Like Lee, Chapman addresses the political dimension of postdiaspora in terms of power shifts (generation) and location (from place of origin to place of residence outside the homeland). This is manifested in the "temporal shift in power from the diasporic first-

generation community to the post-diasporic second- and third-generation community" (42). Chapman is not the first to exclude the first generation from those who experience the postdiaspora condition. Mukadam and Mawani (2006: 110) earlier argued that "we shall use the term 'post-diasporic' to refer to second-generation Indians who have not themselves participated in any form of migration and are the offspring of those who made the journey." Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking (2011) likewise use "postdiaspora" to mean "second and subsequent generations of immigrants."

While in the diaspora condition, an immigrant longs for emancipation from the hostland and equal citizen status from the homeland, in the postdiaspora condition, the struggle is fought for equal status in the hostland, which is presumed to be a fait accompli vis-à-vis the homeland, or, better put, the cosmonation.

Ingyu Oh takes an evolutionary view of circumstances leading to the postdiaspora posture. Focusing on the Korean-Japanese immigrants, he identifies "postdiaspora" as a locational term that emerges from diaspora, a disposition that prepares one for repatriation. He writes, "the evolutionary trajectory from passive migration to transnational diaspora required a mitigating stage of postdiaspora, a period of building strong institutional support for nationalistic repatriation" (Oh 2012: 666). In other words, the postdiaspora condition leads to repatriation.

Within existing literature, the debate over postdiaspora has revealed an idea as to where such writings might be located in any effort at mapping the geography of literary currents. In this way, postdiaspora literary production is framed as a kind of "transitive literature," that escapes any attempt to study it in reference to a homeland or hostland. In the words of Paul Sharrad (2008: 49), "we can ask now whether there might be a 'post-diasporic,' postmodern literature that escapes/ignores/complicates the hyphenated doubleness of here and there, then and now." The debate over the existence of such a literature and what its contents might be is still under way.

What is challenging to gain from the growing literature on postdiaspora is a definition that both captures and circumscribes the phenomenon. Influenced by the typology of what constitutes a diaspora according to William Safran (1991), Mukadam and Mawani (2006: 109) propose their own set of criteria for defining the postdiaspora, which can be summarized as follows: postdiasporic people are those (1) who have not emigrated from another country and resettled in a hostland, (2) who identify "their

country of birth as their homeland," (3) who exert their citizenship rights in what they consider their country of birth, (4) who have no intention to emigrate to the country their parents and grandparents came from, and (5) who are loyal to and actively contribute to the welfare of their country of birth.

While the characteristics provided above by Mukadam and Mawani are restrictive, applying only to the second and subsequent generations of immigrants and couched within the framework of the nation-state, the alternative definition offered below is more expansive, in that it includes some members of the first generation and is framed within a theory of globalization via cosmonationalization.

Postdiaspora might minimally be defined as the situation of individuals who live in a polity other than that into which they or their parents were born—their hostland—but possess full citizenship rights in their ancestral country—their homeland—similar or identical to those enjoyed by its intramural population. This definition identifies three aspects intrinsic to the postdiaspora condition: living abroad does not exclude membership in the homeland polity; the exercise of citizen rights transcends territory and operates across transnational space; and postdiaspora has a different resonance with the homeland than with the hostland. It includes first and subsequent generations of the group who continue to hold formal membership in the ancestral homeland, despite the hostland being their birthplace. Some countries, such as France, allow trans-generational transmission of citizenship, which makes possible the maintenance of strong links with the ancestral homeland of the group. This form of *transnational dual citizenship*, which allows simultaneous participation in the affairs of the homeland and the hostland, is different from *national dual citizenship*, which permits activation of membership and participation in one country at a time.

## The "Post" in "Postdiaspora"

The "post" in "postdiaspora"—as in "postmodernity" and "postcolonialism"—is a problematic prefix and merits deconstruction to unveil its multiple meanings and explore how it transforms the reality of diaspora through expansion of its genealogy (Dirks 2005). The "post" revalorizes the external factor, residence in a foreign country, which is not viewed as an obstacle to the practice of homeland citizenship. It also indicates the basis for belonging to the homeland polity

because of the rights acquired and used for representation in parliament, electing one's representatives, voting in presidential elections, and accessing state services—schools, social security protection, and agencies of government. Its meaning is fully realized in the cosmonational model of postdiaspora, discussed below. In it, territoriality and extraterritoriality are no longer seen as *sites of differentiation* for belonging—because one can attain citizen status whether one lives in the homeland or the diaspora—but simply as *different sites of performance* of such a status, each with its own constraints generating its modalities of expression.

In his analysis of the meanings of "post" in the terms "postcoloniality" and "postmodernity," Appiah (1992) reminds us of its multiple connotations. In its traditional use, "post" implies "temporal posteriority" (McHale 1987: 5); however, it may also mean "above and beyond." For Hollinger (1995: 5), "'posting' is often a way of repudiating a preceding episode." This contingent of meanings invested in its deployment provides clues to the ways in which "postdiaspora" should be reinterpreted to reflect the condition it stands for. In "postmodernity," the meaning of "post" is also problematic, because the difference between the modern and the postmodern has not been established in such a way as to satisfy critics. In this light, Appiah (1992: 141) speaks of the "lack of any plausible account of what distinguishes the modern from the postmodern that is distinctly formal." Clifford, in his musing over the meaning of post in postcoloniality, also pinpoints its ambiguity. He notes that "post is always shadowed by neo. Yet post colonial does describe real, if incomplete ruptures with past structures of domination, sites of current struggles and imagined futures" (Clifford 1994: 328). Hollinger (1995: 6) adds a distinct meaning to post, explaining that "a postethnic perspective builds upon, rather than rejects, the ethnic."

The traditional meaning of "post" as something that comes "after" does not reflect the full reality that the concept of postdiaspora embodies. It is not a new reality emerging from a tabula rasa but the "post" of completion, in which a preexisting aspiration is realized. Grafting homeland citizenship rights onto the diaspora condition of life outside the ancestral homeland, it calibrates difference to illuminate sameness. Postdiaspora is a component of diaspora the same way that the postmodern is "undoubtedly a part of the modern" (Lyotard 1984: 79).

## Postdiaspora's Constellation of Meanings

Postdiaspora operates in the midst of diasporization, since different individuals and communities are in different phases of postdiasporization. As such, postdiaspora has multiple processes going on at the same time, but at different speeds and with different rhythms. One may achieve postdiaspora in one area of social life, but not in another. Put another way, postdiaspora is like a puzzle: some have reached maturity and others not. The coexistence of diaspora and postdiaspora is a characteristic of the postdiaspora condition, and we need to disaggregate and deconstruct postdiaspora in order to unveil its hidden meanings.

Postdiaspora is an emancipatory move, refuting not the connection with one's place of origin, but rather one's unequal status vis-à-vis homelanders and hostlanders. Furthermore, postdiaspora is the outcome of one's struggle to overcome an imposed status position based on place of origin. Postdiaspora does not mean marginalization in the way diaspora does, but rather difference. It purportedly "deminoritizes" one's status. Postdiaspora conceives itself practicing an extraterritorial form of citizenship similar to the homelanders' representation in parliament and their right of participation in public affairs. Thus, it is the outcome and recognition of full integration into the homeland polity. Furthermore, an individual in postdiaspora identifies herself not as the "other," but rather as a citizen—thereby repositioning herself as equal to both homeland and hostland citizens. Postdiaspora not only relocates diaspora status to a different position but also, through its agency, ties the hostland to the homeland through holding membership in both.

Postdiaspora is studied here first and foremost in relation to the homeland, because it recovers citizenship bestowed by the homeland, which was somehow lost because of foreign residence and the acquisition of another nationality. Yet postdiaspora citizenship can be regained because of efforts engaged by the state (new laws, renationalization procedures). The book focuses and stresses the role of the homeland state in the social reproduction of the postdiaspora.

One presupposes that the state does not remain the same, but has introduced some new structure to make it possible for extraterritorial members, although living abroad, to have the same rights as other citizens and the same access to state institutions. For this to happen, state institutions are pressed to have a transnational orientation added to their mission

and to develop crossborder bureaucracies to meet the needs of this extraterritorial constituency.

The hostland either facilitates or hinders the diaspora's exercise of homeland citizenship rights—by allowing its members to serve in elected office in the homeland while living in the hostland, providing them with special services if requested, funding for cultural programs of the group, or providing protection for homeland elections held in the hostland territory.

The individual also plays a role through his intervention vis-à-vis the state to gain full citizenship. While it is recognized that there is definitely an individual dimension to the postdiaspora condition, the emphasis is on the relationship between the homeland state and the extraterritorial membership in the production of the postdiaspora condition through legal and bureaucratic transformation. Focusing on this momentous change will pave the way to circumscribe the contents, forms, and practices of the postdiaspora condition.

Postdiaspora encapsulates different forms of de-diasporization. One can think of postdiaspora as a set of practices that come about from different mechanisms and through different routes such as *re-annexation,* in which former diasporans have reintegrated the jurisdictional space of the national territory; *return migration,* in which former members of a diaspora now live in the homeland; the *redrawing of borders,* in which a portion of what was until now foreign territory has become an integral part of the national territory; or *cosmonational membership and integration,* in which homeland and diaspora form a crossborder multisite nation, or cosmonation. For this reason, different models are presented herein to contrast each with the cosmonational model that guides the argument, based on data analyzed in this project, that is, the elaboration of the study of the postdiaspora condition.

To understand the novelty of postdiaspora and its relationship with the homeland and the hostland, one needs to differentiate postdiaspora from the diaspora condition. It is important to be aware that diaspora is seen differently by the homeland and hostland. For the homeland, diaspora is seen in terms of *differentiation* (a status different from that of those who are in the homeland); for the hostland, it is seen in terms of *subalternization* (projected as others, rather than natives), which necessarily places them in an inferior category. Postdiaspora, when it refers to extraterritorial residence, does not exclusively mean "outside the state," but rather refers to a site outside the territory of the state, yet still inside the cosmonational space of the state. The hostland and the homeland contribute differently

to the making of the postdiaspora condition. While the hostland provides access to legal status so that immigrants can remain in the country, the homeland provides the legal means for the reintegration of emigrants into its polity despite their foreign residence. In other words, they become located inside the cosmonational jurisdictional space, but not inside the homeland territory.

Yet in the same immigrant community, there may be a cohabitation, with both diaspora and postdiaspora living side by side in the same site. For example, some individuals may have metamorphosed into the postdiaspora status while others have no incentive to do so. For others, postdiaspora status is still in a dormant state, to be activated in time of need. However, what interests us foremost in this project is the postdiaspora condition experienced as a result of actions taken by the homeland that give full citizenship rights to extraterritorial members of the polity. Postdiaspora is conceptualized here to explain that one may experience diaspora as dispersion without experiencing it as a disassociation between one's status and the corresponding life condition.

The argument of this book is that the cosmonational state transforms diaspora into a postdiaspora condition, providing the same rights as well as equal access to state institutions to territorial and extraterritorial citizens, while also recognizing differences in the exercise of substantive citizenship based on foreign residence. Additionally, this study benefits from previous approaches to the diaspora question, identifying pitfalls while pointing to alternative ways of unveiling the order of things. While the assimilation approach emphasizes the role of both diaspora and hostland, and transnationalism emphasizes rather the role of diaspora and homeland, the cosmonational approach used here pays equal attention to diaspora–diaspora, diaspora–homeland, and diaspora–hostland relations as the global context in which to understand the content, performance, and architecture of the postdiaspora condition.

One may consider postdiaspora as an evolution leading the diaspora to this ultimate phase of its transformation or as a set of circumstances that creates such an opportunity for the condition to emerge, whether through ease of transnational migration, cosmonational citizenship, or permeability of borders. Here postdiaspora encompasses not only those who permanently reside abroad, but also those sojourners qualified to be considered diasporans.

The debate about postdiaspora has been couched within two axes: the internal versus the external dynamic. By internal dynamic, I mean the

effort deployed by immigrants consciously or unconsciously to elevate or transform themselves into the postdiaspora status through their relations with the homeland, other sites of the group, and the hostland to achieve a way of life that is not minoritized as diasporic. By external dynamic, I mean a condition prescribed through a set of external circumstances that provide a macro-system conducive to such a condition. These are not antithetical routes, though they indicate which aspect is more of a driving force than the other.

Postdiaspora is a site of contestation against the minority status where immigrants in society are designated as outsiders, which they view as discriminatory in their attempts to secure legal, equal status as insiders. They refuse to contribute to the maintenance of an exclusionary status that demeans their identity and minoritizes their membership in society. Refutation and empowerment are two pillar elements that define the ascription of the postdiaspora in a society.

Postdiaspora, as a distributed category, reflects the conditions of people with different levels of consciousness about the deminoritization of their identity. In this respect, postdiaspora cannot be considered to constitute a homogeneous community, but rather to reflect disparate individuals of the same foreign ancestry. Postdiaspora is a category of practices—not a legal category—through which individuals insert themselves as co-equal in society, thereby rejecting the stigmatized, minoritized other status imparted on them by the rest of society. Diaspora is a space where being identified as "other" is resented, and this social inferiority is even more forcefully challenged within the context of the postdiaspora condition. In this sense, diaspora and postdiaspora coexist alongside each other.

## Postdiaspora Models

One may distinguish four models of postdiaspora in the extant literature: the continuity, rupture, repatriation, and dispersionist models, from which this book develops and adds the cosmonational model. The criteria that characterize the postdiaspora condition are not agreed upon by all proponents of these models. For some, postdiaspora status begins with second generation; others identify no point of demarcation.

The *continuity model* argues for a condition that evolves from diaspora (Prabhu 2007; Veyu et al. 2014; Toh 2014). The accent is placed on the "post" (after) to explain a sequence, the difference it leads to, and the condition it makes possible. Postdiaspora becomes a natural progression

and an outgrowth of diaspora, but not all experiences of diaspora culminate in the postdiaspora condition. This model unveils the deployment of a process and uses one point to assert the existence of the other.

Additionally, the continuity model of the postdiaspora condition refers to individuals or community no longer maintaining contact with the homeland and, therefore, no longer considering themselves to constitute a diaspora, except in symbolic terms, after years of separation from the homeland. This is the case of the Anglo-American group, which underwent a process of de-diasporization, first through adaptation and then through assimilation.

Furthermore, the continuity model sees diaspora as a phase in a development that necessarily leads through assimilation to postdiaspora. In this view, diaspora results from an immigrant's integration into a hostland. The community may either maintain its cultural distinctness or may totally assimilate, which reflects the weakening of ties with the homeland.

The *rupture* or *re-annexation model* explains a situation where members of a community have ceased to be diasporic, not because they have consciously severed their ties with the homeland, but rather because the territories they have occupied have been reannexed to the homeland. They thus find themselves not living abroad, but within the homeland (Wong 2004). In other words, there has been a sharp rupture with the past diaspora—they are no longer living outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state.

The return or *repatriation model* is the postdiaspora situation in which members of the diaspora community find themselves after they have relocated to the homeland, either voluntarily or as a policy of the homeland state (Hettlage 2012: 188–190). The hostland of their choice may not wish to host them; diasporans may return to a newly established state, as in the case of the Jewish Aliyah to Israel; the homeland may choose to repatriate skilled workers after a war to rebuild infrastructure; or individual diasporans may return either after the collapse of a dictatorial regime or simply for personal reasons. The return of diaspora Jews to the state of Israel is a prime manifestation of the postdiaspora condition.

The *postethnic model of postdiaspora* developed by Hollinger (2009) is dispersionist, expressed through "diminution of... communal ties," and assimilationist, facilitated in the Jewish case by the "diminution of anti-Semitism after World War II." Envisioning the postethnic culture of postdiaspora requires understanding the ways of its attachment to or detachment from diaspora culture. This phenomenon is observable

among certain members of the group, or those with "relatively weak or non-existent affiliation with the communal [diaspora]" (Hollinger 2009: 76). Herbert Gans (1979) uses the concept of "symbolic ethnicity," while Hollinger refers to it as "postethnicity," to distinguish such a group from the active diaspora community. In this model, postethnicity is presented as a "liberal, cosmopolitan sentiment" that is deployed based on "affiliation by revocable consent" (Hollinger 2009: 77). This flexible model invokes relations with the host society in its production and reproduction, and is agency-based, pinpointing the role of the individual in crossing such boundaries.

All these models take as their referent the nation-state and attempt to explain the deployment of postdiaspora within the confines of this bounded context. What follows is the presentation of an alternative model that draws attention to the globalization process and expands beyond the nation-state frame of reference to encompass the crossborder space of the cosmonation.

## The Cosmonational Postdiaspora Model

The *cosmonational model* of postdiaspora, which provides a frame of reference for this book, distinguishes itself from the other models in that it does not rely on assimilation to a hostland or relocation to, or repatriation by, the homeland as intrinsic to its deployment. It argues instead that postdiaspora results from the relations between the diaspora and the homeland state, as well as the reconfiguration of the diaspora as inclusive to the nation and the state. Having been granted citizenship status, diasporans become postdiasporans, with the same rights and access to national institutions as homelanders. They may serve or be formally represented in the homeland parliament. Campaigning and voting abroad for legislative and presidential candidates are facilitated, and postdiasporan parliamentarians are able to introduce bills that amend laws applicable to the homeland and/or postdiaspora citizens. Crossborder infrastructure and bureaucracies are created to meet their needs and ensure their constitutional rights. The only difference is that they live abroad, but this is no longer an impediment to the exercise of their full citizenship rights (Laguerre 2013, 2016).

Cosmonational postdiaspora moves the diaspora from its minoritized status to a majoritized status on par with the homelanders. Postdiaspora is thus achieved here through the application of existing laws or through the

creation of a new constitution or through constitutional amendments that recognize the equal status of diasporans—thereby postdiasporizing them. In other words, postdiaspora is a legal disposition made possible by the constitution and the transnational organization of state agencies and institutions. It is put into practice in a cosmonational context. This model further distinguishes itself from the others by its dependence on the existence of a cosmonation, rather than on the traditional nation-state arrangement. This model highlights a situation whereby the condition is dissociated from territorial location. It may be thought of as a practice that results from cosmonationalization.

Though the literature on immigration to hostlands is abundant—shedding light on issues of incorporation, integration, racial encounters, and attainment of citizenship rights and looking at the problem from the standpoint of policies of the hostland and the strategies of adaptation of immigrants—one seldom encounters studies that look at the phenomenon from the emigration standpoint of the homeland (Collyer 2014; Green and Weil 2007; Waldinger 2014). To bring more balance to the literature and enhance our understanding of the process, this book studies the postdiaspora question from the combined perspectives of the emigrants themselves, including their descendants and the homeland, in an effort to understand globalization as it relates to postdiaspora, showing too why the issue is not simply one of integration to a hostland, but also one of cosmonational integration, inasmuch as each diasporan or postdiasporan enclave is part and parcel of a larger cosmonational ensemble.

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CHAPTER 3

# Crossborder Social Protection

> [The state of Ecuador] fights for the gradual abolition of the condition of alien as a transforming element in the unequal relationships between countries.... The state [of Ecuador] shall provide assistance to [Ecuadoreans] and their families, whether residing overseas or in the country; shall provide attention, counseling services, and comprehensive protection for them to be able to exercise their rights freely; [and] shall protect their rights if, for whatever reason, they are deprived of their freedom overseas. Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, articles 11–2, 416, 6–7, and 40, cited in Boccagni 2011a (modified).

Social security has always been an issue of concern for immigrants, whether because they cannot support themselves, because benevolent societies and other forms of nonprofit organizations are limited in what they can offer in terms of poverty alleviation, because the hostland does not have a welfare program or one that includes provision of relief for noncitizens, or because the homeland has not established social security protection for its emigrant population living abroad (Jenkins 1988). Until the second half of the twentieth century, no sending state was able to develop a social security program for its diaspora, both because of the prevailing notions of national sovereignty, which insists that a state cannot and should not intervene in the affairs of another state, and because of logistics in general. Factors include unregistered diasporans, the lack of a



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capability for oversight, inability to exercise fraud control, the nonexistence of a social security system in the homeland, and other issues related to transnational mobility and activities carried out outside the borders of the state jurisprudence. The problem has not simply been helping poor immigrants but also determining on whose shoulders responsibility should rest and cost should fall: the homeland, the hostland, or the individual immigrant.

Even after social security provisions had been institutionalized as a state service, as long as an immigrant remained a noncitizen, she or he was not covered by them (Schoukens 2002). These programs were not intended to prevent noncitizen immigrants from becoming indigent, but for citizens—whether immigrants or natives—who happened to be poor. The rationale has been that citizens, through taxation, help and show solidarity with each other through the social security mechanism developed by the state. In contrast, the rationale for not covering noncitizens is that funds are limited, and that such a practice would eventually serve as an incentive for abuse by unauthorized would-be migrants to access social security benefits (Ball 1978). For the majority of emigrants, noneligibility for homeland social security is still an issue that demands resolution–though France is a rare exception, since it has tailored social security protection for its citizens living abroad through the establishment of a special crossborder institution, the *Caisse des Français de l'étranger* (CFE).

Social security is a mechanism of state intervention, designed to combat social inequalities, promote democracy, provide assistance to the needy, enhance mutual interdependence, and sustain intergenerational solidarity in order to consolidate ties among members of society (Baldwin 1990; Barbier 2006; Blais 2007; Borgetto 1997; Bourgeois 1998 [1896]; Ditch 1999). These are the basic premises upon which social security, as a bureaucratic instrument of the state, functions as both an "assistance" (welfare) and "assurance" (insurance) agency. Moreover, its deployment has been traditionally confined to meet the needs of citizens and others who reside within the territorial bounds of the state, including its overseas inhabited lands, if any (Duleep 1994). Unlike most other countries, France provides social protection to extraterritorial French citizens, treating them as a separate group of contributors and beneficiaries. The diaspora portion of French social security may be said to be enmeshed with the rest of the institution in a *cosmonational cross-border social security ecosystem*.

This chapter looks at the way social security contributes to the rise of the postdiaspora condition and how the cosmonational state caters to the needs of the extraterritorial population by developing an additional

component to the national social security regime. Furthermore, the chapter explains how, employing a crossborder bureaucracy for the delivery of services, social security has linked multiple diasporic/postdiasporic sites to the homeland and to one another. In this context, social security may be seen as a mutual expression of cosmonational solidarity on the part of the homeland and its diaspora.

Taking France's provision of social security to the French diaspora as paradigmatic, the chapter attempts to answer the following questions: What mechanisms does the French government use to provide social security protection to its diasporic and postdiasporic citizens? How does social security reincorporate, reinforce, and reoperationalize the diaspora inside the citizenship and polity structure of the French state? How does reincorporation ipso facto induce a permutation from the diaspora to the postdiaspora condition?

In an effort to examine the issues raised above, the chapter begins by providing a brief review of the literature on the interface of immigration and social security, with a specific focus on diasporas. While the literature is abundant on the delivery of social security services by hostlands to immigrants in their midst, it is quite meager on detailing the distribution of social security benefits by homelands to their diasporans. This, perhaps, has to do with the fact that France is the only country so far to have developed an elaborate, and more or less autonomous, social security agency for its diaspora (France, CFE, 2011). The chapter then proceeds with an analysis of traditional social protection schemes that French diasporans had access to prior to World War II, such as secular benevolent societies and Christian, Jewish, and Islamic charitable organizations or relief services. It explains how, after World War II, French social security was established as a component of the state bureaucracy, with benefits later extended to the diaspora population (Dupeyroux 1992, 1997). Finally, the chapter further discusses how social security has propelled the diaspora into the postdiaspora condition.

## Background Literature

Social security is a topic that generates much debate over its purpose in society. Issues include how it is financed; the factors that can impede or enhance its sustainability; the role that contributors and beneficiaries play in its operation; and the type of public policy, government intervention,

and structural reform that should be adopted to prevent abuses, while ensuring that the needy get help (Ewald and Lorenzi 1999; Galant 1965; Gauchet 2010, Skidmore 1981).

In particular, the relationship between immigration and social security has been studied from different angles. A primary focus has been the consumption of benefits by immigrants, who are often thought likely to deplete society's wealth over time, leaving less of it for future generations. In contrast, researchers have also focused on immigrants' financial contributions to the long-term sustainability of social security funds, mostly through the income, property, and other taxes they pay; on the management of social security funds to ensure efficiency and prevent waste; on the democratic principles and values that social security embodies; on proposed reforms that could save social security; and, finally, on the fact that social security can sometimes serve as means to discriminate by race or gender (Elbaum 1995; Huddle and Simcox 1994: 91; Feldstein 1998; Fox 2012; Koubi 2003; Schieber and Shoven 1999; Pierson 2001; Volovitch 1995; Weiss 1983; Woloch 1986; Barglowski et al. 2015a).

Writing on the interface of social security with diaspora has largely hinged on the social protection offered to immigrants by hostlands (state, civic organizations, religious institutions), with little attention paid to social security accorded by homelands to emigrants (Boccagni 2011a: 210–231, Dias 1995; Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman 2011; Berghman et al. 2005). Such studies emphasize the benefits that eligible immigrants receive, which Martin (2002: 230–231) identifies in the United States as "aid to families with dependent children, temporary assistance to needy families, Medicaid, supplementary security income, and food stamps." Some complain that migrants unduly benefit from and take advantage of social security, contending that as long as they remain undocumented, or if they return home before gaining legal immigrant or citizenship status, they are not eligible for such benefits; others respond that the newcomers in fact contribute to social security funds (Borjas and Hilton 1996: 575–604, Borjas and Trejo 1991: 195–211, Jensen 1988: 51–83).

Much of the literature discusses the potential collapse of social security if beneficiaries were to outnumber the number of contributors (North 1983). Different ways of dealing with the perceived problem have been debated. Some have proposed to tackle the issue by reducing the amount of money given to beneficiaries (Hein 1991) and letting more immigrant workers in so that they may contribute to the funds (Massey 1986). Others oppose such ideas, viewing immigrants as parasites. Conversely, however, the state is urged to be more generous to the least fortunate

(Tienda and Jensen 1986; Jensen 1988). Harriet Orcutt Duleep calls for more accurate ways of assessing "the level and timing of emigration that underlies projections of social security's financial status" (1994) to shed light on whether immigration's role in the management of social security is positive or negative. Seeking "to calculate the current social security balance (a deficit) between contributions paid and benefits received" by the foreign-born population, Donald Huddle and David Simcox (1994: 91) focus on the specific impacts of the legal, the illegal, and those who were granted amnesty.

Besides addressing the preceding themes, research on social security and immigrants carried out in France has its own specific concerns. For example, Claudia Paraschivescu notes that North African immigrant workers in France are often unable to obtain social security, which is earnings-based since, because of discrimination in the labor market, immigrants cannot easily find employment (Paraschivescu 2013: 8). Others stress that governments use social welfare to influence the behavior of immigrants or generate comparative analyses that show differences in the consumption of welfare among different immigrant groups, or between natives and immigrants (Pedraza-Bailey 1985; Hein 1991).

In this regard, research was done on "how immigrants differ from natives in using French social security programs" (Hein 1991: 593). In France, researchers found that the percentage of those who rely on social security for health and retirement needs was higher among immigrants than among natives (Hein 1991: 593). French researchers, like their American and British counterparts, have also discussed resolving the social security issue by raising taxes and augmenting individual contributions (Sterdyniak and Villa 1998), balancing the budget to enhance efficiency (Cornil 1964), and reforming social security to make it more sustainable and enhance the performance of management (Berger 1982; Feldstein and Liebman 2002; Diamond 2002; Diamond and Orszag 2004). Others distinguish *protection assurancielle* (insurance protection) for professionals from *solidarité assistancielle* (solidarity-based assistance) for the unemployed (Bec 2008, 2014: 172; Spitz 2014), stressing an evolution in the way of thinking about the issue from the *logic of national solidarity* to the *logic of the management* of the funds (Bec 2014: 173; Bec 1998; Dreyfus 2006; Concialdi 1999; Dufourcq 1994; Dupeyroux 1960; Dupeyroux 1995; Ewald 2002; Ewald 1996; Bebear 1995).

A search through various digital databases has not produced many published analyses on the portion of social security developed for the French diaspora or on French diaspora use of the French social security

system while abroad. Senator Jean-Pierre Cantégrit, who was central to the development of this policy, offers a descriptive account of French social security in his book *Les Français de l'étranger* (1995: 37–40); more useful are the annual reports on the transactions of the Caisse des Français de l'étranger, with which Cantégrit is affiliated and over which he maintains watchful oversight. In the reports for each subsequent year, one gets to the granular level of the Caisse's mode of operation, contributions and expenses, and disbursements to beneficiaries, as well as the challenges the Caisse confronts in attempting to maintain its current level of operation efficiently. Reports by the *Assemblée des Français de l'étranger* and documents produced by the Caisse setting out the legal framework for its existence help shed light on its operations. This chapter seeks both to fill a void in the literature and to attract other researchers to the topic, which is relevant to multiple facets of the globalization process.

More recently, research on transnationalism has reoriented the trajectory of the debate to include the immigrant as an anchor or provider of social security to family left behind, whether through remittances out of the earnings obtained through employment or self-employment or both (Boccagni 2011b: 318–325, Faist et al. 2015; Bocker 1993; Mazzucato et al. 2006; and Zirh 2012). The concern here is not so much with the hostland social security package, or with social security provided to the immigrant by mainstream institutions, as with the emigrant as a disburser of social protection to family in the homeland via remittances and as a provider of long-distance care to old parents, sick relatives, and small or school-age children (Sienkiewicz et al. 2015; Barglowski et al. 2015b). In this new wave of transnational literature, social security is seen as a combination of informal and formal practices of protection. The informal side is entrenched in human capital networks, while the formal side is performed by government and mainstream institutions of civil society. The two complement each other and may be requested or given either at different times for different needs or simultaneously (Bilecen and Barglowski 2015a; Bilecen et al. 2015b; Bilecen and Sienkiewicz 2015c).

The research literature has yet explored another dimension of the informal and mutual social protection of emigrants, focusing on intragroup strategies linking them back to the homeland and to other sites of the cosmonation (Faist et al. 2015). Particular attention is paid to the complementarity of the formal and informal routes of immigrants' transnational social protection, on transnational delivery of health care, and transnational provision of remittances for educational, medical, and livelihood-related expenses (Bilecen

and Barglowski 2015a). By and large, these studies concentrate more on immigrant agency than on the role of the sending or receiving country in allocating social security to immigrants.

The sending state's provision of social security to emigrants is an understudied and undertheorized area of the literature on international immigration. Instead of focusing on hostland state dynamics in the area of social security for immigrants, the research for this chapter takes us in another direction, examining social protection provided by the homeland to emigrants who live permanently abroad and explaining how the system operates, from the justification or rationalization of the polity and the crossborderization of the bureaucracy to the multiple access points for contributors and beneficiaries. The practice of a homeland state providing social security to its citizens living abroad and developing a crossborder bureaucracy to attend to the specific needs of this emigrant population is not something commonly found among the family of nations or analyzed in the sociological and political science literature. But it is an important factor that reflects the deployment of the postdiaspora condition.

## Social Protection Prior to World War II

Prior to World War II, the French state did not make social security protection available to its citizens residing in foreign countries, the so-called *ressortissants français de l'étranger*. Such neglect was not peculiar to France; this was the plight of all the emigrants around the world. Homelands by and large did not engage directly in such schemes granting social security, and they were also not doing much for the poor at home (Choate 2007, 2008; Gabaccia et al. 2007; Guillon 1981; Hatzfeld 1971, 1991; Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003). In some instances, such as the case of white refugees, the hostland was helpful, treating them as if they were citizens or born in the country—as when the US Congress voted to distribute a lump sum of money to destitute French refugees fleeing either the French revolution of 1789 or the Haitian revolution of 1791 in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Charleston, Baltimore, and Norfolk, Virginia (US Congress 1849).

For multiple reasons, the political context for the provision of social security to emigrants was not yet ripe: the system either did not yet exist or was still evolving in the homelands; fast transportation by air was not yet a commercial reality; the logistics for such a welfare program had yet to be developed; the necessary laws were not yet on the books; and crossborder mobility, transactions, and communication were heavily policed in some

parts of the world because of the Cold War. These factors promoted reliance on nongovernmental forms of social protection, such as family networks, benevolent societies, and Church-based charitable organizations, while at the same time retarding the crossborder legal expansion of social security protection beyond its traditional homeland national and territorial niche.

Unlike French diasporans in foreign countries, the overseas French of the former French colonies and territories have a distinct history, since the implementation of social security evolved there on the basis of standard practices in the Hexagon (Weissbach 1991: 197). France's social protection regulations and customary practices have always prevailed in encouraging similar activities in French colonies or former colonies through financial contributions made to established benevolent societies and direct aid to selected needy diasporans. Formal programs of public assistance developed in the homeland were later introduced in the overseas French departments and territories.

Prior to World War II, emigrants to foreign countries were not in the care of their homeland states, but depended mostly on the generosity of family members and friends for help, sporadically also relying on *diasporic benevolent societies*, which usually served compatriots in areas where there were many immigrants from the country concerned. The formation and operation of such diasporic benevolent societies was the same irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds. These were local immigrant associations whose goal was primarily to care for compatriots and only secondarily to assist others in urgent need. The best known of such French benevolent associations that have left written records were formal organizations with elected officials, membership categories, and meeting periods, which held festive galas or concerts for fundraising purposes (Société française de bienfaisance de Philadelphie 1862; Société française de bienfaisance de Londres 1844). They distributed money derived from membership dues, fundraisers, and personal and institutional gifts to needy compatriots.

The main reason for the creation of a benevolent society among French immigrants was the same, no matter in which foreign country they settled. There was always dire need among immigrants (owing to natural disasters, poverty, unemployment, and epidemics) that called for humanitarian aid. Such benevolent societies took different forms, ranging from informal to formal organizations, from specialized to general purposes. In some instances, they established and operated hospitals, such as the French Hospital in San Francisco, established on 28 December 1851, by the Société française de bienfaisance mutuelle, which cared for poor French

immigrants who came in large numbers to the city during the Gold Rush (Girerd 1976).

A central aspect of this form of proto-social security fundamental in all such structures is *burial social protection*, provided by associations that disburse funds only to provide for a dignified wake, funeral, and burial. Sometimes, such associations are referred to simply as funeral societies. Even if a benevolent society did not provide for anything else, it was always there to pay funeral expenses, allowing the deceased compatriot to exit in decency, if not in style. This was a *devoir de solidarité* (solidarity-based obligation), a term used even today by the French government to justify the rationale behind its financial contributions to the Caisse des Français de l'étranger.

The benevolent society—a nonstate civic model of social security—has long been depicted as a local immigrant association with a local vocation, aiming to care for compatriots in dire need, as other such local institutions would do in other cities. On a closer look, one finds, however, that such societies were also global outposts of the homeland. The operations of the Société française de bienfaisance de Philadelphie and the Société française de bienfaisance de Londres uncover the early global roots of social security and the cosmonational choreography of its deployment in terms of membership, the extraterritorial location of its beneficiaries, and the overseas expansion of fundraising practices.

The *Société française de bienfaisance de Philadelphie* was established in 1793 to care for French refugees fleeing either the French revolution of 1789 or the Haitian revolution of 1791, the latter also being victims of an epidemic of yellow fever, an outbreak of which on Saint Domingue (now Haiti) had killed a large number of the Napoleonic troops sent to the island to crush the slave rebellion there (Ducellier 1997: 1). Arriving in Philadelphia shortly before and after the foundation of the Société française de bienfaisance, these two groups of French refugees were the first to benefit from its philanthropy. Its founders later consolidated the society on the basis of what they had learned from the experience (Société française de bienfaisance de Philadelphie, 1831).

An analysis of the society's activities shows that it had not merely a local but also a global outlook, responding to international events that affected compatriots both at home and abroad. For example, in 1815, when a wave of Bonapartists fled France after the fall of Napoleon to save their lives and sought refuge in Philadelphia, the society intervened in full force to help them. It helped not only the incoming immigrants but also those they left behind. Later, Michelle Ducellier, who studied the society's papers archived at the Balch Institute in Philadelphia, writes, "When World

War I left many French children without fathers, the Benevolent Society was quick to sponsor these children, sending money so that they could remain in school. It helped on the home front, as well, by assisting the wives of Frenchmen who enlisted as soldiers" (Ducellier 1997: 2). This concern for the homeland and for extending help to those in need highlights a global understanding of such benevolent societies. It also shows how cosmonationalization was practiced during this period prior to the information technology revolution.

Such a benevolent society's activities often spanned frontiers. For example, dues-paying members and benefactors of the *Société française de bienfaisance de Londres* lived not only in England but also in France and Belgium (Société française de bienfaisance de Londres 1844). Among the beneficiaries of its assistance, there were both newcomers from France in need of aid for resettlement and old-timers who needed help paying the cost of their return trip to the land of their birth.

In a mission statement explaining its activities and modus operandi, the *Société française de bienfaisance de Londres* provides a good summary of the forms of philanthropic interventions that benevolent societies in general undertook during this period:

> The society's objective is: to assist indigent French in England; to procure, when it can, jobs for those who need them; to facilitate the return to France of those who lack the means to live in England; to make sure that indigent French, assisted by the society, are not at the expense of the country that receives them; to give care to the sick, infirm, and elderly; to grant, in cases of duly recorded illness, and on written demand, to provide weekly in-home assistance, [as] determined by the administrative commission, according to the society's resources; and to grant an annual pension to some poor French, elderly or infirm, selected by the society members (Société française de bienfaisance de Londres 1844).

The Société française de bienfaisance de Londres solicited and received donations from benefactors in France (including French government officials), Belgium, and England. In addition to disbursing funds, it helped unemployed French immigrants find jobs through its network of contacts. Assisting those who were poor and needed immediate help often involved providing poor senior citizens, the physically handicapped, and the sick with a monthly stipend, which sometimes included medical care and medications (Société française de bienfaisance de Londres 1844).

Whereas the nineteenth-century Société française de bienfaisance was a substitute for government social security, the assistance of the post–World War II Société, which may be partially funded by the homeland government, can be seen as supplementary to government social security benefits (Cantégrit et al. 2012: 178–179); it does its philanthropic work as a matter of cosmonational solidarity, seeking, as a strategy of self-preservation, to prevent compatriots from becoming an expense or a burden to the hostland. Compatriots are thus helped to become productive members of the community and, in turn, help others.

The tradition of having French benevolent societies caring for the poor is still well and alive. To make them more competitive and obtain grants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other entities, they now operate as *Organismes locaux d'entraide et de solidarité* (OLES), a name that arose out of an initiative of the *Assemblée des Français de l'étranger* (AFE). In 2011, they received 450,075 euros from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cantégrit et al. 2012: 179). Diaspora parliamentarians have lately contributed a portion of the *reserve parlementaire* to such institutions (Cantégrit et al. 2012: 179). Some see this new development as a conduit through which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is outsourcing part of its responsibility to care for the diaspora to benevolent societies, thereby blurring the borders between assistance by benevolent societies and the government (Table 3.1). In reality, this rapprochement has always been there, but informally and not visible to the eyes of the public. Recently, however, it has been formalized, and therefore made visible.

Providing insurance to the diaspora is a relatively recent phenomenon, but assistance by the state has had a longer history, since consulates and embassies have always sporadically helped compatriots when they could with the means at their disposal (Guillen 1982). In the case of the French abroad, interventions have covered the following areas: "Monthly solidarity allocation; monthly allocation for adults or handicapped children; short-term allocations for individuals who are experiencing a temporary difficult situation (death, divorce, illness); monthly allocation for children in distress; occasional allocation to resolve an emergency problem. For these allocations, the maximum rate is different from the one applicable in France because it is set in relation to the living standard in any given country" (Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, 23 February 2012, cited in Cantégrit et al. 2012: 181, Pretot 1981).

The benevolent society is an association of like-minded philanthropists whose purpose is to be of service to those in need. In contrast, the diaspora

**Table 3.1** French government allocations of €10,000 or more to French emigrant benevolent societies, 2011

| *Country* | *Name of the Benevolent Society* | *Location* |
|---|---|---|
| Brazil | Société de bienfaisance "14 Juillet" | São Paolo |
| Greece | Association Française d'Entraide | Athens |
| Israel | Association Française de Bienfaisance de Tel Aviv | Tel Aviv |
| Italy | Association des Dames de Saint Louis des Français de Rome | Rome |
| Liban | Société Française de Bienfaisance | Liban |
| Madagascar | Association Française de Solidarité de Tananarive | Tananarive |
| Mali | Association Française d'Entraide | Bamako |
| Morocco | Association Française de Bienfaisance de Rabat-Salé | Rabat |
| Niger | Fr'Entraide | Niamey |
| Senegal | Association d'Entraide des Français de Sénégal | Dakar |
| Tunisia | Foyer Familial Delarue-Langlois Tunis | Tunis |
| Tunisia | Société d'Entraide et de Bienfaisance Tunis | Tunis |

*Source:* Rapport annuel, La protection sociale des Français de l'étranger, 2012

or cosmonational benevolent society is a cultural immigrant association with more restricted purpose, primarily catering to the needs of compatriots and secondarily in exceptional cases to others if funds are available. It is a way of expressing solidarity while residing abroad, maintaining the integrity of the group despite immigration of members, reinforcing the ties with the motherland, and consolidating the cosmonation notwithstanding the dispersion of its membership.

If the benevolent societies were emblematic of the diaspora condition prior to World War II, in the period since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caisse populaire des Français à l'étranger and similar entities have emerged as emblematic or reflective of the postdiaspora condition. Whereas in the former period one has a sense of distance, if not detachment, on the part of the state vis-à-vis its emigrant cohort abroad, the latter period is marked by an engaged policy of rapprochement by the state, if not the reincorporation of diasporans into the homeland polity.

## French Emigrant Social Security Protection

In essence, the analysis offered below concerns the integration of the diaspora into the French cosmonational social security system. The whole French social protection system is organized in such a way that

one can, based on foreign residence, smoothly move from insurance based on territoriality—which was until recently the exclusive mode of operation of the national system, geared toward the homeland population (the Hexagon plus the overseas departments and territories)—to the other portion—the *Caisse des Français de l'étranger*, which meets the needs of the diaspora population. Likewise, one may move from the diaspora to the mainland insurance regime, because the former is in continuity with the latter. Different portions of the cosmonational French social security system are in synergy and coordinate with each other, since the cosmonational state regulates and oversees the deployment of each section, establishes the legal norms of their functioning, and polices their everyday activities through the appointment of government representatives to serve as members of their governance boards. The smoothness of the reincorporation from one to the other is seen in the case of those who emigrate from the homeland to take up residence overseas and those who immigrate from the diaspora to resettle in the national territory, where they are then eligible and easily able to join either the metropolitan regime or the diaspora Caisse (http://www.cfe.fr).

According to Cantégrit, Sécurité sociale began diaspora operations in 1965 and extended coverage beyond France's national frontiers in late 1976, when the Caisse des Français de l'étranger was established for the sole purpose of meeting the needs of expatriates (*expatriés*) living abroad for a restricted period of time (students, government employees, transfers), to whom it henceforth provided the same or similar services as those offered to the inhabitants of the Hexagon. Permanent French emigrants to foreign countries (*détachés*), who are not included in the category *Français de l'étranger*, are excluded (Code de la Sécurité sociale, Article D761-6). The system has since improved, reaching out to more people and providing more services, and has become an integral part of diaspora daily life (Cantégrit 1995: 38).

The Caisse des Français de l'étranger is an innovation of the French Republic. An understanding of the general organizational matrix of the national system of social security will shed light on imbrications and points of connection between the architecture of the whole and its diaspora portion, showing how they are tied to each other, how funds move from one to the other, and how a subscriber to one can easily migrate to the other.

Securité sociale has a decentralized crossborder bureaucracy and mode of functioning. Its beneficiaries fall into three distinct groups: the

homeland population, inhabitants of France's overseas departments and territories, and *ressortissants français vivant à l'étranger*. One of its basic tasks is the management of the transactions of recipients and contributors. Its funds (*caisses*) are tailored to meet the needs of different constituencies or segments of the population. One subscribes to the *caisse* for which one is eligible and the level of coverage one can afford. Both basic and supplementary schemes are available to subscribers. Each *caisse* is a private enterprise with a public mission, governed by an administrative board consisting of employer and employee representatives, one of whom serves as chairman, and a director appointed by the board in consultation with the Ministry of Social Affairs (Palier 2000: 116). Like all the other caisses, the Caisse des Français de l'étranger "follows the rules laid down in the *Code de la Securité sociale* and functions under the aegis of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Budget" (Cantégrit 1995: 39). In 1984, it became a financially autonomous institution, subject to an administrative council, the great majority of whose members are elected by the Conseil supérieur des Français de l'étranger.

The cosmonational model of the French social security has two different modes of membership: one for which membership is required (the homeland population) and the other for which membership is voluntary (the diaspora population). By voluntarily contributing to the Caisse des Français de l'étranger, the latter can connect with their homeland's Securité sociale and receive benefits to which all French citizens are entitled.

The *Caisse des Français de l'étranger* has three goals: to prevent loss of rights because of foreign residence, to maintain a permanent linkage with the French social security system, and to uphold continuity of practice with the homeland system so that access to it will not be disrupted or interrupted if and when one returns to live in France, including during temporary visits. It accomplishes these goals by providing insurance services that the national model could not efficiently provide to such a geographically dispersed population and extends such services to individuals and families that the homeland could not routinely reach (http://www.cfe.fr).

Illustrating the imbrication of CFE with the homeland social security apparatus, once a client in the diaspora reaches retirement age, her or his funds are transferred to the *Caisse nationale d'assurance vieillesse* (CNAV), based in the Hexagon. And Cantégrit notes that "overseas French can benefit equally, as if they were in the metropolis, from unemployment benefits . . . .[and], under certain conditions, have allocations for

the handicapped or solidarity allocations . . . paid to them through the French consulate out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Assistance Funds created in 1977" (Cantégrit 1995: 40).

The crossborder bureaucracy of the diaspora social security apparatus is a product of the struggle of diasporans for equality and the initiative of the state in making such a service available and accessible to extraterritorial citizens. The multisite makeup of both membership in the funds and the advisory board indicates the level of participation, reflecting the interdependence and solidarity of the diaspora with the rest of the French cosmonation.

To achieve a level of social protection commensurate with the practice in the Hexagon, the French government has also intervened to facilitate access to employment, professional training, and unemployment benefits for the diaspora (Cantégrit 2011, Cantégrit et al. 2012: 229). It does so by making it possible to subscribe to unemployment insurance, by making available professional training so that job seekers can be competitive on the job market, and by matching prospective employees with employers. By intervening in these areas, the French government does for the diaspora what it has been routinely doing for the residents of the Hexagon, that is, providing them with an opportunity to work—considered to be part of the bundle of citizenship rights. Owing largely to different employment ecologies, however, French government intervention in these domains has not been the same everywhere.

The government intervenes through the Consular Committees for Employment and Professional Training under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. In 2011, there were 32 such committees, whose duty was to match job applicants with employers at home or abroad (Cantégrit et al. 2012: 229). Firms in both the diaspora and the homeland thus have access to French labor around the globe, and unemployed French citizens with the right skills can find jobs wherever a French business is located.

The goal of professional training, whether done locally abroad or in France, is to upgrade workers' skills, making them more competitive and preparing them for the job market. Such training is carried out by local experts or by French professionals brought in from abroad. The Ministry of Labor, Employment and Solidarity is also involved in this scheme, making formal professional training in France available to diaspora through the Association pour la formation professionelle des adultes (Cantégrit et al. 2012: 229).

The ongoing blog of the Association démocratique des Français de l'étranger provides a window on opinions of its cosmonational members about the performance and usefulness of CFE:

> *A North African Case (2012)*. After a fall from my motor scooter and ensuing hospital visits, I received a bill for 1,200 euros and was reimbursed 350 euros. If I were living in France, this would have cost me nothing. I have not even asked for reimbursement for my eyeglasses, because the postage stamp would cost more than what I would get from the Caisse (Lettre a l'editeur, *Français du Monde*, 1/12/2002).
>
> *A Southeast Asian Case (2012)*. I live in Southeast Asia and receive a pension of 400 euros; CFE charges 204 euros per semester . . . .When I asked the consular services to redo the calculations so that I could reduce my membership dues, they requested all kinds of paperwork, and I did not know where to find such documentation . . . .The only alternative I was left with was to drop my affiliation with the CFE. In any case, hospital fees are reasonably modest where I live. The hospital staff do not see the need to stamp a form for a doctor's visit, which costs one euro for a specialist and 20 cents for a generalist (Lettre à l'éditeur, *Français du Monde* 12/2/2012).
>
> *A North American Case*. I had breast cancer and went to France in the hope of having my medical needs attended to. The experience was a frustrating one. They kept sending me from one office to another, on the pretext that it fell under the jurisdiction of this or that. The French insurance I had did not work for me. Finally, I left and came back to the United States, using my American insurance (interview with an informant in California, 2012).
>
> *A North American Case*. I was at the consulate in charge of this case work. The lady had a complicated medical problem. The CFE was able to provide her with some help as regards her medical expenses, but she kept asking for more, and at one point we suggested that she should return to France and use the facilities there. She took our advice, went back home, and stayed with her sister, while receiving different sorts of allocations for her disability (telephone interview with a CFE representative at the French Consulate in New York City, 2012).

The CFE reimburses medical expenses according to legally prescribed norms. In less expensive countries, the full bill is reimbursed. In the Maghreb, for example, where hospital costs are less than what is provided for by the CFE, reimbursement covers the expenses submitted. In North America, however, where health care services are more expensive than what is provided by the CFE, the patient gets less than what is billed.

American residents thus experience a disparity between the CFE's reimbursement and the actual cost of health and hospital care, as do those who use the *Centres médico-sociaux* (CMS) in Africa or the medical facilities of French embassies in Asia, both of which are managed by the Association des Français du monde (ADFE). Because of this shortfall, subscribers are encouraged to sign up for supplementary coverage (Cantégrit et al. 2012, http://www.cfe.fr).

## Social Security for Emigrants

According to Senator Jean-Pierre Cantégrit, the *Caisse des Français de l'étranger* had 105,000 subscribers in 2012, with Morocco having the largest number, over 10,000 (Cantégrit et al. 2012), reflecting the size of the French immigrant and resident population there.

The *Caisse des Français de l'étranger* has its headquarters in the homeland and subsidiaries in hostlands. Different ministries of the homeland government and different sites of the cosmonation contribute to its functioning. Networking ties its various units to one another through crossborder staff recruitment and governance. Legislation was not only necessary to form and operate the agency, and thereby meet the needs of the emigrant population, but also to distinguish whom the law considers as an emigrant, since not all the French living abroad fall into this category. Furthermore, policy is required to cover needs that the Caisse does not meet, as well as transfer to the metropole, should an individual decide to resettle in the homeland. This body of law, which started with the creation of the agency, has expanded to cover other areas to put emigrants on a par with compatriots in the homeland.

Cosmonational agencies take various forms depending on the specificity of their mission, the geographical spread of the emigrant population, and the legal constraints imposed by hostlands, which may restrict areas of operation. The prevalent form the crossborder French agency model takes is that of a headquarters in the homeland and subsidiaries or branches in the areas where the bulk of the extraterritorial population resides.

An innovation worth mentioning is the rise of téléconseiller (call center agent) who dispenses advice or reroutes calls from compatriot emigrants across the globe. Since all aspects of the CFE can be accessed through telephone calls, faxes, or online interactions (Cantégrit et al. 2012: 10), the téléconseiller is a central actor in facilitating its functioning as a cosmonational agency, adding subscribers to the basic social security

regime, upgrading membership, and transferring subscribers from the homeland to the diaspora and vice versa.

The CFE's website is its digital face, informing the public about its policy, the services and programs available, membership categories, application forms, actual benefits, and cost structure, depending on subscription level. The website also facilitates referring CFE-insured clients to partner hospitals and health clinics in France and abroad that have signed agreements and contracts with the CFE, giving them access to the current status of referred patients and helping expedite the process of admission for medical treatment, as well as billing and reimbursement for services provided.

Because of its cosmonationality and the multiple arenas in which it operates, the CFE finds it difficult to control fraud (Cantégrit et al. 2012). This takes various forms. Ineligible individuals may obtain admission to clinics by presenting false information on their status—for example, by claiming to live abroad, although actually resident in the Hexagon. Since dues are calculated on the basis of income, to avoid paying a higher rate, full disclosure of this may not be provided. Claims may also be submitted for services that were either not provided or were provided, but overbilled. In Togo, a country with which France has signed an agreement (the France-Togo Social Security Convention) on the provision of social security to the resident French population, two measures have been put in place to prevent third parties from cashing the social security checks of deceased persons. The *Caisse nationale de Securité sociale togolaise* asks recipients of social security payments to fill out a "certificate of life" twice a year to confirm that they are still alive and a physical visit every 5 years is mandated (Cantégrit et al. 2012).

French citizens can access more than 2,000 health facilities around the globe, but only a few have signed contractual agreements with CFE, and these differ from one country to another (Table 3.2). Thus, it is difficult to verify whether bills submitted are accurate, that beneficiaries needed these treatments, or that services were indeed provided. Verification is complicated, not only because of the number of clients and families that require such services in different countries, but also because of the different modes of operation based on cultural traditions, political instability, lack of modern health facilities, and the fact that most are private for-profit entities rather than public nonprofit institutions (Cantégrit et al. 2012).

Cosmonational institutions do not simply interact actively with their branches and clients, but also form partnerships with other institutions for the delivery of health care to subscribers (Cantégrit et al. 2012). For

**Table 3.2** Medical facilities in Asia and the Middle East associated with the CFE

| *Country* | *Name of Clinic* | *Location* |
|---|---|---|
| Egypt | Dar Al Fouad Hospital | Giza |
| Lebanon | Hôtel Dieu de France | Beirut |
| Lebanon | Trad Hospital and Medical Center | Beirut |
| Thailand | Samitivej Srinakarin Hospital | Bangkok |
| Thailand | Samitivej Sriracha Hospital Sriracha | Chonbun |
| Thailand | Samitivej Sukhumvit Hospital | Bangkok |
| Thailand | Bangkok Hospital International Medical Center | Bangkok |
| United Arab Emirates | Hôpital Franco-Emirien | Abu Dhabi |
| Vietnam | F. V. Hospital | Ho Chi Minh City |
| Vietnam | Hôpital Français de Hanoi | Hanoi |

*Source:* France, CFE, 2012

example, in 2011, CFE signed agreements in Morocco with the *Clinique du Detroit in Tangier* and the *Centre hospitalier universitaire Hassan II* in Fes. The same year, it also signed an agreement with Tongji University's Shanghai East Hospital. Likewise, agreements may be renegotiated or terminated. For example, in 2011, too, the CFE ceased its partnership with the *Clinique Darne on Mauritius* (Cantégrit et al. 2012).

The rate at which social security funds are disbursed differs from country to country. In France, disbursements of funds to the needy are based on a national metric, but payments abroad depend on local standards. One gets more if one lives in a country with a higher standard of living and less in a country with a lower standard of living (Cantégrit et al. 2012). The cosmonation thus functions in an *uneven global landscape,* with a homeland community and extraterritorial communities of emigrants in different countries with different democratic traditions and different national income levels.

## The Uneven Landscape of Social Security

From a practice standpoint, the extraterritorial social security landscape is uneven, because the level of services depends on country of residence, the demographic size of the city, the availability of modern medical facilities,

and cost structure. The fluctuation in the volume of interventions also depends on the level of political instability. Countries that are under going a conflict or revolution are prone to request more help of different kinds than others. So political events and natural disasters tend to aggravate conditions and raise demands for social security protection from the extraterritorial population.

Another factor that leads to cosmonation unevenness is the fluctuation of the population when a society experiences either demographic increase or decrease. Out-migration decreases the number of clients, while in-migration tends to increase demands for social security until newcomers are able to find employment and sustain themselves. Unevenness may also arise from historical factors, as in the case of societies emerging from decolonization (e.g., the francophone nations in Africa).

Finally, the distinction is marked between "developed" nations (including, e.g., Japan and Singapore) and "less developed" ones (including, e.g., China and India). Citizens of the former benefit from levels of social security protection not available to citizens of the latter. European Union countries, for example, provide social security of vastly higher quality than what one gets in, say, francophone Africa.

Social security for the French diaspora has a distributional form headed for the most part by CFE for the insurance portion and CCPAS (Comités consulaires pour la protection et l'action sociale) for the assistance portion. The first is based on dues-paying membership and the latter is a state subvention based on the taxation of the employed and apportionment by the legislature. In addition, the state contributes up to a third of the dues for those earning less than the minimum wage (Barry et al. 2010: 68).

The assistance portion of social security is distributed to different groups of people in financial need, including the institutions that work for and with them. The kinds of aid provided include aid to senior citizens, basic and supplementary disability assistance, short-term allocation, emergency aid, including to those detained, aid for persons in transit without financial resources, allocations to benevolent societies, aid to medical clinics under the management of the AFE, and repatriation assistance. This aid is given in recognition of shared citizenship, and citizens are entitled to it as members of the same cosmonation even when abroad. This is the same logic expounded by the government to justify social security for the diaspora. The stated goal of the government is "to reduce the gaps between the benefits provided to the homeland population and those living abroad" (Barry et al. 2005: 61). Hence, as argued earlier,

social security may be said simultaneously to "de-diasporize" and "cosmonationalize" the diaspora, that is, transform it into a postdiaspora.

## Social Security and Citizenship

Social security does more than simply providing sound social protection. It is a mechanism that materializes crossborder institutional arrangements and money transfer and facilitates crossborder mobility, as well as the rise of the postdiaspora condition. Such mobility through social security makes it possible for a retiree to live either at home or abroad. A homelander may retire outside the territory of the state and continue to receive social security the same way a diasporan can return to the homeland and access the same benefits. Social security eligibility is not based on place of residence, but on citizenship status.

While the preceding section discusses the forms the delivery of social security to the diaspora can take, the following section will reconnect diaspora beneficiaries to the state—justifying the practice and unveiling its foundation. The same criteria of solidarity, citizenship, and equality of access used to justify social security for the homeland—in the case of France, its overseas departments and territories—are also valid for the diaspora (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes 2012). Citizens living inside the homeland were the first to benefit from the state's largesse in the form of social security. Even though place of residence was not the sole basis for this, territory matters. It is not the most important criterion but it facilitates identifying the borders of the state, the citizens within it, and the institutional mechanisms through which social security is organized and delivered.

Three issues are raised here to explain how social security incorporates diasporans into the polity of the homeland: the "citizenship question," which explains the basis for this; the "normative question," which invokes citizenship as the legal basis for it; and the "rights question," which explains how they are expressed by overseas citizens (Marshall 1950, Baubock 1994, Laguerre 1998). These issues must be clarified if we are to understand what makes diasporans eligible for homeland social security, integrating homeland and diaspora in the construction and reproduction of the cosmonation.

Identifying diasporans as members of the national group signals that they belong to the same community, that both they and homeland residents depend on one another to strengthen the common body, that mutual help is a consequence of, or derives from, the recognition that

they belong to the same nation and state, and that the social bond is based on such a common solidarity. Solidarity defines the characteristics of a nation. For many years, the need to express this solidarity among those who lived in the same territory was a given. The same sentiment was not felt as strongly vis-à-vis those who resided either outside the national territory or in colonial territories. Originally, common citizenship was experienced and embodied at the city level; then at the national level; and now at the cosmonational level, encompassing both the homeland and the diaspora.

Social security is based on *national solidarity* as a tax collected from the working population and redistributed to the unemployed. In contrast, *collective solidarity* depends on the subscriptions of members, which make the system operative (Bouget and Brovelli 2002). The national solidarity scheme is manifested in the redistribution of money collected by the state to assist the needy, while in the collective solidarity scheme, which takes the form of insurance, subscribers receive benefits depending on their investment. The contributions of the members are central for its survival and operation. Without the contributions of the participants, it would not function because they are the source of its funds.

This solidarity does not confine itself to the homeland population; in fact, it extends it to the extraterritorial citizenry. What separates the diaspora from the homeland population is both spatio-temporal distance and the fact that they live outside the borders of the state. While once latent because of logistics, such crossborder solidarity has now become overt because of the crossborder extension of the state, and because diasporans participate in governance as a result of the rise of the cosmonation.

Because the diaspora is now viewed as part of the nation, the solidarity manifested among its members is cosmonational as well. Originally, solidarity extended among members of the territorial state; now it extends both between diaspora groups and between the diaspora and the homeland, reflecting the interoperability of the cosmonation. The solidarity embodied in *Caisse des Français de l'étranger* is not limited to the diasporans for which it was created. The Caisse is also an instrument through which solidarity between the homeland and the diaspora manifests itself.

The Caisse is itself part of *Securité sociale*, with subscribers, beneficiaries, and funds interwoven to form the cosmonational system of social security. One can benefit from social security no matter where one is located, since access is determined by citizenship status, not place of

residence. Physical location merely determines which fund one is entitled to access, depending on whether one lives abroad or in the homeland.

The distinction made by Kant ([1796] 1887) between *active* and *passive* citizenship is useful here to explain the reactivation of diasporan citizenship—which justifies one's rights to social security. The diasporan was previously a passive citizen; because of distance or extraterritorial residence, s/he was unable to practice homeland citizenship and was, therefore, unable to exercise the rights and accomplish the tasks required by the state and such a status. The state itself was constrained, unable to supply services at proximity to the diaspora because of the distance that separates one from the other. Once the principle of active citizenship while living abroad was accepted in the name of solidarity and equality, and the logistics of the delivery of services had been worked out in terms of crossborder bureaucracy, diasporans became active citizens. Even more, because the homeland and the diaspora share the same citizenship status and therefore, are eligible for the same state services, any substantive distinction between homeland and diaspora became blurred and less significant.

Citizenship enters the field as a criterion for equal status and access to social security. It is operationalized through the practice of *democratie sociale* by requiring participation of stakeholders in the management of the funds. As Bouget and Brovelli (2002: 168) put it, "the recipients of benefits are also the contributors, within a framework of worker solidarity." Solidarity is manifested in two different ways pertaining to the two aspects of social security: *mutual worker solidarity*, because of the insurance subscribers contribute to, and *national solidarity,* because of the assistance they are qualified for and may receive from the state.

Equality is another principle upon which access to social security is based, inasmuch as it includes all the members of the cosmonation and calls for similar treatment of them under the law. The services offered to homeland residents are also offered to diasporans because they have equal rights, which would be undermined by discriminating with regard to social security. Equality of access is the criterion here rather than equality of condition.

Already in 1967, Perrin conceived of social security as having the role of "restructuring industrial societies into global societies" (Perrin 1967: 315). In reaching out to the diaspora, social security has served as an instrument that further ties all of the French citizen segments of the

cosmonation to each other, consolidating the network of sites that constitute its demographic geography.

Cosmonational social security could not work without a crossborder bureaucracy interfacing with the diaspora to determine eligibility and disburse funds. An entire apparatus has been developed to enable the *Caisse des Français de l'étranger* to meet its obligations (Bec 2014: 71). An advisory board is selected from among the diaspora worldwide and a diaspora senator serves as president of the Caisse. Satellite offices are located in French embassies and consulates, and call center agents in the homeland provide advice to constituents around the globe. These factors are what make France's Securité sociale different from other national social security systems.

Ideally, social security should help create a just and egalitarian society (Beveridge 1942; Laroque 1946: 20). Colette Bec shows how collective interdependence promotes worker security in the case of the French social security model aimed at providing insurance for the employed and assistance for the whole citizenry (Bec 2014: 117, 302).

## Social Security and the Postdiaspora Condition

Postdiaspora here means a change of condition as a result of the equality of status gained vis-à-vis the homeland and the hostland, although it is not fully implemented in social and customary practice but is inscribed in law: as rights, citizenship, voting rights, voting abroad, parliamentary representation, and social security. The following factors shed light on the mechanisms through which the state has relocated the diaspora inside its polity and in the process de-diasporized it, which leads to its emplacement in the postdiaspora condition.

Citizenship is a basis for membership in social security in that it identifies who the constituents of the state are and bestows on them the responsibility of maintaining solidarity among one another (Laroque 1985). The state is in charge of social security procurement, taking control over the process, rather than the family, Church, or benevolent society, as in the pre–World War II era. For example, subscription through active membership contributes to providing supplementary funding to the *Caisse des Français de l'étranger*. Diasporans play their part in this, because their contributions help sustain the process. In so doing, they manifest solidarity vis-à-vis other members of the cosmonational state.

By participating in the program, social security subscribers and recipients express their membership in the cosmonation, solidifying the crossborder

form of the nation. The state, by acknowledging social security for emigrants as its responsibility and by establishing an agency and mechanisms to make it operational, has given social security a crossborder identity and has relocated subscribers and potential beneficiaries inside the polity and citizenship structure.

What social security for diaspora does is shift a frame of reference from the national to the cosmonational, which is now the enlarged cadre for its intervention. In the French case, it was not simply a matter of adding a new Caisse, but rather of proposing or dictating a different mode of relations between the various segments of the citizenry. The cosmonation is the new context in which these relations occur, and in which their outcome can be deciphered. The cosmonation is a scale, albeit not the exclusive scale, at which social security can be studied. In this light, one might argue that the cosmonation helps us understand the logic of the deployment of social security benefits from the nation to the cosmonation. Social security is both a key variable that translates status from the diaspora to the postdiaspora condition and a key test of the theory or explanation advanced here, since access to it implies that extraterritorial citizen status is not an issue.

Although social security clarifies the issue of place of residence and does not consider it an obstacle for membership as a citizen, extraterritorial residence may yet have secondary consequences. For example, diasporans may not be able to play an active part in the homeland polity because the logistics are not available. By providing such logistics (e.g., laws that allow citizens to vote abroad, diasporic parliamentary representation), the state reassigns membership in the polity to diasporans despite their location. They thus become postdiasporans.

In the case of social security, the postdiaspora condition is experienced by diasporans, not only through the reacquisition of rights, but also through renewed participation in the democratic rituals of the state, empowering their extraterritorial citizenship, recognizing their contribution to making the nation a cosmonation, and redefining their relations to the crossborder collectivity. This new status generates a cosmopolitan outlook.

The postdiaspora perspective differs from that of the nation-state—the traditional way of framing issues of security. The postdiaspora scale allows new insights into the relations between the components of the polity and the power geometry of the ensemble. There is a shift from the national or transnational to a cosmonational scale that further emphasizes

crossborder relations within a global community. Thus, postdiaspora is not simply a way of life or a status position, but a scale by means of which one apprehends a new sociogeographical reality.

The postdiaspora condition changes the directionality of discourse and analytics of interactions. In it, the homeland is no longer theorized as the immutable center and diaspora as the periphery. Rather, the two are conceived as nodes in a larger network, where people compose and pick their center differently, and different moments bring the peak or decline of a socially constructed center. Such a malleable network differently influences different nodes, and as nodes are valuable for different reasons, they contribute differently to the well-being of the network.

## Conclusion

Prior to World War II, the majority of overseas French were established in the French colonies, and very few resided in foreign countries. Social protection in the colonies was provided by secular benevolent societies and religion-based charitable organizations. In metropolitan France, social protection by nonstate entities was superseded in the 1880s by Assistance publique, a government intervention program established to help specific groups of people in need (sick people, women with children, and senior citizens) (Catrice-Lorey 1982, 1995; Gibaud 1986; Renard 1995: 30–46; Rivero 1985).

In the French case, social security for compatriots abroad did not evolve in phases until it reached its modern form. Rather, there is a history of multiple schemes providing social protection for members: first, the family, whether nuclear or extended; then, before state-regulated mutual assistance, diasporic organizations such as benevolent societies; and, finally, modern, state-endorsed social security.

The history of social protection reveals commonalities in the homeland and the diaspora with regard to the ways in which funds are distributed, the humanitarian profiles of social security's founders, the reasons for which protection is approved, the length of time for which it is provided, the characteristics of the beneficiaries, and the sources of funding (individuals, companies, interest on investments, state, associations, fundraising, consulates, and gifts of money or property).

Social security for diasporans has evolved through different mechanisms (Yeates 2009). Different benefactors have provided different forms of help. Historically, the Church provided hospitals, housing, and free schooling, including scholarships to attend religious schools. Benevolent societies

offered food, companionship, and financial aid, including funeral expenses. Mutual insurance provided assistance in cases of unemployment, illness, the need for repatriation, and death. Today, the state intervenes both directly by providing welfare and insurance in its different forms—health, maternity, pension, accident, and unemployment benefits—and indirectly by subsidizing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that meet the needs of poor people.

Social security expresses the reality of shared citizenship, a hallmark of the postdiaspora condition, which, as this chapter has shown, is a hallmark of the cosmonation. The postdiaspora condition is made possible by acquisition or reactivation of citizenship, via incorporation or reincorporation. It is sustained by crossborder infrastructure and institutions that support its operations and is choreographed by emigrants and their descendants, giving it its distinctive cosmonational geographical and spatial contours. Diasporans are among the actors in its transfrontier interactional public sphere, contributing to the production of its crossborder hybrid cultural identity.

Practices undertaken by entities in the homeland to support compatriots in hostlands or by individuals in hostlands to support family members in the homeland constitute "transnational social welfare" (Yeates 2008; Boccagni 2011a, 2011b). This reduces the scope of support to homeland–hostland relationships, ignoring the broader diaspora-postdiaspora nexus. This relationship cannot be ignored without a cost, however. Assisting a family member in another diaspora location may reduce the amount one is able to remit back to the homeland. Conversely, assistance from several diasporic sites may augment support of a homeland household.

Diasporic benevolent societies constitute another means of social protection, and their membership tends to comprise people of the same ethnic group or ancestral heritage

The cosmonational eco-system of social security protection provided by state intervention with an insurance and assistance package is highly complex. Much has been said about the operation of social security at the national level (see, e.g., Sabates-Wheeler and Macauslan 2007), but further research is needed into the *portability* question (Can I continue to use the benefits I acquire in the homeland in the hostland after my resettlement abroad?), the *importability* question (Am I entitled to homeland benefits, given that I no longer live there?), and the *exportability* question (Will my years of service abroad count toward my benefits when I return home?). This chapter more precisely attempts to identify and circumscribe the question of emigrant social security and redirect attention to the cosmonational form of societal organization it feeds and the postdiaspora condition it engenders and sustains.

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CHAPTER 4

# Transnational Schooling

A nation's schools and students may be spread over more than one country, creating entanglements that are experienced in the mobility of personnel, goods, information, and best practices among them. With territorial and extraterritorial schools embedded in a supranational network, understanding what goes on in any one school requires paying attention to the others in the network. However, transnational administrators, educators, and student activities serve to link any one site to all the others, with digital communication facilitating interactions among them. Operating on the basis of a set of cosmonational policies, a crossbordered network of school ecologies of this kind is sustained by cultural attachment to the common ancestral homeland and its cultural traditions.

The French national educational system makes provision for the extraterritorial schooling of French citizens abroad, with a crossborder bureaucracy providing infrastructure to support the rise, sustenance, and social reproduction of postdiaspora conditions:

> An education that conforms to French programs is dispensed overseas in elementary schools, grammar schools, and high schools that are officially approved by the Ministry of National Education. These 'academic establishments of French education overseas' form a network more extensive than any other in the world .... French education overseas permits French children living outside of France to receive similar schooling to those living in France. Notably, they follow the same programs and pursue the same



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> diplomas. Children whose parents are led to live in successive different countries can nevertheless follow a coherent educational path from nursery school to their final year [in high school]. (France, AEFE, 2011).

Extraterritorial schooling involves, first, *cosmonational educational expansion,* assigning teachers, exporting the homeland curriculum, and taking charge of the creation and maintenance of the infrastructure of such educational facilities. Second, there needs to be *cosmonational standardization*, with schools regulated to create a harmonious common curriculum, promote intergenerational transmission of the French language, culture, and values, and ease transnational mobility between schools. Third, *cosmonational networking* must connect personnel of the Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger, under whose aegis the schools function, with the overseas teachers it appoints, the staff administrators it hires, and elected members of the diaspora who support the goals, agendas, and curricular activities of extraterritorial French schools for compatriots abroad.

## Background Literature

The conceptual shift from canvassing diaspora-homeland relations within the nation-state context to the framing of their entanglements within the parameters of the cosmonation changes the nature of the object of study. As a result of this permutation, diaspora status needs to be reproblematized because of the transformation brought about by immigration and nations rebounding as cosmonations. This chapter explains how the cosmonationalization of the French educational system has been a pivotal factor in the operationalization and choreography of the postdiaspora condition.

Cosmonational education is equivalent to neither "international education," as traditionally understood, nor the "transnational education" of recent literature. Rather, it gives individuals belonging to the same cultural group access to similar curriculums, socializing them in the language, culture, and values of the homeland, notwithstanding the distance that may separate them from it.

The literature on international education focuses prominently on higher education, referring to the phenomenon "in which the learners are located in a country different from the one where the awarding institution is based" (UNESCO/Council of Europe 1999, 2000). What

Knight (2008) finds distinctive and stresses about crossborder education is its reference to "the movement of education (students, researchers, professors, learning materials, programs, providers, knowledge, etc.) across national/regional jurisdictional or geographical borders." Such a characteristic is not often used to describe elementary or secondary education, but in the context of postsecondary or university education. In this light, different concepts such as "borderless education,"(Cunningham et al. 2000) "crossborder education," (Knight 2008), "international scholarship programs" (Perna et al. 2014), "borderless higher education" (Davies 2001), "transnational higher education" (Huang 2003; Mok and Xu 2008), and, in reference to the information technology revolution, "cyberschool" (Jones 2000) or "global e-learning" (Van Der Wende 2003) are used to identify what international education does. This literature does not theorize international education in terms of government reaching out to its diaspora abroad or foreign countries to meet its foreign policy objectives, but rather sees it as an entrepreneurial activity undertaken mostly by nongovernmental entities to maximize profit.

Researchers do not always conceptually distinguish between international and transnational education, as these concepts are interchangeably used in the context of the "borderless university" (Adams 1998; Eldridger and Cranston 2009; Jones 2001; Leask 2001; Sadiki 2001; Waters and Brooks 2011; Brooks and Waters 2011; Lewis 2005; and Waters 2008). In this literature, internationalization is viewed in terms of "transnational educational courses and services being offered to partner institutions around the world usually in offshore campuses" (Feast and Bretag 2005: 63). In other words, scholars interpret the rise of this phenomenon as related to the logic of the market, where "the pursuit of profit is a key aspect of transnational education" (Feast and Bretag 2005: 64).

The literature further concentrates on issues pertaining to the beneficiaries of crossborder education, the range of providers, sources of financing, problems with accreditation, and regulation policies (Knight 2008). Some analysts attempt to explain the proliferation of international education delivery services by identifying a number of internal and exogenous factors including the growing number of secondary school graduates, the expanding middle-class demand for such services, and the incapacity of governments and local institutions to meet the educational needs of the citizenry (Knight 2008). These forces are believed to open new markets, and profit-oriented educational institutions fill the void either by attracting such students to their campuses or by establishing offshore campuses.

Within the debate over international "academic recruitment and mobility," emphasis is placed on the denationalization of the professional culture of the university. For example, Kim (2009) points to the situation in the United Kingdom where "27% of all academic staff appointed in 2005/06 were non-UK and, in the University of Oxford, almost 50% of recent academic appointments went to foreign nationals." This trend is not peculiar to England, but is pervasive in institutions of higher learning worldwide.

The literature further addresses, on the demand side, the causes of "higher education export," discussed in terms of insufficient numbers of universities in relation to high demand by students, the diversity of offerings provided by transnational educational institutions, the demographic increase in the number of students of university age, and the inability of postsecondary schools in developing countries to absorb this surplus. On the supply side, the debate concentrates on international competition, fueled by the opportunity for university expansion. In this context, several types of international education are discussed in the literature. Traditional universities interested in teaching and research are contrasted with private corporations interested in the delivery of services and market expansion. Transnational education is considered as a "marketable service," with different types of mobility envisioned and practiced. Comparisons are made between students in and out of these programs, and their outcomes, international exposure and networking. Fluency in English and complementary education are taken into account, as are the export of faculty, staff, and programs to the students' country, the import of students to the supplier's country, or joint partnerships with different arrangements.

Transnational education encompasses the education of individuals from different countries attending educational institutions outside their countries of origin; institutions providing instruction from abroad; individual programs from abroad; and institutions developing joint programs at home or abroad to meet the needs of international students. Most developed typologies concern different forms of transnational education, such as "articulation," "branch campuses," "corporate programs," "franchises," "online learning and distance education programs," "study abroad," and "twinning," or joint programs or partnerships (GATE 1999; Huang 2003; Mok and Xiaozhou 2008; Eckel et al. 2004; Sidhu 2007; Mcburnie and Pollock 2000 ).

Some analysts distinguish international education from transnational education and see the former as an initiative to enhance the curriculum of the university. As such, it is viewed as a top-down approach to

complement students' education by exposing them to initiatives developed for that purpose. For example, Altbach and Knight (2007: 293) note that "campus-based internationalization initiatives include study-abroad experiences, curriculum enrichment via international studies majors or area studies, strengthened foreign-language instruction, and sponsorship of foreign students to study on campus." Other researchers concentrate on spelling out the characteristics of providers of international education (Davies 2001: 28). For this purpose, one distinguishes the traditional university from regional consortia, corporate providers from partnerships between universities and corporate providers, and innovative distance/virtual universities in the public sector from private universities or consortia bases for out-country providers (Davies 2001: 31–40).

Some researchers nonetheless stress problems encountered by students who participate in these programs. For example, they emphasize "problems relating to language acquisition and proficiency, social isolation and loneliness, inadequate finances and incomes, labor market and workplace discrimination, and experiences in relation to personal safety" (Deumert et al. 2005: 330). Others prefer to focus on issues of regulation of transnational education (McBurnie and Ziguras 2001).

Initiatives designed to provide students with more international exposure have been developed by universities and are often referred to as "student exchange, study abroad, cultural exchange, and international educational exchange programs" (Perna et al. 2014: 63). The rationale behind these programs is correcting what is missing from the training of undergraduate students by offering them an opportunity to take foreign language and area studies classes, interact with visiting foreign students, and spend a semester or year studying abroad.

## Immigrant Transnational Schooling

The bulk of the literature on immigrant schooling is couched within the nation-state context and uses assimilation theory to explain how race, gender, class, and national origin impact learning outcomes, whether negatively or positively; for example, how racial discrimination leads to less than optimal academic results because of the additional obstacles encountered by students (Suarez-Orozco et al. 2008; Arzubiaga et al. 2009; Gandara et al. 2009; Lukose 2007). In regard to national origins, Ogbu and Simons (1998) have discussed how immigrant students tend to

do better in school than non-immigrant minorities because of their higher level of motivation to obtain high grades.

Such concepts as acculturation, integration, or assimilation have been used to explain the trajectory of immigrant students in the United States. (Clauss 2010; Suarez-Orozco et al. 1995; Rumbaut et al. 1995) The aim is to develop policies that facilitate the learning process. In return, students are expected to motivate themselves to succeed in school. The literature on education and assimilation has a limited scope: the nation-state parameters (Coleman 2003). The alternative—transnational model—presented below sees the need to incorporate the best homeland and hostland educational practices into the curriculum, thereby providing students with the skills necessary to compete for jobs, whether in the homeland, the hostland, or other countries.

Within the literature on immigrant schooling, the study of transnational education has recently been a point of attention as a result of a shift of perspective from the mobility of elites and capital to the mobility of individual practices (Sklair 2001; Basch et al. 1994). Now the interest is in understanding how transnational schooling embeds itself in the place of origin and residence, and how students, teachers, and schools use homeland educational materials and experiences to improve and enhance immigrant school practices in the hostland (Greenholtz 2000; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Levitt et al. 2002). In the transnational approach, homeland experiences are invoked to facilitate the learning process in the new place of residence.

Transnationalism then relates diaspora enclaves to the homeland to explain the interaction between both, follows the paths of crossborder connections of all kinds, identifies communication flows, signals commercial exchanges, unveils political interventions, deconstructs remittances sent or received, and pinpoints the mobility of actors (Vertovec 1999; 2004; Gamlen 2008; Khagram and Levitt 2008; Laguerre 1998). Transnational immigrant education is understood in the context of this crossborder entanglement, developed in reaction to assimilation theory, which encapsulates immigrant schooling within the boundaries of the nation-state. In contrast, transnationalism reveals the immigrant learning process to be a continuum encompassing both the place of residence (hostland) and the site of origin (homeland). In other words, transnationalism considers the homeland as a point of reference in the learning process of immigrant students in the hostland. Unlike assimilation theory, which downplays or ignores the importance of the homeland and instead

stresses acculturation to the hostland as the best strategy to achieve educational success, transnationalism understands a diaspora's connection to the homeland as capable of speeding up the process of the social production of the global student to navigate the global world.

Transnational education has been studied at three levels, focusing on student experiences of transnational lives, the use of homeland practices to help students navigate the educational system, and the transformation of the learning structure to induce school operators to pay attention to students' transnational experiences and to develop adequate pedagogical instruments (Sanchez 2007; Suarez-Orozco et al. 2011).

## Cosmonational Education

While the topics and debates referred to above give a sense of the literature and the meanings of transnational education in the nation-state context, there is no parallel literature available yet on postdiasporic cosmonational education. Although they share some similar features, their orientation and mode of organization are different because they are set up to accomplish different goals. *Transnational education is a crossborder practice geared mostly to enhancing and facilitating the learning experiences of immigrant students; cosmonational education is a service provided to people who share the same ancestry or belong to the same ethnic or cultural group for the purpose of their socialization in their common culture and traditions and attachment to their common values and ancestral homeland*. In both, the transmission of knowledge is paramount, but an added value in the second is that it is done to socialize students into the cosmonational culture, values, and citizenship practices of the group.

Whereas transnational education is a product of the nation-state system, it is the rise of the cosmonation and the cosmonational state that produces cosmonational education. In the case of the first, one speaks of the role of the homeland school experience in the learning process of immigrant students; in the second, one refers to similar curriculums used in extraterritorial school facilities for students of same ancestry resident in different countries around the globe.

Cosmonational education is not a new phenomenon. The model of developing or coopting satellite schools abroad was already in existence during the colonial era (Froidevaux 1900; Gordon 1963; Johnston 1971). Colonial schools created by the metropolitan administration were intended for the schooling of the children of the white population and

followed curricula similar to those used in the homeland to prepare equivalent students for secondary and postsecondary schools (Roussier 1930; Mayhew 1938). In the colonies and protectorates, one of the goals and perhaps the main rationale for the creation of such schools was that they would serve as a source for recruitment of local colonial bureaucrats and administrators. Perna et al. (2014: 63) remark that even "in the early twentieth century, some nations established overseas study abroad programs to train the administrative elite of their colonies."

Through cosmonational education, the state invests in education, not only for those who reside in its territory, but also for its extraterritorial population. Conceptually, this includes the crossborder expansion of the schooling apparatus and bureaucracy to diaspora communities; the crossborder agency that sustains the operation of that system; the transfer or secondary migration of instructors, staff, and students; and the use of the same curriculums throughout the cosmonation. All this is choreographed by a bureaucracy, whether centralized or distributed. The resulting crossborder educational ecosystem promotes a cosmopolitan way of life for emigrants and their descendants after they have been reincorporated into their ancestral polity.

The cosmonational educational ecosystem adapts to meet specific needs of each local school, which enrolls not only students from the ancestral cultural group but also local students, and hires local teachers and staff administrators when needed. Local topics are added to the curriculum so that extraterritorial students will not feel alienated from the social environment of their place of residence and will be better prepared for the local, homeland, and global job markets, characteristics shared with non-cosmonational forms of transnational education.

## Framing the French Schools Abroad Question

The French schools abroad network administered by the *Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger* (AEFE), headquartered in Paris, does not, as some analysts believe, concern only the extraterritorial French population. It is an integral portion of the *French cosmonational education model*, shaped by its embeddedness with homeland schools in terms of curriculum content, access to qualified teachers, and acceptance of diplomas for admission to French universities. AEFE's educational practices closely resemble those in the homeland, facilitating the seamless migration of teaching staff and students from an extraterritorial school to

one either in the Hexagon (i.e., European France) or in any of the overseas French departments. Both French diaspora and homeland schools are regulated by French laws and function under procedures established by the Ministry of Education. The French cosmonational educational model is thus composed of two segments, one established for schools in the French territories (the Hexagon and the overseas departments) and the other for the extraterritorial population. One can rightly argue that by controlling the production of extraterritorial schooling, the French state seeks to sustain and reinforce this aspect of the crossborder dimensional life of the cosmonation, which consolidates the crossborder landscape of the cosmonation.

France is not the only country to have developed a worldwide extraterritorial educational operation for compatriots abroad. Germany, Spain, and Italy have similar models. Table 4.1 provides a comparative profile of practices in terms of the number of students accommodated, the government agency in charge of the mission of governing the activities of the network, public school financing, personnel recruitment, and oversight of the curriculum.

To further understand how the postdiaspora condition is expressed and experienced in the context of compulsory education, this chapter analyzes the way in which the schooling of French students residing abroad is organized, showing how the state exerts crossborder jurisdiction through the policing of curricula, the purchasing of school terrains and buildings, the management of promotion and salaries, and oversight over recruitment and transfer of staff.

## The Evolution of French Extraterritorial Schooling

The French colonial school system, developed and implemented by the central governmental administration in the Hexagon, operated "in the image of the French metropolitan [educational] system" (Kateb 2014: 83) for the purpose of attending to the academic needs of French students living in the colonies or protectorates (Ayachi 2003: 24). In the words of Kateb (2014: 83), it "also functioned under the rules, norms, and laws defined by the French parliament for the students attending school in France." Furthermore, these colonial schools had the "same programs, same schedules, same academic contents, same curriculum, same exams, [and] same holidays" as those used in schools in metropolitan France (Jouin et al. 2001: 26). In Algeria, for example, the most prominent

**Table 4.1** Comparative extraterritorial educational practices: France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, 2012–2013

| *9* | *France* | *Germany* | *Spain* | *Italy* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| # of students | 320,000 (2012–2013) | 79,500 (2012–2013) | 40,114 (2012–2013)<br>37,763 (2002–2003) | 31,000 (2012–2013)<br>29,526 (1999–2000) |
| Responsible Authority | AEFE (Agency for French Education Overseas), under the guardianship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Cooperation | ZfA (Central Service for Foreign Education) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Ministry of Education in coordination with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Missions | -schooling nationals<br>-schooling non-nationals<br>-transmission of language and culture | -schooling nationals<br>-schooling non-nationals | -schooling nationals<br>-schooling non-nationals<br>-maintaining cultural links | -schooling nationals<br>-schooling non-nationals |
| Implementation methods and status of establishments | 488 establishments:<br>-75 under direct control (EGD)<br>-156 government regulated<br>-257 partner schools | 141 establishments:<br>-51 offering national diplomas<br>-66 offering binational diplomas<br>-24 with German supported courses | -22 with state schooling<br>-2 joint or former state schools<br>-94 Spanish sections in foreign schools<br>-13 collaboration agreements<br>-19 groups outside of school | -22 with state schooling<br>-131 private schools with state recognition<br>-76 bilingual sections in foreign schools |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financing for state schools | -schooling rights<br>-financing of EGD and government regulated schools (up to at least 44%) | Before 2014:<br>-schooling expenses<br>-private equity<br>-possibility of subsidy each year based on demand<br>Starting in 2014:<br>-schooling expenses<br>-private equity<br>-possibility of a 3-year subsidy | In state schools:<br>-free according to the same rules as in Spain<br>-payments from non-Spanish students<br>-contributions for both categories of students for extra services and activities | |
| Subject Matter | -education conforming with official French programs | -education in German with the goal of obtaining a German or binational diploma | -regulated education<br>-mixed education combining Spanish and foreign systems | -education conforming with the Italian system for state and state-recognized schools |
| Recognition of Diplomas | -equal to diplomas from French counterpart schools | -exclusive preparation for diplomas recognized by the Permanent Conference of Education and Cultural Affairs Ministries | -equal for diplomas from state schools<br>-equivalency for diplomas from schools with collaboration contracts | -equal for state and state-recognized schools |
| Personnel | -civil servants in EGD and government regulated schools<br>-contractors in partner schools | -civil servants and contractors | -civil servants and contractors | -civil servants and contractors |
| Relations with national representatives living abroad | -local scholarship commissions | | -consultation with local Spanish councils about groups that meet outside of school | |

*Source*: France, Senate 2013: 12–15

colonial schools were known as "écoles ministérielles," a name that unveils the metropolitan government agency that creates, sponsors, and oversees their functioning. In other colonial settings in which the French empire had not yet established such schools, it delegated this educational function to Catholic missionaries with the policy goal of producing French colonial subjects (Capelle 1990: 18, Matari 2014: 38–41, Prudhomme 2004; Lallemand 1992).

French colonial policy was geared towards imposing the French metropolitan educational system by way of extending its services to the colonial population (Ayachi 2003: 23, Barthelemy 2010; Seck 1993; Segalla 2012; Thao 1995). To accomplish this mission, a ministry of government (Ministère des Colonies, Ministère de la Guerre, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique, Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, or Ministère de l'Education) was bestowed the responsibility to oversee the functioning of the colonial educational network (Capelle 1990: 43–44). In that capacity, it had control over accreditation, curriculum contents, school administration, hiring, promotion, salaries, and faculty and staff transfers (Jouin et al. 2001: 24–27). As a result, the school system in European France and colonial France owed their existence to the same metropolitan government; this further reinforced the ties that existed between both educational networks during the colonial era. All in all, French colonial schools derived their raison d'etre, coherence, and survival from their attachment and dependence on the metropolitan administration.

Cosmonational schooling of today emerges out of French colonial practices and, as a consequence, many of the features of the latter are found in the deployment of the former. Although both evolve in different contexts–in the colonial case, the schools and students were operating and living in French territories, and in the present situation, one is dealing exclusively with diasporans and postdiasporans living in foreign countries—they exhibit nevertheless similar characteristics such as the control of curriculum contents or oversight of school administrative and pedagogical practices by the Ministry of Education of France; an education provided to meet foremost the needs of French students living inside or outside the geographical boundaries of European France; and the mobility of teachers, staff and students from any site to another within the cosmonational network.

There is a developmental history to unveil in attempting to explain the crossborder organization of the extraterritorial French educational system, reflected in the central role played by AEFE in the network

governance of diaspora schools. At first, the French educational system had a national focus, because the great majority of the population resided in the French territories (homeland and colonies). In contrast, the silent diaspora constituted only a very small portion of the population and their plight was often unknown by design, or otherwise neglected by the metropolitan government. As a matter of fact, the education of the extraterritorial French children was left to the private sector (congregational schools, civic associations, individual initiatives) and also to the hostlands where they resided (Kiemen 1960). Up to World War II, the Ministry of Education was well entrenched in its double mission to provide both educational facilities and services to French students in territorial France, which consisted of both the homeland and overseas possessions.

After World War II, and because of the decolonization movement that led to the independence of former French colonies, these yesteryear colonizers had become diasporans; at the same time, the government felt a greater urgency to provide their children with schools comparable to the educational services offered to students in the Hexagon and the overseas territories. From then on, the schooling of diaspora and postdiaspora children was no longer a responsibility on the margins of the Ministry of Education's mission but had rather become intrinsic to it (Ministère de l' Education Nationale 2014).

The cosmonational educational system in place today took its roots in that post–World War II period and was further modernized with the creation of the Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger in 1990. France did not overhaul the traditional system in order to create a new one that would meet the needs of both the territorial and extraterritorial students. Instead, it grafted onto it a diaspora model constructed by the Ministry of Education consolidating an existing group of schools with newly established ones. This chapter does not concern itself with the history of the relationship between the Ministry of Education and diaspora schooling, but seeks mainly to show how the latter is embedded into the French cosmonational educational system, which facilitates permutation to, and embeddedness in, the postdiaspora condition.

In sum, the schooling of diaspora children has been reassigned to the jurisdictional space of the homeland state. In the process, it has become an integral part of the crossborder landscape of the cosmonation, and the applications of some state laws have been expanded to make them transnational, or have transnational applicability (Code de l'éducation

R 451.1–14), impacting everyday educational practices throughout the francophone world.

## Cosmonational Network

The global deployment of the French educational system is best characterized as a cosmonational network, comprised of schools located in various countries and linked to one another, with AEFE, under the Ministry of Education, serving as the central node of the web. It is cosmonational by reason of the diverse sites the nodes occupy, the relationships they maintain among themselves, the links tying them to the Ministry of Education, and the consistency of curricula with the French educational mainstream.

The French network of extraterritorial schools is unique in its deployment, organization, administration, and embeddedness in the French educational system (Eurocampus Inauguration 2009). Thus, it is worth explaining how it is constructed, since the French did not create such a network from scratch. Although originally exclusive to the Hexagon, the national educational system was later extended to include French schools in the colonies and protectorates; more recently, diaspora schools, mostly established by civic associations, cultural foundations, and religious entities, were added.

The present network of diaspora schools was constructed through the use of three mechanisms, which define their status inside the cosmonation. Although all follow the operational directives of the French Ministry of Education to maintain their association with it and ensure their places within the network, the heterogeneous nodes of the French crossborder extraterritorial educational system are variously administered by the AEFE, the Mission laïque française (Mlf), or associated bodies. Extraterritorial *public schools* are directly administered (*gestion directe*) by the AEFE under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. *Conventional schools* that operate under special arrangements (*convention*) with the AEFE and *contractual schools* accredited (*homologue)* by the AEFE are run by cultural foundations or civic associations such as the Mlf, coordinating their activities with the policies and practices of the AEFE. And, finally, there are also *partner schools* that acquire their status through contracts signed with the AEFE by the civic associations that administer them.

Since some of the diaspora/postdiaspora schools are not under the direct administration of the AEFE, it became necessary to develop a policy

that set the rules for their inclusion. This applies to any country where privately owned French schools are established. Diaspora schools join the cosmonational network by accreditation. Their curricula, pedagogical methods, administrative practices, values, and educational goals are established by the Ministry of Education, ensuring that they conform to the French educational system's overall mission. Occasional inspections by representatives of the AEFE are the chief means of correcting deviations from the approved norms.

These top-down strategies streamline the educational blueprint of all French schools, allowing students, administrative staff, and teachers who migrate from one country to another for whatever reason to be able to work or enroll in any of these schools. The crossborder educational system thus allows for the linking of nodes, multidirectional pathways of crossborder mobility, and permeability of the cosmonational network.

On the one hand, by joining the French educational system, the diaspora schools reconnect with the cosmonational network; on the other, they expand the geographical sphere of intervention and interaction, making the educational system truly cosmonational. This reveals itself in the mode of recruiting the teaching staff of such establishments: in diaspora schools, one finds teachers from France (whether the Hexagon or the overseas territories) recruited to serve abroad; teachers from other diaspora sites serving in the same capacity; and local (diaspora) French teachers who are permanent residents of the country. Thus, the composition of the teaching staff is itself cosmonational, as indicated by their former or current places of residence, and positions are interchangeable. For instance, in 2008, the former principal of the Section française of the École européenne de Taipei was appointed to head the Lycée français de Manille, part of the Manila Eurocampus (Guillotin 2008).

Demographically, the diaspora schools form a significant part of today's French crossborder educational system, and grafting them onto the prior territorial system has transformed it. In 2010, there were 488 schools in the French diaspora school network (75 of which it administered directly and 156 of which it maintained through contractual or conventional agreements) in 130 countries, with a faculty and staff of 6,500 individuals, plus 20,000 locally recruited teachers and a student population of 320,000, including 200,000 foreign students (www.aefe.fr) Its magnitude and geographical spread make it a global and cosmonational operation.

New schools are opened in response to immigration. Reasons for this may include the opening of facilities by French firms, attracting workers and their families to the area; the depopulation and relocation caused by civil war; or even relocation of a country's capital, as was the case in Vietnam with Ho Chi Minh City (France, Office of the Prime Minister 2004). The physical shape of the cosmonation changes as well, since its borders are constantly being reconstructed to account for displacement and emplacement. As a result, the geography of the crossborder extraterritorial educational operation also changes.

The sharing of resources in the cosmonational school system is done, not only vertically as the AEFE furnishes financial aid to these schools, but also horizontally, as one school shares its generated income with another school that does not generate enough revenue to sustain itself. This form of lateral collaboration and solidarity within the network, which derives from shared citizenship, is geared to reduce disparity and ensure its successful operation (ibid.).

## The Cosmonational Budgetary Process

Cosmonationality also transpires in the budgetary process of these extraterritorial French schools. The Ministry of Education allocates funds for their functioning, but units in the network also contribute to each other's well-being through occasional financial contributions, especially in the case of a crisis. In both public schools and conventional schools, the state contributes a portion of the budget and tuition and fees paid by the French families whose children attend these schools make up the rest (Ferrand 2004a, 2004b; France. Ministry of Education 2015). Additionally, in 2011, 28 percent of French students living abroad who attended these schools received scholarships from the French government (France, AEFE 2011). The cosmonational network emerges, not only in the way the state allocates public funds to extraterritorial schools, but also in the way schools generate funds to rescue any of the units in distress. For example, shortly after the earthquake of January 2010, which caused major damage to the Lycée français d'Haïti (i.e., the Lycée Alexandre Dumas de Port-au-Prince), AEFE made the units aware of the problem and requested contributions from the network. By July of the same year, they had donated 105,000 euros for reconstruction, repair, and purchase of furniture and equipment.

## Cosmonational Educational Infrastructure

The cosmonational educational system requires trans-frontier infrastructure to support and sustain its deployment and activities, deployed through the building of schools, the acquisition of equipment, the repair of facilities, the upgrading of furniture, and the availability of educational materials. To operate smoothly, the French educational bureaucracy helps create new buildings across the globe, renovate and remodel others, and rent, sell, or reprogram those that it wants to close. As a global operation, the educational system could not operate without it. Therefore, we must pay attention to its cosmonational mode of deployment and maintenance.

Infrastructural intervention is more pronounced in schools the AEFE administers, and less for partner schools, whose maintenance falls squarely on the shoulders of the civic associations to which they belong. This aspect also reflects the cosmonationality of the operation; it requires appropriating funds from the French authorities, hiring a construction firm on-site or from abroad, and outsourcing the design to an architectural firm in the cosmonation, which may be either local or based elsewhere. In other words, the school building will meet the cultural expectations of the users as well as those of the Ministry of Education and the AEFE.

## Cosmonational Educational Events

The AEFE generates linkages among the nodes of a global extraterritorial operation that function together as a cosmonational network. It accomplishes its role through recruiting teachers for these positions from any site within the cosmonation; through partially financing the functioning of these institutions; and by inspecting schools to ensure conformity with pre-approved programs. Along with government allocations, families with school-age children also contribute financially to the budgetary success of the programs, by paying tuition and fees for those enrolled (France, AEFE 2014). These activities further reinforce binary relations between the AEFE and the schools and among diaspora nodes.

The AEFE strengthens ties between schools through the development of collaborative events in which two or more schools participate and by making cooperative events undertaken by any unit of the network known to other schools. Better informed through its supervisory role in the network, the AEFE is best positioned to share this information with others and stimulate broader cooperation.

The integration of the cosmonational network is promoted by collaborative school events in the diaspora arising out of shared cosmonational agendas. Cosmonational agendas are used throughout the network to facilitate interactions of nodes within the cosmonation to ensure collaboration and solidarity at all levels. This happens among French schools abroad when a common project brings representatives from different sites together for interaction. For example, according to a speech delivered on September 7, 2010, by the director of AEFE, delegates from 17 diaspora/postdiaspora schools (*lycées*) in Europe met in Brussels at the headquarters of the European Union in 2010 to discuss the parliamentary role of their representatives in the educational system of their respective countries of residence. "Femmes de la région méditerranéenne," another event organized in 2010, fostered the same cosmonational collaborative spirit, bringing together representatives of diaspora *lycées* in Mediterranean countries to discuss gender issues in the Muslim world (France, AFE 2010).

The Jeux internationaux de la jeunesse (JIJ), or International Youth Games, constitute another such get-together. Thus, for example, in May 2011, 500 *lycée* students from the Hexagon and abroad participated in the JIJ held in Arcachon, France (http://www.aefe.tv/sports/jeux-internationaux-de-la-jeunesse-arcachon-2011), and in 2013 some 200 students from the five French *lycées* in Chile met at the Lycée Claude-Gay in Osorno, Chile, for interalliance games (Eurocampus 2013). In 2007, too, more than 130 students from various French schools in Asia travelled to Shanghai to participate in the annual Asia-Pacific theatrical get-together, Rencontres théâtrales annuelles de la zone Asie-Pacifique.

By and large, school units participate in cosmonational events to deepen their knowledge about each other, to contribute to the strengthening of ties, to ensure the social reproduction of the network, to socialize with members from other nodes, and to engage in cosmonational activities. Through these cosmonational gatherings and visitations, schools cultivate a better sense of the demographic composition of each unit in the network, the geographical locations of nodes, and the diversity of engagements of each node.

In her speech on September 4, 2011, Anne-Marie Descôtes, the director of AEFE, spoke of having the "ambition to reinforce our logic of global network" and said that the "idea of creating stronger ties within the network follows a logic of reinforced cooperation" (Assemblée des Français de l'étranger 2011b; France 2011). Collaborative events help achieve the goal of reinforcing cooperation among the French schools,

both territorial and extraterritorial. This solidarity mechanism is a channel through which postdiaspora consciousness both rises and takes roots.

## Cosmonational Management of Local School Crises

Local disruptions due to war, natural disasters, or civil unrest are factored into the management of the network, since schools may require additional funding, experience a loss of teachers and buildings, shut down their operation, or cut short semesters or academic years. The government and local schools do not have sole control over these disruptive events, even though they may require immediate and direct interventions by AEFE to help school staff assess losses, undertake a comprehensive plan to protect personnel and property, allocate money to repair damage, hire local teachers, and reopen the school.

Some events are internally generated by the rhythms of the AEFE-financed activities of local schools; others result from the opening of new French industrial facilities, which brings French employees and their school-age children to the area, increasing the demand for admission and thus necessitating additional school facilities. Events such as breaking ground on a new school to add to the network (as in Cairo and Madrid) and the inauguration of new school buildings (as in Brussels, Dakar, Frankfurt, Marrakech, and Rabat) must also be managed, not only to prevent the inconvenience they may cause teachers, students, and staff, but also to soften their budgetary impact on AEFE resources and on other schools in the network. However, since some of the schools it administers require a higher level of funding than others, such new construction does not all make the same demands on the AEFE budget. Some schools necessarily request help from the AEFE every year for maintenance and expansion.

As the sites are connected to each other directly or indirectly through their dependence or affiliation with AEFE, a major event in one site may affect the rest of the network. For instance, the closing of a school reduces expenses for that site and the surplus generated is used to defray expenses in other sites—for new hires, the purchase of equipment, or infrastructure. Such a budgetary redistribution is cosmonational, since it is disbursed to meet other needs in the network.

Mobility within the cosmonation is activated in a case of war, when diaspora teachers may be encouraged to return to the Hexagon for an extended visit until they can safely return, or are simply transferred to

other schools in the Hexagon or abroad (France, AEFE; AFE 2011a). Local disruptions pave the way for both vertical and horizontal integration of the network. Because of the destruction of school buildings, students may migrate to other schools. Such an event is likely to lead to stronger interactions with other entities such as the French government's Centre de crise et de soutien, which may set up a unit to manage the crisis.

One of the roles of the AEFE is to handle major school crises that cannot be coped with locally, such as fires, flooding, earthquakes, tsunamis, or civil war that may force teachers, students, and staff to exit the country with their families. In addition to the Centre de crise at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AEFE has also developed its own crisis unit to care for teachers, staff, and students in the case of a disaster. In the Libyan crisis of 2011, for example, "[t]he embassy was closed and so was the high school . . . . French employees and their families . . . were then returned to France and placed on administrative leave" (France, AEFE; AFE 2011a).

Since the Centre de crise deals with diaspora affairs and foreign humanitarian events more generally, the AEFE concentrates on diaspora schools and collaborates with the Centre de crise when intervening abroad (France, AEFE; AFE 2011a). For example, it dispatches individuals to assist school personnel on the ground; picks up teachers and other staff at the airport and transports them to the hotels reserved for them; provides extra days or months of vacation; and helps the Ministry of Education with their reassignment or the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs with their return to France or to any of the overseas departments or territories, provided they want and choose to do so (France, AEFE; AFE 2011a).

In a network, nodes do not have necessarily the same valence, because some have more resources and power than others. As the central node with authority over French schools abroad, the AEFE ensures that these conform to the established norm as nodes in a multidirectional, interactive network in turn embedded in a structure of administrative, regional, transnational, budgetary, local, transnational, and infrastructural networks, whose multiple entanglements can be unraveled through deconstruction.

## Mutations of the Network of French Schools Abroad

Owing to the closing of some units and the creation of new ones, the network of French schools abroad evolves over time. When emigration or immigration requires more schools in a resettlement area and fewer

schools in an emigration area, there is mutation up, with the creation of new units, or down, with the closing of units. The establishment of schools both in places where the AEFE has historically been active and in new places of resettlement necessarily reconfigures the cosmonational network.

The cosmonational network's capacity of absorption manifests itself during a crisis that causes the closing of a school, when other schools may hire some of the teachers or the Ministry of Education may reassign them or prolong their vacations until their school is reopened. The shock absorber function of a cosmonational network allows it not only to help a unit in distress, but also to nurture it until it regains its strength and reinserts itself as a contributor to the reproduction of the network. Through this mechanism, the cosmonation is able to reengineer its equilibrium.

## The Rise of the Eurocampus

One usually thinks of diaspora and postdiaspora in relation to a homeland country or state; but one may also think of it in relation to a federal entity such as the European Union. The rise of the eurocampus adds one more dimension to the French cosmonation as a form of integration of the French school system into the larger construction of the European Union. In this context, what is a eurocampus? Eurocampuses are joint ventures undertaken to provide extraterritorial students with facilities for schooling in their language or curricula similar to those in the homeland by sharing facilities with another diaspora school that uses the language and curriculum of its European homeland (Agence pour l'enseignement 2010a; Eurocampus. http://eurocampus.org.ph). Attending school on the same campus allows groups of diaspora students to interact with and learn about one another. In the process, such an interaction contributes to the form that postdiasporization takes in the construction of the European Union.

In addition to facilitating interaction, the eurocampus provides an opportunity for students to learn the language of the other group, to access and take courses from teachers from the other group, and to have same required classes taught by an instructor from either group. Together, this system contributes to European integration abroad on a micro-scale, opening new doors that enable students to matriculate in the other group's homeland universities.

The mission of the eurocampus was well stated and defined in the inauguration of one such school in 2009. The "Eurocampus mission is the education

of the European citizens of tomorrow; . . . individuals who are prepared for the multilingual, multicultural environment that awaits them" (France, Dublin Embassy 2009). That is, the eurocampus cosmonationalizes a node of the diaspora by way of redeploying it as an aspect of the postdiaspora condition.

Eurocampuses still function at the experimentation level. Some came into being as a way to reduce cost through the sharing of campus facilities and teachers. In 2010, there were five such eurocampuses as part of the French schools abroad network, located in Dublin, Manila, Shanghai, Taipei, and Zagreb (France, AEFE; AFE 2011b).

The eurocampus in Manila was created in 1992 by combining the Lycée français de Manille and the German school there. Since each school is an extraterritorial extension of the homeland educational system, the curriculum of each is similar to that of the homeland.

St. Kilian's Deutsche Schule in Dublin, which began its operations in 1952, has been a unit of the network of German Schools Abroad before its transformation into a unit of a eurocampus in 2005. Likewise, the Lycée français d'Irlande was already a unit of the French schools abroad network before merging to become part of the eurocampus, when junior classes at St. Kilian's and the Lycée français were integrated to prepare students for the Junior Certificate. The Lycée français and St. Kilian's, the two components of the Dublin eurocampus, continue to operate under the aegis of the German Ministry of Education and the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, represented by the AEFE, respectively. Though "under the same roof," each school is separate from the other. In 2009, one-third of Dublin eurocampus students were enrolled in the Lycée français and two-thirds in St. Kilian's Deutsche Schule (St. Kilian's German School, Dublin. School history; http://www.kilians.com/download/14023/ and http://www.kilians.com/our-school/school-history/2013 and http://www.eurocampus-zagreb.org/; Agence pour l'enseignement 2010b).

The Zagreb eurocampus is the result of cooperation between the Deutsche Internationale Schule there and the École française de Zagreb founded in 1996. The eurocampus was created later in 2005 operating at the kindergarten, primary, and secondary school levels, with 220 students enrolled in 2013. The eurocampus is intended as a visible symbol of the amity between Germans and French, with the goal of constructing a miniature European Union wherever it exists abroad (Bienvenue à l'Ecole Française de Zagreb; http://www.eurocampus-zagreb.org/11 July 2013: L'Eurocampus de Zagreb 2013).

The Shanghai eurocampus, inaugurated in 2005, is made up of the École française de Shanghai, which opened 10 years earlier, and the

German School, which are units respectively of their national networks of schools abroad. Ninety percent of the students enrolled at the eurocampus are French, and by "convention," it is affiliated with AEFE, which is thus responsible for paying the salaries of two teachers among those recruited either locally or abroad, mostly in the Hexagon (France, Ministry of Education 2004). However, the two schools in Shanghai are less integrated than at other eurocampuses in terms of teaching and curriculum activities.

While the aforementioned eurocampuses are comprised of two schools–German and French–the École européenne de Taipei shares three schools: French, German, and British. The Section française of the École européenne is part of the network of French schools abroad, and has a partnership contract with the AEFE. For the validation of a portion of the curriculum, it is also networked with the Centre national d'enseignement à distance (France. Ministry of Education 2015).

The cosmonational deployment of the eurocampus is inscribed in the process of its operation. Furthermore, its program or curriculum is an extension of the homeland educational system in the following ways: the primary language of instruction is that of the homeland; teachers from the homeland are appointed or transferred to work at the eurocampus; in the French case, the homeland-approved program is supervised by the AEFE, and the majority of students are themselves members of the French diaspora community; the French portion of the school is a unit of the network of French schools abroad; and students use this preparation as a stepping stone toward admission to French universities, with information about admission learned through participation in events organized by the cosmonational network of French schools abroad.

The eurocampus system is in general an arrangement between schools, endorsed by the German and French governments, since their accreditation depends on approval of their curricula by the homeland's Ministry of Education. It is not a model generated by the European Union, but by two of its member states for application outside their territorial borders.

Thus, the eurocampus is an educational structure located in a third country, sponsored by two or more national diaspora schools, and exists to prepare students for life in the European Union by facilitating cross-national interaction, reflecting European curriculum standards, approved by the homeland country. It provides parents with two essential services: a European school for their children and interaction with students from at least one other European country, as well as with local students. For

students, it provides opportunities to learn another language, network with other students, and prepare for admission to a European university after graduation.

Beyond the project of educating European students abroad, the eurocampus serves to further the foreign relations of the countries involved. For example, at the 2010 signing of the convention between the French Foreign Ministry and the German Foreign Ministry, the eurocampus at Manila was officially established as an instrument that reflects cooperation and friendship between the two governments, which contributes to the strengthening of their bilateral relations (Guillotin 2008).

## The Heterogeneity of Nodes

The nodes that comprise the crossborder network of French schools abroad are heterogeneous because of an array of factors both internal and external. Heterogeneity then becomes a significant characteristic of the network, feeding its everyday life and its social reproduction. What distinguishes nodes of the network from one another can be explained in reference to the histories of their formations, direct or indirect governance by the AEFE, relations with the hostland, and inclusion in a eurocampus.

The schools have their own unique histories, arising from the different circumstances leading to their foundation. Some are private institutions that came into existence because of a felt need by expatriate families for the education of their children abroad. As such, these schools follow the mainstream French curriculum for the purpose of maintaining the language—and, with it, the values that the French educational system imparts—and preparing the children for post-graduate school and the job market in France. Although, as might be expected, such schools began as small enterprises with few students, some grew to become part of a eurocampus. Some were established by the AEFE and have been, since day one, part of the network of French schools abroad. Other schools were created by associations such as the Mlf, function under their governance, and operate as units of those networks.

Heterogeneity derives also from the diversity of management sources. As discussed before, some schools are directly administered by the AEFE; others are simply accredited by it; and still others have established a contractual relationship with it. The schools respective circumstances determine the AEFE's level of involvement in their administration, the

number of French teachers' salaries it is responsible for, and the number of scholarships it allocates to them.

The different relations of French schools abroad with the hostland are also a criterion of heterogeneity, since curricula are also organized to meet local requirements and prepare students for post-graduate education and professional programs in their countries of residence. Furthermore, heterogeneity depends on whether schools operate in their own facilities or as part of a eurocampus, with joint educational facilities and an integrated curriculum. A French school in a eurocampus abroad has its own set of issues unique to this arrangement. Additionally, French schools abroad are not the same as French missionary schools. French schools abroad are those created for the purpose of the education of children of French expatriate families, even though they also admit local students when seats are available, whereas French missionary schools are created for the purpose of educating indigenous students mostly and are usually administered by members of French religious orders.

What is characteristic of the AEFE network is that one node occupies a central position, responsible for the crossborder cosmonational educational governance of each extraterritorial school. It is panoptical in the way it assembles information from all the other nodes and "sees" at a distance what is going on throughout the network. As defined by Jeremy Bentham (1843) and Michel Foucault (1995) a panopticon is a bureaucratic structure allowing one to view inmates without their knowledge, but AEFE is also a panopticon with respect to the updated information about each node it archives. It has the capability to transform this information into knowledge that can be used to discipline any node in the circuit.

While information flows from node to node, knowledge produced by the panopticon is used to assess the needs of each node, whether it is the salaries of teachers, furniture to purchase, transfer of staff, construction of new buildings, evaluation of programs, school expansion, or enlargement or curtailment of the network. The AEFE is the central site where most strategic information about nodes is kept. As such, it is the nerve center of the network, an archive where information is stored, shared, and used to govern the network, and a bureaucratic panopticon in its interventions to allocate funds, to validate curricula, to restore schools, and to purchase sites. As a bureaucratic panopticon, it is a centralized organization that sees the activities of all the units of the network at a distance through the eyes of its personnel.

## Cosmonational Mobility

A characteristic feature of the cosmonational school system is the mobility it affords both laterally and vertically. Crossborder vertical mobility consists of migration for the purpose of upgrading one's status position elsewhere. For example, it occurs when one is promoted or reassigned to a better position, such as from teacher to headmaster in another school or to a leadership position in the AEFE. Crossborder lateral mobility is the migration of one from one site to another in one's country of residence or elsewhere, but of comparable value.

The network sustains itself by these crossborder movements. For example, as noted above, the head of the Section française of the École européenne de Taipei relocated in 2008 to become principal of the Lycée français de Manille, part of the Manila Eurocampus (Guillotin 2008). The AEFE appoints teachers from the public school system to schools in the diaspora; with some of those returning to their schools in the Hexagon or France's overseas departments at the end of their contract period. Other teachers move from diaspora schools in their country of residence to schools in other countries. Staff and students also migrate to seek better opportunities elsewhere.

The assignment of teachers to other schools in the network is not an exception, but a routine practice. For example, a teacher who had taught at both the Lycée français d'Alexandrie (Alexandria, Egypt) and the École française de Damas (the Lycée français Charles de Gaulle) (Damascus, Syria) was transferred to a teaching position at the Lycée français de Manille. On another occasion, two other teachers who had previously taught at the École française de New York and at the Lycée français de Los Angeles, respectively, were later also appointed to the Lycée français de Manille (Guillotin 2008). Through migration of teachers and students, teams are reconstituted, experiences are shared, and the cosmonationalization of the network is perfected, and all of this because of the crossborder mobility of different actors for different reasons within the cosmonation.

The bold policy of integrating diaspora schools in the cosmonation is best developed by the French state. The French school abroad network is unique in its quality and geographical extension (Fourny 2007: 822–832). However, the policy and practice of developing extraterritorial schools for compatriots abroad is not exclusive to France. As has been noted, Germany, Spain, and Italy have also each established their own extraterritorial schools. And other countries are interested in following the same path. For example, in 2011, a Chinese delegation visited Paris with the goal of studying and

familiarizing themselves with the French diaspora school network with a view to developing a Chinese version of it (France, AEFE; AFE 2011b).

## Extraterritorial Schooling and the Postdiaspora Condition

In this elaborate network of extraterritorial French schools and their embeddedness within the homeland's educational system, the gulf that used to separate the diaspora from the nondiaspora has become less and less significant, at least in terms of exercising full citizenship rights and accessing basic state services. Those who live abroad can now access school facilities and educational training similar to those available in the Hexagon. In this context, extraterritorial schooling expresses and reflects the performance of citizenship rights, formal integration into the cosmonation, the expansion of the state, and the relocation of diasporans in the postdiaspora condition. In leveling the field of practice to make available homeland standard education to French citizens overseas, the crossborder educational bureaucracy transforms diaspora students as insiders rather than outsiders to the system. In this new vision of things, living abroad is no longer an obstacle to the achievement of national inclusiveness, solidarity, and cooperation.

Extraterritorial schooling as an extension of the national educational system implies state recognition of emigrant citizenship and the right of access to equivalent homeland education while living abroad. In other words, the postdiaspora condition expresses both the recognition by the state of this educational right and its actual performance. As people living overseas enjoy same benefits as those bestowed on the intramural population, this phenomenon translates into the obliteration of the diaspora condition that has been traditionally the hallmark of emigrants. Therefore by making primary and secondary education available—in the name of shared citizenship—to the population both at home and abroad, the state has not only obliterated the space between homelanders and postdiasporans, but has also created a *crossborder cosmonational ecosystem* that itself diminishes differences between them because of access to the same rights and common contributions to the social reproduction of the ancestral homeland.

While the distinction between diaspora and postdiaspora is palpable because of the difference that opposes one to the other, the distinction

between postdiaspora citizenship and homeland citizenship has shrunk, hence the rise of the postdiaspora condition. The difference between the postdiasporan and the homelander lies more in the way they express their citizenship than in foreign residence as an obstacle to enjoying such rights. Consequently, in the postdiaspora context, emigration is viewed as dispersion while reconnection to the homeland is seen rather as dependent on one's willingness to do so. This means that one can have a homeland life experience without being in the homeland. In Gabriel Sheffer's words, one is "at home abroad" (Sheffer 2003); it is "the domestic abroad" to use Varadarajan's terminology (Varadarajan 2010). Like homeland schooling, extraterritorial schooling is a channel through which citizenship is enacted.

The postdiaspora condition is the situation emigrants find themselves in whereby, although living abroad, they nevertheless enjoy all the benefits of homeland citizenship.

The postdiasporan subject fully emerges in the context of the delivery of similar educational services in both the homeland and abroad. What the postdiaspora condition reflects is the achievement of equality of citizen status by extraterritorial citizens.

Education is thus a pivotal factor in creating and maintaining the cosmonation. As sites enjoy similar access to homeland education contents, elect their parliamentary representatives, and are eligible for social security, they have become interconnected outposts for the practice of expanded rights, which serve as the backbone of the postdiaspora condition. Extraterritorial schooling not only socializes compatriots abroad in the culture of a cosmonation but signals that one belongs to such a crossborder social formation. It both nurtures one's attachment to the cosmonation and serves as a means of its consolidation. In the process, individuals are liberated from the outsider status imposed by the diaspora condition and reinscribed as insiders. Operating through the cosmonational educational eco-system, the postdiaspora condition creates an interconnected crossborder community that facilitates communication among compatriots, nurtures mobility, generates employment for teachers, and provides access to standard education for extraterritorial students in preparation for graduate school.

Where the homeland school traditionally socializes one in the culture and traditions of the nation, the postdiaspora school relocates one for socialization in the emerging hybrid culture and traditions of the cosmonation. The teaching in such extraterritorial schools is itself a contribution to the social reproduction of the postdiaspora condition. In this context,

the intramural and extramural populations of the cosmonation form an ensemble, and the cosmonational school system provides them with the means to learn and contribute to a common culture and common values.

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CHAPTER 5

# Extraterritorial Human Security

> This nerve center responds in real time to complex situations of all types, which might, for example, require chartering large aircraft, dispatching multidisciplinary and interministerial teams to theaters of operations in environments where security has deteriorated, organizing massive evacuation operations, or dealing with individual situations that are particularly harrowing (hostage-taking, group accidents, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, etc.). Source: France, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Cour des Comptes (2013), 15.

This chapter examines the evolution of the postdiaspora condition through the deployment of the cosmonation in the human security arena. As an infrastructure that facilitates the practice of homeland-centric extraterritorial citizenship, French crossborder state bureaucracy has expanded not only in the areas of social security and emigrant schooling, but also in the human security domain, providing the extraterritorial population with a level of protection similar to that accorded the homeland population. The French state has established a regime of human security protection for the extraterritorial French population—unique in its capacity and its geographical deployment in the world—that operates in tandem with the human security apparatus that has long existed for intramural citizens. To show how this deploys abroad, this chapter identifies and deconstructs various structural features of



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this institution driven by diaspora/postdiaspora needs and its mode of operation. Because of concerns about national security, sovereignty, and crossborder logistics, the human security protection originally developed for residents of the Hexagon and overseas French departments and territories was not designed to cover French emigrants living in foreign countries. However, France's human security protection agency has now been restructured to meet the specific needs of diaspora and postdiaspora populations. This mechanism has become operational with the creation of a crisis center (*centre de crise*) responsible, not only for the security of the extraterritorial French population, but also for coordinating French humanitarian interventions abroad more generally (France, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Centre de Crise 2012).

Located in the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the *Centre de crise* (CDC) was established under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy and began to operate on July 2, 2008. It serves as a foreign policy instrument of the French government for protecting French citizens living or travelling abroad and for coordinating with foreign governments during humanitarian interventions when French diasporans and postdiasporans request help in emergencies such as natural disasters, civil unrest, or a refugee crisis. However, this chapter will concern itself specifically with the extraterritorial population entanglement in human security crises and explain how the CDC intervenes abroad in such circumstances. Human security is studied here from the standpoint of citizenship rights and their expansion to apply to overseas emigrants. The chapter does not cover the full range of issues that fall under human security, but will concentrate on personal and community security during crises that convey "urgency, demand public attention, and command governmental resources" (Paris 2001: 95, Sanger 2000: 3). More precisely, it will concentrate on answering the following question: how does extraterritorial security protection for emigrants give rise to postdiasporization and sustain the postdiaspora condition?

The chapter begins by delimiting the scope of the study, followed by a brief literature review. It then addresses cosmonational features exhibited by both the CDC and emigrants in need of help and discusses how the crossborder bureaucracy operates at a time of crisis, and especially the role of French embassies in collaborating with the CDC. Finally, it shows how crossborder bureaucracy serves as an infrastructure of support for the postdiaspora condition.

## The Scope of the Study

This study is limited in its scope, inasmuch as it focuses on the categories of individuals and communities concerned, the circumstances that bring them to the attention of the Centre de crise, and the relations they maintain with the homeland. In its operational definition of the French abroad, the CDC identifies five categories of individuals and groups that fall under its aegis: French NGOs that operate abroad; French employers, employees, and contractors of French firms (whether independent institutions or subsidiaries) located outside the Hexagon; the population of territorial collectivities such as St. Pierre de Miquelon; French citizens residing abroad or in transit (such as tourists, students, and employees of international organizations); and French elected officials who live in foreign countries (such as diaspora parliamentarians) (France, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, CDC, 4). These categories show the demographic parameters covered by the cosmonational state and the emigrant orientation of such an overseas population.

The chapter draws a sharp distinction between emigrant and immigrant communities in addressing the human security question (Waldinger 2014). One commonly speaks of *immigrant communities*, whose integration derives from their interactions with the hostland, rather than *emigrant communities,* whose logic of integration proceeds from their interactions with the homeland. Furthermore, the emigrant community gives priority to the homeland as the core of its identity, aspiring perhaps to return there and in some cases expecting key services from the homeland government. That is, these emigrants consider themselves formal members (latent or overt) of the homeland polity because of the homeland citizenship they hold or believe they hold, though they live abroad and adjust to their obligations to the hostland as well.

But not all emigrants form emigrant communities, which is why it is important to distinguish this group from other immigrants and explain why studying the diaspora/postdiaspora condition from this angle is productive. Unlike immigrant communities, emigrant communities, wherever they resettle, tend to expect the homeland to provide services if it can, because they still consider themselves citizens of the homeland. The homeland reciprocates these sentiments and, if it has the necessary resources, stands ready to intervene and assist its citizens living abroad. Until World War II, infrastructures acting on these sentiments were

unavailable, but now some countries, like Italy and France, have developed the necessary means to do so.

Emigrant communities may evolve to become immigrant communities, just as immigrant communities may develop into emigrant communities. What is stressed in this interpretation is the difference in orientation that characterizes both offshoot communities. The analysis of human security in this chapter focuses on both emigrant and immigrant communities and stresses their putative citizenship ties to the homeland and the corresponding responsibility of the homeland for their well-being. This is symbolized in the way the homeland refers to the extraterritorial population, not as diaspora, but as homeland citizens living abroad, *les Français de létranger* or *Italiani all' estero*.

Human security protection is provided to an extraterritorial community when a group of people living outside the boundaries of the state are tied to their homeland through citizenship, which engages the state to provide primary human protection to its overseas citizens with or without the support of the corresponding hostland government. In such a scenario, the primary provider of human security is the homeland rather than the hostland, not simply because the hostland may not have the means to do so, but also because any claim to such homeland protection derives exclusively from homeland citizenship.

It is appropriate to draw a distinction between diasporic citizenship and postdiaspora citizenship. Diasporic citizenship refers to immigrants abroad who enjoy descriptive but not substantive citizenship status—that is, voting abroad, parliamentary representation by officials living abroad, access to social security, and so on, are not available to them. In contrast, postdiaspora citizenship refers to citizens who live abroad, or used to do so, who enjoy all the benefits of substantive citizenship just as in the homeland.

## Background Literature

Human security is thought to emerge out of the traditional practice of international humanitarian law (King and Murray 2001, Rudolph 2003, Suhrke 1999: 269, Thomas and Tow 2002, Gasper 2005). Traditionally, security has been discussed and confined to national security in the context of the closed borders of the nation-state. Human security, which emerges as an object of study after World War II partly in response to the tragedy of the Holocaust, is an effort "to broaden the focus of security beyond the level of the state," to recognize "the inherent right of people to personal

security" (Axworthy 2001: 19) and to acknowledge the existence of "human-centered vulnerabilities" around the globe (Liotta 2002: 473). Beyond the state's primary focus on protecting itself, it now must protect individual citizens and communities abroad, whose security may have been neglected, if not ignored, in the past.

The shift in the study of human security from a national to a transnational and then a cosmonational perspective has been largely influenced by globalization. For example, in such overseas operations, the CDC makes use of the assets of the cosmonation, wherever they are located. Myron Weiner's study of the relationship between security and immigration follows a state-centered mode of analysis, showing how "state policies toward emigration and immigration [are] shaped by concerns over internal stability and international security" (Weiner 1992: 94). In the same vein, Adamson (2006: 167) speaks of the "impact of migration flows on the security interests of state actors." In contrast, Bellamy and McDonald (2002: 373) warn that any "attempt to co-opt human security into a state-centric framework is problematic," while Newman (2001: 241) calls for "a model of human security that goes beyond traditional military and state-centric concepts of security." Further considerations are given by those who emphasize a feminist perspective in analyzing human security, aiming to prevent "the dangers of masking differences under the rubric of the term 'human'" (Hudson 2005: 155).

Human security in the context of immigration means different things depending on the types of communities involved—whether they are emigrant or immigrant communities, or something in between. It also depends on the capacity and capabilities of the homeland state to provide support to emigrant communities. Furthermore, discussing human security in the homeland context is not as applicable the same way as in the hostland context as evidenced below. The literature vastly concerns the immigrant community because of the level of threat it is projected to constitute to the hostland, while it is also mostly silent about the emigrant community's condition (Doty 1998: 72). In other words, in the immigrant community, the onus is supposed to be shouldered by the hostland, while in the emigrant community, the problem rests in the homeland's hands. The homeland expresses its attachment to the offshoot community despite the distance, symbolizing its concern for their well-being and its way of expressing its cosmonationalism. The rationale behind this contradiction is that the emigrant is seen as part of the expanded nation, while in

contrast, the state sees the immigrant in its midst as a foreigner and a potential threat in matters of national security.

In the literature, these two views of diaspora security point to different perspectives entertained by hostland and homeland governments, depending on the emigrant or immigrant status of such an individual or group. In other words, the reference can be to fellow citizens abroad or to incoming and long-term immigrants. The meaning of human security may differ as one applies it to a country's emigrant or immigrant community. For example, a country may uphold human security protection for its emigrants while at the same time maintain a different attitude toward its foreign immigrants because of public security concerns (Harada and Kimura 2011). This double standard vis-à-vis the application of human security protection is not exclusive to any country, but extends to all in their efforts to maintain stability and prevent conflict between natives and immigrants (Joppke 2003).

What was missing from the literature was a typology of crises that affect human security around the globe. Fonbaustier (2012: 1) fills the void by providing a useful analytical lens that identifies their polymorphic characters (kidnapping, tsunami, earthquake, and plane crash) and the four dimensions each one reflects (human, political, media representation, and diplomatic domains). He further distinguishes between individual and collective crises. The distinction is important in that it reflects different forms of possible intervention, which may affect the rest of the cosmonation differently. He contrasts individual crises (kidnapping, disappearances, or death by homicide or accident) with collective crises, which can be of natural origin (volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, or inundations), human origin (terrorism or civil war), or hybrid nature (pandemics) (Fonbaustier 2012: 1). This study takes stock of previous analyses of human security protection but reorients the focus toward explaining the processing of cosmonational bureaucracy and the engendering of the postdiaspora condition.

## Cosmonational Agency

A new phenomenon that appears on the horizon in the study of the postdiaspora condition is the rise of the cosmonational agency. Until recently, state agencies had a national mission, confined or pertaining to meeting the needs of the territorial population, but now they are also engaged in routine crossborder activities, thereby providing services to the

extraterritorial segment of the population on a regular basis. A cosmonational agency provides services to a group of people residing either in or outside the homeland. It covers more territorial/spatial levels than local, regional, national, or international agencies and functions on a different geographical and digital scale, based on the dispersed location of the population, which influences its global and geometric shape (Laguerre 2016).

France's Centre de crise provides a good example of a cosmonational agency's deployment, crossborder interactions, and collaboration with other entities. It is therefore important to identify and analyze how the CDC deploys transnationally and how these crossborder linkages can be enhanced, made more complicated, or impeded by nodes of the expansive cosmonational network.

Established to be a cosmonational institution primarily responsible for the security of French nationals living abroad, the CDC coordinates its activities with other agencies in the Hexagon and French overseas territories. Its cosmonationalist orientation manifests in its recruitment procedures, financing of the institution, collection and exchange of information, cooperation with state and private sector entities, and intervention in and management of crises.

The CDC's financing is multipolar. Assembling funds is itself a cosmonational process, since contributors are distributed throughout the global landscape of the cosmonation. The sources of these funds include the French state, which pays the salaries of the staff, individual contributions for the success of any specific project undertaken by the agency, and donations from firms, cultural associations, and civic organizations located either in France (Hexagon and overseas departments and territories) or extraterritorially. The financial basis of the institution is largely sustained by the contributions of these various sectors, which reflect the cosmonational character of the budgetary process.

The agency is also cosmonational in its collection and exchange of information concerning the human security protection of French nationals abroad regardless of their location. This is done through a routine exchange of notes and occasional meetings among CDC security personnel, security personnel of French firms abroad, and French security personnel who work for foreign firms at home or abroad (CDC 2012: 8). This constitutes a layer of a cosmonational shadow network of French security personnel who contribute to the security of members of the cosmonation living outside their sovereign territory. Furthermore, this

distributed technical staff is considered "partners" of CDC in this effort, with whom information and analyses are shared. The CDC meets with more than 100 such experts during the annual meeting it organizes for an exchange of views, assessment of risk factors, networking by staff and guests, and discussion of common interests and concerns (Centre de Crise 2012: 9). The rationale of these partnerships and gatherings, besides the sharing of knowledge, is that the CDC is also responsible for the safety of the security personnel of large companies and NGOs and of expatriate employees and their families. Their personal safety as well as the security of the larger network is paramount, and the CDC relies on these individuals not only in the pre-planning, planning, and intervention processes, but also in the post-crisis period to ensure that security needs of French nationals abroad are met.

In addition to the partners identified above, the CDC also collaborates with other state and government agencies, which have recalibrated their missions by enlarging their spheres of operation from the national landscape to the cosmonational network to meet crossborder obligations. With this recent shift, state agencies now serve not only the territorial population, but also the extraterritorial segment of the population. As their structure evolves, they have also become cosmonational agencies as they continue to engage in expansive crossborder interactions that are a part of their everyday tasks. A structure of collaboration and engagement with other agencies is part of the CDC's functioning and intrinsic to its mission (Fonbaustier 2012: 6). This is required since a human crisis affecting an emigrant community has features to be dealt with that may concern other state agencies in addition to the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs such as security and repatriation (Armed Forces), identification of the deceased (Gendarmerie), school repair (Ministry of Education), and medical assistance (Ministry of Health).

A cosmonational agency functions not only following the rhythms of its everyday routine deployment, but also in moments of crisis. Therefore it is important to analyze its behavior during a period of crisis to see if it might differ from ordinary times. A crisis can be seen as a peak moment, preceded by a pre-crisis period and succeeded by a post-crisis period. However, there are exceptions to this trajectory in cases where a pre-crisis does not differ substantially from ordinary times because the crisis event occurs abruptly as in the case of natural disasters (fire, inundation, or earthquake) or man-made disasters (bombing, kidnapping, or mass assassination). Meanwhile, the post-crisis period may have its own distinct characteristic,

which sometimes results from benign neglect as attention may be diverted to other issues. Although cosmonational management is expressed in both pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, it is the crisis moment that this chapter investigates because it provides useful insights into the intricacies of the postdiaspora condition.

A crisis moment gives us an opportunity to observe crossborder mobility, whether undertaken by individual residents of a site, CDC personnel, or associates to whom specific tasks have been outsourced. French NGOs, such as Premiere Urgence, are associates of the CDC, which in moments of crisis usually serve as frontline partners (Centre de Crise 2012: 6). In this capacity, they are the first to receive funding from CDC to operate on its behalf allowing NGO's to intervene efficiently, strengthen their organization as a result of this funding, and provide information to the agency. A crisis among the extraterritorial French nationals not only provides an opportunity for any NGO selected to partner with the CDC and help compatriots, but also to strengthen its own financial basis, thereby enhancing its entrenchment and survivability.

As a cosmonational agency, the CDC does its security surveillance over diasporic communities on behalf of the government by maintaining a panopticon gaze from its headquarters in Paris through different means: watching TV news on a diversity of world channels and reading dispatches from news agencies, diplomatic posts, extraterritorial firms, and individuals abroad (Cois 2009). Information gained from these channels allows the CDC to plan and prepare for intervention when the time comes to act.

France responded to the Haitian earthquake crisis, not simply as a nation, but as a cosmonation. This is seen in the level of participation of diverse sites of the cosmonation: Fort-de-France, French Guyana, Guadeloupe, and the Hexagon, each providing material resources for the success of the operation, intervention personnel, and hospitality to evacuees. Elements of the form that cosmonational bureaucracy took in regard to its choreography after Haiti's earthquake emerge from the elasticity of its expansion. While the CDC central command operated at a distance from its headquarters in Paris, it also developed a front structure at the residence of the French ambassador. Likewise, the *Commandement de la securité civile* (Civil Protection Command Control) operated through a front structure in Port-au-Prince and a back-up command structure in Fort-de-France. In this logic, sites in the cosmonation are selected to participate in the elaboration of such a crossborder bureaucracy depending on their positioning advantages (tactical resources, personnel, and

equipment) and proximity to the theater of operations, measured in terms of geographical distance and strategic location. Cosmonational bureaucracy facilitates decentralization, enhances network governance, and sustains crossborder mobility.

## France's Centre de crise and Haiti's (2010) Earthquake

Any analysis of the Centre de crise's intervention in Port-au-Prince to help rescue French nationals and provide humanitarian aid to earthquake victims requires some general knowledge about the community, its demographic size, geographical locations, and institutions (Comfort et al. 2010). At the time of the earthquake, there were some 1,600 French citizens living in Haiti, about two-thirds of them permanent residents and the rest individuals who had spent from 6 months to 3 years in the country. They included civil servants, businessmen, employees of French enterprises, NGO or UN staff, including personnel of the Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti; MINUSTAH), and French citizens of Haitian descent (France. Ambassade à Port-au-Prince 2009 France Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2013). Most of them lived in the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area, the rest chiefly in Cap-Haitian (north) or Jacmel (southeast), these being three cities where the French diplomatic corps is located.

Among the institutions in which French nationals provide their services are the Institut Français en Haiti, five Alliances Françaises located in Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, Cayes, Jacmel, and Jérémie, the Chambre de Commerce Franco-Haitienne, and the Lycée Alexandre Dumas, which enrolls yearly 737 students, 161 of whom are French (France, Ambassade à Port-au-Prince 2015). L'Union des Français de l'Etranger (UFE) and Association Démocratique des Français de l'Etranger (ADFE) are also known to be active in Haiti during French presidential elections. French NGOs have penetrated most of the sectors of Haiti's national life. Best known among them are Action Contre la Faim, Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement, AgriSud International, Agronomes et Vétérinaires sans Frontières, Architecture de l'Urgence, Architectes sans Frontières, ATD Quart Monde, Bibliothèques sans Frontières, Care France, Croix Rouge Française, Développer-Former-Informer, Douleurs sans Frontières, Entrepreneurs du Monde, France Volontaires, Groupe de Recherches et d'Echanges Technologiques, Handicap International, Initiative Développement, InterAide, Médecins

du Monde Français, Médecins sans Frontières France, Pharmacie et Aide Humanitaire, Plan International, Planète Urgence, Secours Catholique de Caritas, Secours Islamique, Solidarité Internationale, SOS Enfants sans Frontières, Sport sans Frontières, and Groupe URD (France, Ambassade à Port-au-Prince 2009).

The earthquake took place on January 12, 2010, at 4:53 PM, and the French government was among the first to dispatch humanitarian aid to Port-au-Prince from its military base in nearby Martinique (France, UN Representation 2010).

The first two planes carrying humanitarian aid (food, medications, and medical and security personnel) were dispatched the following day from Marseilles (France) and Fort-de-France (Martinique). Other military planes and landing crafts were also deployed immediately and brought navy firemen, humanitarian freight, vehicles, heavy equipment, food supplies, water, generators, and tents (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010). According to an official report by the Cour des comptes, during the emergency phase of the operation from January 13 to January 22, the French contingent undertook five rotating flights per day between Haiti and Fort-de-France or the Hexagon and, on their way out, evacuated 1,164 French nationals, 888 Haitians, 36 other Europeans, and 56 additional persons from other countries (France, UN Representation 2010). On their way in, these flights brought in 1,173 French personnel (civil protection staff, military police, mobile accident units, soldiers, firemen, and medical teams).

The CDC intervenes foremost to rescue French citizens, to prevent further harm, and to ensure their security. Additionally, as a humanitarian mission, it also provides humanitarian aid to afflicted members of the host population. However, not every French emigrant wished to be repatriated. Some preferred to remain in the country for personal reasons. As part of the rescue mission, the CDC was also involved in the identification of the deceased among the diaspora and the repatriation of their remains (France, Cour des Comptes 2013: 37).

In such overseas interventions, the CDC makes use of the assets of the cosmonation wherever they are located. A repatriation crisis concerns all sites of the cosmonation, since people may be stranded or their sites may be used because of logistics facilities they offer. Such an undertaking shows how sites are connected to each other and can be selected for use because of their *pre-positioning* or *positioning* advantages—that is, the ability to use personnel and material available near the site of intervention and to

transport repatriated people and emergency patients for immediate medical attention. In the case of the 2010 earthquake, Martinique was tactically more suitable than metropolitan France as a base of humanitarian operations because of its proximity to Haiti, and primary aid was quickly assembled there with the aim of being the first French team to deliver medical and security assistance to the earthquake victims. "The transport *Francis Garnier*, based in Fort-de-France, was the first military vessel to unload trucks and engineering equipment in Port-au-Prince. The 33rd Marine Infantry Regiment, also based in Fort-de-France, deployed a tactical staff post on site to relay the orders of the armed forces in the Antilles" (Pierre 2010).

Managing a crisis among the segment of the population living outside the territorial boundaries of the state displays a form of cosmonationalization of the CDC. It reflects both managerial cosmonationalism and cosmonational management. In this capacity, the CDC is a leader in transnationally and locally managing the crisis and provides updates and assessment to any site in the cosmonation that may request it. For instance, family members dispersed around the globe can access the CDC as their primary source of information (Centre de Crise 2012: 16), since a crisis does not concern only a locale, but also other sites in the cosmonational network.

Cosmonationalization of the CDC includes the provision of information to the rest of the network, such as static information posted on its website that any member of the cosmonation can access or information sharing that requires human interaction. This extends to the CDC's involvement in crises inside the Hexagon not as a manager but as a responder to incoming calls from both diaspora/postdiaspora people and homelanders seeking news about the fate of loved ones. For example, if there is an inundation in an area of the Hexagon, former members of the community now living outside the country may call the CDC to inquire about the fate of their relatives.

Likewise, repatriation is a cosmonational operation. Professional teams and planes on a rescue mission depart from various sites of the cosmonation including, in the case of the Haitian earthquake, Paris, Marseilles, Martinique, and Guadeloupe. On the way in, such planes carry humanitarian aid and intervention personnel, and on the way out, they transport French citizens, citizens of member states of the European Union, and local victims going to join family abroad or seek medical treatment in France. These rescue and repatriation missions express both French

cosmonationalism and, at another level, European cosmonationalism. France finds itself responsible for the safety, not only of its citizens, but also of citizens of the European Union. By convention, member states are required to offer such repatriation services to other members of the European Union. Ethnicity has not disappeared with the advent of globalization and cosmonationalization, it has simply re-territorialized its space of interaction and expression (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

In the cosmonational perspective, one does not speak only of repatriation but also of mobility or circularity, since some people may request help to return home to the Hexagon, an overseas territory, or another diasporic site. This is seen again in the example of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, when some French residents joined family members in metropolitan France, the French territories of Martinique or Guadeloupe, Israel, Canada, or the United States.

As the CDC attempts to resolve a crisis abroad, it may have to deal with its own internal frictions. The difficulty comes about as a result of the complexity of governing an expanded bureaucratic structure set in place for the purpose of intervening in a specific human crisis situation that requires assembling funds, personnel, and associates in a short period of time. During a human crisis in an emigrant site, the capability of the CDC is enhanced by the collaboration of other agencies or ministries of government, each with its own bureaucratic culture and interests. It becomes a crossborder bureaucracy in flux with local cells of operation on site made up of local staff from the embassy or consulate, charged with carrying out the mission until operators arrive from abroad.

In its intervention after the Port-au-Prince earthquake, the CDC combined both humanitarian aid and rescue mission, not all the foreign countries concerned were able or had the financial or even logistical means to do so. The primary goal of each interventionist state was the safety of its nationals. If it has the means or considers it necessary, an intervening state may offer humanitarian aid to the host community in distress. This reveals that not all states intervene with humanitarian intent vis-à-vis the larger affected population. "Some states intervened mainly to rescue their citizens and left shortly thereafter," a report on the earthquake in Haiti notes (France, Cour des Comptes 2013).

All in all, in its multitasking capacity as a crossborder agency, the CDC plays a *preventive role,* collecting and sharing information with diasporans; its analysts seek global information on a permanent basis to advise interested parties and keep French citizens abroad out of harm's way.

Additionally, it plays an *analytical role*, assessing incoming information, interpreting data, and deciding on how best to respond to the presumed level of threat. Furthermore, it plays a *coordinating role*, enabling all the government actors to collaborate and contribute to interventions in their respective domains of competence and capacity. And, finally, it plays a *managerial role* in the network governance of a crisis. In these various capacities, the CDC projects itself as a flexible bureaucracy that expands transnationally and contracts demographically depending on the task at hand.

## Crossborder Bureaucracy: Contraction and Temporality

A crisis may differently affect the shape a bureaucracy takes in regard to (a) the global network of interactions it is enmeshed in; (b) the density and depth of crossborder relations it sustains; and (c) the cosmonational deployment of the agency managing the crisis or the geographical expansion of the bureaucratic structure of intervention that it generates. The first (a) refers to not only relations between the Centre de crise and the theater of operation, but also the global recruitment of NGOs and keeping family members and interested parties across the homeland and the diaspora informed. The second (b) refers to relations with French citizens in different sites impacted by the crisis, including family members, business associates, and civic associations with which they have established links for support (transfer of money, travel to other sites for refuge, repatriation, etc.). The third (c) refers to sustained relationships that peak during a crisis both because all those involved have a stake in its quick resolution and because of individuals from different geographical sites helping on the ground.

The homeland agency that oversees the resolution of a crisis experienced by emigrants is called on to develop or activate a cosmonational structure to manage the event. What is the organizational structure that such an operation may take, and does it feed or reflect the specificity of a cosmonational system? A bureaucracy is likely to develop such a structure, use an existing structure and give it a cosmonational orientation, or amplify the existing orientation. A crisis provides an opportunity to understand a crossborder structure, the conditions under which it is deployed, how it feeds a cosmonation, how it may evolve, and how it manifests its flexibility. No country has a bureaucracy on site for every eventual crisis that may affect its emigrants. In the Centre de crise, France has a flexible

and compact agency that can be deployed according to needs, regional specificity, and degree of intervention.

Bureaucratic contraction and expansion are intrinsic to the CDC's operation. As a cosmonational bureaucracy, it may expand to resolve a specific issue, and once this has been achieved, it may contract again. It contracts in ordinary times and expands in times of crisis, when other agencies participate in decision-making, the assignment of tasks, and the oversight of operations. Enlargement of the bureaucracy also occurs when there are denser relations with partner agencies either in the homeland or abroad. At the homeland level, this enlargement is seen through the addition of representatives from other state agencies involved (military, intelligence, environment, and finance) who set the conditions under which they will collaborate, define the parameters of intervention, and spell out the role they want to play. At the local diaspora site level, this enlargement materializes through the addition of individuals from other agencies recruited by the embassy and staff from the Prime Minister Office.

After the news of the earthquake that struck Port-au-Prince in 2010 was communicated to the CDC's Paris office, coordinating a rescue mission abroad was made more complex by the difference in time zones. The earthquake occurred on January 12, 2010, at 4:53 local time, which corresponds to around 11 PM in Paris, that is, not during the day, when agents are at their desk and available, but at night, when they were away from the office. Coordinating the intervention thus fell to the night shift of the CDC's 24/7 quarter-watch (*cellule Quart-veille*), a smaller contingent than the daytime staff (Bernard 2010). A key variable in the functioning of a crossborder multisite bureaucracy is activation. There is a time factor to account for in the multiple activation processes. The units involved are not activated at the same time because of a time lag between headquarters and the subsidiary units. The center becomes operational before a satellite does, and processes such as the recruitment of personnel take place at different times. Since personnel may be drawn from different sites abroad, it takes time to assemble the team. The operation is in full swing when the time lag between center and periphery has been resolved. Since such a structure is set up to manage a specific crisis and is not meant to be permanent, it is disassembled at the end of such a crisis, when the interventionists return home to their permanent places of residence. Crises demonstrate both how the CDC facilitates the practice of substantive citizenship by emigrants and how the French embassy or consulate contributes to the process.

## The Embassy as a Cosmonational Node

Shortly after the earthquake, the residential compound of the French ambassador was transformed into the local headquarters of the Centre de crise, where the heads of French NGOs, leaders of the local French business community, and representatives from diverse agencies of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs met to coordinate their activities on the ground. In a first step, the CDC dispatched a contingent of 30 agents from the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs to provide backup to the ambassador, assess the needs, and make recommendations to headquarters in Paris. "[D]epartures from Port-au-Prince and reception in Fort de France or even directly in Paris . . . [were] made easier by sending consular staff to Haiti. . . . The CDC very quickly sent an initial reconnaissance team into the area and provided the services of both an experienced . . . and a young manager for several weeks" (France, Cour des Comptes 2013: 23, 24). In the second phase, the CDC proceeded with full deployment: "Three *détachements d'intervention catastrophes aéromobiles* (DICA) were deployed . . . DICA Antilles, DICA Brignole, DICA Guyane[,] and a command unit was rapidly installed in the French Embassy buildings" (ibid., 25).

During a crisis, the CDC activates and strengthens its relations with the French embassy in the country affected because of logistical coordination needs. The embassy does not cease its routine tasks and rotation of duty, but adds this contingency to it (France, Cour des Comptes 2013: 223). The embassy serves as a coordination site for interactions among various branches of government, NGO associates, and regular embassy personnel, with all the friction that may result. From this angle, the embassy can be seen as a cosmonational node engaged in crossborder collaboration with other nodes and in reinforcing postdiaspora consciousness of emigrant citizens because of the *service de proximité* it provides.

Traditionally, the principal role of the embassy has been to represent the homeland state vis-à-vis a hostland government, with the ambassador delegated to intervene on behalf of his or her government. The ambassador operates as a go-between, presenting the views of his or her government to the hostland government and submitting the views of the hostland government to the homeland government. The embassy is considered to be foreign territory, and as a foreign diplomat, the ambassador is immune, not from arrest, but from prosecution.

These features have not changed, but what have evolved are the relations between the embassy and the diaspora/postdiaspora. This is visible in the proliferation of the so-called *services de proximité* that the government makes available to the diaspora through decentralization. In addition, the change can be observed in the new role of the embassy in overseeing local diaspora elections (electoral college, committees, commissions, consular councils, and economic councils) and in the inclusion of diasporans in the government's management of French national affairs abroad. Through these developments, the embassy has become more actively embedded in diaspora/postdiaspora affairs.

At the bureaucratic level, the ambassador has become less strategic than before; he is no longer the only official who represents the diaspora vis-à-vis the homeland government. This go-between function is also carried out by both elected parliamentarians who live abroad and represent their constituency and the leadership of the Assemblée des Français de l'étranger, which serves as a platform for policy recommendation and administrative oversight. In matters of *economic diplomacy* or *emergency diplomacy*, the ambassador seeks more cooperation from the diaspora business elite, becomes more involved in diaspora affairs, to the extent of inviting their input, and assesses any negative impact on the diaspora before presenting any recommendations to the homeland government for implementation. At a time of crisis, an ambassador with skills in emergency diplomacy will be more useful than an ambassador with business or international relations skills, because he will be called on to provide safe shelters, collaborate with CDC and other agencies from the Hexagon, and ease repatriation procedures, if needed.

Until recently, the embassy functioned as a formal representation of the government in the sovereign territory of the hostland state in all matters concerning relations between states (politics, trade, terrorism, military cooperation, and humanitarian causes). The embassy was also uniquely in charge of diaspora affairs (diasporic communities, tourists, employees of private firms, students, and volunteers). The role of the embassy as an intermediary between two governments used to be its raison d'être, with the secondary role of helping diasporans by providing limited services such as delivery of passports, protection against discrimination, legal advice in cases of incarceration, and welfare support for the impoverished. With the paradigmatic shift to cosmonationalism, embassies now have the role of ensuring that state services are properly administrated and made available to the diaspora community

in the district. In a more marked way, the embassy has the role outside a crisis of enforcing the substantive citizenship of diasporans. Thus, the embassy has evolved in its relations with the diaspora, passing from a "national logic" in which it views diasporans as second-class citizens to the adoption of a "cosmonational logic" in which it sees the emigrant as a postdiasporan on a par with the homeland citizenry. In the national mode, *ephemeral task forces* are established to solve any issues raised by the diaspora, while in the cosmonational mode, *permanent agencies are created* or the vocation or orientation of existing agencies and structures are expanded extraterritorially to interface with postdiaspora everyday needs (see also Fonbaustier 2012: 1).

During a crisis, the ambassador becomes a central figure, coordinating on the ground, receiving messages from locals, dispatching information and requests to the CDC, providing information to homelanders and diaspora communities, and responding to invitations for media presentation, which affords an opportunity to present the effort of the homeland government in a positive light.

## Human Security and the Postdiaspora Condition

Human security is not simply a matter of protecting individuals inside the homeland; it also involves protecting members of the polity residing outside the territorial borders of the state. We have seen how the study of human security has enlarged its parameters from the national to the extraterritorial to the cosmonational. The newly discovered and theorized cosmonational dimension provides an angle that helps one understand the shift to the postdiaspora condition. Within the space of the cosmonation, the state constructs new bureaus to carry out its transnational activities, appoints transnational bureaucrats to handle these assignments, and realigns its priorities to cover this expanded territory.

Originally crossborder services were provided by mainland agencies to recipients on the basis of their ability to access these from abroad, but little effort was made to develop satellite agencies in these diaspora communities. The embassy or consulate served as an intermediary, providing forms and directing patrons to the right office in the homeland. Even today, this is commonly the case with the embassies and consulates of countries with active emigrant populations. However, cosmonationalization is necessarily tied to the deployment of a crossborder bureaucracy, enabling embassies and consulates to serve both homeland residents and

diaspora communities. Cosmonationalization has made the everyday practice of postdiaspora citizenship a reality.

Underlying human security intervention by the homeland is the recognition that emigrant rights to personal security have not been met by foreign governments. To remedy this situation, homeland governments have taken it upon themselves to protect the rights of their citizens abroad and ensure their welfare wherever they reside. Homeland state intervention in a crisis situation must be viewed as an expression of cosmonational solidarity, based on shared citizenship.

In 2014, with the overhaul of *Assemblée des Français de l'étranger*, the establishment of consular councils, and the enlargement of the electoral college from 155 members to more than 500, the position of the diaspora/postdiaspora has shifted from one dependent on services provided by the consulate to one of engaging in designing the content of such services and oversight of their management. Postdiasporans are now members of consular committees and commissions, developing recommendations to improve the delivery of services abroad in the areas of scholarship, professional formation, social security, and human protection during a crisis. These consular councils are established in diaspora/postdiaspora districts with highest demographic concentrations (France, Cour des Comptes 2013: 27). With these changes, emigrants have become part of the governance structure of the consulate. They are no longer simply consumers of government services but embedded in them as members of consular councils. They have become integrated in the governance of the cosmonation through their local contributions and participation in the delivery of state services and in so doing, have propelled themselves into the postdiaspora condition.

Human security for emigrants must also be seen as an effort to level the playing field of citizenship and bring about equality of access for all because its goal is to redress the asymmetrical relations between state security and human security and between human security in the homeland and human security for emigrants. For emigrants, human security is a way of re-engineering *redistributive justice* and upholding *citizenship rights*, putting the postdiaspora somewhat on a par with the homeland citizenry.

In brief, focusing on crises also helps us understand how diasporic communities help each other in such a situation, sometimes with the mediation of the CDC and at other times without it. Interaction within the cosmonation can be seen as multidirectional and not simply a binary relationship between the homeland and diaspora, but also a mutual

relationship between multiple diasporic sites. Interaction between all these entities during a crisis is often influenced by patterns of exchange before the crisis. Outside a crisis period, these interactions between sites take various forms, ranging from "student exchanges to decentralized cooperation, from twinning to economic partnership agreements" (France, CDC 2012: 7). Interaction among sites via human security protection is a manifestation of the postdiaspora condition based on shared citizenship performance.

## Conclusion

Focusing on assistance to compatriots abroad through an analysis of the 2010 Port-au-Prince earthquake shows, not only how the Centre de crise helps stranded emigrants, but how such intervention reflects cosmonationalism and contributes to strengthening the CDC itself.

The intervention of the CDC in crisis situations, whether natural or man-made, increases citizens' awareness of belonging to a cosmonation. Emigrants come to expect the homeland to come to their aid. Intervention by the CDC is understood as a national responsibility, since the agency is seen as having a mission to rescue French citizens stranded abroad. This constitutes recognition of the diaspora or postdiaspora forms that the expression of citizenship may take outside the homeland.

Although living abroad, a member of a cosmonation enjoys the protection offered by the homeland state. Awareness of one's belonging to a cosmonation results in different perceptions of an individual's options in a crisis. In a crisis situation, French citizens abroad have alternatives the locals do not have: they can remain where they are, return home, or travel to a third country. Postdiaspora citizenship is here enacted, performed and experienced through the rights of return by repatriation that emigrants enjoy.

Like the inclusion of diaspora parliamentarians in the homeland legislature, postdiaspora marks a shift, a transformation, and the advent of a new reality. In this development, a postdiaspora, as in the case of a diaspora, is no longer conceived as an extraterritorial entity and appendix of the homeland state (derived from the logic of assimilation theory) or simply as a crossborder extension of the nation (derived from the logic of transnationalist theory), but rather as constitutive of the nation and the state in the formation of a cosmonation (derived from the logic of cosmonationalist theory).

Postdiaspora is the diaspora reconfigured in the context of the cosmonation. What was considered outside the boundaries of the homeland is within the space of the cosmonational state. In this framework, citizenship trumps extraterritorial residence and postdiasporization has come to realization through different routes. Though postdiasporization via cosmonationalism is simply one such itinerary, this form has been in gestation for many years. However, the conditions for the fulfillment of its trajectory have become widely available only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the advent of the information technology revolution, which allows for greater transfrontier mobility, crossborder interactions, and cosmonational integration. After World War II, some states like France began to develop a cosmonational infrastructure of services, during a period in which cosmonational migration networks became more visible and better understood. These occurrences helped facilitate the reincorporation of the diaspora into the homeland polity, giving rise to the multisite nation and the postdiaspora way of life.

Another form of the cosmonation in gestation, to whose consolidation the Centre de crise also contributes, is cosmoeuropeanization. Cosmoeuropeanism refers to the notion that Europe is a federation of autonomous countries united for the welfare of their territorial and extraterritorial populations. Human security protection of a citizen of any of these countries living in a hostland can be provided by any member state of the Union (Traité sur l'Union européenne, Article 23). Such protection is often provided in repatriation situations. When conflict broke out in Georgia in summer 2008, for example, French military aircraft repatriated French and EU citizens (Centre de Crise 2012: 28). These EU citizens were repatriated by the French on the basis of shared European Union citizenship.

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CHAPTER 6

# The Cosmonational State

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, states have experienced mounting stress as a result of massive international migration, widespread diasporization, entrenched market capitalism, economic neoliberalism, and globalization fueled by the information technology revolution. The modern state has neither remained the same nor vanished; rather, it is undergoing restructuring in many different ways in order to meet new extraterritorial obligations in its metamorphosis into a cosmonational state.

This new development in state transformation is largely seen in multiple ways: in the extraterritorial expansion of the membership of the parliament; the mobility and virtuality feeding the transnational circuit of state institutions; the decentralization and cosmonationalization of the delivery of state services attending to the needs of both homeland and overseas populations; the establishment of state administrative agencies abroad; the rise of the crossborder state bureaucracy and elections abroad, which require state monitoring, oversight, and involvement.

## Background Literature

Scholars have studied the state from the perspectives of both sending and receiving immigrants, considering their role in the process, and globalization as a central factor in its remaking. The interface and interplay of state and globalization is still an issue in need of adequate conceptualization, to



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which this research seeks to contribute. The recent search for a theoretical explanation has followed different directions, fuelled by ongoing controversy and debate in the literature over the nature of the state and the different forms that globalization embodies. It all depends on whether state and globalization are perceived to emanate from the same logic, as theorized by William I. Robinson (1998, 2001), whereby they coevolve, or from two different logics, as proposed by Max Weber ([1922] 1972), whereby market and politics pursue different paths. In this debate, economic and political globalization have occupied center stage at the expense, for example, of diasporic globalization (Laguerre 2007).

This chapter provides a different perspective on the embeddedness of globalization in state structures, based on the role of diasporas in influencing the geographical expansion of the nation-state and the global interactions that this form of global deployment generates. The state engages in different cycles and circuits of globalization. The cycles identify different tempos of each circuit, and the circuits point to different cycles, causing cycles and tempos to crisscross. In this scheme, the theory of diasporic/postdiasporic globalization refers to a specific circuit and tempo. This sheds light on the globalization of the state. In other words, the contributions of politics and market do not subside, but complement that of diasporization. Focusing on diaspora as a factor of state remaking unveils the transformation of the nation-state into a cosmonation-centric state, leading to the reincorporation of the diaspora into the meaningful affairs of the state and the engendering of the postdiaspora condition.

Unlike proponents of binary relations and impact studies, globalization may not be perceived as the main lever in state transformation. Instead, a number of analysts see the state as the architect of its global expansion, implosion, and crossborder institutional practices. Panitch bluntly states that "today's globalization both is authored by states and is primarily about reorganizing, rather than bypassing, states" (1994: 63). Others see a permutation of the nation-state into a "global state" as consistent with "global society" (Maus 2006: 465). Shaw (1997) points to state transformation in the context of globalization by stressing different forms of the state through history in different areas of the world. Keil asserts that "globalization makes states [and] creates new forms of states" (1998: 617), and Barrow argues that "nation-states are the principal agents of globalization as well as the guarantors of the political and material conditions necessary for global capital accumulation" (2005:

123). Chimni argues that the imperial global state is underpinned by "a web of sub-national authorities and spaces that represent, along with non-governmental organizations, its decentralized face" (2004: 1).

For some analysts, the permeation of the international into the national transforms the latter into a node of a global circuit or part of a network. Therefore, its action reflects the logic of the network and not exclusively its own, self-generated logic. For example, local economies are now integrated into the global finance system and reflect the logic of this larger network (Holm and Sorensen 1995).

Those who focus on the role of globalization in the shaping of state structures highlight the heterogeneity of outcomes. For example, Mann does not see the impact of globalization as producing similar results (Baubock 2003; Hansen et al. 2002; Keck et al. 2002; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 2003b, Shaw 1997; Sklair 2001; Tarrow 2005, 2001). As he put it, "these patterns are too varied to permit us to argue simply either that the nation-state and the nation-state system are strengthening or weakening" (Mann 1997).

Other analysts still propose that political and economic globalization disarticulates the traditional relationship between state and nation (see, e.g., Held et al. 1999). Once this premise has been adopted as a basis of common understanding, some interpret the outcome of the process as the weakening of the state, the end of the state, the eclipse of the state, or simply the adjustment of the state to external factors. The premise used shapes the contours of the argument.

Another line of argument takes the external factor as a given and proceeds to show internal mechanisms at play in terms of denationalization, lack of control, and limited sovereignty in economic policies, political engagements, cultural practices, border control, and crossborder practices in general (Jessop 2002; Sassen 1996). This is globalization from the outside looking in. This research takes a different stance. It analyzes the state from inside out, focusing on how diasporization changes the configuration of the state. In other words, it asks how diasporization implodes the state and simultaneously leads to the germinating of the postdiaspora condition.

The debate on the interface of the state with the globalization process so far has been confined to discussions of how globalization is undermining state sovereignty; loss of control because of the impact of outside force; the role of multinational corporations in influencing the direction of state policies and practices; transnational social movements spearheaded

by NGOs headquartered elsewhere that operate inside the state with the capacity of neutralizing or undermining specific state policies or agendas; the role of diasporas in intervening in state affairs; and the different impacts of world political or economic crises on vulnerable countries (Burton 1972; Strange 1996; Evans 1997; Keil 1998; Poggi 1990; Ohmae 1990; Barrow 1993; Shaw 1994; Panitch 1996).

## The State Remade

The trend in the literature has been to highlight 1) the ways in which diasporans intervene in the affairs of the kin state, 2) forms of interactions of the homeland government with the diaspora, and 3) the creation of a ministry or agency for diaspora affairs. While many emphasize the modes of inscription of the diaspora in hostland states, fewer analysts focus on the reshaping of the nation-state, especially the change that has taken place in its form of organization and practice as a consequence of diasporic interface and intervention. What is missing from the current perspective or approach is not only a focus on the anchorage of the nation in multiple territories but also on how this multisite diaspora engagement implodes the shape of the homeland state (Laguerre 2016). The cosmonation implies a diversity of territories in which the nation choreographs its identity, its transnational shape is projected by the cosmonation-centric state, and postdiaspora reveals a new category of stakeholders. Neither nation nor state has a fixed structure; rather, the two coevolve under the pressure of circumstances and take different forms, without disappearing, as *cosmonational laboratories* of identity constructions and crossborder political formations and practices.

The state functions on three registers: its interaction with the homeland population that pays taxes and requires certain services from its government; with the diaspora and postdiaspora or entities that in their own way influence the shape of the state through interventions and interactions with the homeland; and with the cosmonation, whose interest transcends each of the units it comprises. What has happened thus far is the recognition of all actors in the state's midst—the homeland society, the diaspora, and postdiaspora–and its effort to circumvent and discipline these groups by incorporating their representatives into the governance of the cosmonation. This ongoing process is a learning experience for all players, who develop a modus vivendi adjusting to one another. Often the discussion

about the rise of the cosmonation assumes that it either replaces the nation-state or is a new face of it.

The state has not vanished, but it has been transformed. It continues to play a central role; the homeland population continues to maintain its distinctive relations with the cosmonational state, as all the diaspora units do in their own ways (Hovanessian 1998). What is new is that the cosmonation establishes itself as a global arena for social interaction among the members of this reconstituted and reconstructed global social formation and, in the process, influences the reshaping of the diaspora, the role of homeland society, and the configurations of the expanded state. The new role of the state in attempting either to reduce or to magnify the influence of the cosmonation by redefining the citizenship and nationality status of the diaspora reflects the new reality of the dialogue between state and diaspora in the production of the cosmonation. Without completely losing their identity while coping with their transnational trajectories, there is an incremental convergence of state, diaspora, postdiaspora, and nation as they adjust to one another in the formation, consolidation, and enlargement of the cosmonation-centric state.

Unlike those who argue that the state disappears or is weakened as a result of globalization, I see rather a consolidation of the state reinforced by the existence of the cosmonation. Here the state continues to be the site that links "nationality and transnationality under one roof." In this scenario, "this transnational integration of the society is promoted by a multitude of individual links across borders .... In this process, transnational integration is modeled as a process of individual relationships in networks and not as a process of supranational state-building" (Munch 2001). As one shifts the discussion from individual practices to the establishment of transnational state structures, one is right to argue that this is also a process of cosmonational state-building.

The cosmonational state, a politico-legal transnational social formation that attends to the needs of a multisite nation, is the newest phase of transformation of the Westphalian state. What is important to understand is that "the state is not a fixed entity but a changeable, historically contingent and developing one, taking different forms and fulfilling different needs at various times and places" (Keating 2001). Other researchers concur with this assessment and see the outcome as a necessary adjustment since "the powers of the nation-state have varied, but this very variation has allowed them to survive" (Hall 2003). In a way, the enlargement of

the nation through the creation of the cosmonation helps strengthen the state as well because of the consolidating role of the diaspora, which can contribute to its rescue in moments of crisis in its relations with other countries.

The cosmonational state will continue to exist because of the infrastructure it develops and maintains. Furthermore, the institutions it establishes provide key services to its constituency, including the protection of territory, the regulation of transborder movements, and the maintenance of legal relationships with external actors, multinational organizations, and foreign countries—all aimed at promoting the welfare of its citizens at home and abroad.

Cosmonational institutions function both as conduits for transnational interactions and as representative bodies, whose public mandate is to ensure the well-being of the dispersed membership. These institutions are created not only by nation-states and their diaspora but also by cosmonations with or without a homeland, such as the Roma. The International Romani Union, with observer status at the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC), coordinates and monitors activities in more than two dozen states, acting as an umbrella cosmonational institution. In addition, the European Rom Parliament, created after the collapse of the Soviet Union, seeks to function like a state parliament and interface with the European Union Parliament to address issues of concern to Roma. This project, if realized, will be another example of a cosmonational institution (Feys 1997; Liegeois 1994).

The cosmonational process repositions basic instruments of the state, adds global tasks to some ministries, reorients the agenda of others, induces more collaboration among agencies, transforms their leadership and mode of operation, induces latent conflict among pro-change and pro-status quo proponents, posits the primacy of constitutional reforms to accommodate the pro-diaspora faction, and enlarges the scope of representation without broadening the basis of taxation.

## Metaphors Reflective of the Cosmonational State

States have developed a number of metaphors to indicate the inclusion of diaspora in the policies of their administrative practices. I call them metaphors because they refer to de facto practices; however, they are not de jure recognized by hostland states. A state can make laws for itself but cannot impose them on another country, especially if this constitutes an

infringement on sovereignty, autonomy, and constitutional prerogatives. By proclaiming the diaspora to be a unit of its political organization, the state adds an extraterritorial component to its composition. This is unlike the colonial situation, since colonies are legal possessions of the metropolitan center.

By now, several states have reconfigured diaspora communities as extensions of their geographical space. For example, in the case of Haiti, the state conceives the diaspora between 1986 and 2003 as a symbolic overseas nonterritorial extension of the Republic. Until 1962, Haiti was divided into five departments (Artibonite, North, Northwest, West, and South). In that year, the country was repartitioned into nine departments (Artibonite, Center, Grand'Anse, North, Northeast, Northwest, West, South, and Southeast). After the collapse of the kleptocratic, dictatorial Duvalier regime in 1986, the concept of the tenth department was popularly used by government officials, diasporic political leaders, and academic analysts in reference to the nonterritorial departmental status of the diaspora, gesturing that its membership is actively participating in the refoundation of the crossborder nation and the restructuring of the expanded state. When the Nippes Department was carved out of the Grand'Anse Department and created in 2003 as the official intramural tenth territorial department of the country, referring to the Haitian diaspora as the tenth department became obsolete and slowly ceased. No concerned effort and attempt so far has been made to rename the diaspora as the 11th department of the half-island republic.

The practice of referencing the diaspora as a demographic unit of the state is not peculiar to Haiti. Other countries have developed a similar strategy for the same reason, that is, to redefine the country as inclusive of its diaspora and to recognize the contributions of the diaspora to the itinerary, trajectory, and destiny of the homeland.

To explain the geographical expansion of the nation across the globe, states have used metaphors such as "tenth department" (Haitian diaspora), "fourteenth region" (Chilean diaspora), "l'Altra Italia" (Italian diaspora), "eleventh constituency" (Croatian diaspora), "fourth province of Poland" (Polish diaspora), "fifth region" (Ecuadoran diaspora), "fifteenth department" (Salvadoran diaspora), "fifth region" (Peruvian diaspora), and "twenty-seventh region of France" (the French diaspora, officially referred to as Français de l'étranger) to indicate the transnational integration of the diaspora into their everyday affairs and emphasize that the diaspora is part of the nation or cosmonation (Bolzman 2002, Gabaccia et al. 2007,

Rodriguez 2005, Berg 2010, Lopata 1976: 22–25, Boccagni 2011a: 318, 2011b, Shain 2007).

The department or region metaphor used in reference to Haiti, Chile, and France stresses the administrative reorganization and demographic expansion of the state. In this context, the homeland society is conceived of as having offshoots elsewhere that the state is called upon to include in its administration to the extent that such units may in one way or another affect its normal everyday functioning.

The constituency or circumscription metaphor used by Croatia, France, Italy, and Portugal refers to the political inclusion of the diaspora through parliamentary representation. Here, a specific organ of the state has a cosmonational mission and identity. In this scenario, the diaspora is constitutionally incorporated into the country. Such a legal status makes the process more sustainable over time.

The overseas metaphor often used in French official documents is loaded with a different set of meanings, referring to groups the state never considers outside its jurisdictional parameters, such as those in the overseas territories, which are legally part of the homeland territory, and the diasporans residing in an array of hostlands. A technical distinction separates homeland and overseas French from the French diaspora. Overseas French are already represented in parliament because they reside on French territory. Jurisdictional expansion refers here to the French diaspora who live in foreign countries and are also granted the constitutional right to parliamentary representation in both Houses of Parliament (Senat and Assemblée nationale): the Senate since 1948 and the Chamber of Deputies beginning in 2012.

Through these metaphors, the state projects itself into the cosmonation, geographically expanding its activities. In so doing, it interjects itself into the transglobal network, not simply as a local entity but also as a global social formation that uses the homeland as a basis to provide rationale, coherence, and meaning to it. The state has become not simply a place, but a network of territorial and extraterritorial nodes.

The practice of referencing the diaspora as a numerical region, department, or province creates a potential renumeration problem if the country decides to redefine the boundaries of its electoral units through redistricting, as we have seen in the case of Haiti. However, identifying the diaspora as an "extraterritorial" circumscription, constituency, department, region, or province of the state is a sound way to resolve this impending numerical

redundancy issue, while recognizing their differential territorial or non-territorial identities.

## The Cosmonation-centric State

The state has evolved over time and, in the process, has acquired different forms, "from the princely state to the dynastic state to the territorial state to the nation-state" (Ikenberry 2003) and now to the cosmonational state. The state once defined the character of the nation, but now the nation shapes the character of the state. In the first model, the nation operates inside the geographical and legal boundaries of the state, with state institutions developing to discipline the nation through legal norms, governmental practices, cultural traditions, economic transactions, and international relations. In the second model, the nation defines itself in reference to the state to which it pledges allegiance and from which it expects protection for territorial and human security. In return, the state is expected to guide and protect the nation; the ideal is for the state and the nation to play their respective roles in harmony. In some cases, a state may position itself against the wishes of the nation and endanger the welfare of its people. Dictatorial regimes—which oppress their people or impose unbeneficial regulations that are out of sync with the rest of the population—fall into this "state against nation" category.

The existence of a diaspora changes the dynamics of state and national relations because a portion of the citizenry now lives abroad. As the nation expands, its offshoots located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state participate equally in the affairs of the state. As a consequence of this evolution, the state readjusts its institutions and legal instruments to legitimize transnational practices.

In the traditional model where state and nation coexist in the same territorial space, the state plays a proactive role, while in the second model where the diaspora is added to the equation, it takes a reactive role, responding to its emigrant communities. These diasporic interventions in state affairs are done directly by financing electoral campaigns and indirectly through lobbying efforts abroad for the homeland or against the policies of the state. The state is now constantly readjusting its institutions to pay attention to the diaspora's participation in homeland activities and to its lobbying efforts abroad. In other words, because of pressure from the diaspora, which differs from the pressure of foreign states exerted through international organizations, the state no longer concentrates

exclusively on what goes on inside the homeland territory. In the latter case, the state may decide to opt out of the international bodies in question, but in the former it must deal with the pressure.

The recalibration of the nation into a cosmonation has incrementally led to the reshaping of the state, which can no longer control this larger entity. The preponderance of the cosmonation's role over the homeland state is exacerbated by diaspora interventions in homeland affairs and the dependence of the homeland on the diaspora to meet some of its needs.

## The Production of Cosmonational Laws

The fact of the existence of the cosmonation reshapes constitutions to meet new requirements, such as the production of the cosmonational state and cosmonational laws For this purpose, constitutions have been reformulated, or new constitutions have been promulgated, that pay adequate attention to both the homeland and its diaspora. These amendments to or rewritings of the constitution are needed to include diaspora rights to dual citizenship, to vote abroad, to access state administrative services, and to elect diasporans' own delegates to the homeland legislature, now transformed into a cosmonational parliament.

Constitutions are written by constituent assemblies with members selected from among citizen residents of the territory. They delineate categories of belonging, distinguishing the rights of the inhabitants from those of noncitizens. The extension of citizenship rights to administrative services for diasporans could not be accommodated in the old constitutional regime without some revision. The emerging constitution—the constitution of the cosmonational state—expands rights to individuals who do not live in the homeland or its territories. It is no longer the constitution of a nation-state, previously its hallmark, but that of a cosmonational state.

The following innovations are often addressed by cosmonational constitutions, distinguishing them from the historical norm of strictly nation-state constitutions: the right to dual citizenship status, the right to vote abroad, which allows members of the diaspora to participate in national elections and have a voice in the direction of the country; the right of the diaspora to be represented in the parliament by the candidates they elect; the right of the diaspora to access same or similar administrative services as those provided to homelanders; and the right to particular services abroad tailored to the diaspora's needs.

The process of approving a nation-state constitution is different from approving a cosmonation-state constitution. In the nation-state case, the document is approved by the citizens who live in the homeland and its territories on behalf of themselves. In the cosmonation case, the diaspora is not called to vote on the amendments that concern its status, but rather homelanders may either approve or disapprove such a document on behalf of the diaspora. In other words, homelanders decide whether or not diasporans should be provided with such rights.

Unlike the constitution of the nation-state, whose application is immediate, the application of the cosmonational state constitution depends on a number of logistical and operational factors before some aspects can be implemented. For example, there must be a lack of obstacles from foreign governments, which have the ultimate say on permitting foreign elections to be held in their territories. Here, hostlands may limit the extent to which such rights are exercised. As a result of the role played by a third party, rights are unevenly distributed throughout the cosmonation. Likewise, negative rights or duties—that is, obligations to pay taxes to the homeland state—are also unevenly applied, since most diasporans pay taxes to their jurisdiction of residence and not to the homeland.

## Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

For many years, countries with a segment of their population abroad have devised laws and regulations not only to protect their overseas citizens from discrimination in employment, housing, and the practice of religion, but also to uphold their rights vis-à-vis the homeland in terms of their eligibility for voting abroad, parliamentary representation, social protection, schooling, and human security. Despite the willingness of homelands to intervene beyond their frontiers on behalf of their diaspora, they were unable to make much progress because of problems of logistics. It was really after the World War II that a few governments began to codify and implement such laws by using newly developed transnational and global infrastructure—civilian and military aircrafts, information technology and communication, satellite agencies of the state—to facilitate the crossborder deployment and expansion of state services to those citizens who live or are in transit abroad. Evidently, not every emigration country has been able to do so, but France is one of those states that has ventured in this forward-looking policy path and therefore, provides an expansive empirical basis for emulation and sociological analysis.

Emigration countries, by and large, see the provision of social protection, schooling for compatriot abroad, and human security to emigrants as a body of rights they are entitled to as extraterritorial citizens. The rationale is that citizenship, irrespective of place of residence, provides the same legal status to individuals living either in a territorial or a nonterritorial site of the cosmonation (Barry 2006; Bauböck, Rainer 2003; Spiro 2006). However, it is also noted that citizenship may not be performed identically in diaspora as in the homeland because of local and distance constraints of living in a foreign or adopted country.

Implementation of regulatory and procedural practices by a homeland government vis-à-vis its emigrants indicates the recognition and application of the legal principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, defined as " the authority to affect legal interests—to prescribe rules of law (legislative jurisdiction), to adjudicate legal questions (judicial jurisdiction) and to enforce judgments the judiciary made (enforcement jurisdiction)" (Blakesley 1982: 1109), has been discussed in reference to criminal law, international law, transnational law, and more recently diaspora law conceived as a set of rules that regulate the relations between the diaspora and its homeland (Berge 1931; Colangelo 2014: 1303–1305, Chander 2006; Stigall 2012; Addis 2012; Laguerre 2013). Extraterritorial jurisdiction as discussed in this book is more encompassing than, and is not conceived in the limited meaning given to, the concept of "diasporic jurisdiction," which "refers to the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a kin state over crimes committed against members of its diaspora"(Addis 2012: 1030). It is rather used in the sense of cosmonational jurisdiction, a new form of legal category that concerns the symbolic reunification of diaspora communities with the homeland in the formation of a cosmonation, the production of laws conjointly formulated by these two demographic components, and their crossborder application to constituents that form the ensemble. It is extraterritorial protection beyond the homeland territory as set by cosmonational law.

More precisely, extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of the expanded state and the multisite nation refers to activities of citizens in foreign lands that are constructed as occurring inside the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the homeland. It finds its legitimacy under three sets of body of law: laws developed for exclusive application in reference to the homeland; laws formulated to apply to both the homeland and the diaspora; and laws developed for use exclusively in reference to the diaspora (Laguerre 2013).

Moreover, cosmonational jurisdiction implies that the relationships between the homeland and its diaspora are coded in law, which can be invoked at any time to resolve problems peculiar to any of the sites of the network. It shows that three different processes are at work here: diaspora citizenship relocates the individual inside the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the homeland; the homeland empowers itself with a set of laws to exercise its extraterritorial jurisdiction right; and the willingness of countries to allow extraterritorial jurisdiction activity by a foreign government to deploy on their soil.

In other words, three conditions must be met for extraterritorial jurisdiction to have any effect or even to be invoked: the subject must be living or in transit abroad; the activity or practice under investigation must occur outside the borders of the homeland state; and laws have been enacted to provide a legal basis for intervention by the homeland government and adjudication by the courts. Extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of emigration and cosmonationalization is the right of a state to generate laws in order to provide crossborder services to its citizens, who are living or are in transit outside the physical and geographical borders of the homeland, to intervene on their behalf as a measure of protection, and to uphold their citizenship rights and duties.

## Voting Abroad

A major dimension of the cosmonation-centric state is the recognition of the diaspora as an expansion of the nation. From there, the diaspora derives its rights to vote abroad and fulfill its obligations toward the state. Some vote abroad because they are out of the country during the electoral period or because they reside abroad. Different rules may apply in the tabulation of these votes. For example, the vote of the former may be added to the result of the constituency in which the individual resides in the homeland, while that of the latter clearly belongs to the diaspora circumscription.

Voting abroad transnationally stretches the role of the state in the organization, monitoring, and holding of such elections in foreign countries. Here the presence of the state must be highlighted to indicate its logistical and institutional support, thereby ensuring the success of the constitutionally mandated exercise. Three organs of the state supervise the successful deployment of diaspora elections: the executive branch, the parliament, and the judiciary.

The executive branch helps organize elections through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the support of the embassies, while the Ministry of the Interior coordinates the details of districting and redistricting, polices the delimitation of constituencies and determines the final tally of diaspora votes (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européenes; http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.). The parliament is involved in passing the appropriate diaspora laws, while the judiciary intervenes to resolve electoral problems encountered or created by diaspora candidates. In all of these sectors, one witnesses the transnational extension of state laws, jurisdiction, services, obligations, and interventions beyond the national territories.

Voting abroad identifies three areas that show the transnational deployment of the state: the provision of homeland rights to diasporans through the enactment of a cosmonational constitution; the transnationalization of state services that welcome diasporans to take advantage of these opportunities whether they are located inside or outside the homeland; and diasporans who serve as members of parliament. In the process, diasporans contribute to the governance of the state, representing constituency cohorts who do not live in or pay taxes to the homeland state.

## The Cosmonationalization of State Administrative Services

Cosmonational states provide administrative services to their diasporas aside from elections and voting abroad. These are in-country services delivered to the diaspora; the headquarters of the agencies involved are located in the homeland. If no satellite office exists in the country of residence, these services can be reached by a visit to the homeland or through online transactions. In such a case, the process can be slow, cumbersome, and bureaucratic because of the distance involved and because face-to-face interaction is not possible. Lately, some of these services have been made available online, which makes the process simpler and more efficient for those who are computer literate and have access to the Internet.

In addition to expanding services available in the homeland transnationally, states are also involved in establishing overseas agencies that make physical access easier than before. The French cosmonation is a case in point. Specific French state agencies have expanded transnationally, including the parliament, the education ministry, the CDC, and Securité sociale, which is now represented in 205 French consulates. Consultative

agencies called *comités consulaires pour la protection et l'action sociale* (CCPAS) oversee the disbursement of financial aid or social security benefits to elderly diasporans of French descent, the physically handicapped or challenged, the temporarily unemployed, children in need, and, occasionally, to those in jail, or in transit who are in need of help. Here, expansion means decentralization, rather than adding a transnational agenda to the institution's local brief, as was previously the case. Government agencies that used to be centralized in Paris now delegate part of their task to offshoots abroad.

The cosmonational reshaping of state institutions and administrative agencies takes multiple forms. Sometimes the agency acquires an additional mission; sometimes, its practices are transnationalized; sometimes, as in the case of the hybrid parliament, diasporans are called upon to handle diaspora affairs; and sometimes, satellite offices are set up abroad. All these things contribute to the expansion, remaking, and cosmonationalization of the state.

The most visible impact on the restructuring of a state institution, such as the parliament, occurs with the establishment of overseas constituencies. The total number of deputies and senators remains the same, but a block of seats that used to represent districts inside the homeland are reserved for diaspora representatives in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. This could not be done without redistricting, a change in the electoral landscape achieved by the addition of diaspora constituencies. This redistricting has directly impacted electoral districts in the homeland that were redesigned to meet these new changes. The number of parliamentarians representing the homeland needed to be reduced to make room for those who represent the diasporan/postdiasporan electorate. The cosmonationalization of the state-controlled electoral process occurs with the move from a national electorate residing in the homeland to a global electorate with voters located throughout the world. The mechanisms used by each parliament to navigate the global electoral landscape may differ, but the meaning of this extra-state expansion is the same for all.

In the case of Italy, the senators and deputies of the diaspora are elected by voters who live outside the country, including the candidates themselves (Laguerre 2013). In the Croatian case, they are also elected by the diaspora voters, but the difference between the two situations is that the Italian cosmonation is organized into geographical constituencies and each candidate is elected by the voters in one's electoral district. In contrast, Croatian candidates depend on votes cast throughout the entire diaspora for their election to parliament, not on individual constituencies.

French diaspora senators are likewise elected by a global constituency rather than specific geographical districts.

The role of the diaspora in the cosmonationalization of the state can also be seen in the establishment of the French diaspora electoral college, an additional structure whose mission is to elect diaspora senators. The diaspora college is a component of the Assemblée des Français de l'étranger, which lobbies alongside diasporan parliamentarians for the welfare of the diaspora through state services and upholding of diaspora rights. In this capacity, diaspora parliamentarians have been successful in making state institutions more attuned and responsive to the needs of their constituency. They have had remarkable success in promoting the causes of the diaspora, including access to free education for diaspora students, which was endorsed by President Sarkozy, who decided in 2008 that second, first, and final grade tuition would henceforth, be free for children of the French diaspora, extending to it an advantage enjoyed by the homeland. This policy and practice came to an abrupt end in 2011.

Several sectors of the state have adapted to meet the needs of the diaspora. For example, the establishment of a network of French schools abroad under the aegis of the Agence pour l'enseignement des Français de l'étranger (AEFE) and the provision of social security to the unemployed and the elderly living abroad are examples of this. The AEFE is a cosmonational institution, inasmuch as it oversees French schools abroad that educate children of diaspora parents, ensuring their access to tertiary education in the Hexagon; it also disburses scholarships to some of these students. The goal of the Ministry of Education acting through the AEFE is to provide the same opportunity to succeed to diaspora students that homeland ones enjoy.

The secretariat of the Assemblée des Français de l'étranger, headquartered in Paris, interfaces with both the diaspora and state agencies, working closely with the Ministry of the Interior in supporting and monitoring electoral campaigns; with the Ministry of Education in dealing with diaspora school issues; with the Ministry of Culture in facilitating the diffusion of French culture outside of France; and, above all, with the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs on issues pertaining to diasporan welfare.

## Governance of the Cosmonation

Expressing its global social formation, units of the cosmonation emerge in the realm of governance, implementing the will of the governed. Some cosmonations now have members of their parliaments representing

diaspora constituencies who live in foreign countries, whether as immigrants or as citizens. Italy and Croatia, for example, have developed this dual practice in their parliamentary system with homelander and hostlander representatives. In most countries, the idea of allowing citizens who are resident abroad to serve in parliament is still unthinkable. Countries that allow diasporans to serve in the homeland parliament may, however, have resolved the issue of representation but not of taxation. The paradox thus far is that the cosmonation functions on the basis of representation without taxation in regard to its diasporic nodes. This contrasts sharply with the practice of taxation without representation decried in the colonies, which led first to the American revolution and then to the successful Haitian slave revolution. Note here also the invidious case of the US federal district of Washington, DC, whose licence plates proclaim: "Taxation Without Representation."

In the context of the cosmonational state, members of the diaspora are now involved in three forms of political participation: *ethnic politics*, in which the main concern is the incorporation into the hostland; *diasporic politics*, in which the welfare of the homeland and diaspora takes precedence over all other issues; and *cosmonational politics*, in which elected officials from the diaspora are incorporated into homeland political institutions and homeland agencies are involved in providing services to the diaspora. As parliamentary representatives in the homeland, diasporan elected officials make known the views of the diaspora to this governing body and inform the diaspora of any new development that concerns them or the rest of the cosmonation. In the interim, the homeland parliament is transformed into a global platform that processes policies concerning any and all the members of the cosmonation. The diasporic parliamentarian interlocks the diaspora with the homeland the same way the ethnic politician interlocks it with the hostland.

The governance of the homeland state is no longer the exclusive province of homeland politicians; diaspora and postdiaspora politicians are also involved in the process. This is the case because they are sometimes recruited to lead or staff cabinet ministries, selected to serve as advisors to the president or the prime minister, or elected as members of parliament.

The functioning of the diaspora and the homeland as units of the cosmonation can be seen in the transformation of the homeland's governance (Bogason and Musso 2006; C. Jones et al. 1997). Previously, elected officials and government employees were concerned with the governance

of the homeland as a sovereign state. Any influence from the outside was seen as interference in the country's national affairs and was often condemned in the name of territorial sovereignty and national security. With the existence of diasporas—which feed the coffers of the state—and with diasporic politicians intervening in state affairs, governance of the homeland has shifted from being exclusively that of a nation-state to being that of a cosmonational state. Several postdiasporic politicians who have returned home to serve in the parliament or in the presidential cabinet depend for their success as government officials on diasporic resources (organizational skills, money, networks of contacts, and endorsements).

Similarly, the governance of any diasporic site was previously the exclusive domain of ethnic politicians and grassroots leaders, because the major concern was the enclave's smooth integration into the hostland. With diasporans interested in helping the homeland and participating in its political affairs, homeland politicians are now involved in the governance of diasporic enclaves as well (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003: 588). They do so to prevent such sites from developing a hostile stance vis-à-vis the homeland government, to maintain productive relations with these sites, to fundraise during electoral campaigns, to use diasporic lobbyists to advance whatever agenda the government is pushing, and to spy on the opposition in such enclaves.

Since the end of the Cold War, hostlands no longer require diasporans in their midst to be exclusively loyal to their countries of adoption. Furthermore, with efficient modern transportation facilities and information and communication technologies, multisite families are able to move back and forth between hostland and homeland (Shain 1999, Sheffer 2003).

The homeland's foreign policy has also become a matter of cosmonational governance, since the diaspora sometimes aids the state in the conduct of its diplomatic relations. For example, a state is constrained in what it can do outside the formal arena of diplomatic relations. With the diaspora, the state is able to follow a two-track foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis certain countries: handling the formal aspects of these relations itself while allowing grassroots diasporic groups to control the informal aspects. For example, in the case of an inter-state conflict, formal diplomacy may provide the carrot, while the diaspora delivers the stick. This occurred in Haiti's interactions with the Dominican Republic over the handling of Haitian *braceros* and the forced repatriation of a contingent of such workers during the second term of the Preval administration. The Dominican

government's strategy had been to reinforce its good relations with President Preval by inviting him to undertake formal visits to Santo Domingo, with the usual rituals of signing treaties, without concentrating on solving the Haitian refugee problem. In order to maintain normal relations between the two states, the Haitian government did not want to make a fuss about this. However, the diaspora forcefully intervened to assist what it considered one of the sites of the transglobal network nation by organizing teach-ins in Montreal, Paris, and Miami to decry the plight of compatriots in the Dominican Republic. The Haitian government did not object to these teach-ins, since the diaspora mobilized on its behalf, thereby liberating the government to continue its diplomatic work in the formal arena. In contrast, the Dominican government saw these public protests in North America and Europe as vast campaigns of denigration by the Haitian diaspora and its grassroots allies.

In Paris, Montreal, and Miami, the diaspora invited sympathizers, delivered literature depicting the plight of Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic, and showed documentary films (*Le prix du sucre, Les enfants du sucre, L'empire du sucre, Batey zero,* and *Sucre noir*). As a result, the Dominican diplomatic legations readjusted their strategies to circumvent such bad publicity for their country and the creation of hostile working environments. This "in-your-face" diasporic strategy, of course, alerted Dominican government officials because it could impact the flow of international tourism in the country. The Haitian diaspora in Miami rehearsed this same kind of abrasive intervention and once again, the Dominican diplomatic legation was unable to neutralize the protesters. It was obvious that there was nothing either the Haitian or Dominican government could successfully do about this noisy segment of the Haitian diaspora.

The issue of cosmonational governance gives us a glimpse into the imbrications of the homeland and the diaspora in the production of the transglobal network nation and the cosmonational state. Each contributes in its own way to the public expression and everyday life of the other, and both comprise the transnational space of interaction that distinguishes the transglobal network nation from the terrains of other social formations.

## Cosmonational Reunification Policy

France and a few other countries have adopted *cosmonational reunification* policies that encourage and facilitate enduring linkages between the state and the diaspora by way of the legal system and government

agencies. Such initiatives take various forms, including family reunification programs, cosmonational parliamentary institutions, and dual citizenship laws. I call them reunification policies because the outcome is similar to cases of the reunification of two states, as in the example of East and West Germany, or of a state and a territory, as with Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China. There are differences to note, however, in that these cosmonational policies are meant to reunite the nation but not to annex foreign territories, except in cases where borders are challenged.

For example, states have developed *family reunification* policies in the area of immigration to reassemble diaspora household members or members of a same kinship unit. These facilitate the reincorporation of family members left behind and reunite them with the rest of the family in the hostland. While family reunification is important for multisite family organization, *nation reunification* is, however, the latest phase in the evolution of the nation-state and embodies the production of the cosmonation. Sustaining relations with diasporas, welcoming repatriation, soliciting diaspora investments, facilitating overseas voting, and allowing diasporic representation in parliament all promote national reunification, something that can be achieved either by return of the diaspora to the homeland, as in the Israeli case, or through transnational networking of the diverse offshoots of the cosmonation.

States like France, which regards its diasporans as French citizens despite any other citizenship they may have acquired, develop policies of nation reunification and mechanisms to operationalize reunification. States that do not recognize dual citizenship, like Haiti, have also developed similar mechanisms for national reunification. These policies are not geared to territorial reunification, but exclusively to the reunification of the nation despite the geographical dispersion of its members. This is done by bestowing citizenship and nationality rights on diasporans who return to do business or live in the homeland; offering parliamentary representation to those who remain abroad; financing institutions in the diaspora; providing voting abroad accommodations; including diasporans in official delegations abroad; selecting diasporans to serve as members of the presidential cabinet, state councils, or national advisory boards; instituting a "diaspora day" or "diaspora week" in the homeland; and extending invitations to diasporic groups to join state bodies to discuss matters of common concerns.

## Hostland and Cosmonation

Hostlands are also crucial in understanding the rise of the cosmonational state. It is one thing to have parliamentary representation for people who live abroad and seldom travel to the homeland, but it is another thing when they inhabit the same cosmonational space. Hostland immigration laws are tailored to help in this area, allowing family members from the homeland to visit relatives in the hostland provided they can be shown to make no claims for public assistance. Hostland involvement can also be seen in transportation, communications, and banking.

Hostlands' institutions develop special programs through their banking system, allowing immigrants to send remittances securely to their families. For example, a bank may allow hostland immigrants and homeland relatives to share a checking account. Airlines have added more flights or opened new routes to accommodate diaspora demand. While there are situations in which the cosmonation is in conflict with the homeland government, there are also cases in which it transnationally expresses its attachment to the homeland state. A former Canadian ambassador provides the following example:

> A very interesting phenomenon is how the Chinese diaspora reacted to the controversies over the debate on Tibet and the Olympic flame and how a diaspora one had thought was very apolitical, or even slightly disposed against the regime in Beijing, was 94 percent in opposition to the protests against the regime. This is to say that they were offended in the name of their Chinese identity. They were offended by the fact that Tibet, by all of these militants, had upset the preparations for the Olympics. Here in Canada, the government did a poor job of anticipating this reaction. They had thought that the Chinese community would be supportive in a somewhat hard-line manner. It was the opposite. This was very interesting. That is, the Chinese identity is very strong and seems to hold up across generations, a strong sense of being Chinese, an extra-national nationalism.

Relations of the cosmonational state with hostlands varies depending on the circumstances in which they find themselves, whether hostlands are supportive of diasporas in their midst, exploitative of their labor, and neglect or ignore their civil rights, or even calling for their repatriation. These relationships also depend on whether hostlands are politically or economically stable or undergoing internal crisis. Relations with hostlands

are not identical across the global landscape, since they reflect particularities of history and geopolitical context. The relations between cosmonations and hostlands can also depend on the level of support of diaspora enclaves affected.

## Reconfiguring the Space of Transglobal Interaction

The space of diasporic interaction is not only local, national, and regional; it is also transnational, cosmonational, and global. This global dimension reverberates in aspects of social life, state institutions, and practices. In this light, the trajectory of the diaspora impacts both the homeland and the hostlands. It does so through geographical dispersion, out of which the cosmonation emerges by blurring borders (Bordes-Benayoun 2002; Medam 1993). In the process, it imposes a new agenda on the receiving state, which is now additionally concerned with its social integration. Furthermore, the expansion of the nation beyond the territorial boundaries of the state also reshapes the identity of the sending state itself, because it adds new dimensions to its operation.

Several conceptual schemes have been developed to spell out the territorial or spatial identity of the diaspora. One speaks of the diaspora as a marginal community appended to a nation-state; as an incomplete social formation that does not have all the institutions it needs to make it a distinct society but can later transform into a nation-state; as an entity separate from the homeland; as an entity to be integrated with time in the hostland; and as a minoritized cultural enclave that will not attain majority status in present circumstances. These conceptual schemes tend to focus on the trees without seeing the forest. Each provides a tunnel vision of the process, a biased frame of reference. From the standpoint of globalization theory rather than state or international relations theories, the diaspora is seen as the homeland and hostland—expanded, remade, recalibrated, and rewired. In other words, any diaspora site interacts with all of the units comprising the spatial geography of the transglobal network nation.

To formalize linkages between the diaspora and the homeland and legally operationalize the transglobal network nation, some homeland governments try to integrate the diaspora into their national spaces (Biscaro 2006). What one sees here is that the fate of the homeland intertwines with that of the diaspora. In fact, the diaspora in some countries of the global South is so involved in the homeland as a core component of its lifeblood that the homeland does not project its future without

its diaspora. In the study of diaspora and postdiaspora, it is thus important to pay attention to the ebb and flow of the transglobal network nation, even when one attempts to understand how one of its local or transnational components operates (Laguerre 2008, 2010).

Once the cosmonation has come into existence, the state employs cosmonational logic defending national sovereignty and the security of the homeland territory while engaging with the diaspora as inclusive in the cosmonation. Following this logic, the cosmonational government develops an integrated discourse for the consumption of the homeland and the diasporic network, fully aware that each has different needs and expectations. This discourse is mostly heard during electoral campaigns and the president's annual "state of the nation" address in countries where this is customary.

## The Tension Between the Cosmonation and the State

The cosmonation is an ungoing project and the trajectory or itinerary of its construction is fraught with tension. On the one hand, this tension is constant because the state wants to maintain its coherence and legal obligations toward the residents of its territory and meet international requirements. On the other hand, the reality is that the diaspora is living outside the territorial state and must attend to obligations incurred by life in hostlands while maintaining solidarity with the homeland population.

What results is a cosmonational condition that reflects an integrated cosmonational life, whereby compatriots at different times respond to both the needs of the homeland society and those of any diasporic unit of the cosmonation. This introduces not simply space but also time into the configuration of the problem. At times, the problems of diasporic units in the cosmonation must be attended to, while at other times, the focus is on the resolution of homeland problems. The cosmonation is constantly impinging on the homeland configuration of national society in its relations with the state, since it is inclusive of both the homeland and the diaspora.

The re-envisioning of the problem forces us to look at relations between state and nation, nation and diaspora, state and diaspora, cosmonation and nation, cosmonation and state, and cosmonation and diaspora. These pairs are not dissolved; they simply take on different meanings, and constitute blocs within the context of the cosmonation. In other words,

the cosmonation does not replace these binary blocs but simply provides them with new contextual parameters.

Substitution and backup support are two characteristics of the diaspora in its rapport with the state. If the state has no official presence in a foreign country, the diaspora is left with the duty to fill this void. Conversely, if the state has a presence, the diaspora may be called on to serve as backup. In both cases, the diaspora serves as an extension of the state. It either reinforces or rescues the effort of government. Elazar (1991: 22) speaks of "diplomatic activity by Jewish nongovernmental organizations, especially where Israel is not represented or is particularly limited in its access." The diaspora, when seen as an extension of the homeland, at times fulfills functions that are attributed to the state. But the diaspora can also undermine such an effort if the group stands in opposition to government practices. Protest rallies in hostlands against the homeland regime organized and spearheaded by diasporans are examples of such behavior.

The cosmonation may be initiated by emigration from the homeland. In this case, the nation-state creates its diaspora, which in return transforms it into a cosmonation-state. In other cases, the diaspora contributes to the transformation of the state into a cosmonation-state. The Jewish diaspora was the creator of the State of Israel and so were the Norwegian and Czech diasporas in their contribution to the independence of Norway and Czechoslovakia in the first quarter of the twentieth century (Elazar 1991: 25).

## Relations among Cosmonational States

The rise of the cosmonation has changed the form and nature of international relations. Until recently, these were relations between two or more nation-states or relations canvassed by international corporations. With the expansion of the nation through its diaspora, relations between states also involve diasporic outposts within the process. With time, relationships have shifted from international to cosmonational. Countries with an influential diaspora component may strengthen their positions in world affairs, while countries without such an extension are lacking in aspects of their relations with foreign governments.

States have emerged as transnational blocs because of their reliance on their diaspora to mitigate aspects of their international relations, because of the contribution of the diaspora in the form these relations embody, and because of the go-between role the diaspora plays in relations between

states. In the case of these states, their interactions with other countries are evident in the relations between cosmonation-centric states and not simply as relations between nation-states because of the diaspora factor that adds a layer of complexity to those interactions. For example, the homeland relies on its diaspora to take a stand when the rights of individuals in any diasporic site are violated. While the homeland may remain subdued for diplomatic reasons in the way it shows its displeasure, diasporic activists may not have such restrictions and therefore can bring their protests to a higher and more magnified level to help find a solution to the problem. In the process, they may provide backup to the homeland state's actions.

Because of the remittances the diaspora sends to the homeland, some international organizations, like the World Bank, recognize the role of the cosmonation in the management of state affairs. As a source of foreign currency, the diaspora factor is plugged into the calculation of a country's financial basis and eligibility for certain loans, because it is assumed that such remittances enable some countries to repay their debts.

Cosmonational relations cannot be restricted to official relations between states, but must encompass human relations as well. This is seen in the relationship of diasporic NGOs in the hostland, engaging in activities that benefit the homeland. The cosmonational state invites such interventions by the diaspora.

## Mobility within the Cosmonational State

The transglobal network nation is anchored in various sites in which its members reside. However, as these individuals consider themselves part of the same expanded nation, some circulate to live in other sites, visit overseas family members and friends, take advantage of a better educational system abroad, seek employment elsewhere, or engage in border-crossing business practices inside this cosmonational circuit. In a sense, they have reconstructed or redrawn the nation's boundaries and spatial content to include extraterritorial sites of diasporic enclaves.

In the context of the nation-state, citizenship allows a person to move from one place to another inside the sovereign territory. As the homeland becomes a node of a larger transnational circuit of nodes, the meaning of internal mobility spatially reconfigures. The ability to see these external connections is intrinsic to the new claims to citizenship by diasporans. Believing oneself to hold cosmonational citizenship while living in a node within the global circuit allows one to imagine the possibility of moving to

another location, to develop strategies or plans to do so, or effectively to accomplish this goal. In other words, why stay in one node if you can do better in another node in the same cosmonational circuit?

Another notion that reflects this new global reality is that of shared citizenship. In the nation-state context, citizenship is seen as a shared status—that is, a bundle of rights and obligations one shares with other compatriots. One is entitled to them, and others are expected to understand and acknowledge this. In the reconfiguration of the transglobal network nation, "belonging" is believed to be shared with the homeland population and its diasporic offshoots, but not with any hostland that houses the latter. International immigration does not, however, occur in a situation of unregulated circulation, but in one that hostlands control, and immigration can be aborted if the hostland does not grant a visa or permission for permanent residency.

The imagined transglobal network nation lacks the legal institutional mechanisms to manage the transnational circulation of its members. In this sense, the desire cannot always materialize into a palpable outcome. Hence, diasporization and the engendering of a new context in which the informal linkages between diaspora and homeland become fuller and stronger than the formal linkages between them create tension. Strong informal linkages have in the past pressured formal government agencies to consider the existence of the diaspora in matters related to diplomatic assignments, trade relations, and foreign policy.

After 13 members of the official 2007 Haiti soccer team requested asylum in New York en route to a match in South Korea (they later rejoined the group), a Haitian journalist who is a keen observer of the Haitian crisis opined that most Haitian citizens have become "des personnes en transit" ("people in transit"). He was referring to members of the diaspora who travel to Haiti to spend time with their families, to those in the homeland who make short trips abroad, and more particularly, to the vast numbers of Haitians who plan to leave the island. This includes not only those who have family abroad and who will someday emigrate to reunite with their families, but also those who are planning careers in the United States, studying English instead of French in school, saving money to meet US immigration requirements, or training in professions that are in high demand in the United States. The Haitian situation is not unique. Similar trends are observable in the rest of the Caribbean region, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. In the journalist's view, the desertion of the soccer team at the Kennedy Airport reflected an endemic lack

of loyalty and attachment to the motherland, which is characteristic of many people in countries in the global South. The soccer players did not consider their country's reputation or its government's public embarrassment, but simply saw an opportunity to live elsewhere in the transglobal network nation. Residents of the transglobal nation can, in fact, be seen as "people in transit" whether they reside in the homeland or a hostland. As homelanders, they may seek to resettle in a diasporic site, and as hostlanders, they long to visit or even, in some cases, to return to their homeland. Such longings may be purely wishful thinking, but the desire is real and challenges the logic of the nation-state.

A "person in transit" used to fall into the category of individuals with a temporary status in a foreign country. The immigrant may be one who is not a permanent resident or who is allowed to stay in a country, with the expectation that the person will eventually either return home or depart for some third-country destination. Both the receiving state and the individual agree that this is a provisional arrangement, and the person is expected to move on to another country in due course.

In the transglobal network nation scheme, transit has acquired a new meaning and a new status in addition to what it implies inside the nation-state. A person in transit who is a permanent citizen of the transglobal network nation constructs his/her residence in the homeland as a stepping-stone to migrating and living elsewhere. As a consequence of the dire condition of poverty, lack of stability, war zones, and hopelessness, a large group of homeland citizens in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East regard themselves as "persons in transit" in this sense and actively prepare themselves to emigrate.

In Haiti, this phenomenon threatens the very survival of the country. The signs are all too evident: unseaworthy boats ferry undocumented immigrants to foreign diaspora enclaves; young people study English to seek jobs in the United States or Canada instead of preparing for domestic careers; government officials and members of the elite routinely seek health care in Cuba, the United States, or even the Dominican Republic instead of striving to improve the local hospitals; university students depart to complete their studies abroad with no intention of returning; government officials purchase retirement homes in the United States; businesspeople put their money in US banks instead of local ones; diasporans return to Haiti to visit but with no intention to stay. Haitians have become transnationally mobile because of the transglobal network nation, which makes such crossborder movement imaginable and achievable.

The transglobal network nation is the new sphere or arena aspired to by both homelanders and hostland diasporic residents. People feel they should be able to join parents and relatives abroad and see the overseas offshoots of the homeland as part of the cosmonation. They operate inside this larger context to strengthen linkages among family members, to develop communal institutions, and to access political and business practitioners. This incremental erosion of national citizenship constitutes a major challenge for national states in the global South.

The reconstitution of the nation in this way has led to a new concept of citizenship, which has been detached from its national basis and reinserted into the transnational or cosmonational arena. Rather than focusing on definitions, legalities, and national boundaries, I put the emphasis in this book on people's behavior, which clearly does not coincide with the official rhetoric of the state.

## Postdiaspora and the Cosmonational State

The concept of diaspora fits well within the framework of the nation-state, which distinguishes those who live in its territory from those who live elsewhere in terms of belonging, citizenship rights, emotional attachment, taxation, and representation. The use of the diaspora concept magnifies the difference between the internal and the external group and valorizes the former at the expense of the latter, which explains the internal logic of its practices and the unequal stratification it engenders.

In contrast, the concept of postdiaspora fits well in the context of the cosmonational state, which posits, not a *bordered territory*, but rather an *extraterritorial jurisdiction*. The group in this case occupies, not a bounded geographical nation-state, but rather a network of sites, in which the ancestral homeland is simply an important governing node. The shift from nation-state to network transforms diasporans into postdiasporans, and the result is cosmonational citizenship.

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CHAPTER 7

# Conclusion: The Postdiaspora Condition

As we have seen from the preceding chapters, an analysis of the postdiaspora condition may proceed from different angles because of different ways of positioning the object of study: it is a hostland issue with the incorporation of immigrants in state affairs and their acquisition of a new national identity; a homeland issue with the reinsertion of emigrants in its polity; an immigrant issue with attachment and possible recovery of homeland citizenship rights; and foremost a cosmonational predicament, where the outcome of the process may reverberate throughout the components—homeland and multiple diasporic sites that comprise the totality of the population of the cosmonation. Each segment of the demography contributes in its own way to the constitution of the whole, and each diaspora site deals with its own set of postdiasporic issues. Seeing the problem from the standpoint of the hostland, the homeland, the cosmonation, or the immigrant, leads to different ways of understanding the postdiaspora condition. For too long, the postdiaspora portion of the cosmonation has remained unproblematized and undertheorized, kept under wraps, and untouched by formal analytical scrutiny. This study deliberately stresses the cosmonational dimension more than the other aspects, as important as they are, and attempts to circumscribe the phenomenon of the postdiaspora condition to explain its contents, expressions, deployment, and parameters.

The focus on the postdiaspora condition requires reconsidering the notion of dispersion as applied to diaspora, a geographical term that refers



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to territorial and crossborder human mobility. This option leads us to question why diaspora is embedded with a negative meaning or connotation. Diasporans have been considered less than full citizens because of their residence abroad, and the fear that, if reincorporated into the homeland or incorporated into the hostland, they may exert an unbearable influence on the everyday politics of the country, especially legislative and presidential elections, or because they are not natives and of a different stock. In either position, the diaspora is conceptualized as being unequal vis-à-vis the citizens of the sending or receiving state for reasons developed by the homeland or the hostland to rationalize and justify the ascription and structural status of immigrants. This imposed subaltern status—to the extent it remains a permanent stigma—is at odds with what immigrants expect from both their country of origin and their country of residence. However, in reward for emigration or immigration, immigrants are frequently branded with inequality, embodied and reflected in diaspora identification and self-identification. In this light, one argues that through the agency of dispersion, diaspora is a vector conflated with a superposition of meanings. *Dispersion takes two forms: one geographical and horizontal, that is, a lateral movement from one country to another, and the other spatial and vertical positioning in society, that is, downward mobility from a higher status (homeland citizen) to a lower status (hostland denizen). The collapsing of these movements in any one extraterritorial site is the context within which the diasporic subject is produced.*

The introduction and use of the postdiaspora concept in this volume acknowledges these shifting positions, affirms the mutability of the diaspora position, and seeks ways to recapture the geographical dispersion dimension caused by voluntary or involuntary international migration, without justifying or endorsing the downward mobility aspect, which tends to confirm and rationalize the inequality outcome. This is argued through an investigation of the postdiaspora condition, pursued along multiple analytical pathways, in the context of the cosmonation.

## Denaturalizing Diaspora Subalternity

Inequality is encoded in the concept of diaspora and remains hidden there until found and unveiled. It is through decoding language that one can understand the depth of the *naturalization of discrimination* against immigrants and their communities. One must begin then by *denaturalizing* the unequal status imposed on diaspora, viewing it as a socially

constructed category enabled by a discriminatory vision of society, which often projects *diaspora subalternity* as part of the natural order of things. This category of "otherness" is the site where one stands to deconstruct it and witness its mutation in the postdiaspora condition. Denaturalizing the diaspora concept ought to be a preoccupation of social analysts if one hopes to understand how such a term has been the carrier of processes of inequality, and can either skew or illuminate mechanisms perpetuating inequality. Moreover, it must be said that inequality does not follow only the routes of economic, legal, political and social circuits; it also uses language as a carrier of meanings, reflective of subaltern status. In so doing, language naturalizes negative effects to make the outcome more palatable to their biases. In other words, what is needed is a movement away from the piece meal to a more comprehensive approach to the study of the postdiaspora condition, so that critical attention can be paid to the trajectory of the diaspora concept's negative career and its depiction of unequal status branded as natural.

Calling oneself a diasporan either after one is granted citizenship in the hostland or has reactivated citizenship in the homeland, imposes on oneself an identification that marginalizes one's status in society and that keeps one an outsider for life. It provides a basis and justification for discrimination, for one's location in an inferior structural position, and in return, legitimizes the majority's superior position status (Laguerre 1999). In other words, one contributes, not only to the reproduction of one's subaltern status, but also to the undermining of the principle of equality that democracy upholds and citizenship is supposed to reflect.

## Diaspora/Postdiaspora

Crossborder mobility in the context of diasporization is a trajectory that leads the immigrant to an inferior position in society from one incorporated as a citizen in the homeland to one not yet incorporated in the hostland. This transitional position is characteristic of the diasporic condition, but once this threshold is fully crossed over, one may find oneself navigating in what is referred to here as the postdiaspora arena, that is the point at which, because of a change of status, immigrants define themselves as citizens in that they hold full and substantive membership in either or both the hostland and the homeland. I prefer to place the separation line of the transition from diaspora to postdiaspora at the acquisition or reacquisition of citizenship, rather than at the second and

subsequent immigrant generations, because in some countries like Japan and the Dominican Republic, second-generation descendants of immigrant families are not accorded ipso facto citizenship status. Hostland citizenship puts one on a par with its "community of citizens" (Schnapper 1994) the same way that the reacquisition of homeland citizenship puts one on a par with the rest of society. One may acquire postdiaspora status vis-à-vis one polity and not in another.

Diaspora, stigmatized as "the other," is an identification that carries a negative connotation, marking one as a permanent outsider and therefore exposed for discrimination and unequal treatment. In contrast, postdiaspora status is premised on the principle of equality, realized in the exercise of citizenship, whether performed in the homeland or the hostland. It challenges the subaltern status of the incorporated and affirms their emancipation on the basis that all citizens have the same rights.

A diasporan is a person in limbo, an individual who resides abroad permanently, which implies the existence of a recognized or putative homeland, not yet fully integrated into the polity of the hostland or the homeland. For these reasons, a diasporan holds a subaltern status vis-à-vis the homeland and/or the hostland. However, diaspora is not a legal status, but an identification with one's ancestral heritage; this is why one speaks of diaspora in reference to a homeland and life in a hostland. Incorporation into either or both relocates such an individual in the polity of a state as a citizen and in the arena of the postdiaspora condition.

Diaspora concerns both one's status vis-à-vis the homeland and the hostland because it reflects non-incorporation in either state. One is regarded as a diasporan, not only by reason of exit from a homeland, but also because of inability to exercise full citizenship rights in either homeland or hostland. Once citizenship is attained in the homeland and hostland, diaspora as a form of self-identification is relegated to the private domain. Both the sending and receiving states use the same citizenship route to postdiasporize a diasporan. What the acquisition and practice of citizenship does is transform the diasporan into a citizen and proclaim the citizen status to be above diaspora self-identification. Giving more importance to diaspora than citizen status in the case of the immigrant or emigrant insinuates the existence of an inferiority box, labeling oneself as subaltern, legitimizing one's inferior status, and celebrating one's self-exclusion from the majority.

Diaspora and postdiaspora have common roots as terms in the same semantic field, and the two conditions reflect common experiences.

Postdiaspora is an outgrowth of the diaspora condition and means emancipation from imposed subaltern status, enjoyment of crossborder citizen rights, complete incorporation into one or more states, expression of one's equality before the law, and contestation of discrimination in everyday social practices.

## Cosmonation and Postdiaspora

The transformation of the nation-state question revolutionizes diasporan status. Laws that grant the same citizenship status, access to institutions, and benefits as native homelanders to diasporans reposition the latter within the hostland polity, postdiasporizing them. The majority of studies, including those that speak of the global nation, do not reproblematize the nation-state, however, taking it rather as a given, unreflexively following the entrenched model of "methodological nationalism." From there, they study the relations of the diaspora with the hostland or homeland state or conceive of the diaspora either as separate from the homeland (assimilation theory) or as a continuum of it (transnational approach). They do not say why it is so, but focus rather on intensive interactions, circular mobility, and national or transnational interactions (Tololyan 1996; Shain 2007; and Levitt 2001). The present study transitions to the next level, theorizing homeland and diaspora as a multisite nation or cosmonation and explains the rise of the postdiaspora inside this wider, but specific, global context.

Speaking of postdiaspora without reference to the changing face of the nation—a change that the term "global nation" or "transnation" implicitly conveys—limits the scope of discussion. Furthermore, the exponents of such a concept have not retheorized it to say what is meant, what it is, and how it produces postdiaspora. What is needed is a shift in thinking, a focus on the nation-state transformation into a cosmonation, and an understanding of how diaspora is produced and evolves into postdiaspora in this context. The problem becomes then not simply one of diaspora/postdiaspora, but also one of the reconstitution of the ensemble, that is, the homeland and multiple diaspora sites.

Different conceptions of postdiaspora in the literature derive either from assimilation theory or transnationalism. Assimilation sees the shift to "post" as a normal progress that explains immigrant integration in reference to the hostland, focusing on forms of immigrant adaptation and the state's peripheral adjustment rather than on substantive

transformation of state and nation. In contrast, transnationalism theorizes forms of entanglements of diaspora and homeland, explains the blurring of borders, and the expansion of state and nation, but provides explanations of these phenomena in terms of homeland-diaspora relations. Intensity of relations between the two is said to influence and transform the diaspora into a transnational community and the homeland into a transnation-state.

With assimilation theory or transnationalism, one conceives of the homeland and diaspora as either two distinct entities or a continuum. While assimilation assumes a fixed but separate location for each, transnationalism stresses their entanglements, without paying much attention to the multisitedness of the diaspora and interdiasporic site interactions. In other words, transnationalism sees them as either a continuum or the two poles of a transnational community, linked to each other through mass media communication, commercial transactions, political interactions, periodic visits, and migration back and forth. There are limits to such an approach, since it does not problematize interdiaspora relations and how these can positively or negatively redesign the network architecture of the ensemble.

Cosmonationalism corrects deficiencies of assimilation and transnationalism. This approach sees units in the ensemble as flexible and changeable because of migration from any site to the others; explains that diaspora/postdiaspora are not fixed points; pays attention to different relational combinations that produce contingent outcomes; and leaves room for notions of gradation, hybridity, and evolution of status. What is missing from transnationalism, but provided in the cosmonational approach, is recognition of the plural composition of the ensemble (homeland and diaspora), how relations between subunits can impact segments of the homeland or the diaspora, how different diaspora sites imagine the homeland differently and act on the imagined projection of reality in their interaction with the homeland, and the role of the policy design of the state, which reconfigures state-diaspora entanglement as forming a cosmonational state and nation-diaspora entanglement as forming a cosmonation.

Postdiaspora is seen as a category induced by the rise of the cosmonational state because of the legal instruments it makes available to diaspora populations. One refers to such instruments as rights to homeland citizenship, parliamentary representation, schooling abroad, and social and human security protection. What these provisions allow is the ability to have the same privileges, access to same or similar services, and thus to

become an integral part of the homeland community despite one's extraterritorial residence.

While diaspora integration follows the predictable traditional path of acquiring citizenship in the hostland fits well with the trajectory of the assimilation model, reacquiring citizenship status in the homeland is a significant feature of postdiaspora in the cosmonational model. Signs of belonging to the homeland state are materialized in a myriad of ways: by registration in the consular registry of citizens, electing representatives in state elections, accessing state services while in transit in the homeland, and the portability of social security protection from hostland to homeland in retirement. These things are made possible because of the inclusion of the extraterritorial population in the homeland polity, which erase differences between the citizenry at home and abroad. The postdiasporan happens to be a citizen who is living abroad; in this sense, citizenship trumps the diaspora aspect, that is, it postdiasporizes the diaspora condition.

Three developments happen in the reacquisition and reactivation of one's homeland citizenship while living abroad: first, one is reincorporated into the polity of the state where one holds such membership; second, a legal framework is set in place to ensure the formal grounding of membership, which provides a rationale for the extended basis of the citizenry; and, third, the creation of a bureaucratic infrastructure that allows multidirectional operations, transactions, and relations to proceed smoothly, provides services, and sustains crossborder activities.

Laws that allow groups of people located in different sites (homeland versus hostland) to exercise citizen rights indirectly reiterate the prominence of the cosmonational state having not only territorial jurisdiction but also extraterritorial jurisdiction over segments of its population abroad as diasporans or postdiasporans. Thus, extraterritorial space is added to the territory of the homeland to compose the jurisdictional realm of the cosmonational state.

If not living in the homeland, as in the case of returnees, the postdiasporan performs his citizenship abroad, indicating the existence of multiple sites for the performance of citizenship. It also reveals that the community of citizens is not homogeneous, but heterogeneous; is not univocal, but multivocal; and is not in one territory, but resides in a combination of territorial and extraterritorial locations. Therefore, it is not solely in the legal discourse of the state that membership can be understood, but also in the disparate sites in which the expanded nation takes root.

## The Community Dimension of Postdiaspora

Inside and outside the homeland, postdiaspora constitutes distinct communities based on former countries of residence, familiarity with specific diasporic languages, and shared interests in protecting and helping members of the group at home and abroad. Sometimes they do it on their own and at other times with the help of the homeland government. In hostlands, they partake in activities conjointly with diaspora compatriots; in homelands, they engage also in activities that concern the welfare of the postdiaspora group. Whether living in the homeland or hostland, postdiasporans sometimes form their distinct multisite communities through membership in cultural associations they develop. They are formally recruited to encounter compatriots with similar experiences, who provide them with support in times of need and with whom they reminisce about common memories. Through these returnee associations, they signify their groupness and distinctness vis-à-vis the local population.

Membership in the group is split between those who identify more with the hostland and those who do so more with the homeland, depending on where they grew up and where their friends and families reside. This explains their varied level of participation in activities geared toward the welfare of the homeland or any diaspora community in a hostland. Postdiaspora as a group is heterogeneous in the different views they hold about the homeland and hostlands, the political ideologies they embrace, and their perception of the homeland as either a point of light, pride, and progress or a site of backwardness, awkwardness, and embarrassment. Tension erupts among different segments because of different past life experiences as they seek common solutions for common problems they confront. This sociologically distinct community has remained invisible because it has been identified simply as diaspora, which further contributes to the hiddenness of its specific identity. Such a confusion is fueled by politicians, who continue to identify postdiaspora candidates as diaspora to insinuate their divided loyalty to the state and thereby prevent them from winning local, regional, and national elections.

The postdiaspora condition heralds the growing size of postdiaspora demographics, translated into the growing visibility of the population. For example, postdiasporans are also tapped by state and civilian institutions as agents of change both in the homeland and the hostland. Some have developed political agendas of their own, serving as elected officials in

the homeland while living in a hostland, as in the cases of postdiasporan parliamentarians in Croatia, France, and Italy (Laguerre 2013).

## The Legal Dimension of Postdiaspora

The legal apparatus of the state plays a crucial role in the production and sustenance of postdiaspora because it formalizes the process that leads to the condition. If postdiaspora did not exist before, new laws make it happen, or if it exists only in the informal arena and interstices of society, the legal system brings it to flourish in the formal arena. Reincorporation laws providing for membership in the homeland polity while living abroad provide the necessary legal structure or backbone for the activation of the extraterritorial form of citizenship.

The law turns extraterritorial diasporans into postdiaspora citizens, tying them to the homeland community of citizens; in the process, it distinguishes territorially based citizenship from the extraterritorially constructed form of citizenship (Bauböck 2007). The law reinscribes the extraterritorial compatriot inside the polity of the state; makes the extended state a reality as it claims and exercises jurisdiction over overseas diasporic sites; gives citizenship rights to individuals living outside the territory; and assigns the national bureaucracy a transnational orientation to serve the extraterritorial population too.

The cosmonational orientation of state bureaucracy materializes in different ways: sometimes the national bureaucracy expands the extension of overseas services; sometimes this bureaucracy is restructured by adding units that serve the external population; sometimes new offices are created at home and abroad to handle this additional population, with some agencies expanding with headquarters in the homeland and subsidiaries in the hostlands. Laws enacted by the state make any of these potential options possible and can be invoked to obtain compliance.

At times, compliance may become a problem among the extraterritorial population because the state cannot impose its laws on people who live outside its borders. This is one area where the performance of citizenship by the inside and outside populations may differ. Compliance in this scenario depends on the goodwill of actors in some cases; in other cases, such as extraterritorial electoral fraud, compliance is easier to enforce, since a fraud committed in legislative or presidential elections outside the territory by diaspora/postdiaspora candidates falls squarely under the jurisdiction of the homeland legal authorities. It is fraud against homeland law, not the hostland's.

## Postdiaspora Performances

Postdiaspora can be studied from a homeland, hostland, or individual immigrant standpoint. It is one's re-inscription into the polity of the state, regaining full rights of homeland citizenship with a continuous or previous life abroad. By and large, it comes about with the exercise of citizenship, which incorporates the individual into the community of citizens. This is postdiaspora seen from a legal standpoint and in relation to homeland or cosmonational inclusion. When viewed in relation to the hostland, citizenship is emphasized rather than ancestral roots. When analyzed from the perspective of the immigrant, the claim to postdiaspora status tends to be more subjective, because it refers to one's belonging to a nation and expresses or reflects one's identitary roots.

The postdiaspora condition is peculiar not only to hostlands, as sites where diasporans settle, but also to homelands, because of return migration. The performance of postdiaspora differs in significant ways depending on whether it is in the homeland or the hostland. In the overseas sites, it expresses the idea of sharing one's life experiences with members of the group as well as with others, while in the homeland situation the returnee is not considered to be totally one of them. This is why homelanders impose a different identity on such postdiasporans. For example, German diasporans and postdiasporans from Eastern Europe who now live in Germany are known as *i Germanesi*, while postdiasporan Haitians are simply referred to as *diaspo* to express difference based on their previous extraterritorial residence (Hettlage 2012). Such returnees may have a good portion of their family and friends abroad and receive pensions and social security and pay taxes abroad, reinforcing the identitary gaps between themselves and the sedentary homelanders. Such differences may be reinforced by formal associations postdiaspora returnees develop such as the Association of [Jewish] Americans and Canadians in Israel (www.aaci.org), whose members help one another in the search for employment, in filing applications for social security, and in organizing occasional communal activities, among other things.

## Postdiaspora Consciousness

Postdiaspora consciousness, which gives rise to and is reflective of the postdiaspora condition, is a turning point in the study of diaspora/postdiaspora. It forces us to explain the paradox of how diasporic citizenship postdiasporizes diasporans, transforming them from being an appendix to the homeland and hostland to being citizens with equal rights in one or

both. In this sense, postdiaspora is multivocal, since it is performed both at home and abroad. These distinctive features both relocate the diaspora inside the polity of the homeland and contribute to the consolidation of the postdiaspora condition

Postdiaspora consciousness arises because one does not want to be located in a subaltern position forever, with no prospect of incorporation into the dominant majority. What is contested is minoritization by a hostland majority that puts hyphenated citizens in a subaltern position that involves discrimination on the basis of ancestry, not the connection with the ancestral homeland and culture.

Postdiaspora consciousness is not simply discovering and recovering one's cultural roots, but also upholding both one's cultural identity and one's constitutional rights. It is a consciousness shaped by the diaspora experience, the experience of discrimination based on place of origin and a desire to achieve social justice and equality for those so concerned.

## The Postdiaspora Condition

A condition is a way of life that finds its justification in the mode of operation of a cultural collectivity and its daily practice. Such a distinct organization of everyday life reflects and is reflected in the circumstances of a particular period. In other words, a condition is to be understood here as a state of life that has become part of cultural practices. In such a light, a condition is a permanent state, in contrast to ephemeral phenomena. It encompasses the local, the transnational, and the global, depending on the scale on which one wishes to observe its formal, informal, and digital deployment. When one speaks of a condition as a disposition, one indicates a philosophy of life that is well entrenched among contemporaries of a given period. The issue of how a way of life constitutes a condition is explored in *La situation coloniale* by Georges Balandier (1951) and *La condition postmoderne* by Jean-François Lyotard (1979). In both cases, the pervasiveness of the phenomenon reveals how daily life is impacted and how the condition involves all aspects of society.

Postdiaspora brings diversity in line with equality, solidarity, and the normative acceptance of a cosmopolitan worldview. The postdiaspora condition is the situation in which people have outgrown the diaspora reference, inasmuch as it no longer defines them. It may become an item occasionally invoked to indicate a "symbolic ethnicity." For those who have acquired citizenship status, it is not a category routinely used for identification. It can even be a point of contention, because one may not

want to speak about the ancestral country—either because it might be an embarrassment or because such relations are not seen as central to one's identity. The postdiaspora condition evolves in a mixed context of diaspora and postdiaspora sharing the same niche. Postdiaspora can be partial or total. It is said to be total when citizenship is acquired in the hostland and reacquired in the homeland. It is partial when it is acquired in one and not in the other. In this sense, one might say that a postdiasporan is a diasporan who has outgrown his or her unequal status.

Postdiaspora is interpreted here as a form of liberation. It emancipates one from unequal status vis-à-vis sedentary citizens in the case of the homeland and from foreigner status in the case of the hostland. Postdiaspora frees one from the diaspora, since one no longer perceives oneself as being in limbo. For the majority who do not refer to themselves as belonging to a diaspora, even though the definition might fit them, the term signals that they have transcended diaspora and are indifferent to its use as a form of identification. In fact, they have come to regard it as a tool of the subaltern.

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