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Editor

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Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment

Islamic Metaphysics Revived and Recent Phenomenology of Life

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REASON, SPIRIT AND THE SACRAL IN THE NEW ENLIGHTENMENT

Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue

VOLUME 5

Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment

Islamic Metaphysics Revived and Recent Phenomenology of Life

Edited by

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Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

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INTRODUCTION

Abstract: Reason, rationality have appeared always to be essential prerogatives of the human being—"the rational animal." Seen as streaming and centralizing human functioning from and through the faculties of the human mind as it throws out its innumerable rays of attention and builds networks of sense, reason seems to promote understanding throughout the horizon of human reality. The human faculties of reason indeed distinguish man from other living beings—given our striking capacities for differentiating, measuring, evaluating, and selecting in matters of fact and the affairs of life as well as for passing judgments and directing our ways of conduct. But it is doubtful that the reach of the faculties exhibited by these powers alone accounts for the indispensable continuity of "rational" functioning. This is the question that lies at the heart of rationality as such and which prompts reinterpretation in dialogue between Islamic metaphysics and phenomenology/ontopoiesis of life.

1. THE APORIAS OF RATIONALITY

1. There can be no doubting already in the sphere of practical life the living agent's crucial utility in orchestrating the individual progress of life and that this play of reason not only correlates with the cognitive/constitutive structuring of the circumambient reality within which it occurs but also in its fluctuating progress cogenerates with the elements in the world of life within which it is enmeshed.

There is engendered in the mutual completion of individual and elements a joint "rationale." In virtue of what does this correlation occur?

2. Furthermore, when we examine the orchestration of the individual's advance in life, we see that it stretches in two opposite directions: in the progressive unfolding of the living agent's intellective powers in the direction of the specifically human faculties—logical categorizing, the "abstractive" forces of the mind—on the one hand, and in the prompting flow of forces, juices at work in empirical sensing and the generative melding of elements that renews the energies of the root of becoming, on the other. How do these different projects coalesce?

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 1–7.

3. The emphasis of history has been falling either on the network of interlinkages giving priority to the speculative progress of the human mind in its intellective unfolding or on the differentiations discerned by the developing scientific empirical modulations of becoming. Taking different turns, the specific functioning of human reason instead of fusing with the vital/rational schemata of nature's/life's becoming, has become more and more isolated.

What are the mutual intergenerative sources of their molding? What are the steps of nature's and the living being's—the human being's—evolutive advance promoting their existential continuity?

Mark that the sense of rationality does not lie in the distinction of modalities between sensory and speculative functions, between the vital and the abstract, etc. These each and all express the communicative essence of the living agent's participating in life, which culminates in the unfolding of the *human mind*. It is in the differentiating and modulating powers both that lies the sense of reason.

4. Although in the symbiotic unfolding of individualizing life there emerges between the multifarious networks of intergenerative levels a closer and closer concatenation between the animal and the human, there it is that a seemingly unbridgeable gap opens in their communion. Although in their essential core they share a communicative symbiotic "rationality" in which the connectedness found in purpose and the individualizing sequence of each singular life cohere, their continuity breaks down at the deepest level of the becoming of life where IMAGINATIO CREATRIX surges into action. Entering into the heart of the vital/constitutive forces of an individualizing beingness, its rays liberate latent springs of creative inspiration, animating new inclinations, willful tendencies, expectations, and strivings hidden in a person's endowment as well as the sharing of the concerns of one's personal selfhood with other individuals, the community, society. Within innumerable perspectives Imaginatio Creatrix ignites ever new sparks.

Thus above the symbiotic coexistence of living beings, the work of human creative imagination is illuminating the world of life and the world of human community with its complementary vital, societal, humanitarian, and esoteric human concerns—so expands *human existence in the spirit*.

On the wings of creative imagination all the perspectives within life's manifestation acquire infinitely subtle specific senses, having each thrown out their varying links forged by the human mind. But is it in the architecture of the mind itself to grasp and handle the infinite wealth of imaginative sparks ignited by imagination's play with a world of reality so much in flux?

Or could the manifested reality of life account for the cohesion that would found and sustain communicative understanding?

Lastly, could the critical surging of imagination within life's orbit posit its condition, "reason," its Logos, by itself?

And yet is not imagination the gist of the spirit, of the logos, of the *sacral* quest for the very sense of the yawning abysm that is All?

5. Here with imagination prompting the evolving horizons of the full human reality there comes to light the splendiferous variety in the treasury of the human soul outfitted for her pursuit of the highest unfolding of the spirit: the revelation of the sacral spirit, the Logos of the All, the Divine.

Here, as before, we find an enigmatic trajectory to be traversed, this time backwards from the sacral and the communicative-spiritual, from the innermost personal and the shared communal, from the vital cognitive and the natural, on to the primordial generative roots of life. Distinguishing and separating in our mind the different senses of the real, we deal in fact with their innermost coherence, which is manifest despite the divisions and unscrutinizable spaces between their spheres.

In brief, religious faith, sacral spirituality, elevation of soul, mysticism stand within a congenial schema of natural life even if removed from them in practice. What accounts for this coherence?

We have outlined the span of the variations of reason-rationality-communicative spirit and the sacral quest manifested in the human reality, emphasizing the seeming gaps in their otherwise indubitable coherence.

2. THE LOGOS OF LIFE AS THE FILUM ARIADNAE OF THE ONTOPOIETIC CONTINUITY OF BEINGNESS

The questions that we have brought out are questions that have been raised throughout history by numerous thinkers and answered with varying emphasis relying now on the constitutive faculties of human consciousness, now on the vital powers of nature, or now on the revelatory depths of the human soul.

We see in history the tendency to either absolutize one mode of rationality over another, going even so far as to derive one from the other, or to subsume them all metaphysically to speculative considerations in which the cognitive mind with its speculative powers has the upper hand, which is to forget the obvious fact that the different modalities of the real with their specific modes of reasoning, senses, logoi do share an innermost logos, that is, a concordant organization, as an a priori condition for their singular deployments, which cannot occur singularly but only in tandem. And here we arrive at the crucial question: What is the last condition of the rationality of the real: conscious and organic, vital and communicative, speculative and practical, spiritual and sacral?

We have at this point to consider where we must start the new critique of reason. What else could be considered the ultimate ground on which every last expression of the infinite rays of rationality find the common basis and origination if not LIFE, which radiates them all from its inward and outward forces and propensities?!

Life itself is suspended upon the cosmic architectonics of incommensurable, cognitively unapproachable spheres evading all imagination—upon the fluctuating stars, galaxies, universes of the All. To apprehend the gist of rationality in its intricacies and its extension we have then to reach the dimension of the real where life organizes itself in its primordial logos in launching the course of individualizing life and in its generative diversity of linked reasons.

It is through life, indeed, that we find the generative path proceeding from the forge of all sense, radiating rationality, life's conducting logos, which extends beyond its fulfillment.

We need, in fact a new critique of reason, "new" with respect to the traditional emphasis over the centuries on one privileged modality of rationality to the detriment of the others, to the absolutizing of either human consciousness and its powers or of nature.

Indeed, the rationality of life and of the real in their respective horizons cannot be approached piecemeal by exploring distinct themes such as reason, spirit, and rationality. Rather it has to be pursued in the evolving meanders the logos of life makes in originating and unfolding reality together with human consciousness in its creative and imaginative energies.

Understanding "rationality" and reason in its main modalities has involved us in cognitively unscrutinizable aporia, but we have also indicated that we should not seek piecemeal joining links but seek rather to unravel the common ground of their fluctuating becoming, which is not in the static ontological structures of eidoi, and not in speculative metaphysical principles, but in the flux of the individualizing becoming of beingness itself: *the ontopoiesis of beingness in generative flux*, the ontopoiesis of the logos of life.

The new critique of reason culminating in the logos involved in the ontopoiesis of life fulfills these desiderata.

Numerous thinkers and philosophers have sought to establish the continuity of the sense of the real in relation to a conception of reason—by a critique of reason. There comes to mind here the Islamic encyclopedia, the Rasa'il Ikhwan as-Safa, the work of a community of philosophers and scientists of the second half of the tenth century (the Brethren of Purity) who sought the unity of reason and spirit upon an extension ladder following the harmonious interplay between the macrocosmic and microcosmic dimensions of the first originating principle of life. For contrast let us mention a later thinker like Mulla Sadra, who fundamentally relies on three principles: existence, which runs through

all beingness, from the infinitesimal to the absolute, as its innermost stream; the hierarchical graduation of being, which is differentiated by the quiddities of objects; and the principle of "trans-substantial motion," according to which reality is sustained by a substance of matter in a perpetual flux of becoming.[1] While the powerful theory of the Rasa il Ihwan as-Safa philosophers and scientists sustained an all-embracing continuity of the real and upheld a naturalistic interdisciplinarity,[2] Mulla Sadra, projected an extensive metaphysical framework in which reason and spirit differentiate through a gradual transformation effected in the workings of trans-substantial motion. Although Mulla Sadra emphasizes the "concreteness" of the notion of "existence" over against the abstractness of concepts, this concreteness cannot be conceived other than as belonging to the speculation of "wisdom," that is, to speculative metaphysics.

3. LOGOS AND THE NEW ENLIGHTENMENT

With the evolution of the sciences in our times, with such dramatic transformations of our knowledge of reality, the world, and the human being that have progressively occurred, we have to reinvestigate the critique of reason, the basis upon which the classic approaches of reason have been forged. The aporias of the rationality of the real have to be approached on new grounds and within the full perspective of the new insights that our times are bringing forth.[3] The new in-depth scientific research into concrete reality is digging deeper and deeper into its generative processes, is unraveling more and more the hidden networks of life.[4] Nevertheless, the aporias between generative intervals are obscuring the continuity of generative becoming—which still remains obscure, hidden. And yet, as discussed above, as the great aporias of reason, of rationality confront the modes of existence, they yield to the originary encounter of the specifically human conscious faculties, the faculties of the intellective mind—even if pragmatically and empirically tested—with the subjacent flow of life and with the originary logos subtending it all.

Here lies the crux of rationality, *the differentiation of sense* as such.[5] Here lies the key to reality.

There it is, the great advances seen and ever to be anticipated in empirical research have yielded insights into the real that throw new light on its generative background, reaching intuitively its primary and prompting self-generating force: *the logos of life*.

The logos of life is the force that subtends all becoming while shaping it in an ontopoietic unfolding[6]; it comprises the entire flux of originating and generating rationalities from the previtial empirical originations of life, through the ontopoietic phases of the advancing individualization of life and beyond.

As unfolded above, through innumerable steps and phases—now being unraveled by contemporary science—the logos surges with the incipience of life and sustained by the entire ontopoietic apparatus witnesses the appearance of transnatural *sentience*.[7] The logos of life grows with life's constructive progress into the creative endowment of *the human-condition-within-the-unity-of-everything-there-is-alive*. The surging of Imaginatio Creatrix prompts the forces of the logos of life through innumerable steps and modulations, phases, and moldings. In this ontopoietic unfolding, the logos of life undergoes an innermost metamorphic transmutation of sense which we witness in the innumerable rationalities and spiritual modulations of real life. Upon this metamorphic path, the logos of life advances towards its earthly accomplishment—our *sacral destiny* in the Divine.[8]

In the logos of life, which is the force concretely underlying all of reality's becoming and which generates all rationalities from the natural to the sacral in a constant self-promoting origination, we have an underlying, ever-perduring continuity by which we reach below all crevices, all paradoxes of mind, and all aporias. At the same time, by its operation we reach in a metamorphic transmodulation our sacral destiny in the Divine. We reach both the point from this we started and grasp the thread of force that led us forth with life itself: the sentience of the logoic force, the sentience that bursts forth with surging life. Sentience, which marked the incipience of life, is the entrance into reality's orbit in the Divine.

With these newly emerging horizons scanned by intuitive rays, we enter into a novel vision of reality, one surpassing the aporias of rationality within the continuous schema of the logos of life itself. We are entering into a New Enlightenment. This avenue is neither naturalistic nor metaphysical-speculative. It is concretely "ontic," capturing reality not in a static "eidetic" fashion but "in its becoming." In brief, in tracing the Ontopoietic Logos of Life, we are inaugurating a new Critique of Reason and a New Enlightenment.

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NOTES

[1] Hossain Kalbasi Ashtari, "Spiritual Paradigm as the Origin of Life's Capacity in Sadrian Philosophy," infra, pp.

[2] Detlev Quintern, "On the Harmony of Spirituality and Rationality According to the Opus Fasabil Hwan Ao-Nafab," infra, pp.

[3] See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Ontopoiesis of Life as the New Philosophical Paradigm", in A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Life: Scientific Philosophy/Phenomenology of Life and of the Sciences*

of Life: Ontopoiesis of Life and of the Human Creative Condition, Analecta Husserliana LIX (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. 3–30.

[4] See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Evidence and Insights Offered by the Sciences of Life: Post Neo-Darwinian Study of Evolution, Microbiology and Morphogenesis," in *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life,* Book 1, Analecta Husserliana C, op. cit., pp. 58–60.

[5] See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life in Ontopoietic Timing," in *Timing and Temporality in Islamic Philosophy and Phenomenology of Life,* Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue 3 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), pp. 11–72.

[6] Ibid., passim.

[7] Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Ontopoiesis The Proto-Ontic Self-Individualization of Beingness in Life in the New Critique of Reason," in *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life,* Book I, Analecta Husserliana (Dordrecht: Springer), pp. 55–105.

[8] See Tymieniecka, *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life, Book I, The Case of God in the New Enlightenment*.

[9] See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The New Enlightenment" in *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life,* Book 1, Analecta Husserliana C (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), pp. xix–xxix.

SECTION ONE

WILLIAM C. CHITTICK

REASON, INTELLECT, AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT

Abstract: In what follows, I address the broad contours of the Islamic "intellectual tradition," by which I mean philosophy and Sufism. Specifically, I want to suggest that the important issue for this tradition was not how the technical operation of intelligence that we call "reason" is accomplished, but how human intelligence itself can be fully actualized. Notions of reason, intelligence, and consciousness were rooted in concepts of human potentiality, and these represented versions of what can be called "spiritual anthropology." Human nature was understood as an on-going and ever-changing manifestation of the Divine Word or the Supreme Reality, and full actualization of this nature was seen as demanding a disciplined body, mind, and heart.

In what follows, I address the broad contours of the Islamic "intellectual tradition," by which I mean philosophy and Sufism.[1] Specifically, I want to suggest that the important issue for this tradition was not how the technical operation of intelligence that we call "reason" is accomplished, but how human intelligence itself can be fully actualized. Notions of reason, intelligence, and consciousness were rooted in concepts of human potentiality, and these represented versions of what can be called "spiritual anthropology." Human nature was understood as an on-going and ever-changing manifestation of the Divine Word or the Supreme Reality, and full actualization of this nature was seen as demanding a disciplined body, mind, and heart.

Here I will pay more attention to Sufism than to philosophy (*falsafa*), not least because it has been the focus of most of my research over the past 40 years. Definitions of Sufism are easy to come by and typically disagree. I use the word in the most general sense: to designate the tendency among Muslims to strive for a personal engagement with the Divine Reality.[2] This tendency, found from the beginning of Islam, led to a proliferation of individuals, movements, and institutions that can be differentiated from other individuals, movements, and institutions that were more concerned with action, morality, belief, dogma, and rational investigation. Jurists (*fuqahāʾ*), for example, devoted their attention to right activity; they codified the Shariah (the revealed

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 11–35.

law) and offered advice on how to apply it. Experts in Kalām (apologetic theology) focused on clarifying and systematizing right understanding and right beliefs as extracted from the Koran. Neither jurisprudence nor Kalām, however, paid attention to the nature of the knowing subject that is striving to act correctly and believe rightly.

Philosophy and Sufism placed intelligence and consciousness at the center of their concerns. Philosophers studied *nafs*, self or soul, with the aim of actualizing *ʿaql*, intellect or intelligence—though in philosophical contexts the word is more often translated as "reason" and sometimes as "mind." They looked upon *ʿaql* as an intelligent and intelligible luminosity that is innate to the human substance and possesses unlimited potential. Precisely because they gave a high profile both to reason and to logic (*manṭiq*), the tool by which reason is gauged, and they also paid a great deal of attention to mathematics and the natural sciences, they have been looked back upon by historians as the foremost "rational thinkers" of Islam. For most if not all of them, however, philosophy was not simply a rational technique or an investigative tool; it was a spiritual discipline that aimed at illumination, awakening, and self-transformation (as was also the case, according to Pierre Hadot and others, in Greek and premodern, Western philosophy). As for the Sufis, characteristically they were striving to achieve full self-awareness by reintegrating the human self into its divine prototype. Unlike the philosophers, they explicitly grounded their efforts in the Sunnah (the beautiful model, *uswa ḥasana*) of Muhammad and often took on the social responsibility of guiding the masses on the path to God. Nonetheless, at least from the time of Suhrawardī (d. 1191), the founder of the Illuminationist School of philosophy, it is often difficult to distinguish the philosophical quest for wisdom from the Sufi quest for God.[3]

Like scholars in other fields, Sufis wrote countless treatises, usually with a practical orientation, but often containing complex theoretical discussions. Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1240) was the outstanding example of an accomplished master of every dimension of Sufi theory and practice who felt compelled to offer detailed, rational explanations of the human-divine interrelationship. Hundreds of other important authors—most of them unstudied in modern times—also made significant contributions to the formulation of Sufi teachings, whether theoretical or practical.

Before trying to clarify the notion of intelligence and consciousness, it may be useful to recall that the worldview of the modern West—in the context of which all of us have been educated—is radically different from that of pre-modern civilizations generally and the Islamic tradition specifically. We moderns, for example, feel comfortable talking about "consciousness" as something to be studied and investigated, much as we might study microorganisms or the workings of the brain—and indeed, many would consider

consciousness totally explicable in terms of biological mechanisms. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the bifurcation of the human being into a clearly distinct subject and object, which we take for granted (however much we may be opposed to it philosophically), took a long time to become rooted in the Western mind, whether or not Descartes was the first to formulate it clearly.

If we want to understand the Islamic way of explicating the nature of reason and consciousness, we need to remember that the sources provide no terminology corresponding exactly with subject and object. Underlying this tradition is a nondual understanding of things that has profound similarities with schools of non-Western thought like Advaita Vedanta, which identified Brahman with Atman, that is, the Supreme Reality with the Supreme Self. For this Indian tradition, life, consciousness, awareness, and joy are infinitely present in the Self/Reality, and the universe can be nothing but its "names and forms" (*nama-rupa*). Brahman/Atman is *sat-chit-ananda*, "being-consciousness-bliss," and everything else—Maya—is its reverberation. Where subject ends and object begins remains always a puzzle, for the two are intimately linked.

Christian theologians of Medieval times, who spoke of Being as the Beautiful, the True, and the Good, would not have found this Hindu view of things too difficult to grasp, nor would Muslim philosophers and Sufis. But over time, the Western tradition tended to drift into an interpretation of existence, and indeed of reality itself, that stripped it of all that is qualitative, good, and beautiful. Islamic thought, however, had no room for existence divorced from consciousness, nor could it ever imagine that the underlying stuff of reality is an amorphous matter/energy waiting for cosmic accidents to occur, eventually giving rise to life, awareness, self-consciousness, and reason as a series of epiphenomena. On the contrary, existence and consciousness, reality and awareness, beauty and joy, are omnipresent and permeate all that exists.

1. THE CONSCIOUS SELF

Any number of Arabic words are used in ways that overlap with the modern use of consciousness and awareness, two words that I take here as synonyms, though their meanings might usefully be distinguished. My purpose, however, is simply to suggest something of the variety of words employed by Muslim thinkers to address a general field of inquiry.[4] These words made sense in a context that acknowledged that most of reality is unavailable to everyday perception. What we experience through our senses is simply the radiation or sedimentation of deeper or higher strata of consciousness and

awareness. In other words, "In the beginning"—whether we take this as a temporal beginning, or an atemporal, ontological beginning—"was the Word," and the Word was and is alive, aware, and omniscient. What we perceive in our mundane reality can be nothing but what the Koran calls the "signs" (*āyāt*) of God, the markers and signifiers of the transcendent and immanent Real (*al-ḥaqq*).

Generally, Muslim thinkers spoke of the invisible something that animates living things as *rūḥ* and *nafs*. *Rūḥ*, typically translated as "spirit" and cognate with Hebrew *ruwach*, derives from the same root as *rīḥ*, "wind" (Latin *spiritus*). *Nafs*, translated as "self" or "soul" and employed in Arabic as a reflexive pronoun, is written the same way as *nafas*, breath, and is cognate with Hebrew *nephesh*; it plays a role in the conceptualization of the self and the universe analogous to that of both Sanskrit *prana* and Chinese *qi*.

Rūḥ and *nafs* are important Koranic terms and much discussed by Muslim scholars, not least philosophers. Some authors considered *rūḥ* and *nafs* synonyms, and others preferred to distinguish between the two, often following Koranic usage. Either term can designate what we mean if we talk, for example, about the awareness or consciousness of animals. Neither term has any upper limit; each designates a perceived or presumed subjectivity, whether in animals, humans, or angels (the last of which are often defined simply as "spirits," or "spirits blown into bodies of light"). Moreover, it is not unusual for philosophers and scholars to speak of the "mineral spirit" (*rūḥ maʿdanī*) or the "vegetal spirit" (*rūḥ nabātī*), and the Koran speaks of God's *rūḥ* as well as his *nafs*. Clarifying what these terms mean in relation to the Unique, Indivisible God provided theologians, philosophers, and Sufis the opportunity to write countless chapters and volumes.

A third word that is extremely important in discussions of human consciousness is *qalb*, "heart" (Persian *dil*). The Koran situates the heart at the center of human awareness and intelligence. In contrast to modern usage, the heart is not the source of emotions and sentiments, because these are what cloud and obscure the heart. In Koranic terms, the heart becomes "blind," "rusty," or "ill," and this results in ignorance and forgetfulness, which in turn lead to disobedience and sin. The Sufi tradition speaks of attaining nearness to God by means of purifying the heart to the point where only unsullied intelligence remains. Rūmī and others refer to those who achieve this goal as "the folk of the heart" (*ahl-i dil*), to whom they see a reference in an often cited *ḥadīth qudsī* (a saying of Muhammad that quotes the words of God), "My heavens and My earth do not embrace Me, but the heart of My believing servant does embrace Me."[5]

A parallel discussion goes on in the philosophical tradition using the word *ʿaql*, reason or intellect, rather than *qalb*. Whichever word is used, it designates

an ideal human perfection that needs to be realized, not the faculty or organ that goes by the name in ordinary usage. When we ascribe intellect or heart to ourselves, we are speaking in metaphorical terms. The only true intellect—the "actual intellect" (*al-ʿaql bi'l-fiʿl*) of the philosophers—is that which has achieved conjunction (*ittiṣāl*) with the Agent Intellect (*al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl*), also called the Universal Intellect (*al-ʿaql al-kullī*). This is God's first creation, the radiance of divine consciousness, none other than the Pen (*qalam*, Koran 68:1, 96:4), which writes out the universe. In a parallel way, the only true heart is that which embraces God and gazes upon him at every moment.

Sufi texts frequently discuss the soul/self as having levels of actualization. Early schemes often focus on three ascending levels, using terms derived from the Koran: *al-nafs al-ammāra* (*bi'l-sūʾ*), "the soul that commands (to the ugly)" (12:53), *al-nafs al-lawwāma*, "the soul that blames [itself for its own shortcomings]" (75:2), and *al-nafs al-muṭmaʾinna*, "the soul at peace [with God]" (89:27). Other levels are often added, such as *al-nafs al-mulhama*, "the inspired soul" (derived from 91:7-8).[6] It is not uncommon for authors to speak of seven levels; those who achieve the highest level are in constant communion with God.

A similar discussion goes on using the term *laṭīfa*, "subtlety", the invisible dimension of the human being—precisely what is called, from various standpoints, soul, spirit, heart, and intellect. This becomes a standard theme in later Sufi manuals, which instruct disciples in techniques of meditation, though the seven subtleties do not necessarily have the same names in each case, nor are they always called subtleties.[7] A typical list gives *qālab* ([bodily] frame) or *ṭabʿ* (nature), *nafs* (soul), *rūḥ* (spirit), *ʿaql* (intellect), *sirr* (mystery, secret heart), *khafī* (hidden), and *akhfā* (most hidden).[8]

Not surprisingly, Sufis also discuss levels of heart and intellect. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. ca. 912) talks of four stations (*maqām*) of the heart,[9] and Najm al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 1256) speaks of the heart's seven stages (*ṭawr*).[10] Rūmī uses poetical imagery to speak of many degrees of intelligence. As he describes it, the prophets dwell in the consciousness of the Universal Intellect, and others partake of various degrees of the partial intellect (*ʿaql-i juzwī*). Thus, he writes,

> The disparity among intellects—understand this well—
> extends in degree from earth to heaven.
> One intellect is like the disc of the sun,
> another less than Venus or a shooting star.
> One intellect is giddy like a lamp,
> another is like a spark of fire,
> For, when clouds rise up before the intellects,
> their God-seeing eye is obscured.
> Partial intellect has disgraced the Intellect—
> desire for this world has deprived man of his [true] desire.[11]

2. KNOWLEDGE

If we look at consciousness as a general word for human subjectivity, one Arabic word that comes close to having the same expansive meaning is *ʿilm*, knowledge. As a verbal noun, *ʿilm* designates the act of knowing, and in early Arabic it had no plural; later, it also came to designate a branch of knowledge, or a "science," and at that point authors employed the plural *ʿulūm*. The word can also mean a person's knowledge, that is, what someone knows, in which case it is synonymous with *maʿlūmāt* ("known things") and is likely to be translated as "learning." In Sufi writings *ʿilm* often connotes rote and bookish learning as contrasted with real understanding.

Words derived from the same root tell us something of how knowledge was conceptualized. *ʿAlam* means impression, track, trace, landmark, banner; *ʿalāma* means mark, sign, token. Knowledge is thus connected etymologically with distinctions, signs, and marks. Most interesting is the word *ʿālam*, world or cosmos, which the lexicographers explain as meaning "that by means of which one knows," or "that by means of which the Creator is known." Ibn al-ʿArabī is simply reminding us the word's etymology when he says, "We mention the cosmos (*ʿālam*) with this word to let it be known (*ʿilm*) that by this word we mean that God has made the cosmos a mark (*ʿalāma*)."[12]

When Sufis and philosophers discuss the word *ʿilm*, they typically say that it cannot be defined, because it is presupposed by every definition. Any explanation is simply the act of knowing trying to know itself, like vision trying to see itself. It follows that in order to understand knowledge, one must know the knowing self, and in order to know the knowing self, one must not only know where it is situated in all of reality, but also awaken to the full power of intelligence latent in oneself. Typically, however, the attempt to know the self remains at the level of learning (*ʿilm*), that is, studying and analyzing the manifestations of self, or discussing what others have said about the knowing self. Such an exercise, despite its usefulness and perhaps necessity, is not self-knowledge or self-consciousness. True self-knowledge can only come through knowing the conscious self directly, without the intermediary of sense perception, imagination, ratiocination, conceptualization, and theorizing.

The Safavid-period philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640) calls this direct, unmediated consciousness "non-instrumental knowledge" (*ʿilm ghayr ālī*), which is to say that it is found by the knowing/known self without any intermediary whatsoever. In Ṣadrā's terms, it is achieved when intellecter (*ʿāqil*), intellected (*maʿqūl*), and intellect (*ʿaql*) are united as one.[13] One could also say, "when reasoner, reasoned, and reason become one." Moreover, *ʿaql* is the word that was used to translate Greek *nous*, so Ṣadrā's expression can be a translation of Aristotle's definition of God as "thought thinking thought"

(*noêsis noêseôs noêsis*). In any case, this sort of synthetic, unified knowledge is none other than the "wisdom" (*ḥikma*) that the "lover of wisdom" was striving to achieve. The path to achieving it is identical with the quest to become fully human, or what Sufis call "the Perfect Human Being" (*al-insān al-kāmil*).

Sufi authors often refer to unmediated consciousness of self as *maʿrifa*, a word that can be used as a synonym for *ʿilm*, though it connotes recognizing rather than knowing. The secondary literature frequently translates this word as "gnosis" in the sense of direct, intuitive knowledge. Its active participle, *ʿārif*, is commonly used in Sufi texts—and by the great philosopher Avicenna (d. 1037)—to designate the "gnostics," those who have achieved unmediated knowledge of the object of the quest.[14] The most important *locus classicus* for the technical understanding of the word is the purported saying of the Prophet, "He who recognizes (*ʿarafa*) his own self (*nafs*) recognizes his Lord." In the present context, one could equally well translate this, "He who becomes truly conscious of himself becomes truly conscious of his Lord," which is to say that those who attain true self-consciousness simultaneously reach true God-consciousness. At that point, the knowing Self and the known Object are indistinguishable; intellecter, intellected, and intellect are one. As a scriptural basis for this sort of consciousness, Sufis cite the famous *ḥadīth qudsī* in which God says, "When I love My servant, I am the hearing with which he hears, the eyesight with which he sees, the foot with which he walks, and the hand with which he grasps," not to mention the heart with which he is conscious.[15]

The mention of love (*ḥubb*) in this hadith is highly significant. It helps explain the central importance given to love in Sufi writings, not least in the works of the great Sufi poets, like Ibn al-Fāriḍ, Rūmī, and Yunus Emre. Love is considered the motive force that brings about union between lover and beloved, knower and known, intellecter and intellected. In the last analysis, man as lover of God turns out to have been God as lover of man, for man and God are lover and beloved of each other, and the culmination of their love is union. The Koran speaks of this mutual love in the verse, "He loves them, and they love Him" (5:54). At the summit of realized love, no distinctions are to be drawn between lover and beloved, subject and object.

3. THE UNITY OF THE REAL

To put Sufi discussions of transformed consciousness into a broader context, we need to have a clear sense of the underlying worldview, which is founded on the first Shahadah, the four words *lā ilāha illā Allāh*, "(There is) no god but God." This sentence, commonly called *kalimat al-tawḥīd*, "the statement that

asserts (God's) unity," is the starting point of Muslim faith and practice. Islamic God-talk—whether in Kalām, Sufism, or philosophy—unpacks its implications, typically in terms of the many names by which God calls himself in the Koran.

The two halves of the Shahadah—"no god" and "but God"—are known as the negation (*nafy*) and the affirmation (*ithbāt*). They point to two of the Shahadah's basic senses: First, it negates all qualities designated by the divine names from "everything other than God" (*mā siwa'llāh*), which is a standard definition of the cosmos (*ʿālam*), "that by means of which one knows." And second, it affirms that all positive qualities of created things, inasmuch as they are really present, can belong only to God. In other words, *tawḥīd* declares God's simultaneous absence and presence, or transcendence and immanence.

The statement of *tawḥīd* tells us that qualities designated by the divine names—such as life, mercy, knowledge, power, justice, and forgiveness—belong strictly to God. God alone is "Real" (*ḥaqq*), to use the Koranic term; or, he alone is Being (*wujūd*), to use the philosophical expression. It follows that everything other than God, in and of itself, is "unreal" (*bāṭil*) or "nonexistent" (*maʿdūm*). This way of looking at things underlies the famous distinction drawn by Avicenna between the Necessary Being (*wājib al-wujūd*) and contingent things (*mumkināt*). Discussing God in terms of *wujūd* becomes a mainstay of Sufi theory at least from the time of al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), who, despite his critique of Avicenna, was thoroughly philosophical in his approach.[16]

While negating reality from everything other than God, the statement of *tawḥīd* also affirms that things possess a certain conditional and contingent reality. "No god but God" means that everything other than God receives any semblance of reality that it may have as a merciful bestowal from the Real Being. Human consciousness, qua *human* consciousness, is essentially an illusion, because consciousness is a reality, and "There is no reality but the Real." Hence, there is no consciousness but God's consciousness, no intelligence but God's intelligence, no rationality but God's rationality. To say that human consciousness and rationality are "essentially" illusions, however, does not mean that they have no reality or existence whatsoever. It simply means that they are dependent upon and derivative from the Divine Self-Knowledge, which is the only consciousness and awareness that is fully real. Whatever consciousness, rationality, and understanding we may have—and indeed, the exact nature and extent of this is precisely the issue—depends utterly on the Real. "They encompass nothing of His knowing save as He wills" (Koran 2:255). To the extent that we do not acknowledge and experience the derivativeness and relativity of human intelligence and awareness, we fail to recognize the Real, the world, and ourselves for what they are.

4. HUMAN NATURE

In discussing God's relationship with the cosmos, Sufi authors understand implicitly or say explicitly that everything makes manifest the signs (*āyāt*) and traces (*āthār*) of the divine names, which is to say that the cosmos (*ʿālam*) and everything within it are signposts (*ʿalam*) and marks (*ʿalāma*) of the Real. Human beings are distinguished from other creatures by having the potential to show forth the signs and marks of the supreme name of God (that is, the name *Allāh*), or, what comes down to the same thing, the full range of the divine names. This understanding of the human role in creation explains why philosophers sometimes describe the goal of their quest as "gaining similarity to God to the extent of human capacity" (*al-tashabbuh biʾl-ilāh bi qadr ṭāqat al-bashar*) or simply "deiformity" (*taʾalluh*, being like unto God).[17] When Sufis explicate the nature of the Perfect Human Being, they prefer the expression "becoming characterized by the character traits of God" (*al-takhalluq bi akhlāq Allāh*), which Ibn al-ʿArabī offers as a definition of Sufism.[18]

Sufis find the notion of deiformity implicit in God's words, "He [God] taught Adam the names, all of them" (Koran 2:31). They also find it in the Prophet's reiteration of the Biblical statement, "God created Adam in His form (*ṣūra*)." Adam was the first prophet (*nabī*) and the first perfect human being. His perfection was intimately bound up with his omniscience, the fact that God taught him *all* the names—of both created things and God himself. It is Adam's consciousness of the rightful place of things relative to God, as well as his own appropriate response to things, which gave him the quality of being God's vicegerent (*khalīfa*) in the earth. As the Koran makes clear (2:30), God created Adam and taught him the names only after voicing to the angels his decision to appoint a vicegerent.

Islam does not consider Adam (a word that is often employed as a synonym for "man" in the nongendered sense) a "sinner." Rather, Adam "disobeyed" (*ʿaṣā*) after having "forgotten" (*nasiya*) the divine command not to approach the tree, and that was the end of his disobedience. When Adam and Eve remembered, they repented and were forgiven. Only then were they sent down to the earth to play their proper roles as vicegerents. Thus human beings are created in the form of God and have the potential of achieving full consciousness of all the names, but they also have the tendency to forget, and this tendency predominates in Adam's children.

In order to achieve their proper status as vicegerents, people must "remember" (*dhikr*) God—that is, become conscious of Him—and perform their duties toward him as servant (*ʿabd*). All of Islamic ritual is focused on keeping God in mind, and Sufism in particular takes remembrance of God as the essential

task of human beings. Thus the word *dhikr*, which also means "mention," designates already in the Koran and Hadith the ritual repetition of divine names or Koranic formulae. This is why scholars often translate *dhikr* in the Sufi context as "invocation" and they point out that the practice is similar to *japa* in Hinduism or the Jesus prayer in Christianity.

So, remembering God is to repeat his name and to attempt to be aware of his presence, for, as the Koran says, "He is with you wherever you are" (57:4). Remembrance is the means whereby people can recover the knowledge, consciousness, and understanding that are innate to the primordial Adamic nature (*fiṭra*). It is the process of recovering real consciousness and becoming characterized by one's own latent divine form.

5. THE RETURN

In more theoretical discussions of the human situation, authors speak of the "origin" (*mabdaʾ*) and the "return" (*maʿād*), terms derived from Koranic verses like, "He originates creation, then He makes it return" (10:4). So central is this notion to Islamic thinking that theologians take the "Return" (often translated as "eschatology") as the third of the three principles of Islamic faith (after *tawḥīd* and prophecy). In explaining Origin and Return, many Sufis speak of "the arc of descent" (*qaws al-nuzūl*) and "the arc of ascent" (*qaws al-ṣuʿūd*), identifying them with the "two arcs" mentioned in Koran 53:9. Together, the two make up "the circle of existence" (*dāʾirat al-wujūd*), which begins and ends at God.

The cosmos, then, is "everything other than God," and it consists of a descending arc leading away from God and an ascending arc leading back to God. Some parts of the arc are closer to God and others further away (ontologically and qualitatively, of course, not "spatially"), so things can be divided into three basic worlds, which the Koran calls "the heavens, the earth, and what is between the two." These are often called the world of spirits (*arwāḥ*), the world of bodies (*ajsām*), and the world of images (*mithāl* or *khayāl*). This last world, which Henry Corbin called *mundus imaginalis*, is an intermediary realm that allows the intrinsic consciousness of spiritual beings to interrelate with the darkness and dullness of bodily things; on the descending arc, spirits become embodied in the world of images, and on the ascending arc, bodies become spiritualized in the same realm. The three basic levels of existence are replicated in the human microcosm as spirit (*rūḥ*), soul (*nafs*) or imagination (*khayāl*), and body (*jism*). The soul functions as the microcosmic world of images, or the "isthmus" (*barzakh*), between the spirit and the body, allowing the two to interact.

God created mankind, as the Koran puts it, "to serve Me" or "to be My servants" (*li yaʿbudūnī*, 51:56). Ibn ʿAbbās, the well-known companion of the Prophet, already interpreted this to mean "to recognize Me" or "to become conscious of Me" (*li yaʿrifūnī*), using the verbal form of *maʿrifa*. In the later tradition this verse is often explained in terms of a purported *ḥadīth qudsī*: "I was a Hidden Treasure, and I desired to be recognized (*yuʿraf*), so I created the creatures that they might recognize Me." Among all creatures, only human individuals, created in God's form, can recognize him fully—that is, in respect of his Self and the full panoply of his names. Other creatures are imperfect images of the Divine Reality and, in fact, were created as the means to bring man into existence and as the signs and marks of the divine names in the cosmos. The diversity of creatures with their wondrous mysteries is nothing but the outward reverberation of the infinite Hidden Treasure. The fact that man is the "intended entity" (*al-ʿayn al-maqṣūda*) in the cosmos is proven precisely by his unique ability to know "all the names," to become conscious of all that exists, to be the self whose externalized and differentiated counterpart is the cosmos in its entirety.

By meditating on the universe and the prophetic revelations that explain its nature, we can see that it has three basic sorts of creatures—spirits (such as angels), imaginal beings (such as jinn), and bodily things (such as minerals, plants, and animals). At each level, there is an indefinite diversity of kinds and sorts.[19] The distinguishing quality of spirits is the intensity and unity of life, light, consciousness, power, beauty, and so on down the list of divine attributes. The distinguishing quality of bodily things is the feebleness and scatteredness of life, light, consciousness, and so on. The qualities of imaginal beings are situated between those of spirits and bodies. As for human beings, they have the peculiar status of having been created as highly focused forms of the totality. At the spiritual level they have angelic qualities, at the bodily level they possess the diverse characteristics of bodily things, and at the intermediate, psychical or "soulish" (*nafsānī*) level, they are neither spiritual nor bodily, neither knowing nor ignorant, neither awake nor asleep, neither luminous nor dark. In this way of looking at things, the situation of the human self, as contrasted with the human spirit and the human body, is always in-between; the self is an imaginal reality, at once the image of spirit and the image of body.

The vast majority of human selves are forgetful of the primordial covenant that they made with God to carry the "trust" (*amāna*, Koran 33:72), or to act as his vicegerents. The function of the prophets is to "remind" (*dhikr*) them of their own nature and their own function, and their appropriate response is to "remember" (*dhikr*) who they are and to follow prophetic guidance. The goal is to "worship" God or to be his "servant," and that demands recognizing him, loving him, and becoming conscious of him.

Origin and Return are among the first implications of *tawḥīd*—there is no reality but God, so anything other than God is contingent on his reality, both in its coming and its going. The return is compulsory (*iḍṭirārī*), for nothing whatsoever has any say in the matter. In contrast to other creatures, human beings possess a certain degree of freedom because of their divine form and their self-awareness. They can choose whether to accept or reject the call of the prophets. Like everything else, they are compelled to return to God, but they also have the option of engaging in a return that is voluntary (*ikhtiyārī*). In other words, prophetic guidance offers the path that leads to recognizing, understanding, and becoming conscious of the Hidden Treasure and to actualizing the latent divine character traits. By this means alone can people live and act appropriately in the world, that is, in full conformity with the Divine Reality, or in full contiguity with the Agent Intellect, or in full realization of their own deiformity.

Having been created in God's form, human beings are woven of innumerable qualities deriving from the "ninety-nine" divine names. Potentially, they can conform fully to the divine names themselves and make all of them manifest, but typically they manifest only a few, and more often than not they display them in a distorted manner. The soul is dispersed and caught up with bodily and psychical multiplicity, so it needs to be unified by strengthening its awareness of the One. Its latent spiritual and divine attributes need to be brought out, actualized, harmonized, and integrated. Every step taken toward the One intensifies the inner light and, at the same time, brings about further integration of the innate traits of character. The voluntary return, then, aims at, and simultaneously depends upon, the awakening of the human soul to its divine core. That awakening is accompanied by the intensification of the light of reason, intelligence, and consciousness—ultimately, to the point that thought thinks itself.

6. THE PATH

It is worth remembering that the mythic structure of Islamic religiosity is shaped by two events: the descent of the Koran and Muhammad's ascent (*miʿrāj*, literally, "ladder") to the divine presence. God revealed himself through his Word, his articulate and intelligible self-expression. His Word provides the means for human souls to awaken to their innate nature and be guided to self-realization, that is, the actualization of deiformity. The Prophet Muhammad, as the recipient of the message from Gabriel, the angel of revelation, assimilated the message into his own being and was totally assimilated by it; he was then taken by Gabriel to the fruit of that assimilation, the personal encounter with God (the *miʿrāj*, also called *isrāʾ*, "night journey").

The accounts of the *miʿrāj* say that Gabriel took Muhammad on a specific route: first to Jerusalem, then stage by stage through the seven heavens (that is, seven ascending levels of being and consciousness), until he eventually reached the furthest limits of the angelic realm. At that point Gabriel told him to continue on to the Divine Presence alone, which he did. Upon his return, he instituted the daily prayers (*ṣalāt*) as the ritual means whereby believers could themselves rise up to God. As the hadith has it, "The daily prayers are the ascent of the believer" (*al-ṣalāt miʿrāj al-muʾmin*).

Islamic practice is understood as a path or road that leads to God. The Fātiḥa, the opening chapter of the Koran that is recited in every cycle of the ritual prayer, circles around the verse, "Guide us on the straight path," using the word *ṣirāṭ*, which also designates the posthumous narrow bridge that crosses over hell on the way to paradise—the symbolic identity of the straight path and the narrow bridge is not difficult to see. The word that is generally used for the revealed law, Shariah (*sharīʿa*), also means path, as does the word that is generally used for Sufi organizations, Tariqah (*ṭarīqa*). A whole genre of Sufi writings explains in more or less detail the stages (*maqāmāt*, *manāzil*) that travelers (*sāʾir*, *sālik*, *musāfir*) must traverse in order to enter into God's Presence. The archetype for all of this is the *miʿrāj*, the ladder to God climbed by the Prophet. Avicenna himself wrote a book explaining the *miʿrāj* as the stages of intellectual perfection leading to the fullness of consciousness.[20]

This is not the place to go over the diverse depictions of the stages of ascent set down by numerous Sufi authors over history. There is no agreement on the number—10, 40, 100, and 300 are mentioned among others, and often no set number is given. The most famous example in the West is provided by Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār's long poem, *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* ("The speech of the birds"), which provides a seven-level scheme, like the Prophet's own *miʿrāj*. What the authors of these treatises hold in common is that they depict the journey as dependent on divine grace and demanding discipline and self-effacement. By following the path, seekers of God can shuck off their blameworthy character traits and become characterized by praiseworthy character traits, which are nothing but the embodiment of divine names and attributes.

Sufis sometimes sum up the path to God with two words: *fanāʾ*, "annihilation," and *baqāʾ*, "subsistence." These derive from the Koranic verse, "Everything in [the earthly realm] undergoes *annihilation*, and there *subsists* the Face (*wajh*) of thy Lord, Possessor of Majesty and Generous Giving" (55:27). In the typical interpretation, the negative character traits of the soul can gradually be eliminated, and, when they are, they are replaced by the positive traits of the divine Form in which Adam was created—the divine Form that this verse calls "the Face of thy Lord." Annihilation corresponds to the Shahadah's negation ("No god"), and subsistence to its affirmation ("but God").

In short, the path to God is a process whereby the soul is absorbed back into its divine prototype. When seekers advance in nearness (*qurb*) to God, their character traits, and not least their knowledge and consciousness, are transmuted. The modalities of knowing, however, are beyond count, for, as Ibn al-ʿArabī likes to remind us, "There is no repetition in [God's] self-disclosure" (*lā takrār fi'l-tajallī*). In the human case, this divine self-disclosure is nothing other than the Face of God manifesting itself as the spirit, soul, and body of the seeker. In becoming manifest, it constantly bestows new consciousness and new awareness, which helps explain why Ibn al-ʿArabī says, "In the view of those who know the soul, the soul is an ocean without shore, so knowledge of it has no end."[21]

Nonetheless, the diverse modalities of knowing-cum-being that open up to the soul can be classified into sorts and types. A book like Ibn al-ʿArabī's monumental *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya*, "The Meccan Openings," records the modalities of consciousness that were disclosed to the author's soul when the door to the invisible realm was "opened" to him. As he remarks in a poem toward the beginning of the book,

> When I kept knocking at God's door,
> I waited mindfully, not distracted,
> Until the glory of His Face appeared to me
> and He called me, only that.
> I encompassed Being (*al-wujūd*) in knowledge (*ʿilm*)—
> My heart has no knowledge but of God.[22]

7. SEEING BY MEANS OF GOD

Theologians and Sufis commonly divide God's "most beautiful names" (*al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā*) into categories. For example, some speak of "the seven leaders" (*al-aʾimmat al-sabʿa*), which are the seven principal divine names from which the others derive. Saʿīd al-Dīn Farghānī, (d. ca. 1296), a second generation follower of Ibn al-ʿArabī, says that the seven are Alive (*ḥayy*), Knowing (*ʿalīm*), Desiring (*murīd*), Speaker (*qāʾil*), Powerful (*qādir*), Generous (*jawād*), and Just (*muqsiṭ*).[23] The order is based on relative compass and mutual dependence. Alive is presupposed by the other attributes, given that a dead thing does not know, desire, speak, or act. In the same way, nothing speaks without desiring to do so, and nothing desires without knowing.[24]

Each of the Seven Leaders can be understood as a general divine attribute that has many subsidiaries, and, with a little imagination and reflection, one can categorize the remaining divine names accordingly; this is what Farghānī does, using a typical list of ninety-nine names (though "ninety-nine"

is by no means a definitive number). He says that under "Knower," we can place 15 divine names that designate various modes of awareness and consciousness: Manifest (*ẓāhir*), Aware (*khabīr*), Seer (*baṣīr*), Hearing, (*samīʿ*), Encompassing (*muḥīṭ*), Embracing (*wāsiʿ*), Witness (*shahīd*), Finder (*wājid*), Subtle (*laṭīf*), Light (*nūr*), Watchful (*raqīb*), Wise (*ḥakīm*), Remembering (*ḥafīẓ*), Guarding (*muhaymin*), Believing (*muʾmin*).[25] Several of these names provide points of reference in Sufi discussions of transformed consciousness and the actualization of true intelligence. A few examples can illustrate the approach.

The Koran calls God "the Seer" in about 50 verses. We have already met a frequently quoted hadith that tells us that God's love for his servants can reach the point where he becomes their hearing and their "eyesight," *baṣar*. "Seer," *baṣīr*, is derived from this word *baṣar*. Concerning the relationship between divine and human sight, the Koran says, "The eyesights (*abṣār*, pl. of *baṣar*) do not perceive Him, but He perceives the eyesights" (6:103). This is typical Koranic rhetoric. Yes, the verse says, human beings do have eyes with which to see, but they do not see much and their vision does not extend into the unseen realm (*ghayb*). As for the Divine Seer, he sees all things, visible or invisible, including the very act of seeing. As the Koran says repeatedly, God is "Knower of the Unseen and the Visible."

On the human level *baṣar* usually means eyesight, but it can also designate any kind of seeing, and it is contrasted in all of its meanings with "blindness" (*ʿamā*)—the inability to see, whether on the physical, moral, intellectual, or spiritual level. Blindness is a quality found in creation, not in the Creator. As an attribute of the human heart, it is blameworthy and needs to be remedied, for it is nothing other than the firm-rootedness of the momentary forgetfulness that overcame Adam. In criticizing a group, the Koran says, "It is not the eyesights (*abṣār*) that are blind, but blind are the hearts (*qulūb*) within the breasts" (22:46). Or again: "Deaf, dumb, blind—they do not use their intellects" (2:171). The heart, the seat of consciousness, needs to be brought back to health and to its innate vision of things. When the heart sees, it recovers its innate, Adamic intelligence and rationality.

The Koran often refers to the quality of the seeing heart as *baṣīra*, a noun derived from the adjective *baṣīr*. We can translate it as "insight" to suggest the way it is commonly contrasted with *baṣar*, "eyesight." Insight is the transformation of seeing and consciousness that occurs for prophets and those who follow in their footsteps. The Koran addresses Muhammad with the words, "Say: 'This is my way. I call to God upon insight—I and whosoever follows me'" (12:108). Insight is one of the many words that Sufis discuss in trying to explain the nature of true consciousness. Ibn al-ʿArabī says that it is the same as "unveiling" (*kashf*, *mukāshafa*), the generic term for a God-given vision of the

way things truly are.[26] In the Koran, unveiling is associated with the clarity of seeing that the soul achieves after death: "We have now *unveiled* from you your covering," says God to the recently deceased soul, "so your eyesight today is piercing" (50:22). Sufis read this as referring not only to physical death, but also to the death of the lower soul, that is, ignorance and heedlessness, and the birth in its place of true understanding and consciousness. In other words, they take "death" as a synonym for *fanāʾ*, the "annihilation" of self-centeredness, and they hold that death to ignorance is rebirth in knowledge; it is *baqāʾ*, the "subsistence" of the Divine Face, or God-consciousness.

As Rūmī likes to explain, people should strive to put the advice of the Prophet into practice: "Die before you die!" All of us have passed through many deaths in our on-going return to God. We began at the level of the mineral soul and then developed a vegetal soul (in the womb). In infancy, our souls were lifted up to the animal level, and then gradually we began to actualize our human souls. Every time we died to a lower soul, we were reborn to a higher soul. We should be striving to die to this ignorant human nature and be resuscitated through our angelic, spiritual nature. Once we achieve that, we can die once more and be reborn into the Unimaginable. "Why should I fear?," says Rūmī after detailing these several deaths, "When did I ever become less by dying?"[27]

8. ILLUMINATION WITH THE DIVINE LIGHT

One of the best known verses of the Koran begins with the words, "God is the light of the heavens and the earth" (24:35), and goes on to provide an analogy (*mathal*) that numerous philosophers and Sufis have undertaken to interpret. The most famous example is probably *Mishkāt al-anwār* ("The Niche of Lights") by al-Ghazālī. He begins the book by analyzing the meaning of the word light (*nūr*). He says that most people use the word to refer to that which is seen in itself and which allows other things to be seen, like the sun. Then he tells us that eyesight, the power of the soul that allows us to see, is more deserving of the name, because physical light would remain invisible without it. The seeing eye has many imperfections, however, and these are overcome by the eye of the heart, which is called by names like reason/intellect (*ʿaql*), spirit (*rūḥ*), and human soul (*nafs insānī*), so this eye is even more worthy of being called light. The Koran has a still greater claim to the name, because God's Word has the same relation to the intellect as the sun has to eyesight. Finally, God himself, the source of all light, intelligence, and being, is most deserving of the name; only in God's case is light identical with the thing itself, that is, with God's very Essence (*dhāt*). Every light other than God is contingent and derivative, for God is "the Furthest, Highest Light, beyond which there

is no light and from which light descends to others."[28] It follows that "just as everything becomes manifest to eyesight (*baṣar*) through outward light, so also everything becomes manifest to inward insight (*baṣīra*) through God."[29]

Al-Ghazālī's whole treatise is an extended meditation on the formula of *tawḥīd*, specifically the implications of the version in which he cites it: "There is no light but His light."[30] He shows that the universe is a hierarchy of beings made manifest by light, and that human development toward perfection goes by way of a series of five basic levels of spirit; at each level, illumination, consciousness, and rational perspicacity become more intense. He calls these five spirits sensing (*ḥassās*), imaginal (*khayālī*), intellectual (*ʿaqlī*), reflective (*fikrī*), and holy prophetic (*qudsī nabawī*). He also warns against a common stumbling block: "Do not think that utmost perfection comes to a halt at yourself!"[31]

The opposite of light is darkness (*ẓulma*), also an important Koranic term, though in the 23 instances in which it occurs, it is pluralized, for Light is one, and the various forms that darkness assumes are countless. The obvious sense of the word in several of these verses is ignorance and unconsciousness, or the lack of awareness of the way things are: "God is the friend of those who have faith—He brings them out of the darknesses into the light" (2:257). "Those who cry lies to His signs are deaf and dumb in the darknesses" (6:39). "Say: Are the blind and the seeing (*baṣīr*) equal, or are the darknesses and the light equal?" (13:16). "A Book that We have sent down upon you [Muhammad], so that you may bring the people forth from the darknesses into the light" (14:1).

Ibn al-ʿArabī speaks of light as knowledge and consciousness in numerous passages, as, for example, in the following, where he employs the word to show that God as Light is the root of all perception (*idrāk*):

> Were it not for light, nothing whatsoever would be perceived. . . . The faculties of smell, taste, imagination, memory, reason (*ʿaql*), reflection, conceptualization, and everything through which perception takes place are all light. As for the objects of perception, if they did not have the preparedness to accept the perception of the those who perceive them, they would not be perceived. Hence they first possess manifestation (*ẓuhūr*) to the perceiver, then they are perceived. And manifestation is light. . . . Hence every object of knowledge has a relationship to the Real, and the Real is Light. . . . So nothing is known but God (*lā maʿlūm illā Allāh*).[32]

By this final sentence, another version of the formula of *tawḥīd*, Ibn al-ʿArabī is saying that there is nothing to be known but God's signs, or his Face, or his Self-disclosure (*tajallī*), which is the divine light that fills heaven and earth, spirit and body, and everything in between. Light in itself, however, is unknowable, for, as Ibn al-ʿArabī likes to put it, in still another variant on *tawḥīd*, "None knows God but God." It is this divine, all-perceiving, all-knowing Light

concerning which the Koran says, "The eyesights do not perceive It, but It perceives the eyesights" (6:103). At the same time, there is no faculty of the mind and no form of awareness and consciousness that is anything other than this all-perceiving light, for "There is no light but His light." All consciousness is the radiance of God's consciousness, for he is "the Light of the heavens and the earth."

9. FINDING THE TRUE SELF

Al-Ghazālī points out that the divine name "Finder" (*wājid*) indicates that God is the opposite of "lacking" (*fāqid*). It designates God as he who lacks nothing of what is appropriate for him. "All the attributes of divinity and their perfection are 'found' (*mawjūd*) with God, so in this respect He is 'the Finder.' He is the Finder in an absolute sense, and anything else, even if it finds something of the attributes and causes of perfection, also lacks certain things, so it can only find in a relative sense."[33] This is straightforward *tawḥīd*: There is none that finds but God, so anything else that finds has received a glimmer of this divine quality.

In his discussion of the fifteen names subsidiary to the Knower, Farghānī says that the Finder appears "in respect of the Knower's encompassing what becomes manifest from Him and what remains nonmanifest, what comes forth from Him and what belongs to Him, such that it is inconceivable that He lack any of this."[34] In other words, God is conscious of all that he is in himself and all that becomes manifest from him, that is, the cosmos, "everything other than God."

Notice that Finder is the active participle of three nouns: *wajd*, *wijdān*, and *wujūd*. All three mean "to find," but each has different connotations and usages. *Wijdān* commonly designates the act of finding within oneself, so it can mean feeling, emotion, sentiment, awareness. *Wajd* is likely to mean an intense or overpowering form of inner finding and is commonly translated as "ecstasy." Most interesting here, however, is the word *wujūd*, which we have already met in its meaning of existence or being. From the time of Avicenna onward, *wujūd* in the sense of being/existence is a central discussion in philosophy and soon also in Kalām and Sufism.[35] But, we need to remember that what "exists," in the original sense of the Arabic word, is simply "what is found."[36] Existence and finding, or being and consciousness, are inseparably linked; no object can be found/can be existent (*mawjūd*) without a finding/existing subject (*wājid*).

Wujūd, in short, cannot be discussed as inert, passive, unconscious, chaotic, arbitrary, aimless, lacking in qualitative richness. Quite the contrary, *wujūd* in its pure form—the Necessary Being of Avicenna, the Real Being of Ibn al-ʿArabī—demands by its very essence the diverse attributes that give rise to

an ordered, wise, compassionate, and blessed universe. In one work Avicenna counts these attributes as seven (though he does not call them "the seven leaders"): unity, eternity, knowledge, desire, power, wisdom, and generosity.[37] This list is not quite the same as Farghānī's, but the issue is precisely the same: We cannot understand existence, being, reality, the cosmos, things, consciousness, ourselves, without grasping the basic qualities that are innate to the Real Being and that reach their highest cosmic reverberation in human wisdom and goodness. Knowledge—that is, consciousness of the true nature of things—is inseparable from the Necessary Being, as also are wisdom, compassion, and goodness. All contingent and created forms of knowing and consciousness flow forth from the Divine.

In studying the diverse writings of the Muslim philosophers, it is sometimes easy to forget that the final object of investigation—*wujūd*, the very being and existence that is the Primal Reality—is simultaneously the Primal Consciousness and the root of awareness. For his part, Ibn al-ʿArabī frequently reminds us of the quasi-identity of *wujūd*, *wijdān*, and *wajd*, not least by defining the term *wujūd*, in keeping with a standard Sufi gloss, as "finding the Real in ecstasy" (*wijdān al-ḥaqq fiʾl-wajd*).[38] In other words, we find the fullness of consciousness and existence when we find God by losing ourselves; annihilation of egocentric limitations brings about subsistence of the Divine Form/Face. It is at this point that God is "the hearing with which you hear, the seeing with which you see." Or, in Mullā Ṣadrāʾs terms, this transmutation occurs when intellecter, intellected, and intelligence are united as one.

In this way of looking at things, we as humans cannot claim to have "existence" simply because we are here; our true existence is our true finding and consciousness, and our true finding is finding ourselves in the Real. This can happen only when we step out of the limitations of our ignorant, dark, and obscured selfhoods. Those who achieve this goal are then, in Ibn al-ʿArabī's terms, "the folk of unveiling and finding" (*ahl al-kashf waʾl-wujūd*), the perfect human beings.

Ibn al-ʿArabī has been blamed, by Louis Massignon among others, for being an "existential monist," when in fact the *wujūd* that plays such a central role in his vocabulary means consciousness as surely as it means existence. It is only the preconceived notion of "existence" as empty of consciousness and awareness that could have led Massignon to this sort of misinterpretation. When Ibn al-ʿArabī, for example, says that each thing is a divine word articulated by the Breath of the All-Merciful (*nafas al-raḥmān*), and that this Breath is nothing but *wujūd*, he is saying that all things are specifications and limitations of the divine Word, which is the self-aware articulation of the divine consciousness, and that all things are aware in keeping with their own capacity. It is human

beings alone, however, who have the potential to expand their consciousness beyond measure and to become "oceans without shores."

We have already met the word *kashf*, unveiling, as a synonym for insight (*baṣīra*) and as the generic term for the removal of the obscurations that block the innate human understanding of things (that is, the names as taught to Adam). Ibn al-ʿArabī also uses the word as a synonym for *tajallī* or self-disclosure, one of the most characteristic Sufi notions in discussions of existence and consciousness. The word derives from the Koranic story of how Moses asked God to show himself. God responded that Moses would not see him unless the mountain remained standing. "And when his Lord *disclosed Himself* to the mountain, He made it crumble to dust, and Moses fell down thunderstruck" (7:143). In Ibn al-ʿArabīʾs terms, "everything other than God"—the cosmos through which God is known—can be nothing but God's self-disclosure, God's unveiling (*kashf*) of his own names and attributes. Self-disclosure designates the shining forth of *wujūd* as both the existence and the awareness of creatures; each thing receives existence and awareness in its own measure. If Moses fell down thunderstruck, it was because he was annihilated (*fanāʾ*) by the unveiling of God's reality from his own independent consciousness.

According to another common expression, the self-disclosure of God that is known as the universe is *wujūd* "deployed" (*munbasiṭ*). Translators normally render *wujūd* here as existence or being, but it equally means finding and consciousness. God, after all, is the Finder, and when he discloses himself, he places the traces of his finding in all things, so all things are finders, each in its own measure. In some, that finding is so attenuated that we observers find no trace of it, so we call them "inanimate." In others, it is so intense that it blinds our perceptual faculties, so we fail to see the angels and spirits that fill the invisible cosmos, nor do we see Satan and his cohorts among the jinn: "He sees you, he and his tribe, from where you see them not" (Koran 7:27). According to authors like al-Ghazālī and Ibn al-ʿArabī, the folk of unveiling alone are able to perceive the awareness of apparently inanimate things; this often happens when they hear such things talking among themselves or singing the praises of God, who, according to the Koran, "gave rational speech to everything" (41:21). As Ibn al-ʿArabī remarks,

> Each created thing has a specific speech taught to it by God. It is heard by those whose hearing God opens up to its perception. All movements and artisanries that become manifest from animals and do not become manifest save from a possessor of reason (*ʿaql*), reflection, and deliberation, along with all the measures that are seen therein, signify that they have a knowledge of all this in themselves.[39]

Rūmī often refers to the transmuted senses of those who follow the path to God, as in the verses,

Rational speech (*nuṭq*), eyes, and ears are the radiance of the spirit,
like the radiance of fire in boiling water. . . .
The rational speech of water, earth, and clay—
each is perceived by the Folk of the Heart with their senses. [40]

10. WITNESSING THE REAL

Al-Ghazālī sums up the significance of the name Witness, *shahīd*, by saying that it designates the second of the two sorts of knowing that God mentions when he calls himself "Knower of the unseen [or absent, *ghayb*] and the visible [or witnessed, *shahāda*]" (e.g., Koran 6:73). The unseen is everything nonmanifest (*bāṭin*), and the visible is everything manifest (*ẓāhir*).[41] Farghānī explains that the name Witness means that the Knower is present (*ḥuḍūr*) with what becomes manifest from him (i.e., everything) and that he cannot possibly be absent (*ghayba*) from anything. By talking of the two basic worlds, al-Ghazālī makes the discussion of this name pertain to cosmology, and by talking of "presence" and "absence"—standard Sufi terms designating contrasting states (*ḥāl*) of awareness—Farghānī focuses on consciousness.[42]

The name Witness derives from the verbal noun *shuhūd*, witnessing, seeing with the eyes, being present, testifying. The word will be recognized by anyone familiar with the debates that went on in the Indian subcontinent beginning with the Naqshbandī shaykh, Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1624), who famously criticized Ibn al-ʿArabī for believing in *waḥdat al-wujūd*, "the oneness of *wujūd*." According to Sirhindī, a true understanding of *tawḥīd* demands *waḥdat al-shuhūd*, "the oneness of witnessing." His critique, however, has little to do with Ibn al-ʿArabī's understanding of *wujūd* and is grounded rather in one version of the received wisdom concerning Ibn al-ʿArabī current in India at the time. The gist of what Sirhindī says is that *waḥdat al-wujūd*—an expression that Ibn al-ʿArabī did not use and that gained currency two centuries after him—declares the unity of God and the world, or an ontological (*wujūdī*) continuity between the One and the many, much in the style of what we might call "pantheism." According to Sirhindī, Ibn al-ʿArabī mistakenly believes that "All is He" (*hama ūst*), an ecstatic formula that had been used in Persian before Ibn al-ʿArabī was born. Rather, Sirhindī tells us, one must come to realize that "All is from Him" (*hama az ūst*), and, when this is truly unveiled, that is "the oneness of witnessing."

What Sirhindī does not seem to grasp is that Ibn al-ʿArabī saw the true understanding of *wujūd* to lie in "finding" (*wujūd*) the Real within the soul and "witnessing" (*shuhūd*) that there is no finder but God and no witness but God. Like Sufis in general, Ibn al-ʿArabī employs the word *shuhūd* (and *mushāhada*, from the same root) to mean contemplation and vision of the way things are in a

supra-rational sort of way; in other words, *shuhūd* is another near equivalent of *kashf*, unveiling. In fact, Ibn al-ʿArabī often treats the three words *kashf*, *wujūd*, and *shuhūd* as synonyms, especially in expressions like "the folk of unveiling and finding," or "the folk of unveiling and witnessing," or "the folk of witnessing and finding." All these phrases designate those who have achieved *maʿrifa*, true recognition and consciousness of self and Lord. None of them suggests the ontological continuity that Sirhindī perceived in the *waḥdat al-wujūd* that he ascribed to Ibn al-ʿArabī.[43]

The *tawḥīd* that undergirds Islamic thought ultimately demands that, in each case, what is witnessed, what is found, and what is unveiled be the Divine Self-disclosure. Moreover, the one who finds and understands the disclosure is nothing but the Face of God disclosing itself as awareness and consciousness. Ibn al-ʿArabī, in particular, insists on this point, given that it is simply *tawḥīd*'s logical consequence: "There is no knower but the Real," and "None knows God but God." The issue that needs investigation is the modality in which the unreal is given glimpses and glimmers of what truly is. It is these glimmers and glimpses that make up the unreal's knowledge, understanding, consciousness, intelligence, reason, and everything else making it what it is. As Ibn al-ʿArabī says in a typical reminder,

> In respect to His Essence (*dhāt*) and His *Wujūd*, nothing stands up to the Real; He cannot be desired or sought in His Essence. The seeker seeks and the desirer desires only recognition (*maʿrifa*) of Him, witnessing (*mushāhada*) of Him, or vision (*ruʾya*) of Him, and all of these are *from* Him; they are not He Himself.[44]

Many other terms, some of them deriving from the 16 divine names mentioned by Farghānī, some not, could be discussed in trying to flesh out the Sufi understanding of reason, intelligence, and consciousness. I do not think, however, that we would gain anything more than further proof that Sufis—who represent the tendency among Muslims to strive for a personal engagement with the Divine—look at these words as designating a spectrum of subjective possibilities that extend into the infinite, possibilities available to human souls because each is a unique, non-repeating self-disclosure of God's own subjectivity.

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NOTES

1 On the intellectual tradition, see Chittick, *Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007).

2 Sufism is typically defined as Islamic "mysticism" or "esotericism." Neither of these words, however, is appropriate to its actual historical reality. See Chittick, *Sufism: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), Chapter 1.

[3] The greatest philosopher of the later period, Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640), was completely explicit about the quest for illumined consciousness that inspires the philosophical quest. Or, take Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī (d. ca. 1210), an Aristotelian whose philosophy has rightly been called an "autology," because it focuses from beginning to end on the transformation of self-awareness. See Chittick, *The Heart of Islamic Philosophy: The Quest for Self-Knowledge in the Teachings of Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

[4] The more philosophically-minded Muslim scholars were especially concerned to differentiate among the various terms that refer to the modalities of consciousness. Mullā Ṣadrā, for example, provides a chapter at the end of the first journey of his monumental "Four Journeys" (al-*Asfār al-arbaʿa*) on 30 terms that are employed in talking about knowing, such as *idrāk* (perception), *shuʿūr* (awareness), *taṣawwur* (conceptualization), *ḥifẓ* (memory), *tadhakkur* (recall), *maʿrifa* (recognition), *fahm* (understanding), *ʿaql* (intellect, reason), *ḥikma* (wisdom), *ẓann* (opinion), and *khayāl* (imagination). This discussion follows three chapters in two hundred pages dealing respectively with the quiddity (*māhiyya*) of knowledge; the states of the "intellecter" (*ʿāqil*), i.e., the one who knows; and the realm of the known object (*maʿlūm*). Most of the terms that Ṣadrā mentions, as well as many others, are also discussed in Sufi texts.

[5] For a good selection of texts on soul, spirit, heart, and the inner dynamics that are involved in achieving heart-consciousness, see Sachiko Murata, *The Tao of Islam* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), Chapters 8–10.

[6] The widely read Persian classic *Mirṣād al-ʿibād min al-mabdaʾ ila'l-maʿād*, "The Path of the Servants [of God] from the Origin to the Return," by the 13th-century Kubrawī shaykh Najm al-Dīn Rāzī, dedicates the fourth of its five parts to the differing manners in which these four souls (which embrace all of humanity) return to God after death. See the English translation by Hamid Algar, *The Path of God's Bondsmen from the Origin to the Return* (Delmar, NY: Caravan, 1982).

[7] For an interesting example of the use of these levels to flesh out the nature of the ascent from forgetfulness to God-consciousness, see Chittick, "On Sufi Psychology: A Debate Between the Soul and the Spirit," in *Consciousness and Reality: Studies in Memory of Toshihiko Izutsu*, edited by S.J. Ashtiyani, H. Matsubara, T. Iwami, and A. Matsumoto (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998), pp. 341-366. Also published as "Abd al-Jalil of Allahabad on Psychology: A Debate Between the Soul and the Spirit," *Islamic Heritage in South Asian Subcontinent*, edited by Nazir Ahmed and I. H. Siddiqui (Jaipur: Publication Scheme, 2000), pp. 157-185; and "A Sufi Psychological Treatise from India," *Medieval India: Essays in Intellectual Thought and Culture*, edited by I. H. Siddiqui (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), pp. 167–190.

[8] See, for example, Henry Corbin, *The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism* (Boulder: Shambhala, 1971), pp. 124-125; or Jalāl al-Dīn Humāʾī, in a note to his edition of ʿIzz al-Dīn Kāshānī (d. 1335), *Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya* (Tehran: Majlis, 1325/1946), p. 82.

[9] al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, *Bayān al-farq bayn al-ṣadr wa'l-qalb wa'l-fuʾād wa'l-lubb*, translated by Nicholas Heer in *Three Early Sufi Texts* (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2003), pp. 11–81.

[10] Not "faces" as translated by Algar, *Path*, p. 208.

[11] *Mathnawī*, edited by R. A. Nicholson (London: Luzac, 1925-40), Book 5, vss. 459–462.

[12] *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya* (Cairo, 1911), vol. 2, p. 473, line 33.

[13] For a summary of Ṣadrā's views, see his *Elixir of the Gnostics*, translated by Chittick (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2003), especially pp. xxvi-xxvii. See also, Chittick, *Heart of Islamic Philosophy*, pp. 44–45, 148-149, 270.

[14] Avicenna has a section on the gnostics toward the end of his *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt*. It was translated, without sufficient attention, however, to the Sufi grounding of much of the technical terminology, by Shams Inati, *Ibn Sina and Mysticism* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996).

[15] Taking as their starting point the complete text of this hadith as provided by authoritative sources (such as the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim), Ibn al-ʿArabī and his followers discuss two basic sorts of nearness (*qurb*) to God, in one of which God is man's faculties, and in the other of which

man is God's faculties; along the way they express many of the mysteries and paradoxes of the divine/human Form that can only be fully realized by prophets and saints. See Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 325–331.

16 Al-Ghazālī sometimes cites a modified version of the Shahadah to make the point: "There is nothing in existence but God" (*laysa fi'l-wujūd illā Allāh*). See, for example, *The Niche of Lights*, text and translation by David Buchman (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1998), p. 16. For numerous texts from Ibn al-ʿArabī rooted in this vision of things, see Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*; idem, *The Self-Disclosure of God* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).

17 The final sentence of Avicenna's famous book *al-Najāh* ("The Deliverance") ends with the word *taʾalluh*: "He [the Prophet] is a human being who is distinct from other people through his deiformity." The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ (fl. 10th. c.), among other early philosophers, also use the word to designate the goal of philosophy (see Murata, *Tao*, p. 262). Mullā Ṣadrā is famously called Ṣadr al-Mutaʾillihīn, "The Foremost of the Deiform."

18 Chittick, *Sufi Path*, pp. 283 ff.

19 This three-world scheme should be taken as heuristic, not definitive; as soon as authors pay attention to the fine points, they add other realms and speak of intermediary creatures that do not fall clearly into the categories. Already the soul, which corresponds to cosmic imagination, is one such intermediary, never clearly defined, precisely because, in its potentiality, it is an "ocean without shore," and fixity would hold it back from achieving its entelechy.

20 See Peter Heath, *Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), With a Translation of the Book of the Prophet Muḥammad's Ascent to Heaven* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).

21 *Futūḥāt* 3:121.25; cited in Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 345.

22 *Futūḥāt* 1:10.26; Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. xiv.

23 Saʿīd al-Dīn al-Farghānī, *Muntaha'l-madārik* (Cairo: 1293/1876), vol. 1, pp. 19–20.

24 For Ibn al-ʿArabīʾs discussion of the relative compass of the names, see Chittick, *Sufi Path*, pp. 47-54. Al-Ghazālī makes the same sorts of points, mainly through analogy with the human microcosm, in *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, book 25, on *al-tawḥīd wa'l-tawakkul*. See the translation by David Burrell, *Faith in Divine Unity & Trust in Divine Providence* (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2001), pp. 19 ff.

25 Farghānī, *Muntaha'l-madārik*, vol. 1, pp. 31–32.

26 Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 115. For many passages on insight and unveiling, see the indexes to this book and to Chittick, *Self-Disclosure*.

27 *Mathnawī*, book 3, verses 3901-5. For these and similar verses, see Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), pp. 72–82.

28 al-Ghazālī, *Niche of Lights*, pp. 14–15.

29 *Niche*, p. 23.

30 *Niche*, p. 20.

31 *Niche*, p. 37

32 *Futūḥāt* 3:276.32, 277.12 (*Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 214).

33 *al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ maʿānī asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā*, edited by Fadlou A. Shehadi (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq, 1971), p. 143.

34 *Muntaha'l-madārik*, vol. 1, p. 32.

35 It is true that the philosopher Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 1191) does not give *wujūd* the same prominence. Nonetheless, by speaking of reality primarily in terms of "light" (*nūr*), he stresses even more strongly that illuminated and illuminating consciousness lies at the pinnacle of human possibility. See, for example, Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, edited and translated by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2000).

[36] Some philosophers made full use of the dual meaning of the word. Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī, writing in Persian, explains that *wujūd* has two senses, "being" (*hastī*) and "finding" (*yāft*), and then proceeds to describe the entirety of *wujūd* as composed of four ascending levels extending from potential being to actual finding. The highest level of "existence," in other words, is actualized consciousness of all that may be known. See Chittick, *Heart*, pp. 42–45.

[37] The work is the Persian *Dānishnāma-yi ʿAlāʾī* , which has been translated by Parviz Morewedge as *Metaphysica of Avicenna* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973); see also Chittick, *Heart*, pp. 39-40. For a much more detailed exposition of the necessary attributes of the Necessary Being, see Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of The Healing*, edited and translated by Michael E. Marmura (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), Book Eight.

[38] *Futūḥāt* 2:538.1; *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 212.

[39] *Futūḥāt* 3:488.4 (*Self-Disclosure*, p. 341). For similar passages, see *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, pp. 157, 216, 403-4; *Self-Disclosure*, pp. 284-285. For a parallel discussion from al-Ghazālī, see Burrell, *Faith in Divine Unity*, pp. 18–19.

[40] *Mathnawī*, Book 1, vss. 2372, 3279.

[41] *Maqṣad*, p. 137.

[42] In later philosophy, a good deal of attention is paid to "presential knowledge" (*ʿilm ḥuḍūrī*), that is, knowledge achieved through presence with the known object, or through unification of the intellecter and the intellected; it is contrasted with "acquired knowledge" (*ʿilm ḥuṣūlī*), learning that is taken from books and teachers.

[43] On this debate in the context of the history of Islamic thought, see Chittick, "Rūmī and *Waḥdat al-wujūd*," *Poetry and Mysticism in Islam: The Heritage of Rūmī*, edited by A. Banani, R. Hovannisian, and G. Sabagh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 70-111; idem, "Waḥdat al-Shuhūd" *Encyclopaedia of Islam* X, 2000, pp. 37–39.

[44] *Futūḥāt* 2:663.9; *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 228.

DANIELA VERDUCCI

DIFFERENTIATION OF THE LOGOS

From Reason to Sacral Spirit in The Ontopoiesis of Life

Abstract: Ever since her first book in the *Logos and Life* series (1988), Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka has undertaken a new critique of reason. According to A.-T. Tymieniecka's phenomenological descriptions, not only human existence is placed within the unity-of-everything-is-alive, but the human creative condition stays as well within the unity-of-everything-is-alive. Two main results are so achieved: first, re-establishing contact between the transcendental phenomenological consciousness and its vital foundation in the living beingness/living agent and second, demonstrating the intrinsic creative force of the acts of the human living being. Therefore, the living human being through its invention and creation does not at all close the possibilities of life, as Scheler held; on the contrary, "it expands them into possible world of life", for through the creative modus of human functioning there occurs a metamorphosis of the vital system of Ontopoiesis. The moral sense lies at the core of such a metamorphosis as well as the quest prompted through it is a mode of becoming but of an absolutely "spontaneous" becoming, one that does not follow a preprogrammed sequence to be accomplished but is "freely" projected becoming building on the accomplishments of each actor. It is here that a Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life can take place, by which the finite and its ontopoietic logic transmute into the infinite.

1. A NEW CRITIQUE OF REASON

Ever since her first book in the *Logos and Life* series (1988), Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka has been aware of the radically innovative step she is taking, as she advances in the direction of ultimate phenomenology.[1] To this end, unlike the critical dynamic with which modernity has sought the foundation, and in alternative to the idealistic speculation with which Hegel thought he should phenomenologically open for himself the road of science,[2] Anna-Teresa

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 37–50.

Tymieniecka has undertaken a constructive theoretic march on an intuitive basis, in the conviction that she has found in the human creative act "a truly 'Archimedean point' from where everything finds its proper place".[3]

And thus she opens a new critique of reason, entirely focused on "the creative orchestration of the specifically human existence", as "the right source for all the controversies about the legitimacy of questions concerning ultimate principles and reason": here, "all the cords of significant arteries and articulations of life are tied together" and here, according to the intuition of Tymieniecka, "we will find the source of multiple rationalities wherefrom we may proceed further in our quest, wherever the philosophical Daimon prompts us to go".[4] In fact, the creative orchestration of the specifically human existence "leads us into the labyrinth of the Logos of Life, which blew it our way, keeps it afloat through all its roving and brings to light the reasons for its glorious manifestation".[5] A "primeval logos" is what carries the becoming itself[6] and such a Logos which appears "as the reservoir of all the incipient, germinal instances of becoming" is not only "their architect, their builder, their engineer, but the very force, dynamic spring, germinal source of the All". It is true that "the questions about the logos per se may escape the human mind focusing on the origin of reality", Tymieniecka observes, but she asserts that "the universal rules of constructivism of the real may indicate to us some of the crucial intrinsic laws of the reason of all reasons, of the logos itself".[7]

A.-T. Tymieniecka's "re-examination" of the theme of the decline of Western culture—a waning emblematically represented in the work of O. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*[8] and then embraced by the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl in the problematics of his *Krisis*—reveals a crisis that "involves not only man's cultural and social modes of life, but extends down into the very core of human being", because "it underlies not only man's conduct and way of thinking but his innermost tendencies in approaching the evaluation of life phenomena, his tasks, prospects and aims and the meaning of this existence", inducing "the attitude of radical pessimism toward the human condition",[9] as F. Nietzsche had observed, as well.[10] "The most intimately human dimensions of the human being are at stake" and a burning doubt follows: "Should we consider[. . .] rational self-awareness a gift of the gods or their curse?"[11]

The entire anthropologic culture produced since the Enlightenment is under fire from the current crisis, since the illuminist affirmation of the sovereignty of reason, as guiding principle, "pervading the empirical realm of man's nature, life and his world", has meant "giving absolute priority to the rational functions of man as opposed to others".[12]

But the results achieved by rationalistically-shaped inquiry "entail loss of aspiration and hope for the future of humanity, which appears doomed to moral

disintegration and pending extinction": the sciences show us man not so much in the enigmatic depth of his being, but "as the disarmed, helpless victim of the play of nature and of social conditions". It seems that "man's life is nothing other than a course of animal survival, a play of circumstances"[13] without any meaning.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's conclusion is clear and concordant with the one Husserl had drawn in his *Krisis*: "investigated exclusively from the standpoint of his natural, empirical resources man does not reveal a 'secret message', a 'sign' that would answer to the yearning of the search".[14]

Instead, for Tymieniecka an original outlook unfolds, starting from the common evaluation of the situation of crisis: she holds that the pessimism about humanity and the connected *mal de vivre* documented in contemporary literature could actually be overturned and take on the positive sign of a new germination if it could lead to an inquiry that is no longer weighed down by the rationalistic prejudice: "if, instead, such an inquiry were conducted in an unprejudiced way, it would show how limited these scientific method are and how new vistas on human life have still to be considered".[15] To Tymieniecka's mind, it is a matter of crashing through the closed circle of "the pessimism-optimism anti-thesis, [as] the crucial form of man's crisis" and setting out to search for the energetic source that for centuries has provided nourishment for the exercise of that "meta"[16] function, or of transcendence, that even recent anthropological studies acknowledge as species-specific to man.[17] Therefore, phenomenological attention should be aimed at human creativity in order to recover it not as an arbitrary and evasive fantasy,[18] but in its graftedness into the evolutive constructivity that manifests itself in natural life, in such a way as to exploit the quality of spontaneous autoproduction of natural life, to lead human creativity anew to the light. In fact, human creative acts, more than the "cognitive processes of the human mind", manifest "inward givenness of the life progress common to all living beings as such", specified as "the modality of a role fulfilled within the constructive progress".[19] Therefore, according to Tymieniecka, "it is only in a direct, immediate insight into the constructivism of life and its coincidence with our own constructivism that we may expect to disentangle and grasp life's patterns",[20] that nourishes philosophy and with it humanity.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka thus sets off a work of radical metaphysical re-elaboration. In fact, now the philosophical search for the principle of all things claims the field of being no longer only in its ideal wholeness, which embraces all-that-which-exists, but also and above all in its concrete articulation as unfolded in history through individual human living beings; philosophical search now is able to accept the theoretic challenge of comprehension that every-new-being that appears in the horizon of being presents to philosophical

thought, so as to validate the results of research only in presence of principles that are likewise living and vitally comprehensive forces.

As Tymieniecka observes, with post-modernism we have become aware of the fact that in philosophy no approach can claim absolute validity compared to others; none of the so-called philosophical methods is appropriate for adequately grasping "the givenness of life", in its "vast sweep of the significant modalities entering into and interplaying in the vertiginous outburst of unfolding forces in the ongoing gigantic play of the manifestation of beingness" or for revealing "all the fragments, sequences, segments of complete constructive processes subject to disruption by unforeseeable conditions and influences".[21]

For this reason, if we truly desire to get to the "bottom of things", "the source of truth", "the spring of reason that carries on the great streaming edifice of life", it is indispensable to actuate the "twist" of thought on experience, that enables us "to take into consideration insights from any of them that fall within our purview". In this way conscious reflection can turn to re-acquire life as its own context, as "the vertiginous wealth of emerging, unfolding, transformation, degeneration—the vast spectrum of the dynamic fluctuations" and also philosophical discourse will be able to abandon "the stereotypical language of so-called 'scholarly' discourse that would ape science but be merely pseudo-scientific", substituting the "sequential 'therefore' order of writing" with a suitable approach for living life: this "streams in all directions and will at any point refract its modalities and their apparatus into innumerable rays that flow concurrently on ward" and therefore requires the engagement of "all modes of human functioning, all human involvement in the orbit of life".[22]

In this, Tymieniecka valorises "the conjectural movement of thought", that "exalts the contiguity between life and spirit and between nature and humanity", unlike "other cogitative modalities" that leave in the shadows the philosopher's original contact with the evolutive dynamism of living, and of its virtualities—an active and in human life even empowered dynamism—depriving themselves of the chance to gain access, conjecture by conjecture, to the constant beyondness of unfolding of the metaphysical horizon.[23] The success of this new procedure of investigation will make manifest "the way in which philosophy is called upon to perform its fundamental task".[24]

2. LIVED EXPERIENCE AS RESOURCE

2.1. The Human Existence Within the Unity-of-Everything-is-Alive

Therefore, with a renewed phenomenological inquiry, that is, one freed from the prejudices of natural, scientific and philosophical stock knowledge, for a

free comparative examination of "things in themselves",[25] Tymieniecka moves onwards to identify the yet inexpressed virtualities of the lived experience itself of the crisis,[26] in search of a further and more originary talent/disposition of consciousness (*Uranlage des Bewusstsein*). Drawing upon the results of the most recent phenomenological psychiatry,[27] she demonstrates that constituent transcendental consciousness is not closed in its absoluteness, but engages in a fruitful relationship with forming spontaneity (*bildende Spontanität*) of normal and pathological conscious living that develops beyond the system of constitution, for example, in the typical elementary formations of the collective imagination or in states of dreaming or mental confusion.[28] In addition, since developments in the natural sciences have overturned the assertion of corporeality as the point zero (*Nullpunkt*) of the transcendental constitution of the life-world, revealing that consciousness (*das Bewusste*) is rooted in "corporeal nature" (*in dem "Leiblich-natürlichen"*), it is possible to ascertain that consciousness possesses a peculiar modality of "being-body" (*Verleibung*), where, through the lived experiences of the psychic processes in general, their succession, interweaving, and motivation, it enters in contact with the entire spectrum of nature (*Naturgefüge*), in turn understood as autonomous.[29]

Activating this new intuitive level, directed at living humanity, that is carrier of consciousness, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka frees herself from the hobbles that limited Husserlean phenomenology, which, submitting to "to the sovereign rule of intentionality" in the end limited the field of inquiry, concentrating on "a misleading focus: human consciousness". At the same time, she also takes the step out of the dominion of rationalistic despotism, inherited from modernity, but does not lose its achievements, neither from the point of view of consciousness, nor from that of reason. If anything, she integrates both, contextualizing them in the vaster sphere of investigation constituted by the "universe of human existence"[30] "within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive",[31] and radicalising their interrogation, giving rise to an inquiry that can engage the question of metaphysical profundity regarding the "origin of forms of this involvement, that is, of life itself",[32] according to its logos.

Thus contemporary rationalities have their first liberating metamorphosis/differentiation: reason no longer appears as a self-referential entity from Plato's world of ideas, abstract and without history, but now is living and vital because never disconnected from a human living beingness![33] Beyond the "ossified view of things, beings", which for the most part proceeds from the "so-called 'ontology' ", or from the "path usually called 'epistemology' " or, finally, from the same "highly elevated sphere of spiritual speculation", consciousness/reason now catches sight of "a more fundamental grounding, a firmer and more indicative point of departure" in "life itself", as the "indeniable primal state of living beingness", by which "to be means to be alive". This

state cannot be identified with any one experience and yet it underlines all experiences,[34] because "it is not reason that brings order into life". On the contrary, "it is life which brings forth the multiplicity of ratios, rationalities, and reasons in order to unfold its constructive course".[35]

Working backwards, using as a "filum Ariadnae",[36] the Logos of Life, which determines "the dianoiac thread"[37] and the productive order of life evolutive energy—this latter just uncovered at the basis of rationalistic reason and of transcendental consciousness, as their propulsive source—Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka has thus isolated "the spark of life" as the event of its manifestation in reality. It "radiates from the coalescence of the propitious factors of life that favor dynamic consolidation in self-individualization". Starting out from this, "the living being recognizes itself as 'himself' or 'herself', not by a cognitive act but by 'being alive' " that is both: "by experiencing oneself within one's milieu of beingness, directing one's instincts and appetites, recognizing the element of circumambient world in their vital relatedness to oneself" and lastly, but foremostly, "by recognizing oneself as the acting center of the universe of existence, as self-sustaining agent who directs within this universe of existence through experience, observation, reflection and deliberation his or her own course and who, finally, endows that course with moral and aesthetics values, and upon the wings of the spirit seeks to understand the reasons of it all and soars to the metaphysical and spiritual realm above, carrying within a thoroughly felt self aware convinction that to be is to be alive".[38]

Husserl, like R. Ingarden and M. Merleau-Ponty "sought vainly to bring nature, body, soul and spirit under the aegis of transcendental intentionality",[39] because—Tymieniecka observes acutely—"in the focus either on the givenness of the human factor or on the ways in which the givenness is established, the crucial point has been overlooked": that is, even though the phenomenologists desperately pursued the description of lived experiences, they ultimately neglected the consideration that man "constitutes an inextricable segment within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive" and thus that his givenness "is only in its virtual state and is suspended in its actualisation upon the entire complex in which it is existentially woven".[40]

For that matter, such "first awareness- self-awareness- of beingness, which carries all the virtualities of its entire unfolding" comes last to the reflective awareness of the mind and the entire phenomenological course up to Tymieniecka has been necessary to bring it to manifestation.

However from the newly achieved theoretical position, which has its starting point in the "life poignant evidence of the self", we are able "to delineate life's course, retracing in the work of the mind the dynamic vital/existential

lineaments of the logos of life".[41] Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's intention to proceed beyond the essential "givenness" of the genesis constituting objectivity, to the search for its "inner workings as the locus whence eidos and fact simultaneously spring", has succeeded, and the re-grafting of constitutive intentionality onto the "constructive advance of life, which carries it" has re-opened for us the metaphysical road, upon which the first principles of all things can once again be identified.[42]

2.2. The Human Creative Condition Within the Unity-of-Everything-is-Alive

In the new phenomenological outlook that Tymieniecka's description has sketched, therefore, cognitive meaning-bestowing and life-course enactment are united in human experience, in which life-meaning function is grasped anew as issuing from an adequate vital matter of fact. But in this, there also emerges the fact that "this givenness of man within his world is not only of a process-like nature but, moreover, indicates a specific type of constructivism".[43] When life attains the level of the human creative condition, it no longer stops at reproducing itself, but in the acts of the life of man it always interprets itself creatively in existence, giving rise to forms of life that are not only new and previously unimaginable, but also congruent and adequate to the becoming being of life, of which he alone possesses the cipher.[44] For this reason, living man needs both to find the reasons of "beingness" and to avail himself of the principle of being, through which he can confer on creations, that indispensable character of humanly adequate "objective" form, that makes them graspable and usable. Being, so spontaneously put into play, does not limit itself to maintain the significance of "indispensable essential factor of all beingness", in the sense of classical metaphysics, that is, inasmuch as it "concerns beingness in its finished, formed, established or stabilized state". Rather, in the measure in which it appears in the acts of the human living being, being manifests itself as "the intrinsic factor of the constructive process of individual becomings". This means that, since "becoming is a process in its own advance, in qualification", and since "the individual remains always in the process of becoming", that is, continually proceeding toward what is not yet, being, engaged in the creative acts from which becoming proceeds, functions as the intrinsic stabilizing forerunner of the acquisition and transformation of form, that characterizes the natural evolution of individual life. In this sense, compared to all the other givennesses, that of man within his world expresses a specific type of "constructivism", which neither reduce itself to what it develops during life nor to the condition of "meaning-bestowing-agent" and producer of his world-of-life, as Husserl proposed. Man begins

first to "create according to being" (=ontopoiesis) because "his very life in itself is the effect of his self-individualization in existence through inventive self-interpretation of his most intimate moves of life".[45]

In the light of such a new complex of lived experience brought to manifestation, both philosophy and its phenomenological inflection have to accept that "it appeared that it is not cognition (and the intentional network of its highest rational manifestations) but the essential ways in which the human being enacts and delineates the enactment of his life-course that gives us the cornerstones for searching out the origin of the order which he bestows upon the life-world and his social world".[46] In fact, it does not seem that in order to affirm "the vast, seemingly dispersed and yet cogent macrocosm of the human universe in flux", one can count on "any ever-more-precise scrutiny of the cognitive constructivism—constitution," nor "upon the rational nuclei of ontic structurations of objectivity". Rather, as Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka proposes, it is necessary "to strike at the heart of givenness-in-becoming where all differentiates from the virtual powers"[47] and "the creative act of the human being which makes him 'human' " is the place "where the differentiating factors of the macrocosm differentiates"![48] Thus only phenomenology of creative experience can identify the reverse perspectives of the "objective" ontological structures and of those proper to the constituent "subjective" forming; it also enables man's questioning to emerge in the whole and intact breadth of its expansive capacity, "in which all the lines of life's assumed progress gather in order to receive their significance".[49]

For this reason, Tymieniecka proposes "to replace the constitutive by the creative research framework", which uses the "two key notions" of the "phenomenology of creativity", that is "the experiential modalities of life"[50] of man as "living agent" and the "initial spontaneity" of the "new factor of *Imaginatio Creatrix* entering *sua sponte* the game of life".[51] Taking the creative act of man, guided by *Imaginatio Creatrix*, as an investigative focal point, once again a differentiation of reason or rather "a complete overturn" happens theoretically and this is the original and winning intuition of A.-T. Tymieniecka: that the giving of meaning by the transcendental constituent consciousness is not separate from the constructivism of life, but rather, and precisely in differentiation, is so intrinsically connected with the constructivism of life that, reaching the level of the human condition, life itself attains a degree of individualization by which it gains consciousness of itself and concretizes itself as capacity for freely creative auto- and hetero-plasmation.[52] Now, in fact, it issues from the living human being, who is no longer man-source of classical phenomenology, but manifests himself now above all as man-vortex, "vortex of the universal sense".[53] Thus the phenomenologically descriptive, but metaphysically revealing observation that:

Imaginatio Creatrix proceeds from the womb of life and depends on it, yet it lifts the logos, thus far subservient to meeting the needs of survival, to the level of autonomy, in which the living subject becomes endowed with a far-reaching range of conscious intellectual performance. We have the self—directing sphere of consciousness in a fully conscious human individual.[54]

This intuition is certainly supported by the results of the philosophical and biological anthropology of M. Scheler, H. Plessner, A. Gehlen, L. Bolk and A. Portmann, as well as Herder, but also in terms of their advanced point of view—moreover, not shared by Husserl, who held that the pure gold of phenomenology should not be bartered for the low bronze alloy of anthropological research[55]—Tymieniecka seems to see further. For this reason, she re-addresses the Husserlian conception of the human being as "a meaning-bestowing agent, the maker of his life-world", a transcendentally closed conception, so to speak, inquiring into the pre-conditions that enable efficacy on real life, and not only in the ethical dimension, of such a "subjective-creative" activity of giving meaning. In fact, in the constructivism of human givenness, "what comes first is that his very life in itself is the effect of his self-individualization in existence through his inventive self-interpretation of his most intimate moves of life",[56] to the point that, according to Tymieniecka, the self-constructivism realized in the human agent through invention and creation does not at all close the possibilities of life, as Scheler held; on the contrary, "it expands them into possibile world of life".[57]

3. THE GREAT METAMORPHOSIS OF THE ONTOPOIETIC LOGOS OF LIFE

To this point, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's phenomenological journey seems to have achieved two main results, first, re-establishing contact between the transcendental phenomenological consciousness and its vital foundation in the *living beingness/living agent* and second, demonstrating the nature and the intrinsic creative force of the acts of the human living being. Actually, the metamorphoses/differentiations of phenomenological reason highlighted to this point have lead much further ahead theoretically, opening reflective access to a cognitive level that previously seemed unattainable: the level of the logos of life in its ontopoietic becoming While acknowledging the eidetic as well as both the transcendental "reductions" as "three basic pillars" and "indispensable guidelines for understanding the correlate searches for the originary ground and the essential lines of mental processes", Tymieniecka witnesses in Husserl's last turn to the lifeworld "the logoic inward necessity of a *Zweispalt*, or divide", in order to reach the goal of a consciousness absolutely founded on all things. Therefore from the cognitive and intentional she moves on beyond Husserl to

the creative perspective. Consequently, she envisages a fourth and more extensive platform for the search, that would involve all three previous approaches but "run through their very heart in its plunging deeper into life itself"[58] and its logos. In fact, it is precisely "by the human creative act—instead of the cognitive act—that we may enter into the innermost plane of the workings of the logos of life, which in its basic thread of vital force—*vis vitale*—brings individualizating life about, promotes its unfolding and controls his course".[59] Therefore, focusing on the importance of the "human creative mind",[60] which defines the human level of living, we discover Human Condition-within-the-unity-of-everything-there-is-alive and at the same time we cognitively attest to the ontologically fundamental stage of the generation and becoming of life, descending "into the becoming of beings, living creatures and non-living objects in their origination, generative ties, existential connectedness, interactive unfolding—and this in their innermost logos which prompts them", just as in the dimension of freedom, the living human being presses to live his life creatively.

Starting out from the consideration of the human creative act, therefore, unlike classic ontologies that focus their attention on the structure of things and of beings, "we inquire and may follow the POIEIN, the making, the becoming, the unfolding of these structures themselves in their circumambient context of resources, forces, intergenerative energies in their basic self-individualization—in existence".[61] With the uncovering of the ontopoietic plane of life's becoming, "the forces and the arteries of the logos of life are revealed for metaphysical inspection".[62] Tymieniecka concludes: "this last [ontopoietic] platform for intuiting the rational sub-structure of all reality takes for reference the logoic sphere of life, thematizing it in the new schema of the ontopoiesis of life itself with its relevancies in the cosmos, on the one hand, and the transcendent, on the other".[63]

At this point, a crucial metaphysical issue emerges even in Tymieniecka's exciting philosophical design. Even though highlighting the creative-human-condition-within-the unity-of-life has meant that "the core phenomenological method expands its multisphere framework: eidetic, transcendental, lifeworld, ontopoietic", to the point of entering into conscious contact with the ontopoietic logos of life, which expresses itself with the maximum power in the creative act with which each human individual lives, it seems that the ontopoiesis of life remains a mere logoic structure, weighing down man with its impending givenness and anchoring him to the world-of-life, on which the *Imaginatio Creatrix* seems to flatten itself.

Tymieniecka acknowledges that she has considered the unfolding of life above all through the foundational moments of "self-individualizing beingness timing itself in its progress and indicating the most intricate devices by which

the logos of life projects that individualization onwards by functional 'moves' that punctuate in unison life's vital timing". In this way she has outlined the major arteries of life's vitally significant timing. But what metaphysical standing has she assigned to the logos of life, particularly in relation to the advent of the *Imaginatio Creatrix* and the dramatic advent of the specifically Human Creative Condition? In the ontopoietic sequence, the logos of life operates in an evolutionary manner, facilitating each type's maintenance and also its internal transformation, so as to enable the mutation of types and emergence of forms of existence different from preceding ones.[64]

In effect, even in the variety of evolutive vicissitudes, we can observe "a steady advance in complexity of functions, forms, life-manifestation". There has been "a unique phase of evolutive transmutation", that in which the "mature" phase of the platform of life manifests an extraordinary character and gives rise to the Human-Condition within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive. Paradoxically, the human being appears to be integrally part and parcel of nature yet to reaches levels "beyond nature", levels of life that endow the human being with special unique significance that is no longer simply vital but is also spiritual.[65] The appearance of the human living in natural life sets off "a watershed event, essentially a transformation of the significance of life": the "enigmatic" surging of *Imaginatio Creatrix* in the middle of ontopoietic sequence, surging freely as it floats above the inner working of nature. Here we reach—observes Tymieniecka—the most surprising turn of logos of life, because this great shift was being prepared by the logos' constructive steps, starting at the very beginning of self-individualizing of life, but it produces a "countervailing move", that "brings about a complete conversion of its hold on life's individualization and opens the entire horizon of freedom".[66] *Imaginatio Creatrix*, rooted within the functioning of Nature-life and yet an autonomous sense giver, introduces three new sense-giving factors: the intellective sense, the aesthetic sense, and the moral sense. With them life is endowed with meaning beyond what is geared to and strictly limited to survival; there comes about an inner transformation of the vitally oriented and single-minded functional system of reference into the *novum* of specifically human creativity. Within the creative modus of human functioning in its specifically creative orchestration there occurs a metamorphosis of the vital system of ontopoiesis.

The moral sense lies at the core of the metamorphosis of the life situation from vital existence into the advent of Human Condition[67]: here we have the entrance into the game of life of a specific thread of logos of life, that involves human communion and also the sacral quest.[68] The quest prompted by the moral sense is a mode of becoming but of an absolutely "spontaneous" becoming, one that does not follow a preprogrammed sequence to be accomplished but is "freely" projected becoming building on the accomplishments of

each actor. While the human creative condition and moral sense both develop in ontopoietic time, the quest for ultimate understanding goes in a direction reverse to that of the ontopoietic unfolding of life and works to undo its own accomplishments of the progressive transmutation of the soul. Indeed—exclaims Tymieniecka—"through the moral and entirely freely chosen work of the conscience, the self-enclosed ontopoietic course may be undone and remolded in a free redeeming course"! The logos of life has lead us to a borderline place between the ontopoietic logos of life and logos' sacral turn toward territory that is beyond the reach of the logos of the vital individualization of beingness.[69] It is here that the Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life takes place, by which the finite and its ontopoietic logic transmute into the infinite.

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NOTES

[1] Cf.: D. Verducci, *La trama vivente dell'essere nella fenomenologia di Anna Teresa Tymieniecka*, in: A. Ales Bello e F. Brezzi (edited by), *Il filo(sofare) di Arianna. Percorsi del pensiero femminile nel Novecento*, Mimesis, Milano 2001, pp. 63–89.
[2] Cf.: D. Verducci, *Disseminazioni fenomenologiche e innovazioni teoretiche*, in: Id. (ed. by), *Disseminazioni fenomenologiche. A partire dalla fenomenologia della vita*, EUM, Macerata 2007, pp. 11–27.
[3] Cf.: A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, "Logos and Life", Book 1, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/London/Boston/Tokyo, 1988, "Analecta Husserliana", XXIV (1988), p. xxiv.
[4] Ibid., p. 16.
[5] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason*, "Logos and Life", Book 4, Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dordrecht/Boston/London 2000, p. 32.
[6] Ibid., pp. 34–35.
[7] Ibid., p. 35.
[8] Cf.: O. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Gestalt und Wirklichkeit*, H. I. Beck, Munich 1918. Engl. tr. by C. F. Atkinson, *The Decline of the West*, Oxford University Press, USA, 1932.
[9] Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. xxiii.
[10] Cf.: F. Nietzsche, *Der europäische Nihilismus*, 5 [71], in: *Nietzsche Werke Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. by G. Colli and M. Montinari, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York, vol. VIII, 1974, pp. 199–207.
[11] Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. xxvii.
[12] Ibid., p. xxvii.
[13] Ibidem.
[14] Ibid., p. xxviii.
[15] Ibidem.
[16] Cf.: P. Capelle, *Phénomène et fondement. Raison métaphysique et raison théologique*, to be published talk at the Conference on "Metafisica e teologia- Incontri del *Giornale di Metafisica*", Macerata, 29–30 ottobre 2008. See also: J. Greisch, *Le cogito herméneutique. L'herméneutique philosophique et l'héritage cartésien*, Vrin, Paris, 2000.

[17] Cf.: M. Tomasello, *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1999.
[18] Regarding the value of creativity in the economic and productive spheres, a lively debate is in progress in the on-line magazine "Cato Unbound", between R. Florida, author of the best-seller, *The Rise of the Creative Class and How it's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life*, New York, Basic Books, 2002, and R. Hanson, expert in "idea futures". Cf.: R. Hanson, *Idea Futures. How Making Wagers on the Future Can Make it Happen Faster*, in: WIRED, Issue 3.09, Sept. 1995. A section was quoted in the 30 August 1995 *Wall Street Journal*.
[19] Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason*, op. cit., pp. 4–5.
[20] Ibid., p. 5.
[21] Ibid., p. 3.
[22] Ibid., p. 4.
[23] Cf.: D. Verducci, *To Reason as Living Man. Conjecture as the Inferential Supporting Framework of the Human Condition According to the Meta-ontopoiesis of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka*, in «Phenomenological Inquiry», 27 (2003), pp. 63–76.
[24] Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., pp. xxiii–xxiv.
[25] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *From the Editor*, in "Analecta Husserliana", I (1971), pp. vi–vii: "We may undertake *the reflection of phenomenology upon itself*, probing from within the phenomenological horizon of accomplishments into adequacy with which they come to grisp with the evolving universe of cognition". See also: D. Verducci, *Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.La trama vivente dell'essere*, op. cit., pp. 63–89.
[26] Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason*, op. cit., pp. 31–32.
[27] Cf.: H. Ey, *La Conscience*, P.U.F., Paris 1963; G. Lanteri-Laura, *Le problèmes de l'inconscient et la pensée phénoménologique* e Cl. Blanc, *Conscience et inconscient dans la pensée neurobiologique actuelle*, in: H. Ey (ed. by), *L'inconscient*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris 1966 (*Colloque de Bonneval*, 1960, contributions by de Blanc, Diatkine, Follin, Green, Lairy, Lanteri-Laura, Laplanche, Lébovici, Leclaire, Lefebvre, Perrier, Ricoeur, Stein, Waellens et Guiraud, Hyppolite, Lacan, Merleau- Ponty, Minkowski).
[28] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Die Phänomenologische Selbstbesinnung*, in "Analecta Husserliana", I (1971), pp. 4–7, §1. *Das Selbstgegebene*.
[29] Ibid., pp. 2–3.
[30] Ibid., p. 6.
[31] Ibid., p. 4.
[32] Ibid., p. 6. See also: A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The First Principles of the Metaphysics of Life*, in: Analecta Husserliana, XXI (1987).
[33] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, in "Analecta Husserliana", XCII (2006), p. xii.
[34] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, in: A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed. by), *Timing and Temporality in Islamic Philosophy and Phenomenology of Life*, "Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue", 3, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007, pp. 15–16.
[35] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The Three Movements of the Soul*, "Logos and Life", Book 2, Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1988, p. 195.
[36] Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, op. cit., p. 17.
[37] Tymieniecka, *The Three Movements of the Soul*, op. cit., p. 181.
[38] Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, op. cit., p. 16.
[39] Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. 4.
[40] Ibid., p. 5.
[41] Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, op. cit., p. 17.

[42] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Tractatus Brevis. First Principles of the Metaphysics of Life Charting the Human Condition: Man's Creative Act and the Origin of Rationalities*, in "Analecta Husserliana", XXI (1986), p. 3.
[43] Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. 4.
[44] A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed. by), *Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition*, "Analecta Husserliana", LII (1997).
[45] Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., pp. 4–5.
[46] Ibid., p. 7.
[47] Ibid., p. 5.
[48] Ibid., p. 6.
[49] Ibidem.
[50] Ibid., p. xxiv.
[51] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life in Creative Experience. Treatise in a Nutshell*, in "Analecta Husserliana", XCII (2006), p. xii.
[52] Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. 4.
[53] Tymieniecka, *Tractatus Brevis*, op. cit., p. 10.
[54] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Human Development between Imaginative Freedom and Vital Constraints*, "Phenomenological Inquiry", 31 (2007), p. 13. An Italian translation of the text has also been published, edited by D. Verducci, *Lo sviluppo umano tra libertà immaginativa e limiti vitali*, in "Etica ed Economia" 1 (2007), pp. 33–43. With this talk, A.-T. Tymieniecka opened the International Conference, "Lo sviluppo in questione. Le forme umane della trasformazione", Falconara Marittima, 8–9 November 2006, promoted by F. Totaro of the Department of Philosophy and Human Sciences of the University of Macerata.
[55] Cf.: E. Husserl, *Brief an Dorion Cairns*, in: *Edmund Husserl 1859–1959*, M. Nijhoff, Den Haag 1959, p. 285. See also: M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Anthropologie*, in "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research", II, 1 (1941).
[56] Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. 5.
[57] Ibid., p. 6.
[58] A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Phenomenology as the Inspirational Force of our Time*, in: A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed. by), *Phenomenology World-wide. Foundations, Expanding Dynamics, Life-engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, p. 8a.
[59] Tymieniecka, *Human Development between Imaginative Freedom and Vital Constraints*, op. cit., p. 8.
[60] Ibid., p. 13.
[61] Ibid., p. 8.
[62] Tymieniecka, *The Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life in Creative Experience*, op. cit., p. 16.
[63] Ibidem.
[64] Ibid., p. 30.
[65] Ibid., p. 31.
[66] Ibid., p. 32.
[67] Ibid., p. 33.
[68] Ibid., p. 35.
[69] Ibid., pp. 59–60.

DETLEV QUINTERN

ON THE HARMONY OF SPIRITUALITY AND RATIONAL WISDOM ACCORDING TO THE OPUS RASĀʾIL IḪWĀN AṢ-ṢAFĀʾ: *A PATH TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS IN SCIENCES*

Human being is like the egg, which has already a perfect form.
The egg lies in the nest and yet it is a latent flier.[1]

Abstract: More then a thousand years ago IÌwÁn aÒ-ÑafÁÞ, the brothers of sincerity – a community of philosophers and scientists – introduced a philosophy of science which embedded knowledge in the necessary understanding of the interplay of micro- and macrocosm. Here sciences are aware of their connectivity not only regarding the search for truth in the inseparable web of life but as well beyond. The creativity of reason is spiritually orientated towards oneness. Sciences unfold the constructive potentialities of nature with which human rationality communicates. The current crisis of sciences may find a way out from the lapse of destructivity by recovering the harmony of spirituality and rationality.

The unfolding of life, which has human being as its crown of creation, is at the center of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ's teachings. As the egg, which rises in the nest out of a perfect but then broken form to become a flier, the universal life is winged with creative reason. The ontopoiesis endowed with creative potential, interplays in the harmony of microcosm and macrocosm. This interaction between the universal power of creativity and its shaping into human being is focused in the teachings of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ. Human being is able to infer the spiritual unity of being through reason.

The sciences' drift off with increasing specialization, which advances but fails in embedding the specific knowledge into its universal context and goes hand in hand with the loss of ethical dimensions — a long lasting process, which led to the current crisis of sciences. More than 1000 years ago Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ had founded an ethic of sciences, which offers an alternative to and a path out of the current sciences' crisis.

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 51–67.

Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ, a community of philosophers and scientists who appeared in the second half of the 10th century during the reign of the Abbasid caliphate had a lasting effect on the further flourishing of Arabic-Islamic philosophy. The Father of Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037) studied the opus. Ernst Bloch mentioned Ibn Sina's reliance on Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ.[2]

Probably, al-Maǧrītī (deceased in 1007) brought the Rasāʾil (epistles, messages, materials for study) to maġrib al-aqsa (Al-Andalus on the Iberian peninsula),[3] where Ibn Ṭufayīl (1150–1185)[4] a teacher of Ibn Rušd (Averroes, 1126–1198) and later Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406)[5] became acquainted with the opus.

1. HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ appeared during the Abbasid caliphate (752–1258), which flourished since the end of the 8th century in all fields of life, not least in the sciences.[6] The sciences had reached their peak as a result of the knowledge-orientated philosophic school of the Muʿatazila. The teachings about human being's responsibility for actions, which are carried out by free will (iḫtyār), had been a breakthrough in the history of philosophy.[7] The overcoming of the assumption of predestination (ǧabr) mobilized human creativity and inspired the research in humanities as well as in the natural sciences.[8] As a result the cultural and literary life started to flourish as well.

Rereading the collections of 1001 Nights, which often set Bagdad under the reign of Ḫarūn ar-Rašīd (reg. 786–809)[9] as its center, gives an insight into a history of daily life in which knowledge and education played an important role.

It was knowledge and narrative art, which made it possible for Schahrazade to overcome her announced death. In the famous narrative, death stands metaphorically for ignorance. Knowledge, realization and acting facilitate to counteract fate.[10]

The philosophical community of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ is referred to European languages as "the brothers of sincerity" or "purity" ("Frères de la Pureté", "Die lauteren Brüder"), sometimes with the geographical addition "from Baṣra".[11] Yet, even as Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ might have their original roots in Baṣra, the town in southern Iraq was only one among many places to which the teachings spread in the vast world of the caliphate and its scientific and cultural centers like Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus or Cordoba in the West.

Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ named themselves *Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ wa ḫilān al-wafā wa al-ʿadil wa ābnāʾ al-ḫamd wa āhl al-šukr* (The brother of sincerity, friends of truth and justice, sons of modesty and gratefulness). This name refers to a far older tradition of Gnostic orientated communities. A text from the late 2nd century A.D. purportedly gives an account of a community that called itself

"the union of peace and friends of good things, and life eternal and undefiled joy, in a great harmony of life and faith, through eternal life of fatherhood and motherhood and sisterhood and rational wisdom."[12]

The term "brotherhood" as circumscription of these traditions would not be precise, because the participation of women in the community of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ cannot be ruled out. The exact and sensitive deduction of human-being's unfolding from prenatal and earliest childhood stages on provides some evidence that women were among the Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ.

Although we know little about the authorship of rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ besides the names Zaid b. Rifāʿa, Zahrūn az-Zanǧanī, Aḥmad an-Nahraǧurī, al-ʿAufi/al-ʿAuqī and al-Maqdīsī mentioned by at-Tauḥīdī in 983/4 (373 H.),[13] the manuscripts had been bequeathed in different variations, which are nowadays preserved in Cairo, Istanbul, Paris, Oxford, etc. The oldest known manuscript so far is the Istanbul manuscript (ms. Atif 1681), which had been completed under the title Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ in 578/1182. Several editions (Kairo 1928, Beirut 1957/95) on the background of different interpretations were published. Yet, questions of authorship, reception, interpretation and editorial history will not been discussed here.

2. ON THE CONNECTIVITY OF SCIENCES

The harmony of reason and spirituality is the main characteristic in the opus, which includes 52 treatises (Rasāʾil). The opus can be seen as a building with 52 doors, each of these directs to human-being, who is in turn embedded in the interplay of microcosmic and macrocosmic dimensions. It integrates the spectrum of sciences into a systematical order:

> Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ have embraced the entire spectrum of sciences of their time, developed it further and for the first time in the history of ideas arranged it in such completeness into a classification scheme, integrated it and conceived it to a coherent recognitional edifice. To their methods of reasoning belong empiricism (field of experience), mathematics, formal logic and analogies.[14]

Starting with mathematics and geometry, coming to botany, zoology and anthropology before ending in philosophy and theology, the unfolding of life is reflected transdisciplinarily. Fārūqī characterizes the structure of the opus,

> . . . since the good life cannot be lived in isolation from the world and that it is necessarily involves man's relations therewith, these relations, their nature, problems, and terms ought to be fully discovered and possessed. Accordingly, they considered that knowledge cannot be fragmentary, but indivisible, that its parts stand in necessary relation to one another. Hence they endeavoured to cover all the sciences of their times and organize in a *summa* all the departments of knowledge to bound together by a single structure.[15]

Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ were guided as well by didactic considerations while ascending the ladder from abstract sciences, such as mathematics in the sense of understanding the nature of the figure, to applied sciences like music, mineralogy, botany, anthropology, philosophy and theology. The universe of life and sciences begins and ends with the One. Spirituality goes hand in hand with epistemology.

3. KNOWLEDGE AND TOLERANCE

A retrospective approach to the history of ideas in the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ reveals Gnostic parallels in the philosophical foundation of knowledge (gnōsis). Unfolding knowledge and science (ʿilm) is the key to achieve salvation for both of the schools, which agree as well on the principle of tolerance. "Do not be arrogantly in opposition to every good opinion, but take yourself the side of divinity of reason."[16] The Gnostic teacher from the end of the 2nd century calls on the community to "end the sleep, which weighs heavily" and for the need for "the rider which is reason".[17] Finally the teacher underscores the following words, "Do not tire of knocking on the door of reason, and do not cease walking in the way of Christ".[18] Except for the sole identification of Logos with Christ, the common roots of both communities emerge.[19]

Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ emphasized the principle of tolerance towards different beliefs and worldviews. Each of these different world views mentioned in the opus, like Christian and Islamic ones, the natural sciences, music and Indian beliefs, had been understood as inseparable parts of unity, because everything existing is corresponding with the nature of the number:

> The scholars and philosophers (hukuma) of the confessors of unity have investigated the principles of all existing things and the roots of creation. The dualists come across doubly existing things. The Christians across the trebly existing ones. Natural sciences across the quadruply existing ones, others, the Ḫurramīya across the quintuply existing one, other, the philosophers, across the sextuply existing ones, the Bāṭinits across the septuply existing ones, the people, who are concerned with music across the octuply existing ones and the people from India across the ninefoldly existing ones. Each group exaggerated its discovery, it was passionately taken in it, being not interested in anything else. The Pythagorean sages (however) gave everyone its right. They said: The existing things correspond to the nature of number.[20]

The two stands for dualism, the three for Christianity, because it is characterized by trinity, the four for natural sciences, due to the four elements etc. As all the numbers are based on the One, which is the precondition of all numbers rather than a number itself, all beliefs and world views are integrated in an universal and a constructive rivalry towards the path of truth.

On the basis of the mathematical structure of the universe, the first Risāla (fī al-ʿadad) consequentially introduces the philosophy of numbers, before proceeding to geometry based on mathematics.[21] Here two vivid examples, which illustrate geometrical figures, are the beehive and the cobweb. To visualize the mathematical structure of nature seems to be a quite modern approach presented in today's modern museums.[22] Another example is the 25th treatise (risāla) on music. On the one hand music is deducted mathematically while on the other hand it is understood as the composition of spiritual activity enabling human-beings to communicate. Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ developed music for therapeutic purposes while researching the influences of music on certain human sentiments.[23]

A consideration, which follows long-time dimensions in the history of ideas, reveals to further parallels.[24] Self-knowledge was in the focus of the teachings of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ as well as of the Gnostic ones, "If we decide to know the real facts (Sachverhalte) of everything that is existing we have first to start with our self-knowledge, because it is nearest to us."[25]

The teachings of emanation point to parallels of concepts, which are of Plotinus' origin. An Arabic excerpt from Plotinus' Enneads had been identified by Friedrich Dieterici in 1882.[26]

As reason emanates from God, the soul comes out of reason as an intelligent nature, but with darker vision and essence, because it recognizes its object not in itself, but in reason. On one occasion the soul is directed towards the higher reason, on one occasion towards the lower sensorial nature.[27]

Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ approach the cosmic-universal reality in a spiritual-rational manner. Rationality and spirituality flow through each other, although spirituality requires a maximum of rationality. God stands for the One, the first initial principle. Out of the One emanates ʿaql (reason, intelligence), which includes all of the universe's forms.

The reason pours into the universal soul, the Three, which needs for its unfolding matter (al-hayūlā). It follows from this sequence the One, the Two, the Three and finally the Four, the individual beings of life.

Intellect (ʿaql) is the first and the noblest (wāšrafā) that the Creator – great is His name – has called into existence (auğada), then follows the soul (an-nafs) and after that hyle (al-hayūlā). Intellect is a spiritual substance (ğauhar rūḥānī), which emanated from the Creator. Soul is a spiritual substance (ğauhar rūḥānī), which emanated from intellect. It has continuance, is accomplished but not perfect. Matter (al- hayūlā al-ūlā) is a spiritual substance, which emanated from the soul. It possesses duration but is neither accomplished nor perfect.[28]

4. THE UNFOLDING OF LIFE

In this way a creative-evolutionary development of being is initiated by the Creator, in which ʿaql unfolds itself towards human being. Matter (al-hayūlā) becomes nature, from which the bodies derive. The bodies are entering the spheres, from which the elements originate. From the elements the derivatives (muwālidāt) are composed, evolving from minerals to plants and finally human beings. The living beings are at the end of this creative chain. Human being is the final and most perfect link in this chain, unifying all the potentials of life, which preceded the summit of life.

In the composition of the human all spiritual capacities (maʿāni) of the simple and compound things are contained, that have already been cited. For the human is composed of a crude corporeal body and a simple spiritual soul. Therefore the philosophers (ḥūkama) call the human being a microcosm (ʿalam ṣaġrīr) and the world a macro-anthropos.[29]

Therefore human beings do not border upon only one of the animal species, but on several different ones. The ape is man-like only by its form, while the bee has similarities with respect to its skillfulness, if we take the architectural wonder of the beehive into consideration. Further similarities can be seen in the loyalty of the horse or the elephant's understanding and remorse (Einsicht).

The human level is, for it is the repository of all excellence and the source of all virtues, not essentially exhausted by one animal species but only by multiple ones. In the form of the body the ape is close to it, by character the noble horse. Further the human bird (zahme), i.e. the dove, then the understanding elephant and the thrush nightingale and parrot equipped with many sounds, airs and tunes are close to it, but then especially the bee with its fine arts as well as similar animals.[30]

The notion of God allows identifying the Creator, standing for the constructiveness of life, its creative configuration and is a synonym for an ethical orientation: "... for God the exalted only speaks the truth and only does the god – so endeavor to equal Him in this."[31] To foster knowledge, in an indefatigable and, first of all, auto-creative way, then to interfere and not at last to utilize in a constructive manner, is the central message of the opus. To be creative is the destination of human being. To come as near as possible towards the principle of creativity allows salvation. "There is no road to heaven other than in this world, and the whole thrust of the matter is how to conduct oneself on this road."[32]

The pivotal philosophical concept of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ is unity. Matter and spirit, the here and now and the netherworld, light and darkness, chains and liberation, body and soul (nafs), world and spirituality are antipodal pairs of an integrated unity.

Verily the term insān (man) includes both the soul (al-nafs) and the body (al-badan). The body is the visible corpus (al-jasad), which is composed of flesh, blood, bones, veins, muscles, skin, etc.

And all these are earthly masses (ajsām ʿarḍiya) which are dark, heavy, changeable, corruptible. But the soul is substance (jawhar) which is heavenly (sāmawīya), spiritual, living, nimble, moveable, uncorruptible, and a continuous standard (ʿalāmatu darākati) for (discrimating) the (changing) forms (al-ṣiwar) of things.[33]

Reason (ʿaql) orientates the soul towards knowledge. ʿAql (reason) is embedded in spiritual dimensions as the unfolding of knowledge involves salvation: "…. some knowledge of the divine could be acquired here in this world as a means of achieving Paradise."[34] ʿIlm (scientific knowledge) is realized in the sense of an epistemic path in order to self-creatively advance perfection (Vervollkommnung). Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ differentiate the two terms "ʿilm" (knowledge) and "īmān" (faith) while underlining the importance of this distinction:

Because many scholars are not acquainted with the difference between ʿilm and îmân, we must explain first what the difference consists in. Many speculative theologians (mutakallimûn) call faith 'knowledge'. They say that faith is knowledge by way of traditional learning (samʿ), while what is known through analogical reasoning (qiyâs) is knowledge by way of intellect. Therefore, we want to explain right now what knowledge is in reality. The philosophers (ḥukamâʾ) have said that knowledge is the perception (taṣawwur) by the soul of the distinctive characteristics of the objects known in its essence. If this is knowledge, the soul does not perceive it in its reality whenever information about it comes down by way of traditional learning. Consequently, such information is not knowledge, but faith (îmân), acknowledgement (iqrâr), and belief (taṣdîq). It is for this reason that the prophets first asked their particular nations to acknowledge (iqrâr).Then they challenged them to believe (taṣdîq), after clarity had been achieved (bayân), and then they urged them to study the true matters of knowledge (al-maʿârif al-ḥaqîqîyah).[35]

It is knowledge, which redeems and liberates human being. Human self-knowledge is accompanied by the evolvement of reason (ʿaql). Qūwa al-ʿaqlīya (rationality) is the philosophical as well as spiritual quintessence in the opus,

We on our part have accepted reason as the head of our association and arbiter of our contentions with one and another. In fact, reason was elevated to this rank of presiding over the virtuous who obey the commandments of God by none other than God Himself. We have accepted this leadership of reason on the conditions and terms set out in our Rasāʿīl. … Know that the righteously rational persons who join God and reason in determining their minds stand to command, prohibit and incriminate, because reason and providence do take the place of the guiding Imām.[36]

Except for the level of knowledge there is no differentiation of human beings. Any deduction of slavery as natural to human beings, like e.g. Aristotle elaborated it, is absolutely unknown to the ethics of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ. As a matter of course the principle of oneness is held true for humanity. Human beings are inseparably bounded into the web of universal unity.

The process of becoming a human being is not misunderstood as a purely biological one, but rather understood as the evolving of intelligent creation. In the beginning there is the act of creation (faḍa, ibdā, iḫtirāʿ, ḫalaqa),[37] bringing life into being. By unfolding the intellectual capabilities a human being

approaches ʿaql, the primal and absolute power of creation, which had been called into existence (auǧada). This concept of reason, as we find it in the opus of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ, is backed by a broad consensus in Arabic-Islamic philosophy. Al-Ġazzālī (d. 1111) underlines that reason is the most important of all existing:

This reason, by which the human grasps the things, behaves towards the first reason, which the exalted and almighty God has created, like light to the sun; for these types of reason only pertain in relation to persons. That one (the first reason) is absolute and without relation (to any person). On the part of reason the proof for its significance lies therein, that through it alone this-worldly and otherworldly bliss can be achieved. How could it not be the most significant of all things.[38]

Grunebaum displays the conception of ʿaql of Al-Ġazzālī:

(1) It is the quality that distinguishes man from beast and predisposes him to the reception of the theoretical sciences, al-ūlūm an-naẓarīya, (2) it is the knowledge, which teaches a child to distinguish the possible from the impossible and makes him discern "axiomatic" facts . . ., (3) it is also the knowledge, which experiences yields; finally – and here we meet with that ethical turn that is characteristic of the theological examination of ʿaql– (4) we call him possessed of ʿaql who realizes the consequences of action and manages to control his emotional impulses in the light of his foresight.[39]

If we follow Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ the molds of all beings coming into existence, e.g. the globe, because it is a perfect form for the earth, are potentially included in the first, the universal ʿaql. Lastly, the coming into existence of everything-there-is-alive human being derives out of the shaping, following minerals, plants and animals. Human being is provided with a spiritual soul and is composed of all the spiritual capacities (maʿānī) of the simple, or basic, and complex things, which come along with its coming into existence. Basic are the four elements, fire, air, water, earth. Complex is the coming-into-existence, mineral, plant, animal.

That below the sphere of the moon falls apart into two kinds: into simple and composite things. Simple are the four elements fire, air, water, earth. Composite are the products animal, plant, mineral. The mineral was earlier in being as the plant, after that follows the animal, then the human.[40]

5. MACROCOSM AND MICROCOSM

Anthropology is embedded in cosmology. Human being as microcosm is the reflection of the universe (macrocosm). The image of humanity (Menschenbild) is deduced in an epistemological manner. The self-knowledge of human being (microcosm) is the precondition of universal knowledge. From self-knowledge, beginning with perception, advancing to macrocosmic

relations, human being creates itself continually new. Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ developed an epistemology and a learning theory, which begin with perception in early childhood and proceed, ascending to the highest levels of cognition. Anthropology has its initial- and its endpoint in the epistemic unfolding of human being. On the way of developing knowledge man becomes human being, which approaches reality on four epistemologically deducted levels according to successive grades an individual person can experience during the course of life.

That one, who wants to examine the principles of the existing things in order to realize their true facts (ḥaqāʾiq) must previously deal with the principles of the physical, sensually perceptible (al-ūmur al-maḥsūsa) to thereby exercise his intellect and strengthen his grasp for the investigations of the principles of the intellectually perceptible (al-ūmur al-maʾqūla).[41]

The path of knowledge works one's way up from perception (al-ūmur al-maḥsūsa) towards reason-orientated knowledge of the things accessible to consciousness (al-ūmur al-maʾqūla). The evolution of knowledge is derived from and adapted by the life-stadia of an individual.

Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ develop their epistemology from theories of perception, whereby they follow the stadia of developmental psychology beginning with prenatal phases. The embryonic evolvement is thereby related to the sun-cycle. The nine-monthly pregnancy is correlated with the appearance of the ninth constellation of the solar system.[42] With the birth of the neonate the soul becomes a personality. Soul and body are unified, which is announced by the first cry of a child brought into the world. Following Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ the sense of taste develops first (warm/cold), after that the sense of touch, then smell, hearing and finally seeing, which is the most developed sense. A mental delusion, e.g. a imagined reflection of water (sarāb = Fata Morgana), which is perceived visually, is not a fault of the capacity to see, but arises from a cognitive illusion.[43] Analogously to the stadia of modern developmental psychology, Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ ascend to reason-orientated knowledge (quwa al-ʿaqlīya), which is initiated with the 15th year of one's life.[44] At the age of 40 human beings are capable of gaining wisdom, which can ascend to perfection from the age of 50 onwards. When the soul has atained its purpose, it leaves the body. Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ have established the principle of epistemic evolvement. Against the epistemological background four paths of knowledge are differentiated, the knowledge of apperception by virtue of perception, the verifiable knowledge by virtue of adequate demonstration (al-burhān aḍ-ḍarūrī) or on the basis of deduction (istidal). The fourth degree of knowledge, beyond human capacity, is revelation.[45]

Human being, which realizes itself as inseparable and active constituent of the cosmic unity, is not destroying, neither itself nor other life but contributes to the composition of the universal being. The destination of life is constituted

in the constant unfolding of knowledge and its deepening into the potentials hidden in the things, in order to utilize these potentials for the well-being of humanity without eroding nature. Against this background knowledge and science are not taken to mean functional rationality, but are embedded in a metadimension of ethics. Human being is provided with a tender conscience (synderesis).

> It is an instance of control over reason. Synderesis is neither a second nor a substitute for reason. It is a moral instance of control. It observes the moves of thinking and the consequences of their practical implementation following ethical criteria. It accompanies the preparation of plans and looks over their realization.[46]

This tender conscience ensures that reason, knowledge and sciences harmonize with ethical dimensions. The universalism of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ facilitates the unfolding of knowledge and prevents destructive intentions. Human being, which understands itself as an inseparable component of the creative universe, does not destroy, but weighs knowledge regarding its correspondence with the harmony of society, nature and the cosmos. Because human being is identified with the micro-realization of the macrocosm, destruction of one component of macrocosm (insān kabir) will cause the self-destruction of the micro-universe, the "small world" (ʿālam ṣaġīr) or vice versa. Thus a destructive man must already have been wrecked before he starts to vandalize. By fostering the evolvement of life human being is unfolding itself. Against this background the necessity to rediscover universalism becomes obvious. In 1898 Davidson gave an account of the main thoughts of the opus,

> On its intellectual side, it taught men to look upon themselves as having their origin and end in the one supreme principle of the universe, and as being essential parts of the sum of existence. On the emotional side, it made them feel that the entire universe was only their larger self, and that since the same soul pulsated in all things, in wronging another they were wronging themselves. Thus, universal love and tenderness became the dominant impulses of their lives.[47]

6. UNIVERSALISM

The crisis of sciences is first of all caused by the progressing dissociation from the universal interplay of Being. On the one hand sciences deepen the knowledge of matter in order to utilize it, e.g. in nano- or genetic technologies on the other hand this specific knowledge is isolated from everything-there-is-alive. Contrary to this approach, Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ analyze matter on the basis of ethical values and spiritual dimensions. One example may demonstrate this.

In the 19th Risāla minerals are analyzed as one basic component of the unity of life, out of which ascending from the center of the earth, the plants derive.

A mineral is researched with regard to its constructive usability, e.g. precious stones for the treatment of illness, which attacks the eyes, the heart or the skin. It is unthinkable that minerals could be used for destructive intentions like military ones, e.g. uranium. Universalism and its ethical basis, including a tender conscience, orientate knowledge towards a humanistic direction, thus preventing sciences to slip away from its human purpose.

Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ distinguish human beings merely in view of knowledge or ignorance.

We do not find any other differentiation of humanity in the opus, for instance concerning a supposed affiliation to a certain belief, class, "race" or "color".

Only regarded from of a contemporary retrospective this seems to be notable, because the humanities often start with dualistic premises such as "otherization", "clash of civilizations", "Islam vs. Christendom", "Men vs. Women" and further imagined splits, which are caused by theories of difference. Searching for differences among human beings is highlighted in the humanities. Pessimistic schools of postmodernism and ironically even postcolonial ones are founded on a dualistic vision of man (Menschenbild). This defect on the level of meta-theory first of all is responsible for the current crisis of sciences. Against these theories of otherization and alienation universalism offers an alternative.

While universalism bases on the unity of human beings, the unity of human being is based on the interplay of reason and spirit, soul and body, the unity of life upon the integrity of macrocosm and microcosm. The teaching of tawḥīd (oneness, unity) integrates with respect to societal harmony, which is based on the principle of justice and brings nearer the generations, against the discourses of contempt in consumption-orientated systems, because old age is identified with wisdom. Also universalism overcomes dualistic gender concepts. Not least the unity of people, whose desire for justice and peace demands fulfillment and offers a cross-cultural perspective.

As an alternative to the split between humanities and natural sciences Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ offer with their transdisciplinary approach a chance to reintegrate sciences and nature, in order to overcome the progressing destruction of the biosphere. Science should not be understood as an end in itself. Therefore universalism embeds reason and knowledge into ethical and spiritual dimensions. The reestablishment of unity (universalism) overcomes dualistic views. The teaching of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ presents itself as a way out of sciences' crisis in regaining the universalistic unity of human being, society, nature and cosmos, which is a precondition for the further unfolding of life.

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NOTES

[1] Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ, cit., Khella, Karam, *Arabisch-Islamische Philosophie und ihr Einfluß auf das europäische Denken,* Theorie und Praxis, Hamburg, 2006, p. 146.
[2] Bloch, Ernst, *Avicenna und die Aristotelische Linke*, Progress, München, 1952, p. 9.
[3] "Externas: estos tratados, que se creían orginarios de Oriente, fuereon publicados en España por Maslameh el-Madjriti, o sea, el madrilène, muerto a fines del siglo IV, entre 395 y 398, el cual a su regreso de Oriente, declaró haberlos traído de allí junto con otros manuscritos." Karam, J., *Las ideas filosóficas de "Los hermanos de la pureza"* (Ikhuan es-safa), La Ciencia Tomista (Salamnaca), 56, 1937, cit. Islamic Philosophy, Vol. 21, *Ikhwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ wa-khilān al-wafā* (2nd half 4th/10 cent.), Text and studies, II, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, p. 399.
[4] "Ibn Ṭufayīl refers, for example, to the purity and durability of certain minerals in the same way as the Ikhwān, and he deploys the same system of animal classification and the Platonic 'chain of being' that one finds in the Rasāʾil." Conrad, Lawrence I. (Ed.), The world of Ibn Ṭufayīl. Interdisziplinary perspectives on Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān, Brill, Leiden, New York, 1996, p. 27.
[5] Ibn Khaldūn wrote in his famous Muqaddimah: "The powers of sensual perception are graded and ascend to the highest power, that is the power of thinking, for which there exists the term 'rational power'". Here we find a close relation to the epistemology of Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ. Dawood, N.J. (Ed.), *Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to history* (trans. Franz Rosenthal), Princeton University Press, New York, 1967, p. 76.
[6] "The cultural concomitants of this development were to be seen in the development of civilization, the progress of science, industry and the arts and the introduction of a motley of ideologies, interpretations and philosophies." Al-Farūqī, Ismʿaīl Rāgī, *On the Ethics of the Bretheren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Ṣafa wa khillan al-wafā)*, Muslim World, No. 50, Hartford, 1961 cit. Islamic Philosophy, Vol. 21, *Ikhwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ wa-khilān al-wafā* (2nd half 4th/10 cent.), Text and studies, II, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, p. 322.
[7] Baṣra had been a philosophical centre already in the early 8th century, were the muʿatazila school emerged under Wāṣil b. ʿAṭā (699–748) und ʿAmr b. ʿUbaid (699–761). Khella, Karam, *Geschichte der arabischen Völker*, Theorie und Praxis, Hamburg, 1995, p. 94.
[8] For the development of arabic-islamic sciences and techniques see, Fuat Sezgin, *Wissenschaft und Technik im Islam*, 5 Bände. Institut für die Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main, 2003.
[9] For the cultural florescence during the Abbasid period see, Dreßen, Wolfgang, Minkenberg, Georg, Oellers, Adam C, *Ex Oriente. Isaak und der weiße Elefant. Eine Reise durch drei Kulturen um 800 und heute*, Bd. 1, Bagdad um 800 und heute, Philipp von Zabern, Mainz, 2003.
[10] Quintern, Detlev, *Über den Humanismus bei Ihwan as-Safa*, Polylog, Zeitschrift für interkulturelles Philosophieren, Nr. 18, Winter 2007, Gesellschaft für interkulturelle Philosophie, Wien, 2007, p. 85.
[11] In "Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam" written by de Boer in 1901 a chapter is titled "Die treuen Brüder von Basra". De Boer, Tijtze, *Die Philosophie im Islam*, Fromann, Stuttgart 1901, p. 76. In "Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Philosophie. Geschichte und Gegenwart" written by Hendrich in 2005 we find "Die lauteren Brüder von Basra". Hendrich, Geert, *Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Philosophie. Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Campus, Frankfurt a.M., 2005, p. 74.
[12] "*Der zweite Logos des großen Seth*" (NHC VII, 2), in: NHL, p. 369. To call a fellow "brother" was in these communities reflected in a spiritual sense: "For not without reason have I called you

my brother, although you are not my brother materially." "*Die (erste) Apokalypse des Jakobus*" (NHC V, 3), in: Robinson, James N., The Nag Hammadi Library in English (NHL), p. 262.

13 Quintern, Detlev, Ramahi, Kamal, *Qarmaṭen und Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ. Gerechtigkeitsbewegungen im Kalifat der Abbāsiden und die Universalistische Geschichtstheorie*, Theorie und Praxis, Hamburg, 2006, 289. See also Hamdani, Abbas, *Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi and the Brethren of Purity*, in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Oct., 1978), University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. 345.

14 "Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ haben das gesamte Wissenschaftsspektrum ihrer Zeit erfasst, weiterentwickelt und in dieser Vollständigkeit in der Geistesgeschichte erstmalig zu einer Systematik geordnet, integriert und zu einem einheitlichen Erkenntnisgebäude konzipiert. Zu ihren Methoden der Beweisführung zählen Empirie (Erfahrungsbereich), Mathematik, formale Logik und Analogien." Khella, Karam, *Arabische und Islamische Philosophie und ihr Einfluß auf das europäische Denken*, Hamburg, Theorie und Praxis, 2006, p. 102.

15 Al-Farūqī, Ismʿaīl Rāgī, *On the Ethics of the Bretheren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Ṣafa wa khillan al-wafā)*, Muslim World, No. 50, Hartford, 1960, reprinted in: Islamic Philosophy, Vol. 21, *Ikhwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ wa-khilān al-wafā* (2nd half 4th/10 cent.), Text and studies, II, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, p. 329.

16 "*Die Lehren des Silvanus*" (NHC VII, 4), in: Robinson, James N., The Nag Hammadi Library in English (NHL), 384.

17 Ibid., p. 383.

18 Ibid., p. 388.

19 According to Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ Christ is regarded as one prophet in the continuity of prophecy. Lootfy Levonian translated and pointed out the stories of Christ, His praying, crucifixion and resurrection in the corpus according to the 1928 Cairo edition (vol. IV, pages 94ff), in: Lootfy Levonian, *Ikhwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ and Christ,* in: The Muslim World, reprinted in, Islamic Philosophy, Vol. 20, Sezgin, Fuat (Ed.), *Rasāʿil Ikhwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ wa-khilān al-wafā* (2nd half 4th/10 cent.), Text and studies, II, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, p. 226.

20 "Die Gelehrten und Philosophen (hukuma) der Einheitsbekenner haben die Prinzipien alles Existierenden und die Wurzeln der Schöpfung untersucht. Die Dualisten stießen auf die doppelt vorhandenen Dinge. Die Christen auf die dreifach vorhandenen. Die Naturwissenschaften auf die vierfach vorhandenen, andere, die Ḫurramīya auf die fünffach vorhandenen, andere, die Philosophen, auf die sechsfach vorhandenen, die Bāṭiniten auf die siebenfach vorhandenen, die Leute, die sich mit der Musik beschäftigen auf die achtfach vorhandenen und die Leute aus Indien auf die neunfach vorhandenen. Jede Gruppe übertrieb ihre Entdeckung, sie wurde leidenschaftlich davon eingenommen und interessierte sich für nichts anderes mehr. Die pythagoreischen Weisen gaben (jedoch) jedem sein Recht. Sie sagten: Die vorhandenen Dinge entsprechen der Natur der Zahl." Susanne, Diwald: *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie. Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ (III). Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1975, p. 102. Susanne Diwald's translation of part III is based on the Istanbul manuscript ms. Atif 1681.

21 Heisenberg emphasized the scientific revolution in substantiating the universe on the abstraction of the number: "the Pythagorean discovery belongs to the strongest impulses of human sciences altogether… When in a musical harmony…the mathematical structure is realized as the essential core, in this way also the sensible order of our surrounding nature has its basis in the mathematical core of the laws of nature." ["'die pythagoreische Entdeckung gehört zu den stärksten Impulsen menschlicher Wissenschaft überhaupt … Wenn in einer musikalischen Harmonie … die mathematische Struktur als Wesenskern erkannt wird, so auch die sinnvolle

Ordnung der uns umgebenden Natur ihren Grund in dem mathematischen Kern der Naturgesetze haben.'"] Heisenberg quoted in: Böhlig, Alexander, *Gnosis und Synkretismus*, Teil 1, Tübingen, 1989, p. 351.

[22] 2008 is the year of mathematics in Germany. Universities, Museums and educational institutions are invited to popularize the understanding of mathematics. E.g. the Heinz-Nixdorf-Museum in Paderborn created an exhibition-section of mathematical structures in nature.

[23] Quintern, Detlev, Ramahi, Kamal, *Qarmaṭen und Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ*, p. 304.

[24] Due to the universalistic theory of history, which integrates the long-time and universal dimension of history, it is possible to follow the waves of ideas from the gnosis to *Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ*. See: Khella, Karam, Die universalistische Geschichts- und Erkenntnistheorie, Theorie und Praxis, Hamburg, 2008.

[25] "If we are determined to the knowledge of the true facts of all existents. . ., then we must first of all begin with the knowledge of ourselves, for it approaches us the closest." ["Wenn wir zur Erkenntnis der wahren Sachverhalte alles Existierenden entschlossen sind . . ., dann müssen wir zuerst mit unserer eigenen Erkenntnis beginnen, denn sie liegt uns am nächsten."] Diwald, Susanne: *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie. Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ (III). Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1975, p. 71.

[26] Dieterici, Friedrich, *Die sogenannte Theologie des Aristoteles*, Leipzig, 1882, reprinted by Rodopi, 1965, Amsterdam. Against this background new research results point up, that the reception of Aristotle was of Plotin's origin. Plotin discussed Aristotle in the *Enneads*, a part which later seemed to be "Theology of Aristotle". Peter Adams emphasized that, "the so-called 'Theology of Aristotle' is itself only a part of an Original, larger paraphrase of the Enneads. It is now usually thought that this appearance was authored by a member of al Kindī's circle in ninth-century Baghdad." Adamson, Peter, "Aristotelianism and the Soul in the Arabic Plotinus", Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 2, January 2001, University of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania, 2001, p. 212.

[27] "As reason from God, so soul arises from reason as an intelligent substance but with darker vision and essence for it does not behold its object in itself but in reason. It is at one point facing the higher, reason, at another point the lower, sensuality. We have here the same sequence of potencies as with Plotinus and agree 1.2.3. entirely." ["Wie die Vernunft aus Gott, so geht aus der Vernunft die Seele hervor als ein intelligentes Wesen, aber mit dunklerem Schauen und Wesen, denn sie schaut ihr Object nicht in sich, sondern in der Vernunft. Sie ist einmal dem Höheren, der Vernunft, einmal dem Niederen, der Sinnlichkeit zugewandt. Wir haben hier dieselbe Reihenfolge der Potenzen wie bei Plotin, und stimmen 1. 2. 3. vollständig überein."] Dieterici, Friedrich, *Die philosophischen Bestrebungen der lauteren Brüder*, cit. Zeitschrift der Deutsch Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Heft 15, Jg. 1861, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1861, p. 582.

[28] "Der Intellekt (ʿaql) ist das Erste und Edelste (wāšrafā), was der Schöpfer – groß ist sein Name – in die Existenz gerufen (auǧada) hat, dann folgt die Seele (an-nafs) und danach die Hyle (al-hayūlā). Der Intellekt ist eine geistige Substanz (ǧauhar rūḥānī), welche aus dem Schöpfer emaniert ist. Die Seele ist eine geistige Substanz (ǧauhar rūḥānūya), welche aus dem Intellekt emaniert ist. Sie hat Dauer, ist vollendet, aber nicht vollkommen. Die Materie (al-hayūlā al-ūlā) ist eine geistige Substanz, welche aus der Seele emaniert ist. Sie besitzt Dauer, ist aber weder vollendet, noch vollkommen." Susanne, Diwald: *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie. Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ (III). Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1975, p. 53.

[29] "In der Zusammensetzung des Menschen sind alle geistigen Inhalte (maʿāni) der einfachen und zusammengesetzten Dinge enthalten, die bereits angeführt wurden. Denn der Mensch ist aus einem groben, leiblichen Körper und einer einfachen, geistigen Seele zusammengesetzt. Deshalb

nennen die Philosophen (ḥūkama) den Menschen einen Mikrokosmos (ʿalam ṣaġrīr) und die Welt einen Makranthropos." Ibid. p. 71.

30 "Die Menschenstufe wird, da sie die Fundgrube aller Vortrefflichkeit und die Quelle aller Tugenden ist, nicht von einer Tierart, sondern nur von mehreren ihrem Wesen nach erschöpft. In der Form des Leibes kommt ihr der Affe nah, im Charakter das edle Pferd. Ferner steht ihm der Menschenvogel (zahme) d.i. die Taube, dann der einsichtige Elefant und der mit vielen Lauten, Weisen und Klängen versehene Sprosser und Papagei nah, dann aber besonders die Biene in ihrer feinen Kunst, sowie ähnliche Tiere." Dieterici, Friedrich, *Der Darwinismus im zehnten Jahrhundert und neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, Hinrichs, Leipzig, 1878, p. 226.

31 ". . . denn Gott der Erhabene spricht nur das Wahre und tut nur das Gute, bemühe Dich also, ihm darin zu gleichen." Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ cit. Hein, Christel, *Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie. Von der spätantiken Einleitungsliteratur zur arabischen Enzyclopädie*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M., Bern, New York, 1985, p. 120.

32 Al-Farūqī, Ismʿaīl Rāgī, *On the Ethics of the Bretheren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Ṣafa wa khillan al-wafā)*, Muslim World, No. 50, Hartford, 1960, cit. Islamic Philosophy, Vol. 21, *Ikhwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ wa-khilān al-wafā* (2nd half 4th/10 cent.), Text and studies, II, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, p. 337.

33 Jusufji, D.H., *The Forty-Third Treatise of the Ikhwān al-ṣafa*, cit. ibid, p. 226.

34 Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ cit. Netton, Richard Ian, *Al-Farabi and his school*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 35.

35 Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ cit. Rosenthal, Franz, Knowledge Triumphant, The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, Brill, Leiden, 1970, p. 104.

36 Al-Farūqī, Ismʿaīl Rāgī, *On the Ethics of the Bretheren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Ṣafa wa khillan al-wafā)*, cit. Islamic Philosophy, Vol. 21, *Ikhwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ wa-khilān al-wafā* (2nd half 4th/10 cent.), Text and studies, II, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, p. 340.

37 Quintern, Detlev, Ramahi, Kamal, *Qarmaṭen und Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ* , Theorie und Praxis, Hamburg, 2006, p. 386.

38 "Diese Vernunft, durch die der Mensch die Dinge erfaßt, verhält sich zu der ersten Vernunft, der der erhabene und allmächtige Gott geschaffen hat, wie das Licht zur Sonne; denn diese Arten von Vernunft gelten nur in Bezug auf Personen. Jene (die erste Vernunft) ist absolut und ohne Verbindung (zu irgendeiner Person). Von seiten der Vernunft liegt der Beweis für ihre Bedeutsamkeit darin, daß durch sie allein diesseitiges und jenseitiges Glück erreicht werden können. Wie könnte sie nicht das Bedeutsamste aller Dinge sein. Abū-Ḥamīd Muḥammad al Ghazālī, *Das Kriterium des Handelns, Mizān al-ʿamal*, aus dem Arabischen übers. mit einer Einleitung, mit Anmerkungen und Indices herausgegeben von ʿAbd-Elṣamad ʿAbd-Elḥamīd Elschazlī, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 2006, p. 185.

39 Grunebaum, Gustav Edmund., *Concept and Function of Reason in Islamic Ethics*, Oriens, Vol. 15, Dec. 31, 1962, Brill, 1962, p. 8.

40 "Das unter dem Mondkreis vorhandene zerfällt in zwei Arten: in Einfaches und Zusammengesetztes. Einfach sind die vier Elemente Feuer, Luft, Wasser, Erde. Zusammengesetzt sind die Produkte Thier, Pflanze, Mineral. Das Mineral war früher im Sein als die Pflanze, nach derselben folgt das Thier, dann der Mensch." Dieterici, Friedrich, *Die Anthropologie der Araber im 10. Jahrhundert n. Chr.*, Hinrichs, Leipzig, 1871, p. 58.

41 "Derjenige, der die Prinzipien der existierenden Dinge untersuchen will, um sie in ihren wahren Sachverhalten (ḥaqāʾiq) zu erkennen, muß sich vorher mit den Prinzipien des Körperlichen, sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren (al-ūmur al-maḥsūsa) befassen, um seinen Verstand

dadurch zu üben und seine Auffassungsgabe für die Untersuchungen der Prinzipien des mit dem Verstand Wahrnehmbaren (al-ūmur al-ma'qūla) dadurch zu stärken." Susanne, Diwald: *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie. Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ (III). Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1975, p. 48.

[42] Khella, Karam, *Arabisch-islamische Philosophie und ihr Einfluß auf das europäische Denken*, Theorie und Praxis, Hamburg, 2006, p. 145.

[43] Dieterici, Friedrich: *Die Anthropologie der Araber im 10. Jahrhundert n. Chr.*, Hinrichs, Leipzig, 1871, p. 35.

[44] Susanne, Diwald: *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie. Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ (III). Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1975, p. 94.

[45] Khella, Karam, *Arabisch-islamische Philosophie und ihr Einfluß auf das europäische Denken*, Theorie und Praxis, Hamburg, 2006, p. 161.

[46] "Sie ist eine Kontrollinstanz über die Vernunft. Die Synderesis ist weder eine zweite noch ein Ersatz für die Vernunft. Sie ist ihre moralische Kontrollinstanz. Sie beobachtet die Denkschritte und die Konsequenzen ihrer praktischen Umsetzung nach ethischen Kriterien. Sie begleitet die Aufbereitung von Plänen und prüft ihre Umsetzung." Khella, Karam, *Die Philosophie Afrikas aus universalistischer Sicht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Ägyptens*, in: Bouba, Aissatou, Quintern, Detlev, *Das Bild von Afrika. Von kolonialer Einbildung zu transkultureller Verständigung*, Trier, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, p. 57.

[47] Davidson, Thomas, "The Brothers of Sincerity, *International Journal of Ethics,*" No. 8, Philadelphia, 1898, *Rasāʿil Ikhwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ wa-khilān al-wafā* (2nd half 4th/10 cent.), cit. Islamic Philosophy, Vol. 21, *Ikhwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ wa-khilān al-wafā* (2nd half 4th/10 cent.), Text and studies, II, collected and reprinted by Fuat Sezgin, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, p. 96.

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SECTION TWO

SEYYED MOHAMMED KHAMENEI

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL: REASON AND SPIRIT

Abstract: There are so many definitions for the reason and the spirit in both Islamic philosophy and old and new Western philosophies that one is reminded of the story of the elephant in darkness. Therefore, a study of the relationships between them will give rise to some questions and problems. It seems that more research is required concerning the relation between the spirit and reason, which has mainly been defined as wisdom, a faculty, or a predisposition, particularly in terms of the perfection of *intellectus materialis*. The present paper mainly deals with the quality of the reason-spirit relation, specifically concerning the role of the trans-substantial motion (Mulla Sadra's theory) in the above perfection.

1. INTRODUCTION

Before beginning the discussion of reason and spirit, it is necessary to define these two terms. The difficulty here arises from the fact that none of them has a clear definition. Indeed, since the time of ancient Greece until now, various definitions have been provided for them; however, they are so different from each other that one is reminded of the ironic story of "the elephant in the darkness". Accordingly, it is very difficult to discuss them accurately. In this paper, we have limited our discussion of reason and spirit mainly to the related views in Islamic philosophy and, particularly, Mulla Sadra's theory in this regard.

In Islamic philosophy, the word *reason* is usually used as an equivalent for '*aqql*; however, the latter is also considered as an equivalent for the word *intellect*. Therefore, in comparative philosophy, one must always be careful not to confuse them with each other. Nowadays, in Islamic philosophy, in order to avoid this confusion, the word *reason* is sometimes translated as particular or terrestrial *'aqql* and the word *intellect* as universal or heavenly reason.

In order to open the discussion of reason and spirit, it is useful to refer to the different meanings and explanations of the word '*aqql*, the most well-known of which are as follows.

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 71–81.

1.1. Reason

A. Reason is a faculty that can arrive at new answers and conclusions based on the given data and experiences. In the logical sense of the word, it can lead us from evident propositions to optimal theoretical ones and function as a means for solving philosophical and scientific problems. This is sometimes called *theoretical* reason or the knower's reason.

B. Reason is an essential wisdom in human beings which distinguishes between good and evil, and the truth and false. This reason has practical and social applications and is discussed in philosophy and ethics. It is called *practical reason* or administrative reason. Philosophers believe that these two types of reason (theoretical and practical) are not completely different from each other and see a kind of logical relationship between them. They also maintain that they depend on each other.

By inspirations from the Holy Qur'an, Islamic philosophers have based their discussions on these two meanings of reason because in the Qur'an people are invited to use their intellect, think, and activate their power of logical reasoning. In Islamic philosophy, thinking is defined as the move of man's mind from the given data and knowledge towards an answer to the unknown; in other words, a move from evident propositions towards the required theoretical ones.

The Qur'an has also frequently referred to the use of reason in distinguishing goodness from badness and has sometimes called it *wisdom*. Therefore, in this Holy Book reason has two meanings and two functions. Muslim philosophers have been greatly inspired by the Qur'anic views in this regard, and Muslim Peripatetic philosophers have also agreed with them. Since the time of Aristotle, four levels, which have also been discussed in Islamic philosophy, have been considered for theoretical reason, i.e. a faculty that can acquire knowledge and develop it. These four levels are as follows:

1. *Material reason*, which, as defined by Ibn Sina and the philosophers succeeding him, is the same pure disposition for having knowledge and is potential.[1]
2. *Reason by Proficiency,* which means the mind's power for acquiring new knowledge based on apriori data or background knowledge.[2] Muslim philosophers have sometimes equated material reason and reason by proficiency with each other.[3]
3. *Reason in Act,* which means a mind abounding in knowledge and ready for paying attention (intentionality).
4. *Acquired reason,* which refers to the active part of the human mind and is, in fact, one of the faculties of the soul. In case of the need to acquire new knowledge, it can resort to the reservoir of background knowledge and, in other words, pay attention to his intended subject (intentionality). By

formulating premises for logical syllogisms based on the given data, it can also arrive at answers to questions and solve philosophical problems.

If this process of inference and search for answers concerns scientific and theoretical problems and issues, it will be related to the domain of theoretical reason; however, if it concerns the distinctions between good and evil, beautiful and ugly, virtue and vice, and goodness and corruption, it will be related to the domain of practical reason.

Through an accurate analysis of these types of reason, we can claim that the Aristotelian division of reason lacks precision because his material reason is not reason in the real sense of the word. Rather, it is a negative, non-existential entity and a kind of pure disposition. Reason by proficiency is also a kind of mental readiness for receiving knowledge and is considered, in Mulla Sadra's words, "the acquisition power".[4] Farabi also believes that material reason and reason by proficiency are both the same potential reason[5] rather than two independent things.

Aristotle's actual reason is not reason in the common sense of the word; rather, it is a kind of so-called data-bank or "package of the knowledge existing in the mind". In fact, it consists of man's background knowledge. Hence, the Aristotelian classification of reason does not contribute much to our understanding of the issue. The only component of Aristotle's four-fold classification which can be viewed as an equivalent to reason or intellect is the same acquired reason, which enjoys actuality and active presence in the soul (psyche). Some have referred to it as "permanent intentionality" or an entity leading to actual wisdom (*noüs* poletichos). Actual wisdom in Peripatetic philosophy is the very beyond-this-world element that is the origin of all supreme knowledge, scientific discoveries, and creativities. The issue of actual wisdom and its role in epistemology have been forgotten to a great extent in modern Western philosophy. They have also been rejected apriori in empiricist, positivist, and similar schools. Later we will see that if we omit the theory of the relationship between acquired reason and the actual universal reason, which highlights the difference between the human mind and computers, in this classification, the human mind would not be much different from a machine. Consequently, we will face many difficulties in dealing with epistemological problems.

In Islamic philosophy, reason is discussed mainly as a part of the entire world and in relation to it. In other words, it apparently exists in the human species—or even in each human individual—as an independent and self-sufficient reality, can offer its views in both theoretical and practical areas, and guide the human mind and soul in both theoretical and practical wisdom. However, because of man's dependence on the world, his natural structure, and his active presence as a part of the world and an institution in the entire cosmic system, it is logical to assume that man's reason enjoys a kind of organizational relation with a

universal center or cosmic and beyond-matter (actual wisdom) reason and can receive a series of realities through this connection.

In this view, this universal or actual intellect or, according to the philosophers of ancient Iran, *Ravanbakhsh* (life-giving intellect), is the administrator of the world, the source of motion, and the guide of man's thought and truth-seeking instinct. It is this universal faculty that helps the human mind and leads him at every step towards gaining the knowledge of the world, coming into harmony with it, acquiring the knowledge of realities (and nomena), and moving past phenomena. It also contributes to his spiritual and intellectual perfection. It is based on this mental and organic relation between man and the world (actual reason) that he can go through developmental stages in the course of his life and exit the circle of animal attributes.[6] Mulla Sadra and some other philosophers have called these stages the second and third stages of birth,[7] and, sometimes, as the first man, the second man, and the third man.[8]

In most Western philosophical schools, reason is usually viewed as an independent and sometimes a material entity needless of a relation with any immaterial supreme origin. That is why they sometimes mix epistemology with the physiology of the mind and brain. Nevertheless, in Islamic philosophy, the material and immaterial worlds are related to each other in an integrated system.

Considering the above definition of reason (nöus), it becomes clear why since ancient times until now it has been used in Islamic gnosis in two different meanings, namely, as a human faculty and as an immaterial and cosmic truth that conforms to the concept of macrocosmos and can introduce the realities of the world, whether ontological or epistemological, to human beings and guide their intellect.

1.2. Spirit

The disagreements between new Western philosophies, on the one hand, and Islamic and Greek philosophies, on the other, concerning spirit are no less than those related to the issue of reason. Nowadays, the word *spirit* has replaced the Greek word psyche.

Possibly by the introduction of the word spirit in Islamic philosophy and theology (here, spirit means both the human soul, breathing, and being air-like), this word (derived from the Latin *Spiritus*, meaning fairy and jinni) became later common in the Middle Age philosophy and theological philosophy.

In ancient Greece, in order to refer to spirit in its modern sense, they sometimes used the word *noüs* (which was mainly employed in the sense of the intellect or the first substance). Accordingly, it was used as a synonym to *logos*.

In new Western definitions, the word spirit is sometimes used as a synonym to "soul" and sometimes in other meanings, such as any immaterial object, or as an antonym to body or corpse (mainly in psychology). In the latter sense, spirit has been introduced as the cause of life in animate beings.[9]

The word spirit (*rooh*) has also been used in different meanings in Islamic philosophy. Some believe that it is the very energy resulting from the activities of the body organism (temperament). This meaning is apparently the legacy of Alexandrian physicians and the translations of Gustav, the son of Luke, from Greek into Arabic.[10] Muslim theologians mainly considered spirit as a synonym to the soul[11] and sometimes equated it with life (the human soul) in terms of meaning.

According to *Ishraqi* (Illuminationist) philosophers, spirit is an immaterial and independent entity having descended from above. Basically, they viewed it as an immaterial existent which is created before the human body and accompanies it after its creation, makes it alive, and leads it towards perfection.[12] They also introduced it, sometimes, as an existent higher than other existents and an intermediary between God and other existents in the process of creation.[13] This idea was very close to that of pre-Socratic philosophers.

In the view of Iranian Muslim philosophers, spirit is the cause of life in human beings and the essence of their intellect and perception, particularly, in terms of universal concepts (rational issues). They also call it the rational soul. In some cases, spirit is considered as the essence of man's rationality and, to some extent, equal to it. It is also viewed as something beyond and separated from the feelings, emotions, and instincts shared by human beings and animals.

The disagreements concerning the definition of spirit were rooted in the different ideas of different schools in this regard. Moreover, the existing debates among Muslims were rooted in their use of translated Greek books. However, later Iranian philosophers and all the Muslim and sufist Illuminationist philosophers have considered spirit (*rooh*) as an immaterial and disengaged reality and the origin of man's spiritual development, as well as man's connection with the immaterial world.

In the Holy Qur'an, the word *rooh* (spirit) has been used in two ways: 1. with the definite article *al*, and 2. without it in connection to a pronoun or noun (*roohi—roohana*). "*Al-rooh*" is the name of the unique noble angel mediating between God and His creatures. This is a general and unique word (similar to *logos*); however, "*rooh*" (without the definite article) is a life-giving and personal existent that has been sent from God, and there are as many spirits (*roohs*) in the world as there are human beings.[14] This Qur'anic definition has influenced the Islamic culture and philosophy and is accepted by Muslim philosophers.

Although reason and spirit are examined as two different phenomena, an accurate study of these two entities begins when we study their meeting point, that is, human beings. Man is a phenomenon that, while being obvious, is extremely ambiguous and even unknown.

Unlike the justifications of physicists, not only the origin of the creation and development of man, but also even his anatomy and physiology are unknown (*inconnue*)[15] to experts. For example, scholars have not scientifically experimented on the "chakras" and energy circuits in the body (Chinese medicine) yet.

When the time comes to know the spirit and its immaterial aspects, such as thought, will, inspiration, and the like, it becomes much more difficult to know man. Therefore, we will postpone the knowledge or introduction of man to another time and merely deal with the reason-spirit relation and its place in human beings.

1.3. Reason-Spirit Relation

There is no unanimity concerning the real relationship between reason and spirit. Generally speaking, we can refer to three ideas in this regard.

First, reason and spirit, in spite of their differences in meaning and form, in fact refer to the same thing. This assumption has had its own advocates. For example, we have previously seen that Anaxagoras and Stoics, even Plotinus, equated *noüs*, which philosophers considered to be the same as reason, with *logos* and viewed it as the intermediary in the process of creation. Plato also used *noüs* generally in the sense of the first reason (or the same intermediary of creation) in his *Republic*.

Second, reason and spirit are two completely different things with different characteristics. This idea is more common today.

Third, while being separate from each other in terms of meaning and essence, there is a logical relation and connection between reason and spirit. For example, reason is considered one of the faculties of the spirit and a part of its reality.

Based on the third theory, which is accepted by Islamic philosophy, man's spirit, in addition to being the essence of his life and being, controls all of his perceptions, which also include his reason. Therefore, reason is one of the inner and intangible faculties of spirit, and the developmental changes of reason directly help to the development of spirit and affect it.

According to the theory of Peripatetics, who believe that spirit and the soul are the same, this process always accompanies matter. Reason and the perfections of spirit or the soul arise from man's sense experience during his life, and

this process begins with matter (that is, the body) and moves in a direct and linear fashion forwards towards perfection.

Nevertheless, according to Illuminationists' theory, which is rooted in the "Khusrawani" Wisdom of ancient Iran, the development of spirit and its relation with reason are not direct and linear; rather, they are circular. Hence, spirit initially comes in a descending motion from the higher pole (heaven) towards the lower pole (man's material body) and, after a shared journey with the body, continues its ascending and perfectional motion.

This circular line, the lowest level of which is the material point, i.e. the meeting point of the body and spirit, and the highest level of which is beyond matter and in the firmaments, while revealing the beginning point of man's life, that is, matter, also reveals his relation with the world above.

Therefore, the human spirit, which is created by and originated in the exalted holy spirit or *logos*, not only enjoys the possibility to connect to the heavenly spirit and obtain knowledge and realities from Him, but also, like that holy spirit, has the power of creativity and is responsible for the administration of the body and all of its faculties.

The means and faculty by which the human spirit attains new knowledge and obtains the realities and teachings from the active intellect is **reason**. Along with spirit, it is the intermediary between the terrestrial spirit and heavenly spirit (the universal and active intellect). This mediation or relation is of various levels.

The lowest level of relation to the holy and active intellect entails guessing and similar perceptions, and the highest level entails revelation, which is exclusively for the prophets. Between these two levels, there are gnostic intuitions and even poetic and artistic inspirations.

In this school, spirit is an immaterial and heavenly reality and is, therefore, not pure potency. It enjoys actuality and has some knowledge that is called apriori knowledge. According to this theory, from the beginning of his life, man possesses some knowledge in relation to this world, and instruction is a means by which he remembers his background knowledge.

This theory has been detailed more logically in ancient Iranian gnosis and Plotinus's gnosis. Later it was accepted in two other Iranian schools of philosophy, namely, those of Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra and developed an ontological and epistemological form. According to these schools, there is an immaterial reality which can be called "the universal spirit" in the world and beyond the material world. It is the same intermediary between God and His creatures in creation and their material and spiritual growth and development; the same thing that was called "*Ravanbakhsh*" in ancient Iranian philosophy, and can be considered the same Peripatetic "active intellect" and even the Holy Spirit and Gabriel in the Qur'an and other religious books.

This immaterial and heavenly reality is the "active reason or cosmic spirit", which not only is the cause of creation, but also leads them to nature's purpose of creation. The human spirit is created from this spirit; hence, it is not only the cause of life in his body, but also the administrator of its process of development.

In this view, because of this very closeness between man's substance of spirit and the exalted spirit and their natural relation, provided that he is in harmony with that universal spirit or active intellect and is pure from material contaminations, he can have a spiritual relation and connection with the exalted spirit and, in this way, attain knowledge.

2. MULLA SADRA'S THEORY

In order to understand Mulla Sadra's theory (in terms of the reason-spirit relation), we must initially pay attention to the fundamental principles of his philosophy. He based his philosophy on three fundamental principles: the principiality of existence, the gradation of existence, and the flowing motion of the substance of objects (the trans-substantial motion of matter). According to the theory of the principiality of existence, existence (its reality rather than its mental concept) is not an entity abstracted from the differences in the ontological levels of existents.[16] Based on the principle of the gradation of existence, external existents (such as lamp light) are of various degrees; hence, they are gradational and prone to qualitative growth, and each external existent enjoys a specific level of that existence.[17] Finally, according to the principle of the trans-substantial motion, the substance of the world of matter is in flux and becoming, and as Heraclites said, "No flower can be smelt twice."

Mulla Sadra's idea concerning the creation of the soul is different from those of Plato and Aristotle. Plato believed that the soul is an independent, disengaged, and heavenly existent that comes to the Earth in order to administer the body. Aristotle and Peripatetics maintained that the soul is created simultaneously with but separately from the body and accompanies it until death.

However, Mulla Sadra believes that the soul is originated in the body and grows along with the developmental growth of the body and, then, separates its way from it and becomes independent. Although he sometimes completely distinguishes the spirit from the soul,[18] in some cases he uses them interchangeably and in the same sense. In this way, like Plato, he equates the spirit with the soul.[19]

Based on the above principles, at the beginning of creation, each person enjoys a specific quantity and share of existence; nevertheless, by his natural and essential motion, which includes the growth of the body and soul, and the

spirit of both of them, he gradually moves up from the lower levels of existence and traverses the way towards perfection. The soul, spirit, reason, and other realities belonging to man's existence also share in this process of becoming and development.

The soul, spirit and reason (as the symbols of each human being), following the trans-substantial motion of matter, which is an essential and spontaneous motion, are in flux and traverse a specific road in order to attain more perfection and a deserving station.[20]

In Mulla Sadra's school, the growth and development of man's spirit and soul is only possible through developing and increasing his knowledge. In his view, existence and knowledge cannot be essentially included in the same category, and, like existence, knowledge (or science in its general sense) does not belong to the Aristotelian logical categories, either, and is higher than them. It is because of this symmetry that the perfection of *man's existence* is directly related to the *growth and perfection* of his knowledge.

Accordingly, the more man adds to his treasure of knowledge and experience, the more complete his existence will be. Likewise, following existence, his quiddity, which is an abstract entity and is abstracted from the dimensions of existence, increases. As a result, the growth of human knowledge leads to a change in his infinite quiddity, and this process makes man greater and more perfect in terms of his spiritual dimensions at each moment.

In the same way that the addition of construction materials makes a building bigger and more complete, intellection and learning lead to man's perfection, growth, and gradation in terms of existence, i.e. his spirit. This is because man's life and existence originate in his spirit, which functions as the main variable in a living person. The material body and its changes depend on the changes in spirit,[21] which, in turn, depend on the becoming of reason, which is one of the faculties of the soul or spirit, in man.

In other words, spirit has various faculties, and the one whose role is the acquisition of knowledge is called reason.[22]According to this point of view, reason is the cause of man's growth of knowledge and, in fact, the engine of the motion and becoming of the soul or spirit. It helps the growth and perfection of man and his spirit and, at every step, adds a level to the levels of man's existence.

Given the above points, we can discover the relation between reason and spirit in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. The task of reason (as one of the faculties of the soul) is to acquire knowledge through obtaining experience and connecting with the cosmic spirit or active intellect. This continuous motion of reason is the cause of man's spiritual perfection and ontological growth and, like an engine, leads to the becoming of the soul and spirit, which accompany and dominate the trans-substantial motion of matter and are responsible for it.

As long as man's disengaged spirit is in the body, it is limited by time, which, in Mulla Sadra's view, is nothing but the cosmic and continuous motion of the substance of matter. The impact of time and becoming on the spirit is the same provision of the opportunity for scientific and rational growth, through which the human spirit attains its perfectional purpose. Islamic gnosis believes in the Platonic spirit and maintains that the reason for the descent of the disengaged spirit and its accompanying the body is its promotion. They say that the immaterial spirit needs the body, which is material, in order to promote its ontological level. This is because it is alongside the becoming of the body and its material time-creating motion that it can have a gradational motion and go beyond what it is.

Mulla Sadra's philosopher student, Mulla Abdulrazzaq Lahiji states the same issue in a poem in which he assimilates man to the earthly mould of the body and a trap or workshop for substantial perfection so that the earthly small bird, at the end of its residence in the body and staying with its matter, turns into a high-flying mythical bird and reaches the peak of its choice.

The reason of the descent of spirit from the immaterial world (*Malakut*) to the material world is believed to be the acquisition of more perfection. Philosophers usually maintained that the transfer of the separate spirit, which is higher than the material existent, into the body, which is material, is incorrect and illogical because they assumed that the separate spirit has done a regressive motion. Nevertheless, the advocates of this theory believe that in this motion and transfer spirit does not go through a regressive motion and does not leave immateriality. Rather, it increases its level of immateriality through the material and developmental motion of the body, and this time the small bird of Dominion (*Malakut*) turns into a mythical bird, flies high into the sky, and lands at the highest place possible.

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NOTES

1 *al-Asfar*, Mulla Sadra, vol. 3, p. 454, Sadra Islamic Philosophy Institute, 2004.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 485, quoted from Farabi.
4 *al-Asfar*, vol. 3, p. 419.
5 Ibid.
6 We can see the similar idea in the philosophies of ancient East, e.g. in Hindu Philosophy (Dharma).
7 *al-Asfar*, Mulla Sadra.
8 *al-Asfar*, about Alexander of Aphrodisias.
9 André Lalande Dictionary.

[10] Mulla Sadra, *al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah*, p. 237, Publication of Sadra Islamic Philosophy Institute.
[11] Ibn Hazm, *al-Fisal*, vol. 5, p. 93.
[12] Mulla Sadra, op. cit., p. 318.
[13] *Asrar al-ayat*, p. 50.
[14] Seyyed Mohammed Khamenei, *Spirit and the Soul*.
[15] Alexis Karel, *L'Homme, cet Inconnu*.
[16] The quiddity of an object marks its ontological limits and boundaries.
[17] In another place, reference has been made to the difference between the absolute real existence and other existents (*al-Asfar*).
[18] *Asrar al-ayat*, *taraf* 2, *mashhad* 1, p. 147.
[19] Ibid., *taraf* 2, *mashhad* 2, *tanbih*. The orthodox advocates of Mulla Sadra might not agree with this idea; however, following a critical approach, it is difficult to accept the hypothesis of the materiality of the createdness of the soul without accepting the interference of the spirit.
[20] Ibid., p. 145.
[21] Similar to the roles of the variable and function in mathematics.
[22] Here, reason can be considered to be the same as the Peripatetic acquired reason, and the method of its acquisition of knowledge is to connect with the spirit of the world, the cosmic spirit, or the macroanthropos to whom all types of knowledge lead. Of course, in a more accurate sense, the word intellect here is more suitable than reason.

KATHLEEN HANEY

LOGOS DIFFERENTIATING REASON AND SPIRIT IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

Abstract: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's philosophy of life has been unfolding in a series of works, beginning with the her three volume work, Logos and Life. This article examines her latest work on the Sacred Quest and show how it develops out of vital life into sentient life into the Human Condition. Due to the organic nature of Tymieniecka's work, the early stages along life's way are described so that the reader can recognize how the Logos has been striving for the Sacral. In the recent work we see that the Human Condition is a platform for a qualitatively novel mode of being that turns out to have been the telos that has continually though surreptiously motivated the development of life. The Logos of Life is the engine that drives its advance, but this Logos is not to be confused with Reason. The Logos of Life serves as the reason for Reason in the bounty of Spirit.

Whether deliberately or inevitably, Tymieniecka's terms are fluid or even ambiguous, it would seem. Among the most egregious examples, though in the history of thought, Logos has been used to refer to a force, a principle of differentiation, the reason of reasons, the Word, the account, the logic, reason, the meaning of life, the First Emanation, Jesus, the Christ, the second person of the Trinity, Incarnate. Tymieniecka's use seems to contain all these possible meanings. Nevertheless, Spirit, as it functions in the Sacral Quest can be distinguished as a tributary within the streaming Logos of Life that leads to its telos.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's philosophy resonates with Oriental as well as Occidental philosophies. A Christian may read her latest works as a tribute to the inherent process that lead to discovery of the transcendental God, while a Muslim may find a more ready interpretation in the God he worships. The modern natural scientist may be at a loss to recognize the intelligibility that Tymieniecka finds in nature and the natural world. The human condition, for her, may crown life with self-awareness through self-individuating creative acts, but for her the human is not the measure of all life or its meaning. Though

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 83–91.

Tymieniecka's thought can contain divergent interpretations, the aim of this exposition is to bring forth the intentions of our author. As we can see, however, equivocations lurk around the margins.

This analysis takes on less difficult problems than attempting to confirm a single, dogmatic elucidation of Tymieniecka's nouveau phenomenology. Instead, we will concentrate on distinguishing Reason and Spirit. Since Spirit, *Geist*, has shown itself in the history of philosophy to be extraordinarily difficult to pin down, we turn first to Reason, which carries its own complications for the understanding.

Both Reason and Spirit present themselves to Tymieniecka as well understood as forces or motivations within the lifeforce. Before we can tease these notions apart, we must first examine them. Let us begin our study then by identifying the Logos of Life as the lifeforce that powers and directs being. Immediately, we must recognize that the path will be treacherous, since Logos may be a translation of Reason, while the Logos of Life enlivens Spirit, too. The Logos of Life must be larger than Reason, since it directs Spirit. Are the notions different since they include more or less of the fullness of being?

To answer this question, we must first review Tymieniecka's exposition of the Logos of Life.

PART 1

Not only our being, but all being is becoming in Tymieniecka's view. All being engages in ontopoesis—in making itself through the process of transcending itself, reaching out towards a world. Thus, being individuates itself through its "world" and "self" making even in the simple processes of determining sources of nourishment and mates, but especially in creative acts. The being that Tymieniecka analyzes is the being which we intuit in the sense that "to be means to be alive." Since her philosophical project is a metaphysical one, she turns first to the "spark of life." The play of atoms seems not to be controlled; however the interplay of all living beings reaches towards "dynamic consolidation in self-individualization." The power of the logos drives life towards ever more complications until it reaches its density in the individual human. The logos gathers up early instances of living being in order to incorporate them into the being that reflects on its being. This human life continuously opens itself to the world by means of its body. It grows in awareness of its world so that it is "from the inside out oriented toward close integration with the world's life's process." This awareness of being alive, participating by acting and being acted upon, is the only certain starting point for the existential affirmation that philosophy requires. Tymieniecka is quick to point out, nevertheless, that this awareness results from much living that prepares for it. Human

living enjoys flora and fauna which also reach upwards and outwards as they become their individual being within a nexus of interconnectivity. Only human creative efforts transmit the logos of life, nevertheless, and therefore function as the starting point for the analysis of logos. It is as if the logos thrusts towards its own self-understanding through and beyond its creative endeavors.

The power of the Logos of Life drives life towards ever more complexity until it reaches its peak in the individual human's guided efforts towards her self-individuation and transformation. Individuation may be enacted by the myriads of those past and present and future who uncover themselves as instantiations of the Human Condition. In these cases, pre-intentionality rises up from its sources behind it to grasp what is before it. This process has the structure that Husserl described as inner time consciousness. In Tymieniecka's expanded exposition, this consciousness is consciousness first of kronos time, the time of the natural attitude of the Intersubjective world, which strains towards kairic time.

Before the adventure of the Logos can really begin, the Logos must work though the early instances of living becoming in order to achieve the being that reflects on its being in kairic time. Self-reflection and the life of the spirit make this being its own personal being and, given certain conditions, capable of experiencing kairos as its temporality.

In one of the first stations on its journey, Logos, as lifeforce, assumes vital existence, basic sentient life (for life means sentience), which provides the pre-conditions of the fulfillment of the Logos of Life. Further vital spheres of existence emerge and open out in further development. Since our topic is differentiating reason from spirit, we must turn away from origin to telos. The Logos of Life drives the development of life from an unaccountable "spark of life," which Tymieniecka holds to be "the event of its manifestation in reality" (Tymieniecka 2007: 8) to the sense of being alive that provides certitude for philosophizing. This self-awareness of being in becoming expresses itself in human creative acts, which open up the function of ontopoetic life so that it can provide glimpses of what lies beyond it.

The great transformation of sense that occurs in the Human Condition leads through the introduction of a moral sense. In this view, the evolutionary path is not the exclusive business of one species or another adapting to its environment more efficiently. The story of the giraffe, for instance, told as lengthening neck equals greater access to leaves (especially those on higher branches) and greater success for the species in its survival demonstrates the limits of Darwinian conceptions of evolution. As philosophers, we all have wondered about the purpose of survival. So doing is, after all, an intrinsic element in the search for truth. The survival of the giraffe is doubtless important to the members of the species insofar as anything much can be predicated as "important"

to giraffes, but how can its survival have a larger significance? Certainly, the extraordinary giraffe fills a difficult niche in the great chain of being as well as being united in the unity of all that is, but now must we not look for the significance of the chain, beyond its ability to systematize and unify diversity as it manifests itself in reality? After all, what is the point of those activities anyway?

Such activities of reason for a philosopher of the likes of David Hume would encourage our illusion of fictive control over nature, no less than the baffling "laws of science," which in Hume's telling are but laws of psychology. Husserl, in his reflection on Hume's thought, adds that psychological laws themselves fall victim to the fate of all laws of science in Hume's view, insofar as they necessarily suffer from lack of justification.

In *Logos and Life,* Tymieniecka argued that cognitive experience does not exhaust the human potential for describing being and suggested "a truly 'Archimedean point' " for establishing theoretical order among its modes. As we have seen, she identified this point as life, in its acts of creation, but especially in human creation. Rather than an end in itself, human creativity serves as another platform for the passage of the Logos of Life. Significance itself comes into the world, which becomes a spiritual world of meaning, with the Imaginatio Creatrix. Imagination opens doors to bestow meanings and incarnate the spiritual. Without it, there can be no escape from merely vital significance.

The stage that follows is according to Tymieniecka, "the most surprising, if not enigmatic turn of the logos of life" (2007: 27). A force enters to shape being into an unimagined realm that can be conceived of and willed. This force pushes on to the new "sense giving factors": the intellective, the aesthetic and the moral senses. In particular, the emergent moral sense, "is the engine of the human project and carries within itself the germinal propulsions of the sacral quest" (2007: 29). The new factors move beyond survival into moral meaning.

In her later work, moral being achieves a stage in the human condition from which the sacral quest can itself properly begin. All prior stops have been dramatic elements of the human adventure, but the realization that others can and rightly do come first marks the first sight of the tributary that streams to the headwaters.

With the introduction of the Sacral Quest which exposes the spirit and the reason in some of its many senses, we pause here to interject a note. Tymieniecka's method may not be obvious, so a word should be said about it. She talks about interrogation as the path of reason. To my mind, this technique resonates with the zig zag movement whereby Husserl analyses the constitution of meaning. For Husserl, the destructive phase of the epoche, brought about thinking freely about anything but self-contradictions, excavates ground

zero. Reminiscent of Plato's philosopher who leaves the cave to return to it, the meaning subsequently constructed at ground zero can itself be torn down in order to construct a more useful, more beautiful or more truthful expression. Tymieniecka's questions rephrase some of Husserl's own. She too seeks the transcendentally necessary conditions for possibility. And, as we all know, without possibility there can be no actuality. Asking questions about possibility is thus tantamount to the epoche, but with an important difference from Husserl, it would seem. Husserl's Logos plumbs the depths of conscious intentionality, while Tymieniecka seeks to explore the phenomenon of life. In other words, for Husserl, Logos primarily restricts itself to consciousness, though it seeps out into affectivity in passive genesis and in his study of God. Tymieniecka folds consciousness into life, as a platform for the Logos of Life as it moves towards the Sacral Logos. Consciousness for her is neither all of life nor antithetical to life. It is an achievement of the lifeforce that we experience as being alive. For both Husserl and Tymieniecka, this experience finds its validation in the intuitive sense. No additional argument or justification is either possible or necessary.

PART 2

The above brief look at Tymieniecka's phenomenology shows that the Logos of Life actively functions in self-individuating life in all of its myriads of forms, but especially in the rational being that vital existence strives for. First passing through the stage of vital existence, in ontopoetic acts consciousness projects sense into meaningful products. The person engaged in doing so can take on authentic temporality. However, as Tymieniecka cautions us, we must "cover the ground of the transition from the vital to the human significance of life on the way to the Great Metamorphosis" (2007: 33). The vectors of Ontopoesis point in two directions: towards the product and towards its producer, so that ontopoesis has a dual intention, as long as it is governed by the Logos of Life. Spirit, the Sacral Logos, makes the person by constituting, though not constructing, the divine.

If the above was a picture of the macrocosm, let us again follow Plato to hope that we can better envision the unity of all that is alive through examining the microcosm. The Human Condition consists of body/mind (reason)/and spirit for Plato, Edith Stein and Freud and many other philosophers and theologians. In Tymieniecka's thought the body consists of vital life, the life of nutrition, reproduction and death. The mind or the reason embarks on the life of consciousness and thereby unwittingly discovers transcendence. The soul lives the life of the spirit, too. Life in the Human Condition rests on embodiment, but after death, the spirit is transformed in The Great Metamorphosis.

For a Christian thinker such as Edith Stein, the soul's life is slumbering or crippled until its temporal fullness is again embodied, but now in what Christians refer to as a glorified body. We do not hear about this from Tymieniecka. For her, the Human Condition begins in the life of the body, and a living body is besouled. Its sentience means that the human body and human mind interact continuously. Nevertheless, neither Orthodoxy nor Tymieniecka make the claim that the body and soul are one.

In body, soul and spirit our being is becoming. The Logos of Life directs our potentiality for construction and destruction, which are both essential to the development and transformation of the Human Condition. As our life becomes, it times itself or human becoming is this timing. We recall that for Tymieniecka, "our being is becoming." This insight is available as an intuition into the Logos of Life, which allows us to see that the unity of the All means interconnectivity that includes all that is alive. Life is also an equivocal notion, since mushrooms, apple trees, ants and humans and the divine all live. The Logos of Life as a driving force thrusts through the soul's self-knowledge, and its reason bequeathed to it through its ontopoesis, into life animated by the Sacral Logos. Thus, the range of the Human Condition extends through rationality, through creative production, to spirit. The Sacral Logos not only is spirit, but also it is the force that directs the Human Condition towards its telic fulfillment.

Reason seeks to identify these way stations so that a rational consciousness can will to participate in experiencing them. Well, why is this participation reasonable? By doing so, the rational being individuates itself; it becomes itself. As Plato says, the product of philosophy is the soul of the philosopher. More properly spoken, he or she becomes his or her own(ed) person. And, a person would be rational were she to become herself, which entails realizing that the Human Condition can reach towards transcendence through freely willing to participate in the Sacral Logos. The person can experience the Great Metamorphosis. In so doing, the person becomes who she is and her existence is not confined to time in any of its conceptions. This human fulfillment reveals human potentiality. Again, Tymieniecka launches us off into another dimension. This repetition itself intimates a constant structure that the Logos of Life reenacts in generation and destruction before it moves fully into kairic temporality.

To spell out the stages of this transition from vital to sacral life quickly, we must begin with moral development within the human condition "Life engages us in a battle with suffering" (2007: 45). Growth requires obstacles. In proposing projects, an agent concerned with survival can transform himself as he engages in baptizing life with his meanings. She can make of herself a person by imposing free, personal will on what will be. Yet, suffering remains the necessary condition. We suffer from our longing for the Other, and to be known by

the Other. Persons cannot completely coincide with each other while remaining others. The lonely soul seeks beyond other beings; deeply, it looks into to discover a witness.

Even with the impossibility of a total marriage of any two human persons, witnessing the suffering of a beloved other calls for the desire to have a witness to what we have witnessed. The other's suffering makes itself known to us in empathy, which as it were, attacks us with our feelings of the other's pain. The other's feelings are beyond the I's control. Another person lives his pain as he sees fit. But the other's pain may move me to reflection on the littleness of human effort, the meaning(lessness) of human strivings and ambitions. Thus, the drama of human existence in personal relations plays out with other finite beings as well as in our relation with ourselves as we are in these relations. The quandaries and quagmires of these relations jeopardize the presupposition that life must be ineluctably contingent. In striving for solutions, the human being reaches towards the All.

No other human being can understand our explanations of our situations fully. As feelings of the futility of life's pursuits, successes and so forth, intensifies so does our readiness for an inner witness. This witness speaks to us of the common lot of human life, including its pain and brevity.

> . . . there emerges more clearly consciousness of the common lot of existence that we share with all others. And so the more clearly does the other then appear in our concern! Slowly a simultaneous two-way traffic gradually builds between two inner logic streaks most intimately interfused; the advance of our disillusionment with world affairs and ambitions and the opening of an "inner ear" to the Other who stands before in the same network of life, sharing with us its ebbs and flow, and whose life course is interwoven with ours. (2007: 50)

The transformation of the human being can occur through interpersonal actions, inspired by the moral sense. Making inner space for the Witness expands the "self" so that it includes room for All. The spontaneities that release from the human soul surge into novel being, with a "novel type of perception, one that captures an entirely new universe of experience; the evidences of new phenomena, new values of life, values at odds with the current values of the creative logos of life" (2007: 51). Thus, we resound the Logos of Life in its creative fulfillment that must be negated in order to live the Sacral Logos, in its a-temporality. Newness seeks completion in the unity of temporality, moving ahead of itself into history that unfolds the Logos. Only a "surpassing witness" can re-cognize and under-stand our deepest selves.

Since no human witness can perform such functions, the Witness and the mysterious identity of the Witness lead to further pursuit of the sacral quest, which now must be understood as in its own kairic temporality.

PART 3

After spreading out some of the complexities of Tymieniecka's intuition of the Logos of Life and the thread of the Sacral Logos, we can see that the path we tread goes before us if only we recognize the signs. "Life is ever ahead of itself in the actual implementation of its potentialities" (2007: 20). Being ahead of itself need not imply that it is lost only that it continues on the path to fulfillment. To conclude, let us return to our topic—logos differentiating between reason and spirit.

When we began this analysis of the differentiation of reason and spirit, we said that the Logos of Life is the principle of differentiation for reason and spirit, though we did not explain how. Part 2 suggests that the Logos of Life motivates the sequential development of both reason and spirit. We also saw that Tymieniecka's analysis of the Human Condition indicates a body, soul and spirit. Now we shall cash out what we have gleaned so far in this reflection.

Interrogations into the Logos of Life reveal paradoxes. Here at the end of this study, our attention turns first to human freedom as the possibility for the development of a sense of self. Strangely enough the growth of a self strengthens the desire for communication with an other. Only the inner Witness fully satisfies this longing. With the Witness in tow or in tandem with the Witness, the soul can move beyond its prevailing sense of life into a radical conversion in which it turns away from the world and its achievements towards its future, transnatural destiny. Fully engaged in the sacral quest, the hard won self transcends itself.

Growing and shedding, the "essential germ, the logos of life's intrinsic endowment, remains" (2007: 61). The individual life that has no radical beginning, since it starts in the bodies of other living beings, would seem to have no end either. The interconnectedness of the unity of all that is alive provides a nexus of influences that continue past so-called death. The name of the game is the sacral. The life of the spirit was long the goal of the logos of life. Reason, which participates in the process, cannot be its end. We can use reason as a medium for describing the essential passages that lead to the life of the spirit. We can also employ reason to limit the reach of the spirit, which can move beyond itself to the frontiers of faith. "The Logos differentiates itself for the great game of creation-embodiment (incarnation) and then of redemption" (2007: 65).

Throughout the entire process, on the levels of microcosm and macrocosm, we have seen that Logos acts as the force that propels being in its most rudimentary life forms to its intermediate *telos* in the Human Condition, passing through imagination to spirit on a convoluted path to "reach the culmination of sublimation in the Great Metamorphosis while rejoining the Fullness, within the folds of which life has been all the way" (2007: 67).

Reason, thus, acquires its reason. If reason's activities are to be thought reasonable in the sense that they are justifiable as a legitimate authentic expression of temporality in ontopoesis, then what makes them reasonable? Tymieniecka answers that the Logos of Life, the intelligibility of Life itself, (note the equivocation: the Logos of Life functions as truth about life as well as its directing force) in its creative purposes and in its creations, the force and guide for life provides the meaning of life. We see here that we must switch levels between *telos* and strivings, so that purpose is outside of the series done for the sake of the purpose. The end of each of the stages in the progressive unfolding provides a platform for launching off to the next plateau. The thread of the sacral, the spirit, was always, already present in the Logos of Life as its intention. "In the end was my beginning. . . ."

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SPIRITUAL PARADIGM AS ORIGIN OF THE LIFE'S CAPACITY IN THE SADRAIAN PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: The reality of the soul, its levels and actions, and its relation to the body have always been (and are) among the most important philosophical issues, and evidence for this may be found even in the most ancient philosophical deliberations of the Greeks and others. In the philosophical traditions of the Islamic world as well, serious attempts have been made to present a "science of the soul" which is in accord with the spirit of Islamic philosophical sciences. In the Transcendent Philosophy, on the other hand, a version of science of the soul has been presented which both justifies the concrete sphere of "the immaterial and material soul" and describes "the soul's becoming and seeking for perfection". In addition, it is fully consistent with the components and overall structure of the Transcendent Philosophy. Based on doctrines of principality of existence, motion in substance, bodily origination and spiritually subsistence of the soul, Mulla Sadra depicts man's soul and its station in such a way which is free from usual inconsistencies of philosophical traditions in this regard. At the same time, based on the Book and tradition, he opens a new window to man's existence through which the existential dimensions of man are seen in correspondence and as being similar to the whole cosmos. Though, in this way, Mulla Sadra has made uses of the Peripatetic and Illuminationist traditions of his forerunners, his own innovations are unrivalled and exceptionally strong.

Though, today, terms such as "psychology" (*'ilm al-nafs*), and the like suggest a especial branch of knowledge with its origins, methodologies, and goals, reflection on the main aspect of man's life and his existential foundation, i.e. "soul" or "spirit" does not belong to a particular age. One may dare to say that no period of life and no aspect from among various aspects of life may be justified without taking into consideration this spiritual element. And even a part of human's primary knowledge- though in an undistinguished manner- had been devoted to the soul and its state, and belief in it had been cast in myths. General and ordinary beliefs of people, their individual and social rituals, and in particular their creeds in various ages concerning life after death suggest

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 93–107.

man's attention paid to the category of the soul and its predominance on all aspects of life and in particular determination of man's existential level. Many religious rituals and creeds of the primary inhabitants of the South America, Africa, Asia, and in particular Far-East suggest supra-natural aspect of the soul and its role played in spiritual and even material developments of humanity; and according to them, it has been mostly regarded as a intermediate between divinity and ordinary life of human beings.

This is other than creeds and schools which concerned (and in some cases concern) states of the Dead and their destinies after death and in other words continuance of spiritual life of human beings among ancient nations and even new ones on the earth. Anyway, it may be said that the aspect shared between all these schools and creeds is desire for transcendence and permanent life which may be attained through the soul and its immaterial essence; and it should be said that no age of the human history may be found which is void of such desire. Egyptians, Babylonians, Ionians, Iranians, and Indians have mentioned this existential aspect in their own ways and presented various writings and creeds concerning its attributes, properties, and influences on this worldly life, among them are Greeks' reflections and beliefs about "soul" and "spirit" and, generally speaking, origin of life, mentioning them is not without some profit.

In the ancient Greek, two terms *"psyche"* and *"pneuma"* which mean respectively "soul" and "spirit" (or breath, power of life) are among keywords of philosophical science of the soul. Some Greek philosophers such as Milesians, Pythagoreans, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras have used the term "pneuma" as an equivalent for "wind" and "origin of life".[1] Aristotle regarded it as an equivalent for "formal cause", though later this term is replaced by the term "anima" in Aristotelian tradition. For Stoics, the term "pneuma" meant "spirit", "power", and "creative fire", a fire which warms and moves man's existence. In the modern ages, the term "*pneumatica*" is used for what belongs or relates to spirit or spiritual beings.

A heroine of ancient Greek mythology, *"psyche"* is mostly depicted as a young beautiful girl with two wings like butterfly; after many sufferings, she attains freedom and permanence.[2] In Greek myths we read that originally a beautiful mortal, Psyche was warned by the Delphi Oracle that she would love no mortal, but she would fall in love with an immortal being—Eros, boy—God of love, and would face many hardships.[3] The essence of respective myths is that "psyche" is a symbol of man's soul purified by love and suffering which seeks for eternal happiness in love.[4]

In sayings of the Greek philosophers and wise men, man's soul or spirit—psyche—has been mentioned as the best gift of God and nature, and it has been emphasized that one has to know it and care of it. Perhaps the great Greek

philosopher, Pythagoras and his followers as well as followers of Orphicism are the first philosophers who have reflected extensively and systematically upon soul, its properties, and destiny. Their ideas concerning embodiment of the soul, necessity of asceticism, and man's self-control to care of it as well as their belief in transmigration are among the most famous Pythagorean ideas in the science of the soul.[5] As is well-known, their ideas in this regard, numbers, and essence of mathematics have had extensive and long-lasting influences on many philosophical circles in the East and the West. For Socrates, "the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able".[6] Plato mentions soul as follows: "soul, which is the divinest part of man".[7] And thus it should be cared of more than other parts. Because of the fact that the soul is divine, he regards it as being essentially good and beautiful; and thus, he thinks that kinds of vice and evil are caused by imperfections of body or miseducation or corruption of the Polis.[8] It is here where Plato's educational and moral considerations are introduced and a large part of *The Republic* is devoted to them.[9]

Aristotle regards the soul (or "psyche") as the form of body; and to define he says: "the first grade of actuality of a natural organized body".[10] For this reason, the agent of motion which is for him "*telos*", for man is the same as his soul which is both formal cause and *telos* and united with the body. Difference between Aristotle's view and that of other Greek philosophers in this regard is seen in his empirical and objective look at the soul, statements concerning it, its actions, and its relation to the body.

Continuance of the Greek science of the soul may be found in Stoicism and Neo-Platonism. For Stoics, the soul is a share of divine fire; and thus its potentialities should turn into actuality; and this is possible only through practical wayfaring. Neo-Platonism, however, is based on some sort of philosophical-Illuminationist science of the soul. Teachings of those like Plotinus and Proclus are well-known in this regard. In brief, these teachings are as follows: the soul (as the third (the lowest) hypostasis) is at the greatest distance from the origin of light (existence). Thus, it should be, through piety and asceticism, brought to the path of transcendence and, finally, unity with the first hypostasis, i.e. the One. This existential unity looks like connection of a water drop to the ocean; and in this way, the drop is saved from all imperfections, finitude, corruption, and mortality.[11] This description of the reality of the soul and its destiny is distinct from views of Plotinus' forerunners; and at the same time, it has been of extensive influence on his intellectual successors both in the Christian world and Islamic world.

At the same time, it should not be forgotten that Muslim philosophers have reflected upon the soul, its reality, and levels and kinds, much more than

their Greek forerunners. Also, concerning its origins, actions, and that how it relates to the body—which has been (and is) among the most important philosophical problems in the Western philosophical tradition—they have had great innovations, and in this regard, their guiding principles have been epistemic sources such as the Book and tradition. For example, concerning the problem of belong-ness of the soul to the body and the way that the former relates to the latter—where human mind inclines towards embodiment and transmigration—, the Holy Quran has made use of the term "breath", and God has introduced Him as its origin.[12]

Anyway, reflection upon Divine verses has been the most important guiding principle for Muslim philosophers—and in particular Mulla Sadra—in this path. For example, while correcting and completing Aristotle's view about the soul and based on a triple division of the soul—vegetal, animal, and rational—Ibn Sina says that the rational soul which is the most perfect from among the souls includes all perceptions and is defined as "the first grade of actuality of a natural organized body because of doing voluntary actions and perceiving universals".[13] For this reason, in some other cases, he make distinctions between levels of sense faculties—whether apparent or hidden ones—as well as between levels of speculative intelligence on the one hand and "material intelligence" to the "acquired intelligence" and "angelic intelligence", and describes their properties; and in this, he seeks help from the noble verse of "light".[14] Other philosophers (both Peripatetics and Illuminationist) as well as Muslim mystics have devoted great parts of their works to the soul, its levels, and its relation to other beings.

In this regard, views of some theologians are of importance as well. For example, though influenced seriously by views of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina in the science of the soul, Ghazali mentions the faculty of abstraction and its branches in addition to apparent and hidden faculties of the soul listed by his forerunners.[15]

Also, while being influenced by the views of Ibn Sina and writing critical marginal glosses on his *Isharat wa'l tanbihat*, Fakhr Razi has written an independent book called "*al-Nafs wa'l ruh wa Sharh-i quwahima*" (Soul, Spirit, and Description of Their Faculties), in which he has presented his own views.

From among all mystics, however, Ibn Arabi has paid more attention to the station of man and his spiritual and ideal aspect; and one may say that an important part of his works has been devoted to this subject. He takes the term "*ens*" as the root of the term "*insan*" (man), and we find the same in Mulla Sadra's *Mafatih al-ghayb* (Keys to Unseen). As compared to the whole universe (which is called Macrocosm by Ibn Arabi), Ibn Arabi calls man and his sphere "microcosm", and writes: "microcosm means that man is the spirit of the world, its cause and its spheres. . .".[16]

Elsewhere he writes that though man's body and matter is very small as compared with the universe, in spiritual terms he is very great, and he is equal to the whole universe and includes all beings.

Two terms, "comprehensive being" and "perfect (universal) man" which have been repeatedly mentioned in his works and in those of his followers and commentators are allusions to the importance given to man and his station in Ibn Arabi's mysticism. And as we know, both terms have been extensively reflected in the Transcendent Philosophy as well.[17]

Emphasizing the importance of science of the soul and enlisting its eight virtues in his *Mafatih al-ghayb* and based on two theories of "motion in the substance" and "bodily origination and spiritually subsistence of the soul", Mulla Sadra proceeds to present a theory in science of the soul which, on the one hand, includes all strong points of the theories of previous philosophers; and on the other it is free from their weak points. The whole eighth book as well as a part of the ninth book of *al-Asfar al-arba'ah* (Four Intellectual Journeys) have been devoted to definition of the soul, its nature, faculties, immateriality, and attributes. And by study of them one may understand how Mulla Sadra has described previous philosophers' views concerning science of the soul, and what his own innovations in this regard are. In the first five chapters of the eighth book of *al-Asfar*, various issues including quiddity, immateriality, and levels of the soul as well as statements concerning it have been introduced. From the chapter six onward, points concerning human rational soul and in particular subsistence of the soul and "immateriality of the faculty of imagination" have been studied and discussed.[18] In other Mulla Sadra's works such as *al-Shawahid al-rububiyah* and *Mafatih al-Ghayb* valuable points concerning science of the soul and its consequences may be found as well. For example, in the third Mashhad of his *al-Shawahid al-rububiyah*, while separating man's apparent and hidden senses in the same way that Peripatetics do, he mentions some defects in their views in this regard, and goes to complete such views. From the most important items in this part of the book is the author's view concerning the fact that "the soul is bodily in origin and spiritual in subsistence" and arguments for it; and his view is in brief as follows: the soul is originated because of the origination of the body; and there are differences in genus, kind, and personification for the soul because of entrance in various modes after entrance into the body.[19] Also, in the fifteenth *miftah* of *Mafatih al-ghayb*, he mentions a subtle point which is, in brief, as follows:

> Breathing is of two kinds, one to extinguish fire and the other to start a burning; then both existence and subsistence of the soul and its annihilation is by Divine effusion; here, however, there is another mystery; some ancient philosophers have said that the soul is fire and wind (according to the ancient Greek philosophers such as Heraclitus and Stoics), we have not to regard these words as being

stemmed from conjectures; for what has been revealed by the Legislator includes these words as well.[20] Now, to make a general picture of Mulla Sadra's view concerning man's rational soul and its station, we mention some points, and in this way his innovations are introduced. Here, we do not want to go in details of Mulla Sadra's ideas, but rather, we will have only a passing look at the foundations of his science of the soul.

In the fourth "journey" of his "Four Journeys", Mulla Sadra discusses generation of the soul and the way it attains the highest stations of perfection. At first, however, he introduces the meaning of "life" and its existential effects such as sense, motion, feeding, sleeping, and reproducing; and then he explains its relationship to the existing perfectional form.[21] Then quiddity of the soul and origin of actions of vegetal and animal kinds are introduced, and this is followed by a discussion about apparent and hidden faculties of the rational soul.[22] After these issues, one of his most original views concerning the soul i.e. the doctrine that "the soul is bodily or material in its origination and spiritual in its subsistence" (*jismaniyyat al-huduth ruhaniyyat al-baqa'*) has been studied, and arguments for it have been mentioned.[23] In what follows he discusses and proves motion in the psychic substances and its necessity for human perfection. Thus, motion in the psychic substances is from the station of nature, to the station of middle immateriality (*tajarrud barzakhi*), then to rational immateriality, and finally to the super-immateriality. Nevertheless, perfection of the rational soul happens not in a horizontal disconnected way, but in an internal becoming from the material body towards pure immateriality. Now, we have to find how parts and foundations of Sadrean science of the soul are related to each other.

1. According to the Transcendent Philosophy and based on the doctrine of principality of existence (*isalat al-wujud*), existence is real and free from any plurality, and at the same time enjoys various levels and degrees, and quiddity is not other than a shadow and mental manifestation of existence. In other words, both unity and plurality are true, but not so that "plurality of things is other than unity of things", but rather in a way that unity of existence—i.e. that existence is principial and equivocal between beings and quiddity is mentally-posited—is true in spite of plurality of existence; plurality of existence as well is determined in spite of unity of existence.[24]

In this sense, unity is the true description of the reality of existence; and plurality is the true description of the various levels of existence graded in terms of intensity and weakness; none of all these levels, of course, are out of the reality of existence; and plurality in beings is manifestation of graded levels of existence. Thus, in Sadrean philosophy, based on principality and simplicity of existence as well as doctrine of gradation of the reality of existence, distinctions between beings are not of the kind of distinctions stemmed from quiddity so that it may result in some contradictions between them.

To explain, it should be said that in Aristotelian philosophy as well as philosophy of Muslim Peripatetics, divisions such as those between "matter and form", "substance and accident", "actuality and potentiality" are among divisions stemmed from quiddity; and thus relationships between them are of the kind of oppositions; in Sadrean philosophy, however, above-mentioned divisions are existential ones. Based on the principle of gradation of levels of existence, from one of its level "form" is abstracted and from another "matter" is abstracted. For example, from the level of actuality of existence of a body, its "form" may be abstracted, and from its level of potentiality, its matter is abstracted. Other divisions employed in the Peripatetic tradition as well undergo such changes in the Sadrean philosophy.

According to Mulla Sadra, some problems and difficulties in Peripatetic tradition such as essential contradiction between genera and consequently problem of relation of them to each other or reduction of one of them to the other is stemmed from the fact that in the Peripatetic tradition statement concerning existence and quiddity have been confused; and if, according to the Peripatetic tradition, we take for granted limits and quiddal opposition between things, there will be realized infinite various quiddities between the beginning and end of beings, which is against the assumption of Peripatetics.[25]

Thus, we have to admit the "unique connected reality of existence" which is intensified and graded and from each and every grade of it, a limit and quiddity is abstracted. This intensified existence has all perfection of the beginning and end; and species, genera, and differentia are, because of the one connected existence, seen in the essence of being. This appears in Sadrean science of the soul as follows: human rational soul includes all levels of existence potentially; in its becoming, it goes from a state to another; such becoming, however, does not harm the soul's simplicity and immateriality.

2. Taking into account what said in the item 1, existence of "substance and accident" may be justified in the light of true unity and graded levels of existence. And since "accident" is of, by definition, a secondary and non-independent reality, thus, in all its modes, it follows substance and statements concerning it. Thus, in Sadrean philosophy, accidents of objects are not other than aspects and levels of the existence of substance. And what makes a being individuated and distinct is not out of that being, but rather originates from within it.[26] Thus, what was described by the previous philosophers as motion in natural philosophy and was confined and limited to some accidental categories was described, in the Transcendent Philosophy, under the statements of existence (ontology) and metaphysics; and motion in accidents is conditioned by motion in substance while retaining the personal unity of the being.[27]

To explain it should be said that according to philosophers, motion is evident and undeniable; and Aristotle and majority of the Peripatetic philosophers have

confined it to four accidental categories; and thus they have regarded the issue of motion as one of the natural ones. Criticizing this view, Mulla Sadra proceeds to introduce the theory of "motion in substance", whose simplest version is as follows:

> Matter is, by nature, in flux and continuous renewal; but this not means that motion intervenes matter, but rather the external mode of a material being is the same as motion. Nature is the same as motion and becoming by essence; in other words, it is an essence which is the same as renewal. The world of nature is full of motion and flux; and that is not the case that motion and the mover are independent of each other. What is in the external world is only an established being and an unstable essence; and motion and mover are other than each other only in a mental analysis. The material world has no rest even for a moment; and it will not come to a halt as long as its existential potentialities are not actualized.[28]

On the other hand, since existence of accidents is a secondary and non-independent one and the same as relation and belong-ness, as long as there is no motion in substance, there will be no motion in accidents. In this way, "quiddal accidental motion" in the Peripatetic tradition turns into "existential substantial motion" in the Transcendent Philosophy; and inevitably its subject goes under "metaphysics" instead of "natural philosophy".

To explain it should be said that, as mentioned previously, in the Transcendent Philosophy, motion is of the kind of existence (and not quiddity). Motion is the mode of existence whether existence of substance or that of accident; and thus it is regarded as one of the topics of metaphysics. That the topic of motion goes from "natural philosophy" to "metaphysics" is among innovations introduced in Sadrean Philosophy, and this has changed views of forerunners to the category of motion and its statements. This concept is of great influence in the science of soul: since the soul and the body are two manifestations of the same reality, motion in the soul is the same as motion in the substance and origin of life; and change in matter and body depends upon change in the soul and its statements.

3. For Mulla Sadra, motion is among "secondary philosophical intelligibles" and not among quiddal concepts.

According to this view, the reality of existence has two aspects and levels; one is "flux" which is the same as becoming and the other is the level of "stability" which is the same as "being". Being and becoming are not against each other[29]; but rather they are two faces of the same reality; and as said, according to Mulla Sadra opposition is laid in the divisions of quiddity (and not existence).

Thus, the reality of existence has two faces between them there are no conflict and opposition. Motion and moving thing are, in conceptual terms and in a rational analysis, two separate things; in the external world, however, they are a

single identity and reality. Here, one may conclude that substantial motion does not lead to changes in the essentials; for, firstly, motion happens in existence (and not in quiddity); and secondly, since substantial motion is a gradual and continuous one, then connective unity is co-extensive with personal unity.[30] Again from here, distinction between Sadrean view to motion in substance which is, in his own words, "dressing after dressing" (*labs ba'd labs*) on the one hand and mystics view which is called "dressing after undressing" (*labs ba'd khal'*) is seen. In Sadrean view, all changes are continuous, and thus personal unity does not vanish. In mystics' view, however, changing thing loses its own personal unity. This property helps to solve the problem of distinction between the soul and body as well, which is, as is well-known, among the most important problems for ancient and modern philosophers. The soul with all its existential modes and levels is, according to the Transcendent Philosophy, a product of substantial motion of the body; and thus, the soul and the body are not regarded as two separate realities; and, as a matter of fact, the unity between the two is resolved in the substantial unity of "man". The soul and the body are two modes and two levels of man's all-inclusive existence; i.e. man is a multi-leveled existential reality (from the level of nature to the level of intellect, there are three main levels or modes (*mash'ar*): "sense", "imagination", and "intellect"; and all these modes are potentially hidden in man. Thus, man potentially enjoys all natural, imaginal, and intellectual levels and modes; other beings, however, have only one potentiality or mode: they are either intelligible or sensible. In the course of substantial motion, man passes levels of imperfections and finds levels of perfection gradually. This is the same as that journey which begins with "bodily or material origination" and ends in "spiritual subsistence".[31]

Nevertheless, if substantial motion was not proved, analysis of the existential relationship between the soul and the body would not be possible. In Sadrean system, the main foundation of the issue of the soul is the principle of substantial motion in matter. According to this philosophy, man is a dynamic reality who passes its own stages of perfection one after the other in the light of substantial motion; and thus, the soul is a dynamic (not static) reality which is going from the stage of "bodily origination and alteration" to the stage of "spiritual subsistence and intellection". That is why Mulla Sadra regards the soul as a "traveler" and man as a continuously traveling being. In this way, in the Transcendent Philosophy, traditional opposition between the soul and the body is removed in such a way which is in agreement both with natural dualism and unity of the soul and the body. According to the principle of substantial motion, man is a single graded reality, which is the same from material stage to the stage of immateriality and beyond. A traveler which goes station to station and wears a new clothing in each station so that he may be an instance of the

Revelation "Were We then worn out by the first creation? Yet they are in doubt about a new creation" (The Holy Quran, 50: 15).

4. Though Sadrean view concerning substantial motion is based on "relational existence" and the fact that "man is the same as relation" and, consequently, Divine effusion and creation is necessitated continuously, for man and his worlds, Mulla Sadra considers such an extent for man and his existential modes that a level from among the levels of "creator-ness" is proved for man; i.e. in his perfectional becoming man attains such a station that he plays, somehow, his role in creation; this creator-ness is a symbol (and not negation) of Divine Creator-ness. It may be said in brief that the soul and the body which will appear in the Resurrection Day are products of man's reality in the world. Thus, it can be said that, according to the principles of this philosophy, the soul is the best product of the body in the world; and the other-worldly body may be the best product of the soul in the other-world; and all these are consequences of the principle of motion in the substance.[32] Among objections to Mulla Sadra's view in this regard is: "what is criterion for unity and plurality of substantial motion of the soul?" In reply, it should be said.

Firstly, according to the principles of Sadrean philosophy, "unity" is co-extensive with "existence"; thus, since existence is a graded and multi-leveled reality, unity is graded and multi-leveled as well.

Secondly, in this view man is an infinite reality from the stage of "bodily origination" to the stage of "spiritual subsistence"; the former and the latter may be distinguished mentally; but they are a single intensive continuous reality which is permanently in changing. Thus, man is not a being for whom one can determines limits and borders; this means affirmation of the end of his previous motion and beginning of his later motion![33] As a matter of fact, plurality of motions is a mental one; and as already said, there are no conflict and opposition between various levels of man's existence—including his soul and body. For, according to Mulla Sadra, there are no opposition and conflict between divisions of existence; and conflict concerns quiddities and their statements.

Thus, difference between the soul and the body—and as a matter of fact, between intellectual existence and natural existence—refers to the difference between gradual levels of existence. Mulla Sadra writes:

> It is necessary to know that man is a combination of the soul and the body; and difference between the two refers to the difference between levels of existence; and they are the same thing which has two faces; one of them is changing and it is the minor one; and the other is stable and surviving, and this is the main one. And the more perfect the existence of the soul, the more purified and subtle the body, and the more intensified its connection to the soul; and union between the two becomes so intensified and strong that the intellectual existence appears; and the two becomes a single existence without any discrepancy between the two.[34]

It goes without saying that here we find one of the unrivalled innovations of Mulla Sadra concerning relation between the soul and the body in particular and changing of man's existence from the sense-natural stage to the intellectual-imaginal stage in general; with such consistency, this can be find neither in the Western philosophical tradition nor in Islamic tradition. What makes this view distinguished is, in addition to its internal consistency, the fact that it is among necessary consequences of the real unity of existence, doctrine of motion in substance, and personal unity of man's existence.

5. As said, one of the properties of Sadrean philosophy is that in it the science of soul is regarded, instead of as being categorized under natural philosophy, as an independent and separate part of the Transcendent Philosophy. According to Mulla Sadra, firstly man is an "active" being not a "passive" one; secondly, the realm of man's soul similes to the reign of the Creator—the Exalted; and thirdly, there is no halt in man's motion and becoming. Thus, it may be maintained that man's station in the Sadrean philosophy equals to the whole cosmos; and, in one sense, the whole cosmos focuses on man's existence. This focus, however, does not lead to humanism prevalent in the Western philosophical traditions; for man and his soul, in all levels of existence, are "the same as relation and belong-ness"; and thus he does not forget his origin; nevertheless, he is so great that all levels of existence are reflected in his existence, and as "microcosm" he is a mirror of the "macrocosm".

To explain, it should be said that in the embryonic stage, man's soul is a vegetal one. Thus, in this stage, vegetal soul is actual and animal soul is potential. Upon birth, man's soul goes up from vegetal to animal soul; and this continues until formal maturity. In this time and during spiritual maturity and internal growth, man's soul which is potential in him is actualized. Thus, in the beginning, man's rational soul is, in terms of sense perfection, in the lowest level of things and the lowest mode of the material world. The soul in this world is, therefore, the form of each potentiality and its actuality and perfection. For all perceptional and motivational powers as well as their effects are helped and controlled by the soul. In the other-world, this very soul is ready and apt to receive any form by which it appears in this world. Thus, the soul is a combination of two oceans, i.e. it is a locus for the ocean of corporal existence and the ocean of spiritual existence to meet each other.[35]

It should be noted that the greatness of man's station in the Transcendent Philosophy in particular and in the Islamic philosophical traditions in general is not an affirmation of man's independent and the so-called "self-established" existence which is seen in the humanist and subjective views of the Western tradition; but rather man's greatness and infinity in the Transcendent Philosophy is a manifestation of the greatness of the Origin of existence and the Essence of the Creator—the Exalted, who gives all possible beings- including man's

existence—determination as beings related to Him. And thus, certainly this view does not lead to humanism and the like; and it does not face the problems and contradictions facing such views. To explain relation and belong-ness of man's existence to the existence of the Real, Mulla Sadra makes uses of the noble verse: "He caused them to forget their souls" (the Holy Quran, 59: 19) and believes that this verse shows that the soul is the same as relation to God and the Cause of causes; and thus to neglect God—the Exalted—is the same as to neglect the soul.

The reason is that in the circle of "existence", there is no trace of "human-centeredness" and "God-centeredness", of two realities and two worlds. As a matter of fact, story is about a single reality and its manifestations. And this is among consequences of Sadrean philosophy. In this view, there is no opposition and conflict between existence and its divisions; if there is some opposition, it is between quiddal divisions. According to Mulla Sadra, there are things which are oppose to each other, and at the same time each of the two opposites includes the other as well. In this view, though man is the center of the universe, he is a mere relation and belong-ness, and this is one of the fascinations of Sadrean philosophy.

6. As already said, one of the other considerations concerning Sadrean science of the soul is that soul originates from body—and in Mulla Sadra's words, *hyle*—, which has been introduced under the title "bodily origination and spiritual subsistence". Before Mulla Sadra, like majority of Greek philosophers, Muslim philosophers regarded the soul as a part different from the body; and then, they proceeded to justify its unity with material and corporal body. In most of such views, there appeared always problems in introduction and justification of the case.

One of such problems was the problem of essential difference between the soul and the body which could not be easily justified even by Suhrawardi's Illumationist school, doctrine of light essences, and the like. On the other hand, before Mulla Sadra, he who claimed that the soul originates from the body was regarded as materialist and one denying immaterial things. Mulla Sadra, however, posed a different idea and said that "*hyle*" is origin of the soul. Man is a reality from the level of *hyle* to the station of immateriality and beyond; this was not, however, an affirmation of materialism.

According to Sadrean philosophy and based on the doctrine of substantial motion, we have an intensive existential reality called man which covers levels from *hyle* to pure immateriality. Such levels are divisions of existence, and therefore, there is no opposition and conflict between them. The soul is a product of matter and body; but the soul and the body are not two essentially different substances; but rather, the soul is a multi-leveled existential reality of which we abstract a name and definition. The other point is that the reality of

the soul, because of its created-ness is finite and determined; and because of the extent of its existence, it is infinite and undetermined. Thus, because of its *hyle* and natural aspect, human existence is finite; and because of its immaterial and ideal aspect, it is infinite. Mulla Sadra even justifies and explains levels of human perception in correspondence to the levels of existence.[36] And this is one of the consequences of ontology of Sadrean philosophy.

Mulla Sadra's deliberations and innovations concerning "resurrection", "Resurrection Day", and theory of "corporal resurrection" are among issues related to the science of the soul which have been discussed in details in the last part of his "fourth journey", and include subtle points which have to be discussed independently.

Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran

NOTES

[1] *Chambers Dictionary of Etymology*, New York, 2000, vol. 2, p. 809.
[2] This is an allusion to man's permanent goal which cannot be found unless through sufferings and hardships.
[3] Kennedy, Mike-Dixon, *Encyclopedia of Greco-Roman Mythology*, p. 264, Grimal, Pierre, *The Concise Dictionary of Classical Mythology*, pp. 379–380.
[4] Smith, Joule, *Dictionary of Greco-Roman*, Persian translation, trans. Shahla Baradaran Khosroshahi, Tehran, Farhang-e Mo'aser, 2005, p. 149.
[5] Jeager, W., *The Theology for the Early Greek Philosophers*, Oxford, 1947, p. 206.
[6] Plato, *Phaedo*, Translated by Benjamin Jowett.
[7] Plato, *Laws*, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
[8] Plato, *Timaeus*, pp. 86–87.
[9] Plato, *The Republic*, Book IX.
[10] Aristotle, *De Anima* (On the Soul), trans. J. A. Smith.
[11] Plotinus, *Enneads*, 6, 9, 11(771b).
[12] I . . . breathed into him of My Spirit *(The Holy Quran*, 38: 72).
[13] Ibn Sina, *Al-Nijah*, Tehran, Mortezawi, 1984, p. 158.
[14] *The Holy Quran*, 24: 35.
[15] Al- Ghazali, *Ihya 'ulum al-din*, Cairo, 1348 AH (Lunar), vol. 1, p. 118.
[16] Ibn Arabi, *Futuhat al-makkiyah*, Egypt, 1392 AH (Lunar), vol. 1, p. 118.
[17] Ibid., p. 379.
[18] Mulla Sadrà, *Al-Asfar al-Arba'ah*, Book Eight, Tehran, Sadrà Islamic Philosophy Research Institute, 1382/2003 .
[19] Mulla Sadrà, *al-Shawhid al-Rububiyah*, ed. Seyyed Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, Tehran, University Publishing Center, 1981, p. 202.
[20] Mulla Sadrà, *Mafatih al-Ghayb*, ed. Najafqoli Habibi, Tehran, Sadrà Islamic .Philosophy Research Institute, 1386/2007, vol. 1, fifteenth *miftah*, chap. 2.
[21] Mulla Sadrà, *al-Asfar al-Arba'ah*, vol. 8, chap. 1.
[22] Ibid., chapters 2–4.
[23] Ibid., Chapter 8.
[24] Ibid., vol. 1, first *minhaj*, p. 47; *al-Shawahid al-rububiyah*, p. 116.

25 Mulla Sadrà, *al-'Arshiyah*, *al-ishraq al-thani fi haqiqat al-ma'ad*, *al-asl al-thalith.*
26 Mulla Sadrà, *al-Asfar al-Arba'ah*, vol. 3, p. 75.
27 Ibid., p. 77.
28 Mulla Sadrà, *al-Shawahiud al-rububiyah*, al-Mashhad al-awwal, p. 97.
29 Unlike categories in the philosophy of Hegel which are against each other.
30 Mulla Sadrà, *al-Asfar al-Arba'ah*, vol. 3, p. 78.
31 Mulla Sadrà, *al-Shawahid al-Rububiyah*, al-mashhad al-thalith, p. 246.
32 Mulla Sadrà, *al-Asfar al-Arba'ah*, vol. 9, p. 128.
33 Ibid., p. 132.
34 Ibid., pp. 128–129.
35 Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 156–157.
36 Ibid., p. 151.

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The Holy Quran

1. Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, *New York, 2000.*
2. *Kennedy, Mike-Dixon,* Encyclopedia of Greco-Roman Mythology.
3. *Grimal, Pierre,* The Concise Dictionary of Classical Mythology.
4. *Smith, Joule,* Dictionary of Greco-Roman, *Persian translation, trans. Shahla Baradaran Khosroshahi, Tehran, Farhang-e Mo'aser, 2005.*
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10. *Aristotle,* De Anima *(On the Soul), trans. J. A. Smith.*
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13. *al- Ghazali, Ihya 'ulum al-din, Cairo, 1348 AH (Lunar), vol. 1.*
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15. *Mulla Sadra,* al-Asfar al-arba'ah, *Book Eight, Tehran, Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute, 1382/2003.*
16. *Mulla Sadra,* al-Shawhid al-rububiyah, *ed. Seyyed Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, Tehran, University Publishing Center, 1981.*
17. *Mulla Sadra,* Mafatih al-ghayb, *ed. Najafqoli Habibi, Tehran, Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute, 1386/2007, vol. 1.*
18. *Mulla Sadra,* al-Asfar al-arba'ah, *vol. 8.*
19. *Mulla Sadra,* al-'Arshiyah, al-ishraq al-thani fi haqiqat al-ma'ad, al-asl al-thalith.
20. *Mulla Sadra,* al-Asfar al-arba'ah, *vol. 3.*

21. Mulla Sadra, al-Shawahiud al-rububiyah.
22. Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar al-arba‘ah*, vol. 3.*
23. Mulla Sadra, al-Shawahid al-rububiyah.
24. Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar al-arba‘ah*, vol. 9.*

SECTION THREE

THOMAS RYBA

REASON AND SPIRIT IN THE THOUGHT OF EDMUND HUSSERL, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, AND A.-T. TYMIENIECKA: SOME COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SUPPLEMENTATIONS

Abstract: Edmund Husserl, Thomas Aquinas, and A.-T. Tymieniecka each have proposed distinctive formulations of the relations between Reason and Spirit. In this piece, Thomas Ryba reviews and explains the most salient features of each formulation, describing how the features of each thinker's formulation oppose, complement, or overlap one another. He concludes by suggesting in what direction each formulation may contribute to a more adequate synthesis than any one taken singly, a synthesis which expands the respective notions of Reason and Spirit, a synthesis which can avoid both the trap of Scientism as well as the very crisis between Reason and Spirit caused by Scientism.

1. INTRODUCTION

In his *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Edmund Husserl described that broad horizon of reason within which the West had dwelt up through the time of the Enlightenment, a horizon which contracted precipitously when it underwent crisis in the 19th and 20th centuries, a crisis that amounted to a decapitation of higher philosophical interests. As he saw it, the features of this crisis in 20th-century philosophy were either a matter of philosophers' reticence to entertain a specific problem set or a matter of their positive enthusiasm to confer upon this set the status of residual concepts.

The specific problem set Husserl had in mind contained questions pertaining the most important issues of certainty; these were the " 'ultimate and the highest' " questions of human meaning (Husserl 1977 [1954 <1937>], p. 9). Included were specific problems of reason connected with true knowledge, genuine values, and good action. In short, what interested Husserl were the problems connected with " 'absolute,' 'eternal,' 'supertemporal,' 'unconditionally valid ideas and ideals' " (Ibid.). For Husserl, this set of ideas—in its history within western philosophy—could not be separated from metaphysics because

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 111–136.

the investigations connected with these ideas led to the problem of God. God functions, for Husserl, as both the presupposition of these questions as well as their transcendental lure. Within these ideas, God was construed "as the teleological source of reason in the world" because the absolute consciousness of God was the ideal which human science aspired to approach (Ibid.). As their ground and lure, their beginning and end, beyond the world's horizon, it was God who also grounded the world's rational meaning so that questions of ultimacy in meaning could not find resolution in "mere facts" (Ibid.). According to the classical understanding, mere facts found their context in these ultimate questions, and the positivist decapitation of them signaled the crisis which is the theme of some of Husserl's posthumous works.

What we have in this modern crisis is a tragic competition between two notions of rationality. The proponents of modern *scientistic* reason argue that the reductive methods of the natural sciences are adequate for the explanation of all beings. The success and entrenchment of this way of thinking—they argue—are proofs of its universal applicability, but in fact, smuggled into the method is a series of assumptions about ontology. Whatever is not an *empiricistic* datum is ignored. Against the dominant paradigm, Husserl proposes a phenomenological reinterpretation of an older ideal: a conception of reason which is unitary but which recognizes a distinctive difference between the kinds of objects on which it focuses—the human and the natural.

One especially important such theme, one which Husserl took up at a number of places in his writings, was the theme of the relation between reason and spirit. It is my purpose in this article to examine Husserl's formulation of this relationship and then, in keeping with the methodological program of the Husserlian philosophy, to examine the relationship between spirit and reason in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (and, more allusively, in the works of some of his epigones) as well as in the writings of A.-T. Tymieniecka. My purpose is to reactivate their meaning and significance, imaginatively, and then synthesize their respective contributions. The end of this article will be a brief reflection on how this exercise in reactivation contributes to the Husserlian appreciation of the relations between rationality and spirit and the implications they may have for his phenomenological project.

2. SPIRIT AND REASON IN HUSSERL'S *IDEAS*

Husserl's discussion of the relation between spirit and reason takes up about one half of the second book of his work *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* (Husserl 1989 [1925]). There, Husserl's aim is to initiate a new approach to a crabbed series of problems relating to the distinction between soul and spirit in order to lay

the foundations for a new "psychology" which is neither "psychophysical" nor "natural scientific" (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:181/172–173). This new approach is intended to be "a *radical* investigation to the phenomenological sources of the constitution of the ideas of nature, Body, and soul, and of the various ideas of Ego and person" (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:182/173).

Let me briefly sketch Husserl's approach.

According to Husserl, when one brackets everything within the power of the human ego, one finds on one side—as the bracketed, as thematized, as "out of play"—the world of nature or the world of the naturalized intentionality (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:183/174). On the other side, stands the subject like a limit concept which is not susceptible to the *epochê* (Ibid.). Even so, the natural world and ego are in relation to one another and can be analyzed from within subjecthood as a series of strata, each grounding the preceding like so many layers of a cake: first, the experience of the physical, then the experience of the body, then the experience of the soul, then the experience of an ego, then the experience of an ego as a member of a social world (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:184/174).

The phenomenology of animate life depends upon the philosopher's ability to describe an abductive intentionality which Husserl terms the "introjection" of the soul in animate beings. Without subjecting it to critique, it is possible for this introjection to take place according to purely naturalistic presuppositions. To attribute a soul to an animal is simply to recognize a stratum of aesthesiological and psychic qualities, localized in the creature's corporeality, which are responsible for its purposeful motility (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:184–185/175). The precise connection between these qualities and the physically sensed body of the animal is not easy to determine, except to say that they appear and move together (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:186/176).

Only through hyperbolic doubt can this introjective inference to a soul be questioned or cancelled, and then, one presumes, only temporarily. But to say exactly how that soul is experienced, and what its relations are to the grounding strata of corporeal qualities, requires that we postulate an analogy of experience between ourselves and the animal. And yet the animal behavior which manifests its soul is not identical to the human behavior which manifests his/her soul. If we extend the analogy too isomorphically, then we are in danger of anthromorphizing the animal. It is the consciousness of just this possibility that shows an opening into what differentiates a human soul from an animal soul. It is because we have access to absolute consciousness through the phenomenological reduction, and by means of the *via negativa* of bracketing, that the distinctive difference of the absolute ego and its manifest behavior may be differentiated from the behavior and (*by inference*) souls of animals (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:189/179).

This distinctive difference does not preclude the human soul's being understood as natural, inasmuch as humans are corporeal, possess spatial locations, and belong within the "constellation" of natural substances and causes. These are all experienced features of the empirical ego (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:190/180). For Husserl, the distinctive difference lies in the range of the personal. Thus the *personalistic attitude*—the attitude characterized by the array of intentionalities associated with living together and in relation to things, communicating, emoting, arguing, acting in relation to others, etc.—is that which distinguishes us from the reductively natural (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:192/182). All of these modalities are characterized by a common form of social consciousness: humans are always subjects in relation to a surrounding world (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:193/182).

But what does it mean to be in a personal relationship to a surrounding world?

To say that I am a person by virtue of my subjectivity in relation to that world means that ego and environment are correlative: I have this surrounding world, first, because I am a member of a community that shares it, to some extent, and, second, because I have my own partially unique orientation toward it. The surrounding world is object of common and individual purposes and actions. It is the world of meaning constituted by my (and my community's) mutual empathy, and our "feeling, evaluating, acting," and our technical shaping of it (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:195/185). This means that my relation to the others in my community is as one who grasps its members as other persons who represent, feel, communicate, agree, and evaluate as I do, but also those persons stand in relationship to their surrounding world and represent, feel, and evaluate that world in such a way that is essentially non-naturalistic (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:195/185; 2:203/193). For Husserl, conceptions of practical, aesthetic, moral, and scientific value are intersubjective, socially constituted ideas which define a sector of reality to which persons are oriented by non-naturalistic motivations.

These ideas are not more adventitious because they are intersubjective, but like the objects of the natural world, they are capable of being brought to phenomenological clarity (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:198–199/188–189). Also capable of being brought to the same clarity are alter egos in community.[1]

2.1. The Scope of the Spiritual According to Husserl

Here, we finally arrive at the "world of spirit" as the "unity of all social Objectivities" (Husserl, 1989 [1925], 2:206/196). More precisely, the world of spirit is "the sum total of social subjects of lower or higher levels [the solitary individual, at one end, and the largest determining community, at the

other] ... which are in [actual or potential] communication with each other, together with the sum total of social objectivities pertaining to it" (Husserl, 1989 [1925], 2:207/196). For every person who is a member of community, there is one intersubjectively constituted world of spirit and a unique positionality for that person within it.[2] This means that the spiritual world possesses a constitutive structure and horizonality for subjects and intersubjective communities whose direct analogy is the natural world. Just as the natural world's horizon circumscribes a set of expectations about possible natural objects and their law-like behavior, so too the spiritual world defines a horizon in which whatever has spiritual significance defines a set of expectations about possible spiritual objects and subjects as well as their possible relationships (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:207/197; 2:328–329/315–316).[3] Even though the reductive effectiveness of modern science has brought the manifold local conceptions of science to a unity—and along with this has, more or less, established a common objective horizon for the world—a non-reductive science of spirit is still in its infancy. Humans still await their circumscription within a single spiritual horizon, something which will attend their eventual recognition of a common history.

Though the spirituality of the communal world is constituted by feeling, evaluating, and acting, Husserl is interested in discovering what ties individual and communal action together as their common ground. He thinks this common basis is two-fold. First, the personal or spiritual ego is always the subject of intentionality: to be a subject is to live in noematic and noetic relations to any conscious object. Second, the lawfulness of the life of the spirit lies in the motivation behind it (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:231/220). Motivation, for Husserl, is manifold and complex. There are motivations of reason, of habit, of association, of experience, of empathy, of causation, of reflection, of agency or freedom, and so on. The constraints of this article do not permit a capacious exposition of these varieties, so I prefer to focus on motivations that underlie reason, since rationality and spirit are my themes.

2.2. Reason in Relation to Spirit According to Husserl

In *Ideas*, Husserl distinguishes two relevant motivations which lie behind the life of reason. These motivations are present behind typical processes of reasoning, that is behind the way "perceptions ... motivate judgments, the way judgments are justified and verified in experience, ... how the attribution of a predicate is confirmed by the concordant experience of it, how being in contradiction with experience motivates a canceling negation, or how a judgment is motivated by another judgment in drawing a conclusion, but also how ... judgments are motivated by affects and affects by judgments,

how surmises or questions are motivated, how feelings, desirings, willings are motivated, and . . . the motivation of position takings by position takings" which always presuppose some "absolute motivations" (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:231–232/220).

The two motivations behind conscious acts of logical grounding such as those mentioned are: (1) motivations which the conscious acts themselves give rise to and (2) motivations of the ego. The former are those motivations which result from a course of action chosen. They have the form: I choose to do B because I have chosen to do A, and they are pitched either as a result of the preceding motivation or because method dictates that I perform a series of conscious acts, each of which builds on the previous to some end. Syllogistic reasoning within an established axiomatic system would be an example. Connected with these sorts of motivations is a limited reasoning to some end or effect (Ibid., 2:232/221). These motivations are most often limited by the parameters of the scientific discipline and the specific investigative task within it. And, they tend to be instrumental.

The purely egological motivation is different; it is a motivation—as Husserl calls it—of "pure reason." Two varieties, again, may be distinguished: first, it may be a motivation to focus upon the pure formality of the process itself. Here, it is egological because the ego is active in attending to the rigor of the process itself; it is the process of reasoning which is thematized. But, here, material content of conscious acts is secondary. The grounds sought are formal-logical. But pure reason may also be directed as inquiry into the meaning of the true or the moral, and here the pursuit of an explanation or ground is abductive. Here, one *projects* a theory, as *relatively rational*, according to the intentions pre-delineated by one's assumptions. If one has grounded those assumptions logically and phenomenologically, all is well and good, but if one has not, then error is possible. It is the exploratory motivation behind the projection of theories that drives reason to reach "the fundamental questions of ethics in the widest sense, [a sense] which has as its object the rational behavior of the subject" (Husserl 1989 [1925], 2:233/222).

The motivations of reason make it possible to draw some conclusions about how Husserl understands the relation between spirit and reason. *Scientistic* reason is conditioned by a motivation which truncates any interest other than that which is instrumentalist and utilitarian. It is not goal-directed in any universal or holistic sense but only according to the objectives dictated within the respective sciences. Its power to explain, however, makes it seem as though it is the means to answer all questions. In fact, however, it is responsible for the crisis of knowledge because it cannot give reasons for its own project. It is a ubiquitous method which ranges through the individual sciences in search of a grand theory.

Pure reason rescues mediate motivation from empty instrumentalism. It is within the motivations of pure reason—previously characterized above—that we find spirit at play. The motivation behind pure reason in its formal and eidetic orientations is equivalent to the motivation behind Husserlian phenomenology, a motivation which seeks to set descriptions of the full range of consciousness in apodictic certainty. By recognizing that all science is done in human consciousness—as is art, politics, ethics and religion—Husserl proposes his phenomenology as a generalization of a scientific criteriology which thematizes both the natural and spiritual worlds. But this criteriology is not—by itself—sufficient to capture the full scope of rationality because it finds the inexplicability of creative reason insurmountable.

Nevertheless, the unification of both worlds requires that the projective and creative aspects of pure reason be recognized at work in each realm. Natural-scientific endeavor and cultural-spiritual endeavor are united by a common genius, one that originates in the projective and inventive motivations of pure reason. As A.-T. Tymieniecka has noted in her works, and has demonstrated in her own life, it is in the creativity of theory-building that the spiritual life of humans is more perfectly expressed.

3. SPIRIT AND REASON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS' THOUGHT

Edmund Husserl described the spirituality of humankind in terms of intersubjectivity, the social world, and pure reason at work in criteriology (human judgment) and theory (human projective abduction). But even with his success in doing so, he delineated only a limited, horizontal dimension to the relation between spirit and reason. This is because his concerns were with the human intersubjective community and its history through time. For Husserl, the transcendence of the transcendental ego is a *horizontal* teleological transcendence: it is a transcending of what humanity has become in the direction of future scientific or spiritual advancement. But it is, for this very reason, a limited transcendence; it is merely diachronic; it is circumscribed by the historical horizons of the natural and cultural worlds. This is because his notions of spirit and the spiritual are construed according to senses established by Enlightenment thinkers (like Herder) and later by the German idealist philosophical traditions. Spirit, here, is understood by way of an analogy: cultural expressions stand to peoples' unique vitality (or *Geist*) in the way manifestation stands to essence. Husserl's notions of reason and spirit are, thus, almost wholly immanent within an Enlightenment rationalist worldview. They are thus more expansive than scientistic reductionism, but they are reductionist in this particular sense, nevertheless.

But there are other connotations of "the spiritual," "the rational," and "the transcendent" whose interconnections transcend Husserl's diachronic reductionism. These meanings are not incompatible with Husserlian phenomenology, even though they are generally absent from it. Ignored is another sense of spirit, another sense of reason, and another sense of transcendence which Husserl hints at the beginning of the *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* but which are connected to an older theological worldview. These complementary ideas are found exceptionally developed in the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas.

St. Thomas carries his analyses of reason and spirit out not according to phenomenological description but according to a set of positive theological and philosophical assumptions and arguments. The theological content of his argumentation comes from the Christian scriptures, the writing of the Church fathers, and the conclusions of Greco-Roman philosophers, especially Aristotle and the Neoplatonists.

3.1. The Methods and Kinds of Reason in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas

Commonly, Thomas is caricatured as a "logic chopper" whose only argumentative type is deduction and whose only argumentative tool is the 'axe' of the Aristotelian syllogistic, but this representation is patently false. In fact, deduction functions for Thomas, not as a method of discovery, but as a method of "exposition," once the first principles have been arrived at by other means. As he puts it, the demonstrative syllogism is ordered to the attainment of certainty; its *end* "is the attainment of science" (*scientia/epistêmê*) (Thomas Aquinas, *Com. Post. Anal.* 1:1:7a 1–10, p. 6). One of the sources of first principles, on the basis of which syllogisms are constructed, is previously existing knowledge which has already been certified as having this status, some of which is intuitively self-evident some of which is known to be true by other means. For example, the laws of logic fall under the first kind; the revelation of God falls under the latter kind.

Thomas' conception of the means for arriving at first principles runs the full range of forms which Thomas describes in his *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*. These means or methods are discursive representations of three classes of reasonable acts.

The first of these classes encompasses the understanding of things as a functional or essential unity; this is the conceiving of *what* a thing is, an action which is understood as equivalent to the *in-forming* of the intellect. This class circumscribes the class of acts that go by the name "intellection." The *Categories* of Aristotle correspond to the textual site where these mental acts may be discursively analyzed.

The second class encompasses those acts whereby the mind synthesizes or analyzes. Thomas thinks that Aristotle's work, *On Interpretation*, treats the second class.

The third class includes those acts of reason which characterize *reason* as such and thus which differentiate it from *intellection*, proper. This class circumscribes acts of discursive reasoning from the known to the unknown, acts treated in the remaining books of Aristotelian logic (Thomas Aquinas, *Com. Post. Anal.*, Foreword, 1–2).

Along with these three classes of mental acts, are coupled three possible degrees of surety. The first level of surety is *certainty*. Certainty is the product of well-formed judgments based upon the intuition of first principles, or well-formed judgments based upon the formality of syllogisms, or well-formed judgments based upon syllogisms which are both formally *and* materially certain because they are about *per se* or necessary things. Certainty is given a discursive method which is purely formal in the *Prior Analytics* and a discursive method which is formal *and* material in the *Posterior Analytics* (Thomas Aquinas, *Com. Post. Anal.* Foreword, 2).[4]

The second level of surety is *probability*. Probability is what the *investigative methods* of logic are directed to produce. Probability falls short of science in the absolute sense, but sometimes one cannot arrive at perfect certainty about an idea, so that what is needed are methods by which the probability of a judgment being true must be maximized for one to make a decision. The dialectical syllogism is the discursive form of this kind of reasoning, and this kind of reason is chiefly treated in the *Topics* (Thomas Aquinas, *Com. Post. Anal.,* Foreword, 2–3).

The third level of surety is *dubitability*. Dubitability is of degrees and is characteristic of alternative propositions or contents of thought which are nearly equipollent, but one of which seems preferable because of passion or character, on one hand, or aesthetics, on the other. The methods of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are addressed to making preferable the nearly equipollent when there are reasons of passion or character; the methods of his *Poetics* is addressed to making preferable the nearly equipollent, when there are aesthetic reasons for doing so. When the nearly equipollent propositions are more dubitable than not, *On Sophistical Refutations* contains the methods for resolving issues in favor of a negative judgment (Thomas Aquinas, *Com. Post. Anal.* Foreword, 3).

The edifice of Thomas' requires that all three kinds of mental acts be engaged, throughout, but what he calls "sacred doctrine" (*sacra doctrina*)—which for him is the highest science—he bases on what he understands to be certainties, while—I would argue—his theology (*theologia*) makes use of both certainties and probabilities.[5]

In the little treatise on sacred doctrine with which he begins the *Summa Theologiae*, Thomas warrants the certainty of the content of his conclusions by the soundness of his logical methods, but also—as importantly—by arguing that the knowledge which forms the premises of his system come from three indubitable sources, according to two kinds. Most certain are three varieties of knowledge. First is the direct contemplative knowledge of God—this is certain because it is the *scientific* or indubitable knowledge of those who see God face-to-face; second are the propositions and non-discursive experiences of revelation—these are certain because they come directly from "the mouth" of God; third is knowledge called the *ancillae philosophiae*—the indubitable "servant maids" (or supplementations) of philosophy which make all discursive knowledge possible. The non-discursive varieties of revelation and beatific knowledge are purely intellectual while discursive revelations and the discursive supplementations of philosophy are forms of propositional knowledge which, *properly actualized*, result in intellectual knowledge. We may represent the cross classification of these epistemic kinds in the following chart:

Varieties of Certain Knowledge According to St. Thomas Aquinas



Thomas' distinction between the rational and the intellectual is an important one, one whose significance is sometimes missed. As I hinted above, Thomas, though calling human thinking rational, really believes that rationality applies most properly to the kind of thinking that accompanies discursive forms. Intellection, on the contrary, is a higher mental operation. Because in thinking we always convert the perceptual stream to a phantasm—that is, to a material *presentation* of the reality—when we think the world before arriving at essential insights, we think the world according to a perceptual presentation of the reality. When we arrive at insights that grasp the true essences of things, then we move beyond the perceptual aspects of the reality's presentation; we move into the realm of intangible intellection. The phantasm is always composite, but the grasped essence is unitary and simple. The phantasm is presented according to qualities that have virtual spatial and temporal extension; the essence is presented as an insight without either. This, in outline, is Thomas' often misunderstood conceptualism, which lies at the origin of Husserlian intentionality, which is developed down a line of thinkers beginning with John of St. Thomas and ending with Franz Brentano. For Thomas, concepts are real relations to

the realities they present. More precisely, they are *presentational signs* of a particular sort.

All discursive forms either simply represent the perceptual contents of phantasms or even when discursive forms point beyond the perceptual contents to the essences; they do so through presentations that are inseparable from perceptions. For Thomas, abstraction to essential reality is like climbing a ladder from less attenuated phantasms to more attenuated phantasms, until one is conceptually able to do without perceptions and composition in grasping the essence of a thing as a unity in an undivided act of consciousness. Bernard Lonergan has called this essential grasp "insight."[6]

What is important about this brief sketch of Thomas' epistemology is that it gives us an insight into his distinction between reason and intellect, reasoning and intellection. For Thomas, *only* intellection is knowledge in the *scientific* sense as a stable, certain, and abiding possession. Reasoning, at best, is merely an instrumentality that can lead to a higher grasp of essential realities. Discursive reasoning can lead to intellection, but intellection may not always be susceptible to exhaustive discursive expression. Intellection, though it results in certain knowledge, may transcend human expression.

But there is more. Thomas distinguishes intellect and intellection, one hand, and reason and reasoning, on the other, in another especially significant sense. It is intellection which alone is *spiritual*.

3.2. Intellect in Relation to Spirit According to St. Thomas Aquinas

In Thomas' thought the relationship between spirit (*spiritus*) and soul (*anima*) is not always clear because their connotations sometimes overlap. Generally speaking, spirit is the state of being of immaterial substances, while soul—whether material or not—is the principle of animation of living things which is defined by Thomas as the form of the body (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, 4:23:2, 128). The soul may be immaterial or not, but spirit is almost exclusively associated with subtle matter or the immaterial. Humans have immortal and non-terminable souls which are spirit; God has no soul but is spirit.

In the case of humans, the spirituality of the soul or intellect implies a subtlety which allows it to become one with what is known, a becoming one which Thomas says is analogous to the penetration of matter by form, though this analogy is somewhat misleading, because Thomas thinks of rational thought leading to intellection as an active process (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a: Q. 55:A. 1 & 2; *De Veritate*, 8:6). Knowing is not simply a matter of becoming one with the object and of greater extensive knowledge of the object; it is also a coming to greater reflexive self-knowledge in the process of knowing (*Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 12:1:5; *Metaphysics* A,7:1072b, 20).

In knowing the world, I also become aware that I am different from the world. I become aware of my power to know the world and myself in their difference, because I can know the world as one with it. It is the spiritual character of the human intellect to be able to know another thing by plastically becoming like that thing, sharing a common term with it, and yet—because it simultaneously knows the thing as object and itself as subject—to keep each separate while growing in knowledge of each.[7] The acts which make the subject and the object immanent to consciousness are spiritual acts. The greater the power of consciousness to make the known object conceptually immanent to it, the more spiritual the knower, according to Thomas.

Thomas—like Tymieniecka—does not believe that either essential or exhaustive knowledge of the individual soul is possible because we do not have perceptual access to it the way we have access to external realities. Rather, we come to knowledge of it in the effects other things have upon it, in its coming to reflexive self-knowledge, and in whatever sensations it leaves in the wake of its actions. For this reason, there are limits to its thematization as an eidetic object. It cannot become an object of apodictic knowledge in the way the transcendental ego can for Husserl.

Spirituality of intellection follows another proportion, as well. Thomas thinks that as intellection approaches the unified insight of the beatific vision, it is more exemplary of pure spirituality. Thus, Thomas accords—like Husserl and Tymieniecka—a high value to theory, but—unlike Husserl—Thomas does not ensconce the possible objects of theory within the horizon of space and time. The notion of theory which is the most highly spiritual, for Thomas, is the one which is the equivalent of beatific vision and whose Latin designator—*contemplatio*—signifies a unitive understanding focused on a divine object. For Thomas, the pinnacle of theoretical intellection is the knowledge of God that the saints have in the afterlife. For Thomas all other forms of theoretical intellection are imperfect copies of this highest, most spiritual, way of knowing. Moreover, Thomas roots the desire to know in the implicit love of God which he believes all humans share. He believes that our greatest potentialities are ordered toward God as the only final object of knowledge and the only final subject of love.

This becoming one with the form of the object known is the height of spiritual existence for Thomas. It is an idea that allows him to speculate about the varieties of possible knowledge among other creatures more spiritual than us, who are capable of knowing without resorting to sensorial data. Thomas, of course, here has in mind the angels and the disembodied saints.

4. SPIRIT AND REASON IN A.-T. TYMIENIECKA'S THOUGHT

In her *magnum opus*, *Logos and Life*, A.-T. Tymieniecka returns to some of the Husserlian themes of the *Crisis* but with the intention of reformulating what she thinks is really at issue, philosophically. Tymieniecka does not—with Husserl—primarily equate the crisis in European science with the neglect of evidential or constitutive grounds but, nevertheless, does agree that this crisis is rooted in the reductionism of some of the practitioners of the sciences. Their reductionism is tantamount to hubris about knowledge that assumes: (1) a truncated idea of reason in place of what reason really is in all of its richness and variety and (2) that this truncated reason is necessary and sufficient to make the behavior of humankind empirically accessible.

What accompanies the hubris about this idea of reason is the attempt to demystify and reduce human behavior under the assumption that all forms of human behavior and expression can be analyzed according to their survival value or according to a calculus of utility or self-interest (Ryba 1990, 30). Despite the limited successes of the sciences that rely on this conception of reason, Tymieniecka thinks that they are at a loss to explain uniquely human behavior such as creativity and transcendence. For such phenomena, sciences thus grounded are capable of providing only superficial, epiphenomenal readings. Creativity and transcendence cannot be mapped as processes which are easily generalizable because they are not repetitive, law-like, and predictable in the same way as are the logical, mathematical, and natural worlds are. It is in the very nature of human creativity and transcendence for humans to act and be constructive in a unique and unrepeatable way (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:18–19).

What is wanted is a new re-orientation of phenomenology which is not limited to the Husserlian correlation of reason with the explication of object-constituting consciousness. Tymieniecka thinks that the weakness of the Husserlian method is its incapacity to provide an eidetic description that captures the "intrinsic principle of development" at the heart of the teleology of human existence (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:22). Whereas Husserlian phenomenology is capable of providing eidetic descriptions of conscious acts which have already been accomplished and whose intentional features and constructed products are well known, it is impotent to provide an account of the processes that result in novel creations and their accompanying rationale. It is this description which Tymieniecka's augmented phenomenology is designed to accomplish.

4.1. Tymieniecka's "Logoic" Expansion of Reason

The expanded notion of rationality which accompanies Tymieniecka's re-orientation of phenomenology toward the creative entelechy of human existence is one which is *personalist*. It does not simplistically associate the distinctive difference of human nature with Cartesian rationality but views human nature as more complexly organized according to the full hierarchy of powers which function in the unity we call the human *person* (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:13). In this, it has similarities to the notion of rationality in J.H. Newman's writings, particularly his *Grammar of Assent*.[8] To imagine that the perfection of human nature is epitomized in Cartesian analysis is to reduce human nature to a capacity for a specific variety of logic-chopping. Tymieniecka, instead, recommends a re-orientation of the Husserlian phenomenology and its attendant conception of rationality to a new set of acts and objects that do justice to human creativity in all of its spontaneity and freedom. By this re-orientation, phenomenology will avoid a reduction of human nature which sums up its essential humanity in terms of Cartesian rationality.

Accompanying this new re-orientation of method is the direction of its re-orientation to a new set of objects. Phenomenology is no longer exclusively oriented toward the intellect but toward a "new division of human faculties in which the supreme role passes from the intellect to the *Imaginatio Creatrix*, and sensory perception cedes primacy to the will" (Tymieniecka 1988, 1: 10–11). Among these objects, though key to the creative process, is the creative teleonomy, or the "entelechial factor" as Tymieniecka terms it (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:22). This entelechial factor lies at the material center of a person's identity and orchestrates the biogenic unfolding of the person in all of his/her particularity. Despite expectations, however, this entelechy does not, *in potentia*, contain the person's "final attainment" (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:23). Though it is the means by which humans adapt and shape their surrounding environment, and though it is constrained and partially limited by that environment, it is not exhausted by the determinations which result from the dialectic between individual and environment. Neither can a person's final attainment be understood as pitched toward the end of material well-being. None of the achievements of the person, none of the proximate ends of human existence, provide a sufficient reason for a human's unique character. "[T]he simple productive and reproductive functioning of intentional constitution," within a closed horizon of natural needs and purposes, is insufficient to explain the freedom, originality, and creativity of humans (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:23). What they supplies the missing *telos* which explains this creative excess? Tymieniecka tells us that this *telos* is nothing less than absolute transcendence.

With this recognition, it becomes possible to chart another kind of rationale or *logos* at work in human life. The Husserlian notion of reason is expanded by it. Through this logos of transcendence, it is possible, especially, to read the regular features of a particular class of human actions as manifesting a characteristic orientation toward absolute transcendence. Especially, in human actions connected with self-creation is this orientation seen.

Self-creation, according to Tymieniecka, occurs in three modes: (1) the mode of the poetic *logos*, (2) the mode of the spiritual *anti-logos*, and (3) the mode of the intellectual *logos* (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:17). It is through the third of these modes that we have intellectual access to the other two; it is through the third that we are able to map the intelligibility of the others. By "intellectual *logos*" Tyminiecka designates an augmented notion of rationality which is connected with human self-creation and which she thinks is accessible to an expanded notion of the intellect which she terms the "creatively orchestrated intellect" (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:17, 143). The creatively orchestrated intellect is open to a wider horizon of human actions, than Husserlian cognition. It is capable of having "plurivocal insights," of projecting novel "synthetic unities," and of discerning and implementing a "pluri-rational operational system" on the basis of a skeletal system of structures, regulations, and principles," which it is able to discern in the creative process (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:17). Partially, it is able to describe those features of creativity neglected by Husserlian phenomenology and, on the basis of these descriptions, it is partially able to guide the creative process. In all of this, the creatively orchestrated intellect is radically oriented toward theorization.

By observation of the modes of self-creation, the creatively orchestrated intellect discovers three phases which are common to each of the creative process' three modes. Thus, the poetic logos, the spiritual anti-logos, and the intellectual logos, though different in their operations in self-creation, contribute to this self-creation by passing through three common phases: (1) creative vision, (2) the construction of an objective form of the creative project, and (3) the transition from the form to a unique style of existence (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:168–169).

Of the three, creative vision is the most difficult to describe, according to any regular features or creative structure, because it is "incipient and characterized by a free non-rational spontaneity in which all the human faculties, emotions, and strivings interact intergeneratively to produce a message to be conveyed or a purpose to be achieved" (Ryba 1990, 36). The early stages of this first phase—creative vision—are mysterious; they are characterized by a coalescence of images and ideas serving a unique accomplishment. Once the new creative act begins to take form, however, the hyletic conditions for

its embodiment—media such as words, sounds, canvas, paints, wood, stone, movement, etc.—are all reviewed as possible means for the expression of different potentialities of the original vision. In the process of conforming matter to idea, the resistance of the material in which the form is expressed conditions the realization of the form. Ultimately, vision and form are realized as a material object, as an existing entity in its own right, which possesses a causal efficacy independent from its creator. It is the causal efficacy of the new object, as the object enters into the world, which is responsible for new forms of human experience.

The creative process resulting in new objects is the means by which humankind achieves a measure of transcendence. This transcendence derives from the discontinuity between the new object and the old world into which it erupts. But the break is never perfect or complete. For the new object to have meaning it, must have a context in some intersubjective world (Tymieniecka 1988, 1:114–115). Even so, that new creation transforms that world and injects new experiences into it. The continuous advance in the cultural world's transcendence of itself is driven by the creative advance of human beings, who conceive new meaningful objects and bring them to effect in the world.

4.2. The Anti-logos of the Spiritual

The most radical form of creative transcendence issues neither from the poetic logos nor the creatively orchestrated intellectual logos. The most radical form of creative transcendence is connected with that class of human acts which are attempts to oppose themselves to every human experience in order to grasp the meaning of human experience from a vantage point beyond the horizon of this world. The most radically transcendent form of creativity is that connected with spiritual acts.

The radical transcendence of spiritual acts demands a further augmentation of the phenomenological method which makes it possible to orient it toward two new sets of objects: (1) the soul as the seat of spiritual acts and (2) the spiritual acts taken in themselves. Tymieniecka does not accept the Husserlian conception of the soul, *simpliciter*, as the one of the four functional systems under the hegemony of consciousness but understands the soul, instead, both as an entelechy interlaced with other human powers and as a mediating dynamism between creativity and existential self-interpretation (Tymieniecka 1988, 2: 7–8). When the soul is occupied with the spiritual per se, it is not intent upon the creation of new objects in the world but the opposite. Its activity is in the mode of an *anti-logos,* whose purpose is the devaluation of rationality through the dismantling of the networks of object-constituting creativity, a devaluation which is not an end in itself but which is attempted as a means

to achieve an ultimate goal: to discover the "*innermost destiny of the human being*" (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:6).

What are the regular features of this dismantling? In the mode of the anti-logos, the soul's movement toward its ultimate goal is accomplished through a series of spiritual acts. These acts, though possessing a resemblance to object-constituting acts—in the Husserlian sense—have salient differences. Spiritual acts are primarily oriented toward the deconstruction of object-constitution.

In itself, the spiritual act does not construct creative objects but takes the form of a directed intentionality, a "dynamic gush," or a vector field (Koffka 1963, 42–55). To be objectless does not to be purposeless, however. The ultimate purpose of this directed intentionality is to "transcend objectivity itself" (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:41). It is this aim that paradoxically causes this act to attach itself to objective goals because, for it to achieve its ultimate purpose, it must begin with recognizable hurdles to overcome. "[T]he spiritual act is polythemic; it measure its ultimate *telos* of transcending objectivity by successively positing intermediate goals, achieving them, and then comparing them" (in their transparent inadequacy) "against the achievement of ultimate transcendence" which in the process becomes ever clearer (Ryba 2000, 38–39). Against the dimly perceived, but infinitely open, space of spiritual freedom, quotidian existence—defined by the consciously-constituted world—is gradually disclosed as a realm governed by limiting rules. The mundane world "appears as a screen [en-]closing a horizon" and blinding us to the possibilities of spiritual achievement (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:41).

The features of this directed—but not object-constituting—intentionality are nine-fold: (1) it presents itself with certainty; (2) it anchors itself in the subject's dynamic existence; (3) it penetrates the depths of the contents of consciousness; (4) it is present in all actions of the subject; (5) it manifests itself as a mute summons which, nevertheless, has supreme deontic force; (6) it assumes superiority over the constitutive acts to which it is attached; (7) it is characterized by the affective modalities of peace and serenity; (8) it intrudes and reshapes the processes of constitution; and (9) it coordinates a harmonious polyphony between the various levels of consciousness so that they cooperate toward achievement of the spiritual act's ultimate goal (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:28–29).

Though their regular features may be thus described, spiritual acts are wild things. Like other creative acts they possess an elusive and complex structure which can only be glimpsed segmentally as they lace themselves in and out of conscious awareness (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:38–39). Therefore, the nature of spiritual acts demands a further readjustment and expansion of Husserlian phenomenology, a readjustment and expansion which makes it sensitive to the accurate descriptive rendering of fluid and dynamic lived-experiences but

without casting them into preconceived categories (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:24). It is at this point that the importance of theory to Tymieniecka's re-orientation of phenomenology can be seen.

Because spiritual acts transfuse themselves throughout consciousness, they are not always available as intuitive apodictic evidences. Like Thomas, Tymieniecka limits the intuition of the soul to evidences which are, for the most part, mediate and must be pieced together. When this is what is presented, the phenomenological method has no other recourse than a modification of Leibniz's conjectural method which trades on the analogy between spiritual acts and cognitive acts Ryba 2002, 444–445). Here, the inseparability of theory and metaphysics is indicated, because it is by conjecture that one reasons from the fragmentary, but related evidences, to flesh-in the total picture of the spiritual act and its functions. At these times, phenomenology becomes more speculative than either constitutive phenomenology or even the phenomenology of creativity (Tymieniecka 2:46). However, the process of describing spiritual acts is not wholly speculative. When spiritual acts present themselves as immanent perceptions possessing a kernel of intelligibility, then the phenomenological method is able to treat them eidetically (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:28).

According to Tymieniecka, spiritual acts are the mainsprings driving three sequential movements of the soul toward it unique accomplishment. These movements are: (a) radical examination, (b) exalted existence, and (c) the movement toward transcending.

When the soul comes to reflective awareness of its "transempirical aspirations," the confinement of the quotidian, and the under-determination of the meaning of the world, it reaches a point of alienation where all which was familiar and taken for granted seems arbitrary and capricious and is, thus, called into question (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:47, 65). This crisis of meaning occasions radical examination. At the end of this examination, the soul seeks to discover an absolute guiding principle that would constitute a break with the mundane and objectively-constituted world. It seeks to discover a new style of life in which interior spontaneity and emotional depth might be actualized not in some external expression or object but as its own possession, as its own being (Tymieniecka 2:69). Put this way, the alienation from the constituted world is a search for new meaning beyond this world, a search which stands as an antilogos to the logos of mundane creativity.

Because the method of this *anti-logos* is deconstructive, it bears a resemblance to the phenomenological method. Like the phenomenological method, radical examination is not primarily interested in *knowledge-to*; it is not directed to knowledge for the solution of problems which implies a minor practical readjustment or minor personal reorientation (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:53).

Also like the phenomenological method, radical examination is a questioning of all sedimented meanings, including objectivity's claim to be ultimate knowledge. It is different from the phenomenological method, however, in that it is not oriented toward knowledge as an end in itself but rather it takes knowledge as the means to an end. That end to which radical examination is directed is the meaning of being—not as a kind of knowledge but as lived reality.

With the hope that the world might be transcended, that the foundation of the life of the Spirit might be discovered, the soul is poised on the selvedge between the first and second movements of the soul. Here, it initially looks to the forms of transcendence which have been attempted in the world—the pursuit of perfect beauty, the pursuit of perfect truth, the pursuit of perfect goodness—and how these are realized in material creations and the lives of the artists, scientists, and saints. The result is disappointment. It sees, here, only the measure of human mediocrity. Even the idols of the constructed concepts of God do not satisfy. "God" inevitably "steals away" (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:72). The problem is in thinking that concepts or objects might satisfy what only the development of the latent potentialities of the soul can achieve (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:91). The frustration, sadness, and despair that result either drive the soul into the abyss or to a new liminal point where it is electric with expectancy.

Realizing that the construction of new concepts or objects is not the means to transcendent fulfillment, the soul discovers that what it aspires to is beyond the grasp of consciousness. Even the utterances of the mystics about the divine are mere "extrapolations from the soul's experiences" (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:90). The soul thus enters the third movement. Here, the aim of the spiritual acts is discovered to be without an object, and thus the spiritual intuition is directed beyond the realm of conscious representations. With this realization, a "network of latent functions" is activated, an all-encompassing peace comes over the soul, the "empirical will is suspended" and a new volitional dynamism takes its place. The result is a dwelling in beatitude (Tymieniecka 1988, 2:95). Here, the experience is one of union with the infinite which issues in a transformation of the moral will. No longer does one perform moral actions within the natural order of cause and effect, or means and ends. Rather, moral action issues unconditioned and spontaneous from the union. In addition, in its third movement, the soul waits on novel revelations, and once received, turns to the matter of interpreting them.

In attempting to understand these communications, the soul must return from the spiritual realm to re-enter the mundane in order to test the validity of the revelations it has received. It must subject them to the test of application in the real world. The end of the third movement is the selfless communication of received truths, and their reformulation and integration into the world. This process of communication engages the whole intersubjective community in

dialogue and issues in new experimental communities of faith. These communities are able to create new social realities with new spiritual values at their core. Such communities are able to measure their success to the degree that they are able to live these values in the world and transform the quotidian world, in the process. Such communities of spirit are social incarnations of spiritual transcendence.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The moment has come to draw some of the threads of this exposition together. In closing, I wish to ask two questions about Husserl's understanding of the spiritual. First, is it an adequate understanding of the spiritual? Second, if not, do St. Thomas and A.-T. Tymieniecka, perhaps, have something to tell us which will make it more adequate? Before I answer these questions, however, I would like briefly to rehearse of the similarities and differences between the Husserlian, Thomist, and Tymienieckian projects.

5.1. Homologies and Heterologies Between the Ideas of Husserl, Thomas, and Tymieniecka on Reason and Spirit

Husserl, Thomas, and Tymieniecka think that their philosophies are totalistic, that they each provide a unifying basis—or, at least, a good starting point—for explaining natural, personal, and spiritual reality, though what constitutes this explanation and its modes are differently nuanced by each. Husserl and Thomas' respective notions of explanation intersect at the level of what constitutes analysis. This has meant that contemporary analytic philosophers have found each to be a matter of some interest. Tymieniecka's philosophy is probably too new to attract such an interest.

Tymieniecka, Thomas, and Husserl are also alike in emphasizing *theôrein/contemplatio* as key to an expansion of understanding and truth. Though each nuances "theory" a bit differently, they are unequivocally united on this point: theory leads to the expansion of the material content of truth. Excessive concentration on the formality of knowledge is not fundamentally productive.

Despite these similarities, the essential orientation of Husserl's philosophy is epistemological, while the orientations of Thomas' theology and Tymieniecka's philosophy are metaphysical. Tymieniecka, Thomas, and Husserl also come at the question of spirit and its subjecthood from different philosophical angles. Husserl proceeds from the intersubjectivity of spirit in the natural and social world, while Thomas proceeds from the position of the soul's metaphysical subsistence and interminability. Tymieniecka, on the

other hand, is most interested in providing a phenomenology which charts the soul's creative transcendence.

In each approach, the word "spirit" refers to different, but not necessarily exclusive, features of human existence. It seems to me that there is an important way in which the Thomist notion of human personhood as a human substance with a rational nature and the Husserlian notion of the transcendental ego intersect. But there is also an important way in which Thomas and Tymieniecka stand against the Husserlian project by asserting the impossibility of bringing all the acts of the subject to apodictic certainty. Paralleling this difference from Husserl is their similar view on theory. Tymieniecka and Thomas understand theory as conjectural method capable of delivering deep insights into human subjecthood and its non-rational processes. Through the lens of conjectural method, it becomes possible to see—to some degree—what lies below the waterline of subjectivity. Husserl's notion of the transcendental ego is what is rationally constructed above that ego's "waterline," in apparent indifference to the mass of cognitive processes at work below.

5.2. How the Ideas of Thomas and Tymieniecka Supplement and Complement Husserl's Ideas on Reason and Spirit

I began this article with a brief discussion of Husserl's evaluation of the crisis faced by the western scientific spirit. There, it was clear that Husserl accepted the spiritual origins of that scientific ethos, but he construed that ethos as having moved beyond the necessity of the problem of God, except perhaps as a necessary regulative idea, that is as 'as the teleological source of reason in the world.' His solution, as I understand it, was to apply the phenomenological method to the history of this ethos in order to extract its essence and then to show how this essence was inseparable from its successes, and especially to show that it could not be separated from a non-reductionist understanding of human personhood, one he associates with the *distinctiveness* of rationality and the human transcendental ego. For Husserl, the distinctiveness of human rationality as universalized in the transcendental ego is the spiritual, par excellence.

Clearly, Husserl's attempt to head off the forces of scientistic reductionsim by reactivating the grounds of the western scientific spirit has been a failure. The juggernaut of reductionism continues to ply on, and no rescue ship comes sailing down the philosophical tributaries originating in Husserlian philosophy, either. In the other direction, postmodernism has effected a radical critique of the transcendent and has retreated off the capacious ocean of being to find shelter in the enclosed but brackish harbor of the immanent signifier. In their denial of human subjectivity, the claims of reductionists and the postmodernists often sound strikingly similar.

But does the dire contemporary situation warrant an abandonment of Husserl's project as a whole? I don't believe it does. What it does require is an identification of the myopia of the Husserlian program. Let me make a brief diagnosis and a few suggestions.

Husserl's representationalist (that is idealist) epistemology reduces knowledge of the other to a coordination problem: it makes an explanation of the problem of empathy impossible because it forecloses the possibility of real empathetic or sympathetic union with others. On the other hand, the presentationalist (realist) epistemology of St. Thomas posits the possibility of the union of spirit at a level deeper than the Husserlian epistemology. This is because for Thomas, in truly knowing others, I—in a sense—become them. If Thomas is right, then it sets the explanation of the transcendental ego on a firmer footing, while re-introducing a Neoplatonic inflection. It may be that the *ethoi* or spirits of movements, ideologies, ages, or peoples are not simply reducible to the ideas which people share in common; it may be that to have an ethos is to participate in a real collective spirit because the people who are its members are in a unitive solidarity based upon intellection and love. Here, an appropriately modified Thomist epistemology might be the basis for explaining mass phenomena, but it might also better serve to ground the Husserlian notion of the transcendental ego.[9]

Husserl and Tymieniecka's respective notions of the transcendental as spiritual and Thomas' notion of the soul are complementary ideas which, I think, can be made to fit together in the following way. If we allow the expansion of the transcendental ego, beyond the simple rational transcendence of the individual ego, and accept two further orientations—a general form of creativity and a general form of religiosity—then that gives us an serviceable conception of humanity for a global civilization. Of course, this expansion also means an augmentation of the Husserlian phenomenology and its limitation to the rational.

In the philosophy of Tymieniecka, the Husserlian transcendental ego—which, by his admission, is a *spiritual* ego—is also augmented in a way which Husserl admitted he neglected.[10] Without this augmentation, something is deficient in Husserl's characterization of the relation between rationality and spirituality. For Tymieniecka, no longer can the transcendental ego be understood as the essence of rational personhood, where rationality is understood in terms of apodictic reasoning about data, logical forms, or object-taking intentionality. The idea of rationality must be expanded. It must also embrace abductive reason in order to represent the full range of human spiritual motivations. That final completing conception which unites the spirituality and rationality of humankind is the will to theory which we find also in the

theology of St. Thomas Aquinas but with a much different—and decidedly *theological*—inflection.

Three different notions of spirit are implied. One (Thomas') is construed in terms of properties of the substance which is the formality of the individual. The second (Husserl's) is construed in terms of the potentialities of human nature, though enclosed within a horizon of rationality. The third (Tymieniecka's) is also construed in terms of human potentialities, but with a difference: these potentialities are the potentialities of the individual subject, and they are only incompletely mapable, so that even the horizon of rationality cannot contain them.

The Husserlian notion of spirit is not identical to the formality of the soul but is a constellation of *specific* habitualities which bring human nature's potentiality into act. Thus the *Ethos-Geist* associated with the western philosophical project—with western science, in the broad sense—is the common spiritual character—the second nature, in the Thomist sense—of those dedicated to it. Likewise, the Husserlian transcendental ego is not constitutive of the individual human soul but is an abstraction. It is the habitual actualization of a set of common potentialities shared by individuals with a purely rational orientation to the world. On the other hand, Thomas' notion of an immortal and interminable soul corresponds to the Husserlian notion of the empirical soul with respect to its uniqueness and individuality. But the empirical soul is not the transcendental ego, nor is Husserl's empirical soul necessarily immortal and never-ending. Rather, it is the Thomist conception of human nature as essentially rational that is correlative to the Husserlian transcendental ego.

Tymieniecka adds an important supplement that changes the terms of the compatibility between soul in Thomas and spirit in Husserl. Though her recognition of the importance of creativity in human cognition is not anti-rational, it does mean that to construe human nature as *essentially* rational or as confined within the horizon of rational projects, is to neglect an indispensable component to theorization and human progress.

For Tymieniecka, to be *rationalist* is to neglect human powers which, though non-rational, nevertheless possess a *logos* that does not fit neatly within the confines of either Husserl's or Thomas' notions of reason. What Tymieniecka does for Husserlian philosophy is to expand Husserlian reason in the direction of explaining the creativity of *Geist* as well as its rationality. What Tymieniecka does for Thomas is two-fold. First, she provides the means for an understanding of the immortal and interminable soul in its spiritual self-formation. This is expressed in her analysis of the three movements of the soul. Second, she provides the means for an expansion of the Thomist notion of human nature as essentially *logical* (in her special sense) and creative. Here, like Thomas, she

recognizes a form of knowledge which transcends the rational but which is not, simply for that reason, *irrational*. Nevertheless, for Tymieniecka, understanding the *logos* of creative, non-rational processes is not equivalent to Thomist intellection, which is the non-discursive intuitive grasp of essential realities. About the latter, she remains silent. She sees the method of this *logoic* understanding to be conjectural abduction; its purpose is the discursive expression of theory.

Thomas' recognition that all humankind has an entelechial orientation to the divine means the expansion of the Husserlian notion of the transcendental ego, as Tymieniecka's emphasis on spiritual self-creativity also means the expansion of Thomas' understanding of humankind's transcendental orientation. Because these supplementations of the transcendental ego fall outside of the scope of rationality (as Husserl understood it), but are constitutive of human aspirations when and whenever we find them, they force a reevaluation of the adequacy of the Husserlian scope of spirit.

In conclusion, what I am suggesting is that what Husserlian philosophy requires is a more expansive anthropology, one that restores a broader understanding of spirit along the lines of Thomas' and Tymieniecka's insights. This augmentation, I think, can be summarized in three stipulations: (1) the transcendental ego must be understood as more than the spirit-form of rationality; (2) to be conceptualized adequately, it must include the idea of humankind as constitutively oriented toward and dependent upon God; but (3) it must also include (as an essential constituent of human nature) the creativity of humans, who—in their individual self-creation and in their creation of novel objectivities—must be considered co-creators with God.

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NOTES

1. Husserl never satisfactorily accomplished this task. In *Ideas*, as a preliminary sketch of how it might be accomplished, he distinguishes: (1) the surrounding world of communal spirit, (2) the subjective sphere of the solitary subject, (3) pre-social subjectivity, (4) social subjectivity, (5) immediate experiences of the subject and (6) mediate experiences of the subject. Applying the techniques of phenomenological reduction, *epochê,* and eidetic variation, he thinks an apodictic picture of the constitution of the spiritual may be built up. See: Husserl, 1989 [1925], 2:208–210/198–200).

2. This is summarized in the view of the Rabbis that when a person dies a world dies, too.

3. In an appendix to *Ideas*, Husserl hastily describes the strata of the spiritual world according to the following heterogeneous list of things and processes: (1) spatio-temporal nature and the natural environment, (2) men and animals in their characteristic behavior, (3) tangible goods, including instrumentally useful things found naturally or constructed, (4) laws, morals and customs in language, religion, and culture, (5) incomplete social personalities, (6) spiritual genesis of individuals

and social worlds, (7) biography as psychogenesis, (8) history as the socially constituted self-understanding, (9) social transformations, (10) art and its development, (11) development of the inner life/religious life of *humanity*, and (12) the evolutionary development of man's capacity for culture. See: Husserl, 1989 [1925], 2:328–329/315–316.

4. In contrast to formal logic which treats the consistency of arguments based upon their form, material logic treats of the contents of the premises according to their truth. Thus, we may have a syllogism of the same type, and perfectly consistent, but with three different conclusions: one false, one probable, and one *scientific*. See Yves Simon's foreword to John of St. Thomas. *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas*. Yves R. Simon, et al., Trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. ix–xxiii.

5. This idea is hardly new. It has been persuasively argued by Brian Davies and James Weisheipel. See: Brian Davies. *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 10–14. I think this view is supported by a close reading of the first question of *pars prima* of the *Summa Theologiae*.

6. Lonergan's understanding of insight is somewhat broader than Thomas' grasp of essences but they intersect in that Lonergan believes insight always attends real intelligibility. Thomas would confine this to essential knowledge, but Lonergan sees it as "an act of organizing intelligence that brings within a single perspective the insights of mathematicians, scientists, and men of common sense." Bernard Lonergan. *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992), p. 4 and throughout.

7. See: Pierre Rousselot. *Intelligence: Sense of Being, Faculty of God*, Volume 1, Collected Philosophical Works (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1999 [1936]), p. 14.

8. John Henry Newman also proposes expanded notions of reason and logic which go beyond mere "paper logic." The data and form of reasoning of these expanded notions, he argues, bear an affinity with those behind the Aristotelian notion of *phronēsis*. According to Newman, although intuitively established and without the validity of the formal syllogism, such judgments are certain, though they have the forms of the practical syllogisms. In a number of places, Newman describes this kind of inference in a way that seems convertible with Peirce's notion of abduction or Tymieniecka's notion of conjectural method. Also reflecting the Thomist distinction between first and second intentions is Newman's distinction between real and notional assent, the former referring to the assent directed *through* the notion to the reality, the latter takes the notion as the object of assent. The former is suggestive of the Thomist notion of real relation to the reality, the latter a notional relation. See: John Henry Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (New York: Image Books, 1955 [1870]), pp. 49–92, 209–299; *Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford Between A.D. 1826 and 1843* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997 [1843]), pp. 54–74, 176–201, 202–221, 251–277.

9. I should be clear that I am not arguing that Thomas thinks it is possible to know the other in a way it is not possible to know the self. I am simply arguing that a critical realist approach to empathy as a feature of intersubjectivity might be more fruitful than Husserl's early idealist approach. Although I do not think that Thomas would argue that the other in the fullness of his/her personhood could be delivered as essential knowledge—no more than one's self can—still, some truth about the other is thus deliverable. If persona knowledge comes the way other knowledge comes, then experiencing subjects can, to a degree, become one another.

10. Robert Sokolowski describes the transcendental ego as that orientation of the ego which transcends its individuality and is pitched toward truth and justice in their universality. The transcendental ego is a particular intentional stance toward the world; it lives in the world through the structures of reason. See: Robert Sokolowski. *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 115–122. Husserl establishes the ideal and spiritual nature of the transcendental ego in the following passage of the epilogue to *Ideas*: "[T] here is

a remarkable and thoroughgoing parallelism between a correctly executed phenomenological psychology and a transcendental phenomenology. To every eidetic, as well as to every empirical, constatation on the one side, a parallel must correspond on the other side. And yet this whole theoretical content, if taken, in the natural attitude, as psychology, as a positive science relating to the pre-given world, is utterly non-philosophical; whereas the 'same' content in the transcendental attitude, and consequently understood as transcendental phenomenology is a philosophical science. Indeed, it even achieves the rank of the philosophically fundamental science, as a science that cultivates . . . the transcendental ground, . . . the exclusive ground of all philosophical knowledge." See: Edmund Husserl. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Second Book (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 2:413–414.

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A.L. SAMIAN

REASON AND SPIRIT IN AL-BIRUNI'S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

Abstract: Much have been written about al-Biruni's contribution to the development of astronomy and *materia medica* that has earned him a distinguished place in the history of science. Yet little is known about his philosophy of mathematics, especially pertaining to the interplay of reason and spirit in his view of the foundation of mathematics. In this article, the author will examine al-Biruni's position regarding the matter based on some of his writings, in particular, his *Kitab al-tafhim li-awa'il sina'at al-tanjim* (The Book of Instruction in the Elements of the Art of Astrology).

1. INTRODUCTION

The mathematization of nature has always been an important theme in the development of Islamic science and its modern counterpart, Western science. The flowering of Islamic science is closely related to the development of Islamic mathematics and it is impossible to understand Islamic mathematics in its totality, particularly its philosophy, without mentioning the obvious contribution of the Greeks because preceding the advent of Islamic science there was Greek science. Central to Greek mathematics is the Pythagorean School which embraces the view that both qualitative and quantitative aspect of mathematics are important. Numbers and geometrical figures are more than merely quantitative representations. For example, geometrical figures bear images of Unity, and numbers are projections of Unity. In Islamic philosophy of mathematics, it is well known that Ikhwan al-safa adopts a similar philosophical position as the Pythagorean with regards to mathematics. Their concept of unity underscores their concept of mathematization of nature. Since aspects of unity are so crucial to their concept of mathematization of nature, mathematics function as a "Jacob's Ladder" for them to internalize the concept of the Divine.

Al-Biruni (973–1051AD) flourished during the rise of Islam in Central Asia. It has been argued that al-Biruni was one of the first Muslims to "develop the scientific and empirical methodology for the study of nature".[1] Nature, which

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 137–146.

is regarded in Islam as 'al-Quran al-takwini', is objective and has several levels of reality. These are the spiritual (or angelic), animistic (or psychic) and material (or corporeal). Where is the place of mathematics in the link between the mathematician and nature? In particular, how does al-Biruni view the role of mathematics in problem solving? We believe that no proper philosophical study of al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics is possible without a prior investigation into some aspects underlying his concept of the mathematization of nature, such as the belief in the mathematical structure of the universe and that mathematical aspects of Nature are knowable. It is only from this investigation that we can unveil the true significance of mathematics to al-Biruni.

Al-Biruni's work on astrology and astronomy, particularly his *Kitab al-Tafhim li-awa'il sina'at al-tanjim* is invaluable to this study because in it he defines basic mathematical entities and states his opinion on the relationship between geometry, arithmetic and astrology. We will examine his view of numbers since numbers are one of the major criteria that demarcate mathematics and non-mathematical disciplines. We will also examine his perception on the place of numbers and mathematics in unraveling nature. What, if any, is the connection between numbers, mathematics, and nature? What is the status of mathematical laws, entities, theories, and infinity in his mathematical works such as the aforementioned *Al-Tafhim*? How can mathematics increase our knowledge about the Divine? What is the limitation of the mathematical method? In what sense is mathematical knowledge uncertain? These are some of the pressing issues treated.

2. MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE

Al-Biruni's view with respect to the mathematical regularity of genera and species is shared by others, particularly the followers of Pythagoras. However we claim that al-Biruni certainly was not a Pythagorean. It is true that Pythagoras made similar statements such as the statement by Nicomachus who wrote that:

> All that has by nature and with systematic method been arranged in the Universe seems both in part and as a whole to have been determined and ordered in accordance with number, by the forethought and mind of Him that created all things; for the pattern was fixed, like a preliminary sketch, by the domination of number pre-existing in the mind of the world creating God, number conceptual only and immaterial in every way, so that with reference to it, as to an artistic plan, should be created all these things, times, motions, the heavens, the stars, all sorts of revolutions.[2]

When al-Biruni says that the universe has a mathematical structure, he is not only implying that the universe is such because everything can be associated with numbers. Rather he is also inferring that the structure of the universe

can be analyzed geometrically. In addition to numerical relations, things in the universe are likewise related geometrically. Al-Biruni argues that such is the case because sensible objects take space and space has dimensions. Space has length, breadth and depth (or height). Says al-Biruni:

> The dimensions of space (ab'ad al-makam) are three in number, length, breadth, and depth; these terms are not applied to the dimensions in themselves so as to be invariable, but relatively, so that one of them is called length, that which crosses it is breadth, and the third, which traverses both, depth, but it is customary to call the longer of the first two, length, the shorter, breadth or width, and that which is extended downwards, depth [or thickness], while if its extension upwards is considered height.[3]

Therefore al-Biruni's concept that the universe has a mathematical structure means that there are always mathematical relationship between things in the universe and that this relationship is both numerical as well as geometrical.

3. THE PRESENCE OF NUMBERS AND GEOMETRY

So far we have attempted to show that in al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics, the universe has a mathematical structure, that is the constituents of the universe are mathematically related. In this section, we want to make a stronger claim by arguing that in al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics, he perceives that things are not only mathematically related but they are also mathematical objects. In other words, one can always find the presence of numbers and geometrical figures in them.

The mathematical aspect of a plant is a case in point. Al-Biruni maintains that if one observes the plant carefully, one discovers that its shape follows the law of geometry; that the plant actually is an embodiment of geometry. Besides, the number of leaves too is in accordance with that law. Al-Biruni argues further that such phenomena is true in most cases. Sensible objects in nature do have mathematical properties. States al-Biruni:

> Among the peculiarities of the flowers, there is one really astonishing fact, that is, the number of their leaves, the tops of which form a circle when they begin to open, is in most cases conformable to the laws of geometry. In most cases they agree with the chords that have been found by the laws of geometry, not with conic sections. You scarcely ever find a flower of 7 to 9 leaves, for you cannot construct them according to the laws of geometry in a circle as isosceles. The number of their leaves is always 3 or 4 or 6 or 18. This is a matter of frequent occurrence.[4]

Therefore a number (al-^{c}adad), which according to al-Biruni "is defined as a sum of units (ahad)"[5] is always present in every sensible object. They invariably bear numerical aspects.

In addition to numbers, al-Biruni embraces the view that geometrical figures are likewise present in sensible objects. Every physical objects possesses

some kind of mathematical forms or figures. That is the reason that they have geometrical properties. The different shapes and sizes conform to different geometrical figures. There are circles in some flowers and triangles in some leaves. The leaves of the palm tree are triangular in shape whereas the interior of its fruit is spherical. Since these various forms and figures have geometrical properties, it is only proper that al-Biruni gives the following description about geometry:

> Geometry (al-handasah) is the science of dimensions and their relations to each other and the knowledge of the properties of *the forms and figures found in solids*.[6]

Given that geometrical figures are present in every physical objects, they do not only occur in sensible things which are clearly observable but also in those which are not immediately observable. In order to illustrate this aspect of geometrical figures, al-Biruni gives the example of the center of the earth. The earth is a physical object yet nobody has actually seen its center. Still al-Biruni argues that it must have a center. When we think about the center of something, usually we think of it as a point which in the middle of the object.[7] It is the concept of center in this sense that al-Biruni attempts to show. The center is nothing but purely geometrical. Explains al-Biruni:

> The center [of the earth] is nothing but a point, and a part of the earth, no matter how small we conceive it to be, cannot fit at the center.[8]

The center of the earth is only one of the many geometrical figures present in al-Biruni's concept of the earth. Al-Biruni's belief that geometrical figures are present in sensible objects is also clear if we examine closely his concept of a geometrical figure. What is a figure to al-Biruni? According to him, the concept of a figure is directly related to that of a line. Everything that we can observe has at least one line, from a simple instrument such as a pencil to the complex building, for example an observatory. All of them are figures. In more specific term, they are physical representations of some geometrical figures. "A figure (al-shakl)", writes al-Biruni, "is that which is surrounded by one or more lines".[9]

Geometrical figures are related by some geometrical concepts. This is especially true when one compares geometrical figures. Al-Biruni maintains that these geometrical concepts are present in every sensible things. In order to illustrate this aspect, let us consider an important concept in geometry which al-Biruni has described. The concept is that of a ratio (al-nisbah). It is an important concept to al-Biruni especially because of his scholarly tendency to compare things, so much so that he is known as a comparitivist. In his discussion about geometry, al-Biruni relates his concept of ratio:

Ratio is the relation between two things of the same kind, by which we know the measure of the one as compared with the other. Thus we call a man 'father' when contrast him with his son, and the latter 'son' when comparing him with his father. Similarly we call one thing half of another, which is double the former.[10]

Since numbers and geometrical figures are so fundamental in al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics, they play a significant role in his theory concerning the mathematical structure of the universe. Those who want to study the structure of the universe and like to delve in branches of science associated with mathematical knowledge for example astrology, should first familiarize themselves with numbers and geometry. It is his belief in their presence in the constituents of the universe that he writes in the preface of one of his book:

I have begun with geometry and proceeded to Arithmetic and the Science of Numbers, then to the structure of the Universe and finally to Judicial Astrology, for no one is worthy of the style and the title of Astrologer who is not thoroughly conversant with these four sciences.[11]

And elsewhere:

I say firstly, that the subject of this investigation can hardly be comprehended except after encompassing (knowledge of) the constitution, excluding what the various groups of people apply to it of what they have heard from their ancestors, as well as recourse from the sects to their beliefs, and (also) after (attaining) the capability of dealing with its varying situations, in which one cannot dispense with arithmetic and deep investigation of it by geometry.[12]

In light of the above statements, we conclude that al-Biruni views numbers and geometrical figures as mathematical entities that are deeply entrenched in sensible objects. From his point of view, one may also conclude that sensible objects are merely physical representations of these entities because it is by way of arithmetic and geometry that one can know more about them.

4. HOW MATHEMATICAL ASPECTS OF NATURE ARE KNOWABLE

In the foregoing discussions, we have focused on al-Biruni's belief in the mathematical structure of the universe, in the presence of numbers and geometrical figures in created things and his view on the nature of mathematical knowledge. In this section, we shall examine al-Biruni's position with respect to the way mathematical aspects of nature are knowable. In other words, we want to analyse how mathematicians can arrive at mathematical methods and models.

In our opinion, al-Biruni believes that there are levels of mathematical representations based on his statements about "things" mathematical. These various levels correspond to the levels of reality in nature as we will show in due course. In more specific term, there are mathematical representations at both material

and immaterial levels. Mathematical models are products of applying mathematical methods to these mathematical representations. Mathematical methods in turn are results from applying mathematical concepts to mathematical representations.

In order to illustrate his belief that there are levels of mathematical representations, let us consider his statement concerning lines. He writes:

> If a surface has boundaries, these are necessarily lines, and lines have length without breadth therefore one dimension less than the surface, as that one has one less than the solid; if it had breadth, it would be a surface. A line can be imagined by observing the oil and water at the side of the glass, or the line between sunshine and shadow, contiguous on the surface of the earth, or, also, it is possible to picture all that to oneself from a thin sheet of paper [although it has thickness], until the familiar sense-perception leads gradually to the intellectual concept.[13]

In the above statement, al-Biruni's example of the mathematical representations of lines at the material level are the boundary separating "oil and water at the side of the glass" and the boundary dividing "sunshine and shadow".

We will give another example to buttress the claim that al-Biruni believes in levels of mathematical representations. In his explanation about the number "one", he writes:

> Although 'One' (al-wahid) is in reality indivisible, nevertheless the unit one as a technical expression, employed in dealing with sense-objects (al-mahsusat), ... is obviously capable of sub-division ...[14]

So there are two mathematical representations of "one". The first is at the immaterial level whereby "one is in reality indivisible" and the other is at the level of material objects.

In al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics, a mathematician arrives at a mathematical method by applying mathematical concepts to these mathematical representations. An example of al-Biruni's mathematical concept is "ratio" (nisbat) which he describes as "the relation between two things of the same kind". The "two things of the same kind" include the mathematical representations of two numbers or two lines. It is the application of the mathematical concept of "ratio" that a mathematician can arrive at the mathematical method of measuring. Thus his statement that "ratio is the relation between two things of the same kind, by which we know the measure of the one as compared with the other".

Al-Biruni uses the mathematical method of weighing which is deeply rooted in the mathematical concept of ratio in order to explain another mathematical method, algebra (al-jabr wa'l-muqabalah). He describes algebra as follows:

> If things of different nature in the scales of a balance are in equilibrium, the scales remain parallel, the tongue vertical and the beam level. It is obvious that if you take anything from one of the scales of one kind you must remove the like from the other both in kind and amount so as to preserve the

equilibrium and the previous condition. Similarly if you add anything to one scale you must add a like amount to the other.[15]

As suggested by the name "al-jabr wa'l-muqabalah", there are two operations involved. One is "jabr" and the other is "muqabalah". "Should there be a minus quantity on one side [of the balance] it is necessary to remove it and to restore the equilibrium by adding a like amount to the other side. This is the operation of jabr",[16] says al-Biruni. Concerning the operation of muqabalah, he writes:

When the operation of jabr has been concluded, we turn to that of muqabalah which consists in comparing things of the same nature, (munajasat), which maybe on the opposite sides, and then deducting the smaller of these from both sides.[17]

In addition to mathematical methods such as measuring, weighing and algebra, al-Biruni also used another method which is common to other branches of knowledge. Still, the method is connected to the concept of ratio or "comparing things" of the same kind. The mathematician compares solutions to the same problem. We are referring to the usage of examplars[18] by al-Biruni.[19] Examplars are analogical examples found in textbooks, functioning as heuristic guides. The examplar in the particular problem al-Biruni seeks to solve is the work of Erathosthenes. Writes al-Biruni:

We have not so far been able to experiment with this dip, and its value in any high place. We were led to this method of Abu al-Abbas al-Nayrizi who states that Erathostenes has mentioned that the heights of the peaks of the mountains would be five and the half miles when the length of the radius of the earth is approximately 3,2000 miles. For the solution of this problem, it is necessary mathematically that the dip of the horizon in the mountain wherein the perpendicular is so high should be about one third degree.[20]

5. MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION BY THE INTERNAL SENSES

In our previous discussions concerning al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics, we have shown, *inter alia*, that mathematics is intellectual in nature and that there are levels of mathematical representations which correspond to the levels of reality in nature. The mathematician gains knowledge by processing these mathematical representations through his senses. In this section we wish to focus on the cognitive aspect of al-Biruni's concept of mathematical abstraction, especially the function of the internal senses.[21]

That al-Biruni concedes to the significance of the internal senses is reflected in some of his comments concerning the way mathematical representations are abstracted and processed. There is a connection between the intellect and

the imaginative faculty. He refers to the intellect in the course of mathematical abstraction at several places. For example, he writes about the line, that "it is possible to picture [a line] to one self from a thin sheet of paper until the familiar sense perception leads gradually to the intellectual concept".[22] He also states that the point "cannot be apprehended except by the intellect", even though "they occur on solids which bear them".[23] So there is a process which is not carried out by the external senses whereby mathematical representations reached the mathematician in the manner that the intellect can arrive at the meaning of the mathematical representation.

Interestingly, one of the noble aims of mathematical abstraction in contemplating nature is also in striving for the truth because The Truth (al-Haqq) is one of the at least ninety nine Names of God. What is more noble than a quest for one of the attributes of God since al-Biruni believes that man is a theomorphic image of God?

From the above statements, we can derive an important principle in al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics; that the function of the intellect is crucial in the course of mathematical contemplation of nature. Unlike al-Farabi or al-Biruni's contemporary Ibn Sina, al-Biruni did not spell out in great detail the nature of the intellect as far as mathematical abstraction is concerned apart from the fact that it is the intellect which perceives the meaning of mathematical representations. He was vague concerning the manner by which the intellect operates although he knew that there is a connection between the intellect and the imaginative faculty.

In short, the role of the internal senses in al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics is not clearly defined even though he alludes to the connections between the intellect and the imaginative faculty, especially the faculty of memory. We can only claim that in his concept of mathematical abstraction by the internal senses, the ascension of sensibles in the external world in the form of mathematical representations begins with sensual perception, through imagination then it attains to a higher level of abstraction by way of the internal senses which include the faculty of memory before the mathematical representations are finally abstracted by the intellect which is the seat of intelligence.

6. CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussions on al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics shows that he firmly believes in the mathematical structure of the universe and the presence of number and geometrical figures in created things. The fundamental nature of order pervading the cosmos such as harmony and uniformity is mathematical. It is due to all of these aspects of the phenomena of nature

that problems can always be mathematized and solved mathematically, by the external as well as the internal senses.

Al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics enables us to see the organic relationship between mathematics and religion, of reasons and spirit. His perspective on the mathematization of nature surely enlightens those mathematicians who see mathematical activities as separated from religion, as well as those so-called religious experts who consider mathematics to be of merely extrinsic value to the general well being of the society.

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NOTES

[1] See Inamullah Jan, "The Rise of Islam in Central Asia with special Reference to Educational Activities," *The Islamic Quarterly*, xvii(3), 1984, p. 187.
[2] See Nicomachus, *Introduction to Arithmetics*, trans. M.L. D'Ooge (Chicago; Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1953) pp. 813–814.
[3] See *Elements of Astrology*, p. 2.
[4] *Chronology*, pp. 294–295.
[5] See *Elements of Astrology*, p. 24.
[6] See *Elements of Astrology*, p. 1.
[7] We say "usually" because not all centers are located in the middle. The center of gravity of a falling object could be outside that object.
[8] See the quotation from Dehkhoda in S.H. Nasr, *An Introduction . . .*, p. 169.
[9] See *Elements of Astrology*, p. 4.
[10] See *Elements of Astrology*, p. 11. We can see how easy it is for al-Biruni to shift from one subject to another and to see the analogies between them from the above quotation. According to a well-known twentieth century mathematician, Banach, a great mathematician usually has this ability: "Good mathematician see analogies between theorms or theories, the very best ones see analogies between analogies". See M.C. Sharma, "Mathematics Learning Personality," *Math Notebook*, (7)(1&2)(1989), p. 52.
[11] See *Elements of Astrology*, p. 1.
[12] See *The Exhaustive Treatise on Shadows*, p. 6.
[13] See *Elements of Astrology*, p. 3.
[14] Ibid., p. 24.
[15] See *Elements of Astrology*, p. 37.
[16] Ibid., p. 37.
[17] Ibid., p. 38. The operation here is, essentially the same to that given by Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarazmi (d. 863H), the first Muslim to work on Algebra.
[18] The significance of examplars is stressed by 'Kuhn in his *Structure of Scientific Revolution*, op. cit., Examplars, to Kuhn, are tools for scientists to solve "puzzles", that is, his term for scientific problems. Al-Biruni's view on scientific problems however, is by no means identical to that of Kuhn because of the "sacredness" associated with them.
[19] A Saidan has shown that al-Biruni compares the trigonometrical works of his contemporaries. See A. Saidan, "The Trigonometry of al-Biruni", in *Commemorative*, pp. 681–683.

[20] For further computational details, see S.H. Barani, "Muslim Researches in geodesy", in *Al-Biruni Commemoration Volume*, p. 33.
[21] That the internal senses have been identified by earlier philosophers such as al-Farabi, see O. Bakar, *Classification of Knowledge in Islam: A Study in Islamic Philosophies of Science* (Kuala Lumpur, 1991) pp. 49–64. Critics of al-Farabi's treatment can be found in ibid., p. 54. On the internal senses as presented by Ibn Sina, see F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology* (London, 1952).
[22] See *Elements of Astrology*, p. 3.
[23] Ibid., p. 24.

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MOHAMMAD KHAJAVI

REASON AND SPIRIT

Abstract: The debate if spirit and reason in Islamic philosophy is one of the most difficult ones which has not been researched yet. In this article it has been tried to consider the spirit and reason in two aspects: The first aspect is spirit and reason in the view point of the "World of Command" and the second aspect is spirit and reason in the "World of Nature": For describing each of them I refer to Quran verses, Islamic hadiths and the books of dignitaries of gnosticism and philosophy. In Islamic hadiths we have; The first thing that God created was reason. This existent is called "First Intellect" by Aristotelians, "Extending Existence" by mystics and "Mohammadan Reality" by mystic researchers. In quran it is called "Haqq". God stated: I created the skies and the Earth truthfully – be' haqq – Q.6/19. So first intellect is the greatest, closest and the most perfect creature, for this reason another group of mystics call it "the Absolute Being". In Islamic hadiths the prophet Mohammad stated: "The first thing that God created was My light or Mohammadan spirit", or the first thing was Reason. These are the descriptions of one thing, but in different considerations. Ebn e Arabi and Molla Sadra deliberated different aspects of this truth in their works and the result of their words is this: Reason belongs and connects to nothing except to its creator and in its essence there is no non-existence aspects, contingency and inaudibility because for the necessity of God Almighty it has been compensated, so it is called Divine Empire because it is full of light and beneficent and it has no intercourse with evil. God has two worlds: 1-The World of Command 2-The world of Creation. The World of Command is the world of abstractions (angels), and it has no intercourse with material at any time at all. The ultimate perfection of existents particularly the Divine human being is, ascending to the world of abstractions and to the world of command and to be united with the First Intellect. There have been several considerations in the First Intellect containing Supreme Spirit and Universal Intellect. Divine Knowledge consists of Universal Intellect because Universal Intellect is the truth of Divine absolute Knowledge that existents are inscribed in it since the beginningless eternity till the endless eternity that is the Knowledge to all of the existents. All of the heavenly books are issued from this Universal Intellect not from the First Intellect, for this reason it is called "Guarded

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> Tablet" or "Archetypal Book". The former mystics knew the Universal Intellect in the stage of spirit, because they know both of them united. Of course this argument has a whole relation to the Universal Perfect Man who is the epitome of the Iward and Outward Divine Names. Allah-He-Hoo-has two aspects: His reality and inner state is Universal Intellect which identical the Highest Pen-Qalam Aala- and the Supreme Spirit and His inward is Visible World that is the Great Man. It should be stated that there are 5 kinds of spirits: Holy Spirit and Spirit of Faith, these two belong to the World of Command that the theosophists interpretated it as Active Intellect and three other spirits are: spirit of power, spirit of passion and the spirit of corpus (body). In Quran the spirit is interpretated as the Word and this spirit is called "related spirit" for the purpose of the relationships and its radiation on the molds (bodies). Although the formation of human spirit is along with the creation of body, it is not created from anything but it comes into being together with body not for the sake of body, but by God's command and from the World of Divine Command. Essentially ethereal spirit is a shadow of Divine Spirit and carries all the power existing in the body, and comes into existence by the ether of blood circulation in the body. When this ether becomes very fine it will be the locus of the related spirit.Q.15/29. As the human being's animal spirit moderates he will be intellectual and apprehensible, and soul in the world of Divine Command comes into existence from the angelic celestial supreme related spirit, such as Eve's coming into existence from Adam in the world of soul creation, although in the world of creation and sense Her coming into being is physical, but in the world of analogies. Her survival and spirituality is spiritual and she is from the world of Divine Command and since an interest and affection appears between these two, "Heart" comes into being in the world of command, and at this time Reason which is a light radiated from the related, celestial spirit to the Heart and it is the expressive tongue of the spirit and the guide of Heart comes into being towards the spirit.

I thank God and I send my greetings to all of the prophets and to the saints.

The debate of reason and spirit in Islamic and divine philosophy is one of the most difficult ones that has not been researched sufficiently yet, except some, because this subject is an essential subject of creation that the human perception is in its underpart. For this reason we shoot in this endless darkness in order a light shines and we will be able to find a way toward the reality.

Before I start my topic I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to professor Mrs. Anna-Teresa.

The president of that organization who has shown that she is from the family of great scholars who accomplishes everything with much care and pity. I wish her a great success in this endless path.

In this article I tried to consider reason and spirit in two aspects: The first aspect is spirit and reason in the viewpoint of the world of command, and the second aspect is spirit and reason in the World of Nature. To describe and explain each of them I rely on Quran verses, Islamic hadiths and the great mystical and philosophical books and works.

(1) Reason and spirit in the viewpoint of the world of command:

In Islamic hadiths (traditions) and also in formers' philosophy and prior to Islam we have: The first thing that God created was reason, this essence is called, the first Intellect by Mesha (a method of philosophy) philosophers and Aristotalians. Mystics call it Extended Existence that all the essences have been issued from it, and it is called Mohammadan Reality by mystic researchers. In Quran it is called the true "haqq" and God states: " He is the one who created the heavens and the Earth truthfully", "behaqq".[1] His word Be "kon" is true "haqq", that He says: Be! "kon". It exists immediately, "And God created the sun and the moon truthfully, "behaqq".[2] And God created the heaven and the earth truthfully" "behaqq".[3] And also chapter the Rock verse 85 and chapter the Bee/3 and the spider/44 and the Romans/8, the companies/5 and the Evident Smoke/39, and the Sand Hill/3 and the Cheating/3 and other verses of Quran.

So the first intellect was the greatest, closest and the most perfect creature, built and as its name shows, it was the first phenomenon of the world of being—and the second existent in being existed—and this is called Absolute Being by the other group of mystics, although by side of God Almighty's Reality, the second non-existed because God Almighty's unity and oneness is the real unity and this first Intellect is the shadow of the real unity that is also called numerical unity. But in Islamic philosophy there are many discussions and controversies among the philosophers for calling these titles to the first Intellect that I can not express all of them here.

There are many Islamic hadiths (traditions) that the prophet S.A. stated: the first Existent that God created was my light and in a narrative we read that the first Existent that God created was my spirit and it is also stated: The first thing that God created was the Qalam (pen), and it is also stated: The first thing that God created was a spiritual angel—Charubin and Guardians—and it is also stated that the first God Almighty's creature was Reason.

These are all the descriptions and the attributes of one thing but it takes different names if it is considered from different points of view. There are plenty names but the one that is appointed is a single name, because He is sole (unified) in Essence and Existence.

Sadral Motalehin (Sadra) about the first intellect in the description of the book "Osool kafi" stated[4]: this existent's reality is the same reality of Supreme Spirit, God stated: "say, spirit is form the world of command of my God—" Q.17/85.

He called it Qalam (Pen) in the aspect of being the mediator of God Almighty in composing sciences and realities in the sensual fatalistic books and He stated: Write, what will happen until The Resurrection Day.

Since it was an abstract essence and released from material and darknesses He called it light, because light is existence and darkness is non-existence and light in its essence is self radiated and enlightens other than itself.

And since the principle of life is highest and inferior souls, he called it spirit and that is Mohammadan Reality "Haqhiqhat Mohammadi" to the great researchers and mystics—**The end of his words**.

Ebn Arabi in chapter 73th of the book " Fotoohat—in replying to the 89th question—says[5]: The mainfestation of God Almighty is in the first intellect which is the highest pen, "Qalam A ala" and that is the first creature that God has created. In this case He is the first one in regard to that symbol, because it is the first being that has been issued from Him, so the Eternal Essence is not described as the apriority but "Allah" is described as the apriority and the first symbol that has been appeared was the Divine Pen "Qalam" that is identical the first Intellect and reason is a veil and covering on God (Allah), and as a shield (cover) against repeatedly attacks of attribute on it, since God created only one truth (reality) but pen (Qalam) or the first Intellect, so God's "Allah" beginning is identical as the existence of the first Intellect, and this is the identical truth "Haqq" that for it He created the heavens and the earth—**The end of his words**.

So reason doesn't have any dependence and contact to anything except to its creator and in its essence there are no aspects of non-existential and potentiality and inexpressiveness, because for the sake of the necessity of God Almighty it has been determined, and for this reason it is called Divine Empire "Alam Jabaroot" that is filled with light and beneficent and it has no intercourse with Evil and that is the first Intellect, Divine Command and His word which is existential Be, "Kon".

Principally, we should know that God has two worlds: (1) The world of command and (2) the world of nature as God stated: "Be aware that God has the world of command and nature".

The world of command is the world of abstractions (angels) that it hasn't had in anytime any intercourse with material at all.

This world, has no descending and manifestation in the lower universe, materials, non-materials, souls and so on, but it is absolute perception and there is a unification of intelligent, intelligible and intellect there, and they are not considered as three, but as a single one, and they have real reality. This is the particular intelligence and perception that considers them three. So the supreme perfection of the existents—specially Divine Man—is ascending to the world of command and abstractions and makes a unification with the first Intellect.

In the first Intellect there are several considerations that consists of Supreme Spirit and Supreme Intellect. Divine knowledge consists of supreme intellect because supreme intellect is the truth of Divine Absolute knowledge that the existents are registered there from the beginningless eternity until the endless eternity[6] and that is, the knowledge to all the existents, all of the revealed scriptures are issued from this supreme intellect—not from the first intellect—for this reason it is called the Guarded Tablet and Archetypal Book "Omal ketab".

The former mystics knew the supreme intellect in a level as spirit, and they were not opposed to the statement of spirit as they consider both of them identical. Seyed Ghotb alDin Neirizi in his Arabic lyric says[7]: spirit is identical reason and divine high pen (Qalam) which registers the divine predestinations first in the Guarded Tablet and in the intellectual Archetypal Book, "Omal ketab" and then in the Universal Soul. All of the people's spirit are from the radiations of that unit spirit and in some level it is called the Great Spirit, and the aspects of their multiplication depend on the amount of the individual's spirit connection with the Supreme Spirit and the amount of their aptitude and receptivity which exists in their particular spirit, so the individuals, souls are multiplied by the lights that are radiated from it to the molds.

Ebn Arabi in chapter 198 about soul knowledge says[8]: Reason is identical the pen "Qalam" that the prophet S.A in two hadiths, in one hadith he stated: "The first thing that God created was reason" and in the other hadith he stated: "His first creature was the pen Qalam". so the first creation that God created from the sigh that is identical that Dark Mist (Cloud), and the world images were opened in it was Reason that is identical the pen "Qalam" and then soul that is the Guarded tablet and after that it was nature . . .

In chapter 289[9] he says: The first existent is reason that is identical the Qalam and that is a Divine and innovative light from which, he created the soul that is the Guarded Tablet and in luminosity—in regard to that mediator between God and it—it is lower than reason.

In chapter 295 he says[10]: Reason is the first existent is from the world of systematisation and "Tastir" and the Guardian (Mohaiman) spirits who are Cherubie angels and have no knowledge except God and they don't know that God has no other existent except them. They are love—mad and bewildered of Divine magnificence and majesty. The first intellect is rooted in them and their substance and origin is from the first intellect, and God created the Guarded Tablet which is the soul and God's knowledge in its creation, after that—without time dimension (perhaps stage dimension) which is in a lower stage than pen Qalam—and that is in a lower stage than pen and pen in luminosity and brightness stage is identical the first Intellect—**The end of his words**.

Of course this debate and conversation greatly relate to the Divine Perfect Man that with the manifestation of two names, the Divine Inward and Outward

"Baten and Zaher", has two aspects, its reality and inward is the Universal Intellect which is the highest pen and Supreme Spirit. Its outward is sensible world that is the Great man and in this state the first Intellect is one good action of its good actions, but, as it is not related to the requested subject, I avoid expressing it, perhaps some time later it is needed.

Spirits are five kinds: (1) Holy Spirit that is specific for divine favorite of God and (2) Spirit of Faith which allocated for right hand friends—i.e., the believers—these two spirits are related to the world of command. Theosophists call it Active Intellect "agal faal" and that is the world of the conversion and image of the Guarded Tablet that is identical the Active Intellect, and in it God wrote the truth of what is in the heavens and the earth (in a higher and superior manner) by his own hand and His hand is the Highest pen which is the first Intellect "agal aval", so the Guarded Tablet is identical the active intellect. [11]

In Quran the spirit is interpretated as the word and this spirit is called Related "Ezafi" i.e., in respect of relationship aspects and its radiance to the molds. So from the relation and the radiation of the Universal Supreme Spirit to the molds, different souls entified and spread i.e., its plurality and multiplicity is in terms of plurality and multiplicity of the souls and particular spirits who are connected to Him.

Until now it was related to the metaphysical world, Now reason and spirit in the world of nature:

(2) Sadral Motaalehin says[12]: Although the establishment of the human spirit is along with the creation of body, it has not been created from anything, but it is originated (Hadeth) with the body—not with the mediation of the body—and by God's command and from the world of command and its origination in the aspect of its inward which is the entity of the separated intellect is not posteriory to material and duration and its origin is not from material—but the body is the condition of the spirit's dependence, management and dominion, otherwise after passed the time the material doesn't remain—**The end of his word**.

Essentially animal spirit (steam spirit) "Rouh Bokhari" is the shadow of Divine Spirit and it is the carrier of existing faculties in the body which emerges by means of steam (Bokhar) of the blood circulation in the body and when this steam becomes pure and similar to the aether of sphere it will be the locus (Mahall) of the related Divine spirit. As He stated: "When I made him pure and moderate, I blew him up with my spirit". Q. the Rock-29. So human souls with the assistance of substantial motion achieve the perfection and become so pure that it will be the locus of the radiation of Divine Spirit that is identical the Supreme Spirit.

This is in the aspect of preparation of the locus in order to connect to the Divine Sprit which the capable prepares ownself the act, agent in itself, but in the aspect of reasoning and perception:

This very spirit that here acquired this purity, obtains preparedness for ascending and connecting to the supreme intellect—perhaps the first Intellect—and since the supreme intellect (as it was said) is the divine knowledge as well, it also connects to the Divine Knowledge center—as much as the extent and wideness of its preparedness, and the real union of knower, known and knowledge will be acquired.

Qunawi in his Hadieh essay says: When God Almighty does a servant a favor, as a spiritual ascent He leads him toward Himself and releases him from his body. In that mode he reasons the individual essences along with their eternal determinations, i.e., in the manner of God Almighty reasoning them-eternal reasoning—i.e., his soul unifies with the universal soul and it will be like Him, and if his ascent and removal is perfect, he will unite with the first Intellect that is identical Mohammadan Reality and when his union becomes perfect by Him, he will be purified from all of the status of contingence and multiplicity which are the properties of ipseity (quiddity)—except one judgment that is the intelligibility of his being contingent in his own soul—identical the first Intellect.

Here he acquires the real proximity which is the first stages of attainment, and without an intermediary he receives the effusions—as the occasion of the first intellect is along with God Almighty—so God Almighty's knowledge in regard to the existents is, differentiated and posteriory, to dependence of his knowledge to the first intellect that is Mohammadan Reality. Hence the souls as long as are particular it is impossible to observe the first principle, so they must make progress by connecting to the universals—in real ascent and removal of the body—and from each connection they acquire the existential preparedness and spiritual insight light until they are led to the first Intellect and they become the spiritual observer of the first Almighty.

The rational soul and the human spirit consist of his ideal body that is identical his apparitional body. Mystics call it mind (heart) and cosmorama bowl. This ideal body becomes the spectacle of the universal spirit sun and the Supreme Spirit.

Plato in the book Osologia says[13]: In this physical man a sensual (ideal) and a noetic (spiritual) man is hidden.

I don't mean that a physical man is identical the sensual and noetic man, but a physical man by his effort and His favor, connects to Him, and this physical man is the form (image) and Qibla for those two men.

Seyed Qhotbaldin Neirizi in his Rohieh essay says[14]:

Man as in the aspect of animal spirit is purified and equilibrated and becomes intelligible (universals perception) and inspirable. Soul in the world of command—engenders from the related sovereignty casual spirit like the creation of Eve out of Adam in the world of creation, and the soul although its origination (Huduth) is physical in the world of creation and sensible, in

the world of archetypal images its subsistence and reality is spiritual and it is from the world of command, and since between those two interest and love is formed, heart emerges in the world of command, and at this time reason which is a radiant light and luminous from the related causal spirit to the heart, and it is the verbal language of spirit and the heart guide is entified toward the spirit—**The end of his word**.

Human's reason is from the world of sovereignty because in essence and action it is abstract and its perception is knowledge and science. Spirit is from the higher part of sovereignty, but the secret of human is light which is from the world of divine divinity which is the light of Essence of Divine Unity.

At the end I would like to express my appreciation to the organisers of this important congress and once more my deepest gratitude to professor Mrs. Anna-Teresa.

I represent this survey of a significant topic whose description requires a book to be written about. Hoping that it will be acceptable and I would have been able to clarify even one dark point of the vague points about reason and spirit, although this subject requires other subjects seriously, (which are indispensable), but since it naturally gets out of the requested subject I avoided expressing it, hoping that by cooperating with this institute in other fields, I could achieve this desire.

Gilan University, Iran *Translated by: Mrs. S. Kazemi-Nuri*

NOTES

[1] Q. The Cattle /72–73.
[2] Q. Jona/5.
[3] Q. Abraham/19.
[4] p. 153/vol. 1.
[5] p. 386/vol. 6.
[6] But supreme Intellect—not the first intellect—the highest pen and the Guarded Tablet and so on, they are all from the levels of Divine knowledge.
[7] p. 93.
[8] p. 36/vol. 4.
[9] p. 262/vol. 3.
[10] p. 363/vol. 4.
[11] Three other spirits: (1) strength spirit and (2) desire spirit that are in the worlds of command and creation and (3) corpus spirit that is from the word of creation.
[12] Asfar, chapter Elahiat—soul's journey, "safare Nafs".
[13] p. 123.
[14] p. 149.

SECTION FOUR

ILONA KOCK

THE DEBATE ABOUT GOD'S SIMPLICITY: REASON AND SPIRIT IN THE EIGHTH DISCUSSION OF AL-GHAZALI'S *TAHAFUT AL-FALASIFA* AND IBN RUSHD'S *TAHAFUT AT-TAHAFUT*

Abstract: Against a more or less categorically fixed understanding of al-Ghazali and ibn Rushd in European discourse that considers the first to be an orthodox theological polemic, the second a rationally orientated free-thinker or Aristolelian, the dabate about God's simplicity enables to comprehend the authors more differentiated. It allows glimpses into the complex cosmologies, philosophies and debates important in the 11. and 12. century. Finally it renders al-Ghazali's and ibn Rushd's positions to be quite conciliatory: philosophy and religion, reason and spirit form a harmony; they are closest kins and together allow society to unfold and enlarge its knowledge as well as to preserve its moral constitution.

1. PREFACE

Regarding the judgment of their philosophical qualities and characteristics al-Ghazali (1058–1111) and Ibn Rushd (1126–1198) occupy a more or less categorically fixed position in the European discourse. Mostly the first one is considered as an orthodox theological polemic, the second one as rationally orientated freethinker or Aristotelian.[1] This is certainly an oversimplification of their respective classification but it is intended to indicate a basic tendency, which shows through at least between the lines of many articles. This (mis-) interpretation is often deduced from and based on al-Ghazali's *tahafut al-falasifa* and Ibn Rushd's reply on this, his *tahafut at-tahafut*. The European reception and discussion of both philosophers translated *tahafut* into Latin as *destruction* and thus meant to be able to judge al-Ghazali as the enemy of philosophy par excellence, Ibn Rushd on the other hand as its fiercest apologist. Later German editions translated into the term *Ungenügen* or *Inkohärenz*, the English equivalent being *Incoherence*. This Interpretation comes far nearer to

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 157–183.

the authors' intentions; al-Ghazali himself emphasizes in his introduction to the *tahafut al-falasifa* that he intends to demonstrate that the reasoning of the philosophers is insufficient, inconsistent and inconclusive.[2] *Tahafut* thus means that the philosophical discussion al-Ghazali touches upon remains behind the standard he expects.[3] His critique therefore challenges philosophy instead of destroying it. Ibn Rushd on his part accepted this dare and reacted with the same claim: he reveals where al-Ghazali's line of reasoning is incoherent and where he misunderstood the philosophers he criticized. Nevertheless, where appropriate, Ibn Rushd fairly accepts the critique. There can thus be no talk of reciprocal destruction. *Tahafut al-falasifa* and *tahafut at-tahafut* rather illustrate a fruitful debate, conciliating philosophy and religion, reason and spirit, to allow them to serve, enhance and enrich each other, that gained relevance, because their authors took their positions as outstanding thinkers seriously and implemented their responsibilities and demands accordingly. Beyond that al-Ghazali refers his objections to al-Farabi and Ibn Sina by name,[4] which furthermore excludes the generalization that he would attack philosophy as such.

The present article pursues the intention, following the problematic nature of interpreting and characterizing the philosophical position of the two savants, to analyze and itemize both *tahafut's* lines of argument. One discussion out of the metaphysical part—by the way one that does not pursue the claim to convict the aforementioned philosophers, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, of unbelief[5]—shall serve as a main thread that guides through the subjacent complex of figures of thought, theorems and convictions. Excursions into the respective backgrounds of al-Ghazali's, Ibn Rushd's and Ibn Sina's way of thinking try to track, against what the arguments oppose, what is being criticized and where inconsistencies and conflicts arise. Furthermore, they want to illustrate on what grounding the critique is based, wherefrom the objections or refutations come and which convictions conflict here. In this way, an image of the context of the discussion, as complex as possible, shall develop and an enhanced insight into the philosophical situation at that time be sought for. The question, how indisputable the attribution of the abovementioned categorization can be executed, provides a latent background; a question that, in consideration of the article's extent and the limited reception of texts, can not be resolved exhaustively but only kept in mind implicitly.

2. THE EIGHTH DISCUSSION

Most texts about the *tahafut* deal with the three discussions in which al-Ghazali accuses the philosophers—al-Farabi and Ibn Sina—of unbelief. The first discussion faces up to the rejection of the world's eternity, the 13th opposes

the assertion, God did not know individuals (Partikularia) and the 20th—out of the physical part—contradicts the denial of bodily resurrection. Due to the charge these debates are especially serious and accordingly complex. In these points the philosophers interfere with al-Ghazali's understanding of religion's fundaments, which complicates the argument through the severity of the consequences. The other controversial subjects admittedly run contrary to al-Ghazali's convictions, still he does not judge them as unbelief but as insufficiently proven and inconsistently discussed—and therefore heretic. Here he tries to point up to the philosophers' theoretical confusion; by way of consistent and systematic inferences he intends to show that the thinkers in question revise their own foundations or would have to draw entirely different conclusions. Herein the focus is rather on the inner contradictions of the line of argument than on religious dogmas or decrees through consensus (*ijma*). Therefore to al-Ghazali's philosophical grounding can possibly be given priority against the claim to defend religion.

The eighth discussion deals with the essence of God; it levels at the assertion that the existence of God or "the First" were simple. The heading specifies already how al-Ghazali conceives this position: God is pure existence without essence or reality; He is necessary existence. This is for God what is essence for other beings. This discussion develops two lines of argument that later are summarized, reviewed and correctively replied or criticized by Ibn Rushd. The following examination adheres to this structure to consolidate the respective backgrounds comprehensibly.

3. THE DISCUSSION'S BASIS

Initially al-Ghazali demands to expose the deduction: did the philosophers reach the conclusion that God were simple and did only possess existence without essence through rational necessity or through reflection? The first way he excludes straightaway and therefore expects that the method of reflection be indicated.

What is instantly apparent is that al-Ghazali excludes, without any further comment, that rational necessity could lead to the conclusion, God would be absolutely simple being. This can possibly be elucidated by his attitude towards *ijma*, consensus over religious issues: al-Ghazali assumes that the authority of *ijma* derives from the principle of infallibility of the Muslim community.[6] Since this predominantly presumes and believes that God does have essence and reality, which do not conflict with the simplicity of His existence—likewise the reality of the divine attributes is taken for granted without making God being compound—in this point there is a consensus. Because the majority of

Muslims does not err it can not be that rational necessity leads to another statement. Rather it is proven that it must necessarily be assumed that God has essence; the *ijma* of the Muslim community cannot be nullified through the disregard of a philosophical elite.

Here already a conflict with Ibn Rushd's position is indicated. He presumes that there can not be acquired any consensus upon theoretical concerns.[7] Following al-Farabi's tradition[8] Ibn Rushd views philosophy as a carrier of universal truths, whose contents are translated religiously into a language that the public is able to comprehend.[9] He thus differentiates the intellectual capacities of men into rhetoric (the public), dialectic (the theologians) and demonstrative abilities (the philosophers).[10] Since demonstration provides the securest knowledge,[11] the philosophers take, concerning truth, the highest rank in society.[12] It is them, who reflect upon theoretical issues that are not open to the public; thus there is no consensus possible in these matters.

It shows that the discussion is backed by an epistemology that relates knowledge and belief differently with society as well as with juridical concerns and methods of interpretation. On this basis al-Ghazali can reject already in the beginning that God can be known as simple existence without essence by rational necessity and this must therefore be conceded as true. This is at the same time the base that allows for a refutation in the first place.

4. AL-GHAZALI'S FIRST OBJECTION

Al-Ghazali begins with summarizing how God can be justified as pure existence. Would God have essence—quiddity—His existence would be coupled with this and would thus ensue it, would be with it necessarily. It would thus be an effect and this would make necessary existence an effect, which is a contradiction per se.

The reason for the confusion al-Ghazali sees in the expression "necessary existence". He himself assumes that God has reality and essence. He exists as reality, which means His existence is linked with His reality. Existence can only be understood as (necessary) effect, without letting a problem accrue, if it is specified at the same time that this existence is eternal and does not depend on an initiating agent or antecedent origin. Is this originlessness admitted no inconsistency arises, since this can only consist in an endless regress of causes, which is in this way avoided. The end of this chain is, according to al-Ghazali, the existing reality of God and a concrete essence is in consequence possible. The dispute only subsists due to the designation or differing interpretations of the position of existence. The only proven impossibility is a (reflexively) perpetual chain of causes.

Another objection al-Ghazali conceives, reads: "The quiddity then becomes a cause of the existence which is consequent on Him, existence becoming caused and enacted."[13] He replies to this analogously: since the essence of created beings does not cause their existence, how can that be the case with the Eternal? If cause relates to that, which creates existence this question arises; but if it denotes something without which existence cannot subsist there is no problem at all because it does not designate anything impossible. Again al-Ghazali emphasizes that only an endless regress of causes is demonstrated as not possible; is this avoided no difficulty comes up. He concludes that a demonstrative proof is hence required to provide evidence for the impossibility of essence. In this case however demonstrations were only negligibilities that ground on the term "necessary existence" solely and the consequences derived from this. Moreover they base on "their"—meant are the philosophers who hold this position—acceptance that this "necessary existence" with all their hypothetical qualities is demonstratively proven, which is not the case.

The whole proof can, according to al-Ghazali, be ascribed to the denial of the divine attributes and difference in the Divine. Concerning this question the problem is nevertheless reducible to the mode of expression. While reason can normally accept an existing godly essence the philosophers view herein a plurality of essence and existence. Al-Ghazali accounts this a stupidity since it is indeed intelligible that an existing being is in any condition—for example reality—one and simple. There is never existence without reality and this existing reality does not negate their oneness.[14]

Briefly condensed the contradiction between essence and existence is only made up of the consequences that the expression "necessary existence" implies. Difficulties emerge only nominally. Ultimately no proof but the impossibility of an endless chain of causes underlies the debate. The conclusion of it, God as existing reality, eliminates this and everything else is peripheral and unsubstantiated.

5. IBN RUSHD'S REPLY

Before he responds to it, Ibn Rushd precisely outlines al-Ghazalis line of argument.[15] In what follows it emerges, which philosopher al-Ghazali criticized: Ibn Rushd clarifies this to be Ibn Sina and states him to have been misunderstood by al-Ghazali. He then sketches Ibn Sina's opinion: Ibn Sina assumes that existence is an additional attribute to the essence of a thing. Therefore he cannot suppose that essence is the causing agent unfolding its existence out of potentiality, since this thing would thus cause itself and had no other source. From this Ibn Sina deduces the principle that everything whose existence additionally goes with essence must have a causing origin and, since

"the First"—God—does not have this it follows necessarily that existence and essence are identical with Him. Consequently al-Ghazali's understanding, Ibn Sina would assimilate this existence as a necessary attribute to essence, is not true. A thing originates its necessary attributes but cannot do so with its own existence because this subsists before essence. When Ibn Sina identifies existence with essence he does not deny the last one but testifies the unity of both. But if you take existence for an accidental attribute of the existing being and this is the agent, the origin that bestows their existence upon things, this would necessarily mean that the thing, which is causeless, cannot have existence, what would be absurd, or that its existence is one with its essence.

The error hence is to presume that existence would be an attribute of a thing. Ibn Rushd supposes that existence precedes essence and is accordingly the truth. The question, if a thing exists, consequently refers on the one hand to something that has a cause bringing about its existence: it must be asked, if the thing has got a cause or not. In this place Ibn Rushd points out Aristotle. On the other hand it refers to something that has no cause and here it must be inquired, if the thing has got a necessary attribute determining its existence. If an existing being is conceived as a thing or entity, it must be discussed analogously to caused things. Existence is here a concept describing the truth. If it means something additional to essence, it exists subjectively and only potentially outside the soul, such as the universals (Universalia). According to Ibn Rushd the "First Principle" was understood in this way by the antique philosophers and defined to be simple. This was later accepted by the philosophers in Islam.

Ibn Rushd now submits his preference to handle the issue. He recommends, as the securest proof, to assume that actualization of potential existence necessarily happens by way of an operating actuator, who moves it and brings existence to actuality out of its substance. If this cause is itself only potential, it needs another origin and so forth. The final source must then be substantially necessary; in this way the infinite sequel in nature is survived and this preserved. The stability of nature is effectuated by the necessary cause. Were there any moment of cessation, no movement at all could be actuated. The relation between temporal and eternal existence can only persist because "the First" is not altered and diversified by the half eternal half temporal movement. But that thing that is concerned by this motion is, according to Ibn Sina, an existence that is necessary through another. It is an eternally moved body connecting the evanescent world with the everlasting. Since this body is substantially necessary but potential in relation to its movement, this chain must be established through a necessary existing being. In this there is no potentiality at all and it is thus simple. Would it be composite, it were potential not necessary and would need a necessary cause itself. In accordance with Ibn Rush this is a valid proof.

Now follows a critique at Ibn Sina: Ibn Rushd considers it redundant to say a potential being can ground in another being necessary through another or in itself, where the first one again needs a being necessary through itself for it is only potential in itself. According to Ibn Rushd this is not only a needless amplification but as well incorrect, since potential and necessary things constitute contradictory opposites and no necessary being can contain a potential one. He gives in, one thing could be to one side necessary and to another potential, as he assumed for the abovementioned bodies—the heavenly bodies—that are substantially necessary but potential concerning their motion. Ibn Sina though errs in his presumption the heavenly bodies were essentially necessary through another but potential in themselves. Ibn Rushd therefore judges: if Ibn Sina does not employ the mentioned restrictions, here is only a case of dialectical conceptuality; but if he does so, this is a demonstrative proof.

Finally Ibn Rushd takes the side of theology[16] and indicates a critique at al-Ghazali that refers to his epistemology, which is applied to the interpretation of the Scripture.[17] According to the Qur'an, Ibn Rushd asserts that becoming (das Werden) is empirical and takes place in the form—the philosophers' "form"—of the existing things; this becoming emerges only through a cause in time. About the relation between potential and necessary existence nothing is to be found in the Scripture, since the common man—the one only gifted with rhetoric abilities—can not grasp this and does as well not need it to achieve bliss. The assumption held by the Ash'ariyya—Ibn Rushd classes al-Ghazali as one of them—, the world of the potential beings has been created out of nothingness—what the philosophers according to Ibn Rushd deny—, does finally not find any support in the Scripture and no proof. The Qur'an only advises to not delve into such matters about which it does not make a point. If someone does find the true proof, he is rewarded but the masses are not to gain any insight into such debates, since they cannot grasp them and would hence only be cajoled into unbelief.[18]

6. IBN SINA'S THEORY OF NECESSARY AND POTENTIAL EXISTENCE

The origin of the dissociation of essence and existence is, as Corbin says, to find with al-Farabi (ca. 870–950). He was the first to implement this on the caused things logically and metaphysically. Existence here is an accident of essence and no immanent quality. Subsequently this enabled the differentiation of being that is necessary through itself from that, which is only potential in itself but necessary through another to develop. The necessary being—God—converts potentiality into being by bestowing existence upon it.[19] It is

important to underline here what Ibn Rushd already indicated: the separation between existence and essence touch the caused things and not the ultimate, necessary cause, God Himself.

Ibn Sina (980–1037) shows how tightly existence is associated with the idea of God and with the theory of creation. His theology and cosmology are related very closely with the concept of being (Sein). Existence is, following Ibn Sina, either necessary or potential and thus contingent. The last one would remain potential in itself and could not reach being without the causation through necessary existence.[20] "Therefore, its existence is possible in itself, necessary through another, and impossible without another."[21] The last cause must be necessary, since, as al-Ghazali remarked, there cannot be an infinite regress of causation. Above that a succession of contingent causes can only be completed by a necessary ultimate ground outside the only potentially being things,[22] otherwise it could not be a possible chain.[23] Ibn Rushd already indicates this context in his reply. He considers the necessary cause to be the safeguard for an endless regress of contingent causation, which by this enables the perpetual motion of the world and repels stagnation, but at the same time remain itself unaltered and steady, since it stands outside of potentiality and contingency.[24] So, in the beginning is necessity; "the First" is essentially characterized by it. A further classification of God is His absolute oneness. Since any mode of composition signifies the only potential, caused being, the first cause must be simple. It goes with this also that God cannot be composite of essence and existence rather existence is itself His essence. He does not have any further differentiation at all—Genus and difference—and is therefore indefinable ("negative theology")—a further proof of His uniqueness.[25] His existence is to be thought entirely immaterial; it is thus free of deprivation and is the pure Good (das reine Gute).[26] Above that it is intellect; God's simplicity comes to His being at the same time thinker, thinking and thought.[27]

This idea fundamentally influenced the notion of the genesis of the world. Unlike Aristotle Ibn Sina does not conceive the first cause predominantly as the actuator of movement but as that, which bestows being itself.[28] This happens through the act of thinking in God; in thinking Himself from Him the first intellect emanates, in which the process is repeated down to the tenth intellect that determines the ephemeral world.[29] In this way the principle that from the One—God—can only derive one simple being (Eines) is kept as well as the transition from unity to multiplicity expounded.[30] The emanation of being takes place in infinity. Otherwise in the first cause a change would have to occur what the posit of its simplicity and unity/oneness rules out. As absolute perfection it cannot be possible that "the First" alters. It is accordingly unthinkable that God created the world by His will out of nothing(-ness). In accordance

with this creation is no act of volition but happens necessarily.[31] God cannot have will at all, since He is absolutely simple existence.[32] Another reason why the world can not have been created by divine volition is that a perfect existence cannot intend a less perfect one—such as the world.[33]

The infinite unfolding of being leads to the assumption of the world's eternity—one of al-Ghazali's main accusations that is implied in the discussion about the simplicity of God. This becomes apparent in the impossibility of nothingness that merges into the world and would thus create—by way of a causing will—an alteration in God. Above this al-Ghazali rejects the idea of *necessary* creation of the world; God does have, following him, volition and absolute power to create out of this.[34] Furthermore this discussion already indicates the one about the denial of God's knowledge of individuals (Partikularia). If the world emerges necessarily and not volitionally, God can know nothing about it, since His knowledge is coupled with will. Even if God's essence were knowledge, He could only know that, which emanated directly from Him, hence the first intellect—such is al-Ghazali's interpretation.[35] Ibn Sina conceives God's knowledge as universal and Ibn Rushd, warning against an equation of divine and human knowledge,[36] deduces God's knowledge about the world from His knowledge about the first causes, from which the individuals (Partikularia) eventually originate.[37]

The discussion about the simplicity of God, although it does not class among those, in which al-Ghazali accuses the philosophers of unbelief, yet implies these especially serious debates. It points towards the questions of eternity or creation of the world and God's knowledge about individuals. Therefore, despite its less exposed rank in the *tahafut*, God's simplicity is a significant discussion with large theoretical scope.

7. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO AL-GHAZALI'S LINE OF ARGUMENT

Presuming the simplicity of God as a basis Ibn Sina takes the position that all being must emanate from the first being by necessity. God does not possess will by which He creates the world; it flows necessarily out of His simple essence. Consequently al-Ghazali does not have to give a proof for the existence of God[38] in his *tahafut al-falasifa*, for this is generally assumed; rather he discusses the mode of God's being. With this in mind a theological aspiration underlies the discussion.[39] Al-Ghazali's foundation is the claim for a strict partition of religion and rational demonstration. The spiritual character of faith can not be grasped scientifically.[40] A further indication for his religious ambitions is thus the effort to keep religion free from philosophical interference

and rationalization.[41] In the case of al-Ghazali this happens with the help of philosophy itself or with a marked philosophical approach.[42] As the title accentuates al-Ghazali's concern is to show that the philosophers—Aristotle, Ibn Sina and al-Farabi—contradict themselves, do not develop secure a basis for their theories and do not reach certitude.[43] Above that he illustrates that their theories demand consequences they do not draw. By evolving those al-Ghazali demonstrates the inconsistencies of the philosophers transparently.[44] The opening of the eighth discussion elucidated already that al-Ghazali urges for an unshakable proof, a secure demonstration of the twenty questions forming the *tahafut*.[45] The trouble consists in the inappropriate application of scientific methods on metaphysical provinces.[46] The basis of this though is to be sought in an even deeper layer: blind imitation and following are to blame for the disaccord with religion. The Islamic philosophers take the antique sages as authorities, whose names they emulate yet without examining their reasoning and working out the difficulties relative to revelation. In doing so they not only offend against the last one but also do not comprehend their models, who, following al-Ghazali, have not defied religious laws and faith.[47] Blind following is al-Ghazali's main point of critique that designates his whole biography. Very early he asks himself where knowledge stems from and obtains certainty and discovers that many persuasions are only held on to because of *taqlid* (blind following) and not of one's own insight or reason. Thereupon he plunges himself into the study of theological and philosophical schools and doubts the sources of perception and knowledge; he withdraws into solitude and follows the sufi path of ascesis and contemplation to eventually find certitude in pure reason that connects every single human being with the divine level. The foundation of al-Ghazali's thinking is hence everyone's own intelligence that every individual must acquire him- or herself instead of adopting theories unquestioned. Only in this way a human can genuinely reach safe understanding and possess veritable knowledge.[48] In his *tahafut* al-Ghazali meets his requirements by criticizing the philosophers out of their own positions. He appropriated their theories during a long time of deep study because he can only allow himself a refutation through his own understanding.[49] Furthermore al-Ghazali does not, according to his own information, follow any single group and does not develop an opposing system. He rather connects the individual groups to refuse the philosophers in the metaphysical realm from their entirety.[50]

Ibn Rushd indicates in his reply to al-Ghazali that he sees him as a follower of the Ash'ariyya. The eighth discussion can elucidate this quite well. Thus, al-Ghazali rejects God's simplicity for two reasons: firstly he regards it, true to his demand for a demonstrative proof, as not sufficiently safely deduced. Substantiated is barely the impossibility of an unlimited sequence of causes. Secondly though, the simplicity of God is based on the denial of the

divine attributes. This has severe consequences, since those are tightly coupled with the idea of the creation of the world and God's omnipotence and—science.

Against Ibn Sina's thesis, the world would necessarily emanate from the first cause, al-Ghazali defends the reality of God's will. The simplicity of God should secure His incomparable position in being; to keep God's essence free from multitude God had to dwell inside Himself without alteration and any further determination. Therefore the philosophers ridded "the First" of His will and thus took away His freedom "to create the world when and how He wanted." ("die Welt zu erschaffen, wann und wie er wollte.").[51] Volition for its part is closely joined with God's knowledge; what He wants He also knows and vice versa. If God creates the world willingly, He knows creation entirely; if it emanates by necessity, God cannot know anything, ultimately not even Himself. Will and Knowledge of God lead to the attribute of life, since to be able to will and to want God must be alive. If God neither wills nor wants His vitality cannot be deduced, for these three attributes are tightly intertwined.[52]

Al-Ghazali on the other hand underscores God's will. This is essential for His mode of being and facilitates His voluntary creation of the world. Herein the moment of creation is left to God's free will or arbitrariness (Willkür); the philosophers' error lies in their identification of divine and human will what produces the problem of the release of creation by will—or the impossibility of change in God through an altering willing choice.[53] God's will is yet eternal—thus different from volition of every created being. Through His will God creates the world and hence knows it, because He knows what He wants; knowledge of the world by way of will culminates in the necessity of His vitality.[54] The attribute of volition consequently secures God's knowledge, even of Himself, a principle Ibn Sina vindicates but cannot prove logically.[55] Al-Ghazali's emphasis of volition as creative principle accomplishes an alternative to God's temporal or essential precedence of the world that substitutes necessity by voluntariness.[56]

The Ash'ariyya opposes the theory of emanation also because it presumes God's freedom and will as characteristics of divine essence. They defend the reality of God's attributes additional to His essence; they do not exist without the last one though. Essence and attributes represent distinguished concepts whose difference is qualitative and not quantitative.[57] With the Ash'ariyya absolute will is linked with absolute omnipotence of God. This leads to a complete deranging of the concept of causality that is to be found, among other things, in al-Ghazali's seventeenth discussion of the *tahafut*. There is no necessary causation in nature without God's will; it is it that causes that e.g. cotton burns through the contact with fire. Because the created world is contingent and thus only potential or possible, God's will possesses the power to cause an

effect or not.[58] Here again there is no necessity but God's free will arrays all events. A human attains certitude by God creating corresponding knowledge.[59]

The Ash'ariyya takes an atomistic cosmology as a basis for their scepticism against causality. They assume the world were comprised of primary, indivisible and indistinguishable atoms that are held together only by an exterior cause.[60] The plainness of these particles necessitates the influence of a first cause that determines, composes and arranges them. From this it follows that matter cannot differentiate and combine itself. Every transformation as well as every duration has to be created anew by God in every moment. Only God's agency preserves the unity of the world and its order.[61]

The discussion about God's simplicity touches upon the issue of causality. By denying the attributes the philosophers enmesh themselves in contradictions concerning the knowledge of God and the emergence of multiplicity; at the same time they retain the validity of natural causality through the necessity of creation. Al-Ghazali's defence of God's attributes, with His will leading the way, engenders fundamental scepticism towards the causation of the world but enables a lucid derivation of the omniscience and omnipotence of God what resolves the philosophers' confusion. Al-Ghazali's position can be compared with that of the Ash'ariyya in the accentuation of God's free will and is thus assignable as religious. At the same time it is to be underlined that al-Ghazali does not take a theological position decidedly but demands a valid, demonstrative proof without any inconsistencies.

8. IBN RUSHD'S BASE OF ARGUMENTATION

Ibn Rushd's philosophy epistemologically turns on two axes of thinking: the first one describes the trisection of properties of reason that are conferred on society.[62] The stratification of society by means of epistemological ability can already be found with al-Farabi. To him religion represents a symbolic, pictorial translation of philosophical truths; the public can only grasp this whereas the learned men are able to perceive the truths themselves.[63] Al-Ghazali as well divides society in the public, from whom esoteric knowledge—this is interpreted deductions of qur'anic wording—has to be kept away, and the educated, learned men, who are capable of the knowledge of God.[64] Ibn Bajjah (end of 11th century—1139) also championed the epistemological segregation and used Plato's allegory of the cave to depict the condition of the general public, which touches on ideas only mediated by the senses, pictorially, but deny the causal source of truth because they cannot discern the pure light.[65] Ibn Tufayl (beginning of 12th century—1185/6) describes in his *Hayy ibn Yaqzan* the protagonist's resigning realization that the public can be orientated towards truth

merely by symbols and strict rules; the notable dilemma here is that those are identified erroneously with the truth and thus entirely veil it.[66] Ibn Rushd now divides the skills of reason into three—rhetoric, dialectic, and demonstrative. An interesting thought further associates him with al-Farabi: both assume that prophets are characterized by their possessing a particularly strong imagination that enables them to translate philosophical truths into imagery and to make it accessible for the public.[67] This does not only place the philosophers—their demonstrative and intellectual capacities—on a high societal level, almost similar to the prophets, but also indicates the second constitutive persuasion of Ibn Rushd.

The further sustaining basic idea of Ibn Rushd's philosophy concerns the harmonizability of philosophy and theology with a simultaneous methodically sharp distinction of both. The preceding consideration evinces that there are different aptitudes for perception or reason, which a respective language has to do justice to. From this it follows that there are indeed no differing truths, but the truth nonetheless knows divers standards, forms of expression and approaches.[68] Negative theology insinuates already with al-Kindi (ca. 801–866) that God can not be defined and comprehended by the intellect.[69] Ibn Rushd concludes that philosophy and theology operate principally—by theory and method—on detached levels.[70] Al-Ghazali has already—in support of spirituality—warned against a rationalization of faith,[71] but philosophy as well through the stringent differentiation experiences greater freedom towards religion.[72] This reciprocal emancipation yet pursues the subjacent conviction that there exists one truth that unites the two ways in order that they cannot counter one another. Revelation and reason both constitute infallible and primary sources of truth; thus they can neither contradict nor eliminate each other.[73]

Ibn Rushd's cognitive path follows deduction; he reasons the unknown from the known, the abstract from the concrete.[74] This approach likewise defers to the compatibility of religion and philosophy; according to Ibn Rushd religion even obliges to philosophize for the human is above the knowledge of existing things—with this philosophy is exclusively occupied—able to grasp their cause, God.[75] Also in the eighth discussion Ibn Rushd's orientation along the existing things can be reconstructed: he underlines that it is existence that designates the truth. It precedes essence and any interrogation concerning existence either refers to that, if it has a cause or, if not, a necessary attribute determines it. Existence is the principle of truthfulness and as an additive to essence it can only be conceived as subjective, at the individual.[76] It follows from the reality of existence that matter is eternal[77]; it is infinitely brought from possibility to actuality. This chain of contingent actuators has no end in its motion in order to preserve the world. God is the necessary cause that

grants the permanence of causation but is exterior, remains unaltered.[78] From this conception Ibn Rushd explicates Ibn Sina's theory of the body that is necessary through another and possible in itself. Because of the necessity of the eternity of motion in the world God is necessary existence; everything else merely exists potentially, but actually through another. The temporal world is connected to the eternal sphere by the actual body being necessary in its substance, since it exists, but possible or potential—and contingent—in its movement that is caused in the end. As this final cause is absolutely free of potentiality, it is necessarily simple for any composition contradicts necessity.

Ibn Rushd declares that al-Ghazali misunderstood Ibn Sina; he has not denied God's essence but identified it with His existence. Since Ibn Rushd considers existence to be the principle of truth he can accept this identification. Critically though he evaluates the delineation of a thing as necessary through another and possible in itself. An object cannot be necessary and potential at the same time for they constitute contradictory opposites.[79] Simultaneity is here only thinkable in the already developed manner namely that a thing is in one regard, by its motion in space, possible and in another respect, substantially, necessary. Essentially though, as with Ibn Sina, the opposites cannot exist in a being thing. Behind this criticism already the accusation occurs, Ibn Sina would misconceive and adulterate Aristotle.[80]

Ibn Rushd apprehends philosophy as elimination of contingency ("Kontingenzbeseitigung").[81] Therefore he rejects al-Ghazali's critique towards causality; with this order and rationality would be annihilated.[82] Theological as well the concern is to meet the contingency of the world by a final, necessary cause providing the run of events with a beginning. This "First" is accordingly predicable rationally by means of a deductive conclusion from the existing things to their releasing principle.[83]

As necessary cause God, just as has been shown, has to be simple. Ibn Rushd conceives God's essence first and foremost as thinking, as the thinking-Himself of God (das Sich-selbst-Denken Gottes); in this he affiliates himself to Aristotle and al-Farabi.[84] Consequently God does not create from His will but His thinking. He accuses al-Ghazali to have misinterpreted the divine attributes; he construes them, according to Ibn Rushd, anthropomorphically. Ibn Rushd sharply distinguishes human and divine powers: the human being can conclude God's knowledge through the order of the world. It is likewise with the other attributes: their reality is deducible but they cannot be designated adjectively.[85]

The conclusive reproach of the eighth discussion reads that the Ash'ariyya, al-Ghazali with them, militate against the Qur'an in their assumption the world

would have been created out of nothing(-ness). The Scriptures, according to Ibn Rushd, speak of the empirical becoming of the worldly things in their form and initiated in time. It does not say anything though about the relation between necessary and possible being. This occurs for the reason that the public cannot grasp such things and must thus be saved from unbelief to grant the continuity of the common weal.[86] Al-Ghazali consequently trespasses against the testimony of the Scriptures and against the prohibition to express interpretative speculation publicly.[87] The createdness of the world can above that, following Ibn Rushd's understanding that is stamped by Aristotelian thinking, not be proven demonstratively.[88]

9. AL-GHAZALI'S SECOND OBJECTION

After having previously sketched his understanding of Ibn Sina's position, al-Ghazali directly delves into the discussion with his second argument. Existence, al-Ghazali says, is without essence and reality unthinkable. Likewise, as one can solely think a nonexistent thing in relation to an existent that is assumed as being nonexistent, existence is only conceivable with respect to a real nature. Is existence apprehended as a simple entity, without reality it can in addition not be discerned from another one—without real essence simplicity is not differentiable conceptually. Namely essence is reality and if this is negated from an existent thing, it is unintelligible. Al-Ghazali tapers the inconsistency of the philosophers: "It is as though [the philosophers] have said, '[There is] existence without [there being] an existent', which is contradictory."[89] As a proof for the incomprehensibility of existence without essence he alleges that, if it were intelligible there would be among the created things one, which, like "the First", is without reality and essence and differs from Him only through its being caused. According to al-Ghazali this would be a logical consequence of Ibn Sina's theory. It is merely unintelligible because it is not thinkable. Accordingly it cannot become thinkable by relating to a thing that is not caused and something thinkable does not become incomprehensible by its being caused. Existence without essence is thus unreasonable per se whereas essence must be presumed in any case. The philosophers are in al-Ghazali's view subject to a severe error with the simplicity of God. They actually thought to discharge God in this way from any similarity with the created world; the result however is pure negation, for with the denial of essence any reality of "the First" is as well repudiated. The only remain is "existence" according to the letter without any reference since it cannot be associated with an essence.

The philosophers object with al-Ghazali's words that God's reality consists in His necessity and this is His essence. Here again al-Ghazali disagrees; God's necessity purports nothing else but that His existence is uncaused. It is pure negation by which the reality of essence cannot be substantiated. To deny a cause of God's reality is a necessary concomitant feature of this reality und presupposes this. Therefore it should be something intelligible and be characterized as something that has no cause and whose nonexistence is incomprehensible for this is the only true meaning of necessity. Al-Ghazali finally presents the philosophers' idea of multiplicity: if necessity was something additional to existence, God would be manifold; were it not added—and this is the way it has to be—al-Ghazali raises to question how it can then be essence, if existence is not after all. Everything that is not added to existence can as well not be essence.

10. IBN RUSHD'S REPLY TO THE SECOND LINE OF ARGUMENT

Again Ibn Rushd reproduces al-Ghazali's objections quite precisely and faithfully; only then he interferes with the discussion.[90] Ibn Rushd views al-Ghazali's entire argument as sophistry, since the philosophers do not at all assume that "the First" would have existence without essence ore vice versa (this has already been illustrated in the first objection). They merely suppose that existence of a compound accrues to its essence as an additional attribute by a releasing agent; with simple things without cause however this attribute is not an additive one to essence that is not differentiated from existence. This does yet not mean that it would have no essence at all as al-Ghazali apprehends it. Since al-Ghazali's basic understanding already deviates from Ibn Sina's ones, his arguments are untenable.

To the reference, there must be a further existent thing to "the First" without essence were this intelligible, Ibn Rushd returns that the philosophers do not presume any such existent thing without any essence but merely assert that essence differs from others.[91] Al-Ghazali's thoughts thus happen to be a sophistic fallacy based on the ambiguity of the term "quiddity". His argumentation is accordingly sophistic as well, because the nonexistent—an existent entirely without essence—cannot be described by denying or maintaining something of it. Ibn Rushd rather judges such interspersed misinterpretations as wickedness than ignorance and provocatively asks if there was any necessity for this?

Also al-Ghazali's characterization of necessary existence as something that does not have a cause Ibn Rushd deems false. "Necessary existence" rather has

a positive meaning; it follows a nature—a mode of being—that has no cause, no agent outside itself and no agent that partakes in it.

To al-Ghazali's last objection that necessity added to existence would lead to plurality and not added could as well not be essence, Ibn Rushd replies that the philosophers consider necessity not to be an attribute that is appended to essence. It is predicated of it in the same way as its inevitability and eternity. If you take existence as a mental attribute it is no supplement to essence; but if you view it, like Ibn Sina with composite things, as accidental being, it is, even following Ibn Rushd, difficult to explicate how simplicity can be essence itself. This could perhaps be similarly understood as knowledge is identified with the knowing one in a (the) simple being. For Ibn Rushd though the best way is to reckon the existent things as the truth for hereby any doubt looses its foundation; even if the existent thing designates an entity the statement is true that simple existence is essence itself.

11. REFLECTION OF THE SECOND OBJECTION AND ITS REPLY

The second line of argument circulates around the background described above; it does not introduce new theories but enlarges upon the problem. On the acquired basis of comprehension there can therefore be contemplated some subtleties at this place.

Al-Ghazali's parlance uncovers his emphasis on essence; he identifies essence with reality or the real mode of being of "the First". Existence is only intelligible if it is assumed in its relation to this real essence.[92] A simple entity is primarily determined by its essence; this differentiates it from other things. The individuating principle is the essence of the being thing (des Seienden); being (Sein) adheres to this but simultaneously and in one. This accentuation of the reality of essence renders a thinking of existence without essence incomprehensible.[93] The question is, if existence is not thinkable without correlating it with essence, is essence thinkable without existence?[94]

Ibn Rushd disagrees with al-Ghazali's conception of Ibn Sina's theory with some reason; it has already been shown that Ibn Sina strictly discerns composite, caused things from the simple first cause. From the last one essence is not denied; merely existence is not accrued as an additional attribute and essence is not differentiated from existence. The existence of essence is its characteristic mode of being because it is not caused by another. Interestingly Ibn Rushd here introduces (as already in the first objection) the concept of the attribute that does not emerge with al-Ghazali. Ibn Rushd comprehends existence as a

supplementary attribute in the things and as coessential in "the First". Is existence, understood attributively, with God the expression of His mode of being, that, which al-Ghazali terms reality? In this case existence with Ibn Rushd is the reality of simplicity and its essence is only describable thus.[95]

Al-Ghazali convicts the assumption of an existent being without essence as unthinkable via analogy. Were this possible there would have to be such a thing in the world that only differs from "the First" by its being caused. Ibn Rushd describes in *fasl al-maqal* that philosophy is thinking of the existent things and necessary to conclude from that their cause—God.[96] Al-Ghazali consistently applies this idea and reveals that God's simplicity cannot be detected deductively. He thus shows that an existent thing without essence does not become methodically more thinkable at all, if this is uncaused. Reversal control can hence challenge the theory's rationality and signalize that by the negation of essence "existence" only wavers around as a hollow term.

Ibn Rushd seems to get the objection, the philosophers would assume an existent thing without essence, as a reproach that he rejects. He declares that they merely differentiate the concept of essence; "the One" does not have the same essence as other existent things. Because al-Ghazali ignores the ambiguity of the term of essence, his argument is, following Ibn Rushd's appraisal, only sophistic for a nonexistent thing cannot be described. But, would Ibn Rushd not have to suppose, following his own deductively defined philosophy, that the nonexistence of a thing that has existence but no essence is indicative of the impossibility of this combination? Or does he dismiss the deductive process of conclusion in this case? By speaking about the ambiguity of the term "essence" Ibn Rushd here indicates the same distinction as with knowledge before: an eternal, simple essence is not to be confused and thus not to be described also as an evanescent, contingent one as like the essence of a human being. Perhaps Ibn Rushd conceives of essence as a homonym as well.

The classification of reality as necessary being that is the essence al-Ghazali does not accept. Necessity for him predicates nothing else but that this being has got no cause. It thus is another case of negation that does not present any substance for reality. This negation, according to al-Ghazali, necessarily accompanies the reality of "the First"; only if this is presumed it can be defined as an uncaused, necessary being. Necessary being does not relate to essence itself but its characteristic: it has no cause and cannot be thought as inexistent. Necessity and existence *go together with* essence imperatively but cannot replace it for they would not be without it.

Ibn Rushd demurs that al-Ghazali does not define "necessary being" correctly. It is not only causeless and therefore pure negation but has a positive meaning above that. This ensues from a mode of being without a cause, exterior or partaking interior agent. This positive meaning Ibn Rushd does not

allege though; perhaps he insinuates eternity, unmediated knowledge through the identity of knowledge with the knower and the known and the creative force that streams necessarily from the first cause what al-Ghazali, as delineated, rejects. But it seems that Ibn Rushd does also not equate necessity with essence, for after all he says that these positive assignments *ensue* the causeless character.

Another line of thought of al-Ghazali concerning necessity affects the idea of plurality. If necessity would be added to existence plurality in "the First" would be the consequence. This is of course only the case if you, like al-Ghazali, assume existence as a substitute for essence here. If necessity would not be added, what would have to be presumed to avoid plurality, it could again not be essence. This objection however is only thinkable through al-Ghazali's misunderstanding: existence is no essence and simplicity is pure existence without essence. If existence is not essence, everything that is appended to it cannot be essence either. Implicitly al-Ghazali always keeps an underlying essence in mind that constitutes the actual reality of "the One".

It is remarkable in Ibn Rushd's comment on this final thought that he replaces "existence" by "essence". He used this term before in relation to al-Ghazali's "reality".[97] He elucidates that the philosophers do not see necessity as an attribute that is added to essence. Rather necessity is predicated qualitatively of essence just as eternity. As before Ibn Rushd views al-Ghazali's objection as a reproach and not as a methodical argument that introduces an own idea as a consequence to Ibn Sina's theory. Therefore in the beginning he vindicates the philosophers' response. But then he illustrates a difficulty in Ibn Sina's deduction. If you understand existence as a "mental attribute"—qualitatively—it is no supplement of essence (reality) and thus preserves its simplicity. The apprehension of existence as accident, as with Ibn Sina in his composite existent things, complicates the description of the simple being as essentially existent. Ibn Rushd does not explain why this is difficult; perhaps a different deductive approach is subjacent here: if the finite things receive existence through another, the eternal things also have to obtain existence secondarily. But since the eternal has no cause the source of existence is difficult to detect; it can only be in "the First" itself and this complicates the idea of simplicity for there would have to be a part that unfolds existence. Ibn Rushd tries to solve this dilemma by suggesting to assume in this case that existence in "the One" would be its essence proper like "[. . .] the knowledge in the uncompounded becomes the knower himself."[98] Ibn Rushd's own proposal for solution now is to consider the existent things as the truth or as entities. Existence in that case is the principle that unfolds and describes the being individual essentially; only existent things are true and a being thing (Seiendes) is always an individual that can be expressed by its being there (Dasein).

Existence is thus neither accident nor qualitatively descriptive attribute but essential, essence itself.[99]

12. CONCLUSION

The eighth discussion exemplarily shows how complexly intertwined the theoretical backgrounds are in Arabic-Islamic philosophy. God's simplicity at the time of *tahafut al-falasifa* (1094/5) and *tahafut at-tahafut* (1180/1) relates back to a long tradition. Above that the debate refers to additional subject areas—such as God's attributes, especially His will and His knowledge, the creation or eternity of the world or the relation between the eternal and the ephemeral spheres. Subjacent lie difficultly organized cosmologies—like the atomistic one or the concept of the eternity of matter—that implicitly shape and determine the discussion. But arguably both *tahafuts* focus on the issue of the relationship of religion or faith and philosophy. Al-Ghazali as well as Ibn Rushd endeavor a methodical and contentual disassociation of the two realms, each of them with their own aspirations however.

Al-Ghazali warns against a rationalization of faith, which has, according to his opinion, its locus in the subject's world of experience and cannot be grasped by syllogistic proofs or speculation. Important is here the distinction between religion and faith: religious issues, messages from the Qur'an can be interpreted and discussed theologically very well; rational speculation is possible here with restriction to the erudition of the person who leads the argument. Treated against this background al-Ghazali's concerns in his *tahafut* can be read as religiously or spiritually determined. That he rejected philosophy altogether is an interpretation though that goes too far, because al-Ghazali again and again stresses the validity and significance of philosophical and scientific methods where they lead towards secure knowledge. He charges philosophy only in so far as it, according to his understanding, contradicts itself and leads itself ad absurdum. He parades these aberrations possibly in order to defend the spiritual essence of religion but still consequently philosophical in his claim for demonstration. Where philosophy—or science—attains valid and true insights, he appreciates them. Moreover al-Ghazali underlines to not take sides within the religious fractions. He consequently remains with his refusal of blind imitation—*taqlid*—and merely accepts positions that he considers to be assured. Certainly, he takes this decision on the basis of an own cosmology that can as well dismiss what others apprehend as valid proof. As further evidence for the philosophical tendency of the discussion could hold that not even the term "God" drops; He is always designated as "the First" hence treated as a philosophical but at the same time real principle.

Ibn Rushd apparently finds the relation between philosophy and religion challenged by *tahafut al-falasifa*. His background to the discussion is decisively coined by his epistemological conception of society. To the cognitive capabilities of the human being methods of argumentation equate that he sharply differentiates against each other. Accordingly it is a severe accusation against al-Ghazali that he would argue sophistically and thus not advance certainty but on the contrary confuse it even more. Moreover this confusion is accessible to those people who cannot encounter it with philosophically educated spine. Nevertheless Ibn Rushd is fair in the controversy and only attacks those points of criticism of al-Ghazali's whose methodical basis he regards as unsupported or where he deems the position of the discussed philosophers unequivocal and true. Yet, if he detects inconsistencies therein he supports al-Ghazali's objections if he considers them argumentatively correct. Ibn Rushd as well debates following a cosmology; in this he takes the empirical things, the actually existent things as the truth into the center of his judgement. Secured knowledge can be attained in a deductive way and abstract things can be realized by grasping concrete things. Thus Ibn Rushd constantly designates God as "the First"; from the caused things he deduces their ultimate cause, which is hence the first one in the chain of causation. However, Ibn Rushd cannot exclusively be classified as a philosopher and Aristotelian; as a judge of Islamic law und an expert of the religious scriptures the reference to theology is an important foundation of his thinking and argumentative approach. He justifies philosophy through the interpretation of Qur'anic verses and advocates the dissociation of the discourses in relation to the cognitive abilities of the humans to preserve faith that decisively regulates society. The duty of a philosopher is to act for the welfare of the community and this means in Ibn Rushd's view to take account of and to socially invigorate the level of spirituality. Thus he considers the connection of philosophy and religion, reason and spirit as important and tight; only as closest kins a society can unfold and enlarge its knowledge and at the same time preserve its moral constitution.

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NOTES

[1] See for example Fakhry (1983): 129; 221 et seq.; 271.
[2] Al-Ghazali (1997): 1–11.
[3] Cf. Khella (2006): 246. See also Marmura's introduction to al-Ghazali (1997): xxvi: "The term also relates to *haft*, discourse that is not well thought out, that is unintelligible, incoherent."
[4] Al-Ghazali (1997): 4.

[5] This distinction is relevant if you take Iysa A. Bello's reference to the juristic character of the script seriously, as the legal consequence of a charge of heretic innovation differs from that of a sentence for unbelief. Cf. Bello (1989): 1.
[6] Bello (1989): 34.
[7] Ibid.: 47.
[8] Black (2003): 181; Bakar (2003): 963 and Khella (2006): 96.
[9] This concept is found at many notable philosophers after al-Farabi. Ibn Tufayl conceives the symbolic language as the only one accessible for the majority of the public (Goodman (2003): 326). See also Ibn Tufayl's text *Hayy ibn Yaqzan*: Ibn Tufayl (2004). He follows Ibn Bajjah's idea that the philosophers should retreat from society as "weeds" to find truth and bliss. This bases on the conviction that the majority of the people cannot reach wisdom (Cf. Avempace (1963): 122–133). Ihwan as-Safa like Ibn Rushd know three stages of cognition (Fakhry (1989): 181). Al-Ghazali also separates scholars from the public by their abilities of intellect or to unfold reason: "learned men cannot but know God and appreciate his omnipotence and providence. But this learning is not fit for the masses" (Campanini (2003): 270). He thus mentions two categories of intellect.
[10] Ibn Rushd (1875): 6, 20. According to Fakhry Ibn Rushd reduces Aristotle's four types of arguments to three and associates those with their respective intellectual "state" (Fakhry (1983): 278/9). See also Flasch (2006): 28/9.
[11] In this the philosophers follow Aristotle's conviction, that demonstration is the highest form of syllogism and leads to secure knowledge (Inati (2003): 808). Cf. also Ibn Sina's view (Inati (2003): 235/6).
[12] Sari Nuseibeh suggests that the political position of philosophers in society may have been Ibn Rushd's actual concern that led him to the harmonization of revelation and reason. (Nuseibeh (2003): 825).
[13] Al-Ghazali (1997): 119.
[14] The whole summary can be reviewed at: al-Ghazali (1997): 118/9 or al-Ghazali (1963): 132–134, available as pdf-file at http://www.ghazali.org/works/taf-eng.pdf or html-file at http://www.ghazali.org/books/tf/index.htm .
[15] The summary of Ibn Rushd's reply is based on the translation by Simon van den Bergh: Ibn Rushd (1954). It is online available as html-file at http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ir/tt/index.html. Cf. also Max Horten's translation: Ibn Rushd (1913). Al-Ghazali's eighth discussion is here the sixth and can be found on p. 226–230.
[16] Theology here, due to the Islamic understanding, signifies the sciences of religion, *ulum ad-Din*.
[17] Ibn Rushd here proceeds as he did already in *fasl al-maqal*, where he also accused al-Ghazali of making public theories and convictions that are not substantiated by the Qur'an and thus causing unbelief (Ibn Rushd (1875): 17; 20–22). For the theory of intellectual capacities, the separation of philosophical discourse from the religious one and the access of the public and the connections of this to Ibn Rushd's writings see also Ben-Abdeljelil (2005): 41/2.
[18] Max Horten's translation goes again directly into al-Ghazali's misconception. „Wenn Gazali glaubt, ein Wirkliches ohne Wesenheit sei undenkbar, so ist zu erwidern: Die Philosophenschule lehrt nichts von einer Existenz Gottes ohne Wesenheit, noch von einer Wesenheit ohne Existenz. Sie glaubt vielmehr nur, die Existenz des Kompositums [. . .] sei eine äussere Eigenschaft, die es von der Wirkursache empfange. Das Einfache und Ursachlose besitze aber keine vom Dasein verschiedene Wesenheit. Eine absolute Leugnung dieser liegt also nicht vor."(Ibn Rushd (1913): 230). ("If al-Ghazali thinks a real being without essence were inconceivable, it is to be replied: the philosophical school does neither teach an existence of God without essence nor an essence without existence. It rather believes the existence of a composite [. . .] were an exterior quality it receives from the cause. The simple and causeless does not possess an essence disparate from existence. An outright denial is not at hand.")

[19] Corbin (1993): 160.
[20] Cf. Corbin (1993): 170. Here also one has to keep in mind that existence and essence are segregated in the *caused* beings; only they have being through another. "[. . .] bei allen Geschaffenen kommt das Sein akzidentiell zum Wesen hinzu." (Flasch (2006): 130). ("[...] with all the caused things it is, that being is added to essence accidentally.")
[21] Inati (2003): 241.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Cf. Fakhry (1983): 153.
[24] Thus God is absolutely incomparable with other being; there is nothing that is like Him, hence He is sole, one and simple—"the One" ("der Eine") (See Flasch (2006): 130).
[25] Cf. Fakhry (1983): 153 and Flasch (2006): 130.
[26] The first cause is the quintessential being and hence perfect. It is therefore the absolute Good (Cf. Fakhry (1983): 154). Its immateriality liberates it from any deficiency; only matter can suffer deficits and consequently be the source of evil (Cf. Inati (2003): 241).
[27] Cf. Inati (2003): 241 and Fakhry (1983): 154/5.
[28] Cf. Flasch (2006): 123.
[29] Fakhry (1983): 156 and Corbin (1993): 171/2.
[30] Corbin (1993): 171.
[31] Fakhry (1983): 156, Corbin (1993): 170/1 and Inati (2003): 241.
[32] And nothingness cannot exist, because the regress of contingent—natural—causes is infinite since cessation would forbid motion (see above).
[33] Inati (2003): 241/2.
[34] See e.g. Campanini (2003): 262.
[35] Cf. Bello (1989): 111.
[36] Ibn Rushd (1875): 10/11.
[37] Fakhry (1983): 155/6.
[38] Al-Ghazali apparently criticized proofs for the existence of God anyway. He regarded the refusal of an infinite chain of causes merely as a supporting pillar of the Aristotelian system and above that rejected the underlying causal deduction (Flasch (2008): 153). Nevertheless: in the *tahafut* he took the impossibility of endless chains of causation for proven (see above).
[39] Cf. Marmura's introduction in al-Ghazali (1997): xv.
[40] Khella (2006): 236; 306.
[41] Flasch (2008): 145.
[42] Al-Ghazali (1997): 9.
[43] Ibid.: 4.
[44] Ibid.: 7.
[45] "The criterion of demonstrability underlies the whole argument of the *Tahafut*" (Al-Ghazali (1997): xxi).
[46] Ibid.: 8. It must be noted and stressed that al-Ghazali did not repudiate natural sciences, mathematics and logic. On the contrary he emphasizes their validity and even warns to condemn then in favour of religion, since this would harm religion more than benefit it (Al-Ghazali (1997): 6, 9).
[47] Ibid.: 2/3. See also Pavlin (2003): 113.
[48] Cf. Al-Ghazali (1988) and the chapter about al-Ghazali in Khella (2006): 215–274.
[49] At this time al-Ghazali taught under Nizam al-Mulk at the Nizamiyya in Baghdad. Corbin writes there were taught the theories of the Ash'ariyya (Corbin (1993): 119). Ibn Rushd classed al-Ghazali among them (see above). The *tahafut* emerged as the outcome of al-Ghazali's extensive studies when he still had his position at university. Marmura mentions, it has been written between 1091 and 1095 (Al-Ghazali (1997): xvii). Bello reduces the timeframe to 1094 until 21 January 1095 (Bello (1989): 9).

50 Al-Ghazali (1997): 7/8.
51 Flasch (2008): 147.
52 Fakhry (1983): 226/7 and Bello (1989): 111.
53 Pavlin (2003): 111. Just as the philosophers deem God's knowledge unique, al-Ghazali urges the same for divine will. See also Bello (1989): 92/3.
54 Ibid.: 112.
55 Fakhry (1983): 227. Also the definition of God as pure intellect is thus more plausible than only by the statement He were immaterial.
56 Bello (1989): 96/7.
57 Corbin (1993): 115.
58 Campanini (2003): 263.
59 Cf. Fakhry (1983): 230–232.
60 Nuseibeh (2003): 828.
61 Corbin (1993): 121/2. See also Fakhry (1983): 55 footnote; 211. The Ash'ariyya by the way sees the nonexistent, nonbeing things as objects that can be known (Fakhry (1983): 210. Cf. also Rosenthal (1970): 54/5). Perhaps this makes creation out of nothing(-ness) (creation ex nihilo) plausible for them? The atomistic occasionalism is not only common in the ash'arite *kalam*-school but is passed on among the *mutakallimun* since the ninth century. The idea of permanence or duration and evanescence through God's creative work of these accidents can be found in Fakhry (2008): 40–43.
62 This point has been seized on already. It is interesting that Ibn Rushd apparently methodically categorized his own works according to this graduation. This reference and a further good summary concerning the capabilities to reason can be found in Ben-Abdeljelil (2005): 41–43.
63 Black (2003): 181. Al-Farabi deduces the philosophers' claim to power from their talents to reason as Plato already did (Fakhry (1983): 124). Since genuine bliss is the knowledge of truth only few, according to al-Farabi, reach this goal (Frank (2003): 963).
64 Campanini (2003): 270.
65 Goodman (2003): 326. Similar to al-Farabi's limitation of bliss on the philosophers according to Ibn Bajjah only very few achieve the divine privilege of enlightenment or inspiration (Erleuchtung) (Fakhry (1983): 263).
66 Goodman (2003): 326. Cf. Also Fakhry (1983): 269/270.
67 Black (2003): 187 and Urvoy (2003): 339. Ibn Rushd with his philosophy pursues the welfare of the entire society thus the translation of fundamental truths into a language conceivable to all is ethically eminently relevant. The talented are obliged to study—they are also not allowed to be detained from that—and through this effectively serve the community (Frank (2003): 966/7 and Ibn Rushd (1875): 5/6).
68 Nuseibeh (2003): 830 and Khella (2006): 288.
69 Klein-Franke (2003): 168.
70 Khella (2006): 258.
71 Ibid.: 306.
72 Thus even knowledge derived from thinkers, who do not originate in the cultural context of Islam, can be adopted. Al-Kindi already emphasized that knowledge of every earlier and as well foreign philosopher should be acquired (Klein-Franke (2003): 171 and Fakhry (1983): 70/1). Ibn Rushd accepts this candor: Ibn Rushd (1875): 3–5.
73 Al-Kindi already championed this creed: Klein-Franke (2003): 171 and Fakhry (1983): 277. Ibn Rushd very emphatically stresses the close relationship of philosophy and religion: "[. . .] philosophy is the friend of religion and its dear sister [. . .]" ("[. . .] die Philosophie ist die Freundin der Religion und ihre Milchschwester [. . .]") (Ibn Rushd (1875): 25). Already the status of the prophet

in Ibn Rushd's system adumbrates this close tie of religion and philosophy (Urvoy (2003): 339). This implies in turn the relevance of interpretation in case of inconsistencies (Fakhry (1983):277).

[74] Khella (2006): 277.

[75] Ibn Rushd (1875): 1/2.

[76] See above and Ibn Rushd (1954), translated by Simon van den Bergh. An existing thing is a respective being individual that has been unfolded from potentiality to being. This potentiality can here be interpreted as essence that in the condition of being merges in existence. Existence is thus only secondary in the sense of an individuating principle (this concerns particular things as much as universal ones). Truthfulness is here the being things.

[77] Bello describes following Hourani that the eternity of matter with Ibn Rushd has been inaccurately deduced: he, as other philosophers as well, confuses logical possibility and potentiality. Through the Aristotelian principle of the eternity of possibility and the maxim that potentiality implies matter, eventually eternity concerning matter is asserted (Bello (1989): 102).

[78] God does not move in giving off things, He is their model, their aim they imitate by their movement (Flasch (2008): 157). An interesting and perhaps helpful thought is the distinction between making (*factio*) and creating (*creation*): "Making presupposes something that is different from that, which makes; creation presupposes the nonbeing of that, which is to be created." ("Das Machen setzt etwas voraus, das vom Machenden verschieden ist; die Erschaffung setzt das Nichtsein des zu Erschaffenden voraus.") (Flasch (2006): 136).

[79] Ibn Rushd (1954) and Fakhry (1983): 290.

[80] Inati (2003): 243 and Flasch (2008): 158.

[81] Flasch (2008): 156.

[82] Ibid. As a result by the way God's reasonableness would evanesce; only through an understandable order of the world the existence of God can be deduced, thus Ibn Rushd's conviction.

[83] Urvoy (2003): 338.

[84] Fakhry (1983): 258 and Black (2003): 189.

[85] Fakhry (1983): 284/5. See also Ibn Rushd (1875): 10/1. Here, Ibn Rushd warns against a confusion of divine and human knowledge; knowledge is merely a homonym. Interestingly Ibn Rushd seems to comprehend divine will analogously to the human one: God had the choice between existence and nonexistence of the world and had to decide for the best, the existence, because He is the pure Good (Bello (1989): 92/3).

[86] Ibn Rushd (1954).

[87] Cf. as well Ibn Rushd (1875): 21–25. Ibn Rushd differentiates three cognitive abilities, al-Ghazali only two. From that it can be concluded that the last one does not especially accentuate the philosophers as capable of interpretation (Bello (1989): 59). Since the theologians argue dialectically and are authorized for exegesis in al-Ghazali's view there might not prevail any offense against the exclusivity of the discourse.

[88] Flasch (2008): 155/6 and Ibn Rushd (1954). "A demonstration is a syllogism in which the certainty of the premises necessarily leads to the certainty of the conclusion"(Inati (2003): 808). By the way Plato regarded dialectics as the highest stage of philosophy; Aristotle on the other hand utilized this term frequently to enunciate that an argumentation was solely persuasive. This hint can be found at Kilcullen under the heading "Dialectic and Demonstration". This lecture can be read at: http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/x52t07.html.

[89] Al-Ghazali (1997): 120. The complete progression of the argument can here be followed on the pages 119/120.

[90] Ibn Rushd's reply can be verified at Ibn Rushd (1954). This second strand can not be found in Max Horten's translation.

[91] The translation (Ibn Rushd (1954)) here says: "[. . .] it has not a quiddity like the quiddities of other existents [. . .]". Probably "it" here means the first cause, God?
[92] It is interesting that al-Ghazali describes the connection analogously to the apprehension of a nonexistent thing as a relation to an existent one. As mentioned above the Ash'ariyya presumes that the nonexistent is an intelligible object; al-Ghazali seems to differ from that.
[93] Perhaps the thinking of the relevance of essence is necessary to correlate the divine attributes sensibly with the first cause. If this were existence above all, the attributes had no possibility of relation without procreating plurality in simplicity. But if essence is the point of reference for all further determinations, these can be predicated qualitatively without destroying the unity or oneness of the ultimate ground, the essence.
[94] Would from this turn not result Ibn Sina's differentiation between the possible or potential in itself and necessary through another? Would essence here be the agent that unfolds existence out of potentiality?
[95] Still, in this case essence would be the underlying being; the attribute of existence as coessential unfolds essence to reality.
[96] Ibn Rushd (1875): 1.
[97] Does this indicate that existence is the reality of being for Ibn Rushd, its essential classification? It has already been shown before that Ibn Rushd qualifies existence as the truth.
[98] Ibn Rushd (1954). Has the problem here not been ignored? Knowledge is with Ibn Rushd the fundamental determination of God (see above) und is thus no accident. In the present case he supposes however that existence with Ibn Sina is to be thought as accident. Ibn Rushd still apparently treats it implicitly as an attribute that essentially classifies God qualitatively.
[99] This definition reminds of Aristotle's first substance, the „essence in the very strict and first and most actual sense [. . .]" ("Wesen im sehr strengen und ersten und eigentlichsten Sinn [. . .]") (Aristotle (1998): 13).

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NADER EL-BIZRI

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DIALECTICS ON REASON AND SPIRIT: RATIONAL DISCOURSES AND SPIRITUAL INSPIRATIONS

Abstract: Philosophical interrogations around the notions of "reason" and "spirit" are essentially self-reflective, in the sense that they presuppose *the matter to be thought* to be itself posited as a *ground* that founds the unfurling of such impetus in thinking. This self-reflexivity lets itself also appear in this transition as being seemingly *groundless* in its self-grounding (as *Abgrund*). This reflective state of affairs becomes significantly complicated in the context of a *dialogue* between "phenomenology" and "philosophical thinking in Islam"; especially when such endeavor is undertaken in the context of a colloquium held as part of the *American Philosophical Association* meeting (keeping in mind the manner by virtue of which mainstream academic/professional "philosophical *analyses*" assess investigations of "spirituality").

Philosophical interrogations around the notions of "reason" and "spirit" are essentially self-reflective, in the sense that they presuppose *the matter to be thought* to be itself posited as a *ground* that founds the unfurling of such impetus in thinking. This self-reflexivity lets itself also appear in this transition as being seemingly *groundless* in its self-grounding (as *Abgrund*). This reflective state of affairs becomes significantly complicated in the context of a *dialogue* between "phenomenology" and "philosophical thinking in Islam"; especially when such endeavor is undertaken in the context of a colloquium held as part of the *American Philosophical Association* meeting (keeping in mind the manner by virtue of which mainstream academic/professional "philosophical *analyses*" assess investigations of "spirituality"). The complexities of this initiative are further accentuated by the fact that its *dialogical* efforts hopefully aim at surpassing the confines of "comparative studies", and perhaps aspire also to go beyond the simple schema of "perspectivism". The multiplicity of the meanings of the theoretical terms that we use in the context of such dialogical exercises, confront us from the onset with the risks of conceptual distortions and notional misunderstandings, given the displacement of the

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significance of such words when deployed across differential and variegated traditions, which may not be readily commensurable in terms of their philosophical outlooks, or their epistemic and ontological presuppositions. Semantic nuance, with close textual exegesis and hermeneutics, in addition to careful approaches to philosophical sources in terms of well-grounded inquiries in historiography and philology, might all assist in overcoming the obstacles or eschewing the impasses that naturally arise in such dialogical exchanges of ideas. Nonetheless, it is also essential that conceptual prolegomena, and methodological directives, are ultimately discussed and projected in view of orienting our philosophical *conversations*, and revealing their *horizons* and intentions, while taking into account the rich spectrum of the diverse traditions in philosophy within the history of Islamic thought, and the multiple schools of modern phenomenological thinking, and their evolved expressions.

While discourses on "reason" or the "intellect" performed pivotal conceptual roles in the unfolding of epistemology and ontology across the history of science and philosophy, and in the context of systems of metaphysics and psychology in particular, reflections on the notion of "spirit" are rarer, specifically when such contemplations are not readily reducible to the order of ponderings on the nature of the "soul", which has been customarily associated with the *Peri psukhes*, *De anima*, or the *Kitab al-nafs* classical textual sources (namely in the legacies of Aristotle, Ibn Sina [Avicenna], European scholastics, etc.). Taking into account these epistemic challenges and cognitive obstacles, we could perhaps initiate our tentative reflective endeavor concerning the question to be thought ("reason and *spirit*") in terms of a *relatively neuter* and brief account of etymology; even though such pathway in thinking presupposes the sequence of civilization in the dialectical transmission and adaptive assimilation of knowledge, with the transformational character of translation by way of variegated channels of conceptual metamorphosis and interpretation (exegetic and hermeneutic).

The notion of *reason* (*raison*; *Vernunft*) offers us a rendition of the appellation *ratio* in Latin, which is a rendering of the Greek *logos* (*qua* "speech"). The parallel concept of "intellect" translates the Latin *intellectus* and the Greek *nous*, while both, "reason" and "intellect", correspond with the Arabic *al-ʿaql*, which commonly refers to the Greek *nous*, and loosely designates *logos*, which in its turn is rendered as: *al-nutq*; with *al-mantiq* as: "logic".

The concept of *al-ʿaql* preoccupied the philosophers, theologians, and mystics, within the history of ideas in mediaeval Islamic civilization (and across diverse traditions of *falsafa*, *kalam*, and *ʿirfan* / respectively: philosophy, theology, and mysticism). This foundational rational notion of *al-ʿaql* was central to cosmology and metaphysics, and to reflections on the veridical aspects of the acquisition of knowledge, its verifications and explications, and to *the conditions of possibility for there being experience*, in addition to determining the

ethical-political horizons of thought; all being questions that were generally debated at "the *limits* of human understanding".

Epistles focusing on *al-'aql* are witnessed in most of the influential textual legacies in the intellectual history of Islam; in philosophy, the (exact) natural sciences, mathematics, theology, psychology, and mysticism (inclusive of the so-called: "Sufism"). As for meditations on "spirit" these are less common, especially when they are not mediated through treatises on "the soul" (*al-nafs*). The notion of "spirit" is inherently mysterious and uncanny with its differential meanings, which do not readily point to a clearly defined corresponding determinate *referent*. "Spirit" designates a *signifier* that is destined to a continual deferral of the definitive occurrence of its adequacy with a given *signified*. . . Reflecting on "spirit" requires preparatory linguistic, epistemic, and etymological mediations, in view of conducting its existential analytic. "Spirit" (*esprit*; *Geist*) derives from the Latin "*spiritus*", which is a rendering of the Greek "*pneuma*" that correlates with the Arabic "*al-ruh*". Some reductively assimilate "spirit" to the "soul", which points to the Latin "*anima*", the Greek "*psukhe*", and the Arabic "*al-nafs*". "Spirit" is conventionally associated with the idea of the existence of a ubiquitous, non-quantifiable substance, energy, or impetus in life, which could be present individually or collectively in living beings. In some cases, "spiritualism" signals certain traits that may be mistaken for animism, or, at times, are also relatable to classical alchemical treatments of the workings of volatile "spirits" (*al-arwah*) in matter. Nonetheless, in its loftier conceptual forms, "spirit" refers to the "mind" or to "consciousness", as a synergy of the individual living being, or as having provenance from a higher, or universal, synergetic, transcendental consciousness.[1] "Spirit" may also refer to the dynamics of the deeply rooted passions of the soul, and of its faculties, with their existential metamorphosis in ecstatic vivacity or anguished dread.

"Spiritualism" (*al-ruhaniyya*), which concerns itself with "the mysteries of spirit", is customarily contemplated through the hermetic conventions of gnosis and the arts of the occult. It is also tied to expressions of religious life and faith; with images at the root of the believer's thinking that seemingly transcend the temporal, the spatial, and material realms. In abstract metaphysical terms, "spiritualism" opposes "positivism" and "materialism". The notion of "spirit" presupposes conceptually (or ontologically) a separation of mind and body, soul and corporeity, ideas and matter, by way of pointing to some sort of a connectivity with a reality that is beyond worldly beings, which also evokes emotions of awe and reverence in encounters with signs that hint at what is sublime, sacral, and "Holy". Some cynics or skeptics may associate certain exaggerated and extremist "superstitious" manifestations of these experiential "spiritual" states with projected "pathological" signs of potential psychological disorder, hallucination or delusion. Others grasp them symbolically and

globally as being part of lived expressions of a way of life that concerns itself with aligning the human will and mind with the universe in a supposedly harmonious and ordered manner; like for instance it would have been the case with pictures of reality that were based on the classical "microcosm-macrocosm" analogy.

Spiritual disciplines enjoin practicing disciples to cultivate the so-called higher potentialities of the human essence in view of transforming coarse energies into subtle and nobly pleasing ones, in order to become gradually freed of the lesser *ego-logical* self, and in favor of being more fully one's "own true self". In "fundamental ontological terms", this *penchant* in thinking might have been perhaps suggested through Martin Heidegger's *worldly* phenomenological reflections on the "authenticity" or "in-authenticity" of *Dasein*'s *being-in-the-world*.

Spirituality may tacitly depreciate the dominance of formulaic religious rituals in preference of lifestyles that are guided by strivings to nurture intimate personal relationships with the Divine; in willing goodness and pursuing a *sapiential* sense of happiness, while also seeking truth in what is supposedly beyond the order of sensory perception or the quantifiable ways of objectified thinking and saying. Spirituality would possibly cultivate eschatological drives, *soteriological* hopes of salvation, in contemplation of an eternity that is posited with conviction and by way of persuasiveness as an "Afterlife" (*akhira*), with its rewards and punishments (*al-thawab wa-al-'iqab*). Nonetheless, spiritual innovators and hermits, who operated within the context of dogmatic orthodox clericalisms, became suppressed as heretics, separated as schismatic and persecuted (and this brings to mind the memory of the destiny of the "martyred" mystic al-Hallaj in Islamic intellectual history).

It is usually claimed that spirituality designates states of meditations on the so-called "inner experiences", as if these were also amenable to an analytic (and measurable qualification-quantification) that matches that of the outer sensory experiences. And yet, even such proclaimed "journeys of self-discovery" are in many cases re-appropriated in inter-subjective terms, in the form of traditions that are handed down over through the hierarchy of master and apprentice; hence instating institutional structures and orders that resemble those of established formal religions. Spiritualism may well result in clericalism after the appearance of the founding spiritual guide.

In epistemic terms, "spiritual" concepts are imprecise, vague, ambivalent, idiosyncratic, and open to multiple hermeneutic and exegetical interpretations, which possibly result in seeming antinomies, paradoxes, contradictions, and they are furthermore accommodating of doctrinal exploitation, which affects outlooks on reality and conditions everyday comportments. The "spiritual" may cultivate superstitious accounts of the supernatural, the mythical, and the

folkloric in projecting claims about what is sacred, miraculous, or granted with grace in terms of divine providence. These elements of belief are at times recollected in terms of self-enclosed cults, which are marked by an obstinate insularity in *praxis*, and veiled behind esoteric proclamations about the arguable disclosure of the *truth* of the so-called *arcana* (the mysteries; *al-asrar*). The "spiritual" remains un-dominated by the power of ratiocination, even though we use comprehensible inferential modes of reasoning in terms of attempting to describe it or converse about it; and yet, thoughts about "spirituality" and its emotive appendages flourish in certain poetic regions of language with their allegorical (and, at times, also *pictorial*) landscapes.

To reorient our interrogations thus far around "spirit" we could briefly evoke some of the *Qur'anic* verses that signal to us the "religious truth" of: "the ascent and descent of spirit" (which by no means is readily obvious in terms of the essential *truthfulness* of its scriptural interpretation by exegetes). This meditative *turn* towards the *Qur'an* in the context of a *philosophical* discourse, a dialogue or reflection, does not necessarily "handsomely" fit with the presumed "elegant" editorial sensibilities of contemporary academic scholarship. This is the case, even though the practice of reciting selected "directive" *Qur'anic* verses in traditionalist scholarly circles of Islamic thought, and when also conversing about "the questions of philosophy (*falsafa*; *hikma*)", was not that uncommon. Nevertheless, in terms of the unfolding of our present line of inquiry herein, and in view of the dialogical endeavors that orient our reflections (and the APA philosophical-academic *milieu* in which they occurred), we effect in this instance a conceptual, textual, and discursive *LEAP* (of *thought* [of "faith"?]) towards the fundamentals of religious thinking in Islam; hence, we unhesitatingly recite from the *Qur'an*: *Ta'riju al-mala'ikatu wa'l-ruh ilyah* ("*The angels and the spirit ascend unto Him*" [Lxx.4; *al-Ma'arij*; *The Ways of the Ascent*]); *Tanazzalu al-mala'ikatu wa'l-ruh fiha* ("*Therein descend the angels and the spirit*" [Xcvii.4; *al-Qadar*; *The Night of Destiny*]); *Wa nafakhtu fihi min ruhi* ("*And I breathed into Him of My Spirit*" [Xv.29; *al-Hijr*: *The Rocky Tract*]). Yet the mystery abides in un-concealment: *Wa yas'alunaka 'ann al-ruh, qul al-ruh min amr rabbi, wa ma u'tiytum min al-'ilm illa qalila* ("*They ask thee about spirit, say the spirit is of my Lord's order. You have been given a little knowledge*" [Xvii.85-6; *Bani Isra'il* (The Sons of Israel) / *al-Isra'* (*The Night Journey*)]). Faced with the "mystery" that *this* names—and from a "phenomenological" viewpoint (which albeit does not readily render visible the *essence of this truth*)—such scriptural recitations are perhaps *signs* that: "spirit" runs its course in time; that it sustains historicity; that it has a history!

Recovering-recollecting our philosophical *mood*, and from the standpoint of "fundamental ontology", we say: the essence of "spirit" is the "concept" of thinking that *thinks itself* as the differentiation of difference; as a *negational*

negation in self-conceiving itself. Spirit has to overcome itself (*Aufhebung*; leverage) in a hard struggle against itself, in order to bring itself to its concept. As a "*negation* of a negation", it appears in time in accordance with its essence. Its historical actualization is presented in a dialectical-ontological-apophantic analytic of a differentiated self-differentiation.[2] Time appears as the fate of spirit in the primordial "temporalizing" of "temporality" and of "world-time" whose horizon is history. But, why spirit as history falls into time? Here, the essence of history is that of *being*, namely as a drive of spirit towards the Absolute in its movement of self-awareness, and in contemplating the imperishable life in a self-knowing truth. This is the subject matter of philosophy, which contains all determinateness within itself. The whole course of the development lies behind what is set in the beginning, which itself comes to meet the end in the culmination of its self-movement. This brings to our mind reflections on "Hegel and the Greeks" as they were advanced in Martin Heidegger's rethinking of the commencement and consummation of philosophy.[3] History is determined as being philosophical in its fundamental traits, and intrinsically unitary in the movement of spirit towards itself. Philosophy appears in the wholeness of its destiny in terms of its progression towards its goal, namely: "Truth". The *ego cogito sum*, Transcendental Subjectivity, *Dasein*, all gather the manifold in the apprehension of opposites in their unity!

Phenomenological reflections on "reason" and "spirit" tangentially tempt us to evoke the dialectical tradition from within German idealism of Hegel, and as set in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*Phenomenology of Mind*),[4] which is posited as a "systemic science of the experience of consciousness" that is grounded on the *Science of Logic*.[5] The dialectic of consciousness in its self-reflections, and as mediated by meditations on its objects, is a mode of "pure looking" at what presents itself in self-showing. This is echoed in Heidegger's interpretation of the Greek conception of *phainomenon* as: "what shows itself form itself as it is itself".[6] Phenomena are thus not simply appearances, but rather appearing depends on them, and they are constitutive of apparition. *Phenomenology of spirit* is posited as a science that studies appearances throughout the *history* of the rational evolution of philosophical consciousness, from the commencement of philosophy up to the epoch of its consummation; while supposedly "transcending" natural, artistic, or religious forms of consciousness, with their saturation with imagery and pictures, by aiming towards the Absolute, and glimpsing "the End of Time", beyond phenomena, in contemplation of the *noumena*!

Philosophizing becomes an analytic of the dialectics of consciousness that surpass the flow of deductive reasoning. Knowledge is to be examined not simply in terms of veridical criteria of epistemology, as much as through actual

processes of its unfolding in knowing (the same perhaps happening to *thinking*). We cannot readily evaluate our knowledge of spirit unless we first know what it is, or what is meant by uttering this term, which seems to be all too familiar, yet, withdraws from the sphere of meaning when we inquire about its essential kind of *being*. The dialectical unfolding of knowing is a *negative* movement in the sense of overcoming itself, which also shelters what is surpassed of itself within its own folds, until ultimately an adequacy between the object of consciousness itself and how it is for consciousness become one. The bifurcating separation between object and subject disappears in this "spiritualization" of the object of consciousness. The being-in-itself (*Ansichsein*) of the object is "sublated" in the being-for-itself (*Fürsichsein*) of the concept as the unifying oneness of self.[7]

In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, lectures of 1824), Hegel argued that, in self-reflection spirit becomes inwardly free in "being-for-itself" as "subjectivity", yet without having its freedom within itself. It then gets hold of itself inwardly in its own self-determination, and appears to itself as being appropriated by the pull of an indeterminate purpose or finality. Being expedient on its account, spirit is still finite and limited; its next stage would be that of the Absolute in being itself for itself.[8]

We wonder at this critical junction of our interrogations (with the constellation of texts and traditions that we evoked) about the plausibility in our age to *philosophically* "talk about spirit (and the Absolute)", particularly in view of the distress enveloping our epoch due to the so-called: "withdrawal of Divinity" (*le retrait du divin*), the "flight of gods" (*die Flucht der Götter*).[9] We might be inclined to invoke herein Jacques Derrida's notion of *l'attente* as: *waiting* that is not marked by messianic eschatology, in preparation for: an awaited yet utterly surprising (un-revengeful) event of letting the other come (*laisser venir l'autre*) with unconditional hospitality (and pardoning)?[10] This matter took a captivating phenomenological significance in Martin Heidegger's notion of "the last God" (*le dernier dieu*) or "the other God" (*l'autre dieu*); namely, the *One Who Comes and Passes* (*du dieu qui vient et du dieu qui passe*) within the advent of nihilism and the workings of the *Gestell* (en-framing) in the unfolding of the essence of technology[11]; despite the un-restful sense of modernized (metaphysical?) *un-rootedness*, *de-divinization*, *dis-enchantment*.[12] "Abandonment and withdrawal" signal "remembering-expecting"[13]; thus facing us with the dilemma of remoteness and indecision: whether the Divine moves away from us or towards us in a hesitating self-refusal, which also hints at the gift of revelation as it occurs "without flight nor arrival of divinities" (without "ascent" or "descent"!). In evoking the preparation for *the ones to come* (*Zukünftigen*) Heidegger mystifyingly states: "a people is only a people when it receives its

history as apportioned in the finding of its God". What belongs to the essence of a people is grounded in the historicity of "those who belong to themselves out of belongingness to God". Yet, "how should a people find God?"[14] "What about *gods*... who are not from within *religion*"? The migrating-deserting withdrawal of the divine (*le retrait du divin*) is an evacuation of a world grounded on it that lets another *world* surge, while also continuing to hold within itself the privative lack of what retreated (*Un monde est en retrait dans un autre*).[15] The last God (*der letzte Gott*) is outside the metaphysical determinations of monotheism, pantheism, or atheism... Being over against gods who have been, the last is not one of the gods in flight (*les dieux enfuis*).[16] The *last* is not the end but is rather the other beginning of immeasurable possibilities for our history[17]; calling for *being-able-to-await* an encounter, a sign...[18] "Modernity" has come to philosophically (onto-theologically) signify a privation of the divine (*la mort de Dieu*; *Gottlosigkeit*); perhaps such exceptional situation was hinted at by Heidegger in his thought-provoking *Der Spiegel* interview (1966), with its (Nietzschean/post-Nietzschean moods), that: "Only a *God* can save us"!

"The wasteland grows"; especially and essentially, when, with careless perversions, what is aimed at by *this saying* turns into mere idle chatter, into a platitude of quotidian conversation...

What must be thought about with mindfulness, what concerns us and touches us, mysteriously turns away from us! Yet, this event of withdrawal is most *present* in infinitely exceeding the actuality of everything actual. What withdraws "draws us along nearer" by its retreat, and develops its incomparable *nearness*. We are drawn towards *what draws away from us in the draft of its pulling withdrawal*. We are "pointers" in our recollecting thoughtfulness about what in essence gives fruit for thought. In thinking, we point to *what is not being transposed into the language of our speech*; we are in this like "a sign that is not read"[19] of something fateful, which cannot be lost to thinking; of that which thinking must come back to the more thoughtful it aspires to become...[20]

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NOTES

[1] Due to restrictions in terms of the theme of this inquiry, its length, and the nature of the "dialogue" to which it responds, the focus will be set on the phenomenological traditions, even though many aspects of this line in thinking correspond also with some of the thoughts of Henri Bergson; particularly in the context of his treatises: *Matière et mémoire* (1896), and *L'évolution créatrice* geistes (1907); and specifically in terms of his development of the conceptual notions of *l'élan vital*

and *la durée* (Bergson's tracts can be consulted via his collected works that were eventually published by the Librairie Félix Alcan in 1939, and reprinted by the Presses Universitaires de France in 1959).

[2] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1953), sect. 82.

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1967); Martin Heidegger, "Hegel und die Griechen", in *Festschrift für Hans-Georg Gadamer* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960).

[4] Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Meiner, Hamburg, 1952).

[5] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* (Meiner, Leipzig, 1948).

[6] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, op. cit., sect. 7.

[7] Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit., pp. 558, 562.

[8] The Hegelian account of the Absolute, and its Heideggerian analytic in relation to "fundamental ontology", was criticized by Emmanuel Levinas, particularly in the context of the latter's influential *Totalité et infini: essai sur l'extériorité* (Nijhoff, La Haye, 1961).

[9] Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1989), sect. 56.

[10] Jacques Derrida, *Foi et Savoir* (Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1996); sect. 20–22, 24, 26; Derrida, *De l'hospitalité* (Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1997).

[11] Heidegger, *Beiträge*, op. cit., sect. 255.

[12] Emilio Brito, "*Déification, dédivinisation et divinisation selon Heidegger*," *Studia Phaenomenologica*, I (2001), pp. 197–223; Heidegger, *Besinnung* (Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1997), sect. 18.

[13] Based on Jean Beaufret's interpretation of Heraclitus's fragment: "*phusis kruptesthai philei*", it is said that: "*l'éclosion aime le retrait*." Jean Beaufret, *Approche de Heidegger* (Minuit, Paris, 1974), p. 92.

[14] Heidegger, *Beiträge*, op. cit., sect. 242, 251, 254.

[15] Beaufret, *Approche de Heidegger*, op. cit., p. 102.

[16] Jean Beaufret, *Le chemin de Heidegger* (Minuit, Paris, 1985), p. 48.

[17] Heidegger, *Beiträge*, op. cit., sect. 256.

[18] Heidegger, *Beiträge*, op. cit., sect. 252; Beaufret, *Le chemin de Heidegger*, op. cit., p. 48.

[19] Martin Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken?* (Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1954); Lecture I, Part 1; also refer therein to Heidegger's reflections on Hölderlin's *Mnemosyne* verse.

[20] Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken?* op. cit.; Lecture I, Part 1.

KENNETH AVERY

THE MYSTICAL POETRY OF SHIBLĪ

Abstract: Sufism, the mystical movement of Islam, has seen various manifestations of reason and spirit, amalgamating highly refined thought and experience in the prose or poetry of writers such as Rūmī or Ibn `Arabī. For some Sufis, however, 'spirit' has predominated in their thought and experience, while the abstractions and intellectual pursuits of reason have been downplayed.

Sufism, the mystical movement of Islam, has seen various manifestations of reason and spirit, amalgamating highly refined thought and experience in the prose or poetry of writers such as Rūmī or Ibn `Arabī. For some Sufis, however, 'spirit' has predominated in their thought and experience, while the abstractions and intellectual pursuits of reason have been downplayed. For the 9th–10th century mystic from Baghdad, Abū Bakr Shiblī (d. 945), a member of Junayd's circle, a Sufi who was an outsider, unconventional, and who suffered from mental derangement on many occasions, manifestations of the spirit were supreme in his life. He struggled to find nearness to God, and sought direct experience of the transcendent in everyday ways. His exploration of ecstatic states of consciousness, his renown as an 'intoxicated' mystic, and his being always on the verge of ecstatic utterance and poetry is well documented in the biographical sources. In these ways, the life of the spirit was an intense and powerful passion which at times overwhelmed him.

In this paper, I wish to explore the dimensions of his poetry which have not been discussed before, though the Shiblī scholar Florian Sobieroj wrote a perceptive article in 1994 concerning some of his poetic writings.

> The relationship between mysticism and poetry is necessarily enigmatic. Because the mystical experience is ineffable, mystical doctrine is approximate, mystical language allusive. And, so, mystics have often turned to poetry with its phonemic patterning and symbolic richness to speak of their experiences and beliefs (Homerin, *Tangled Words*, p. 190).

Shiblī's only literary 'remains' – apart from the various records of his sayings – are of a significant scattering of poetic fragments, no full length *qasīda*s or other specific genre poems, but a large number of short verses, sometimes only a single *bayt*, which are preserved in several of the early

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment, 195–203.

Arabic sources. In 1967 these scattered pieces were collected together by Kāmil al-Shaybī to form a *Dīwān*, and published in Baghdad. The most frequent source for these poetic fragments is the 10th century compendium of Sufi thought and practice, Abū Nasr al-Sarrāj's *Kitāb al-Luma`*, though a number of other sources also contain verses from Shiblī.

In some ways it is problematical to scrutinize mostly isolated verses, at most three or four *bayt*s, without the context of the full poem from which many of these fragments have been taken. On the other hand, Shiblī chose to express himself by means of these short verses, and most of them are comprehensible in their isolated state. These brief utterances, often like explosive outbursts of condensed symbolic or theosophic meaning, are reminiscent of the inspired ecstatic sayings or *shathiyāt* associated with many early Sufis such as Hallāj and Bistāmī. Martin Lings remarks that 'Shiblī is known to have been one of the most spiritually intoxicated of Sufis, and one has the impression that he lived as it were on the verge of poetry – whence the many single lines and couplets, both brilliant and profound, which flashed forth from him so spontaneously' (Lings in CHALABL, p. 244).

Before entering our discussion of Shiblī's verse, however, it is instructive to consider Sarrāj's approach to Sufi poetry in general. In fact the very title of Sarrāj's chapter on this subject, chapter 92 in R.A. Nicholson's edition, is indicative of the author's conception of the significance of Sufi poetry. It is entitled: 'A chapter concerning their poetry dealing with the inner meanings of their psychological states and their symbolic allusions' (*Luma`,* p. 246). This immediately sets the scene for a discussion of Sufi poetry, though Sarrāj mainly limits himself to a large number of verse quotations. The title also nicely justifies the use and importance of poetry among the Sufis, countering the opposition of conservative detractors who might point to its frivolity and licentiousness. Thus Sarrāj underlines the spiritual qualities of poetry, its expression of the mystics' inner states, and its indication of the transcendent through symbolic and allusive language.

At the end of the chapter, Sarrāj again acts to counter opponents of poetry and also to acknowledge the difficulty and obscurity of some of this verse. He concludes: 'These poems have difficulties in them as well as plain meanings, both subtle symbolic expressions and intricate spiritual meanings. So let one who looks into them consider them carefully so that they understand their intentions and their allusions, and that they not ascribe to their authors what is not appropriate. If one finds a difficulty which is not understood, search out an answer by questioning one who does understand, for to every situation there is an appropriate sentiment, and to every type of knowledge there are those who have mastered it. Were we to occupy ourselves with explaining this, our book would become too long' (*Luma`,* p. 257).

In his introduction to Shiblī's *Dīwān*, Kāmil al-Shaybī provides an excellent analysis of his poetry, its style and significance. Shaybī notes that Shiblī's verse is concerned only with his life as a Sufi, expressing his states and experiences in the second half of his life, finding voice for the full intensity of his experiences and beliefs (Shiblī, *Dīwān*, ed. Shaybī, pp. 67–68). It is perhaps not surprising that Shiblī only speaks of his present state and ignores his life before his 'conversion' to the Sufi path, since his intense spiritual experience and its expression in poetry is much more important for him.

Shaybī argues that Shiblī went beyond the usual modes of poetic expression, from plain exoteric meanings to the extreme of spirituality, being inspired by what perplexed his spirit: 'this is the difference between those who drift along behind a conventional life and those who make divine love their food and drink, clothing, sleeping and waking . . . thus Shiblī and his like among Sufis stand in greater need of having a language filled with echoes and allusions which they use to express what is in their hearts of sentiments or thoughts, their 'overflowings', the mere words of which are incapable of being carried to and understood by ordinary people' (Shaybī, p. 69). In finding this incapacity of words, Shiblī makes use of the poetry of the pre-Islamic, as well as other Muslim, poets.

Shaybī emphasizes the part played by the early Arab tradition of the Laylā-Majnūn legends in Shiblī's poetry. This literary motif is important for his self-understanding and the psychological ramifications of the divine-human relationship. As with Hallāj and other Sufi poets before him, when asked about the beloved Laylā, the poet would respond with the self-referential 'I am Laylā', taking the role of the distraught lover Majnūn who identifies as one with his beloved (ibid., pp. 70–71; see further Khairallah, *Love, Madness and Poetry*, esp. pp. 99, 102, and Sobieroj in *Sufi*, 1994, p. 12).

Shaybī outlines the complex nature of Shiblī's poetry, with its intertwining of three strands: '(1) a reflection of his psychological state . . . (2) his cultural refinement, and (3) his guidance for his disciples; thus it is multifaceted in its expression, meanings and purposes' (Shaybī, p. 76). His poetry expresses firstly his inner state, the anguish and longing of his heart. Secondly the 'meanings' are expressed in highly refined, allusive and subtle language which taps into the huge reservoir of the Arabic poetic tradition. The third strand, the 'purposes' and 'guidance' mentioned by Shaybī, is the didactic thrust of his verse, the need to teach and instruct novices and disciples, sometimes taking the form of exhortation or giving counsel to his fellow Sufis (ibid., p. 77). The versatility of Shiblī is also evident in his ability to dress his verse in the technical language of Sufism, to employ deftly the esoteric vocabulary in describing psychological states or alluding to spiritual matters (ibid., p. 76). Another common feature of his poetry is a frequent reference to his distaste for feast days and celebrations,

showing the extent of his ascetic disposition, and also a virtual 'boasting' about his self-imposed austerities (ibid., p. 77).

Shaybī also notes that on various occasions Shiblī expresses an idea in prose, and then returns to it with an illustrative verse (ibid., p. 79). In such cases, however, the authenticity of either the poetry or the related prose should probably be questioned, since it is likely to be a situation of the tail wagging the dog. The appropriateness of a particular verse as an 'illustration' of a prose narrative allows for the juxtaposition of the two, irrespective of their real connection and origins.

In terms of style, Shaybī argues that 'Shiblī's expression does not fall outside the familiar (in poetic language) except when he comes to Sufism and its technical language. Nor is he given to meanings which entail difficulties of interpretation; rather the mind and the pen alight upon them easily and smoothly; . . . they have a connection to the heart like that of perfume which diffuses in the air from fully opened blossoms' (ibid., p. 80). Perhaps his style was not formally quite correct, however, as he sometimes uses repetition which would not please a fastidious critic (ibid.).

This mention of some 'incorrect' stylistic features is reminiscent of the criticisms of Sufi poetry by some medieval writers, notably `Abd al-Malik al-Tha`ālibī (d. 1038) and Abū al-Fath `Uthmān b. Jinnī (d. 1002). Th. Emil Homerin argues that these early Arabic literary critics identify certain linguistic and stylistic elements of verse associated with Islamic mystics. Thus al-Tha`ālibī censures the famous poet al-Mutanabbī (d. 965) for 'imitating the expressions of the Sufis and using their tangled words and abstruse meanings' (Homerin, *Tangled Words*, p. 194). Without directly mentioning any examples, it seems that al-Tha`ālibī and Ibn Jinnī have in mind the uses of multiple and contrasting prepositions, repetition of a verb with different subjects, and the creation of paradox within a verse, among other stylistic faults (ibid., pp. 194–196).

Some of these formal 'errors' are apparent also in Shiblī's poetry, but as Homerin points out, such features are deliberate 'plays on formal literary devices to induce a shift in perspective, to transcend rational abstractions to speak about nonrational concerns' (ibid., p. 194). Shiblī, like Hallāj and many other Sufi poets, attempted to push the boundaries of language and meaning in trying to both understand their extraordinary experience and to allude to spiritual realities which were ultimately ineffable. That Shiblī's verse is nearly always richly meaningful is eloquent testimony to his linguistic and creative genius.

Shaybī gracefully states that 'Shiblī's poems are constant in divine love, and these poems are truly among the most beautiful that his talent devised' (Shaybī, p. 79). His sayings and verse dealing with the topic of love is the subject of a

valuable article written by Florian Sobieroj in 1994, which is one of the few analyses of Shiblī's poetry (*Love in the Mystical Discourse and Experience of Abū Bakr Shiblī* in *Sufi* 23, 1994, pp. 10–15). Unfortunately Sobieroj included in his discussion verse which Shaybī regarded as not authentic. Sobieroj does not mention their doubtful status, and I have disregarded these problematical poems in the discussion which follows.

An interesting and perhaps paradoxical adjunct to Shiblī's renowned asceticism is his apparent bodily corpulence, a rather unexpected outcome given his constant austerities. Sobieroj notes that this is not in keeping with the prototypical sufferer of love's affliction, who should in traditional fashion waste away. Perhaps Shiblī sought to justify his being overweight by claiming that his body was ignorant of the love in his heart:

'My heart loves, though my body does not know,
for if it knew, it would not remain corpulent'
(Shaybī, p. 126, no. 62; Sobieroj, p. 11)

Despite the anguish of love's suffering, Shiblī expresses joy at annihilation in the Beloved, and if released from illness, he would call it back:

'I am delighted to perish in him because
I am overjoyed in what the lover delights in;
and if my bones were asked about their torment
they would certainly deny it, and you would hear the refusal;
and if I was released from my illness, the fire of yearning in me
would cry out, hoping for its return'
(Shaybī, p. 93, no. 12; Sobieroj, p. 13)

His fervent longing even had physical or psycho-somatic effects on him, as shown in a short couplet:

'Ardent longing for You has caused an ulcer
to grow on my liver;
my distraction for You makes me like
a prisoner in fetters'
(Shaybī, p. 100, no. 25; Sobieroj, p. 13)

Sobieroj also notes that the recitation of these verses was accompanied by violent physical reactions. If love causes physical illness, it also has the effect of melting or dissolving his body from his heart and diverting him to the spiritual domain:

'My body melted through what is in my heart,
and my heart melted from what is in my body;
cut my cord, or if You will, join it,
to me every deed of Yours is excellent;
people believe truly that I am in love'

but they do not know with whom I am in love!'
(Shaybī, p. 124, no. 58; Sobieroj, p. 13)

Shiblī was not averse to quoting or slightly modifying lines from earlier poets. Sobieroj remarks on his interpretation of a quatrain from Dhū 'l-Rumma (d. 735) describing the beloved's eyes. He expresses the thought that the lover has eyes in his heart which bring about intoxication:

'As for the two eyes, God said: 'Be! and they were,
acting on the hearts [of lovers] as wine does.'

This quote is recorded in Sarrāj's *Luma`*, and is followed by a rare comment attributed to Shiblī: 'I do not mean the wide eyes [of the face] but rather I refer to the eyes of hearts, within the breast; and happy is he who has an eye in his heart and an attentive ear and pleasing speech' (*Luma`*, p. 252; Sobieroj, p. 14).

Sobieroj's discussion centres on the theme of love in all its manifestations: ecstasy, illness, intoxication, madness; we will return to these aspects later. An important motif which occurs frequently, however, is the more mundane theme of asceticism and the question of celebrating religious festivals.

In several poems, Shiblī emphasizes the constancy of his proclaimed asceticism which does not allow for the feasting and other celebrations of the festival days. Moreover, he makes a virtue of his unwillingness to celebrate, even to the point of boasting, and of vaunting his exceptional status: 'they' have their festivals but 'I' am alone in my patient vigil:

'The people have fast-breaking and feast days,
I am solitary, alone, peerless'
(Shaybī, p. 96, no. 16)

'The people rejoiced and were glad at the festival,
But I only rejoiced in Him, the One, the Eternal'
(Shaybī, p. 97, no. 19)

'On festival day the people dress for the celebration,
but I have dressed in blue and black clothes;
I have prepared a lamentation and eulogy with weeping,
an antidote to the wine, sweet incense and aloes;
all have turned to joy at their feast day,
but I have gone among you with lamentation and eulogy;
I have turned to grief but the people are rejoicing:
what a difference between me and the people at the feast day!'
(Shaybī, p. 98, no. 21)

This air of superiority and almost self-glorification is perhaps a little odd given the humility most often associated with ascetic renunciation, but it shows a different side to Shiblī's personality. Such a boastful attitude is a constant

danger which some ascetics, notably the *malāmatīya* (those seeking blame), were well aware of, and took steps to combat (see further de Bruijn, *The Qalandariyat* in Leg. Med. Pers. Suf, pp. 75–86).

In returning to the love poems, we may note that Martin Lings writes of 'the state of spiritual expectancy, poised between longing and patience' epitomized in Shiblī's verse:

'A cloud from You one day overshadowed us,
the lightning dazzled us but it held back its rain;
and its clouds did not clear so that one hoping might despair,
nor did its rain come that the thirsty might drink'
(Lings, *Myst. Poet*. in CHALABL, p. 235, and *Sufi Poems*, no. 37; *Luma`*, pp. 251–252)

Lings argues that such statements represent an advanced stage on the spiritual path, that at the endpoint there are temporary 'absences' of the Beloved: 'when the soul resumes its earthly life it has a sense of separation, while remaining none the less aware of the supreme presence which it has not left and cannot leave' (CHALABL p. 236). Thus Shiblī says:

'He saw me and kindled in me marvels of His grace;
I understood, and my heart melts in separation;
so He is not absent from me, though I seek consolation in remembering Him,
and He does not turn away from me that I be absent'
(Shaybī, p. 86, no. 3)

Sobieroj expresses similar remarks in noting that 'The correlative of union is separation, which in Shiblī's experience is preceded by the fear of being deserted by God. The fear for Shiblī was not of hell-fire, but that God might turn away from him' (*Sufi*, 1994, p. 15). Sobieroj quotes verses containing pairs of correlatives, a characteristic feature of Shiblī's poetry:

'If separation were to settle in paradise,
the grace of the garden would turn to hell for God's servants;
and if union were to settle in hell,
the fire would turn to paradise for the servants'
(Shaybī, p. 123, no. 57; Sobieroj p. 15)

Another type of paradoxical expression used by Shiblī, as alluded to above, is the Beloved causing illness and at the same time being the cure of the lover's pain:

'My trials for You are such that
I have no care for my hardships;
O cure of my illness,
even though You are the cause!'
(Shaybī, p. 91, no. 10)

Lings comments that this 'inward sickness' so often mentioned by the Sufi poets is 'the "contradictory" condition of the relative that has been touched by the absolute, of the finite that has been opened to the infinite. The only cure is another touch, another opening. It is this "sickness" which sets the adept apart from other men, and it is by its very nature a secret, since none can understand it except those who are smitten by it' (Lings in CHALABL, p. 240).

In another example of the contrast between nearness and separation, Shiblī also uses the secular tradition of wine imagery to express intoxication and spiritual perception:

'One who is accustomed to nearness does not endure absence from You patiently,
nor does one whom love has enthralled cope with separation from You;
so take your time, wine-bringer, for the drink has already intoxicated me,
for if the eye saw You not, then the heart has already perceived You'
(Shaybī, p. 87, no. 4)

Secular love imagery is also used in the following verses, the beloved (she) being an enchanter, her eyes making captive:

'In her glances are flashes of sorcery,
by these she kills or brings to life whom she wishes;
and she makes captive the two worlds by her two eyes,
as though the two worlds were slaves to her;
I glance at her, and she knows what is in my heart,
I look at her, and she knows what I desire'
(Shaybī, p. 95, no. 14)

The image of the lover as a captive is also highlighted in the following couplets:

'My limbs are not free of You for a moment,
they are ever occupied with carrying out Your wishes;
nothing comes to my tongue
-as God well knows – except remembrance of You;
and You are visible to my eye
- whether You are absent or present – it sees You'
(Shaybī, p. 117, no. 47)

Shiblī also uses imagery from nature with wit and a touch of humour, though his subject is ever serious:

'Praise be to God that I am
like a frog that rests quietly in a lake;
when it croaks its mouth is filled,
else it is quiet and dies of grief'
(Shaybī, p. 121, no. 53)

The importance of spiritual perception is expressed in the following couplets:

'When ecstasy (*wajd*) showed me Your presence
I witnessed Your existence (*mawjūd*) in every place;
so I declared Your existence without speaking,
and I saw Your certainty without seeing by the eye'
(Shaybī, p. 127, no. 63)

Finally, the last word is best left to Martin Lings who describes the following verses as 'a serene expression of the permanent consciousness which the great mystic retains over and above any vicissitudes he may have to undergo:

Let the moons set or still be bright,
Ours is a full moon: in its sight
Full moons are humbled; for us its light
A splendour is by day and night.
No change of time can alter it'
(Shaybī, p. 105, no. 31; Lings in CHALABL, p. 245)

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Note: The letter 'n' followed by the locators denotes 'note numbers'.

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