Brad West

Re-enchanting Nationalisms

Rituals and Remembrances in a Postmodern Age

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Here is your country. Cherish these natural wonders, cherish the natural resources, cherish the history and romance as a sacred heritage, for your children and your children's children. Do not let selfish men or greedy interests skin your country of its beauty, its riches or its romance.
-Theodore Roosevelt

I should like to be able to love my country and still love justice.
-Albert Camus

Art must be parochial in the beginning to be cosmopolitan in the end.
-George A. Moore

to Blake and Paxton

Preface

In sociological scholarship there is a widespread assumption that either the end is nigh for the nation or that it is an out-dated form of cultural identity in need of overthrowing. This monograph bucks this trend by examining a number of new ritual engagements with national history and identity, arguing that these indicate a possible key role for the nation in a 'global' future. Such a project should not be interpreted as a reactive defence of the nation, nor seen as the romanticising of national citizenship.

My interest in the topic derives from empirical observations of the emergence over the last two decades of various new kinds of rites and remembrances that involve a reviving of national attachment. The monograph does not attempt to engage in dialectical debates around whether the nation has a primordial or instrumental basis. Rather the focus is squarely on the nation in the future by examining the popularity and influence of these new rituals forms, with an in depth analysis of particular cases. This endeavour allows for a reassessment of assumptions about the decline of the nation and national history in Western societies.

A core theme throughout the monograph is that in order to comprehend the influence of these new national rituals we need to attain a greater appreciation of the adaptive powers of the nation. In considering the current deficiencies of social theory in this regard it is a worthwhile exercise to contrast the sociological theorising of nationalism with that of capitalism. Like nationalism, capitalism has its origins in modern social and economic conditions that are vastly different to that that of today. In particular, the consumerist culture which emerged in the second half of the twentieth century poses a strong 'contradiction' (Bell 1971) to the Protestant work ethic. Despite such tensions, few see capitalism in demise. Instead social theories across disciplines note its transformative dynamics and power to remain relevant to the age. Yet in the case of nationalism it is strongly argued that either it has inherent qualities that lack adaptive properties or that any shift away from its modern basis is evidence of it slowly but surely being cast into the dustbin of history. This poses its own dilemma: how to explain the enduring qualities of the nation or the reasons why the nation has, for at least a century, defied predictions of its demise. Scholars have typically explained this in relation to the public's attraction to the regressive identity politics of the nation, with the nation considered unable to incorporate cultural diversity and global realities, something exploited by the state for short terms political power.

In developing the argument that the nation is able to reattain cultural relevance by adapting itself to the spirit of the contemporary age it is not my intention to suggest that social theorists of globalization, and more recently cosmopolitanism, propagate a utopian belief about the future in relation to an integrated 'global village' or international governance. Nor do I wish to suggest that this literature simplistically envisions a future in which national identity is eradicated and has no role to play in a revitalised global system. It needs to be acknowledged that important scholarship has been undertaken on the origins of the nation being within a global system (Giddens 1985; Grenfeld 1992) and the ongoing links between nationalism and cosmopolitanism (Fine 2003; Delanty 2006). However, even when social theorists are advancing fairly pragmatic institutional ways of increasing cosmopolitan democracy (Habermas 2001; Held 2004; Kaldor 2003) or analysing cosmopolitan dispositions as they exist within the everyday lifeworlds of national citizens (Lamont and Aksartova 2002; Nava 2002; Urry 2003), there is little consideration of national identity as dynamic and transformative. Rather the national assumes a kind of backstage role in the scholarship on globalization and cosmopolitanism, seen as a functional organisational entity or reduced to the notion of 'local' culture, playing an important role in providing ontological stability in a world otherwise afflicted by an avalanche of global culture (Appadurai 1990; Robertson 1995).

In the majority of sociological scholarship on contemporary culture we find little explicit and separate investigations of national identity. To take an example relevant to the various case studies explored in this monograph, in the last two decades a significant literature has emerged around the ways in which cosmopolitanism is expressed and enhanced through global mobility (Beck 2006; Hannerz 1990; Urry 2000). However, within this writing there is no in-depth exploration of how such exposure to difference may translate to a transformation of nationalism. Rather such work tends to assume that mobility per se automatically advances the trend of indifference to national identity in Western nations (Fenton 2007). For all that globalisation and postmodern scholars have written about sociology being driven by methodological nationalism (Beck 2002, 2004; Urry 2000), this theorising of cosmopolitanism is similar to classical sociology in that the nation is often taken as given, with the dynamics of the nation being assumed and seen as not meriting separate investigation (Smith 1983).

An exception to this neglect has been the field of nation and nationalism studies that has long engaged in detailed studies of national contexts, an empirical approach that has been well placed to appreciate the diversity of national forms and the resurgence of nationalism in particular cultural contexts (Brubaker 1992; Kumar 2003; Smith 1995). While such work has pointed to the plurality of nationalism and avoided assumptions about the decline of national consciousness, it has generally not engaged with postmodern theories about the decline of grand narratives and the role of new consumption, leisure and travel identities. As elaborated upon Chap. 1, this is in part because of an intellectual concern with the origins of nationalism and its inherent qualities rather than national futures. While large scale national and world value surveys have monitored attitudes towards the nation and attempted to map issues of pride in one's nation, this approach has various problems in compre-

hending the future of the nation. Firstly, it tends to find high levels of national pride throughout the developed world (Evans and Kelly 2002) which is counter to other empirical findings and theories about national sentiment (see Chap. 1). Secondly, the dominance and homogeneity of questions asked in the surveys, often justified for purposes of comparative validity, has meant that there has been a lack of analysis of how changes in self-identity connect with attitudes towards the nation (Phillips 2002). The result is an ambiguous and monolithic conceptualization of the nation and national identity, failing to appreciate the diversity of national culture and forms of cultural attachment to the nation and national history (Kim and Schwartz 2010). Finally, survey data can only tell us about shifts in national sentiment and attitudes towards the national, not the mechanisms by which change occurs. It is these limitations which I address through proposing a cultural approach to understanding the ways in which the national through ritual might be rejuvenated in the West, what I refer to as national re-enchantment.

The new ritualistic ways that the public are engaging with the nation and its past offer re-enchantment through providing forms of participation and expression that differ from that offered in conventional state-sanctioned rituals, forms which continue to dominate the study of nation and nationalism. The social and political influence of these emerging ritual forms though is not only through the level but the type of engagement that they allow and how this facilitates new comprehensions of national identity. In making this argument it is important to acknowledge that the emerging rites analysed in this monograph are not essentially unprecedented and have not been completely neglected by cultural scholars. However, when these rites have been examined they are taken as evidence of national decline or the short term vested interests of elites rather than a potential basis for genuine national rejuvenation. For example, scholarship that is connected to the classical theory of Max Weber on disenchantment (1958 [1904]; 1968) frequently undertakes analysis of cases where national commemoration interlinks with popular culture. However these conclude about a broad desacralization of history and routinization of historical charisma. This is most prominent in the analysis of historical engagement in the United States which is often assumed to act as a forerunner for cultural shifts in relation to nationalism (Smith 1995). However, assumptions of disenchantment equally appear in contexts that have far different histories of national identification. For example, Rogers Brubaker and Margit Feischmidt (2002) in their analysis of the 150th anniversary remembrances of the revolutions of 1848 in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania argue that there has been a shift from the ‘holy to holidays’ where people’s engagement with history is more detached.

At times critical theorists also examine cases not dissimilar to that analyzed in this monograph. The emphasis in this work is often on national history being propagated in popularist ways for political gain (Berezin 1997). A great deal of scholarship in this tradition borrows from understandings of nationalism as something that is ‘invented’. Ernest Gellner (1964, p. 169) used the term ‘invent’ to show how nationalism is not the primordial awakening of nations to self-consciousness. It became more popularised though by the widely cited book *Invention of Tradition* edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983). For Hobsbawm and Ranger,

an invented tradition is a set of practices which inculcates certain values and norms by repetition. As the term is used, it refers to two phenomena. Firstly, 'traditions' which can be shown to have been actually invented by elites. Secondly, traditions whose origins are more difficult to establish, but which have been seized upon to symbolise membership and social cohesion. Reflecting the growth of the production of culture perspective in sociology, such notions have been widely illustrated in cases of Western nationalism. More recently they have been globally applied to various post-colonial contexts, although in a slightly broader frame appreciating greater levels of agency and hybridity than the term had originally allowed (Bhabha 1994, p. 247). We have also seen a hybrid perspective emerge between the Weberian and critical traditions whereby the nation is seen as a site of identity exploited for political and economic interests though in the process trivializing it (Gottdiener 1997; Sturken 2007).

In addressing such perspectives I do not discount their empirical findings but challenge their conclusions about the inevitable direction of our engagement with the nation. While the aim of the monograph is to engage in the profiling of rituals which suggest that national attachment can be re-enchanted, I differentiate my position from literature which suggests that the nation remains vibrant by acknowledging the decline of the nation. For example, the French cultural historian Pierre Nora is indeed correct to argue that much of the study of national commemoration and collective memory has been on contexts and remembrances of the past, which can easily be seen as "fleeting incursions of the sacred … vestiges of parochial loyalties…" (1996, p. 7). Nora is wrong though in thinking that these are the "rituals of a ritual-less society", forever condemned to be a disenchanted world currently "busily effacing all parochialisms" (1996, p. 7). The waning of certain beliefs I take as a natural part of national identity as it operates in what Geertz (1973, 1983) refers to as a cultural system. Similarly I do not discount critical scholarship that points to the ways in which economic interests and entrepreneurial activity symbolically shape the nation. However, to limit ourselves to these understandings of national attachment is to suggest that national myths and traditions can be reducible to other social or material forces. In contrast, this monograph argues that the national has its own logics and power which can see it not only endure but become re-enchanted by being reimagined as a source of identity in the contemporary age. This is not to argue that the nation will automatically remain relevant or the dominant identity in the future, only that it is reductionist to suggest that it is inevitable that the nation cannot re-attain cultural significance.

Despite the continuing prominence of Weberian and critical theories in sociology, it is postmodern scholarship towards which this monograph concentrates its critical lens. The engagement with this paradigm is in part because in many ways it is most recent and influential manifestation of the death of the nation thesis. However, it is also because it has made important advancements in comprehending historical variability in cultural attachment and identified the cultural prominence of new forms of ritual engagements. It is argued that postmodernists through appreciating the decline of grand national narratives; the increased social and political significance of consumption, leisure and travel; and the emergence of new ritual engage-

ments with national history have, largely unknowingly, pointed to the conditions around which we may see a re-enchantment of national identity in the West. While postmodernists have rightly pointed to a 'waning of affect' in relation to modernist engagements with the nation, they have been wrong in dismissing the possibility of new ritual forms allowing for its re-enchantment, and as a consequence the nation re-attaining strong cultural and political significance in an era of globalization. In making this case I do not attempt to engage in a detailed epistemological critique of postmodern scholarship or conversely spend any considerable effort to develop a case for its relevance within sociology. There has already been a significant amount of literature about postmodernism as it intersects with sociology (Lemert 2005; Mirchandani 2005; Seidman 1991; Woodward et al. 2000). Rather, working from the perspective of cultural sociology, my argument is directly focused upon the need for sociology to appreciate new forms of national ritual. In this I engage in more grounded 'middle-range' cultural theorizing (Alexander and Smith 2010).

The starting point for such a perspective is to establish some definitional specificity. Critics have argued that the breadth of the ways in which the postmodern is used and applied to different dimensions of social life makes it more of a "buzzword" and useless for anything but the most general descriptor of contemporary culture. While this is somewhat true, such breadth also means that in critiquing the field of postmodern studies it is also important to refer to the term in an inclusive manner. As such in this monograph the concept of the postmodern is used to describe the social, cultural, political and economic forces which have been thought to be oppositional to the central tenets of modernity. When reference is made to postmodern social theories I generally refer to scholarship and paradigms that hold the West has or will move into a new social era in which the modern basis of identity is dismissed or greatly diminished. This definition means that the postmodern here applies both to scholarship that celebrates the spectacle and irony of the postmodern worldview as well as those that point to its dangers. This includes that which emerges from a Marxist critique of postmodernity if it argues that the aesthetic codes of postmodernism have become dominant (eg. Jameson 1984). The descriptor of postmodern as used in this monograph is also inclusive of scholars who predate the widespread use of the term and those that have attempted to replace it with a litany of similar terms and theories. Despite important differences between them, here I refers to concepts like post-industrial (Bell 1973, 1976); late capitalism (Jameson 1984); reflexive modernization (Beck et al. 1994); liquid modernity (Bauman 2000).

Generally I use the notion of postmodern scholarship to refer to a certain intellectual consensus around the future of the nation as it relates to globalization, risk and uncertainty, global ethics and social movements (Mirchandani 2005). It is worth noting two of these in this opening section given the prominent position of their authors within recent sociological scholarship around globalization: Anthony Giddens' conceptualization of de-traditionalization and Zygmunt Bauman's ideas about "liquid" society. Both scholars could claim not to be postmodern in that they have argued that there has not been a complete severing from modernity, but apart from a matter of degree there is a similar emphasis in their work to scholars who more dogmatically argue that the contemporary age is completely divorced from the modern.

Giddens, for example, argues we have moved into a "post-traditional social order" in which the disintegration of culture as a guide for behavior has meant that individuals now must "negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of options" (1991, p. 5). This has occurred through a process he refers to as de-traditionalization. It has two referents, the impact of globalisation under which "Western societies are being opened up from the hold of tradition" while other societies "that remained more traditional are becoming detraditionalised" (1999, p. 4). As outlined above, I do not deny that this process is occurring and Giddens' theories provide important insights into the contemporary age. For example, the de-traditionalization thesis provides a useful alternative to past Durkheimian ways of conceptualising tradition that emphasise its universal functions. Edward Shils most notably defined tradition as anything "handed down from one generation to the next." (1981, p. 12). This included "material objects, beliefs about all sorts of things, images of persons and events, practices and institutions" as well as "buildings, monuments, landscapes, sculptures, paintings, books, tools, machines" (Shils 1981, p. 12). The problem with Shils' schema is that everything becomes tradition and thus takes attention away from varying degrees and forms of engagement with history. At the other end of the spectrum though Giddens and his followers pay little attention to the circumstances under which such tradition might reattain cultural significance. Giddens does discuss 're-traditionalisation' but this is limited to the past becoming a fundamentalist refuge from the complexities of the contemporary world. He has little to say about ways in which history can become re-enchanted for society as a whole and instances where it is a resource for the advancement of progressive politics.

Like Giddens, Bauman associates historical engagement today with fundamentalism, failing to comprehend it as an enduring source of guidance for social action. While the nation was once a 'solid' basis for "the comfort of … universal guidance (and) … self-confidence" (Bauman 1992, p. xxii) it is now, according to Bauman, metaphorical liquid (2000), being a source of instability, uncertainty and as a consequence fear. Like other postmodern theorists, Bauman sees consumerism as a key part of this process. It is not only the act of consumerism which is consequential but also it as a worldview. Again metaphorically Bauman points to the tourist outlook, an individual driven by the pleasure principal with a desire to escape the everyday but finding themselves in a world where tourist signifiers are infiltrating the everyday (cf. Urry 2007). In this scenario our relationship to the nation shifts, with home becoming a "mix of shelter and prison" (Bauman 1996, p. 31); a mere transitory place to recharge batteries before the next journey. As will be highlighted through case studies in this monograph, contemporary tourism is indeed both an experience and a way of seeing the world, something to have emerged from the process of de-differentiation involving the meshing of the boundaries between leisure, work, education, religion, and science (du Gay 1993; Lash 1988; Rojek 1995). However, this does not necessarily result in the disintegration of historical consciousness, but can be something that re-enchants the nation, not simply through an alternative mode of engagement with the past but by prompting reinterpretations of historical narratives.

Just as with postmodern scholarship, the study of nations and nationalism has been involved in various definitional debates with important distinctions made be-

tween the nation, nation-state, national identity, various different sorts of nationalism and related terms such as civil society and cosmopolitanism. Many of these definitions are underpinned by assumptions about the origins and nature of contemporary nationalism and as such their particular utility will be discussed throughout the book as my argument about national re-enchantment develops. However, it is worth laying out some initial parameters in regards to these terms for my analysis. I refer to the nation as a society of people who, despite diversity, perceive themselves, and are perceived by others, to share some common cultural characteristics and to whom there is an attachment to a physical homeland. The nation-state is the geo-political entity that by whatever means institutionally governs the nation. Civil society refers to that part of society that is beyond the family and local sphere but is short of the state and largely autonomous of it, including religious, economic, academic or political institutions. Nationalism involves a patriotic attachment to the nation and the perceived commonalities of its people. Civic nationalism is a form of nationalism that is associated with the traditions and ideals of civil society in contrast with the state. National identity is the form through which nationalism is expressed in terms of common myths and beliefs about the national character and the symbolic expression of the relationship between the land and its people. I take cosmopolitanism as referring to openness to the world and cultural differences within it. From this perspective I refer to a cosmopolitan form of nationalism. However, this is different from references I make to cosmopolitan theorists that represent the dominant philosophical usage of cosmopolitanism, equating it with the possibilities for a world citizenship and the need to abandon national attachment in preference to international law and governance.

The emphasis of the monograph, as indicated in its title, is to explore the plurality of nationalisms and their transformations within new ritual forms rather than debate the supposed inherent qualities of nationalism. Whether it was ever possible to think about nationalism in the singular, in a world where globalization is producing a plurality of cultures rather than a bland uniformity, such intellectual endeavors lose some of their relevance. The continuance of these debates though is consequential. As argued above, a focus on national origins by nationalism scholars has taken them away from seriously looking towards a range of possible futures that exist independent of the 'real' happenings of yesteryear. This is not to argue that the origins of the nation are not significant but that greater analytic attention needs to be given to how these different origins feed into possible futures. Even within Western nationalism we see a great deal of differentiation in how countries at various levels are able to embrace globalisation, immigration and contemporary identity politics. The empirical focus of this monograph is consistent with such a comparative tradition, focusing on nationalism in Australia and the United States while appreciating their global dimension such as in relation to the influence of populations in Asia and the Middle East. I do not argue that the pairing of Australia and the United States is representative of either nationalism or even Western nations. As settler societies the nationalism found in both cases is strongly focussed upon nation-formation and foundation moments, typically more so than in countries with a more primordial ethnic imagining (Spillman 1997). While both forms of nationalism involve de-

marcating and enforcing both real and symbolic boundaries, the ideological basis of civic nationalism in Australia and the United States arguable involves a more active policing and debate about the national in relation to its more inclusive notion of citizenship (Brubaker 1992). However, the analytic focus of this monograph is not distinguishing between national forms but broadly highlights the potential of new ritual forms to re-enchant national identity. As particular cases Australia and the United States provide a valid basis for challenging the dominant assumption in social theory that global and postmodern forces will inevitably result in the demise of the nation.

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Chapter 1
Towards a Cultural Sociology of Re-Enchantment

The following chapters explore the role of ritual in rejuvenating national attachment in an increasingly plural and global world. As postmodern scholars have rightly highlighted, since the second half of the twentieth century we have seen a general demise in the West of the symbolic power of national historical narratives. To put it another way, traditional beliefs about the nation in Western societies have been subject to a broad "wanning of affect" (Jameson 1991). Whereas national identity once provided citizens with an ontological security for their lives and a cultural framework for understandings of the self, this is now greatly diminished or is actively rejected as a cultural template for social identity. In many cases national foundational myths continue to be evoked and established commemorations still take place, however, more often than not they do not succeed in creating social solidarity through a heightened emotional energy or communicating a clear moral understanding of the world (Schwartz 2008). This monograph does not dispute the presence of this malaise but challenges the assumption that it will inevitable continue. In particular it points to various new forms of national ritual that are broadly consistent with the highly aestheticized form of capitalism now dominant in the world. In this scenario the process of globalization is not antithetical to the nation but provides a potential basis for a counter-shift in meaning whereby the nation becomes re-enchanted. This does not suggest that the incredulity towards traditional grand narratives is dissolving, that there is a return to older ways of being. Rather, I argue that the nation as an object of cultural identification has the ability to embrace the spirit of the current age, for example as expressed in relation to consumption, global mobility and tourism. This re-orientation is neither automatic nor inevitable but is certainly possible. If the nation is to reappear at the heart of cultural life, it is argued in this monograph that a core part of this occurrence will be its re-imagining within rituals that allow for new meanings to come to fore.

I develop the idea of national re-enchantment in close connection with the writings on ritual by the classical sociologist Emile Durkheim. In his masterpiece *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim acknowledged that "[T]he great things of the past which filled our fathers with enthusiasm do not excite the same

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ardor in us…", yet envisioned that there will come a time "when our societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formulae are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity" (Durkheim 1915/1968, p. 475). Such societal shifts though have been largely neglected by intellectual followers of Durkheim's writing on social solidarity. Instead, Durkheimian scholars have been concerned with the essential meaningfulness of modern social life, arguing against Max Weber's influential account of capitalism creating a rational and disenchanted world (Weber 1968). The problem with this dialectical debate that emerges out of Enlightenment thinking (Campbell 1989; Gane 2002) is that it has seen Durkheimian scholars neglect an appreciation of historical variance in regards to the nation. In particular, there has been a failure to acknowledge an expanding and deepening public incredulity towards national history. Above all, the lack of acknowledgement of dis-enchantment has meant that the Durkheimian tradition hasn't systematically addressed what I refer to as the process of re-enchantment.

The Durkheimian tradition, however, in other ways is well positioned to play a significant role in comprehending a possible re-enchantment of the nation. In particular this relates to a general conception of society as "sui generis", a Latin term used to refer to society having a life of its own. Durkheim used the term to emphasise the influence of cultural structures, such as symbols, meanings, and emotions in the constitution of social organisation. Durkheim's explicit identification of society as having a life has been widely critiqued as neglecting power and inequality. However, Durkheim can alternatively be thought of as a theoretical predecessor of much recent French social theory that addresses disadvantage by emphasising action, emotion and affect over economic and material structures (Smith and Alexander 2005). For Durkheim, all societies, whether they be indigenous tribes, nations or indeed a possible future global unity, requires a symbolic distinction of sacred phenomena which is activated within ritual celebration. The sacred are those symbols that demand attention and inspire reverence, in contrast to the profane which are constituted by everyday and mundane phenomena. In indigenous societies the sacred might be constituted by totems such as a particular animals or creation myths. For nations the sacred can be certain emblems such as flags and certain places and people related to real or imagined acts of sacrifice and heroism. No matter what the particular symbol, the power of the sacred comes via its ability to represent collective identity (such as national character), embodying abstract notions and beliefs that can never be fully conceived and articulated in a rational way. In national societies the sacred often takes the form of tradition involving an "iteration of events" (Giesen 2006) over time with these symbols having an air of primordial significance. However, as Durkheim (1915) argues, their power ultimately rests on enactment through rituals and the social effervescence which this symbolic action creates. In this schema ritual is not secondary to belief systems, functionally legitimising the sacred, but ideas about society and their ritual enactment are intertwined. Durkheim wrote that ritual "practices translate beliefs into action, and beliefs are often only an interpretation of the practices" (1975, p. 22). This does not occur in a cognitive way through clarification but aesthetically (Cossu 2010, p. 42) through

people being allowed to "forget the real world so as to transport them into another where imagination is more at home" (Durkheim 1912/1995, p. 384). In this way rituals have a playful quality, "[T]hey entertain" (Durkheim 1912/1995, p. 384). This includes in "remembering the past and making it present … by means of a true dramatic performance (Durkheim 1912/1995, p. 376)".

An important part of the separation of ritual from the profane is its positioning in time and space. Time is an important factor in rituals being carried out on "specified days or periods assigned to it" (Durkheim 1912/1995, p. 313). Rituals that are part of a ritual calendar (Zerubavel 1985) are typically associated with joyous celebrations of society. Durkheim refers to these as positive rites. They can be contrasted with negative rites involving taboos and prohibitions, protecting the sacred from profane or impure forces. Initiation rites, for example, involve subjecting individuals to various types of suffering and engaging in group sacrifice in order to expel and protect the sanctity of the sacred. As outlined below, both positive and negative rites can be thought of as cultural universals, found both in indigenous and contemporary Western societies. This is because "[T]here can be no society that does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make up its unity and personality (Durkheim 1915/1968, p. 427)". However, the plurality of societies today makes such rites less effectual. In Alexander's terms, where in simpler societies involvement in ritual was obligatory and would automatically result in social solidarity by creating a "fusion" between performance and audience, in more complex societies involvement in rituals are elective and their effectiveness reliant upon their performances being interpreted as compelling, undertaking project of "re-fusion" (Alexander 2004, p. 529). However, Durkheim notes a third ritual form, piacular rites which involve responding to cases of disaster or death as ways of dealing with uncertainty and fear. Consider this in relation to Durkheim's consideration of times of drought in Aboriginal society:

> …whenever the drought is very great, the great council assembles and summons the whole tribe. It is really a tribal event. Women are sent in every direction to notify men to assemble at a given place and time. After they had assembled, they groan and cry in a piercing voice about the miserable state of the land, and they beg the Mura-Mura (the mythical ancestors) to give them the power of making an abundant rain fall. (Durkheim 1915/1965, p. 404)

While positive and negative rites are weaker in contemporary society, piacular rites are in some ways more prevalent today as they relate to higher levels of cultural anxiety. For this reason many of the new ritual forms considered in this monograph are spontaneous in nature, responses to times of crisis or emerge in ways that are relatively independent from commemorative tradition. As Durkheim notes, these piacular rites are also marked by a greater level of ambiguity about the sacred, again something which makes them relevant to more plural societies with competing notions of morality and truth. The ambiguity surrounding the sacred is possible, Durkheim argues, because the evil power and holy thing share a number of similarities (West 2004), that "there actually is a certain horror in religious respect, especially when it is very intense; and the fear inspired by malignant powers is not without a certain reverential quality" (1912/1995, pp. 412–414). Durkheim even goes further arguing that "[A]n impure thing or an evil power often becomes a holy thing or

a tutelary power-and vice versa-without changing its nature, but simply through a change in external circumstances" (1912/1995, p. 414). The transformations to which Durkheim alludes are not those that result due to historical relativity of the sinner emerging as a saint (Merton 1968, p. 238), what below we will outline as collective memory. Rather they are much more sudden and occur within ritual. Such elusiveness allows rituals to be a time of reinterpretation of the sacred, rather than functioning to precisely existing beliefs.

No matter the particular form of the rite being considered, Durkheim fairly much sees ritual operating in similar ways, establishing social solidarity by evoking sacred symbols and creating collective effervescence, a heighten social energy in society, from engaging in a unison of movement and in sharing a single cognitive focus. For Durkheim "the very act of congregating" works as "an exceptionally powerful stimulant" (1912/1995, p. 217) in establishing solidarity. While such rites are embedded in the rhythms of social life or respond to the unexpected circumstance, Durkheim argues that rituals also occur "when it again feels the need" to renew social bonds (1912/1995, p. 353). This is most apparent in Durkheim's analysis of crime when he emphasises that degrees of indignation and punishment are as much about sharpening the shared morality of society, what he refers to as collective conscience, as the severity or harms caused by the criminal behaviour itself (1893/1984, pp. 42–44). In all forms of ritual spatial factors are as significant as temporal ones, with the sacred requiring "special places … from which profane life is excluded (1912/1995, p. 312). Space though has been less appreciated in the Durkheimian tradition of cultural analysis (Smith 1999), despite influential work on war memorials (Barber 1972; Inglis 1987; Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991).

A large part of the problem in the analysis of the national within the Durkheimian tradition has been a concern with ritual's universal characteristic and affects. While a strong suit of *Elementary Forms*' is its empirical and analytic concern with distinguishing between various types of rituals and their cultural consequences in indigenous tribes, Durkheim never translated this to a discussion of modern society. For example, Durkheim asks "[W]hat essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates of the life of Christ, or of Jew remembering the exodus from Egypt or promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in national life?" (1915/1968, p. 427). Yet he never elaborated an answer to his own rhetorical question. For the objective of Durkheim's study of ritual, to consider the essence of culture and religious commitment, a detailed empirical analysis of contemporary rites was not needed.

A starting point in adapting Durkheim's insights to national rituals today is to appreciate the difference in perceptions of time between indigenous, pre-modern and contemporary societies, and the new spatial dimensions of remembering in each. Important for this is the work of Durkheim's colleague and fellow editorial board member of the early French sociology journal L'Annee Sociologique, Maurice Halbwachs. For Halbwachs societal memory is not universal but rather the outcome of particular social conditions. The indigenous societies that Durkheim analysed may recall the past but not in a way in which it is revised to remain relevant to the age, what Halbwachs refers to as the process of collective memory. Rather, for tradi-

tional indigenous tribes there was no separation from the past and the present in that the past was so unquestionable sacred that it was ever present. In pre-modern societies historical remembrance was also relatively unproblematic, with the slow rate of social change and low levels of geographic mobility seeing a strong adherence to precedent and custom. As society was weakly integrated, the dominant history of elites had little relevance for most, with the past essentially remembered as it related to one's own class and village. In contrast, the modern nation-states are dominated by the struggle to recall and reimagine history. On the one hand history becomes more important for social integration, serving as a primordial function of creating a sense of continuity with past generations, which functions as the mythologies of descent without the requirements for blood kinship (Shils 1995, p. 100). On the other hand, the pace of social change and increased cultural diversity in society makes it hard to engage with the past. This 'acceleration of history' (Nora 1996), where even the relatively recent past seems lodged in a distant era, creates a dilemma of forgetting and a splintering of historical interpretation. For the past to remain relevant it must be recalled in public narratives worth remembering (Halbwachs 1950, p. 79) requiring in equal measure a coherence of facts and adherence to genre. To manifest themselves in this collective form, Halbwachs argues, interpretations of the past must be strongly influenced by present concerns and spiritual needs (1941, p. 7).

In collective memory research there have been numerous empirical accounts of the incorporation of events into national collective memory. Beginning with something sacred to the nation, we can trace the variability (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Lowenthal 1985; Schwartz 2000) but also the consistency of its meaning to the society (Schudson 1989; West and Smith 1996; Zhang and Schwartz 1997). A problem with such an approach, however, is that it tends to assume that phenomena once located in collective memory remain there. In fact, neither the process of inclusion within collective memory nor its longevity is automatic or guaranteed. Due to globalisation national collective memories also can no longer be thought to simply reflect the social and political conditions within the nation-state but a variety of global flows including diaspora populations, international media representations and the mobility of national citizens for the purpose of leisure and tourism (Conway 2008). As detailed below, while there has emerged new ways of ritually engaging in history and as a consequence shifts in the types of memory, this has not been reflected in scholarly studies which have tended to continue to focus on traditional state-sanctioned forms of commemoration.

In making this critique it is important to note that there is much important scholarship on various national rituals such as state memorial days (Bellah 1967; Olick 1999; Spillman 1997), the memorials that contextualize them (Wagner-Pacific and Schwartz 1991; Barber 1972) and patriotic responses to traumatic events (Alexander 2004; Edkins 2003; Verba 1965). These works are influential on my analysis of new ritual forms though within them there is a general failure to appreciate historical variance and global processes. An early example of the tradition which remains prevalent is Robert Bellah's writing (1967, 1970) on "Civil Religion in America". Examining United States Presidential statements in Inauguration ceremonies, Bellah argues that these rites advance the idea of American nationalism being a kind of

pseudo-religion. According to Bellah, the American national narrative is characterised by Judaeo-Christian themes such as the Exodus and belief in being the Chosen People, but also “its own prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and symbols” (1970, p. 186). These include Presidents like Washington, Lincoln and later Kennedy, events such as the Civil War and the battle of Gettysburg and rituals such as Memorial Day, the Fourth of July and also Inauguration addresses. Cast against prevailing theories that aligned secularisation with disenchantment, Bellah and others such as Thomas Luckmann (1967) played an important role in highlighting the continuing role of deep levels of meaning in modern society.

Steven Lukes (1975) notably argued that such work typically assumes social consensus and fails to address social conflict. Writing in the early 1970s Lukes pointed to the remarkable lack of empirical evidence for many sweeping claims made by ‘neo-Durkheimian’ scholars about shared sentiment and about integrative effects of rituals. He went on to argue that far from guaranteeing solidarity and peaceful coexistence, rituals are often used to generate conflict. In Northern Ireland, for example, Orange Day parades held by the Protestant community engender hostility between themselves and the Catholic population. Lukes’ critique has been influential on Durkheimian scholars who in recent decades attempted to reorientate their study of national ritual to move beyond many of the assumptions about social consensus and integration.

While providing an important counterpoint to Durkheimian consensus thinking, such critical and conflict theorising of ritual also have focussed on the essential and universal nature of ritual rather than pointing to its diversity of forms. This is most evident in David Kertzer’s influential work on ritual. In his book *Ritual, Politics and Power* (1988), Kertzer argues that what is important for the maintenance and integration of society is not social consensus which generates a ritual, but rather participation in ritual. Rather than focussing on a coherence of political beliefs in society, Kertzer argues that the function of ritual is to produce solidarity in the absence of any commonality of beliefs. Kertzer relates this notion to Durkheim’s own emphasis on the primacy of social action within indigenous ritual. He illustrates his argument that agreement over symbols does not guarantee solidarity by pointing to the case of Joan of Arc. Despite their being a consensus over the sacredness of her as a national symbol in France, she is a point of social conflict between the political left that views her as representing secular republicanism and the political right who sees her as signifying French royalty and religious patriotism (Smith and West 2001). Kertzer’s emphasis on the primacy of ritual highlights the nature of the intellectual debate about ritual concerning its universal characteristics and levels of emotional energy. As will be highlighted through case studies in this monograph, while ritual does not emerge from social consensus, it is wrong to think that belief at a deeper level doesn’t play a role. The consensus which makes ritual consequential is not related to specific beliefs but rather exists in relation to more intangible social realities about the nation or society which it represents (Schwartz 2000, p. 64). As Durkheim argued, during times of national crisis social actors cannot rationally comprehend their emotions but orientate their behaviour to symbols, “connecting

them to some concrete object of whose reality they are vividly aware" (1915/1965, p. 251).

The Durkheimian tradition has made steps in the right direction to appreciate the diversity of contemporary ritual forms with cultural sociologists striving to develop analytic frames that are at once empirically attentive to cultural conflict and agency while also attempting to account for the influence of the symbolic (Alexander and Smith 2010). This represents a broad shift away from emphasizing how culture restricts social action and possibilities, to being much more aware of the ways in which culture is also a resource for social action. Individuals and groups are now seen to be active agents in influencing their social worlds rather than passive 'dopes' following cultural scripts. Important to this development has been the utilizing of Habermas's (1989) idea the public sphere as an arena between the bureaucracy of government and the private world of individuals that through societal debate facilitaties institutional change. For Habermas (1989) the public sphere in the eighteenth century was characterized by rational forms of argumentation and influential in the emergence of formal political democracy. Habermas considered the public sphere to have disappeared under the weight of class interest as capitalism developed. The concept in cultural theory today, however, is frequently used in more universal ways as being an inherent component of contemporary social life, and one significant in comprehending the pluralisation of communication in an internet age. Here Habermas' focus on communicative rationality is replaced with an appreciation of the emotive dimensions of discourse and the seemingly irrational nature of meaning-making in the postmodern world (Gray 2006; Kellner 2000; Tucker 1993). This is clearest in recent work advancing the idea of a cultural public sphere. Where Habermas (1989) mostly concentrated on the political public sphere engaged with by elites, the idea of a contemporary cultural or aesthetic public sphere refers to "the articulation of politics, public and personal, as a contested terrain through affective (aesthetic and emotional) modes of communication" (McGuigan 2005, p. 435). Here popular cultural forms and the everyday life-world can take on a political dimension. It allows for an appreciation of how ordinary people's use of popular culture and leisure can create a basis to engage in more serious debate about social problems and matters of political concern (Jacobs 2012; Jones 2007; McGuigan 2005).

The Strong Program' (Alexander and Smith 2010) of cultural sociology is the intellectual tradition most closely aligned to the analysis in this monograph and its attempt to advance Durkheim's ritual theories and having cultural analysis be focussed on the process of 'meaning-making' (Spillman 2002). The conceptualization of "strong" in the naming of this tradition of cultural analysis comes from science studies (e.g. Bloor 1976) which pointed to how the rhetoric of science disguised flawed analysis. The idea of a strong cultural sociology is used in a similar way, largely by members and fellows of the Yale Centre for Cultural Sociology, to distinguish their own perspective from what they see as 'weak' cultural approaches. These are ones that points to the 'hard' variables of social structure and material forces to emphasise the 'seriousness' of their scholarship but in doing so fails to fully comprehend culture by not seeing it as a social force in its own right, one

that can shape society rather than merely being shaped by it. In this way the Yale Strong Program draws on Durkheim's ideal conceptions of the sacred and profane in understanding the collective influence of culture while simultaneously wanting to detail causality "in proximate actors and agencies, specifying in detail just how culture interferes with and directs what really happens" (Alexander 2003, p. 14). As critics of the strong program of cultural sociology have noted (Kurasawa 2004; McLennan 2005; Trondman 2008) there are some inherent tensions in claiming to simultaneously be working at a meta-level concern with the symbolic, documenting situated social action and aiming to produce transposable theories of social life. However, the mark of the Strong Program, and this monograph, is this ambitious attempt to bring together such divergent epistemological pursuits, wanting to point to the outcomes of cultural forces in an era when other perspectives have simply reverted to discursive descriptions of social life.

Many of the analytic themes of the strong program are also evident in other cultural studies paradigms but generally only in ways that have concentrated on sub-cultural and niche identities. In contrast, the Strong Program of cultural sociology much more focuses upon the role of culture in relation to national societies, and being concerned with it as a "historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed by which 'men' communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes towards life" (Geertz 1973, p. 89) (gender qualification added). In comprehending the strengths of the strong program for my concern with national re-enchantment, it is useful to attempt and distinguished its forms of cultural sociology from two competing approaches which are dominant in cultural analysis: that associated with British cultural studies, with its historical origins in the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham (Williams 1977; Hall 1992), and those which draw heavily on poststructural theory, in particular Foucault (1963/1973; 1991/1975). While cultural studies is a broad interdisciplinary intellectual project that has avoided attempts at programmatic definition, and as such hard to pin down for specific criticism (Inglis 2007), from the perspective of cultural sociology its analysis is overly interpretive and plagued by a self-conscious advocacy for particular left-wing and minority political positions. This tends to either reduce culture to ideology with power explained in relation to either notions of rational calculation of personal advantage by elites or limit power to discourse that exists independent of human action (Schudson 1997). The latter failing is also evident within post-structural cultural analysis which can be dismissive of the existence of deep levels of meaning and the ability of social actors to have sufficient agency to bring about social change (Bell 2007; Smith 2008). In both traditions the analysis of contemporary social life is largely limited to the interpretive study of texts and the "reading" of social action itself as if it were a text (Smith and West 2003). The strong suit of cultural sociology, in contrast, is in detailing the relationship between discursive and semiotic representations and the actions of actual people. To do this the field draws on a range of social science research methods.

As outlined in the preface of this monograph, in distinguishing the Strong Program from cultural studies and post-structural perspectives I again do not wish to be dismissive of alternative intellectual perspectives. These two traditions are a sig-

nificant influence on the construction of cultural sociology broadly, including that of the strong program, and I frequently draw on their insights in this monograph. For example, they are influential for my analysis of the political dimensions of popular culture and on the open, playful and relational nature of national discourse (Maffesoli 1996; Melucci 1996). The work of Mikhail Bakhtin's (1981, 1986) and his concept of the 'dialogic' is particularly prominent in my analysis of nationalism and its interactions with global forces. Such perspectives also remain influential in challenging the consensus assumptions that can too easily creep into analytic concerns with cultural systems. This is evident within collective memory studies, with its concern for the ways in which the past comes to be understood in reference to present social conditions. Traditionally this field comprehended ritual as merely facilitating the past naturally adapting to the "spiritual needs of the present" (Halbwachs 1941, p. 7). Through cultural studies and post-structural theorists collective memory studies has increasingly come to document its role as a highly symbolic terrain around which individual and groups contest meaning and actively sanction certain types of historical interpretation (Bodnar 1992; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). A particularly significant theme in this literature has been the ways history is used to legitimise conservative ideologies to the detriment of lower socio-economic groups, women, ethnic minorities and particular generations (Brabazon 2005; Samuel 1994; Sturken 2007). While this critical focus have provided greater insight into the machinations of power and appreciation of creative social action, the distain for the nation by scholars working within these traditions have I argue seen them unable to adequately comprehend the significant new ways in which the national is manifesting itself in contemporary society. Instead, the nation is often written off as an empty signifier without any real cultural significance, something that can and should be dismissed, society able to simply start again with a clean slate.

The theorizing of national re-enchantment in this monograph needs to be distinguished from postmodern notions of cultural re-enchantment (Gottidiener 1997). For postmodernists re-enchantment emerges from the collapsing of modern spheres of culture, science and the economy. As the boundaries between these break down it is thought that new forms of creativity are unleashed, resulting in various new engaging identities being established (Du Gay 1993; Lash 1988). Two kinds of empirical examples are frequently cited as evidence of this liberation of expression. Firstly, illustration of the blurring between culture and the economy often draws attention to themed environments such as fun parks, malls, casinos and concept restaurants, sites thought to now hold a quasi-religious importance as the "cathedrals of consumption" (Ritzer 1993). The nation somewhat enters into this analytic frame. However, when the nation is considered it is always in ways where it is subject to branding and consumption, assumed as being subsumed by late-capitalism. The nation is not considered, as it is in this monograph, associated with dynamic and contemporary forms of identity that influence the social organization of society. Secondly, the significance of individualism and the emergence of alternative institutional structures are often explored in relation to new religious movements. In particular it is argued that a renewed desire in postmodernity to attain transcendence has given rise to religious forms that accommodate therapeutic concerns and popular culture (Possamai 2003; Miller 2005). Rather than religion being character-

ized by its doctrinal and institutional character, as it was under modern conditions, in postmodernity religion is defined by the search for elective and more supra-conscious other-worldly meaning.

This postmodern sense of re-enchantment is associated with forms of social solidarity that are considered largely superficial. While it has been argued above that the nation is reliant upon history to provide it with a primordial source of solidarity, postmodernists argue that the re-enchantment process creates a present focussed social world lacking a perceived sense of continuity. For example, Jean Baurillard (1983, 1988) famously argued that we now live in a simulated or virtual world where signifiers no longer connect with their traditional signified meanings, but rather promote cultural disorientation where social life has little more than "a hallucinatory resemblance" with the real (Baudrillard 1983, p. 3). Others such as Frederic Jameson have pointed to the postmodern age having a "historical deafness" (Jameson 1991, p. xi) or "amnesia", lacking emotional affect and cultural depth (Jameson 1991, p. xv). In this schema the erosion of the grand narratives of high modernity is considered synonymous with society being unable to address ultimate questions of origins and purpose. Postmodern identities are conceived as counter-national due to their transient and fluid nature, reflecting the increased pace of social change and rise of uncertainty in society. As Bauman contends, contemporary identity is about seeking identities but "with no strings attached" (1997, p. 88) and avoiding any sense of "being fixed" (1995, p. 89).

Not all social theories have followed the postmodern paradigm in casting the nation into the dustbin of history. For example, Gramscian and postcolonial theories emphasise the enduring power of the national imagination. However, from these perspectives the nation is comprehended as an out-dated cultural entity. Conceived purely in relation to its origins, the nation is broadly thought of as a product of the Enlightenment, with an inherent orientation for cultural exclusivity resulting in racism and oppression (Gilroy 2000). In the rare instance that such dystopian understandings are challenged, such as by Edward Shils (1995) and Craig Calhoun (2003), who emphasise the inclusive and social justice aspects of nationhood, the emphasis again is on the nation's core characteristics, such as its connections with the historical development of civil society and the institutional emergence of political liberalism and equality.

In various ways the objectives of this monograph, and that of the Strong Program, overlap with a cultural tradition of analysis within the study of nations and nationalism (Woods and Debs 2013). However, there are some important differences. When consumption, leisure and tourism has been incorporated into nations and nationalism studies it has focussed on the ordinary ways that people engage with the nation (Billig 1995; Edensor 2002; Fox and Idriss-Miller 2008, Skey 2011). This is most evident in Billig's analysis of 'banal nationalism' (1995) where he argues that nationalism in the West now exists in mundane ways, through such things as unwaved flags on flag poles, in the coin and banknotes we use daily, and through media and other discursive references to national boundaries, history and symbols. Its cultural power is in that it goes almost unnoticed yet it is internalised through daily reproduction. He contrast this with the traditional focus of national-

ism scholars on 'hot nationalism', that associated with tyranny, warfare and ultimate sacrifice, much of which Billig sees is on the decline in the West. For Billig, it is this postmodern suspicion of overt forms of nationalism which gives this 'banal nationalism' significance, providing institutional entities for the national to endure. Durkheim similarly argued that while the sacred is most visible during times of crisis, solidarity in society is embedded in the routines of life and corresponds to "the rhythm of the collective activities, while at the same time its function is to assure their regularity" (Durkheim 1915, p. 23). The problem with such conceptualisations of the relationship between nationhood and its everyday representations is that it de-emphasising the transformative role of such engagements. It is seen as lacking any strong cultural commitments and having no particular consequences other than the maintenance of a weak national attachment, a kind of national identity of last resort (cf. Gans 1994, p. 578).

This monograph, in contrast, demonstrates how national identity is increasingly associated with consumption, leisure and tourism, yet it argues that these produce symbolic forms which are transformative and re-enchanting. As suggested above, this occurs by producing heighten levels of emotional energy, typically in new geographical and cultural contexts than that found in traditional commemorative practices. It is not that the mere presence of nationalism or engagement with history in itself contravenes the postmodern argument that centers on the severing of the tie between historical consciousness and cultural commitment. However, I argue that the rituals outlined below actually helps the past again become relevant to answering ultimate questions about collective identity. This is not done by them reinstating the greatness of the past or the historical respect of yesteryear. For the national past to be re-enchanted in the contemporary age both the ritual engagement with it and the meaning which emerges from it must be consistent with contemporary sentiment. The new national rituals outlined below thus reflect core post-Fordist characteristics, such as the desire for individual experience and transgressive identity. The historical interpretations that they promote disrupt existing knowledge and engagements with national history but in doing so provide a heightened symbolic field upon which cultural reconstruction can occur.

Again, in making such distinctions I do not wish to suggest that the Strong Program of cultural sociology is a silver bullet to solve the intellectual dilemmas we face in studying the future of the nation. It is also a paradigm with limitations of its own in appreciating the new national ritual forms and their affects. For example, in attempting to account for conflict and agency the Strong Program has deliberately focussed its analytical attention on prominent times of social disruption such as terrorist acts (Alexander 2004); sieges (Wagner-Pacifici 2000); scandals (Jacobs 2000) and warfare (Smith 2005), typically engaging in textual analysis. Such empirical concerns have been important in establishing the ability of the perspective to understand social, political and economic change. However, it has simultaneously taken attention away from the role of more everyday non-mediatized rituals that also engage with popular culture and have equally had a role in bringing about structural shifts in society. In this monograph these are explored in relation to new tourist and recreational experience. These rituals have an influence through being

reported in the media. However, they also work quite independent of traditional media orientated conceptions of the public sphere. In a digital age, embodiment becomes increasingly associated with authenticity, with the rise of the service sector not only providing avenues for escape and detachment from the real but experiences which marks out the world. As Franklin and Crang (2001) highlight in relation to tourism, leisure based experience increasingly provides a language that signifies and categorizes the world, a system that fuses discourse, materiality and practice (2001, p. 17). To capture this cultural significance and the consequences of this new consciousness we need to move beyond a study of ritual as involving representations and consider cultural performance as the way individuals and groups beyond the glare of the media are able to utilize representations, deploy narrative and link together images, place and history.

A second notable limitation of the Strong Program is that in examining times of crisis it has quite uniformly followed Victor Turner in conceiving of social drama as a liminal episode (1974) in the "realm of pure possibility" (1967, p. 97), "betwixt and between … custom, convention, and ceremony"(1969, p. 95). The problem with emphasising this dimension of Turner's work is that it neglects the role of the imagined past (Anderson 1983) and the programmatic influence of historical figures, events and places in providing an orientating function for actors during times of uncertainty (West 2008). It also is to read Turner in a way that discounts his emphasis on the particularities of ritual forms. Much of Turner's scholarship emphasises the universal characteristics of ritual, having a liminal in character and providing social integration through creating heightened social effervescence through and the sanctioning of various activities and identities that would normally be considered deviant. In Turner's words, ritual has an "anti-structure" character, allowing for intense emotional energy and a sense of community, what he refers to as communitas, that works as a kind of release valve for pent up tensions emerging from conformity. However, arguably Turner's most powerful conceptualisation of liminality appears in his analysis of the particular ritual form, that of pilgrimage. His extensive empirical investigation of this rite forced him to conclude that rather than being consistent with his characterisation of ritual functions and changes to ritual forms, pilgrimage has distinctive characteristics. While pilgrimage has ancient origins, for example, Turner argues that it is qualitatively distinct from other primordial rites. He characterises it as essentially a liminoid phenomenon (1973, 1974, 1979), a conceptualisation he otherwise used to refer to modern industrial leisure rites that are "plural, fragmentary, experimental, idiosyncratic, quirky, subversive, utopian … (1979, p. 153). Turner argues that at different times in history pilgrimage has been associated with popular nationalism, peasant revolt, and millenarianism. He also emphasises differing categories of pilgrimage. There are those that exhibit more liminal qualities by involving travel to places located a long distance from the pilgrim's community where institutional controls are weakened; where pilgrims are more likely to come from various cultural backgrounds; and participation is temporarily dispersed so that the pilgrim has the freedom to get physically close to the sacred without it being mediated by institutional authority. It is such empirically informed middle range theorising of the distinctiveness of ritual forms which I attempt to undertake in this monograph.

To understand the proliferation, constitution and consequences of new national rituals we must aim to go beyond understanding the principal function of ritual being related to the levels of social effervescence or equivalent terms such as emotional energy (Collins 2004). As outlined in the following chapters we will see that as consequential is the way that ritual forms themselves facilitate the emergence of new understandings of the past. This includes the way different ritual types privilege new social actors and social forces, allowing for different kinds of participation and access to competing embodiments of the sacred. In Turner's terms these different ritual structures allow for contexts of "possibility whence novel configurations of ideas and relations may arise" (Turner 1967, p. 97). This allows us to appreciate the performativity and creativity of actors, incorporating issues of agency, multiplicity and contestation, while simultaneously appreciating the potential programmatic influence of historical figures, events and places. In this regard the relevance of the public sphere is not only as a context for debate but in popularizing certain ritual activities and subsequently in communicating the historical interpretation which they promote.

To address the neglect of tradition and the general theorising of ritual in the strong program of cultural sociology I attempt to further incorporate the work of Clifford Geertz (Alexander 2008) into the perspective, particularly his theorising of cultural systems. While it is not uncommon to use Geertz in cultural sociology and there is considerable overlap between Geertz's analysis and that of the Strong Program (Trondman 2008), the conceptualisation of cultural systems is a strategic way to incorporate notions of collective memory (cf. Schwartz 1996). Geertz analysis of cultural systems (1964/1993a, 1967/1993b, 1983) can be thought to work between the traditional Durkheimian and Turnerian approaches to analysing culture by at once emphasising the enduring qualities of cultural systems and how they operate discursively through symbolic patterns and programs while also accounting for agency and change within the system itself. For Geertz cultural systems both provide members of collectives with a "model of" society—which resonates with its cultural life and logics—and a "model for" society - offering a cultural template for directing social action and bringing about social change. In particular, Geertz's concept of 'pairing' within cultural systems brings analytic focus to the dynamics of memory and the influence of the past. An infrequently utilised concept in Geertz's intellectual framework (cf. Schwartz 1996), pairing refers to the way "in which an object (or an event, an act, an emotion) is identified by placing it against the background of an appropriate symbol" (Geertz 1973, p. 215). It will be argued that this notion is particularly useful in providing a way of comprehending the influence and use of cultural patterns by social actors (Geertz 1973, p. 89) in contemporary Western societies that exhibits traits of de-traditionalisation and fundamentalist attachments to the past. While Geertz's work, particularly in relation to nationalism, has been accused of being politically conservative and lacking an appreciation of historical variability, as deployed in this monograph the emphasis is on its potential to comprehend how the nation and the past can both decline in cultural relevance and possibly become renewed, in particular by incorporating global cosmopolitan realities and new niche identities (Calhoun 2012; Levy and Sznaider 2002; Nash 2008).

Outline of the Book and New Ritual Forms

International Civil Religious Pilgrimage

Framed by Victor Turner's insights into pilgrimage (1979) the opening case study in Chapter Two of the monograph examines the rite of international civil religious pilgrimage. This pilgrimage involves the act of visiting a site sacred within the history of the actor's nation but which lies outside its sovereign territory. Much of the belief about globalisation is related to the idea that the nation, with it supposed inherent qualities of exclusivity, cannot adapt itself to recognising the Other. As will be illustrated in the case study of Australian independent travelers touring the WWI Gallipoli battlefields in Turkey, international civil religious pilgrimage can result in the establishment of a national history where there is a greater appreciation of former foes and cultural Others than is typically perceived. The vast majority of this type of pilgrimage comes from the intersection of the two great international flows of people in recent centuries: the mass travel associated with warfare and colonialism, and the increased global mobility for the purposes of work and leisure. Foreign fighting fields often become sanctified in national history as places where ancestors' blood was spilt and, as in the case of the world wars, where many of their remains reside. However, only in recent decades have these sites become readily open to international tourism, often unintentionally creating new pilgrimage traditions. While various literature has conceived of tourism as a pilgrimage, with the emphasis on tourism containing enchanted threshold experiences beyond the mundane (Cohen 1992), this conflates tourism and pilgrimage. I develop an alternative conception of contemporary pilgrimage that highlights the way that travel experience challenges existing national histories but also explore how the logics of tourism encourage new collective memories which recognize and positively incorporate the Other. Drawing on Mikhail's Bakhtin's theories of communication I refer to these as working dialogically, whereby "every word is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates…" (Bakhtin 1981, p. 280). Rather than international travel and awareness excluding the state, it provides it with a new diplomatic role in reference to a cosmopolitan orientated nationalism.

Re-Enacting

We continue our exploration of national re-enchantment by analysing one of the fastest growing recreational pursuits in the United States, American Civil War battle re-enacting. For postmodernists, historical re-enactment has been the epitome of Baudrillard's simulacrum where a copy and the original become indistinguishable, or the copy more important than the real (1988). Dennis Hall, for example, has argued that [R]eenacting manifests the postmodern taste for the simulacrum in a near-

ly pure form… (1994, p. 10). Will Kaufman similarly holds that in re-enacting the boundaries between the real and the virtual have reached "psychotic proportions" (2006, p. 127). They are correct that unlike other traditional rituals re-enacting involves a greater level of temporal disorientation, with participants aiming to achieve a loss of present consciousness, to metaphorically step back in time. However, this generally is far from one of complete historical disorientation or political disengagement with contemporary issues. Rather it is an important ritual in the current 'culture wars' in the United States over the relevance of national history for the contemporary age. Far from nationalism being a historical artefact, it is a key part of a new political position of orthodoxy (Gitlin 1995; Hunter 1991, 2006). According to Hunter, the orthodox believe in "an external, definable and transcendent authority" (1991, p. 44), which "is predicated upon the achievements and traditions of the past as the foundation and guide to the challenges of the present" (Hunter, 2006, p. 14). Such groups are highly represented in re-enacting. The intimate experience of the past that they seek though not only reinforces their worldview but provides them with a type of capital for political activism, what I term affective authority. This is issued by re-enactors for contesting more institutional interpretations of the past, in particular through their educational activity within schools and at museums. Drawing on interviews and ethnography as well as performance literature, the power of this re-enacting ritual is theorised as the outcome of living history worldviews being associated with political orthodoxy. While such rites reflect a differential attachment to the nation in the United States, the potential for re-enacting to be used by political progressive groups is outlined.

Dialogical Crisis

The third case study is the 2002 Bali Bombings, which informs us about the significance of dialogical national collective memories in a time of crisis. Focusing on the Australian public sphere, the case highlights the positive role national sentiment can play in relation to a new form of global threat. Theories concerning the cultural response to terrorism have tended to focus upon and generalise from the '9/11' terrorist attacks (Black 2004), arguing that national identification only exacerbates the threat by not allowing for a rational response to combating the terrorist threat. In reference to the memorialisation of 9/11 the emphasis has tended to be on the inability of the nation to remember and memorialise terrorism in an adequate way that brings about consensus and cross-cultural understanding. In contrast, the response by Australia to the Bali attack, where young western tourists were targeted by Islamic fundamentalists, illustrates how national commemoration can actively promote international co-operation around anti-terrorism and establish new cultural ties between culturally distinct nations and their government agencies. In the aftermath of the Bali bombings we see tourism promoting dialogical nationalism, with tourists themselves being a key part of the narration of the crisis and its commemoration. Far from simply reflecting the structure of the post-industrial economy, the

case study highlights how cosmopolitan nationalism only entered the public sphere as a counter-narrative to a more immediate and direct application of traditional understandings of Australian national identity. While this counter-narrative continued to be used in the anniversaries of the attack, it is one that has been continually challenged, illustrating the politics surrounding dialogical remembrance.

National Humanitarianism

The social problems that arise from national identification frequently become a basis for arguing that the national era should come to an end. The general argument typically made is that the solutions to new social and technological complexities require us to move on from nineteenth century conceptual frameworks. It is argued that environmental crises such as the nuclear reactor meltdowns at Chernobyl and Fukushima, oil tanker spills such as the Exxon Valdez and the Deepwater Horizon accidents, and the inadequate responses by state emergency and welfare services to natural disasters such as that to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans are key cases that diminish modernist ideas about progress and science. Most sociological studies of risk argue that there is increased fear and anxiety in Western societies, either directly through a social construction of such threats or this heightened awareness being a result of their qualitatively different character to those faced in the past. While specifically focussing on man-made catastrophes, Ulrich Beck's influential *Risk Society* thesis (1992, 2002) is illustrative of this scholarship by arguing that new understandings of risk encourage national borders to become increasingly irrelevant. According to Beck we live in a world threatened by the products of modernization with the spatial consequences of these problems extending over and across national boundaries. Beck speaks of what he calls a "boomerang effect" in which ecological risks sooner or later come back to haunt those who produce them. Pesticides and toxic waste dumped in a lesser developed country, for example, might be exported back to the point of origin in a food product. He argues that dealing in an effective way with these sorts of issues requires solutions which undermine traditional national sovereignties and established policies of short-term national self-interest. However, just because the problems we confront are supra-national in impact does not mean that they constitute an inherently globalising force. According to Beck, associated cultural shifts will include increased reflexivity about the dangers of modernity and the growth of a more democratic, social-movement driven polity. Others see decline of national grand narratives resulting in a permanent culture of fear which is dominated and exacerbated by a range therapeutic orientated experts who stress the need for caution and prevention (Furedi 2007; Glassner 2010).

The possibility that such literatures ignore though is that the creation of widespread anxiety can result in re-attachment to traditional sources of identity, such as that associated with the nation. This chapter outlines the way that the construction of fear intersects with national discourses by focussing on the narration of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in the public spheres of Australia and the United States. Far

from the nation not being able to adapt itself to global problems, I argue that the tsunami illustrates how Western nations can effectively respond to natural disasters in lesser developed nations by coding them in terms of their own national boundaries. I refer to this as national humanitarianism. This provides an alternative way of conceptualising the problem of 'distant suffering' (Boltanski 1999), moving away from examining how individuals cognitively respond to it. Rather than national sentiment always resulting in a downplaying of environmental risk and the suppression of concern with global events, I demonstrate how national symbolic boundaries and mythologies can provide compelling frames to effectively mobilise populations around global environmental catastrophes.

Conclusion

This chapter reflects upon the principal failings of existing literature on the nation, ritual and understandings of (re)enchantment. There has tended to be a meta-divide in the social sciences between those who have assumed and advocated for the end of the national and others which have naturalised the nation as the unit for sociological analysis. This chapter spells out a third way whereby postmodern insights into the re-enchantment of the world are incorporated within a Durkheimian tradition that can appreciate the relative autonomy of cultural forces in reconstructing and maintaining national identity. From this perspective there is nothing inevitable about the nation being the focal point of mass solidarity and neither does the past automatically come to reflect contemporary social, spiritual and power structures. While postmodern scholars have rightly pointed to the disintegration of traditional national attachments in recent decades it has failed to appreciate the potential for a renewal of national identity. Rather than being inherently destructive to national attachment I outline how through symbolic reconstruction new ritual forms that are orientated to the postmodern forces of consumption, leisure and tourist logics provide a stage for national history to be reimagined and the nation to again inspire commitment.

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Chapter 2
International Civil Religious Pilgrimage: Gallipoli and Dialogical Remembrance

In this chapter I further the argument that global forces can work to re-enchant national identity by examining a new form of transnational commemoration, what I refer to as international civil religious pilgrimage. This pilgrimage rite, as will be explored within a case study of Australian travelers touring the WWI Gallipoli battlefields in Turkey, involves the act of visiting a site sacred within the history of the traveler's nation but which is located outside its sovereign territory. In classifying this ritual I adopt Bellah's (1967) notion of civil religion to refer to the quasi-religious character of enchanted nationalism, without assuming that this quality is either inherent or universal. Pilgrimage has often been used in considering the ritualistic aspects of contemporary travel, most commonly in differentiating tourist experiences from everyday social life (Cohen 1992). I refer to pilgrimage in a different manner, as a type of travel ritual that needs to be distinguished from the general act of travel and tourism. However, international civil religious pilgrimage in a significant way works to re-enchant national history by being shaped by the cultural logics of international travel and tourism, including its orientation to remember history in more engaging and pacifist ways. We begin exploring this pilgrimage rite by considering how pilgrimage generally promotes what in Bakhtin (1986) terms dialogical discourses.

Pilgrimage and Dialogical Discourse

On 25 April 1915, the 'Anzacs'—an acronym for the all-volunteer Australian and New Zealand Army Corps—attacked the Gallipoli peninsula in Ottoman Turkey. Unlike many other national mythologies in Western nations this event resonates with younger generations and continues to act as a potent myth, with popular culture engagements with its history prompting new pilgrimage led official commemorations by the state. This chapter analyses the central role of the international travel

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in this development and considers what this tells us about the role of transnational memorialisation and tourism in the re-enchantment of nationalism.

International civil religious pilgrimage is inclusive of a variety of ritual forms that involve both individual travel experiences and participation in formal ceremonies at a sacred site distant from one's homeland. As a ritual both types of experiences differ from the traditional modern ways of engaging with national history and encourage the formation of new collective memories of the past. As flagged in the previous chapter, the cultural anthropologist Victor Turner argued that pilgrimage has an inherent liminal quality (Turner 1974, 1979), referring to the ambiguous and fluid nature within times of ritual. This is distinctive from other collective rituals such as state sanctioned rites involving mass participation that social scientists are most familiar with analyzing. Turner argues that even when looking at institutional religion " … there is something inherently popularist, anarchical, even anticlerical, about pilgrimages in their very essence" (Turner and Turner 1978, p. 32). However, for the most part Turner sees pilgrimage promoting social integration through the emotional energy created by this ritual form. This involves a temporary suspension of dominant cultural codes and the sanctioning or celebration of what is normally considered deviant or lowly appreciated. In this way Turner's thesis reflects the Durkheimian idea of ritual reinforcing solidarity through social effervescence.

To appreciate the power of pilgrimage to re-enchant history we also need to give attention to one of Turner's other major insights into this ritual form, that it is influential in the actual shaping of collective memory. This principally occurs through the breaking down regional attachments and creating broader fields of identification. As pilgrimage involves actors being literally outside of everyday surrounds, exposed to a wide range of differing geographic, climatic and social conditions (Turner 1979, p. 132), pilgrimage has been thought to facilitate the forming and sustaining of transnational identities. For example, Turner notes that the Hajj to Mecca and Medina has served to support an idea of transnational Islam (1974, p. 174). Turner famously illustrates the power of this pilgrimage to challenge isolated nationalisms in the case of Malcolm X, whose experience of Mecca prompted a radical rethinking of his militant Afro-Americanism, widely thought to have been a contributing factor in his assassination. Consider his newly found cosmopolitan philosophies outlined in a letter written from Saudi Arabia following his participation in the Hajj on April 20, 1964.

> You may be shocked by these words coming from me. But on this pilgrimage, what I have seen and experienced has forced me to *rearrange* much of my thought-patterns previously held and to *toss aside* some of my previous conclusions…. During the past eleven days here in the Muslim world, I have eaten from the same plate, drunk from the same glass, and slept in the same bed (or on the same rug)- while praying to the same *God*—with fellow Muslims, whose eyes were the bluest of blue, whose hair was the blondest of blond, and whose skin was the whitest of white. And in the words and in the actions and in the deeds of the "white" Muslims, I felt the same sincerity that I had felt among the black African Muslims of Nigeria, Sudan, and Ghana. We were *truly* all the same (brothers)- because their belief in one God had removed the "white" from their minds, the "white" from their behavior, and the "white" from their attitude (Malcolm 1966, p. 325).

In a similar vein various postcolonial theorists have for several decades been arguing that international travel is a key social force that heralds in a new era of global identifications (Kaplan 1996). Clifford, for example, has argued that travel is "a figure for different modes of dwelling and displacement, for trajectories and identities, for storytelling and theorizing in a postcolonial world of global contacts…" (Clifford 1989, p. 177). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) see travel as producing "deterritorialization", where national attachments are weakened by knowledge of alternatives cultural values.

The role of pilgrimage in creating wider fields of identification can be acknowledged without assuming the demise of national consciousness. Postcolonial and other scholars rightly theorize travel as producing cultural anomalies that challenge insular parochial nationalism. They are wrong though to think that there is only one way that these can be resolved. As Mary Douglas (1966, p. 38) has pointed out in her analysis of the classification systems of culture, there are several possible responses. We can simply choose to ignore and not perceive them. A long tradition of tourism literature, for example, has noted how travellers exist in a kind of environmental bubble when experiencing foreign cultures (Greenblat and Gagnon 1983; Turner and Ash 1975, p. 130). Another option is to condemn or dismiss the opposing beliefs. Various theorists have highlighted how the age of exploration, and arguably much international travel since, was based on a perception of local cultures as being romantically barbaric and uncivilised. Oriental discourses in the West, for example, have marginalised Eastern societies as child-like and immature (Prakash 1995; Said 1978). However, the fall of communism and increased global engagement has significantly depleted the viability of such traditional responses to cultural difference. This has prompted Ulrich Beck and others to question how national solidarity can exist in a world 'without enemies' (Beck 1998, 2000). Rather than the West defining itself against a clearly defined Other, we see in tourism how many engagements with foreign culture have involved a complex search for authenticity by both guests and hosts involving various forms of cultural innovation, liminal and carnivereaque experiences and re-engagments with the local as part of a unprecedented global circulation of people, images and commodities (Edensor 1998, 2002; MacCannell 1976, 2001; Gotham 2005; Urry and Larsen 2012).

There is another option for confronting anomalies that does not so much involve ignoring or rejecting existing positions but incorporating it with others to create "a new pattern of reality" (Douglas 1966, p. 38). This is not nationhood being replaced by a revolutionary cosmopolitan citizenship (Beck 2009) but a reimagining of existing cultural beliefs and institutional practices. As Clifford Geertz (1973) notes, new cultural traditions, even those that make no reference to the past, typically draw on existing cultural resources and are an outcome of established cultural patterns. This is principally what occurs today within international civil religious pilgrimage. It involves travel challenging existing dominant understandings of the past. However, as this occurs within a ritual environment, new enchanted understandings emerge that incorporate the foreign context and in turn ritually sanction it. As Geertz explained in reference to early Indonesian participation of the Hajj: within pilgrimage actors believe they are seeing the world "through an undarkened glass" (Geertz

1968, p. 67). This is not to argue that pilgrimage involves a simply adoption of the Other but that within this ritual form the sacred itself becomes projected and interpreted in ways that account for different audiences.

The insights of Maurice Halbwachs (1941) on travel and the spatial dimensions of collective memory are helpful in thinking through the ways in which pilgrimage deconstructs and subsequently reconstructs national narratives. Halbwachs is widely thought of as the founder of collective memory studies. The majority of interest amongst North American and British scholars though has been on his book *Collective Memory* ([1951] 1980) and particularly his theories regarding temporal factors in the social construction of history. Much less attention has been given to his earlier *The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land* (1941) in which he also conceptualizes the role of spatial variables in the process of remembering the past. According to Halbwachs, the "group not only transforms the space into which it has been inserted, but also yields and adapts to its physical surroundings. It becomes enclosed within the framework it has built." (1941, p. 130). For Halbwachs, space does not merely reflect memory but "place and group have each received the imprint of the other" (1980. p. 130).

Collective memory scholars have long recognized that collective memory utilizes immediate spatial environments that anchor meaning and provide contexts of remembrance (Barber 1972; Warner 1959). However, Halbwachs understood that there often simultaneously exists a greater distant and imaginary spatial focal point where memory and space have more combative relations. Halbwachs states that "we are acquainted with this place not because we have seen it but because we know that it exists and could be seen" (1941, p. 154). For Halbwachs, such is the importance of these distant places that he notes it may even "be difficult to evoke the event if we do not think about the place itself", albeit often in a highly mystical way (1941, p. 154).

These sites are above and more powerful than local places of remembrance. Despite local shrines being the frequent sites of worship and remembrance, these distant foci endure for, just as with memory there is a tendency to sanctify origins (Elaide 1963; Shils 1975), the definite location of events have extraordinary significance (Halbwachs 1941, p. 222). From this perspective local, regional and national shrines are in many ways surrogates with the distant sacred acting as the broader point for projecting remembrance. Drawing on the case of the Holy Land of Palestine for Christianity, Halbwachs notes that knowledge of this place emerges from scripture, but importantly also through living witnesses, pilgrims to the hallowed ground, and through telling their accounts. As with other forms of commemorative ritual, we can hypothesize that greater emphasis will be put on these rites during particular periods of anomie. However, unlike rituals internal to the nation-state, the significance of pilgrimage is also determined by technological and geo-political forces that determine access to the sacred site.

What occurs to belief when such distant sacred sites are revealed to a new generation? According to Halbwachs, while space is generally dialectically consistent with memory in a restricted locale, when the sacred is located outside this zone it is more likely to establish itself as a context of difference and disorientation. The

traditional relationship between memory and space is problematized as the mythology and space onsite has developed under different social conditions, particularly when located abroad and in differing religious and cultural contexts. Halbwachs' analysis of the Crusades illustrates this social process. As the Crusaders had been spiritually close but geographically isolated from the Holy Land there existed a disjunction between the perceptions of the sacred formed from the community's collective memory and the Crusaders' corporeal experience of the sacred. The Crusaders' initial direct interaction with the hallowed ground was not simply awe inspiring but demystifying as they experienced Jerusalem in its contemporary social-spatial reality. Consider Halbwachs' description of the Crusaders and how distance from the sacred results in complex interactions when it is engaged with in a corporeal way.

> For the Christian world, Jerusalem was the holy city par excellence … But this image vastly differed from the actual city of the epoch, with which the Christians who lived there were familiar … Time was at work here as elsewhere to erase more and more traces of the past. But when the Christians living in Europe talked of Jerusalem, they had quite different mental representations: a supernatural city where the majesty of the Son of God had never ceased to radiate; an external city where what had been the framework and the support of the events told in the Gospels was expected to be miraculously preserved. It seems that they never doubted for an instant that the city would appear to them just as it had appeared in the past … What did they know of successive sieges that had left no stone unturned, of reconstructions, of changes in the direction of streets, in the situation and appearance of houses or districts? They knew very little of these matters (Halbwachs 1992, pp. 230−231).

The anomalous emotions of the Crusaders not only emerged from the disjunction between the mythologizing of place in pilgrims' collective memories and the act of witnessing but also from the social and environmental changes that had occurred there since such legends were established. The Crusaders attempted to resolve these anomalies by physically reconstructing Jerusalem not only to be consistent with historical accounts but also contemporary collective memories within Christendom. As Halbwachs describes, the Crusaders were:

> …inspired whenever possible by the traditions that still remained in regard to Christian monuments, if not also by the traditions pertaining to evangelical facts that could still be invoked at the time of Constantine … But they were not content with rebuilding the ruins in this manner. They instituted new localizations, guided no doubt by the Gospels, but also by apocryphal writings and legends that had circulated for some time in the Christian lands, and even by a kind of inspiration … The Crusaders behaved as if this land and these stones recognized them, as if they had only to stoop down in order suddenly to hear voices that had remained silent … (Halbwachs 1992, pp. 231−232).

I argue that today a somewhat similar process plays itself out through international civil religious pilgrimage. Travel experience of the distant sacred challenges established national collective memories. This in turn results in a transformation, and possible re-enchantment, of national history. Where it was the case that the Crusaders achieved resolution through military occupation and transformation of the built environment, today problematic collective memories for the pilgrim are more likely to be dealt with through the politics of dual historical consciousness. Following Bakhtin (1981, 1986) I refer to this as dialogical national remembering.

In the age of mass global travel collective memory narratives are increasingly impacted upon by Bakhtin's idea of the "dialogic" (Bakhtin 1981) involving an appreciation of the double-voicedness of discourse and social life. For Bakhtin "every word is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates…" (1981, p. 280). "The word in language is half someone else's" (Bakhtin 1981, pp. 293). From this perspective the meaning of discourse needs to be understood not only from analysing its internal structure and context, what Bakhtin refers to as a monological approach, but that which it stands in relation to. In its broadest sense, Bakhtin views dialogism as a universal principal of language and social life. He argues that "[R]esponsive understanding is a fundamental force, one that participates in the formation of discourse" (Bakhtin 1981, p. 280).

Applying this dialogical perspective to collective memory, we gain an avenue through which to appreciate that the national mythologies of one country are not simply established through the actions of elites, internal pressures, or narrative constraints to reinterpret the past. In this vein it is important to recognise that nationalism itself is largely a product of global forces. As Liah Greenfeld's (1992) work on the history of nationalism points out, the spread of nationalism in the eighteenth century emerged in a global context where an English model that had arisen during the Tudor era was adopted and indigenised by other nations against a backdrop of international competition and military hostility. Benedict Anderson (1983) similarly points to the emergence of nationalism as a response to globalisation processes such as colonialism. For Anderson, nationalism initially arose not in Europe but the colonies where it was advanced by Western immigrants who came to abandon their cultural ties to the homeland and sought a new solidarity in the lands where they had originally migrated to in order to advance their economic capital.

Bakhtin also sees dialogicism as a historically and situational specific variable. This aspect of dialogism is best illustrated by Bakhtin's (1981) contrast of "dialogic" with "monologic" discourse and his division between poetic and novelistic genres. Bakhtin starts by noting that poetry, historically, has been the privileged form of literature. Its language was considered to be free and plural with the signifier and signified being most disconnected. By contrast, novels have negatively been thought of as highly ideological and determining, attempting to connect signifiers to "real" signifieds. Bakhtin argues quite the opposite, that poetry is "centripetal", containing a fixed "monologic" discourse that limits differences amongst languages. Poetry's self-referential character, what Bakhtin refers to as "autotelic", means it operates as if it were a "hermetic and self-sufficient whole", "it presumes nothing beyond the borders of its own context (except, of course, what can be found in the treasure-house of language itself)" (Bakhtin 1981, p. 671). The novel, by contrast, is "completely shot through with dialogized overtones" (Bakhtin 1981, p. 671). They are characterised by "centrifugal" dialogic relations and "heteroglossia" forces of multiple sign systems. According to Bakhtin, dialogism is not restricted to the literary forms but is also heavily evident in everyday speech. Here there are clear multiple voices and utterances inevitably taken into account by the listener. This not only relates to individuals but has a broader significance for international communication and relations.

The historically specific notion of the dialogic is significant is understanding both the foundational nature as well as future possibilities for national attachment. Various scholars have argued that the novel was an important medium in the development of nationalism by reducing the diversity of language and creating larger fields of fixity and belonging (Lewis 2000). For example, through the novel, Anderson (1983) argues, individuals imagined themselves belonging to a national community where its members could "never know or even hear of most other members, and yet … conceive of themselves as co-members of the same over-ridding important unit…" (Anderson 1983, p. 16). Given the historical connection between the nation and the novel it is tempting to suggest that the nation too has dialogical origins, and as such has been misunderstood as a closed system of identification. It is the contemporary dynamics of the nation though which is the focus of this study and where the situational definition of the dialogic is most significant in explaining how national history becomes re-enchanted under the conditions of postmodernity.

The analytic focus of the chapter is on the role of international travel in producing dialogical discourses, however, these have broader socio-political ramifications beyond the sphere of tourism. This includes altering official international relations and facilitating the reshaping of popular and official histories. In relation to Gallipoli, it is the argument of the chapter that the historical meanings promoted on the battlefields cannot simply be read in a structural manner in reflecting a contemporary ethos, but is the outcome of the way tourism empowers certain, and in many cases non-typical, individual social actors to provide powerful narrative understandings of the past. In the Gallipoli case study below, it is young Australians in their 20 s and 30 s, the first to travel to Gallipoli and who remain the most frequent visitor type, who have been most influential in influencing historical meaning. Today more older and mainstream Australian tourists visit Gallipoli. However, the original generational narratives endure and emanate from on the battlefields, a development that provides insights into the relationship between the established stages of global travel development and national collective memory. Before we can start to consider the experiences of these tourists, however, we need to look further back at the Gallipoli campaign itself as this provides much of the raw material for reimagining the campaign, helping to naturalise what I will argue is characteristic of a contemporary cosmopolitan remembering.

Gallipoli and the Tyranny of Distance

The Gallipoli campaign holds an important place in the history of military strategy, being an ambitious but ultimately flawed Allied plan by Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, to take the Dardanelles Strait and create a vital supply line to embattled Russia, potentially breaking the stalemate on the Western Front. It began with an unsuccessful British led naval attack in March 1915, abandoned following the loss of several battleships to resistance. For Turkey this event is the traditional commemorative focus in remembering the Gallipoli campaign. It is the

subsequent Allied ground invasion involving a 35,000-strong Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) to secure the Dardanelles that holds salience in the Australian national memory, the commemoration of which is the empirical focus of this chapter. The campaign failed to achieve its aim with the Anzacs evacuated after nine months being bogged down in trench warfare, never advancing more than a kilometre inland. Yet, there is a popular consensus that it is the most important historical moment for Australia, widely seen as providing a baptism of fire for the recently independent country. Ever since the battle ended it has been a core component of Australian national mythology, associated with a national character of courage, ingenuity and mateship. The anniversary of the landing on the 25th of April is Australia's state memorial day, Anzac Day, which is traditionally marked by veteran marches and services. Its significance is etched into the urban landscape with every town and city in Australia having an Anzac memorial, which as Bruce Kapferer notes, have acted as totems of Australia's civil religion (Kapferer 1988).

As with other national mythology in the West, the engagement with the Gallipoli/Anzac tradition has been effected by the postmodern incredulity toward grand narratives. In particular, far smaller crowds were seen at Anzac Day ceremonies throughout the 1980s as a consequence of the Vietnam War and peace movements. Unlike many other national mythologies, however, engagement with the Gallipoli battle unexpectedly turned around in the late 1990s, with significant growth in the numbers attending Anzac Day dawn services and veteran marches. In the capital city of Melbourne, for example, newspaper reports of Anzac Day crowds grew from approximately 25,000 spectators in 1989 to 50,000 in 1999. Davison (2003, p. 79) has estimated that the number of spectators at Anzac Day parades across Australia in 1984 was a mere 50,000 and national figures remained relatively low until 1995, when they reached about 200,000. Whereas Australian social commentators continue to be puzzled by this patriotic turn (McKay 2003a), typically looking for explanations in a supposed growth in political conservatism amongst youth, I argue that much of the newfound interest in Anzac flows from the emergence of international civil religious pilgrimage to Gallipoli.

The relevance of pilgrimage to the commemoration of Gallipoli though begins much earlier than the late twentieth century. This conception of pilgrimage was a core component of commemoration during and in the immediate aftermath of WWI. However, as we will see this has been important in facilitating the rapid rise of international civil religious pilgrimage in recent decades by providing material infrastructure for dialogical relations. Against the backdrop of the Allies policy on non-repatriation in WWI, Anzac soldiers surrounded by bloodshed were comforted with the belief that if they died national pilgrims in the future would come to pay homage. This sentiment is evident in the *Anzac Book*, a collection of writing and drawings by Australian soldiers at Gallipoli in the weeks before the evacuation (Bean 1916). For example, the soldier Hector Dinning wrote:

> The day is far off (but it will come) when splendid mausoleums will be raised over these heroic dead. And one foresees the time when steamers will bear up the Aegean pilgrims come to honour at the resting places of friends and kindred, and to move over the charred battlefields of Turkey (Bean 1916, p. 21).

The notion of pilgrimage was also influential in the Allied memorialization of the battlefields at the end of WWI. Charles Bean, Australia's official war correspondent and later official national historian of WWI, was particularly influential in the planning of the cemeteries at Gallipoli, having travelled to Gallipoli in 1919 leading a team of Australians to report on the state of the graves and make recommendations concerning the establishment of memorials (Bean 1952, p. 12). In Bean's official report 'On Graves at Gallipoli and the Future of Anzac', cabled to the Australian Department of Defence on 13th March 1919, the first recommendation was that Anzac graves should not be located in a central cemetery but remain in their present locations, marking the battles of the campaign (Bean 1952, p. 385). As Bean notes, the whole Gallipoli area would become:

> …one big graveyard, which would probably be visited by thousands of Australians and others yearly, and the dead, merely by being buried where they fell, or where their comrades had carried them, would commemorate their achievements … (Bean 1952, pp. 327-8).

The Allied graves came to be marked by low rectangular slightly curved plaques measuring 2 ft, 8 in in height. Every headstone contains the emblem of the soldier's religion, typically a cross. These headstones differ to those erected in France by the United States where the headstone itself constitutes a cross. Aside from accounting for imperial religious diversity, it was decided that the rectangle headstones better represented the view that the Commonwealth soldier's principal identity was not religious but rather national, and one of Empire (Inglis 1998, p. 255). In addition the graves were marked with the soldier's rank, name, age at death, battalion or unit, badge of service, date of death and an inscription from the soldier's relatives. The family inscriptions are varied, defying any unified message, spanning nationalist, imperialist, personal and religious sentiments. Some samples of these inscriptions are provided below:

> Died the way he wished, To die for his country
> He died for righteousness and Empire, But as a soldier
> Death divides but memories cling
> He followed in his saviour's steps—nobly he lived, bravely he died

As one of the first civilians to visit the battlefields after the withdrawal, Bean's experiences there are instructive in understanding the consequences of later mass pilgrimage to the battlefields by Australians. While Bean had reported from the battlefield during the campaign, being a central figure in the initial mythologising of the heroic qualities of the Anzac soldier at Gallipoli, upon his return to Turkey he began to appreciate what occurred on the other side of the front line. Being able to roam and view the Australian trenches from the Turkish position gave him "a strange thrill" (Bean 1952, p. 50). Bean's unexpected meeting with a Turkish military official, Major Zeki Bey of the Ottoman General Staff, though provides us with insight into the dialogical relations which would makes Gallipoli one of the most visited battlefields in Europe (Bean 1952, p. 327). Bean writes "I had never dreamt of being able to obtain information of the Turkish side from an authority with such experience" (Bean 1952, p. 126). Zeki Bey told Bean about Turkish military logistics but also of the heroism and honour of Turkish soldiers during the campaign.

Particularly prominent were the legendary stories he heard about Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli, later to be known as Ataturk, the founding President and 'father' of modern Turkey (Bean 1952, p. 224). These accounts encouraged Bean's sympathetic portrayal of Turkish foes in the *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18* (Bean 1924). This discourse helped address public concern and fear about the Turkish treatment of Allied graves in the two decades following WWI (Ziino 2006). Paradoxically, for many years it also allowed Turkey to be ambiguously absent from Australia's remembrance consciousness, not easily cast as either a friend or foe (Fewster et al. 1985).

There were other Turkish accounts that Bean encountered which did not end up in his official history. Zeki Bey told Bean how the Turks were not expecting them to land at Ari Burnu due to the precipitous terrain (Bean 1952, p. 131). From the Turkish perspective the Anzac landing was relatively uninterrupted with only one of their battalions located in that area (Bean 1952, p. 131). Even following the news of the landings, only one other battalion from 19th Division was ordered to Ari Burnu, as the German and Turkish officials thought that the main landings would still be taking place at Gaba Tepe (Bean 1952, p. 352). This countered the perception in Australia at the time that after landing in the wrong location, the Anzacs overcame daunting odds under extraordinary heavy firing from Turks in superior firing positions.

With the Turkish War of Independence and then WWII, pilgrimage to Gallipoli became a largely neglected commemorated form. There were some visits to the battlefields by Australians in between the wars. The first in 1924 was by S.M. Bruce, the Australian Prime Minister and Gallipoli veteran, to check that the Turkish were respecting Allied graves and memorials (Bean 1952, p. 342). A few Australians did take part in a British pilgrimage in 1926 and 1929 (Lloyd 1998, p. 197). However, these exceptions aside the commemorative focus on Gallipoli by Australians has been of state sanctioned memorials and anniversary remembrances within the nation. These commemorative forms have tended to privilege a parochial and isolationist form of nationalism (Inglis 1987, 1999; Winter 1995). During this time Anzac mythology came to reinforce dominant Australian ideologies about frontier masculinity (Lake 1992; Connell 1995) and Eurocentric conceptions of citizenship (Castles et al. 1988; Curthoys 1999). Representative of such accounts Buchanan and James (1998) argue that the myth of Gallipoli is essentially conservative, masking "such issues as rape in war, the betrayal of our war-time ally East Timor, and the wars of 'settlement' on our soil when colonisation of the Aboriginal peoples of this country allowed for the original 'forging of a nation'" (1998, p. 26). The problem with such a conception of nationalism is that it does not appreciate the possibility of ritual and collective memory reimagining national history in more global and cosmopolitan ways (West 2008a, 2008b). As outlined below the actual experiences of Australian tourists on the battlefields since 1990 and the accommodating of these by local tourist operators have had a significant effect on broader national understandings of Gallipoli and as a consequence national identity generally. However, unlike the postmodern conception of tourism and its consequences (see Chap. 1), the origins of tourism at Gallipoli are closely intertwined with actions of the state

and one of the consequences of pilgrimage to Gallipoli has been a revitalization of state commemoration of the Anzac legend in Australia.

On Sacred Ground

The rise of tourism in Turkey plays an important contextual role in the rise of pilgrimage to Gallipoli and the meanings surrounding it. Following the national government enacting the Tourism Incentive Law in 1982, Turkey's tourism sector grew significantly as a percentage of GDP from 1.5% in 1980 to 4.6% in 2006 (Kaplan and Celik 2008, p. 13). However, such structural developments cannot explain the particular tourism which developed at Gallipoli and the meaning which it attached to the campaign. To understand these we need to consider the specific origins of the Australian pilgrimage tradition which I argued emerges as a consequence of the official state commemorations on the battlefields for the 75th anniversary of the campaign. To mark the event the Australian federal government organised for selected political, military and civil representatives to accompany fifty-eight WWI veterans, forty-six of whom served at Gallipoli, to commemorate Anzac Day on the battlefields.

Through the 1980s there had been an increased public re-engagement with the Anzac tradition as politicians and the mass media increasingly starting to think of Australia in a more global context (Fiske et al. 1988; McKay 1991; Turner 1994). This included in the context of the professionalization of 'world series' cricket, within tourism promotions of Australia, including those featuring comedian Paul Hogan, and amongst celebrations associated with the 1988 bicentennial. There was also an array of Australian films and TV programs that flowed from increased federal government funding of the arts. The latter ventures included the miniseries *The Anzac*s (1985) and the feature film *The Lighthorsemen* (1987), both of which directly connected with Australia's participation in WW1. However, the most significant popular representation was Australian director Peter Weir's multiple award-winning film *Gallipoli* (1981). The film dramatizes a series of suicidal charges by the Australian Light Horse that both denigrated British military leadership and glorified archetypal Anzac traits (Broadbent 2011; Leonard 2009; Ward 2004). Despite popular interest in the Anzac legend rising significantly in the 1980s, this had little effect on halting declining participation in Anzac Day parades that were organized by the politically conservative Returned Servicemen's League (RSL).

In broad terms this 'return to Gallipoli' for the 75th anniversary was the product of the disjunction between the Hawke government wanting to connect with the new nationalism of the 1980s, while dissociating itself from the RSL and its anachronistic stewardship of the Anzac Day tradition. This event was organized similarly to Anzac Day ceremonies in Australia but differed in two important ways. Firstly, it demanded a new type of diplomatic engagement with Turkey. Secondly, the unexpected attendance at the ceremonies by young Australians, began a new pilgrimage tradition to the battlefields.

As was evident in Weir's *Gallipoli*, Turks had not previously featured significantly in Australia's collective memory of the campaign, with the focus being on the Anzacs' relationship with British high commanders (Fewster et al. 1985). But engaging with Turkey involved a dialogical remembering of the war that significantly altered collective memories in both nations over the next decade (West 2008a). This was evident in Hawke's praise for Atatürk, the Turkish commander during the campaign. Atatürk's brave and skilful leadership at Gallipoli and critical roles in both winning the War of Independence (1919–1922) and founding the autonomous Turkish republic (1923) made him a national hero. Consequently, he was given the name 'Atatürk' ('Father of the Turks') and is the most revered person in Turkey nearly 75 years after his death with images of him omnipresent, including the national park that surrounds Gallipoli. Hawke also stressed that Gallipoli 'was not a conflict which engendered lasting hatred…' but 'had imbued the adversaries with a deep and abiding respect for the courage, prowess, endurance and self-sacrifice of the other' (Fewster et al. 1985, p. 11). From Istanbul the expedition boarded a cruise ship for Anzac Day commemorations at Gallipoli. During the services, Prime Minister Hawke laid a wreath on Ataturk's memorial and paid further complement to his hosts, stating that there is "nothing more honourable than the custodianship of this hallowed ground by the people and Government of Turkey for 75 years" (Kelly 1990, p. 2).

The dialogical relations accompanying the political pilgrimage though began well before the actual visit with a flurry of memorialization in the lead up taking place on the battlefields by Turkish authorities in consultation with Australia and New Zealand governments. This memorialization was accompanied by other forms of institutional remembrance, such as the establishment of a museum and information centre on the battlefields in 1983. The significance of these physical constructions is that they established the battlefields as a site to be visited, and in doing so embed dialogical meaning to the campaign for visitors, establishing a cultural framework to be used by tour guides and visitors to interpret the campaign.

There are a number of different forms of dialogical memorialisation constructed on the battlefields. The Turkish government officially renamed Ari Burnu, the beach where the Australians and New Zealanders first landed, as Anzac Cove, reflecting a fast developing reciprocal relationship of diplomatic exchange and recognition. At the same time the Australian government unveiled memorials to Ataturk in Canberra and Western Australia (Taylor and Cupper 2000, p. 163). This renaming of place has been significant for Australian tourists engaging with Gallipoli as a sacred site rather than just an event in their national history. Emblematic of the importance of such diplomacy is a small sandstone monument engraved "ANZAK KOYU" and underneath the English translation "ANZAC COVE" erected in 1985 on the battlefields for the 70th anniversary of the campaign as 'a sign of goodwill' between Turkey and Australia. For Australian tourists it signals their arrival at a place they have grown up hearing about but have actual little knowledge of its visual appearance. It is one of the most emotionally significant sites on the battlefields, a monument they wish to be photographed alongside, marking a transition from the profane to

the sacred, bringing about an emotional awe that they are now on hallowed ground. Unlike traditional memorial sites which demand certain forms of dress, the liminal qualities of the tourist context on the battlefields means that no such conventions need to be followed. Backpackers do not remove their hats at such sacred sites and they simply wear the same type of casual clothes that they are attired in throughout during their travels.

Dialogical memorialization at Gallipoli is not only focussed on bi-lingual recognition of place. It also is found in a memorial to diplomatic relations between the former foes following the war. The Ari Burnu memorial is a large sandstone monument with an English only abbreviated version of Ataturk's speech to a group of Allied pilgrims in 1934, one of the few visits by relatives and veterans in between the wars. Read to the group by the Turkish Minister of the Interior (Igdemir 1978), the greeting was part of a diplomatic strategy addressing the potential for local hostility to the group, part of Ataturk's controversial modernisation efforts. The inscription reads:

> Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives … you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours … You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries, wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well (Ataturk).

For Turkey such an occurrence is significant as it involves its national hero and founding president. Though the Turk's appreciation of Ataturk's role in the Gallipoli campaign has only become prominent since the rise of Australian and New Zealand visitors to the battlefields. This monument is also part of the sacred realm for Australian tourists as its dialogical sentiment gives them permission to engage in patriotism abroad, something which may in normal circumstances be counter to the post-Fordist travel ethic. The enshrining of Ataturk's message also diverts commemorative attention away from the violent conflict and the enduring cultural and religious differences between Allied nations and these former foes. As recited by politicians on official memorial day speeches, Ataturk's message as known through its memorial form has a broader significance in reimagining the campaign and in remembering the history of Australia's most culturally significant historical event.

When dialogical memorials on the battlefields do focus on soldiers and the battle itself, as traditional war memorials do, the concern is not with the mass loss of life through modern warfare, but with humanistic exchanges between soldiers on either side of the front line. This is particularly evident in the Kanhsirt memorial which is a bronze statue depicting a Turkish soldier carrying a wounded Allied captain (Fig. 2.1). As quoted below, the memorial's plaque tells the story of how the Turkish soldier carried his enemy to the Allied trenches, as described by an Australian witness, First Lieutenant Casey, who later would become Australian Governor General, the Queen's representative who acts as Head of State.

> Chunuk Bair on 25th April 1915, there was heavy trench fighting between the Turks and the Allies. The distance between the trenches was between 8 and 10 m. Cease-fire was called after a bayonet attack and the soldiers returned to their trenches. There were heavy casual-

Fig. 2.1 Kanhsirt Memorial

> ties on both sides and each collected their dead and wounded. From between the trench lines came a cry for help from an English Captain who was very badly wounded in the leg. Unfortunately no one could leave their trenches to help because the slightest movement resulted in the firing of hundreds of bullets. At that moment an incredible event occurred. A piece of white underwear was raised from one of the Turkish trenches and a well built, unarmed soldier appeared. Everyone was stunned and we starred in amazement. The Turk walked slowly towards the wounded British soldier gently lifted him, took him in his arms and started to walk towards our trenches. He placed him down gently on the ground near us and then straight away returned to his trench. We couldn't even thank him. This courageous and beautiful act of the Turkish soldier has our love and deepest respect to this brave and heroic soldier.
> First Lieutenant Casey
> (Later to become Australian Governor General 1967–71)

The Treaty of Lausanne following WWI had provided the Allies with control over memorialization in the main parts of the battlefield. The development of dialogical memorials by the Turkish government has facilitated a greater sharing of this sacred space. In the above cases this is fairly consensual, the result of high levels of consultation and diplomacy, so much so that it is difficult to align many of the recent memorials with one particular nation. Such dialogical memorialization recontextualizes and softens the original meanings attached to Allied memorials on the battlefields. In the case of Turkey it addresses the traditional absence of national memorials in the Anzac

Cove area, prompting the construction of several monuments focussing solely on Turkish history and culture. This is vividly illustrated at Chunuk Bair, a contested site of both New Zealand and Turkish military victories. In close proximity to the New Zealand memorial the Turkish Conkbayin Ataturk memorial was constructed, a bronze statue of Mustafa Kemal- Ataturk, telling the legendary tale of this being the location where a piece of shrapnel hit him in the chest, but he was saved by it impacting his pocket watch (Bademli 1997, p. 16; Taylor and Cupper 2000, p. 199).

Such memorials may have been initiated as a response to the Allied memorial dominance on the battlefields, however over the past fifteen years it has resulted in the Anzac Cove area increasingly becoming a site for commemoration and pilgrimage by the Turkish. As a site where Ataturk first established himself as a leader, politicians have declared that every school child should visit the battlefields. Gallipoli is also an increasing popular attraction for domestic tourism, particularly amongst professionals based in Istanbul. As such it is not only the memorials themselves which are dialogical but the Australian tourists' experience of them where tourists and locals stand side by side. This is particularly the case at the museum where Australian and New Zealand tourists rub shoulders viewing both Allied and Turkish relics. Many of the objects on displays can be found at the Australian War Museum in the nation's capital of Canberra, such shells, bullets, water bottles, uniforms, and accompaning photographic displays. However, emphasising the liminal dimension of the battlefields for Western visitors the museum also curates more ghastly items such as a human skull with a bullet embedded in it and a soldier's shoe with the remains of a foot within.

The increased interest in the battlefields by Turks has seen greater restrictions put on Australian and New Zealand memorialisation and commemoration. The original site for the Anzac Day service was the Ari Burnu Cemetery though this had become inadequate as a consequence of the increased number of tourists visiting the battlefields for Anzac Day, with damage occurring to the graves as pilgrims sought better vantage points. Following Charles Bean's report in 1919, the battlefields had been memorialised to cater for pilgrims, however, it was not imagined that Anzac Day ceremonies, which began in Australia one year following the invasion landing, would be hosted on the site. Working with New Zealand, approval was sought by the Turkish government to construct a new memorial site for hosting Anzac Day ceremonies. The Commemorative Site was originally conceived to be part of a proposed Peace Park on the peninsula, which in 1994 the President of Turkey had initiated a design competition to reshape the entire Gallipoli Peninsula into a National Historical Park, of which the Anzac battlefields are part. This had the aim of taking on a "world peace park character", incorporating the "display of Turkish courage, determinedness, devotion and self-sacrifice as exemplified in the 1915 Canakkale (Dardanelles) battles (with live-history techniques)" (Bademli 1997). The Commemorative Site was subsequently built at North Beach between the sea and the cliffs, the open area covered in a low native heath allowing for a large attendance. Constructed on the site was a connecting pathway system to Ari Burnu cemetery, allowing visitors to pass this sacred spot that marked the landing of troops at dawn in 1915. The focus of the Commemorative Site though is a low wall which acts as a

stage for dignitaries on Anzac Day. Outside this date the wall serves an educational purpose with 10 large panels made up of historical accounts and photographs facilitating an appropriate interpretation of the campaign. The Panels carry a broader educational influence being featured on Australia's Department of Veterans Affairs website as a classroom teaching resource.

Reflecting the surrounding memorials, the Panels contain strong dialogical histories in their chronological detailing of the campaign. Panel 1 *The Dardanelles* has a quotation from Winston Churchill, with whom the idea for taking the Dardanelles originated, indicates something of the contempt which the British had for Turkey's military capabilities. It then goes on to note that those who fought the Turks there in 1915 soon found them a formidable enemy. Panel 2 *Landing* features the painting by George Lambert *Anzac, the landing* but as will be elaborated on below when considering the cultural influence of the tour guides, it largely tells the Turkish memory of the landing which saw the aim of the campaign to capture the heights, with only little initial resistance. Panel 3 *Defence of Turkey* has a photo of Ataturk commanding his troops at Gallipoli, emphasising the resourcefulness of the Turkish army, their losses of at least 87,000 and how following the counter attack of 19 May in which Turks suffered severe casualties, "the Australian and New Zealand soldiers began to regard the Turkish soldier with much respect". Panel 4 *Krithia* also emphasises Turkish resistance, this time in relation to the British landing at Cape Helles and the co-ordinated attack by Australian and New Zealand soldiers that "found the enemy fire so accurate and intense that some men raised shovels in front of their faces to protect themselves". Panel 5 *Turkish Counter Attack*, Panel 6 *Lone Pine and the Nek* and Panel 7 *Chunuk Bair* contain similar themes in profiling these advances. Panel 8 *Sick and Wounded* stresses the suffering of Anzacs from disease and the conditions of trench warfare rather than the enemy. This theme continues in Panel 8 *Evacuation* with November bringing on frostbite and exposure, and the decision to withdraw. The final panel, *ANZAC,* provides totals for Allied dead and notes how the first Anzac Day in 1916 started a tradition for remembering. In a more heroic way than previous panels, it states this began "when Australians and New Zealanders landed on the shores of Gallipoli, where they founded a lasting tradition of courage, endurance and sacrifice". The Panel is headed by a quote by Charles Bean, the Australian official historian of the campaign, noting that "Anzac stood, and still stands, for reckless valour in a good cause, for enterprise, resourcefulness, fidelity, comradeship, and endurance that will never own defeat".

Having been established in response to, rather than prior to the onset of pilgrimage traditions to the battlefields, the Commemorate Site panels can also be understood as reflecting the dialogical historical accounts which have developed on the battlefields. Like the memorials this physical infrastructure facilitates tourism on the battlefields. However, due to restrictions in the construction of the Anzac Commemorative Site it has not solved the commemorative problem of meeting the demand for those who want to attend the centennial ceremony for Anzac Day. As will be explored in further detail below, it has particularly failed to address the dilemma of representation for the Centennial of the battle in 2015. Australia and New Zealand had initially proposed something more grandiose. However, Turkish authori-

ties had insisted on a minimalist design for the Commemorative Site, which sees the platform accompanying the retaining wall being consistent with the natural slope of the embankment, with no change to the slope leading up to the foothills. The result is that despite allowing for up to approximately 15,000 to attend the ceremonies, at least half of the attendees cannot view the ceremony. For the 90th anniversary, this was addressed with audio-visual screens erected to broadcast the ceremony to those in attendance. This use of this multi-media markedly contrasts to major dawn service ceremonies in Australia where no artificial lights, such as from news cameras, are permitted. The large video screens also serve the purpose of entertaining the crowd prior to the commencement of the ceremony. Due to logistics of travel from nearby towns and for security reasons most in attendance must arrived up to five hours prior to dawn. A multi-media prelude also gives the Anzac Day ceremony a more carnivalesque character than its equivalent in Australia. Not surprisingly this aspect of the pilgrimage tradition has been an object of criticism.

The 90th anniversary pre-ceremony DVD selection of the Australian popular music band the Bee Gees by then Veterans Affairs Minister Deanne Kelly attracted particular criticism, with their hit song Stayin Alive deemed inappropriate. The logistics of arriving so many hours prior to dawn also means that in other ways the ceremony takes on characteristics of a concert. This is evident with rubbish. Given the time involved waiting for ceremonies to begin, tours provide pilgrims with food bags that subsequently results in litter as security reasons mean there are few bins. This has prompted protests by Australia's Returned Services League (RSL) to not allow Anzac Day at Gallipoli to differentiate itself from that in Australia, with the RSL president of New South Wales, Don Rowe arguing that it has "become now a day of celebration which it never should be" (Gallipoli Litterbug Fallout 2005).

Tourism and Memorial Interpretation

The new memorial context at Gallipoli in itself does not determine the meanings assigned to the battle. Rather it establishes a context for a broader process of meaning- making (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991, p. 382). Central to this is the dynamics of international tourism. The official 75th anniversary observance of the campaign did more than establish dialogical memorials. It also advertised Gallipoli as a place that could be visited. Particularly important in 1990 was the arrival of hundreds of Australian backpacker tourists who travelled from London and elsewhere in Europe for the anniversary on the battlefields. This promoted a significant Australian backpacking travel tradition to Gallipoli. The identity of these Australians as backpackers is significant as this is a type of independent tourist who is more likely to visit less developed and more remote places in search of an authentic tourist experience, laying the foundation for subsequent mass tourism (Cohen 2003; Elsrud 2001). According to a study prepared by the Turkish government, in 1995 11,200 Australians and New Zealanders visited the battlefields outside of Anzac Day (Bademli 1997, p. 37). The records of one local tour guide indicate that

approximately 70% of these were Australians (Ali Efe, personal communication; cf. Bademli 1997, p. 38). In 1996 there were thought to be 4000 visitors on the battlefields for Anzac Day (Bademli 1997, p. 38) and some 30,000 in attendance for the 90th anniversary of the battle in 2005 (Inglis 2005). Significantly more than half of the backpackers visiting the battlefields are women. As such not only does this pilgrimage rite centre around a generation that is typically marginalized within commemorations of the world wars that has traditionally focused on veterans, but it also allows women to be on equal footing in remembrance participation.

It is my contention that the growth of this pilgrimage rite amongst backpackers is not driven in a direct way by any external rise in patriotism amongst Australia's youth. Rather the popularity of the pilgrimage itself is responsible for the enhanced national connection to Gallipoli. To understand the attraction of participating in this pilgrimage then we need to consider the attraction of visiting Turkey and the experience of these travelers on the battlefields. Social commentators mistakenly speak of Australian youth at Gallipoli generically, where in fact there are a number of different types of travelers with different motivations at Anzac Day and visiting outside this date. Australians living in London, many on the popular working-holiday-maker visa, often would undertake a short-stay return trip to Turkey for Anzac Day. This is often done with short notice, some not booking any accommodation near the battlefields, and as a consequence it is not unknown for hostels to rent out floor space for sleeping. Others experience Anzac Day at Gallipoli as part of their backpacking 'grand tour' of the world, carefully planning their itinerary to be in Turkey on this date. From Turkey many of these Australians will travel onto Greece and then other parts of Western Europe, often seeking out experiences at other events such as the Running of the Bulls or Octoberfest. Some of the more 'hardcore' backpackers will go touring to neighboring countries such as Iran, Armenia and until recent hostilities Syria. Both sets of tourists though have been influential in the establishment of tourism infrastructure on the battlefields and in the nearby towns of Ecebat and Cannakale. In addition to Anzac Day crowds, the battlefields receive a steady stream of Australian backpackers throughout the year.

For Australians who undertake the pilgrimage outside of Anzac Day, which account for the majority of visitors, there is a greater emphasis on experiencing place rather than formal ceremony and the social effervescence of social gathering. Rather than these pilgrimages reflecting social conditions in Australia they are principally the result of the opening up of Turkey to tourism in the 1990s. Not only did this encourage potential Australian pilgrims to visit Turkey, it transformed backpackers into pilgrims, with many only deciding to visit Gallipoli, or in some cases realised Gallipoli was located in Turkey, once they were there or started to plan their trip. Importantly the majority of those who deliberately planned a visit to Gallipoli as part of their 'grand tour' did so following the advice and on the basis of stories told by their friends and fellow Australian travellers. Examine the interview quotes below as an illustration of these points.

> Yeah, everyone says, oh, you've got to go to Gallipoli. Gallipoli, it is a big pilgrimage really isn't it. Yeah and you're in the country so you might as well pop up and have a look (Female, Age: 25, News Camera Operator).

> Turkey as a country is an attractive place to visit and then you are there and you suddenly realise, Oh I'm only a couple of hundred kilometres away from Gallipoli and that's when you start, that's when I started thinking of coming to Gallipoli (Male, Age: 28, Management Consultant).

> We wanted to go to Turkey for a number of reasons. First of all my wife teaches a lot of Turkish adults, teaches them English, and they talked about how nice Turkey was and people I work with said Turkey was fantastic. So because of that and because it was cheap and we are going overseas for six months so we needed to go to some cheap places as well. So not specifically for Gallipoli but we thought it was something that we would definitely do while we are here (Male, Age: 31, Postgraduate University Student).

As outlined in the quote above, the knowledge of Turkey attained through migration and the attractiveness of Turkey as a tourist destination in prompting a visit to the country and subsequently touring Gallipoli is significant as it illustrates the multi-dimensional ways in which national and global flows interact.

Appreciating that the pilgrimage rite at Gallipoli typically occurs within a larger travel experience is important in understanding the meanings which derive from this ritual. As we have seen, the state continues to play an influential role in shaping and interpreting the battle, in particular through an ongoing process of memorialization. Equally significant though are two less appreciated 'reputational entrepreneurs' (Fine 1996), those individuals that are influential in the popular and formal understandings of history. These are the tourists themselves as pilgrims and Turkish tour guides. Collective memory studies have tended to identify traditional elites in this role, as discussed earlier in the monograph, and tourism provides opportunities for new actors to shape understandings of the past. The tourists themselves give life to the memorials and there can be no pilgrimage tradition without such participants. These tourists have a certain cosmopolitan disposition to the world and to cultural difference. This means that they interpret the memorialised battlefields in a different way to that of older generations and parts of their own age group who are less globally mobile. The tour guides that take these backpackers around the battlefields are equally significant. The Turkish government regulation that battlefield tours must be led by a licensed guide has seen these foreign tourists provided with a new perspective on the campaign that accounts for both Turkish and Allied histories. Here the memorials provide physical cues for historical interpretation by the guides, whose role as reputational entrepreneurs represents a wider historical transformation of the tour guide from instrumental to more discursive functions (Cohen 1985).

The ritual status of Australians visiting the battlefields is evident in their elevated levels of 'emotional energy' (Collins 2004). The Visitors Book on the battlefields, for example, is full of emotive patriotic descriptions of their experience such as "reunites and ignites the Australian passion," "I shall always remember what you have given up for the future generation," and "thank you for uniting our country." Gallipoli may have initially formed one part of a larger travel itinerary, including beaches, classical ruins and busy cities, though following the battlefield tour it typically is thought of by Australian backpackers as a highlight and the most emotive experience of their time abroad.

> I almost felt last night that if I had only come to Turkey for that one reason, or if I had only come to this side of Europe for that one reason it would have been worth it. It's that special (Female, Age: 35, Receptionist).

The Australians feel they are receiving a privileged memorial viewing of the Gallipoli legend, something that was denied to the majority of grieving relatives at the end of WWI, and still only seen by a small percentage of their elders. Rather than being a point of difference with the ancestors buried on the battlefields, the pilgrim's identity as tourists allows for a cultural connection to be made with the Australian soldiers who died here. The tour guides are particularly important in creating this cultural 'pairing' (Geertz 1973) of backpackers and the soldiers, with both being portrayed as young 'innocents' abroad.

> And then when we first went to the first cemetery, that had quite an impact, especially when I was looking at the different inscriptions on the headstones, some of them my age. You know 24, some of them 20, 22 and then I thought if I was born back then I could have been you know … I was still really a bit sad at that time (Male, Age: 24, Lawyer).

> I do miss home and I think that's partly, that's the thing that got me today as well, so many Australian, young Australian blokes and women who died here and they are not even, they never, they never got back home. So far away, even their remains are here and that sense of distance and loss is just huge. I mean I feel it when I am homesick about being so far away … I mean if I died somewhere overseas, not that it's likely, but if I did I would really hope that my remains could at least go back from where they came from (Female, Age: 28, Registered Nurse).

The direct witnessing of the sacred has brought an embodied 'reality' to Gallipoli for backpackers, in contrast to either their active or passive participation in larger, distant, and more 'imaginary' modern Anzac rituals in Australia (Anderson 1983). In Western culture the act of witnessing is privileged in matters of truth (Sather-Wagstaff 2011; Wagner-Pacifici 2005; Zelizer 1998). As John Durham Peters (2001) notes, this is due to it being cultural embedded in various spheres of Western society, including in legal notions of testifying, a Christian theological tradition of martyrdom and as the survivor of atrocity. The latter is particularly significant for the case studies of re-encahnting nationalisms in Chap. 4 and Chap. 5.

Such an experience is likely to be enduring for them and has a wider impact on the understanding of the event within civil society. Australian schoolteachers in the interview sample, for example, committed themselves to telling their students of the experience next Anzac Day. Hearing travelers tell of the Gallipoli battlefields tour has been important in motivating other Australian travelers to visit Gallipoli, as has the media attention given to this unique tourist phenomenon. Academic associations in Australia have held conferences nearby the battlefields and Australian universities have set up formal relationships with the local university which itself has been motivated to establish an Australian Studies centre.

What interpretation of Gallipoli though is entering the Australian public sphere as a consequence of the emergence of this powerful ritual form? As noted above, the significance of pilgrimage is in challenging and potentially reshaping existing collective memories not simply reinforcing them. The Anzac spirit these backpackers refer to is not simply that of traditional white, Anglo-Celtic Australian mythology or one mirroring their generational worldview or Australia's current socio-political

climate. Rather it is principally a result of the ritual of pilgrimage. The Gallipoli pilgrimage not only involves a threshold experience but historical anomalies that backpackers must resolve while in the presence of the sacred and face-to-face with the Other. These emerge from the interplay between the Australian constitutive narrative of Gallipoli, corporeal experience of the battlefields, and Turkish interpretations of the battle as principally communicated by the Turkish tour guides and Turkish memorials. The experience of Australian visitors at Gallipoli significantly derives from their former foes. This occurs through information they are told during the locally arranged organized tour, through exhibits at the battlefield museum, and from Turkish and Allied memorials, as well as experiences elsewhere in Turkey and from personal interactions with locals.

One of the most influential figures shaping this dialogical understanding of Gallipoli then are the Turkish guides who act as 'mediators' (Macdonald 2006), positioned at the intersection of the two different traditions of historical interpretation. Undertaken by the vast majority of visitors, the tours that the guides lead play a central role in the tourist performance. Here the guides re-tell Anzac legends with reference to Turkish beliefs and what they perceive these tourists wish to attain from their battlefield experience. On the battlefield tours the Australian tourists attentively listen to the guides as they provide a historical orientation to WWI and Turkey's involvement in the war. Tourists are told of the demise and vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire (but little about its rise and former strength) as part of which Turks fought during WWI. As far as possible, Turkey's alignment with the Austrian Hungarian Alliance is underplayed. The Ottoman Empire's decision to join the German side is also typically portrayed as nationally strategic or even accidental, with the motivation of the Turkish soldier at Gallipoli seen as more local and primordial. Far from being driven by nationalist or racial propaganda, the Turkish soldiers at Gallipoli are characterized by tour guides as innocent victims with primary concern for their families and villages. The tour guide Ali illustrates this when he rhetorically asks "[W]hat was that reason of that bitter resistance realized by the Turkish soldier?" He answers:

> …it was a trick made by the Turkish high command … the soldiers fighting during the campaign on the peninsula, Turkish soldiers they were purposely chosen one by one from small small towns and small small villages on the peninsula … During the battles, thinking or believing that they were trying to defend, to protect their homes, their families namely, and then Turkey (Ali Efe, Tour Guide for Anzac House Hostel).

In this way the Gallipoli battle is seen as nationally significant and a site of pride but also a way that avoids traditional nationalistic ideas of cultural difference and Otherness. This is not a straight forward process but involves resolving various anomalies which are inherent in dialogical discourse (Douglas 1966, p. 38). For example, upon hearing the above interpretations of the battle many Australian backpackers for the first time realize that Australians were the invaders at Gallipoli, and more so the apparent aggressors.

> Yeah I guess their role I feel more was like defending their land where as before I guess I thought they were more part of the German ideals and stuff like that (Female, Age: 35, Music Teacher).

> I think that's the big thing, it brings home that they were defending their motherland sort of thing. When you are in Australia and you hear about it at Anzac Day it's Australia took on Turkey and Germany at Gallipoli but it doesn't really sink in that they were defending from an invasion but now you can see it first hand and you know they gathered as many locals as they could and fought very hard and died to protect their families and their homeland (Male, Age: 27, Public Servant).

This Turkish perspective on Gallipoli, however, is an essential element of their authentic tourist experience. Just as standing on the sacred ground seemed to be the missing piece of the puzzle in understanding Gallipoli, so too finding out about the Turkish side gives them a greater sense of involvement with the legend and a feeling of integration with the local environment. As many Australians visit Gallipoli as part of a larger travel itinerary such stories of Turkish heroics are warmly accepted as part of a broader tourist search for vicarious experiences of the host culture and confirm for many their earlier tourist based interactions with Turks.

> I've got a lot more respect for them now and from hearing what Ali told us yesterday and a few of the stories. Just being in Turkey the people are so friendly anyway and I think that one statue where the Turkish soldier, there is a statue of a Turkish soldier who actually waved the white flag and walked out and picked up a wounded English Captain I think and took him back to the trenches. I thought that was just, that's more or less what Turkish people are like you know. They are just really beautiful people. (Male, Age: 31, Electrician)

Australian participants on the battlefield tour are thus confronted with two competing sentiments. On the one hand the battlefield experience brings about strong feelings of patriotism as a consequence of exposure to the sacred. On the other hand, the pilgrimage occurs within a larger travel itinerary in which backpackers want to experience the local culture, and as such the Turkish perspective on Gallipoli is also accepted, even where it seemingly contradicts the Anzac legend. As discussed above, postmodern and globalization literature has argued that such cultural disparities from international travel will lead to a movement away from patriotic understandings. In the context of international civil religious pilgrimage, however, we often see such anomalies resolved through the development of new collective memories. At the heart of this is the formation of a patriotic understanding of history in which national historical figures are portrayed in ways in which they are seen devoid of nationalist ideals. This is what occurs in the Gallipoli case where we see the establishment of dialogical national narratives around the idea of needless sacrifice (Bakhtin 1981, 1986). Facilitated by the logics of tourism the Australian pilgrim develops a commitment to the Anzac legend at the same time that a sympathetic inclusion of the Turkish perspective occurs. The two themes do not merely run in parallel, rather the Turkish perspective is fused with the traditional Australian story, forming a new integrated narrative.

> I have the utmost respect for them. You pretty much feel the same way about them as you do the Australians. You feel sorrow for them and the lives that they lost, just as much as you do the Australians. The utmost respect for them, they were fighting for their land (Male, Age: 29, Public Servant).

Such an appreciation of dialogical history can only be attained by examining its construction from the point of view of social actors. If considered in pure struc-

tural terms it is difficult to conceive how such an empathetic understanding of the Turks could emerge amongst Western tourists and then subsequently in the Australian public sphere. Australia is a mostly Anglo-colonial nation and was part of the WWI Allied invasion force. The Islamic Turks were on the other side as part of the Ottoman Empire, foot soldiers for German generals. Yet the various actors and stages of the tourist performance, largely absent from traditional commemorative activity, help weave together a dialogic narrative where Turkey's and Australia's involvement in the campaign are aligned. This fusion is propagated in the physical surrounds. However, the tourist guides' discourse is essential to the tourist's comprehension of the dialogical narrative.

The guides are particularly significant in evidencing the Australia and Turkish relationship by creating an enemy pairing of Britain and Germany. The Turkish guides descriptions of the Anzacs as gentlemen, brave soldiers and, as we will see, even friends with Turkish soldiers, contrast with their charactization of the British who commanded and fought as part of the Allied forces at Gallipoli. Consistent with the anti-British sentiment of the dominant Australian understanding of Gallipoli, the guides indicate that due to British incompetence, Australians needlessly were required to "sacrifice their lives."

> When those Australians soldiers were sacrificing their lives for the safety of the British troops, the British troops down below were safe enough even to enjoy themselves having a good swim in the blue waters of the Aegean Sea. That is a tragedy! (Ali Efe, Turkish tour guide)

The separation and distancing of Turkey's role in the campaign from Germany is done within a similar anti-authoritarian narrative. The stories by the tour guides about locals defending their families and homes from invasion are reinforced with an emphasis on Turkey wanting to join the Allies or remain neutral in the war. They argue that it was only out of mere necessity or British trickery that they could not. All guides at Gallipoli argue that in a secret protocol Britain had agreed that with victory they would not oppose a Russian invasion of Turkey. Thus both the Turkish and Australians are portrayed as reluctant or forced into their participation at Gallipoli. For example, consider in the below quotes how prior conceptions of the British by the backpackers have been reinforced by the tour guides with contrasts made to other prominent anti-authoritarian national narratives of the Irish and Scottish.

> I think it was like, this sounds silly but have you ever seen the movie Braveheart and they are going into battle and he said send in the Irish because you know people don't cost money, instead of sending in the artillery because they had horses or whatever. It was like let's send them in to see how they go (Female, Age: 23, Public Servant).

> Total loss of respect actually, especially the high command. I haven't got any respect for them at all. I think they were quite weak and as Ali said yesterday they were just swimming on the beaches when Australia was charging and getting slaughtered. And that they promised Turkey to Russia and it wasn't even their country to do it. Like Northern Ireland as well. Of all the things that they actually do they really have no right to do (Male, Age: 27, Plumber).

Australia's involvement in the invasion of Turkey is represented in similar cosmopolitan ways with the tour guides concentrating on and developing some narratives

of compassionate and friendly acts between the two sides in the latter part of the campaign. In particular, stories of the exchange of gifts at specific places along the front line work to evidence an emotional and pacifist relationship between the Anzac and Turkish soldiers (cf. Mauss 1969).

> Near the end of the war the two parties became first good neighbours, then good friends. First they started singing their own folk songs for other party's enjoyment. Then they started to exchange gifts. First time in our history Turkish man taste chocolate from the Anzac soldiers. Instead of throwing hand grenades onto the Turkish trenches they were throwing chocolate bars and the Turks were throwing back apples, oranges and some tomatoes in order to receive, to get more chocolate bars … It was a gentleman's war and they were gentlemen (Ali Efe, Turkish tour guide).

Such historical interpretations are the result of specific performance work by Turkish tour guides and the willingness of the Australian backpackers to interpret and accept alternative histories of Gallipoli. This possibility reflects broader social and cultural changes within Australia and Turkey. However, it is unlikely to have occurred if not for the emergence of international civil religious pilgrimage to Gallipoli. This ritual form promoted the development and enchantment of dialogical collective memories where both Turks and Australians work to uphold a certain interpretation of Gallipoli. For Australia this involves rescuing a tragic victory from military defeat at Gallipoli, thinking of its soldiers as egalitarian, brave and humane. For Turkey it is rescuing a victory from defeat in the war and emphasising the moment when Ataturk saved his nation. By fusing the collective memory of Gallipoli with pacifist and multicultural ideologies, dialogical remembering has salvaged important foundation moments of blood sacrifice for both nations.

These dialogical constructions are not inevitable and cannot adequately be explained by functional adaptations to the strain of new circumstances, a perspective which still underpins a great deal of collective memory scholarship. To think in this way not only fails to appreciate agency but the autonomy of ritual to bring about social change. The contingent nature of the ritual meanings surrounding pilgrimage and an example of the social, cultural and economic factors involved in the production of dialogical discourses (Bakhtin 1981) can be illustrated by profiling Kenan Celik, an ex-guide and local university tutor, without who the contemporary cosmopolitan meanings at Gallipoli may have never emerged. After studying in the United States on a Fullbright Scholarship he returned to Turkey in 1983 and was one of the original battlefield guides following the de-militarization of the battlefields, a role he acquired prior to the rise of backpacking tourism. During the frequently long waiting times for customers in the tour agency he would read books on Gallipoli, originally Turkish ones but he would subsequently also learn about Australian historical accounts from tourists and historians on the tours. Many of these historians would later mail him English language books on the campaign. Being one of few individuals in the area fluent in English, Kenan played an important role in interweaving different national historical accounts. He openly admits to promoting a cosmopolitan view on the campaign, both to locals and foreign tourists. Noting that very few locals knew much about the Gallipoli land campaign in the 1980s, he says he felt a responsibility to educate them, but in a way that concentrated:

Fig. 2.2 Tour guide Ilhami Gezici (TJ) with WWI recruitment poster

> …on the mutual display of understanding, not hatred. So just imagine fifteen years, I don't know how many people (visited) but many, maybe 40,000; or 50,000. So I told them stories, so they learnt stories and they told the stories again, so it was handed over again and again. So I think I am like an ambassador here and I think I have a share in this growing, mutual respect and understanding between Australia, New Zealand and Turkey (Kenan Celik, Turkish tour guide and university tutor).

Many of the younger guides taking the tours today were once his apprentices and are greatly influenced by his historical narratives. One such guide, Ilhami Gezici, popularly known to tourists by his English nickname of TJ, now runs his own tour and hostel with his Australian wife who he met while she was touring the battlefields. Acutely aware of the experience Australian backpackers seek from their visit, he has been a particularly important figure in dramatizing and embellishing some of Kenan's more dry historical details. As illustrated in the below quote, Ilhami uses tourism as a frame to encourage visitor empathy for the fallen Allied soldiers.

> A sense of respect grew between the Anzac and Turkish soldiers in the trenches … Sometimes you know Turkish would throw them fresh water, milk, bread, cheese or everything. During the war Anzacs and Turks they were really friendly. They did not ever hate each other … Anzac soldier did not know why they were here. They didn't know why they were fighting here. Just here for a holiday (TJ, Turkish tour guide).

In this scenario the soldier himself is portrayed as a tourist. It is a revisionist history that is evident in all tours of the battlefields, extending Kenan's emphasis on good relations and mutual respect between the trenches. Earlier in his tour TJ, for example, promoted the idea that Allied soldiers held a contemporary tourist ethos through showing a book containing a recruitment poster selling soldiering as a way to achieve world travel (Fig. 2.2). Emphasising this particular enlistment strategy is important as it avoids issues of racial and religious hatred between the Allies and Turkey while encouraging the tourists to make a cultural connection between their experience of travel and that of the Anzacs.

Pilgrimage, Agency and Conflict

These new dialogical meanings at Gallipoli are not the inevitable result of structural change in society but rather the outcome of the ritual of pilgrimage. This is not to reify ritual. As has been identified above, this ritual form has various iterations and is reliant upon the work of social actors. The role of young Australians as travelers is particularly significant in establishing the meanings associated with this pilgrimage as they provide a particular audience generally appreciative of cultural difference for which tourist guides and others associated with the tourism industry at Gallipoli have shaped their message. Generationally the backpackers have reenergized the commemoration of Gallipoli which has been dominated by a focus on aging male veterans and state officials. The backpackers, of course, are not representative of their generation. As various studies have shown, backpacking are overwhelmingly from middle-class backgrounds with higher levels of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984) which they both display in their choice of travel and search to strengthen in a romantic search for authenticity and their concern with narratives of the self (Noy 2004; O'Reilly 2006). It is not the representativeness of these travelers though which is significant but their search for an insider's account and how this has attributed the tour guides with a cultural power in retelling the Gallipoli story in dialogical ways.

As outlined above the experience of Australians at Gallipoli is significant in producing alternative historical discourses within the public sphere, whether through their occupational activities, such as with school teachers, or through general word of mouth. As Habermas (1989) notes, such discourses have the power to spark public debate and as a consequence bring about institutional change. In the case of Gallipoli the dialogical meanings from the battlefields have come to be the core narrative of diplomatic discourse that Australian government ministers, including the Prime Minister or Australia's Commonwealth head of state, the Governor General, utilize when attending the annual Anzac Day ceremonies on the battlefields or in Australia. The broadening of the Gallipoli mythology to include Turkey as a friend has also promoted more multicultural portrayals of the Anzac legend. The Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, for example, at the 2012 Anzac Day dawn service at Gallipoli spoke of it belonging "to every Australian. Not just those who trace their origins to the early settlers but … migrants … who embrace the whole Australian story … [F]or Indigenous Australians, whose own wartime valor was a profound expression of the love they felt for the ancient land. And for Turkish-Australians who have not one but two heroic stories to tell their children". Rather than the increasing crowds at Gallipoli coming at the expense of engagement with traditional state commemorations within Australia, these too have as a consequence of this new collective memory become more widely supported. Similarly the state's role in commemorating the past is not vanquished by tourism forces but re-orientated, in this case given a more global diplomatic focus.

Gallipoli also has come to have greater significance in the Turkish public sphere as a consequence of the dialogical meanings assigned to the campaign. As we have

seen this is evident in memorialization and increased visitation by Turks. It is also evident within Turkish and global popular culture. The documentary Gallipoli (2005), for example, was written and directed by the Turkish film maker Tolga Örnek, and narrated by the Holloywood stars Jeremy Irons and Sam Neil. The tag line of the movie's promotion is that "the war itself is the only enemy in this film". Like the dialogical memorials on the battlefield, the film also is difficult to assign to a particular nation such is its inclusive nature. As Örnek notes in an interview, the film is "made by a Turkish director, but I see it as an international, universal film. I think it's as much an Australian film as a Turkish or New Zealand film" (Simpson 2007, p. 93). The role of the contemporary Gallipoli pilgrimage in promoting such a work can be nicely contrasted with the role pilgrimage played in the producing of the previous blockbuster on the campaign, Peter Weir's 'Gallipoli' (1981) starring Mel Gibson. While the film predates widespread pilgrimage activity to Gallipoli this ritual form was still crucial to it being made. After being sounded out about making a film about the campaign, Weir travelled to the battlefields in 1975 from London. Having made his own way there from Istanbul he states that "I saw no one in two days of climbing up and down slopes and wandering through the trenches, finding all sorts of scraps left by the armies" (Weir 1981, p. 213). Like the experience of the many Australians who would later visit the battlefields, Weir states that "I felt somehow I was really touching history, that's really what it was" (Weir 1981, p. 213). However, without the dialogical discourses of the memorials or tour guides on the battlefield to narrate the battle to Weir the film contained little recognition of the Turkish perspective. Instead the focus was solely on Australian mateship and the incompetence of British high command and their willingness to send the Anzacs into the line of fire.

In contemplating the influence of dialogical narratives at Gallipoli it is also important to consider their potential to create social conflict. To correctly comprehend dialogical relations we not only need to study what is said and represented but what is absent from this historical revisionism. Certainly the issue of war crimes, including the treatment of those captured by the enemy is infrequently discussed. Neither are other 'bad characters' (Stanley 2010) who robbed and murdered their comrades. There is, of course, some evidence that the humanitarian acts that are documented in memorials and by the Turkish tour guides did actually take place. Certainly not all Allied soldiers were blood thirsty and driven by imperial and national loyalty. Based on his post-combat interviews in WWII, S.L.A. Marshall concluded in his book, *Men Against Fire*, (1947) that only 15–20% of the individual riflemen fired their weapons at an exposed enemy soldier. Those that were nearly always fired, such as those on a machine gun, was due to the proximity and surveillance of a nearby officer rather than individuals acting autonomously. However, there is also little doubt that WWI, as in conflicts today, involved horrors and dehumanising mistreatment of the enemy. Joanna Bourke (1999) argues in her book *An Intimate History of Killing*, based on the examination of letters, diaries, memoirs, and reports from conflicts including WWI, that in warfare there are many soldiers that enjoy killing and committing acts of depravity. As Bourke notes, actions that would easily be interpreted as war crimes today were ubiquitous in WWI.

There is not only silence about such acts in the tourist engagement with the Gallipoli campaign but horrors committed by the Ottoman Empire and Turks elsewhere. The Armenian genocide which is thought to have begun the day prior to the land invasion at Gallipoli in 1915, for example, has largely been absent from discourses in the remembering of Gallipoli and in the celebration of the Turkish spirit of warfare (Manne 2007). When recently the Armenian genocide has been raised in Australia it soon results in Turkish threats to the continuance of friendly dialogical relations around Gallipoli. For example, in May 2013 the New South Wales parliament passed a motion recognising the Armenian, Assyrian and Greek genocides at the hands of the Ottoman Turk regime. The Turkish government which has long denied the Amermenian genocide, responded to the New South Wales motion with a press release stating that:

> …[t]he proponents of such initiatives aimed at dealing a blow to the very special relations that exist between our peoples will doubtlessly be deprived of the hospitality and friendship that we will never withold from the people of Australia. These persons who try to damage the spirit of Çanakkale/Gallipoli will also not have their place in the Çanakkale ceremonies where we commemorate together our sons lying side by side in our soil. (Republic of Turkey 2013)

The Premier of New South Wales, Barry O'Farrell, diplomatically played down the incident by stressing that he would think that descendants of Anzac veterans rather than politicians should attend the centennial services at Gallipoli. Significant within this diplomatic row is the dismissal of the type of first person history of soldiers which, as we have seen, is central to the dialogical history which has developed around Gallipoli. In her letter to the NSW Parliament, Turkey's Consul General in New South Wales, Gulseren Celik, pointedly dismissed the evidence of Anzac Prisioners of War as a fabrication.

> As we near the centenary of the Gallipoli Campaign the proponents of the so-called genocide will continue their quest to try to hijack the very special bond that exists between our two countries by fabricating that Anzac soldiers who were PoW were witnesses to these so-called allegations (ABC News 2013)

This is not to say that such social conflict counters the argument that the memory of Gallipoli is now largely shaped by dialogical discourses. As Bakhtin notes, the two sides of double-voicedness do not exist in some organic harmony but frequently cause discursive combative relations, unstable positions, discord and narrative shifts (Vice 1997, p. 49). Not all dialogical tension though makes such headlines, with many being 'backstage' (Goffman 1974) and characterised by media and political silence. For example, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission has had to frequently enforce details of the Treaty of Lausanne at Gallipoli, as in cases where Turkish authorities have constructed trenches for tourist display where none had been during the war. The Australian media often notes controversies about the behaviour of young Australians on the battlefields, such as drunkenness and the leaving behind of litter. However, little is noted of local Turkish frustrations about being banned from attending these Anzac commemorations or cases of sexual harassment of Australian female tourists by local men around Anzac Day. In 2005 Tur-

key's federal Islamic government and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also 'encouraged' New Zealand to cease sending indigenous Maori groups to perform their traditional dances as part of the Anzac Day ceremony on the battlefields, due to the revealing state of traditional dress and the perceived erotic nature of the dance movement. This failed to attract the concern in the public sphere which one might expect (Turkey bans Maori war dance for ceremonies 2005). The Anzac Ceremonies at Gallipoli have also in the past been marked by travel warning due to terrorist threats by both Kurdish liberation and Al Quada related groups. Given the strategic significance of the Gallipoli peninsular, any growth of tension in the region would inevitably dampen the desire by Australians to participate in the pilgrimage rite or even see the re-militarization of the battlefields as occurred during WWII.

Dialogical commemorative rituals not only establish new forms of diplomatic discourse and challenges but pose unprecedented domestic questions about who are appropriate national representatives at these events. In traditional Anzac ceremonies such as dawn services and marches, it was the veterans themselves that took centre stage. In the late twentieth century with many of the original WWI veterans passing away and pilgrimage to Gallipoli rivalling the RSL ceremonies at home, the question of representation became more problematic with the Anzac Day march committee allowing for descendants of deceased veterans to march in their place and alongside relatives, typically young children, to march alongside veterans. Along with a general increase of interest in Anzac associated with pilgrimage activity, such developments helped the revival of Anzac Day participation in Australia.

Modernist rituals such as Anzac Day marches, however, have difficulty in sustaining such liminal qualities, with the popularity of such participation in recent years resulting in them either being banned or regulated heavily. In the capital city Brisbane, for example, children are no longer allowed to march alongside fathers and grandfathers. Elsewhere descendants are no longer permitted to carry photos of the solider for whom they are marching and there has been a strict enforcing of relatives wearing what is considered appropriate dress, including 'discouraging' of them wearing war medals. There are no such limitations on dress for Anzac Day at Gallipoli, with backpackers particularly highlighting the civic nature of the event by often wearing a variety of patriotic attire such as replica shirts of national sporting teams. The institutional aspects of Anzac Day at Gallipoli, which sees it import many of the rites carried out in Australian such as the dawn service, political speeches and formal ceremonies have also proved problematic in accommodating its growing popularity.

The limits on participation in Anzac Day at Gallipoli have become particularly evident for the centennial of the landing in 2015. As highlighted above, the Gallipoli pilgrimage as a participation rite has in many ways sat outside of the normal institutional power structures of a single nation-state, with representation being dominated backpackers. This is as a consequence of them being the group most willing and able to undertake the journey as a consequence of their travels around Europe. A dilemma of representation though emerges with increased interest by more mainstream tourists in attending Anzac Day on the battlefields and the geographical, environment and social problems of fitting so many people in one place at one time.

As such the Australian government has agreed with Turkish authorities to have a cap of 8000 Australians for the centennial ceremonies, a fraction of the numbers who want to attend. This poses questions for organisers of what should be the criteria and process for who should be allowed to attend. The Department of Veterans Affairs, who heads the planning and logistical organisation of the centennial event on behalf of the Australian government, began addressing these questions by engaging in a public consultation. This consultation involved an online survey and thirty-six public forums being held in cities and towns across Australia. The results will form criteria for selecting individuals who forward their names to a national ballot. As noted by the former Minister for Veterans Affairs, Warren Snowden, there are strong claims for attending the ceremonies by a variety of groups as close to one million Australians who can claim to be decedents of veterans that fought at Gallipoli as well as from veterans from other wars, war widows, current members of the military and young people with an interest in military history (Snowden 2012). This selection process has yet to be finalised at time of writing, yet there continues to be controversy about Australian attendance at the centennial being restricted. Various travel agencies have already indicated that they have booked ocean liners to take people to the centennial and if needed will establish their own Anzac ceremonies on the Gallipoli peninsula.

As suggested above, it is unusual for pilgrimage rites to cap attendance, certainly at such a low level, with many institutional religious forms involving hundreds of thousands of people. This is made possible by a procession format rather than a fixed ceremony. The Anzac Day rites in this way are not typical of pilgrimage but rather a modern and immobile rite. The problem is not the capacity of the battlefield as such but that Anzac Day rites are based on being at a specific place and time, for example Anzac Cove at dawn on the 25th April. Given the controversies regarding attendance and the past criticism of the centennial public consultation and ballot by the newly elected Prime Minister Tony Abbott when he was the opposition leader, it is believed that a variety of alternative ritual forms were considered and discussed with Turkish authorities but to no avail. These included establishing various ceremonial sites on the battlefields with all the ceremonies observed via live link on large screens from their own site (Basarin 2012). While this option does not seem appropriately solemn, as noted above, even those at the dawn service site will need such audio-visual screens to see the ceremony given the slope of the site. Having two services, one at dawn and the other at dust, has also been floated. However, such options are thought to only double those able to attend (Basarin 2012), still leaving the government with the dilemma of ticketing the event. Interestingly, no consideration has been given to the procession form. This is perhaps no surprising as Turner (1974) notes, a key characteristic of pilgrimage is that it works to marginalise institutional authorities such as federal governments and the RSL, with participation being highly democratic, leaving little space for political speeches and military symbolism.

Conclusion

In concentrating on social forces internal to the nation-state, collective memory studies have failed to appreciate how new global flows can create both the ritual conditions for heightened levels of engagement with national history as well as its reimagining. By appreciating the ritual of international civil religious pilgrimage and the dialogical dynamics which underpin it, this chapter has highlighted the potential of widespread national re-enchantment as a consequence of global connectivity in contemporary society. The significance of pilgrimage is not that it reinforces consensus but that a physical witnessing of the sacred results in both a heightened historical engagement and a disruption to established collective memories that prompted repairing and a reimagining of national history and mythology. In the case of the Gallipoli battlefields the resulting anomalies prompted the Australian visitors and Turkish tour guides to seek the construction and acceptance of new more cosmopolitan understandings of the campaign. This was influenced by a tourist context where the Australians desired an engagement with Turkish culture and the Turkish tour guides developed a historical interpretation that fostered cross-cultural understanding.

This dialogical relationship involves both Turkey and Australia upholding a certain account of the campaign. The vested interest of Turkey is the desire to encourage tourism and receive recognition of their history by Western nations. The concern for Australia is to retain commemorative access to the battlefields and maintain the historical accounts that have encouraged new forms of patriotism amongst its youth. While this ritual has come about by the world becoming a smaller place, in Robert Merton's sense it has had an 'unanticipated consequence' (1936) of reinforcing the symbolic boundaries of the nation by providing the historical event with contemporary cultural relevance.

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Chapter 3
Re-Enacting the American Civil War: Conflict, Simulation and the Sacred

By examining the recreational pursuit of American Civil War re-enacting this chapter furthers our ritual comprehension of the role that contemporary leisure can play in re-enchanting national history. In this case national re-enchantment is explored as it occurs in a partisan way through provoking social conflict and facilitating activism. Over the last two decades, American Civil War battle re-enacting (henceforth referred to as Civil War re-enacting) has been one of the fastest growing leisure activities in the United States with an estimated 50,000 participants. The recent 150th anniversary re-enactment of the battle of Gettysburg alone attracted approximately 10,000 re-enactors (Hurdle 2013). However, it is a pursuit principally being undertaken by politically conservative white men. While a handful of studies have employed ethnographic methods to highlight re-enacting as a serious leisure pursuit involving a search for historical meaning (Allred 2009; Daugbjerg 2013; Hart 2007; Hunt 2004; Schneider 2011; Turner 1990), these are concerned with challenging the popular belief that this re-enacting is a superficial act of 'playing war' rather than highlighting its relationship to nation and the public sphere. Conversely, as detailed below re-enacting has often been cast as the epitome of postmodern hyperreality (Schwartz 2008; Kaufman 2006; Radtchenko 2006; Walsh 1992). This scholarship highlights some of the distinctive characteristics of re-enacting as a ritual form, however, by casting it as inherently superficial its role in terms of historical meaning and contestation is neglected. In contrast, this chapter points to the ideological significance of Civil War re-enacting by empirically detailing how performance factors of the ritual itself engage participants with national history in ways that motivate activism.

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Performance and Political Orthodoxy

In the West there has been a general demise of attachment to the grand narratives of national history. However, out of this trend has arisen a resurgent nationalism by groups within the nation-state holding politically orthodox views. As Hunter (1991, 2006) argues, this differential attachment to the nation in the West is part of a new form of cultural conflict between those holding orthodox and progressive political perspectives. Those holding a new found attachment to the nation overwhelmingly subscribe to orthodoxy, seeing the nation and its heroic historical moments as "an external, definable and transcendent authority"(Hunter 1991, p. 44). They view a moral society as one that "is predicated upon the achievements and traditions of the past……" (Hunter 2006, p. 14), seeking out "reinvigoration and realization of what are considered to be the very noblest ideals and achievements of civilisation" (Hunter 2006, p. 14). These groups are not simply nostalgic but look to the past to address present challenges and problems (Hunter 2006, p. 14). Progressives, by contrast, typically see the nation and historical reverence as obstacles to building a moral society, being indifferent to national identification and suspicious of patriotism. Rather than wishing to be modelled by tradition, progressives are "defined by the spirit of the modern age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism" (Hunter 1991, p. 44) that promotes global integration and post-national ideals of citizenship. As will be outlined later in the chapter, this has allowed political orthodox groups to dominate such rituals as re-enacting.

What new insights into the culture war can be attained by an examination of re-enacting as the basis of attaining a re-enchanted engagement with the nation? Based on a discourse of anti-elitism and literal interpretations of historical texts, the rise of political orthodoxy has typically been understood as a defensive, if not fundamentalist, reaction to postmodernity. Scholars such as Bauman (1995), for example, see the new religious right in the United States as a mere "symptom" (Geertz 1973, p. 200) of the contemporary age, a by-product of an individualist and consumerist culture whereby some inevitably seek refuge in simple truths. The problem with this type of analysis is that it understands orthodox nationalism monolithically, reducing it and its influence to an inevitable consequence of a global late capitalism. In contrast, this monograph has argued for the need to comprehend new forms of nationalism in reference to their own cultural logics and ritual dynamics as well as the structure that they exist within. This involves an appreciation not only of economic and political change but of interacting symbols, multiple actions and patterns of meanings. As argued in the introductory chapter, this is not to defend such cultures but to give them proper analytic attention.

This chapter undertakes this form of cultural analysis for political orthodoxy through examining the activity of American Civil War re-enacting, a popular leisure activity amongst the new political right in the United States. As outlined in the earlier case study of pilgrimage activity to Gallipoli (Chap. 2), while traditional commemorative forms may have worked to reinforce existing ideological beliefs, contemporary rituals of the nation typically disrupt the status quo. The purpose of this chapter though is not to simply show that rituals now generate social conflict.

Cultural scholars already widely appreciate the divergent outcomes of national rituals including contestation of the status quo, as well as their failure to ignite any form of heightened social engagement (Schwartz 2008). Neither is the aim of the chapter to simply argue for a connection between leisure and politics. Various theorists have demonstrated how leisure has been utilised by the state, such as through national memorial holidays, to attain political influence (Berezin 1997; Etzioni 2000). Hobsbawn, amongst others, has argued that this is but one way in which elites have utilised "the importance of 'irrational' elements in the maintenance of the social fabric and the social order" (Hobsbawn 1983, p. 268). As various social theorists have highlighted, leisure is also the basis of less institutional forms of political engagement. This is a consequence of new reflexive self-identities (Bauman 2008; Boltanski and Chiiapello 2005) associated with a collapse of boundaries between consumption and politics. This has been explored in a range of examples, including youth music cultures (Riley et al. 2010), fundraising festivals (Nash 2008) and volunteer tourism (Butcher 2003). However, our knowledge of such 'everyday' political performances are overwhelming from cases associated with progressive politics. Civil War re-enacting, by contrast, provides insights into the relationship between leisure performance and the enactments of political orthodoxy as it relates to the nation. Unlike classical nationalist movements, Civil War re-enacting is not solely focussed on the national identity and formal political processes. In contrast, part of its attraction is that it indirectly but significantly engages in contemporary debates and disenchantments about contemporary social life through its engagement with national history.

Like the politically progressive performances that sociologists are more familiar with analysing, American Civil War re-enactors challenge the monopoly of the state in interpreting the past. However, to fully comprehend the political significance of re-enacting we must appreciate its distinctive ritual characteristics. In particular, account needs to be taken of how it differs from performances primarily associated with projecting meaning to an audience or where ritual influence derives from creating solidarity within the group through heightened social effervescence. While both are applicable to re-enacting, re-enacting through its unique symbolic engagement with the sacred forces us to move beyond a performance perspective that evaluates its significance in relation to the emotional connection or in Alexander's terms "fusion" that can be established between the performance itself and the audience, judged by whether it is considered authentic and compelling (Alexander 2004a, p. 529). However, not all contemporary rituals are undertaken for an audience. As was earlier outlined in relation to pilgrimage (Chap. 2), re-enacting is a new form of recreation that is participatory in nature rather than a rite focussed on portraying meaning to an audience.

In many ways performance studies is apt at comprehending re-enacting. Expanding upon interactionist and dramaturgical theory, it provides a macro account of social change by acknowledging how ritual engagement and the social consensus which results from it have changed over time. By contextualising social structures and variables in time and place it also can comprehend how certain arguments, interpretations and beliefs about history "stand or fall on their ability … to create,

via skilful and affecting performance, the emotional connection of audience with actor and text" (Alexander 2004a, p. 547). It is broadly adaptable to appreciate varying distinctive ritual forms, as evident in its utilisation by a broad array of empirically informed studies where performative social action is seen to be orientated by engagement with collective identities and myths. This includes analysis of the aesthetical aspects of state power (Berezin 1997; Mast 2006), oppositional social movements (Conway 2007; Taylor 2003), terrorist acts (Alexander 2004b; West 2008a) and post-Fordist consumption logics (Sturken 2007; West 2008b). Applying dramaturgical notions such as acting, genres, stages, scripts and audiences to comprehending symbolic action, this perspective has been able to account for the contingent nature of social change, highlighting the contextual and agential factors around why certain issues and events become prominent in the public sphere and why particular interpretations of them win out over others (Jacobs 2000). In reference to the nation, this has encouraged scholars to move beyond the traditional empirical focus on state sanctioned remembrances and the associated dialectical debates about the primordial or instrumental nature of national integration to comprehend a variety of new forms of symbolic engagement with the nation and their political consequences.

To document the social and political consequences of Civil War re-enacting, I argue that performance theory should incorporate Geertz's (1973, 1983) concern with the role of symbols in orientating behaviour. While performance theory is able to provide a strong account of the difficulties involved in meaning-making through re-enacting, something which will be highlighted below, Geertz (1973, 1983) allows us to simultaneously analyse the way this production of culture intersects with the attainment of certain "moods and motivations" (1973, p. 90) amongst the actors themselves. In re-enacting I argue that the shift from focussing on social actors only and performative outcomes in relation to the audience to considering the emotive experience of the ritual by participants. This allows us to understand how such experiences by participants can encourage subsequent social and political action. In re-enacting, the key to this transition is the attainment by participants of what I term an affective authority, which is a belief in having authentically experienced the past and a basis for propagating historical 'truth' to others.

This performance perspective provides a broad theoretical alternative to the postmodern paradigm for studying new leisure based engagements with the nation. In breaking away from Marxism's concern with the material exchange of goods, postmodernists were amongst the first to highlight the growth in such new symbolic engagements with the past. This included pointing to the way they blur commemoration, consumption and play. The analytic frame for analysing these rituals, however, was Baudrillard's theory of hyperreality (1983, 1988). As argued earlier (Chap. 1) this perspective goes too far in emphasising the historical disorientation that result from such historical engagements, and in doing so ignores their potential as a site of deep meaning and political resistance. For Baudrillard the hyperreal involves a replacing of the real with a simulated or virtual world, where it comes to only be "a hallucinatory resemblance of the real with itself" (Baudrillard 1983, p. 3). The hyperreal environment thus is one where the sign loses a cultural refer-

ence point, becoming full of simulacra where the actor is unable to distinguish between the blurring of the real and the copy (1988, pp. 123–124; cf. Lyotard 1984). In Jameson's terms rather than hyperreality being a place of ritual consequences, it is a sphere of 'spectacle' that fosters cultural amnesia, being "dehistoricized and dishistoricizing" (Jameson 1991, p. xvi), leaving "no room for interpretation of the older kind" (Jameson 1991, p. xv).

American Civil War re-enacting has not only been considered illustrative of this hyperreality but the epitome of it. Hall, for example, has argued that "[R]eenacting manifests the postmodern taste for the simulacrum in a nearly pure form … the imitation of history tends to become the primary reality of history. (1994, p. 10). Kaufman similarly holds that in re-enacting the boundaries between the real and the virtual have reached "psychotic proportions" eroding the possibility of portraying any intelligible history (2006, p. 127). These understandings are echoed in the representation of re-enacting in popular culture where it is heavily parodied. In the animated light comedy television show The Simpsons, for example, a school fieldtrip to Diz-Nee Historical Park results in havoc when the group cannot afford the admission fee. Afterwards the class is caught peeking over the wall to Civil War re-enactment field with the re-enactors becoming an angry mob wielding their muskets and chasing them for "learning for free". In the darker animated comedy television show South Park, the child protagonists participate in the annual re-enactment of the fictional Battle of Tamarack Hill, an event sponsored by Jagerminz S'more-flavored Schnapps. After several failed attempts at portraying the battle with accuracy with the taking of the Hill by the Union, the now drunken Confederate re-enactors decide to reverse history and win the battle leaving several injured and dead Union re-enactors.

Contrary to such popular understandings of Civil War re-enacting, this chapter highlights how the ways in which re-enactors strive to attain a deep engagement with the past by using approaches that differ from the solemn forms or remembrance and rationalist approaches to knowledge attainment. The focus is on Civil War re-enacting and the specific argument about its politics do not necessarily relate to other re-enacting forms. While the Civil War is the most popular historical event to be re-enacted, throughout the United States other campaigns from a variety of historical eras and events are also recreated, including the Revolutionary War, the World Wars and the Vietnam conflict (Thompson 2004). Civil War re-enactments also occur outside of the United States, such as through associations in Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom. All these re-enactments though can be understood as part of the broader emergence of living history leisure forms, defined by Anderson as "the simulation of life in another time" (1985, p. 3). Sociologists have undertaken important research on living history pursuits. These have highlighted a diversity of cultures, including in relation to first-person historical interpretation at museums (Tivers 2002; Voase 1999) and historical role playing at historical tourist precincts where costumed interpreters act, work and dress as they might have done in the era (Anderson 1982; Gable and Handler 2000; Maggelssen 2007). Agnew (2007) has also highlighted how the logics of living history underpin popular historical reality television series such as *The Trench* (UK), *Frontier House* (US), *Pioneer*

Quest (Canada) and *The Colony* (Australia). In whatever form it takes, living history involves the use of real or recreated historical artefacts, costumes and dramatic displays to represent and experience the past in order to achieve knowledge of it.

As Crang (1996) and Bruner (1994) argue, such a living history approach can have educational merit. Indeed, in part it draws from a progressive intellectual discourse about understanding the past "from below", focussing on ordinary historical figures and everyday social life. Unlike this academic paradigm, the concern of living history practitioners though is with simulating or recreating a historical place, action or event as part of a broader quest for a sense of 'authenticity' (MacCannell 2001; Meethan 2001). Such a quest can be contrasted with historical simulations that involve greater irony in their portrayal and interpretation by audiences (Urry and Larsen 2012). However, the connection between living history and political orthodoxy which we find in Civil War re-enacting is one that occurs due to a nostalgic view of the contemporary age as inauthentic and a shared critique of history as it is found within the established academic canon (Barr 2005; Handler and Saxton 1988). The emphasis of living history on community teaching is also critical in transforming re-enacting from a leisure pursuit to a kind of social movement with practitioners engaged in activism. The performance analysis that follows begins by considering Civil War re-enacting in relation to the historical development of the genre. The organisational production of the performance will then be outlined and finally its interpretation by audiences detailed.

Producing the Civil War

Broadly it may be true that the victors write history, however, in remembrance of civil wars organisers too are sensitive to the need for post-war nation building and the potential for commemorative activity to reopen cultural divisions. For the Centennial of the American Civil War, re-enactments were selected by organisers as an appropriate commemorative form as it was thought they would help suppress any enduring political divisions between the Northern and Southern states (Bodnar 1992, p. 213). As Bodnar (1992, p. 208) demonstrates, organisers deliberately encouraged the spectacle of re-enactments, along with pageants, historical displays and tours of battlefields, as a way of promoting patriotism without rekindling sentiments of regionalism. Re-enactments also flourished as a consequence of the federal Commission's decentralisation strategy to encourage state and local celebrations that would be relevant for Americans. While many re-enactments encouraged public participation, and as such being an early form of contemporary re-enacting, others were spectator focussed productions. This included the largest re-enactment of the centennial, the 1961 recreation of the Battle of Manassas, undertaken by members of the U.S. Army on the site of the original battle with the permission of National Park Service. The involvement of the armed forces was frequently legitimised by framing the Civil War as the origins of modern warfare (Public Information Office 1962). Other spectator focussed re-enactment de-emphasised such historical

ties, being promoted as within a culture of celebration. The Charleston Confederate Centennial Commission's re-enactment of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, for example, advertised its pyrotechnics display as recreating the past as "only fireworks can authentically recreate" (Ohio Fireworks Company 1961).

As the popularity of battle re-enactments began to overwhelm more official solemn initiatives they were subject to widespread media criticism which led to the state distancing itself from this commemorative form (Bodnar 1992, p. 213). As Bodnar (1992, p. 241) notes, the commercial aspects of re-enactments, which included the public willingly paying to play soldiers, did not sit easy with either the aim of centennial planners to provide both sombre remembrance and civic education. While the sanctioning of re-enactments had originally been done as a way of limiting cultural divisions, there was also a concern that re-enacting had revived sympathies for the confederate cause. Ralph McGill, publisher of the *Atlanta Constitution* was particularly critical, declaring that re-enactments were responsible for a popularist culture of remembrance in the South, whereby people were apparently involved in "wearing sleazy-imitations of Confederate uniforms, growing beards, making ancient wounds bleed again … and otherwise doing a great disservice to the memory of those who fought and died" (quoted in Bodnar 1992, p. 214). The Centennial Commission, whose most influential members were citizens with military backgrounds, were sensitive to such criticism and from December 1961 it went on record "opposing any and all battle re-enactments" (Robertson 1962). It declared that "re-enactments possess too much celebratory spirit and too little commemorative reverence … This soldier playing mocks the dead" (quoted in Bodnar 1992, p. 215). The decentralisation strategy of the Centennial organisers resulted in the public continue to flock to re-enactments that were arranged by local organising committees. However, this would mark the end of the state's widespread utilisation of Civil War re-enacting as a commemorative form.

As I have outlined above, American Civil War re-enacting would re-emerge years later in the guise of a mainstream leisure rite. In part this can also be considered part of the post-Vietnam War growth in paramilitary masculine identities, with anti-heroic sentiment replacing the traditional victory culture in the recalling of United States history (Gibson 1994). However, as outlined above this understanding alone is somewhat reductionist. Rather than being inevitable its continuation can be understood as a consequence of its survival, if only irregularly, in various non-state guises. In particular, contemporary re-enacting should be understood as the product of two related performances. Firstly, there were a number of one-off re-enactments associated with the 125th anniversary of the Civil War which again sparked public interest in re-enacting. The Battle of Manassas re-enactment in 1986 involving six thousand re-enactors is particularly considered as influential in raising public interest in the recreational pursuit (Hadden 1996, p. 5). The professional choreographed spectator focussed re-enactment of the Battle of Antietam in 1987, however, is equally significant as its scale created a supply of replica uniforms and armaments which helped supply subsequent recruits to Civil War re-enacting. Secondly, the rise of the North-South Skirmish Association (NSSA) who engaged in shooting competitions with original and reproduction civil war 'black-powder'

pistols, rifles and cannons was important in supplying replica armaments and significantly produced knowledge of how they could be safely used with black powder. This not only gave the performance of recreational re-enacting a greater sense of authenticity in terms of display but provided the material culture necessary to achieve an emotional sense of living history (Agnew 2007; During 2007). From an ethnographic study of Civil War re-enacting, for example, Strauss (2003) argues that the uniform is particularly significant, being "used to step into character and to drape history over the shoulders of re-enactors … [W]ithout … the stage upon which history was replayed evaporates…" (2003, p. 159). The sacredness of the uniform is also indicated in a Civil War re-enacting handbook's statement that "when you wear these clothes, they will have much more significance than anything else you have ever worn (Hadden 1996, p. 35). Today there is a cottage industry of Civil War replicas with a national network of sutler stores which can supply re-enactors with 'authentically' reproduced and company specific uniforms, weaponry, saddles and tack, musical instruments and camping accessories.

Below I explore how these materials provide the props for engaging in a performance of contemporary Civil War re-enacting by drawing on my own ethnographic observation of the 135th anniversary Battle of Gettsburg re-enactment and interviews with twenty-two participants, ten Confederate and twelve Union re-enactors. This is the largest Civil War re-enactment ever undertaken with an estimated 41,000 participants (reenactor.net). All interviews were conducted in the week following the re-enactment with informants recruited at the Colt Museum, Gettysburg Sutler and Wax Museum, all local sites at which Civil War re-enactors shop for supplies, gather socially and undertake educational encampments. As a disputed territory during the war, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, provides a strategic research site for sampling both confederate and union re-enactors. It is not argued that this interview sample is representative of re-enactors across the United States but instead that they provide a rich insight into the broad culture of re-enacting, both at a pragmatic and ideological level. While much is made in the media of 'hardcore' re-enactors, enthusiasts who produce an extreme portrayal of the average soldier including sleeping without tents and fighting without boots, my focus is on the more everyday participant in re-enacting.

A key characteristic of the performance perspective is the notion that social action cannot be reduced to the consideration of social structure, that even when scripts are set, each performance is unique and distinctive, being the outcome of different embodied interplays between stages, scripts, actors, props, audiences etc. This performative contingency is a key characteristic of Civil War re-enacting. As a voluntarily organised recreational pursuit its portrayal is altered by a number of production pragmatics. The selection of a stage is of key importance. While the site where blood was spilt has an inherent sacredness, the United States National Parks Service (NPS) has banned any forms of re-enactment being undertaken on the original battlefields. This cultural divide is illustrated in a NPS study into their relationship with re-enactors, with many NPS personnel stating that they are troubled by the desire of reenactors to recreate combat and the aim to provide spectators with a stimulating but eventually sanitised portrayal of the destructive horror of war (Stan-

ton 1999, p. 23). The most attractive surrogate site for re-enactments are open fields close to original battlefields. The 135th Gettysburg anniversary re-enactment, for example, took place at Bushy Farm, six miles from the battlefields. Greater improvisation is required for re-enactments that occur elsewhere in the United States, or indeed internationally, where the Civil War was not fought. For example, in opening scenes of Jessica Yu's documentary *Men of reenaction* (1994) a re-enactment is staged on a Californian beach.

Various considerations of production are also involved in the choreographing of battles. A significant degree of effort is taken in arranging the performance; however, portrayals remain highly contingent as re-enactments are reliant upon co-operation between and within the multiple independent units of the two armies of re-enactors. A key issue is the willingness of participants to conform to certain role restrictions. In the Pickett's Charge re-enactment at Gettysburg, for example, only one person is permitted to play General Robert Lee. Similarly within any unit there can only be one commanding officer and so forth. Yet competition to play such elite roles is less than might be assumed with a majority of re-enactors happy to be portraying soldiers of lower rank believing that in this role they can best honour those who lost their lives in the Civil War. In Turner's terms this is a form of liminal status reversal that sees an inversion of hierarchies which normally hold sway in society (1969). This is illustrated in the quotes below in which two re-enactors describe their decision to re-enact soldiers of low rank.

> I think what we do is basically a man in the ranks and the reasons we do is to teach and to sort of honour what they did. These are men who gave everything … I like the ones I am doing, it is a nameless man in the ranks (Union Private, Age: 42, Retired Prison Guard).

> Private (chose to re-enact) cause they were the ones out there fighting … the low lifes of the Confederate army and they were the dogs and they did the work and a lot of them died and they were all Americans (Confederate Private, Age: 28, Truck Driver).

A successful re-enactment also requires the relatively equal involvement of re-enactors of both armies. While public concern with Civil War re-enacting has been with portrayals of the confederacy, evoking fears that it encourages nostalgia for pre-Civil Rights beliefs (Horwitz 1998; Farmer 2005), re-enacting is also popular in the northern states of America. The residency or heritage of re-enactors though does not determine their selection of units and armies. There are, of course, some re-enactors that have either a parochial attachment or family lineage which they feel directed their decision to portray either the Union or Confederate army. However, a vast majority in the interview sample expressed more pragmatic and circumstantial factors in coming to join a particular unit. Significantly, when re-enactors in the interview sample clearly associated themselves with a particular army, this was most often linked to their personality traits rather than any lingering ideological beliefs associated with the North or South. Consider the quotes below regarding to the particular ways in which re-enactors happened to join one particular unit from either side. As we will explore later in the chapter, the cultural attachment for re-enactors is most prominently to the living history genre itself and its approach to understandings the past than to a particular side of the Civil War.

> Originally I am from Connecticut and Pennsylvania … I came to a Gettysburg re-enactment to get contacts. And initially I was walking around the Union camps and many of them had told me that to come back when you get all your gear … so I start wandering the Confederate camps … and in five minutes I had a uniform, accoutrements, a rifle in hand and cartridges and I was ready to take the field that day. And I fully didn't expect to do that (Confederate, Age: 38, Museum Director).

> I had always wanted to do a Union impression (as) primarily the four ancestors that I know of that fought in the American Civil War all fought for the Union. However … the church I was going to at the time in Frederick Maryland, a man that went to that church was in the 9th Virginia Cavalry … the guys were really into it and you know really into historical accuracy doing a real quality impression … And so I went ahead and joined that unit and really enjoyed it (Union private (previously Confederate) Age: 40, Military Soldier).

> I considered Confederate because it just suits my personality better. I am a Pennsylvania resident. I've grown up in Pennsylvania. I've always been in a state of the Union and you know personally I can understand why they did it but I've always been the type of person takes (the side) for the underdog and during the war the Confederates … (Confederate, Age: 21, Labourer).

The ability of re-enactments to resemble original battles is of course not reliant upon the national totals of re-enactors but a fairly equal distribution of re-enactors from both armies at any particular battle. Unequal numbers is addressed by what is known as galvinizing, where re-enactors willingly switch sides to improve the historical accuracy of the re-enactment. Such is the frequency of this practice that many re-enactors have both a union and confederate uniform. Units themselves also have spare uniforms and equipment to facilitate galvinising. This is not to say that re-enactors do not have a commitment to portraying one army and unit. Many do not galvinise as they state that this would weaken their ability to authentically portray the past. Others who do galvinise note that their performance creates for them different emotional states, at times which are "uncomfortable".

> I strive to do a 100 % impression of what I do which requires a great deal of time, investigation, investment in equipment and research … to turn around and do a 15 % impression of a federal would be counter productive to what I am trying to achieve (Confederate, Age: 38, Museum Director).

> When I first started re-enacting … I played a Confederate … And you do it differently. It just feels different. You're a Rebel. You're rebelling. It feels strange shooting at your flag too. It's hard to explain. You definitely feel different … In a way you feel more free in a way. It makes me feel uncomfortable (Union Sergeant, Age: 46, Library assistant).

Another problem in the choreographing of Civil War re-enactment is the assigning of particular roles to units and individuals within them. An ongoing issue is the willingness of re-enactors to die in battle scenes. During the Civil War cannon fire and musket volleys killed many before battle lines met and hand to hand conflict ensued. Re-enacting units deploy various strategies to deal with the propensity of participants to want to engage in the final stages of fighting, to come face to face with the enemy. Some units draw numbers randomly from a hat, in others the commanding officer determines when particular individuals will fall, and who will be

Fig. 3.1 Civil War re-enactors. (Compliments Mads Daugbjerg)

dead and who will be injured. Volunteers also come forward to fall early from the less aerobically fit members of the group who suffer during summer battles while wearing the stifling wool uniforms (Fig. 3.1). Despite such organisation, circumstance can result in the battles being complete farces. In local re-enactments this is most likely to be associated with levels of participation. In larger battles of historical significance it is more likely to emerge as re-enactors become swept up in the emotional energy of the performance. The quotes below demonstrate two different ways in which the portrayal of battle can lose historical accuracy.

> Here in Gettysburg … it was 1982 … There was 286 Confederates at the event and there was only twenty Federals, that was it. Not one of the Confederates would galvinize to do federals …One canon went off, all the other five are loaded, one canon went off, everyone went down … The battle lasted one minute … And when we did the next one some of the Confederates galvinized… (Union, Age: 41, Handicap Instructor).

> Like when we did the Sunken Road at Antietam … we finally went up for a final push, we were to cross the fence, cross the road to 50 yards beyond and then the battle was going to be over. Well we got up there … hand to hand combat in most reenactments is a no no … And that's all it was! We got across the fence and the Confederates didn't want to (relinquish) their spot so we got across and it was like real. And I watched guys swinging rifles and stuff … They couldn't have stopped it if they wanted to … after it was over everybody was hugging everybody else and crying and it's just a feeling, it's just unreal (Union Captain, Age: 40, Motor Mechanic).

As explored below, such moments for re-enactors are often thought of as providing highly authentic experiences, times in which they conceive that they have attained a true comprehension of what it was like to be involved in the Civil War. This is illustrative of the competing aims of re-enactment: to mimetically portray the past and to achieve mnemonic engagement with it.

Affective Capital and Cultural Conflict

Unsurprisingly re-enactors hold a strong nostalgia for the past. To "revert to the simpler ways of an alleged Golden Age in an earlier lifestyle" has long been a key characteristic of national attachment (Smith 1986, p. 175). As has been outlined above, in contemporary society such nostalgia is not universal but rather differentially held. Nostalgic engagement with the past in re-enacting is not only a characteristic of political orthodoxy, it is a weapon utilised by these groups in the culture war (Hunter 1991, 2006). The attachment to the past amongst Civil War re-enactors of both armies correlates with this broader worldview. As outlined in the quotes below, this includes a literal understanding in the significance of God, a strong anti-abortion position, a belief in the differences between men and women, and opposition to a strong welfare state.

> There was a lot more belief in God…. And you don't have all that now. It's a shame that we don't because society is missing the big picture on life (Confederate, Age: 21, Labourer).

> I think in modern life people have no respect, no responsibilities … I don't believe in abortion. I mean you are killing a baby, you're killing a person … (Union Captain, Age: 40, Motor Mechanic)

> I hope people don't take this wrong but (today) women want to do what men do but back then men did one thing and women did another. That is how I look at it. Women didn't work in the factories, men did. Women stayed at home, sewed, did this did that … (Confederate Private, Age: 21, Factory Worker).

> Back then you worked for it. What you put into it is what you got out of it but in life today you can put your best in (and) you still can't make it. Big brother up there always trying to knock you down (Confederate, Age: 40, Technician).

However, from a performative perspective it is important not to reduce our understanding of ritual to the political beliefs of its participants as symbolic engagement attenuates these and orientates subsequent political action. As will be elaborated upon later in the chapter, part of the political power of re-enacting is that it celebrates the traditional puritan beliefs outlined above but in a way that participants embrace rather than deny themselves the gratification of play and leisure. We will also see later in the chapter that participants face various hardships and risks in re-enacting though, as the quotes below illustrate, re-enactors also readily admit that it is also a leisure pursuit that they enjoy. Lasting for either a weekend or for up to an entire week, re-enacting provides a form of escapism. Consider the quotes below as illustrative of how participants view re-enacting as a leisure activity and a time for bonding with family members away from everyday routines and stresses.

> I have a wife and three children and they come out and have a great time. The kids run around with other kids. My wife talks to the other women and it's all just like a family atmosphere. We're all just one big happy family (Confederate, Age: 21, Labourer)

> It is the one hobby and the one getaway that I do on a weekend that you don't think of any of your troubles at home. You don't think about work. You don't think about your car payments due. You don't think about what you have to do around the house. It just doesn't even come into your mind. It is just like a total getaway (Union Private, Age: 55).

> It was mostly for him (son) and to get away together. I do it more so now to get away from reality. You know away from telephones and everyday life. It's really stress free, that's what's nice about it (Union corporal, Age: 50, Insurance Broker).

While critics of re-enacting often belittle it in relation to the more solemn moods of modernist commemoration that dominate Western remembrance of warfare, re-enactors themselves perceive little if any contradiction between the often carnivalesque nature of re-enacting and the reverence they have for national history. The leisure dimension of re-enacting is clearly acknowledged by re-enactors but this is seen as compatible with living history logics that argue understanding of the past requires one to become physically and spiritually removed from the complexities of the modern world. In re-enacting, participants believe that they must withdraw from their normal routines and environment in order to attain an intimate appreciation and understanding of the Civil War. For this reason Civil War re-enacting is best understood in Geertz's terms as a form of "deep play" where the seeming trivial dimensions of leisure are underpinned by contemplation of broader dilemmas about the nature of the world (Geertz 1972). In the performance of Civil War re-enacting though this emotional engagement within the past is not inherent or guaranteed through mere participation. Instead it is somewhat illusive and fleeting, involving a great deal of emotional work, including the altering of bodily expression and cognitive thought (Hochschild 1990), as well as contingent on environmental variables such as the weather and the authentic display of others, including the production of noise, such as through the use of black powder, battle cries and war drums. Consider the role of these variables in the quotes below in which re-enactors describe the times in which they experienced time travel, both during as well as outside of simulating battle.

> Almost impossible to describe without actually being there. When you're looking at a line of men, then all of a sudden there's 3000 rifle muskets all aimed at you. It certainly does get the adrenalin going … That is very close to what it is like (Confederate, Age: 38, Museum Director).

> To me I wouldn't say its fun … to me it's something kind of serious and special. We try and represent as best we can how the fighting was done. And sometimes through the smoke and everything and the sound it is almost like being transported back into time … So it is kind of a way of history coming alive to me, that's why I like it (Union Private, Age: 40, Military Soldier).

> Just looking down and seeing the feet and the dust and how your vision is limited if you're in a rear rank or in the middle of a column. All of that and sometimes at night too. The campfires and the way the lighting is really gives you an idea of the way it was (Union Sergeant, Age: 46).

As illustrated in the quotes above, there is little sense that most re-enactors attain complete temporal disorientation. The quotes also indicate that 'time travel' is not

Fig. 3.2 Civil War re-enacting camp site. (Compliments Mads Daugbjerg)

only achieved within battle but through more mundane activities during weekend re-enactments, including at campsites (Fig. 3.2). While re-enactors only engage in a simulation of fighting, an important part of participants seeing it as an appropriate form of historical remembrance is that it involves a level of hardship and danger. In relation to the former, sleeping and the wearing of uniforms is often noted. In relation to the latter, re-enactors cite the risks associated with the use of explosives, cavalry and the acting out of hand to hand combat scenes.

> Brogans are murder on your feet. Your feet hurt. In the summertime the heat is unbearable….Bad enough … in shorts and t-shits, but you start talking about wool uniforms … (Confederate Captain, Age: 50).

> I've seen people die. I've seen people get ram rods put through them. I've lost my sight. I've been knocked out, got stiches, heat exhaustion … I've seen people get trampled and men fall off horses … (Confederate, Age: 40, Technician).

In postmodern terms it could thus be argued that this re-enacting rite is less 'schizophrenic' (Jameson 1991, p. 27) than has been widely considered. However, when the living history ideal of 'time travel' is attained it significantly alters participants' 'mood' (Geertz 1973) and relationship to history. Principally it provides them with a belief of knowing history and an experience which they can utilise in claiming an authority for authentically comprehending the past. This becomes activated by the broader culture of re-enacting that involves a commitment to teaching history to others. This occurs through educational activities at re-enactments, museums and in schools. For many re-enactors the educational dimension is a large part of being involved in this subculture with many preferring to refer to themselves as history teachers rather than re-enactors. This teaching though does not simply aim to encourage a greater awareness of the Civil War but is directed at challenging dominant historical narratives which they see as misrepresenting the past and as such providing a poor basis for contemporary society. Consider the evangelistic zeal of re-enactors regarding teaching in their self-description of why they are involved in the leisure pursuit.

> If we can get one person to change their attitude or rethink their opinions and give them a new direction we really have done a whole lot" (Union Private, Age: 42, Retired Prison Guard)

> The only way the story is really going to be told is by people who really do their research, really learn, live it and show it (Union Private, Age 55).

Most re-enactors research historical sources in preparing to re-enact, focussing on diaries and regimental histories of those directly involved in battles. As such they have a certain textual claim to intellectual knowledge. Re-enacting manuals outline strategies for deploying such insights, including principals followed by the National Parks Service (Hadden 1996, p. 10). Re-enactors claims to historical expertise in their teaching though tends to emphasise and ultimately rest on their emotional experience of re-enacting and bearing witness to the simulation of the past, which allows them to claim a particular affective authority in arguing against established historical entrepreneurs and those that produce and sustain them such as professional historians and school teachers (Fig. 3.3). Consider the quotes below in which re-enactors claim an authority in understanding history.

> What you receive in your history classes is a filtered down version and the politically accepted version of what happened. And you learn through re-enacting and research of your units and research of battles and research of people through local records and through personal accounts and diaries that what you learnt in school is not what it was at all. It was very different (Confederate, Age: 38, Museum Director).

> Being a re-enactor makes you understand it more, understand out forefathers more, what they went through. And they had guts, true heart. I mean they suffered and reading books doesn't let you comprehend it until you go actually out and do this. When you start doing it and you get raped up into it, you understand! (Union, Age: 41, Handicap Instructor).

Much of this rhetoric is framed by the logics of living history emphasising aesthetic representations and empathetic understanding, which has synergies with shifts in popular educational pedagogies (Crang 1996). Indeed, many well intentioned history teachers invite or take up offers by re-enactors to address their classes in the spirit of bringing history to life for their students. However, the educational activities led by Civil War re-enactors are not simply an alternative way of understanding the war that focuses on minutiae and the first person perspective. Rather the performance that re-enactors use in the classroom (Fig. 3.3) is a platform for challenging more substantial aspects of contemporary historical knowledge. As demonstrated in the quotes below, this is most evident in the central insistence by re-enactors of both armies that the Civil War was not fought over the issue of slavery.

> It's a lot of fun going out there and blowing powder and playing war but the main part of it is teaching the public exactly what went on because a lot of them think it was fought over slavery which it wasn't. It was fought over state's rights (Confederate, Age: 40, Technician).

> I guess you almost become more of a crusader for the truth. Because you are learning you want to go out and say hey everybody it wasn't just fought to free the slaves, it was so much more than that the way it started out (Union Captain, Age:50).

Fig. 3.3 Re-enacting in the classroom

The Civil War and slavery has been a continual site of cultural politics and form a central trauma narrative around which Afro-Americans have become culturally accepted as full United States citizens (Eyerman 2002). As Barry Schwartz notes, a key aspect of this has been the historical linking of Abraham Lincoln and the Emancipation Proclamation (Schwartz 1997) to modern civil rights beliefs about racial equality. To challenge the contemporary tie between slavery and the Civil War is not necessarily historically inaccurate but it does work to untangle the cultural basis around which the majority blacks in the United States have been able to legitimately identify themselves as being both American and of African heritage. The slavery issue though is not principally racially motivated but is seen by re-enactors as emblematic of a broader historical revisionism and cultural relativism dominant in contemporary American culture and education. For example, it is used by re-enactors as a basis for also contesting the role of religion in public education, affirmative action, minority rights and sexual norms.

Re-enactors seldom are activists for particular social issues or political causes. This helps them maintain their self-perception as living historians and educators.

However, in arguing for states' rights being the principal reason for why the war was fought, they attempt to reinstate a type of reconciliation memory of the Civil War, something that was dominant in the several decades following the end of fighting. In this narrative the traumas associated with bloodshed are interpreted in terms of shared sacrifice and the bonding of the nation. It was this meaning that allowed for and was propagated by the ritual of soldier reunions in which veterans would wear their old uniforms, socialise and drink alcohol. For example, the 50th anniversary the Battle of Gettysburg had seen a mass encampment of approximately 40,000 veterans wearing their uniforms and it even included a kind of re-enactment of the Battle of Pickett Charge. However it was only carried out by a handful of selected veterans and there "were no flashing sabers, no guns roaring with shell … at the end, in places of wounds or prisons or death, were handshakes, speeches and mingling cheers (Gray Meet Blue Again in 'Battle' 1913, p. 4). The reconciliation narrative is not traditionally racist in that it contains no notions of racial supremacy and does not attempt to defend slavery. However, it is representative of political orthodoxy in that it allows for a celebration of the past, avoiding assigning moral indignation to the South, stressing notions of equality and egalitarianism rather than contemporary cultural emphasis on respectful recognition of cultural differences, particularly around race and gender (Honneth 1995; Taylor 1994).

In this way re-enactors highlight the orientation of nationalism to cultural uniformity and the difficulty it has incorporating cultural hybridity (Bauman 2000). Re-enacting is not the typical form of ritual that we would associate with an insistence on cultural uniformity and rejection of cultural hybridity, for as we have seen the experience of re-enacting involves a "fuzzy" creative mind and the cognitive collapsing of modern classifications (Zerubavel 1991). The political power of re-enacting is not that it symbolically reflects pre-existing ideological beliefs but that it orientates them through participants attaining an affective authority in laying claim to authentically comprehend the past. By bringing together the logics of living history with political orthodoxy, Civil War re-enacting as a social movement has been driven by a new cognitive understanding of the past (Eyerman and Jamison 1991), one that is ritually based by privileging experiential leaning and playfulness in advancing contemporary social conservatism. This differs from the puritan worldviews that traditionally has had a "tendency toward uniformity of life" and "repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh" (Weber 1992, p. 114). Perhaps the principal attraction of re-enacting amongst politically orthodox groups is that it legitimises an engagement with impulsive culture in the name of a culture of restraint, even if embedded in this are cultural contradictions that defy the traditions that re-enactors aim to protect (Habermas and Ben-Habib 1981). In this way re-enacting can be considered representative of broader shifts within political orthodoxy in the United States, with the religious right embracing popular culture genres that once were the sole domain of political progressivism, including rock music (Luhr 2009), science fiction (McAlister 2003) and self-help literature (Singleton 2004).

In this regard we can think of the current political significance of political orthodoxy in the West, less in terms of the number of adherents and more in terms their affective power. Hunter (1991, 2006) argues that the culture wars have caused

a new cultural realignment, suggesting a somewhat equal divide in society, as well as within institutions and groups such as established political parties, churches and ethnic collectives. However, attitudinal survey research has shown that no such clear division exists, with the orthodox position on many issues remaining a minority one (DiMaggio et al. 1996). Indeed around issues of national attachment attitudinal studies find that there are greater levels of consensus between groups, including migrants (Clark 2009), than social theory often assumes, particularly in discussions of a post-national future characterized by some kind of 'super diversity' (Vertovec 2009). It is in the public sphere and through ritual performances though that the culture war gets played out and as I have argued, in terms of activism it is not the political belief that is significant but the attainment of affective authority in motivating individuals to take up the fight.

Counter Performances

To what extent should re-enactment as a commemorative rite be associated with political orthodoxy? All historical engagements tend to be open to the accusation that they are conservative as they remember a past society with different values and demographic constitutions, one prior to the ideas of civil rights, gender equality and cultural tolerance. However, as we saw in the case study of Gallipoli (Chap. 2), there are different degrees to which national history excludes the 'Other'. There certainly is not anything inherent within re-enacting that associates it with political orthodoxy. While the majority of Civil War re-enactors advance an orthodox social and racial agenda, various counter performances have also come from divergent groups and individuals who subscribe to the re-enacting subculture. The dominant comprehension of slavery amongst re-enactors, for example, has been challenged by the twenty African-American orientated Civil War re-enacting units spread throughout the United States (Fields-White 2011). Many of these were encouraged to form by the popular Hollywood film *Glory* (1989) that depicted the all-black 54th Massachusetts Voluntary Infantry.

The meanings of Civil War re-enacting have also been co-opted by the state itself, with some incremental shifts to incorporate re-enacting within state sanctioned commemorations. This is most obvious with Afro-American re-enacting groups being invited to march in both of President Barack Obama's inauguration parades. The involvement of re-enactors from Coloured Troops was widely reported as addressing a failure of recognition of the contribution to the war, with few marching in the victory parade after the war. However, this was not the first time that re-enactors had been involved, in this rite with the Union 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment based in Georgia having marched in George Bush Jnr's 2005 inauguration parade at the invitation of Vice President Dick Cheney whose great-grandfather fought with during the Civil War. Given the numbers attending significant anniversary battles it is unlikely that politicians and the state would ignore it. While the National Parks Service continues to disallow re-enactments on original battlefields,

for events such as the 150th Gettysburg re-enactment it must work closely with re-enactment organisers as such events have flow on effects with increased numbers of tourists visiting the battlefields during that time. This falls well short of the type of state involvement that we saw in the centennial but it does indicate the ways in which the popularity of re-enacting both encourages and demands involvement by the state. In other national contexts the state is less reluctant to adopt re-enacting as a commemorative form, actually initiating them and supplying the re-enactors. For example, as part of the recent 60th anniversary commemorations of the Korean War a re-enactment of the 1950 Battle of the Naktong Bulge was performed, with South Koreans soldiers in dress playing soldiers from both armies.

The logics of living history have also been used to address gender discrimination. This is particularly evident in the much publicised sex discrimination suit by Lauren Cook Burgess who was banned from undertaking Civil War battle re-enactments on the basis of being a woman. Cook Burgess subsequently won the case by highlighting that women, an estimated 400, did fight during the war as part of the infantry, cavalry and artillery by disguising themselves as men(Young 1999, p. 288). The research for the suit would later provide a basis of significant publications with Burgess now holding something of a public intellectual status, being featured in publications such as the Smithsoniam Magazine and the Magazine of the Civil War Society. Her first book *An Uncommon Soldier: The Civil War Letters of Sarah Rosetta Wakeman, alias Pvt. Lyons Wakeman, 153rd Regiment, New York State Volunteers, 1862–1864* (1994) is claimed to be the only type known to exist. Her second book *They Fought Like Demons: Women Soldiers in the Civil War* (Blanton and Cook 2002) saw her collaborate with DeAnne Blanton from the United States National Archives. Like other re-enactors, it is Burgess' status as a re-enactor as well as the scholarship itself which has brought this story into the public sphere. Subsequently there has been a widespread acceptance of women fighting in the ranks amongst the Civil War re-enacting community, with the dissemination of the history of women soldiers significant in encouraging the growing numbers of women in the ranks and their continued involvement with the recreational pursuit. For example, the Civil War magazine *Camp Chase Gazette* recently profiled Mary Henderson who re-enacts as Private Marty Hendrickson in the New River Rifles—24th Virginia Infantry Regiment. Asked why she decided to portray a solider, she replies:

> When I went to my first event I met I met some other women who were portraying soldiers. They had told me stories about demales who had fought as soldiers during the Civil War. I knew that was what I wanted to do as well. I still love hearing and reading about the women who were soldiers during the Civil War ('Ten Questions for women in the ranks' 2014)

While still very much a minority, women are particularly prominent in cavalry units (Hart 2007). For both Afro-American and women re-enactors, it is their use of living history logics and their attainment of affective authority through participation in re-enacting which allows for a more inclusive historical narrative.

These progressive counter performances are more representative of the type of protest that have been analysed within performance studies, such as symbolic re-

sistance by minority groups and culturally marginal figures such as those in the arts (Bell 2007; Taylor 2003). Judith Butler (1999) amongst others, for example, has argued how gender norms can be subverted through alternative performative acts. From this perspective the analysis of Civil War re-enacting addresses a dearth of research on the ‘everyday’ politics of politically orthodox groups, helping us to appreciate that the power of performance exists independent of any one point on the political spectrum. However, in the West it would be doubtful that political progressive groups would extensively engage in the act of re-enacting history as political progressivism is overwhelmingly linked to post-national sentiment. For example, survey research in the West shows that amongst young adults there is a particularly prominent rejection of the national in preference of supra-national affiliation (Fenton 2007). Comparatively we know that political progressivism can be associated with nationalism. The post-colonial context provides ample examples of revolutionaries looking to nationalism, and its association with democracy and individual rights, for greater freedom. This will be again explored in the next chapter on national patriotism and the ‘distant suffering’ (Boltanski 1999) of ‘Others’. It will be argued it will be argued that not only can national attachment attain a cosmopolitan orientation (Chap. 2) but that this can have an important role to play in adequately addressing global environmental problems.

Conclusion

Through a performance analysis of Civil War re-enacting we have seen how a dramaturgical and carnivalesque engagement with history can re-enchant when the act is combined with the logics of political orthodoxy. While postmodern literature has framed the politically orthodox nationalism associated with re-enacting as a defensive reaction to unstoppable global developments and fragmenting social forces, we have seen how it is a dynamic cultural entity reliant on its own rituals. The emphasis of the case study has not been on the reinforcing of particular historical beliefs for participants but how participation in re-enacting allows for subsequent political performances and activity. The experience of re-enacting is highly variable, reflecting the practicality of performance, but all re-enactors interviewed noted that they had at various times achieved their aim of losing historical consciousness. This in most cases is only momentarily though it is assigned important cultural significance and allows re-enactors to feel they have directly experienced the sacred. It is something that is empowering, both motivating re-enactors emotionally and providing them with a resource to challenge the existing dominant interpretation of the Civil War. Ultimately the political influence of re-enacting rests on these subsequent performances undertaken in museums and at schools.

This study attempted to contribute to the emerging academic literature on performance by highlighting the need to move beyond the study of their production and reception to also comprehend their affect on actors themselves. As similarly outlined in relation to pilgrimage (Chap. 2), re-enacting provides a unique symbolic

engagement with the sacred with its power not being diffused but located in the way participants can undertake emotional and organisational work independent of the state, allowing for a more direct engagement with the sacred. In Geertz's terms, the 'mood' of this rite allows them to claim an affective authority, 'motivating' (Geertz 1973) them to challenge dominant historical accounts. From this perspective Civil War Reenacting should be understood as one of a number of ways that political orthodox groups in the United States have become politically mobilized to attain an unprecedented influence within the public sphere. The performance analysis undertaken does not assume the re-enchantment of the nation for society as a whole but neither does it start from the belief that national identification is incompatible with the ethos of the current age. In the terms of cultural sociology it allows us to conceptualise the nation as a cultural symbol that exists relatively independent (Alexander 2003) from instrumental and material forces and as such highlights the power of culture to direct social change.

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Chapter 4
Dialogical History in a Time of Crisis: Tourist Logics and the 2002 Bali Bombings

The rituals examined thus far in the monograph have involved re-engagement with and the re-imagining of national foundation moments. The re-enchantment of the nation, however, not only involves the remembering and commemoration of history. Also significant is the way national pasts help frame contemporary conflicts and uncertainties. This is an under studied aspect of national identification. For example, there is an established literature on memory and trauma within cultural sociology (Eyerman 2002; Schudson 1992; Wagner-Pacifici 2000; Zelizer 1992) though the historical frames used during such episodes have been little explored. From a postmodern perspective it is assumed that the evoking of the nation during such times of upheaval is reactive and short-lived rather than representing a basis for seriously re-engaging with history. This chapter examines what Schwartz's refers to as the role of collective memory in a "time of crisis" (1996) through an study of Australia's response and subsequent commemoration of the 2002 Bali bombing terrorist act. While international terrorism is frequently cited by postmodern theorists to highlight the deficiencies of the nation-state, the Bali bombing case highlights how national identities can play an important role in countering terrorism without indiscriminately demonising Others and evoking fears of cultural difference. In Geertz's terms, this is an instance when the nation provides a cultural 'model' that enables "us to react to such a tragedy not 'blindly' but 'intelligently'" (Geertz 1973, p. 216).

Crisis and Narrative

In order to examine the role national collective memory can play in framing a crisis, this chapter again follows Clifford Geertz's schema of a cultural system (Geertz 1973, 1983). As outlined in Chap. 3, cultural systems operate discursively through symbolic patterns and programs that provide members of collectives both with a "model of" society—which resonates with its cultural life and logics—and a "mod-

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el for" society—offering a cultural template for directing social action. As such Geertz accounts for the programmatic influence of culture on social action while appreciating how culture provides a resource for actors to creatively use in constructing meaning. As outlined in Chap. 1, Maurice Halbwachs (1950) sees collective memory working in a similar way where the past structurally restricts and shapes our understanding of the present while also being selectively remembered and evoked in ways that engage with present concerns, needs and power structures. The Geertzian framework, however, avoids pre-empting either the presence or absence of sacred historical events, figures and places in the narration of crisis. As such it allows a measure of historical consciousness in (post)modern society. Contrary to traditional applications of Durkheimian perspectives (see Chap. 1), I do not assume that there is one well defined national sacred that becomes illuminated within crisis episodes. Rather, there are multiple symbolic frames that compete in prompting and orientating interpretation by commentators and social actors. This search for narrative comprehension occurs within a liminal state where there is no existing dominant or embedded meaning.

The discursive constructions of terrorist acts are particularly significant as they have 'real-world' implications for domestic social cohesion and international conflict. Unlike conventional warfare, the objective of terrorism is not to rationally deplete the resources of the enemy but to engage in violent action with the aim of creating fear and intimidation (Khosrokhavar 2005; Pape 2005; Schmid and Jongman 1988). Solidarity discourses that counter this objective, however, can amplify perceptions of threat and advance xenophobic sentiment. This in turn may strengthen latent support for terrorists in their home countries and amongst expatriate minorities.

The symbolic displays following the 9/11 attacks on the United States (Collins 2004) demonstrate such possibilities. For example, Smith (2005) has argued that the discursive construction of 9/11 in the United States following an apocalyptic narrative was influential in the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. For this reason 9/11 has frequently been used to argue that nationalism is antithetical to global complexities. Bauman, for example, assumes 9/11 to be a water-shed moment in the death of the nation, an event that exposes the myth of national sovereignty and the belief in the "mutually assured vulnerability of all politically separated parts of the globe" (2002, p. 82). Along similar lines others have interpreted 9/11 as representative of broader challenges to the modern notions of progress and Western autonomy which they inherently associate with the nation. For example, Baudrillard (2002) interpreted that the cultural significance of 9/11 was not simply related to the level of death and destruction or the symbolic power of the 'home' targets, but that the enemy of the United States carried out their attack by arming themselves with Western technology: aeroplanes, video cameras, cable television networks, and the Internet.

Scholars have similarly pointed to the consumerist nature of patriotic responses in the United States and social conflicts around memorialising 9/11 as evidence of the inevitable decline of national attachment in the West. As Sturken has argued, in the immediate aftermath of the disaster the nation was not so much brought together in grief but reduced to comprehending it through a fetishized consumerist engage-

ment and a desire for kitsch souvenirs of the disaster (Sturken 2007, p. 169). The contestation over the appropriate memorial form at the twin towers was also seen as reflecting the postmodern argument of society now being constituted by a diversity of unattached 'neo-tribes' (Maffesoli 1996).

However, there is a danger in generalising from 9/11 to other cases of terrorism and more broadly to the state of nationalism in the West. While 9/11 has been popularly understood in terms of the failing of the nation-state, terrorist episodes and the consumerist context of commemoration can also bring about new dialogical forms of engagements between nations and improved cross-cultural relations. As explored below, this is the case with Australia and Indonesia in relation to the in the 2002 Bali Bombings where post-Fordist travel logics became a symbolic resource for nationally narrating and subsequently commemorating the crisis in a more cosmopolitan way.

Targeting Tourism and the Nation

The Bali bombing as an act of terrorism was of a smaller scale than 9/11. It also differs in relation to the status and symbolism of its targets. The Al Qaeda attacks on the United States in 2001 had targets that were iconic sites of U.S. power and global capitalism, allowing for a grand spectacle as well as a clear sense of the targets being fair game, with the ambition of removing US troops from Saudi Arabia and other Islamic territories. This differs to the Bali bombings where the majority of fatalities were foreign tourists. The scale of the bombing though can be thought of as more representative of terrorism than 9/11, with the majority of terrorist acts being on a small scale. For example, out of the 15,532 records of terrorist acts on the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents from 1972 through 2009, only 35 have more than 100 fatalities.

In the Bali bombing Australia suffered the heaviest fatalities with 88 dead, followed by 38 Indonesians, 26 British, 25 Europeans of various nationalities and seven Americans. The low death toll of Indonesians was due to locals having been banned, years earlier, from attending the Sari Club. Despite the international dimensions of the attack, in Australia it was largely interpreted as a national rather than an international tragedy. While the bombers and conspirators later convicted for their involvement in the attack have been associated with the transnational terrorist group Al Qaeda, being members of the South East Asian Islamic group Jemaah Islamiah (hereafter referred to as JI), within the public sphere they too became representative of Indonesia as a sovereign nation.

Ideas of nationhood have been intimately tied to past terrorist campaigns with separatism being a core motivation for undertaking such violence. Attacks on tourists are also not unprecedented. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) frequently targeted international tourists in order to reduce government coffers for counter-insurgency warfare and discourage economic development within a contested territory. JI and Al Qaeda differ from the PKK and other secular terrorist groups. Formed

during the late 1970s in Indonesia as an Islamic order, members of JI's radical wing were repressed by the secular Suharto regime and sought sanctuary in Malaysia where they developed transnational political objectives and links. JI's spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir, imprisoned for his involvement in the 2003 bombing of Jakarta's Marriott Hotel and later found guilty of sanctioning the 2002 bombings in Bali, has publicly supported the political struggle of Osama bin Laden and endorsed the struggle to establish Shariah law across Muslim nations. While the connection has been debated, in 2002 the United Nations Security Council declared JI a terrorist organization with links to Al Qaida. JI is certainly consistent with Al Qaida in seeing the principal barrier to its objective as being oppression of Islamic faith and, in particular, those who promote the emulation of Western culture in the Islamic world, whether through their support for capitalism, socialism, nationalism or Christianity (Hoffman 2003). In such instances when religion rather than nationhood directly informs terrorism, the selection of targets relates more to their than economic significance (Rapoport 2002).

The Bali bombing has been considered by various analysts as representative of soft target terrorism signalling a new indiscriminate and instrumental era of attacks, one where nothing is off limits and in which the terrorist's purpose is to inflict maximum fatalities and destruction (Ervin 2006). As Jonathan Stevenson, a terrorism expert with the Washington office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, states: "[T]he raising of the bar is a result of the need to draw attention of a global audience that is increasingly difficult to shock, the growing sophistication of the militants as a result of experience, and cooperation between terrorist groups whose causes and cultures may otherwise have little in common." (Soft Targets Off Limits No More 2009). While it is difficult to know the decision making process of terrorists in selecting targets, to think of all soft targets as being necessarily lacking in potent national symbolism is to misunderstand contemporary national identity and at very least to misinterpret the cultural trauma caused by such attacks.

It is more likely that the tourist district of Kuta in Bali was chosen for the attack because of its status as a 'mecca' of Western tourism and a perceived place for moral licentiousness. As described by a cultural geographer prior to the bombing, Kuta is characterized by:

> low cost packaged tourists and … 'swinging singles': noisy night-time customers that are contributing to a rapid and disordered commercialization of the locality … a chaos of lights, noise, bars, discotheques … cheap thrills … satellite television, Pizza Huts, fast foods joints and Karaoke Bars … exotic advertisements alternate with Western status symbols: Benetton, Gucci … residues of Balinese culture appear on the calendar of events of the large hotels, right alongside notices of happy hour specials and the rugby match between Australia and New Zealand. (Minca 2000, p. 395)

In this vein it is important to note that the bombing occurred at one of the busiest times of the year in Kuta when the normal stream of budget tourists from Australia, Europe and Japan, including surfers and other alternative types of travellers in South East Asia (Cohen 2003), are joined by Australian sporting teams, largely from Australian football, rugby league and rugby union codes, making their annual end of season trip to 'party hard'. As explored below, the ability of these various

tourists to be heard in the public sphere and their relation to national archetypes are centrally important to how the bombing became collectively understood within Australia.

The media interest in the Bali bombing followed a classic progression in the narration of crisis, with the majority of attention concentrated in the first few days following the attack, declining rapidly but enduring at relatively low levels once the core crisis is discursively resolved in some way (see Chap. 5). For example, the number of articles appearing in *The Australian* newspaper peaked on 16th October, 2 days after the attack, with 57 articles. Two weeks into the coverage and for the following month the number of articles appearing each day stayed in the range of between five and thirteen. An exception was a peak of eighteen articles on 15th November following the release of images in which bombing suspect Amrozi is seen laughing and joking with police as he was interrogated (Martin 2002a, p. 9) and the appearance of a recording believed to be of Osama bin Laden, stating that "Australia … ignored the warning until it woke up to the sound of explosions in Bali" (Dalton 2002, p. 1). Despite such extensive coverage, the bombing lacked a clearly defined cultural template to guide its narration as it was an unprecedented event in Australian history. As a consequence journalists, commentators and politicians were required to seek broader frames of meaning, including national cultural frames and traditions. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States that occurred a mere 13 months earlier did to some extent provide a historical reference point for narrating the bombing. This can be seen, for example, in the national debate over whether Australians were directly targeted as a consequence of the deployment of Australian troops in Afghanistan and Australia's support for the planned United States military intervention in Iraq. However, this provided limited cultural direction for narration as 9/11 was largely interpreted as an American catastrophe with Australians only indirectly affected as a consequence of their emotional ties to the United States and attachment to the idea of the West upholding ideals of freedom, democracy and liberty. By contrast, the Bali bombing, despite its own international dimensions, became primarily narrated through national mythologies and conceived as a threat to the Australian way of life. This is clearly evident in media reports where the attack is interpreted in relation to Australia's 'exceptional' self-identity as the 'lucky country'. For example, an article in *The Daily Telegraph* stated that:

> …Australia yesterday grappled with the realisation that life in the Lucky Country would somehow never be the same… one unspeakable, unexpected atrocity had delivered a painful knock to the Australian dream. The land of sunshine, stability and opportunity—untouched by civil war, famine or terrorism on any substantial scale—was suddenly a place of peril. (The Lucky Country will never be the same Australia 2002, p. 1)

A dominant characteristic of this national narrative was Australian media concentration on the suffering of Australians in Bali, paying little attention to the loss of locals and other international tourists. The Australian media though was careful not to construct Australian victims as objects of pity. As will be explored more closely later in the monograph (Chap. 5), Westerners generally interpret news of catastrophes in developing nations within a broad tragic narrative that understands this suffering in relation to luck or fate (Boltanski 1999). The loss of Australians

in Bali, however, was alternatively rationalised by references to national heroic frames and mythologies. This occurred in two ways. Firstly, a focus on the loss of Australian footballers in the attack worked to place grief within a patriotic context, reminding the public of the strength of national character at a time when it was perceived to be under threat. Secondly, Australian tourists in Bali became symbolically matched with Anzac soldiers serving abroad during WWI, as outlined in Chap. 2. This allowed the bombing to be both comprehended within a history of national sacrifice geographically outside of Australia and simultaneously to be keyed into the cultural logics of global travel and post-Fordist consumption (West 2008). Studies on Australian national identity have highlighted that the national archetypes of the sportsman and Anzac soldier share a similar historical basis in masculine nationalism (Mangan and Nauright 2000) and are often used interchangeably in evoking patriotism (Miller et al. 2001). In the aftermath of the Bali bombing they provided distinct 'models for' (Geertz 1973) narrating the crisis.

Heroic Sportsmen

As with other Western nations, sport in Australia has been an important arena for defining the national character. Sport has been used historically as a vehicle for distinguishing Australia from 'Motherland' Britain, providing a rich source for mythologizing the colonial frontier. Historical scholarship, such as Mangan's (1996) work on Victorian and Edwardian England provides a basis for thinking about how the origins of Western masculinity are tied to racism and colonialism. Mangan (1996) argues that masculinity was an important part of the enthusiasm for enlisting at the outbreak of WWI. In the Australian context, this is evident in the cult that arose around the members of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) following their involvement in WWI (see Chap. 2). Slaughter and defeat in Gallipoli (Turkey) was framed as a sacrificial act by Australian manhood which allowed the new nation to finally come of age. The Anzacs, despite suffering a clear defeat at the hands of the Turks in what was Australia's first battle following federation, were depicted in heroics ways with feats of bravery on the battlefield widely celebrated in popular culture, with masculine virtues such as strength, aggression and domination seen as the embodiment of the national character. The national mythologizing of sport continues today with sportsmen being key heroic and celebrity figures in Western societies (Hutchins 2006; Rowe 2011, also see Chap. 5). However, there is considerable debate around the extent to which traditional masculinity is socially reproduced today (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) and the extent to which contemporary cultures of masculinity can feed into cultures of peace and cosmopolitanism (Higate 2007).

The narratives at play in the reporting of the Bali bombing are illustrative of such debates about the contemporary connections between masculinity and the nation. As a consequence of the connection masculine sport has to national imagining, sportsmen in Bali at the time of attack attained disproportionate media attention and

their loss became a focal point for national mourning. Not only was there greater media attention to this category of victims but there was an overt recognition of them as symbolic of the national character. The sports writer, war historian and social commentator Peter FitzSimons, for example, wrote in *The Sydney Morning Herald* that:

> As passionate Australian sportspeople, they were individuals who led, in their own fashion, full and colourful lives which embraced an ethos of camaraderie, a love of club and belief in team values … We shed tears for all of those who have died and been cruelly maimed from whatever country and whether or not they were sportspeople but can be forgiven for shedding just one more for you, our sporting brothers and sisters. (FitzSimons 2002, p. 36)

Similarly, amongst the many survivors of the attack it was the profiles of male Australian footballers and their witness accounts that most frequently appeared in the media. This worked to portray footballers as the archetypical victim and as natural representatives of the national character. It also privileged the heroic feats of this group above that of others. As indicated in the quote below from *The Age* newspaper, particular emphasis is given to the athletic prowess of sportsmen, with the underlying suggestion being that this provided them with not only the physical ability but the charismatic and heroic disposition to risk their own lives attempting to rescue others.

> We made it up a wall, up some crates, helped some girls up. By the time we got to the top of the wall … the heat from the flames that were 15 m away was burning my neck. It was unbearable. I had to jump down off the wall eight, 10 m, into another wall and slid down to take the impact. "From that point I was looking for my teammates and helping people so they did not have to make that jump". (Munro 2002, p. 5)

The telling of such heroic tales countered the potential symbolic threat that the bombing posed in deflating Australian national identity. However, in doing so it failed to adequately account for the multiplicity of behaviour during a disaster and the decision making required in heroic acts. Many of these gruesome situational details that were absent in the original media coverage of the bombing appear in court documents and interviews published on the tenth anniversary of the disaster (Moor 2012). For example, in the below quote consider the practicalities involved for rescuers in selecting who to save amongst a multiplicity of victims.

> There were so many injured, dead and dying that Mr Alazraki then had the aweful task of deciding which he would help next and began concentrating on those who were small enough for him to carry and who looked like they would survive. "it was a difficult decision to make, but I just wanted to get the most people out of there," he said. (Moor 2012)

The traditional heroic sentiment in the Australian media not only ignored such realities but fostered a defensive reiteration of the Australian way of life. Prior to the bombing, the economic underdevelopment of Bali had largely been a signifier for natural exoticness and escape from the worries of the profane world of work, with the island holding a special place within the Australian psyche (Lewis 2006, p. 224). In the aftermath of the bombing, however, Australian social commentators attempted to ostracize Bali from the national imagination through symbolically classifying both it and Indonesia as 'un-Australian' (Smith and Phillips 2001). For

example, consider this quote from a *The Sydney Morning Herald* article arguing that Australian suffering should be understood in relation to the inadequacies of the economic and health infrastructure of Bali and Indonesia, urguing the public to let go of their understanding of Bali as a 'little Australia'.

> …Bali, for all the ocker mood of Kuta, is not Australia… Indonesia is a developing country and Bali a cheap holiday destination. It is not capable of an Australian standard of response to an emergency of any type, let alone a catastrophe of world scale. …The thatched roof and weak walls of the Sari Club tell much of the flaws in all developing countries. Standards are pathetic. That is why it's cheap … for many of those swept up in this tragedy, Bali, and particularly Kuta, was a little Australia. It was. And then suddenly it wasn't. (Cameron 2002, p. 4)

This point is further evidenced below in quotes from *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*, with criticisms of Indonesia's medical and administrative response to the bombing situated within a broader binary discourse that celebrated Australia as an advanced, rational, efficient and caring nation, in contrast with Indonesia being described as backward, irrational, inefficient, insensitive and as such cast as culpable in the suffering and death of Australians.

> We just kept running into people with body parts missing. Taxis would not take people with blood on them, they wanted $ 50 to take you out of there. (Moore 2002, p. 3)
> The trauma for so many relatives and friends trying to identify loved ones killed by the blast has been exacerbated by a mix-up at the Denpasar morgue in which identification tags were removed from bodies. (Martin 2002b, p. 6)
> Later yesterday, she visited other hospitals, searching for friends. The smell inside was "horrific". "People who were missing legs, arms and faces were screaming. They were dying in front of me because there was no one to help them," Ms Graham said. (Crawford 2002, p. 1)

This discourse not only resonated with the insular and provincial national identity being advanced by the sporting archetype but sportsmen themselves were central actors in articulating such sentiments and bringing media attention to concerns about Indonesian treatment of Australia's dead. The professional rugby league player Craig Salvatori, who lost his wife in the bombing and was subject to misidentification, was a particularly important figure, articulating a critique of both the Indonesian bureaucracy for their incompetence and the Australian government for respecting Indonesian sovereignty in Bali. Consider the following profile of Salvatori in *The Australian*:

> Craig Salvatori is built to withstand pressure … But nothing could have prepared the former rugby league star for the trauma of the past 24 h, after authorities told him the woman he'd positively identified on Monday as his wife, from photographs of corpses, was not Kathy … "I'm shattered, I'm going to kick arse, its bloody unbelievable, I can't believe the incompetence of it all." Mr Salvatori was one of many grieving relatives expressing frustration yesterday with Australia's decision to leave the chaotic morgue in the hands of the Indonesians … "Australians came in and ran the show to get everyone out," he said. "And they did that well. "But now they're not running the show anymore. It's the Indonesians running the show, and we're sitting on the backburner and we don't know what's going on. "We should be able to take control in a country we support so much, with aid and stuff. "We should be able to take control of our own citizens". (Lyall 2002, p. 3)

Retired professional rugby league player Shawn Garlick, a friend and former teammate of Craig Salvatori, was also a significant witness to events. Garlick was significant in communicating the broader emotional distress of not being able to identify the dead. Adding to his trauma was the irreverence with which the bodies had been handled, piled on top of each other and visible to a throng of curious onlookers, Garlick said. He was reported to have seen an estimated 200 bodies but thought only about 50 could be identified without the help of DNA tests. "They were just charred, skeletal remains," he said. "You would not know whether they were male or female, let alone whether they were Australian" (Sexton and Kogoy 2002, p. 2).

As the above quote suggests, the drawn out process of identifying bodies not only resulted in an anguish for those wishing to administer funeral rites to loved ones, but a fear that with their national identity being unrecognisable the Australian dead will not receive the respect expected of 'lucky country' citizens. As the post-mortem body has traditionally been a sacred object for the nation, demanding special commemorative respect and adornment (Anderson 1983), the handling of bodies by Indonesians sat uncomfortably within the insular Australian national narrative which had been constructed in response to the bombing. This concern would diminish, however, with the emergence of a more cosmopolitan Australian patriotic narrative for interpreting the bombing.

Leisure and the Defiance of Terrorists

National sacrifice became central to the narration of the bombing as journalists, politicians and social commentators attempted to rationalise the loss of young Australians abroad. Unlike Australian soldiers abroad during the world wars, the international travel of the Australian tourists in Bali was not motivated by the patriotic sentiments of 'duty', 'service' and 'honour' (Winter 1995). However, in reports of returning victims and survivors to Australia (post)Vietnam War rhetoric of not leaving behind the fallen was evoked and the psychosocial importance of homecoming rituals emphasised. Consider the two quotes below from *The Age* and *The Daily Telegraph*.

> They arrived as brothers in arms and no one—not even their families—can convince them to come home with anything less. Eleven members of the Kingsley Football Club, shattered, bruised but alive, yesterday made a pact to return to Perth as they left—as one… "We decided, all of us, that we didn't want to put our mates' families through the shock of having to come up here and try to find their boys. We think it's best that we try to find them and bring them home" (Barrass 2002).

> Like an army back from battle, the strained survivors of the Bali bombings are streaming home, struggling to contain a torrent of grief … like the war-weary soldiers they resemble, the torment of their remembered terror will burn like acid … So they need our help and our support. With open arms we need to join with those family and friends who stood vigil at airport terminals and in arrival halls. We need to let them know that they are not alone … In the past, to our discredit, we have failed in our duty to such damaged people—Vietnam veterans are a case in point …. We must not make that mistake again. (Widening Impact of Bali Blast 2002, p. 34)

It was Australian military mythology associated with WWI, however, that was most significant in providing a historical national frame for comprehending the bombing with Australian tourists in Bali portrayed as contemporaries of Anzac 'diggers' at Gallipoli. Like Vietnam, Gallipoli involves young Australian men losing their life in an unfamiliar foreign country. More significant in this symbolic matching of Anzacs and Australian tourists in Bali, however, was a perception of them sharing a sense of adventure and good time, as evident in the quote below from *The Daily Telegraph* newspaper.

> There are emotive parallels between the experiences of our Diggers and the young Australians caught in the Kuta carnage … they were a bunch of young, naïve Australians thrust into a foreign conflict for which they could never be prepared. For most of those taking part, it was their first trip overseas. They made new discoveries, enjoyed some drink-fuelled shenanigans and developed their sense of mateship which is a recognised part of the Australian psyche. (Cock 2002, p. 35)

Elaborating on traditional understandings of WWI soldiers as tourists and travellers (Fussell 1975; White 1991), over the past 2 decades the Anzacs have increasingly become understood as innocents abroad in search of global adventure and cultural experiences. This reflects the broad influence of global post-Fordist cultural logics on national memory and, in particular, the reimagining of Anzac mythology within the burgeoning ritual of Australians visiting the Gallipoli battlefields. As argued in Chap. 2, for example, tourist discourses of cultural exchange and respect found on the Gallipoli battlefields have made their way into the Australian public sphere and allowed the popular memory of Gallipoli to become more pacifist and cosmopolitan.

This Anzac memory and the tourist context of the bombing itself facilitates the development of a counter narrative to that which developed around the archetype of the Australian sportsman. This occurred in two ways. Firstly, the Anzac legend promoted a general mythologizing of tourists as national representatives which in turn encouraged a greater diversity of witness discourses to enter the public sphere, altering the narrative construction of events (Peters 2001). A particularly important group were the more than fifty Australian tourists, both men and women, who stayed in Bali following the attacks and showed their respect for the dead by participating in local Hindu cleansing ceremonies (Howe 2005, p. 6). Consider the description of their involvement by the broadsheet *The Sydney Morning Herald*.

> …Balinese, foreign tourists and a few expats marked the first Saturday night since October 12. In the minutes before and after 11.30 pm, the time the bombs went off, attention focused on the makeshift shrine of floral tributes and offerings piled at the bomb site's southern end. Candles glowed against baskets of bread, eggs, water and trays of cigarettes placed there for the spirits of the dead. Near a pile of shoes in front of the flags of the foreign dead was a note written on yellow cardboard from Annie, Baggio, Kairney, and Shada from Wamberal, on NSW's Central Coast. "To the innocent and our loved ones who fell victims so inhumanely," it read. "Our hearts and souls go out to you all. We will be back next year and we'll never stop visiting Bali. Love to you all. XXX." A cleansing ceremony had been held earlier on Saturday at sunset on nearby Legian Beach where locals and Australians cast flowers into the waves. (Gibbs and O'Rourke 2002, p. 5)

In Goffman's (1976) terms this caused a shift of "where the action is". The participation of these Australian tourists in this traditional Balinese commemoration drew

attention to the sorrow and suffering amongst the Balinese, helping to 'deterritorialize' (Gilroy 1993) the attack in the national imagination from simply being an Australian event. The willing participation of Australians within the exotic ceremony helped resurrect Bali's image as a peaceful paradise, interrupting the binary contrast being made between Australia and Indonesia. The expression of patriotic sentiment within the cleansing ritual also demonstrated to the Australian public that patriotism is not reliant on a bounded nation-state devoid of transnational flows. As noted in Chap. 3, accounts from those who have experienced events are attributed with high levels of authenticity and truth, what I referred to as affective authority. As this relates to atrocity, the survivor witness genre is strongly connected to the Holocaust. While a vast array of studies demonstrate that witness accounts are unreliable and change over time, survivors and victims are given a strong moral claim in speaking out (Zelizer 1998; Peters 2001). Witnesses not only shape the collective memory of events but as we will see influence their consequences. From the perspective of cultural sociology this shows that social crises are not simply narrated in ways that reflect social structures or pre-established genres, but by social actors using cultural forms whereby "both meanings and outcomes depend on the interaction between events and their narrative understandings (Jacobs 1996, p. 1267).

The second way that collective memory of the Anzac legend promoted a more cosmopolitan nationalism was through it legitimising a return to global travel and post-Fordist consumption practices, providing a mandate for Australian authorities to engage in dialogical relations with Indonesia. The then Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, was an important actor in establishing this understanding, defying his own government's official warnings against travel to Indonesia in the days following the attacks. His speeches in Bali spoke of international travel, cultural engagement and leisure as representing the Australian way of life. Howard stated that:

> Our nation has been changed by this event. Perhaps we may not be so carefree as we have been in the past but we will never lose our openness, our sense of adventure. The young of Australia will always travel, they will always seek fun in different parts, they will always reach out to the young of other nations, they will always be open, fun-loving and decent men and women…. (Hewett 2002, p. 1)

While the Australian Prime Minister did not directly mention the history of Australian soldiering, it is this 'model for' (Geertz 1973, 1983) Australian national identity that he implicitly refers to in describing "our sense of adventure" abroad. Such sentiment not only mythologised leisure and consumption as part of Australian national identity but as acts that defy Islamic terrorists and their political objectives. While outward displays of hedonistic leisure in the immediate aftermath of the bombings were seen as disrespectful, the Anzac framing of the attack encouraged a return to everyday activities and lifestyles. As evident in the below quote from *The Age* newspaper, even raucous forms of leisure became sanctioned, as it was these being undertaken by Australian tourists in Kuta at the time of the attack.

> Every night of the year, beneath my veranda, party boats beat up and down the Brisbane River … Clouds of marijuana smoke and the thrashing of garage bands … Champagne and wine glasses clink … roars as loudly as any crowded beer garden on a Friday night. In fact, it probably sounds like the Sari Club just before the car bomb detonated … But it's right

> that as a people we can still find it within ourselves to gather for strong drink, and dancing, and a little ill-advised flirting while under the influence; for laughter and forgetting, to borrow from Kundera. Because the murderers of our kin fervently want to put an end to such things. (Birmingham 2002)

As outlined earlier in the chapter, the insular nationalism that appeared following the bombing criticised the Australian federal government for its cooperation, deference and tolerance of Indonesian authorities. Following the emergence of the Anzac counter narrative, diplomatic relations between Australia and Indonesia became strengthened without protest and unprecedented levels of cooperation between the Australian Federal Police and Indonesian national police forces emerged through cooperative investigation of the Bali bombing and in the development of counter terrorism strategies in the region (Lawler 2004). The endurance of such alliances though, like their formation, are subject to ongoing cultural processes, particularly the politics of commemoration.

Remembering Terror

The dialogical narration of the bombings provides a cultural pattern for its remembrance but, as Durkheim (1915) originally argued, to remain culturally relevant such meanings must be periodically ritually remembered (Chap. 1). As has also been argued in earlier chapters, it is not only the heightened social effervescence created by ritual which is significant for the collective memory process but the form of the ritual itself. The transnational dialogical narrative which developed around the Bali bombing is particularly reliant on a comparative dialogical form of commemoration and memorialisation. This will be discussed in relation to two remembrance activities which have been significant in the collective memory of the bombings. Firstly, the significance of the return of tourism to Bali and a growing pilgrimage tradition. It will be argued there is an emerging pilgrimage tradition to Bali associated with the bombings, one that has similar qualities to that outlined in Chap. 2 at Gallipoli. This has been significant in maintaining the cosmopolitan meanings surrounding the attack, combating periodic xenophobic portrayals of Indonesia. We will explore below how this informed the media reporting of the trials of the Bali bombers and controversies involving Australians imprisoned in Bali. Secondly, attempts at memorialising the bombings in Australia have had a significant influence in remembering the bombing, allowing for regional and local involvement in commemorating the past.

Earlier in the chapter it was argued that Australian tourists returning to Bali soon after the attack was significant in the development of dialogical discourses around the attack. The remembering of the bombings though have been more significantly influenced by the return to the Island by survivors and the family of victims. Amongst the first to return were a number of survivors testifying in the trial of the Bali bombers. Others voluntarily attended the trial hoping it would bring them some closure. High profile survivors such as the Australian Rules footballer Jason

McCarthey meanwhile would make independent "pilgrimages" to Bali, a mere 5 months following the bombing (Stevens 2003). Media reports of such travel aided the establishment of an institutional pilgrimage tradition to Bali for official commemorative activity. On the first anniversary of the attack Australian survivors, families of the dead and government leaders, including the Australian Prime Minister, participated in a commemorative service held in Bali with their Indonesian equivalents despite official Australian government travel advisories against non-essential travel by Australians to Bali and Indonesia (Fischer 2006). Due to security issues the ceremony would not be held at the bomb sites but nearby Garuda Wisnu Kencana Cultural Park in Jimbaran, which would serve as the venue for subsequent anniversary events. Incorporating religious symbols and readings from Christian, Hindu and Islamic religions, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard vowed to collaborate with Indonesia in the 'common cause' of fighting terrorism. Then soon to be Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, aware of the international audience in attendance and viewing the televised broadcast in Australia, stressed the importance of shared values across national boundaries and emphasized that the Bali bombers 'belong in our darkest dungeons' while also quoting from the Koran about the proscription against taking life (Fischer 2006, p. 143). Such official state commemorative activity played a role in allowing for a rejuvenation of tourism in Bali which in 2003 had dropped to 186,400 Australian visitors from a pre-bomb high of 288,800 in 2001 (Sobocinska 2011, p. 217).

Such dialogical remembrance has continued. The recent 10th anniversary of the bombing was attended by various officials from Australia and Indonesia, both diplomatically acknowledging each other. In her speech the then Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard declared that since the bombing the "two countries drew closer than they ever had been before" (Bachelard and Robertson 2012, p. 4). The former Australian Prime Minister John Howard reflected on how the terrorists had failed to bring about religious conflict and that out of the bombings had come the Interfaith Dialogue in Australia with leaders of Judaism, Islam and Christianity meeting annually to discuss how the key principals in each have led to misunderstanding and tension. The Indonesian foreign minister Marty Nataegawa expressed how Jamaah Islamiyah had "utterly failed" and that the aftermath of the bombing had provided a chance to fight extremism and intolerance in all its forms; for different countries to work together to ensure that "such views will never take root in our societies; to see to it that the voice of reason prevails against prejudice, so that humanity prevails over hatred". Yet it was the voices of victims and their relatives that were particularly poignant in reinforcing the dialogical ethos around the bombing. A young Indonesian boy, Made Bagus Arya Dana, read a poem he wrote to his dead father, the head waiter in the Sari Club who was killed in the bombing. As translated by his mother standing by his side, he read "I stare at the picture of your face. I listen to mum's stories of you … how daddy really loved me. How I miss your hugs … I am almost 12 years old now, I have started to understand what happened. I can feel Mum's sadness. I realise Daddy will never be home" (Bachelard and Robertson 2012, p. 4). The discourse in the boy's speech is not based on a direct acknowledgement of the other but nevertheless strengthens the dialogical relationship through

the grief being shared within ritual, reinforcing a sense of jointly experienced suffering and loss.

As we saw in Chap. 2 with the return of veterans to Gallipoli for the 75th anniversary of the landings, not only are such ceremonies heavily scripted but the attendance of key pilgrimage figures is also something that is sponsored by the state. Under the Bali Memorial Assistance scheme administered by the Australian Federal Government's Department for Human Services, funding was available for family members of Australians who died as a result of the 2002 Bali bombings and Australians who were seriously injured and their families to attend memorial services in Bali, Indonesia. Those eligible could receive a one-off payment of AUD $ 1500 as a financial contribution towards the costs of airfares, insurance, visa and ground transport to attend the Memorial Service in Bali and an additional living allowance payment (to include the cost of accommodation) of up to $ 300 per night, capped at $ 2100 per claimant. If under 18 years of age, the claim was slightly reduce to a one-off payment of $ 1400 and a living allowance of up $ 100 per no more than seven nights. Rather than restricted to a short fly-in and flight-out experience, the funding allowed for a week stay, a similar time of many of the short packaged holidays undertaken by Australians. This initiative was instigated amongst a litany of media reports about this anniversary representing a 'final pilgrimage' to Bali by grieving relatives. It also was offered against a backdrop of political pressure on the government by the then Opposition leader Tony Abbott over compensation to the Australian victims of terrorism, a topic which previously had been seen as a bipartisan subject. In the month leading up the 10th anniversary of the Bali bombings, Abbott called for the government to retrospectively pay Australian victims of terrorism overseas, or their families, about AUD $ 75,000 each in compensation, including the Bali bombing victims. Not to discriminate against those not wanting to return to the scene of the trauma, a lower level of financial assistance by the federal government was also provided to those wanting to attend memorial services in the Australian national city of Canberra. In addition to domestic airfares, adults could claim a one-off payment of AUD $ 100 as a financial contribution towards the costs of ground transport and a living allowance payment (to include the cost of accommodation) of up to $ 210 per night, capped at $ 630 per claimant, allowing for three nights in contrast to the seven in Bali. Children under 18 years old could receive a AUD $ 100 payments and $ 100 per night in addition to domestic airfare.

Dialogical commemoration is also seen in memorialization around the Bali bombing site itself. At the time of the first anniversary a temporary memorial altar was established on the bomb site at Paddy's Bar, designed by the architect Wayan Gemida (Fig. 4.1). It is constituted of Balinese "Kayonan" carvings containing decorated inscriptions of the names and nationalities of 196 victims of the bombing. By the second anniversary this had become a permanent memorial dedicated through a Balinese Hindu cleansing ceremony. While the memorial ceremonies may be held elsewhere for security reasons, it is this memorial that attracts the most popular focus due to its close proximity to the hallowed ground of the attacks. In the significant 10th anniversary commemorations in Bali, for example, it was the visit to the Kuta memorial by the Prime Minister Julia Gillard with Bali Governor Made

Fig. 4.1 Kuta Bali bombing memorial

Mangku Pastika which attracted a majority of newspaper headlines. Applauded by a large group of visiting Australian tourists, Gillard laid a wreath at the memorial as many other tourists have done and stood silently and reflected.

The Bali bombing is also remembered, though in a discrete way, through the establishment of the Kuta Karnival, a 9-day long event held around the Bali bombing anniversary, sponsored by the local government and commerce council (Gurtner 2007). While no direct reference is made to the bombing in the cultural festival it is in many ways aimed at restoring Bali's image following the attack, as suggested by the marketing description of it as "Celebration of Life". Such pilgrimage experiences to the bomb site have resulted in as much conflict as consensus in the dialogical remembrance of the bombing. Central to this has been the absence of memorial recognition on the Sari Club bomb site. Since the bombing it has been left vacant with several nightclub re-development plans submitted by the owner of the site, Kadek Wiranatha, being turned down by local authorities. Most outspoken about the site is a group of survivors in Western Australia who have lobbied for the establishment of a peace park there. This has included establishing the Bali Peace Park Foundation and subsequent Bali Peace Park Association. According to the head of the foundation, Dallas Finn, his plans for the peace park, which included recruiting

the landscape designer Michael White and receiving support from the Kuta Village heads, stalled at the unwillingness of the owner to sell the land. It is reported that the asking price was AUD $ 7.2 million, which is seen to be far in excess of the valuation of the site (Allard 2010). As outlined in Chap. 2, the nature of dialogical relations means that such politics are generally downplayed in the public sphere with this social conflict generally playing itself out behind the scenes. For example, there was an under reporting of Indonesian police moving on Australians as they attempted a candlelight vigil at the Sari Club to coincide with the time of the initial bombing at 11.08 pm (Robertson 2012).

The popularity of the Bali bombing memorial is significant as it relates to the ability of memorializing terrorist acts. An increasing amount of scholarly literature has pointed to the contemporary complexities of memorialisation, principally in relation to the new political divisions emerging from the culture wars and multiculturalism (Schwartz and Bayma 1999; Werbner 2009; Zuber 2006). Terrorism though has posed somewhat of a genre dilemma, with various terrorist attacks, such as that of the IRA in Britain, failing to be recognized by official memorials while those that have been established, such as at 'Ground Zero' in New York, have been marked by controversy about form and function. As Sturken notes Ground Zero became a battleground "over which the families of the dead, politicians, real estate developers, and designers claim ownership" (2007, p. 169). While in recent decades there has been an overall growth in memorials to past conflicts that had previously been without such recognition, including the Korean and WWII memorials in the United States, these have tended to be established on variations of traditional memorial forms.

As Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz (1991) note, studies of memorials have traditionally emphasised how they work to crystallise social unity and sacred beliefs of one particular society. In Durkheim's terms they "serve to sustain the vitality of these beliefs… to revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness…" (1965, p. 420). However, conventional memorial genres in the West such as obelisks, arches, granite monoliths, fountains, realistic statues and other monuments in which names of the dead are prominently marked are associated with national sovereignty and the grand Western narratives of freedom and sacrifice. However, these values have been subject to greater levels of incredulity in the West (Engelhardt 1995; Inglis 1998) and significantly for cross-cultural terrorist acts such as the Bali bombings they also do not translate into Eastern symbolic representations and notions of collective identity (Tong and Schwartz 1997).

This dilemma of memorial genre is significant as memorials not only provide the public with a place to grieve and commemorate, but as we saw in Chap. 2 they actively shape the history that is remembered. Part of the significance of the Bali memorial is not only that it is on the hallowed ground where blood was shed, but that it is an exception to the failures to adequately memorialize the bombings by Australian governments. These have involved the use of various memorial genres and placements. The first was by the federal government that as part of the Bali assistance package gave $ 4.5 million to build a "12 October Australia Memorial Centre" at the Sanglah Hospital in Bali where many of the bombing victims were

treated. At its opening the Prime Minister John Howard stated that it ”is a practical memorial to those who died in the attack on 12 October, 2002” and “is a permanent reminder of the depth of our gratitude to the people of this beautiful island” (Sutton and Waldon 2003). However, this memorial has little resonance in the imagination of the Australian public and is not visited by Australian tourists in Bali as a site of remembrance. As the sociologist Bernard Barber noted in his important study of war memorials, there has long been a conflict around the value of “living memorials”, that is memorials that have a utilitarian function (1972). The advantage of living memorials is that they can fold memory into the contours of everyday life, however, there is the danger that they will neglect the importance of aesthetic symbolism and thus fail to provide meaning to the painful event (Barber 1972; Low 2004).

Despite the traditional difficulties in memorializing terror, we have seen a number of memorials built in Australia. These include sites constructed in Canberra, Melbourne, Perth and at Sydney’s Coogee Beach and the Gold Coast. Each has their own distinctive character, evidencing the genre dilemma outlined above. However, they all are dominated by a regional focus with no clear articulation to established national collective memory. In Canberra a granite cube serves as a memorial in the Eastern Formal Gardens of Parliament House. While Canberra as Australia’s capital city is the site of prominent national memorials, such as the Grave of the unknown soldier, this does not feature amongst those publicised to visitors nor is it used as a site for public commemorative practice on anniversaries of the bombings. It did recently enter the public’s imagination with then Australian federal Opposition Leader Tony Abbott controversially using it as the site of a press conference about retrospective compensation for all Australian victims of overseas terrorism (Johnson 2012). It is not only the placement of the memorial but the memorial form itself which is significant. While gardens and landscapes are not devoid of political significance (Mukerji 1997; Urry 1990), in this case the naturalistic design is used to overcome the memorial genre dilemma of how to appropriate memorialise the crime of terrorism and the loss of innocents and avoid assigning particular meaning to the disaster.

The city of Melbourne also has a Memorial Garden at Victorian State Parliament. The most prominent memorial to the bombing though is located in the central business district, in Lincoln Square on the western side of Swanston Street. It was officially opened on 12 October 2005 with musicians from Melbourne’s Balinese community playing at the dedication ceremony, coinciding with the third anniversary of the bombings (Holroyd 2005). Architecturally the memorial design is minimalist and consists of a simple granite platform divided by two pools incorporating 88 individual water jets—one for each Australian who died in the catastrophe and 202 lights to represent all of the victims. Its regional emphasis is obvious in its design and location being decided upon through consultation with the 22 Victorian families. It only has the names of the Victorians who perished prominently inscribed around the perimeter of the fountain, with a list of other Australians appearing on a stainless steel plate offset from the memorial closer to the road. While the memorial has the status of being within the centre of the city it is distant from the neo-classical

shrine of remembrance to Australians who had died in war and other monuments in the memorial precinct of Kings Domain Park.

The Bali memorial established in Perth, the capital of Western Australia, is located within the war memorial precinct of Kings Park. As alluded to above, this location is significant as it allows for the maintenance of a symbolic connection between the Anzac legend and the Bali bombings. This perhaps reflects a particular cultural connection by Western Australians to both the Bali bombings and Bali itself, with Perth the closest state capital city. For example, as outlined in the below quote, the Perth based deputy leader of the opposition Julie Bishop speaking at the memorial service in Canberra for the 10th anniversary of the bombing made reference to Perth's memorial as sharing the same hallowed ground as military memorials.

> So deeply did our community feel for those who died on that day 10 years ago in Bali, so keenly did we share the pain of those who were injured, so aware were we of the loss suffered by their families and friends, such was the outpouring of grief, that a monument was erected in their memory within the same revered patch of earth reserved to honour our fallen soldiers.

The connection to the Anzac tradition is also emphasised by the memorial being a site of a dawn service on the anniversary of the attacks, with the memorial designed so that it attracts the morning light for the anniversary (Seal 2011). Despite such symbolic resonances, the Perth memorial is far different from those used to remember past wars. It was dedicated on the first anniversary of the bombing to Western Australians who died, or were injured, in the Bali terrorist attacks on 12 October 2002, and as such follows a contemporary trend in memorialisation by focussing on survivors as well as the dead (Schwartz and Bayma 1999). The memorial utilises a modern design and a pastiche use of materials, including a cleanly cut stone wall and one of (pre)rusted iron, and an uncut stone to the side holding the memorial plaque. On the wall are two inscriptions. The first states "may you find serenity in this sacred place", representing the role of the memorial to provide a place for grief and sorrow to be expressed. This also relates to the spectacular view from the memorial of the Swan River and Darling Ranges, which is emphasised by a glass balcony connecting the two walls of the memorials from which visitors can admire the scenery. The second states "we cherish the spirit and unity of all those that came to help", making reference to the emergency services associated with the recovery of victims to which Perth was central. This is also emphasised in the message on the main plague. Headed by two hands shaking, the plaque reads:

> In the shadow of our sorrow
> We find a light,
> With the dawn come hope,
> With the setting sun, time to heal.

Such a message is significant as it emphasises the idea of mutual obligation during a time of crisis, however, without acknowledging to whom the commitment extends.

In other cases the site for official remembrance have become memorials established at the local level by-passing the type of public debate around commemorative form which we have come to associate with terrorism. Such memorials are signifi-

Fig. 4.2 Coogee Bali bombing memorial

cant as they are allowed to break with the traditional conventions of Western memorialisation sanctioned by the state. This is the case for the memorial at Sydney's Coogee Beach (see Fig. 4.2). Located 8 km from the central business district of Sydney and nearby the iconic Bondi Beach, the memorial is dedicated to twenty of the Australian victims of the 2002 Bali bombing who were residents of Coogee and its neighbouring suburbs, including six members of the Coogee Dolphins rugby league team. Whereas the Australian memorials to the bombing outlined above were regionally focused on the state, the Coogee memorial has a local suburban emphasis, with the memorial plaque stating that "Sydney's Eastern Suburbs were devastated by the tragic loss of twenty local residents and injuries to many more" and that "[T]he community of the City of Randwick remembers all the victims and dedicates this site to those local residents who lost their lives." Representative of a piece of public art, the memorial is constituted of a bronze sculpture made of three linked figures signifying family, friends and community, representing sorrow and remembrance, as well as comfort, strength and unity (Fig. 4.2). While it is common for local authorities and councils to engage in memorialisation, what is distinctive in this case is that it used as a site for official remembrance. Unveiled by the then New South Wales Premier Bob Carr on the first anniversary of the bombings, the memorial is a focal point of the state's anniversary remembrances. Rather than overriding the local such services retain an emphasis on local grief, by-passing broader questions of official national remembrance.

The Coogee memorial's beach location though does tap into national iconography and mythologies of the beach. The beach is a national symbol riddled with tension. Historically it has challenged imperialist notions of Australia being tied to Britain (Fiske et al. 1987, p. 168), usurped puritan sexual conventions (Morris 1992) and been a symbolic site for the playing out of racial tensions (Hartley and Green 2006). The meanings of a beachside memorial to the Bali bombings is significant as there has been a rise of beach related nationalism since a 'riot' between young white locals and Lebanese immigrant youth in December 2005 at Cronulla,

an increasingly affluent beach suburb south of Sydney. The violent clash occurred following an alleged attack on a surf lifeguard and harassment of bikini-wearing women by men of `Middle Eastern appearance' (Shaw 2009). There were also various revenge attacks that occurred over the next few days. According to many Australian critical scholars, the 'Cronulla riot' is evidence of the resurgence of white nationalism in Australia and emblematic of the popular nationalism being evoked by the Howard government at the time around boat asylum seekers from Muslim countries (Poynting 2006). Amelia Johns (2008) reflects much of this analysis arguing that the riot is the outcome of a renewed Anzac mythology amongst Australian youth. As the Anzac legend pre-dates multiculturalism she argues it inherently celebrates the traditional values of a white Australia and a neo-liberal governmentality which has renewed fears of outsiders. A core part of this belief is that the riot was reportedly sparked by an attack on a surf-lifesaver, a key national symbol that emerged out of Australia's military history and part of a organisation that celebrates its para-military origins through the ideals of service and enactment of competitions, including beach parade marches, and 'patrols' of the water.

Apart from such analysis of the Cronulla Riot failing to acknowledge the ways that Anzac mythology has taken on cosmopolitan dimension in recent years (Chap. 2), it fails to appreciate local and contingent circumstances around such events. While such scholarship does not claim a direct causality, their explanatory models over predict ethnic violence. As such they cannot explain why there is not more riots relating to ethnic issues in Australia and why when they do occur what were the particular circumstances that explain why it happened at that time and place. Some such explanatory factors include that the violence that day was the outcome of a long running tension between locals and groups from multicultural Western Sydney (Westies) for whom Cronulla was the beach of choice due to it being easily reached on the train (Wise 2009). As Wise argues this involved different use of the beach by each group, including young men of Middle Eastern background playing soccer (football) on the dry sand, a sport that in Australia has been traditionally coded as an ethnic activity (Hughson 2000). However, simple notions of the riot being a clash between an ethnic minority (Lattas 2007) and a white majority also fail to appreciate the diversity of beach culture in Australia and how similar clashes have been reported in public parks (Bloch and Dreher 2009). Rather than representing beach goers at large, the violence at Cronulla occurred between two specific groups to which masculine violence has increasingly become normalised. On the one side it involved marginalised, mostly Lebanese, young adult men of first and second generation migrants from Western Sydney, whose masculinity has been shaped by embodied experiences of racism and broader societal racial stereotyping (Poynting 1999). On the other side are aggressive surfer 'gangs' of male youth (Davis 2007) often adopting the idea of localism from the North Shore of Hawaii (Scott 2003).

Far from such surfers being culturally aligned with surf-lifesaving, as Kent Pearson's (1982) showed in his foundational analysis in the area, their masculinities substantially differ. In fact there has been various levels of conflict between surfers and surf-lifesavers since the 1960s. Using Ralph Turner's (1976) classic schema of institutional and impulsive bases for identity in contemporary society, Pearson

points to the surf lifesaver being ‘establishment par excellence’—a policeman on the beaches in an association that emphasises co-operative, humanitarian (selfless) service of rescue work. The surf board rider by contrast is connected to subcultural ideals of resistance to norms and institutional power, driven by pleasure-seeking and other bohemian ideals. The localism of such surfing groups is not without a nationalist dimension, as the rhetoric of those involved in the riot at Cronulla illustrated by the wearing of Australian flags, t-shirts and hats, expressing a nationalist rhetoric that migrants should ‘go home’. However, this is more of a tribal nature rather than necessarily reflecting youth attitudes more broadly and the incapacity for nationalism to take on cosmopolitan forms. This tribalism is evident in the role of the Bra Boys, an infamous and at times publicity seeking surfer gang who are connected to the surfing champion Koby Abberton and his family. The Bra Boys were involved in reprisal clashes the day following the Cronulla riot but whom also through their ‘underground’ connections the following day appeared with the Lebanese dominated Comancheros Outlaw Motorcycle gang to call for a peace. In press engagements Mr Trad, president of the Islamic Friendship Association, and two Bra Boys leaders, Koby and Sonny Abberton, encouraged an end to the violence. Mr Trad said the “Bra Boys were one of the most multicultural groups of surfers in Australia and showed people from all backgrounds could enjoy the beach” (Bid for Sydney Peace Deal 2005).

The rise of regional and local memorials of significance associated with beach culture is also evident in the Bali memorial on Queensland’s Gold Coast. Like the Coogee memorial it functions as a site of official commemoration. While the Coogee memorial was a local government initiative and located in public space, on the Gold Coast the Bali memorial at Allambe Memorial Park was privately commissioned and located amongst the graves and plaques at a for-profit memorial gardens and cemetery. The monument was established in 2003, an initiative by locals Geoffrey Thwaites and his wife of Balinese heritage Syamsinar Thwaites who lost their son Robert in bombing. Allambe Memorial Park donated the site with the memorial, dedicated to all victims, being donated by the Balinese Royal Family. The memorial is a Balinese-style design that is indicative of Hindu sites of worship. However, this eastern character has been popularly embraced by the community, acting as a commemorative site for local victims and the families of the dead who attend annual sunset services on the anniversary of the bombing. At its official ddedication, the then Governor of Queensland, Quentin Bryce said the 5-m high concrete monument designed and built in Bali, “speaks of the triumph of good over evil and of the need to remember and to achieve peace”.

As noted above, the differing efforts in Australia to memorialize the bombing represent a wider problem of how to give meaning to terrorism within the collective memory process. The rush to memorialize the bombing over the past decade can be understood as part of a broader movement to recognize trauma and its victims in the public sphere (Taylor 1994). Such local sites are important in allowing local communities to come together in the long road of managing personal grief. However, despite acting as official sites of remembrance in the absence of alternatives, the local and regional qualities of these memorials mean that they do not represent

sacred sites that greatly influence national identity and narrative interpretation of history. It is against this background that the growth of dialogical international pilgrimage is significant. The Kuta memorial and the anniversary services in Bali not only maintain a dialogic dimension to the remembrance of the bombing, they help nationalize the bombing in Australian collective memory. It is for this reason that the then Prime Minister Julia Gillard was promising to support the purchasing of the Sari Club site and on the 10th anniversary of the bombing the New South Wales Premier expressed his willingness to contribute nearly $ 150,000 to the cause.

With more than half a million Australians visiting Bali annually, travel is likely in the short term to remain a significant force in the remembering of the bombing. While the continuance of such pilgrimage activity cannot be assumed (Chap. 2), remarkably Australian tourist numbers to Bali rebounded over the past decade despite a number of challenges to the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. The 2002 bombing of the Island led to another attack on tourists in 2005. Also the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade estimate that one Australian dies in every 9 days in Bali, with consular assistance needed frequently in relation to the high risk of injury associated with nightclubs fights, drug use, alcohol poisoning and motorcycle accidents.

The Bali bombing survivors and the family of victims have also been significant in debating the Indonesia and Australia federal alliance. Their voices, for example, were highly evident in the media in regards to the arrests and sentencing of the Bali bombers and conspirators. The dominant narrative of the Indonesia and Australia alliance portrays these two countries jointly engaged in actively and heroically combating terrorism in the region. For this to be maintained it was significant for the Indonesian government to be seen as bringing justice to the perpetrators of the bombing. From a Western perspective, this did not simply involve the doling out of punishment by whatever means but submitting the bombers to a rational “degradation ceremony” (Garfinkel 1956) in the courts, attempting to bring on the emotional sentiments of moral indignation and shame. While there are thought to be seventeen individuals of Jemaah Islamiyah involved in the bombing (Koschade 2006), the popular focus in Australia was on the arrest of the three bombers who were subsequently convicted and executed by a firing squad for carrying out the bombings: Imam Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim, and Ali Ghufron. Out of the three it was Amrozi Nurhasyim, known as Amrozi, who would come to be the face of the trio due to the perception of his positive demeanour during detention and in the court room, actions that were met with outrage in Australia. Dubbed the “smiling assassin” he was arrested on 30 April 2003 and found guilty and sentenced to death on 8 August in a trial nationally televised in Australia. Amrozi responded to the verdict with raised thumbs, after which he is reported as stating that he would become a martyr and that his death would inspire jihad.

Some cultural commentators have suggested that the case of Amrozi is simply a matter of cross-cultural misunderstanding as the smile in Indonesian culture is often used to indicate anxiety and shame. As such it can be thought of as illustrative of the problems in maintaining such a dialogical relationship around trauma between such nations with differing cultural and religious traditions (Saniotis 2006). How-

ever, as Phillpot (2005) has argued, to limit the controversy to such an interpretation is to deny that the particular production of the trial and its extensive mediation was aimed at both Western and local audiences. Unlike in the West, such public interrogations have little precedent in Indonesia, particularly in regards to terrorists or enemies of the state. Anggraeni (2002a), the Australian correspondent for the Indonesian newsweekly *Tempo*, suggests that the Indonesian police were eager to demonstrate that they are playing their part in America's 'war on terror' and to both the United States as well as the Islamic world they wanted to show how the 'suspects' had not been coerced into giving evidence. The latter is believed to have been a common occurrence under the anti-Islamic authoritarian regime of Suharto. As such Indonesian police were happy to be seen treating Amrozi well and in front of cameras and joked around with him, unaware that in the West and in particular Australia such images would be met with moral outrage, with the potential of subverting the desired meanings of justice (Smith 2008).

Despite such dimensions of farce the trials did not come to challenge the dialogical relationship between Australia and Indonesia as united against terror. This was not a matter of consensus around the guilt and punishment in the national public spheres but rather that there was a lack of consensus in the Australian and Indonesian public spheres which did not allow a strong binary divide to develop. This is consistent with Coser's (1956) idea that social conflict can be thought to have a functional effect in maintaining social order. As Coser states, "groups require disharmony as well as harmony, dissociation as well as association; and conflicts within them are by no means altogether disruptive factors" (1956, p. 31). In other words, cross-cutting conflicts, in which someone was an ally in one dispute and an opponent in another prevents conflicts falling along dichotomous lines. In a way these conflicts can be understood as acting as a kind of balancing mechanism that prevents social disintegration. For example, in Indonesia there was widespread interest and debate about Amrozi but there was little sense that the trial was a circus. In her study of the Indonesian internet forums around the time of the Bali bombers executions between July 2008 to January 2009, Sunesti (2010) found that there was a range of condemnation and praise for the bombers. Rather than the public debate being about innocence or guilt, the dominant focus of the online discussions was regarding the punishment of execution and whether the bombers deserved martyr (mujahid) status. This was found in mainstream secular internet forums such as *Detik*, which is connected to one of the most prominent online news websites in Indonesia with 15 million readers (iklanbaris.detik.com), and Kompas, a newspaper with a readership of 1,250,682 a day (www.pasangiklan.com). While there was many who argued that the bombers are "acclaimed as a hero because they are truly heroic" (Grail 11/11/2008 in Detik forum as cited in Sunesti 2010, p. 58) the dominant discourse is one of seeing their action as unjust. This takes two important strands. One demonising Amrozi and the other bombers as:

> "fools and inhuman killer. They are not courageous people, but the losers who are just brave to kill civilians who are not able to defend themselves. They are the traitor of the country! How much suffering they put on their own country. I am really happy these three clowns have been executed, an proper punishment for their sin and crime. Only fool people who are

sympathetic to them and call them martyrs…". (Ntut 11/11/2008 in Detik forum, as quoted in Sunesti 2010, p. 58)

As outlined in the quotes below, the other perspective points to structural problems within Indonesian society and the failure of elites in maintaining social stability.

> for Indonesia, the economic and educational factors play the most important role. If government can ensure their people welfare, all people have jobs and money for their lives and then enable them to send their children to school so that they can differentiate which one is wrong and which one is right, there should be no terrorist again in the future…. (Jackalcen 11/11/2008, in Forum Kompas.com, as quoted in Sunesti 2010, p. 55)
>
> …did Islamic leaders and scholars who do not agree with jihad by violence including MUI (as I know the number is higher than the extremist groups) ever tried to hold a dialogue with those groups such as ABB (Abu Bakar Ba'asyir), Abu Jibril, Habib Rizieq shihab (I believe more than those people)? I think if they (MUI) can correct that wrong perception, it will be easier to deal with thousands of their followers. (Sherry 7/11/2008, in Kompas forum, as quoted in Sunesti 2010, p. 56)

The lack of a sense of retribution against the perpetrators in this discourse needs to be considered in the context of the frequency of terrorist activity in Indonesia and the dilemma of culturally framing the suffering of outsiders within one's sovereign territory. Using media reports, Fox (2006, p. 993) claims that there were at least 66 bombings in Indonesia between 1998 and 2002, with many reports highlighting a public disillusionment with officials. Perhaps for this reason the initial Indonesian media reports about the bombing were very matter-of-fact and dramatically under estimated the number of victims with little photography used or eye-witness accounts of the scene (Fox 2006, pp. 1018–1020). While the Western media had symbolically linked this attack with the US 'war on terror', from the immediate aftermath of the bombing the Indonesian media had narrated it in terms of "internal stability, the economy and the image of Indonesia in the eyes of the rest of the world" (Fox 2006, p. 1019). Rather than focussing on the victims themselves, the bombing was seen as an attack on Indonesia with the intention of terrorists to ruin its image in the international community (Fox 2006, p. 1027).

In contrast to the coverage from mainstream media in Indonesia, the Internet forums can be thought to exhibit the dynamics of the public sphere. As the world's largest Islamic nation the nature of such communication is significant. As the internet forums outlined above are connected to major news agencies it is problematic to make any simplistic separation of old and new media. However, such web forums certainly give the public a greater input into the public sphere around the bombings than was possible within newspaper reporting of the bombing and its perpetrators (Hill and Sen 2005). While the fall of the dictatorial Suharto regime in Indonesia has seen a rise in freedom of speech and growth of independent media forms, there remains a high level of government control (Mahony 2005). The internet not only provides us with an insight about public debate that would not be achieved by other methodologies but a new space for opinion and communicative influence with its own power to influence democracy and political change. In lesser developed countries such as Indonesia such influence of the Internet can easily be under appreciated. Indonesia certainly has much lower levels of usage compared with Western

nations as a percentage of the population. However, at current levels, approximately 20% of those aged between 15 and 49 are active, accounting for 45 million users (Media Indonesia 2011), twice that of Australia entire population.

Like other spheres of social life, however, the Internet can also easily become a form of communication that reinforces and embeds opinion rather than opening it up to rational debate and contestation. This can be seen in radical Islamist online forums that were used in fairly uniform ways to champion the Bali bombers and propagate the belief that they will upon execution become martyrs. From Sunesti's (2010) research, this is clearest in the Arrahmah, web forum with its 17,040 online members (www.arrahmah.com, last accessed November 2010). Representative of this discourse, one contributor states that "[Y]ou cannot equalize the blood of Bali's victims with the blood of Muslim victims around the world. The blood of Muslim victims is more valuable double!! Even the blood of 202 Bali's victims is not equal with those three martyrs" (dr_daieyah 9/11/2008, in Arrohmah Forum Diskusi Islam, as quoted in Sunesti 2010, p. 60). The site is run by Muhammad Jibriel Abdul Rahma, who was subsequently found guilty of concealing information about the whereabouts of terrorists behind the 2010 bombings of two Jakarta hotels. While there was some dissent on Arrahmak about the killing of Muslims in the attack, even this was justified through their association with the Western tourist sites.

> We are here are supporters who continue what Amrozi cs' fight for … and what they did is for establishing Islamic state in Indonesia in which Muslims as majority (90%) but they proud of laws made by non-Muslims!! it is true that the Bali bombing was planned to kill non-Muslims who have no morality there. The time and place were already calculated. Then if there were Muslims there at that time, that should be questioned. For what reason they were there, moreover if they are Muslim women. How come they were there. (Fadly 27/11/2008, in Arrahmah Forum Diskusi Islam)

In Australia the death penalty for the bombers was also a source of division. While some survivors and the families of victims were reported as being glad that the bombers no longer had the privilege of living, others directly affected by the bombing had rallied against the use of capital punishment in this case, either morality or for the fear of bestowing martyrdom. Amongst the most outspoken individuals was Adelaide magistrate Brian Deegan whose son Josh was killed in the bombing. As well as being prominent in the media in opposing the death penalty for the bombers, he became a vocal critic of Australia's involvement in the war in Iraq, arguing that the Bali bombing had been used to justify its support for the American 'war on terror' which he argued had "no connection whatsoever with my son's death" (Father of Bali victim angry at PM's Iraq comments 2003). As a lawyer, Deegan has some expertise in regards to justice and a certain social class status that affords him a certain prominence within the media. However, his key role in the public sphere around such debates is better explained in relation to the affective authority (see Chap. 3) which he has attained through intimate participation in the ritual of grief surrounding the bombing.

For such status reasons medical practitioners involved in the Bali relief effort have also become prominent in its subsequent remembrance. For example, Dr Fiona Wood, who was the burns specialist who treated many of the victims of the bomb-

ing at Royal Perth Hospital, gave one of the key speeches at the 10th anniversary service in the Australian capital city of Canberra, having been previously bestowed a Member of the Order of Australia in 2003 and named Australian of the Year for 2005. Less frequently more ‘ordinary’ Australians connected to the bombing have attained space in the public sphere to voice opinion. Hanabeth Luke appeared in one of the key global news images of the bombings, helping a young man escape from burning carnage at the Sari Club. With her British boyfriend, Marc Gajardo, losing his life in the explosion she subsequently became a “poster girl” for the war against terror, confronting Tony Blair in a live television debate about his support for the invasion of Iraq. She argued “If we go to war it will further isolate us from the Islamic community and they will feel more isolated and desperate and that could lead to more terrorism”. During the TV debate, she confronted Mr Blair with a photo of her and Marc taken the night before the bombing saying that it showed “how happy we were and what has been destroyed”.

Controversy around the justice system in Indonesia and a contestation of the dialogical relationship with Indonesia formed in the Bali bombings has also been ignited by several high profile cases of Australians imprisoned in Indonesia for drug trafficking. The most prominent is that of Shapelle Corby, a young woman arrested at Bali’s Denpasar airport on the 8th October 2004 with a Boogie Board bag containing 4.2 kg of cannabis and sentenced to a 20 year jail sentence in Bali. Travelling to Bali with her brother and two friends to visit her sister who is married to a local Balinese man, Corby has, since her arrest, maintained her innocence. The case attained widespread media attention in Australia with the verdict of her trial broadcast live on television in Australia through the Nine Network. Like the case of Lindy Chamberlin in the 1980s who was imprisoned for killing her child and claiming it was eaten by a wild dog (dingo) (Seal 2009), Australia has been divided over Corby’s innocence. A Herald Poll of 1401 people at the time showed that while only 17 % of the population thought she was innocent of smuggling drugs, another 30 % thought that she was probably innocent and 36 % could not make up their minds (Seccombe 2005). Significant for Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, however, 35 % of the sampled population thought that the trial was fair. Making reference to the lenient sentence given to the spiritual leader of JI Abu Bakar Bashir for his role in terrorist activities, The Daily Telegraph in an front-page article titled “Nation’s Fury” argued that “[T]his terrorist planned the murder of 88 Australians and got 2 years. Yesterday, Schapelle Corby got 20.” Introducing its discussion forum on the sentence *The Age* newspaper sums up the public discourse stating that “[T]here have been reports of Australians wanting tourists to boycott Indonesia, that some charities are having trouble collecting money if it may be used to help Indonesia tsunami victims, and the Indonesian Embassy and businesses being subjected to abusive calls” (Your Say 2005).

The majority of Australians in jail across South East Asia seldom attract this level of media coverage and as such the public interest in this case is exceptional. It has been speculated to be associated with a number of factors. Widely perceived to be an attractive and outgoing woman, Corby was often portrayed by the media as a typical Australian beach girl, and as such symbolically close to the Australian vic-

tims of the Bali bombing. Despite a *Sunday Age*/Nielsen poll recently showing that the Australian public belief in her innocence has now diminished to 10 %, the media interest in Corby has been enduring and the constant calls by the media for her to serve out the remainder of her sentence in Australia. This is echoed by public opinion with the same poll showing that 74 % believe her sentence is too harsh (Allard and Gordan 2010). The enduring interest in the case was again highlighted upon being released on bail in February 2014, sparking the broadcasting of a telemovie on her case and mass national media attention. Whether perceived as innocent or not by the public, she was widely portrayed in the media as symbolically Australian, and as such in need of rescuing from a strange foreign land, with media attention frequently focusing on the poor conditions of her incarceration. However, Rosleigh Rose, Corby's mother, had once indicated that Corby would prefer to serve her sentence in Bali rather than an Australian jail as almost any luxuries can be acquired for a price (Corby 2006). The enduring media attention on the Corby case is not only a product of public opinion but the successful use of the media by Corby, family and supporters. Not only was she the object of media attention, she actively engaged in the celebrity industry by selling her hair on ebay, willingly providing interviews to women's magazines from her prison cell (Lambert 2008), including giving details of her beauty regimes and even publishing her own book of her ordeal (Corby and Bonella 2006).

The cosmopolitan meanings surrounding Bali though continue as the dominant narrative with Australians. The Indonesian commitment to the dialogical relationship formed in the bombings was evident in the April 2005 visit to Australia by the then newly elected Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Speaking in the Great Hall at Parliament House in Canberra, his focus was not only retrospective concerning Bali but emphasising its relevance as a frame for understanding the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Australia's rescue efforts (see Chap. 5) which included an Australian military helicopter crash in the Indonesian island of Nias which killed nine of what the President described as "Australia's finest … who died in glory: the glory … a selfless act to help the suffering of those in need…" (Sheehan 2005). He continued, stating that every "Australian in this room, and in the living rooms across Australia, who saw our hardship, felt our pain and acted upon it, has every reason to be proud … When we in Indonesia were down and out, when we needed help most, you came and stood by us… (Sheehan 2005).

Conclusion

Following a cultural sociological approach to narrating crisis, this chapter has illustrated the importance of collective memory in the Australian narration of the Bali bombing. It was argued that sacred historical figures, events and places worked as 'models of' and 'models for' society, both orientating responses to this episode of cultural trauma while providing a resource for actors to recreate narrative understandings of events. In particular the chapter documents how the national ar-

chetypes of the sportsman and WWI Anzac soldier were utilised to comprehend the attack within a patriotic frame. The sportsman provided both a convenient and deeply rooted 'model of' society, with the media using both its mythology as well as witness accounts by footballers in Bali as a 'model for' promoting an isolationist and provincial nationalism. While this resulted in heightened social solidarity it did little in actually redressing the crisis as it heightened cultural trauma in the Australian community, casting Indonesians as culpable in the suffering and death of Australians.

A counter-narrative, however, appeared in the Australian public sphere with contemporary memories of WWI Anzac soldiers promoting a more cosmopolitan nationalism, helping to reestablish the status of Bali as an exotic place. As a 'model for' society the Anzac legend allowed for alternative witness accounts to enter the public sphere and the bombing to be keyed into the logics of contemporary global travel and post-Fordist consumption. This sanctioned Australians returning to their everyday activities and provided a mandate for Australian authorities to develop closer diplomatic ties and engage in joint commemorative activity with Indonesia. While it is not suggested that all 'militaristic' collective memories would have such consequences, the paper illustrates how national discourses can play a constructive counter terrorism role in the post '9/11' world.

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Chapter 5
National Humanitarianism and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami: Charitable Response and the Ethical Dilemma of Cultural Understanding

This final empirical chapter of this research monograph again examines the cosmopolitan possibilities of civic nationalism, this time in the context of humanitarian responses to foreign disasters. This is considered in a case study of the discursive construction and chartable response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (from here on referred to as tsunami) in Australia and the United States. In contrast to the Bali bombings examined in Chap. 4, our concern here is with distant suffering (Boltanski 1999), involving a grieving and empathy for others where there is an absence of strong cultural ties to the majority of victims. Cosmopolitan literature on humanitarian communication assumes that the nation is an impediment to charity, and therefore looks to theorise humaitarianism in terms of global values and individual cognitive processes (Boltanski 1999). In contrast, this chapter will emphasise how the national framing of distant suffering can positively influence humanitarian assistance. The case study demonstrates how national sentiment can provide a cultural relevance to disasters, which in the case of the tsunami helped facilitate the largest humanitarian response on record (Flint and Goyder 2006, p. 21). In the public spheres of Australia and the United States the national imaginary in particular allowed for a universalising of risk and a basis for organising charity events such as sporting contests and music concerts.

Distant Suffering in Cognitive and Cultural Sociology

As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, questions are raised about the relevance of existing cultural identities and how we relate to those whom were previously culturally distant. Sociologists have generally moved on from utopian beliefs about culture automatically reflecting global flows of people and commerce, with cultural identities being abandoned in favour of a universalist and pure cosmopolitan sense of citizenship. Comprehending what beliefs and identities are retained and under what circumstances they can adapt themselves to new global flows

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though remains a work in progress. Disasters which capture global attention provide a strategic site for theorising such processes.

The influential work of Luc Boltanski (1999) on humanitarianism has provided one way of understanding how global flows are mediated by cultural forces in relation to international crises. He argues that the rise of global electronic news media has provided a challenge to previous entrenched public positions to humanitarianism. Previously humanitarianism was based on Enlightenment ideas of universal welfare to the less fortunate. At its basis was a politics of pity for Others and by Eurocentric notions of Western progress and cultural superiority. In postmodernity Boltanski argues humanitarianism is more contingently based on emotional appeals to individuals and the situational media portrayal and narration of suffering. He points out that the electronic media has now more than ever before made us aware and 'witnesses' to the misery of 'Others' around the world. However our response to this exposure is increasingly variable, not only between cases of suffering but the ways individuals respond to each. The major divide in the latter is between those that interpret suffering in lesser developed countries from a standpoint of abstract universalism and those that view it from the perspective of local particularism. Universalists are willing to identify with victims and take up the humanitarian cause independent of circumstance while other viewers will choose not to respond, rationalising the suffering in particularistic ways, principally by arguing that attention should in the first instance be concerned with inequalities closer to home. In a somewhat fatalistic analysis, Boltanski highlights the limitations of the cosmopolitan response, arguing that it is a kind of egotistic altruism that feeds on images of suffering and silences about its causes. As such it inadvertently reinforces Eurocentric notions of the 'other'.

Boltanski (1999) expresses the need to find pragmatic ways to relieve distant suffering. However, he sees no particular alternative to the discourse of cosmopolitan individualism, certainly not at the level of national attachment. Three reasons can be suggested for why this is the case, all indicative of a broader neglect in comprehending a role for national solidarity in enhancing humanitarianism. Firstly, as outlined in the previous chapters in relation to social theory, Boltanski (1999) assumes that national consciousness is inherently an impediment to empathy towards the 'Other'. In terms of humanitarianism this belief is mostly based on the traditional reluctance of the state to increase or maintain their foreign aid spending with existing policy directed by political and economic considerations rather than by compassionate reasons or needs based. Secondly, Boltanski's (1999) empirical focus is on international charitable organisations and their framing of humanitarianism in reference to global citizenship. This typically echoes the globalisation mantra of individuals acting locally and thinking globally. For example, the Australian Red Cross has the slogan "the *power* of humanity" which they describe as "the strength of individual commitment and the force of collective action. Both must be mobilized to relieve suffering, ensure respect for human dignity and ultimately create a more humane society". Other relief groups similarly emphasise the moral and ethical responsibility of individuals by organising their charity around the sponsoring of individual children. While these are noble causes such efforts tend to emerge from elitist and individualist conceptions of global citizenship (Calhoun 2003; Turner

2002). Thirdly, Boltanski (1999) reflects a cognitive turn in sociology whereby culture is perceived of as a 'toolkit' (Swidler 1986) with an analytic focuses on individual mental processes. This too is an attempt to move away from the presumption "that culture is organised around national societies … is highly thematized, and is manifested in similar ways across many domains" (DiMaggio 1997, p. 264). As such where Boltanski's (1999) emphasis on the moral ties of giving can be understood in relation to a French intellectual tradition that builds on Durkheim's and Marcel Mauss's analysis of classification schemes, Boltanski has little appreciation of how the individual act of giving is affected by enduring national attachments and the ritual activities and symbolic representations which surround them.

This is not to say that the collective is completely absent from the study of humanitarian aid. In fact issues of humanitarian communication and distant suffering have been of significant concern to scholars in cultural sociology. However, despite an appreciation of the structural dimension of culture, there is little direct consideration given to the nation playing a constructive role encouraging humanitarianism. The reasons for this neglect, however, differ between the two major paradigms that inform academic literature in the area.

The first paradigm addressing humanitarian communication emerges from the critical tradition in comprehending globalisation and points to the ideological role of the media in maintaining a symbolic exclusion of 'others' (Cohen 2001; Silverstone 2006). This is principally thought to occur by media portrayals de-legitimising suffering. Typically this involves employing orientalist discourses to portray victims as inferior (Sontag 2003; Szorenyi 2009), which in turn limits the recognition and international response to disasters and other episodes of suffering in the lesser developed world. Various scholars in this perspective have pointed to the psycho-social effects of the global electronic media in this regard, the result being a kind of compassion fatigue and viewer desensitization (Moeller 1999). From this perspective there is often seen to be an inverse relationship between media exposure to suffering and the willingness of the public in Western nations to provide humanitarian relief. A common belief within this literature is that we have moved into a post-humanitarian era in which viewers have become spectators of suffering, being engaged by the media portrayals of suffering, but not emotionally moved to take action (Mestrovic 1997). As will be outlined below in the case study of the Indian Ocean tsunami, orientalism is ever present as a way of discursively framing distant suffering. However, as outlined below, interestingly this can be limited by national discourses. While national discourses tend to inhibit the expression of pure cosmopolitan empathy for local victims, it can facilitate charity rituals which results in a greater levels of humanitarian giving.

The second paradigm on humanitarian communication does not emphasise the lack of public attention to distant suffering but the role of new communication technologies and global flows in increasing our attention and ability to address global problems (Chouliaraki 2012; Cottle 2009; St John 2008). Similar to Boltanski (1999), this literature points to a post-Cold War shift in humanitarian communication associated with the decline of grand narratives. It also points to the cultural basis of giving fundamentally shifting, moving away from an idea of obligations to venerable strangers and the self-sacrificing Good Samaritian. Humanitarian

campaigns are now more elective and theatrical; involving what Chouliaraki (2013) refers to as the ironic spectator. However, this figure is at once "sceptical towards any moral appeal to solidarity action and, yet, open to doing something about it" (Chouliaraki 2013, p. 2). Rather than embedded in lifelong religious commitments and institutional affiliations, this contemporary form of humanitarianism is associated with new forms of identity politics and performative protest (Castells 2009; Kurasawa 2004; McDonald 2002). As Castells notes, the strength and popularity of such global movements is found in their utilisation of new digital technologies such as the Internet for their formation and global recruitment, yet they lack a consensus around issues of ideology and morality (2009). In a similar vein they differ from traditional humanitarianism in that there is not a strong separation from the sphere of commodity exchange (Chouliaraki 2013). Instead the ritualistic dimension of this aid generation is associated with rock concerts such as Live Aid, Live 8 and Make Poverty History concerts and associated with celebrity driven campaigns (Lester 2006; Littler 2008; Meyer 1995).

Technology also comes into this paradigm by emphasising the influence of the internet, and particularly user-generated digital content of disasters in promoting humanitarian giving. Part of this is the role of digital communication, involving the blurring of cultural production and consumption. The argument typically made by social theorists is that such media allows for such a plurality of voices that not only eroded the quality press and the traditional journalist practice of objectivity but broadly undermines modern notions of truth, reason and national identity. In Bauman's words, the unlimited possibility of being constantly and immediately aware of happenings in the world has seen the value of 'being connected' replace that of 'being engaged' (Bauman 2003, p. 63).

For others, however, the new lines of communication and association that come with the digital age has allowed for a reinvigoration of emerging public spheres. However, again the emphasis is on the decline rather than enduring significance of national identity, in this case through the role information technology plays in allowing for the formation of new social movements and global networks. The network society thesis of Manuel Castells (2000) is indicative of this scholarship. Castells argues that the rise of a global economy, which was not only made possible by digital information but largely constituted by knowledge generation, has caused a disruption to identities based on notions of national sovereignty. Resistance to neoliberal globalization does not come about through national solidarity but appears in the shape of transnational social movements which form and organise themselves through Internet based communication (Castells 2009).

This perspective can be referred to as transformationalist, given it shares with contemporary globalization theory the idea that globally connectivity involves the formation of organisations and cultural sentiments that are detached from the nation-state (Bauman 2011; Beck 2009; Held 2010). As we will see below, this transformationalist perspective on humanitarianism provides important insights into Australia's framing of the tsunami. However, its emphasis on global technologies and postmodern sensibilities tends to always be associated with the emergence of new global identities rather than considering how national attachment and identity may also be ignited through such processes. As significant as digital technologies

are in establishing a new global consciousness and resistance, it does not negate the significance of national discourses and traditional media. While there has been a decline in the revenue model of advertising for traditional media, they remain popular. This particularly is the case as they incorporate themselves into the digital environment, for example through newspaper websites. Making any easy binary contrast between new and old media is also problematic in that newspapers and television are increasingly drawing on user-generated content for information. This is clear whether it be in regards to the leaking of information to newspapers from freedom of information sites such as WikiLeaks, established news reporting on twitter posts or television news using photos and video drawn from social media. Apart from economic factors, there are clear cultural attractions to this type of social media in an age when there is wariness about grand narratives. In the words of the French structuralist Claude Levi-Strauss, it appears to be 'raw' rather than 'cooked' (1969). This is despite survey research showing that social media such as Twitter posts are not very representative or valid indicator of public opinion (Mitchell and Hitlin 2013).

The availability of such user-generated online material, particularly sensational digital footage of disasters from 'smart' mobile phones that can be instantaneously and globally distributed, has been used by various scholars to explain recent cases of generous global humanitarian, including the Indian ocean tsunami (Chang 2006; Kellner 2007). There is a danger, however, that we overstate the influence of such technology, overlooking the importance of broader cultural frames such as the nation in narrating disasters and episodes of crisis. This is suggested in studies of the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. They have been widely understood in relation to the influence of social media and new technologies and their role in creating new generational understandings of the world in these countries (Howard and Hussain 2013). However, Aday et al. (2013) have questioned the empirical evidence for such claims. In a study utilising internet history data, Aday et al. (2013) has argued that most of attention to the online content regarding the Arab Spring came from those not directly involved in the protests. They also argue that it was the mass media rather than online social media sites that were more influential in keeping the world informed about what was happening amongst protesters on the ground. As will be outlined below in the case study of the 2004 Indian ocean tsunami, while the real life video capture of disasters may facilitate charity, the different levels of humanitarian giving and types of reporting on the disaster cross culturally means that we also need to look at national public spheres, and I will argue national identity and symbolic representation, to understand collective responses to distant suffering.

The Nation and Global Social Drama

There can be little debate that the tsunami was a significant 'global' event. It took the lives of approximately 230,000 people from 50 different nations with devastation spanning two continents. The majority of deaths were within Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand, representing three of the world's great institutional re-

ligions: Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. However, its global significance just as much occurred through its mediation, in particular the reporting and humanitarian response from Western countries not directly subject to the disaster. As highlighted by various natural disasters in the lesser-developed world, such as the under reported 2008 Sichuan Earthquake in China, the extent of devastation does not guarantee a high level of reportage in the Western media. As such it was the media itself that gave the tsunami its 'event-ness' (Mast 2006).

In the Australian and United States public spheres the tsunami dominated front page stories of broadsheet and tabloid newspapers with circulation significantly higher than on the same period in previous years (Jackson and Sinclair 2005, p. 15). A large part of this attention has been associated with the impact of the tsunami being recorded on personal video recorders. Due to the remoteness of the regions affected and the degree of devastation, these images continued to emerge over time. For example, the dramatic footage of a wave of water surging through the streets of Banda Aceh did not appear for 2 weeks following the tsunami's initial impact (Snowden 2012, p. 125). This highlights a complex inter-relationship between new and old media forms in relation to the narration of the tsunami.

As will be detailed below, by examining the narration of the tsunami in Australia and the United States I argue that as well as an international event that occurred elsewhere, the tsunami also took on something of a national ritual. This doesn't simply relate to the extent of media attention on the tsunami in Australia and the United States but the narrative framing of the tsunami which tied it to the nation and in a way made it traumatic for Australians and Americans. I argue that understanding how this occurred is significant as it relates to levels of humanitarian giving. To examine these variables I draw on a sampled data set of over 800 newspaper articles between 27th December 2004, and 27th January 2005. In Australia these were drawn from the only national newspaper *The Australian*, and two state newspapers, Victoria's quality broadsheet *The Age* and Sydney's high circulation tabloid *The Daily Telegraph*. In the United States articles were collected from the *New York Times*, taken as a broadsheet paper of national record, and the tabloid *USA Today*, the newspaper with the largest circulation. As suggested above, there is no doubt that the availability of dramatic video footage of the tsunami encouraged media coverage of the disaster and that as a consequence this increased the public attention given to the event. However, as outlined in Chap. 1, it is important that a cultural sociological paradigm avoids technological determinism and looks for cultural variables that interact and shape these other factors.

From a discourse analysis of the sampled newspaper articles seven dominant thematic categories were identified. These are outlined in Fig. 5.1. From these I outline three significant ways in which national sentiment in Australia and the United States worked as a cultural frame for the disaster: (1) media concern with ex-patriots; (2) emphasis on the universal threat of the disaster; (3) the linking of charitable response with national identity.

The argument being forwarded in outlining these three cultural frames is that the media reporting of the tsunami in Australia and the United States was not only the narration of the cultural trauma being experienced by foreign Others but that the

Category	News Focus
Aid	Reporting of government assistance, military aid, aid agencies, and those reconstructive efforts carried out at the site of the disaster.
Tourism	Reporting of tourists, tourist resorts, expatriates, and non-locals
Charity	Reporting of fundraising activities and charity drives such as benefit concerts and includes articles regarding amounts of charity amassed
Miscellaneous	Reporting not otherwise classified, including local people, warning systems and earthquake specialists, and novelty articles about sharks trapped in swimming pools
Mortality	Reporting of makeshift morgues, mass-graves, body identification, and death tolls
Economy	Reporting of the effect of the crisis on world economy, tourism, insurance, and finance
Commemoration	Reporting of memorial services, funerals, church services, and minutes of silence

Fig. 5.1 Discursive themes

tsunami initiated a crisis domestically. Exactly how this occurred will be outlined below in detailing the narration of the disaster. Some evidence for this claim comes from the diachronic structure of the media reporting itself, particularly its consistency with Victor Turner's stages of a social drama (1974, 1986). Turner's conception of social dramas has been a useful tool for cultural sociologists theorising the structural sequence of crisis episodes (Jacobs 2000; Smith 2005; Wagner-Pacifici 1986). For Turner social dramas were a kind of societal performance involving an assigning of meaning to social forces which disrupted the normal flows of social life. Rather than reflecting the particular circumstances of the events, Turner argued that they had a certain predictable narrative sequence. He stated that these might be "culturally elaborated in different ways in different societies" (Turner 1986, p. 105) but four key phases were always involved. These are easily translatable to the order

of the dominant themes that appear in the reporting of the tsunami in Australian and United States newspapers outlined in Fig. 5.1.

The first stage, 'breach', marks the beginning of the social drama, with a violation of social norms and expectations (Turner 1974, p. 38). As outlined below, this did not occur merely as a consequence of hearing about the tsunami disaster but the media focus on tourists and ex-patriots in the disaster zone. This dominated media coverage between day one and two of the aftermath. The second stage, 'crisis', involves the elevation of social interaction with the event. Turner highlights that this is a highly fluid and contingent stage that may fuel conflict along existing divisions in society (Turner 1974, pp. 38–9). For Turner such conflict is an essential part of establishing meaning, which occurs as a consequence of "cognitive hindsight but something existentially emergent from the entanglement of persons" (1986, p. 33). This is not instrumental and rational but occurs through the use of narratives that "become scripts or arguments to be used by the instigators of new sequences" of meaning (1986, p. 33). In the tsunami coverage this conflict over the meaning of the crisis can be seen in relation to debates about causality and state aid which appear at fairly high levels over the 6 days following the disaster. The third stage, 'redress', involves efforts at conflict resolution and bring an end to the cultural anxiety around cultural crisis and sees the emergence of narratives and deployment of symbols which resolve the crisis surrounding the event as it appears in the public sphere (Turner 1974, p. 39). Reflecting this phase the number of articles regarding public charity and fund raising events rise sharply around the 10th and the 12th of January. The final stage, 'reintegration', is a period of resolution and a marked return to the status quo (Turner 1974, p. 42). This stage can be thought to occur around January 17th when newspaper articles pertaining to the tsunami peak, particular in relation to charity events and commemorations, resulting in a general waning of the media coverage. However, the normality that is returned to is different as the specific ways that the social drama played out becomes part of the cultural system (Geertz 1973) and a model or pattern that will influence the response to similar times of crisis in the future.

Ex-Patriot Witnessing and Suffering

As suggested in the above section, the tsunami provides a particular cultural puzzle: how can a foreign catastrophe become relevant for a nation that has not directly suffered or has a history of responding to such a threat? In the colonial history of Australia and the United States the natural environment posed a threat that helped bond national identity (Slotkin 1973; West and Smith 1996). Nature provided an outside enemy, acting as a surrogate for nations that had yet to experience European style warfare on its soil. For these two countries the natural environment continues to resonate with national identity. However, in both cases there are no strong cultural traditions related to the narration of tsunamis. As the then Australian Prime Minister John Howard stated in the immediate aftermath of the disaster: "Tsuna-

mi, because it is a Japanese word, doesn't mean a lot to Australians" (McPhedran 2005a, p. 22). This is despite some threat and historical cases in mainland Australia and the outlying states of Alaska and Hawaii. There are also few strong cultural ties to the countries affected. While Australia is geographically close to many of the countries that suffered most and the United States has strong strategic and economic ties in the region, including as a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, there is a broad consensus that both countries remain cultural distant from Asia. However, the national narration of the tsunami did not follow a well-established cultural script of marginalising distant suffering. Rather it attained a strong cultural relevance through a narration which must be understood in relation to contingent factors rather than only reflecting pre-existing social and economic structures.

As we saw in the previous chapters, as national boundaries have become more porous so have the opportunities to imaginatively utilise national categories in the narration of global events. At a basic level in relation to the tsunami this involved the media concentrating on expatriate groups as a way of discursively engaging with the event and local suffering without directly having to account for either foreign cultural traditions or the horror of the event. Principally this involved a focus on nationals and Westerners abroad. As a *New York Times* article stated "it was the presence of large numbers of foreign tourists that distinguished this disaster from the many floods and typhoons that take a heavy toll in the region every year" (Mydans 2004). Although only 26 Australians and 33 Americans died, the loss and lifeworlds of these victims attracted an extraordinary media attention. Such foregrounding is clearly evident in the headline "Aussies at centre of catastrophe" (AFP 2004, p. 7). Instead of compassion being directed at the tragic circumstances of whole local communities and devastated villages, the media genre focussed upon individual Western victims and the sorrow of their families, typically embedded in a Judaeo-Christian tradition of mourning.

> Richard Nott wept as he spoke yesterday of "his beloved son, who I loved so much". Yet through the tears, he was able to acknowledge the despair of so many others in his position. 'There are a lot of Australian families my sentiments will echo into, and my heart goes out to them,' he said. 'May God help them throughout this terrible process'. (Lawson 2005)

> Mr. Abels, 33, is real estate broker whose travelling companion provided meticulous detail of his whereabouts when the tsunami hit, is among 20 Americans missing and presumed dead. His family is one of the scores that have spent 2 weeks on computers and cellphones desperate for clues. (Wilgoren 2005)

In the United States media stories also emphasised the concerns migrant groups held for relatives in their homelands, openly providing recognition of transnationalism and dual citizenship.

> The same mix of grief and desire to help was apparent on Staten Island, which has a large Sri Lankan community … People filled the temple … bought bags of clothes, food … many donors simply brought envelopes of cash and dropped them in the box in front of Budda. (O'Donnell and Newman 2004)

> Many of those killed there were foreigners, but the most prominent of the dead was Poom Jensen, 21, the Thai-American grandson of King Bhumipol Adulyadej. (Mydans 2004)

Fig. 5.2 Front page photo of tourists in Thailand as tsunami approaches.

One explanation for this Western bias is that prior to media communications being re-established in the disaster zones, tourists and other expatriates through mobile phone communication provided important information about the situation on the ground. This is particularly the case for cultural elites in the disaster zone. For example, an American sociology professor, Faye Wachs, who with her husband survived the tsunami by scuba diving in deep water, was heavily drawn on by the media as an expert witness to describe the devastation (Wachs 2005). Unlike the case of the Bali bombings (Chap. 4) this reporting was largely factual and had few political dimensions. Despite the vast number of images of the tsunami causing devastation, this witness reporting was typically not accompanied by any powerful images of the survivor in the disaster zone that provides such accounts with a strong cultural authority (Zelizer 2010). Illustrating the prominence of this eye witness genre, regularly over the first week of the crisis *The Daily Telegraph* printed the request: "tell us your stories about Australians returning home" (Casella and Sun 2004, p. 7).

The focus of the media though was not only on nationals abroad but Westerners more generally. Apart from general eurocentrism, this discursive focus can be explained by its connection to the dramatic visual images typically recorded by tourists being disseminated globally via television media and the Internet. For example, the *New York Times* led their reporting of the tsunami with a dramatic image of foreign tourists (Fig. 5.2) on the beach trying to rush to safety with the tsunami wave in the background (Revkin 2004). This focussed continued in the following days. For example, the New York Times profiled a Swedish survivor who appeared in one of the other iconic images of the tsunami on front pages of newspapers around the world.

> A photograph published across the globe last week showed her in her swimsuit walking away from Rai Lay Beach in Krabi, Thailand, on Dec. 26, as a wall of foaming water rushed toward it. Then, in a subsequent frame, she is seen running back to alert her family, still threatened by the waves …. About 7000 European tourists are still unaccounted for in the disaster wrought by the tsunamis… But, in a remarkable twist, Mrs. Svaerd, 37, escaped to tell her story to a Swedish newspaper, … back at home at Skelleftehamn, in the north of Sweden, with her husband and three children. (Cowell 2005)

This narrative framing of the disaster emphasising Western suffering and grief is echoed in the recent Hollywood film on the tsunami *The Impossible* (2012). Staring celebrity actors Naomi Watts and Ewan McGregor, the movie is based on the real life experience of Maria Belon, a Spanish doctor in Thailand who was separated from her family in the aftermath of the tsunami.

In other ways the enduring popularity of disaster films provides us with insights into the diversity of ways distant suffering can be interpreted in the West. While such films can be understood in terms of guilty attraction to the spectacle of disaster, they resonate with audiences because they have embedded in them important cultural meanings about how to live with technology, nature and each other (Gans 1975; Sontag 1996). In these sorts of stories the natural world is more than just a vehicle for supernatural vengeance and justice—it is also an agency through which surviving humans can learn about human arrogance and error (Smith and West 2004). The central concern of these movies is about the unpredictability of the natural world and of its ability to humble human arrogance, a need for the application of technology to be balanced with an appreciation of human community and resilience. In a sense, then, they can be thought to provide a social and environmentalist manifesto in an era of global risk and as such can potentially allow for overcoming notions of national isolationism (Beck 2009). The focus on Western tourists in *The Impossible* though also signifies the endurance of local particularism in the public spheres of Australia and the United States.

It is significant to note in relation to the arguments put earlier in the monograph that while the focus in such accounts was on tourists, tourist discourse, as it relates to post-Fordist understandings of the world, are largely absent from these media reports. When tourist discourses did appear in the reporting it tended to work to reduce cultural difference rather than exacerbate it. This occurred by connecting readers to place, for example through highlighting the long history of travel by Australians to particular sites and regions in Thailand and Indonesia. Travel and tourism in these cases provided a principal way that the Australian media were able to provide locations with cultural relevance and allow reporting of distant suffering to be undertaken. In such instances there was often a discursive emphasis on the equality between locals and Western tourists.

> The killers did not discriminate. They came for them all. And tens of thousands more. … villages would be obliterated, tourist resorts wiped out, and sunbathers and fishermen alike swept out to sea. ('The cruel sea' The Age 2005)

Again, the contention that the minor loss of Australians could be equated with local suffering is highly Eurocentric. However, as we will see it is consequential in providing a basis for the tsunami to be interpreted as relevant to Australia.

Orientalist discourses certainly were evident in the media reporting of the tsunami (Prakash 1995). Representing the enduring dimensions of this genre, the media discourses in Australia and the United States consistently portrayed 'us' as efficient, organised, and generous, while concurrently constructing the affected nations as inefficient, disorganised and corrupt. This binary discourse was particularly assigned to Indonesia and India rather than Thailand where Western tourists were most prominent in providing eyewitness accounts and as Cohen notes the govern-

ment in the aftermath of the tsunami prioritised the needs of Western tourists over those of locals (Cohen 2009).

> Colombo's first response, predictably bureaucratic and highly centralised, took several days to evolve after the disaster. The centre became fully operational only last Thursday, 4 days after the tsunami. (Farouque 2005, p. 6)

> In Nagappattinam, India … No one had yet tried to tried to compile a list of the missing. No system was in place to ensure that the truckloads of donations coming in were fairly distributed, or that the overabundance of food was promptly meted out. (Rohde and Waldman 2005)

> Experts have warned that Indonesia's budget is particularly inefficient, raising concerns that the saving could be whittled away on expensive subsidies and bureaucracy. (Gordon 2005, p. 8)

While the media in Australia and the United States did account for the local religious cultures in their reporting this again followed a tradition of orientalism that emphasises the simplicity of non-Christian mystical belief systems.

> A deeply religious Muslim province, many of the Acehenese believe the tsunami was a sign from God, a punishment for sins. (Wockner 2005a, p. 23)

> Sri Lankan Buddhists believe that rebirth follows death, and that sin and good deeds determine one's future in this life and the next. Many Buddhists said they suspected that those who had lost children had done something wrong in a previous life. (Waldman 2005)

As we will see below, such local religious responses were contrasted with media report of rational Western understandings of risk that privileged scientific explanation and mitigation.

Global and National Risk

Oriental notions of Western maturity and rationality are also evident in early reporting of the tsunami in the Australian and United States media in relation to risk. This sees modern science and technology as panaceas to the threat posed by tsunamis. Along these lines Australia and the United States are cast as 'advanced' nations able to play a lead role in preventing future deaths. However the romantic dimension of such heroism is undercut by a sentiment that lives could have been saved if these nations had been more generous in sharing their technological expertise. This is particularly evident in relation to debate surrounding the funding and development of a tsunami early warning system in the Indian Ocean.

> No human power could have stopped the wall of water that washed over low-lying coasts from Indonesia to East Africa on Sunday. But human foresight could, and should, have mitigated the resulting tragedy…That death toll could have been cut at least in half if the affected region had had the same kind of international warning network the United States has set up to protect the adjacent Pacific basin. ('Sounding the Alarm' 2004)

> An Australian seismology expert has claimed thousands of lives could have been saved if the Australian Government had come forward 10 years ago with the $ 10 million it is now giving to help tsunami victims and used it instead to help fund a regional early-warning system. (Alford et al. 2004, p. 8)

Overall though there is very little discourse about a causal link between suffering and levels of development; for example in relation to the construction quality or buildings permits being issued in tsunami prone regions (Kellehear 2007, p. 5). As Furedi (2007) reminds us, this is counter to the contemporary trend in interpreting disasters whereby the finger of blame more often than not is pointed towards human factors, involving either individual scapegoats or the vested interests of elites such as governments or big business. For Boltanski (1999), such oriental discourses are limited as for many in the West they bring with them a guilt regarding viewing the spectacle of suffering, which is not dissimilar to cinema genres that rouse fascination, horror, or exhilaration (Boltanski 1999, p. 21). As such the tsunami is more often than not portrayed in Australian and United States media as a potent 'natural' event that indiscriminately caused destruction. In other words it is cast broadly in terms of nature's fury rather than an outcome of human action.

> The nature we saw this week is different from the nature we tell ourselves about in the natural history museum, at the organic grocery store and on a weekend outing to the national park. This week nature seems amoral and viciously cruel … wilful and uncontrollable. (Brooks 2005)

> It is a disaster of catastrophic if not biblical proportions. (English 2004, p. 29)

> So the tsunami reminds us of our fragility and vulnerability. To some it suggests we are God's playthings, given free will so that we can choose love or hatred, goodness or evil, as our moral options. (Murray 2005, p. 26)

This conception of the tsunami as a universal, and as a consequence national, threat also allowed it to be framed in relation to Judeo-Christian mythology. In the Australian case not only were expatriates at risk but the continent of Australia. This is despite the affected regions having a long history of tsunami risk and Australia almost none.

> This is the call to all of us in Australia. This disaster is on our doorstep. It could well have been our coastline and our towns and defenceless beach-lovers devastated. (Costello 2004, p. 13)

> The move came as geologists warned that the Australian eastern seaboard and Western Australia were at risk of tsunamis. (Schubert and Gauchi 2004, p. 3)

In contrast, little was made of Hawaii, Alaska and the Californian coast being at risk of tsunamis. This differential construction of risk is likely to have been responsible for Australia and the United States initially responding to the tsunami in quite different ways.

International Aid and National Identity

It is standard practice for national governments to offer immediate aid to foreign countries following a disaster the size of the tsunami, as it is common that such pledges will not be fully honoured or are promoted in ways in which they seem more generous and targeted than is the case. Strategic aid is nevertheless culturally significant for both the donor and recipient. For this reasons the Indian government,

and initially Sri Lanka, declined international assistance for the relief operations, declaring that sufficient resources were available in the country to assist those made vulnerable. In Australia's case, what is unusual is the way that this government aid became to be seen as representative of the national character. The state's immediate offer of foreign aid in the aftermath of the disaster and its implementation on the ground was broadly championed by the domestic media and came to establish the tsunami as a kind of social drama (Turner 1974) involving various personifications of national virtues and embodiments of a good society.

> We were the first foreign country to get assets in and we followed up with this very big aid package. It all adds up to a very swift, generous and long-lasting response. (McPhedran 2005b, p. 22)

> AUSTRALIANS are known for their resourcefulness. To prove it, in Banda Aceh, a medical team built an emergency department out of empty water bottles. "There's nothing you can't do with a drink bottle". (Gibbs 2005, p. 6)

The construction of tsunami relief as something patriotic was likely significant in the Australian federal government increasing it's initial aid pledge of 10 million and subsequently 25 million in late December to a billion dollars of state aid to Indonesia on the fifth of January. As a result Australia's total aid came to approximately 0.255 % of GDP, far exceeding all other nations. The significance of this aid though needs to be tempered by the fact that not only was a large part of the latter in loans but broadly reflected Australian existing aid strategy developed prior to the tsunami (O'Connor et al. 2006). In the entire aid pledged by Australia to Indonesia only $ 50 million was for the nation's principal devastated region of Aceh, where a separatist war was being engaged in at the time the tsunami struck (O'Conner et al. 2006). However, Australia was cast by the media as showing leadership during a time of global crisis. Oxfam policy director James Ensor stated that Australia had set a fine example for other nations (Australian aid sets the standard 2005).

In contrast to Australia's aid response to the tsunami that was interpreted positively as a reflection of the nation, the initial $ 15 million pledge of the United States was negatively interpreted as indicative of the national character. As Meunier argues, editorials in all the major broadsheets, including the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times* had criticised the United States for a lack of inaction and the decision by the then President to remain at his Texas ranch where he was holidaying over the festive period (Meunier 2007, p. 137). Such criticisms included "comparisons of the tsunami relief aid promised by the United States and the budget for the festivities at the second Bush inauguration" (Meunier 2007, p. 137). When the United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland was reported to have accused the United States of being "stingy" in its humanitarian response to the tsunami, the administration responded swiftly. While Egeland would qualify that his remarks were about aid giving generally and not this particular emergency, soon afterwards the Bush administration contributed a further $ 20 million and sent additional military hardware and troops for relief operations. More significantly it made the United States administration adopt the rhetoric that its tsunami aid was a symbol of nationhood. In particular it emphasised that it was indicative of the moral foundations of the United States and a way of

repairing America's international image following the invasion of Iraq. On his visit to Indonesia, the then Secretary of State Colin Powell, for example, spoke of it as challenging misconceptions of the United States in the Muslim world, "giving an opportunity to see American generosity, American values in action" (Raum 2005). President Bush argued that "[W]e're showing the compassion of our nation in the swift response" (Keen and Slavin 2005). As summed up by Morton Abramowitz, the American Ambassador to Thailand, "[I]t's a tragedy but its also an opportunity … a chance … to show what kind of country we are" (Sanger 2004).

As outlined above, it was the financial response by the general public that was largely responsible for the record humanitarian response to the tsunami. This too was framed in nationalistic ways, breaking with the typical emotional calls for individual compassion utilised by the aid industry. It is not only that the sum of individual giving was framed in national terms but that much of the mobilisation of the Australian population around this cause required national framing and sentiment. This call for aid was not as individual world citizens but as Australians and Americans being called to duty. In launching a drive for public donations, for example, President Bush saw such giving as being representative of "the good heart of the American people".

This national aid was also narrated comparatively. Australia, which has long compared itself with larger Western nations, contrasted its generosity most frequently with the United States. The United States mostly contrasted its giving with that of China. The United States would also reignite cultural tensions with France (Sanger and Hodge 2005). In responding to Jan Egeland's criticism of aid levels and those levied in the French Press, Andrew Natsios, the administrator of the US Agency for International Aid, told Fox News that "I'm not an expert in the French aid programme but they do not tend to be dominant figures in aid".

> Before the USA, it was Australia that reacted quickly and with such compassion. This country showed how to take care of the rest of world. (Phillips 2005, p. 4)

> China's offer of aid, if slightly belated, is sizable, given its often inward-looking history. But it is also a reminder that the world's most populous country is still far from being the dominant power in Asia …. (Yardley 2005)

As the above quotes demonstrate, rather than the discursive focus being around the circumstances of those suffering, concern was inwardly focused on charitable endeavours with both Australia and the United States favourably and defensively measuring themselves against other countries. Such discursive constructions can be thought of a type of media ritual, concentrating societal attention around a single issue while evoking and debating key values and symbols of identity. However, following Dayan and Katz's notion of media events (1992) we can think of the media's role also being connected to the production of televised spectaculars. This is clearest in the organising of fundraising events such as concerts and sporting matches where an important part of the ritualistic qualities of these events is crowds in attendance as well being broadcast to a viewing public (Dayan and Katz 1992; cf. Rowe 2000).

As outlined by Dayan and Katz (1992), a core characteristic of such media rituals is bi-partisanship. In Victor Turner's (1974) terms this is due to such events being during a liminal time where the breaking of traditional boundaries creates a strong

sense of community. In Australia we saw this with the normal competition between the three free-to-air commercial television networks being suspended, with all pooling resources to co-produce and co-host a concert telethon. Such initiatives saw a total of US$ 14 billion pledged or donated by the international community (Flint and Goyder 2006, p. 7). Australian inter-city rivalry also took a back seat for the tsunami cause, with concerts held simultaneously in Australia two most populous cities, Sydney and Melbourne, who normally compete for events that signify them as Australia's world city. Official rating calculations were also suspended for the broadcast of these events. In the United States the NBC telethon also saw the bridging of differences as represented in the co-presenting by ideologically warring personalities of George Clooney and Fox News' identity Bill O'Reilly. Political divides were also put aside with former Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush Senior working jointly together at the request of then President George Bush Jnr to help raise private money to augment government pledges for tsunami victims. George Bush Senior told MSNBC that he hoped such bipartisanship "sends a signal around the world that we have come out of a divisive political period and we're together" (Keen and Slavin 2005).

Dayan and Katz (1992) noted the ability of such bi-partisanship to evoke a sense of internationalism. For example, they highlight how the moon landing was coded in terms of global advances rather than a Cold War victory by the United States. As outlined above, such insights are consistent with the global dimensions of the tsunami. However, in a world in which the relevance of national identity is in question, what is significant about the media events surrounding the tsunami is the role of national symbols. The inward looking celebration of the nation is reflected in the name of Australia's telethon: "Australia Unites". The aim of the telethons and concerts may have been humanitarian but this was achieved through deploying national icons and forms of popular culture. In the United States, for example, the telethons heavily used national music personalities and genres such as that represented by Sheryl Crow and Bruce Springsteen. In Australia, Kasey Chambers and a reformed Noiseworks were amongst others performers that connected to Australian country and rock genres (Stratton 2007). In Australia, the site of the concerts was also significant with the largest held in normally public space outside of the national icon of Sydney Opera House. As indicated in the printing on a woman's t-shirt in Fig. 5.3, "sending Aussie love", this national background reflected and helped amplify the discursive focus on Australia's generous national identity.

The tsunami also allowed for the overt mixing of sports and nationalism in ways that are typically reserved for times of national and international competition such as with the Superbowl or Olympics. In the United States charity drives were undertaken at NBA basketball games and individual players generously donated and team gave proportions of ticket sales to tsunami appeals. Australia hosted the World cricket tsunami appeal one day match. While officially organised by the International Cricket Council it was largely seen as sponsored by Australia. The then Australian Prime Minister John Howard tossed the coin at the start of the match after two Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-130 Hercules aircraft conducting a fly past before continuing their journey to Indonesia to support relief efforts. The crick-

Fig. 5.3 The Age newspaper

et match included iconic national cricketers such as Steve Waugh who has been widely acclaimed as a national hero and seen as carrying on distinctively Australian traditions of competitive sportsmanship as derived from Australia's most renowned sportsman, Don Bradman (Hutchins 2002). Waugh also has a strong connection to Australian national identity for establishing the Australian Cricket team's 'pilgrimage' to the WWI Gallipoli battlefields when journeying to England to play in the Ashes series (Macleod 2007). Shane Warne also played in the match, someone who is considered as representative of a recent characterisation of the anti-heroic national 'larrikin' archetype in Australia (Bellanta 2012), one consistent with nationalism in a commercialized celebrity focussed age (McKay et al. 2009).While sociologists have emphasised that such professional sportsmen are in many cases transnational citizens in this era of global sport, as highlighted above they simultaneously remain key symbols of national identity (Miller et al. 2001).

A similar argument can be made about celebrities and their significant role in the tsunami appeals. While the celebrity industry is typically associated with transnational trends, we can also point to distinctive national celebrity markets with a celebrity having both global as well as national significance. For example when the actor Sandra Bullock donated a million dollars to the tsunami appeal she was lauded as symbolising the American spirit. In the Australian case the telethon was littered with special guests, not from the large amount of imported television shows, but the focus being on domestic celebrities from popular nationally produced television shows. Graham Turner et al. (2000) argue that in Australia such a domestic celebrity industry rivals that associated with American popular culture, finding that they account for nearly half of all celebrity reporting in the Australian media. In Appadurai's terms, this can be understood as a process of the indigenousisation whereby cultural traditions retain significance in the face of global conditions (1996). This is not to suggest that these figures play the same role as the great national heroes of

early nationalism. In contrast, celebrities are relatively ordinary, something that is seen as attainable and for the masses aspire to (Rojek 2004). However, celebrities broadly function in similar ways to traditional heroes, providing a mythical kind of icon that is separated from the mundanity of everyday life and ordinary people in a Durkheimian sense (Alexander 2010). In some ways national celebrities are even more consistent with the national project through celebrating egalitarianism.

Not only was the tsunami linked to the nation through contemporary national symbols but through national collective memory. In Australia's case this involved the tsunami being linked to military relief efforts such as that related to WWII and more broadly Australia's imagined Anzac tradition (see Chap. 2). In the United States the tsunami drew occasional comparisons with other key events such as 9/11.

> Mr Howard said Australia's role in the relief effort was on a scale comparable only to its involvement in World War II. (McIlveen 2005, p. 1)

> A third hospital, the former public hospital of Banda Aceh, has been dubbed the Anzac Field Hospital. (Wockner 2005b, p. 30)

> As Asia suffers through a 9/11 of its own a natural calamity instead of a man-made one, but at least 25 times more deadly …. (Sanger 2004)

Such comparisons between the tsunami and Western events of death and suffering are made on the basis of cultural equivalence rather a rational evaluation of measurement. It is as much to do with emphasising the enduring significance of these past disasters, and of national culture generally, during this unprecedented crisis as it is to emphasise the extent of suffering from the tsunami. This is evident in the controversy which surrounded the World Wildlife Fund's (WWF) press advertisement in 2008 titled "Tsunami" which used images of dozens of planes about to crash into New York City skyscrapers, including the World Trade Center towers, in an attempt to demonstrate the scale of the lives lost in the 2004 tsunami. Widely seen to be insensitive to the victims of 9/11, the advertisement was quickly removed with WWF issuing a statement that the "ad should never have been made, approved or published" (Sweney 2009).

The narration of distant suffering is not only about the present, as Boltanski assumes (1999), but how an event can be established and remembered in a cultural pattern of historical events. This national content was significant in encouraging pragmatic responses to the tsunami though it did not foster meaningful dialogical discourses (see Chap. 2) or any deep compassion for local victims. However, there are various instances in the tsunami appeals where the two co-exist. For example, the actor George Clooney was particularly prominent in the media as representative of an 'all-American' celebrity but also emphasised the need for long term global solutions to global poverty. The complexity and contradictions of this nationalism/cosmopolitanism nexus is also evident in the case of the cricketer Adam Gilchrist who was particularly prominent in the Australian media reporting of the tsunami, not only due to playing in the World Cricket tsunami appeal but as a consequence of his position as an official ambassador for the aid organization World Vision. He highlighted the need for ongoing charity in the lesser-developed world, pointing out that the annual deaths in nations such as in Africa exceeded the death toll of the tsunami.

The Nation and Global Events

In general, humanitarian aid strategies typically aim to encourage donations through evoking a pure cosmopolitanism spirit. In the context of humanitarian communication then the national framing of the tsunami can be considered exceptional. However, there is little doubt that the narrative framing of suffering is influential on the charitable response. The death and destruction caused by the tsunami, and the ability of new technologies to provide for the recording and transmission of the disaster, may have demanded our attention. However, this did not automatically account for the extent or the narrative construction of the charitable response. Evidence for this argument can be found within the varying levels of response in previous disasters and the varying giving between nations to the tsunami. The response by the state to the tsunami was significant but it was not the largest ever with the $ 8.5 billion of international government pledges being less than the US$ 9 billion for Hurricane Mitch in 1988 and the United Nations appeal for Sudan in 2005 (Flint and Goyder 2006, p. 21). The private response to the tsunami raising US$ 5.5 billion though was unrivalled. Is this simply in relation to some rational notion of need by victims? If so it is difficult to clearly evidence the relationship. For example, consider differences in the volume of aid per affected person in the tsunami compared to other recent disasters. In the tsunami Flint and Goyder estimate if the donations were shared equally amongst the 2 million people directly affected each individual would receive approximately US$ 5500 (2006, p. 24). In contrast, the million people directly affected in the 2005 South Asian earthquake amounted to US$ 250 per head and the 2005 drought in Somalia directly affected somewhere in between 700,000 and 1.1 million people with each having an approximate allocation of between US$ 114 and US$ 178.

As highlighted in the review of literature earlier in the chapter, pointing to such selective recognising of distant suffering is not new. However, the tsunami case as analysed above does providing unique insight into how charitable responses can be generated by using national symbols and sentiment. The national framing of the tsunami worked to bring about a record public and state response in Australia and the United States by overcoming the traditional binary response (Boltanski 1999) where knowledge of suffering can be rationalised through the belief that the charitable focus needs to be closer to home. In the tsunami the national discourse worked to addresses this response by providing a cultural relevance to the disaster for those who would otherwise dismiss it with local particularism. Although the graphic footage of the tsunami helped bring worldwide awareness of the disaster, I argue that the particular discursive construction and the ritualistic qualities of charitable events in the West were just as significant. Not only did nationally coded fundraising activities such as telethons, concerts and sporting events become media events (Dayan and Katz 1992) in their own right, and as such help prolong the tsunami in the public's imagination, but news stories more generally related to the levels of charitable giving. In Boltanski's terms, this provided a discourse for narrating what would otherwise be unspeakable horrors (Boltanski 1999, p. 21).

In the tsunami case the nation was not only symbolically strategic but also administratively, raising broader questions about the assumed decline of the nation-state. Kate Nash (2008) in her analysis of the 'Make Poverty History' campaign outlines how the national public sphere was utilised in this global campaign. She argues that "culture, and especially popular culture, is essential to the creation, maintenance and extension of meanings of citizenship … of its recreation and its transformation beyond the usual boundaries of the nation … (Nash 2008, p. 168). Like the tsunami concerts, the Make Poverty History campaign was a global initiative but one that was organised at a national level. It did not only take place "*through the media*" but "*in the media*" (original emphasis) utilising celebrities through national campaigns that engaged with national themes most relevant to particular states (Nash 2008, p. 170). As 'show business' Nash argues the campaign avoided local particularism and utilised the national public sphere to force the state to become more of a global citizen. For Nash, however, this finding relates to the possibilities of global citizenship. In contrast, I suggest that it equally highlights the adaptive qualities of national identification and its continuing relevance in a global world. As discussed in previous chapters, my argument is not that the nation is merely enduring as a symbolic entity in some kind of everyday nationalism where national frames remain relevant by being embedded in consumption and leisure practices (Billig 1995; Edensor 2002; Fox and Idriss-Miller 2008). As is particularly evident in Billig's (1995) conceptualisation of what he terms banal nationalism, such notions tend to emphasise the weakening of ties to the nation, how the national endures in a post-heroic world by remaining an everyday cultural referent such as in flags, coin and banknotes, national sporting events and the discursive references of the media. In contrast, I argue that these everyday symbols of the nation can also be ritually activated in times of crisis. This not only activates traditional notions of the nation but helps to transform them by being associated with global social life. These give a relevance to the nation in a time of crisis and in an age of fear without reverting to the grand narratives of modernity.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the role of the nation in humanitarian aid giving in relation the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. It was argued that the nation became a key cultural frame for giving to foreign Others with national discourses overcoding the normal emphasis surrounding distant suffering that emphasises individual moral duty and attachment to a universal sense of citizenship. The construction of crisis and charity rituals surrounding the tsunami did not result in the development of any strong dialogical discourses that focussed on the suffering of locals. However, this allowed for the devastation and the risk agent to be associated with familiar national frames of reference and as a consequence allowed for a successful fundraising effort. The role of national celebrities from the entertainment and sporting industries

were particularly significant in the response to the tsunami becoming a time for solidarity within Australia and the United States.

Utilising Boltanski's (1999) analysis of the dynamics and limitations of humanitarian aid, the chapter outlined how the nation can play a positive role in relation to the global issue of humanitarian aid. This centrally involves making global issues culturally relevant for those who would otherwise fail to respond to them. On the other hand the nation allows cosmopolitan responses to be coded collectively, impelling civil society to respond with fundraising events, transforming it into a national ritual event. Such patriotic coding in contrast with the discourses of individual cosmopolitanism is also more affective in impelling the state to act on behalf of its citizens. This is important for a practical humanitarian response as the state can bring about change at a level not possible for non-government organisations. As will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter, such findings challenge various understanding of contemporary social change.

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Chapter 6
The Power of Ritual and the Future of the Nation

This monograph has theoretically explored and empirically illustrated four new national ritual forms as they relate to national re-enchantment: international civil religious pilgrimage, recreational battle re-enactment, dialogical crisis and national humanitarianism. Profiling these rites has advanced the sociological study of nationalism and ritual in two ways. Firstly, the examining of new national ritual forms has contributed to an understanding of ritual as a cultural variable able to bring about social and political change. While various sociological perspectives have previously made significant advances in moving beyond an empirical concern with modern state based rites, and the idea that these simply sanction dominant beliefs systems or becomes are a site of conflict reflecting broader social and economic structures, the nation is largely absent from these accounts and analytic frameworks. In contrast, I have argued that the new rituals profiled in the monograph themselves can help bring about social and political change through a renewal in national attachment. Secondly, the ritual analysis and case studies in this monograph provides a theoretical contribution by evidencing the need for postmodernists and others to understand that national meanings and symbols run deep and that they have adaptive qualities that allow them to become reinvented and re-enchanted in contemporary Western societies. In particular, the case studies highlighted that national identity does not automatically erode when it is engaged with through contemporary consumption, leisure and tourist practices and logics. This chapter reviews these intellectual contributions for comprehending the future of the nation by discussing three core themes that appear across the different ritual forms and case studies: re-orientating the Other, responses to suffering and ritual innovation.

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Re-Orientating the Other

As outlined in Chap. 1, the vast amount of scholarship on global forces, memory and ritual has focussed on the formation of new post-national identities rather than how national ones adapt to new global conditions. At the heart of this work is the belief that past attachments to national history will be replaced by a subscription to a new present focused cosmopolitan ethics and sense of citizenship. This monograph, however, has demonstrated that many of the new ritual forms that promote cosmopolitan sentiment can also build strong attachments to the nation and national identity, what I referred to as cosmopolitan nationalism. In this scenario national identity takes on new cosmopolitan characteristics. This emphasises a humanist and universalist sense of citizenship but, as the case studies reveal, this is achieved through quite specific ritual and cultural engagements between distinctive national traditions and identities.

In the examination of the WWI Gallipoli battlefields, for example, we saw how international civil religious pilgrimage re-enchanted this battle and its mythology in Australia by allowing it to be reimagined in ways that required recognition of former foes Turkey. The context of tourism at Gallipoli, in particular the prominence of youth orientated backpacking travel, was significant in this process. This travel not only facilitated the establishment of a pilgrimage tradition but initiated the process of re-enchantment by allowing for new reputational entrepreneurs to reinterpret the past in ways that reimagined history in culturally relevant ways. At Gallipoli this principally occurred through Turkish tour guides helping to establish new dialogical understandings of the war, with these individuals also taking on a role of cultural representation for their country. This involved inventing historical interpretations that accounted for the previously largely separate histories of both Australia and Turkey. Such interpretations by guides were initially targeting young backpacker tourists and their reception by locals, but these were subsequently adopted as a discursive frame for commemorative activity and embedded within contemporary memorial forms on the battlefields. These commemorations and memorials in turn advanced and sanctioned the tour guides' interpretations of the past.

It was highlighted in the monograph that while such outcomes are encouraged by the ritual form, there is nothing automatic or inherent to this cultural production. Rather, ritual needs to be comprehended in relation to symbolic performance and social action rather than in a determinist structural way. Indeed, international civil religious pilgrimage will not always result in re-enchanted national narratives that are relatively cosmopolitan in character. The 1989 revival of the Serbian nationalist pilgrimage to the 'Field of Blackbirds' in Kosovo and the subsequent genocide of ethnic Albanians vividly illustrate the atavistic power of this ritual form. However, numerous comparable cases highlight that tourism as it combines with pilgrimage often allows for an increased openness to difference and the bridging of racial, cultural and national differences. Another example is the multi-lingual Pearl Harbor museum and USS Arizona Memorial tour that is amongst the most popular tourist sites for the approximately 1.3 million Japanese visitors to Hawaii each year and

a site that promotes an empathetic history of this episode, avoiding a demonizing of one side by the other (Yaguchi 2005). With the opening of Vietnam to trade and tourism, increasing numbers of Americans are also touring 'American War' tourism sites such as the Cu Chi tunnels and De-militarized Zone, bringing about a new dialogical comprehension of this controversial conflict in a way that moves beyond old controversies through a narrative of national building (Henderson 2000). As Bleakney (2006) notes, amongst the Americans now travelling to Vietnam are veterans of the war who in part are motivated by accounts that visiting rapidly developing Vietnam helps to address 'individual' issues of cultural trauma.

In the case studies of the Bali bombing crisis (Chap. 4) and the Indian ocean tsunami (Chap. 5) we also saw the central role of tourism in promoting a simultaneous celebration of the national character and new cosmopolitan narratives about cultural Others, those who have traditionally been cast as inferior or ignored within account of national identity. In these instances though it was not the experience of tourism per se which was crucial in facilitating more cosmopolitan engagements but tourism as a discourse, a way of viewing cultural difference as something to be embraced and experienced. As will be highlighted in the next section of this chapter, such a tourist comprehension of the world provides an important institutional basis for addressing a variety of contemporary global problems. The Bali bombing case also highlights the contingent nature of this discourse, not only in relation to particular cultural contexts but ritual dynamics and directions. For example, in the aftermath of the bombing we initially didn't see national cosmopolitan narratives emerge. Instead it was largely unreconstructed national ideologies that came to the fore, in particular through negative portrays of Indonesian authorities. New cosmopolitan national narratives would later emerge within the narration of the crisis and ultimately win the day only after the key protagonists in the public sphere crisis ritual changed from mass to post-Fordist Australian tourists. Equally consequential was the national media finding a solution to their genre dilemma about comprehending suffering by culturally pairing together Australian victims of the bombing with the new cosmopolitan comprehension of Australian soldiers who sacrificed their lives abroad in the World Wars.

In the Indian Ocean tsunami, we also see a great variety in cultural responses, with the narrative framing of government responses in Australia and the United States taking on different ritual trajectories, though both involve symbolic actions directed at international perceptions of each nation. While humanitarianism and charitable responses to international suffering are traditionally seen as being in a zero sum-game with national sentiment, the ritual of national humanitarianism was outlined to show how national codes can be used to engage and respond effectively to what Boltanski (1999) refers to as distant suffering. Again the presence of cosmopolitan nationalism in this instance certainly differs significantly from the cosmopolitan ideal involving deep levels of cross cultural understanding and pure compassion for other humans. Cosmopolitan nationalism, by contrast, has a more particularist and parochial focus. However, unlike traditional nationalism it is one that plays itself out through global events and social action on the world stage where ritual engagements are transnational and involve claims of cross-national solidarity

with other nations and people where there were previously no strong cultural bonds. The discourses of national cosmopolitanism are formed and contextualized through engagements with particular nations and places rather than based on a broad notion of global citizenship and human rights. As such, in the response to the tsunami we find a variance in the discourses formed in relation to the different nations impacted.

The term dialogical (Bakhtin 1986) was widely used to refer to this type of transnational sentiment and remembering. While it has long been understood that nations in a more globally integrated world, need to account for the Other, this has typically been understood in general terms that worked on the assumption of the death of the nation. Bakhtin's conceptualization of the dialogic as referring to double-voicedness was used to allow for a more specific account of how nations directly and indirectly engage with each other to achieve a consensus, albeit a fluid one, on historical interpretation without the surrendering of national identity. Certainly Western nations no longer think of themselves in isolation, but this is affected not only by other nation's perceptions of each other but other nations' understanding of themselves. While in some ways dialogical relationships are opportunistic and built on unstable foundations, they do create real feelings of solidarity and promote new historical understandings and re-imagined forms of national identity.

Not all contemporary national ritual forms have a strong transnational dimension or promote cosmopolitan narratives. However, even in these cases we see dialogical relations as a key characteristic of their dynamics. While it was once the case that national commemorations could be seen in totalizing ways and accounting for society as a whole, in principle if not in practice, we now see a diversity of ritual forms undertaken by particular subsections of society, engaging in a dialogue with the perceived mainstream or other select groups. Like the transnational ritual forms associated with tourism, travel and global crisis, however, it is the form of such rituals not only the participants own biographies and interests that ultimately shape the meanings that derive from them.

This ritual process was empirically illustrated in the recreational pursuit of American Civil War re-enacting. While all dramatized representations of the past are political, it was argued that in the case of re-enacting its most significant political dimension is the distinctive and highly emotive engagement with the past that the rite provides. It is the sense of what re-enactors refer to as 'time travel' which motivates re-enactors to engage in political advocacy about national history and politics. In particular, such experiences motivate them to engage in volunteer educational activities in schools and undertaking encampments at local museums. At these institutions re-enactors draw on their experience of re-enacting and the 'living' historical understanding it provides to propagate their politically orthodox worldview about the centrality of the nation, including overt challenges to the dominant historical narrative that the war was fought over slavery. It is not only that the re-enacting subculture promotes such educational activity but that participants through attaining an intimate connection to the past feel empowered and are given what I termed an affective authority to speak out and challenge existing historical narratives and the institutional figures, such as teachers and historians, that uphold them. From this perspective re-enacting can be understood as the politically ortho-

dox equivalent to a progressive new social movement that uses leisure as a basis for group integration and identity.

Responses to Suffering

At the core of the new ritual forms outlined in this monograph is the cultural framing of suffering, either through the remembering of past wars or the interpretation of present disasters and attacks. The various case studies highlighted the need to address suffering as it occurs on a national as well as a global level. The failure of traditional national rites to retain a cultural relevance relates both to their inability to adequately account for the Other in a more globally integrated world, but also that they have not been able to remember or commemorate death in ways consistent with a new comprehension of the self. There is no shortage of cultural engagement with the past in contemporary society and we have seen history become a site around which various new social movements have formed to contest the power of the state. The question is how does the nation not only endure but possibly thrive in such conditions? Certainly there is unprecedented contestation surrounding national history and identity. Indeed, such a societal development is at the heart of the performative turn in cultural sociology and the reconceptualising Habermas (1989) notion of the public sphere to account for diversity and counter-narratives within domestic and international public debate (Conway 2010; Olick 1999). National history and the nation can be strengthened through particular rites which have an anti-authoritarian character. The rites do this in two ways. Firstly, they provide compelling emotive experiences for participants by breaking away from the solemn modern tradition of remembrance, embracing the practices and logics of consumption, leisure and tourism, including a capitalist orientated willingness to break away from tradition. Secondly, they promote new forms of collective memory which can be taken up by the public, and possibly in turn the state, through involving social actors in their production who have been absent or marginal from traditional commemorative practices. The latter cannot occur without the former. It is not only that it provides an institutional setting for the production of meaning but also in Durkheim's (1912) terms it ritually sanctions the meaning, with the contemporary characteristics of the rites providing a sense of authenticity, overcoming the postmodern skepticism around the nation and history.

In the case of the pilgrimage by Australians to the WWI Gallipoli battlefields it was argued that the generational attraction for Australian backpackers to visit Gallipoli was not only that it allowed for a new compelling way of engaging with the past, one in which this generation could be more central to than traditional remembrances in Australia, but that the onsite historical interpretation of the campaign is one that is more aligned with their own cosmopolitan worldviews. Consistent with Victor Turner's (1974) argument about institutional religious pilgrimage, it was the very fact that the ritual disrupted existing beliefs which was a large dimension of its popularity. However, within the pilgrimage ritual itself we also saw the process

of the reconstruction of collective memory. Such a rite differs significantly to Durkheim's original account of ritual whereby social integration is established through a collective experience of social effervescence.

The examination of national collective memory and national commemoration during the 2002 Bali bombings crisis (Chap. 4) and 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Chap. 5) similarly expanded on traditional conceptions of ritual and national identity. In terms of the nation, crisis has typically been considered as a time when the populace seeks ontological security in tradition and becomes suspicious of cultural diversity. These case studies, by contrast, highlight the ways in which crisis episodes can also allow for national identity to take on more progressive forms. While the Gallipoli case study (Chap. 2) highlighted how national history can be remembered and commemorated in more cosmopolitan ways, the narration of the Bali bombing and tsunami demonstrated the capacity of national identity to play an important role in addressing global problems, here in relation to counter-terrorism and disaster relief for lesser developed countries.

Central to the postmodernist belief about the death of the nation is a functionalist rationale that it cannot play a constructive role in responding to global social problems associated with suffering. From this perspective any resurgence of nationalism or enhanced engagement with the nation is always understood as being transient and the product of short-term political opportunism during a time of unrest. From my empirical analysis though we can see that times of crisis can promote ways in which the nation can play a more significant role in a globally interconnected world. In the Bali bombing we saw how global mobility can work to sustain awareness of distant suffering, not through a universalist discourse of pure compassion but by developing a dialogical narrative that draws on national collective memories of the military fighting abroad. As these national historical narratives have already been subject to a dialogical cosmopolitan turn (Chap. 2), characterised by an empathy for former foes and an unwillingness to assign protagonists with intent, they facilitated dialogical discourses in which the bombing was cast as a shared disaster between Australia and Indonesia. This discursive construction in turn allowed for Australian and Indonesian security agencies to work collaborative in counter-terrorism initiatives.

In the tsunami case there was also a focus on the national, with a disproportionate media attention on expatriates rather than on the suffering of locals. However, this particularistic focus did not result in a classic orientalist narrative and a weak humanitarian response. Rather the use of national symbols in the coverage provided a basis for championing relief efforts, projecting them as reflecting the national character. The nation also encouraged giving through the celebration of national cultural pursuits in telethons and other fundraising concerts and sporting contests. National humanitarianism was advanced as a concept for such cases when humanitarian efforts discursively draw on the nation. This contrasts with the more common humanitarian discourse that appeals to the individual's moral duty and promotes a global sense of citizenship. While national humanitarianism is limited in facilitating cross-cultural understanding and largely draws attention away from the act of local suffering, it can facilitate a pragmatic humanitarian response, both in relation to

public and state aid by offering a wider source of solidarity (Calhoun 2010; Eckersley 2007, 2008). In Durkheim's words, global problems are addressed in these case studies not through "putting a completely new society in the place of an existing one", say as cosmopolitan theorists such as Beck (2009) and Bauman (1997) have argued, "but of adapting the latter to the new social conditions" (Durkheim 1967, pp. 246–47).

It is possible though to go further by suggesting that the nation is not simply another way of addressing global problems but, as Eckersley (2007, 2008) argues, cosmopolitan theorists may even be facilitating problems by seeking to weaken national identities. Rather than chase what Calhoun (2007) refers to as the cosmopolitan dream, Eckersley argues that it might be more effective to promote dimensions of nationalism that are orientated "to common liberty and justice at home and abroad" (Eckersley 2007, p. 675). Nation-states, particularly Western ones, are certainly responsible for exploiting natural and social resources in a way which has resulted in the global problems we face today. However, this is not to say that they cannot be the basis of the solution. The demonstrated relevance of the nation for mitigating against distant suffering and terrorism as outlined in this monograph may also help address other global problems such as climate change.

Giddens (2009) has recently argued that strong nation-states have an essential role to play in preventing as well as addressing the experience of climate change related environmental catastrophes, which is predicted to include a greater number of earthquakes and tsunamis. A weakness of Giddens' analysis though is that he sees that the state derives its power from its functional role. This is consistent with his earlier work (Giddens 1985) that theorised the emergence of nationalism as inseparable from the rise of the state and its time-space geographies. Such studies are valuable in that they detail institutional processes and emphasise social structural forms (cf. Gellner 1983). However, they are hermeneutically "thin" (Geertz 1973). By this I mean that the thick descriptions, ontological discussions and detailed semiotic analyses, like that undertaken in this monograph, are missing (Smith and West 2001). Culture is treated by Giddens as a kind of dependent variable arising from shifts in technology, power, social organisation and so on rather than as a powerful constitutive force in the playing out of history. In contrast, the perspective of cultural sociology emphasises the need to prioritise the analysis and explication of the engagement and content of nationalist beliefs systems, rather than explaining them away in terms of their social contexts. From this perspective the ability of the nation-state to address global problems associated with suffering must be considered from the perspective of how the nation is given cultural meaning, not in relation to some rational logic about the institutional utility of the state.

What might be the benefits of narrating climate change in relation to national identity? Firstly, for many nations there is an existing close connection between the natural environment and national identity that could be extended to climate change. This would allow the climate change threat to be coded in ways in which it attains cultural relevance. In this scenario climate change has the potential to act much like a folk devil during a moral drama, bringing about calls for moral unity within the group. As occurs during moral panic it is possible that climate change could attain

a cultural relevance by being linked to a litany of other indicators of anomie such as concern for youth, crime and the institution of the family (West 2000; West and Smith 1996). This would be significant as such issues are heavily associated with political orthodox groups who have been the most sceptical about the science of climate change.

This is not to say that the application of national frames would go uncontested. As was detailed throughout the monograph, national discourses play themselves out in national and international public spheres. This is illustrated by the recently elected conservative Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who has accused the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Christiana Figueres, of "talking through her hat" for suggesting that the October 2013 bushfires in New South Wales were linked to global warming. Abbott said that "Fire is part of the Australian experience … it has been since humans were on this continent" (Taylor 2013). The ensuing national debate about this contention though is significant as if symbolises a greater use of national discourses and symbolism by Australian environmentalists. For example, the deputy leader of the Australian Greens political party, Adam Bandt, stated that Abbott's lack of support for a emissions trading scheme meant that he was not "protecting the Australian way of life" (Greens MP Adam Bandt defiant over bushfire tweet 2013).

Secondly, the nation provides a well-established, and I have argued in many cases a re-enchanted, form of collective identity associated with sacrifice which could be applied to legitimising the lower levels of consumption and economic growth required for reducing carbon levels and mitigating against climate change. As Anderson argues, the nation is "imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each… it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings (1983, p. 16). The sacrifice needed for climate change though is across nations as well as between them. However, as we have seen in the tsunami case study, if the population of a nation mobilises, it puts pressure on the state to take action globally. In Durkheim's terms this spirit of liberty, rights and cultural pluralism emerges from the collective but is represented by the state. In turn, the state is also independent from the public and as such needs to be kept in check by a strong civil society (Durkheim 1957, p. 91). In this scenario the individual benefits from society, not in the rational individualistic way that Rousseau suggests, but where individualism is a collective ideal not related to "egoism but sympathy for all that is human, a wider pity for all suffering, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire to combat and alleviate them, a greater thirst for justice" (Durkheim 1969, p. 24). This possibility relates to what Nash (2008) terms the 'cosmopolitanizing state', one where its legitimacy is based on effectively acting within global governance structures and abiding by international agreements and laws.

Thirdly, the framing of risk as simultaneous universal and a national threat tends to promote public fundraising drives. Such responses to distant suffering will be significant in a world dealing with the effects of climate change. While much has been written on the ability of transnational identity and governance structures to

address climate change now (Shove 2010; Urry 2010), it is unknown how these will hold up during times of climate change induced disasters. As Mauss (1969) reminds us, giving is a ritual which in inherently political, culturally binding together the two parties. Like current humanitarian responses to natural disasters, international recognition and public awareness of climate change induced disasters is also likely to be selective and uneven. A strong sense of the nation and cultural ties to climate change may help avoid the bleak future that Urry (2010) envisions where climate induced disasters are associated with an increase in international conflict and the growth of failed states.

Ritual Innovation

As outlined above, ritual has been principally conceived by sociologists in terms of establishing social bonding through simultaneous action. We see this whether scholars are examining society sui generis and emphasising the reinforcing of dominant symbols and values, or focussing their analysis on social conflicts and movements, involving the empowerment of subgroups within or across nation-states. It is also evident within attempts in the study of ritual to overcome dualisms, principally the divide between so called consensus and conflict perspectives. Collins (2004), for example, has over a number of years made important steps in providing a synthesis between Goffman's interactionist approach (1974) and both conflict and neo-Durkheimian theory by focussing on the emotional energy and associated "chains" of meaning and social structure that they create. The rise of performance theory and more recently cultural sociology's notion of cultural pragmatics (Alexander 2004; see Chap. 2) similarly are attempts at bringing together the appreciation of agency in the micro sociological tradition, the conflict tradition's appreciation of social power and the neo-Durkheimian perspective's concern with social integration. Such recent theorising in the field appreciates the contingency of social forces and the multitude of ritual effects. However, it does this by attempting to develop a general theory of ritual focussing on how dramatic representations of the world can attain a sense of authenticity for audiences, and how this in turn reverberates into the public sphere. It was argued in this monograph that this broad intellectual theorising of ritual overlooks that there exists distinctive ritual forms, each promoting or allowing for different understandings of the world.

The specific meaning of these rituals is ultimately dependent on historical, contextual and importantly performance factors. However, as outlined above, global tourist forces are significant in promoting pacifist dialogues between former foes. Global tourism and leisure though also plays a significant role for increasing the number of cases of these new ritual forms. For example, with the continued growth of global tourism new instances of international civil religious pilgrimage continue to appear. These are not only at established places of national history abroad. However, the opening of lesser-known historical sites to tourism can also result in historical episodes becoming a more central part of a collective memory. For ex-

ample, before being limited by security issues in the region, the dramatic increase in Australians travelling to Sabah saw the rise of Australians visiting the memorial to the WWII Sandakan Death Marches. As a consequence this military campaign became much more prominent within Australia's Anzac mythology (Braithwaite and Lee 2006).

Like international civil religious pilgrimage, the rite of historical re-enacting (Chap. 3) has a participatory character and a relative autonomy from institutional authority that makes it different from state sanctioned national rituals. In the case study of American Civil War re-enacting we saw how the mimetic qualities of this ritual form were closely aligned with the logics of living history, as evident in the strong belief amongst participants that history can only be correctly understood from the perspective of ordinary people living at the time and through simulating their role in the past. As we saw from interviews with re-enactors, their involvement in the recreational pursuit was not initially a political one but related to their interest in living history. The popularity of the past in this case being that it allows for an escape from the perceived complexity and burdens of contemporary life, a disenchantment strongly felt by the white middle aged men who dominate participation in Civil War re-enacting.

The significance of re-enacting as a ritual though is not that it simply reflects the ideological attachment of its participants but that it provides it with meaning. In Durkheim's (1915) terms it allows for a symbolic engagement that is beyond what is permitted from thought itself. From a Weberian theoretical standpoint, the hedonistic playfulness at the heart of the re-enacting rite has little association with traditional puritan belief systems (Weber 1992, p. 114). While political orthodoxy may rhetorically state that they want to reclaim past ways of life, its fundamentalist tendencies are quite contemporary. In fact, I argue that part of the attraction and cultural power of re-enacting is that it allows for political conservatism to engage with a seemingly contradictory (Bell 1972) impulsive culture that is infused with therapeutic-like reflections on emotions and reflexivity about lifestyle. From this perspective Hunter's (1991, 2006) division between political orthodoxy and progressivism can be thought to be two sides of the same coin.

In contemplating whether re-enacting could become more widely accepted form of commemoration, it is important to remember that there is nothing universal about death and warfare being remembered in solemn ways. In the decades following the Civil War commemorations were dominated by soldier reunions which were fairly raucous affairs and even involved partisan political speeches from veteran group leaders. By bringing together Blue and Grey veterans the state was attempting to achieve reconciliation through simultaneous ritual involvement. This was not just to reduce tensions between veterans and Northern and Southern states. It was also to sanction a reconciliation narrative whereby the legacy of the war was interpreted in relation to shared sacrifice rather than one side being morally superior (Blight 2001). As the Barry Schwartz (2007) notes, this reconciliation narrative gave way to one concerned with emancipation, with the Civil War increasingly becoming associated with slavery and subsequently the civil rights movement.

This transformation not only occurred as a consequence of demographic and cultural shifts alone but changes in the commemorative genre assigned to the Civil War. As the veterans died away participatory rites made way for more imaginary remembrances such as Decoration (now Memorial) Day, which as a particular remembrance of the Civil War had by the twentieth century been diluted to become a holiday honouring all Americans who had died in wars. It was within these modern remembrance rites that the emancipation narrative that focussed on the war being fought over slavery became dominant. However, it never fully replaced the reconciliation narrative which focussed on unity through sacrifice, with the latter being retained by many in the South and others promoting national unity. I argued that this counter-narrative is what re-enactors from both sides engage with and promote.

Re-enacting, as with the other ritual forms outlined in the monograph, illustrates the complex relationship between embodied engagements and the issue of authenticity. The liminal nature of the ritual forms gives rise to frequent debates about their appropriateness in representing and remembering the nation. This is not only as a consequence of the consumerist character of the rituals but that they privilege the participation of certain groups in society rather than have mass appeal (though as we have seen their significance exists at a societal level). In comprehending how such consumerist rites can also act as meaningful remembrances it is useful to think about playful engagements and representations of the nation working at two different levels. One the one hand they can reflect the declining cultural significance of the modern nation, something that has been reduced to popular culture. However, this level of interaction can lead to a more meaningful engagement with the nation and the development of new ritual forms and a broader re-imagining of national history and identity. In other words, an initial consumerist level of interaction with the nation can result in it taking on deeper cultural significance for participants and through the establishment of a ritual tradition the propagation of these meanings. This can occur as popular cultural projections of the nation like other symbolic communication are polysemic, able to have multiple meanings simultaneously (West 2006). As they exist independent of the state they also provide a more culturally open environment for the nation to be reimagined. This process though is not automatic or inevitable. So while the popular and seeming trivial can contain structural deep meanings, as well as wider struggles for meaning and status, this is not necessarily the case. However, neither can we say that consumer and leisure orientated engagements with the nation are necessarily a kind of nationalism of last resort, merely sustaining national identities in a world in which they would otherwise have no relevance.

The national re-enchantment involved in the case studies, no matter whether it is promoting a progressive or orthodox worldview, involves a new nationalism rather than a return to a prior modern form associated with tyranny, warfare and ultimate sacrifice. As Billig argues, such aspects have traditionally been the focus of studies on nationalism (Billig 1995). Such an alternative conceptualization of new nationalism and national ritual as outlined in this monograph is of course open to the accusation that it is not really nationalism that is being studied. This might be the case if we judge nationalism by Anderson's (1983) famous conceptualization

of it as a social phenomenon that has seen citizens willingly give up their life for. In fact, the monograph highlighted something quite different, a national identification that is characterized by a pacificist revisionism of the motivations and actions of those who were willing "not so much to kill, as willing to die" (Anderson 1983, p. 16) on behalf of the nation. However, I argue that although full of contradictions, this new nationalism does have a basis in patriotism and that the means by which this is established differs from the ways in which it is drawn upon and deployed. The new ritual forms that have established this reconnection with the nation, are currently characterized by a more reflexive national attachment in which actors do not completely lose their critical capacity.

As a sub-discipline cultural sociology has appreciated cultural forces such as myths, narratives, traditions and symbols, seeing them just as significant as material and other structural forces in shaping social life. However, national identity and nationalism has at times been relatively neglected within this paradigm (Woods and Debs 2013). In part this is as a consequence of the emphasis placed on conceiving of culture as a resource for meaning making, thus emphasising individual action and culture in a plural sense, rather than as an existing symbolic structure and collective. To take up the argument that national culture in a global world needs further analysis, cultural sociology will potentially face the critique that it is again engaged in methodological nationalism and has reverted to being politically conservative. However, as argued throughout the monograph, cultural tradition is also a source for challenging the status quo and introducing new meanings about the nation and the past. To reiterate my point from the beginning of the monograph, the case studies and profiling of new ritual forms that they represent is not analysed in an attempt to defend the nation but to highlight its adaptive qualities as well as the societal attraction to its various contemporary forms.

Conclusion

The objective of this monograph was to expand the field for thinking about global futures by pointing to the adaptability of national identity and the role of ritual in facilitating its reimaginging. In doing so I point to the ways in which national commemoration now exists in various forms that are relatively independent of the state and informed by as well as embodied within tourist, leisure and other popular cultural activities and logics. However, far from automatically marginalizing the state it was argued that a consequence of national re-enchantment, a new diplomatic and commemorative role for the state in remembering the past and representing the nation is established. This is not so much a direct counter argument to the postmodern theories that have rightly pointed to a decline in grand narratives but a consequence of this trend and the power of popular culture to open up history and the nation to being re-imagined. Whether the process of national re-enchantment will become sufficiently widespread to see an institutional rejuvenation of national identification throughout the West will be dependent on various social and political factors. How-

ever, if the rituals that underpin this process continue to proliferate I have argued that national re-enchantment is possible. If this occurs hopefully this monograph can provide a conceptual framework and guidance for scholars to comprehend such an age.

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