BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM

Social Analysis
after 1989

Edited by

MARIAN BURCHARDT
and **GAL KIRN**

APPROACHES
TO SOCIAL
INEQUALITY AND
DIFFERENCE

Approaches to Social Inequality and Difference

Series Editors

Edvard Hviding
University of Bergen
Bergen, Norway

Synnøve Bendixsen
University of Bergen
Bergen, Norway

Aim of the Series

The book series contributes a wealth of new perspectives aiming to denaturalize ongoing social, economic, and cultural trends such as the processes of "crimigration" and racialization, fast-growing social-economic inequalities, depoliticization or technologization of policy, and simultaneously a politicization of difference. By treating naturalization simultaneously as a phenomenon in the world, and as a rudimentary analytical concept for further development and theoretical diversification, we identify a shared point of departure for all volumes in this series, in a search to analyze how difference is produced, governed, and reconfigured in a rapidly changing world. By theorizing rich, globally comparative ethnographic materials on how racial/cultural/civilization differences are currently specified and naturalized, the series will throw new light on crucial links between differences, whether biologized and culturalized, and various forms of "social inequality" that are produced in contemporary global social and political formations.

More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/14775

Marian Burchardt • Gal Kirn
Editors

Beyond Neoliberalism

Social Analysis after 1989

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Marian Burchardt
Max Planck Institute for the Study
of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
Göttingen, Germany

Gal Kirn
Institute for Cultural Inquiry
Berlin, Germany

Cover image © Sam Dao / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

CONTENTS

v

Beyond Neoliberalism? Social Analysis after 1989

Marian Burchardt and Gal Kirn

The year 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall have long been seen as the axial time images that initiated the era in which we live. There is no doubt that the end of the Cold War has profoundly reshaped social and political life across the world. More specifically, it is routinely understood to have led not only to democratization, globalization, the rise of neoliberal capitalism, and global human rights regimes, but also to the defeat of socialism and of the welfare state model of social solidarity. Francis Fukuyama (1992) famously and apodictically saw in these changes the "end of the history," as there was presumably no more history that could supply alternative pathways for societies other than catching up with Western modernity. More than 25 years after these events, the present book is focused not on these changes themselves, but on the extent to which the end of the Cold War has reshaped social theory and the conceptual vocabularies social scientists employ to interpret the social world. Did 1989 bring about paradigmatic ruptures and enduring transformations within different social science disciplines and subfields? What shifts have been shared across

M. Burchardt (✉)
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen, Germany

G. Kirn
Institute for Cultural Inquiry, Berlin, Germany

different fields of research and theory? Do we have to argue in retrospect that these "new" shifts were actually "old" ones simply affirming what, in historical reality, had already been unfolding long before? For many critical observers and even former enthusiasts, 1989 failed to fulfill its historical promise of democratic renewal, while the triumphant *end of history* is now seen as a mocking trope that simply cemented the new ideological formulations. Any critical examination of 1989 will need to answer one central question: what was actually defeated in 1989, and what was actually won?

The contributors to this volume address and situate the changes occurring in and around 1989 between the epistemic level of paradigms and theories on the one hand, and empirical and historical processes in specific domains of social life recorded through particular scholarly and empirical operations on the other. Anthropologists, sociologists, political theorists, and geographers explore how epistemic change occurred in certain fields (the sociology of religion, human rights law, political theory, financial economy, etc.), critically interrogate how these changes prefigured scholarly perceptions, and confront these with ethnographic observations in specific empirical contexts. They also critically evaluate the "transition" literature that marked the post-1989 period. The triumphalist narrative of the 1990s is now opposed by both critical accounts and the current global predicament: economic crisis, warnings of ecological catastrophe, and the return of a form of militarism that was thought to have ended along with the Cold War.

The central argument of this book is that 1989 signals not so much the global spread of standard versions of capitalist society as dramatic changes and variation in capitalism's organization and culture. These changes have shaped the directions and paradigms of the social sciences, which have converged around new narratives of neoliberal capitalism. The book not only explores the ways in which neoliberalism has been transmuted into the seemingly unquestionable and triumphant framework that articulates economics globally with epistemology and social ontology, but also how new narratives of neoliberal capitalism are being scrutinized by social scientists with a view to understanding capitalism's ramifications in diverse domains of knowledge.

At the same time, we argue that there is a need to move social theory beyond the now time-honored analytic of neoliberalism and that there are political changes that indicate and warrant such a shift. Various chapters, for instance, explore the numerous local counterforces and examples of resistance "from below" to neoliberalism's encroachments, which are

reorienting the formerly assumed finite shifts after 1989. As Dominic Martin's chapter shows, such resistance may come from religious movements that reject the power of the neoliberal logic over them and posit alternative ontologies and temporalities. Simultaneously, religion may also be intricately entangled with contemporary capitalism, for example, through the religious rules for financial transactions that characterize Islamic finance (see the chapter by Kustin). But perhaps more importantly, we see shifts in the exercise of power and authority and new forms of control that originate from within capitalist formations themselves and that are moving us "beyond neoliberalism." James Ferguson (2015) has recently suggested that there is a new politics of distribution, demanded through popular protests in many parts of the world and illustrated in the rise of cash payments to mass populations, which moves us beyond neoliberalism and actually contradicts classical neoliberal marketization stories. As our title *Beyond Neoliberalism* suggests, the contributors to this book explore neoliberalism in the context of a much longer and deeper dynamics of uneven capitalist development (Harvey 2006). Capital always moved with different temporalities in different places, resulting in more or less brutal forms of dispossession, exploitation, and repression. This renders mainstream critiques that limit neoliberalism to financialization theoretically questionable, while also stressing that the underlying logic of capital cannot be isolated from its financial operations. While clearly not providing definite answers, this book seeks to contribute to forms of social analysis that aim to imagine social life "beyond neoliberalism."

Many contributions to this volume suggest that the significance of 1989 needs to be re-oriented and relativized in the light of earlier developments, especially the emergence of neoliberal political orientations from the 1970s onwards. As Streeck (2014) and Wagner (2008), among others, have shown, crucial changes in the organization of Western welfare capitalism began during the late 1960s and were reinforced with the fall of the Berlin Wall. More generally, we observe that it is only recently that critical accounts of neoliberalism have entered mainstream social theory debates.[1] As economic instability becomes endemic worldwide, the time seems ripe for more sober assessments of continuities and discontinuities. Recent years have lent both political and theoretical legitimacy to such endeavors as the post-1989 capitalist utopia has waned and, as some argue, finally been replaced by "capitalist realism" (Fisher 2009). This book addresses a series of conflicting political, religious, and ideological formations that produced disenchantment with the capitalist utopia.

Moreover, as the recent protest movements against austerity regimes in countries such as Spain and Greece to the Occupy movement, from the Gezi Park protests in Turkey to the "Arab Spring" revolts in North Africa and the Middle East show, the age of utopia has not been yet buried. It is precisely the uprisings and revolts from different corners of the world that are targeting the highly acclaimed legacy of 1989, namely representative democracy and capitalism, marked as they are by the regime of neoliberal austerity and the post-Fukuyamian slogan "There is no alternative" on which it thrives. In light of the major financial crash in 2008 and the long-term economic and political crisis in Europe to which it led, as well as the current falls on the Chinese stock market, which are prompting a second and more global slump, the ideological, theoretical, and political legitimacy of the neoliberal order seems to be coming under further challenge.

Simultaneously, the trope of TINA ("There is no alternative") persists despite these political upheavals, the growing awareness of ecological catastrophes and the increasing remilitarization of many parts of the world, despite militarization also allegedly having ended with the Cold War. Slavoj Žižek (2011) has argued that it is only now, when we are entering the "end times" in which the bifurcation of history is bringing us to a new beginning, that a real alternative to capitalism can be imagined. Alain Badiou (2012) suggests that these riots and uprisings are a clear sign that "history awoke" and that they have brought to an end the historical interval between the 1970s and the 2000s, which was marked by political reaction and the global reign of capital. Similarly inspired by these lines of thought, this book focuses on 1989 as a political and theoretical problem reverberating through the ethnographic record, as both its dominant interpretation and its critics have become immersed in the trope of "neoliberalism."

Yet in mainstream social theory and research, the immediate aftermath of 1989 was characterized by the triumphant return of positivist modernization theories. Modernization had clearly become, again, a grand narrative, ironically emerging at a time when all such grand narratives had already been subjected to skepticism by postmodernist discourses (Lyotard 1984). Several contributors to this book point out how this return to modernization reflects the continuity of the *longue durée* marked by Western domination. Once again, the triumphant interpretations and prescriptive analyses relied heavily on notions of simple, linear, and teleological progressions of history. This implied that the transition toward liberal democracy and free market economies was seen as the last goal and

horizon of historical development, while all other deviations or alternatives were relegated to the "dustbin of history" or viewed as regressive reactions fueling the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996). The triumph has remained with the West, despite 1989 being won in reality by people and by the democratization movement in eastern Europe, Chile and South Africa. However, in mainstream social theory and in the political ideologies that underwrite it, these peripheries needed to catch up with the West and its modern institutions (a market economy, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, and individual freedoms). The Second and Third Worlds had no choice but to emulate, imitate and implement modernity.

In analyzing the shifts in social theory that stem from 1989, we follow theoretical insights on the reorganization of capitalism with regard to three key concerns. *First*, there is the move toward flexibilization and networked regimes. Beck (1994) saw in this move a "modernization of modernity" bringing with it both new freedoms and risks, Wagner (2002) addressed it as a transition from solid to disorganized modernity, Castells (1996) diagnosed in it the rise of the network society, while Sennett (2006) explored how the flattening of formal hierarchies, changes in authority and capitalist reorganization was affecting forms of work and introducing a "flexible personality" (Holmes 2007). *Second* are the relationships between capitalism and cultural identities: Fraser and Honneth (2003) famously addressed these relationships from the perspective of justice as a series of shifts from claims for redistribution to claims for recognition. In a somewhat different vein, Boltanski and Chiapello (2006) and Illouz (2007) argued that capitalism's contemporary success must be traced to the way it incorporated and commodified the cultural critique that issued from the expressive elites that emerged since the late 1960s. *Third* is the move from industrial to financial capitalism, which recent scholarship has shown erodes organized labor power (Fraser, this volume; Harvey 2011), infringes upon states' abilities to regulate their economies and steer growth cycles (Streeck 2014), and has catapulted Western societies into the era of "post-democracy" (Crouch 2004). Building on these lines of thought both affirms and unsettles the notion of 1989 as a turning point, as several of the intertwinings of social thought and capitalism addressed in this book emerged well before that date.

In fact, during the 1960s and 1970s, feminist, postcolonial and post-structuralist theorists had already severely criticized the ethnocentrism and androcentrism of universalist modernist thought. The end of the Cold War,

however, sparked the triumphalist return of universalist modernization theories predicting linear progressions of history toward a standard model of "modern society" organized around a set of core institutions (the market economy, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, and individual freedom). According to transition theories, the inherent superiority of these institutions would lead to their proliferation around the globe. And indeed, politically it seemed that after 1989 there were neither objective obstacles nor viable alternatives to liberal-democratic pathways. Modernization discourses affirmed Western political normativities and drew on older paradigms that proclaimed the rise of the post-conflict society.

Beyond the ideologically driven modernization paradigm, however, a much more complex debate on modernity had already ensued in the social sciences since at least the early 1970s, providing an important critical contextualization for 1989. Since some notion of modernity underlies most social theories, it seems critical to briefly review this debate. As opposed to universalist theories of modernity, which saw modernity as crystallizing around a defined set of political, economic, legal, and cultural institutions, Eisenstadt (1973) and others argued instead that modernity was multiple and contingent. Based on both Weberian sociology and Marx's political economy, theorists such as Wagner (1992), Therborn (1995), Wittrock (2000), and Knöbl (2007) explored modernity in terms of historical breakthroughs, processes of diffusion and local interpretation. Eisenstadt (2000) famously coined the term "multiple modernities" to point to the ways in which older civilizational cultures provide the basis on which modernity is interpreted as resulting in variegated, non-standardized sets of institutions worldwide. In subsequent debates, while neo-modernists (Schmidt 2006) interpreted the multiple nature of modernity as resulting from its diffusion, postcolonial theorists (Bhabha 1994; Mignolo 2011; Boatcă 2013) insisted that modernity had multiple origins. Significantly, this multiplicity of modernities opened up perspectives on a comparative analytical framework that rejected the absolute opposition between the singular monolithic concept of Western modernity on the one hand, and traditionalist Third World, or authoritarian Second World "others" on the other.

Three implications of this turn are important for contextualizing the end of the Cold War. First, this view provided a new perspective on communism and Marxism as distinct and historically grounded forms of modernity. Exploring Soviet modernity, in a now classic article Arnason (2000: 61) argued that

> If communism can be located within the spectrum of multiple modernities, the crisis and collapse of the Soviet empire may have some bearing on the question of more general crisis tendencies inherent in modernity. At a more practical level, the problems of post-Communist transition take on a new complexion when they are seen as the legacy of a disintegrating mode of modernization: the promise of "shock therapy" could only be taken seriously by those who mistook communism for a total rejection of modernity, followed by total collapse.

In a more anthropological vein, Donham (1999) explored the metanarratives of modernity that drove the 1974 Ethiopian revolution and its distinct version of Marxist modernism. Secondly, the turn to multiplicity opened up pathways for the analysis of modernity as a feature not of institutional landscapes but of collective experiences and utopian aspirations. The anthropologist James Ferguson was a key protagonist of radically reflexive turns of this sort. In his book *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (1999), he explored how development discourses in Africa and other parts of world infused collective desires and fantasies with concrete expectations of progress. Thirdly, if modernity were multiple, this would mean that these different social and cultural formations had not developed in isolation from one another but had connected and entangled histories (Randeria 2006). Therborn (2003) suggested that these entangled histories, in turn, reflect "entangled modernities." "The problematic of entangled modernities," he claimed (ibid.: 294), "is then part of two broader intellectual efforts, towards a global scholarship, and towards a new historical self-conception." We argue that the theoretical significance of the end of the Cold War must be viewed against the background of these shifts in theories of modernity.

While, as mentioned above, the importance of 1989 needs to be relativized in the light of earlier developments, it also needs to be rethought from non-Eurocentric perspectives. In his contribution to the present volume, Dipesh Chakrabarty describes the ways in which postcolonial theory has been instrumental in this regard. One important lesson is that transition studies and their notion of linear, irreversible progress have clearly exposed the relationships between power and knowledge (Foucault 1982). Critical thought, despite being factually and methodologically correct, was only weakly tied to emancipatory political practice (Milner 1992), and after 1989, it was separated from emancipatory projects or entered into dialog

with neoliberal governmentality. The more refined version of transitional discourse, by contrast, refashioned the term "globalization" as new place-holder of modernization. In her chapter, Julie Klinger traces the rise of globalization discourse in area studies debates and interrogates its peculiar relationships with studies of China. She concludes that, "the totalizing force of globalization failed to subsume the Cold War and colonial distinctions between 'East/West' and 'Occident/Orient'" (Klinger, this volume).

The present book is divided into two sections. The first section provides a theoretical and genealogical framework for understanding the shifts in conceptual vocabulary of the last decades of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, re-orienting our understanding of the historical sequence of 1989–1991. A set of alternative vocabularies and narratives that had been developed previously are re-visited and used to develop a more critical assessment of the events of 1989. In the second part, by contrast, contributors explore how these theoretical challenges became visible and were confronted in concrete and historically situated domains of social life.

Nancy Fraser's chapter returns to Karl Polanyi's book *The Great Transformation*, which analyzed the major crisis of the 1930s through the notion of the "double movement": on the one hand, there was a movement of political forces that advocated the deregulation of markets, while on the other hand, progressive social movements and political parties successfully strove for the adoption of greater social security policies. In comparison to the current crisis, Fraser elaborates on Polanyi's theory and introduces the "triple movement," which adds to market forces and social protection a third element: *emancipation*. Fraser ponders the question of why the political response to the current crisis remains so weak, even though the challenges of the crisis seem much more threatening.

In another highly original reflection, **Saskia Sassen** argues that one critical feature of the current phase of capitalism is a proliferation of systemic edges inside national territory. She conceptualizes these systemic edges "as the point where a condition takes on a format so extreme that it cannot be easily captured by the standard measures used by governments and experts" (Sassen, this volume). She works in particular on two axes of research, seeking to understand present-day capitalism in terms of its "predatory formation," while on the political level scrutinizing the logic of "expulsion." It is only through a dialectical movement of both aspects that one can arrive at a more nuanced view of current transformations.

Gal Kirn's chapter critically evaluates the so-called "transition" studies, which offered the main ideological legitimacy for the real processes of the transition after the fall of socialism(s). Transition studies were based on a reductive notion of temporality, which could be traced back to the paradigm of "modernization" (linear and teleological). Rather than abandoning the concept of transition, the author suggests that we rethink it through the analysis of tendency (Marx). Kirn's concrete study of Yugoslav socialist self-management and market reform since the 1960s puts the usual neat divisions between East and West, capitalism, and socialism, under critical scrutiny. If critical theory is of any analytical value, it should not simply affirm what already exists and is evident (diagnosis of "post" phenomena), but should rather locate identity contradictory movements (e.g., post-socialism in socialism) that thwart conceptual binaries.

The following contribution by **Ajay Gandhi** starts from the observation that the post-1989 world inaugurated a movement away from narrative as a political, economic, and cultural value toward the fetishizing of fragmentation and disruption. After official communism's demise and the universal triumph of capitalism—and alongside rapid changes in ecological thinking, technological communication, and popular aspirations and affiliations—elites emphasized discontinuity, a lack of control, a rupturing of certainties. This discourse has pervaded Western society in its prevailing demands to accept contingency, uncertainty and change as facts of life, as well as anthropology as an academic discipline. The study of society and politics has turned away from overarching totalities, structures, or continuities, and instead emphasizes the fractured and discontinuous. Gandhi criticizes certain trends in poststructuralist anthropological theory and argues for a reevaluation of narrative in social science research.

The first section of the book ends with an conversation with **Dipesh Chakrabarty**, conducted by the editors, on how the changes around 1989 have impacted on the critique of capitalism and imperialism in the field of postcolonial studies. Chakrabarty describes the complex interplay between Marxism and post-structuralism in such studies. He argues that one of the initial concerns of postcolonial studies was the critique of monist understandings of notions such as capital and labor in orthodox Marxist analysis. In this context, poststructuralist concepts always played a major role. As a consequence, 1989 posed less severe challenges for postcolonial studies than for other theoretical projects.

The opening chapter of the second part, by **Jane Guyer**, reviews the analysis of currency markets in the context of the ruptures of 1989. It

provides a historical overview of financial currencies after the fall of the Bretton Woods system to the post-colonial moment in Africa in the 1970s and the end of socialism that saw the introduction of plural "soft currencies." Despite the affirmation that the post-1989 era saw control of the currency markets being concentrated in the hands of the big banks, there has also been a multitude of small interventions in regional markets and the global networks that mediate trade and currency exchange in the small-scale commodity economy. This makes a vital contribution to the intersection between local and global in the perspective of finance, which includes the position of subjective response.

Guyer's chapter is followed by three contributions that address the multiple ways in which the end of the Cold War is linked with the resurgence of religion, cultural identities, and the claims made in the cultural civilizations. In the first of them, anthropologist **Bridget Kustin** explores the phenomenal rise of Islamic finance during the 1990s. She suggests that Islamic finance rejects the notion of wholly rational calculations of uncertainty and risk, and provides opportunities through which the calculative rationality of economics can be refracted and understood anew—namely through ethical possibilities that are typically taken as a counterpoint to market-driven capitalism. Kustin addresses the daunting question of the extent to which Islamic finance provides an alternative to neoliberal capitalism. She shows how its anthropological analysis evolved in the context of real existing socialism's demise.

Marian Burchardt's chapter observes that religion has made a spectacular return on to the agenda of sociology and anthropology since 1989. He argues that this return is closely linked to the broader identitarian drift in post-1989 social mobilizations and the shift from social inequality to cultural difference as key frames for theorizing society. However, he also shows that there are three genealogies of discourse on religion that precede 1989 and that explain the contemporary entanglements of religion with neoliberalism and the particular affordances of religion and the "market society": first, the emergence of new spiritualities and their articulation with consumerism; secondly, the apology for wealth, success, and entrepreneurial selves that is promoted through evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity and its "gospel of prosperity"; and thirdly, recent debates on secularism and religious diversity that promote religious expressions as corollaries of the transnational mobility regimes of neoliberalism.

Dominic Martin's contribution approaches the conceptual shifts in and around 1989 from a decidedly peripheral position. He explores the

lives and values of a group of Old Believers at the Siberian, eastern end of Russia that emerged at the interface between the planned economy of state communism and the market capitalism of post-Soviet society as two different economic regimes. Yet he shows that, instead of merely adapting to the new regime, these Old Believers "achieved a blending of communist and liberal values and practices that defies the binary logic of this paradigm" (Martin, this volume). Martin makes two trenchant critiques. First, both "communist society" and "liberal democracy" were often presented as over-determined categories that rarely reflected real social and political possibilities. Secondly, such categories are unable to come to terms with the ways in which this group of believers bases their lives and world views on an ontology that transcends and therefore deeply unsettles the events around 1989–1991 as the core political divide.

In her contribution, **Bree Hocking** argues that the end of the Cold War is specifically linked to the rise of a new kind of consumer capitalism that thrives on the construction of people as "symbolic citizens." By this, she means the ways in which citizenship is more and more loosely tied to rights and responsibility and instead construed as participation in a "cultural democracy," based on the right to cultural difference. The chapter argues that the renewed focus in social theory on symbolic issues in the aftermath of the Cold War served to strengthen the hegemony of neoliberal networks and regimes, thus furthering a number of trends and developments in corporate-bureaucratic governance.

Pierre Minn shows how the rise of humanitarian activity and its increasing significance within the field of medical anthropology are specifically related to the end of the Cold War. He does this by exploring how Cold War politics influenced social life in Haiti and Haiti's shifting geopolitical significance. He suggests that the focus on Haiti is especially apt in illustrating how "two of the hallmarks of neo-liberalism—namely the move away from state expenditures on health and social services for populations and an emphasis on individual action and responsibility—have shaped contemporary humanitarian activity" (Minn, this volume).

Julie Klinger's chapter points to the contradictions and ambivalences in recent scholarship on China. The mainstream approach presupposes a dichotomy between "Euro-Atlantic" globalization and Chinese exceptionalism within globalization. Rather than repeating the "Westernized" view of the events of Tianmen Square and the post-1989 era, this chapter interweaves theoretical and historical analyses that reorient the post-1989 shift to the decade before, to Reagan's and Thatcher's historic deregulations of capital and Deng Xiaoping's market reforms.

Ingo Richter's chapter addresses theoretical and political shifts in human rights scholarship from the Second World War until today. His argument arrives at the dramatic changes in 1989, which seemed to place liberal, social and international human rights theories under great challenge. New approaches advocated the greater inclusion of the topics of dignity, participatory democracy, religious and ethnic diversity and gender equality. However, in the context of neoliberal domination, private property rights were strengthened at the expense of the social responsibility of the state, which had many consequences for human rights discourses. Richter ends on the question of cosmopolitanism and its possible significance within the context of human rights.

The book closes with a critical reflection by **Jürgen Kocka** about the changes of 1989 with a special focus on the process of German (re)unification in the field of the sciences. His approach first dismantles the "predictive" capabilities of his own discipline (history) and evaluates the extent to which the "surprise" of 1989 affected discussions of it afterwards. Secondly, Kocka offers a personal account of academic reforms in the discipline of history after the re-unification of Germany in order to highlight the extremely ambivalent results of this process.

Note

1. See for instance the tremendous public interest in Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the twenty-first century* (2014).

References

Arnason, Johan P. 2000. Communism and Modernity. *Daedalus* 129(1): 61–90.

Badiou, Alain. 2012. *The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings* New York: Verso.

Beck, Ulrich. 1994. The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernisation. In *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, ed. U. Beck, A. Giddens, and S. Lash, 56–110. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bhabha, Homi. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. New York: Routledge.

Boatcă, Manuela. 2013. Two-Way Street. Moderne(n), Verwobenheit und Kolonialität. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 38(4): 375–394.

Boltanski, Luc and Eve, Chiapello. 2006. *The New Spirit of Capitalism*. London and New York: Verso Books.

Castells, Manuel. 1996. *The Rise of the Network Society—The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture*. London: Blackwell.

Crouch, Colin. 2004. *Post-democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Donham, Donald L. 1999. *Marxist Modern: An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 1973. *Tradition, Change, and Modernity*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

———. 2000. Multiple Modernities. *Daedalus* 129(1): 1–29.

Ferguson, James. 2015. *Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution*. Durham: Duke University Press.

———. 1999. *Expectations of modernity: myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian Copperbelt*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.

Fisher, Mark. 2009. *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* Winchester: O Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1982. The Subject and Power. *Critical Inquiry* 8(4): 777–795.

Fraser, Nancy and Axel, Honneth. 2003. *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*. London and New York: Verso Books.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Simon and Schuster.

Harvey, David. 2006. *Spaces of Global Capitalism*. London and New York: Verso Books.

———. 2011. *The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism*. London: Profile Books.

Holmes, Brian. 2007. "Flexible Personality". http://eipcp.net/transversal/1106/holmes/en.

Huntington, Samuel. P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London: Simon and Schuster.

Illouz, Eva. 2007. *Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Knöbl, Wolfgang. 2007. *Die Kontingenz der Moderne: Wege in Europa, Asien und Amerika*. Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus Verlag.

Lyotard, Jean-Francois. 1984. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Mignolo, Walter. 2011. *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Milner, J.-C. 1992. *Constat*. Lagrasse: Verdier

Piketty, Thomas. 2014. *Capital in the 21st Century*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Randeria, Shalini. 2006. Entangled Histories: Civil Society, Caste Solidarities and Legal Pluralism in Post-colonial India. In *Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives*, ed. J. Keane, 213–242. London: Berghahn Books.

Schmidt, Volker H. (2006). Multiple modernities or varieties of modernity?. *Current Sociology*, 54(1), 77–97.

Sennett, Richard. 2006. *The Culture of the New Capitalism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Streeck, Wolfgang. 2014. *Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism*. London and New York: Verso Books.

Therborn, Goran. 1995. *European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945–2000*. London: Sage.

———. 2003. Entangled Modernities. *European Journal of Social Theory* 6(3): 293–305.

Wagner, Peter. 1992. Liberty and Discipline: Making Sense of Postmodernity, or, Once Again, Toward a Sociohistorical Understanding of Modernity. *Theory and Society* 21(4): 467–492.

———. 2002. *A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline*. New York: Routledge.

———. 2008. *Modernity as Experience and Interpretation*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Wittrock, Björn. 2000. Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition. *Daedalus* 129(1): 31–60.

Žižek, Slavoj. 2011. *Living in the End Times*. London: Verso.

Epistemic and Conceptual Shifts in the Wake of 1989

De-theorizing in Order to Re-theorize Emergent Alignments: *A Rumination*

Saskia Sassen

Introduction

One critical feature of the current phase of capitalism is a proliferation of systemic edges inside national territory. I conceptualize such systemic edges as the point where a condition takes on a format so extreme that it cannot be easily captured through the standard measures used by governments and experts. The key dynamic at these edges is expulsion from the diverse systems in play—economic, social, biospheric. Thereby, what lies beyond such an edge becomes conceptually and analytically invisible, ungraspable. Each major domain has its own distinctive systemic edge or edges—thus, the edge is constituted differently for the economy than it is for the biosphere or the social realm. This type of edge is foundationally different from the geographic borders of the interstate system.

The core hypothesis is that we are seeing a proliferation of such systemic edges originating partly familiar conditions—in the decaying Western-style political economy of the twentieth century, the escalation of environmental destruction, and the rise of complex forms of knowledge that far too often produce elementary brutalities. The expulsion logics I focus on are just a few of the many that might exist; they are, generally, more extreme than

S. Sassen (✉)
Department of Sociology, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

17

whatever expulsion logics existed, for instance, in the preceding Keynesian period. Further, these expulsion logics are also evident beyond the West, as I argue particularly in a long chapter on environmental destruction in *Expulsions* called "Dead Land Dead Water."

The Need to Develop New Instruments for Analysis

In my earlier work (Sassen 2006, 2007) I developed methodological and conceptual elements to cut across the weakened categories developed in the 1950s for studying the interstate system. I identified a variety of vectors that allow one to track processes whatever their geographies. Thus, my intent there was not to contest the weight of interstate borders, but rather to study how a given process scales globally. What are the instruments—of the law, the economy, the social, the cultural— that have been and continue to be developed to enable the making of cross-border processes. One result of that inquiry was that perhaps the critical question marking the contemporary period is not so much the weakening of interstate borders than who has the power to *make* new types of borderings (Sassen 1991, 2006).

Thus, the current work on the systemic edge in *Expulsions* (2014) represents an additional conceptual instrument; it does not override or contest the earlier (1991, 2006) work. On the contrary, it often builds on that earlier work and takes it further both theoretically and empirically by calling for the need to de-theorize—to go back to "ground level"—so as to see these new alignments. In other words, to de-theorize in order to re-theorize. For instance, I compare a highly polluting industrial complex in Russia and one in the USA, and ask what matters more to understand the current period, that one has a long communist trajectory and the other a long capitalist trajectory or that they both have vast capacities to destroy the environment.

Inserting the environmental question here serves to triangulate what is otherwise a mere comparison that uses conventional variables (capitalism versus communism). It enables a third knowledge space to emerge. Thereby, it helps us go beyond traditional comparisons: we leave behind the Cold War and organize our research and interpretation in terms of what is urgent or meaningful today, with the environmental question representing one such significant current issue. This kind of third dimension takes on specific contents and meanings depending on the domain or variables I focus on. For instance, I explore the growth and privatizing

of prisons in the USA and the growth and privatizing of refugee camps. Both grow, and both have increasingly private sector interests at work. My question becomes: Are these two very diverse formations, with such different specifics, actually systemic parallels, each adapted to its particular environment? This is a methodological and interpretive practice that recurs continuously in *Expulsions.*

Furthermore, the extreme character of conditions at the edge helps make visible what may also take place via more moderate instances inside the system—a bit less equality in the earnings distribution or the small symptoms of climate change we experience every now and then. In the spaces of the expelled, we find far sharper versions, from middle classes that have lost it all to dead land and dead water. In this regard, I conceive of the systemic edge as signaling the existence of *conceptually* subterranean trends—trends we cannot easily make visible through our current categories of meaning. From there, the importance of positioning my inquiry at the systemic edge, where a condition takes on its extreme form and in that process also escapes our conventional measures and representations.

A key source of these expulsions is a mix of elements often experienced (and admired) as requiring specialized knowledges and complex organizational formats. One example is the sharp rise in the complexity of financial instruments, the product of brilliant creative classes and advanced mathematics, that often winds up destroying healthy non-financial firms. Another is the complexity of the legal and accounting features of the contracts enabling a sovereign government to acquire vast stretches of land in a foreign sovereign nation-state. And yet another is the brilliant engineering and innovations that make possible types of mining that destroy land and water bodies. In my work I explore the extent to which we have reached a point in our advanced political economies where complexity tends to produce elementary brutalities.

What is expelled and the conditions of those expulsions vary greatly. This is one reason why it is not easy to see these diverse expulsions as emerging from shared emergent dynamics. I include a broad range of processes and conditions under the notion of expulsions. What marks them all is their acute character. They range from the impoverishment of the middle classes in rich countries to the eviction of millions of small farmers in poor countries due to the over 300 million hectares of land acquired by foreign investors and governments since 2006. Most familiar are the growing numbers of the abjectly poor who give a whole new meaning to poverty, and the displaced warehoused in formal and informal refugee camps. Then there

are the minoritized in rich countries warehoused in prisons and able-bodied unemployed men and women warehoused in ghettoes and slums. Some of these expulsions have existed for a long time, but not at the current scale. Some are new types of expulsions, such as the 14 million households in the USA whose homes were foreclosed in a short and brutal history that lasted a mere decade. In short, the character, contents, and sites of these expulsions vary enormously across social strata and across the world.

The globalizing of capital and the sharp rise in technical capabilities have produced scaling effects that break historical records. What may have been minor displacements and losses now become massive expulsions. I found that simply understanding this scaling as more inequality, more poverty, more technical capacity, and so on, is not helpful.

An organizing question running through my work on the notion of "expulsions" is whether these diverse instances across social strata and urban rural divides, across the global north and global south divide, are the surface manifestation or the localized shape of deeper systemic dynamics that articulate much of what now appears as unconnected.

These dynamics might be operating at a more conceptually subterranean level than the familiar formations through which we understand our current condition. We rely on markers such as capitalist economy, communist China, sub-Saharan Africa, and so on, to give a familiar shape and meaning to facts and events that might actually be originating in unfamiliar systemics. To that end, I use the notion of subterranean dynamics—strictly speaking, conceptually subterranean—in that they are invisible to us who remain attached to older categories of meaning. New dynamics may well get filtered through familiar thick realities—poverty, inequality, economy, and politics— and thereby take on familiar forms when in fact they are signaling accelerations or ruptures that generate new meanings.

A Quick Remapping of the Operational Space of Economic Power

Two profound shifts stand out beginning in the 1980s, and they are happening across the world. But they evolve with highly specific characteristics in each locality. One is the material development of growing areas of the world into extreme zones for key economic operations. On the one hand are the global outsourcing of low-wage manufacturing,

services, and clerical work to areas with low wages and weak regulation. At the other extreme is the active worldwide making of global cities as strategic spaces for advanced economic functions; this includes cities built from scratch and the often brutal renovating of old cities. The network of global cities functions as a new geography of centrality that cuts across the old North-South/East-West divides. And so does the network of processing zones for outsourced labor. One geography concentrates on global wealth and the other on global cheap labor.

The second is the ascendance of finance as a core capability in the contemporary global economy. The network of global cities is a strategic operational space in both the Global North and Global South. Finance in itself is not new—it has been part of our history for millennia. What specifies finance in the current era is the capacity to develop extremely complex instruments and to benefit from electronic networks and their enormous multiplier effects. This rise of finance is consequential for the larger economy. While traditional banking is about selling money the bank has, finance is about selling money it does not have. To do this, finance needs to invade nonfinancial sectors to get the grist for its mill. And no instrument is as good for this as the derivative. The result is an extreme escalating of the value of finance as measured by outstanding derivatives.

Inside capitalism itself we can characterize the relation of advanced to traditional capitalism as one marked by extraction and destruction. At its most extreme this can mean the immiseration and exclusion of growing numbers of people who cease being of value as workers and consumers. But it also means that traditional petty bourgeoisies and traditional national bourgeoisies cease being of value to the larger system. These trends are not anomalous or the result of a crisis; they are part of the current systemic deepening of capitalist relations, and so is the rapidly shrinking economic space in Greece, Spain, the USA, and many other developed countries.

From the perspective of this systemic logic, the natural resources of much of Africa and good parts of Latin America and Central Asia count more than the people on those lands count as consumers and as workers. When this happens, we have left behind earlier forms of capitalism that thrived on the accelerated expansion of prosperous working and middle classes. Maximizing consumption by households was a critical dynamic in that period. But its importance keeps diminishing as finance and extraction take over.

Beyond the Rich: Predatory Formations

Besides the concept of the systemic edge and the associated concept of expulsions, another central category I have sought to develop and deploy to capture the particularity of the current period is that of predatory *formations*. I conceptualize these as going well beyond the common notion of the power of the rich. Such formations include pieces of law and accounting, technical capacities, the willingness of the executive branch of government to see with the eye of global corporations, and more. These predatory formations break through the edges of established features of, and notions about, the economy, government, and policy. In other words, the current phase cannot simply be explained in terms of the concentration of income and wealth in a small group at the top. The rich by themselves could not have brought about the massive shifts we have seen over the last 30 years.

Today's vast destructive processes are often complex assemblages of aims and instruments (legal, technical, etc.). The expulsions of people from reasonable lives can be a secondary effect, even if the minoritized are more likely to appear as targeted because they are more vulnerable and marked. I see much of what constitutes expulsion as beyond targeting. Expulsion is even more brutal than targeting: these men and women do not count at all; they are not in the picture. Targeting might set in if they resist before being expelled, but a lot of the destruction is rapid, anonymous, or faceless, and total. Indeed, the expelled in this particular period are increasingly diverse: they belong to an enormous diversity of groups, places, projects, and histories. These expulsions touch the discriminated minorities and mainstream middle classes.

One element here is my emphasis on the fact that remarkable new tools at the disposal of powerful individuals and firms actually begin to constitute formations where these users are just one element, rather than masters of the domain, so to speak. The other elements include, among others, advanced mathematics and communications, machines that can literally move mountains, global freedoms of movement, and maneuver for top-level executives that allow them to ignore or intimidate national governments and their laws, and increasingly international institutions (global firms, the IMF, etc.) that force compliance with their agenda. And then there are Western governments, central bankers, the IMF, and kindred international institutions, all now pushing the need to reduce excess government debt, excess social welfare programs, excess regulation, which are all geared toward reducing social services and assistance to the disadvantaged.

This is the language of today's key order-making institutions in the West and increasingly elsewhere. One effect and aim is the de facto project of shrinking the space of a country's economy, although not the economic profitability of the corporate sector. It entails the expulsion of growing numbers of sectors and types of workers who are no longer valued. In its simple brutality, the transformation of Greece illustrates this well: the massive and rapid expulsion of small, modest-profit-making firms and of the modest and not-so-modest middle classes from jobs, social and medical services, and increasingly their homes. This sort of process is taking place in many countries, from the familiar case of Spain and Portugal to the less-recognized case of Germany and the Netherlands. Even countries with growing employment, such as the USA, have in fact shrunken the space of their economies, as is evident when we include the sharp rise in the numbers of the long-term unemployed, of the incarcerated, and of the small modest firms that are dead.

We must not forget the earlier periods of regions that now seem hopeless, whose better times have been forgotten by many observers as if their hopelessness were an intrinsic constitutive element of their cultures. Beneath today's wars and dismembered societies in much of sub-Saharan Africa lies an earlier period of mass manufacturing, growth of the middle classes, growth of thriving market towns and capital cities, and governments developing infrastructures and health and school systems. Before it broke down, Somalia was a fairly prosperous society, a fairly well-run country even if autocratic, with a well-educated middle class. Or, consider Russia, where today's huge numbers of homeless people, the abandoned elderly, and the growing numbers of very poor without access to social services are also a new development. Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had welfare states that took care of their citizens.

One effort in *Expulsions* along these lines was to make visible the crossing into the space of the expelled—to capture the visible site or moment of expulsion, before we forget. The villagers and small farmers evicted from their land due to the development of palm plantations soon disappear in the vast slums of megacities where they materialize as slum dwellers—completing the erasure of their past as small farmers with knowledge about plants and crops and weather. Government employees in Greece cut out of their jobs in the name of European Union (EU) demands to cut the debt become part of the mass of unemployed, soon not recognized as erstwhile government employees. Stretches of dead land, poisoned by toxic emissions from factories or mines, are expelled from working land, best forgotten.

New Geographies of Centrality and Marginality

There have long been what I refer to as transversal circuits—that is, circuits that cut across familiar, well-established divisions. In past work I decoded some of the circuits originating in the "West" that have historically cut across diverse histories and geographies through war, trade, slavery, annihilation of indigenous peoples, and more (see *Territory* 2006: chaps. 2 and 3). And I have especially studied and conceptualized today's versions of such transversal circuits.

Among the latter, I have documented empirically the active making of distinct geographies of power/privilege/extraction that began in the 1980s and cut across the traditional divides of the modern interstate system (North and South, East and West). These transversal geographies of privilege and power can comfortably coexist inside countries with many of the traditional divides that continue to operate, notably the lack of health care and easy access to food and water in the Global South, and the ongoing existence of a strong Communist government structure in some of the East.

I make quite a bit of the fact that these new transversal geographies can coexist with older divides. The elites of Nigeria are more at home and more oriented toward the elites of London and Mumbai than they are to the poor and modest middle classes in their own country. In this sense, also, these new geographies have the effect of disassembling societies and cultures, as well as their territories and their national states (see *Territory* 2006: chaps. 5, 7, and 8; *Expulsions* 2014: chaps. 1, 2, and 3). Parts of these territories are built in the image of the richest cities across the world, enabled by the latest technical developments, while other parts are completely neglected, not even supplied with running water and electricity.

These geographies of centrality incorporate particular sectors (leading cities, corporate elites, the rich, the executive branch of the state, including its central bank, major public-owned corporations, and more). And they expel the rest. Thus, a country with vast stretches of impoverished localities that lack all the basics, from health care to education, may nonetheless put its limited resources in developing its key city so that it can be a hub in one of these global geographies of centrality. There are many examples, some familiar, such as Abuja in Nigeria, and some just emerging, such as Luanda in Angola. The so-called rich countries did more or less the same beginning in the 1980s, eventually cutting social services and countrywide infrastructure upgrading, while promoting the glamorizing of their key cities. I develop this in *Cities in a World Economy* (2012) and in the two editions of *The Global*

City (1991, 2001). I have also found that the making/justifying of these emergent transversal geographies has been a powerful tool for mobilizing, persuading, and justifying the larger cross-border corporate project.

In the past, the British Empire wanted the whole of Africa, Spain wanted the whole of Latin America, and so on. Today's powers want only specific components of the diverse national territories across the world within which they operate. Once done extracting the minerals, or the water, or the crops, they exit and move on to the next set of sites for extraction. These are mobile geographies that leave behind land and sites destroyed by their use, which are in fact expelled from these geographies of centrality—expelled to the zone of dead land and dead water. Another instance is the expelling of much of the traditional middle classes: once a key actor in the making of an industrial- and consumption-based economy, these are now increasingly useless from the perspective of these geographies of centrality. In short, it is not only the "lumpen," the refugees, and other such desperate people who become "human waste." These are, then, increasingly particularized geographies of centrality, ready to expel people, places, and chunks of the biosphere.

Conclusions: Going Back to Ground Level

As indicated earlier, one of my core arguments to get at the current condition is that we need to go back to "ground level" as a way of de-theorizing, or destabilizing master categories and powerful explanations, in order to re-theorize. We cannot do without theory if we are to go beyond the empirics of complex configurations and processes. Nor am I arguing that one person by herself can do that re-theorizing. Rather, my image is one of unstable meanings, which generate a need for collectivizing the task of grappling with the issues discussed thus far. We might aggregate these as (a) emergent conditions (e.g., the strengthening of global cities and the neglect of hinterlands); (b) transversalities that exit our master categories (e.g., the fact that prisons and refugee camps may increasingly share features); and (c) dynamics that erase contents (e.g., when environmental destruction is so absolute that the result is not simply degradation, but dead land and dead water.

One effort in my recent work is to find resonances between very different types of expulsions, such as long-term imprisonment and long-term refugee camps. These are never put in the same knowledge space. Each is examined on its own terms, by very different types of experts, and never put in conversation with each other. In contrast, I make a strong point

about the need for bringing very diverse conditions in conversation with each other. It generates a mode of researching that insists on de-theorizing in order to detect features that take on very diverse contents and formats in each condition: in the social sciences, prisons and refugee camps are placed in radically different, unconnected, conceptual spaces. For instance, I insist on prioritizing the enormous capacity for environmental destruction of both Russia's Norilsk nickel-producing complex, the largest in the world, and the vast gold mining operations in Montana, regardless of the fact that one belongs to a communist history and the other to a capitalist one.

In short, and to illustrate what is a very broad set of domains, I argue, for example, that today's capacity to destroy air, water, and land overrides the master categories of the interstate system. Further, the spaces of the expelled are not like the "regular" spaces where most of social, political, and economic life keeps taking place. But neither are they simply nonspaces. Indeed, the spaces of the expelled in this particular period arise from increasingly diverse groups, places, projects, and histories.

I explore whether there is a disjuncture between the surface individuality of distinct types of expulsions and deeper dynamics that underlie them all. It is this possibility that leads me to the notion of expulsions. This is one feature they all share, even when the character and the contents can vary enormously. The fact of multiple specialized fields of research, knowledge, and interpretation, each with its cannons and boundary protecting methods and theories, does not help in this task.

At its most brutal my hypothesis is that beneath the specifics of each instance lie emergent systemic trends shaped by a few very basic dynamics, no matter their enormously diverse visual and social orders. In that sense, empirical research and conceptual recoding must happen together: empirically, it may look "African" or "Italian," but are these markers of an earlier era still helpful in understanding the character of our epoch. To invoke a somewhat self-evident case, China may still have much that is communist, but its growing inequality and most recently impoverishment of the more modest middle classes might be rooted in deeper trends it shares with a country as diverse as the USA. They are very different countries, and will remain so for a long time. Nonetheless, they may both "host" finance, speculation-driven tendencies, and a push for maximizing profits. And these parallels and their consequences on people, places, and economies may well turn out to be the more significant change of our times. Clearly, this focus on the interiority of countries contrasts with the far more common focus on national borders as the sites where change is happening.

Bibliography

Sassen, Saskia. 1991. *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo.* 1st ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2001. *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo.* 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2006. *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages.* 1st ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2007. *A Sociology of Globalization.* 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton.
———. 2012. *Cities in a World Economy.* 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
———. 2014. *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/Belknap Book.

A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of Crisis after Polanyi

Nancy Fraser

In many respects, today's crisis resembles that of the 1930s, as described by Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation*.[1] Now, as then, a relentless push to extend and deregulate markets is everywhere wreaking havoc—destroying the livelihoods of billions of people; fraying families, weakening communities, and rupturing solidarities; trashing habitats and despoiling nature across the globe. Now, as then, attempts to commodify nature, labor, and money are destabilizing society and economy—witness the destructive effects of unregulated trading in biotechnology, carbon offsets and, of course, in financial derivatives and the impacts on child care, schooling and care of the elderly. Now, as then, the result is a crisis in multiple dimensions—not only economic and financial but also ecological and social.

Moreover, our crisis seems to share a distinctive deep-structural logic with the one Polanyi analyzed. Both appear to be rooted in a common dynamic, which he called "fictitious commodification." In both eras, ours and his, free-market fundamentalists have sought to commodify all the necessary preconditions of commodity production. Turning labor, nature, and money into objects for sale on "self-regulating" markets, they

N. Fraser (✉)
Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, New York, NY, USA

proposed to treat those fundamental bases of production and exchange as if they could be commodities like any other. In fact, however, the project was self-contradictory. Like a tiger that bites its own tail, neo-liberalism threatens now, just as its predecessor did then, to erode the very supports on which capitalism depends. The outcome in both cases was entirely predictable: wholesale destabilization of the economic system on the one hand and of nature and society on the other.

Given these structural similarities, it is no surprise that many analysts of the present crisis are now returning to Polanyi's *magnum opus*, nor that many speak of our time as a "second great transformation," a "great transformation redux."[2] Nevertheless, the current conjuncture diverges in a crucial respect from that of the 1930s: despite the structural similarities, the political response today is strikingly different. In the first half of the twentieth century, social struggles surrounding the crisis formed what Polanyi called a "double movement." As he saw it, political parties and social movements coalesced around one side or the other of a simple fault line. On one side stood political forces and commercial interests that favored deregulating markets and extending commodification; on the other stood a broad-based, cross-class front, including urban workers and rural landowners, socialists, and conservatives, that sought to "protect society" from the ravages of the market. As the crisis sharpened, moreover, the partisans of "social protection" won the day. In contexts as divergent as New Deal America, Stalinist Russia, fascist Europe and, later, in post-war social democracy, the political classes appeared to converge on at least this one point: left to themselves, "self-regulating" markets in labor, nature, and money would destroy society. Political regulation was needed to save it.

Today, however, no such consensus exists. Political elites are explicitly or implicitly neo-liberal—outside Latin America and China, at least. Committed first and foremost to protecting investors, virtually all of them—including self-professed social democrats—demand "austerity" and "deficit reduction," despite the threats such policies pose to economy, society, and nature. Meanwhile, popular opposition fails to coalesce around a solidaristic alternative, despite intense but ephemeral outbursts, such as Occupy and the *indignados*, whose protests generally lack programmatic content. Progressive social movements are longer lived and better institutionalized, to be sure; but they suffer from fragmentation and have not united in a coherent counter-project to neo-liberalism. All told, we lack a double movement in Polanyi's sense.[3] The result, therefore, is a curious

disjuncture. While today's crisis appears to follow a Polanyian structural logic, grounded in the dynamics of fictitious commodification, it does not manifest a Polanyian political logic, figured by the double movement.

What should we make of this disjuncture? How can we best explain the decidedly non-Polanyian character of the political landscape in the twenty-first century, and how should we evaluate the present constellation? Why do political elites today fail to champion regulatory projects aimed at saving the capitalist economic system—let alone society and nature—from the ravages of out-of-control markets? And why do social movements not unite around a counter-hegemonic project aimed at defending threatened livelihoods, battered communities, and endangered habitats? Are we dealing here with political mistakes—with failures of leadership, defects of analysis, and errors of judgment? Alternatively, does the current constellation of political struggle in some respects represent an advance over Polanyi's scenario? Does it reflect hard-won insights that point to weaknesses in the idea of the double movement? In what follows, I propose to address these questions in two stages. First, I shall assess some widely cited hypotheses as to why the current political landscape deviates from Polanyi's analysis. I shall then propose an alternative hypothesis, which in my view better illuminates our situation. This hypothesis requires that we revise Polanyi's idea of a double movement in a way that better clarifies the prospects for emancipatory social transformation in the twenty-first century.

A Failure of Leadership?

Let us begin, then, by asking: Why is there no double movement in the twenty-first century? Why, despite apparently favorable structural conditions, is there no counter-hegemonic project aimed at protecting society and nature from neo-liberalism? Why do the political classes of our time cede the making of public policy to central bankers, and why do their ranks include so few committed Keynesians, let alone socialists, willing to champion solidaristic alternatives? Why is there no broad coalition of new-New Dealers: trade unionists, unemployed, and precarious workers; feminists, ecologists, and anti-imperialists; social democrats and democratic socialists? Why no popular front insisting that the costs of fictitious commodification should be paid, not by "society" as such, nor by nature reduced to a sink, but by those whose relentless drive to accumulate capital precipitated the crisis? Why have the creative protests of the *indignados* and Occupy movements failed to find any coherent, sustained political

expression that could mount a credible challenge to those "malefactors of wealth," as Franklin Roosevelt would have called them, and to the governments who do their bidding?

Several explanations suggest themselves. The simplest attributes the absence of a double movement to failures of political leadership. This hypothesis must have leapt out at anyone who followed the US presidential campaign. To the dismay of many, Barack Obama proved unwilling or unable to articulate an alternative to the unabashed neo-liberalism of Romney and Ryan. In the presidential debate of October 3, 2012, for example, the moderator fed the incumbent a softball question: How does your view of the role of government differ from Romney's? It would take a psychoanalyst to plumb the full depths of the president's failure to offer a full-throated answer, the hesitancy expressed in his body language and tone of voice, and the embarrassed character of his response:

> Well I definitely think there are differences. The first role of the federal government is to keep the American people safe … But I also believe that government has the capacity—the federal government has the capacity—to help open up opportunity and create ladders of opportunity, and to create frameworks where the American people can succeed … the genius of America is the free-enterprise system, and freedom, and the fact that people can go out there and start a business … But as Abraham Lincoln understood, there are also some things we do better together … Because we want to give these gateways of opportunity to all Americans, because if all Americans are getting opportunity, we're all going to be better off.[4]

Contrast this with Franklin Roosevelt boldly mocking his market-fundamentalist opponents as he campaigned for re-election in 1936; here again, the transcript cannot do justice to Roosevelt's delivery—his self-assured sarcasm and evident pleasure in mocking his opponents' transparent bad faith:

> Let me warn you and let me warn the nation, against the smooth evasion that says: "Of course we believe these things—we believe in social security, we believe in work for the unemployed, we believe in saving homes. Cross our hearts and hope to die, we believe in all these things. But we do not like the way the present administration is doing them. Just turn them over to us. We will do all of them, we will do more of them, we will do them better, and most important of all, the doing of them will not cost anybody anything."[5]

The comparison shows that the hypothesis of leadership failure has genuine force. A charismatic individual can indeed make a difference to the course of history, and the prospects for a double movement today would certainly improve if FDR, and not Obama, were leading the charge. Nevertheless, this idea does not suffice to explain why there is no double movement in the present conjuncture. It would be one thing if we were dealing here with the foibles of a single individual. But Obama's weakness is hardly unique. It is the broader pattern—the across-the-board collapse of political Keynesianism among the elites—that must be explained. Faced with the failure of an entire ruling stratum to make any serious attempt to stop an impending train wreck, we cannot restrict ourselves to hypotheses centered on individual psychology.

Labor and Financialization

Let us turn, therefore, to a deeper explanation, which concerns a fundamental change in the character of capitalism since the 1930s. What is at issue here is the shift from a Fordist regime of accumulation, resting on industrial production, to a post-Fordist one, dominated by finance. In the Fordist capitalism of Polanyi's day, labor occupied a central place, as its exploitation constituted the principal engine of capital accumulation. Industrial workers possessed considerable clout: concentration facilitated organization and the threat to withhold labor was a potent weapon. Organized labor constituted the backbone of a broad-based popular front, spearheading efforts to regulate capitalism and shield society from the disintegrative effects of *laissez-faire*.[6] Structurally, then, industrial capitalism generated a ready-made constituency and political base for the protective pole of the double movement.

The situation of present-day capitalism is fundamentally different. In the current conjuncture, capital prefers, when possible, to bypass the risky business of production. Simplifying the circuit of accumulation, investors find profit in the buying and selling of money and of new financial products that commodify risk—thereby avoiding dependence on labor, whose role is in any case further reduced by new technologies. Necessarily, then, labor lacks the leverage it had in the 1930s. Manufacturing decamps to the semi-periphery, union membership plummets and the strike weapon loses much of its force—at least in the Global North. Equally important, the class division between labor and capital ceases to appear self-evident, becoming obfuscated by the seemingly more salient divide between the thinning ranks

of the stably employed, on the one hand, and the swelling precariat on the other. In this situation, organized labor does not speak for society as such. In the eyes of some, it defends the privileges of a minority that enjoys a modicum of social security against the far greater number who do not.

For structural reasons, then, labor cannot supply the backbone for the protective pole of a double movement in the twenty-first century. Nor is there any obvious successor in sight: the precariat or "multitude" has the power of numbers on its side, but its situation is not conducive to organization; and much of it possesses nothing that capital needs and that it could withhold. Youth, peasants, consumers, women, the no-longer-so-"new" class of symbolic workers, lately appearing in the guise of hackers and cyber-pirates—all have been tried and found wanting in political heft. All told, a capitalism dominated by finance poses formidable structural obstacles to the Polanyian political dynamic. By its nature, it generates no identifiable social force that could spearhead a counter-hegemony, let alone any designated "grave-diggers."

This hypothesis of a shift from production to finance offers some insight into the conditions militating against the emergence of a double movement in the present era. Yet it fails to capture the full spectrum of political possibilities. For one thing, this approach neglects to consider labor's prospects outside the Global North. For another, it does not look beyond the official economic system to the broader terrain of *social reproduction*, which currently serves as a major site of opposition to neo-liberalism—as witness struggles throughout the world over education, health care, housing, water, pollution, food, and community life. Then, too, the financialization hypothesis focuses one-sidedly on class relations as the sole or principal ground of political struggle, while failing to consider relations of *status*, which presently serve as major bases of mobilization—as witness the politics of recognition, arguably the dominant grammar of protest today, organizing struggles over gender, sexuality, religion, language, race/ethnicity, and nationality. Finally, this hypothesis misses the discursive face of politics—the grammars of claims making that mediate structure and agency, the social imaginaries through which social conditions are experienced, interpreted, and evaluated by social beings.

A Crisis of Framing?

A third hypothesis focuses on another structural shift that has taken place since the 1930s. What has changed, in this case, is the scale on which crisis is experienced—and therefore the frame through which it must be

addressed. What is at stake, specifically, is the shift from a twentieth-century crisis scenario that was framed in national terms, as requiring action by territorial states, to a twenty-first-century scenario, which has destabilized the national frame without yet generating a plausible replacement.[7] In Polanyi's time, it went without saying that the modern territorial state was the principal arena and agent of social protection. The parameters of the double movement's protective project were therefore clear: in order to manage its national economy, the state needed to mobilize the national purse, which in turn required controlling the national currency. Virtually the first thing Franklin Roosevelt did upon assuming office in 1933 was to take the USA off the gold standard. This was the move that made possible the entire range of policies and programs, including Social Security, which we associate with the New Deal. After the Second World War, moreover, in the USA and elsewhere the national frame continued to specify all the major parameters of social protection: defining the protecting agent as the national state; the object to be managed as the national economy; the means to be employed as national policy—fiscal, monetary, and industrial; and the circle of those entitled to protection as the national citizenry. Just as important, the imagined community of the nation supplied the solidary ethos that made protection a viable political project, able to command broad support.[8]

Today, however, the national frame no longer goes without saying. Out of the wreckage of the Second World War, the USA spearheaded the construction of a global capitalist system based on the Bretton Woods framework, which aimed to combine international free trade with state regulation at the national level. But that compromise formation crumbled within a few decades. By the 1970s, the USA was on its way to becoming a *rentier* nation; scuttling the system of fixed exchange rates, investing its capital abroad, and incurring massive sovereign debt, it ceded control of its currency and enfeebled its capacity to manage its economy. Other, weaker states also lost the ability to steer development, if indeed they ever had it. Thanks to long histories of colonial subjection, as well as to the continuation, after independence, of imperialist predation by other means, postcolonial states never enjoyed protective capacities equal to those of the core—a disparity later exacerbated by neo-liberal policies of structural adjustment. Meanwhile, the construction of Europe as an economic and monetary union, without corresponding political and fiscal integration, disabled the protective capacities of member-states without creating broader, European-wide equivalents to take up the slack. Today,

the evidence is all around us: Greece is reduced to a protectorate; Spain, Portugal, and Ireland are ruled from Brussels; and central bankers set limits to domestic policy even in Germany and France. The upshot is that the project of social protection can no longer be envisioned in the national frame. With no alternative on the horizon to replace it, the project seems to lose its credibility. We therefore lack another crucial presupposition of the double movement.

The "frame" hypothesis provides a real insight into the difficulty of building a counter-hegemony to neo-liberalism in the twenty-first century. It sheds light on the weakness of national movements for social protection, which exists mainly in counter-historical, retrograde forms like *lepenisme* in France or Golden Dawn in Greece. But this hypothesis fails to explain the weakness of broader, transnational alternatives. Why is there no European-wide movement against austerity? If capitalists have organized globally to extend the reach of markets and to liberate them from national controls, why have the partisans of social protection not organized a counter-movement at a comparable scale? In short, none of the hypotheses considered here is fully satisfying. Nor would a simple combination of the three suffice: even were we to succeed in articulating psychology, financialization, and globalization, we would still have failed to grasp the specifically *political* dynamics that have derailed Polanyi's scenario. We would still be left to wonder: Why does "society" not organize politically to protect itself from "economy"? Why is there no double movement in the twenty-first century?

Emancipation: The Missing Third

Whenever a question stubbornly resists sustained interrogation, it is worth considering whether it may have been wrongly posed. When we ask why there is no double movement in the twenty-first century, we repeat a familiar counter-factual gesture—as in, why were there no socialist revolutions in the advanced industrial states of the capitalist core? The problem here is clear: focusing on what is absent, we ignore that which is present. Suppose, however, that we recast our inquiry in a more open-ended way, by examining the grammar of really existing social struggles in the decades following publication of *The Great Transformation*?

To this end, let us consider the vast array of social struggles that do not find any place within the scheme of the double movement. I am thinking of the extraordinary range of emancipatory movements that erupted on the

scene in the 1960s and spread rapidly across the world in the years that followed: anti-racism, anti-imperialism, anti-war, the New Left, second-wave feminism, LGBT liberation, multiculturalism, and so on. Often focused more on recognition than redistribution, these movements were highly critical of the forms of social protection that were institutionalized in the welfare and developmental states of the post-war era. Turning a withering eye on the cultural norms encoded in social provision, they unearthed invidious hierarchies and social exclusions. For example, New Leftists exposed the oppressive character of bureaucratically organized social protections, which disempowered their beneficiaries, turning citizens into clients. Anti-imperialist and anti-war activists criticized the national framing of first-world social protections, which were financed on the backs of postcolonial peoples whom they excluded; they thereby disclosed the injustice of "misframed" protections, in which the scale of exposure to danger—often transnational—was not matched by the scale at which protection was organized, typically national. Meanwhile, feminists revealed the oppressive character of protections premised on the "family wage" and on androcentric views of "work" and "contribution", showing that what was protected was less "society" per se than male domination. LGBT activists unmasked the invidious character of public provision premised on restrictive, hetero-normative definitions of family. Disability-rights activists exposed the exclusionary character of built environments that encoded ableist views of mobility and ability. Multiculturalists disclosed the oppressive character of social protections premised on majority religious or ethnocultural self-understandings, which penalize members of minority groups. And on and on.

In each case, the movement criticized an aspect of the "ethical substance"—*Sittlichkeit*—that informed social protection. In the process, they forever stripped the term "protection" of its innocence. Aware that a wage could serve as a resource against domination premised on status, these movements were naturally wary of those who idealized protection and demonized markets. Demanding access, as opposed to protection, their paramount aim was not to defend "society" but to overcome domination. Nevertheless, emancipatory movements were not proponents of economic liberalism. Having broken ranks with "society," they did not on that account become partisans of "economy." Aware that marketization often served more to refunction than to eliminate domination, they were instinctively skeptical, too, of those who touted the "self-regulating" market as a panacea. Wary of efforts to totalize marketization, they claimed the freedom of contract not as an end in itself, but rather as a means to emancipation, broadly conceived.

In general, then, the social movements of the post-war era do not fit either pole of the double movement. Championing neither marketization nor social protection, they espoused a third political project, which I shall call emancipation. Occulted by Polanyi's figure, this project needs to be given a central place in our efforts to clarify the grammar of social struggle in the twenty-first century. I propose, accordingly, to analyze the present constellation by means of a different figure, which I call the *triple movement*. Like Polanyi's figure, the triple movement serves as an analytical device for parsing the grammar of social struggle in capitalist society. But unlike the double movement, it delineates a three-sided conflict among proponents of marketization, adherents of social protection, and partisans of emancipation. The aim here is not simply greater inclusiveness, however. It is rather to capture the shifting relations among those three sets of political forces, whose projects intersect and collide. The triple movement foregrounds the fact that each can ally, in principle, with either of the other two poles against the third.

POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE

To speak of a triple movement is to posit that each of its three constituent poles is inherently ambivalent. We can already see, *contra* Polanyi, that social protection is often ambivalent, affording relief from the disintegrative effects of markets *upon* communities, while simultaneously entrenching domination *within* and *among* them. But the same is true of the other two terms. Marketization may indeed have the negative effects Polanyi stressed. But as Marx appreciated, it can also beget positive effects, to the extent that the protections it disintegrates are oppressive—as, for example, when markets in consumer goods are introduced into bureaucratically administered command economies, or when labor markets are opened to those who have been involuntarily excluded from them. Nor, importantly, is emancipation immune from ambivalence, as it not only produces liberation but also strains in the fabric of existing solidarities. Even as it overcomes domination, emancipation may help dissolve the solidary ethical basis of social protection, thereby clearing a path for marketization.

Seen this way, each term has both a *telos* of its own and a potential for ambivalence which unfolds through its interaction with the other two terms. *Contra* Polanyi, therefore, the conflict between marketization and social protection, cannot be understood in isolation from emancipation. Equally, however, subsequent conflicts between protection

and emancipation cannot be understood in isolation from the mediating force of neo-liberalization. A parallel critique can thus be made of emancipatory movements. If Polanyi neglected the impact of struggles for emancipation on conflicts between marketization and social protection, these movements have often neglected the impact of marketizing projects on their struggles with protectionist forces.

We have seen that emancipatory movements challenged oppressive protections in the post-war era. In each case, the movement disclosed a type of domination and raised a claim for emancipation. However, these claims were also ambivalent—they could line up in principle either with marketization or with social protection. In the first case, where emancipation aligned with marketization, it would serve to erode not just the oppressive dimension, but the solidary basis of social protection *simpliciter*. In the second case, where emancipation aligned with social protection, it would not erode but rather transform the ethical substance undergirding protection.

As a matter of fact, all of those movements encompassed both protectionist and marketizing tendencies. In each case, liberal currents gravitated in the direction of marketization, while socialist and social-democratic currents were more likely to align with forces for social protection. Arguably, however, emancipation's ambivalence has been resolved in recent years in favor of marketization. Insufficiently attuned to the rise of free-market forces, the hegemonic currents of emancipatory struggle have formed a "dangerous liaison" with neo-liberalism, supplying a portion of the "new spirit" or charismatic rationale for a new mode of capital accumulation, touted as "flexible," "difference-friendly" and "encouraging of creativity from below."[9] As a result, the emancipatory critique of oppressive protection has converged with the neo-liberal critique of protection per se. In the conflict zone of the triple movement, emancipation has joined forces with marketization to double-team social protection.

Here, at last, we begin to recognize the actual state of political play in the twenty-first century. In the present alignment, an emboldened neo-liberal party draws strength from the borrowed charisma of emancipatory movements. Styling itself as an insurrection, it adopts the accents of emancipation to excoriate social protection as a fetter on freedom. Meanwhile, a deflated protectionist party struggles to rid itself of the taint of domination, exposed by emancipatory movements. Demoralized, on the defensive and lacking conviction, it generates no romance, no counter-hegemonic vision that could galvanize opposition to neo-liberalism. Finally, the party

of emancipation finds itself on a narrow precipice. Tacking between the other two poles, its dominant currents repeatedly cross the line that separates a valid critique of oppressive protection and legitimate claims for labor-market access, on the one hand, from an uncritical embrace of meritocratic individualism and privatized consumerism, on the other.

Rethinking the Politics of Crisis

By clarifying this constellation, the triple movement highlights the specifically political challenges facing efforts to build a counter-hegemonic project to neo-liberalism. Parsing the field of really existing struggles, it brings into focus the grammars of claims making and social imaginaries that mediate the responses of political actors to their situation. This political focus does not invalidate, but enriches and complements, the three hypotheses we considered earlier. Above all, it clarifies the processes that have demoralized social-democratic elites, endowed neo-liberalism with the charisma that enabled its hegemony, and defanged and dispersed the forces of emancipation. Equally important, the triple movement suggests a post-Polanyian assessment of the present state of political struggle. For one thing, it implies that we should not mourn the absence of a double movement. However much it complicates the struggle against neo-liberalism, the rise of emancipation represents an advance. There is no going back to hierarchical, exclusionary, communitarian understandings of social protection, whose innocence has been forever shattered, and justly so. Henceforth, no protection without emancipation.

At the same time, the triple movement suggests the need to complicate the project of emancipation. Disclosing the latter's ambivalence, this analysis implies that emancipation is not the single, all-inclusive name for all that is good. Everything depends, rather, on how the impulse to overcome domination is shaped by its historical encounter with other intersecting projects—above all, marketization and social protection. An emancipatory project colored by naive faith in contract, meritocracy, and individual advancement will easily be twisted to other ends—as has been the case in the present era. However, an emancipatory project wedded to the wholesale rejection of markets effectively cedes indispensable liberal ideals to free marketeers, while abandoning the billions across the globe who rightly understand that there is something worse than being exploited—namely, being counted as not worth exploiting. In general,

then, there is no emancipation without some new synthesis of marketization and social protection.

Finally, the triple movement suggests a political project for those of us who remain committed to emancipation. We might resolve to break off our dangerous liaison with neo-liberalism and forge a principled new alliance with social protection. In thereby realigning the poles of the triple movement, we could integrate our long-standing interest in non-domination with the equally valid interest in solidarity and social security. At the same time, we could reclaim the indispensable interest in negative liberty from the neo-liberal uses to which it has been bent. Embracing a broader understanding of social justice, such a project would serve at once to honor Polanyi's insights and remedy his blind spots.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this chapter was published in New Left Review. An earlier version was delivered as a "Luxemburg Lecture" in Berlin on November 22, 2012. I gratefully acknowledge support from the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, the Einstein Stiftung (Berlin), the Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften (Bad Homburg), and the Centre for Advanced Studies "Justitia Amplificata," Frankfurt. Thanks also to Blair Taylor for research assistance.
2. The number of such interpretations is enormous. Examples include Burawoy (2000), Brie and Klein (2011), Zincone and Agnew (2000), Webster and Lambert (2009), Bernard (1997), and Munck (2002).
3. For a salutary corrective to the "pollyanna-ism" of many present-day Polanyians, see Burawoy (2010).
4. See the October 3, 2012, presidential debate on YouTube, from 1:09:25 to 1:10:35.
5. See "FDR: 'Let me warn you' (1936)," on YouTube.
6. Silver (2003) and Therborn (2012).
7. For the destabilization of the national frame, see Fraser (2005).
8. Of course, this framing was also a *misframing*, as it excluded from the circle of those entitled to protection all those non-nationals in the periphery whom the market exposed to danger and whose labor helped to finance social provision in the countries of the capitalist core. For "misframing," see Fraser (2011).
9. For the dangerous liaison between feminism and neo-liberalism, see Fraser, "Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History" and "Feminist Ambivalence and Capitalist Crisis," both in Fraser (2013).

Bibliography

Bernard, Mitchell. 1997. Ecology, Political Economy and the Counter-Movement: Karl Polanyi and the Second Great Transformation. In *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, ed. Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman, 75–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brie, Michael, and Dieter Klein. 2011. The Second Great Transformation: Towards a Solidarity Society. *International Critical Thought* 1(1): 18–28.

Burawoy, Michael. 2000. A Sociology for the Second Great Transformation? *Annual Review of Sociology* 26(1): 693–695.

Fraser, Nancy. 2005. Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World. *New Left Review* 36: 69–88.

———. 2011. Marketization, Social Protection, Emancipation: Toward a Neo-Polanyian Conception of Capitalist Crisis. In *Business as Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown*, ed. Craig J. Calhoun and Georgi M. Derluguian, 137–157. New York: New York University Press.

———. 2013. *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis.* London and New York: Verso.

Michael Burawoy, "From Polanyi to Pollyanna: The False Optimism of Global Labor Studies," Global Labour Journal vol. 1, no. 2 (2010): 301–313

Munck, Ronaldo. 2002. Globalization and Democracy: A New "Great Transformation"? *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 581: 10–21.

Silver, Beverly J. 2003. *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization since 1870*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Therborn, Goran. 2012. Class in the 21st Century. *New Left Review* 78(5): 5–29.

Webster, Edward, and Robert Lambert. 2009. Markets against Society: Labor's Predicament in the Second Great Transformation. In *The ISA Handbook in Contemporary Sociology: Conflict, Competition, Cooperation*, ed. Ann B. Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman, 265–277. Los Angeles and London: Sage.

Zincone, Giovanna, and John Agnew. 2000. The Second Great Transformation: The Politics of Globalisation in the Global North. *Space and Polity* 4(1): 5–21.

A Critique of Transition Studies on Postsocialism, or How to Rethink and Reorient 1989? The Case of (Post) Socialist (Post)Yugoslavia

Gal Kirn

BETWEEN THE TRIUMPH OF 1989 AND THE CATASTROPHE OF 1991

More than 25 years have passed since the triumphant banners of liberal democracy and the "end of history" were raised, and until very recently the reign of TINA ("there is no alternative") has remained unchallenged, with a few notable exceptions in South America.[1] However, TINA was born neither with the fall of the Berlin Wall nor with the rise of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, but in Chile with the CIA-backed military coup against the democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. The subsequent military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet tested neoliberal polices that had long-lasting social and political consequences for Chile (Harvey 2005) and that have only permitted a stronger political opposition to emerge in the country very recently. All TINA cries after 1989—with or

G. Kirn (✉)
Institute for Cultural Inquiry, Berlin, Germany

43

without military force—have continued to pacify and normalize the new political landscape and have attempted to block any move beyond the current predicament, whether it be called "capitalocracy" (Badiou 2005), "empire" (Hardt and Negri 2000) or simply "global capitalism." This article will shed some light on how TINA became inscribed in postsocialist transition studies, especially in the post-Yugoslav context, as well as pointing out how it provided ideological legitimacy for capitalist utopias in the new nation-states after the 1989. Seen in retrospect and in light of the current deep economic and political crisis of the European project, which east European socialist countries and their democratic movements reanimated only two decades ago, a critical assessment of studies of the postsocialist transition has now become both politically and theoretically urgent. If one has to understand the present crisis and the sedimented ideological anchors that make austerity such an effective policy for resolving the crisis (Seymour 2014), then one should be able to reorient certain consensual readings of the capitalist and socialist projects.

Thus, this chapter takes 1989 as a critical point of departure, agreeing with Boris Buden's lucid observations (2009a), that it was immediately after the fall of Berlin Wall that a whole array of Western experts and academic disciplines hurried to channel the newly emerging democratic energies into a unified goal to establish "consolidated democracy" on the European horizon. The former east European countries had to be guided to the proper maturity of real democracies, while their existential condition was further relegated to the new "area studies," which could immediately be recognized by the use of the "post-" prefix: "post-socialist, post-communist, post-Soviet, post-Yugoslav, post-Marxist, post-conflictual, post-totalitarian." This "post-" spoke of a certain dilemma, a hesitation to name these new societies fully, thus almost entirely flattening out both the socialist past and the current heterogonous processes of uneven capitalist development. Moreover, a long project of right-wing historical revisionism set itself the goal of forgetting what was there before: *socialism*, and any revolutionary reference that was being practiced in the twentieth century (Losurdo 2015). This chapter accordingly has two aims. First, it will demonstrate the continuity between state socialist theories of history and (capitalist) transitology, which are both based on linear temporality with already-prescribed goals of history. Second, I shall put forward a more concise definition of socialism as a transitional form.

The changes of 1989 have constituted a contested field of research, which in its first phase was undoubtedly marked by triumphalism. However,

the closer to the present we move, the much less clear it becomes what was actually defeated in 1989 and what was achieved with the fall of the Berlin Wall. To simplify the predominant judgment on 1989, one can break it down into one of two alternatives: was it a break with the past and the start of a new democracy, or was it rather a simple restoration of old ideas and political practices? In political philosophy, those two poles were occupied by oppositional narratives, the first being represented by Francis Fukuyama and the second by Alain Badiou. For Fukuyama (1992), 1989 was the event that marked the "end of history," with the paradigm of liberal democracy finally defeating authoritarian forms of governance and socialism. In this perspective, not much more has existed than the West, with the state and liberal democracy as its ideal political forms. Opposed to Fukuyama is the French political philosopher and one the most vocal representatives of the "idea of communism," Alain Badiou. In his book *D'un désastre obscure* (1998), he claims that *nothing took place in 1989* but the restoration of capitalism and liberal democracy, which, rather than constituting a triumph, has made 1989 an "obscure disaster." Yet although these two philosophers come from different political camps, they both regard 1989 not as a revolution and revolutionary caesura in the post-Kantian sense but rather as a revolution in the premodern sense summed up in the word *revolvere*. For Fukuyama, 1989 revolves around the liberal democratic triumph, which ends the history; for Badiou, this event also represents the liberal restoration of the state of affairs. It is curious to see that these politically opposed arguments share at least two central aspects that will be of concern here when redefining the concept of "transition." First, on the general level, their respective theoretical viewpoints are not interested in tackling the processes of the transition, but conclude in the respective claims of "the end of history" and that "nothing changed" after 1989. Secondly, they both fail to assess properly the past social formation, namely *socialism*—this contradictory social formation from which the transition took place.[2]

If we follow these political judgments, we can easily forget the existence of the various socialist and democratic revolts and organizations that took place in the period of socialism. This oblivion of democratic and revolutionary experiences merely allows the famous figure of the *national(ist)* and *anticommunist* dissident to play an important role in the postsocialist narrative. This dissident successfully migrated, in real or metaphorical terms, to the West, where it was to stay. This theoretical and postsocialist space has been under siege for a very long time and was prepared by the right-wing, twentieth-century interpretations of historical revisionism. This revisionism

orchestrated an ideological attack, or in the words of Dominco Losurdo (2015) a systematic "eradication of the revolutionary tradition." The conservative turn in Europe went so far as to criticize the Jacobin sequence of the French Revolution (e.g. Francois Furet), obviously the October Revolution (*nouevaux philosophes* on the necessary link between communism and the gulags) and the subsequent exculpation of National Socialism as a barrier to Bolshevik expansion, as well as the relativizing of the anticolonial struggles that produced "failed states" and that deserved to be subjugated by military intervention (e.g. Henri Bruhl-Lévy). This ideological attack finally came to the conclusion that fascism could be equated with communism under the highly ideological term "totalitarianism," which can be only opposed by an enlightened West that will teach and guide everyone to imitate its best form of neoliberal governance. Contrary to the overall flattening of (post)socialism in the liberal and conservative narratives of 1989, this chapter attempts to make a clear differentiation by pointing out the specifics of the socialist and "post-socialist" situations, respectively.

Apart from providing a much less triumphant analysis of the postsocialist transition, critical theory should be able to elaborate an alternative concept of transition. This consists in one working hypothesis that I would like to test, namely that the transitional process is a set of open and contingent elements which cannot be simply attributed to one schema, be it socialist or capitalist teleology, and which always concludes in the "end of history" (liberal), nationalist mythology (from fascism to conservation) or the European Union. This conceptual and historical hypothesis will attempt to prove that, rather than 1989 representing a clear break with the socialist past, one should highlight a set of discontinuities and transitional periods that I call "post-socialism within socialism," using the example of socialist Yugoslavia in the 1960s. The case of Yugoslavia is also illuminating because it plays against the dominant trope of the triumph of and ideological justification for the (neo)liberal transition. If Western spectators greeted the fall of the Berlin Wall with enthusiasm in 1989, soon followed by the Western-led "unification" process, Yugoslavia saw the emergence of ethnically cleansed territories, with new walls being erected in and after 1991. The subsequent four-year war, the first in Europe since the World War II, ended in the Dayton peace agreement, which baptized the principle of ethnically segregated communities and instituted a semicolonial external frame for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This neocolonial experiment was later joined by Kosovo, which remains an international protectorate rather than an independent state. The violent "building" of new nation-states

and the transition to democracy in the Balkans saw the intense institutionalization of a "new logic of space and motion" (Harvey 1991: 201). Most notably, the once federal and socialist space was renamed, it became "nationalized" and all its marketed goods and institutions were later "privatized." What used to be the single federative entity of Yugoslavia disintegrated into the seven independent republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.

In the following sections, I will closely analyze the mainstream transitology studies that have been imported into the post-Yugoslav context and demonstrate their problematic *teleological* and anticommunist core. This evaluation will be accompanied by my own critical diagnosis of the post-Yugoslav transition. In the last part of the chapter, I shall suggest an alternative concept of the transition that, instead of merely confirming the obvious postsocialist present in the 1990s, will posit postsocialism as a *tendency* that is not yet achieved and that can only be grasped by taking account of the dynamic movement that, counterintuitively, can already be located in socialist Yugoslavia as far back as the mid-1960s.

Postsocialist Transitology: Between Anticommunism and the Dream of Consolidated Democracy

Many critical researchers were quick to observe that transition studies in the post-Yugoslav context simply used the "Western" literature on the transition, thus reiterating the ideological commonplaces of its chief representatives, such as Fukuyama (1992), Przeworski (1991), Vanhanen (1990), and Schöpflin (1993).[3] Dejan Jović (2010) was correct to locate major inconsistencies in these major figures. First, instead of analyzing transitional processes, transitologists were merely interested in anticipating where the transition would (necessarily) take these societies. Secondly, even though the point of departure for these "transitional" political scientists may have promoted the scientific foundation of their discipline, their concept of "transitional temporality" was vulgar and idealist, that is, it was inscribed in a linear progression and teleology of progress. Jović noted that transitologists interestingly avoid any deeper discussion of the ambivalences and contradictions of the transition process and simply argue that there

> might be some setbacks and even "counter-waves", or "restoration" on this journey, but in the longrun they will embark on "democracy". Authoritarianism is simply unsustainable in the long run. By claiming this,

they in fact tell us that they know the end of history and the historical necessity. By doing this, they often became missionaries and come dangerously close to various political "visionaries" politicians. In doing so, their attempt to stay "objective" more often than not then ends in another great failure. (Jović 2010: 65)

But what happens when these allegedly short "counter-waves" develop into a new form of authoritarianism (e.g. Orban's Hungary), continue into long wars (Yugoslavia yesterday, Ukraine today) with catastrophic consequences, or impose austerity on the whole European Union without any democratic discussion (Greece)? The concept of transitional temporality, as I will show in the second part, demands an additional theoretical elaboration that grasps the "post-" tendency as a dialectical movement which does not a priori embrace linear progression (or regression) as the natural movement of history.

In the post-Yugoslav situation, the core of history was occupied by three different agents of "progress": the free market, democracy, and the nation (with corresponding religions). Departing from my own Slovenian theoretical context, the most representative mainstream transition studies were conducted by a group of social scientists and published under collected volumes entitled *Democratic Transition I, II* (ed. Fink-Hafner and Haček 2000). I have offered a more detailed criticism of this enterprise elsewhere (Kirn 2007, 2011). I shall extract a few key points from that criticism here, which confirm critical observations made by Dejan Jović and other critical theorists.[4] First of all, the contributions to the volumes *Democratic Transition* employ a linear conception of temporality, which is infused even by a historical necessity. For these authors, transition in Slovenia should be called "democratic" because it clearly departed from A (called "authoritarian socialism," "dictatorship," "the one-party system," or "the totalitarian regime") and will necessary arrive at B, which is equated with "consolidated democracy" ("multi-party free elections," "democratic institutions," and "the free market") on the horizon of Europe. What happens on the path from A to B is interesting in so far as it confirms B and can be measured by the goal represented by B (the only alternative). Furthermore, any deviations from this path are only to be seen as temporary but normal phenomena in these "young democracies."

In effect, this temporal-teleological arch is structured as a "self-fulfilling prophecy." Once this insight is inserted fully into the research, the object of all transition studies becomes clear and can be measured using

"scientific tools." Transitology tries to answer to a set of typical questions: How developed are the political institutions in their path to mature democracy? How much trust does the population have in democratic institutions, measured by surveys of public opinion? What is the level of political participation (e.g. elections turnout) and satisfaction with one's political representatives? What is the level of corruption, and how far is the state open to foreign capital investment?

The authors of the collected volumes *Democratic Transition* developed a strong methodological apparatus with a positivist orientation that focused on measuring public opinion within a population by using extensive longitudinal surveys, interviewing opinion leaders, and content analysis of media reports and the political elite. These methodological surveys do not enter into conceptual discussions of what a "population" is, or of how it is traversed by plural conflicts, but instead they assess the (un)popularity of certain topics that become useful for the political apparatus that manages the very same "population."[5] It would be incorrect to criticize these studies for the level of their methodological performance, since many of the results are properly investigated and proved. However, as implied above, they are antitheoretical and follow a presupposed goal (democracy) with which reality should be identified (democratization processes, democratic institutions, popular trust).[6] This is the strategic place where reality and theory blend together, where transition studies openly succumb to transitology as an ideological formation with a clearly apologetic viewpoint regarding the existing state of affairs. The positivist core reminds us of Lacan's criticism of Pavlov's famous experiment that diagnosed a reflexive automatism with the triggering of a dog's saliva. Lacan's criticism of Pavlov's behaviorism is correct but also harsh: "There is no other subject here (in this experiment) than the subject of experimenter" (2004: 228). This does not mean that the saliva of the dog was an effect of the dog's real "natural" behavior, or that we as readers-observers would gain any new knowledge about the dog. Rather, in Pavlov's simplified model, the conditions of the experiment structured the behavior of that poor dog. If anything, this experiment tells us more about Pavlov and his methodology than of a subject which it was presupposed was being researched. Mutatis mutandis, transitologists prove (see) what they want to prove (see), that is, their results will always return to their normative point of departure, be it the end of history, consolidated democracy, or TINA. A further Foucauldian reading could show how the entanglement of transitology, with its produced knowledge, enters into direct relationship with the forms of the transitional power apparatus (Lukić and Maslov 2014).

Serious theoretical work starts only when the explanatory power and fundamental presuppositions of theoretical orientations are scrutinized. That is, the theory needs to develop by confronting its own contradictions and blind spots, where the elements do not fit easily with its research objectives and methods. How does transitology proceed with deviations from the path from A to B? Deviations and collateral damage are often either justified through a variant of social Darwinism (the openly neoliberal stance), or, more moderately, as a short-term setback on the path to consolidating democracy. Rastko Močnik poignantly observed that, faced with inconsistencies, transitologists and state philosophers refer to a "lack of democratic culture," "remainders" of the totalitarian past or the persistence of "unstable" democratic institutions, "immature" leaders, and people (e.g. a typical statement: "Slovenian democracy is still so young"). Močnik (1999) further pointed out that these notions work as "gaskets," which avoid addressing the deep social changes that were at work in the transition and by so doing leave the question of class out of the transition.

Instead of addressing questions of marginalization, inequality, and new antagonistic fault lines in the transitional society, the self-imposed immaturity of young democracies focuses rather on more or less explicit "demonisations" and projections of their own guilt into the gray totalitarian past. This is where liberal transitology stops short and opens up a space for the conservative ideological wing to enter the stage with a decisive and open *anti*communism on new nationalistic grounds.[7] The price paid for this ideological marriage is high: not only did mainstream transitology fail to produce any complex account of the history of real socialism,[8] but the oblivion of the revolutionary past robbed the people and the masses of their own activity and memory, placing them in the position of a child that needs to be taught and monitored along the road to consolidated democracy. Through his postcolonial critique of the Enlightenment, Boris Buden lucidly tackles this trope of the alleged "immaturity" of eastern countries:

> Eastern Europe after 1989 resembles a landscape of historical ruins that is inhabited only by children, immature people unable to organize their lives democratically without guidance from another. They see themselves neither as subjects nor as authors of a democracy that they actually won through struggle and created by themselves. It has been expropriated from them through the idea and practice of the post-communist transition, only to return now from the outside as a foreign object that they must reappropriate in a long, hard and painful process. In the strange world of post-communism, democracy appears at once as a goal to be reached and a lost object.[9]

If the strong civil society and democratic movements of the 1980s initiated systemic changes within socialism that eventually toppled authoritarian regimes, then during the 1990s, these democratic agents became superfluous and were incorporated into the NGOs that responded to the commissions of the state apparatus. People were put to sleep and dreamed about the capitalist utopia.

The historical amnesia of the democratic socialist past and its culturalization (nostalgia) fits well into the long ideological project of historical revisionism (Losurdo 2015), which, instead of historical contextualization, performed a deep moralization of the past revolutionary experience in the light of the gulags and extreme terror. Among other things, this relativized the complicity of fascism with capitalism (Sohn-Rethel 1978). The liberal progressivist core of the future goal B (consolidated democracy) was thus cemented by a conservative prescription of the negative past A (totalitarianism) that blocked any attempt to think beyond real existing capitalism. The concept of temporality in this capitalist transitology is thus theoretically impoverished: it is without either past (gulag) or future (TINA). On a formal level, this capitalist temporality resembles the temporality that the ideologues of real socialism proclaimed (Lukić and Maslov 2014). It was socialist ideologues who have long insisted on thinking that socialist society itself was merely a transitory and temporary form on the way to communism, thus sharing with their neoliberal antagonists the deep teleological core with a black-and-white portrayal of temporality.[10] History was on their side, and it should have brought us to communism. However, this self-fulfilling prophecy of the communist utopia became more and more distanced from the contradictions of socialist societies the more time passed. Moreover, the authoritarian forms of socialist state apparatuses participated in the erasure of revolutionary sequences either by subjugating them to the Cold War pragmatism of the Soviet Union or by all communist parties gradually abandoning any revolutionary politics apart from the ossified remembrance of its founding event (Althusser 1977). Thus, the socialist and capitalist versions of transitology both offer us a clear goal, which also entails a presupposed *agent* that will execute the change: a successful transition going beyond the authoritarian forms of the past will develop a democratic culture that rests on three central agencies: the liberal state, with its separation of powers; the free market economy; and the nation. In the case of socialist transitology, the privileged agent of change was obviously the communist party, which had an avant-garde role in directing the working

class. If this comparison functions on a more formal level, where it pinpoints the normative core of both communist and capitalist utopias, then I should refrain from describing theoretical and concrete historical experiences of struggles, since the "idea of communism"—despite many ambivalences and inconsistencies in its practical realization—promoted the universal emancipation of the oppressed and exploited, and fought to resolve the injustices and inequalities that are still the order of the day. In contradistinction to the still powerful defense of the idea of communism (Duzinas and Žižek 2010), the (de)regulative ideas of the free market, the liberal state, and the idealization of the nation bring us directly to the core of capitalist inequalities, uneven development, and (civil) wars. Not much can be found about universal emancipation in the sober accounts of capitalist realism (Fisher 2009).

Post-Marxism as a Theoretical Symptom

The large body of transition studies belongs to the major strands of the post-Marxist theoretico-ideological condition, whose prefix "post-" became increasingly fueled by the prefix "anti-" as the 1990s progressed. The nation-building process came with a direct negation of the former socialist regimes, demanding a strong anticommunist position that was automatically accompanied by a strong anti-Marxist sentiment. From the perspective of right-wing historical revisionism, anti-Marxism could be easily justified: Marx was often put into a direct causal relationship with socialist failure, or even made responsible for all the totalitarian crimes of the twentieth century. On the institutional level, at least two orchestrated activities are worth mentioning. First, all ex-socialist contexts encountered a large-scale ejection of Marxist-related literature from universities and libraries, some of the books being sent directly to recycling mills, while only a minority was saved by librarian enthusiasts. Secondly, Marx as a theorist was largely expelled from academic institutions and curricula, and, if mentioned at all, accompanied with a mocking and "appropriate" introduction. If bourgeois thinkers had been exposed to ridicule in socialist times, now was the time for revenge. In the post-Yugoslav context, the politics of lustration against former communist cadres in politics or education was not as strict as in some other countries in the eastern bloc: some professors retired early, while many others converted to new trends in the

social sciences. Marxism, by contrast, was dumped into the dustbin of history, which became symptomatic of the postsocialist condition. Ozren Pupovac describes this process in following words:

> Post-Marxism is a theoretical symptom of post-socialism (if not *the* theoretical symptom of post-socialism) inasmuch as it is a theoretical reflection of a historical and political *status quo*, a reflection of a thoroughly blocked historical situation. If Marxism was *the* theoretical orientation which entertained and sustained the question of radical political change, which had an organic relationship to the problem of the revolution, and if, at the same time, Marx's theoretical endeavour provided the exemplar of an uncompromising notion of *critique*, then the post-Marxist participation in the "death of Marxism" represents a proper debacle or a defeat of thought: it represents that precise point at which thought is effectively being reduced to a compromise with the "existing state of affairs". (2008: 25)

Pupovac's work deploys a solid analysis of the effects of post-Marxist turn that, already in 1980s, took part in the process of the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, thus inverting the logic of Minerva's owl, which argues that theory always comes after politics: here, rather, post-Marxism actively participated in the transition and reign of postsocialism. The 1980s can be seen as constituting the theoretical battlefield on which the internal exhaustion of Marxist theory with leading socialist ideologues lost important battles and conceded terrain to the liberal (necessary orientation to the West, reintroduction of private property) and nationalistic (rehabilitation of the local fascism of the World War II) arguments and their historical agents.[11] Therefore, the post-Marxist turn should not be seen as a mere theoretical symptom, but as a crucial element in the transitional process that provided an ideological backbone to the new counterhegemonical historical block. The demise of socialist Yugoslavia and its transition to capitalist horizons and ethnic wars cannot be understood without the ideological battles within and economic transformation of the austerity regime during the 1980s.[12] We can conclude that the "post-" in the postsocialism and post-Marxism should be simply described with the prefix "anti-" as open anticommunism and anti-Marxism, while the enunciation of *pro*-capitalist utopia and *pro*-nationalist community became "affirmative" referents realized in their fullness during the 1990s.

Specific Features of the Post-Yugoslav Transition: 1991 as the Start of the Catastrophe

Although critical research need not idealize or romanticize the period of socialist Yugoslavia, in light of the ongoing demonization and revisionism of the socialist past, one nevertheless needs to reiterate a few key sequences in its history that are still valid today, from the antifascist and revolutionary struggle (Yugoslav *partisan resistance* was the only resistance besides Greek partisans that liberated itself with its own forces from the Nazi occupation, and unlike Greece, it started a process of the revolutionary transformation of society) to the strategic NO to Stalin in 1948, which propelled Yugoslavia on an at first isolated but then independent road to socialism involving *self-management socialism* (workers' councils and social property) and a *non-aligned movement* that went beyond Cold War divisions (Kirn 2011). The period between the early 1950s and 1965 could be described as one of relative economic and social prosperity, when the socialist modernization project yielded some impressive results. The Yugoslav economy generated one of the highest growth rates in the world (around 15 % of GDP yearly), with decisive material improvements in everyday life, education (the struggle against illiteracy), social housing, improved conditions of work, and low unemployment rates, while the cultural and transport infrastructures received proper attention throughout Yugoslavia (Suvin 2014). The postwar economic model was based on inter-republican solidarity and a gradual improvement in the social lives of all working people and regions. I will return to the reasons for the gradual exhaustion of the self-management model, both internal and external, in the next section, but for now I will simply highlight that during the 1980s Yugoslavia was subjected to severe pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), being forced to adopt a harsh austerity program that resulted in a spiral of ever-growing debt, inflation, and unemployment.[13] This transitional frame of crisis prepared the ideological ground for neoliberal recipes, starting already in the late 1980s with the privatization of social and later state ownership, while the welfare state withered away gradually or, in some parts, collapsed more rapidly (Močnik 2003). The "democratic" transition was never a democratically controlled process that would see large democratic forums discussing the future of the country. They were much closer to the process Marx described as "primary capitalist accumulation," which meant the de-socialization of property (which turned into either tycoon crony capitalism or state enterprises controlled

by the ruling political parties), the reorganization and disciplining of labor power, the opening up of the economy to foreign investments, and the dissolution of the welfare state. All the sacrifices and costs that people in the post-Yugoslav context needed to make and take into account to achieve the transition became end results and not merely collateral damage. The capitalist promise, the national utopia of a free and democratic space, soon became a postindustrial desert of unrealized promises, which has lost most of its mythical power in recent years through much social unrest and many uprisings in the Balkan region, reflecting mass pauperization, peripheralization, and the demise of the welfare state.[14]

Undoubtedly, the most tragic role of all the transitional countries was played by Yugoslavia, which from the day a few republics proclaimed independence, recognized prematurely by some core West European states, entered into a period of long civil wars. As Boris Buden argues:

> After having overthrown totalitarian rule the societies of former Eastern Europe don't enter directly into the world of developed capitalism and Western democracy, but rather must undergo first the process of transition to this final condition, which poses as normality. […[This also includes the logic that before things get better—normal, capitalist, democratic, etc.— they must first get worse in comparison to the former situation, concretely to the state of actual socialism. But the problem is that the transition process can turn into a real disaster. This is precisely what happened in former Yugoslavia: the collapse of the state, civil wars with horrible destruction, ethnic cleansing, atrocities, human losses, economic breakdown, political chaos. (Buden 2008)

The transition from socialism and federation to civil wars and ethnically segregated communities came with an ideological prism that promoted eternal hatred among the Balkan people with recurring tribal violence,[15] while politically it was long sustained by the alleged neutrality of Europe and the international community, which prematurely recognized the call for independence of few former Yugoslav republics. If one should agree that at this point the most prominent ideology of the state-building process became nationalism, the civil wars entailed a transition toward a clear re-traditionalization and re-patriarchalization of society, with a double identification of "nation-religion" (Muslim-Bosnian, Catholic-Croatian, Orthodox-Serbian). Minorities, women, the young, and critical agents were particularly affected by these regressive tendencies, while religious institutions,

whether Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim, started playing an important role within the ruling-class hegemony and the new economic network of power. This was part of the political process that Tomaž Mastnak (1987) had already described earlier as "totalitarianism from below."

If the post-Marxist liberal tradition displaced the central political agency from the party or democratic movement to the liberal state, which was supposed to be open to all, it became increasingly clear that the model that dominated the postsocialist transition was a political entity based on pure ethnic determination: "one nation in one state." This, however, was promoted not only by the liberal and nationalist intelligentsia, but also by the "international community," which crystalized its positions in the Dayton peace agreement, itself designed to prevent future wars. What the Dayton agreement came up with was a simple confirmation of the ethnic principle in the name of which the wars had been fought: what happened in reality was a consolidation not of democracy, but of ethnically cleansed areas. This was an important precedent in resolving the crisis for the whole Balkan region, which has recently seen its extension to Kosovo, while the case of Macedonia still awaits a "solution." The Dayton agreement not only built new walls and exclusions, it openly supported various degrees of institutional racism.[16] The only (self)orientalizing alternative for the new nation-states was presented in the aspiration—the light at the end of the tunnel—to join a civilized Western Europe freed from the dark, backward Balkans (Močnik 1999).

To sum up, the way the actual transitional ideology took shape in the post-Yugoslav context was through the articulation of ethnonationalist ideology and anticommunism on the one hand (right-wing conservative bordering on the open rehabilitation of local fascism), and (neo)liberal economic arguments in favor of privatization and austerity on the other. This is the tragic truth we find at the end of the fascinating transitional journey from A (the dark totalitarian state) to B (consolidated democracy).

In Defense of Different Concept of Transition: A Return to the Althusserian Concept of the Aleatory and Contingent Processes of History

Contrary to the teleological reasoning of transitology, which has been based on an understanding of history that presupposes the existence of a *goal* (be it communism or consolidated democracy) and a *subject* (be it the party or

the liberal nation state), I will here introduce a conceptual innovation drawn from Louis Althusser, one of the key intellectual figures in French Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s, in order to provide an alternative definition of "the transition." Althusser, like many of his contemporaries, such as Foucault and Deleuze, was very keen to attack the dominant appropriation of Hegel into the French, and in his case, the Marxist context, where certain form of economic necessity continued to exert a strong influence on the politics and science of history. Against what he called Hegel's notion of "expressive totality" (Althusser 2005), which always knows what comes at the end (Idea: economism, the primacy of productive forces), Althusser promoted a concept of "overdetermined" structure that does not fit comfortably with the dominant formula in which the economic structure determines the politico-ideological-legal superstructure. Only the concrete analysis of concrete situations can tell us which instances in social formation determine, codetermine, or overdetermine others, or which rather follows a structure that is decentered and exposed to secondary elaborations, displacements, and condensation. In this vein, for Althusser historical movement cannot embody either a prescribed goal (telos) or a presupposed subject of history.[17] This means that history is not a closed process (e.g. "the end of history"), but should be treated as a set of "contingent" processes that cannot be anticipated.[18] The Althusserian conceptualization of history defines it as an open-ended process that cannot be fitted into a philosophical formula, theological plan or transitional scheme. Even if retrospectively, one can (and should) interpret events such as 1989 as a series of rational and well-ordered casual relationships. One should not deduce history as a teleological movement, as if there has always been a hidden plan that unfolded into reality. In the words of Althusser, teleological reasoning stands for the already-"accomplished fact" and does not risk thinking beyond the dominant coordinates of the existing state of affairs. Althusser's late "aleatory" turn (2003), which revived a series of thinkers who had thought from the position of the "not-accomplished fact" (Epicurus, Machiavelli, Spinoza, Marx, Freud, even Heidegger), was primarily intended as an attack on Marxist theories that fetishized the understanding of history, including revolutions, through the iron laws of economic necessity (the history of capital). While Althusser was concerned to launch a critique of "economism" and Stalinism, I apply this theoretical intervention to thinking about the transition and transitional sequences of around 1989–1991 and before 1965–1972. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that most scholars who were integrated into Cold War area studies encountered a veritable shock in seeing the advance of 1989 and the

rise of the democratic movements that were able to bring down regimes with their own hands (Buden 2009). Their distinction between the first and second worlds came to a full stop and showed a certain deadlock. The old mental schemes that had consequently become outdated now needed a quick update. As Boris Buden has poignantly shown, they quickly returned to the old "modernization" theory frame aimed at educating and "colonizing" the Other: the *East*.

However, Althusser's lesson is that, in moments of revolutionary rupture and democratic upheavals, history is not yet written, and it does not yet ascribe to the positive or negative side of the historical movement. An alternative concept of the transition entails reasoning that is not afraid to think out of the box and that embraces the development of antinomies, contradictions, and non-anticipated moments in the course of social change. This, among other things, is actually essential to understand once one returns to Marx yesterday and today: thinking dialectically, that is, which means thinking tendentially in order to grasp the "object" that is constantly moving, be it class struggle or capital. The discovery of Marx does not belong to a positivist description of the wealth of nations, which we might detect in the currently fashionable theories of Thomas Picketty, but to the theorization of what in Marx's time did not yet exist historically on the global scale: the movement of capital and the domination of commodity production over other economic forms of production and exchange. And with the domination of capital comes necessarily also the exploitation of labor power, which highlights the definition of capital in terms of relationality and asymmetry. Marx's theory is today much more historically correct than it was in his time, as shown by the theoretical power of "thinking tendentially." And how should we use this theoretical lesson in order to think about "post-"socialism, which is not only a simple confirmation of a contemporary condition, which would merely state the obvious? An alternative definition of transition claims that grasping a tendency in a particular social formation should be done from the position of a not-yet-accomplished fact. This means that thinking tendentially does not fit into the well-established schemas of either official socialist ideology or postsocialist transitology, but follows the contradictory movement of uneven development. I therefore argue that we should shift the attention to contradictory movements of tendencies long before 1989 in Yugoslavia and the catastrophe of 1991, in order to arrive at the concept of aleatory and contingent temporality, which is more heterogeneous and cannot be flattened out in yet another historical revisionism or nationalist mythology.

Testing Tendential Thinking: "The Post-Socialism in Socialism"

The conceptual frame for the above will be used here in a rather condensed manner in order to analyze a historical period of Yugoslav socialism which literature knows by the names of "mature self-management" or "market socialism"—the period from 1965 to 1972. This historical period is of particular importance for epistemological departure, which, as already stressed, goes against a linear-stage conception of socialist temporality and promotes a more concise definition of socialism as neither a project doomed to fail nor some stable totalitarian control society. Rather, socialism is defined here as a transitional form that constantly shifted between capitalist and communist elements (Samary 1988; Suvin 2014).[19] Furthermore, socialism in its interiority implies a deeply contradictory and tensed relationship for social reproduction and its apparatuses. This definition of socialism, which has been taken up by different critical Marxists, also posits the thesis that there was no "socialist mode of production." Rather, one should analyze a concrete set of different temporalities and the ways in which the capitalist world system became entangled with socialist social formations and their political arrangements. These implied different forms of control and regulation, and through their economic cooperation they created sometimes parallel, sometimes overlapping neuralgic points with the capitalist system. To understand socialist process in its interiority, it is therefore not enough just to analyze the history of the communist party and its alleged totalitarian logic, nor is it enough to reduce it purely and simply to (state) capitalism and the external logic of the world market. This historical period in socialist Yugoslavia points to intersections and experiments with the model of self-management that pushed for political empowerment through both socialization of the means of production and market regulations, resulting in a contradictory combination at times with the best, at times with worst elements of both systems. The contradictory movement of socialism was exposed and amplified in the mid- and late 1960s with the introduction of "market reform," which was designed as a new step in the course of the Leninist "withering away of the state" (Kirn 2011; Suvin 2014) and which would expand the decentralization process to tackle the problems of political monopoly and the transfer of control of social capital toward the workers' control over the means of production. Moreover, the critique of the federative (centralist) political structure was designed to empower communes and local municipalities in

all spheres of life, so they could represent the interests of workers and citizens most faithfully. At this point let me just recall the extremely uncritical reception of one central element of this reform: the *market*. A close reading of socialist ideologues shows that they (i.e. Tito, Kardelj, and other "hard-liners" in the socialist leadership) sincerely believed that there is no contradiction in combining a socialist market with socialist commodity production, as if there would be no contradictions or inequalities structuring the socioeconomic processes involved (Bavčar et al. 1985). However, for the leadership and dominant economic groups, it seemed necessary to install market mechanisms against administrative social regulation and expand the course of "decentralization and democratization." The introduction of the market reform had massive and unanticipated effects on the whole political constitution of Yugoslavia: rational economic criteria started becoming important referents within socioeconomic life. If it is true that enterprises and workers' councils received more political freedoms by taking decisions about the accumulation of capital, it also has to be said that those decisions were not always taken in the spirit of workers' solidarity. Moreover, the process of the autonomization of social capital into small independent capitals had a centrifugal effect and resulted in a reduction of the level of employment in individual firms in order to retain or acquire a surplus to satisfy the level of wages, as well as spontaneous competition on the internal Yugoslav market, where the companies with better capital and infrastructural capacities could outgrow and subcontract companies from other, less-developed regions.

Simultaneously, with the internal institutional changes came a much more open integration into global markets, with the arrival of large credits from the IMF and World Bank. The real struggle took place on the level of the distribution of the new credits: all prior economic development and monetary flows were to a large degree controlled through federal institutions, most notably the Fund for Investment, which was designed to redistribute the wealth among the republics and minimize the economic differences. In 1966, in the midst of marketization, the Yugoslavian federal parliament passed a law that created commercial banks and abolished a network of small banks (workers' deposits). The aim in creating commercial banks could be created by 25 large enterprises within each republic; these new commercial banks were the assigned crucial control over the flow of credits that came from the external crediting agencies. Banks—as in capitalism—started giving credits on condition that viable and profitable plans were presented to them. The initially spontaneous market self-management was soon transformed

into more or less formal politico-economic conglomerates of power, a kind of osmosis between directors, bankers, and municipal party leaders (Samary 1988), from which workers were almost completely excluded and on which the future investment cycles of particular companies were largely dependent. The model of social solidarity between workers in different companies and different regions was thus defeated and gradually replaced by a principle of economic rationality. Instead of class coalitions of technocrats, directors, and workers, the new ruling class in socialist Yugoslavia consisted of coalitions of technocrats and bureaucrats (Bavčar et al. 1985). The technocrats presented themselves as an "internal" alternative to an ideologically suffocated and politically saturated field: the economy should be left to experts, while the "ideology," with its political monopoly, should be rejected. This was a liberal strand of the anti-Stalinist critique, which, however, did not achieve democratization or the empowerment of workers through the market reform. Rather, market socialism through economic decentralization openly embraced the asymmetries of the market economy that resulted in the systemic underdevelopment of the poorer regions (e.g. Kosovo), the growing debt dependency of the whole federation, rising levels of unemployment (Woodward 1995a) and the intensification of exploitation. Furthermore, when Yugoslavia was first hit by a serious crisis and economic stagnation at the end of the 1960s, it could not respond to it macroeconomically due to its decentralization and market reforms.

I argue that the period of market socialism was not only a temporary stage, it also prepared the way for a larger historical stage, when the initial defeat of socialism within market socialism—what I call postsocialism—occurred. This did not mean that workers and citizens in socialist Yugoslavia remained passive observers of the leadership's manipulation and their political monopoly. Rather, the late 1960s saw an immense outburst of alternative cultural production and political revolts that ranged from the May 1968 student protests and hundreds of wildcat strikes to internal opposition within the League of Communists on both the federal and republican levels. I suggest calling these processes a "postsocialist" tendency within socialism; in other words, Yugoslavian politico-economic policies already in 1960s supported a protocapitalist, which found solid agents in the emerging technocracy. Also, in the early 1970s, the Yugoslav political space witnessed the first serious and mass nationalist outbursts, which first set out from economic arguments that defended republican autonomy (richer republics, such as Slovenia and Croatia), and secondly were given an openly political twist. In Croatia, Maspok (Dragović-Sosso 2002) connected culturalist, linguist, economic,

and political voices that for the first time demanded the independence of Croatia, which was to become a state for Croats only (and not also Serbians or Hungarians—what had happened to the working class referent?)! The ideological block of nationalist and liberalist forces was defeated in 1972 by a mass expulsions and purges of the party apparatuses organized by Tito's circle. However, the structural conditions that triggered national-liberal responses within the self-management model were only delayed, and 15 years later they made a victorious historic block that, in the midst of prolonged economic crisis with immense inflation and austerity imposed by IMF (Magaš 1993), organized first the dissolution of the socialist paradigm and then the violent breakup of Yugoslavia as its continuation. A close analysis of the sequence of market reform between 1965 and 1972 crystallizes the postsocialist tendency that existed deep in the socialist period, casting a very different light on the "totalitarian prism" of censorship and rigidity.

In this vein, an alternative account of socialist transition(s) breaks with both mainstream and right-wing revisionist historiographies, which either divide socialism chronologically into various stages that necessarily lead to defeat or cement socialism into one homogenous body, namely totalitarianism, which was also bound to fail. In opposition to the mainstream views on socialism and their neat categorization into various stages, the critical tendential analysis shows that postsocialism appeared well before the breakup of Yugoslavia, and it also highlights the gradual exhaustion of communist politics, which was there to be defended from its earlier beginnings. One could dwell on a fictional narrative *what if*, or how the defeat of the later historical conjuncture might have been prevented, but the central epistemological lesson of this reading of postsocialism points out that history was not linear and also not as closed as the "totalitarian" lenses suggest. Rather, this offers an alternative view of where to locate the real discontinuity (here with the idea of communism and revolutionary tradition), which allows the transitional caesura of 1989 to be decentered onto the late 1960s, or later, onto 1991, which brought Yugoslavia to a position of complete catastrophe.

CONCLUSION: WITHERING AWAY OF THE PREFIX "POST-"?

This chapter first assessed the central weaknesses and blind spots of the literature on the transition regarding the postsocialist and post-Yugoslav conditions, with its linear-teleological (consolidated democracy) and substantial cores (nationalism, anticommunism, and pro-capitalism). My

critical reading concluded that in its actuality transitology has confirmed, in an apologetic way, the existing state of affairs. This assessment was accompanied by a consideration of a few of the most catastrophic consequences of the so-called democratic transition in the post-Yugoslav context, namely civil wars with ethnic cleansing, the privatization, gradual or rapid, of the means of production, new forms of authoritarianism, and the re-traditionalization of society. In the last part, I borrowed the concepts of heterogeneous temporality and aleatory history from Louis Althusser in order to develop an alternative concept of "post-," which enables us to think tendentially, from the position of not yet accomplished fact that goes against both TINA and the nationalist mythologies that are so present in the transitional literature. Rather, history should be seen as an open-ended and contingent process, which cannot anticipate the future, let alone simply end it. This conceptual frame was tested, counterintuitively, in grasping postsocialist elements within the mature phase of socialist self-management from the mid-1960s (the market reform of 1965–1972), which in my view created discontinuities with both the federative and solidarity models and socialist paradigms, which 20 years later would terminate the project of Yugoslavia in circumstances of acute austerity. The dialectical journey into Yugoslav market socialism stands as an analytical and particular unit that marks one of the central contradictions, which in different socialisms emerged in earlier-later time: Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s, China in the late 1970s and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Instead of positing the socialist failure as imminent and as due to an inferiority to capitalist modernization, one should rather observe how the "oil shock" of the early 1970s unfolded into a deep socioeconomic crisis and dependency on the second and third worlds, while participating in the gradual demise of the real socialisms, which in return signaled the end of the project of the welfare state in the West. This double movement of theoretical work and historical assessment can be seen as a philosophical intervention into the (past) historical and political works of transitology. However, the question I want to pose to end with is one of political urgency: Today, in the light of the prolonged economic crisis and the peripherialization of large parts of Europe and its people—immigrants and refugees included—shouldn't one finally conclude that the last hour of the capitalist utopia has ticked away? Who still believes in the European project today, which, after the initial triumph of 1989, was followed in Yugoslavia by the catastrophe of war and in other parts of the east by social catastrophe, and which is now finally reaching the south? This might be a good point at which to say farewell to

the times of "post-," and in particular to the postsocialist condition, which, as I have analyzed here, existed much more within socialism than later in the 1990s. The good old TINA of liberal democracy and the free market has today been replaced by another alternative: the technocratic-led neoliberal apparatus of the EU, with its strong tendency toward authoritarian forms of governance. This shows us that even the political representatives of capitalist states do not believe in the European project, since ideological legitimacy does not present a political problem for them. The reigns of technocrats and experts, which are supposedly ideology free, merely execute the plan that is on the agenda. There seems to be more than just one important lesson to be learned from the postsocialist dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, once we draw closer to the last hour of the postsocialist European Union.

Notes

1. The popular struggles, revolutions, and parliamentary victories of the (socialist) left in the last decade in South America, ranging from Venezuela and Bolivia to (if to a lesser degree) Equador and Argentina, could be seen as rare occasions on which the neoliberal consensus and transnational corporations and institutions have been defeated, at least temporarily. South America has opened up an alternative sequence that has triggered the political renaissance of revolutionary popular organizations (movements) on the one hand and socialist parties on the other. In this respect, the condition of postsocialism has already been defeated outside the Western context, with socialist specters receiving new political forms and new life. There are however signs of the strong neoliberal backlash against this socialist experiments in the recent years. I will leave this topic aside in this chapter.

2. As a liberal theorist, Fukuyama obviously does not believe in socialism, while for Badiou socialism was a problematic political formation which, through repression and the synthesis of party and state, actually distanced itself from the idea of communism.

3. A good critique of transitional studies has been conducted by the sociologist Rastko Močnik (1999), and there is also a more extensive study by Boris Buden (2009a).

4. This chapter is particularly indebted to the works of Buden (2009a), Močnik (2003), and Lukić and Maslov (2014), who have outlined few important epistemological and critical observations of the so-called transition studies.

5. Pierre Bordieu wrote an excellent theoretical critique of the methodology of public opinion research (Bordieu 1979).

6. The distinction between theoretical concept and reality has been well developed within the tradition of French epistemology (e.g. Gaston Bachelard, Louis Althusser), but it can also be ascribed to many other intellectual figures in the history of thought.

7. In the Slovenian case, historical revisionism came from the right-wing journal *Nova Revija*, which from the mid-1980s published openly nationalist and anticommunist articles. These national dissidents cooperated with Catholic Church and would later hegemonize the democratic movements that formed in the 1980s. For details, see Kirn (2007).

8. I have already mentioned the erasure of democratic experiences from the Hungarian revolution in 1956 to the thousands of workers' strikes in Yugoslavia and the workers' movement of Solidarność in the 1980s and many others. However, even the functioning of the political economy of socialism should be explored in a more nuanced way that does not simply emphasize a command economy with administrative decrees. For a more liberal perspective, see Sabel and Stark (1982); for a Marxist analysis of, for example, the Soviet Union, see Bettleheim (1978), or more recently the analysis of Michael Lebowitz (2012).

9. Buden (2009a). http://roundtable.kein.org/sites/newtable.kein.org/files/Buden%20-%20Children%20of%20postcommunism.pdf

10. Slavoj Žižek has in many places criticized precisely this teleological core of the communist leadership that centered on the concept of a history that will necessary proceed on the "good side," toward the proletarian revolution. However, all the historical experiences of the twentieth century showed that there is nothing automatic about capitalist development that guarantees the coming community.

11. Political recomposition after Tito's death in 1980 resulted in more fragmented and more nationalist-oriented party leaderships, while the external opposition framed its struggles outside the socialist paradigm (Goldstein 2005; Suvin 2014).

12. Jochana Bockman recently wrote a book on the left-wing origins of neoliberalism claiming that through intellectual and theoretical exchange between East and West (e.g. labor management school), self-management actually served as one of the models for critique of state, and in certain respect got reappropriated in the neoliberal horizon (2011).

13. Works by Woodward (1995a, b), Samary (1988), and Suvin (2014) are the best studies of economic transformation in late Yugoslavia up until today.

14. For a good framework and summary of some alternative political positions and interpretations of the post-Yugoslav context, see also the volume edited by Srećko Horvat and Igor Štiks (2014). For a good critique of the transition to postsocialism, see Gajić and Popović (2011) and for a good overview of cultural and memorial changes of the post-Yugoslav landscape see the volume edited by Karamanić and Šuber (2012).

15. A vast array of orientalizing accounts was written; for this purpose, let me refer only to the (in)famous book of Kaplan (2005), whose work was quoted in the circles of the Western political leadership.

16. Not to exclude Slovenia from this somber picture, it should be said that even though it escaped the civil wars, and while there was no real ethnic cleansing, in 1992 the state apparatus performed a legal cleansing of almost 20,000 people from the registry of permanent residence. This phenomenon was only discovered ten years later by individuals and reports in the weekly media, *Mladina*. Those affected were described as the "erased," who overnight in 1992 were left without documents, pensions, and welfare protection, even though they had been living and working in Slovenia for 20, 30, or more years before the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Although the Constitutional Court of Slovenia ordered the government to make good this systematic injustice, this has not been done in its entirety. For details of this topic, see Dedić et al. (2003).

17. See especially the section in Althusser (1973: 94–99).

18. For a fruitful epistemological discussion of the relationship between universality, contingency, and emancipatory politics, see Žižek, Butler, and Laclau (in Žižek 2000).

19. For a detailed discussion of how opening up to the West affected China in the late 1970s, which illuminated the poverty of both the modernization approach and exceptionalism, see Klinger's chapter in this volume. The stress is thus on a dialectical and concise understanding of how the "exterior" and "interior" forces come to play a role in and are transformed into the socially (de)formative processes of a concrete situation.

Bibliography

Althusser, Louis. 1973. *Elements of Self-Criticism*. London: NLB.
———. 1977. On the 22 Congress of the French Communist Party V. *New Left Review* 104 (July–August): 3–22.
———. 2003. *Humanist Controversy and Other Texts*. London: Verso.
———. 2005. *For Marx*. London: Verso.
Badiou, Alain. 1998. *D'un désastre obscur: sur la fin de la vérité d'État*. La Tour d'Aigues: Éd. de l'Aub.
———. 2005. *Metapolitics*. London: Verso.
Bavčar, Igor, Srečo Kirn, and Bojan Korsika. 1985. *Kapital + Delo v SFRJ*. Ljubljana: Krt.
Bettleheim, Charles. 1978. *Class Struggles in the USSR*. London: The Harvester Press.
Bockman, Johanna. 2011. *Markets in the Name of Socialism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Press.

Bordieu, Alain. 1979. Public Opinion Does Not Exist. In *Communication and Class Struggle*, ed. Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelaub, vol. I, 124–130. New York: International General.

Buden, Boris. 2008. Behind the Velvet Curtain. Remembering Dušan Makavejev's W.R.: Mysteries of the Organism. *Afterall* 18. http://www.afterall.org/journal/issue.18/behind.velvet.curtain.remembering.dusan.makavejevs.

———. 2009a. *Zone des Übergangs: vom Ende des Postkommunismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

———. 2009a Children of Postcommunism. *Radical Philosophy*. http://roundtable.kein.org/sites/newtable.kein.org/files/Buden%20-%20Children%20of%20postcommunism.pdf

Dedić, Jasminka, Jalušić Vlasta, and Jelka Zorn. 2003. *Izbrisani: organizirana nedoložnost in politike izključevanja*. Ljubljana: Mirovni Inštitut.

Dragović-Sosso, Jasna. 2002. *Saviours of the Nation? Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Duzinas, Costas, and Slavoj Žižek, eds. 2010. *The Idea of Communism*. London: Verso.

Fink-Hafner, Danica, and Miro Haček. 2000. *Demokratični prehodi I, II*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.

Fisher, Mark. 2009. *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* London: Zero Books.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and The Last Man*. London: Penguin.

Gajić, Zoran, and Željko Popović, eds. 2011. *Kroz tranziciju*. Novi Sad: Ako.

Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 2005. *Short History of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Horvat, Srećko, and Igor Štiks, eds. 2014. *Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics after Yugoslavia*. London: Verso.

Jović, Dejan. 2010. Problems of the Early Post-communist Transition Theory. https://dspace.stir.ac.uk/bitstream/1893/3070/1/Jovic,%20Politicka%20misao,%202010,%20Transition%20theories.pdf

Kaplan, Robert. 2005. *Balkan Ghosts*. London: Picador.

Karamanić, Slobodan, and Daniel Šuber. 2012. *Conceptualisation of Politics and Reproduction in the Work of Louis Althusser: Case of Socialist Yugoslavia*. Dissertation thesis, University of Nova Gorica.

———. 2014. *Partizanski prelomi in protislovja tržnega socializma v Jugoslaviji*. Ljubljana: založba Sophija.

Kirn, Gal. 2007. Slovene Independence Never Happened, Or How to Reconstruct the Historical Mode of Politics? *ISH-Monitor* 9(1), 91-108.

———. 2011. Transformation of Memorial Sites in the Post-Yugoslav Context. In *Reading Images in the post-Yugoslav Context*, ed. Slobodan Karamanić and Daniel Šuber. Leiden: Brill Publishers.

Lacan, Jacques. 2004. *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. London: Karnac Books.

Lebowitz, Michael. 2012. *The Contradictions of Real Socialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Losurdo, Dominico. 2015. *War and Revolution*. London: Verso.

Lukić, Atila, and Maslov, Gordan. 2014. "Did Somebody Say 'Transition'?" A Critical Intervention into the Use of a Notion. *Praktyka Teoretyczna* 3(13). http://www.praktykateoretyczna.pl/czasopismo/did-somebody-say-transition/

Magaš, Branka. 1993. *The Destruction of Yugoslavia*. London: Verso.

Mastnak, Tomaž. 1987. Totalitarizem od spodaj. *Družboslovne razprave* 4(5): 91–98.

Močnik, Rastko. 1999. *3 teorije: ideologija, nacija, institucija [3 Theories: Ideology, Nation, Institution]*. Ljubljana: Založba /*cf.

———. 2003. *Social Change in the Balkans*. Online Eurozine: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2003-03-20-mocnik-en.html

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Pupovac, Ozren. 2008. *Post-Marxism and Post-Socialism*. Dissertation thesis, Open University, London.

Sabel, Charles, and David Stark. 1982. Planning, Politics and Shop-Floor Power: Hidden forms of Bargaining in the Soviet Imposed State—Socialist Societies. *Politics & Society* 11(4): 439–475.

Samary, Catherine. 1988. *Le marché contre l'autogestion: l'expérience yougoslave*. Paris: Publisud, Montreuil.

Schöpflin, George. 1993. *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945–1992*. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Seymour, Richard. 2014. *Against Austerity*. London: Pluto Press.

Sohn-Rethel, A. 1978. *Economy and Class Structure of German Fascism*. Wheat Ridge: CSE Books.

Suvin, Darko. 2014. *Samo jednom se ljubi: Radiografija SFR Jugoslavije*. Belgrade: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.

Vanhanen, Tatu. 1990. *The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980–88*. New York: Crane Russak.

Woodward, Susan. 1995a. *Balkan Tragedy*. Washington, DC: The Brookings institution.

———. 1995b. *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia 1945–90*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.

Žižek, Slavoj. 2000. *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left*. London: Verso.

A Fractured Globe: Anthropology and Narration after 1989

Ajay Gandhi

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War in 1989 was, among other things, the end of a narrative. The peculiarities and permutations of this narrative varied. Depending on one's location and loyalties, 1989 marked the rupture of the communist dream, or the triumph of the capitalist system. Yet more important than where one plotted oneself in this narrative arc, the Cold War's conclusion signaled a crisis of faith in narrative itself.

We know that the Cold War supplanted, in the twentieth century, other compelling narratives. Nationalism and fascism are obvious examples, communal stories stitched out of industrial capitalism, populism, modernism, antimonarchism, and anticolonialism. Worldwide, the twentieth century—marked by national print cultures, worker's activism, and pan-regional cooperation—can be seen as a century where ambitious narratives were spun, disseminated, contested, and supplanted with unprecedented scale and velocity.

It was quickly understood that the Cold War's end put this faith in narrative into question. Francis Fukuyama's phrase about the end of the

A. Gandhi (✉)
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen, Germany

Cold War, that it constituted, in terms of viable historical movements and political choices, "the end of history" (1992), suggested that that the previous century's political tumult and economic tinkering were over. This may now, with the benefit of hindsight, seem naïve. The fervent technological changes of the past two decades, the political and economic ambitions of Asian, Middle Eastern, and South American nations, and the unpredictable constellations of militarism, paternalism, populism, and neoliberalism from Argentina to India suggest a world still very much in motion. And the viability of crypto-authoritarian and populist-despotic regimes—Venezuela, Rwanda, Russia, and Egypt—qualifies Fukuyama's assertion that only liberal democracies would be able to legitimate themselves; it seems that many states outside this fold likewise have "ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society" (Fukuyama 1992: 13).

But Fukuyama's phrase still aptly captures the widespread disorientation that the end of the Cold War wrought on many. At the core of this disorientation was the rupture in well-worn certainties. For as long as the Cold War continued, albeit in continually modulated forms, the future would resemble the present, which in turn resembled the past. The year 1989 popped the bubble of this eternal present, this narrative somnolence. The title of a monograph on the last Soviet generation—*Everything was Forever Until it Was No More*—captures this surprise at a sudden end to a narrative that was thought eternal (Yurchak 2006).

Since 1989, what have been the stories employed to bind people together, acquire their consent, and motivate them toward action? One trend, in the face of uncertainty and change, has been to fall back on narratives formerly questioned, softened, or discredited. Thus, in countries as disparate as Japan, Russia, and the Netherlands, a nationalism of ethnic, religious, and racial purity has been visible. The people-as-nation is still, for many, a compelling narrative, even as its fictiveness is readily visible.

The rhetorical force of capitalism as an ideological project, however, has diminished, with neoliberalism becoming a prevailing universal reality. Capitalism is now omnipresent and unquestionable and does not, as during the Cold War, require ideological goading or narrative succor. In the post-war period, many intellectuals published books explaining how capitalism is the most rational method for organizing resources and the apex of scientific rationality. Now, we subscribe to the system without the need to believe in it; capitalism is a faithless faith.

What is perhaps more striking is the prevalence, in public discourse, of an antagonism toward any narrative. We live in an era hostile to any

attempt to forge narrative. Witness the ubiquitous use, by politicians, public intellectuals or businesspeople, of terms such as "creative disruption," "environment in flux," "uncertain climate," "unprecedented developments," and "unforeseen factors." Variants of these phrases regularly pepper stock reports, party manifestos, and policy documents. Rather than telling us something about how the world works, about the way to evaluate phenomena, and how to act in the future, this discourse insists that the world cannot be coherently understood as such. Rather than reassurance—we are here, we are going there—the prevailing thinking admits impotence to larger forces. We are told—about war, the environment, jobs, the future—that the only certain thing is uncertainty.

A number of seemingly unassailable factors—climate change and fears of ecosystem collapse; the circulation and jostling of microbes, species, and hosts; the monthly ascendance of new technological platforms and portals that make obsolete former communication methods; and the non-ideological and unpredictable alignment of global actors on specific issues—have contributed to a post–Cold War decline of narrative. Whereas prior to 1989, loyalties and aspirations could be seen to hew toward one bloc or another, for either capitalism or communism, toward the Soviets or the Americans, no such subsumption is possible today.

But it is my thesis that it is not merely greater awareness of what is out there—a more subtle, less Manichean, more globally attuned sensitivity—that has led to narrative insolubility. Rather, the erosion of belief in narrative itself has made these factors seem vexing and disabling. For some, their world does not offer them a narrative home—does not allow them to inhabit a meaningful tale—but excises them from the story. Many workers, minorities, and outsiders are told that their skills are obsolete, their salary is threatened, their loyalties are questionable, and their way of producing and living is antiquated.

I contend that we approach these matters not merely as objective, material problems—as questions of arrangements and policies—but as ones of self-understanding grounded in narrative. The way we inhabit the world is inseparable from the stories we employ so as to dwell. Narrative provides both a means to act in the world and to reflect on it, and is an essential component of the self, time, ethics, practical activity, and the perceptual senses (Ingold 2000, 2011; Ricoer 1984–1988). It is my purpose in this chapter to reflect on some of these broad global changes post-1989 with respect to the idea of narrative, and as concerns my discipline, anthropology. Anthropology has long been an awkward misfit in the university; like

psychology, it has at times been allied to the humanities and to philosophy, and conversely to the natural sciences. My purpose, however, is not to wade into these well-charted and periodically turbulent waters.

Anthropology may be an art or it may be a science, but whatever else it is, it is a narrative practice: it feeds on others' narrative, and it in turn produces its own narrative. This narrative hinges on a correspondence, inevitably imperfect, between the word and the world. Like other narrative practices which were consolidated in the nineteenth century—such as literature and journalism—anthropology is a *modernist* practice expressed in the *realist* genre. Those other forms, have, since the Cold War's end, faced their own assaults. For example, critics of realist literature have for years sought to overturn that form's pretenses; many avant-garde writers today seek to signal their awareness of their artifice, to consciously undermine the power of narrative, under the banner of post-modernism or post-realism (Wood 2008). To take a different form, a documentary film today is much more likely to employ staged re-creations or other fictive means to elucidate a point formerly made through strictly naturalist, non-fictional means. In contemporary fiction as in contemporary documentaries, the refusal to concede to narrative is accomplished by fracturing the temporal flow, employing a pastiche of sources and perspectives, and by reminding a reader or viewer of narrative's necessary illusion.

In anthropology, too, a number of different forces have assaulted the discipline's narrative authority. Influenced by the harder, physical sciences branch of the discipline, some anthropologists have revived the structuralist belief in brain-wired universals. During structuralism's heyday, Claude Levi-Strauss maintained that human similarities across time and place—irrespective of outward manifestations of sovereignty or ritual or kinship—could be accounted for by reference to a "deep structure" embedded in the mind (1966). Structuralism was based on Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic ideas about generative grammar—a skeletal form underlying all expression. The anthropologists who revive the notion that formal principles can be located in human cognition now draw from work in cognitive psychology, evolutionary science, and neurology (Bloch 2012). These arguments seek to displace the hermeneutic enterprise on which post-structuralist anthropology was based—culture as a text that can be read and interpreted (Geertz 1973). Indeed, they oppose the notion that people experience time in different ways, or the primacy of language in mapping the world—temporal and expressive forms in which narrative is crucial (Bloch 2012).

Anthropology's narrative authority has being challenged from other angles, too. One can look, in the past decade, at the "post-human turn": the effort to map "post-human ontologies," or worlds of being, that reside in non-human animals and objects. In this thinking, identity and subjectivity are not sole privileges of the human and elide the influence of propensities and energies in the material or non-human realm (White 2013). The western philosophical emphasis, since the Enlightenment, on dualism, on a distinction between subjects and objects, is untenable. The capacity to shape events and forms must be extended to material and non-human forms. Notably, as in the effort of those influenced by cognitive science, language, and narrative are suspect. This is especially clear in the emphasis, especially in anthropology in the Anglophone world, on "affect": somatic intensities and propensities that emerge prior to language but are understood to have an outsized imprint on social life (Mazzarella 2009).

It would seem that only a hopelessly old-fashioned fiction writer, documentary maker, or anthropologist would have faith in realist versimilitude or naturalist narrative. Still, in perhaps a somewhat quixotic effort, I seek to survey and critique some of these trends in closer detail, and in so doing defend a narrative-based approach. To do so, in the following section, I gloss some of the tenets that prevailed within anthropology during the Cold War. Thereafter, I move on to what I see as self-paralyzing trends within the discipline that characterize the post–Cold War era. Finally, I seek to argue that anthropology can only be relevant in the present and future if it hews to narrative thinking.

COLD WAR ANTHROPOLOGY AND BEYOND

Anthropology during the Cold War was profoundly influenced by ideas from outside the discipline, as well as the imperatives of the post-war order. At the liberal, internationalist end, there was Margaret Mead, who argued against the homogenizing tendencies of modernization theory (Mandler 2013). No anthropologist today has the visibility and influence that a twentieth-century predecessor like Mead had: she served as a museum curator, newspaper and magazine columnist, university professor, and state department consultant, to wide acclaim. Mead, and her mentors Ruth Benedict and Franz Boas, emphasized the existence of discrete cultural patterns and personality types. But though they disavowed the racist, evolutionary paradigm that anthropology, in the nineteenth century, started with, they preserved the distinction between modern and

primitive societies, and adopted Freudian notions of culture as built on an individual's personality development. This resulted, during and after the war, in some reductive studies of national communities such as the Japanese and Russians. At its most reductive, Mead's culture and personality project maintained that swaddling and toilet training determined cultural habits and political postures (ibid.).

Thus, anthropology during the Cold War spawned a set of narratives influenced in turn by narratives emblematic of that period: modernization, industrialization, and personal psychology, as well as the faith, prevalent equally strongly in communist and capitalist spheres, of rational planning and mastery over nature. At the center of the discipline was the human: the question of human universals, difference, dominance, resistance, and adaptation.

Some of the debates that reshaped anthropology in the 1980s and 1990s—at least in the Anglophone world—have been extensively discussed elsewhere. These include the unholy alliance between anthropology, the development state, and modernization theory (Ferguson 1994); the prerogative of white, western anthropologists to essentialize and make timeless its others (Fabian 1983); the presumption of rational authority and scientific insight into the Other (Clifford and Marcus 1986); and the neglect of how transhistorical and translocal flows shaped seemingly isolated communities (Wolf 1982). There is probably greater caution in asserting claims, and greater sensitivity to issues of power and authority, than at any other time in the discipline's history.

Yet, while today's anthropologists remain, in general, scrupulously skeptical of any official line, this may have come at the cost of evading one of the tasks that anthropology is best suited for: narrative building. Anthropology, at its best, accumulates evidence from around the world to qualify, disrupt, and refresh conceptual narratives that are consolidated by other disciplines such as philosophy or economics or psychology. That is, it makes use of people's own narratives to reorient our grand narratives, whether we speak of the self or the state, or of time or space. Very few anthropologists have the ambition or wherewithal to attempt such a task today. A common diagnosis is to blame the sheer volume of research that must be mastered by any one specialist, which leads to a parochial splintering of audiences and an equally obscure style of writing.

I wish to move in another direction of critique, via an illustration of a major trend in contemporary anthropology: the move, heralded as radical, to destabilize a reigning philosophical distinction, between subjects and

objects, or humans and non-humans. For some years, a growing band of anthropologists have argued that, in analyzing how people use things, or relate to animals, according overwhelming agency to humans is misplaced. It is not that humans are in the driver's seat, fashioning the world, and bending it to our will; rather, materials and animals may be accorded their own agency, their own being-in-the-world. Much of this writing is nowadays glossed under the rubric "post-human ontology" and "materialist studies" (Miller 2005; Moore 2012). The Cartesian dualism between persons and things, which has informed anthropology since its genesis, must, in this view, be overthrown. What this means is to see objects not as merely worked upon, but as active agents, and to understand animals as possessing reflective consciousness, not lacking it. Objects serve as agents which set off effects and can thus act; animals have intentions and cannot be considered mere brute mass (Latour 1993).

This view is illustrated by the anthropologist Stefan Helmreich's monograph on marine microbiologists in the realm of oceanography (2009). In his view, new forms of representation—such as molecular biological techniques, gene sequencing, bioinformatics, and remote sensing—allow for unprecedented awareness of underwater life. In Helmreich's view, the scientists' understanding of microbes such as extremophiles, which live far below the water surface, at temperatures inhospitable to most life forms, represents a new way to understand life. Such scientists seek, like many before them, to harness such creatures for use by humans. With lateral gene transfer, and "the rise of an informatically inflected bare life," earlier notions of genealogy or descent as key to human reproduction might fade (ibid.: 101). That is, the way we understand life and its renewal is deficient, or insufficient.

But is Helmreich suggesting that a speculative practice of an unproven technology in an obscure realm of natural science will displace our commonsense notions of sex and inheritance? Since these ideas remain prevalent among only a very few professionals, then what are the grounds for vouching that such knowledge constitutes a revolutionary rupture in how we imagine our relations to others? And finally, since this thesis is ultimately dependent on human narratives—despite new forms of representation, and despite awareness of creatures formerly marginal to our consciousness—how radical a shift is it? This kind of analysis is symptomatic of how today's anthropologists rush toward anything that is "new" and use it to insist on a radical break with all that came before.

An important critique of these kinds of claims has come from the British anthropologist Tim Ingold. In his writings, he has continually drawn the link between dwelling, interacting, producing, and storytelling (2000, 2011). In Ingold's view, human relations with the non-human environment—both animate and inanimate—are inseparable from narrating. While animals may have histories of their own relations with humans, for example, only humans can narrate them (2000: 76). Materials do not exist in a readymade, finished state outside of ongoing interaction, but are necessarily part of an ongoing conversation with humans, a perpetual story of their becoming (2011: 26) Storytelling and narration, in this view, are not divorced from material interventions or mental constructions, but intertwined with dwelling, making, and living. To term a vast array of materials, forces, and things "objects" is to render them lifeless, to extract them from an ongoing, vital flow (2011: 215). Being is an ever-unspooling story called becoming to which each generation adds one chapter. Though humans relate to animals and materials in complex ways, our interaction is informed not by an abstract idea of agency and autonomy, but a fundamental interdependence that can only be articulated via narrative.

In my view, the hectic urge to displace the human in the discipline—to eliminate the "anthro"—has mirrored the retreat of anthropology from the public sphere. Anthropologists during the Cold War, such as Margaret Mead, may have reproduced a somewhat reductive psychologising in their view of culture. But their views were part of a wider public debate where cultural difference could be marshaled to support or critique contemporary policy. Such prominence today is unimaginable, because few anthropologists have the wherewithal to employ cultural narratives so as to critique the prevailing narratives in our society.

Perhaps a signal failure here has been contemporary anthropology's disinterest (or refusal) to engage with its own archive. We can put this in narrative terms. For Paul Ricoer, narrative exists in a world that is at once timeless and universal, and finite and particular; the paradox of narrative is that, via our experience of speaking and reading and reflecting, it exists in a bounded and boundless manner (1984–1988). A novel by Flaubert or Dickens or Tolstoy tells us something about a time and place and offers pleasures and truths that exist forever. In my understanding, anthropology's core strength has been to accumulate an archive—through repeated visits by different people over time—of stories that do something similar. These narratives tell us both what things were like at a particular moment, to particular people, and about the weaving of these finite, specific expe-

riences with preexisting habits, rituals, and structures, and about their evolution or mutation afterward. Any anthropologist who does fieldwork will be grateful to find that a previous ethnographer found something beforehand that resonates with what they experienced. In a fundamental sense, an anthropologist's true task is not to write for her peers, but for future readers, who seek to compare and contrast what is unfolding then with what occurred before.

Yet, the value of reading and building upon this narrative archive has been steadily eroded since the late twentieth century. I am not merely referring to the fact that new theories have taken root and older theories discarded within the discipline. That is, my concern is not merely that of the evolution and natural selection of ideas, that new paradigms, trends, and fields emerged and displaced others. I refer to something more fundamental: the epistemological skepticism of anthropological authority and its consequences for how human experience is narrated.

It may be helpful to step backward and survey how this occurred. Since the nineteenth century, the anthropological enterprise, despite being allied to different strains of thinking—such as evolutionary theory, functionalism, and structuralism—was committed to elucidating a "logically coherent system" (Graeber 2001: 21). Anthropologists sought to stitch, out of widely different experiences, a unifying story of those people at that time in that place. Since the 1970s, however, a different kind of process has unfolded: the insistent questioning of this possibility under the cloak of "radical" and "critical" theory. The most prominent banner under which this unfolded was post-structuralism—including thinkers as diverse as Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and Derrida—which sought, above all, to "shatter totalities" such as society, language, and the psyche, and see reality instead as a "heterogeneous multiplicity" of fractured fields, discourses, and planes (ibid.: 26). Anthropology had, prior to post-structuralism, sought to emphasize that society could be understood in terms of an overarching structure, hierarchy, civilization, or cosmology. This may have presumed a coherence and continuity that was not there. Yet the relentlessly critical effect of post-structuralism was to make it seem as best unfeasible and at worst ridiculous to examine patterns, rituals, and cosmologies where narration plays a critical role. At its more extreme, post-structuralism imparted a kind of "aggressive nihilism," insisting on the impossibility of description, and even of a concept such as "reality" (ibid.: 51).

Post-modernism's onset in the 1980s and 1990s, in this light, may be seen to echo the larger destabilization of the global order that occurred

with the end of the Cold War. In the university, the abandonment of "mass action for revolutionary change" was given theoretical grounding in the idea that comparison, reality, and social possibility was impossible (ibid.: 253). Note here how the trends within anthropology echo and mirror the larger story of the end of the Cold War: history is over, there are no alternatives, and there is no point trying to develop compelling, alternative frameworks that might speak to both relative experiences and universal processes.

In my view, the self-reflexive turn within anthropology—and related influences, such as post-colonial theory—made anthropologists far too ashamed and timid. The anthropological archive was deemed to be corrupted by its writing by white, Eurocentric scholars. Thus, the actual narratives, developed and conceptualized since the nineteenth century, of how processes such as sovereignty and exchange were enacted were marginalized. And the confidence by which anthropologists could critique contemporary processes in their own society by reference to developments elsewhere was diminished.

The result can be considered a form of self-sabotage. What is presented as critical or radical scholarship is often merely aloof; what is seen as appropriately reflexive is often a navel-gazing retreat. Anthropology was once seriously engaged by those in other social science and humanities disciplines. Consider anthropology's historical and contemporary relation to philosophy. From the late nineteenth till the mid-twentieth centuries, philosophers such as Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Jean-Paul Sartre drew from anthropological writings on taboo, religion, and the potlatch (Da Col and Graeber 2011: x). In the mid-twentieth century, as I've discussed, psychologists and development experts engaged with anthropological discussions of personality, race, gender roles, reproduction, and difference (Mandler 2013).

This would, in contrast, be unimaginable today. Anthropologists of my generation generally do not draw on their own disciplinary archive—what one could call an internal ethnographic narrative—but on European philosophy, which is why terms such as "deterrorialization" or "governmentality" (one could also use neoliberalism, rights, citizenship, and democracy) are as prominent inside anthropology as cultural studies, human geography, and feminist studies. Thus, anthropology has ceded the ground by which intellectuals could make sense of the universality of human experience, and is today often indistinguishable from other forms of "theory."

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have not advocated for an anthropology that is merely a kind of descriptive mirror, generating human reports on human behavior—there are far superior forms, such as literature, for this. Nor would I deny that attention to non-human phenomena, such as materials and animals, are not crucial for understanding of the human self. Clearly, in the age of the Anthropocene, we are at the historical juncture where the Enlightenment fiction that humans rationally stand above and apart from their environment has been proven false (Chakrabarty 2009). What anthropology is well suited to, however, is narrating human experience as it encounters and unfolds along human and non-human others. Tim Ingold's notion anthropology is both deceptively simple and lyrically capacious: "the study of human becomings as they unfold within the weave of the world" (2011: 9).

The post-1989 world has, I've argued, been one where the prevailing messages of the political and economic order, and the ambitions of anthropology have converged, to ill effect. After Soviet communism's demise and the universal triumph of capitalism—and alongside rapid changes in ecological thinking, technological communication, and popular aspirations and affiliations—instead of being offered new narratives to make sense of the world, leaders emphasized discontinuity, a lack of control, a rupturing of certainties. Echoing and mirroring these messages of helplessness, the study of society and politics has turned away from overarching totalities, structures, or continuities, and instead emphasizes the fractured and discontinuous.

I do not believe that an anthropology that is so timid and recessive is desirable or sustainable. Ultimately, it is only anthropology that can address fundamental comparative questions as to why certain classifications, identifications, and subjectivities are present in certain places and not others (Descola 2013). And it is only anthropology that can overturn existing narrative orthodoxies about ubiquitous and universal phenomena such as debt, by marshaling comparative evidence from across time and space that acknowledges the existence of similar social forms in contexts marked by relativity and historicity (Graeber 2011). To make sense of the persistent differences as well as underlying continuities in human communities, and to redeem the imprisoning effects of dominant political and economic thought, will require more such anthropological ambition.

References

Bloch, Maurice. 2012. *Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2009. The Climate of History: Four Theses. *Critical Inquiry* 35: 197–222.

Clifford, James, and George Marcus. 1986. *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Col, Giovanni da, and David Graeber. 2011. "Foreword: The Return of Ethnographic Theory." Hau 1 (1):vi-xxxv.

Descola, Philippe. 2013. *Beyond Nature and Culture*. Trans. Janet Lloyd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fabian, Johannes. 2002 [1983]. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ferguson, James. 1994 [1990]. *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Graeber, David. 2001. *Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2011. *Debt: The First 5,000 Years*. New York: Melville House.

Helmreich, Stefan. 2009. *Alien Ocean: Anthropological Voyages in Microbial Seas*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Ingold, Tim. 2000. *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihod, Dwelling and Skill*. London: Routledge.

———. 2011. *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description*. London: Routledge.

Latour, Bruno. 1993. *We Have Never Been Modern*. Trans. C. Porter. London: Prentice Hall.

Levi-Strauss, Claude. 1966. *The Raw and the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of Mythology*. New York: Penguin.

Mandler, Peter. 2013. *Return from the Natives: How Margaret Mead Won the Second World War and Lost the Cold War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Mazzarella, William. 2009. Affect: What is is Good For? In *Enchantments of Modernity: Empire, Nation, Globalization*, ed. Saurabh Dube, 291–309. London: Routledge.

Miller, Daniel. 2005. Materiality: An Introduction. In *Materiality*, ed. Daniel Miller, 1–50. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Moore, Henrietta. 2012. Avatars and Robots: The Imaginary Present and the Socialities of the Organic. *Cambridge Anthropology* 30(1): 48–63.

Ricoer, Paul. 1984–1988. *Time and Narrative* (vols. 1–3). Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

White, Hylton. Summer 2013. Materiality, Form, and Context: Marx contra Latour. *Victorian Studies* 55(4): 667–682.

Wolf, Eric. 1987 [1982]. *Europe and the People without History*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Wood, James. 2008. *How Fiction Works*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Yurchak, Alexei. 2006. *Everything was Forever, Until it was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Postcolonial Criticism after 1989: A Conversation with Gal Kirn and Marian Burchardt

Dipesh Chakrabarty

MB: *This book is about the ways in which the political changes around 1989 have affected and become entangled with social theory more broadly. What in your view are the dominant genealogies of postcolonial studies, and how have they been shaped by the Cold War context?*

DC: I think, when we talk about postcolonial studies, you have to make distinctions between mainly Anglophone and Francophone post-colonial studies. In the French case and in the British case what is similar is that postcolonialism begins as a response to the experience of immigrants, their experience of racism in a postimperial context. Importantly, these postcolonial thinkers distinguish themselves from pure anticolonial positions, which emerged in the anticolonial struggle. Fanon in Africa or in Martinique, Gandhi in India or Africa, Mao in China, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam—in their own places these individuals theorized anticolonial themes, whereas postcolonial theory happens first in the West. And then it travels back to these territories and actually creates tensions. For instance,

D. Chakrabarty (✉)
Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory, University of Chicago,
Chicago, IL, USA

the Indian academics become postcolonial and then criticize expatriate Indian academics, who were already postcolonial, for not having a sense of place with respect to India, which points to the tensions. But the people who write early on postcolonial issues, which is happening in the late 1970s and 1980s actually in Britain—in Britain these different streams of migration and intellectual movement, so somebody like Homi Bhabha or somebody like Stuart Hall, come together. For instance, in a conference in the late 1980s on Franz Fanon, people read Fanon from the different experiences of migration, while it is all done in the context of fighting British racism. Brown and black people came together in order to fight against white racism. Interestingly, these kinds of postcolonialism are actually patronized by parts of the state at the city level, for instance, by the London Council. In some places, postcolonialism in these ex-colonial countries also had a functional role to play, which is to make the ex-colonial countries become multicultural.

Anticolonial nationalism was against colonial forces and wanted to see them off, whereas postcolonialism was often initiated by immigrants who were maneuvering the state. They were struggling for recognition, and therefore conceptually it was much more important for postcolonial theorists to find a middle ground, rather than a do-or-die opposition, or a win-lose struggle. In a peculiar way, if you were in India before the end of British colonial rule in 1947, you had to essentialize the British to say, "You have to go." But in postimperial Britain, the British can only in a racist way say to the Pakistanis or the Indians, "You have to go." Nor can the Pakistanis say, "You have to go." In a way, we can see that, occasionally, postcolonial theory was about maneuvering to find place, to find recognition. The fight was really against racism so that, in that sense, the agenda of postcolonialism was not necessarily hostile. It was practical to any vibrant project of multiculturalism.

But on the other hand, philosophically, the situation was different. Politically, we might say it had functioned, but philosophically postcolonialism—until Homi Bhabha's writings—it was sympathetic to currents of deconstruction, to Foucault and to all these currents coming over from Europe. In that sense, postcolonial theory is very open to writers who were called "difference philosophers" and to philosophizing difference. And so philosophically postcolonials were not necessarily thinking of a plain liberal picture of harmony: you are Pakistani, you are Bangladeshi, you all have your place and we are a happy family. Philosophically, they were trying to make liberalism more complex by taking up the question of difference. But on the other hand, you can see that the reason

they were receiving grants from parts of the state apparatus was because within British or French society there were intellectuals who supported the project to become multicultural or culturally pluralist. So there is post-structuralism and deconstruction, the one genre that clearly guides Spivak's and Bhabha's work. They loosely tried to relate to Lacan theoretically and to philosophize difference in an interesting way. There is also the push within these countries of an internal anti-imperial attitude: "We should not be racists, we should open up." So the question that emerges is, how can you make liberal democracies more inclusive? Moreover, how can you have a liberal democracy without necessarily always classifying Indians and Pakistanis and so on? If Britain was a liberal democracy, how can we understand difference in such a complicated way as not to essentialize identities? That was one question, and I think post-structuralism was feeding that question more generally in the 1980s and 1990s. It also feeds, at least in the American scene, into the emergent critiques of liberalism, because clearly the strong tradition of racism in all of these countries shows that the liberal project was not working very well. If the countries were liberal enough, then they wouldn't have the struggle for cultural pluralism. So in some ways, another question that is coming up is this: Is liberalism enough, or can liberalism become more complicated?

GK: *This suggests that postcolonial studies entered into a confrontation with liberalism, but also that it developed a kind of liberal and pluralist critique of liberalism. It would be interesting if you could expand on the relationship of postcolonial studies to Marxism?*

DC: There are, of course, important questions related to Marxism. I think what was happening was that, because the Soviet Union collapsed and the Berlin Wall fell, many Marxists were already becoming disenchanted with real existing socialism. This began in Hungary in 1956 and then goes through Czechoslovakia—one could say that about the whole story of the eastern European states and the Soviet expansion into those areas, ending with Afghanistan. I would say from the 1960s onward there was, among Marxists, the recognition that the Soviet Union was not what ideally a Marxist state should be like. And this was coming up through French theory, where already Charles Bettelheim wrote a very interesting book on property structure, trying to prove that Soviet Union was not a communist country. Some people tried to theorize these socialist experiments as a kind of capitalism. Simultaneously, in different forms people were trying to demonstrate how there could be capitalism without private ownership of the means of capital. In this context, Gramsci became very

popular, and it is known well how Stuart Hall was influenced by Gramsci. With Gramsci they thought that there might be a democratic form of Marxism. However, there was still an urge among many thinkers for a revolutionary kind of Marxism that would confront capitalism and actually fight for something else. And these Marxisms became unhappy with deconstruction and Foucault. Christopher Norris is a good example: he wrote a book actually explaining Derrida, and then one of his later books was very hostile to Derrida. I think of Hardt and Negri's book *Empire* as a culminating point in that, where they argued that because postcolonialism was already being founded by the state or one part of the state, they said that it is only helping what was on the agenda of the state anyways; postcolonial thinkers are pushing a door that is already open. Thus, they did not see postcolonialism as transformative enough, trying to transform society; they saw postcolonialism coming to terms with, not hostile to, capital as much as it should be.

Hardt and Negri are the last gasp of the romantic revolution of Marxism, which is looking for a global revolutionary subject. For them, it was a fact that global capitalism gives capital the freedom of movement from one part to another, but not to labor because that is how you keep labor cheap. Thus, they argued if there is free movement in the world, as everybody's basic right, then capitalism will come to an end. It is a logical development because globalization is already happening, and therefore they emphasized the struggle for the right to movement: if you do that, then what happens is that it basically runs the labor market in the way capitalists don't want to, and therefore it produces a crisis in capitalism. In their eyes, postcolonialism was not revolutionary enough.

GK: *Even more recently, there have been a few critics who attacked postcolonialism for gradually evacuating the terrain of Marx and by a theoretical displacement of the question of class onto "culturalisation." This seems to be the major emphasis of the book by Vivek Chibber, but already Balibar and Wallerstein, in their seminal work on the importance of the intersectionality of struggles, showed in what way class antagonism, in postmodern theory and everyday ideology, became secondary, while identity politics and culturalization logic have reigned supreme. In what way can we bring together those critical currents and the Marxist legacy with current postcolonial studies?*

DC: Many Marxists think the world is always moving toward the real subject, which I question. I think there are other deep problems in Marx and that he could not help it, he was not born in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, and he was born in the high noon of Prussian imperialism,

so he thought that the factory was the paradigmatic form of capitalist organization. He did not think of the plantation as paradigmatically capitalist, nor of the farm as agriculturally paradigmatic of capitalism. For Marx, it was the factory that became the paradigmatic form of capitalist organization, where the logic of Hegel's master–servant relationship functioned well. This phenomenology implies that through capital–labor relationships, one can look for emancipation. I mean, these are some central problems that are not even resolved in Marxist theories, so I felt that Chibber's criticism was too simple. I mean, there was a problem in my own writing, and the problem was with the word "culture." Sometimes I write the word in a simplistic way, as if a fixed body of ideas is what is culture. But the criticisms that targeted my work did not understand what I meant by "pre-capital." When I say pre-capital culture, I do not suggest that something is inherently pre-capitalist. I argue—with Marx—that it is only after the emergence of capital, that we can look at something from the point of view of capital and call this something "pre-capital." That's why I quoted that sentence from Marx: "The anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of the ape." It is this Hegelian point again that only when the more advanced development has come can you look back and make sense of what was happening before. So in that sense, the word "pre-capitalist" in my use assumes the arrival of capital, whereas they think it is a word that actually implies the delaying of the arrival of capital. They think I read "pre-capital" from a position that is itself pre-capital, whereas my position is that "pre-capital" is only possible in a postcapital world.

GK: *Earlier you made an important distinction between anticolonial and postcolonial thought. Could you expand more on this? It seems to me that there has been a political logic in the shift from anti- to postcolonial thinking? But while one usually stresses the "negative" (anti-) part of the anticolonial, the anticolonial ideologies also had positive programs and visions of modernity.*

DC: Yes, they thought in terms of modernization, either in a revolutionary way, as in China, or in a non-revolutionary way, as in India. All these anticolonial nationalisms were also modernizing nationalisms. Césaire actually addressed this issue in his book *Discourse on Colonialism.* In the last paragraph, he formulated the basic accusation against colonialism in the sense that the message was not wrong. He said, "You did not keep your promises, that you came to modernize us, you came to civilize us, to modernize us, building hospital and universities, but you did not build us as many as you should have. So you promised modernization, but you did not deliver it." I think this was an important position for most modernizing anticolonial nationalists. So in a way, anticolonial

nationalisms intellectually had the same project as the colonials. The only big exception is Gandhi, who was anti-industry and antimodernization, essentially anticolonial and antimodernization. But most of the anticolonials were pro-modernization, including Fanon. If you read Fanon's writings on African traditional medicine, you get the impression that it is all superstition. So they were all modernizers. Negation was very important for them, whereas postcolonialism moves from negation to negotiation. That's how Homi Bhabha put it: not negation but negotiation.

GK: *Could you give us a concrete example of this move from negation to negotiation and the ways in which it was related to the modernization project of the postwar period?*

DC: On the whole postcolonial thinkers are more critical about the modernization project, but they are totally inside. They already accepted it. But there are interesting differences, again for me as a historian. The decolonization process in the world goes on in the 1950s and 1960s, and around 1965 all these major economies like the USA, Canada, and Australia changed their immigration laws and allowed skilled labor such as engineers from the ex-colonies to migrate. So through that development I come to be in the USA, and Bhabha came to be there. Partly because of demography, these societies were not able to produce as many skilled people as they needed. Australia is a very interesting case. Australia initially only had immigration from Britain. Then they decided that Britain could not give them enough people. Then they attracted people from southern Europe, Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Italians. And then eventually, when they could not have enough Greeks, we came, and the Lebanese came and the Arabs came. So it is interesting that actually, as the decolonization phase is coming to an end, these countries open up.

In a way postcolonialism is very much engaged with liberal democracy in host societies on this practical level, trying to oppose the politics of racism with a politics of recognition. At the philosophical level, there is this question of how much pressure cultural pluralism put on liberalism. These debates themselves are about putting pressure on liberal democracy, they are not so much about fighting capitalism than about changing it.

MB: *That would mean, if you move and look at the matrix of our relations and knowledge production in the bipolar world and move toward the end of the Cold War, does it mean that in the situation where you have several universalisms—Marxists, political liberalism, economic liberalism, all universalist theories—that postcolonial studies was actually so much interested only in the first place by the philosophy of difference and post-structuralism that it was remaining at the margins of the kind of epistemological challenges?*

DC: I think there were growing distances between political economy and postcolonialism. The argument about political economy would have been that theoretically the very categories with which you are thinking are Eurocentric. The postcolonial project really pushed for as much pluralism as possible, whether at the state level or at the capital level, or at the level of thought. That is what the project became. All this begins to happen in the late 1980s, so it is moving toward the fall of the Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but actually happening in the very late period of the Cold War. Even the beginning of post-structuralism Foucault-style lies in May 1968, and May 1968 is the story of the French left and it is one part of the French leftists, disillusion with the French Communist Party. So to the degree that post-structuralism comes from the French left, it emerges out of the tensions within the field of the Cold War and a certain disillusionment with Marxism: Czechoslovakia in 1968, Paris in May 1968. Franz Fanon wrote himself that Marxism had to be stretched when applied to the colonies.

Once the Cold War ended, there were western Marxists and eastern Marxists who were looking for an alternative revolutionary force, and I place Hardt and Negri in that context. These writers were very unhappy with postcolonialism because their project was to undo capitalism, and the postcolonial project was to push difference. So, even if you say "capital," postcolonials put difference into capital. So it was the philosophical project against monism, whether the monist category was capital, whether the monist category was gender, whether the monist category was the male–female distinction. Postcolonialism belongs to a form of thinking, which I think has deep theological roots, but basically but it is against monism. This is the idea that any category which will organize your thinking can be brought into crises. Those things were to become very important resources for postcolonial thinkers, because philosophically for them the one is the enemy. This notion has deep roots in European thinking, and I don't think it is only postcolonial. Deleuze and Derrida were doing that, for all the different philosophers one is the enemy. If you think in terms of one, then you simplify life. So they reject certain readings of Hegel and particular French Hegelian traditions, which were already far removed from the German tradition. The traditional German thinking is actually getting modified in the French setting. Both Hegel and Heidegger come to the Anglophone world having been translated through French thought. There is also a deep French Catholicism that injected pluralism. France is a strongly Catholic country, and strongly given to rituals and multiplicity. Whether that is the deepest layer of French thinking, though, I don't know.

GK: *It seems to me that the deep philosophical problem, the choice between Hegel or Spinoza, between monism (the one) and anti-monism, had deep theoretical consequences for the creation of postcolonial studies. Could we say that, armed by "difference," postcolonial studies continued the critical dialogue with certain strands of Marxism and political economy?*

DC: I once argued in an essay on political economy and postcolonialism that often, when the economic historians compare China and Japan, or India and England, during the eighteenth century, they work with categories like land and ignore problems associated with translation. They think that land is given, and once they assume it's given, they can do their calculations. However, in my imagination the postcolonial economic historian would also be a philologist and must capture what is the Indian word for land, or the Chinese word for land. Political economy historians or economic historians often think the categories of political economy are self-evident, for example, capital, whereas postcolonial persons think that nothing is self-evident. I argue that the history of capital is full of unacknowledged problems of translations. Economic historians are mostly deaf to philological questions, and philologists don't have any training in economics, so these disciplines don't meet. But in an ideal world they could meet.

We are basically talking about decisions that have to be made by arbitrarily putting a stop to philosophical questions. You can go on forever with problems of translation, and there is nothing logically wrong with that because there is no end to those interpretations. But because of some other pressures, you say, "I'll stop thinking at this point in the translation problem and make a decision." But what political economists don't acknowledge is that their categories involve the making of decisions. Humans do it all the time—the world intrudes into our thinking as a question of urgency. That urgency, for instance, comes up in how I think whether economic inequality in India is unacceptable and something must be done about it in my lifetime. That urgency can actually cut short your thinking. I am coming to a Heideggerian problem: the temporality of human life allows the external world to turn into a question of urgency, the question of decision. Every discipline has a very practical side, and that practical side has to do to with what I am calling "making a decision." But at least if political economists understood what I am asking for, then debates will come up between Marxist and postcolonialists. Marxists behave as though they have truth on their side and that the postcolonials are making trouble for no reason, the postcolonials are being a nuisance.

In my chapter on Marx in *Provincializing Europe*, I went back to the *Nichomean Ethics* because Marx used it as well in order to understand exchange. And Aristotle astutely observed that on the ground there is only difference: no two things are identical—anything you see is not identical to anything else you see. And therefore he says that you can only impose exchange by arbitrary convention—this is what I am calling a decision. Many thinkers are not aware that the decision is part of their categories, and that's why they see this anti-monism as creating trouble for no reason, as just nuisance. Postcolonialism was deeply influenced by this French rebellion against any tendency to overcome difference, which I think is there in Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze. That's why, when Bhabha said, "Not negation, but negotiation," negotiation was not an opportunistic category as Marxist thought. Negotiation was a philosophical category in order to say that on the ground there is only difference and we negotiate it by making provisional temporary decisions. But we should know that all decisions are provisional, and we should be open to an ongoing exploring of difference.

MB: *Let's move from culture to identity, another monist term, probably. You talked about "having a sense of place." "Having a sense of place" points to standpoint theory, which is one epistemology that seems to have been influential in postcolonial studies over and against the abstract universalism of the "position from nowhere." We can link this to the question of identity politics, which has surged since the end of the Cold War because it was released from that bipolar world where economic universalisms were dominating the scene. What is the relationship between postcolonial studies scholarship and identity politics?*

DC: As I said, if you fight racism, you get into the politics of recognition. But at the same time, because of its interest in difference, postcolonialism was undermining identity politics from within. Homi Bhabha used the expression "difference within," so in that sense postcolonial theory was not a theory of identity. It was actually a theory of non-identity, and in that sense was very sympathetic to positions of non-identity. I think it is the politics of recognition which involves identity, so there is a kind of political sympathy for identitarian movements, but philosophically almost an antipathy. Think of Native Americans, Australian Aboriginals, indigenous people: it is very hard for anybody not to be sympathetic to their claims for recognition, and the claim for recognition is made in the name of an identity, and you are sympathetic to the politics up to a point because postcolonialism was looking not for Manichaean divisions but a middle ground. But philosophically, they were not sympathetic. So there is a kind of a delicate dance.

MB: *Would you say politically, the politics of difference and the politics of identity are two different sides of the same coin, but philosophically they are much more opposed? Can you give us an example that pinpoints the political implications of this tension?*

DC: I made a distinction between identity and dwelling. In a way, dwelling is about the fact that you are never the first human being to live in a place, which means that other human beings have already left you signals about how to be in there: through language, through practices. Whatever you know, you learnt from people who were already there. So when you come to Germany as a Turkish person, you don't have to learn from another German how to be, you can learn it from another Turk because that Turk has already learned it from another German. I call that dwelling. In this sense, dwelling is the accumulation of historicity in a place, so the fact [is] that the place has been inhabited by a number of people, who might not share the same identity. And that leaves an imprint on how we dwell. But dwelling is not the same as lack of movement: a Turkish person comes here, then he goes somewhere else. And everywhere you have to find out minimally what people do there, and what people do there is handed down over time by the people who have been there.

MB: *Let us address the debate on modernity as one of the most important sites of debates over monism and difference. The notion of modernity grew out of the Enlightenment and ran in parallel to it. Let us look again at 1989 and the contradictory effects it had on visions of modernity. Some concluded that there is only one modernity now and suggested the idea of the end of history. Others said there is not one modernity, there are actually civilizations emerging out of the ruins of modernist universalisms such as capitalism and socialism, and that these civilizations leave imprints on interpretations of modernity. How did the end of the Cold War affect your thinking about modernity?*

DC: I think increasingly the end of the Cold War made us see the environmental crisis, which has shaped my thinking for the last several decades. The end of the Cold War and the environmental crisis together have made me realize that if we want to sustain seven billion or ten billion people, at a decent level of living, we cannot go back to the backyard production of goods in a small decentralized manner. And even if you find an alternative to capitalism, you will be not able to dispense with technology and the connectivity of the world. And you will not be able to dispense with accumulation. In a way we might historically come to a point of no return. We might go somewhere else, but that has to be through a series of

unfortunate experiences like population collapse. Humanity might shrink to a smaller size. I think at the present moment, a lot of people are still used to thinking in terms of alternatives to capitalism. There are still some alternatives to capitalism, and they don't have to be Soviet style. Even if you think about alternatives, there are things that you share with capitalism. One is the huge investment in technology. First of all, we realized that in the last several decades the world is getting urbanized very fast. More than 50% of the population now lives in cities. There are in fact two things: living in a city, people take for granted the subway, food, water, electricity, energy, but somebody else has to produce that. If you are living in a small house in the countryside, you are going to capture rainwater and use it, but in the city somebody has to do it for you. So then we realize that most of the cities are slums. Mike Davis' expression "Planet of Slums" is very apt. So if you want to raise people's housing level, you will need more technology. But we have also entered a model, which some people call de-growth. But do you know can we shrink? I don't think we can shrink without collapsing the human population. In a way it is possible that we will encounter many tragedies and through it we will go somewhere else. That is one possibility, but at the moment, given the value that we don't want people to die, it means we will probably continue in industrial civilization. So in some sense, I think we have reached a point of no return, whereas in 1989 we thought that the socialism that existed was not good, but maybe we could build another kind of socialism, and many Gandhian dreams came back.

Whether it is sustainable is the question. But its logic is driving us forward. Now we are seven billion people; two billion people don't get freshwater, and we consume so much energy. Since the 1950s, the Indian population grew five times in 60 years. If you think of giving them all education and health, you need even more energy, and you cannot get energy without high technology, because ultimately the source of energy is the sun. There are storms and tides and so on, but for energy to be used by humans we will need technology, which means high investment in technology. It is very hard to imagine other alternative futures in the way that Gandhi once imagined in the nineteenth century, or the American transcendentalists, and Tolstoy's ideas that we can live on little farms, ideas that we can go back to eating locally grown vegetables.

MB: *Does that mean that we are moving from different civilizations into one technological civilization?*

DC: German thinkers typically feared that technology will make us all uniform and boring. This is also akin to the criticism of the cultural industry of the Frankfurt School. I don't think there is anything like that, nor is it technology that makes us boring. But I can't see a future without technology. I would ask, for ten billion people you need more energy, how do you get that energy without technology?

GK: *Our last question concerns environmentalism and climate change, on which you have written in recent years. Environmental critique has been with us for at least four decades with quite impressive (academic) scholarship, but it seems that has been a major limit for its translation into more universalist politics. In what way do you see the "duration" (temporality) of environmental challenge?*

DC: I think you can zoom in and zoom out of human history. Take the last 500 years: if you zoom in, you will see all sorts of nuanced descriptions. Basically you have a very dissolved photograph of what human beings do: they go around the world with ships, the Spanish were colonizing and you see the whole picture. If you step back and you think about history starting seven millenia ago, you must still see, long before that, the ancestors of the modern apes, and then see them splitting, and then you see one kind of *homo sapiens* being of one kind getting rid of others and mixing with others and then leaving Africa 60,000 years ago. The big brain evolves, and this evolving capacity started 40,000 years ago. When you take that and then the resolution of the last 500 years, basically you see that humanity becomes a very dominant force on the planet. Five hundred years is nothing, so if you can resolve it, if you go close, all the questions we are discussing are important. But if you take a step back, then basically the story looks different. Some groups of people might say, "We want to live like this," and their vision is a possible survival strategy that works for a small section of people. But for the whole of the species? It doesn't work when you generalize to seven billion, but we have no option of not trying it. So moving forward, we have to try this and see if it works. If these strategies don't work out, something new will come, but I am not wishing it on anybody.

New Narratives of Capitalism: Interrogating Knowledge Production and Ethnography

Cash and Livelihood in Soft Currency Economies: Challenges for Research

Jane I. Guyer

INTRODUCTION

Understandably, people's access to resources for making a living has been a central focus in the anthropology of the globalizing world economy. Research on the dispossession of peasantries is a crucial topic of study, particularly in Africa, which is often presented as a frontier for the new global economy, even "the ultimate frontier" (Mataen 2012) and the "last investment frontier" (Kilel 2014). There have been shifts in land law and land valuation due to other nations searching for arable land, corporations developing commercial crops and extractive industries, and national elites aiming to control national resources (Hammar 2014; Peters 2013a, b; Koopman 2009). This theme of expulsion in the face of the new forms of capitalist expansion is argued to be more general than in Africa (Sassen 2014). People's new difficulties and possibilities for making a living then come into focus, especially as they move into urban areas, as the population of world cities grows at unprecedented rates and as urban social infrastructures develop from attempts to create livelihoods and social ties.[1] Without the early industrial configuration of European history, where

J.I. Guyer (✉)
Department of Anthropology, John Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA

dispossession of land fed into the creation of a wage-earning class in factory and public works employment, the currently dispossessed move into the intricate vastness of urban self-employment and small-scale business, lived through a money economy that is necessarily linked into the global monetary world, in complex ways that deserve their own study.

In the recent past, even where small-scale farmers have been commercial in orientation and very important in urban market provisioning, they have also had access in kind to local supplies for food and water sufficiency, and for self-provision of housing. In cities, however, the self-provisioning component diminishes and even vanishes, and all of livelihood is mediated in currency, so they become almost wholly dependent on commodity and resource markets, which are increasingly embedded in global markets, which includes money markets whose composition and importance have expanded sharply since the 1970s. The relative stability of the currency in which people gain their livelihood is a crucial component of both the absolute level of living and the possibility of planning over time. The price of most goods—the nominal price, the real price, and price stability over time—will all be affected by overseas dynamics and international exchange rates. Essentials for production and personal health may be even more affected: vehicles and petrol for transport, pharmaceuticals for health, imported materials for construction, spare parts to repair vehicles and machinery, including tractors for farming (Guyer 2002) and so on. Likewise, the prices paid for people's own products will adjust to international factors beyond their own control, in particular global demand for their commodities and the exchange rates for the currency in which they live and produce these commodities, day to day. As a result, the question of livelihood in the globalized economy of the past 25 years must be linked to the question of the exchange value of national currencies in world money markets, and to the implications for prices and predictability in the markets through which people live. Lining up the exigencies of economic life across all the levels of valuation and projection, from state to business to family and locality, then depends on people's ability to understand and adjust in the face of trends and fluctuations in the exchange rate, and conditions of money supply, for their currency.

Through measures that we can examine in more detail, over the three decades which many theorists have defined as a novel phase of capitalist development—global and financialized, fraught with contradictions (Harvey 2014), producing conditions that "change everything" (Klein 2014), depicted as having a "new spirit" (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007)— some national currencies have proved much more stable in the world

money markets than others, and are referred to as hard currencies. Those that have fluctuated in exchange rates are termed "soft currencies." Given the continuing relevance of the classic four functions of money—medium of exchange, means of payment, unit of account and store of value—the logical expectation, following Gresham's Law, would be that people (and nations and organizations) put long-term plans into hard currency form, and resort to their own (soft) local currencies for rapid-turnover transactions. There are beginning to be studies of what must be an expanding proliferation of localized adjustments made to monetary shifts and changes: within economies and at borders.

The contribution I hope to make here is to draw particular attention to the need for several coordinated efforts: compiling the findings of these local studies; focusing closely on the composition of exchange rates themselves in the macro-study of globalization; extending ethnographic studies of their local mediations and implications in producing the exchange rate *par le bas* ("from below"), a concept which draws from Bayart, Mbembe, and Toulabor's *Politique par le Bas* (1992) and was used to organize a collection of papers in *Politique Africaine*, edited by Beatrice Hibou (2011), on *La Macro-Economie par le Bas*; and, finally, tying our understanding of these practices back into the theory that aims to encompass the world at large.

The multiplicity of world currencies, and the variability in the exchange rates among them, is a theme that does not yet seem to have been accorded the high profile in theory that it requires in the new transnational dynamics of the twenty-first century. Financialization has been a crucial theme in the study of the global economy, and the dynamics of its dollarization is well argued, for example, by Amato and Fantacci (2014), to be part of the problem of extraction, and of the wealth polarization which affects everyone (Picketty 2014). However, the markets in national currencies, and their deployment in specific contracts and transactions, have been less closely examined, at least as a collaborative intellectual field of enquiry. They probably contain many "devices" (Callon et al. 2007) about which one learns intermittently through the financial news media (for which, see later). They certainly mediate complex relations among migrants and home families (see Chu 2010). And they might well be studied ethnographically, drawing on Boltanski and Chiapello's (2007) general advisement, as they drew up a sketch of a "third spirit of capitalism" since the 1990s, that "global approaches often end up by attributing a preponderant role to explanatory factors (usually technological, macro-economic or demographic in nature) which are dealt with as if they were forces that exist outside of the human condition, and out of the reach of nations who

are subjected to them much as people are subjected to a storm." (2007: 179). One can see the contrast here between their focus on the place of agency, power, and culture and an argument such as David Harvey's (2014), where he identifies "*Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism*," as structural dynamics. I endorse the focus on agency, while at the same time following the work of those that see certain key structural conditions, whose enactment is then motivated, provoked, and responded to. The existence of multiple national currencies, with different capacities for value maintenance over time, is one of those key structural conditions, but the interstices *within* the powerful systems of the twenty-first century, and the conditions of livelihood when *living* with them, also demand the approach from an agency and power perspective.

The first section of the chapter is a brief outline of hard currencies in the post-1989 globalized world economy. In the second, I review some dynamics of currency instability in popular economies, in Africa; and in the third, I discuss a recent book by economic historians of the financial system (Amato and Fantacci 2014) on the prospects for extricating the world from the dollarization that, they argue, ensures the hard–soft distinction, siphons value into hard currencies and into the domain of money's store-of-value function (in the sophisticated financialized sense of the present system), and subjects soft currencies to its logic, as they mediate much of the local transactions through which livelihood is mediated. They argue for unhitching local and regional currencies from a global reserve currency such as gold, sterling, or the dollar, and for a revival of local currencies, markets and financial institutions such as clearinghouses for mediating debt, outside the currently structured financial system. The study of multiple currencies, under past, present and future-possible conditions, becomes a compelling topic for interdisciplinary collaborative work, and especially for close ethnographic attention to the mediations and their effects.

This is a very large topic, for which I may not yet have been able to compile all the relevant theoretical and interpretive sources, in all the languages of publication. So, my main ambition here is to contribute to that process of compilation and extension.

PART I: MULTIPLE CURRENCIES IN HISTORY, AND ESPECIALLY SINCE THE 1970S

For all of monetary history, multiple currencies have co-existed in the world, with the experience of some of them having greater stability over time in the equation of nominal value with purchasing power (real value)

than others. Indeed, attempting to keep the money supply steady enough to avoid disruptions in people's sense of its "real value" was defined as a function of the early modern state, under the quantity theory of money, and Gresham's Law that "bad money drives out good," that is, people will take stable monies to fulfill the "store of value" function and keep the velocity of circulation high for unstable currencies, which then fulfill the function of medium of exchange. These observations and the associated policy recommendations are attributed to Copernicus, who advised the King of Poland on the re-establishment of the state after the Prussian Wars. His major monetary writings date from 1517 and 1526. The question of how, then, to run multiple-currency international systems, based on national currencies, rather than on—or, in practice, alongside—imperial and trade currencies, arose as a policy challenge. Einaudi (1953) argues that for several centuries the European trading systems worked through fictional units of monetary account, and the Hanseatic League maintained a clearinghouse for trade mediation in multiple currencies in Bruges.

The institution of a particular reserve currency has old foundations in the value of gold, but control through the gold standard was elaborated and backed by the imperial power of Britain from the nineteenth century. It was then modified and restricted under the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, until it was completely terminated by the abandonment of all gold referents by the United States in 1976. There was a parallel and increasing prominence of the dollar as the international reference point and reserve currency in the monetary system of what was then referred to as the "first world" and its dependencies in the "third world." The oil economy became denominated in dollars, worldwide. The post-war communist "second world" was largely run from regionally imperial currencies: the Russian ruble, the Yugoslav dinar, and the Chinese renminbi (RMB). The only other imperial kind of currency was the West African CFA franc (CFA) in Africa, which was pegged to the French franc, and is still pegged to the euro. So the post-war, post-imperial world returns the world economy to multiplicities of national currencies.

Relative stability in exchange rates had been sought in the Bretton Woods system, so the USA's abandonment of reference to gold in the 1970s put international focus on the dollar, while leaving certain financial transactions, and exchange rates with other currencies, to an expanding set of institutions. After 1989, the "second world" of communist states joined the global markets and therefore the currency markets, with their own national currencies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) monitors and can influence monetary policy and trends in inflation, but does

not directly control them, as was the case under classic imperialism. In 1969, a system of "special drawing rights" was put in place to allow member countries access to reserves, and these are now defined in four currencies—the dollar, the euro, the pound sterling, and the Japanese yen—and constitute the unit of account for the IMF. The value of these currencies is fairly stabilized against one another, but not entirely. They simply fluctuate less markedly—by definition and by policy management—than the soft currencies of the world.

To take a soft currency example: the Nigerian naira was first issued in 1973, at two to the pound sterling. In April 2015, it stood at almost 300 to the pound, having fallen from about 220 to the pound over the previous four years. Unlike the new post-Soviet national currencies, which I will illustrate later, the exchange rate value of the naira fell fairly slowly at first, until a rapid drop in the early 1990s, and then another in the early 2000s. After this the decline has been steady but slower. By comparison, over the past four years the pound to the dollar has gone from about 1.5 to 1.7 and back to 1.5. The pound to the euro has gone from 1.2 to 1.4, over the same period, perhaps due to financial crises within the EU. The yen has fared a little worse: going from about 140 to 177 over the same period. (All historical rates sourced at oanda.com, April 8, 2015). When we look at African currencies by comparison with each other, we do see fluctuations but not anything like as deep as their decline against the hard currencies. With highly porous commercial borders, and in the context of hard currencies operating in certain markets and at the reserve level, the currency dynamics of trade are likely to be quite intricate and sophisticated. The naira is simply an example, but we might expect comparable exchange rate dynamics in other new hard–soft currency situations, which grew in the post-1989 era.

The second major factor in soft currency dynamics has been their growth in number, in the post-colonial and post-1989 world. Since 1960, 22 new national currencies have been created in Africa. Since 1989, 15 have been created in the former Soviet Union and 5 in the former Yugoslav Union. The names returned to historical cultural-national values, as they had in Africa: the Georgian *lari*, the Ukrainian *hryvnia*, and the Azerbaijani *manat*. Like the African currencies, the post-Soviet currencies suffered inflation, although certainly more rapidly in their own case than in Africa, perhaps due to global conditions in the 1990s. The Romanian currency went into rapid inflation, reaching 300 % p.a. by 1993, and only stabilized in the new century.[2] Many of the post-socialist currencies were

redenominated, some more than once: the first Uzbek *som* lasted less than a year (1993–1994); the Turkmenistan *manat* has gone through three valuations since it was introduced in 1993. The Belarus *ruble* was rede-nominated after six years. The Russian *ruble* itself was redenominated in 1998, and appears to have taken a sudden plunge in value in January 2009, against several other currencies, including the now-independent republics of the former Soviet Union. Estonia moved into the euro zone in 2011. In the rising scares over counterfeit, many currencies were reprinted, so presumably there were widespread dislocations and mediations between old and new banknotes.

So this post-socialist, post-military, global era suddenly opened up spaces for currency innovation of many kinds: new monies in newly inde-pendent states with new regulatory and control regimes, new borders within which they are supposed to operate, new trade partners, and simply more currency notes in circulation as inflation took off in several places and the financial sector produced much more wealth. With the threat of counterfeit, the legitimate manufacture of currency became a competitive business, with De La Rue—the apparent leader—manufacturing paper and printing currency for more than 150 countries in five factories, in Britain, Malta, Sri Lanka, and Kenya. They write: "In today's competitive markets, De La Rue Currency has attained leadership by investing heavily and seek-ing excellence in research, innovation, design, production and customer service."[3] They assert that "cash is king," and that, with the growing use of mobile and plastic monies, fraud is much more frequent with the latter than with sophisticated products of the former.

The advocates of the current system of multiple national currencies, of physically high quality, let loose into increasingly complex financial mar-kets may not, at the time, have had in mind the possibility of intricate fraud *within* the formal system itself. We read in the newspapers of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) manipulation scandal in 2012 and of enormous fines exacted against banks for conspiring to manipulate the foreign exchange markets (*The New York Times*, November 13, 2014, B1). An earlier article describes the complicity of the formal banking sec-tor in money laundering and specifically mentions value fluctuations in the post-socialist currencies:

> As early as the mid-1980s, the K.G.B., with help from the Russian mafia, had started hiding Communist Party assets abroad, as the journalist Robert I. Friedman has documented. Perhaps $600 billion had left Russia by the

mid-1990s, contributing to the country's impoverishment. Russian mafia leaders also took advantage of post-Soviet privatization to buy up state property. Then, in 1998, the ruble sharply depreciated, prompting a default on Russia's public debt. … According to the Greek Ministry of Finance, much of the illegal loan activity in Greece is connected to gangs from the Balkans and Eastern Europe. (Saviano: NYT Review section, Aug. 26 2012, 5)

These, too, are serious topics of research into the functioning of the newly elaborated multiple-currency world that we otherwise depict as "neoliberal": more currencies, digital monies, more participants, more financial instruments, and complex interweavings of systems with one another. By virtue of the available money at the top of the wealth scale, by the saying "cash is king" we now mean purchase of a commodity—such as real estate—at its asking price, all at once, by bank transfer, as distinct from the buyer having to negotiate loans and repayment schedules. Some debt has moved down the social scale into the sector more usually studied by anthropology (see e.g., Deborah James (2015), on consumer debt in South Africa).

The increased number of currencies, along with the decline of imperial control in favor of national control, yet also with the differential positioning of national currencies on a hard–soft spectrum, and the concomitant importance of official reserve currencies, clearly makes exchange rates a topic for close local analysis. We must also see how the increasingly mobile working and trading populations of the world manage the monetary aspects of their economic lives, as they may earn in one currency, live domestic lives in another and possibly pass through domains of yet others. They may juggle the different currencies that come within their purview. For the anthropological study of the place of exchange rates in globalization, we have Gustav Peebles' (2011) field study of the euro and local currencies on the Denmark-Sweden border. We can also read closely into works about borders (Sarah Green 2005), and give attention to informal money changers who deal in a very wide range of currencies, and often very large amounts of money that mediate trade within south-south networks (Olutayo Adesina 2002). Through these works we may see deeply sedimented knowledge of how to work with the ambiguities and unpredictability of borders and monetary exchange. Probably there are many more localized studies and works on specific themes that we could bring into the analysis of transnationality in the twenty-first century. At all levels, then, the topic of exchange rates itself deserves close and comprehensive

attention since the survival and expansion of national currencies, alongside the rise of social and digital currencies, in the era of financialization and the global denomination of reserves with reference to the dollar may deeply affect so many aspects of economic and social life.

All of these currency dynamics depend on, and interweave with, the process of financialization that has been more foregrounded in the theoretical study, in part because hard currencies remain so relatively stable *against each other*, so can be more or less assumed in order to focus on structural factors. Amato and Fantacci depict the exchange rates of eight major currencies, in a bargram, and write, "The present level of the real effective exchange rate remains fairly close to the 1973 level, when the floating exchange rate system came in"(2014: 84). Strong as this analysis is on the global scale, it nevertheless devotes much less attention to places depicted as "emerging countries" (89), some of which, in the literature more broadly, are grouped together as "emerging economies," rated in the Emerging Markets Index, and themselves put into the dense and complex financial indexing system. This presumably affects investment, as well as being a financial product itself. As quoted, for 2008 (see Wikipedia entry, accessed April 11, 2015), there were only six African countries that qualified, three of them in North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt). The others were South Africa, Kenya, and Senegal. By implication then, many countries do not qualify as "emerging," but the financial, and broader economic implications, of their own position in the monetary and exchange rate system remains in the background of the overall depictions of the global economy.

Part II: Anthropology and Life in Soft Currencies

I focus here on living everyday life within soft currency systems, rather than with the larger institutions that mediate exchange rates, since it is likely that the internal intricacies of the international currency market are too opaque and arcane for direct study except where there can be transparency and access to the sources. With the currency logics that have been sketched here in mind, and with the knowledge that formal employment with a salary is increasingly scarce in these contexts, it is important to turn to how soft currencies mediate local economies and the everyday life where people live within the medium of exchange function. Soft currencies would probably fall under the "bad money" definitions of Gresham's Law, so people who had access to other currencies would make the "bad"

money circulate at fast as possible. In the case of the national soft currencies of the present, I would argue that this is not only for the classic reason that volatility makes it not worth hoarding, but because people who live in the present soft currency economies desperately need their money to be a medium of exchange, and for the velocity of circulation to be high, in order to make enough transactions to move goods and to make possible a high number of low and irregular cash incomes. Practices have developed to give a positive gloss to keeping it moving, and also give a negative gloss to hoarding or retaining wealth in the soft currency itself. I draw briefly on several works that pick up on specific dynamics.

(a) "There's no money!" Shortage of cash in rural Western Nigeria (Guyer and Salami 2011)

In the 1980s, when the state level of government in Nigeria was short of funds, so postponed paying teachers, medical personnel, and the police, and the wholesale prices of food fell, there was a time when people in a small rural town inveighed against the insufficiency of currency for their needs. It was not a question of being poor, but of needing to make more transactions than there was money to mediate them. We could describe several consequent developments: in particular, the rise of a promissory system of deferred payment, the expansion of hire-purchase kinds of debt for larger items, and a quietly practiced—but culturally supported—collaboration among those who practiced different kinds of money lending or money management. We, the authors of the paper (which was published in French), posed the ensuing question (quoted from the English typescript):

(T)here is the question of how those who deal almost entirely in cash, promises and short time frames, struggle to make meaningful practices out of their conditions: polymer notes versus coins versus torn and dirty paper; promissory records versus verbal commitments versus insistence on cash-on-the-barrel; pay schedules from now until next market day versus now until the end of the season versus longer still. Between the two there is the question of what—in fact—determines the volume, the range of variation, the calendrical rhythm, velocity of circulation and many other conditions of the money supply in regions, communities and key occupations where all transactions work in cash, or promises of cash, and where all promises are expected to clear.

We also found strong social pressures to keep cash in circulation. Saving (or hoarding) was not regarded favorably. In our paper (Guyer and Salami 2011: 46), we quoted the poem entitled "Hard Times," by famous writer Lanrewaju Adepoju (Okunoye 2011), which declares that "The people are starved of money" and then continues to indicate how that can be the case: through "embezzlement," money "airlifted abroad," "siphoned" out of the system by "gluttons" and kept from circulation by the federal government. This has "left the country in agony." Cash itself is in short supply in the people's economy. One rapidly expanding practice, then, is bookkeeping, as an elaborated "promissory" system. The rise of "forms" in the "informal economy" is a much larger phenomenon as well, operating also in the South-South international trade where cash has to be mobilized on these short-link arcs of monetary mediation (Okunoye 2011: 193–200).

In the same region, Mimi Wan (2001) found certain Nigerian practices in her study of *gari* (a cassava flour) production and trade, which requires a steady and predictable supply of cash and precise synchronization because of the several stages from production to sale. Some transactions are sometimes defined as on "credit," but this is not—obviously—the same type of credit as in the financialized world. It is conceptualized as "deferred payment" in a notionally "clearing" system, and is more like a promise to pay than a debt. It is defined in calendrical terms (e.g., "on next market day"), and usually linked to a socially defined guarantor (association member, regular client, etc.). Along this short arc of links, relationships are crucial in running the synchronies. Wan writes, "Quick sales turnover is the crucial and determining influence on a trader's economic calculations," so traders work with a mnemonic consisting of different purses for each commodity's cash earnings. Routines of expert, rapid adjustment operate among the participants along the commodity chain, less in a mode of a generalized "trust" than in a mode of professional expertise and professional relationships keeping the cash and promises in the system moving.

(b) The popular economy's international trade. The money market from below

In these cases, people in what would be termed the informal economy are themselves working in multiple currencies, of varying stability. Joost Beuving (2004) tells complex narratives of the used car market of

Cotonou, capital of neighboring Benin Republic, which largely serves the Nigerian market from this point across the national border, for several reasons, including the arbitrage between the franc CFA, which is tied to the euro, and the naira, and the use of other international currencies from the sources of the goods (Europe, the USA, and Japan). He writes, "Capital is therefore scarce, and traders like Abdul commonly lack sufficient capital to dedicate themselves wholly to buying and selling cars. One way to resolve a shortage of money is to pursue several economic activities simultaneously, which requires a constant switch between various roles in response to varying circumstances. The money earned elsewhere is then often invested in the car trade" (Beuving 2004, ref. pages to find). He describes a deal over a Toyota Corolla, where slippage in the temporal synchronies from France to Benin to Nigeria was mediated not by promises but by the capacity to earn rapidly in another domain (in this case a refrigerator repair job for one of the other parties). Beuving writes of the ethical landscape here: "Car traders … compete for capital and profit, and withhold information. In the car trade, forms of cooperation therefore tend to be short-lived and conflictive." in part by virtue of the diversification of skills allowing for tapping into other sources for spot cash. He writes that the transactions in international trade are in hard currencies, and always in cash: mainly the $100 bill.

Another case of hard–soft currency mediations, within popular economies, is described by Filip De Boeck (1998) in his study of the Congo diamond trade. Entitled "Domesticating Diamonds and Dollars," his article depicts the intricacy of mediation across the hard–soft spectrum, especially since diamonds are expected to hold value like the hard currencies of the countries for which they are largely destined. Nyamunda and Mukwambo (2012) describe artisanal diamond mining in Zimbabwe, and Nyamunda also depicts the cross-border remittance economy where workers send funds through couriers, who then deal with money changers (Nyamunda 2014). One is reminded that a large proportion of US$100 bills circulate outside the USA ("According to former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, more than two-thirds of all $100 notes circulate outside the United State" Wikipedia 4/11/15). Clearly, in many contexts cash currencies are being exchanged against each other according to the exigencies of the time and place.

The cash economy that mediates the wider international South-South trade, as distinct from the immediate cross-border and multiple-currency contexts, has not been studied in broad terms and commodity place-specific

detail (as far as I know). But I do know of parallel market money changers changing up to $100,000 and of the creation of written accounts for deals in cash that cross the globe. One such example, reported to me by a money-changer, was payment for an order of Chinese carpets by a group of Nigerian market traders, who would be buying in RMB (or classic hard currencies, however the deal was to be contracted) and earning their margins in naira (however the exchange rate fluctuated over the period between purchase and sale). How promises, deferred payment and spot earnings might figure here—alongside other committed long-term relationships such as regular patronage and clientage—is a topic for research. But accounting expertise and capacities to mobilize skilled work and relationships appear to figure prominently in creating the temporal regimes of world trade in cash. Expertise and relationships also figure in the local industries that employ locally and sell nationally and regionally, beyond national borders.

(c) An ethical orientation to stable relations under uncertainty

Kate Meagher (2010) describes the manufacturing industries of Eastern Nigeria: shoe-making and garment manufacture, for sale for government procurement, national markets and consumers up and down the West African coast. She does not focus acutely on the temporal/cash regime but one can tease out some salient points about another instance, namely the interface between the cash and formal/state economies. She makes it clear that the ebbs and flows of electricity from the state and orders from regular buyers made it impossible for small businesses to maintain a labor force: she writes that business owners "had no problem hanging on to their employees if they paid them regularly and had plenty of work for them to do…(but) such stable relationships (became) increasingly difficult… to maintain." As for the ethical regime: in this case the lapse of "predictability, offering a basis for contractual loyalty, (is) where affective, redistributive ties move in as people switch in ethics from accumulation to survival." So she suggests that in addition to an accounted promissory system (with its experts), and a cultivation of multiple skills for plugging temporal gaps, there does remain a shadow ethic if "survival" (page references to find).

This provides a segue into the condition of the "unemployed" in such cash economies: those with very few resources from which to tap into the circulation of cash. Here we see the cultivation of personal capacities, able to be mobilized in instantaneous spot transactions.

(d) Rapid transactions in unstable currencies

Jeremy Jones (2010) writes on the Zimbabwe inflation of the 2000, and the elaboration of an economic niche where everything is done very rapidly, *kukiya-kiya*.

An extreme is the intense rapidity and seizure of time exemplified in his study of inflation in Zimbabwe. The country is awash in cash, but its worth is very little and changing all the time. One person working in *kukiya-kiya* says:

> You see, that's how these deals work; I made money in two minutes and four seconds. I overcharged my (boss) that I'm doing work for, then I put that money in my pocket. That's what we mean by kukiya-kiya: you pocket a lot of money. Maybe more than you make doing the actual work. I might even make money without doing any work at all. It might take ten minutes. (pages to find)

In terms of ethics, Jones defines

> a phenomenology of economic expediency and cunning. People claimed that they could justifiably steal, defraud, and engage in corrupt behavior, at least for the time being. They were, as the local saying went, "forced by the situation". Thus the paradox: because there was nothing to do anything seemed possible, and indeed, justifiable. It was as if people were obliged to snatch possibility from impossibility itself. In a context devoid of opportunities, they had to act opportunistically. (ref)

(e) Finally, living without money

Michael Ralph describes the tea drinkers of Senegal, many with education, who are simply "killing time" until a job arises: a practice that exists in other primarily Muslim areas of West Africa. There is cash in the economy, but they have very little of it. But then they need very little money to meet for these ritualized occasions, to discuss life and to cultivate information networks and ethical orientations. Transactions in money hardly exist within this milieu. But there is a distinct ethic of generosity:

Ralph quotes a tea drinker.

"My friend Baba's older brother Mar'ta was Convinced … that making and serving tea was one of the best ways to build character: "If you want

to be generous, start with the way you distribute tea—are you fair and just, or just selfish? Are you greedy? Do you play favorites?" (17). Proficiency was associated with "the amount of time at your disposal" (20). There is a certain explicit self- and other-cultivation here, and a rehearsal of sociality centered on a very cheap and slow, continuous activity. So, we see various personal skills—self-cultivated crafts, acquired accounting practices, constant attentiveness to opportunity—and various regularly rehearsed socialities—associations, dyadic relationships—each informed by emergent ethics of life.

Summary: First of all, there do appear to be skeletal macro-monetary theories and practices in systems where the medium of exchange function is paramount in people's lived experience. It includes a particular "quantity theory of money" of its own, where there always needs to be enough cash, largely ensured through a high velocity of circulation; an increasing proportion of transactions being kept in written accounts of some kind, to hold people to promises; the holding of actual cash as soundly criticized, even though people can hold wealth in other forms if they keep the money circulating; people's creation of their own temporal regimes, which intricately interweave transactional, social, and personal rhythms of life, all of which are crafted and cultivated. In some places, and some transactions, people also work in multiple cash currencies and do spot-price mediation of the exchange rate.

These cash economies clearly have to rely on non-monetary assets to support the longer durations of livelihood, but they do so in a variety of different ways, some clearly risking great dangers of falling through unbridgeable gaps in the timing of livelihood and even survival. We may even be seeing some aspects of the popular economy's patterns of investment in "real" assets, such as real estate, rather than saving money, in our own systems, now that the reliability of the state's assurance of, for example, pensions may be in question. Like the Nigerian motorcycle taxi driver, a poor European homeowner may plan in liquidating their asset to support urgent cash needs. To study those ways—their practices, ethics, and consequences for life, from tomorrow's food to the completion of a "life cycle"—may help to inform the study of "everyday life" in financialized economies as the arc of links through dependable financial institutions, for many populations, shortens, downsizes, and impoverishes. So, what "real" assets in resources, personal skills, and socialities will be created that ensure "liquidness," and some dependability, in the only form of money available to people?

Part III: A Macro-solution?

I take the concept of "liquidness," in distinction from "liquidity," from economic historians Massimo Amato and Luca Fantacci (2014). It forms the basis for their critique of the current monetary order, which focuses on one international reserve currency or monitored basket of currencies, and enables debts themselves to be put into the market. This is their definition of the distinction between the two phenomena in the financial world, which they develop in order to identify certain indispensable features of finance in order to preserve them while excising the features that create all the dangers of its current form. Liquidity "is the principle in virtue of which debts are made not to be paid but to be bought and sold on that *sui generis* market that is the financial market. Liquidity transforms the risk inherent to every act of credit, namely the risk that the debtor may not be able to pay, into a different risk: the risk that the securities representing the debts find no purchasers" (2014: 19). Here the capitalist gains are rents rather than profits on production. They argue, "The more capital becomes rigid as financial capital, demanding sure returns, the more labour has to be flexible" (2014: 7). They argue that liquidity fosters the kind of narrow circulation at high levels of the economy, and extraction from the people's economy, that the modern history of monies has shown. In their earlier book (2011), they showed how the possibility of deferral had been crafted by state policies over the centuries of the development of the current financial system, thus encouraging the creation of vast reserves. It is interesting to note that Alan Greenspan cited the importance of liquidity in the conditions before the financial crisis of 2008: too much monetary reserves searching among too few "opportunities" for "investment" (given that a smaller and smaller proportion of "investment" goes into production, as distinct from financial instruments such as derivatives and index funds such as (Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts, an exchange traded fund on the financial markets SPDRs)). He wrote of "the overwhelming sense of liquidity that has suffused financial markets for a quarter century" (Greenspan 2009: 496).

Liquidness, by contrast, is the availability of credit for investment, ensured by institutions that make credit and debt mutually compatible within a single system of circulating money capital. It ensures the availability of credit and means for clearing debts, mainly for productive purposes in the markets for goods, labor, and inputs. The key institutions would be a "clearing function," rather than a bank, run by a "clearing union," where credits and debts always cancel each other out and there is no need for substantial

reserves which would be kept and deployed as financial assets. Accounts are kept in translatable "units of account," such as prevailed in the European trades of the past and was promoted by Keynes for the international system at the Bretton Woods conference. In effect, while arguing for much stronger institutions that would promote the kind of dependability, within economies based strongly on medium-of-exchange currencies, that we see the inhabitants of soft currency economies struggling to develop in a non-formalized way, and also as a way to extract themselves from subjugation to the store-of-value aspect of money, especially when access to this function is limited to a superior class with access to hard currencies that retain value over time. By the final argument of the book, Amato and Fantacci are suggesting that this process can be localized, thus fostering a cooperative mutuality among different enterprises within a particular region. Their "watchwords" are "re-localization, reorganization, cooperation" (2014: 37), to rescue the money economy from "the faceless breed of creditors with no responsibilities" (2014: 2). This recuperation and retooling of known institutions may well be very promising.

Since they have a concrete set of suggestions, Amato and Fantacci are not arguing for the total abolition of the current financial system but rather for its scaling down, pruning, and augmenting in ways that "distinguish between markets for actual goods and services, which should be as free, integrated and extensive as possible, and financial markets which shouldn't even exist" (2014: 6), at least in their current form. They propose their own series of macroeconomic stages in the capitalist globalization process, covering several centuries. The first was an integration of trade; the second, an integration of capital for production; the third is an integration of money capital, much of it bearing little relationship to trade or production.

From an anthropological and economic historical perspective, the one component that is missing here is that both of the previous stages have also had their own disproportionate beneficiaries. It is impossible for scholars of Africa to fail to note that one of the most lucrative of the early integrative trades was the transatlantic and trans-Saharan slave trades (Inikori 2002). From the same sources, we learn that the manipulation of exchange rates has probably been a component of all of these stages of the growth of global capitalism. So, we can augment their argument by asking how the soft currency economies are to work, and to get more resources at their disposal, under the clearinghouse system they suggest, and where local systems will still be linked to global markets. Exactly how the hard–

soft spectrum has been crafted, regularized, practiced, and propelled into the systemics of livelihood, across the whole range that is implicit in the very old intimation that some currencies hold value over time and others do not, could be a key topic for macro-theoretical development as well as the micro-ethnography of life in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. On specific African cities, see De Boeck and Plissart (2004), Simone (2004), Nuttall and Mbembe (2008), and Guyer (2012) for a review of their books.
2. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanian_leu. Consulted August 28, 2012.
3. http://www.delarue.com/ProductsSolutions/BanknoteProduction/IndustryExpertise/.

REFERENCES

Adesina, Olutayo. 2002. Growth and Change in the Ibadan Underground Foreign Exchange Market during Devaluation. In *Money Struggles and City Life*, ed. Jane I. Guyer, LaRay Denzer, and Adigun Agbaje, 77–91. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

Amato, Massimo, and Luca Fantacci. 2011. *The End of Finance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

———. 2014. *Saving the Market from Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bayart, J.-F., J.-A. Mbembe, and C.N. Toulabor. 1992. *Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire: contributions a une problematique de la democratie*. Paris: Karthala.

Beuving, Joost. 2004. Cotonou's Klondike. African Traders and Second-hand Car Markets in Benin. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42(4): 511–537.

Boltanski, Luc, and Eve Chiapello. 2007. *The New Spirit of Capitalism*. London: Verso.

Callon, Michel, Yuval Millo, and Fabian Muniesa, eds. 2007. *Market Devices*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Chu, Julie Y. 2010. *Cosmologies of Credit. Transnational Mobility and the Politics of Destination in China*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

De Boeck, Filip. 1998. Domesticating Diamonds and Dollars: Identity, Expenditure and Sharing in Southwestern Zaire (1984–1997). *Development and Change* 29(4): 777–810.

De Boeck, Filip, and Marie-Francoise Plissart. 2004. *Kinshasa, Tales of the Invisible City*. Tervuren: Royal Museum of Central Africa.

Einaudi, Luigi. 1953 (translated from 1936). Ch. 14 The Theory of Imaginary Money from Charlemagne to the French Revolution. In *Enterprise and Secular Change. Readings in Economic History*, ed. Frederic C. Lane and Jelle C. Riemersma, 229–261. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Unwin.

Green, Sarah F. 2005. *Notes from the Balkans: Locating Marginality and Ambiguity on the Greek-Albanian Border*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Greenspan, Alan. 2009. *The Age of Turbulence. Adventures in a New World*. New York: Penguin.

Guyer, Jane I. 2002. "Kos'ona miran": No Other Way. Mechanized Farming in the Era of Devaluation. In *Money Struggles and City Life*, ed. Jane I. Guyer, LaRay Denzer, and Adigin Agbaje, 115–132. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

———. 2012. Terms of Debate versus Words in Circulation: Some Rhetorics of the Crisis. In *Handbook of Economic Anthropology*, ed. James Carrier, 612–625. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Guyer, Jane I. with Kabiru Salami. 2011. "Kos'owo". Il n'y a pas d'argent! In Special issue of *Politique Africaine* on "La macroéconomie par le bas", ou les enjeux sociopolitiques des représentations économiques en Afrique" 124(4): 43–65 (Quotations are from the English typescript).

Hammar, Amanda, ed. 2014. *Displacement Economies in Africa. Paradoxes of Crisis and Creativity*. London: Zed Books.

Harvey, David. 2014. *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism*. London: Profile Books.

Hibou, Beatrice, ed. 2011. La macroéconomie par le bas, ou les enjeux sociopolitiques des représentations économiques en Afrique. Special issue of *Politique Africaine* 124(4): 127–154.

Inikori, Joseph E. 2002. *Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

James, Deborah. 2015. *Money From Nothing. Indebtedness and Aspiration in South Africa*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Jones, Jeremy. 2010. 'Nothing is Straight in Zimbabwe': The Rise of the Kukiya-kiya Economy 2000–2008. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 36(2): 285–299.

Kilel, Beatrice. 2014. *Africa. Last Investment Frontier: A Middle Class Approach*. Frederick, MD: Zapphire Publishing.

———. 2014. *This Changes Everything. Capitalism versus the Climate*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Koopman, J.E. 2009. Globalization, Gender and Poverty in the Senegal Valley. *Feminist Economics* 15(3): 253–285.

Mataen, D. 2012. *Africa—The Ultimate Frontier Market: A Guide to the Business and Investment Opportunities in Emerging Africa*. Petersfield: Harriman House.

Meagher, Kate. 2010. *Identity Economics. Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria*. Suffolk: James Currey.

Nuttall, Sarah, and Achille Mbembe. 2008. *Johannesburg: The Elusive Metropolis*. Johannesburg and Durham, NC: Witwatersrand University Press and Duke University Press.

Nyamunda, Tinashe. 2014. Cross-Border Couriers as Symbols of Regional Grievance? The Malayitsha Remittance System in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe. *African Diaspora* 7(2014): 38–62.

Nyamunda, Tinashe, and Patience Mukwambo. 2012. The State and the Bloody Diamond Rush in Chiadzwa: Unpacking the Contesting Interests in the Development of Illicit Mining and Trading, c.2006–2009. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38(1): 145–156.

Okunoye, O. 2011. Lanrewaju Adepoju and the Making of Modern Yoruba Poetry. *Africa* 81(2): 191–200.

Peebles, Gustav. 2011. *The Euro and Its Rivals: Currency and the Construction of a Transnational City*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Peters, Pauline E. 2013a. Conflicts Over Land and Threats to Customary Tenure in Africa. *African Affairs* 112(449): 543–562.

———. 2013b. Land Appropriation, Surplus People and a Battle over Visions of Agrarian Futures in Africa. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 40(3): 537–562.

Picketty, Thomas. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sassen, Saskia. 2014. *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Simone, AbdouMaliq. 2004. *For the City Yet to Come. Changing African Life in Four Cities*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Wan, M.Y. 2001. Secrets of Success: Uncertainty, Profits and Prosperity in the Gari Economy of Ibadan, 1992–94. *Africa* 71(2): 225–252.

Rationality, Risk, Uncertainty, and Islamic Finance

Bridget Kustin

INTRODUCTION

In 1921, economist Frank Knight's famous distinction between risk (measurable uncertainty) and uncertainty (unmeasurable uncertainty) laid the groundwork for economics as the science of risk and return, anchored by the utility maximization of "rational economic man." Innovations in Western financial activity heralding the era of financialization aligned with political redistributions of power that occurred from the late 1970s through the early 1990s—including the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, both a symbolic and a technical erasure of borders that rapidly accelerated the global circulation of capital. The entwined rise of processes of financialization and neoliberalism were further propelled by a series of monumental reorganizations in the political economy of oil production in the Middle East that suddenly increased cash liquidity on the world stage.[1]

These processes, as well as the velocity and reach of capital's circulation engendered new forms of risk, muddying distinctions between risk and uncertainty. I suggest that risk has come to subsume uncertainty in conventional finance, and recognition of the category of economic uncertainty

B. Kustin (✉)
Department of Anthropology, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA

requires a reckoning with a vision for an open future in which true complexity and emergence remains possible.

I explore these questions through Islamic finance, which rejects the notion of wholly rational calculations of uncertainty and risk and provides opportunities through which the calculative rationality of economics can be refracted and understood anew—namely, through ethical possibilities that are typically taken as counterpoint to market-driven capitalism. This chapter does not discuss the typical products and services of Islamic finance, or the features of the modern Islamic finance industry (Kustin 2015). Rather, here I examine how global shifts in concentrations and movements of capital and power are entwined with the Islamic finance industry's rapid ascent from experimental to full-fledged in the 1990s. As an economic anthropologist, my approach to Islamic finance invokes disciplinary shifts in anthropology related to the late 1970s and early 1990s triumph of capitalism and new velocities in capital circulation across eroding borders.

Financialization and the Anthropology of Finance

Economic anthropologists working from the 1950s to the 1970s—what Hart (2007) terms the "golden age" of economic anthropology—could presume a relative stability around their primary systems and objects of study: from exchange in formal and informal economies, to Marxist questions of capitalism and production, to consumption and value. But from the 1970s onward, financialization[2] introduced new conceptual and technical vocabularies and heralded the spatial and temporal reorganization of financial activity. Arrighi (1994) describes financialization as the process whereby profits are made through "financial channels" (such as transactions or capital transfers to yield interest or dividends) rather than through "productive activities" that involve asset-backed transactions. The largest profits are generated through technologies of finance and the ballooning capital in circulation is largely fictive, tied to promises of loss or gain within financial channels.

After 1989, the rise of post–Cold War globalization, neoliberalism, and structural adjustment policies enabled the technologies and processes of "financialization" initiated in the 1970s to rapidly mature, heralding massive spatial and temporal reorganizations of financial and economic activity, including exponentially increasing risk and novel strategies for risk management (Martin 2002; MacKenzie 2006; Amato and Fantacci

2011; Appadurai 2013). Through financialization, what political scientist Connolly (2011) describes as true emergence, creativity, and randomness became subject to capture and neutralization into the scientific, stable category of "risk" through stochastic models. Not that this diminished the danger of these new, expanding forms of risk. Indeed, theorizations of financialization suggest that risk and new forms of risk-bearing subjectivities are sites through which the present economic and capitalist condition can be understood (Dore 2000; Krippner 2012).

As a result, anthropological interest in "finance" as a technical field of knowledge and domain of corporate and governmental engagement underwent dramatic revisions in the early 1970s (Amato and Fantacci 2011; Gregory 2009). In the 1990s and early 2000s, the circulation of capital and modes of corporate and institutional engagement set in motion by these occurrences was rendered progressively more concentrated, global, and esoteric, aided by broader currents of globalization, neoliberal ideologies[3] favoring privatization, and innovations in financial models and products (MacKenzie 2006) and financial technologies and "market devices" (Callon et al. 2007). A profound material expansion of credit and debt relations also required the pooling and dispersal of new forms of risk engendered by these relationships, and the rapid expansion of fictive capital and increasing velocity of circulation.

New, specific technologies (e.g. derivatives) and channels for distribution (e.g. securitization) emerged in this period, but more critical for economic anthropologists were the market preferences that emerged through and from them and came to be embodied by human market participants who moved from *doing* economic activity (the traditional provenance of economic anthropologists) to *becoming* economic activity (Martin 2002).[4] Financialization shifted from being an object of study to being a logic or analytic frame through which human relations, labor, and production could be understood.

The challenge for economic anthropologists studying finance and financialization isn't just that the object is potentially immaterial, but that post-1989 revolutions in the writing of ethnography have meanwhile opened up hermeneutic horizons for understanding the dialectical constitution of the writing subject and the object of study. The interventions of Clifford and Marcus (1986) reoriented anthropological fieldwork and ethnography as intersubjective knowledge production, with anthropology understood as cultural critique and as an act of "writing culture." In this self-reflexive vein, Gupta and Ferguson (1997) collapsed presumed distinctions in time

and space between moments of knowledge production through "data gathering" versus "writing and analysis." These interventions have now become part of the field within which cultural anthropology theorizes itself, to the point that Riles (2006) can note: "If anthropologists ever truly believed that facts were 'collected' in the 'field' rather than produced collaboratively in the intersubjective experience of the ethnographic encounter, they have abandoned any such pretense" (2).

Here, economic anthropologists studying finance confront a methodological challenge: acknowledging processes through which humans "become" finance and finance gets created through humans pushes against mainstream macroeconomic perceptions that finance and markets are animated by self-regulating logics and thus can be quantitatively "known" through appropriate mathematical models and economistic assumptions (Schlefer 2012). From the twentieth century onward, economics has remained concerned with the allocation of material goods and the maximization of utility. As Knight explained in 1924, since "from a rational or scientific point of view, all practically real problems are problems in economics," the "general theory of economics is therefore simply the rationale of life" (1). This all-encompassing approach to economics is echoed by economics Nobel Laureate Gary Becker in 1976: "The economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behavior, be it behavior involving money prices…emotional or mechanical ends…rich or poor persons" (in Sandel 2012: 49).

Knight presaged the difficulties that "giving too predominant a place" to the rational "science" of economics would come to pose for anthropologists of finance, noting that the "field of values," "the value of the process," and the "qualitative or esthetic aspect" of economics become invisible and inaccessible under the hegemony of scientific rationality (1924: 3). The rise of behavioral economics in the past decade has opened up space for theorizing how psychosocial human contingencies affect finance and markets. However, per Knight's prediction, this field still resists locating finance and markets as social forms, and tends to defer to quantitative models to explain and contain such human contingencies. The rapidly expanding field of behavioral economics identifies, isolates, and explains the outliers, oddities, and irrationalities of human behavior that disrupt economics by defying prediction, derailing models, and inducing bubbles and bursts.[5] Through these efforts, order can be restored to self-regulating markets and models can be adapted to accommodate the contingencies that can be revealed to have underlying predictability and

structure. True excesses or aberrations remain contained; economic rationality as a singular frame for comprehending life remains intact.

Economists' belief in the "comprehensiveness" of economics invokes a conflict described by Strathern (2006), whereby the space between the field and the anthropologist is overshadowed by the expert languages that determine idioms available to the anthropologist to describe the subject of study. Guyer (2012) offers a similar challenge to financial anthropology, noting that the "distinction between the popular and the expert is muddled because there are also terms created by experts and intended for popular use." Riles (2011: 79) conceptualizes this distinction in the form of a "precondition of distance" between the anthropologist and the "object of study, between 'our' knowledge practices and 'theirs.' The existence of an 'outside' to anthropological knowledge—difference—is the precondition of anthropological work." For Riles, anthropology acknowledges the "problem of studying knowledge practices that draw upon and overlap with the anthropologist's own rather than serving as a point of analogy or comparison for the anthropologist's questions."

This distance is necessary for the production of anthropological knowledge. But economic rationality requires that concepts of profit, markets, value, and price are all-encompassing enough to refer to whole spectrums of ideas--but what exactly does "the market" refer to?. Meanwhile, the lack of specificity, or what Guyer (2012) refers to as "an increasing vagueness of referent," means that "finance" has already colonized anthropologists' terrain. How can discussions of finance escape the expert grammatical, conceptual, and mathematical languages of finance that ontologically constitute finance?

Moreover, the preponderance of anthropological ethnographies of financiers, financial institutions, and financial technologies produced in the past ten years[6] presumes that finance is professionalized. In other words, "finance" as a subject of inquiry tends to colonize its frame of study. Finance professionals, their workspaces, and technologies become the subjects for comprehending finance, even as the frames of reference within which these entities exist are predetermined by finance. An implicit assumption arises that finance is created, inhabited, and animated by the individuals paid to work within it—even as financialization draws into question the agency or autonomy of these workers (Gregory 2009; Ho 2009), and necessarily places them into networked relationships powered by the circulation of capital.

Uncertainty, Risk, and Ethics

Knight's famous distinction between risk and uncertainty, first articulated in his 1916 economics dissertation, contributed to the theoretic foundation of twentieth-century calculative, rational economics. Risk is "measurable uncertainty" or "objective probability," whereby "the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known," either from calculation or from past statistics. Uncertainty refers to "unmeasurable" uncertainty or "subjective probability," with outcome distributions that escape theorization and remain unknown (1921: III, VIII). Due to the hegemonic rationalism of the "economic man" who reliably acts in such a way that "under given conditions certain things can be counted on to happen," Knight argues that risk has come to marginalize uncertainty, such that economics has become the science of risk and return (1922: 51; Marglin 1990: 241). Risk would come to assume its position of superiority through a genealogy of theories exploring rational, utility-maximizing decision-making.[7]

However, soon after Knight's dissertation was published in 1921, he registered his unease with economic overtures that dismissed uncertainty by presuming that "human motives in general…can adequately be treated as *facts* in the scientific sense." Knight suggesting instead that human "wants," "desires," and "motives" are not merely scientific data, but can instead be considered as "values" or "oughts" possessing "an essentially different character."[8] This reformulation of the human away from the static rational pursuit of utility maximization opens up a space for other forces to gain recognition for animating economic decision-making—although this space would come to be pinched into obscurity in coming decades. But, for Knight, the main countervailing force to rationality is ethics: "Only if the 'creation of value' is distinctly more than the satisfaction of desire, is there room for ethics in a sense logically separable from economics" (1922: 41–42).

Of course, the enfoldment of risk into the calculative reason of the field of economics does not preclude anthropological exploration into the category of risk—it can and should be approached as a site for uncovering the sociocultural dimensions of finance. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argue that rather than possessing any single "correct" definition, risk is "a joint product of *knowledge* about the future and *consent* about the most desired prospects," rendering determinations of risk an eminently "social process" (4–6). And yet, while Knight does not further theorize the philosophically laden concept of "ethics," his invocation of ethics points to a domain,

however messily or ambiguously articulated, beyond mathematical rationality and the "risk society" (Beck 1992) that reached maturity with the open borders and free flow of capital post-1989. By the mid-1990s, risk had become the "dominant material and epistemological reality of the contemporary world," as the condition has extended unabated into the present (Reddy 1996: 224; Appadurai 2013). I take this domain as a site for anthropological considerations of Knightian uncertainty (true, creative emergence) within the "economy," or a collection of networks, processes, actors, and technologies organized around the creation, distribution, and exchange of capital. The discipline of economics is equally implicated, requiring, as Reddy (1996: 224) explains, an "alternative and more humane conceptions of indeterminacy to substitute for the dominant scientistic approach to uncertainty."

Theorizing the "values" that Knight invokes requires engagement with their temporal horizons—Knight's hesitation with rational, probabilistic economics was based in part upon the notion that human wants, desires, and values can "grow and change," and not "stay put" (1922: 41). Values animating individual economic decision-making and by extension, broader macroeconomic trends, are in motion, shifting in time. And yet, the abstract, monetized risk of contemporary speculative capital—the lifeblood of financialization—is seen as an "acultural and ahistorical species of knowledge" (LiPuma and Lee 2004: 54). When complex entities such as price and value are subjected to rationalization and expressed mathematically, they are "susceptible to further calculative and comparative processes" (Guyer 2010: 123–124). The reduction of complexity to static (even if only for brief moments in time) numeric datum allows for manipulations and juxtapositions in secondary regimes of comparison, calculation, and ordinal rankings.

This forecloses the ability to confront risk as a social construction, rather than a mathematical fact. Knight registered unease with the way that calculative, mathematical economics dispenses with real uncertainty, foreclosing the possibility of multiple lifeworlds. The hegemony of rationality in mainstream economic thought could even override what was to Knight the obvious proposition of the coexistence of multiple, unknowable possibilities. As he explains, "The entire science of probability in the mathematical sense is based on the dogmatic assumption that the ultimate alternatives are really equally probable, which seems to…mean real indeterminateness" (1921: III, VII).

Instead of offering an alternate genealogy of uncertainty that dispenses with rational and calculative reason in favor of sociocultural factors—a zero-sum argument between disciplines—new possibilities emerge when the temporality of financial uncertainty is considered. Certain temporal logics in Islam provide a platform for resurrecting the place of uncertainty against the rationality of mainstream economic thinking that has come to foreclose the viable existence of uncertainty, in favor of risk. The radical difference of this approach is the possibility of alternatives to rationality as the animating force for economic activity, both for individuals and for a broader aggregate.

A consideration of the place of "ethics" in rational versus Islamic economics can help to make this point clear. A tenet of rational economics is that "ethical behavior is a commodity that needs to be economized" (Sandel 2012: 126). As individuals are presumed to maximize self-interest, they ostensibly engage in ethical behavior only when it is in their self-interest to do so. Economist Gary Becker explains that there are "shadow prices" to not engaging in ethical behavior, such as legal recourse, community ostracization, or other discord with friends and family. Tellingly, even these negative social implications can be mapped in mathematical terms: shadow prices are the "the imaginary prices said to be implicit in the alternatives we face and the choices we make" (in Sandel 2012: 61). Thus, altruism must be regarded as a scarce resource. As a result, another economist, Kenneth Arrow, advises against the abundance or needless deployment of ethics in economic decision-making. Such reckless behavior risks depleting a scarce resource: "I do not want to rely too heavily on substituting ethics for self-interest. I think it best on the whole that the requirement of ethical behavior be confined to those circumstances where the price system breaks down…We do not wish to use up recklessly the scarce resources of altruistic motivation" (354–355).[9]

Much of the writing on ethics and morals in economics tends to takes this position as a starting point: by virtue of creating structures that allow for the economization of virtue and altruism, economics embodies an ethical sensibility. Of course, this also presumes that economics embodies an ethical sensibility insofar as altruism is considered as a scarce resource. Ethical economical behavior is a corrective for aberrant moments of price system breakdown—as a check on greed or other such manifestations of self-interest that would disrupt market principles of rationality.

Sandel's heterodox interpretation is that altruism and benevolence are not assets that deplete with use, but that can be deepened and enriched

through usage (2012: 128). Anthropologists of capitalist economics have grappled with the place of ethics, morality, religion, and the other human excesses beyond rationality (de Goede 2005; Hacking 1990; Leyshon and Thrift 1999; Rudnyckyj 2010). Knight also acknowledges that economics and ethics "*naturally* come into rather intimate relations with each other since both recognizedly deal with the problem of value" (1922: 40, italics added). The naturalization of this relationship is paralleled in the commercial vocabulary of the Qur'an that speaks to the existence of a moral economy linking up the here and the hereafter.[10]

Uncertainty, Risk, and Islamic Finance

The history of early Islam is also an economic history: The Qur'an, *Sunnah* (the practices, teachings, and path of the Prophet Mohammed), *hadith* (collected sayings and acts of the Prophet Mohammed), and *fiqh* (juridical interpretations of the Shari'a) offer guidance for trade and business, and have produced a rich Islamic contract law tradition. The protracted timeframe of merchant expeditions for long-distance trade in medieval Islam gave rise to the *mudaraba* (mark-up financing) contract—the most common Islamic financing contract today. Extensive guidance also exists regarding socially just distributions of wealth. In Islam, believers are recognized to struggle against tendencies toward self-benefit. Meanwhile, self-interest is foundational to conventional economics and its principle of scarcity, where limited supply interacts with demand. As individuals are presumed to maximize self-interest, they ostensibly engage in ethical behavior only when it is in their self-interest to do so—Sandel's point above.

Islamic economics, by contrast, posits a sufficient amount of God-given resources for all human needs. The strain on the supply or the "perceived scarcity" of goods results from the "lack of effort and insatiable needs on the part of man," due in part to *haram* indulgences or activities prohibited in Islam (Jackson-Moore 2009: 3). Wealth is not inherently immoral; the Qur'an allows for the acquisition of wealth and acknowledges that wealth disparities will always exist (Kuran 2010; Lewis and Algaoud 2001; DeLorenzo and McMillen 2007; Meenai and Ansari 2001; Saeed 1996). Redistribution of wealth occurring via *sadaqat* (voluntary charity), *zakat* (mandatory annual tithing), and *waqf* (donated land or cash held in an irrevocable trust), for example, is in principle meant to help mitigate the most egregious economic inequalities.

On a more theoretic and theological register, the Islamic remembrance of death (Al-Ghazali 1995) allows for the present to become enfolded by the future promise of the eternal hereafter. Critically, this remembrance yields a comprehension of the present in light of this future that is not "rational," as rationality is understood in conventional economic terms. It is emotional, embodied, and affective, which allows this remembrance to become a platform upon which, as Taskhiri (2004) explains, individual "self-interest and social interest are integrated." I suggest this constitutes a primary site of difference between Islamic finance and conventional finance. Islamic eschatological orientations toward the present and future are mobilized in the structure of new products and services in ways that make particular assumptions about the temporality and knowability of excessive uncertainty and risk. The notion that the future is truly unknowable, and thus truly creative, is a testament to the existence and divinity of God in Islam, whose planning cannot be foretold, anticipated, or otherwise mapped. Islamic finance does not necessarily introduce religion to a "secular" conception of finance, but rather introduces conceptualizations about uncertainty and risk that render the future (understood economically and anthropologically) as an open space of possibility. Indeed, acceptance of uncertainty requires a reckoning with what Khan (2012) describes as the "open future" accessible in Islamic temporal horizons.

This presents one explanation for why economists and financiers both within and outside of Islamic financial institutions tend to describe Islamic finance as an ontologically separate system from capitalism; a "moral economy" or ethical alternative (Hallaq 2013: 146; Choudhury 1997), despite theorizations about the place of ethics in conventional rational economics. In 1992, M. Umer Chapra, arguably the most prominent Islamic economic theorist of the past few decades, released the momentous *Islam and the Economic Challenge*. The first lines encountered by a reader in Kurshid Ahmad's *Foreword* to the volume embed the significance and future prospects of Islamic finance in the events of 1989 and thereafter: "The collapse of socialism and the centrally-planned economies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has raised a host of critical questions for all concerned with the ideological future of mankind. Does this represent the final demise of the social system and unequivocal victory of the Western doctrine of economic and political liberalism…?" (xiii).

The volume goes on to argue for the modern necessity of Qur'anic guidance for economic activity as a solution to failed Western attempts to prevent economic crises through experiments with "capitalism, socialism,

nationalist-fascism, and the welfare state." These systems, Ahmad argues in an echo of Chapra's central thesis, are based on "the fundamentally and characteristically Western premise that religion and morality are not relevant to the solution of man's economic problems, that economic affairs are better settled by reference to the laws of economic behavior and not in respect of any social code of moral conduct" (xiii-xiv). The fall of socialist and communist regimes and the visible economic failure of states still clinging to these ideologies after 1989 signal that "the search for appropriate answers need not be confined to the Western experience…it can profitably widened to other religio-cultural horizons…More satisfying and befitting answers to the economic questions of our time can be found in the Islamic approach to them" (xiii).

The failure of capitalism became clear insofar as the risk of social breakdown failed to be contained. Islamic finance offers an alternative through a "social code of moral conduct" premised on the existence of a future known only to a divine authority—an authority who supersedes the various government structures collapsing amid the publication of Chapra's volume. In other words, uncertainty becomes a more relevant frame for comprehension of economic activity, rather than risk. Chapra's take on uncertainty, the failure of conventional capitalism, and the promise of Islamic finance becomes prescient in light of the 2008 financial crisis, after which the global Islamic finance industry received a wave of positive attention. Islamic mortgages and financial institutions had contributed little to the causes of the crisis, and were largely shielded from its worst effects.

Islamic jurists have struggled with interpretation of relevant texts over centuries as economic conditions evolve, and modern Islamic financial products and services continue to require the input of Islamic scholars. Since their inception, Islamic banking and finance institutions have been subject to frequent and sudden ruptures as theologians and Shari'a courts ruled upon and revised the Shari'a compliant structure of products.

For example, the inclination against *maisir* (gambling, specifically games of chance or divination) and *gharar* (excessive uncertainty) in Islamic finance seeks to eliminate the potential for a party to lose or double an initial investment simply due to market fluctuations or other circumstances, as this would constitute a form of *riba*—an unjustified increase, or "money begetting money." Of course, classical Islam could not have anticipated modern esoteric finance. Recent successful Islamic bond (*sukuk*) offerings notwithstanding, Shari'a compliant participation in futures markets or speculative investments remains subject to disagreement among scholars.

In 2009, for example, the chair of one of the world's main Islamic financial regulatory authorities, the in-house Shari'a board of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) declared the vast majority of sukuk non-Shari'a compliant, creating industry-wide shockwaves (Foster 2009).

Gharar refers to financial transactions embedded in uncertainty.[11] This raises the question of how much uncertainty can be borne before legitimate speculation, where inherent risks can be mitigated through information, devolves into mere chance—a gamble on a future outcome (Al-Zarqa, in El-Gamal 2001: 5). Practically speaking, risk or speculation cannot be categorically unlawful. Some jurists have specified that since no contract is completely free from uncertainty, "minor" *gharar* is permitted (Al-Baji Al-Andalusi, in El-Gamal 2006: 59; Hamoudi 2006: 25). Consensus generally exists that "major" *gharar*, or a fully *gharar*-based sale (known as *bay' al-gharar*), is prohibited.

However, contracts with major *gharar* can be deemed permissible if a certain threshold of necessity is met: if "excessive" costs would result from avoiding *gharar*, a transaction may be permitted.[12] *Makharij*, or legal exceptions, can be mobilized to prevent detrimental or *haram* activity that might occur without an intervention. These types of "adaptive mechanisms" are attuned to the necessities of *'urf* (prevailing standards or customs), *maslaha* (public interest), and *darura* (necessity) (Warde 2001). As a result, determinations of excessive uncertainty remain contested. Fatawa and guidelines from Shari'a advisory boards, Shari'a courts, and regulatory institutions regarding uncertainty regularly contradict. Exceptions abound, such as the *salam* contract for purchase of non-material abstract entities and the *istisna*contract for purchase of goods before they are manufactured (El-Gamal 2001, Kustin 2015).

One way to understand what *gharar* and *maisir* accomplish, even as it might be set aside to reduce constraints on economic activity deemed necessary, is to consider the temporal implications of mapping uncertainty as a source of danger. *Gharar* and *maisir* forces a continual confrontation with the question of how much uncertainty can be borne before legitimate speculation, an act possessing inherent risk that can be mitigated through information, devolves into mere chance—a gamble on a future outcome (Al-Zarqa, in El-Gamal 2001: 5).

Islam has long concerned itself with social justice through just economic affairs and transactions. However, major Islamic banking and finance institutions possess these obligations to social justice alongside obligations to

successfully compete with conventional institutions whose financial health can be greatly enhanced (or decimated) through the presence of interest income, aggressive risk-taking, and unrestricted investment in all types of industries—whereas these activities are greatly curtailed if not completely absent in Islamic banking and financial institutions. Observers of Islamic banking and finance have long identified a split between the types of institutions that exist: those that focus on technical Sharia compliance (the letter of the law, so to speak) in their contract forms, and those devoted to the social justice mission of Islam (the spirit of the law) (El-Gamal 2006; Khan 1986; Kustin 2015; Lewis and Algaoud 2001; Vogel and Hayes 1998). As governments and institutions experiment with different degrees of adherence to the letter or spirit of the law (or both), this does not necessarily reflect on inherent religiosity. Instead, Islamic banking and financial institutions' activities are contextual, relating to trends in their country or region, behaviors of peer institutions, or national political or legal developments.

Market-driven conventional capitalism does have its own literature relating to ethics and collective versus individual self-interest. However, these literatures operate within the lifeworld and temporal frame of capitalism—the most well-known arguably belonging to Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and Adam Smith's *The Theory of Modern Sentiments*. As *gharar* and *maisir* preserve the domain of the uncertainty of an open future, whose contours are known to God alone, the role of human accountability in economic activity is preserved, instead of attributing the state of economic affairs on the more diffuse and ephemeral notions of markets, models, "black swans," behavioral irrationalities, or risk.

Notes

1. See Mitchell (2011) for a detailed examination of how, before the 1970s, the vast majority of the world's oil was traded in long-term agreements with multi-national corporations, with contractually agreed-upon prices. It wasn't until the mid-1970 that the "market" for oil, and concomitant understandings of the infinite expandability of price and circulation, emerged. The sudden, immense cash liquidity of "petrodollars" in the Middle East allowed small, localized experiments in Islamic finance to develop, often with government support, into multi-national banks and investment houses.

2. Processes of financialization originated in the United States in the late 1970s and 1980s: interest rate deregulation spawned fierce competition among banks, and the temporality of profit-making was compressed as banks engaged in arbitrage on interest rate fluctuations within increasingly smaller time intervals. The development of new products and services enabled securitization and the creation of secondary markets for trading, while new esoteric, mathematized technologies measured and priced the newly emerging risk that could then be newly sold on these secondary markets.

3. Neoliberalism here refers to practices and discourses stressing human rationality, entrepreneurship, and self-reliance as parallel to the presumed efficiency of self-regulating markets (Ong 2006). Deregulation, free competition, and meritocracies are privileged, as government involvement hinders "entrepreneurial freedoms and skills" (Harvey 2005: 2). As the state retreats, non-state actors, particularly corporations and non-governmental organizations, begin regulating the life of citizens and providing key services.

4. For example: credit scores that instantiate new forms of human worth and desirability and manifest in online dating sites like www.datemycreditscore.com, and the bodies of Wall Street traders understood as corporate liquid assets to accommodate the heightened velocity of capital circulation: traders are fungible, and their addition to or termination from trading floors reflects quarterly gains or losses (Ho 2009).

5. For example, George Akerlof and Robert Shiller (2009, *Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism*, Princeton: Princeton UP) resuscitate and rework John Maynard Keynes' "animal spirits," or ineffable emotions and irrational desires, to explain how the 2008 financial crisis took economists by surprise. Daniel Kahneman (2011, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, New York: Macmillan) introduces cognitive biases in economics as a result of individuals' idiosyncratic heuristics. Robert Shiller (2000, *Irrational Exuberance*, Crown Business) explains how "irrational exuberance" causes unduly optimistic value inflations and economic bubbles that can lead to crisis.

6. For example, Caitlin Zaloom, 2006, *Out of the Pits*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Karen Ho, 2009, *Liquidated*, Durham: Duke UP; Martha Poon, 2008, From New Deal Institutions to Capital Markets: Commercial Consumer: Risk Scores and the Making of Subprime Mortgage Finance, *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 654–674; Hirokazu Miyazaki, 2013, *Arbitraging Japan: Dreams of Capitalism at the End of Finance*, Berkeley: University of California Press; Annelise Riles, 2011, *Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets*, Princeton: Princeton UP; Douglas Holmes, August 2009,

"Economy of Words," *Cultural Anthropology*, Volume 24, Issue 3: 381–419).

7. This includes expected utility theory (von Neumann, Morgenstern), portfolio theory (Markowitz 1959), the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1970), the capital asset pricing model (Sharpe 1964), and the Modigliani–Miller theorem which foregrounded capital structure arbitrage (1958).

8. Knight was not the first to question that "life is a matter of economics"—he acknowledges his predecessors as Veblen, Hamilton, and J.M. Clark (42). J.H. von Thunen was Knight's predecessor in theorizing distinctions between risk and uncertainty (see Reddy 1996: 227).

9. The total number of Nobel Laureates in the Economic Sciences mentioned in this paper is nine (Akerlof, Arrow, Becker, Fama, Kahneman Markowitz, Miller, Modigliani, Scholes, Shiller)—gesturing toward the reality that the ideas presented in this paper as constituting mainstream economic theory—however surprising to those outside of economics—are accepted as foundational to the discipline.

10. Qur'anic verses (often included in financial institutions' annual reports and other documents) illustrating the use of commercial vocabulary include (italics added):

   - "Behold, God *has bought* of the believers their lives and their possessions, promising them paradise in return" (9:111)
   - "Hence, let them fight in God's cause—all who are willing *to barter* the life of this world for the life to come" (4:74)
   - "And *spend in charity* for the good of your own selves […] If you *offer up to God a goodly loan, He will amply repay you for it*, and will forgive you your sins" (64:17–18)
   - "And be conscious of the Day on which you shall be brought back unto God, whereupon every human being shall be *repaid in full for what he has earned*, and none shall be wronged." (2:281).

11. Classic examples from *ahadith* include: "The sale of the fruit of a tree; the sale of flowers before they appear on the plant; the sale of fish caught in one throw of the net; the sale of an unborn camel; the sale of a bird in the air."

12. Opinions from three classical jurists in El-Gamal (2006: 59).

Bibliography

Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. 1995. 'Kitab dhikr al-mawt wa-ma ba 'dahu (*The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife*). *Book XL of the Revival of the Religious Sciences.* Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society.

Amato, Massimo, and Luca Fantacci. 2011. *The End of Finance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Appadurai, Arjun. 2013. *The Future as Cultural Fact*. London: Verso.

Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*. New York: Verso.

Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society*. London: Sage.

Callon, Michel, Yuval Millo, and Fabian Muniesa. 2007. *Market Devices*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Chapra, M. Umer. 1992. *Islam and the Economic Challenge*. Riyadh: International Islamic Publishing House.

Choudhury, Masudul Alam. 1997. *Money in Islam: A Study in Islamic Political Economy*. London: Routledge.

Clifford, James, and George E. Marcus. 1986. *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Connolly, William. 2011. *A World of Becoming*. Durham, NC: Duke UP.

De Goede, Marieke. 2005. *Virtue, Fortune, and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

DeLorenzo, Yusuf Talal, and Michael J.T. McMillen. 2007. Law and Islamic Finance: An Interactive Analysis. In *Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge*, ed. Simon Archer and Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, 132–197. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia).

Dore, Ronald. 2000. *Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Douglas, Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1982. *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

El-Gamal, Mahmoud. 2001. An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of *Gharar* in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence. In *4th International Conference on Islamic Economics*, Leicester, UK, 13–15 August 2000.

———. 2006. *Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fama, Eugene. 1970. Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. *The Journal of Finance* 25(2) (May): 383–417.

Foster, John. 2009. How Sharia-compliant is Islamic Banking? *BBC*, 11 December. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8401421.stm

Gregory, Chris. 2009. Whatever Happened to Economic Anthropology? *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 20: 285–300.

Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson. 1997. Discipline and Practice: 'The Field' as Site, Method, and Location in Anthropology. In *Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science*, ed. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, 1–46. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Guyer, Jane. 2010. The Eruption of Tradition? On Ordinality and Calculation. *Anthropological Theory* 10: 123.

———. 2012. Terms of Debate versus Words in Circulation: Some Rhetorics of the Crisis. In *A Handbook of Economic Anthropology*, 2nd ed., ed. James G. Carrier, 612–625. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Hacking, Ian. 1990. *The Taming of Chance*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Hallaq, Wael. 2013. *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament*. New York: Columbia UP.

Hamoudi, Haider Ala. 2006. Muhammad's Social Justice or Muslim Cant: Langdellianism and the Failures of Islamic Finance. Columbia Law School: *Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group*, Paper No. 06-116. http://ssrn.com/abstract=909556

Hart, Keith. 2007. A Short History of Economic Anthropology. *The Memory Bank*, 9 November. http://thememorybank.co.uk/2007/11/09/a-short-history-of-economic-anthropology/

Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford UP.

Ho, Karen. 2009. *Liquidated*. Durham, NC: Duke UP.

Jackson-Moore, Elisabeth. 2009. *The International Handbook of Islamic Banking and Finance*. Cranbrook: Global Professional Pub.

Khan, M.S. 1986. Islamic Interest-free Banking: A Theoretical Analysis. International Monetary Fund: *Staff Papers*, 1–25.

Khan, Naveeda. 2012. *Muslim Becoming: Aspiration and Skepticism in Pakistan*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Knight, Frank. 1999a. [1924].The Limitations of Scientific Method in Economics. In *Selected Essays by Frank H. Knight, Volume One, "What is Truth" in Economics?* ed. Ross B. Emmett. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1999b [1922]. "Ethics and the Economic Interpretation." In *Selected Essays by Frank H. Knight, Volume One, "What is Truth" in Economics?* ed. Ross B. Emmett. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 2000 [1921]. *Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit*. Library of Economics and Liberty. http://www.econlib.org/library/Knight/knRUPCover.html

Krippner, Greta. 2012. *Capitalizing on Crisis*. Cambridge: Harvard UP.

Kuran, Timur. 2010. *The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kustin, Bridget. 2015. *Islamic (Micro)Finance: Culture, Context, Promises, Challenges*. Seattle, WA: The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Lewis, Mervyn, and Latifa M. Algaoud. 2001. *Islamic Banking*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Leyshon, Andrew, and Nigel Thrift. 1999. Moral Geographies of Money. In *Nation-States and Money: The Past, Present, and Future of National Currencies*, ed. Eric Helleiner and Emily Gilbert. London: Routledge.

LiPuma, E., and Benjamin Lee. 2004. *Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk*. Durham, NC: Duke UP.

MacKenzie, Donald. 2006. *An Engine Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Marglin, Stephen A. 1990. Losing Touch: The Cultural Conditions of Worker Accommodation and Resistance. In *Dominating Knowledge*, ed. F. Apffel-Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Markowitz, Harry. 1959. *Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Martin, Randy. 2002. *Financialization of Daily Life*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple UP.

Meenai, S.A., and Javed A. Ansari. 2001. *Money and Banking in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, Timothy. 2011. *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil*. New York: Verso.

Modigliani, F., and M. Miller. 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. *American Economic Review* 48(3): 261–297.

Ong, Aihwa. 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham, NC: Duke UP.

Reddy, Sanjay. 1996. Claims to Expert Knowledge and the Subversion of Democracy: The Triumph of Risk Over Uncertainty. *Economy and Society* 25(2) (May): 222–254.

Riles, Annelise, Ed. 2006. Documents: Artifacts of Modern Knowledge. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

———. 2011. Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.

Rudnyckyj, Daromir. 2010. *Spiritual Economies: Islam, Globalization, and the Afterlife of Development*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.

Saeed, Abdullah. 1996. *Islamic Banking and Interest*. New York: E.J. Brill.

Sandel, Michael J. 2012. *What Money Can't Buy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Schlefer, Jonathan. 2012. *The Assumptions Economists Make*. Cambridge: Harvard UP.

Sharpe, William F. 1964. Capital Asset Prices—A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk. *The Journal of Finance* 19(3): 425–442.

Strathern, Marilyn. 2006. Bullet-Proofing: A Tale from the United Kingdom. In *Documents: Artifacts of Modern Knowledge*, ed. Annelise Riles, 181–205. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Taskhiri, Ayatullah Muhammad Ali. 2004. Islamic Economy: Its Ideological and Legal Foundations (Trans. M. Azimi Etemadi). *Message of Thaqalayn: A Quarterly Journal of Islamic Studies* 2(2&3). http://www.al-islam.org/mot/default.asp?url=20Islamc.HTM

Vogel, Frank E., and Samuel L. Hayes III. 1998. *Islamic Law and Finance*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

Warde, Ibrahim. 2001. The Prophet and the Profits: Islamic Finance. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September. http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/09islamicbanking#nb5

Religion and Secularism in Neoliberal Capitalism

Marian Burchardt

INTRODUCTION

Whatever else it may mean to historians and the witnesses on whose accounts they stake their claims, for most people in the world today the fall of the Berlin Wall came to signal the victory of capitalism over socialist alternatives of any sort. Importantly, this was not the endpoint but rather the beginning of a long triumphal procession to which there is no end in sight. In the process, the mostly peaceful, democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe became midwives of capitalism's late twentieth-century reincarnation based on the infamous "Washington consensus" (liberalization, deregulation and privatization), now widely encapsulated in the notion of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005). At the same time, the end of the Cold War came with cultural changes of all kinds, one of the most remarkable of which has been the increasing prominence of religion.

This is especially reflected in the intellectual production surrounding it. In fact, few fields of social science research and theory have seen such a dramatic rise since the fall of the Berlin Wall as the sociology and anthropology of religion. But are the two phenomena related? And if yes, how? I suggest

M. Burchardt (✉)
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity,
Göttingen, Germany

135

that, in order to understand the centrality of religion in both public and sociological discourses today, it is indeed imperative to explore the ways in which the rise of neoliberal capitalism has facilitated the return of religion in public and political agendas in both the Western European heartlands of welfare capitalism and the capitalist newcomers in Eastern Europe. However, we can also observe new configurations of religion and the neoliberal economy in the peripheries of the bipolar confrontation, that is, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. More precisely, I suggest that, as neoliberal capitalism goes from one rebirth to the next, and as the great divisions of the bipolar world between capitalism and communism have ultimately been reduced to a species of more or less ephemeral, social movement politics, religion has turned into the main category of globalized identity politics (Fraser 2009; Hervieu-Léger 2000).

While the renewed significance of religion is often noted, the precise terms in which it plays itself out are highly contested. On the one hand, there is the notion that religion never declined and that the secularist bias of modernist social science blinded scholars to the changing forms of religious expression (Luckmann 1967). On the other hand, scholars have noted the "Return of the Gods" (Graf 2007), "The Resurgence of Religion" (Riesebrodt 2000) and "The De-secularization of the World" (Berger 1999), illustrated through the upswing of religious fundamentalisms and presumably increasing levels of religious belief, participation in ritual, individual religious practices and pious life more generally. While this is true for some parts of the world, such as some Muslim majority and African countries, it is plainly wrong for Western Europe and North America (Chaves 2011). The notion of the coming of a "post-secular society" (Habermas 2006), by contrast, is more indebted to a changing ethical awareness of the increasing complexity of the epistemological conditions of democratic inclusion and justice. Most famously, the rise of religion after 1989 has been interpreted in terms of a global confrontation or as a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996). As we now know, this argument has partially worked as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead of analyzing how such confrontations are symbolically constructed and politically and economically enabled, Huntington erroneously assumed that, by and large, people really see their interests in civilizational terms.

As Casanova (2011: 261) argued, "The problem is not just that Huntington's analysis rests on an essentialist conception of Islam, but that the construction of 'the West' on which it is based is no less essentialist." Instead of relying on Huntington, he suggests (ibid.: 263) that "the con-

cept of multiple modernities, first developed by SN Eisenstadt (1973, 1987, 2002) and now gaining increasing acceptance (…) is a more adequate conceptualization and pragmatic vision of modern global trends than either cosmopolitanism or the clash of civilizations." Casanova's writings on public religion (1994) and Eisenstadt's (2000) concept of multiple modernities suggest that the renewed significance of religion is much better interpreted as a phenomenon of public life and of the contestations around forms and values of the public sphere, as well as of access to it (see also Casanova 2007). While I find both authors' contributions highly convincing, I suggest that their theorizations of the cultural politics of the present should be complemented by an analysis of the effects of the globalization of neoliberalism on religion as initiated, among others, by Tugal (2009) and Gauthier and Martikainen (2013).

In this chapter, I argue that there are three genealogies of discourse on religion that explain contemporary entanglements of religion with neoliberalism and the particular affordances of religion and "market society": firstly, the emergence of new spiritualities and their articulation with consumerism; secondly, the apology for wealth, success and entrepreneurial selves that is promoted through evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity and its "gospel of prosperity"; and thirdly, recent debates on secularism and religious diversity that promote religious expressions as corollaries of the transnational mobility regimes of neoliberalism. While these discussions gained particular traction after 1989 as a watershed event, their genealogies clearly predate it. I argue that the critical analysis of formations of power around religion and secularism must take neoliberalism as its starting point. This perspective reveals that there is no exclusive articulation of religion or secularism with discrimination and exclusion on the one hand, and liberation and citizenship on the other. Rather, both can be tied to regimes of "symbolic citizenship" and "cultural democracy" (see Hocking, this volume) that enhance the acceptability of neoliberalism's chief consequence: massive social inequality.

Sociological and Anthropological Discourses on Religion before 1989

Moments of Certainty: The Heyday of Modernization

While the most dramatic reconceptualizations of religion in the sociology and anthropology of religion happened in the wake of the end of the Cold War, they were in some way prepared by earlier developments that

occurred amid the precarious stabilization of the bipolar world order after the Second World War. In order to render these changes intelligible, we need to place them in the context of post-war modernization and its overarching paradigm of production. In the West, post-war modernization implied the restoration of market-driven economies, Keynesian interventionist welfare states, liberal governance and parliamentary democracy, as well as the rule of law and educational expansionism, all of which had been to restore public and popular faith in reason and progress. If certainty was the paramount value, normalization was the substrate that carried it.

In the Soviet world, post-war modernization implied the nationalization of the means of production, the building of a planned economy and centralized administrative rule, instead of autonomous pluralist politics. But apart from that, things were not dramatically different (Meyer 2000), both ideologies agreeing on the principal notions of production and growth (Wagner 2002). In the so-called "Third World," by and large, decolonizing or recently decolonized states sought to fashion themselves in the image of modernist principles of interventionist statecraft, relying on lofty fantasies of the malleability of the social order and their own mission in History, for the first time in their understanding with a capital H of their own making. As they sought, or were incited or forced, to emulate either the capitalist or the communist model of economy and society, they were definitely co-opted, if to some degree only on paper, into the project of modernist progress. All of these social formations were expressions of what has variously been termed "solid modernity" (Bauman 2000) or "organized modernity." According to Wagner (2002: 123), the latter phrase designates the "conventionalization of social practices within set boundaries."

Such conventionalization was certainly reflected in mainstream sociology, especially the North American variant, with its dominant paradigm of modernization theory according to which societies would tend successively to adopt elements of the modernization package because of its inherent superior efficiency. It is important to note that this was in no meaningful sense a continuation of Weberian sociological thinking, even though it was often portrayed as such. Quite the opposite: while Weber routinely emphasized the particularities of Western and non-Western (Chinese, Indian, etc.) rationalisms (Weber 1998), post-war modernization theories assumed that the different elements of the modernization package (the nation-state, liberal democracy, the rule of law, modern science, etc.) would depend on one another.

Within this conception of modern society, it was assumed that the social significance of religion was reduced to the internal affairs of communities of worshippers and the sphere of the private life of family values and domestic devotion. The shrinking importance of religion for society was summarized in the paradigm of secularization, which was an integral part of the modernization story in its three versions: it was assumed to be achieved (1) as a mechanistic, quasi-natural but peaceful process in the West; (2) through antagonistic power struggles in the Communist world; and (3) through the ceding of visionary power to modernist sovereign states and their historical mission in postcolonial countries. At the same time, Western modernization theorists assumed that, while pathways might differ, the outcomes would, in the long run, be the same and that history would unfold through diffusion pushing toward *convergence*. It was then the rapid economic and political rise of the "Asian Tiger" economies (Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea), as well as of China, India and Brazil, that contributed to the belated recognition of the modernity of these societies by (Western) sociology and that unsettled the hitherto prevalent identification of modernity with Western civilization. Importantly, their different experiences with modern religion have also helped to unsettle further the global pretensions of the secularization paradigm.

However, well before these global pretensions were proved plain wrong, the Iranian revolution of 1979 inserted a moment of major irritation and disturbance into the genealogical pathways of modernist secular thought. Happening in a modernizing country with a pro-American regime, this was a revolution that was celebrated, by Foucault and so many others, as anti-capitalist while not adopting Soviet-style politics or tendencies, much less Communist mainstream thinking about religion. Given that, in books on the sociology of religion, Iran's Islamic Revolution is conventionally referred to as the *Ur*-scene of global religious revitalization and resurgence, it seems remarkable that its capitalist problematique is widely forgotten.

From Solid to Liquid Modernity

In the West, however, during the 1960s we see developments that increasingly disrupt these images and storylines. The emergence of diverse countercultures, the student movement and especially the hippie movement framed a context in which a huge variety of spiritualities would emerge

and flourish. Sociologist Talcott Parsons (1973) summarized the cultural outcomes of all this in the notion of the "expressive revolution." In a way, this was the beginning of the long walk toward post-material values centered on ideas of self-fulfillment and self-realization, which some of the most influential work on value change later found to be central to Western culture and presumably the world at large (Inglehart 1997). That post-material cultural orientations have religious sources matters here, and not only because initially Inglehart did not find them quite important. It also matters because these sources point toward a moment in which religion is intricately entangled with the passage from solid modernity to liquid modernity (Bauman 2000).

These entanglements are expressed, among other things, in processes of detraditionalization (Heelas et al. 1996), that is, the generalized rejection of traditional forms of legitimating authority, institutions and people's allegiance to them. The more individual choices and subjectivity are conceptualized as authoritative of legitimate agency, the more we see the reproduction of at least some of the inherited religious institutions and the communities they sustain coming under pressure. This also implied that inherited anthropological and sociological understandings of religion were insufficient to capture the varieties and meanings of spiritual and religious life as it unfolded after the end of solid modernity. The initial moment making researchers aware of this was the publication of Thomas Luckmann's book *The Invisible Religion* in 1960.[1] In this book, Luckmann denounced sociology's blindness vis-à-vis the deeper religious implications of the cultural changes in the West and proposed a neo-Durkheimian reading of individualism, subjectivity and sacrality as they were enfolded in neo-paganist practices, the appropriation of East Asian and Indian spiritualities, the widespread promotion of new bodily techniques aimed at well-being and self-awareness, and subject-oriented technologies of all sorts that target the self as an object of optimization (as in Scientology) or of cosmological wisdom (as in New Age movements more generally). These were neo-Durkheimian practices in the sense of elaborating "a cult of the individual."

From the late 1960s through to the early 1990s, the Western sociology of religion is characterized by the parallelism between these two strands of research: the secularization paradigm on the one hand, and the focus on individualization and the "spiritual turn" on the other, both with their own co-imbrications with capitalism. The secularization paradigm, for its part, saw churches as coming under increasing pressure to rationalize

their strategies under conditions of overall declining demand. Here, Peter Berger (1967) supplied a well-known study exploring how religious bodies bureaucratized in response to the need to differentiate their products, find "market niches" and so on.

A Neo-Durkheimian Age?

More interesting, and also more influential, for current debates were the entanglements of Luckmann's neo-Durkheimian approach with advanced capitalism. While it was only around the turn of the millennium that sociologists began talking of a "Spiritual Revolution" (Heelas et al. 2005), some clearly revolutionary features of this program were already visible in the late 1960s. This is especially true for the ways in which new spiritual practices and the communities sustaining them operated outside the existing religious institutions and began to depend on entirely new recruitment mechanisms. Over the decades to follow, we see an emerging and later consolidating "spiritual marketplace" (Roof 2001) in which emergent forms sociality and spiritual practice do not follow conventional pathways of institutionalization, including the establishment of criteria for membership. Instead, they continue to exist more or less permanently in and through networks and flows, through constantly ephemeral and evanescent means (Hervieu-Léger 2000). This is also why these spiritual practices have been seen as the quintessential religious form of postmodernity.

If membership and participation were no longer regulated through hierarchy-based institutions, this also implied that spiritualities were increasingly to be chosen by people acting as consumers. As a consequence, sociologists began to understand neo-Durkheimian practices more and more in terms of the consumer society and consumer capitalism. In an important sense, the spiritual revolution unfolds as a key form of advanced commodification for which the dual emancipation of believers from the church as a monopoly institution and of "spirituality" from religion (as exclusively appropriated by the church) were necessary conditions. As a consequence, as Possamai (2003) noted, alternative spiritualities have become part of the cultural logic of late capitalism in that they thrive on the appropriation and consumption of elements from popular culture and history.

Of course, as fundamentally individualist projects, New Age and other forms of post-1960s spirituality also resonate with the depoliticiz-

ing logic of late capitalism in that they individualize its pathologies and propose individualized solutions to it. In this regard, neo-Durkheimian spiritualities coalesce with the general therapeutic revolution and late capitalism's therapeutic ethos (Illouz 2008). Spiritual practices even found their way into penitentiary institutions—hallmarks of sovereign power—where inmates were increasingly offered yoga and meditation classes that have become part of pedagogical imaginaries surrounding rehabilitation (Griera and Clot-Garrell 2015). The notion of therapeutization suggests that the contradictions of capitalism are increasingly being defined and interpreted through the hermeneutic of therapy, which again, in its rendition as a product to be purchased in the market, allows for the commodification of the self-same contradictions; in other words, capitalism begins to render productive its own problems and critique in new ways (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006). This is, of course, ironic as alternative and countercultural movements overwhelmingly endeavored to liberate people from capitalism's chains. Yet, eventually their solutions became more symptomatic than subversive of consumer society. This is especially true for self-optimization cults such as Scientology, which explicitly see it as their task to make individuals fit to become successful competitors in the capitalist world.

Religions of Success, Gospels of Prosperity

However, some currents within conversionist (neo-)Pentecostalism in Asia (Hefner 1993), Latin America (Martin 1990) and Africa (Meyer 2007) have also drawn on the notions of the market, competition and entrepreneurialism and developed ideologies to consecrate wealth and consumption and apologies of capitalism. Importantly, such religious communities do address the lack of wherewithal and promote understandings of religious belief and practice as means to liberate people from the shackles of poverty and misery. However, contrary to the theology of liberation of the Christian base communities that had emerged during the 1970s in many parts of Latin America and Africa—that is, in societies where Pentecostalism is most triumphant—they do not construe liberation in terms of a collective socialist project. On the contrary, Pentecostal understandings of human improvement as facilitated by the power of the Holy Spirit that one can only access through charisma and prayer inevitably foreground the individual.

While the advances of Pentecostalism in some parts of Latin America and Africa are linked to the powerful support of American evangelical missions, they also respond to particular local articulations of neoliberalism. In some African countries in the 1990s and 2000s, for instance, people witnessed the emergence of a new, small class of individuals endowed with massive conspicuous wealth that they had acquired seemingly out of nowhere. Popular interpretations of the sources of this wealth ranged from corruption to witchcraft. As Comaroff and Comaroff (2000) noted, these occurrences must be understood against the backdrop of structural adjustment measures, imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which dried up state resources and penalized redistributive policies. In some way, people correctly understood that there were magic means that produced spectacular wealth in financial and speculative economies. And it was in the same context that Pentecostal pastors began to morph into "pastor-preneurs" who conspicuously showed off their wealth in order to demonstrate that, through the power of the Holy Spirit, they had been released from poverty, a poverty that had been caused by evil spirits. They also began to demand "spontaneous sacrifices" in terms of massive monetary contributions from followers that would help them achieve salvation, in other words: liberation from misery, still in this life, and being born again into a world of success (Burchardt 2013). These practices consolidated a magic economy based on the notion of getting rich by giving away that has powerful resonances with neoliberal finance and its practice of selling debts (Sassen 2010).

But how did scholars of religion relate to the new visibility of religion that is expressed in these changes, that is, the emergence of new spiritualities and new expressions of Christianity? Before 1989, scholars were sometimes sympathetic toward the "new religious movements" (as were scholars of political activism working on the "new social movements" on which the former were modeled), especially when these movements were publically denounced as dangerous "sects." However, there was no general sense of scholarly advocacy for the objects of study. While some important researchers had initially been theologians (like José Casanova) or priests (like David Martin), the majority of scholars were secular and went about their research with the soberness and detachment of rationalists. This changed dramatically with the fall of the Berlin Wall, as did the very topics that sociologists and anthropologists of religion had to deal with.

Sociology and Anthropology of Religion after 1989: Religious Diversity, Secularism and Conversion-Led Movements as New Frontiers

Migration-Driven Religious Diversity

Looking at the contemporary moment, it quickly becomes clear that the focus of research has shifted dramatically. While concerns over new spiritualities are still important, in the globalized world the major sensibilities with regard to religion have moved toward "conversion-led religious movements" (Lehmann 2013)—especially Pentecostalism and Islam—on the one hand and migration-driven diversity and secularism on the other. The unleashing of worldwide migratory movements and the multiplication of diasporas that have increased ethnic and religious diversities in many societies brought to the fore issues of culture and belonging. Migrations have precipitated processes whereby notions of religion, culture, territoriality and citizenship have been partially separated.

In many Western nations, the resulting questions concerning rights, belonging, national identity, and everyday coexistence have been framed in the discourse of multiculturalism. More recently, however, we observed that both the struggles for recognition by minorities and governmental attempts at integration have been recast in religious idioms, largely redefining issues of multiculturalism in terms of religious pluralism. In the process, historically shaped arrangements regulating the relationships between religion and the state have been challenged, as have normative understandings of the place of religion in modern secular and democratic societies. All of these challenges and the particular social and political responses to them, it seems, are manifest in controversies in the public sphere, which I see as the prime locus of religious revitalization today. In some parts of the world, these controversies express historically shaped patterns of secularity (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012).

Secularization and Secularism

Looking at the dynamics of these controversies, it becomes clear that the hitherto dominant framework of the sociology of religion, namely secularization theory, has little to offer in terms of explanatory value. The critique of secularization theory has contributed to a much more nuanced understanding of the complexities and particularities of developments in

different national contexts, different religious traditions and different historical circumstances in both the West and beyond. In Western sociological discourse, this was expressed in the discussions about "European Exceptionalism" and "American Exceptionalism" (Berger et al. 2008). However, anthropological critiques of secularization theory (Asad 2003) have also called attention to the now blatantly visible Eurocentric leanings of the very assumptions of the concept of secularization and its epistemological cognates.

These developments have had two crucial implications. First, they were accompanied by important reformulations of theories of modernity, most notably by the emergence of the "multiple modernities" approach and its rise as a new paradigm at the interface of civilizational analysis and the sociology of religion. In the process, formerly held assumptions about modernization precipitating the final convergence of forms of life and the mutual dependence of modernization and secularization gradually withered away. Secondly, they have drawn attention to the specific Christian historicity of modern historical processes of secularization (Casanova 2006) and its implications for the meanings of the concept of the secular. Casanova, for instance, argued that, in the context of Chinese religions such as Confucianism and Taoism, the concept of secularization hardly makes any sense, as these religions have always been distinctly worldly and are not characterized by any major tension between transcendence and immanence that is fundamental to the notion of the secular.

These genealogical inquiries and analytical advances have been crucial for the development of a new sociological realism with regard to religion and secularism, but they have also engendered a number of conceptual difficulties. First, it is certainly necessary to dismantle some of the public myths and narratives about secularism in Europe and elsewhere, the most powerful of which are ideas about the internal connections between secularism, modernity, progress and democracy, as well as the notion that secularism itself provides equal opportunities and equitable religious freedoms. Simultaneously, however, the promotion of religious influence on politics and religious diversity as end in itself, instead of a means toward an end, does not make societies more egalitarian either.

Secondly, empirical and analytical critiques of secularization theories as inaccurate or reductive have been enmeshed with normative critiques of secularism as oppressive, partial and particularistic. Together they have formed an anti-secularist affect in contemporary academia that produces narratives that are sometimes as contradictory as the secularist preten-

sions they seek to dismantle (Gourgouris 2008: 453). On the one hand, the secular is seen as vanishing, either empirically, through global religious resurgences, or conceptually, through the genealogical deconstruction of its epistemological assumptions. On the other hand, especially in governmentality-inspired accounts of the powers of the secular modern, secularism is seen as omnipotent in shaping and regulating "religious subjectivities, practices, and forms of life" (Mahmood 2008: 464) and in producing religious sensibilities that are compatible with sovereign state power under the regime of political liberalism. In these accounts, religious identities, practices and expressions are always already products of the alignments of secularism, state power and empire, rendering the historical variations of secularism in form and degree negligible.[2] In this perspective, even US foreign policy under George W. Bush, with its explicitly Christian legitimizing formulae for military intervention, becomes and is analyzed as a secularist project (Mahmood 2006). Are such the powers of the secular modern?

The first of these perspectives, the idea that secularity vanishes through religious resurgences, misses the point that religion has rather become contemporaneous with the secular modern (Göle 2010: 44). Governmentalist perspectives, by contrast, sometimes underestimate the internal variations of secularism or fail to capture and theorize the multiple resistances against secularist state power, the indigenizations and transmutations of secularism outside the Western world, as well as the manifold pragmatic compromises between religious and secular claims (Casanova 2006).

Thirdly, when it comes to secularism and secularization outside the Western world, one is often faced with two opposed approaches, leaving one to choose between a rock and a hard place. According to the first, because of the specifically Christian historicity of the notion of the secular, secularism per se is regarded as an alien concept to non-Western societies and cultures and therefore inappropriate as an analytical category that can only yield methodological artifacts. In the second approach, which often underpins positivistic survey research, employing the category of the secular in non-Western contexts to study the diverse manifestations of the secular is relatively unproblematic. As Göle (2010: 43) points out, however, both approaches are reductionist, as they ignore the influence of Western secular modernity in the way it has unfolded through military conquest, colonialism, the globalization of the model of the nation-state, the proliferation of a world polity (Meyer 2000) and world culture (Lechner and Boli 2008), and myriad practices of emulation and

imitation. Especially the emphasis on the uniqueness of local cultures and on cultural differences has given rise to the idea that the construction of adequate, non-ethnocentric categories of comparison is indeed impossible. For a comparative cultural sociology of secularity that aims to explore the multiple manifestations of the secular, its cultural refractions and indigenous traditions while taking into account the diverse cross-civilizational entanglements, this idea can only be a dead end (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012). Significantly, uncritical scholarly framings of the "West" as secular and the "Rest" as religious inadvertently accept parts of the Huntington's legacy, which they would otherwise clearly oppose.

The critique of classic secularization theory, outlined above, can be reduced to three fundamental objections: (1) its alleged universalism, (2) its underlying teleology and evolutionism, and (3) its modernist normative bias. Overall, however, these critiques themselves are highly normative. While the secularization paradigm is often considered Eurocentric and anti-religious, recent research generally fashions itself as sympathetic toward religion. Many studies call forth the impression that there is a "natural" religiosity among populations worldwide, as well as an ideological secularism founded on an alliance between political and academic elites.

When compared to debates before 1989, recent contributions often engender an inversion of the subject and object of the critique: whereas secularism used to be regarded as a means of liberation from the constraints of traditional and religious authority, religion now appears as a space of freedom, and secularism as an instrument of regimentation and exclusion. The heightened awareness of secularism's articulation with power relations and knowledge regimes—including in the production of religious forms of subjectivity and expression that are compatible with liberal modernity—leads to one-sidedness when it downplays the autonomy associated with modernity and secularity against moments of domination, and then dismisses them in the name of religious freedom. The triumphalism with which scholars have generally endorsed the new significance and visibility of religion is associated to the symbolic rehabilitation of their research subject and its presumed ability to question social boundaries in new ways. More importantly still, it is associated with the notion that the rehabilitation of religion feeds into new forms of empowerment of the oppressed.

In this context, it seems to me that the contemporary sociological and anthropological critique of power and the state is better understood if viewed less through the angle of its object than its subject. In sociology, critical social theory and research suffered heavily from the end of the

Cold War and the end of the socialist dream. While some critical energy was channeled into support for new social movements, especially those of the World Social Forum variety, it was also channeled into support for religious groups constructed as suffering at the hands of an oppressive secularist and undemocratic state that curtails individual and collective freedoms in order to secure sovereign power (Bader 2007). While within sociological and anthropological discourse with its enthusiasm for religion's emancipation, states' power over religion was increasingly taken for granted, the power of religion over people was largely obliterated as a field of concern. This seems to hold even if we take the critical scholarship on fundamentalism into account. As a critical concept, for many reasons fundamentalism has largely disappeared from scholarly debates, while its most extreme manifestations of its subject matter, such as violent religious radicalism, are now mostly dealt with as lying outside the realm of religion proper, as terrorism pertaining to the purview of security studies.

As for anthropology, the enthusiasm for religion and its presumed emancipatory potential is linked to the gradual disappearance of tribal communities as anthropology's long-standing and main object of scholarly advocacy. Tellingly, anthropology's engagement with religious communities more or less coincides with the rise of globalization, understood in the first instance as the globalization of capitalism and its abstract forms of social organization. Needless to say, processes of globalization were greatly accelerated by the end of the Cold War, as was research into Christian, especially Pentecostal, Islamic, Hindu and other religious communities, which were seen as formulating their own modernities, their own notions of globalization, their own cosmopolitanisms, each time with an emphasis on the local, the particular, the communal. In this vein, so to speak, religion turned in scholarly imagination into a "warm place" in a "cold world"—warm in the sense of community based. As a consequence, scholars criticized ad nauseam, and denounced as Western, any conceptions of religion that would question the community dimension of religion.

Transnational Mobility Regimes: Diversity, Capital, Labor

In contemporary Europe, the most interesting and least researched entanglements of religion and neoliberal capitalism are meanwhile unfolding through pervasive discourses and policies promoting diversity. While initially geared toward a rethinking of the links of disability- and gender-based

marginalization and discrimination with migration-driven ethnicity and ethnically based exclusion, in recent years diversity policies has increasingly addressed questions of religion. However, it is often forgotten that state and supra-state policies directed toward social inclusion through the promotion of religious diversity are principally inspired not only by concerns over the rights of minorities per se. While anti-discrimination policies are normatively justified by liberal democratic values, an important goal of diversity promotion is indeed not only to respond to but also to *make possible* the circulation of labor for the greatest benefit of capital, while recognizing that this labor sometimes comes with religious characteristics and needs that must be catered for in order to be incorporated. From this perspective, the political and legal promotion of religious diversity is thus a by-product of the transnationalization of labor markets.

These economic imperatives underlying religious diversity are accompanied on the one hand by the confluence of diverse culturalized strands of identity politics (European Christian conservative, Islamic) and on the other by the rise of religion as a category of legal protection against discrimination in Western judicial politics, as well as minority rights and human rights discourses more broadly. As claims in the name of religion have acquired greater legitimacy (Koenig 2005), in religiously diverse liberal polities people are increasingly incited to understand themselves as religious beings and to construe their participation in society in terms deriving from religious membership.

The promotion of religious diversity, like diversity regimes more generally, has partially displaced earlier discourses and policies around multiculturalism. In a well-known critique, Slavoj Žižek (1997) argued that multiculturalism was the ideal form of the ideology of global capitalism. He saw multiculturalism as the "attitude which, from a kind of empty global position, treats each local culture the way the colonizer treats colonized people—as 'natives' whose mores are to be carefully studied and 'respected'." He went on to state that "in the same way that global capitalism involves the paradox of colonization without the colonizing Nation-State metropole, multiculturalism involves patronizing Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without roots in one's own culture" (Žižek 1997, 44). In a related critique, Bauman (2011: 46, see also Hocking in this volume) observed that multiculturalism as a theory of cultural pluralism that postulates the support of liberal tolerance for identities is a conservative force.

> Its achievement is the transformation of social inequality, a phenomenon highly unlikely to win general approval, into the guise of "cultural diversity," that is to say, a phenomenon deserving of universal respect and careful cultivation. Through this linguistic measure, the moral ugliness of poverty turns, as if by the touch of a fairy's wand, into the aesthetic appeal of "cultural diversity." The fact that any struggle for recognition is doomed to failure so long as it is not supported by the practice of redistribution gets lost from view along the way.

Now, as states and cities recognize cultural diversity, they increasingly address people on the basis of their membership in groups, organized as categories of allegiance. In doing so, they increasingly incite people to view themselves and their own form of being in these same terms. There have been trenchant critiques of the essentialisms that accompany these ways of governing people. Other scholars, in turn, have defended multiculturalism against these critiques. Yet, as a regime that handles the effects of transnational mobility, diversity is clearly linked to the operations of multinational capital, as Žižek showed.

Conclusions

Why does this matter for the relationship between religion and neoliberal capitalism? I suggest that the rise of religion is in a strong sense the rise of religious identities that should be respected and cultivated within a regime of cultural diversity, and that religious diversity is today perhaps the most powerful articulation of this regime. Beaman (2013) calls this "the will to religion," which should be analyzed in terms of "obligatory religious citizenship." In a similar vein, and with particular reference to Islam, Tezcan (2007) notes how religion is increasingly conceptualized as a resource used by liberal governmentality in an effort to secure social order. Such transformations can be observed in the practices of "government through community" (ibid.: 59) and the rise of interreligious dialogs, which prefigure the shift from "race" to "faith" and are premised on the construction of a *Homo Islamicus* of sorts.[3] In order to understand these shifts, which run in parallel to the transformation of "community" from natural spontaneous social units into a mode of governance, it is important to recall their links with the premises of liberal governmentality. "Individuals are to be governed through their freedom," as Rose (1996: 41) noted from a Foucauldian perspective some time ago, "but neither as

isolated atoms of classical political economy, nor as citizens of society, but as members of heterogeneous communities of allegiance."

If one wishes to acquire a better understanding of the power and significance of religion today and at the same time reflexively and critically explore the *doxa* of the construction of religion as a research subject, one should therefore scrutinize the ways in which not only the secular state but religion itself are implicated in technologies of governmentality in which people are categorized, classified, named and rendered legible through and with religion.

Notes

1. For a review on the impact of the book on German-speaking debates, see Wohlrab-Sahr (2003).
2. For this criticism, see also Casanova (2006).
3. On the British variant of this story, see Schönwälder (2007).

References

Asad, Talal. 2003. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bader, Veit. 2007. *Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. *Liquid Modernity.* Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons.

———. 2011. *Culture in a Liquid Modern World.* Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons.

Beaman, Lori G. 2013. The Will to Religion: Obligatory Religious Citizenship. *Critical Research on Religion* 1(2): 141–157.

Berger, Peter L. 1967. *The Sacred Canopy.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

———., ed. 1999. *The De-secularization of the World.* Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center.

Berger, Peter L., Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas 2008. *Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variation.* Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.

Boltanski, Luc, and Eve Chiapello. 2005. The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso.

Burchardt, Marian. 2013. Belonging and Success: Religious Vitality and the Politics of Urban Space in Cape Town. In *Topographies of Faith: Religion in Urban Spaces*, ed. I. Becci, M. Burchardt, and J. Casanova, 165–185. Boston and Leiden: Brill.

Casanova, José. 2006. Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad. In *Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors*, ed. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind, 12–30. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

———. 2007. Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism: A European Union/ United States Comparison. In *Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism*, ed. Thomas Banchoff, 59–83. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2009. The Secular and Secularisms. *Social Research* 76(4): 1049–1066.

———. 2011. Cosmopolitanism, the Clash of Civilizations and Multiple Modernities. *Current Sociology* 59(2): 252–267.

Chaves, Marc. 2011. *American Religion: Contemporary Trends*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff. 2000. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming. *Public Culture* 12(2): 291–343.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 1973. *Tradition, change, and modernity*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

———. 1987. *Patterns of Modernity: Beyond the West*. New York: New York University Press.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (Ed.). 2002. *Multiple modernities*. New York: Transaction Publishers.

———. 2000. Multiple Modernities. *Daedalus* 129: 1–29.

———. 2009. *Scales of Justice: Re-imagining Political Space in a Globalizing World*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gauthier, Francois, and Tuomas Martikainen, eds. 2013. *Religion in the Neoliberal Age: Political Economy and Modes of Governance*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Göle, Nilüfer. 2010. Manifestations of the Religious-Secular Divide: Self, State, and the Public Sphere. In *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, ed. Linell E. Cady and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, 41–53. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gourgouris, Stathis. 2008. Detranscendentalizing the Secular. *Public Culture* 20(3): 437–445.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm. 2007. *Die Wiederkehr der Götter: Religion in der modernen Kultur*. München: C.H. Beck.

Griera, Mar and Anna Clot-Garrell. 2015. Doing Yoga Behind Bars: A Sociological Study of the Growth of Holistic Spirituality in Penitentiary Institutions. In *Religious Diversity in European Prisons*, ed. Irene Becci and Olivier Roy, 141–157. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2006. Religion in the Public Sphere. *European Journal of Philosophy* 14(1): 1–25.

Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heelas, Paul, Scott Lash and Paul Morris, eds. 1996. *Detraditionalization: Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Heelas, Paul, Linda Woodhead, with Benjamin Seel, Bronislaw Szerszinski and Karin Tusting. 2005. *The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality*. London: Blackwell.

Hefner, Robert W., ed. 1993. *Conversion to Christianity: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives on a Great Transformation*. Los Angeles, Berkeley and London: University of California Press.

Hervieu-Léger, Daniéle. 2000. *Religion as a Chain of Memory*, 133. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New Delhi: Penguin Books India.

Illouz, Eva. 2008. *Saving the Modern Soul: Therapy, Emotions, and the Culture of Self-help*. California: Univ of California Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Koenig, Matthias. 2005. Incorporating Muslim Migrants in Western Nation States: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 6(2): 219–234.

Lechner, Frank J. and John Boli. 2008. *World Culture: Origins and Consequences*. John Wiley & Sons.

Lehmann, David. 2013. Religion as Heritage, Religion as Belief: Shifting Frontiers of Secularism in Europe, the USA and Brazil. *International Sociology* 28(6): 645–662.

Luckmann, Thomas. 1967. *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*. New York: Macmillan.

Mahmood, Saba. 2006. Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation. *Public Culture* 18(2): 323–347.

———. 2008. Is Critique Secular? A Symposium at UC Berkeley. *Public Culture* 20(3): 447–452.

Martin, David. 1990. *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America*. Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell.

Meyer, John W. 2000. Globalization Sources and Effects on National States and Societies. *International Sociology* 15(2): 233–248.

Meyer, Birgit. 2007. Pentecostalism and Neo-liberal Capitalism: Faith, Prosperity and Vision in African Pentecostal-Charismatic Churches. *Journal for the Study of Religion* 20(2): 5–28.

Parson, Talcott and Georg M. Platt, with Neil J. Smelser, and J. Toby. 1973. *The American University*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Possamai, Adam. 2003. Alternative Spiritualities and the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. *Culture and Religion* 4(1): 31–45.

Riesebrodt, Martin. 2000. *Die Rückkehr der Religionen: Fundamentalismus und der "Kampf der Kulturen"*. München: C.H. Beck.

Roof, Wade C. 2001. *Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rose, Nicolas. 1996. Governing Advanced Liberal Democracies. In *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism, and Rationalities of Government*,

ed. A. Barry, T. Osborne, and N.S. Rose, 37–64. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Sassen, Saskia. 2010. A Savage Sorting of Winners and Losers: Contemporary Versions of Primitive Accumulation. *Globalizations* 7(1–2): 23–50.

Schönwälder, Karen. 2007. Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt und kulturelle Differenz: Muslime und Debatten über Muslime in Großbritannien. *Soziale Welt. Sonderband* 17: 241–260.

Tezcan, Levent. 2007. Kultur, Gouvernementalität der Religion und der Integrationsdiskurs. *Soziale Welt. Sonderband* 17: 51–76.

Tugal, Cihan. 2009. *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Wagner, Peter. 2002. *A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline*. London: Routledge.

Weber, Max. 1998. *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Hinduismus und Buddhismus. Schriften 1916–1920*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.

Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika. 2003. "Luckmann 1960" und die Folgen. Neuere Entwicklungen in der deutschsprachigen Religionssoziologie. In *Soziologische Forschung: Stand und Perspektiven*, 427–448. Opladen: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika, and Marian Burchardt. 2012. Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities. *Comparative Sociology* 11(6): 875–909.

Žižek, Slavoj. 1997. Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism. *New Left Review* I/225(September–October): 28–51.

The Last Men before the Last: A Russian Messianic Revival in the Twilight of History

Dominic Martin

Introduction

This chapter presents an ethnographic case study, the "revival" of a tradition of ancient Russian Orthodoxy, as an empirical mirror to critically reflect the epistemological paradigm shifts that simultaneously occurred within Western social sciences. The religious revival on which the chapter focuses took place within a military-industrial monotown in the remote Far East of Russia when the country was suffering from a fire-sale privatization under the guidance of the IMF policy of "shock therapy." Meanwhile, a group of young ex-communist youth league members (*komsomol*) established a religious community that functioned according to the principles of mutual aid and collective action. The community flourished in the window between the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991 and the ascendency of the "ordo-liberalism" (Foucault 2007) that emerged with the regrouping of state power under Vladimir Putin's premiership in the 2000s.

The immediate post-Soviet aftermath did not give birth to rationalistic capitalism in the Russian Far East, but rather unleashed violent quasi-feudal modes of "primitive accumulation" (Harvey 2005). Most ordinary people not involved in these new risky circuits of exchange, however, relied on

D. Martin (✉)
Division of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK

155

the basal functioning of the remnants of the Soviet social state (Collier 2011). It was therefore in the interphase *between* two economic regimes, between the collapse of the centrally planned economy of provisioning on the one hand and installation of governmental ordo-liberalism on the other, that this Old Believer community formed and flourished. It is not a coincidence that, in the single monocity within a thousand-mile radius to retain its state subsidies, a re-transcription of some elements of communist society was accomplished by ex-*komsomol* activists who, freed up from state supervision, grafted these communist vestiges into the soil of alternative traditions and thereby concocted an unexpected hybrid that can only but appear monstrous when reflected in the mirror of the post–Cold War social scientific paradigm.

I argue that, in the interregnum between the regimes of neo-liberal capitalism and state socialism, these former *komsomol* activists achieved a blending of communist and liberal values and practices that defies the binary logic of this paradigm, which collected together such disparate elements as democracy, law, modernity, human rights, freedom and free markets together into a single package. This ideological assemblage was set in polar opposition to an overdetermined variant of "communist society," which was characterized in turn as liberalism's totalitarian, inhuman, and economically obsolete anti-type. This discursive paradigm casts the corruption and organized crime that flourished in Russia at this time as the result of the toxic legacy of so-called "communism" an atavistic holdover which was blocking Russia's road to rejoining the fast lane of capitalist modernity.

Yet, this Old Believer community took elements from the communist tradition and from pre-revolutionary Russian Orthodoxy to forge a bricolage that combined such values as communal ownership and labor for the benefit of the collective together with supposedly antithetical "liberal" values, such as a desire for economic self-sufficiency independent of state control. If one version of resurgent Russian Orthodoxy is the political-theological analog to the autocratically ordered liberalism of Vladimir Putin's "Capitalism with Orthodox values," then the tradition of Russian Christianity on which these young activists drew presented a plausible exemplar of a genuinely indigenous Russian *Wirtschaftsethik* (Weber 1904). One can thereby observe an elective affinity between the transitional mode of production that held sway in 1990s Russia, and the advocacy of a moderate "third way" to Russian modernization, as embodied in a local revival of priestly Old Belief. Post-Soviet demonetization

spurred the growth of this communistic, self-sufficient Christian *oikos*. This chapter uses ethnography to question why such hybrids of supposedly antithetical "liberal" and so-called "communist" values have been hitherto rendered anomalous by a post–Cold War social scientific paradigm, which slices the spectrum of human political possibilities into an ideologically freighted opposition between two hackneyed stereotypes of "communism" and "liberalism."

Genesis, Conflict, Uproar, and Schism

My doctoral research has examined the "revival" within the former Soviet Union of the Old Belief, a tradition of Orthodox Christianity that for three centuries has rejected the liturgical reforms of the state-backed Russian Orthodox Church. This project has comprised extensive ethnographic research in locations and archives in Ukraine, Siberia and especially in the Russian Far East, where I spent a year living among Old Believers communities, including a monastery in the "closed" city of Bolshoi Kamen'. This latter community, located within a network of abandoned military barracks, became in the 1990s the center for several hundred young converts who, led by a former *komsomol* (communist youth league) secretary and Hare Krishna devotee, spearheaded the restoration of the priestly tradition of Old Belief: the Belokrinitskaya Hierarchy. My dissertation *Zealots of Piety: Old Orthodox Revival in a "Closed" Post-Soviet City (1989–2014)* describes how and why this community creatively recycled many of the material, political and ethical norms and forms of socialist modernity into an Ancient Orthodox community.

Old Belief is a Russian Orthodox religious movement that formed in the seventeenth century in the wake of the liturgical changes that the Patriarch of the Russian Church, Nikon, tried to impose violently on the Russian population, with the support of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. Led by the recalcitrant prelate Avvakum, the Old Believers (*starovery*) refused these blasphemous changes, and were branded as "schismatics" (*raskolniki*) and persecuted for two centuries by the Russian state. They divided into two branches: the priestless (*bezpopovtsy*), who held that the Tsar's apostasy had forever deprived the world of a legitimate priesthood; and the priestly (*popovtsy*), who accepted the possibility of re-establishing the priesthood as long as the hierarchs repented from their heretical deviations. The Bolshoi Kamen' Christians belonged to the "Belokrinitskaya Hierarchy," the branch of Old Believers who managed to re-establish the three-rank

hierarchy of the Church thanks to the defection in 1846 of the bishop of Sarajevo, Ambrosius. This hierarchy was located in the town of Bielo Krinits in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, hence the name. This Church grew so much in the 60 years between its foundation and declaration of religious freedom within the Russian Empire in 1905 that in its "silver age" (1905–1917) the state Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) considered it a genuine competitor for parishioners, and therefore a dangerous rival (Melnikov 2005).

The development of the Far Eastern Old Orthodox revival, recounted in my thesis, reached its critical and climatic phase at a point of schism in 2007 when, in the context of a church-wide synod or *sobor*, the young Far Eastern zealots rejected the authority and legitimacy of the national Old Believer church leadership. At this conciliar junction, the aspiration of the Far Eastern periphery to resurrect the autarkic and democratic ideals of Orthodox community (*sobornost'*) came up against the centralizing and hierarchical imperatives of the Muscovite ecclesiastical metropole, as that institution at the inducement of the Russian state (and its proxy, the Russian Orthodox Church) tried to reintroduce the "vertical" of Church power.

The schism reveals two different possible trajectories of post-Soviet Old Orthodox tradition: one in which the Old Belief concedes the ground of religious hegemony to the state Church in order to secure for itself a favorable sinecure as the privileged keeper of Ancient Russian "culture"; the other an attempt to reignite the eternal flame of Old Belief's resistance to all attempts to suborn it into a hegemonic order. In this instance, the two rivals' relationship to Orthodox "revival" revolve around the archetypical figure in Orthodox tradition of the apostolic truth-speaker and bold upbraider of sovereign excesses: the zealot of piety.

An archeology of this exemplary model-character yields two concepts that Russia received from the source culture of Eastern Orthodoxy, late antique Greece. These two concepts, *parrhesia* and *thumos*, which arose within the nascent democratic political culture of fourth and fifth century BC Athens, have been significant keywords in the discourse that has accompanied the government of selves and societies for almost three millennia. These two concepts have been re-used by Old Orthodox Christians to defend the ground zero of Christian tradition, faith in the event of the "Christ Crucified." The guardians of this divine kernel are emboldened by the historically embedded moral sentiment of zeal. I argue in this chapter that zeal is a necessary condition of this fidelity to the Christ event

(Badiou 2003); that it keeps the possibility of (Christian) historical action alive. Yet the prevailing cynical, ironic and nihilist moods of a putatively post-communist and post-historical era militate against taking such a living relationship to messianic history seriously. Without the trusty guard dog of zeal to alert the pastor to the threats to the flock, however, both the flock and the pastor are liable to be gobbled up by the wolves of powerful political-economic interest.

During the 2000s the Russian Orthodox Old Believer Church (ROOBC) had tried to follow the example of the state Church and centralize the administrative and economic apparatuses of Church government (Mitrokhin 2004). Parish and diocesan tithes were to be transferred directly to the Rogozhnoe Cemetery (ROOBC headquarters in Moscow), whence, after passing through the Metropolitan's financial director, funds would be re-distributed back to the communities. As the least developed diocese, however, the Far East sought and was granted an exemption from this command since it had barely even reached a self-sustaining level, let alone be able to pay taxes to Moscow.

The Far Easterners from the beginning of their voluntary entry into the *Belokrinitskaya* hierarchy in 1995 often found reasons to revolt against episcopal subordination. The bravery of the young Christian aspirants in the face of episcopal power abuses signaled that they were recovering from "the disease of servility" with which the Communist epoch had blighted them. The main symptom of the "disease of servility" was silence. Father Elisey, the charismatic archpriest and leader of the Bolshoi Kamen' community, himself a former *komsomol* secretary, wrote in a fiery polemic, reminding that the great Church Father, John Chrysostom, had taught the laity never to unquestionably rely on their pastors. The article related how the freedom to speak up and out for Orthodoxy knows no hierarchical bounds: "In the Church—says Chrysostom—there is space neither for on-high bosses nor slavish subordinates … If the latter leaders do not say something useful, let the other arise and speak even though he is lesser; if he suggest something useful prefer his opinion even though he was the last: do not ignore him." Elisey's article identified those people who were silent when the faith was in danger as the "cold and lukewarm" who demonstrated the anti-virtue of "lying humility" (*lzhe-smirenie)*. Stout-hearted defenders of Orthodoxy, on the other hand, who spoke out courageously against heretical pastors evidenced that quality that had particularly distinguished the Old Belief's progenitors, Avvakum and Boyarina Morozova: fiery zeal.

Old Believers had looked on without surprise as the last vestiges of *sobornost'* within the post-Soviet ROC had dissolved when Patriarch Aleksei II had failed to convene the all-general *sobor* that had been promised for the year 2000. Insider critics remarked that the ROC was returning to the ossified top-down structure that had characterized the synodal period from Peter the Great until the Revolution.[1] This was mirrored by legal and jurisdictional changes that in practice abolished the ROC parishes as independent juridical personalities (CF Mitrokhin).

Old Believers, on the other hand, had traditionally distinguished and prided themselves on their preservation of *sobornost'*. For Old Believers, the principle of Church hierarchy (*svyashchenonachalie*) was always within a framework and in service of more general principle of Church democracy (*sobornost'*), which extended from the parish to the diocese up to the Church-wide level. It must be remembered that for almost two centuries the Old Believer Church had survived without any formal hierarchical structure whatsoever. Those men who held priestly rank were not alienated from the communities that they served, but were selected by and subordinate to a council of laypeople. Speaking of the Old Belief before the (post-) Soviet period, the Old Believer lay-saint historian Feodor Melnikov wrote: "In the Old Orthodox Church there is not a class or caste (*soslovnyi*) of priesthood; rather it has a priesthood of the people (*narodnoe*), which are genuinely picked by the laity from their own communities. That's why the priests are close, family (*rodnoe*), and one's own (*svoe*). And the laity are not nominal members of the Church but a vital spiritual building block" (Melnikov 2005: 468). The impression that this ancient Orthodox norm of having the laity choose their priests and bishop was disappearing became a major grievance with the Old Believer rank-and-file in the post-Soviet period.

Attempts to gerrymander the appointment of a new Old Believer Metropolitan in both 2003 and 2004 were the catalyst for open conflict. As Metropolitan Alympii lay dying, an extraordinary meeting of the *soviet* to the Metropolitan was called in Moscow with such haste and little notice that, because of the distances involved, the delegates from Ukraine, Moldova and the Far East were all but barred from attending. The Far Eastern zealots sprang into action and printed off thousands of copies of a polemical pamphlet that railed against these blatant violations of procedure and canon: the forcing through of candidates for the episcopate, the illegal sentencing of priests and laypeople to canonical prohibition in absentia, the single-handed authorization of Church-wide decisions without prior

conciliar discussion, the falsification of Church minutes and decrees. The warning signs were clear. A decisive moment had arrived in history when it was necessary to follow Avvakum's example again and defend Orthodoxy: "The History of the Church knows many cases when the laity broke off from fallen pastors, or when clerics ran away from unorthodox patriarchs," wrote the Far Easterners in their polemical pamphlet, "Sadly, we are writing another page in this same history. But what else can we do? Otherwise despotism and arbitrariness will reign in the Church without limits."[2] This resistance initially paid off, and the young and popular Adrian, Bishop of Kazan, was chosen as successor in preference to Alympii's corrupt and domineering brother, Leonid. However, the benign Adrian lasted only a few months in office before dropping dead with heart failure. Adrian's replacement was Konstantine Titov (Metropolitan Kornelius), a former communist party member who came from the Old Believer heartland of lower Muscovy on the Guslits river (*Orekhovo-Zuyevo*). He had been a bishop for just five months, after having been ordained a priest only a year prior to that. As a layperson, Titov had been a strong advocate of the so-called Uniate course (*edinoverie*) which sought Old Belief's rapprochement (and eventual re-unification) with the state-Church.

Kornelius' election also coincided with a significant intensification of the Russian state's interest in Orthodox affairs. The second presidency of Vladimir Putin had been crowned off by an enormous ceremonial fanfare in the Kremlin on May 17, 2007. The putative cause of this ceremony was the re-unification of the ROC with the ROC Abroad, the emigré Church that had split off from the mother Church after Patriarch Tikon had made a concordat with Soviet power in the 1920s. Following this event, a discourse of "Orthodox Unity" began to circulate in the press. The ROC's department for External Affairs was the main mover behind this media campaign, especially the statements made by its head, Metropolitan Kirill (Gudyaev). The Metropolitan, who in 18 months would himself become Patriarch, singled out the Old Believers as his next targets for implementing the project of "Orthodox Unity": it was high time, he said, that centuries of "mutual misunderstanding" were overcome.

In the summer before the next forthcoming Old Believer *sobor*, the new Metropolitan Kornelius flung himself into a series of engagements that brought him into contact with the leaders of other "confessions." At the "All World People's Gathering" of 2007, he was brought before the state-sponsored ROC Patriarch Alexei II, Nikonian commander-in-chief. The two leaders embraced and exchanged a ceremonial kiss (*lobyzanie*) the

symbolic import of which could not be lost on Old Believers throughout Russia. A picture of the encounter naturally spread like wildfire over the Old Believer internet and during the summer that followed a movement of resistance was organized to counter the Metropolitan's new course. The Far Eastern diocese mobilized its considerable powers of agitprop to this side. A fiery Old Believer monk called Olympius, an ex-gymnast and himself formerly amanuensis to ROC Metropolitan Kirill in Smolensk, who lived in an hermitage in *Selognovo* forrest (but with internet access!), wrote an "open letter" addressed to the *sobor*, which denounced the politics of "ecumenical tolerance" as the "heresy of heresies." Two hundred Old Believer clergy and laity appended their signatures to the "open letter." Kornelius tried to sidestep the mounting criticism by claiming that Aleksei II had caught him off guard. His detractors were unconvinced: "This excuse is pardonable for an absent-minded schoolgirl, but for the leader of the Church of Christ is so unacceptable, that it defines less your innocence, than your negligence towards your flock, which you obviously treat not as a flock but a blind herd! (…) You, our leader, sit at the high table *somewhere to the left* of the first hierarch of the Nikonian heresy!"

An essay circulating at that time, Monk Daniel's "Communism as Mystical-occult Teaching of a Satanic Bent," caused a particular outcry, as it argued that Communism was a pagan religion and that those who had willingly entered into the party's ranks were apostates and were thereby forbidden from holding priestly rank. The vast majority of the Far Eastern wing of resistance were younger than the Metropolitan, who was born in 1946. Although most had not been members of the Party, many younger clerics such as Archpriest Elisey and Father Alexander Pankratov, and the main Old Believer publicist-activists-laymen, Andrei Ezerov and Alexander Pisarevskii, had been prominent in the *komsomol* and, to their critics, their dealings betrayed a "*komsomol* style."

The *sobor* was convened in Moscow in the autumn of 2007. Since their internal dispute was first on the *sobor* agenda, the Far Easterners decamped *en masse* to Moscow. The week-long journey on the Trans-Siberian railroad gave them time to lay out their battle-plan. Not only did Father Elisey and the other Far Eastern priests embark on the journey, also in the retinue were many lay delegates. The build-up to the *sobor* had been too stormy to allow for rational scrutiny of the issues. It was clear that battle lines had been drawn well before the assembly gathered. Delegates had complained of the squeezing of the agenda. On the second day of

the *sobor*, Father Elisey, who had become the de facto resistance leader and the Metropolitan's chief detractor, confronted Kornelius outright: "I don't believe in your Orthodoxy, your eminence!" Elisey then asked the Metropolitan to give a declaration of his faith and to reaffirm the denunciation of the Nikonian heresy, a speech act traditionally performed by the Metropolitan at every *sobor*. But the Metropolitan dismissed this offer. In turn Elisey refused to be seated and started a diatribe against Metropolitan's heterodoxy. According to onlookers, the Archpriest got carried away and began to shout with the "zeal of God" (*revnost' po bozhe*). An uproar erupted at the young priest's audacity. From the seat of the older established clergy shouts went up of "provocateurs!" "a band," "enemies of the Church." The chairman encouraged this clatter.

Next morning, the Metropolitan began proceedings with an apology, in which he admitted that through inexperience and imprudence he had made certain mistakes in inter-confessional interaction. Despite this verbal acknowledgement of guilt, however, the *sobor* was asked to pass a decree that affirmed that the Metropolitan was innocent of any canonical crime, thereby bullet-proofing the hierarch against any attempt to impeach him before a canonical court. At this suggestion, Father Elisey leapt up and cried: "You'll break up the Church!" The *ecclesia* again drowned out his protests; shouts were heard of "He's a paid agent!" Elisey received his second warning from the chairman (a third and he would be ejected from the *sobor*).

The vote was adjourned until after lunch. Reconvened, the assembly majority started to file in and cast their votes to exculpate Kornelius; the minority that included the Far Easterners, Monks Olympius and Daniel, and the other lay critics rowdily barged into the meeting late. While the gathering neatly went about the business of validating point 4.1 on the bishops' guiltlessness, Father Elisey started to swagger around the auditorium, bellowing, "They've gathered here a satan's coven (*satanicheskoe sborishche*), haven't they?" Another prominent zealot, Father Alexander Chernogor, started to thrash around and brandish wildly the *kormchaia kniga*,[3] which he tried to throw at the Metropolitan. In the midst of this uproar, the leading delegates also called for a bill to depose these offending clerics. Before they could do so, before even they could pass the bill exculpating the Metropolitan, however, the rebels as one stood up and left unceremoniously, with the rest of the assembly hurling abuse at them.

There was one epithet that was applied to the wing of resistance during the *sobor* and for the five years of dispute that followed it, which did not have the Soviet-sounding ring to it as had the shouts of "band," "provocateurs," and "paid agent." It was, moreover, a title that the conciliar minority took over as its own. They were called, and called themselves "zealots of piety" (*revniteli blagochestiya*). Their enemies always qualified this epithet with derogatory adjectives: "so-called" (*tak nazyvaemyi*), "would-be" (*pretendenuyushii*), or "self-declared" (*samozvanyi*), or simply placed the title in quotation marks. This metapragmatic modification was necessary because "zealots of piety" is one of the most honorific, though amorphous, titles by which the Old Believers have traditionally referred to themselves. I argue that "zealots of piety" is what Hent De Vries calls, in a discussion of the applicability of philosophical pragmatics to the understanding of religion, a "radical interpretive key" (De Vries 2008: 38). It is such a key insofar as it brings to the surface the web of implicit suppositions that underpinned this conciliar dispute and reveals some of the historical logics that were reactivated during its course. Unlocking the epithet "zealots of piety" provides a "radical" method for understanding how an ancient invocation disclosed the present situation of post-Soviet Old Belief. The ambiguous honorific is at least worth investigating because both sides used it consistently without ever agreeing on its meaning or its import. It is a starting point from which to try to establish a certain kind of intelligibility on an event, a *sobor*, a gathering that understood itself to be rooted in the deepest antiquity, but whose unfolding was determined by the legacy of very recent history, specifically that its main protagonists two decades previously had been either communist party members or youth activists in an atheist state.

Genealogy of a Term

Back in the seventeenth century, the stance taken by Avvakum against patriarch Nikon and the tsar was a repetition of the stand that John Chrysostom had taken against Theophilus of Alexandria and Empress Eudoxia in the fifth century: then the great hero of Russian Orthodoxy, John Chrysostom, had refused to bow to imperial tyranny and accept the installation of the Empress's graven idol outside of the Hagia Sofia. So Avvakum and the other Russian dissenters were self-consciously emulating the heroic actions of John Chrysostom, Theodore the Studite and other stolid champions from the annals of Orthodox history. But what

more specifically was this exemplary action that they were emulating? If we return to Late Antiquity of the fourth and fifth centuries AD, to the stormy era of the Church councils when Orthodox doctrine was still in vivo, one sees that the Church Fathers lionized "zeal" and in particular the "zeal of piety" as the most indispensable virtue for the defense of the Faith. Historians of this epoch, such as Peter Brown (1992) and Wolf Liebeschuetz (2011), have argued that what Chrysostom and Ambrose "have in common [was] their outspokenness (*parrhesia*)" (Liebeschuetz: 211), both of whom feared neither to accuse the emperor nor to upbraid his oligarchical supporters who were simonizing the priesthood.

The virtue of divine daring (*parrhesia*) and the motivating semi-virtue, the zeal of piety (*zelon eusebia*), are presented together within a single homily of seminal importance for Russian Christianity, promisingly entitled "On the zeal of piety and the blind man" ("*peri zelou kai eusebieias, kai eis ton genetes tuflono*"; in Russian, "O *revnosti i blagochestii, i o sleporozhden-nom*"). This fourth-century text is part of the corpus, the pseudo-Chrysostomus. At the birth of Orthodoxy in Russia, pseudo-Chrysostom's corpus had an unrivaled popularity and availability among the hungry reading publics of the recently converted pre-Mongolian 'Rus.[4] Russian Christians' love of the pseudo-Chrysostom grew throughout the Medieval period up until the *raskol*, whose main protagonist, Avvakum, liberally regurgitates both acknowledged and unacknowledged passages from this most revered by Russians of the Church Fathers (Hunt 1995: 46). The homily tells of the blind man's fearless truth-speaking in the face of a pharisaical interrogation. Pseudo-Chrysostom exclaims conclusively that all that is now left for the pious listener to do is to emulate this zealous *parrhesia*: "Learn from this the zeal for truth (*zelon tes aletheias*)[5] and from this love of *parrhesia* for Christ (*agapesen ten uper Xristou parrhesian*)! Follow your Teacher as the Apostle invites you: 'imitate me as I am of Christ'" (1 Cor 11:1).

The Greek Church Fathers describe zeal almost word-for-word in the same terms and, in its location in their moral psychology have it do the same work, as their neo-Platonic contemporaries and predecessors had spoken of "spirit" or "*thumos*." *Thumos* is the middle part in Plato's threefold schema of the soul and stands between the rational principle (*logistikon/ nous*) and the desiring part (*epithumia*). In the *Phaedrus*, Plato presents an image for this triadic configuration: a Charioteer (reason) who in one rein holds a strong but compliant horse (spirit) and in the other a wild and unruly steed (desire). *Thumos* thereby is construed as the "ally of reason" in quelling fear, anger, desire, and the other animal emotions in pursuit of the Good. Early Church Fathers certainly considered the thumotic element

a crucial part of Christian person: "Basil compares it [*thumos*] to a loyal soldier who has left his weapons with his wise general—that is reason—and is ready to serve at his commander's bidding" (Harrison 2008: 84).

It is a plausible hypothesis that the "zeal of piety" is an important Eastern Christian re-casting of the Greek virtue of "courage," the courage which was, according to Michel Foucault, the moral condition that underpinned the use of *parrhesia* in the Greek polis. On this account, for a Late Antique Christian the "zeal of piety" was the thumotic accompaniment of truth-speaking and to bearing witness to the truth (martyrdom). In Eastern Orthodoxy therefore zeal and *parrhesia* are complementary, the one underpinning and giving motive force to the other. There was one Patristic author whom Foucault singled out as a paradigmatic *parrhesiast* for whose loquacity and characteristic of saying everything he named the "most impenitent chatterbox produced by Christianity" (Foucault 2014: 143); that is, both Avvakum's and Father Elisey's exemplar: John Chrysostom. Foucault remarks in his Berkeley seminars that *parrhesia* appears "dozens and dozens of times" (Foucault 1983: 2)[6] in the *corpus Chrysostomus*, an example of the *spuria* of which is referred to above. Avvakum described himself a *parrhesiast*: in both his Life and his "Fifth Petition" to the tsar in which he reproaches the monarch's apostasy, he describes his own actions and those of his followers as exemplifying "*derznovenie*" (Hunt ibid.: 280), the word used in Old Church Slavonic to translate *parrhesia*.

History and Dialectic

As the dissenter movement solidified during the end of the seventeenth century, Old Believers began to inscribe themselves into their own narrative of sacred history through writing hagiographies and martyrologies. These works depicted the Old Believers as the synthetic culmination of the apostolic zealous tradition, whose lineaments we have been tracing. The first martyrology of Old Believers, the *Russian Vineyard*, which was written by Semen Denisov, abbot of the rebellious Vyg monastery, depicted the martyrs as both the followers of the exemplary *parrhesiasts* of the Christian past, as well as figures of emulation for a messianic future. The combination of a courageous will-to-live-truth and a desire to shape Christian history reached its zenith in the "militant martyrs" (Crummey 2011: 121). These zealots provoked such perplexity in the Russian authorities because their militancy resided, not in Maccabean-style divine violence, but in inviting and inciting scenarios that could be chronicled later as repetitions of first Christian martyrs' feats.

The zealots' sacred-historical self-consciousness therefore meant that, for them, the martyrographers' retrospective inscriptions were just as important as their ability to submit to the deed itself. Robert Crummey notes that Denisov's "scheme of historical interpretation draws on the ancient Judeo-Christian tradition of 'sacred history' (*Heilsgeschichte*): the Vyg fathers traced God's relationship with his chosen people through an examination of concrete historical acts … Under radically new conditions that followed the Nikonian reforms, the only real historical actors and actresses were the guardians of true Christianity. *History continued to unfold only for Old Believers*" (Crummey: 131–132 my emphasis). As we will see now, as we turn this archeology into a genealogical analysis of present day Old Belief, it was indeed this awareness that history can still unfold for Old Believers that animated the spiritual revival of Old Orthodoxy in the post-Soviet Russian Far East: to live as zealots of piety.[7]

In *On the Use and Abuse of History for Life*, Nietzsche compares one's relationship to history as a kind of instinct that can be used for good or ill. Nietzsche asserts that the purpose and the proper use of history are to inspire, not make people cower from acting. The question he asks is, "To what degree does living require the service of history?" Nietzsche called this zealous relationship to the past worthy of imitation, "monumental history." The Far Eastern Christians could be examples of the young people of the future for whom Nietzsche wrote: "Forget the myth that you are epigones…[because] such late arrivals naturally live an ironic existence" (Nietzsche 1983: 103-4). These youngsters came to Christianity with an almost childish naivety and freshness, which was most alien to the arch-irony of Nietzsche's contemporaries.

Our archeology has uncovered how the "zealot of piety" acquires a kind of thumotic instinct to live in the light of the models of sacred history, into which one should try to breathe new life. The Far Eastern Christians always insisted that "history had put them in this place and time in order to *act*." Orthodoxy for them was a religion of action. It was not for nothing that the motto of Russian Christianity (Fedotov 1966: 221), which the Far Eastern Old Believers quoted again and again, was the unforgettable maxim of the first zealot of piety, St James: "Belief without works is dead" (James 2:26). The Far Eastern Old Believers were never shy to think through their own times in terms of the models of Orthodox history. Far from being timeless, these historical models were more relevant now than ever since the Far Eastern Christians occupied a position in their society that relatively resembled the one which the early Christian community had assumed in theirs: a small island of *agape* in a sea of heretics.

Elisey had written a history of his friends in the religious revival and listed them in the company of such great epoch-defining Christian *lichnosti* as Elijah and Enoch, Chrysostom and Sergius of Radonezh, on whose personal exploits the church had been built: "Little has changed now," wrote Elisey, "[t]oday the emergence and development of the Church of Christ depends on the work and prayers of the devotees of *our* time. Today we cannot know how their descendants will appreciate the current feats—time will tell—but we can be sure that their story will not be eroded by time and memory." The thumotic passion and drive of such "devotees of our time" meant that even recently deceased and still living personalities could be written of in this future anterior mise-en-scène, a present taken from the perspective of future descendants surveying ancestors' apostolic feats. These narratives were cast in the same register of "proleptic saintliness" (Maslov 2012) in which Avvakum wrote his Life, where the author writes a hagiography of himself from the point of view of his own future canonization.

In this evocation of a hagiographic foreshadow we can recognize the markers of a "messianic history." It contains a recursive temporality of the "future perfect": an immanent typology by which a past's possible future finds its realization in the present (the possibility that one day these courageous men would be recognized as saints); as well as a dialectical image in which the present projects itself into the future as the restoration and continuation of a recovered past (Far Eastern Christians' understanding that they were engaged in a sacred world-historical task by restoring the Church). By means of writing these messianic histories the Far Eastern Old Orthodox Christians re-sutured the threads of sacred history, and thereby wrote themselves as the new protagonists into the story. These are "messianic histories" because the divine teleology that their writing uncovers emerges from the mise-en-scène's retroactive dynamic, whereby the narrator's present condenses and conjugates the sacred potential of the protagonist's past into a saving possibility for the future.

In his prophetic notes *On the Concept of History*, Walter Benjamin wrote: "The eternal lamp is an image of genuine historical existence. It cites what has been—the flame that once was kindled—in perpetuum, giving it ever new sustenance" (Exodus 27:20 "you shall command the people of Israel to bring to you pure beaten olive oil, that a lamp may be set up to burn continuously") (Benjamin 2006: 407). The Far Eastern Christians had tried to reignite the eternal lamp of an Old Orthodox faith by genuinely taking over and re-living that tradition. In their services, icon and relic processions and their commemorations, they were engaged in "festively enacted history" (ibid.: 404).

During the events at the stormy *sobor*, which we described earlier in this chapter, Father Elisey and his comrades had warned that "history is repeating itself." Since Metropolitan Kornelius was a "New Nikon" then, according to this discursive over-coding, Archpriest Elisey was cast in the role of a "New Avvakum." Elisey announced it was again time to recapitulate the zealous *parrhesiasts* of Orthodox yore; to follow St. Theodore, the Studite, who stood up against the *ekklesia* to declaim the heresy of iconoclasm; to emulate Mark of Ephesus, who had been the only Orthodox bishop to have walked out of the Council of Florence, at which for the sake of political expediency the Eastern Orthodox Church hierarchy had accepted the heretical Roman formula, the "*filioque*" (by which the son issues from the father). But Avvakum's behavior was the most exemplary model of all: at the 1666 *sobor* when asked to recant his adherence to the two-fingered *dvoeperstie*, Avvakum not only refused this offer but adopted the (to worldly eyes) brazen and offensive postures of a "fool for Christ" by rolling around the floor and spouting gibberish like a drunkard while his accusers laughed awkwardly (Hunt 2009: 22).

Igal Halfin (2000) has argued that Soviet Marxist historical exegesis also relied on a typological schema that understood political actors as embodiments of timeless historical figures. He follows Karl Löwith's hypothesis that the historical teleology of universal progress was a secularized Christian eschatological script in which actors occupied pre-defined roles. The genre of Christian sacred historical interpretation, by which Old Testament events and personages prefigured those of the New Testament, was employed by Marxist typologists when they drew parallels between the emissaries of "October" and the revelators of bygone revolutions: "A typological approach was at the root of the prevalent use of last names as nouns in Marxist discourse, 'our Cromwells' 'our Dantons' 'our Babels'… [people were] instruments that occupied the role history had assigned them" (Halfin: 51).

Perhaps a legacy of such Soviet historical meta-narrativizing is that a happening, which seemingly recapitulates a past occurrence, can strike contemporary Russian historical consciousness as the unfolding of a pre-directed performance. To such an ironically (in)formed audience, events in turn appear as a farcical facade that covers over a cynical reality. Because of the widespread incredulity toward adopting any possible meta-historical perspective (Lyotard 1984), any principle that tries to stand above and order occurrences into a series is rendered suspect. Today is thereby made incommensurable with the *belle-époque* of Orthodox

history. Attempts to hold up the mirror of historical ideals in order to make the present moment recognizable are laughed off. As they were hooted out of the *sobor*, Father Elisey and his followers were written off by the cynical mainstream hierarchs as parodists.

Benjamin insists that a historical episode's "fundamental citability" is the condition of the possible appearance of a "dialectical image" by which a past moment finds its fulfillment in the present, and vice versa. If that moment is one that makes a claim on truth, then its intended audience cannot step back, distantiated and detached, with a sense of dramatic irony as the performance unfolds. It is necessary to immerse oneself inside the stream of theatrical time to see the event's actualization on stage; to step out of the tableau's mise-en-scène and instead observe coldly a recitation of a script which deprives oneself of the chance of recognizing a "dialectical image." If one spots an enactment as the performance of a historical citation, one spoils the effect from eventuating.

Zeal and Irony—The Last Men

We saw that the "zealots of piety" were a party of protagonists who re-lived the ur-scenes of apostolic bold speech: Paul's declaration on the Areopagus, Chrysostom's denunciation of Byzantine Imperial excesses, Avvakum's holy tomfoolery. All these events had a family resemblance with each other, had a similar mise-en-scène. They were in some way "citations" of each other, since, as Benjamin comments, it is the nature of the historical object to possess a "fundamental citability" (Benjamin 2006: 405). But the Far Easterners' zealous recapitulation was not arch or self-consciously reflexive: it had a certain naivety. History is perhaps a stage, but when the theatrical props are foregrounded, instead of the action itself, an ironic smile starts to break out on the audience. When the conservative opponents of the Far Eastern Christians, either in speech or in text, insisted on enclosing the honorific zealots of piety in inverted commas or by various other meta-pragmatic devices, they were acting with an awareness that, just as citing a performative speech act brackets its felicity, so reflexively citing a scene of *parrhesia* deprives it of fidelity.

This impasse opens up questions about irony. When Father Elisey and his comrades stepped forward and spoke out against the Metropolitan, they were making a pretense to stand in the line of the zealots of *parrhesia* who had preceded them. That their audience perceived the priests' self-representation in Avvakum's image as an ironic performance suggests that

for contemporary Old Believers a large gap has opened up between the aspiration to accede toward a place within their sacred historical tradition and the ability to consummate that identification through an act of mutual recognition. Jonathan Lear defines an ironic existence as one that subsists precisely in this gap between the pretense of occupying a social role and the pretense-transcending aspiration.[8] Lear comments that Kierkegaard formulated the ironic condition of Lutheran Christendom in the form of a question: "Among all the Christians, is there a Christian?" The ironic mood of the post-Soviet *sobor* might lead one to transpose this question into an Orthodox register: "Among all the Old Believers, is there an Old Believer?" Zeal was the engine of emulation that inspired its bearers to throw themselves into incendiary situations where possibilities of *parrhesia* might be present. There was therefore a certain existential temporality internal to zeal, a kind of historical drive to re-present (or to "re-cite"), to iconically imitate (or to "be in the likeness of") the paradigmatic scenes of the zeal of piety. This "festively enacted" Orthodox history to cynical eyes appeared not as zealous piety but as an over-exaggerated and anachronistic pantomime. But the link that even this skeptical audience saw between motivational force, history and drama was no doubt a real one.

Father Elisey seemed convinced that his and his coreligionists' "zeal of piety" was a historically dynamic force. Although he did not draw on the psycho-political theories of Plato to explain it, he did have another Russian-derived theory to understand the relationship between the psycho-geography of the soul and the physio-geological gyrations of history. To account for how the youngsters of Bolshoi Kamen' had single-handedly given re-birth to a religious movement in the Far East and were now, thanks to the new schism, its singular guardians for all Christendom, he said that what distinguished these people was their "passionarity": it was this quality which allowed them to break with the established model of life into which they been reared; passionarity gave them the capacity to stand against the overwhelming inertia of post-Soviet society. The term "passionarity," which is used widely in both lay and expert Russian historical discussions, originates from the writings of the Russian ethnologist Lev Gumilev and his theory of "ethnogenesis." In *From Rus' to Russia*, Gumilev singles out Avvakum as an individual whose enormous level of passionarity gave him a history-making role.[9]

Peter Sloterdijk has recently proposed an analysis that situates the political and religious problematic of contemporary Euro-America in the psychological and political hinterlands that have been traditionally considered

the territory of *thumos*. He affirms Francis Fukuyama's argument that *thumos* is coterminous with the site of the struggle for recognition and the fount of the "anthropogenic desire" which Hegel said (and Alexander Kojéve popularized) lay at the root of human subjectivity. Like this school of Hegelian thought, Sloterdijk holds to Fukuyama's line that the present-day Euro-American situation is largely "post-historical" in its major outlines. By "post-historical" he means that "its form is no longer oriented by *epos* and tragedy" (Sloterdijk 2010: 42).

Sloterdijk views the so-called "return of religion" in its various fundamentalist guises as the psycho-political side effect of the universalization of a consumer capitalism, which conflicts with the deficiency of resources that are available to satisfy the needs of *thumos*: recognition, prestige and self-esteem. This deficit results in the systematic production of Nietzsche's "Last Men" whose thumotic rage at sheer animal existence most often gets transcribed into the idiom of monotheistic zeal, wherein this resentful energy is transacted into the timeless currency of apocalyptic expectation. Religion for Sloterdijk thereby converts resentful malcontents into zealots: "Moderates will observe that their respective zealots and apocalyptic warriors are usually activists with only a brief training whose anger, resentment, ambition and search for reasons to be outraged actually precede faith. The religious code exclusively serves the textualization of a socially conditioned, existential rage that demands to be let out" (2005: 159). Sloterdijk delineates four monotheistic religions: together with the three traditional faiths of Islam, Judaism and Christianity, he considers Communism a "zealotic counter-religion," whose monotheism subsisted in both its supremacist claim to embody the One and Only truth and in its violent confrontation with all other religious competition. He regards Soviet socialism as having implemented a fundamental mutilation and expropriation of thumotic resources, especially self-regard and pride. The resultant mood of devastated resignation is an aftershock with which Russia still must contend: "The re-thymotization of post-Soviet 'society' turns out to be a protracted endeavour because of the scarcity of psychic and moral resources … People who know about the contemporary situation observe that Russian 'society' does not currently indulge in consumerism without limitations, as one might expect, but is committed to a daily *bellum omnium contra omnes*. The return of self-affirmative lifestyles happens in the form of generalized mobbing" (2010: 160).

While the general direction of Sloterdijk's psycho-political analysis seems to capture an important dimension of the tensions that traverse post-Soviet society, his purely negative characterization of religiously directed thumotic energies is fundamentally misconceived. Sloterdijk works in a Nietzschean vein, but the genealogy of *thumos* he presents is very limited; it resembles the broad-brush epochal and civilization characterizations that Nietzsche postulated in the nineteenth century and lacks the micro-historical richness and rigor that Foucault injected into the genealogical method. As our alternative genealogy of Orthodox zeal has shown, the simplified story according to which Christians introverted the external manifestation of thumotic force into a ruminating resentment so as to energize their ascetic ideal is false. As we have seen "zeal" became a positive and legitimate re-valorization of the thumotic cluster of the self; it became the Christian equivalent of pagan "courage" relative to Pauline "divine knowledge."

These zealots' refusal to be defined by their vital needs is indeed the refusal to be abandoned to live as the "Last Men" (Fukuyama 1992: 306) for whom self-preservation is put above all else because history has ended. In this particularly thumotic firebrand of the post-Soviet Russian Christian, one sees the confirmation of one of Sloterdijk insights into the psycho-political dimension of *thumos*, namely its aversion and opposition to *eros*. Sloterdijk insists that, in spite of our psychoanalytically saturated culture, the richness of thumotic sentiments and attractions cannot be reduced to erotic objects of lack. These Russian zealots perform a critical reduction of the necessities of human existence, in order to overturn a hierarchy of needs that sees its end in a this-wordly "quality of life," which is realized in appetitive satisfaction, expenditure, and consumption.

Because *thumos* has as its distinctive "object" the internal ideals of self-regard, the historic standards of exemplary conduct, and the admirable outlines of aspirational possibility, it is mistaken to treat it as a raw, libidinal force that can be displaced onto various indifferent objects. But in their discussions about Bolshoi Kamen' Christians' zealousness, the Moscow critics often spoke in such terms of energetic transference. One wrote: "Really—what is it with these zealots (*revniteli*)? Are they not bothered what they get zealous about (*o chem revnovat'*)? They were in the *komsomol* and were zealous for Lenin; they were in Hare Krishna and were zealous for Krishna; into rock and roll, zealous for 'drive' (*draiv*). Now they are into Old Belief—its Christ about which they get zealous. Don't these people have too much 'bigness' in their hearts?" Despite his intention to

discredit Father Elisey, the Moscow commentator alighted onto a crucial point: that within each of these fields (*Komsomol*, Hare Krishna, rock music, and Old Belief) the zealots were able to sustain their activity at a certain thumotic pitch, to develop the thumotic apparatus and extract the thumotic goods internal to these practices.

The view of the Muscovite faction's leader, Archpriest Evgenyi Chunin, that the "zealots" had enacted a farcical performance, and his exclusion of the question "in whose likeness are our actions," suggested that his relationship to Orthodox history was fundamentally different from the naively vital one discovered by the Bolshoi Kamen' Christians. Archpriest Evgenyi found the whole concept of coding the synodal speech situation according to the Pauline esthetic of divine imitation inadmissible. He accused Elisey of a "self-proclaimed messianism" (*samozvanoe messianstvo*): "I will not perplex myself with that question 'Who is more like Avvakum?' (*'kto bolee pokhozh na Avvakuma?'*) Only Avvakum is like Avvakum. I am frightened by your thoughts of "imitating the saints" (*podrazhanie svyatym)*." Evgenyi's exposure of Elisey's zealotry as a form of infelicitous plagiarism, an unreferenced historical citation, implied that he was very conscious of the ironical and inter-textual potential of shifting statements and performances in and out of contexts. Archpriest Evgenyi's citational exposure had unveiled the architecture of agreement, which constitutes the context for the speech activity of apostolic *parrhesia*.

In this battle of hierarchs Archpriest Evgenyi's actions seemed to betray an awareness that "[e]very sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic spoken or written (in the current sense of this opposition), in a small or large unit can be cited, put between quotation marks; in doing so it can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is illimitable" (Derrida 1988: 12). Through his tactical deployment of ironic citationality (his bracketing of "zealots of piety" in scare quotes), Archpriest Evgenyi seemed to be adopting with respect to Archpriest Elisey the role that Jacques Derrida took up in his (non-)debate with Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The conversation that never happened" (Bernstein 2008). If the zealots were trying to prove their relationship of fidelity to a tradition of truth-speaking, then Archpriest Evgenyi was pointing out that the sender of such true-speech cannot control the context of receivership and that such acts can always be subject to ironic play.

Rather than see "the zealots" actions as reflected in the image of the Old Orthodox truth-speakers of yore, Father Evgenyi reached for the most ironic trope in the post-Soviet tool box of post-historical dramaturgy. Of the zealots' actions he said that "history is first tragedy, then farce."

Here was an Old Orthodox Archpriest deploying the most famous Marxian historical schema to judge the actions of priests at a holy synod. Instead of reflecting their actions in the light of James the Just and other exemplars of Church synods, *sobor* attendees felt more comfortable at identifying their historical situation with the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.

The zealots saw in their elder clerics "the disease of slavishness"; this malformed self-regard was evident in these clerics' unspoken acceptance that the "informal practices" (Ledeneva 2006) that governed all worldly dealings in Russia even held sway at the holy synod. Father Elisey would probably have agreed with Fukuyama that, in Brezhnev developed socialist societies, for "people whose thymotic sides were not nearly so well developed, normal life meant acceptance of petty day-to-day moral degradation" (Fukuyama ibid.: 169); and he would have added that this weak-willed akrasia was still evident in his elder colleagues' lack of courage and willingness to broach moral compromises for their own benefit. The Far Easterners' "festively enacted history" struck their Moscow audience not as pious emulation pitched within a paradigm of *parrhesia*, but as an the over-identification that bordered on genre of late Soviet irony known as "stiob."[10]

For the elderly clerics, whose esthetic attitude was less attuned to picking up such sophisticated late-Soviet resonances, the Far Easterners' zeal simply appeared as activist enthusiasm always does when a meaningful and truthful relationship to history is foreclosed: as nothing but smoldering resentment, as the covert will-to-power of a "bunch of neophytes" who were trying to turn things upside down. For these Old Believer nihilists (that is, the Muscovites, not the naively fervent Far Easterners), the question of whether in the midst of the 300 synod delegate there *was* an Old Believer had been settled in the negative long ago. Instead they intuited that the motivation behind such zealotry was the same old enmity for "hereditary enemies" that Nietzsche diagnosed as the root of modern eruptions of "monumental history": "The theatrical costume in which they pretend that their hate for the powerful and the great of their time is a fulfilling admiration for the strong and the great of past times" (Nietzsche 1983: 72).

Conclusion

> There will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual taking care of the museum of history. (Fukuyama 1989: 18)

The widespread assumption that the alleged triumph of late capitalism/neo-liberalism has closed off the possibilities of the future is challenged

within this ethnographic study. It is my contention that Father Elisey and his Far Eastern congregation, which rose quite literally out of the ruins of socialism, at the very lowest nadir of the post-Soviet state's existence, have effected a Benjaminesque alchemy that has redeemed that ruined legacy. They are transmuting an ancient, almost extinct tradition into a living historical paradigm that escapes the frozen postmodern presentism that is so condescendingly allocated as their lot by Fukuyama and his disciples. They refuse to be the "Last Men" or to be zealots playing the role, qua Sloterdijk of "quasi-putschist" eschatological instigators, dedicated to worsening the situation and bringing on the Apocalypse. In the exemplar of their struggle with the Moscow metropole, they are reflecting an epic battle for the horizon of history, not "taking care of its museum." In this chapter I have not identified these Old Believers' thumos, unmodified and with the same "imperturbable confidence" and hubris (Derrida 1994: 45) with which Fukuyama defines it, as the timeless source of struggle for recognition in the mirror of the eternal Other. On the contrary, the zeal of piety was discovered to be a striving to (re-)appropriate and be (re-)appropriated by, to holding-out-for so as one day to be held in that phenomenon which "is most lacking from such [Fukuyama's] a discourse" (Derrida: ibid): the event.

Notes

1. Mitrokhin quotes a layperson from a parish in "Kirgizia" who lamented the decline of Church *soviet* and the elevation of the rector (*nastoyatel'*) to the status of absolute ruler (*polnovlastnyi khoziain*): "Now everywhere has been restored the principle of single-leadership (*edinonachaliya*), long present in the Orthodox Church but in violation of soviet/conciliar power (*sovetskaya vlast'*)…Now the parish council (*soviet*) has only been preserved formally" (Mitrokhin 2004: 222).
2. The thought that interventions into the course of Church *sobornost'* can be historically notable is far from a new one in Old Belief. Douglas Rogers wrote of nineteenth-century Urals Old Believers: "To participate in a council was often to write oneself into Christian history" (Rogers 2009: 78).
3. The *Kormchaia Kniga* is the the nomocanon, effectively, the "rule book" of Old Orthodoxy.
4. Though it must be remembered that just as Russian readers assumed that the texts of *pseudo-*Dionysius the Areopagite (which were also widely consumed in Medieval Russia) were written by a contemporary of St. Paul, so they presumed that such homilies as "On the zeal of piety and the blind man" were written not by a pseudonymous author, but composed by Chrysostom himself.

5. The homily is unavailable in English. I cross-translate between the Russian (http://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Ioann_Zlatoust/o_revnosti/-accessed Nov 2016) and the Greek PG Migne 4582 found in Patrologiae Graecae Tomus LIX S. Joannes Chrysostomus, Paris 1862 (9ed) J-P, Migne.

6. Http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/DiscourseAndTruth_MichelFoucault_1983_0 accessed November 2016

7. The *Russian Vineyard* is also noteworthy for the particular emphasis it gives to the actions of such "piously-zealous" (*blagochestivo-revnostnyi*) young female martyrs as the Duchess Evdokea (Denisov in Logvinenko 2012: 195) and, in the Martyrlogue's climatic episode, the 14-year-old maiden from Torzhok, Paraskeva: "O terrifying wonder! O, the strange spectacle! A young girl, softer than wax, showed herself firmer that stone… How can such wounds and afflictions, such horrible threefold tortures, a body of a little girl bear? Glory to the one all-powerful God, who gave such endurance to his piously-zealous slave!" (ibid.: 200).

8. The ironic condition is "to continually interrogate oneself about the gap between the pretense of being who one claims to be and the aspiration to be that person" (Lear 2009: 24).

9. Igor Strelkov, the former leader of the armed rebellion in the so-called Donetsk People's Republic, subscribes to the same account that history is divided into two groups, zealous and the lukewarm: "I consider that all of human history is done by a relatively small group of people, that is 10–15 %, who live a collective life not enclosed on everyday cares of work and family. 70 % of people live such a life. Lukewarmness (*teplokhladnost'*) is their character (Rev 3:15–16)…But the elite of society should have such a character: to be either hot or cold, that is, take up and stand by a position." *Igor Strelkov - Esli Zavtra Vioyna* [If tomorrow there is war] http://www.russdom.ru/node/8167 - accessed November 2016.

10. Alexei Yurchak defines stiob as an ironic aesthetic of a very particular kind that thrived in late-Soviet socialism. Stiob "differed from sarcasm, cynicism, derision or any of the more familiar genres of absurd humor" in that it "required such a degree of overidentification with the object, person, or idea at which [it] was directed that it was often impossible to tell whether it was a form of sincere support, subtle ridicule, or a peculiar mixture of the two" (Yurchak 2006: 250; see also 1998: 84). One of the key characteristics of stiob irony was that its identification with its object was unaccompanied by metacommentary on its ironic procedure. In other words, stiob was a "straight," deep caricature that usually did not signal its own ironic purpose (Boyer and Yurchak 2010: 181).

Bibliography

Badiou, Alain. 2003. *St. Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*. Trans. Ray Brassier. Stanford: Stanford UP.

Benjamin, Walter. 2003. *Selected Writings: 1938–1940*. Vol. 4. Edited by Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bernstein, Richard J. 2008. The Conversation that Never Happened (Gadamer/Derrida). *The Review of Metaphysics* 61: 577–603.

Boyer, Dominic, and Alexei Yurchak. 2010. AMERICAN STIOB: Or, What Late Socialist Aesthetics of Parody Reveal about Contemporary Political Culture in the West. *Cultural Anthropology* 25(2): 179–221.

Brown, Peter. 1992. *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire*. Vol. 1988. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Collier, Stephen J. 2011. *Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Crummey, Robert O. 2011. *Old Believers in a Changing World*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

Derrida, Jacques. 1988. *Limited Inc*. Trans. Samuel Weber, vol. 100. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

———. 1994. Spectres of Marx. *New Left Review*, 205 (May/June): 31–58.

De Vries, Hent, ed. 2008. *Religion: Beyond a Concept*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Fedotov, George P. 1966. *The Russian Religious Mind*. Vol. II *The Middle Ages, the Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Foucault, Michel et al. 2007. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977- 78*. Vol 4. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2014. *Wrong-doing, Truth-telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. The End of History? *The National Interest*, 3–18.

———. 1992. *The End of History and The Last Man*. New York: The Free Press.

Gumilev, Lev. 1992. *Ot Rusi K Rossii: ocherki etnicheskoi istorii [From Rus' to Russia: Points of Ethnic History]*. Moscow: ekopros.

Halfin, Igal. 2000. *From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Harrison, Nonna Verna. 2008. The Human Person as Image and Likeness of God. In *The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology*, ed. Mary B. Cunningham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hunt, P. 1995. Justice in Avvakum "Fifth Petition" to the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. In *Christianity and the Eastern Slavs: Vol. 1 Slavic Cultures in the Middle Ages*, eds. Boris Gasparov and Olga Raevsky-Hughes. California: University of California Press.

———. 2009. The Theology in Avvakum's Life and His Polemic with the Nikonians. In *The New Muscovite Cultural History: A Collection in Honor of Daniel B. Rowland*, eds. Valerie Kivelson, Karen Petrone, Nancy Shields Kollmann, and Michael S. Flier. Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers.

Lear, Jonathan. 2009. *Irony and Identity*. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Harvard University, November 4–6.

Ledeneva, Alena V. 2006. How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Liebeschuetz, John Hugo Wolfgang Gideon. 2011. *Ambrose and John Chrysostom: Clerics between Desert and Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Logvinenko, Alexey A. 2012. *Translations from Popular Medieval Russian Compendia*. (http://russianprolog.com - accessed Nov 2016)

Lyotard, Jean-Francois. 1984. *The Postmodern Condition*. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Maslov, Boris. 2012. Prisvoenie k Bogu/Oikeiosis pros theon: The Afterlife of a Stoic Concept in Old Rus. In *Translation and Tradition in "Slavia Orthodoxa"*. Valentina Izmirlieva and Boris Gasparov, eds. Lit Verlag: Münster.

Melnikov, F.E. 2006. *Kratkaya istoriya drevlepravoslavnaya (staroobryadcheskoi) tserkvi. [A Short History of the Ancient Orthodox (Old Believer) Church]*. Barnaul: altapress.

Migne, Jacques-Paul. 1862. *Patrologiae Graecae Tomus*. LIX S. (9th Edition) Paris: Joannes Chrysostomus.

Mitrokhin, Nikolai. 2004. *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov': Sovremennoe Sostoianie i Aktual'nye Problemy [Russian Orthodox Church: Present State and Problems]*. Moscow: New Literary Review.

Nietzsche, Frederick. 1983. On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. In *Untimely Mediations*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rogers, Douglas. 2009. *The Old Faith and the Russian Land: A Historical Ethnography of Ethics in the Urals*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Sloterdijk, Peter. 2005. *God's Zeal. The Battle of the Three Monotheisms*. Cambridge/Malden: Polity.

———. 2010. *Rage and Time: a psychopolitical investigation*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Weber, Max. 1904. Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Bd 1.5 (1904): 17-206. APA 131.

Yurchak, Alexei. 1999. Gargarin And The Rave Kids: Transforming Power, Identity, and Aesthetics In Post-Soviet Nightlife. In *Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and Society Since Gorbachev*. Durham: Duke University Press.

———. 2006. *Everything was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

The End of Ideology? Reconceptualizing Citizenship and Culture in a Post-(political) Place World

Bree T. Hocking

Promotional materials for "The Circle" herald the birth of "a small city with a global reach" (The Circle n.d.-a). But rather than pioneering civic association, this planned "networked community of service providers," now under construction in the shadow of Switzerland's Butzenbüel Hill, is trumpeted as a "brand communication and marketing tool" (The Circle n.d.-a). Adjacent to the Zürich Airport, The Circle, a crescent-shaped development rising against a lush, parklike backdrop, is envisioned as a place of pure capitalism, a self-described "platform" for corporate embassies and international brands to interface with "an above-average number of inquisitive, cosmopolitan people" who are expected to flock to what is breathlessly billed as "Switzerland's top global location" (The Circle n.d.-a). In this brave new civic laboratory of 180,000 square meters of usable space, the "representational spaces" (Lefebvre 1991) of the public square are to be explicitly subservient to the needs of capital synergies. But those who do not meet its capital requirements are unlikely to make an appearance in this self-anointed "divers(c)ity" designed by Japanese

B.T. Hocking (✉)
The Open University, Belfast, UK

architect Riken Yamamoto as a series of themed modules—with focuses ranging from health and beauty to the international art market—intended to convey the atmosphere of a "small scale, high class city centre" (The Circle n.d.-b) abuzz with international trade and upscale lifestyle offerings. In one module, for instance, "[t]he squares and lanes will glitter with the stores, showrooms [and] 'Corporate Embassies' of famous companies and brands" (The Circle n.d.-c). Like many contemporary urban developments, The Circle, an initiative of the marketing and real estate division of the Zurich airport company, emerges as a village of, by and for the corporation. Tellingly, nearly half of its projected 1 billion Swiss franc price tag will come from the global insurance behemoth, Swiss Life (Zurich Airport Company 2015).

As demonstrated by the spread of pseudo-civic spaces such as The Circle, this essay posits that the dissolution of an effective counterbalance to Western capitalism ushered in an era not of liberal idealism and social justice but rather of total commoditization and the corporatization of everyday life. This condition threatens to subsume both physical and virtual space and signals a major paradigm shift in theoretical and practical conceptions of polity and citizenship with specific resonance for cultural anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists. In this vein, I consider how the physical spaces of the built environment have been reconstructed to reflect "the civic identikit of flows" (Hocking 2015) or those forms perpetuated and replicated by the whims of the global capital network, a system of macro-spatial organization that encompasses and co-opts place. Nevertheless, these same spaces may also retain "heritagized" cultural expressions largely denuded of meaning, or what I have referred to as the "civic identikit of place" (Hocking 2015). Across the post-Fordist social landscapes of "late capitalism," the subject/citizen has been reduced to a series of symbolic consumptions and performances, with culture serving a key role in an experience-based economy predicated on esthetic reflexivity and transnational connectivity. Increasingly, citizenship rooted in rights and responsibilities has given way to a two-tiered, civic caste system whereby *symbolic citizens* serve as extensions of the cultural-consumerist "showrooms" they perform and service for the perusal of physically and virtually mobile *consumer citizens*, who fuel a seemingly endless cycle of multiscalar transnational consumptions (Hocking 2015). This consumer-symbolic citizen dialectic poses particular challenges to the work of scholars tasked with untangling the hierarchies of authenticity contained in any construction of market-mediated community. Post-1989, the economic

logic has become the lived logic. The "backstage" of power has been shifted to an evermore impenetrable and intangible realm; and, the simultaneous rearrangement of actual physical spaces attests to this dynamic. As such, this chapter argues that the renewed scholarly focus on symbolic issues in the aftermath of the Cold War worked to strengthen the hegemony of neoliberal networks and regimes furthering a number of trends and developments in corporate-bureaucratic governance. The subsequent explosion of the surveillance state in the West is examined as a natural outgrowth of global capital's ongoing commoditization of society, dependent as it is on technological innovation and evermore precise predictive models of consumer behavior and categorization. In light of such conditions, future social science scholarship is faced with the daunting task of unpacking the increasingly inscrutable power structures that shape and direct human agency from afar. As subjectivity is further integrated into the "network society" (Castells 1996), penetrating the social worlds of the networked "self" will require new methodologies and approaches if the symbolic scholarship of recent decades, evident across so much of the social sciences and humanities, is to be avoided and a credible resistance to a new form of "soft totalitarianism" launched. Given this dynamic, this chapter concludes that just as citizens have ceded the right to privacy and autonomy in the emerging network society, so too, must our new corporate governance structures.

Changing Spaces: Capital Flows, Transnational Networks and the New Landscapes of Eternal Consumption

The contours of late capitalism came into sharp relief with the end of the Cold War. Leading social science and humanities theorists, including Manuel Castells (1989, 1996, 2006), David Harvey (1989), and Fredric Jameson (1991), were among a cadre of intellectuals from diverse disciplines to examine the relationship between the late twentieth-century restructuring of global capital and the subsequent reorganization of social space to reflect the now fully globalized network of capital domination. Abetted by the near complete collapse of its ideological counterbalance and the "time-space compression" (Harvey 1989: 240) of the information technology revolution,

the new international economy create[d] a variable geometry of production and consumption, labor and capital, management and information—a geometry which denies the specific productive meaning of any place outside its position in a network whose shape changes relentlessly in response to the messages of unseen signals and unknown codes. (Castells 1989: 348)

This information technology revolution, spurred in part by significant American military investments intended to secure US advantage in the Cold War (Castells 1996: 6), facilitated the rise of the "network society" (Castells 1996, 2006), based on highly transnational, interconnected flows of capital, labor and informational goods, whose logic impacts and shapes all levels of global social organization (Castells 2006). The arrival of the postindustrial age in the West heralded a shift from an economy based on the production of material goods to one that ran on the production of cultural signs, services, and information. This post-Fordist condition, which manifests globally, is otherwise characterized by its flexibility, volatility and essential placelessness (Harvey 1989), as any node in these networks is vulnerable to deletion based on capital requirements. (See Detroit as a classic example of a deleted node.) This has had a profound impact on the anthropology of space (Castells 1996), restructured to reflect the material requirements of the "geography of nowhere" (Kunstler 1993). Indeed, at the very moment Western commentators declared the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992) and the triumph of liberal democratic values, these very values began to recede in civic space with the expansion of privatized consumerist landscapes given over to spectacles of consumption and exclusionary spatial regimes. As Sorkin writes:

In the 'public' spaces of the theme park or the shopping mall, speech itself is restricted: there are no demonstrations in Disneyland. The effort to reclaim the city is the struggle of democracy itself. (Sorkin 1992: xv)

Like Disneyland, the quintessential capitalist utopia, postmodern public space conforms to the logic of the network, where "every interaction is carefully planned" (Mitchell 2003: 139–140) and space is reconfigured after "an ethic of seamless, individuated movement and circulation; public interaction based on the model of commodity and capital flows" (ibid.: 11). Such interactions take place in urban conurbations that have also been reimagined as programmable spatial networks of feedback loops. The growth of "smart cities," spurred by the rise of Big Data-fueled

"quantitative urbanism" and conceptualized in such programs as MIT's Senseable City Lab and Microsoft's CityNext project, presages an ongoing transition to city as computer (Hollis 2013), where every input is categorized and known, and potential disruptions or disorder preempted. While potentially a boon to sustainability and resource allocation, this paradigm shift in urbanization also has substantial implications for the absolute control of people and place. The network society, is, above all else, smooth space, space that functions best in the absence of surprise or resistance. Thus, the logic of a network society lends itself to the circumscription of public space reconstructed to reflect an ever-expanding menu of exclusions.[1]

Meanwhile, the built environments of postmodernism, awash in spectacle and endless consumer possibilities (Harvey 2000), reflect the fundamental placelessness and adaptability found in the "space of flows," or what Castells defines as the "material organization" of the "dominant processes and functions," which direct economic and social life under late capitalism (1996: 412). The result has been a harmonization of space via the spread of "homogenous architecture" (Castells 1996: 417) linking an "ahistorical, acultural" (ibid.: 418) space of flows as it touches down in specific places through "grobalized" (Ritzer 2003), content-free forms, or what I have termed "the civic identikit of flows" (Hocking 2015: 8). Much of this contemporary built environment is essentially a "non-place," where the connection "between individuals and their surroundings" occurs "through the mediation of words" (Augé 1995: 94). These abstract, highly interchangeable, art or architectural works are then "overlaid with location-specific narratives" (Hocking 2015: 8) to bestow a measure of place-based relevance and civic value to what are otherwise the products of globalized capital institutions, be they design consultancies or private equity funds. Just as the language used to describe The Circle development evokes a pointedly civic ethos—the development, after all, aspires to be nothing short of a "second centre" for the city of Zurich—the new "corporate city" (Zukin 2010) of today has been turned over to the concerns of the transnational business class.

That said, distinctive cultural practices and esthetics have not been obliterated by the space of flows, nor are they irrelevant to spatial hermeneutics. Rather, such localisms continue to exist within an overarching dominant capitalist discourse. After all, the grobalized quickly becomes the glocalized as it moves from theory to practice; and, as users of Facebook and Instagram are readily aware, even the most homogenous and technocratic of platforms

may be particularized in both place and virtual space. However, the nature of these cultural particularizations has also altered, as cultural expression itself is commoditized and integrated into a symbol-rich informational economy, dependent on a stream of cultural images and, in turn, exerting its own, often touristic, order on cultural practices. The result: remaining cultural spaces, or the "space of places" (Castells 1989), where actual people live and work, have been thoroughly shot through with the logic of the network. What remains of "the city of collective memory" (Boyer 1994) is a memory that has been prepackaged and scripted to meet the marketplace. This "civic identikit of place" references "specific local identities and histories" (Hocking 2015: 8), albeit in a Disneyfied context that is divorced from the "routines and rituals" (Zukin 2010: 245) that initially gave rise to them. Much social science scholarship has been slow to acknowledge this cultural-capital dialectic and its implications for claims to authenticity (ibid.: 244–245), a point I will return to in the following section.

The Great Culture Attraction/Distraction

If, according to Eriksen, processes of globalization are marked by the diminishment of "local power" alongside an intensified focus on "local identities" (2007: 6), then it's hardly surprising that the 1980s cultural turn in many of the social sciences occurred at the precise moment when post–Cold War, neoliberal economic regimes and the networks that support such regimes were ascendant. As Jameson presciently noted at the time, the collapse of "critical distance" between a once-semiautonomous cultural realm and the "massive Being of Capital" had effectively collapsed (1991: 48). The expansion of multinational capital, he argued, rendered it impossible to consider acts of "cultural resistance" and even "political interventions" outside of a system whose expansion had both "disarmed" and co-opted cultural production, which henceforth, he considered "as so many attempts to distract and divert us from that reality" (Jameson 1991: 49). This appropriation of culture by capital so fundamental to the postmodern economy signaled a major shift in the social role of cultural production, now subsumed as Baudrillardian sign value. As Zygmunt Bauman contends, culture's once central function in social reproduction and civilization/cultivation processes has been upended in favor of culture as a tool employed to pique a menu of consumer desires, while simultaneously distracting from the wider structural injustices of neoliberalism. To wit, the language of The Circle development relies heavily on cultural

terminology to further its essentially corporate or financial goals, noting, for instance, the development's permanent exhibition space for highlighting "brand experience" and "brand heritage" across a range of "Brand Houses" (The Circle n.d.-c). In this way, culture has become just one more way of generating "clients" (Bauman 2011: 16).

But among many on the intellectual left, a commitment to cultural identity as vehicle of social justice and social deconstruction/reconstruction was reinvigorated just as the validity of such claims, given the widening reach of capitalist exploitation, were most in need of critique. A body of scholarship emphasizing symbolic struggles as a means to address social inequalities and persistent injustice (see, for instance, Deutsche 1996; MacKinnon 1989; Young 1990, 2000) flourished at the precise moment the neoliberal paradigm enjoyed near unilateral sway over the American academy.[2] This is what I have dubbed "the Great Culture Attraction/Distraction" of the post–Cold War social science and humanities research agenda, which combined an enthusiasm for the estheticized economy of "signs and space" (Lash and Urry 1994) with a renewed emphasis on cultural recognition rights for marginalized groups. The outcome of this agenda, due to its inability, or even unwillingness, to address underlying economic inequities or meaningfully challenge emerging power structures, has fundamentally strengthened the role of global capital to reshape social organization after its own requirements.[3] While affording symbolic recognition to some, that recognition has, in most instances, not led to a material change in actual social conditions.

In a recent *Guardian* article, the prominent feminist political philosopher Nancy Fraser outlined concerns that many of the ideas forwarded by the feminist movement (and fermented in Anglo-American women's studies departments) had inadvertently provided "the justification for new forms of inequality and exploitation" (Fraser 2013). For instance, she posits that the feminist critique of the family wage (rooted as it was in an ideal of the male breadwinner) played into the hands of "flexible capitalism" (Fraser 2013), a concept central to the functionality of the network society, where the prototype worker is now the "flexible woman" rather than the "organization man" (Castells 2006: 9). In the West, depressed wages, increased job insecurity as well as hours worked—not to mention irregular unreliable schedules—and declining living standards for the middle class have resulted; while, in the East, profoundly exploitative labor conditions, often incubated in Western factories, predominate. Fraser writes:

> Rejecting "economism" and politicising "the personal," feminists broadened the political agenda to challenge status hierarchies premised on cultural constructions of gender difference … the feminist turn to identity politics dovetailed all too neatly with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing more than to repress all memory of social equality. In effect, we absolutised the critique of cultural sexism at precisely the moment when circumstances required redoubled attention to the critique of political economy. (Fraser 2013)

This assessment has also been forwarded by Bauman who contends that multiculturalism discourses have to some extent helped morph the "moral ugliness of poverty" into the "aesthetic appeal of cultural diversity" (Bauman 2011: 46), a focus that has the perverse effect of distracting from actual social inequality and powerlessness (tied to economic and educational levels) while simultaneously advancing a largely symbolic view of citizenship and rights informed by theories of cultural democracy.[4]

An emphasis on symbolic cultural processes as a means to address nettlesome social problems points to yet another key, but often overlooked, development in post–Cold War spatial anthropology: the multiscalar linkage between the rise of cultural recognition discourses and a wider commoditization of the cultural landscape—from museums to working-class ethnic ghettoes to religious pilgrimage trails—as the network society subsumes identity expressions under the "cultural offer" rubric. In other words, the capital-cultural dialectic is inseparably linked to a consumer-symbolic citizen dialectic. Under this conception, *symbolic citizens* serve as extensions of the reimagined cultural showrooms they perform and service for the perusal of consumer citizens, the bread and butter of global capital. These categories are hardly fixed, however, with individuals moving between (and often collapsing) classifications (Hocking 2015).

This theoretical assessment comes into sharp relief in respect to the European Capital of Culture designation, a yearlong, site-specific festival of cultural programming, which typically sees significant public-private investment in high-end cultural facilities such as new museums, gallery spaces, and regenerated waterfronts. The program has also inspired a number of spinoff cultural titles including the recently launched UK City of Culture. The capital of culture model, which in nearly all instances, makes expansive claims about social uplift and economic development that often fail to materialize, has become a reliable feature of the transnational symbolic economy of urban areas (Palmer 2004). As such, Miles (2007) underscores the program's centrality to remapping European municipalities

as viable, postnational nodes in the global network society that are capable of attracting capital, talent and tourists. In effect, the model represents the practical manifestation of a theoretical embrace pairing the cultural theming of the "civic identikit of place" with the networked commoditization of the "civic identikit of flows" (Hocking 2015). Under the capital of culture model, citizens are called on to assist in the performance of landscape as destination, where harsh social realities are downplayed in favor of civic and capital promotion (Hocking 2015). These cultural "events" also further circumscribe public space, reconfiguring its purpose for the exclusive appetites of consumer citizens. Zukin, for instance, acidly points out that "control over public spaces depends on both security guards and festivals" (Zukin 2010: 230).

This raises important questions about the hierarchies of authenticity contained in any representation of market-mediated community. With cultural consumptions rather than politics invoked as the primary forum for citizen expression and democratic participation in an age where "an aesthetic rather than a political view of social life" (Zukin 2010: 237) predominates, questions of public policy have been easily shifted to corporate-bureaucratic processes mostly operating in black boxes beyond the researcher's ken. While the culturally specific manifestations of capital of culture programs vary by location, the discourses and processes shaping them exhibit substantial convergence and standardization, including a reliance on publicly funded "spectacle" urban constructions produced by many of the same global multinational consultancies and firms (Hocking 2015). In this way, the capital of culture model has become a de facto means of co-opting the space of place, and its constituent populations, for the benefit of the space of flows. Such models also foreshadow the whole-scale capitalization of connectivity and sociality (Van Dijck 2013) by private interests in the new virtual public spheres. In these domains, the user is effectively invited to upload his or her self, the results of which are translated by multinational tech firms into a menu of marketing profiles, strategies and advertising campaigns. Such data also supports an expanding architecture of total consumer/user surveillance. As the remaining cleavages between Net and Self dissolve, so too, does our understanding of citizenship and subjectivity in the remotely controlled super networks of this brave new world. Accordingly, just as the network society privatizes public space, it also publicizes the private spaces of subjective existence for the aims of corporate-bureaucratic regimes.

Circling Back: Transnational Subjectivity and the Challenges for Social Science Scholarship in a Post-everything World

The American writer Dave Eggers's 2013 novel, which, like the Swiss pseudo-city mentioned at the start of this chapter is also titled *The Circle*, provides a dramatic hint at the possibilities for subjectivity in a post-political place world. The plot centers on the rise of Mae Holland, an employee at the world's most powerful tech company, a company, much like Google, Facebook or Apple,[5] whose aspirations stop at nothing short of global domination, where every social/civic/human activity from voting to shopping to mating is mediated through its all-consuming operating system. Here, the professional existence of the protagonist, forced to wear a camera to record her every action (including bathroom trips) is contingent on a steady diet of instant ratings and categorizations designed to measure every aspect of her daily "performance" (Eggers 2013). She is, effectively, the perfectly synched citizen of the future: orderly, ambitious and entirely committed to the quest to generate symbolic content for the consumption of the masses and benefit of her employer, a company run on the mantra: "All that happens must be known" (Eggers 2013: 67). More brand abstraction than human subject, Holland represents both ideal symbolic citizen, actively feeding the panopticon of consumer citizenry and corporatized governance, and upwardly mobile consumer citizen of the space of flows, nimbly navigating the technological goods and services of the global marketplace to maximize her own position and self-actualization in her never-ending quest to collect millions of personal followers.

While the dystopian extremes of life in Eggers's fictional *Circle* may seem far off, its underlying technological framework is already largely in place. Interactive billboards and smart TVs, facial recognition technologies, tracking devices, biometric passwords and wearable computers (such as Google Glass and the Apple Watch) are manifestations of an interlocking architecture of technology that plots a record of nearly all human action (evident in the emerging Internet of Things), and increasingly aims for total predictive capabilities. While sold on the efficiency and accessibility these advances offer the consumer, they have also enabled the explosion of the surveillance state in the liberal West, a natural complement to global capital's total commoditization of society, predicated as it is on technological innovation, the elimination of disorder or resistance to flows in the network, and precise models of consumer/citizen behavior. In a postindustrial age where information, rather than product, is the primary

commodity, control, power and profits are maximized through knowledge of the system and its constituent parts (i.e., people). But as Bauman and Lyon (2013: 12) note in their work on postmodern surveillance regimes, despite the widespread transmission of discourses of openness in the digital age, "transparency is simultaneously increased for some and decreased for others," with "social sorting" (ibid.: 13), carried out by a corporate-bureaucratic surveillance regime that operates from a distance and without the correcting forces of mutual engagement or public accountability (ibid.: 7). Meanwhile, as government bureaucracies and major corporations hoover up expansive behavioral information about the subject and consumer (a practice once reserved for the criminal element), such entities operate under a cloak of secrecy.[6] Tech elite pioneers at the helm of the global economy's most successful firms, such as Google cofounder Larry Page, have gone so far as to float the idea of corporate "safe places," which would exist outside of government regulation or public accountability (Schulz 2013). In these third spaces, a variety of social experiments would be exercised, presumably free of ethical, legal and moral considerations. Meanwhile, the National Security Agency's mass surveillance program was justified based on secret interpretations of the law of which both the public and Congress were largely unaware (Friedersdorf 2014b). The reach of the NSA's activities, including the extent that large, multinational tech firms had collaborated in its efforts, likely would have remained unknown were it not for the revelations of fugitive whistle-blower and former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.[7] Just as the NSA in recent years inaugurated a million-square-foot warehouse in the Utah desert built to store and process its massive trove of electronic communications data, private data brokers, such as Acxiom Corporation, have compiled highly detailed demographic and behavior dossiers on the majority of adult Americans (and hundreds of millions of non-Americans worldwide). The profiles, which may include information on one's income, religion, politics, marital status, health status, projected inheritances and race, categorize individuals by spending capacity and preferences, ranging from those of desirable high-end households, who may be targeted with tailored discounts and deals, to low-income earners who are otherwise dismissed as "waste" in industry parlance (Singer 2012).[8] Acxiom, whose origins stretch back to a company founded in the late 1960s to assist the Democratic Party with voter outreach, sells its information to a range of powerful public and private clients, and has also worked with the US government on issues related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Singer 2012).[9]

So what type of citizenship and/or subjectivity does these surveillance-saturated capital networks and commoditized cultural forms prefigure and encourage? Writing at the dawn of the post–Cold War network society, Castells asserted that the fundamental opposition to emerge on the new informational-oriented landscape was the Net/Self binary (Castells 1996). But in actuality, the logical extension of the capitalist network society Castells describes is the eradication of this binary. The model consumer-symbolic citizen of the future will likely be fully embedded, branded and tracked in transnational, corporate-bureaucratic networks, thereby removing remaining impediments to both "total information awareness" (the one-time name of a proposed Pentagon surveillance initiative, the aims of which were subsequently pursued under other labels by the NSA)[10] and the economic and security assurances such certainty is presumed to facilitate. Already in South Africa, an initiative spearheaded by the Department of Arts and Culture and Brand South Africa, the country's marketing agency, aimed to create a digitally generated "Formula of a South African," whose attributes were to be subconsciously instilled in residents through art projects (Bizcommunity 2012). By encouraging desirable civic traits via "a formula for how we as South Africans should *behave*" (FormulaSA 2012, emphasis added), the initiative hoped to enhance the country's position as a global destination for capital and tourists. Just as civic identikit models of development globally standardize social behavior and cultural expression, both civilizing and harmonizing space for capital interests, the South African citizenship project sought to program people to conform to certain corporate-driven ideals (Hocking 2015).

But as Don Mitchell reminds us, the "perfectly ordered city" … is "an authoritarian, even totalitarian, fantasy" (2003: 230). Nevertheless, the liberal West whose virtue was once defined by the inherent "evilness" of its antipode has increasingly exhibited the same preoccupation with surveillance and control once found in the Soviet bloc, where a preoccupation with secrecy and infallibility abounded (Kennan 1947). The impenetrability of corporate-bureaucratic structural determinants leaves social science scholarship confronting limited access to meaningful data about a transnational power structure whose command centers have been shifted to impenetrable and intangible realms akin to "cloud governance." And with political representatives also coming under the eye of such surveillance regimes (Friedersdorf 2014a), the result may be a symbolic policymaking apparatus that reduces social scientists and other scholars to little more than theater critics.[11] Whether it will be possible to

offer a relevant critique or muster any meaningful intellectual resistance to a system of capital/control, where, as Gertrude Stein once noted of Oakland, California, "There is no there there" remains to be seen. After all, how does one produce scholarship about a power structure without a public archive? The coming collapse of the Net/Self binary will also demand a reevaluation of existing methodologies for studying issues related to networked subjectivity in a virtual world where privacy has been all but eliminated and the individual integrated into completely surveilled, interlocking transnational networks. New externally imposed regimes of self-monitoring will further exacerbate the difficulties social scientists face with unraveling degrees of subject authenticity on the post-agency social terrain.

In light of such developments, the outlook for future social science scholarship is troubling at best. The completely networked society, which tracks every interaction, movement, consumption and communication, as well as all scholarly investigation, lays the foundations for the completely controllable society, a condition that will almost certainly create a distorted intellectual climate akin to Soviet-era *Lysenkoism*, which demanded the perpetuation of scientifically unsound theories based on the ideological biases of Communist leaders.[12] This raises the ultimate question: Has the end of the Cold War wrought not greater intellectual freedom but merely a quasi-form of "symbolic scholarship" encouraged by funding regimes to embrace postnational models of empathy production and diversity discourses that ultimately distract from the far greater revolution in social and economic organization now under way?

Some commentators hold out hope that limitations are still possible that may curb the worst excesses of the digital future, while embracing its obvious benefits of ease, connectivity and instantaneity (Lanier 2013), and organizations such as the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University are to be commended for grappling with such issues. Moving forward, scholars will be forced to take on a social landscape shaped by networks and new forms of fully corporatized "governmentality" (Foucault 1991) previously unimaginable. These dynamics will demand a revolutionary reappraisal of public and private space, and an accompanying intellectual and political movement which seeks the recategorization of the corporate itself. If citizens must cede the right to privacy and autonomy in the emerging network society, so, too, must our new corporate governance structures. Making public those entities which maintain claims to a level of sacrosanct

privacy no longer feasible for ordinary citizens may be the struggle of our generation. Indeed, the extraordinary public power of the private sector imbues it with new responsibilities of accountability to which it was previously immune. But whether the social science community will choose to meet these challenges and forward such reforms, or drifts further into the realm of practical irrelevance, remains to be seen.

Notes

1. Given the overarching logic of the capitalist network society, it should come as no surprise that the British government's Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act of 2014 created new mechanisms for the imposition of geographically defined restrictions on certain activities known as Public Spaces Protection Orders. These orders, which, according to a recent article in *The Guardian*, "allow for broad powers to criminalise behaviour that is not normally criminal," have been invoked to target everything from sleeping rough to so-called "anti-social" or "nuisance" speech (Garrett 2015).

2. As an undergraduate at a major US university in the late 1990s, I was struck by the complete absence of critical alternative to multinational capitalism presented across curriculums in the economics, political science and international studies departments. At the same time, identity politics and an array of controversial social issues, primarily related to racial and sexual concerns, consumed university newspaper editorial pages as well as classroom discussions and debates.

3. A feature in *Slate* examining the annual Modern Language Association conference, a marquee event in the humanities academic calendar, considered the gap between the discourses on display there with the reality of working conditions experienced by faculty at American universities, where more than half of staff can now be qualified as flexible labor, or adjunct professors (Schuman 2014). Writing about an effort to contest the status quo orientation of the annual conference and the largely symbolic scholarship on display there, Schuman (2014) writes: "Instead of esoteric panels about revolutionary impulses in literature, the subconference's roundtable discussions seek to start an actual revolution … employing what participant Lucia Pawlowski, an assistant professor of English at the University of St. Thomas, refers to as 'militant research … the practice of bringing to the surface and mapping out information that someone is trying to hide from you—information that can provide the essential tools you need to organize.'"

4. Along these lines, Kwon (2004), in her incisive study of the community public art process, notes that the frequently "uplifting" community representations embraced by such programs in low-income neighborhoods may ultimately "obscure the effects" of the underlying structural causes of social deprivation.

5. Apple's new Norman Foster-designed corporate headquarters, slated to open in 2017, will feature a 2.8-million-square-foot circular donut ring-shaped structure, set within a verdant landscape meant to seamlessly merge futuristic glass-and-metal design with the agricultural heritage of the Santa Clara Valley, albeit with controlled access points and a subterranean auditorium (Vanhemert 2013; Schulz 2013). Ironically, the aerial view of the new headquarters shows a perfect circle.

6. Similarly, the journalist Michael Lewis chronicles the "rigging" of the US stock market via impenetrable and largely incomprehensible "black boxes," where high-frequency stock orders are executed to the unfair advantage of some (Lewis 2014). Ironically, he cites a Russian tech expert who compares the contemporary Wall Street environment to that of a Soviet-controlled economy, abstruse to all but a select few and "riddled with loopholes" (Lewis 2014).

7. In comparison to the seemingly limitless ambitions of American intelligence and multinational corporations to capture information about practically all communication and consumption habits, Stefan Roloff's art installation, "Life in the Death Zone" at Potsdam's Villa Schoeningen, which interrogates the Stasi-era penetration and surveillance of domestic life in East Germany, appears almost quaint. There, in a one-room installation, Roloff recreates a standardized GDR sitting room. On various screens, video footage depicts scenes of life along the death strip, including shots of watchtowers, binocular wielding guards in patrol boats and militarized security barriers, meant to inject a sense of surveillance and unease into an otherwise-domestic scene (personal observation, December 5, 2013).

8. Such language echoes concerns that the networked global economy increasingly jettisons future possibilities for a transnational class of "wasted humans" (Bauman 2005: 147; see also Castells 1996).

9. In 2013, the company launched a program to invite individuals to view some of the information Acxiom had collected on them, and even update their profiles, thereby assisting the company's overarching goal to compile ever more accurate digital dossiers on the participating individuals to, in turn, sell to third parties (Singer 2013).

10. See Harris (2012).

11. Ironically, a literal "total transparency" of all legislators is among the goals of Eggers's fictional *Circle*, where to shun the acceptance of an ever-pres-

ent camera is tantamount to an admission of ethical or criminal guilt. In the Orwellian world of *The Circle*, "Privacy is Theft" (Eggers 2013: 303). Similarly, Eric Schmidt, the executive chairman of Alphabet Inc., Google's parent company, has asserted, "If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place" (quoted in Nocera 2013).

12. Notably, American and British universities have increasingly embraced corporate-dictated curriculums and programs, as was the case at the University of Maryland, which recently partnered with Northrop Grumman, allowing the defense contractor to help design an undergraduate academic program in exchange for funding (see Belkin and Porter 2014).

References

Augé, Marc. 1995. *Non-places: Introduction to the Anthropology of Supermodernity.* Trans. John Howe. London: Verso.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2005. *Liquid Life.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

———. 2011. *Culture in a Liquid Modern World.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt, and David Lyon. 2013. *Liquid Surveillance: A Conversation.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Belkin, Douglas, and Caroline Porter. 2014. Corporate Cash Alters University Curricula. *Wall Street Journal*, 8 April, A1.

Bizcommunity. 2012. Formulating a South African. 4 July. Accessed 5 July 2012. http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/19/77907.html

Boyer, Christine. 1994. *The City of Collective Memory.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Castells, Manuel. 1989. *The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers.

———. 1996. *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. Vol. 1, *The Rise of the Network Society.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

———. 2006. The Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy. In *The Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy*, ed. Manuel Castells and Gustavo Cardoso, 3–21. Washington, DC: John Hopkins Center for Transatlantic Relations.

Deutsche, Rosalyn. 1996. *Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Eggers, Dave. 2013. *The Circle.* New York: Knopf.

Eriksen, Thomas. 2007. *Globalization: The Key Concepts.* Oxford: Berg.

FormulaSA. 2012. What is FormulaSA? Accessed 8 January 2013. http://www.formulasa.co.za/default.asp?CPH_ID=1054

Foucault, Michel. 1991. Governmentality. In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 87–104. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fraser, Nancy. 2013. How Feminism Became Capitalism's Handmaiden—And How to Reclaim It. *The Guardian*, 14 October. Accessed 15 November 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/14/feminism-capitalist-handmaiden-neoliberal

Friedersdorf, Conor. 2014a. The Danger of NSA Spying on Members of Congress. *The Atlantic*, 6 January. Accessed 5 January 2014. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/the-danger-of-nsa-spying-on-members-of-congress/282827/

———. 2014b. Why Secret Law is Un-American. *The Atlantic*, 3 January. Accessed 3 January 2014. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-secret-law-is-un-american/282786/

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

Garrett, Bradley. 2015. PSPOs: The New Control Orders Threatening Our Public Spaces. *The Guardian*. Accessed 30 July 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/sep/08/pspos-new-control-orders-public-spaces-asbos-freedoms

Harris, Shane. 2012. Giving in to the Surveillance State. *New York Times*, 22 August. Accessed 4 January 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/opinion/whos-watching-the-nsa-watchers.html

Harvey, David. 1989. *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

———. 2000. *Spaces of Hope*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Hocking, Bree. 2015. *The Great Reimagining: Public Art, Urban Space and the Symbolic Landscapes of a 'New' Northern Ireland*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Hollis, Leo. 2013. How Big Data is Entering Every Corner of Our Lives. *The Daily Beast*, 26 July. Accessed 8 August 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/26/how-big-data-is-entering-every-corner-of-our-lives.html

Jameson, Fredric. 1991. *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Kennan, George. 1947. The Sources of Soviet Conduct. *Foreign Affairs*, 1 July.

Kunstler, James Howard. 1993. *The Geography of Nowhere: The Rise and Decline of America's Man Made Landscape*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Kwon, Miwon. 2004. *One Place After Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Lanier, Jaron. 2013. *Who Owns the Future?* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Lash, Scott, and John Urry. 1994. *Economies of Signs and Space*. London: Sage.

Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. *The Production of Space*. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Lewis, Michael. 2014. The Wolf Hunters of Wall Street. *New York Times Magazine*, 6 April.

MacKinnon, Catharine. 1989. *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Miles, Malcolm. 2007. *Cities and Cultures*. London: Routledge.

Mitchell, Don. 2003. *The Right to the City*. New York: The Guildford Press.

Nocera, Joe. 2013. A World Without Privacy. *New York Times*, 14 October. Accessed 5 January 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/opinion/nocera-a-world-without-privacy.html

Palmer, Robert. 2004. *European Cities and Capitals of Culture: Study Prepared for the European Commission*. Brussels: Palmer-Rae Associates.

Ritzer, George. 2003. Rethinking Globalization: Glocalization/Grobalization and Something/Nothing. *Sociological Theory* 21(3): 193–209.

Schulz, Thomas. 2013. From Apple to Amazon: The New Monuments to Digital Domination. *Spiegal Online International*, 29 November. Accessed 29 December 2013. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/tech-giants-like-apple-and-amazon-building-monuments-to-digital-domination-a-936095.html

Schuman, Rebecca. 2014. Conventional Wisdom. *Slate Magazine*, 3 January. Accessed 5 January 2014. http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2014/01/marc_bousquet_and_others_at_the_mla_subconference_try_to_change_the_academic.html

Singer, Natasha. 2012. Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome. *New York Times*, 16 June. Accessed 2 January 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html?pagewanted=all

———. 2013. Acxiom Lets Consumers See Data It Collects. *New York Times*, 4 September. Accessed 6 January 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/technology/acxiom-lets-consumers-see-data-it-collects.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Sorkin, Michael. 1992. Introduction: Variations on a Theme Park. In *Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space*, ed. Michael Sorkin, xi–xv. New York: Hill and Wang.

The Circle. n.d.-a. Accessed 29 December 2013. http://www.thecircle.ch/home.html

———. n.d.-b. Architecture. Accessed 15 April 2015. http://info.thecircle.ch/architecture.html

———. n.d.-c. Brands and Dialogue. Accessed 15 April 2015. http://info.thecircle.ch/brands-dialogue-en.html

Van Dijck, José. 2013. *The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vanhemert, Kyle. 2013. Look Inside Apple's Spaceship Headquarters With 24 All-New Renderings. *Wired*, 11 November. Accessed 29 December 2013. http://www.wired.com/design/2013/11/a-glimpse-into-apples-crazy-new-spaceship-headquarters/

Young, Iris Marion. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Zukin, Sharon. 2010. *Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zurich Airport Company. 2015. News Flash: Realization Partner Chosen for "The Circle," *Media release*, 30 January. Accessed 20 April 2015. http://www.zurich-airport.com/~/media/FlughafenZH/Dokumente/Das_Unternehmen/News_Flash/2015/20150130_News-Flash_Realisierungspartner_EN.pdf

Humanitarianism after the Cold War: The Case of Haiti

Pierre Minn

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary humanitarian activity largely operates in reaction to events: the disasters and conflicts that bring suffering and misery into the sphere of global media. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti was not only one of the world's most catastrophic disasters in terms of loss of life and material destruction, but also one of the most mediatised. Several factors, including the severity of human casualties and structural damage, Haiti's proximity to the United States, and the widespread use of social media contributed to the visibility of both the earthquake and the response it engendered. The representations that circulated in the weeks that followed the calamity appeared in forms that were familiar from other earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, or landslides: aerial views of widespread damaged, close-ups of distressed and grieving populations and narratives of heroic rescues and stoic endurance. The temporalities of immediacy and emergency that govern contemporary humanitarian responses work to erase the historical context and contingencies of both catastrophic events and the responses they

P. Minn (✉)
Department of Anthropology, Université de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada

engender. In this chapter, I aim to illustrate some features of humanitarianism in the post-Cold War period. Drawing on ethnographic data from fieldwork conducted in Haiti over the past two decades, I will illustrate how two of the hallmarks of neo-liberalism—namely, the move away from state expenditures on health and social services for populations and an emphasis on individual action and responsibility—have shaped contemporary humanitarian activity. In doing so, my intention is not to make sweeping claims about all forms of humanitarianism. The approaches, activities and projects that fall under the category of humanitarianism are varied and diverse, and are difficult to categorize or address as a single phenomenon. Rather, I wish to use specific examples from Haiti to illustrate how geopolitical and economic forces can shape individual encounters. I do so knowing that many aspects of humanitarianism in Haiti have equivalents elsewhere, and that the phenomena I describe are not restricted to that particular setting.

After presenting some of the developments that have tied the anthropology of humanitarianism to medical anthropology, I will provide a brief overview of how Cold War politics influenced Haiti history and current situation. While the roots of contemporary humanitarian activities in Haiti can be traced back centuries, I will focus on the period following the 1986 fall of the Duvalier dictatorship, whose 30-year reign roughly coincided with the Cold War period. As was the case for many smaller nations during this period, Haiti found itself caught between larger East-West geopolitical tensions. Its position in this struggle had far-reaching consequences that are still visible today. In particular, aid activities in the Haiti have been strongly shaped by Cold War and post-Cold War dynamics, in no small part because of Haiti's proximity to Cuba and the United States. In addition, the persistent characterization of Haiti as a "failed state," the weakness of Haitian governmental structures and services and the central role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in providing for Haitians' basic needs bring into focus what is at stake in current debates about the obligations of states, collectivities and individuals in the context of contemporary neo-liberalism and global capitalism.

The Anthropology of Humanitarianism and Medical Anthropology

Anthropological studies of humanitarianism have multiplied in the past decade. Determining what exactly falls into this category of scholarship is challenging, as humanitarianism can be interpreted to encompass a

wide range of activities and affective states (charity, aid, development, intervention, care, compassion and others). However, the number of anthropological research projects and publications that explicitly use the term "humanitarianism" has grown significantly in a short period of time (Minn 2007). Ticktin (2014) traces this rise to developments in legal and medical anthropology. She describes how medical anthropologists turned from cross-cultural studies of health to "universal forms of experience," with a particular emphasis on suffering (275). Work by Arthur Kleinman (1988), Veena Das et al. (2001) and others interested in the subjective experience and meaning attributed to sickness worked to position suffering as a central issue of concern for medical anthropologists. As Robbins (2013) described, this attention to suffering strangers came at a point when critical perspectives within anthropology made attention to "savage Others" less viable. Anthropological studies of suffering have been used both to understand processes of narrative and meaning-making by individuals (DelVecchio Good et al. 1994) and to connect the suffering of marginalized individuals and populations to wider economic and political forces (Farmer 1992; Scheper-Hughes 1992). Ticktin, herself a leading anthropologist of humanitarianism, points out that "[the] affective—and often, moralized—connection to one's research subjects engaged anthropologists in a moral imperative to intervene" (277), an imperative that mirrored those faced by humanitarian workers and volunteers.

Ticktin describes three categories that are salient to contemporary studies of humanitarianism by anthropologists: spaces (focusing on camps and other liminal spaces where interventions are carried out), people (the populations that are targeted) and events (the natural and man-made epidemics, disasters, catastrophes and conflicts) that elicit humanitarian responses. Post-Cold War dynamics are strikingly visible in all three of these categories, from the reconfiguration of and conflicts related to territorial boundaries after 1989 to the emergence of categories of "stateless" persons and collapsed states. To this list, I would add shifts in time and temporality that have captured the attention of scholars of humanitarianism (Fassin and Pandolfi 2010): the prominence of emergency in humanitarian responses and the move from sustained support for state-building apparatus to the collapsed logic of the one-, two-, or five-year project, or of the one-week mission, which I will describe below. After the Haiti earthquake, images and testimonials of the disaster were broadcast moments after the ground stopped shaking; the immediacy of internet-based technologies were central for communicating, visualizing, and representing the catastrophe, as well as for crafting appeals for aid and intervention. The social networking services Facebook

and Twitter, which were undergoing enormous expansion in 2010, were instrumental in spreading images and texts about the disaster. Organizations such as the American Red Cross and Doctors With Borders set up systems whereby donors could contribute funding by texting a code to the organizations' number, generating significant sums of support within days.

The collapsed temporalities that govern humanitarian assistance have a particular salience in Haiti, where the language of immediacy, crisis and emergency are pervasive. Even before the earthquake, a viable future for Haiti seemed difficult for the country's citizens (as well as outside observers) to imagine (Beckett 2008). Haiti's frequent designation as a "failed state" as well as its enduring poverty and the perceptions of corruption that tarnish its government (Transparency International 2014) means that interventions directed at immediate relief (medical services, food, water, and shelter) for populations deemed worthy or needy (children, orphans, and women) often gain more traction and visibility than sustained support for governments or institutions. The director of an American NGO that works in partnership with the Haiti's Ministry of Health to strengthen its public services (through trainings, infrastructure support, and salary support for public employees) often remarked that his organization would have much better success in garnering donations if it ran an orphanage. The decades it could take to transform systems of governance in Haiti cannot compete with the immediacy of sick or hungry children.

Haiti in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Periods

Cold War politics in Haiti were most evident in two related phenomena: US support (in the form of military and financial aid) to 1957–1986 Duvalier family dictatorship as a measure to contain the Cuban Revolution and the divergent policies adopted by the US government in the treatment of Haitian and Cuban migrants. Gerlus (1995) describes how the American government used both trade and aid to secure the allegiance of François Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, in exchange for their anti-communist stances. Not only did these policies support one of the most violent and murderous regimes in Haiti's history, but they also contributed to Haiti's ever-increasing dependence on international aid at the expense of local production, particularly in the agricultural sector.

During the same period, Haitians began to flee the dictatorship and the grueling economic conditions that resulted from its misguided, repressive and exploitative policies. Beginning with professional and middle-class

migrants (who were particularly target by the Duvalier government) in the 1960s, to larger numbers of migrants from rural areas and secondary cities in the 1970s and 1980s, the number of Haitian migrants to the United States swelled to several thousand per year (Stepick 1982). However, US government policies singled out Haitian migrants, accusing them of being economic (rather than political) migrants and incarcerating or deporting them. Agreements were signed between the US government and Jean-Claude Duvalier's regime that stipulated that American authorities could board Haitian boats, return potential migrants to Haiti, or detain them in US detention centers (Gerlus 1995). This was in stark contrast to Cuban migrants, who were largely granted asylum in the United States and only rarely deported to Cuba. Officially, the discrepancies were based on differences in Cuba's and Haiti's governments (communist and non-communist); however, it seems clear that racial prejudice in against Haitians was a compounding factor.

With the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti entered a period of transitional governments and military coups until the country's first democratic election in 1990. Former Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whose promises of social justice, inclusion and equality won the support of wide segments of the Haitian population, won the election by a wide margin. He was ousted by a military coup and spent three years in exile, before being reinstated (with US support) in 1994. While the US agencies, organizations, individuals, and branches of government involved in determining US policies toward Haiti during this period were diverse and often worked toward contradictory goals, it is important to know that accusations of communism or leftism would continue to be leveled at Aristide long after 1989.

The remnants of Cold War tensions in Haiti were particularly visible in the dynamics of trade and aid that developed between Cuba, Venezuela and Haiti in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Beginning in 1998, the government of Cuba began sending teams of *internactionalistas*—physicians, nurses, laboratory technicians, and other health professionals—to work in Haiti for two-year shifts. Working in coordination with Haiti's Ministry of Public Health and Population, the Cuban health workers were primarily sent to public health facilities in isolated areas. Haiti's 2007 agreement with Venezuela's PetroCaribe program further strengthened Haiti's ties to socialist nations in the Caribbean and increased the resources available for tripartite (Cuba-Venezuela-Haiti) development and health programs. The death of Hugo Chavez in 2013 and recent moves toward normalizing

relationships between the United States and Cuba will certainly have an impact on humanitarian activities in Haiti, although the nature of these impacts remains unknown. I now turn to an examination of contemporary humanitarian activities in Haiti in order to illustrate how neo-liberal features of the post-Cold War period have shaped aid activities. In particular, I will describe how humanitarian activities are shaped by an important ambivalence: the pressure to provide tangible, unmediated and immediately quantifiable aid, which exists alongside pressures to make aid activities "sustainable" and to ensure that interventions can be "scaled up" in order to have an impact on the greatest number of potential recipients.

Humanitarianism in Haiti: Suffering Bodies and Scaling Up

The Haitian case is particularly interesting to think through these issues because transnational humanitarianism and development activities are so pervasive in all spheres of Haiti political, economic and social life. From 2007 to 2009, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in and around Cap-Haïtien, Haiti's second largest city. I followed the work of international groups and organizations who intervened through diverse programs in Haiti's health sector, ranging from visiting orthopedic surgery teams who corrected club feet to associations of Haitian-Canadian nurses who carried out trainings and continuing education for Haitian nurses. Through qualitative interviews and participant observation, I examined the daily workings of medical aid, in particular the dynamics that developed between Haitian clinicians and the international volunteers, staff, and organization that they work alongside or for. Given the prevalence of international aid bodies throughout the Haitian health care sector, all Haitian clinicians have some degree of contact with international aid bodies, although the extent of this contact varies significantly (Minn 2011).

One of the groups I followed during my research is emblematic of North American medical aid to countries like Haiti, in that its model of intervention is widespread throughout the country. The group was a small Canadian NGO I will call Helping Haiti, whose primary activity was to support a small clinic in an isolated village on Haiti's north coast. Two to four times a year, teams of Canadian health professionals traveled to Haiti on weeklong trips to provide health services for the area's residents, most of whom earned their living from farming, fishing, and small-scale

marketing. Working with another Canadian organization that sponsored education projects in the area, Helping Haiti's teams set up their temporary clinics in a primary school and provided consultations, basic pharmaceutical products and first aid services. I accompanied the group on three of its weeklong missions, serving as translator, observing the group's interactions with Haitian patients and staff and talking informally with both Haitians and Canadians about how they perceived their transnational encounters. During my fieldwork, I also followed the work of several similar organizations, and while groups differed in their approaches, resources and activities, certain patterns emerged across the groups.

The first was medical volunteers' desire and enthusiasm for direct and unmediated access to patients' suffering bodies. In the case of Helping Haiti, the volunteers set up makeshift clinics in the classrooms of a local primary school. Eight of the rooms were converted into examination rooms, one into an "Operations Centre," one into a pharmacy and one into a laboratory for rudimentary analyses. The area's residents had been informed of the group's arrival one week before, and began lining up at the school's gate in the early hours of the morning. The Canadian volunteers (nurses, physicians, physical therapists, pharmacists, medical technicians, and other health professionals) looked forward to seeing patients, and because the area was understood to be one of great deprivation and unmet need, the assumption was that the patients they encountered would be ill, suffering and untreated. Two Haitian nurses employed by the group were also present, at times offering Creole to French translation, and assisting with consultations.

Particularly serious medical cases were met with more marked interest and attention. For example, untreated infections, dramatic wounds, pathologies involving children or mysterious symptoms led to consultations among the Canadian health workers, photographs that would be sent back to specialists in Canada, and occasionally referrals to contacts in the group's network that had ties to hospitals in Haiti. Narrative accounts by the volunteers of their work in Haiti often focused on a dramatic case, often a child with a serious condition for whom the volunteer developed particularly strong compassion or empathy. Volunteers recounted these cases in great detail in my interviews with them, and also appear as central components of trip reports and postings on social media sites. The outcome of the case has an impact on the meanings and rhetorical force attributed to the encounter: in cases where the patient is successfully treated, volunteers describe the rewards they feel for their efforts and their satisfaction at

having helped a person in need. In cases where treatment is unsuccessful or the volunteer loses track of a patient, the latter describe the encounters as haunting and unforgettable. In both types of cases, the encounters often serve to renew volunteers' commitments to stay involved in this type of medical aid, and are also used to solicit financial support and other resources from potential donors. The narratives become a type of witnessing that is a prevalent dimension of humanitarian aid (Redfield 2006).

The promise of being able to directly treat patients was what brought many of the North American volunteers to Haiti. These health professionals spoke to me about how meaningful it was for them to be able to aid patients in need, and many compared the work they did during their volunteer trips in Haiti to their routine practices in North America: seeing essentially healthy patients for routine medical encounters or minor ailments, filling out paperwork, dealing with administrative tasks. Of course, volunteers had other motivations that brought them to Haiti, not all of which were made explicit. For younger clinician-volunteers, their consultations with patients in Haiti also allowed them to encounter rare pathologies or unusual manifestations of medical conditions, many of which had been poorly or partially treated. Groups operating through religious organizations offered volunteers to carry out "good works" in accordance with the teachings of their church or temple. For the most part, however, medical aid volunteers spoke about "making a difference": an individual act of good that improved someone's quality of life and reduced suffering. The immediacies of a clinical encounter—with the potential to see, feel and touch the object of one's intervention—contribute to the knowledge that a difference has indeed been made. These encounters are premised on the primacy of individual action and responsibility, hallmarks of contemporary neo-liberalism.

This emphasis on individual action leads to another, paradoxical dynamic in the structure and functioning of transnational medical aid organizations. During my fieldwork in Haiti, it was common for NGOs to be led—formally or informally—by a single, charismatic leader. This individual, oftentimes the founder of the organization, generally held a formal role as director or president, and took on a wide range of roles in the organization: securing funding, reaching out to new volunteers, communicating with other groups on behalf of the organization, coordinating trips to Haiti and interfacing with partners and recipients in Haiti. Groups with formal, institutionalized names were often referred to by my Haitian informants by the leader's name ("*Ekip Doktè Wheeler*" [Doctor Wheeler's

team] or "*Gwoup Debbie*" [Debbie's group]). While specific volunteers and employees tended to change and rotate over time, these leader figures generally maintained their activities in Haiti over long periods of time, returning on multiple trips and developing long-term relationships with individuals and institutions in Haiti. This particular feature of humanitarian interventions in Haiti is paradoxical in two ways. Firstly, despite the pervasive language of individual action, the presence of charismatic leaders in many aid organizations also implies the presence and contributions of a greater number of volunteers: individuals whose activities in Haiti would not take place if it weren't for another person's initiatives and energy. (This is evidenced by the dissolution of aid organizations after the death or retirement of individual leaders, or after internal conflicts involving these leaders result in fractured organizations or offshoots.) The second paradox is that the prevalence of charismatically leaders in organizations persists despite a stated emphasis on collectivities, and communities. There are a far greater number of organizations whose names invoke collective efforts than those named after single individuals (although the latter do exist, often as homages to deceased individuals). Aid organizations' representations of their work in Haiti, include those of Helping Haiti, are replete with terms such as "grass roots," "community-based," "village" and other markers of collective action and processes.

While the possibility of providing biomedical services directly to suffering individuals was what initially drew volunteers of Helping Haiti, those who led the organizations or returned on subsequent trips were soon confronted with a paradox: while providing direct services to patients led to immediate satisfaction and the tangible accomplishment of the organization's goals, expanding the group's activities and measuring the impacts it was having would be essential for securing funding and resources for its activities. The group began rudimentary data collection, using basic forms for patient intake and keeping a logbook of the numbers and types of patients seen. In the case of other organizations with longer histories of operating in Haiti, a pattern emerged through which the formalization and expansion of aid activities led to a greater volume of administrative activities for North American staff and volunteers. Direct service provision was often handed over to Haitian clinicians, who could see a greater volume of patients due to their residency in Haiti, their ability to communicate directly with patients, and their familiarity with local pathologies and symptoms.

Helping Haiti's early attempts at formalization existed outside of any larger framework. The group operated for over a year without seeking the authorization of Haiti's Ministries of Health or Planning and External Cooperation. Once the organization did file the paperwork to receive official NGO status from the government of Haiti, the approval process took over two years. Conversely, the group did not have explicit ties with the government of Canada. Individuals paid for their own travel to and expenses in Haiti, and the group's other activities—namely, the sponsorship of a small clinic—were funded by individuals or foundations. References to the Canadian state appeared in small details, including a Canadian flag emblazoned on the group's t-shirts and a group photograph taken with both the Haitian and Canadian flags.

In Haiti, it would be difficult to claim that the state has retreated from the provision of services in the post-Cold War period, given that the Haitian state has never adequately addressed the needs of its population through basic services or infrastructure. Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1990) has illustrated how the Haitian state exists in opposition to the Haitian nation (or population), with the former exploiting, neglecting, or terrorizing the latter. Racial, social and geographic hierarchies have led to the majority of the Haitian population existing on the margins of the state apparatus, while the urban elite who have had access to government have primarily used it as a means for personal financial gain. The Haitian state today has inherited a legacy of weak institutions, high rates of professional emigration and limited avenues for generating revenue. Its relationship with international NGOs can best be described as a chicken-and-egg predicament: NGOs weaken state structures by creating parallel services and provoking internal "brain-drain" (in which professionals leave or bypass employment in the public system for better wages and working conditions in NGOs), but exist in order to compensate for a generalized lack of public services.

These predicaments, of course, are not unique to Haiti, but reflect patterns on a global scale. The structural adjustment programs of the 1970s and 1980s, which aimed to reduce the role of states in the provision of basic services (such as health care, education and welfare programs) have been critiqued for the toll they take on the well-being of populations. While it was assumed that a strong private sector would taken on the role of assuring basic services for populations, this has not been the case overall. Impoverished populations continue to lack access to services and infrastructure for health and education, and in many contexts, NGO

have stepped in to fill the void. The discrepancy in resources between international aid bodies and national governments is flagrant in Haiti and elsewhere.

The sidestepping of state structures in the aid process was particularly evident in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, when less than 1 % of international aid was channeled to the Government of Haiti (UN Special Envoy to Haiti 2011). As in the years that preceded the catastrophe, the majority of the aid was disbursed to multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations. Strategic use of development and humanitarian aid for political aims is not new to Haiti, as I described earlier. The US government, with its strong political and economic interests, has been particularly prone to increasing or decreasing its support for the Haitian government in accordance with the latter's compliance with American policies. An aid embargo was particularly damaging to President Aristide's second mandate, which lasted from 2000 to his ouster in 2004.

In addition to the specific policy aims of major donors, a reticence to engage with state structures stems from a widespread suspicion by individual aid workers that Haitian government workers and institutions are corrupt and morally bankrupt. My claim here is not to argue that there is no corruption in Haiti's government. Rather, it is to highlight that contemporary humanitarianism is dominated by an idealized dyad of generous donor and needy recipient. State structures in an impoverished country trouble this dyad. The government of Haiti is rarely considered to be a worthy recipient of aid in and of itself, and its reliability as an intermediary for aid that would be channeled to the country's impoverished citizens is constantly questioned.

Conclusion

It may be too early, however, to predict the state's complete retreat from humanitarian spheres. Bilateral, governmental aid continues to constitute a significant source of support for humanitarian health and development projects. Organizations that are described as "non-governmental" may in fact be receiving significant portions of their revenue from governmental bodies such as USAID, a major funder of humanitarian activities in Haiti. In addition, there has been increasing pressure to "partner" with local governments as part of an effort to ensure the sustainability of humanitarian projects and "build capacity" in impoverished areas to address health disparities and catastrophes with local solutions.

An example of this pressure is evident in the work of Partners in Health (PIH), a US-based NGO that is one of the most prominent organizations working in Haiti today. When the organization was founded, in 1987, Haiti was ruled by a transitional Conseil National de Gouvernement (CNG), put into place after the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier. The CNG would be overthrown by a succession of coups and military juntas, ending in the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990. Despite Haiti's reputation for instability and weak governance, the past decades have been unprecedented in terms of stability in governance: democratically elected governments have ruled Haiti for 22 of the past 26 years (although low recent elections have been marked by irregularities and low voter turn-out), and there has been only one ouster during this period. Recent years have clearly offered more palatable opportunities for partnership than during the Duvalier dictatorship or the years that immediately followed it. PIH and its Haitian "sister organization," Zanmi Lasante (ZL), work in collaboration with the government of Haiti, so that every new PIH/ZL site is technically part of the public system. The group's most ambitious project, a 300-bed teaching hospital in Haiti's Central Plateau, was built following the earthquake, and operates jointly with Haiti's Ministry of Health. The organization has committed to transferring complete administrative control of the hospital ten years after its inauguration. In the words of Ophelia Dahl, PIH's president and executive director, "You see that most NGOs work alone—when there are thousands of NGOs in Haiti, and simply forming partnerships, connecting to local and national government, makes things much, much more efficient" (Hamblin 2012). It remains to be seen if the claims that partnering with local governments leads to greater efficiency can compete with long-standing perceptions of the governments of poor countries as being inefficient and corrupt.

The emergence of "global health" as a mode of intervention, a category of funding and an academic discipline best reflects the current ambivalence in relation to humanitarian activities and formal state structures. On the one hand, the term "global" has largely replaced "international" in this domain, and with it, evacuated the nation state in not only its appellations, but also its funding structure (drawing in great part from non-state sources, such as the Gates Foundation and other private sources of wealth), its key implementers (NGOs) and its reliance on supra-national human rights language. On the other hand, "partnering" with national governments has emerged as a stated priority in global health projects, and a focus on strengthening "health systems" will continue to place state

structures squarely within the realm of global health interventions, if not at the center. The tentative creation of a national healthcare system in the United States, currently the largest actor in the global health field, may have unexpected and unforeseen impacts on the transnational humanitarian activities conducted by its citizens, organizations and institutions in the years to come.

REFERENCES

Beckett, Greg. 2008. *The End of Haiti: History Under Conditions of Impossibility.* PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago.

Das, Veena, Arthur Kleinman, Margaret Lock, M. Ramphele, and Pamela Reynolds, eds. 2001. *Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

DelVecchio Good, Mary-Jo, Paul Brodwin, Byron Good, and Arthur Kleinman, eds. 1994. *Pain as Human Experience: An Anthropological Perspective.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Farmer, Paul. 1992. *AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Fassin, Didier, and Mariella Pandolfi. 2010. *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions.* New York: Zone Books.

Gerlus, Jean-Claude. 1995. The Effects of the Cold War on U.S.-Haiti Relations. *The Journal of Haitian Studies* 1(1): 34–56.

Hamblin, James. 2012. The Moral Medical Mission: Partners in Health, 25 Years On. *The Atlantic*, October 12. Accessed 20 July 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/10/the-moral-medical-mission-partners-in-health-25-years-on/262974/

Kleinman, Arthur. 1988. *The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing and the Human Condition.* New York: Basic Books.

Minn, Pierre. 2007. Toward an Anthropology of Humanitarianism. *The Journal of Humanitarian Studies* 51. Accessed on July 28th, 2015. https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/51.

———. 2011. *Where They Need Me: The Moral Economy of International Medical Aid in Haiti.* PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University.

Redfield, Peter. 2006. A Less Modest Witness. *American Ethnologist* 33: 3–26.

Robbins, Joel. 2013. Beyond the Suffering Subject: Toward and Anthropology of the Good. *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 19: 447–462.

Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 1992. *Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stepick, Alex. 1982. Haitian Boat People: A Study in the Conflicting Forces Shaping Refugee Policy. Law and Contemporary Problems. *Duke University Law Journal* 45(2): 163–196.

Ticktin, Miriam. 2014. Transnational Humanitarianism. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 43: 273–289.

Transparency International. 2014. Haiti: Country Report. Accessed 15 July 2015. http://www.transparency.org/country/#HTI

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. 1990. *Haiti—State Against Nation: Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism.* New York: Monthly Review Press.

United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti. 2011. *Has Aid Changed? Channelling Assistance to Haiti Before and After the Earthquake.* Accessed 12 July 2015. www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/download/Report.../has_aid:changed_en.pdf

The Uneasy Relationship between "China" and "Globalization" in Post-Cold War Scholarship

Julie Michelle Klinger

INTRODUCTION

The 1989 fall of the former Soviet Union stimulated new forms of social scientific inquiry in China and the West, notably with the addition of "Global Studies" or "Globalization" departments to the Cold War-era Area Studies specialties. Meanwhile, the field of "China studies" reemerged after several decades of marginalization in the West, and took on new domestic significance in the context of post-Reform China. The new prominence of these fields is generally understood as accompanying broader changes in post-1989 international politics and culture, notably: the expansion of tenets of Western economic liberalism; the internationalization of China's scholars, political vision, and economic strategy; and the concurrent (but incomplete) relaxation of controls against foreign researchers in China. As significant as these changes are, there remain some important continuities: the former distinctions between "East/West" and "Occident/Orient," rather than being overcome by the totalizing forces of globalization, per-

J.M. Klinger (✉)
International Relations, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies,
Boston, MA, USA

215

sist in the conceptual gaps between "Global" and "China" scholarship insofar as "globalization" is often taken to mean "westernization," which is counterposed to an essentialist view of "China." This tendency is equally conspicuous among contemporary Chinese and Western scholarship.

Although China's transformation into a twenty-first-century power has been facilitated by what are generally understood as the tenets of global neoliberal modernity, namely capital deregulation and the emergence of the new international division of labor, there remains an uneasy epistemological relationship between scholarship on post-Reform China and "globalization." This tension emerges from the tendency to view globalization as driven by Euro-American power on one hand, while considering China as somehow exceptional to—rather than thoroughly embedded within—globalizing phenomena on the other. While place-based specifications provide a crucial check against the homogenizing tendencies of certain global models and discourses, this chapter contends that the troubled relationship between "China" and "globalization" paradigms is due more to enduring Cold War-era geographical imaginaries in both China and the West, which insist on placing *either* China *or* "the West" as the driver of contemporary history.

This chapter emphatically does not argue for collapsing "China" into "globalization" or vice versa: globalization alone cannot explain China's transformation any more than China's transformation is sufficient to explain globalization. What has not yet gained sufficient traction in post-Cold War scholarship on these subjects is a cogent, grounded sense of how these processes are mutually informed through material and discursive practice. This has important implications for how we differentiate between "global" capitalism and "state" capitalism as well as theories of the state under neoliberal modernity. Examining these implications in depth is beyond the scope of this chapter and is taken up elsewhere (Klinger 2015). In service to the more modest project of exploring the roots of these epistemological tensions, the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides some historically informed definitions to orient the discussion. This is important because identical theoretical terms carry very different meanings between Chinese and Western scholarship (Liu 2009). Section two discusses the problem, or the source of the tension between post-1989 epistemologies on "China" and "globalization." Sections three and four delve a bit deeper to look at the disciplinary situations of "globalization" and "China" studies inside and outside of China. The concluding section briefly evaluates how the disciplines and research practices have contended with the post-1989 world order.

Although this collection is concerned with the changes in social scientific inquiry following the Cold War, it bears mentioning that the paradigm shifts of the post-Cold War world emphasized certain longer-term historical currents that are emblematic of the contradictions within contemporary globalization *writ large*, namely an ongoing struggle between integration and nationalism, as well as the tension between identity politics and class politics on national and global scales. This chapter argues that the epistemic rupture between "China" and "Globalization" is something that owes its particular form to Cold War-era continuities, while its intensity is attributable to the post-1989 processes generally understood as "Globalization" and "China's Rise." The political roots for both can be traced to the decade before the end of the Cold War: to Reagan and Thatcher's determination to deregulate capital across international space in the late 1970s and early 1980s, following closely on Deng Xiaoping's 1978 "Open Door Policy," which selectively allowed international capital into China.

DEFINITIONS: GLOBALIZATION(S), CHINA STUDIES, AREA STUDIES

The *Dictionary of Human Geography* has this to say about globalization:

> A big buzzword in political speech and a ubiquitous analytical category in academic debate, *globalization* operates today like *modernization* did in the mid-twentieth century as the key term of a master discourse about the general state of the world. (Sparke 2009)

In the post-1989 world, globalization has been used to describe supposedly inevitable global integration driven by free-market capitalism which also (paradoxically) required sweeping neoliberal reforms in order to be realized.[1] Arguably, the most famous Anglophone champion of this sort of globalization is Thomas Freidman, who wrote in 1999 that it is characterized and driven by "free-market capitalism…enabling individuals, corporations, and nation-states reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before" (Friedman 1999: 7–8 quoted in Sparke 2009: 308–309). In this view, the protagonists were "First World" actors "reaching" into the underdeveloped "Third World," to create a liberal capitalist totality. The idea of global integration is hardly new, however much it might have been understood as the highest point of

civilizational development following the end of the Cold War. Over a century before, Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto* advanced a very similar interpretation of global integration but as part of an inevitable *anti*-capitalist process. The idea was that the internationalization of the bourgeoisie would likewise create a globally united working class that would eventually revolt (Sparke 2009).

Mao Zedong, founder of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and its leader until his death in 1976, read the *Communist Manifesto* in 1919 while employed as a library assistant at Peking University (Brook 2005). His stance on globalization is generally interpreted through his rejection of Japanese regional hegemony and American global militarism as "semi-feudal" and "semi-colonial." In the West, this refusal of imperialist subjugation has been understood as isolationism amidst the inevitable march of globalization, evinced by Mao's elevation of self-sufficiency above all other values as well as his eventual conflation of communism with nationalism. The latter move was a political expedient to banish counterrevolutionaries from a very specific ethnonational imaginary of the Chinese nation.

What is often missing from the conventional wisdom on the matter is that Mao's rejections of Amero-Japanese hegemony, and later of what he called Soviet revisionism, was a rejection of globalization on American, Japanese, or, later, Soviet terms. Amidst the various splits and rejections, Communist China pursued globalization on its own terms, with countries participating in the 1955 Bandung conference and Non-Aligned Movement. Driving Mao's international engagement was his own formulation of the Three Worlds theory, which held that the superpowers, both the United States and the USSR, belonged to the first world; the second world consisted of their allies, and the third world of the Non-Aligned Movement. Mao held that the first and second worlds exploited the third. He envisioned as a solution global agrarian revolution driven by peasants in nonaligned countries overthrowing their oppressors. This, in turn, would inspire the peasants and proletariat in the first and second worlds to revolt. In keeping with his philosophy that "political power comes from the barrel of a gun," China provided military aid to Maoist and insurgent groups in Africa and Central and South Asia. Anticipating the worldwide revolution, Mao extended economic aid and comprehensive scholarships in science, engineering, and political training to scholars from nonaligned countries, a practice that still continues today.

Since the end of the Cold War, this story of Maoist internationalism is generally sanitized out of most accounts of contemporary globalization,

both in Anglophone and Sinophone literature. In China, Mao's thought has been revised to be pro-business and staunchly ethno-nationalist in contradiction to his hybrid philosophy of "patriotism as internationalism" that drove his third world anti-imperialist projects.[2] A recent, two-volume compendium of significant events of Mao's life contains sections on the revolutionary role of business in enriching the country, citing events in which Mao reportedly praised merchants as contributing to a strong China (Li and Zheng 2011). Slowly, over the two decades between Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms and China's 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), globalization came to mean westernization and consumerism "with special Chinese characteristics" (Zemin 2002).

These shifting definitions of globalization emphasized an essentialist notion of ethno-nationalism, which in translation lent itself to hegemonic Anglophone discourses about a once-closed and mysterious China "coming out" into the world. This essentialism serves the ends of the one-party state, which deploys slogans of ethno-national unity in opposition to the outside world as a core part of its domestic propaganda work (Bulag 2012; Enlai 1984). Although contemporary economic activity in China is decidedly capitalist in character, it is not called as such: terms such as "finance," "economic growth," "development," and "Socialism with special Chinese characteristics" help maintain cognitive separation between the capitalism in the rest of the world, and the exceptionalism of the "China model." This is consistent with the theories of resurgent nationalisms in the contemporary era of globalization insofar as post-1989 scholars noted the apparently paradoxical trend of "unexpected" or "unprecedented" militant identity politics during what was supposed to be a time of growing openness and integration (Sabanadze 2010).

China Studies

The field of China studies differs inside and outside of China. Although in both contexts the field takes an interdisciplinary approach to acquainting students with the history, culture, politics, economy, and languages of China, there are three major differences. The first two are to be expected: China studies outside of China are generally taught in translation, and begin at the introductory level with postsecondary students. The third difference is more significant for the epistemological rupture with which this chapter is concerned. Namely, China Studies within China has its roots in the Imperial Examination system, in what could perhaps be understood

as the Chinese humanities canon, whereas China studies outside of China has its roots in Cold War-era Area Studies specializations, which grew out of the post–World War II geopolitical priorities of the United States (Wallerstein 1997). The significance of this lies in the difference between a civilizational and a geopolitical approach to "China." The former is humanistic and the latter is adversarial; likewise, the former is primarily motivated by an imperative to enrich and appreciate the historical-cultural canon, while the latter is driven by the imperative to understand a significant (and potentially rival) "other" to the Euro-American "self." Both approaches can share similar pitfalls, namely state-centrism and ethno-national essentialism.

Area Studies

What it takes to be considered an Area specialist is not complicated: someone with sufficient language proficiency to focus their research in a given place (usually defined by country or region), using primary resources. This need not be a foreign country, though the implicit assumption is that this is often the case. China studies, therefore, is a subfield of East Asian studies populated by specialists across social scientific disciplines: political science, history, anthropology, sociology, economics, geography, and so on. Although the geopolitical assumptions of Area studies have been critiqued in several disciplines (Walder 2004), the geographical commitments necessary to conduct research in anthropology, geography, and history have kept runaway universalisms in check with the steady onslaught of evidence that place matters, places are different, and difference is fundamental to the functioning of globalization as we know it. Yet, this has not addressed the epistemic rupture between China studies and globalization studies.

The Problem

The crux of the problem lies in the role of the state in relation to globalization as imagined after the end of the Cold War. Not just any state, but the difference between immediate Cold War victors on the one hand and China on the other. The hegemonic narrative of globalization—that of universalizing economic liberalism along with ever-deepening global integration—has assigned an exceptional position to the United States and Western Europe as primary drivers of a process in which "inexorable market and technological forces…take shape in the core of the global economy

and radiate out from there," to "impact" the rest of the globe (Hart 2002: 13). Social scientific literature is rife with such framings (Zheng 2002; Nissanke and Thorbecke 2006; Black and Brainerd 2002), which deny agency to "the local" and conceive of globalization as a teleological rather than dialectical process. On the other hand, China had been assigned a passive role insofar as China's post-1989 transformations were generally understood as resulting from "the impact of globalization," on domestic politics, culture, and economics (Zheng 2004). This is a problem because globalization has been framed as a unidirectional process; something to which China "responds" or "adapts" as part of its linear trajectory toward liberalization.

Globalization as we know it would not exist without China's transformations, which facilitated the entrée of 400 million newly disempowered laborers into the world market, thereby enabling vast transformations in global industrial and agricultural production now understood as typical of corporate globalization (Muldavin 2003). Yet, it has proven very difficult, even in the context of a putatively more open post-1989 world, for social scientific inquiry to engage this fact without falling into one of three traps engendered by state-centrism, identified by Brenner (2004). The first is *spatial fetishism*, which holds that space is timeless and static and therefore immune to the possibility of historical change that deviates from the dominant telos. The inevitability narratives and "impact models" (Hart 2006) of globalization are one example of this, which tend to overlook the dynamism between China's domestic transformations and global capital in the dialectical constitution of the global economy. The second is *methodological territorialism,* which assumes that all social relations are organized within discreetly bounded territorial containers, generally contiguous with national territory. It is through such thinking that some aspect of 'globalization' can be talked about as influencing "China" as a whole rather than, say, a discreet group of officials in a particular town who then exert power over a particular neighborhood which may or may not have links to other places within or beyond China (Bair 2009). The third trap, *methodological nationalism*, is closely related insofar as it assumes that the nation-state is a coherent unit of analysis; that social relations are homogenous across national space and are organized at the national scale. This is particularly evident in Anglophone and Sinophone discourses on "China," as though it were actually a monolithic unit driven by a coherent centralized state. The subsequent section discusses how this trap is especially evident in academic discourses within and about China.

Globalization in the West; Globalization in China; Globalization and China

Critiques of globalization are not new. A rich debate around the turn of the millennium—appropriately after the first decade of living in a post-Cold War world—held that "there are many globalizations" (Kaldor et al. 2003) and that scholarship should concern itself with "globalization from below" (Portes 2000; Brecher et al. 2000) in search of "grassroots" (Appadurai 2000), or "alternative globalizations" (Maurer 2000; Fischman et al. 2005). These critiques inspired and grew out of grounded, ethnographic research into "resistance," "alternatives" "emancipation," and "subversion" or "contingency" with respect to globalization (McLaren and Jaramillo 2008; Hart 2006; Naples and Desai 2002; Gosine 2005; Tsing 2005). Yet, with very few exceptions (Ngai et al. 2009; Stalker 2000), these tales of resistance within China concern efforts directed against the state, or against the local state in cahoots with domestic capital rather than "globalization." Few scholars have argued for an epistemology built around the mutual constitution of contemporary China and globalization and fewer still for the dialectical entanglement of local sites in China with globalizing processes. There are, of course, exceptions. Broadly speaking, Swyngedouw (1997), Herod (1997), and Tsing (2005) argued for reconceptualizing globalization as produced by, through, and in dialectical tension with specific places, driven above all by local(ized) actors such as laborers and power brokers rather than an ephemeral "global" or placeless class, while Lee's (2014) groundbreaking transnational ethnographic work puts this in action between China and Zambia.

With respect to China, Muldavin (2003) argued for considering globalization in terms of China's global integration and articulation to the core processes of economic globalization: for example, the flight of Silicon Valley jobs to Beijing, the loss of US and European manufacturing jobs to China, and even the downfall of Mexico's *maquiladoras* as multinational corporations that had moved south of the US-Mexico border after NAFTA fled unionizing labor to China's eastern seaboard, flooding global markets with cheap goods that undermined manufacturing everywhere from Japan to Europe to the Americas. The crux of this analysis hinges on a refusal to "blame China" for creating these economic ills, but rather to understand the role of China's socialist transition occurring contemporaneously with the global deregulation of capital in the years preceding and following the end of the Cold War.

China's policies, laborers, and environments have played a key role in the global political economic restructuring resulting from several decades of internationally institutionalized neoliberal prescriptions harnessed by footloose capital on the one hand and China's state-supported development strategies on the other. In other words, key actors in China's state apparatus were "willing partners with global capital in a restructuring process long advocated by Western economists" (Muldavin 2003: 9) and global economic institutions. Under such circumstances, any firm determined to keep its facilities in the West rather than leveraging the global race to the bottom became a target for corporate takeover. This is understandably an immense problem with which to grapple because of the demands of a combined research focus on detailed aspects of social change among select groups in China and elsewhere, drawn together through the activities of a particular firm acting according to a contingent set of privileges and pressures. Social scientists using ethnographic and embedded research practices to focus on labor and/or firms (Yan 2008; Lee 1995; Ngai et al. 2003; Yang 1995) have excelled at tackling dimensions of this complex problem. Such inquiries have been aided by geographically minded historians (Pomeranz 2009; Arrighi et al. 2003; Perdue 2005; Han 2011) who have offered analyses exploring the longer transnational links among China, Eurasia, and the world.

Although the "Open Door" policy began in 1978, academics within China were censured against talking about globalization with accusations of being unpatriotic (Yu 2009a) because globalization was equated with Americanization and, therefore, a loss of cultural dignity. Since China's campaign to be recognized as a market economy following its accession to the WTO (Cheng 2011), there has been a growing view that globalization is inherently neutral, and just like a market economy, can work for both socialism and capitalism (Yu 2009b). In contrast to the Western framing of globalization as a capitalist process with a detailed, if often implicit and disavowed, political project, in China globalization is described as a growth-oriented historical-cultural process that must be choreographed by the socialist state in order to harness economic advantages. The result of the conflation of economic growth with globalization is that, anymore, the working definition of globalization looks similar in China and the West with the key difference that it is in China, at least discursively, enlisted to realize socialist modernization (Zemin 2002). The globalization debates published in the China's journals follow this orthodoxy, tailored to the contemporary state directives of economic development. Such discursive

practices have been necessary in order to get published (Hong 2000). Amidst all of this, there are resounding critiques of globalization as neoliberal consumerism among Leftist scholars in China; many have relocated to Hong Kong or elsewhere overseas (Wen 2005; Zhang et al. 2012).

The persisting imaginary of globalization as Euro-American hegemony has hobbled analyses of China's role in the process of globalization. This is evident in the literature around China's "going out" strategy, which is characterized by a pervasive low-level alarmism (Kurlantzick 2008; Kaplinsky et al. 2007). Globalizing China is seen as an ongoing exception to the norm of globalization driven by the West: these happenings challenge Euro-American observers' capacities for sober assessment (especially in the popular press) because China as an *agent* of globalization is troubling insofar as China is globalizing forms of political economy that allegedly deviate from Western norms (Rebol 2009). Complicating analyses of China's agency in globalization is the fact that Beijing has taken pains to distinguish itself from the neoliberal orthodoxy associated with "globalization," ẓ, south-south cooperation, and mutual benefit (Naidu 2007; Jilberto and Hogenboom 2010).

There is an important and growing body of research on China's overseas activities. Unfortunately, much of this research reproduces the "impact" model, as evinced by the proliferation of articles and conferences concerning "China's impact" on other parts of the developing world. The only difference here from the Western globalization discourse is that agency is attributed to China and denied other actors. This perpetuates the tendency to subsume the distinctions of African, Latin American, and such places and peoples under the category of "Third World," or "underdeveloped." Although these terms have been roundly critiqued, the latter is increasingly standing in for the former (Escobar 2011; Mohanty et al. 1991; Mohanty 2003; Prakesh 1990). Furthermore, critical inquiry across these alliances is burdened by a long-standing marginalization of China, Africa, and Latin America in turn across multiple Area studies disciplines. This "persisting symmetrical neglect" (Large 2008) of Africa in studies of China's foreign relations, for example, as well as of China in studies of Middle Eastern, Latin American, or other Area studies fields reflects yet another Cold War legacy that is slowly changing post-1989, driven by interest and alarm at China's overseas activities. It is nonetheless telling that that Euro-American overseas activities continue to be understood as "globalization," while China's overseas activities are differentiated as "China's overseas activities."

China in the West; China in China

Essentializing "China" has been conspicuous in "China studies" in China and the West. Based on observation, there are far more Chinese scholars fluent in Western languages than there are Western scholars fluent in Chinese. It is much more common for a non-Chinese researcher to rely on translators in order to carry out their research in China than for Chinese researchers to rely on translators to conduct their research in the Euro-American world. This is in part attributable to the divergent approaches to language education which have only recently begun to change: it is common for Chinese researchers to have had training in Western languages, history, and culture since primary school, whereas until recently in the United States the process of learning the language, history, and culture of China typically did not begin until college or graduate school. Walder (2004) noted that the task of becoming a China *specialist* under such conditions was hardly realistic, requiring in a few short years "mastering a punishingly difficult language, familiarizing oneself with a history and culture of extraordinary subtlety, variability, and historical depth, *while at the same time* learning the canon of theory and research in one's discipline and the skills necessary to pose significant questions and design research." Instead, most "emerged from the process with only rudimentary language skills, a stereotyped set of cultural traits of 'the Chinese' or of China's 'modern historical dilemmas'" (316–317, emphasis original). The result of this was "an unwitting 'occidentalism,' an orientation that led us *implicitly* to compare what we observed in China with a stereotyped textbook image of 'the West.'" This explains much of the research orientations on China which have been overwhelmingly concerned with "modernization," "development" "growth," and "democratization," processes as measured against the yardstick of a highly idealized notion of these processes in the West (O'Brien and Li 2006).

Because China was effectively closed to foreign researchers until the final years of the Cold War, many Western specialists of China during the third quarter of the 20th century had never been to the People's Republic of China (cf. Walder 2004). They relied instead on translations provided by the BBC World Service and the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, interviews with émigrés, and what could be gleaned from visits to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Although China's government fostered educational exchange students from other Third World and developing countries on a scale and duration unparalleled by other states during the

Cold War, very few first world westerners were able to conduct research in China until well into the 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, government and private foundations in the United States expanded funding opportunities to send Euro-American students to China; Chinese universities sought to send more students abroad and to open opportunities to Western scholars. Although record numbers of Euro-Americans are learning and attaining professional proficiency in Chinese, the legacies of this cruder approach to understanding China in relation to the rest of the world—a crudeness that lends itself to the more simplistic narratives of economic globalization—will take some time to overcome.

There is still a lot of work to be done to liberate social scientific inquiry about China from the normativities of neoliberal globalization. As Breslin (2011: 1323) points out, the growing interest in the "China model" as something distinct simply ignores the norm of "strong state developmentalism over history." As noted, ignoring the "relatively well-trodden statist development path" is attributable to the narratives of exceptionalism surrounding China, within both Anglophone and Chinese scholarship.

In China, China studies is a vibrant field known as *zhongguoxue* or, literally, Central Country Studies. Legal and dynastic records dating back 5000 years, a literary canon dating back 3000 years, and religious sites dating back over 1000 years provide ample material for research, especially within a political context intent on emphasizing cultural and civilizational exceptionalism (Zhang 2013). There are vast bodies of work, and lively debates concerned with historical, literary, and cultural details of such subtlety that are unknown outside of Chinese-language scholarship simply because it has thus far proven difficult in the extreme for a non-native to acquire the requisitely deep cultural frame of reference to identify, much less engage in, certain specialized discourses (Klinger under review). Yet, there are limits: China studies within China is no picnic, either. Historical revisionism has been state practice since dynastic times,[3] and there are few protections for "academic freedom" for political or historical matters deemed "too sensitive" to stray from the party line. Scholars have a duty to serve their government, which means generating research to support state mandates (Hong 2000).

Part of the revisionism now includes reinterpreting China's global integration. Whereas the post-Cold War years emphasized a qualified importance of studying international norms, a growing number of books, and commentaries by public intellectuals in China are reframing China's rise away from the discourses of global integration toward an essentialized

ethno-national telos. These narratives maintain that due to China's unique civilization—particularly its imperial past—China is culturally destined not only to rise, but to rule Asia and the world (Callahan 2012) according to a hybrid of "traditional Chinese values," command capitalism, and eth-nonational distinction. Notably, this line of thinking reaches back beyond the revolutionary era of the twentieth century to the "century of humili-ation" at the hands of colonial powers while conjuring idealized visions of the imperial past to stimulate feelings of longing for and entitlement to a resurgent golden age where China rules all under heaven (Liu 2010; Yan 2011). In this sort of political and historical scholarship, the epis-temic break between China and globalization is simultaneously reified, subsumed, and transcended. It is reified insofar as inquiry is structured in order to furnish evidence of China's exceptionalism, and subsumed because such narratives do not take responsibility for China's agency in producing the current global order. The transcendence occurs not because the uneasy relationship between "China" and "globalization" epistemolo-gies has been reconciled, but because in the future-present imagined by these texts, the Euro-American hegemon is irrelevant.

Conclusion

In his now infamous lecture, Fukuyama (1989) stated, "The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism." This way of thinking did not, and could not, account for the transformations unfolding within China, or how post-9/11, post-2008 Euro-American countries would eviscerate democratic civil liberties in service of gargantuan growth in the military, surveillance, and transnational finance sectors. The Tiananmen square demonstrations, wishfully misread by the Western press as a stand for American-style liberal democracy (Kristof 1989a, b), were in fact a coalescence of students, workers, and immiserated farmers against a dete-riorating social contract. The former two were agitated by vulnerability and exploitation engendered by the market transition (Walder and Gong 1993), while the latter had come to Beijing to petition the central gov-ernment to ameliorate the landlessness, poverty, and vulnerability that emerged in the wake of decollectivization of rural communes. It was, in fact, a demonstration against the dismantling of state commitments and the socialist safety net (Muldavin 1993). This epochal misreading did, however, facilitate social scientific inquiry by stimulating massive new

funding allocations to study questions of democratization, consumerism, and the formation of civil society in China. These particular material and ideological conditions encouraged an intense interest in stories of "resistance" against (Lee and Hsing 2010), or negotiation with (Hsing 2010), the heavy-handedness of the state; within these practices perhaps lay the seeds of democratic transition driven by an emergent rights-consciousness among the populace (O'Brien and Li 2006).

What has become clear, however, is that Western hubris about the inevitability of democratic liberalization did not anticipate the way in which developed and developing countries would emulate certain aspects of China's state capitalism in light of the Asian country's economic growth amidst intensifying unrest around social inequality around the globe. There is growing debate around this "cross-fertilization" and the "China model," (Fukuyama and Zhang 2014; Naughton 2010; Huang 2011), which is provisionally framed as "statist globalization" (Harris 2009). The most significant methodological effects of this include a revival of critical comparative methods in the wake of the post-modern critique of positivist approaches (May 2011; Ragin and Amoroso 2011). The purpose of comparative methods is not to identify the objective truths of homogenous bounded units, but rather to understand the relational and world historical processes shaping what are generally understood to be vastly different places (cf. Arrighi et al. 2003; Hart 2002; Pomeranz 2009). The outcomes of such inquiries, though relatively few as of yet, are promising. Such a necessarily broader and more reflexive research approach would not have been possible, arguably, without the extreme Western triumphalism following the end of the Cold War and its subsequent critique; soul-searching among China's academics amidst the country's transformation; and the growing recognition that Western liberalism is but one of many idealizations informing knowledge and practice and, therefore, an insufficient rubric around which to structure social scientific inquiry.

NOTES

1. The key conundrum has been how to globalize the power of capital without globalizing the power of the working class (cf. Harvey 1995).
2. It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every Chinese Communist must learn…. We must unite with the proletariat of all the capitalist countries, with the proletariat of Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy and all other capitalist countries, before it is

possible to overthrow imperialism, to liberate our nation and people, and to liberate the other nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the internationalism with which we oppose both narrow nationalism and narrow patriotism. "In Memory of Norman Bethune" (December 21, 1939), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 337.

3. A Manchurian studies scholar at the China Academy of Social Sciences has devoted his career to identifying omissions and revisions in Qing dynasty translations between Manchu and Mandarin records; many of the records, some three hundred years old, are still considered "too sensitive" for scholarly inquiry (Author interviews 2013).

References

Appadurai, Arjun. 2000. Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination. *Public Culture* 12(1): 1–19.

Arrighi, Giovanni, Takeshi Hamashita, and Mark Selden. 2003. The Rise of East Asia in Regional and World Historical Perspective. In *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 100, and 50 Year Perspectives*, ed. Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita, and Mark Selden, 1–17. London and New York: Routledge.

Bair, Jennifer. 2009. The New Hegemon? Contingency and Agency in the Asian Age. *Journal of World Systems Research* 15(2): 220–227.

Black, Sandra E., and Elizabeth Brainerd. 2002. Importing Equality? The Impact of Globalization on Gender Discrimination. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Brecher, Jeremy, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith. 2000. *Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Brenner, Neil. 2004. *New State Spaces: Urban Governence and the Rescaling of Statehood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Breslin, Shaun. 2011. The 'China Model' and the Global Crisis: From Freidrich List to a Chinese Mode of Governance? *International Affairs* 87(6): 1323–1343.

Brook, Timothy. 2005. Mao Zedong (1893–1976). In *Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium*. Accessed 10 September 2014. http://www.globalautonomy.ca

Bulag, Uradyn. 2012. Good Han, Bad Han: The Moral Parameters of Ethnopolitics in China. In *Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China's Majority*, ed. T. Mullaney, J. Liebold, S. Gros, and E.V. Bussche. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.

Callahan, William A. 2012. Sino-speak: Chinese Exceptionalism and the Politics of History. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 71(1): 33–55.

Cheng, Yunjie. 2011. Recognizing China's Market Economy Status Opens the World to New Possibilities. *Xinhua News*. Accessed 10 September 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2011-12/08/c_131295187.htm

Enlai, Zhou. 1984. *Minzu quyu zizhi you liyu minzu tuanjie he gongtong jinbu. [The Autonomy of Ethnic Regions Benefits the Unity of Ethnic Groups and Common Progress]*. Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe.

Escobar, Arturo. 2011. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Fischman, Gustavo E., Peter McLaren, Heinz Sünker, and Colin Lankshear, eds. 2005. *Critical Theories, Radical Pedagogies, and Global Conflicts*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. The End of History? *The National Interest*. Summer 1989.

Fukuyama, Francis, and Zhang Weiwei. 2014. The China Model. *New Perspectives Quarterly* 31 (January): 60–83.

Gosine, Andil. 2005. Dying Planet, Deadly People: "Race"-Sex Anxieties and Alternative Globalizations. *Social Justice* 32(4): 69–86.

Han, Meihai. 2011. *Who Made the History of the Past 500 Years?* Beijing: Jiuzhou Press.

Harris, Jerry. 2009. Statist Globalization in China, Russia, and the Gulf States. *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 8(2–3): 139–163.

Hart, Gillian. 2002. *Disabling Globalization: Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California.

———. 2006. Denaturalizing Dispossession: Critical Ethnography in the Age of Resurgent Imperialism. *Antipode* 38(5): 977–1004.

Harvey, David. 1995. Globalization in Question. *Rethinking Marxism* 8(4): 1–17.

Herod, Andrew. 1997. Labor as an Agent of Globalization and as a Global Agent. In *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, ed. Kevin Cox, 167–200. New York: The Guilford Press.

Hong, Shen. 2000. Academic Freedom and Academic Duty in Chinese Universities. In *Current Issues in Chinese Higher Education: Education and Skills*, ed. OECD, 21–36. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Hsing, You-tien. 2010. *The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in Urban China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huang, Yasheng. 2011. Rethinking the Beijing Consensus. *Asia Policy* 11: 1–26.

Jilberto, Alex E. Fernandez, and Barbara Hogenboom. 2010. *Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations Beyond the Washington Concensus*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Kaldor, Mary, Helmut Anheier, and Marlies Glasius. 2003. *Global Civil Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kaplinsky, Raphael, Dorothy McCormick, and Mike Morris. 2007. *The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

Klinger, Julie Michelle. 2015. *On the Rare Earth Frontier*. PhD, Geography, University of California, Berkeley.

———. *under review*. Sex, Race, and Revisionist History on China's Northern Frontier: The Role of Affective Myth in Nation-building Projects. *Gender, Place and Culture*. Submitted 2 February 2016.

Kristof, Nicholas D. 1989a. China Erupts…The Reasons Why. *The New York Times Magazine*, 26–29, 86–90.

———. 1989b. Crackdown in Beijing; Troops Attack and Crush Beijing Protest; Thousands Fight Back; Scores are Killed. *The New York Times*, 4 June.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2008. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*. New York: New Republic Books.

Large, Daniel. 2008. Beyond 'Dragon in the Bush': The Study of China-Africa Relations. *African Affairs* 107(426): 45–61.

Lee, Ching Kwan. 1995. Engendering the Worlds of Labor: Women Workers, Labor Markets, and the Production Politics in the South China Economic Miracle. *American Sociological Review* 60(June): 378–397.

———. 2014. The Specter of Global China: Contesting the Power and Peril of Chinese State Capital in Zambia. *Global China Colloquium I*, 180 Doe Library, University of California, Berkeley, 12 September

Lee, Ching Kwan, and You-tien Hsing, eds. 2010. *Reclaiming Chinese Society*. Ed. Mark Selden, *Asia's Transformations*. New York and London: Routledge.

Li, Xinzhi, and Mingjun Zheng, eds. 2011. *Mao Zedong Record of Events, 1893–1976*. 2 vols. Vol. 1. Beijing: Central Documents Publisher.

Liu, Weidong. 2009. Where is the Bridge? *Progress in Human Geography* 33(7): 7–9.

Liu, Mingfu. 2010. *The China Dream: The Strategic Thinking of Great Powers and the Position of China in the Post-American Age*. Beijing: China Friendship Publishing Company.

Maurer, William. 2000. Alternative Globalizations: Community and Conflict in New Cultures of Finance. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 23(1): 155–172.

May, Tim. 2011. *Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process*. Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Education.

McLaren, Peter, and Natalia E. Jaramillo. 2008. Alternative Globalizations: Toward Critical Globalization Studies. *Rizoma Freiriano* 1(2): 1–21.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 2003. *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds. 1991. *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Muldavin, Joshua. 1993. Unpublished Manuscript in Possession of Author.

———. 2003. Unpublished Manuscript in Possession of Author.

Naidu, Sanusha. 2007. China-African Relations in the 21st Century: A Win-Win Relationship. In Lee, Margaret (ed), China in Africa, 41–47. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Naples, Nancy A., and Manisha Desai, eds. 2002. *Women's Activism and Globalization: Linking Local Struggles and Transnational Politics*. London: Routledge.

Naughton, Barry. 2010. China's Distinctive System: Can it Be a Model for Others? *Journal of Contemporary China Studies* 19(65): 437–460.

Ngai, Pun, Chris King Chi Chan, and Jenny Chan. 2003. Subsumption or Consumption? The Phantom of Consumer Revolution in "Globalizing" China. *Cultural Anthropology* 18(4): 469–492.

———. 2009. The Role of the State, Labour Policy and Migrant Workers' Struggles in Globalized China. *Global Labour Journal* 1(1): 132–151.

Nissanke, Machiko, and Erik Thorbecke. 2006. *The Impact of Globalization on the World's Poor: Transmission Mechanisms*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

O'Brien, Kevin J., and Lianjiang Li. 2006. *Rightful Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Perdue, Peter. 2005. *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2009. The Great Divergence Before and After: East Asia and the North Atlantic in Comparative and Long-run Perspective. The Role of the State in the Great Divergence, Leiden University.

Portes, Alejandro. 2000. Globalization from Below: The Rise of Transnational Communities. In *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back in*, ed. Kalb Don, Marco van der Land, Richard Staring, Bart van Steenbergen, and Nico Wilterdink, 253–270. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Prakesh, Gyan. 1990. Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32(2): 383–408.

Ragin, Charles C., and Lisa M. Amoroso. 2011. *Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method*. Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Rebol, Max. 2009. Unconditional Aid and Accountability: Reassessing Chinese Unconditional Engagement in Africa. *Journal of Research in National Development* 7(2): n.p.

Sabanadze, Natalie. 2010. *Globalization and Nationalism*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Sparke, Matthew. 2009. Globalization. In *Dictionary of Human Geography*, 5th ed., ed. Derek Gregory, Ron Johnston, and Geraldine Pratt, 308–311. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.

Stalker, Peter. 2000. *Workers Without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization on International Migration*. Geneva: International Labour Organization.

Swyngedouw, Erik. 1997. Neither Global nor Local: 'Glocalization' and the Politics of Scale. In *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, ed. Kevin Cox, 137–166. New York and London: The Guilford Press.

Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. 2005. *Friction: An Ethnoghaphy of Global Connection*. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Walder, Andrew G. 2004. The Transformation of Contemporary China Studies, 1977–2002. In *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*, ed. D.L. Szanton. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Walder, Andrew G., and Gong Xiaoxia. 1993. Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation. *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 29 (January): 1–29.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1997. The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies. In *The Cold War and the Universit*, ed. André Schiffrin, 195–232. New York: The New Press.

Wen, Dale. 2005. *China Copes with Globalization: A Mixed Review*. San Francisco, CA: International Forum on Globalization.

Yan, Hairong. 2008. *New Masters, New Servants: Migration, Development, and Women Workers in China*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Yan, Xuetong. 2011. *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Yang, Xiaohua. 1995. *Globalization of the Automobile Industry: The United States, Japan, and the Peoples' Republic of China*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Yu, Keping. 2009a. *Democracy is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

———. 2009b. Globalization Studies in China: Is Globalization a Credible Threat to Chinese Society?. *The Globalist*. Accessed 10 January 2014. http://www.theglobalist.com/globalization-studies-in-china/

Zemin, Jiang. 2002. *Build a Well-off Society in an All-Around Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*. Ed. National Congress of the People's Republic of China. Beijing: National Congress of the People's Republic of China.

Zhang, Feng. 2013. The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 19(4): 1–24.

Zhang, Heather Xiaoquan, Bin Wu, and Richard Sanders. 2012. *Marginalization in China, Perspectives on Transition and Globalization*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Zheng, Shiling. 2002. The Impact of Globalization on China's Cities and Construction. *Chongqing Construction* 3: n.p. (In Chinese).

Zheng, Yongnian. 2004. *Globalization and State Transformation in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

New Human Rights Theories for Post-Constitutional Societies

Ingo Richter

THE APPARENTLY RELENTLESS PROGRESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Many had expected that in the year 1989 an "age of human rights" would begin, a time in which the human rights set down in 1948 in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" would truly be established and de facto enforced in all countries of the world, as it had been promised in article 28 of that declaration: "*Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.*" The concept of the "three generations of human rights" seemed indeed to back this expectation (Vasak 1977). The first generation of liberal human rights was followed by the second generation of social human rights, and, in turn, a third generation was to come after that, which should include such rights as those of peace, development, environmental protection and many more. And, indeed, the activities of the United Nations (UN) in the field of human rights were quite impressive: 1966, the two International Covenants on Human Rights[1]; 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 1984,

I. Richter (✉)
University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany

235

the Convention Against Torture; 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and many others. Regional declarations followed the 1948 UN Declaration as, for example, the most important European Human Rights Convention of 1950 (Tomuschat 2014). Nearly all member states of the UN ratified the international conventions on human rights and most of them transformed them into national law. The UN established international bodies for the implementation of human rights, and international as well as national courts enforced the human rights by their decisions. Therefore, more and more human rights were no longer regarded just as philosophical ideas but as individual rights with the force of law (Tomuschat 2014).

Although the modern human rights can be dated back to the European enlightenment of the eighteenth century and the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 and the French Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen of 1789, only in the twentieth century they became truly universal, recognized also in the American, African, Arab and Asian Conventions on Human Rights (1969, 1981, 2008, 2012), which can be regarded as "area expressions" of universal human rights (An-Na'im 1990). The Helsinki Conferences and the establishment of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the 1970s were milestones on the path toward the worldwide implementation of human rights. The Helsinki Accords meant international recognition for the states of Eastern Europe following the Second World War, but they promised the West that human rights would be implemented in the East as well. These rights were soon invoked by a number of dissidents in the East, and, ultimately, this played a far-from-insignificant role in the eventual collapse of the socialist systems of these countries. So, the scene seemed to be set for the ultimate reign of human rights all over the world and the fulfillment of the promise of article 28 of the 1948 declaration. But, this did not come to pass, and, Christian Tomuschat subtitled his book on human rights *Between Idealism and Realism*.

Triumph and New Fronts—Human Rights after 1989

If the history of human rights until 1989 can be described as one of a relentless progress, then, to paraphrase Francis Fukuyama, it is possible to say that these developments have reached a certain conclusion with the establishment of democracy, the market economy and the rule of law in the former socialist countries (Fukuyama 1992). Human rights

have indeed experienced a triumph that could hardly even have been dreamt of in 1948. But, this triumph may perhaps have been a pyrrhic victory, because, soon after 1989 new fronts opened up in the battle for human rights.

Post-Socialism

In 1990, all former socialist countries signed the Helsinki documents on human rights, but not all of them implemented the human rights. There are post-socialist countries, such as Poland, where the protection of human rights is guaranteed both legally and in practice, but there are other countries, like Hungary, where the freedom of the press is more and more restricted, and others, like Russia, where the violation even of basic human rights happens quite often and is not sanctioned.

Neo-liberalism

In the western societies, the right to property and the freedom of contract guaranteed personal freedom and economic growth, thus serving as the legal basis of capitalism. But, the right to property and the freedom of contract were counterbalanced by union power and they were restricted by the social welfare legislation in favor of the working classes and the poor. In the last third of the twentieth century, however, neo-liberal ideas have weakened the model of "social capitalism." Union power declined, and the dogma of deregulation struck down also on the welfare legislation. Social human rights were on the losing side.

9/11

During the "War on Terror" after 9/11, basic human rights have been violated in several countries, particularly by the United States, namely the ban on torture (article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), the Habeas Corpus Clause (article 9 of the Declaration) and the right to privacy (article 12 of the Declaration). Notoriously, during the Second Iraq War, in Abu Ghraib American soldiers tortured Iraqi prisoners; those soldiers have been put on trial and were punished (Gourevitch and Morris 2009; Siems 2012). In Guantanamo, hundreds of prisoners have been kept in camps without hearing and trial, and only after many years the US Supreme Court declared the adjudication by military courts unconstitutional (548 US 557

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld). The American National Security Agency (NSA) after 9/11 secretly collected, recorded and processed millions of telecommunication data of American and foreign citizens on a daily basis without valid reason, and it still does so, violating not only the privacy of citizens all over the world, but also business secrets, political and administrative procedures as well as the sovereignty of other states.[2]

Failed States

This concept refers to "states at risk" (Englehart 2009), to "states with limited statehood," where there is no legitimate state authority. Mostly, in these states ethnic, religious and social conflicts provoked long-lasting civil wars (Kaldor 2013), and basic human rights are violated by the fighting militia as well as by the state military and police. In some cases, the UN Security Council ordered a military intervention on the basis of the "Responsibility to Protect Doctrine" (R2P), and in some cases the responsible political or military leaders are put on trial before the International Criminal Court, but in general even the greatest violations of human rights stay unsanctioned.

SOCIAL REALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Can it be that what seemed to be just a backlash in the "relentless progress of human rights" turns out to be a complete breakdown of the theoretical model which underlies the human rights concept? At the end of the eighteenth century, the idea of human rights based on natural law was a revolutionary idea in the American colonies and in the European feudal societies, and it provoked indeed revolutions. During all these 200 years, "freedom, equality and solidarity" became the leading principles of the modern constitutional state which were adopted all over the world, as the emblems of modernity as such. But, the political and social development during this time cannot be described in the terms of freedom, equality and solidarity, not even in Europe and North America, and not even after the de-colonization of the world. Freedom, equality and solidarity did not reign in the world of capitalism and imperialism in the nineteenth century and of capitalism, socialism and underdevelopment in the twentieth century, not to mention the warfare of the nineteenth century, the two world wars of the twentieth century and the "New Wars" of our times and their atrocities. The "relentless" progress at best was a hope for the future, a utopia, if not an illusion. A realistic concept of the idea of human

rights nowadays can no longer be based on the natural law, but requires the fulfillment of two conditions, namely the unity of shared values in the society (Dworkin 2011; Joas 2011; Honneth 2011), some kind of empirical research on the social reality of human rights (Honneth 2011), and communication and consensus building on the implementation of these values as "rights" (Arendt 1951; Habermas 1996).

I rely here on Axel Honneth's "Theory of Justice as Society Analysis" and his four premises: (1) The reproduction of the society depends of binding common ideals and values. (2) The theory of justice can only be based on those ideals and values which determine the conditions of reproduction of the existing society as social norms. (3) Through the method of "normative reconstruction" only those institutions and practices are analyzed which as norms serve the implementation of institutionalized social values. (4) The "normative reconstruction" has to avoid the mere affirmation of the reality and contribute to a "reconstructive critique" of the existing institutions and practices in the light of the common ideals and values (Honneth 2011: 18). On the basis of this theoretical approach, I will now turn to a short analysis of five central values which are protected by human rights.

Life

In the tradition of human rights life on earth has always been taken for granted, and so was the individual existence. The planet itself had not to be protected. Birth and death were natural phenomena. Normally, the society was forbidden to decide on life and death. Population growth and shrinkage depended on health and nutrition, but health and nutrition were not on the agenda of human rights policies. This has changed completely. The planet is threatened by environment destruction and by atomic warfare. Humans can be produced artificially, and the lifetime can be regulated on the basis of medical knowledge and competence. The size, distribution and well-being of mankind on earth now depend on population, health and food policy decisions. Based on empirical research human rights must be reframed and reformulated in order to grasp these new conditions of life on earth.

Private Life

Privacy, sexual relations, private property, family, religion, and education were high values and well protected by human rights, and this was true not only for the individualized societies of the West, but also for societies

with collective traditions. Nowadays, the distinction between private and public has been blurred, particularly through the creation of a public-private sphere by the mass media and the internet. Sexual relations of any kind are a matter of choice, and no longer restricted and regulated, and they are of public interest. In western societies private property permitted entrepreneurship and protection against the risks of life, whereas nearly everybody now depends on social security and some people on the ups and downs of the stock market. In traditional societies where the family was the basic unit of production and distribution of goods and of "social security," mobility and modernization destroyed the traditional social order without creating new forms for a private life. The family no longer is the quasi universal and exclusive reproduction unit of the society, but has become an optional open form of communal life for everybody. Religion, which for a century seemed to be restricted to the private sphere, is back on the public agenda and the "religious revival" can be felt everywhere, and not only in the Islamic countries. Education finally, which was a privilege of the upper classes and indirectly determined the class structure of the society, has become the central means of social stratification and individual mobility and has become a meritocratic system based only on achievement. This social change makes human rights look pretty old fashioned, incapable to restore the old values or to build a consensus on new values.

Social Structure

What did eventually equality mean in the slave society of the United States or in the European class society in the nineteenth century. Indigenous peoples were exterminated all over the world, and six million European Jews were killed by the Germans. How could one speak of equality at times when the "Third World," which meant the majority of the world population, was exploited by the colonial powers and by international capital? Socialism ended the exploitation of the working classes by the bourgeoisie, yes, but with socialism a new "class," the "nomenclatura," emerged and came to power and wealth. The US Declaration of Independence of 1776 holds that "all men are created equal," but women were not; they were profoundly different and unequal compared to men, and they still are in most parts of the world. But, the French declaration of 1789 was quite clear that equality means that "La loi doit etre la meme pour tous." Meanwhile, there is a change of paradigms. Diversity, pluralism, identity

politics are the slogans of the day. Equality, yes, but on the basis of differentiation! The ethnic, religious, linguistic and political groups as well as men and women shall enjoy their specific collective rights, and nobody shall be discriminated against because of his or her specific interest or orientation. The principle of non-discrimination in a way has replaced the equality clause. All men and women are created equal, yes, but they have the right to be treated differently because of the social structure.

Public Sphere

The modern constitutional state is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Democracy as a political system means representative government on the basis of voting rights and individual political rights such as freedom of speech, of assembly and of association. The rule of law requires an independent judiciary as well as equal and free access to a fair trial, particularly fair hearing rights. The modern mass democracy functions as a competition of political parties and of public leaders such as politicians, journalists, show stars, business men and religious leaders. They use the audiovisual media and more and more the internet and the social media. Much money and/or a media identity are needed in this competition, and therefore corruption is omnipresent. The access to the media becomes now more important than the traditional political rights such as freedom of speech, of association and of assembly. This transformation of the democratic political system results in an extremely low voting turnout at general elections of mostly not much more than 50 % of the electorate, and very often less. A general de-legitimation of the "ruling class" and of "democratic government" as such is the consequence. The citizens speak out their frustration with the political system in new popular social movements, like in the "Arab Spring," in "Occupy" in the United States, in the Anti-Corruption movement in India or the "Red and Yellow Shirts" demonstrations in Thailand, and in many other countries of the world which call themselves democracies. And they strive for more participation in the local communities, at the workplace, in the classroom and in planning activities such as city planning or road construction. Local Participation replaces voting in political elections. The only public institution which seems not to be affected by public discontent is the judiciary. In most countries of the world the courts enjoy a high reputation because of the personal independence of the judges. This makes human rights in this respect extremely valuable.

Globalization

Strange enough "human rights" at first were the rights of the citizens of national states, voted by the national legislatures. And even nowadays, human rights in international treaties in general can only be enforced if the treaties are ratified by national parliaments and the "human rights" are incorporated in the national law—exceptions granted. There is no world government and there is no global citizenship. But, in the age of globalization, there is the worldwide mobility of capital and the worldwide migration of workers, students, refugees and tourists. Do human rights apply to transnational corporations everywhere in the world? Do workers, students, refugees and tourists shed their human rights when they cross the borders of another state? In legal theory there is something like "cosmopolitan law" (Held 1995) and "transnational human rights" (Richter 2008). But, the dogma of national sovereignty hinders the institutions of the national states to apply such rights.[3]

New Human Rights Theories

Dignity

The Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 and the French Declaration des Droits de L'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 did not know the word "dignity," but the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 called the "inherent dignity of all members of the human family" the foundation of freedom, justice and peace of the world. Since, some constitutions refer to the dignity of man not as a human right but as the foundation of all fundamental rights.[4] But, for a long time in constitutional theory, nobody exactly knew what the notion "dignity" means and how to integrate it into the canon of human rights. This has changed. "Human dignity" has become one of the key concepts of constitutional theory.

Ronald Dworkin explains that human rights are rooted in the respect for human dignity and that a violation of human rights is a violation of human dignity (Dworkin 2006: 33). For Dworkin, human dignity relies on two ethical principles: self respect and authenticity. "Each person must take his own life seriously: He must except that it is a matter of importance that his own life be a successful performance rather than a wasted opportunity" (Dworkin 2011: 203); and, "Each person has a special, personal responsibility for identifying what counts as success in his own life; he has a personal responsibility to create that life through a coherent narrative or style that

he himself endorses" (Dworkin 2011: 204). Dworkin identifies two kinds of these human rights which are based on human dignity, first "baseline human rights" which are so fundamental, that they forbid acts "that could not be justified by any intelligible interpretation of the ideas that people's lives are of equal intrinsic value and that they have a personal responsibility for their own lives" (Dworkin 2006: 36) The other kind of human rights forbid governments "to act in ways which cannot be justified under the conception of dignity that the nation has embraced" (Dworkin 2006: 43). Dworkin in this respect speaks of "Bad faith violations."

Hans Joas also thinks that human dignity is the basis for all human rights. For him human dignity is rooted in the "holiness of the human personality" ("Sakralität der Person"), and violations of human rights are violations of the sacred (Joas 2011). According to Joas, a fundamental change took place in the eighteenth century, which best can be demonstrated in criminal law. The torture was banned because the body was regarded as something sacred. Criminals should no longer be tortured and killed but they should be put in prisons and educated for their own sake and for the best of the society. Slavery is another example. Slaves should no longer be treated like animals or objects, but as human beings, because man was created after the image of God and therefore be sacred. "I propose," Joas writes in the introduction of his seminal work, "to understand the belief in human rights and universal human dignity as result of a specific process of 'sacralisation', a process in which every human being more and more in a motivating and sensitizing way was regarded as sacred, and that this understanding was institutionalized as law" (Joas 2011: 18, trad. I.R.). This process resulted in the constitutionalization of human dignity because of the history of violence in society (Joas 2011: 110). The Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was a direct reaction to the Nazi crimes during the Second World War.

Dignity is a much broader and deeper concept than the "right to life" as we know it from article 3 of the UN Declaration of 1948. The basic controversies on topics such as abortion and assisted suicide, sperm donation, in vitro fertilization and prenatal diagnosis, death penalty, euthanasia and life-saving fatal shots are discussed and decided within this new framework. New human rights are derived from the concept of dignity, rights which did not exist in the classical catalog of liberal human rights, such as a right to security (Dworkin 2011), the freedom from poverty (Pogge 2002), the right to reproductive health (Cook and Fathalla Mahmoud 2005), the right of nature and environment protection (Redgwell 1996) and the inclusion of the disabled (Nussbaum 2006).

Capabilities

Originally, the capabilities approach has been introduced in economics by Amartya Sen in order to overcome the measurement of the quality of life by GNP figures (Sen 1993). It was Martha Nussbaum who borrowed Sen's notion to make it her central approach to social justice (Nussbaum 2006). She identified ten central capabilities which are grounded in the concept of human dignity and which characterize a "good life" in the Aristotalian sense: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, life with other species, play and control over one's environment (Nussbaum 2006: 76). Capabilities are not rights, but they are similar to rights. Human rights stem from the tradition of "negative freedom," which forbids state interference into the realm of "bourgeois liberties." Capabilities enable everybody to live his or her personal life and to form it along one's personal interest. "The capabilities approach remains focused on the person as the ultimate subject of justice, and thus refuses to compromise on the justification of the capabilities list itself" (Nussbaum 2006: 295).

The capability approach allows to master the personal life of the post-modern man. The "privacy clause" of article 12 of the 1948 UN Declaration is for two reasons no longer sufficient in the post-modern world: first, because there is no real privacy anymore, and second, because the personal life can only be thought of as a "vita activa," and that definitely requires more than "privacy." Specific human rights can be derived from the capability approach, rights that permit to live a personal life in dignity: the right of residence and to work, including the right of migration (Touzenis and Cholewinski 2009); the right to personal development, including religious freedom and its public confession and practice (Casanova 1994); the right of sexual orientation (Heinze 1995), freedom of education and training, the freedom of intellectual life, creativity and research, communication rights including the free knowledge access and the freedom of the internet (Wikipedia 2015); the right to marry and to found a family; the right of data self-determination[5]; and, last but not the least, property rights, because private property is an essential foundation of personal freedom.[6]

Recognition

The politics of recognition has an individualistic as well as a collective source. Axel Honneth relies on European philosophical traditions, when he points out that for Hegel the category of "mutual recognition" was the

key of his notion of personal freedom (Honneth 2011: 85). "Ultimately the subject can only be called 'free', if he encounters 'the other' to whom he relates in a relationship of mutual recognition, because the goals of 'the other' are a condition for the realisation of his own goals" (Honneth 2011: 86, trad. I.R.). And, already in Hegel we can find the explication of this idea when he wrote about the model of love and about the concept of the market. Love can only be fulfilled if the lover is mutually loved by "the other" as well, and the market principle only functions if an offer meets a corresponding demand. The source of the collective concept of recognition is quite different. The "politics of difference," which had its breakthrough in the 1970s, takes into account the differences between people and especially the differences in gender, ethnicity, religion and language. Other differences, especially those presented as being social or economic in nature, take second place. Feminist philosophy played a pioneering role here: equality, yes—but only if the differences were recognized—not the differences between the sexes as such but the differences within the cultural construction of gender (Butler 1990). The social liberal constitutions were able to guarantee freedom and equality as such, but not "the good life," for which the supporters of the "politics of recognition" strove (Taylor 1992). In the Marxist tradition of thinking, all differences in sex, race and language were wiped out or at least ignored, and religion was denied anyway. Therefore, Marxism stood for the idea of equality, internationalism and unity and advocated exactly the opposite of the "politics of difference." If identity and particularly group identity, the core idea of the "politics of difference," played a role in Marxism at all, then it will be in the form of class consciousness during the time of class struggles.

Recognition is something else than tolerance and much more. In history, tolerance meant that one did not kill or enslave "the other," if he was of different race or religion, but that one lived together side by side more or less peacefully. The UN tried to give the notion of tolerance a broader meaning and understood tolerance as "active tolerance" in the sense of recognition.[7] The organizational power of this concept of recognition becomes clear when it comes to the "politics of multiculturalism." The UN adopted several declarations and conventions in order to protect minorities and indigenous people,[8] but minority protection is not multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is a concept of a social structure based not on social class but on cultural difference. All religious, ethnic and language groups enjoy the collective right of self-governance, and this does not threaten the national identity and cohesion but strengthen it, because internal tensions and conflicts are mitigated (Kymlicka 2007).

The freedom of speech as it is granted in the First Amendment to the US Constitution as well as in article 19 of the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights is the best example for "negative freedom." "Congress shall make no law." Any opinion can be uttered. The content is irrelevant. Recognition on the other hand means that every opinion is regarded as a valuable contribution in the decision-making process. And the same is true for the sciences and for the arts. In science, every theory and every research result—if they are acceptable as contributions to the search for the truth—must be recognized. And every work of art is valuable, if it is indeed a work of art. Recognition therefore is a precondition for cultural pluralism.

The defenders of the democratic political system western style call it "pluralistic," because it is a multiparty system and not a single-party system like in the former socialist block. The political parties in these systems say that they represent all societal interests, and that they constitute a system of "mutual recognition." But, in these systems there is misrepresentation, because not all the persons who are concerned are represented (Fraser 2005). The "classical" theory of political pluralism asked for the equal representation of all relevant social interests in political parties (Dahl 1961). Indeed, political parties try to cater to all relevant social interests in order to get voters, but they only reach interest groups which are organized. They do not care for those who are affected by their political decisions. The "all concerned principle" instead relies on the recognition of all citizens who are concerned and gives them a voice in political decision-making (Fraser 2005).

Access

Private property has always been a cornerstone of the declarations of human rights,[9] although property is not a "natural freedom" but a result of public regulation. And this regulation has made property rights not only the economic basis for the personal life of everybody (v.sp.) but the foundation for the worldwide capitalist system. Jeromy Rifkin has introduced another view of the economic order (Rifkin 2000). As social history makes quite clear, economic security of the elderly relies no longer on private property like real estate, cash and gold or capital stock, but on the access to the old-age insurance within the social security system which is organized by state legislation, be it a public or a private insurance system. And the same is true for international investment in the infrastructure or

in business. You still do need capital for the investment. But, this capital is no longer the private capital of the investor. It is subventions from public authorities or loans from private national banks, international investment banks or from the investor's home state or the state where the investment is to be done. And it is not the capital alone that is necessary for an investment. Access to the stakeholders is important, for example to the local administration, to the business community including the banks, to the central administration, to the tax authorities, the labor unions, and so on. And Rifkin makes quite clear that access to capital is not enough. Labor is an important factor for economic development as well. Also access to knowledge becomes important, because besides capital and labor, knowledge has become the third factor for business development. Even access to culture becomes an important factor for business locations.

In the Marxist tradition, the property of the means of production decided on the class structure of the society and on the exploitation of the masses. Sociologists nowadays look not only at the income and the assets of the people but also at the education level and the job performance when they analyze the social structure. Therefore, the right to education and the integration into the labor market have become as important as the actual income and the accumulation of private wealth. Capital is versatile, and education is stable.

Justice

Human rights are based on the individual interest, on a negative conception of freedom. "Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm others: the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no bounds other than those that ensure to the other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These bounds may be determined only by law" (article 4 of the French 1789 Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen). Social justice demands a restriction of these purely negative rights in the interest of the community, be it that they can only be thought of as restricted by a fictional original "social contract" in the sense of Hobbes or Rousseau or be it that their use is restricted by the same use of these rights by others in the sense of the so-called "Golden Rule" or Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative. As article 2 of the German Constitution of 1949 puts it: "Every person shall have the right of free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional

order or the moral law." But, the constitutional order and the moral law do not guarantee social justice. They only guarantee procedural justice like article 3 of the German Constitution (equality before the law) or the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution and its "equal protection" and "due process" clauses.

Therefore, it was a new beginning, when John Rawls in 1971 asked the question on social justice again. In order to make individual freedom and social justice compatible, John Rawls based his Theory of Justice on two principles: first, that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with the similar liberty for others, and, second, that the social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society, consistent with the just savings principle (the difference principle), and offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971). Rawls insisted—against Habermas—that "justice as fairness" is not mere proceduralism, but substantive social justice (Rawls 1993). Charles Taylor accepted Rawls' conception of an "overlapping consensus" (Rawls 1993), but he challenged Rawls' liberalism as the basis of social justice and pleaded for communitarian values (Taylor 1999). Axel Honneth asks for a normative reconstruction of the basic social institutions as friendship, intimacy and family in the personal realm and capital, labor, and knowledge in the market sphere, because the social reproduction and the cultural socialization can only be based on common societal ideas and values (Honneth 2011: 18, 232–409). I will stop this "name-dropping" of prominent philosophers of law by referring to another German author, Stefan Gosepath, who—also following John Rawls—stipulates that equality prevails over justice, that social justice indeed means distributive justice. Civil liberties in the political sphere and participation in the democratic sphere have to be equal for everybody without any exception which is not legitimized by the rights of others. Equality in the economic and in the social sphere can never be based on original unequalities, and cannot be legitimized by need or achievement, but only by responsibility and efficiency (Gosepath 2004: 15, 288–347, 347–446).

The new social justice discourse is a response to the discussions on the "crisis of the welfare state" and the "end of work" in the 1990s. The second-generation human rights had been en vogue in the 1970s and 1980s: articles 6–9 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights had guaranteed the right to work, the right to a minimum wage, the

right to strike and the right to social security. In 1976, the Covenant became effective; by now 162 countries have ratified it, and in 2008, an Optional Protocol on individual communications to the Committee on Economic and Social Rights was signed and has already been ratified by some states. Goesta Esping Anderson wrote his path-breaking book on "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" Esping-Anderson in 1990, designing the Anglo-American, the social-democratic Scandinavian and the conservative-continental model of "social security," but the "crisis of the welfare state" in the end of the century ended these models more or less. Jeremy Rifkin foresaw the upcoming "service society" and the "end of work" also in the 1990s Rifkin 1995. Both developments weakened the social human rights, because the rights to work and to collective bargaining as well as the right to social security were the battlefields of the unions. Their power eroded in Europe continuously, and a "neo-liberal age" began, based not only on economic theories but also on human rights, namely the property rights and the freedom of contract, which were said to prevail over workers' rights, union power and welfare, which was more and more regarded as an ineffective "bottomless jar." The prognostics of the type "end of" were presumably premature. The new discussion of social justice makes quite clear that the property rights and the freedom of contract are not without limits and that a new discussion on social justice begins, which this time is not primarily based on human rights.

Deliberation

Jürgen Habermas described in his dissertation of 1962 the public sphere as the structure for the formation of public opinion where all citizens have access and where all matters of public interest are discussed on the basis of the freedom of assembly, the freedom of association and the freedom of opinion (Habermas 1989). And beginning in the eighteenth century, this was a bourgeois public sphere which more and more replaced the public representation by the monarch and his court. With the development of the political parties and mass democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this public sphere changed completely. Jürgen Habermas in his major work on discourse theory insisted on deliberation as the basis of public social ethics and democracy (Habermas 1984). In Habermas' theory of communicative action, the speech act theory serves as mutual understanding of the speakers and finding of the truth, and finally of justice (Habermas 1996). Habermas was criticized for painting an idealized

picture of a free communication process, because not everybody has equal access to the public sphere, particularly not women (Fraser 1990), and because in the internet age such a model which is based on face-to-face communication is mainly outdated (Thompson 1995).

Even having this critique in mind, Habermas' model of a free communication in the public sphere helped to overcome the restriction of democracy on human rights as voting rights. Everybody in a civil society should have the right to participate in this communication process on equal terms. Participatory democracy was to complement parliamentary democracy. The model was introduced in numerous fields of public discourse, in city planning and in the planning of atomic power plants, in schools and universities, for workers' co-determination as well as for media participation. More and more the public sphere was not so much the parliamentary debate but the public hearings on public interest issues. The internet and the social media now allow the participation of everybody in the public discourse, and the vision of mass communication in a direct democracy no longer is a utopia. The 2012 uprisings during the so-called Arab Spring, and social movements in many countries in all continents, demonstrated a new force of basis democracy, as for example the "Occupy" movement in the United States and elsewhere in 2012. The mostly young people occupying Wall Street called themselves the "99 Movement," meaning that they represented 99 % of the population. But, they did not represent 99% of the population, by far not. They did not represent anybody but themselves. It was not representative democracy, but "liquid democracy." Everybody could participate and claim the public sphere. "Flash mobs" make use of their human rights of assembly and free speech. They are everywhere and nowhere, being "liquid." Democracy comes out of the backrooms of the bourgeois society and is "on the street again," but not as Habermas might have thought in a free communication process of equals, but as a violent conflict over the domination of the public sphere in the mass society (Hauser 1999). The "networking society" is a society where everybody can be present with his private as well with his public interest. The consequence is the complete irrelevance of the public discourse (Loader and Mercea 2011).

Transnationalism

Although it is a contradiction in itself, human rights are not human rights as such, but human rights need the ratification and implementation by national authorities in order to get the quality of law. There is still no "world

government" which could attribute to human rights the quality of "super national law." "Humanity" is still by and large dependent on "nationality." Therefore, the sources of human rights are still international treaties and conventions as well as declarations of international bodies, but these agreements and declarations need the consent of the nation states that are members of these international organizations to acquire the force of law. Some human rights have the quality of "international customary law" and some are valid "inter omnes," but these are exceptions. The international law since the seventeenth century is based on the so-called "Westphalien order," which means it relies on the consent of sovereign states.

What then about the universalism of human rights, which seems to be acknowledged by everybody? "Human rights," wrote Jürgen Habermas 1999, "are of such self evidence, that moral arguments are sufficient for their validity. These are arguments which justify why the guarantee of these rights is in the equal interest of all persons because of their personhood, why they are equally good for everybody" (Habermas 1999, transl. I.R.). But, which are these human rights that are of such self-evidence that they are valid because they are good for everybody? Is it the freedom of religion, which is guaranteed for everybody now for more than 200 years and which was contained in all declarations of human rights since 1776? If we look at movements like "Boko Haram" or the "Islamic State," it does not seem so.[10] Or, is it the right to reproductive health, which is widely accepted as such, but not yet guaranteed by international conventions? The still-unchanged position of the Vatican and the recent practices in India and China let us doubt about the self-evidence of this "human right" (Eriksson 2008). What about the human right of environment protection, if the biggest producer of greenhouse gas, the United States, does not sign the UN Kyoto Protocol (Redgwell 1996)? What about the "right to a decent living" as guaranteed by the 1966 International Convention of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 7) or—as we might call it—the "right to a dignified existence," if 40 % of the world population live under the "Two dollars a Day" threshold and half of them even under the "One dollar a Day" marker (Pogge 2002)? The situation of human rights in the world of today explains why new theories on human rights are needed and why legal philosophers in the last decades tried to find new ways of thinking about human rights. The approaches that I tried to sketch in this chapter show quite clearly that the philosophical fundament of the liberal human rights theory is eroded and that the new approaches are more or less based on the ideas of a "good life" and not so much on individualistic "rights."

A Post-Constitutional Society?

"Toute societee dans laquelle la garantie des droits n'est pas assuree, ni la separation des pouvoirs determinee, n'a point de constitution" (article 16 de la "Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du citoyen" 1789). If we give up human rights, do we give up constitutionalism? No, we replace it with cosmopolitanism!

Constitutionalism was a great leap forward in the history of man. Human rights and the separation of powers ended centuries of absolutism and the exploitation of the peoples by their rulers. And, peu a peu, the courts became the third power in the states and restricted entrenchments of the legislature and the executive into the individual rights, replacing the sovereign in a way as the supreme power. After the backlashes of two world wars and two totalitarian regimes in Europe and after decolonization of the world in the 1950s and 1960s, "the right to have rights" (Hannah Arendt 1951) became the moral standard of the world. But, as we have seen, the triumph of human rights was a pyrrhic victory and new conflicts and new fronts in the struggle for human rights emerged after the "end of the cold war." Might be that the notion of cosmopolitanism can become the headline for the new theories on human rights, which integrates the various approaches which I tried to outline in this chapter (Held 1995; Appiah 2006; Kumm 2009).

Notes

1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, Treaty Series 1966, Vol. 999 I-14668 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966, Treaty Series Vol. 993 I 3.
2. The European Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court held that these measures are unconstitutional and a violation of human rights; see ECJ April 8, 2014, BVerfGE 121, 1.
3. There are some exceptions. The South African Constitution asks the courts to consider the declarations of human rights of all democratic states. The German Constitutional Court held that it will restrain from judicial review of European Law as long as the European Union respects the principles of human rights which are common to all European states BVerfGE 73, 339.
4. So does the German Constitution of 1949 in its first article: "Human dignity shall be inviolable."
5. See endnote 2.

6. In its decision on the German Industrial Codetermination Act of 1976, the German Constitutional Court made a fundamental distinction between property rights serving personal freedom and property rights serving profit interests, BVerfGE 50, 290.

7. See the UNESCO "Declaration of Principles on Tolerance" of November 16 1995.

8. See article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries of 1989.

9. See article 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights 1776 or article 2 of the French Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen.

10. See the skeptical but also hopeful report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission on the Freedom of Religion and Conscience Abdelfattah Amor (2008).

Bibliography

Amor, Abdelfattah. 2008. Das Menschenrecht der Religionsfreiheit. In op.cit., ed. Ingo Richter, 241–264.

An-Na′im, Abdullahi Ahmed. 1990. Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights. In *Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na′im and Francis Mading Deng, 331–367. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2006. *Cosmopolitanism—Ethics in a World of Strangers.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Arendt, Hannah. 1951. *The Origins of Totalitarianism.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Butler, Judith. 1990. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.* New York: Routledge.

Casanova, Jose. 1994. *Public Religions in the Modern World.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Cook, Rebecca J., and F. Fathalla Mahmoud. 2005. Advancing Reproductive Rights Beyond Cairo and Beijing. *International Family Planning Perspectives* 22: 115–121.

Dahl, Ronald. 1961. *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dworkin, Ronald. 2006. *Is Democracy Possible Here?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 2011. *Justice for Hedgehogs.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Englehart, Neil A. 2009. State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights. *Journal of Peace Research* 46: 163–180.

Eriksson, Maja Kirilova. 2008. Das Recht auf Familienplanung. In op.cit., ed. Ingo Richter, 203–222.

Esping-Anderson, Goesta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fraser, Nancy. 1990. Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. *Social Text* 25: 56–80.

———. 2005. Reframing Justice in a Globalising World. *New Left Review* 36: 69–88.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin Books.

Gosepath, Stefan. 2004. *Gleiche Gerechtigkeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Gourevitch, Philip, and Errol Morris. 2009. *The Ballad of Abu Ghraib*. New York: Penguin.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

———. 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cambridge.

———. 1996. *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———, ed. 1999. *Kant's Idee des ewigen Friedens—aus dem historischen Abstand von 200 Jahren*. Frankfurt: Die Einbeziehung des Anderen.

Hauser, Gerhard. 1999. *Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres*. University of South Carolina Press, New York.

Heinze, E. 1995. *Sexual Orientation: A Human Right*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Order*. Stanford University Press, Hoboken.

Honneth, Axel. 2011. *Das Recht der Freiheit*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.

Joas, Hans. 2011. *Die Sakralität der Person—Eine neue Genealogie der Menschenrechte*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Kaldor, Mary. 2013. *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kumm, Mattias. 2009. The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State. In *Ruling the World? International Law, Global Governance, Constitutionalism*, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, 258–326. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kymlicka, Will. 2007. *Multicultural Odysseys—Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loader, Brian D., and Dan Mercea. 2011. Networking Democracy? Social Media Innovations and Parcipatory Politics. *Information, Communication and Society* 14: 757–769.

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. *Frontiers of Justice—Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pogge, Thomas. 2002. *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsabilities and Reforms.* Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 1993. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Redgwell, Catherine. 1996. Life, the Universe and Everything: A Critique of Anthropocentric Rights. In *Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection*, ed. Alan E. Boyle and Michael Anderson, 71. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Richter, Ingo, ed. 2008. *Transnationale Menschenrechte: Schritte zu einer weltweiten Verwirklichung der Menschenrechte*. Opladen: Barbara Budrich.

Rifkin, Jeremy. 1995. *The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era*. New York: Tarcher/Putnam.

———. 2000. *The Age of Access*. New York: Tarcher/Putnam.

Sen, Amartya. 1993. Capability and Well-Being. In *The Quality of Life*, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, 30–53. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Siems, Larry. 2012. *The Torture Report: What the Documents Say about America's Post 9/11 Torture Program*. New York: OR Books.

Taylor, Charles. 1992. *Multi-culturalism and the "Politics of Recognition"*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 1999. Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights. In *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel Bell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, John B. 1995. *The Media and the Modernity: A Social theory of the Media*. Cambridge: Polity.

Tomuschat, Christian. 2014. *Human Rights between Idealism and Realism*. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Touzenis, Kristina, and Ryszard Cholewinski. 2009. The Human Rights of Migrants. *International Journal of Multicultural Societies* 11(1): 1–19.

Vasak, Karel. 1977. Human Rights: A Thirty Year Struggle: the Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNESCO Courier 30:11, Paris.

Wikipedia, Internet Censorship. 2015. See en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet.censorship. Accessed 3 March 2015.

1989/91 as a Caesura in the Study of History: A Personal Retrospective

Jürgen Kocka

Surprise and Methodology

There have been exceptions, but, on the whole, historians were as surprised by the upheavals of 1989–1991 as most of their contemporaries. It all happened in just a few months, something that most of us—*for all our historical arguments*—had still, in the middle of 1989, considered extremely unlikely: a revolution in East Central Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the re-establishment of a German nation state without war and without paying the price of being neutralized in a "third way" between the West and the East.

That was a surprise. For historians who not only wanted to describe how things had been and how it all happened but also claimed that they could explain past events out of preceding constellations, this surprise—regardless

J. Kocka (✉)
Department of History, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany

257

of what people desired politically—had something professionally irritating about it. This irritation has to be understood in two different respects:

If it is so difficult to predict vital changes in our own time from our knowledge of preceding and existing structures, as is the case here, doesn't this point to the limitations of the structural historical and processual historical explicability of past changes, too? Might it not be better to simply say *what* happened—and *how*—instead of trying to analyze *why* it took place and which constellations brought it about?

Even more irritating was that precisely because we tried to learn from past history for the benefit of the present, the upheaval caught us on the wrong foot. In the light of our historical knowledge about declining regimes and civilizations, wasn't it extremely unlikely that the Soviet empire's power would disintegrate so quickly and relatively peacefully—thus making the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe possible? Wasn't it considered to be more or less impossible for a revolution to succeed in a highly developed, complex industrial society? Hadn't there been many failed attempts to make compatible, in the middle of Europe, the existence of strong nation states, democratic freedom at home and peacefulness abroad, and didn't it seem extremely unlikely that something like this could occur in our lifetime?

And yet all this actually happened! Those who had attempted to orient themselves on the basis of historical experience at the time were in for a very big surprise and turned out to have a particularly bad orientation. Wasn't this a case of historical knowledge impeding a correct view of reality—instead of opening our eyes?

Still, in the years that followed, we obviously did not allow ourselves to be paralyzed by this irritating experience. Over the last 24 years, much scholarly work has been done in order to *historically* explain the surprising upheavals of 1989–1991, not without success. The usual approaches of historians were applied. Researchers attempted to compile all of the relevant factors, reconstruct their interrelationships and estimate their impact: factors, which over the preceding years and decades had contributed toward making the period 1989–1991 what it was. We discussed the fragility of the Soviet model and the role played by Gorbachev, the widespread dissatisfaction and impressive courage of the dissidents, the dynamics and impact of the mass movements in the socialist countries, their impact on international politics, the role of globalization and the strength of capitalism—and much more besides.

And we found many *ad hoc* explanations to show why we hadn't been better placed to foresee this development. In this context we, for example, identified the counterproductive specialization of knowledge in the historical and social sciences: not only the deceptive self-presentation of the socialist states as strong and powerful as we had uncritically believed but also the political passions and ideological biases that may have blurred our analytical judgments, although contemporaries of the most diverse political shades and colors, be they doves or hawks, leftists or right wingers or simple middle of the road, were all surprised to a similar degree.

Still, at the end we have to admit the true state of affairs: contemporaries including historians are only partially aware of what is actually happening around them; they usually fail to understand the full spectrum of conditions and consequences of what they observe and experience. Their knowledge and understanding of the present is imperfect since they are part of this present, cannot have full information and cannot know where it is heading. But after conducting extensive research with historical methods, with the passage of time and with the benefits of hindsight historians can know more, understand better and be wiser than the contemporary eye witnesses. If one argues in this way, one should not use the inability to foresee a development at the time it happens for excuse not to explain it later in historical terms. As contemporaries, historians may not be (much) better than others. But after serious research and with the advantages of hindsight, they may know and understand more.

However, other historians drew different consequences from their experience of surprise in 1989/91. They pointed to a methodological insight which was dramatically underlined by the events of 1989–1991, although it had not been unfamiliar beforehand either, and also applies to other areas of historical knowledge: it is necessary to admit that historical events—like the birth of a human being, an economic crisis or a revolution—do not *with necessity* follow on from events and processes preceding them. They are not *fully* conditioned by antecedent factors and their contexts. They cannot be simply derived from them. This is why future developments cannot be predicted *with certainty* from the present state of affairs (even if it were fully known) and why past developments cannot be *fully* explained from the structures and processes preceding them.

It is due to this element of indeterminacy or freedom, this hiatus between events and actions on the one hand and structures and processes on the other, that history contains surprises, and that historical explanations—even when we have all the knowledge of the factors relevant to these

explanations—can generally only say why a past change was possible and likely, but rarely that and why it was necessary. In a world of probabilities, the improbable sometimes happens. This demonstrates the limits of historical explanation—and not only the boundaries of historical prognosis. Hence, the experience of surprise from 1989 to 1991 calls for methodological modesty.

Scholars and Politics

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Soviet empire and the reunification of Germany suddenly opened up vast new fields for study: new sources, new working contacts and new questions. But before I begin to discuss these, I would like to report a great, important and fascinating distraction that prevented some of us from immersing ourselves in these new and tempting historical labors right away: the distraction of politics. In many respects, the break that occurred in Germany in 1989–1991 created a surge of interest in politics for many scholars, among them many historians. I am thinking here of two things: the politics of reunification in the sciences and new challenges of *Geschichtspolitik* (history politics).

At the time, I was a member of the *Wissenschaftsrat*, an important body composed of scholars and political actors, which advised the science policy of the federal government and the *Laender* and had, under the guidance of the legal scholar Dieter Simon, a great influence those days on the policy of merging West and East German academic institutions. It was in this context that I, in the early 1990s, was involved in the process of reorganizing the humanities and, above all, extra-university research institutes in what was by then a declining and dissolving East German state, where such institutes were very numerous, important and well staffed. Certainly, basic decisions on science policy were taken at a very high political level, such as the decision to create as quickly as possible an integrated system of academic institutions and processes on the West German model, instead of living with two academic systems for a few years under the umbrella of a common constitution, or instead of having both sides negotiate something new, which would prolong neither the West nor the East German state of affairs. These were fundamental decisions taken by elected politicians and their top officials together with the heads of the largest science organizations.

However, the specific, concrete decisions about individual disciplines, institutes and projects, about the definition and the staffing of positions and, thus, about the occupational fate of many academic staff members

from the declining East German state were taken with the considerable participation of academics involved in providing consultation, making recommendations and exerting influence.

Numerous evaluations were carried out to wind up, recompose and, at times, newly found institutes. These evaluations, generally involving extensive meetings at the institutes under assessment, were primarily undertaken by West German academics and experts and supplemented by the occasional East German or foreign colleague—generally from Western countries. Evaluations were supposed to meet international standards. They should lead to the reconstruction of an integrated landscape of research which would be of top quality by international standards and be compatible with the constitutional and democratic principles. And they actually did this—within the framework of the above-mentioned political decisions (made in advance), in the form of a legitimate evaluation that produced extensive plans for renewal. Much of this would be implemented in the years to come.

Some of these ideas are still controversial today, even though heat of the moment has meanwhile cooled down quite considerably.

As was the case in reunification as a whole, it was, from start to finish, an asymmetric process marked by West German dominance and East German inferiority. We were aware of this every time we carried out an inspection. There were winners and losers. The West had won, even though we—as colleagues—communicated with one another, in principle, on an equal footing. Was there any way that this asymmetry could have been limited and the considerable human costs of the unification process reduced? In my opinion: yes. However, there was little room for maneuver—and not only because of the all-defining East-West divide but also because of the countless and sharp East-East conflicts that suddenly erupted after several decades of dictatorship and made themselves felt when, for example, staffing decisions were made.

Basically, the West German system was extended to the acceding East, which had to be incorporated. Wouldn't it have been possible to take greater advantage of this unique constellation to improve the Western system, which was extending eastwards—with or without the adoption of useful elements from the declining Eastern system? Many of us presented this argument at the time, generally in vain. Looking back, I doubt whether the energy to carry out further internal reforms was there at the time. The actual process of transforming the East in a Western sense was complex and costly enough. And after the events of 1989–1991, the West Germans were riding a high wave of confidence. Why should they change their approach self-critically after such a victory?

Some things simply failed—such as the declared program of integrating academics from the extra-university institutes into the universities. Some things happened that were not intended: such as upgrading the institutional evaluation to a normal instrument of permanent inner-academic evaluation and control. Many other things have succeeded, however. With satisfaction, I recall the newly founded research centers in the humanities, including the Centre for Contemporary History Research in Potsdam, which was founded in the face of opposition. I was deeply involved in its founding and administration during the early 1990s, and it now continues to exist as an internationally recognized high-performance institute for contemporary history.

It is now time to add some thoughts about the role played by German *Geschichtspolitik* (history politics). The decline of the East German state and German reunification under the dominance of the Federal Republic of Germany was not merely a political, economic and institutional challenge but also a challenge at the ideological and cultural levels. Ever since the peaceful revolution took place in East Germany in the autumn of 1989, the decline of the (smaller) East German state, its absorption by the (larger) West German Federal Republic and the integration problems that have presented themselves have also been controversially dealt with in the medium of public interpretations of history, where science and politics overlap— although it must be said that conflicts have by no means arisen only between Western and Eastern spokespeople, but also between East Germans and East Germans, and between West Germans and West Germans.

This cannot be described in great detail here and now. I merely wish to point out that this happened at a time when the Germans' conflicts over their National Socialist past—a conflict conducted very differently in the East and the West—had already reached an advanced stage and in the 1980s—remember the speech by the Federal President von Weizsäcker on the 40th anniversary of 1945 and at the time of the so-called "historians' dispute" during that period—had experienced a very intense phase, in West Germany, at least. As a result, the conflict over the historical location of the (East) German Democratic Republic (GDR) rapidly shifted to become a long-term comparison of perspectives that revolved around the similarities and differences, the continuity and discontinuity between the two German dictatorships. The debate over the history and the heritage of the "second German dictatorship" (the GDR) did not suppress the debate about the history and the heritage of the "first German dictatorship" (National Socialism), but both debates intermixed and mutually promoted each other.

The historical dimension in the intellectual interpretation of the German reunification was very striking. Correspondingly, the public role of historians in public debates has been influential and prominent.

So much for the boost in politicization, which the revolution of 1989–1991 meant at least for some of us. So much, too, for my excursion into politics. As a result, a few strictly professional books and articles were not written, which might have been written otherwise. But, for historians involved in these practical processes, the gain in experience was quite considerable. We became—on a small scale, of course—historical actors, a part of the process, which we would otherwise merely study. We could try to find out whether and how the universalising orientation toward scientific principles (to which we had become accustomed), could be realised in political practice—across and beyond political and ideological trenches. There were times when we were successful, and others when we were disappointed. We intellectually benefited from the pressure to think beyond our own specializations and to act politically. I am well aware that many of my East German colleagues had very different experiences, and that many West German academics did not take such steps in practice. I am glad that I succeeded in keeping my excursion into politics short.

A New Future—A New History?

It can be shown that, over the centuries, interpretations of history that set the tone are partly shaped by the ideas—even if they are often only fragmentary, vague and implicit—that historians have had of the future. Future expectations co-determine the way that our past experiences are interpreted and related—as history—to the present. For instance, the expectations placed on progress shaped interpretations made by eighteenth-century Enlightenment historians of the history of civilization. The longing for a German nation state structured the primarily national-historical interpretations of the Borussia school of historians in the nineteenth century. The vision, or rather proto-vision, of a post-capitalist social order gave the Marxist synthesis of history vitality and strength. And the highly fragmented concept of the future of post-modernist authors is reflected in the late twentieth century in the dissolution of, or departure from, history as a conceptualized nexus. Notions of the future always co-determine our interpretation of the past.

Without any doubt, the break that occurred in 1989–1991 placed a burden on some future expectations and opened others anew. Francis

Fukuyama's essay "The End of History" was immediately criticized and later revised by the author himself, but his theses have been (and will be) very frequently cited and taken seriously because they formulated future expectations on history which were—to some extent at least, and often only vaguely—very widespread in 1989–1991: namely that state socialism, totalitarian dictatorships and authoritarian rule had lost out, whereas the market economy and liberal democracy had won—once and for all—because they would be strong enough to "overcome, in the future, all contradictions and to satisfy all needs." As a consequence, there would be no war of ideologies in the future. This would mean the "end of history" as we know it within which ideological debates had always been central.

In other words, there is some evidence that the break of 1989–1991 has changed expectations of the future. Has it also changed the way that historians think about and write about history?

An answer is hard to find for a number of reasons: on the one hand, because it is impossible to know exactly how historical thinking and the practice of historians would have developed without that upheaval; on the other hand, because very many different things are happening within historical science across the globe; and, finally, because, perhaps, 25 years after that break, it has become evident that the ideas and practice of historians have changed less than some of us imagined under the immediate impact of the turbulent events of the those years.

It goes without saying that the end of institutionalized Communism under Soviet hegemony, the "Wende" in Central Eastern and Eastern Europe, and the reunification of Germany have consummated old developments and initiated new ones, in the study of history.

For German historians, this opened up an extensive new field of study. Almost overnight, the sudden end of the East German state made a gigantic, complex and hitherto inaccessible stock of documents and other sources available. Without the otherwise customary statutory closure periods, the gashed interior of four decades of East Germany became, in the form of vast mountains of files, accessible to curious historians, who threw themselves into the new fields of work in great number. Within a few years, they created an image of the history of East Germany that was, generally speaking, different and much gloomier than the images of the GDR that had existed in the East and the West up till then.

In the meantime, the GDR has become one of the best researched areas of German history. In the countries neighboring East Germany, the rupture was not so dramatic. Research into the Communist decades proceeded

more sluggishly. But here, too, the emerging views were critical in principle and frequently, as in the case of East Germany, guided by historical questions related to dictatorship and totalitarianism. Trans-national, comparative research remained rare.

Research has produced many new results, often politically volatile and important for the societies' self-understanding. Still, I am not aware of any paradigmatic changes or exciting new theoretical developments. In these countries, Marxism-Leninism had been more or less compulsory. Now that the historians were enjoying a newly found freedom, they made use of it, generally by distancing themselves from Marxist premises altogether. They moved in the direction of precise, highly empirical studies without too much theory, and generally within a national-historical framework, with the core focus on political history, and with a tendency to expand into cultural rather than into social history. The diversity was great, however, and the harvest bountiful: East German historical research evolved into a large, highly subsidized special field whose integration into the long-term processes of German and European history has also made a certain degree of progress during the past few years.

Just as the collapse of the Soviet empire between 1989 and 1991 resulted in the spectacular confirmation of the principle of the nation state—with an increase in the number of independent nation states and a great gain in national sovereignty and identity in Central, East and South-Eastern Europe—the break as a whole has, to a certain degree, elevated the *concept of the nation state* which has been anyway dominant in the study of history ever since the nineteenth century. This trend has many faces, but, on the whole, it has tended to strengthen tradition, even a return to convention, for a while, at least.

Soon, however, counter-tendencies also appeared: approaches reaching *beyond the national-historical framework*, which was also directly or indirectly related to the break of 1989–1991:

The East-West division of the continent during the decades of the Cold War had structured not only politics and other areas of life but also patterns of historical thought, especially since such patterns could build on older traditions that situated *Europe* in East-West categories. Historians' practice and thinking during the decades-long division of the continent were shaped by the East-West divide. For my cohort of social historians, this meant, for instance, that we—inasmuch as we were drawing comparisons—generally compared the German situation with corresponding situations in neighboring Western countries. We looked to the West, much less to the East. The

self-critical thesis of a "special German path" ("deutscher Sonderweg") in modern history was a product of intellectually orientating ourselves to "the West." For German idiosyncrasies, weaknesses and shortcomings, which were identified as aspects of "Germany's special path"—the belated creation of a nation state, the weaknesses of liberalism, the failure of representative democracy and the downward spiral into dictatorship in the early 1930s—turned out to be German particularities and weaknesses only in comparison with England, France, the USA, and other Western countries while they would not have been seen as such in comparison with neighboring countries in the East. Logically, some authors translated "Germany's special path" as "German divergence from the West."

With the fall of the—already perforated—Iron Curtain in 1989–1991, this changed. The eastern part of Europe came closer; people came nearer to seeing Europe as whole. This corresponded with real historical processes: after all, the battle cry issued by east-central European dissidents against dictatorship and soviet hegemony in 1989 had been "back to Europe." And soon, the European Union would decide to expand eastwards and south-eastwards. In historical studies, Eastern Europe was now becoming increasingly recognized as a major area of research, also among historians who did not belong to the small group of specialists who had always concentrated on the history of this European region. The German situation was now being increasingly compared with Western *and* Eastern Europe, especially here in Berlin. This has been one of several reasons why the thesis of a "special German path" has faded over the past two decades. Historical comparison has become richer. In this sense, the end of the division between East and West has led to progress in the field of historical studies. But there is still much to be done.

Indirectly, the break of 1989–1991 has also encouraged the rise of *global history*. For with the end of the great East-West divide, minds became free and more receptive to other lines of tension which, admittedly, had not lacked altogether over the decades, but were now increasingly entering peoples' consciousness and having a growing influence on historians' coordinate systems. I am referring here to the North-South tensions, among them the consequences of colonization and decolonization, post-colonial debates and theories. With the disintegration of the Eastern Block, important trade, communications, and migratory barriers were overcome that had hitherto slowed down genuine globalization. With the East-West conflict, rigid patterns of behavior and thinking were overcome, which had prevented historians from opening up to global-historical questions. Certainly the move toward global historical approaches had begun earlier,

especially in the USA. But this trend has noticeably accelerated since the early 1990s, as a consequence of the end of the East-West conflict which had structured power relations and political thought over the decades. That is, in any case, the way I see development in Germany and Europe.

The upheavals of 1989–1991 confronted social historians like me with *additional-methodological-challenges*. They testified to the great role played by factors of *political* change relative to social and economic ones. Through Gorbachev, it became apparent again and in a dramatic way what a central role individual actors can play in socio-political crisis situations. The break of 1989–1991 made it absolutely clear how difficult and even misleading it would be to proceed from a general belief in the "primacy of domestic politics." It is beyond any doubt that foreign policy questions, international relations of power, as well as border-crossing perceptions and links played quite an important role in the period 1989–1991. I am thinking of the way in which the Soviet Union declined at the foreign, foreign trade, and military levels. This had certainly a lot to do with domestic factors within the Soviet Union, but, at the same time, it strongly conditioned the domestic political and social situation within the Eastern European countries. As a consequence, the changes within the GDR and, therefore, in Germany, as well as in other "satellite" countries of Central and Eastern Europe, were conditioned by the international system of power and changed with the latter.

This is not the place to explain this in detail. But inasmuch as economic and social historians had tended, still in the 1980s, to grasp domestic and foreign policy primarily as functions of social process occurring within the societies they studied, they were now cured of this one-sided perspective inasmuch as they openly faced the experience that the upheavals of 1989–1991 had in store for them. We became more skeptical about general formulae and withdrew—in general statements—to the figure of thought of a historically variable relationship between socio-economic or social, political, and cultural dimensions of change as well as between internal and external policies, inasmuch as we had not already positioned ourselves accordingly before—in the tradition of Max Weber, for instance.

All this was undoubtedly related to the *decline of Marxist thought*, which was accelerated by the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the politically institutionalized form of Marxism-Leninism prevailing there. But the decline of historical-materialist paradigms had started much earlier. On the other hand, Marxist models of interpretation continued to be applied in a non-dogmatic form after the break of 1989–1991—one need only take Eric Hobsbawm's work *The Age of Extremes*, or Immanuel Wallerstein's latest

analyses as examples. In the contexts of post-colonial discussion, Marxist arguments continue to have considerable weight. As a subject of historical research and presentation, capitalism has increasingly been gaining in significance recently and, as a result, Marxist concepts are becoming important again, even though they—originating in Europe in the mid-nineteenth century—can only be applied worldwide with considerable modifications to contemporary findings. In other words, the impact of the caesura of 1989–1991 on the decline of Marxism has been quite limited.

The upheavals of 1989–1991 are grist to the mill of modernisation theories. Such theories have been—and still are—repeatedly used by historians to structure their findings, especially when they dare to produce comprehensive syntheses. In fact, 1989–1991 appeared to confirm what modernisation theoreticians since Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, Neil Smelser, Barrington Moore and Wolfgang Zapf have repeatedly claimed: that, *in the long run*, the market economy, an open society, constitutional government, the rule of law and cultural pluralism belong together, mutually condition and strengthen one another, and are—taken together—superior to competing alternatives. This has, however, not led to a general breakthrough of modernisation theory approaches among historians. Criticism of this approach was, and remains, powerful due to its pro-western bias, its conceptual schematism and its apparent blindness to contradictions, alternatives and diversity. Shmuel Eisenstadt's conception of "multiple modernities" attempted to take account of this, albeit at the price of a far-reaching renunciation of conceptual substance. The example of China seems to show that capitalism can flourish under dictatorial conditions. Many other new conflicts have emerged. The victory of modernisation theory in the study of history as a consequence of 1989–1991 has been very partial and short lived.

Final Remarks

The caesura of 1989–1991 has influenced historians' thought and practice. I have examined some of the consequences from a German and a European perspective. However, the upheavals that occurred at the time have not led to a distinct trend or change in paradigms of historical thought, research and presentation. The impact of that caesura has been limited in these respects. This is very apparent when viewed from a temporal distance of roughly 25 years—correcting the occasional, exaggerated expectation that some of us may have had in those years of upheavals.

This is not really surprising. In contrast to the revolutions of 1789 and 1917, the upheavals of 1889–1991 did not go hand in hand with a new utopia, a vision of a new, civilizing transformation or a new design for political change. For this reason, many people are hesitant, also in retrospect, to speak of a revolution. Basically, the events involved implementing pre-formulated principles in a part of the world that had hitherto blocked them. If anything, it was a "revolution aiming to catch up," as Jürgen Habermas has suggested. And although its impact reached far beyond the region in which it occurred, it did not offer a new interpretation of the world. The belief, which arose for a short period, that the end of history had been reached with this break, soon proved to be a deception. In the historical studies, this caesura has neither contributed to new paradigms nor to a new consensus, but to single advancements, greater diversity, and healthy skepticism.

Bibliography

Ash, Garton. 2009. *Facts are Subversive: Political Writing from a Decade without a Name*. London: Atlantic Books.

Beyme, Klaus von. 2001. Revolutions of 1989–90 in Eastern Central Europe. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, 13306–13310. Amsterdam and Oxford: Elsevier.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. The End of History? *The National Interest* 16: 3–18.

Iggers, Georg G., Q.E. Wang, and Supriya Mukherjee. 2008. *A Global History of Modern Historiography*. Harlow: Longman.

Jarausch, Konrad H. 2015. *Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kocka, Jürgen. 2000. Reform and Revolution: Germany 1989–90. In *The Problem of Revolution in Germany, 1789–1989*, ed. Reinhard Rürup, 161–179. German Historical Perspectives 12. Oxford: Berg.

———. 2012. An Asymmetric Affair: West and East German Academia During Reunification. *Baltic Worlds* 3–4: 71–72.

Saxonberg, Steven. 2001. *The Fall: A Comparative Study of the End of Communism in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic.

Wirsching, Andreas. 2010. *Wissenschaft und Wiedervereinigung: Bilanz und offene Fragen*. Berlin: Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Conference Proceeding.

———. 2012. *Der Preis der Freiheit: Geschichte Europas in unserer Zeit*. 2nd ed. Munich: Beck.

Index[1]

NUMBERS & SYMBOLS

9/11, 237–8

1978, 51, 217, 219, 223

1989, 1–12, 43–66, 69–79, 83–94, 100–2, 117–19, 123, 126, 127, 136–50, 157, 175, 182, 203, 205, 215–17, 219, 221, 224, 235–8, 253n8, 257–69

A

access, 23, 24, 37, 40, 97, 98, 102, 105, 113, 137, 142, 162, 192, 195n5, 207, 210, 241, 244, 246–7, 249, 250

Africa, 4, 5, 7, 10, 20, 21, 23, 25, 83, 94, 97, 100–2, 104, 105, 110, 113, 136, 142, 143, 192, 218, 224

agency, 34, 51, 56, 60, 75, 76, 100, 121, 140, 183, 191–3, 205, 211, 221, 224, 227

agent, 35, 48, 51, 53, 55, 61, 75, 163, 164, 224

agricultural, 195n5, 204, 221

aid, 155, 202–9, 211, 218

alternative globalizations, 222

Amato, Massimo, 99, 100, 105, 112, 113, 118, 119

anamnestic unveiling, 174

Anglophone, 73, 74, 83, 89, 217, 219, 221, 226

anthropological theory, 9

anthropology, 9–11, 69–79, 97, 104–12, 118–21, 135, 137, 144–50, 184, 188, 202–4, 220

anthropology of Religion, 135, 137, 144–50

anti-capitalist process, 218

anticolonialism, 69

Apple, 190, 195n5

area expression of human rights, 236

area Studies, 8, 44, 57, 215, 217–20, 224

Asia, 21, 136, 142, 218, 227

---

[1] Notes: Page number followed by 'n' denotes notes.