Jeffrey Broadbent
Vicky Brockman *Editors*

East Asian Social Movements

Power, Protest, and Change in a Dynamic Region

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To Charles Tilly (1929–2008), pioneer, mentor, and target in the study of social movements.

Preface

To many Westerners, the countries of East Asia, whatever their formal system, seem heavily controlled from top to down. They might find the title of this book quite surprising. Do social movements really exist in East Asia? Yes, they do, and with increasing vitality and importance throughout the region. Social movements have been and are now playing key roles in East Asia's transition to democracy and to its gradual maturation and fulfillment. Like the force of nature that sprouts up through the crusted soil and into the sunlight, social movements give public voice to long suppressed or newly realized aspirations by marginalized people for justice and dignity. Often these aspirations lead to pursuit of a more diverse and liberal society, but sometimes they envision solutions through a more authoritarian political regime. In pursuit of their goals, social movements often have to push against obstinate resistance and suffer punishment and failure. But sometimes they succeed, and in the process contribute to producing a new, often more pluralistic and diverse society and political order.

Up until recently, professional social science writing in general, and the study of social movements in particular, has mostly originated in Western countries and flowed outward from there. This book represents one of the first reversals of that flow–with social scientific ideas generated in East Asia flowing to the West and establishing a dialogue. In the process, this book, with its representation of China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, also contributes to social scientific dialogue among the countries and areas within East Asia. The authors, all of East Asian origin except one, range from established senior scholars to recent assistant professors in universities, colleges, or research institutes.

Producing this book has taken many years and required great patience from editors, authors, and publishers. Its difficulties illustrate the barriers in the way of attaining better cross-cultural understanding. At the 1989 conference on "Frontiers of Social Movement Research" held at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, a social movement scholar editing a series on the topic approached the senior editor with the request to edit a volume on social movements in East Asia. The purpose was to introduce East Asian social movement scholars and their works to the Western audience. Here we finally

have the product, more than 20 years later. Assembling and editing the manuscripts took a great deal of time, and it was only possible with the help of a graduate student (at the time) in social movement studies, Vicky Brockman, who by her great service to the book became its co-editor. As a result of the care everyone has taken along the way, the chapters, hopefully, explain their subjects in a readily accessible manner to the non-East Asian reader without a deep knowledge of those societies.

We deeply thank our colleagues who provided excellent comments on the introductory and concluding chapters: Mark Selden, Ron Aminzade, Jeff Goodwin, Doug McAdam, and Craig Calhoun. We also express our great appreciation to the editor of Springer books, Teresa Krauss and her assistant, Katherine Chabalko, who stayed with us through the long gestation of this book and shepherded it to publication.

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Introduction: East Asian Social Movements

Jeffrey Broadbent

On September 1, 1997, in Taipei, Taiwan, about one hundred Gong Cang (licensed prostitutes) women, their faces hooded with large baseball caps and sunglasses in fear of revealing their identities, broke social taboos and went public. Like other "ordinary" protesting citizens, they visited the Taipei City Council and then tried to find Mayor Chen Shui-bian in City Hall. Demanding respect and the right to their occupation, they appealed for the continuation of the Gong Cang system of legalized prostitution, which the City had threatened to abolish in less than two weeks. (MK Chang, Rosy Periwinkle)

The licensed prostitutes of Taiwan kept to themselves, out of the public eye. They worked in a ramshackle part of Taipei, in old wooden two-story pre-war buildings. They did not particularly like their work, but they were aging and it was the only trade they knew. Impoverished and social pariahs, they were still proud of their independence. Their legal status kept them from the exploiting clutches of pimps in the illegal prostitution trade. But when a proposed law threatened to make their work illegal, despite their marginal social status, they suddenly erupted into public protest. Once mobilized and launched, the movement's goals expanded from legal rights to gaining public respect. Going further, they demanded protection for the rights of all sex workers. In Taipei, the movement hosted marches with banners and public festivals to bolster public support for sex-worker rights. These rallies drew international attention, with visits and participation by foreign sex-worker campaigners. The movement found considerable sympathy from sectors of the public and from the labor movement, itself so recently liberated from martial law.

What explains the startling mobilization of these humble prostitutes and expansion of their goals from their personal concerns to demanding rights for

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sex workers in general? What empowered these aging social pariahs to move from stopping a law to challenging the basic gender and sexual codes of their society? Traditional culture justified their humble position, but not their expanded goals. In traditional male-dominated East Asian Confucian culture, prostitution had for millennia held an accepted place outside the family system, as had concubinage within it. That moral system did not include formal political rights as citizens. To the contrary, the cardinal Confucian virtues were being filial to parents (*ko*) and loyal to leaders (*chu*) (Tu 1996).

But, is culture destiny? The East Asian values debate concerns the contemporary relevance of this traditional collectivism. Lee Kwan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, argues that culture *is* destiny – that their Confucian values suit East Asians to an authoritative government, not an active democracy backed by human rights (Zakaria 1994). But rebutting this view, Kim Dae Jung, the former democratic activist who became President of South Korea after the fall of its dictatorship, finds strong support for democratic values within the Confucian tradition and maintains that in any case, culture change and democracy is East Asia's future. Noting that democracy has been proven to work in East Asia, he criticizes Singapore's "near totalitarian police state" (Kim 1994).

This debate reveals how much East Asian leaders differ in their interpretations and applications of their traditional cultures. And in the roles and freedoms those governments grant to citizens – civil society, voluntary associations, and social movements. This debate has come, of course, not only from within East Asia, but also from its contact with Western societies and its more recent and wider globalization. Along with demands for market openness, Western values of democracy and rights have pummeled East Asia's shores and hinterlands. Did Taiwan's aging legal prostitutes somehow activate existing values or learn new ones, become convinced of their rights to demand legal redress, and thus subjectively prompted, sally forth into the public arena? Or despite scholarly debates and political rhetoric about values, was such high culture irrelevant to the prostitutes' mobilization, with other factors pushing them along? Such questions open the door to deep debates in social movement theory.

This book represents the first systematic attempt to test social movement theory in a non-Western context. It brings together prominent and rising East Asian scholars of social movements and gives them collective voice. East Asia is a particularly good context to conduct this experiment, because the region embodies a distinct civilization of great historical depth and continuity. As the conceptual tools of the existing social movement toolkit meet the hard wood of East Asian realities, do they run against the grain? These case studies of East Asian social movements, though not conceived to test such grand propositions, reveal in their fine-grained particulars the interplay of conceptual tool and on the ground realities.

This book covers movements in China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore during the 1980s–2000s. Despite the popular reputation

of East Asia as having an acquiescent populace and weak civil society, in fact, the region has always been replete with movements. This remains true during the period examined by this book. The types of movements range from the so-called old social movements concerned with economic injustice or political restrictions, to "new social movements" attempting to protect the environment, improve women's status, and reduce ethnic discrimination. In Japan, we find movements opposing the use of nuclear power, trying to end discrimination against the Korean minority, and preventing the building of a polluting garbage incinerator. One chapter investigates the effects of 1960s movement participation on individual's later life activism. In South Korea, the movements struggle to end dictatorship, reduce environmental pollution, and secure equal status for women. Similarly, movements in Taiwan struggle against dictatorship, environmental pollution, and inferior status of minority populations. In contrast, movements in Hong Kong under the British concern labor rights and Communist ideology. But after Hong Kong reverted to Chinese control, they started to target restrictive governmental controls. In mainland China itself, movements also target the unresponsive state, both those at Tien An Men but also movements by local peasants protesting local government malfeasance on dam relocation compensation. Again, one chapter traces the effects of participation in the Chinese Cultural Revolution on individuals' later life politics. In contrast to these examples of activism, the tiny island country of Singapore exhibits an unsettling quietude, an absence of social movements – the result of tight control by a centralized, paternalistic government.

As an object of scientific study, movements remain hard to grasp. Like eels in muddy water, they elude the cage of concepts. Attempts to describe them, much less to theorize about them, remain fraught with ambiguity and debate. Social movement theory developed in Europe and North America over the past 50 years is now spreading beyond those borders. But the field's concepts and theories remain deeply contested. To get a better grip on the realities, social movement scholars have taken to making detailed case studies. Most of the chapters in this book, like the Rosy Periwinkle study, follow suit. Their on-the-ground accounts will give the reader a feel for the realities of social movements in East Asia. At the same time, this ethnographic approach permits a firmer testing of existing and development of new concepts and theories to account for these realities. An introduction to each section sketches in the points of history, society, and culture relevant to the understanding of its social movements.

The authors of these studies, all but one indigenous to the societies being studied, enjoy insider linguistic and cultural knowledge. However, they do more than just explain their social movements in local cultural terms. As professional social scientists, the authors use their studies as evidence for the development of theory-based explanations. In crafting their hypotheses, the authors, mostly schooled in Western social movement theory, often draw upon the analytical toolkit of structural-instrumental concepts such as the political opportunity structure. In the process of applying these concepts to explain their cases, though, the realities often push the authors into new ground; they often point

to or craft new explanatory concepts. Other authors start from their own original analytical concepts derived from their field studies within their own societies. Through this process, these authors initiate a deep intellectual dialogue with Western social movement theory. While the chapters in this book were not written with the purpose of searching for the effects of cultural differences, many of them end up indicating such effects. Their contributions to this goal will be assessed in the editor's concluding chapter.

How do groups of people come together around common discontent, take shape, exert influence, and sometimes bring about social change? That is the classic question of social movement studies. Scholars of social movements have focused on three core questions: Why do movements *mobilize* in the first place? Why do certain people, that is, become social movement actors? Why, for instance, does a group of downtrodden aging prostitutes suddenly launch a disruptive public protest? Secondly, what factors determine their *trajectory*? Why do some movements grow stronger while others fizzle and fade? And finally, do movements really *accomplish* anything beyond giving vent to feelings of dissatisfaction? Why do some movements attain their goals while others leave little or no imprint on society? These three questions direct our attention to the movement itself, from there looking out at the surrounding society (McAdam et al. 2001, 38).

Social movements, though, cannot be fully understood as isolated units. Social movements appear within and are heavily influenced by a specific social context. Rather than self-activating units, social movements may even be better understood as the product of tensions in the context – as the white-hot friction at the grinding point of social tectonic shifts. Seeing social movements this way requires a shift in perspective from seeing them as units to seeing them enmeshed within their context. Exactly what that context consists of, though, and how it articulates with social movements, remain much-debated questions.

Up to now, the dominant school of social movement studies – here called the structural instrumental school – has mostly thought of context as the political opportunity structure (POS). This useful concept has been defined in practice as the likelihood of help or repression coming from political authorities (Tarrow 1998, 76; McAdam et al. 2001, 41). This restricted concept of context has focused the study of social movement toward the strategic, instrumental, and coercive contention between the state, or governmental authorities, and protest movements. Since most social movement studies have been conducted in Western democracies, these studies have assumed a POS consisting of liberal political institutions (Aminzade and Perry 2001, 155). However, studies of the interaction process between movements and their contexts, combined with developments in cultural, network, and relational perspectives, have been expanding this narrow view of context.

When we study social movements in a non-Western setting, if culture matters, the limitations imposed by the political opportunity structure concept should become all the more evident. To the extent that different regions have their own distinct cultures, they constitute civilizations. Civilizations are

defined by having certain foundational cultural values and norms that persist through the ages and keep influencing the operating customs and institutions of society (Eisenstadt 1996). In its ideals, Western civilization has come to center around the development of the individuated self, the political sovereignty of the citizen, competition among competing interests, and democratic political institutions that reflect the resultant pluralism (Lipset 1963, 1994). Scholars distinguish other traditional civilizations with their own distinctive contemporary qualities (Huntington 1996). Among these entities they number Chinese civilization and, more broadly, East Asian civilizations (De Bary 1988), though China and Japan have very distinct civilizational qualities (Eisenstadt 1996). During the 1960s, modernization theory posited that cultural differences would fall away under the rationalizing pressure of capitalist and democratic development. Since then, though, the spectacle of uniquely rapid economic growth in successive East Asian societies (now China), coupled with relative failure elsewhere, brought theoretical questions about the effect of culture back into sharp focus. Ideas of individual rational-choice in markets, so favored by Western economists, did not work well to explain these East Asian economic miracles (Wade 1990; Vogel 1979; Evans 1995; So and Chiu 1995). Do cultural differences also affect the emergence and trajectory of East Asian social movements?

Attempts to integrate culture with political power structures hover at the margins of sociology (Archer 1988; Giddens 1993) and have only begun to penetrate social movement research. Referring to the case of South Korea, Kim Byung-Kook provides a theory of deep context that could account for persistent cultural effects. Civilizational influences, he says citing Bourdieu, remain as *doxa* – "subjective principles about human existence whose validity is regarded as self-evident . . . and reaffirmed in everyday social practices and rituals" (Kim 1998, 120). Supporting this view, a world culture map reveals distinct clusters. East Asian societies cluster together at the very top of the secular-rational value scale (like many European countries), and have a central position on the survival versus self-expression dimension (consonant with their relative prosperity) (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 64). In this map, most other societies in the world exhibit the less rational sectors defined by "traditional values" (meaning religious influences). One problem with this use of tradition, though, is that East Asia's secular-rationality was not arrived at through modernization; 500 years before Christ, Confucius taught secular-rational values, not religious ones. As we dig deeper, though, striking differences emerge between Confucian secular rationality and the recently hard-won secular-rationality of the West, as elaborated below.

Western scholarship has developed a useful toolkit of concepts and theories to analyze and explain social movements. But are these concepts really able to grasp the effects of such wide differences in cultural context? In the 1960s, the dominant *structural-functional* school of theory considered social movements to be rooted in participants' understanding of the situation. But it assumed those understandings to be *irrational* and leading to futile outbursts akin to riots and panics. The *structural-instrumental* school arose in the 1970s as a salutary

critique of this view. In the 1980s and 1990s, this school, developed and promulgated by Charles Tilly, Meyer Zald, William Gamson, Sidney Tarrow, Douglas McAdam and many adherents, attained dominance. In this view, social movements are rational actors pursuing reasonable goals of opposing unjust oppression. A great virtue of this school was to focus research on the relations among actors – albeit instrumental ones of repression or support (Tilly 1978). The main explanatory concepts of this approach became the *structure of political opportunities, mobilizable resources including social organization* and the *tactical use of framing* (McAdam et al. 1996; McAdam et al. 2001, 41). Context became political opportunities built from actors' use of resources to *instrumentally dominate* one another (Hunt 1984). Oddly, this instrumental view focused on the state, rather than on class – the classical structuralism of Marxian political-economy. Ideas played a role only as more or less accurate mirrors of the existing political realities, not as autonomous motivators in themselves (McAdam 1982). These authors also assimilated specific forms of culture, such as emotion, to the same instrumental core (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 17, 34). For instance, Meyer Zald stated clearly that it [resource mobilization (RM) theory] had no purchase at all on the "linguistic-cognitive-emotive conditions of meaning systems . . ." He added that ". . . the issue plagues all instrumental theories, of which RM theory is but one . . ." (Zald 1992, 341). By ruling out culture, this structural approach eased the task of analysis at the cost of truncating reality.

Under criticism from cultural, social-psychological and network perspectives on social movements (Mueller 1992), however, these structural-instrumental scholars began to modify their restrictive framework (Tarrow 2005). Turning from static structures and away from social movements per se, they sought to analyze *processes* of contention among actors. To dig into process, they identified discrete *mechanisms* that change the content and direction of contention (McAdam et al. 2001, 22). Mobilization, for instance, consists of the mechanisms of "attribution of opportunities and threats, social appropriation, construction of frames, situations, identities, and innovative collective action" (McAdam et al. 2001, 70). Contention with authorities consists of "competition, diffusion, repression and radicalization" (McAdam et al. 2001, 68–69). The authors claim, or hope, that different combinations of these mechanisms can be fitted together to build an explanatory model for any specific contentious episode (McAdam et al. 2001, 24, 346).

Their mechanism approach, the authors argue, "reeks" of culture because it includes mechanisms that operate through culture, like frames or collective identity, thus distinguishing the Mau Mau Rebellion from the French Revolution (McAdam et al. 2001, 345). However, this claim fails. The mechanisms themselves are generic social categories – such as "identity" – devoid of any specific cultural content. Can one simply fill them with culture? Certainly, building a generalizable explanation of anything depends upon the use of generic categories. But the utility of the generalization and the validity of a theory depend entirely upon how well the category grasps reality. Do their

mechanisms in themselves really *explain* anything about process, about what drives people into contention and funnels their trajectory through time? Or are their mechanisms only heuristic devices that just direct our attention to process (not an insignificant accomplishment), but do not explain it? In other words, can we abstract from the particular without losing the essence? There's the rub, the bane of comparative sociology, the nemesis of nomothetic modeling (Ragin 1987). The authors veer toward making strong explanatory claims for their mechanistic models. Cultural understandings, they claim, are "rarely particular" and, in any case, make their effects through the specified mechanisms (McAdam et al. 2001, 346).

Let's consider this claim for a specific mechanism. Take the mechanism of "repression" for instance. The presence of this mechanism, the authors argue, produces "predictable effects" – stiffening resistance, evasion of surveillance, discouraging mobilization (McAdam et al. 2001, 69). Take the specific example of police beating demonstrators. It often does have such effects. But when Gandhi led his followers on the Salt March against the British police, he taught them to keep the attitude of *satyagraha* – love for those who beat you, do not resist, let them beat you more. The demonstrators kept going despite the beatings. Their humility started to resonate in British hearts. Eventually, they won their cause. Simply plugging the mechanism of repression into a model of the Salt March would not explain anything. To the contrary, a particular set of cultural meanings held by the protestors and by the British constituted the essence of the interaction and its effects upon the outcomes. If all the mechanisms specified by the authors are equally ambivalent, any model built from them would be useless. It would collapse like a structure built of wet noodles.

What if we started from culture, not abstracted social forms? We would look first for the meaning of an act. Meaning gives birth to specific forms of social action and interaction. In this light, Max Weber compared the effect of culture to that of a railroad switchman. With a slight effort, the switchman can send the ponderous juggernaut of the locomotive hurtling down a different track to a new destination (Weber 1946). So too can specific cultural meaning shape the process of social interaction around even material goals. To illustrate, Weber compared the effects of the Protestant Ethic versus the Confucian Ethic on economic development in the sixteenth century and later. The Protestant economies prospered while the Chinese ones languished. Specific cultural meaning held by particular groups, in his view, diverted the trajectory of instrumental contention toward otherwise unexplainable outcomes.

Bellah called this approach "symbolic realism" (Bellah 1970, 237–59) and Geertz called it the "web of meaning" (Geertz 1973). Applying this logic to the study of social movements and contention, the relations of contention take shape around the moral and normative implications of core symbols, whether mutual and distinct among the contending parties. Consider the counter-factual. If during the Rwandan massacre, a Tutsi Gandhi had led his followers to treat their machete-wielding Hutu attackers with love, they probably would have been cut up anyhow. Satyagraha was not part of the Rwandan cultural

code. Symbolic meanings pervade and define the social relations and engagements of the actors. If so, different types of culture should produce different types of contentious processes – even if the physical objects of contention are the same, such as illness caused by industrial pollution or relatively low pay to workers.

Cultural scholars have devised many typologies to distinguish cultural values and norms. One of the most popular is the distinction between collectivist and individualist cultures (Parsons 1949; Hofstede 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2003). More finely, cultures differ on many lines; for instance on whether, to judge people's actions, they use universal moral standards or degrees of particular consanguinity. And each of these has its particular content. From this point of view, to understand social movements and contentious processes, we have to start afresh from the actors' understandings of each other and the situation and build up descriptions of process from there, as in the method of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967).

Cultural sociologists do differ on the strength of culture's capacity, whether strong or weak (Alexander 2003). Collective symbols might constitute a civil religion that puts a sacred aura around political events like the presidential inauguration (Bellah 1967). But how determinative this sacredness is of real political decision-making remains an open question. Even to culture-centered researchers, then, the exact impact of a given cultural orientation on action remains a subject for case-by-case investigation.

Applying a culturalist view to social movements, Goodwin and Jasper argue that culture permeates "all social relations, structures, networks and practices" (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 23). Actors on all sides become soaked in culture and develop their goals and criticisms in reference to it (Whittier 2002, 305). Such themes have been present from the early phases of social movement studies (Gusfield 1963; Turner 1981). Even once instrumentally oriented social movement scholars are recently coming to recognize the power of culture, if mainly in its most cogent form as religion (Aminzade and Perry 2001). However, to say that culture permeates social relations assumes that the social relations, like the mechanisms, have an existence independent of culture. Perhaps, to the contrary, culture *constitutes* relations rather than just filling them with meaning.

Long years of fieldwork on environmental movements and power in a community in southern Japan (1978–81) forced the author (of this introduction) to a constitutive view of culture. He conducted an ethnography of power and protest, interviewing and observing participants on all sides and levels of the contentious process. This research revealed that the real behavior of protest and the operation of power, despite arising around sharply opposed material interests, derived its real dynamics from the existing cultural ontology of the place. These culturally constituted processes did indeed, as Weber would have predicted, lead through distinct channels to different outcomes than similar interests would have done in the USA (Broadbent 1982, 1998, 2003). Under different cultural conditions, the very dynamics of contention take on

completely different contents and formations (Broadbent 2005). This profound shaping of interactive form, right down to the very constitution of the self, renders the concept of mechanism a useful heuristic, but not an explanation.

If culture constitutes contentious relations, it defines the operational forms, structures, and systems. Specific cultural *flows* produce a level of integral reality giving distinct shape and performance to any process. The intensity of cultural integration, the degree of implicit acceptance by all parties, however, is not universal. It depends upon the integrity and homogeneity of the particular culture. With the USA having relatively very low cultural integration, it is not surprising that its native researchers should slight the shaping effect of culture. There, the demographic realities produce a culture of relationships mediated by pragmatic testing, often reducing to a blind instrumentalism due to not knowing the other. In denser, more integrated cultures, deeper knowledge of the other gives greater assurance of mutual adherence to preconceived value and normative schema, producing what some call trust. But estrangement contributes to what is celebrated as a culture of individualism. In any case, in studying social movements and contentious processes, the quest for culture must focus on the living relationships among the actors (not just on texts).

Network analysis has given us a method for studying relational patterns. Up to now, most researchers have restricted their studies to social relations, such as contact or no contact. As noted above, the structural-instrumental school focused attention upon instrumental relations, a focus Tilly later called *relational realism* (Tilly 1999). Tilly's realism, following the approach of Harrison White, restricted relationships to strategic and instrumental efforts at control over others, with culture as the by-product of such processes (White 2008, 14). These instrumental theoretical frameworks produced a conceptual model of economic and political markets composed of opposed, goal-rational, interest-driven, control-seeking actors. Identity becomes defined by the quest for control. By White's own admission, this strictly social approach cannot grasp the culturally defined meanings of relationships (White 1992, xi).

As it has grown, though, the study of social networks opened up to a much wider canvas. It can be applied to study of different types of relationships composing a contentious process, including those defined by their meaning content (Broadbent 1989). In this perspective, it became possible to study the interplay of many different types of relations, ranging from dominative-instrumental to those built through cooperation and social inclusion, and to commitment to the same sets of ultimate values (Broadbent 2003). Such an expanded use of networks enables the study of how relations carry meaning between participants, not just instrumental treating of each other as objects. This approach fulfills the goals of what some call relational sociology (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).

The contrast of these two theoretical paradigms – *structural-instrumental-mechanistic* versus *cultural ontology* – poses a central causal question – how and to what degree do specific local cultural meanings affect the interaction of movement and context in contentious processes (Johnston and Klandermans

1995, 22)? Can the empty analytical mechanisms presented by instrumental-mechanistic theory be filled with any cultural content and explain things just fine? Or are these discrete mechanisms too abstract, or too bound up with Western culture, so as to be devoid of reliable causal efficacy across cultures? Alternately, does an essential instrumentalism – crafty power – underlie and determine contention everywhere, rendering cultural particulars no more than differing rationalizations? As the study of social movements spreads across the globe, such questions will gain increasing bite.

Looking more closely at the Rosy Periwinkle movement by the aging Taiwanese prostitutes, does it tell us anything about the relevance of mechanisms and culture? The movement, Mau Kuei Chang indicates, formed around a situation of rational self-interest – the protection of their legal right to work. This evidence rules out the irrationalist school of social movement theory in explaining their initial mobilization. The resource mobilization school, though, fares little better. The prostitute's impoverished and marginalized lives had not changed, so they had no new internal resources, nor any particular social organization except their common circumstances. Their political opportunities had indeed changed. The Chiang dictatorship and martial law had ended; freedoms and democratic politics were just blossoming in Taiwan. But the women did not attribute such opportunities to themselves, as the mechanism approach would readily imply. No, uneducated and long marginalized, they did not seem to initially grasp the positive implications of this new situation. Nor did they really construct a frame or collective movement identity or initiate innovative collective action through their own internal discussions. Rather, a contextual factor stimulated their mobilization. Chang identifies this factor as the chance effect of social networks impinging on the prostitutes from outside their community. The networks brought to them the activating presence of an aspiring young politician who appealed in terms *meaningful* to the prostitutes. The author calls this intersection of networks *relational contingency*.

In a nutshell, the Rosy Periwinkle reveals the weaknesses of the structural-functional and structural-instrumental-mechanistic schools alike, in the absence of a cultural understanding. The case clearly illustrates how *social* and *cultural* aspects of the context can deeply affect the mobilization of social movement – and ultimately their trajectory and outcome as well. That socio-cultural context includes a mix of factors, drawing upon fields of status identities, community customs, local institutions, values and expectations, discourse and patterned networks of relationships carrying specific cultural qualities of belongingness, morality, and emotion. The concluding chapter to this book will draw out and systematize the implications of the chapters for a better conceptualization of the effects of cultural context.

The Rosy Periwinkle movement exemplifies one type of social movement – the kind that boils over into unruly and boisterous public protest. Not all social movements are so obstreperous. Their activity can take many forms, from retreat into inward-looking utopias or spiritual gatherings, to working quietly to help those in need, to pushing outward to change the very operation of

society. Social movements use many different tactics, from those approved by the existing institutions and customs to those that purposely break them to draw public attention. Among the types of social movements, protest movements are the most extreme, taking sometimes unruly or shocking public actions to more forcibly push for change. Protest movements arouse passion and contention, often run afoul of the law, give rise to counter-movements, and invite harsh repression. Their contentious behavior sometimes succeeds, but often fails.

Explaining East Asian Protest Movements

East Asian scholars, as they began to develop their own social movement studies in the 1990s, at first sailed with a Western wind in their sails. They imported the dominant structuralist-instrumental conceptual tools of resources and political opportunity structure.[1] As the chapters in this book show, these concepts certainly found traction in their studies. But the authors quickly began to redesign these concepts to work better in their local contexts and cultures. Some imported analytical concepts from European social movement theory that better handled culture. Others largely discarded the Western concepts and fashioned their own new ones directly from the materials around them. The result has been innovative analyses that mix the many perspectives into new amalgams, and enlarge the total conceptual toolkit of social movement studies. The essays in this book provide many examples of this healthy tendency. They give us an in-depth examination of protest movements, of contentious politics, within the rich context of vibrantly alive non-Western societies. Sometimes the chapters in this book study the same case using different theoretical lenses and reach different conclusions. This illustrates the principle of paradigms, that the theoretical angle of vision can affect the conclusions.

One set of papers focus on movement motivations and identities, and illustrate the paradigm principle. Two papers about labor movements in Hong Kong (before the 1997 reunification with China) take opposite theoretical points of view in explaining their driving forces. Stephen Chiu adopts a structuralist, instrumental-rationalist explanation, arguing that Hong Kong labor movements erupted when they assessed their situation as possessing relatively strong political resources vis-à-vis their opponents. Benjamin Leung, however, takes a motivational and culturalist tack. He maintains that labor movements mobilized when they were inspired by ideologies flowing in from movements in mainland China such as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1967–1977). In Leung's view, waves of new ideas shape the basic identity and motivation of social movements,

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[1] Japanese translation of Tilly's *From Mobilization to Revolution* (translated by Yoshiaki Kobayashi) appeared in the mid-1980s, and of key articles in resource mobilization (translated by Shinji Katagiri) in the early 1990s.

irrespective of their structural contexts. The culture in question, though, flows not from traditional Confucian values but rather from exciting social processes in the neighboring "mother country," mainland China. These ideas impress the minds of susceptible idealistic groups in Hong Kong.

In two more chapters, the authors show how the identities of movement activists can be imprinted by the intense experience of activism at one point in time and persist and continue to motivate behavior in much later and very different circumstances. Youth who participated in Japan's New Left movements of the 1960s, Nobuyoshi Kurita shows, continued to be involved in and advocate similar causes much later in life. Likewise, youth who participated in China's Cultural Revolution, Guobin Yang reveals, deeply absorbed those ideals into their personal identities and continued to fight for similar goals in later life. Both these analyses reveal a generational formation of culture and identities that is out of synchronization with immediate structural conditions.

Discrimination structures the lives of groups in many societies. But how do their identities reflect those structuring conditions? Do they incline the victims to grievance and protest, as structuralists would argue? Yasunori Fukuoka shows how Koreans-in-Japan suffer from systematic denigration and discrimination. In the contemporary United States, new ethnic groups attain rapid symbolic inclusion by getting a hyphenated identity, such as Korean-Americans. But Japanese culture is not so welcoming. No matter how many generations a Korean family may have lived in Japan, they are still called "Koreans-in-Japan," not Korean-Japanese. This rejection includes many discriminating practices that make Koreans-in-Japan into a second class group (even if they become citizens). Japanese society does not so much dominate or exploit them as reject them. Koreans-in-Japan react in different ways: withdrawal, "passing," coming-out, and social protest. Their protest movement had to devise a culturally appropriate form of agency, pushing at certain vulnerable spots in the existing institutions, in order to begin to change the discriminatory customs of Japanese society. This case study clearly reveals the explanatory limits of structural theory and the need to include social and cultural institutions.

Another set of cases focuses on resources and political opportunities. During the 1980s in South Korea, as Songwoo Hur describes, the dictatorship suppressed all movements. The Korean women's movement, while keeping a low profile, worked as a united front demanding better status for all women. After the end of the dictatorship, though, the women's movement pluralized into a number of different sub-movements, each defined by different identities: middle class, poor, and minority. Hur describes this shift in the composition and fluidity of boundaries with the theoretical term *transversal politics*. In this case, the structural concept of expanding political opportunities clearly explains the new diversity of movements.

On the other hand, two other papers on Korea and one on Taiwan show how movements were able to bring about change in the political regime despite the lack of good political opportunities. Sunhyuk Kim shows how Korean movements contributed to the fall of the dictatorship. Once it did fall, as in Taiwan,

the new political opportunities spurred the growth of many more social movements. As Do-Wan Ku demonstrates, Korean environmental movements exhibited great instrumental skill in framing the environmental message so as to recruit widespread support and build solidarity among social movements. In this way, they became a major force in the democratic transition and later national politics. They built a unified Korean environmental movement more resembles Germany's Green Party than the dispersed environmental movements in Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. This capacity hinges on social and cultural aspects of Korean society, not simple resources or political opportunities. Mingsho Ho shows in detail how the process of interaction between social movements and aspects of the political opportunity structure in successive stages brought about political transformation in Taiwan. In these three cases, the political opportunity structure becomes a dependent variable, not a causal independent one.

Jun Jin deploys structuralist-instrumental concepts of resources and political opportunities to explain Chinese peasant movements. The peasant leaders of Chinese peasant movements, he shows, tend to prolong protest movements once they start them, even to the point of rejecting settlement offers. As Jun discovers, this contradictory behavior can be explained by the local political opportunity structure, but only by paying close attention to its social and cultural aspects. Hostile local officials, angry at being criticized and forced to divest their illegal gains, wait for the movement to die down. Once that threat is gone, they harshly punish the movement leaders to teach a lesson to other potential movement leaders. An active movement, therefore, is a source of strength and protection for the peasant leader. The behavior of both sides is quite rational and instrumental. But the goals and strategies are pushed by and infused with culturally defined expectations and networks.

A socially and culturally infused form of domination also appears in the case of Maki, Japan, generating a local specificity of contention. Yasuko Hirabayashi shows how the town of Maki managed to avoid a proposed nuclear power plant planned by the government and the regional power monopoly. In such cases, government ministries and big business usually manipulate and control local officials, browbeating residents into acquiescence. Japan's relatively uniform ethnic identity buttresses state authority weakening alternative moral supports for protest. But some Maki townspeople, having gained greater faith in civil society, imported a new political tool they had heard about – the citizen referendum. The referendum had no legal status, but it mobilized enough resistance to deny the company its needed land. Innovation outside the formal institutions, coupled with the good fortune of particular town land ownership, brought them success. Their intervention inspired other citizen referenda throughout Japan. Here the shifting moral terrain erodes the traditional dominant ontology of power.

In urban Hong Kong, social movements completely contradict the expectations of political opportunity theory – or at least force its thorough rethinking. Under socially liberal British colonial rule, movements were plentiful and

usually permitted. They were usually modern interest group movements such as unions or else student ideological movements supporting Communist China. After Hong Kong's 1997 reunification with mainland China, though, under the distinctly less liberal Chinese Communist Party, political opportunity theory would predict a rapid decline in public social movement activity. China did promise "one country, two systems," but political protest was beyond the pale. However, as Alvin So shows, instead of disappearing, social movements re-emerged in post-modernist form. Under Chinese rule, Hong Kong movements arise from an amorphous middle and professional class without a distinct economic or ideological interest basis. They organize in the virtual world, through cell phones and the web, gather suddenly for a street protest about corruption or some other critique of the government, and just as suddenly disperse and evaporate. This virtual and leaderless mobilization allows dis-gruntled individuals, used to personal freedom and chafing at new restrictions, to voice their criticisms while escaping the heavy hand of repression. These cracks in social control allow popular criticism to achieve a public voice. New, counter-system collective identities gel on line in cyberspace. These then allow for flash mobilization and disbandment without social networks, a new social form barely traceable even to state spies. The already decaying legitimacy of the Chinese state could gain little traction over Hong Kong's wild entrepreneurial culture coupled with open networks of communication.

At the core of the concept of political opportunities lies the state (Tarrow 1994). In structural protest movement theory, the state remains the typical antagonist – an objectified black box, a unitary actor pursuing its own interests and issuing forth various threats and opportunities for movements (Evans et al. 1985; Tilly 1978). This view purposely contradicted the long history of theory seeing the state – at least in democratic and capitalist societies – as pushed around by social interests, in particular by powerful business or class interests. In the social power view, though, the real contention would be between the controlling and subordinate social interests, with the state only as an intermediary (Broadbent 1988). Noting this bias in structural theory makes it easier to compare state centrality and composition East Asian versus Western societies. In the power ontology, since the end of World War Two to the present, the East Asian state has been considerably more central than in most contemporary Western societies. But this centrality has been under tremendous challenge, and its decay is a key theme underlying the social movements in the chapters.

The chapters in this book treat the state in a more nuanced and insightful way. To grasp the issues at stake, Western readers need to distinguish between two aspects of the state, what in the West are called the administrative and legislative branches. In East Asia, the "administrative" branch does more than administer the laws, it largely makes them. In East Asia, this branch is better called the ministerial state – powerful governmental bureaucracies full of talent and expertise that devise the best policies in (their view of) the national (not private) interest. The power of politicians squabbling in legislatures is relatively new, and subject to popular suspicion. However, capitalism and democracy, to

the extent unleashed, have weakened the centrality and legitimacy of the ministerial state (introducing more private interests but also more checks and balances). Learning this new system has proven profoundly challenging for East Asian publics.

In his chapter, Harutoshi Funabashi presents a new general theory of the state as it affects protest movements. The state inherently has two faces – a domination aspect and a managerial aspect. The dominative aspect creates problems for ordinary people, while the managerial or "nanny" aspect helps people solve their problems. State ministries legitimize their activities and cover their blunders or corruption by stressing their selfless, materialistic service to society. By recognizing this inherent dualism, Funabashi transcends structural dominative versus functional service-oriented theories of the state. One state has both faces, exhibited depending on circumstances. Using examples of environmental protest movements, Funabashi shows that social movements have to adapt their tactics to fit the face they confront. Neither state face recognizes the legitimacy of people power, the active civil society. Under such circumstances, Funabashi argues, movements need to draw out and use the maternal managerial side of the state, while rigorously resisting its dominative instrumental side. Here, protest movements have to position themselves carefully in a hilly moral landscape. They have to represent their cause (in discourse and framing) so as to affect the state's construal of its interest and use of institutional power. Both movement and state are embedded in and angling around a culturally specific moral field of common meaning.

Similarly, Dingxin Zhao's explanation of the Chinese state's repression of the 1989 pro-democracy movements also probes the moral field of state–society relationships. The two sides, democracy movement protests versus state agencies and Party leaders, held very different definitions of the situation. The educated youth and their followers among the regular people saw themselves as advocating democracy in order to improve society. Within the state, while some party officials agreed with the students, eventually the faction that saw them as an illegitimate threat to the state won out, leading to harsh repression. The emotional and interpretive mode of this interaction between power and protest contrasts with the structuralist rational exchange approach.

The most insidious penetration of state control into society occurs in Singapore. There, the state suppresses all manifestation of social movements through soft social control – the incorporation of all citizen groups under state leadership (corporatism), the promotion of consumerist ideology, and suppression of all ideologies promoting discontent or independent thinking in civil associations, and use of police force if needed. As a paternalistic state with reputedly low levels of corruption, Singapore has achieved great prosperity and high standard of living, education and professional skill for its people as well as relative harmony between the diverse ethnic groups (Chinese, Malay Muslim and Hindu). In this regard, Singapore contrasts with the nearby states of Indonesia and Malaysia, where ethnic strife, poverty, and government corruption are more prevalent. Singapore's prosperous social order has come at the

price of detailed state supervision and regulation of civic life. As the case study shows, even a Christian religious-based movement intended to help the poor was banned and suppressed by the state. John Clammer, our only non-East Asian author, wrote about this movement case after leaving Singapore. While this system is oppressive to civil liberties, it is difficult to make the structuralist assumption that grievances are constant and waiting for opportunities. One would first need to make a social and cultural assessment of whether ordinary people accept the government argument, that the rigid social order is the necessary price to pay to attain their prosperous and peaceful situation.

The movement mobilization process is central to all social movement theory. MauKuei Chang presents one of the most trenchant challenges to the structuralist theory of social movements. In his paper on the Rosy Periwinkle prostitutes' movement, he envisions movements not as calculating actors, but as localized swirls of activity. Like eddies and whirlpools in a river, these activity swirls arise as the result of broader relational flows and patterns in the society. Movements are the outcomes and products of larger dynamical systems, not the calculating intentions of local leaders. He labels his theory *embedded contingency* because movements are so entangled with their immediate ties with other actors in the social vicinity. This view challenges the structuralist view of networks as resources that the movement can use in its mobilization. In Chang's account, networks brought new ideas and inspirations to the prostitutes, and thereby encouraged them to form a movement.

Similarly Chulhee Chung's paper on mesomobilization in Korea shows how the student movement under the dictatorship attained regime-challenging power not by being autonomous, calculating groups, but by joining in larger coalitions. The tendency to merge into larger coalitions, his work implies, is not simply due to instrumental calculations of effectiveness. Such coalitions were harshly discouraged in those repressive times. Rather, it is due to an associative and collaborative cultural tendency that spans across Korean society and inclines groups to join hands in common cause. This paper too challenges the rationalist structural account of mobilization and alliance building.

Movements must impress not only the state, but the wider society. Even under harsh conditions, movements have some capacity to make their own opportunities – to challenge state policies and regimes but also to change the perceptions of the general public. Michael Hsiao shows how in Taiwan three waves of movements played important roles in ending martial law and promoting political liberalization. While conservative Chinese culture initially inhibited public acceptance of movements, over time the public became more accepting and supportive, which in turn helped the transformation of political institutions. Hsiao's paper presents a learning model of social change by which protest movements gradually persuade major sectors of society that both their causes and their unruly means are legitimate. This learning occurs not just through each movement presenting the public with an appealing framing of its particular issue, but also through a broader growing acceptance of the need to end the dictatorship and replace it with a democratic system. The

tension between the dominant mainlanders running the dictatorship, and the majority Taiwanese natives who were subjected to it, added to the inherent popular legitimacy of protest.

In his Triangular Model of Social Movement Analysis (TRIM), Koichi Hasegawa brings together the three causal categories of the structuralist school (noted above) – political opportunities, resources, and framing (noted as cultural framing) – to compare anti-nuclear movements in the United States and Japan. For each society, he fills these categories with culturally and institutionally informed observations. To summarize his main comparative points, concerning political opportunities, the centralized and closed nature of Japanese policy decision-making, monopolized by central ministries, a single ruling party, and concentrated big business rendered protest movements politically impotent. As a result, protest actions tended to give expressive venting to feelings of resistance, rather than make practical policy proposals. In contrast, US pluralism gave more openings to protest movements and NGOs to affect the policy making process and they did. As for resources, the lack of funding, no tax-exempt status and low public support for Japanese NGOs also weakened them dramatically in comparison to their US counterparts. Finally, a deeper culture affected how the two publics tended to frame nuclear power: Japanese people maintained a strong confidence in technology, while the US public harbored greater doubt about nuclear power. In this culturally sensitive way, Hasegawa's triangular model integrates structural and socio-cultural factors, thereby overcoming many of the theoretical tensions between the structural-instrumental and socio-cultural ontology approaches. This happy marriage of the two schools retains their respective strengths, leaves behind their respective weaknesses, and shows a way forward for cross-cultural social movement explanation. But if culture is crucial, what is the real content of East Asian culture?

Social Movements and East Asian Culture

Social movements and interest groups, defined as independent groups newly formed by ordinary people coming together to define and pursue common goals, have become accepted as normal in Western pluralistic societies (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). They are seen as part of *civil society* – the realm of autonomous associations self-organized by citizens and residents that supports democratic rights and culture (Schwartz 2003b, 25). Civil society gives rise to the public sphere, the realm of popular discussion of topics of the day and their own status. The concept of civil society, arising during the European Reformation and Enlightenment, marked the first clear distinction between the state and society (Shils 1996, 38–44; Schwartz 2003a, 3; Alagappa 2004b). It identified society as an autonomous realm not entirely subsumed under the King. This concept lay behind the outbreak of revolution and the growth of democracy in

the eighteenth century. These democratic ideas have since diffused and infiltrated societies around the world. The concept of civil society is now an important part of political discourse in most countries around the world (Alagappa 2004a). However, its actual practice has often met with resistance from established rulers and elites.

In East Asia, urban and rural residential and occupational associations have long existed and flourished – as they did in medieval Europe. But the societies composed of such groups did not on their own produce a philosophy of social contract and liberate themselves from the dominating or embracing state. The long course of East Asian history has seen plenty of uprisings by existing communal groups, such as farmers and religions, to protest for better life conditions (Hane 1982; Perry and Selden 2000, 7). Such protest movements sometimes grew to the size of civil war and sought to replace existing dynasties. They had their philosophical justifiers and critics of the system. But ideas of popular formal rights, of the authority of citizens to help select their own rulers, never became an integral part of traditional East Asian political institutions (Redding 1996, 325). Wittfogel, following Marx, explained the persistence of "Oriental Despotism" as due to the social hierarchies required by the irrigation systems necessary to the rice paddy agriculture of the region (Wittfogel 1957). But the content of philosophy and religion could also have played an important independent causal role (Eisenstadt 1996).

Confucianism and Buddhism pervaded East Asia, while other religions attained more local prominence. At its core, Confucianism taught a humanistic social ethic of responsibility. Buddhism, in contrast, counseled the ultimate wisdom of detachment from worldly affairs. Neither of them developed the Christian ideal of transforming society into a more perfect state closer to a heavenly ideal. But Confucian reformers sometimes tried to "rectify" society – to bring social practices back into line with those prescribed as proper and moral for a given social role or station. But both Confucian and Buddhist teachers preferred the path of education to humanize society and make leaders more compassionate.

The multi-millennial history of Confucianism and its many variations cannot be simply summarized. Discussion of contemporary relevance refers actually to Neo-Confucianism, a revision of the traditional teachings that began around the year 1000 CE and promoted both moral and practical learning for ordinary people as well as elites (De Bary 1988, 48). The Confucian ethic stressed the virtue of cultivating the self and educating others, including the sovereign, as the proper way of bringing about peace and prosperity for all – its larger social goal (De Bary 1988). The social order was formed by playing one's proper role in five cardinal social relationships: rulers and subjects, husbands and wives, parents and children, siblings, and friends (Yamashita 1996, 153).

Due to the interplay of Neo-Confucian teachings with local conditions and cultures, the specific ethics took on diverse hues. Chinese Confucian ethics, for instance, stressed loyalty to the family and kin over loyalty to the sovereign (De Bary 1988). When disaster occurred, doctrine recognized the right of the people

to overthrow the sovereign who had lost the Mandate of Heaven. In addition, Chinese Confucian, as well as Buddhist and Taoist, ethics had a more universal flavor, providing an ethical basis for criticizing the sovereign. Even the Confucian Mandarin bureaucracy, recruited through the examination system, attained some degree of political influence autonomous from the sovereign (Eisenstadt 1996).

Korea imported Neo-Confucianism in the 1400s and adopted it for all their social institutions, far more thoroughly than the Chinese had (De Bary 1988, 60). The Confucian literati developed different schools and debated issues freely. They exercised great influence in spreading education and humanizing the behavior or kings. In contrast, Japanese Confucianism led a very restricted existence. The Tokugawa Japanese state imported and used Confucianism specifically to legitimize and buttress its own power. As a result, Japanese Confucianism lost much of its original populist and humanist qualities. It recognized no special rights to families, popular criticism or revolution; all loyalty, unending and self-sacrificing, was due the feudal lord (De Bary 1988; Eisenstadt 1996). Even the native local shamanistic cults, amalgamated into a national religion under the name of Shinto, were enlisted to this purpose.

In all East Asian societies, Neo-Confucian ethics reflected and supported the strong kinship or village-collective social groupings typical of rice-agriculture societies. These cultures were strongly collectivist but centered on the welfare of the village community per se, not the larger society (Murakami 1984). They lacked a concept of universal public good or public rights, such as assembly, participation, or protest (Shils 1996, 71). In the Confucian view, subjects should not pursue their own interests and demands independently, but rather appeal the matter through the paternalistic authorities. Thus, official doctrines did not give any formal political authority to society. However, Confucian doctrine recognized consultation as important and also legitimated family-based associations. Kin-based associations became very important in China, while wide political consultation became valued in Japan (De Bary 1988).

Starting with the era of European colonialism, these traditional orientations and institutions have been increasingly battered by transformative events. Along with special European trading enclaves in China, the British colonized tiny Hong Kong and Singapore for long periods. Japan too occupied Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria, imposing its own cultural order. After World War Two, the old Neo-Confucian institutions as state structures and schools largely disappeared. But Confucian attitudes and norms about propriety, education, self-cultivation, and social order still influence popular culture and behavior. These values are not antithetical to new ideas about popular rights and civil society, nor do they necessarily impede the emergence of social movements.

Historical experiences have deeply affected East Asian politics. World War Two left deep and bitter scars in all the region's societies. Because in their view the Japanese government has never adequately recognized, taken responsibility, and apologized for the depredations of their invasions and colonization, people in China and Korea feel profound continuing resentment toward Japan. These

feelings have given rise to protest movements against Japan in Korea and China, and against Russia in Japan. The War left contradictory tensions in Japan as well. Some citizens opted for a new internationalism, fielded movements against nuclear war anywhere in the world, supported Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibiting a military and bitterly critiqued the return to power of segments of the war-time elite. Other citizens wanted to return to the pre-War Imperial system and make Japan a mighty military power once again.

On top of these tensions, a few years after the end of World War Two the Cold War ripped East Asia in two and forced every country or area to take sides. The political tensions, under the aegis of two regional hegemons the USA and China, intensified authoritarian tendencies throughout. Authoritarian East Asian rulers, building on traditional Confucian-style hierarchy, gave little leeway to attempts at voluntary associations and social movements (Gold 1996; Yamashita 1996; Alagappa 2004a).

But as the second half of the twentieth century wore on, developments began to erode this authoritarianism. Rapid economic growth intruded into society, generating an educated middle class while concentrating industrial workers in production zones and provoking peasants by polluting the environment. People began to demand more say in their governments. As the Cold War deflated around 1990, political tensions eased; the USA began to allow and encourage more liberal and democratic systems in its East Asian allies. Under pressure from outside and within, repressive authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea collapsed with astounding ease and rapidity. Under the same pressures, citizens in Japan slowly began to explore, practice, and fulfill the freedoms already enshrined in their post-war democratic Constitution. In Hong Kong too, with the return to China looming, the British colonial government gave increasing freedoms to civil society. Only China and Singapore remained bastions of centralized, authoritative government.

The East Asian values debate mentioned earlier raises questions about the contemporary effects of such values upon politics and social movements in East Asia. Like Lee Kwan Yew, some East Asian scholars (especially from Singapore) argue that "Asian values" support state-led corporatism rather than pluralistic democracy (Kausikan 1998). On the other hand, like Kim Dae Jung, other scholars see Neo-Confucianism as fostering more liberal values (Chan 1998; De Bary 1983). What do surveys show about such values across East Asia? Differences in popular values among the East Asian countries are clearly shown by the results of the Asia Barometer Surveys (ABS) of 2006 and 2007. For instance, in response to the question "What is most important," the ABS survey asked respondents to rank four choices: maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in important government decisions, fighting rising prices, and protecting freedom of speech. In comparison, the World Values Survey (WVS) of 2000 asked the same question in Western countries. To the extent that traditional Confucianist values of social order shape public opinion, one would expect the East Asian countries to give higher priority to social order over giving people more say in government or protecting freedom of speech. In contrast to such

culturalist theory predictions though, Inglehart's social change theory predicts that as societies grow more prosperous, they change to support post-materialist values of free speech and political participation (Inglehart 1997).

Drawing on the two surveys, Table 1 reveals some interesting evidence in this regard (Inoguchi 2009, 78). Concerning protecting freedom of speech, the East Asian societies show a lot of variation, but tend to be lower than the Western societies. Many of the prosperous capitalist East Asian societies (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore) give it less priority than any of the Western countries. However, Hong Kong and Japan rank about equal to Germany, by far the lowest among the Western countries. As former English colonies, Hong Kong and Singapore would be in an ambiguous relation to their colonizers' liberal values, having learned them but also suffered from their lack of practice. In terms of priority given to maintaining order in the nation, though, with the exception of high scores in China and Singapore, the East Asian and Western societies have roughly similar scores. Levels of concern with giving people more say in government decisions are very similar in Hong Kong and Japan and the Western countries (averaging around 35%). But South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and China are distinctly lower.

The statistics tell an ambiguous story about the remaining effect of traditional values. Confucian values should produce greater concern for social order, compared to the liberal and individualistic West. But the statistics show that concern

Table 1 Distributions on what is most important

ABS	HK (%)	China (%)	Japan (%)	S. Korea (%)	Singapore (%)	Taiwan (%)
Maintaining order in nation	28.50	58.42	38.39	47.26	71.15	33.23
Giving people more say in important government decisions	37.20	17.14	33.40	13.11	12.86	24.78
Fighting rising prices	24.00	20.66	18.74	36.50	13.44	38.61
Protecting freedom of speech	10.30	3.77	9.47	3.13	2.55	3.38
WVS	USA (%)	UK	France (%)	Germany (%)	Canada (%)	Italy (%)
Maintaining order in nation	32.60	–	43.05	42.24	22.23	32.12
Giving people more say in important government decisions	32.18	–	23.55	32.36	39.87	39.14
Fighting rising prices	9.84	–	19.95	15.92	15.79	11.89
Protecting freedom of speech	25.38	–	14.45	9.49	22.10	16.85

ABS-Asian Barometer Survey; WVS-World Values Survey
Source: (Inoguchi 2009, 78)

to be quite universal. Hence they do not support that conclusion. On the other hand, the relatively low concern for protecting freedom of speech in most East Asian societies, plus the low concern for giving people more say in government decisions (South Korea and Taiwan) might indicate the effect of Confucian values. However, the high concern for giving people more say in Hong Kong and Japan contradict that thesis. Of course, random sample surveys of attitudes only show the tip of social iceberg. All the responding individuals are deeply embedded in a social matrix that their individual responses do not clearly reveal. Our chapters often trace this matrix on the ground.

Despite these evident differences, scholars claim to find common remnants of the ages-long Confucian influence still embedded in the East Asian social and cultural matrix. Vogel for instance, comparing Japan and the "Four Little Dragons" (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore), finds they share four similar institutions that help account for their common economic miracles: "a meritocratic elite, an entrance exam system, the importance of the group, and the goal of self-improvement" (Vogel 1991, 101). Similarly, de Bary finds among all the East Asian societies a "love of learning, commitment to education, social discipline, and personal cultivation" (De Bary 1981, ix–x) cited in (De Bary 1988, 101). De Bary attributes this common orientation to the diffusion and positive reception of Neo-Confucian teachings throughout East Asia starting from year 1000 and extending in the nineteenth century CE (De Bary 1988). The author sees it as a figure/ground difference–Western consciousness focuses on the figure, East Asian on the ground, the context.

Conclusion

As a social scientific experiment, how do these nineteen studies of movements in East Asia intersect with existing and new analytical concepts, theories, and explanations? What do they tell us about the interaction of culture and structure, or meaning and mechanisms? Is Weber's cultural switchman anywhere in evidence? Do these protest and power processes each exhibit different mixtures of the causal factors? Do any generalities hold across all the cases? The studies were not designed to test such broad questions, but some tentative observations are in order.

In comparison to the United States, where businesses are often the targets of protest, one common thread through the chapters is the centrality of the state in the protest process. In East Asia, the state ministries hold much greater power over business and civil society than in the US or contemporary Europe. Accordingly, protest against business or social plans and practices leads quite directly to a confrontation with the state in some form. From prostitute's rights in Taiwan to rejecting a nuclear power plant in Japan to demanding compensation for relocation due to a dam project in China, the state is the target. We can call this an institutional difference, but institutions have a history and a meaning in

their societies. States have always been very central to East Asian societies, and only in the latter twentieth century have they started to decay under the pressure of powerful pressures.

Max Weber held that the state could not long rule by instrumental force alone; to endure, it required popular legitimacy to justify its rule (Weber 1978). Over the post-World War Two period, the East Asian states asserted legitimacy due to their positions in the post-War geopolitics, whether as a revolutionary state, an anti-Communist state, or a post-colonial liberation state. The centralized states also tried to rely on Confucian paternalism – "we can solve your problems, leave them to us." As the terrors of the War gradually receded and the problems of economic growth and social tensions emerged, though, these legitimizing rationales gradually lost efficacy. In the Taiwan case, the ruling Nationalist Party justified its authority rule by its purpose of preparing to re-invade and take back China. The bulk of the Taiwanese population did not care, and as time wore on, the likelihood of a re-invasion shrank to zero. In the South Korean case, the rationale was imminent invasion by North Korea. This too has not occurred since the Korean War. As the North Korean state has weakened, the rationale for a dictatorial counterpoint in the South also weakened.

In China, the Communist Party's initial rationale for imposing its revolutionary new regime had been to crush feudal and class oppression and liberate working people. It initially succeeded in this task, but after time, the new system created its own disasters and injustices, faltered economically, and increasingly gave way to a revival of capitalism in both manufacturing and agriculture. This social change weakened the ideological rationale of the Communist Party, forcing it to justify its rule by producing economic prosperity through its hybrid state-owned and private-owned capitalist economic system. Similarly in Japan, the failures of one-party leadership weakened popular faith enough to allow the victory of a new party in 2008. As the core rationales of these power structures decayed, their power also waned.

The effectiveness of the Confucian paternalist state rationale, and its counterpart the acquiescence and quietude of civil society, depended in part on the degree of ethnic homogeneity in the society. In the East Asian society with the highest degree of cultural homogeneity, Japan, the populace elected a single ruling party for over 50 years (1955–2008). Until at least the 1980s, the Japanese state actively promulgated the idea of ethnic homogeneity, of the Japanese people as a "single ethnic group" (*tanitsu minzoku*) in order to make governance easier. This ethnic unity especially entailed common moral standards of loyalty to one's bosses and dutiful performance of one's given role within a relatively egalitarian national collective – a society vertical in obedience and organization but horizontal in reward and belongingness (Nakane 1970). This view was taught in schools and held enough truth to make it widely accepted as the Japanese identity. Its dominance crushed the legitimacy of alternative or alien identities, as the situation of Koreans-in-Japan so amply indicates (chapter by Fukuoka). Similarly, the central socialist state in China enjoyed greater

legitimacy among the dominant Han people than among ethnic minorities. While the Chinese state has tried to promote appreciation for "national minorities," the Han identity and language remain hegemonic. However, since obedience to the central state was never the cardinal virtue of Chinese Confucianism and China has always exhibited a plethora of local movements, ethnic identity persuasion has not been a state governance tactic as in Japan.

In South Korea, ethnic divisions based on the domains of ancient kingdoms have always been central to politics. Moreover, the deep penetration of Christianity decayed Confucianist rationales and brought about a more pluralistic and activist political society. On these several ethical bases, South Korean civil society has a history of opposing the central state, even during the post-War period of authoritarian rule. In Hong Kong ruled by the British, the foreign-ruled state had no cultural legitimacy but enjoyed high marks for supporting economic prosperity. The British colonial governor freed Hong Kong civil society from close supervision, as long as it did not challenge colonial governance. Under these permissive circumstances, the society developed an intense kin-based entrepreneurial market and financial system full of autonomous associations of all kinds, from labor to civic to criminal. The ethnic division in Taiwan moved the society in the opposite direction, toward authoritarian controls. The Nationalist Party that lost China and moved its leaders and military to Taiwan from the late 1940s wanted to use Taiwan as a platform to retake the mainland. The existing Taiwanese people did not accept this ideological rationale. The mainlanders set up their own government of China in exile with Taiwan as one minor province. Political and ethnic tensions overlapped to render the state illegitimate in native eyes. Given this cultural vacuum, during the 1950s to early 1980s, the mainlander state ruled by harsh dictatorship with terror and martial law.

Singapore is the exception to the rule of ethnic homogeneity and governance legitimacy. While the Singapore state was originally run by ethnic Chinese, it incorporated the other ethnic groups at all levels and has been relatively successful in promulgating an integrated Singaporean culture as well as bringing peace and prosperity, thereby bolstering its legitimacy.

Whatever cultural nuances inhabit the state, however, the state is still everywhere in possession of brute force – the ultimate structural, instrumental sanction – which it can use to enforce obedience to its laws. A centralized authoritarian state has the capacity to use violence against its citizenry at will. However, whether it will do so or not depends upon a kind of indirect, publicly acted-out dance of negotiation between the state and groups in the nascent civil society. On the one hand, the end of dictatorship in Taiwan and Korea marked a crucial historical watershed that liberated civil society and led to an efflorescence of autonomous associational and movement activity. Conversely, the sudden imposition of an authoritarian government upon a formerly liberal political system, as happened when China repossessed Hong Kong, created a rapid decline in civil society activity. But at the same time, compared to the Korean dictatorship, the Taiwan dictatorship gradually allowed a variety of

movements to proliferate, as the Hsiao chapter illustrates. And the Chinese state was not internally consistent in repressing civil society. In the Tienanmen case, it took a period of negotiation before the repression manifested. Thus the state and the political opportunities it allows do not, as structural theory assumes, automatically pursue goals of domination or exploitation. They reflect a complex process of cultural negotiation.

When we look in detail, the operation of structural-instrumental concepts such as resources and political opportunities as well as mechanisms such as brokerage and identify-shift depends greatly upon the local cultural and social situation. To some extent, barring the application of naked force, the effects of resources and opportunities, for instance, are *culturally constructed* by the expectations of the actors – both the powerful and the protestors. We can see that in the two protest movement studies from China concerning the Dahe Dam protest and the Tienanmen democracy protest. In the former, structuralist thinking would not normally consider the prolongation of the protest movement by rejecting its sought goals to be a movement resource. But yet due to the immediate circumstance of power, it became such. Certainly this instance involves the threat of instrumental power, that a local party boss would devastate the protest leader. And the prolongation of the movement was equally instrumental a counter-tactic. Yet, neither action would be sensible without an understanding of the intense pressure from above on the local boss to keep "his" villagers under control. In this possessive paternalism, it would seem, lurks not just the values of bureaucratic state socialism, but also the residue of Confucian values, which even though not its primary virtue, did instill an expectation of peasant obedience to the officialdom. The same paternalistic obedience expectations pervaded enough of the Chinese leadership to tip them into brutally suppressing the student democracy demonstration, instead of accepting it as a new stage of political development consonant with their economic changes.

In these cases, then, the explanatory validity of the structures and mechanisms posited apriori as explanatory categories is very low. Rather, these concepts are useful heuristics. Similarly, the structural view of protest movements as awaiting needed resources and opportunities also has heuristic value, but is insufficient to explain the observed protest processes in East Asia. Likewise, the motivations and collective identities of protest groups and other actors are internalized, but also exist as negotiated templates of behavior in social space. Structures and mechanisms exist everywhere and transform the process of contention and the trajectory of movements. But they emerge from underlying cultural and social dynamics that define their particular operations. Therefore, it is misleading to assert, as the instrumental-mechanists do, that a concatenation of mechanisms can be added together and then filled with culture to explain a given case of contentious politics (McAdam et al. 2001, 346). We can at best take such posited abstract analytical categories of analysis as hints about how to look at contention. But we should not use them as the "starting place" for an effective analysis and explanation. Rather, we need to start with deep empathy

for the culture in question, and see how people carry their culture into conten-
tion. In East Asia, actors are more embedded in context.

East Asian culture and social customs obviously exhibit great variation
around a common basic theme established by 1000 years of Neo-Confucian
teachings, mixed with Buddhism and local cultures. As formal institutions,
traditional values were shattered by the events of the twentieth century. But
the habits and orientations linger among the families, small groups, and orga-
nizational patterns of East Asian societies. To give the reader a framework for
understanding the relevance of this complex mixture, each section of this book
will start with an introduction to the historical and contextual factors and major
social divisions and tensions relevant to understanding social movements in
that society.

In their emerging vibrant distinctiveness and responsiveness to global cur-
rents, the realities of contemporary East Asian societies complicate any simple
distinction between the civilizations of East and West. Rather, their distinctive
features are more likely to be found in the details of the stories about the social
movements. Characterizing these nuances in the more general theoretical terms
and debates set by this introduction remains a thorny challenge. As the first
collection of social scientific research on a wide range of protest movements in
East Asia, though, this book opens the door to deeper social scientific dialogue
between East and West. Whatever its specific theoretical outcomes, this East-
West dialogue will greatly enrich the study of social movements. The chapters in
this volume display the colorful new hybrid concepts that can come of such
cross-pollination. The garden gate is open, the flowers are in bloom, and the
reader is invited to take a stroll.

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Part I
Introduction to Japanese Society, Culture, and Politics

Koichi Hasegawa and Jeffrey Broadbent

Japan occupies on an archipelago of large and small islands off the coasts of Korea and China. The total land area is smaller than the US state of California, with two-thirds of land mountainous and forested. In 2005, this area held a population of 127.8 million, mostly in dense coastal settlements.

From antiquity (Jomon Period 14,000 to 400 BCE) Japanese society developed its own indigenous qualities based on hierarchical clan organization. The first strong central state (Nara period 8th century CE) adopted Chinese Buddhist and Confucianist values to codify and legitimize its regime. Its founding Seventeen Article Constitution by Prince Shotoku stressed seeking harmony through Buddhist virtue, respecting others, properly performing one's social role and making decisions through broad discussion (De Bary 1988). Through such legitimizing documents the Yamato clan authorities sought to establish an Imperial center, pacify clan warfare, and bring the clan gods under a single religious narrative. After alternating between Imperial centralization and civil war over the ensuing centuries and fighting off foreign invasions, the Tokugawa Regime (1603–1868) finally unified the country under a centralized feudalism that again imported Chinese Confucianism to legitimize its rule. Contrary to the Chinese example of meritocratic recruitment to elite bureaucratic positions (despite exclusive dynastic families or clans), Japan set up a society-wide stratification of inherited statuses with the military aristocracy at the top. During famine periods, peasants often erupted in protest movements demanding better conditions under the Confucian social contract, only to be violently suppressed.

According to many scholars, the Tokugawa Period (1603–1868) solidified some enduring Japanese social and cultural qualities that continue in various forms to the present day (Bellah Murakami 1984). This regime "chained off" (*sakoku*) the country from then encroaching foreign influences, intensifying an inward-looking attitude of surviving only through mutual reliance. Village society (*mura*) developed a strong mutual reliance system through the disciplined collective work demanded by rice agriculture, with severe ostracism for non-conformists. The family system (*ie*) consisted of an extended hierarchical patriarchy that fit within the larger village society (Fukutake 1989). The

paternalistic hierarchy of mutual aid became a basic template for building social organization (Nakane 1970). This hierarchical social pattern militated against the development of autonomous associations and social movements in civil society even into the post-World War Two period (Sugimoto 2003; Broadbent 2003). Toward the end of the Tokugawa Period, Japanese scholars tried to identify an authentic Japanese essence apart from the foreign Buddhist and Confucian influences. This movement created an ideology of a national body (*kokutai*) consisting of a unified Yamato people existing under a single Imperial lineage since the time of creation (as told in Japanese mythology). This ideology implicitly criticized the rule of Tokugawa Shogun, which had long displaced the Emperor as the effective center of the society.

In 1854, the black ships of US Commodore Perry's fleet and ensuing demands shocked the Tokugawa feudal system into turmoil. In the Meiji Restoration of 1868, revolutionaries bearing the *kokutai* ideology overthrew the Tokugawa regime and restored the Emperor to his rightful central role. In the process, they reformed the entire social system so as to make it fit to meet the challenge from the West. This unprecedented revolution from above (Trimberger 1978) adopted Western institutions, abolished feudal privileges, freed the serfs, set up a Constitutional Monarchy ruled by a central peerage and bureaucracy under the Emperor, enacted universal education and conscription, created industrial and finance capitalism, and imported the full range of technology. Japan built up a powerful army and navy and, taking the hint from British and Dutch Imperialism, won wars against tottering Imperial China and Czarist Russia that gained it the colonies of Formosa (Taiwan) (1895) and Korea (1910).

The Meiji Charter (1868), like Shotoku's Articles, called for widespread consultation (including public deliberative assemblies), an end to feudal customs, and the pursuit of new knowledge (De Bary 1988, 79). The Meiji Constitution (1889) provided parliamentary institutions and a limited amount of civil liberties. Pro-democracy movements managed to form an opposition political party that gained parliamentary representation and expanded freedoms to the point of universal male suffrage. Pushed by economic hardships during the Depression era, though, Japan's military suppressed democratic politics at home, invaded China, and sparked off the Pacific side of World War Two (Maruyama 1969).

After the war, the victorious American-led Allied Occupation imposed another revolution from above on Japan, intending to remake its institutions to create a peaceful, productive, and prosperous pro-American ally in the Pacific. Defeat had shattered Japanese popular faith in their Imperial system and its military leaders and left people surprisingly open to democratic reforms. The new Constitution imposed by the Allies established popular sovereignty, a liberal democracy with fundamental democratic rights, renounced the right to wage war (Article 9), and reduced the status of the Emperor to a symbol of state. It legalized unions and opposition parties, and gave women the vote. The Occupation destroyed the conservative landlord class by essentially giving the

land to the tillers, the vast numbers of tenant farmers. It tried to weaken the concentrated economic elite by dispersing the giant industrial conglomerates (*zaibatsu*).

The new political opportunities allowed by the Constitution and the Occupation unleashed a huge wave of contrasting and sometimes conflicting popular movements. The newly formed Japan Socialist Party and also the Japan Communist Party, each pursuing diverse visions of a socialist future, helped organize a vast expansion of labor unions. Disastrous memories of the war, especially the horrors of the atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, spurred popular movements to Ban the Bomb and protests against US–Japan military cooperation treaties. At the same time, right wing movements organized to oppose the new Constitution and to restore the status of the Emperor as sacred Monarch. In its late 1940s Reverse Course policy, the Occupation leaders decided that the leftist union movements threatened Japan's economic growth and allowed corporations to fire union leaders, weaken the unions, and establish more docile unions in their place.

Japan's postwar history has often been defined by its stages of economic growth: recovery from wartime devastation (1945–1954), first stage of rapid economic growth (1955–1970), second stage of rapid economic growth after absorbing sharp rises in oil process and environmental reforms (1970–1980), super boom years of Japan's "gilded age" and global economic power (1980–1990), economic collapse and long recession combined with spread of information technology and internationalization (1991–2009).

At the end of the postwar recovery period, faced with a growing Socialist Party, the two conservative parties came together and formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (the "1955 system"). This single conservative party controlled the national legislature (the Diet), selected the Prime Minister and decided national policies for decades. The LDP, working closely with the national government ministries and the leadership of corporatistically organized big business, formed a Ruling Triad that monopolized power, judicious compromised with rising demands, and guided the country in its rapid economic growth (Calder 1988; Broadbent 2005). During the Cold War period, the LDP's pro-US leaders resisted right-wing attempts to roll back parts of the Constitution, but also rejected student and opposition party movements against the 1960 and 1970 US–Japan Security Treaties. Until the end of the 1960s, poor young people with nothing to lose led Japan's social movements and NGO activities. Guided by progressive socialist ideals, they dreamt of revolution and hoped to achieve thorough-going political reform (Hasegawa 2005).

The 1960s saw astonishingly rapid expansion of steel refineries, petrochemical factories, manufacturing facilities, and fossil fuel-powered energy plants, all emitting extensive pollution into the surrounding communities. The resulting environmental devastation and illnesses spurred a huge wave of local environmental protest movements, sometimes led by activist youth who had returned to their homes (McKean 1981). The resulting political pressure forced the LDP government to make extensive reforms that substantially reduced air

and water pollution (Broadbent 1998). The sudden OPEC oil price rise of October 1973 brought an end to this period of high economic growth. From the middle of the 1970s, though, social movements began to diversify including feminist movements (Pharr 1982) and the media and young people became increasingly apolitical. The 1980s and 1990s youth were the blessed beneficiaries of an affluent society and the leading actors in the consumer society.

The end of the Cold War around 1990 rendered the previous capitalist–socialist ideological framework obsolete in Japan. Japanese social activists lost their long-held illusions of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries as being highly developed welfare societies. The new goal for Japan's social movements became the building of a liberal, vibrant civil society that would counter the country's conservative, authoritarian, and paternalistic political tradition (Schwartz and Pharr 2003). In this light, Japanese social movements rediscovered the United States as a country of NGOs, a land of citizen activism. A sudden disaster spurred this trend. In January 1995, Kobe, one of Japan's most beautiful cities, was severely damaged by a strong earthquake that killed over 6,000 persons. In the face of official impotence, community members banded together to help one another. Thousands of people from all over Japan rushed to Kobe to help the victims. The effectiveness of these emergent groups to help the victims of Kobe earthquake dramatically changed old attitudes toward NGOs and NPOs among Japanese citizens, business, and government, opening the way for new legislation. The 1998 Non-Profit Organization Law finally legalized the incorporation of civil society groups promoting a wave of new NGOs and NPOs, whose activities represent the new face of citizen activism in Japan (Hasegawa 2004; Hasegawa et al. 2007).

Except for a one-year gap in the early 1990s, despite increasing loss of control over the weaker Upper House (Sangiin), the LDP continued to dominate the more powerful Lower House (Shugiin) until 2009. However, recession and globalization gradually weakened the Japanese Ruling Triad and mutual-reliance system (economic and cultural governance by central ministries, lifetime employment, prevention of bankruptcies), leading to increasing popular disaffection. In the historic election of 2009, the LDP suffered a devastating defeat losing control of both houses of the Diet and ending the 1955 system. In its place, the Democratic Party of Japan assumed leadership. Japan had finally evolved into a largely two party system with both parties supporting a democratic society but differing on political positioning and policy details, conservative or relatively liberal.

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The Duality of Social Systems and the Environmental Movement in Japan

Harutoshi Funabashi

Introduction

In postwar Japanese society, incessant economic growth has caused many environmental problems. Residents' and victims' movements have fought environmental destruction and contributed greatly to its solution. What are the characteristics of Japanese social movements in this domain? What theoretical perspectives are necessary to grasp the nature of environmental problems and social movements? Under what conditions can environmental movements contribute to resolving an environmental problem?

   To address these questions I will use my theoretical perspective based on the dual character of social systems. Social control in social organization involves two aspects, domination and management. Applying this theoretical perspective explains the nature of environmental problems, the role of social movements, and the potential for effective social change. I will analyze three cases of environmental problems: garbage collection issues in Numazu, the Niigata area Minamata disease, and the Tokyo "Garbage War." A brief historical overview of these environmental movements illustrates three basic problem-solving processes: creating a new system of management, reforming a system of domination, and improving both systems through "cooperative problem solving by opposing actors." These processes show the gradual penetration of the environmental control system into the economic system.

Management and Domination: The Dual Character of Social Systems

The dual character of social system (Funabashi 1980) is a perspective that regards any given society, institution, or organization as having two analytically distinct aspects, a management system and a domination system. The

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notion of management system is constructed by generalizing the relation of cooperation, and the notion of domination system by generalizing the relation of domination.

However, this is an analytical distinction. In reality, both systems occur within the same organization. Systemic functions are carried out by the same members, but each system has distinct goals, tasks, and principles of operation. In the abstract, then, management and domination can be said to constitute distinct "systems."

Figure 1a (three-dimensional figure) presents an image of social reality that has a dual character. Figure 1b (plane figure) shows the aspect of the management system and illustrates the horizontal relation of actors. Figure 1c (lateral elevation) depicts the aspect of the domination system by focusing on their vertical relations. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the management system and the domination system.


Fig. 1 Image of the duality of social sytem. (**a**) Three-dimensional figure, (**b**) Plane figure = aspect of the management system, (**c**) Lateral elevation = aspect of the domination system

Table 1 Comparison of management system and domination system

	Management system	Domination system
Basic actor	The leader⟷the follower	The ruler⟷the ruled
Definition of problem to be resolved	Management problem	For the ruler: domination problem For the ruled: deprivation-victimization problem
Focus of actor's attention	Better achievement of management tasks and better satisfaction of needs	For the ruler: establishment of order in vertical political system and conservation of stratified structure of closed benefit zones For the ruled: enlargement of their power and equalization of distribution of goods
Typical idea	Growth, efficiency, development, competition	For the ruler:law and order, cooperation For the ruled:freedom, liberation, justice democracy, equality
Character of conflict	Conflict between optimization effort of subsystems resulting from contradiction of multiple management tasks	Conflict between strata concerning distribution of power and distribution of goods as well as bads
Criteria of criticism	What is the optimum method for excellent management?	What is the legitimate power distribution? What is the justifiable distribution of goods and bads?

The Management System and Management Problems

If we look at social control as a management system, we focus on the mechanisms through which society (and its component institutions and organizations) fulfills its various managerial tasks. These tasks involve the allocation of finite resources to meet the functional requirements of a society and the needs of its members. Utilizing this perspective, society exists as an aggregate of numerous management systems of varying sizes. In the business world, examples of management systems include control over the business cycle through fiscal policy (at the total society level), control over-garbage collection (at the level of local society), control within private business organizations, and nonprofit organizations (at the organizational level).

The characteristic operational logic of a management system is that of homeostatic maintenance accomplished by carrying out necessary functions. As the cooperative aspect of society, the management system involves constant efforts to fulfill multiple management tasks. The business cycle management involves tasks such as maintaining a low unemployment rate, maintaining competitive prices for products, and maintaining an adequate economic growth rate. Within the realm of private businesses, (including production, marketing, and normal profit, etc), the management system strives to satisfy the needs of

various stakeholders. If a firm fails to attain a certain level of production or marketing, for example, its members will not be paid and, in extreme cases, the firm will fail.

Every management system is composed of a leader(s) and followers. The leadership, at the core of a management system, is responsible for making decisions and disposing of the resources necessary to execute those decisions. The leadership coordinates the followers by connecting their wills and actions. All systems of cooperation need leadership in this sense. In formal organizations, the chairperson, president, or CEO leads the organizational members. These roles fulfill very important management functions for the sake of the whole organization. Within national and local governments, leadership is necessary to maintain a semblance of order among citizen-based organizations. Without leadership, cooperation between various actors is much more difficult.

A prototype image of management system is presented in Fig. 1b. A leader and sub-leaders are situated near the center. They are involved in cooperation, and they work to connect and sometimes coordinate members' activities. With a larger pool of sub-leaders, larger scale cooperation is possible and social problems can be solved. Social problem arising as a result of a poor management system can be remedied by altering the management method.

The Domination System and the Problems of Inequality and Victimization

While society can be seen as a management system, it may also be viewed as a system of domination in which one group holds power and extracts benefits from the other. As analytical roles, the ruler and the ruled in the domination system occupy congruent positions with the leader and the followers in the management system (Fig. 1a). Usually, in a given society, the actual people occupying the roles are the same. When the strata increase, sub-roles emerge, with the sub-rulers corresponding to the sub-leaders. Depending on circumstances, the same set of people can perform either domination or management relations.

The domination system consists of a vertically controlled political relationship. Within the vertical political structure, politics occurs through interactions between the ruling stratum and the ruled stratum. This sector of the domination system is the main site of tension and conflict. The key factor determining the level of tension and conflict is the degree of consensus between the two strata concerning the legitimacy of the system. Four ideal types of political relations occur between these strata: loyalty, negotiation, confrontation, and oppressive exclusion. As the degree of disagreement between strata increases, the use of power, sometimes including coercive force, becomes necessary for the maintenance of social order (see Fig. 2).

loyalty   negotiation   confrontation   oppressive exclusion

consensus about
the legitimacy

coercive force

strong ⟵——————————————⟶ weak

degree of the consensus about the legitimacy
between the ruling stratum and the ruled stratum

Fig. 2 Four phases of vertical political system

The domination system produces a stratified structure of closed benefit and victimized zones. A benefit zone refers to a group that enjoys consumer goods or other benefits unavailable to non-members. By contrast, a victimized zone refers to a group forced to suffer from various disadvantages, such as exposure to environmental pollution and industrial related diseases. These zones produce a stratified structure of effects. Benefit zones are characterized by the privileged who garner access to consumer goods, as well as healthy, non-polluted, and safe surroundings. These privileged zones are closed to outsiders at the bottom of the system of social stratification. Figure 3 shows four types of "stratified structures of closed benefit and victimized zones," defined by the degree of inequality in the distribution of surplus goods produced by the society.[1] Generally, rulers garner the most benefits, while the ruled must accept much less.

The four forms of distribution of valued societal benefits (including consumer goods and a healthy and safe environment) are egalitarian, weak differences, acute inequality, and exploitation. In the *acute inequality* type, the ruler and sub-rulers monopolize surplus benefits producing an unequal distribution of various goods and chances. They create a closed zone of those with benefits and another zone of those without benefits. When the inequality of distribution

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[1] A surplus good is defined as the difference between the goods produced by the cooperation of a certain number of persons ($G(\Sigma i)$) and the sum of goods produced separately by the same number of persons ($\Sigma G(i)$). $S = G(\Sigma i) - \Sigma G(i)$.

is acute, people in an unfavorable position may consciously suffer from it and judge it as unjust. On the other hand, in the *exploitation* type, the ruler and sub-rulers acquire privileged goods by extracting them from people and imposing damages on them, producing a victimized zone at the bottom of the social structure. The victory of victims is usually very difficult because the power relationship is unfavorable.

Interrelation of the Two Systems

The management system and the domination system overlap completely in an organization. But the domination system can extend further into society than the management system. The ruled (who oppose the ruler in the domination system) may be outside the management system and not participate in it (see "exploitation type" in Fig. 3). Furthermore, the two systems are not independent. The management system operates in a social space defined by the domination system.

More concretely, the domination system defines two conditions within which the management system can operate. First, many management tasks are defined through negotiations between the two political strata, the rulers and ruled. In other words, the political system transforms the demands of the ruled into management tasks. For example, 40 years ago, the prevention of environmental pollution was not a management task in Japan, it was just the object of protest by anti-pollution movements. Only recently, due to many such protests, has environmental protection become a management task within both the government and firms. Secondly, a well-functioning management system depends upon a stable social order that is assured by the domination system. Leadership requires either popular legitimacy or coercive force. Without stable social order, a management system cannot function successfully. For example, a strike in a firm may destroy the stable social order and make management impossible.

But a management system can also affect the domination system. A successful management system enhances the legitimacy of rulers. Leader failure in management tasks may reduce loyalty and produce societal instability. The flow of resources going to actors in management system roles gives them


Fig. 3 Four types of the stratified structure of the closed benefit and victimized zones

exchange power in the domination system and possibility to extract privileged benefit . Also, the logic of efficiency may accelerate meritocracy in management system. This tendency may bring about unequal distribution of goods and positions, producing stratified structures with benefit zones and victimization zones.

In this way, management systems can have both positive and negative effects upon victimization of members. A competitive executive can help his firm survive and prosper, thereby avoiding the termination of employees (one type of victimization problem). On the other hand, the firm may neglect protection of the environment in order to increase profits, and may cause a victimization problem. Generally, people who occupy both the management leader role and the ruler role tend to explain their intention and action as driven by management necessities. Managers project an image of a cooperating leader, not a dominating ruler. A leader has to coordinate the followers. When complete consensus exists among them, the leader's coordination process is purely technical. But there usually exists some conflict among them. Then the leader's coordination requires the political adjustment of conflicting interests. In order to carry out a project successfully, a leader must select optimal means in the context of a management system. At the same time, as a ruler, he must exercise his will against occasional resistance from the ruled who are simultaneously followers.

I conclude this section with three remarks about the implications of this theoretical perspective. First, this perspective can explain the ambivalent attitude of those lacking power toward those holding power. People who lack power simultaneously admire and resist those in leadership positions. Second, leaders and rulers, as well as followers and the ruled, do not exist in themselves. These roles arise as positions in systems of cooperation and domination. So, this type of role division can be found universally. Third, some sociological theories (for example, the contingency theory of organization: Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) adequately grasp the management aspect of social systems. Other theories (for example, Marxian theory) are sensitive to the domination aspect. But to fully understand a social problem and conflict related to it, we must grasp it and analyze social systems as having the dual character noted.

Such theoretical framework is indispensable for analyzing problem-solving processes facilitated by social movements. However, it is curious that most of social scientists do not explicitly refer to the dual character of the social system involved in these processes. The notion of "la double dialectique des classes sociales" presented by Alain Touraine (1973,146–154) is one of the rare exceptions that are sensitive to this dual character.

Utilizing this theoretical dual system perspective I examine three cases of the resolution of environmental disputes each illustrating a different type of problem-solving process.[2] In each case, the environmental movement played a

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[2] The reason I chose these three cases is simple; I have directly carried on these case studies and they are adequate for the discussion of this section. Using other cases, we can perhaps develop similar theoretical reflection.

decisive role. In this context, "movement" refers not only to collective actions that try to resolve problems in the domination system, but also those that attempt to reform the management system. After examining the three cases, I discuss their historical positioning and theoretical implications.

Three Cases of Environmental Problem-Solving Processes

The dual character of social systems explains the three types of problem-solving processes illustrated by these three cases. The Numazu case shows problem solving in the management system. The Niigata mercury poisoning case illustrates problem solving through the domination system. The Tokyo "Garbage Wars" case represents a response through the management system as well as the domination system. The last case is a model of "cooperative problem solving by opposing actors."

The Numazu Waste Separation Case

The first case of environmental problem solving involved environmental activists' efforts to implement a system of garbage separation in Numazu.[3] With rapid economic growth in Japan during the 1960s, the amount of waste produced by households increased doubled in volume between 1965 and 1973. By the early 1970s, the garbage management systems in municipalities across Japan were overburdened by the volume of waste. In one example, the landfills and incinerators in the city of Numazu (population 200,000), located in east of Shizuoka prefecture in Honshu Island facing Suruga-bay, were filled to capacity.

Across Japan, protests erupted by local residents demanding action. By 1973, Numazu residents living near the city's waste sites complained of the toxic odors, swarming insects, and scavenging birds surrounding the site. Local residents threatened to block the garbage trucks from entering the landfill if local officials did not respond to their concerns. By the end of 1973, after tough negotiations, a temporary settlement was reached on condition that the city office would make a new incineration plant in order to reduce negative impact. This compromise was limited, and by February 1974 another conflict broke out concerning a proposal to build a new incineration plant next to the existing plant. In September of 1974, after long and difficult negotiations, residents near the plant site accepted the city's plan on condition that all efforts should be done to avoid possible pollution.

These two incidents clearly revealed a crisis in Numazu City's garbage management system. Faced with this crisis, a group of workers in the sanitation section of the Numazu city office began to search for some way to improve the

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[3] The description of this case is based on Yorimoto (1981), Ide (1990) and my own fieldwork.

situation. The 60 workers in this section engaged in garbage collection and the operation of the incineration plant and dumping site. Through their daily work in the field, these workers knew precisely the actual composition of the waste. Some of the workers conceived a bright, innovative idea, that the public should separate recyclable material from the garbage before collection.

Until then, in Numazu, household garbage had been separated into two categories, combustible rubbish such as papers and kitchen garbage, and non-combustible wastes including metal, cans, glass, bottles, electrical equipment, and furniture. The former were burned in incineration plant and the latter were dumped in the landfill. The sanitation workers knew that if recyclable materials were separated from trash it would reduce the amount of waste and extend the capacity of the landfills. The workers proposed adding a third category of garbage separation: resource recyclable garbage including newspapers and magazines, cans, metals, glass, and bottles. They developed a slogan "Resource if separated, garbage if mixed."

Sanitation workers faced a number of obstacles in implementing this garbage separation and recycling proposal. The first barrier involved gaining the support of sanitation workers, some of whom informally profited from separating out expensive metal from the trash and selling it. This informal custom was wide spread in municipalities across Japan and was referred to as "arbeit" (part-time work) in workers' groups. The second obstacle concerned whether the citizens would be willing to take on this additional garbage sorting task. A third obstacle involved assuring end-users who would buy the recycled materials of a steady supply.

The young generation of workers overcame the first barrier. Through focused discussions at the work place stressing an image of improved future garbage collection, they persuaded the older ones to abandon this informal profit system.

Next they had to obtain public cooperation. If local residents refused to separate their trash, the program would fail. Advocates of waste recycling developed a public relations campaign, releasing data findings in June 1974 confirming that 56.5% of non-combustible garbage was recyclable materials. Based on this data, they launched a 3-month trial of the public sorting and recycling program with five cooperating residents' associations. This trial was successful in demonstrating that 64% of non-combustible rubbish could be "recycled as a resource."

Convinced of the feasibility and merits of the new separation and recycling collection system, the sixty sanitation workers worked to persuade all of Numazu's residents' associations to participate in the program. They utilized a variety of methods including face-to-face dialogues, pamphlets, lantern slides, and 8-millimeter movies to highlight garbage problems and to demonstrate the merits of the new garbage separation collection system. Workers organized over 400 evening meetings with residents all over the city in a period of 6 months. These meetings were successful in gaining public cooperation, with eleven neighborhood associations joining in the program in October, 42 in November, 91 in December, and the final 168 in March 1975. By earning the cooperation of these neighborhood associations, the sanitation workers convinced the end-users of the availability of a continual supply of recycled materials.

Based on the results of this trial program, in April 1975 Numazu city officials mandated the implementation of this collection system across the 248 residents' associations. As a result, the city reduced their garbage going into dump sites, prolonging their utility, saved resources reducing the environmental burden, and also brought financial income to the city and the residents. During 19 years from 1975 to 1993, this recycling system gave 425 million yen to the city office and 249 million yen to the residents' associations. This innovative program was quickly replicated in municipalities across Japan.

Implications of This Case

This problem-solving process is situated in the management system. The workers' movement for change achieved a reorganization of the garbage management system. Their efforts redefined management tasks by introducing new tasks such as the separated collection of garbage, recycling of various materials, organization of residents' cooperation, and arranging for sales of the recycled materials to end-users. This redefinition of management tasks led inevitably to a series of changes on the level of instrumental action, such as the actions of households in separating out their recyclables. In addition, it is notable that the reorganization of the management tasks was guided by the redefinition of the values guiding the management system. It can be said that the workers tried to search for an authentic form of a rubbish management system. In sum, this reform of a management system by solving a management problem included three dimensions: the redefinition of values, the redefinition of management tasks, and the reorganization of instrumental actions.

This problem-solving process indicates one type of innovative power that enables social change. I call it innovative power based on *inspired resonance*. In that inspired resonance diffuses by willing adoption, it contrasts with an innovation that can only be spread by manipulative or coercive force. Innovative power based on inspired resonance means that an innovative practice provides an excellent new solution with universal validity to a difficult problem which is shared widely. Due to its resonance with, its capacity to solve, a widespread problem, the innovation diffuses rapidly and is adopted by many others, producing an immense influence.

At the starting point of this process, only a few workers took initiative to improve the garbage management system. However, support for and cooperation with this system increased step by step as follows: the 60 workers in sanitation section agreed to support the idea, the five residents' associations accepted a trial of separated collection, during the next 6 months cooperating residents' associations increased continuously, comprehensive adoption of new system in whole Numazu city from April 1975, rapid spread to other sensitive municipalities after 1975, and further vast spread into other municipalities in general. At last, the National Government adopted the idea of separated collection as a policy principle in the amendment of 1991 to the Waste Disposal and Public Cleaning Law.

Conditions That Enable Change

What Factors Enabled This Reform?

First, the workers who tried to introduce the new system adopted effective measures to bring about change. When faced with crisis, they clearly defined the problem, then collected information through research, created an innovative idea, ran a small scale trial, and gradually expanded the number of users based on the successful model.

Second, the workers tried to construct a cooperative network with citizens through persuasion based on sufficient data. They succeeded in reaching consensus with a vast number of residents. Third, actors who had promoted the reform had excellent personal qualities such as intensive effort, sensitivity that enabled problem definition, creativity that produced a new idea, and moral sentiment that enabled them to abandon informal "arbeit" practices.

Fourth, the new recycling system spread widely to other municipalities because it was universally adoptable and did not require any large scale investment, special technology, or extensive land. The new system could be realized in any municipality where residents and the municipal office had a common will to reduce the amount of garbage and improve the environment by recycling.

Problem Solving in the Domination System: The Case of the Niigata "Minamata" Disease

The Original "Minamata" Disease

The tragic environmentally induced disease called the "Minamata Disease" first appeared in the city of Minamata in Kumamoto Prefecture in the early 1950s.[4] The second instance later appeared in the Niigata prefecture. The disease is caused by methyl mercury condensed in fish and shellfish through the food chain. Patients of this disease showed a variety of symptoms including sensory disturbance, tremors, auditory disturbance, constriction of the visual field, and finally convulsions and paralysis leading to death (Iijima 1979). Today, it is clear that two chemical enterprises, the Chisso Company in Minamata and the Showa Denko company in Niigata, caused the disease.

Minamata disease was first officially recognized in May 1956 at Minamata City in Kumamoto Prefecture. By December of 1956, with 52 victims and 17 deaths, the cause of the disease remained elusive. But in the spring of 1957, it came to light that cats that had eaten fish from Minamata Bay contracted the disease. People soon started to suspect that the Chisso Minamata chemical plant, the only large chemical factory in the area, had contaminated the fish by dumping its waste water into the bay. The waste water contained various heavy metals. A group of victims and their families attempted to get compensation

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[4] The description of the two Minamata disease cases is based on Ui (1992), George (2001), Harada (2004), Iijima (1979), Iijima and Funabashi (1999) and my own fieldwork.

and good care for the patients, but in vain. In July 1959, Kumamoto University researchers released a report identifying the cause of the Minamata disease: organic mercury poisoning. By the fall of 1959, as the disease spread and the number of victims increased, a vocal anti-pollution movement arose in fishery associations across the Kumamoto region. Fishery associations and a patients' group demanded that the chemical plant stop releasing harmful waste water and provide compensation to the victims. In spite of repeated protests by the two groups, the Chisso chemical plant, claiming the cause of the disease was still not known, refused to accept responsibility or to compensate victims. Local and national governments joined in defending the chemical industry and ignoring the victim's demands.

In December 1959, faced with lack of political support from government officials and continued economic difficulties in marketing contaminated fish, the prefectural Cooperative Fishing Alliance accepted a proposal made by the arbitration committee.

According to the proposal, the alliance would receive 35 million yen from Chisso. This settlement implied a direct payment of only about 5000 yen (about US $50) per family.

On the other hand, at the end of 1959, the patients' group was obliged to sign the "solatium contract" that did not admit the responsibility of Chisso with regard to the cause of Minamata disease and gave a certain amount of sympathy money, not compensation.

Assuming that the cause of the Minamata disease was unknown, this agreement granted only 300,000 yen (about US$3000) for the dead victims. The agreement contained the provision that additional claims could not be lodged against the Chisso Minamata chemical plant, even if it was later proved at fault for the disease. This agreement stifled future protest actions aimed at gaining compensation for victims of the Kumamoto-area Minamata disease. But one group of victims turned to the courts and filed suit against the Chisso Company in 1969.

Niigata Area Minamata Disease

The second outbreak of Minamata disease occurred in 1965 at the basin of the River Agano in Niigata prefecture.[5] The Niigata mobilization process differed from that in Kumamoto in it supporters and tactics. A group composed of doctors, labor unions, local residents, and political parties calling itself the Niigata Prefecture Council of Democratic Groups for Minamata Disease Countermeasure (*Niigata-ken Minshu Dantai Minamatabyo Taisaku Kaigi*, abbreviated *Minsuitai*) organized in support of the Niigata Minamata disease victims. On the victims' behalf, this group initiated court litigation over the Minamata disease.

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[5] Iijima and Funabashi (1999) presented the first systematic sociological study of the Niigata area Minamata disease.

On June 12th, 1967, victims of mercury poisoning filed a damage suit with Niigata District Court against pollution from a Showa Denko plant. The group consisted of thirteen members of three families. This lawsuit was the first of the big four cases against pollution in Japan and it encouraged other groups of victims to file legal cases. The three other big cases included the Itai-itai ("ouch ouch") disease caused by cadmium poisoning (Toyama Prefecture), the asthma disease in Yokkaichi City (Mie Prefecture), and the first Minamata disease in Kumamoto Prefecture. By 1971, the number of plaintiffs in the Niigata Minamata disease suit reached 77. Jun Ui, an engineer and researcher (*joshu*) at Tokyo University who had investigated the Kumamoto-area Minamata disease, cooperated with the victims' lawyers to support the Niigata victims' suit.

On September 29 of 1971, the Niigata-area Minamata disease suit ended with a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court established the epidemiological cause and effect relationship, declared that the defendant Showa Denko was guilty of professional negligence, and attached responsibility for the disease to the company (Iijima 1979). Following the verdict, both government and business were forced to acknowledge the problem of pollution that was tied to rapid economic growth. But victims of the disease were disappointed when the total amount of the settlement was reduced to half. The group of victims began to negotiate directly with Showa Denko officials to obtain more compensation.

On March 20 in 1973, the indemnity suit instituted by the Minamata disease patients in Kumamoto was decided in favor of the victims. The defendant, Chisso Corporation, was found to have been responsible for dispersing industrial wastes that caused this disease. After this decisive judgment, Showa Denko officials were obliged to accept the victims' demand in Niigata. On June 21 in 1973, Showa Denko officials and the Niigata-area victims of Minamata disease signed a damage settlement. The company agreed to pay a lump sum of 15 million yen (about US$150,000) to each decreased and seriously ill patient, 10 million yen to other patients suffering from the disease, and an additional 500,000 yen annuity (US$5,000) for each living victim.

Despite this legal settlement, new conflicts arose between the victims and government officials. The Showa Denko Company agreed to pay compensation only to qualified Minamata victims, certified by an official committee whose members were appointed by the national and local government. With the favorable legal settlement, the number of patients who applied for certification increased sharply. The burden of compensation became very heavy for both the Showa Denko Company in Niigata and for Chisso Company in Kumamoto. Moreover, due to corporate profit shortfalls associated with the 1973 oil crisis, the Committee of Certification and the Environment Agency responded by scrutinizing and increasingly rejecting Minamata victim's applications. The Environmental Agency revised the criteria used to certify people as victims of Minamata disease in 1977 and again in 1978. Each time they narrowed the definition of a victim, making it more difficult to obtain certification.

In the Niigata case, by 1980 the number of residents suspected to be victims who had been refused official certification reached 1200. In 1982, 94 of these refused victims filed the second Niigata-area Minamata disease trial, seeking compensation from the company and also claiming government responsibility. Victims in the Kumamoto then living in various regions filed similar law suits in several district courts such as Kumamoto, Tokyo, Fukuoka, Kyoto, and Osaka. By 1989, the number of victims who joined in these suits increased, and the total number of plaintiffs reached more than 2000 (including 234 Niigata patients).

The courts ruled in favor of the uncertified victims. In March 1992, almost all members of the first group of Niigata victims won an indemnity suit. The majority of uncertified Kumamoto victims also won their suits. But both were considered partial victories because the responsibility of the government was not decided, and the Showa Denko and Chisso companies appealed the decision. Finally, in 1995 in Niigata and 1996 in Kumamoto, the victims and the companies arrived at compromises (except one group of victims in Osaka). The Showa Denko and Chisso companies agreed to pay 2.6 million yen (at 100 yen to the dollar, $26,000) to each patient who had been refused official certification.

After the Niigata and Kumamoto settlement, the Osaka group of victims continued their lawsuit and won a victorious ruling in the Osaka High Court in 2001, and finally in the Supreme Court in October 2004. The Supreme Court ruling recognized most of uncertified patients as victims of the Minamata (mercury-poisoning) disease. The ruling determined that the Central as well as Kumamoto Prefectural Governments bore responsible for spreading Minamata disease. However, after this ruling, negotiation between uncertified patients and the Environment Ministry still dragged and remained unsettle even by 2010. Despite these sporadic favorable legal settlements, the problem of Niigata Minamata disease as well as Kumamoto Minamata disease lingers in Japan 50 years after its discovery.

Implication of This Case

The legal suits associated with the Minamata disease victims were examples of an environmental issue, handled within the context of a domination system. The victims were in a position of subordination relative to the chemical industry as well as the government, and experienced a victimization problem. The victims protested against this system of domination, but their demands were ignored by both company and government officials. Victims later sought monetary compensation for their injuries and challenged officials. Filing the first damage suit demonstrated a transition from a stage of oppressive exclusion to a confrontation phase. The court victories represented a great deal of progress for the victims. The judgment of the first suit in favor of the victims enabled them to further move from confrontation to negotiation. But another obstacle in the oppressive exclusion phase appeared when the government refused to certify

more patients. The second damage suit instituted in 1982 implied another transition stage from oppressive exclusion to confrontation.

The Minamata disease cases occurred within a stratified structure of closed benefit and victimized zones; domination and exploitation created a victimized zone at the bottom of this stratified structure. The court victories brought some victims limited monetary settlement for the disease, but for many victims, their suffering remains unrecognized and uncompensated. Victims' movements have demanded adequate compensation, but two factors hindered their efforts: concealment and discrimination, and power inequality.

Concealment and Discrimination

The first political obstacle facing the Minamata victims' movement was the concealment and denial of the chemical industries' role in the release of dangerous chemicals into the environment. A second obstacle was the tendency of victims in the Minamata cases to conceal their illnesses. This pattern of concealment was evident in past cases of pollution. For example, in the Meiji period (1868–1912), Shozo Tanaka, an eminent leader of the anti-pollution movement in the Ashio Copper Mine case, noted the tendency of victims to conceal the damage they have suffered. The threat of stigma, isolation, and discrimination were key factors in pushing victims to conceal their illness when it appeared among family members. The victims lived in fear that if Minamata disease appeared in a family, the remaining members would be viewed by the community as unsuited for marriage and employment.

For example, in Matsuhama, a fishery community in Niigata City at the mouth of the Agano River, the residents formed a conspiracy of silence about the Minamata disease in spite of widespread illness and damage. Residents were fearful that that they could not sell their fish if the existence of Minamata disease patients in their community became widely known. This concealment of illness was a rational strategy for a fishing community protecting its interests in the face of industrial and governmental disregard of the problem. However, this concealment prevented the clarification of the firm's responsibility for victims and it has hindered a complete solution of the problem. Today, many victims in the basin of the Agano River who concealed their illness in fear of stigma and discrimination regret their actions. In Japan, any social movement against pollution-borne illnesses must overcome this deep fear harbored on the part of victims of stigma and discrimination.

Inequality of Power

Another obstacle in challenging a system based on domination is the imbalance of power between the dominant and subordinate groups. In the Minamata mercury-poisoning cases, the responsible firms (Chisso and Showa Denko) utilized considerable economic and political power in mobilizing experts with

technological knowledge in defending its interests. On the other hand, specialists in Kumamoto University investigated independently and identified organic mercury compound as the cause of Minamata disease, thus contributing greatly to the victims. However, they were hampered by a lack of information from the factory and by other experts' objection defending Chisso.

A final obstacle confronting the powerless in a system characterized by domination is the lack of neutrality in the governmental administrative organizations. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)) defended the chemical firms against the protest of the victims in a one-sided fashion. MITI attempted to deny the report presented by the Food and Sanitation Investigation Council in November 1959, that identified organic mercury as the cause of Minamata disease, and succeeded in perishing its influence. At that time, there were few laws and regulations that could effectively prevent pollution. Even if some applicable laws exist, their interpretation is deeply influenced by unequal balance of political power. As a result, administrative organizations failed to respond to this environmental disaster in a timely fashion. Deeply influenced by the interest of business world, in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, Japan's governmental organizations always gave priority to the economic growth policy, neglecting cases of environmental pollution associated with Minamata diseases.

Conditions Facilitating Change

Comparing the mobilization processes in the Kumamoto and the Niigata mercury-poisoning cases indicates conditions facilitating the power of victims' movements. Several important factors helped the victims' movement in Niigata attain greater success. First, a support organization formed soon after the discovery of Minamata disease victims in Niigata. Members included professionals in engineering, medicine, journalism, and law who investigated the cause of the pollution. Second, several other social movement organizations such as labor unions and leftist political parties in the district joined in coalition with the Minamata victims. These organizations provided a favorable basis for the construction of a victims' support coalition. Third, unlike Kumamoto, in Niigata there was a geographical distance between the major group of victims and the responsible firm. This served to insulate the community from pressure by the company. Unlike Kumamoto, most of the victims did not work at the chemical company and were not subject to its direct political and economic influence. Fourth, in the initial phase of the Minamata mercury poisoning the Sanitary Bureau of Niigata Prefecture helped identify the cause of the pollution. Fifth, the victims' movement chose the correct strategy, by filing a damage suit and achieving a judicial victory. These factors facilitated victims' organizations and enabled them to challenge the system dominated by industrial interests.

The case of Niigata Minamata disease provides an example of how environmental victims' advocacy organizations can successfully challenge a domination system, stop the pollution, and provide compensation for the victims. In

the domination system, the essential factor that influences the outcome of conflict is the power relationship between the dominant and subordinate groups. In order to resolve the victimization problem, it is necessary that the relationships transit from a phase characterized by oppressive exclusion to a phase in which the victims confront the vertical and unequal political system. Finally, with confrontation, the structure of benefit and victimized zones of environmental pollution can be altered, resulting in environmental justice.

Cooperative Problem Solving by Opposing Actors: The Case of the "Garbage War" in Tokyo

The Tokyo "Garbage War" from 1966 to 1974 involved three major actors: the Tokyo prefectural office, the residents of Koto Ward, and the residents of Suginami Ward (two of Tokyo's 23 wards [*ku*] or subdivisions).[6] Koto Ward, situated in the marginal areas of Tokyo facing Tokyo Bay, had a garbage incineration plant and a landfill for waste, both of which accepted trash from all of Tokyo's 23 wards. Combustible trash was burned in the incineration plant and noncombustible trash was dumped into the landfill. In the course of rapid economic growth after 1955, the quantity of garbage increased sharply and became more diverse, including various kinds of plastic waste. By the early 1960s, hundreds of garbage trucks flowed into Koto Ward daily, overwhelming the ward's garbage processing capacity. The Ward had to dump combustible trash into the ocean because its incineration plants could not burn it all. The unsanitary dumps let off odor and attracted insects that assailed the residents. Angered, the residents demanded that the Tokyo prefectural office reduce the volume of garbage brought to Koto Ward by constructing more incineration plants in other wards.

In response to the concerns of the Koto Ward, in November 1966 the Sanitation Bureau of the Tokyo prefectural office proposed a new incineration plant in the Takaido area of Suginami Ward. But Takaido residents raised concerns surrounding the impact of pollution on this residential community, and organized protests in opposition to the plant. Landowners of the plant site refused to sell their lands. The project reached a deadlock. The Sanitation Bureau's efforts to persuade the residents of the safety of the Takaido incineration plant failed repeatedly.

When the efforts to slow the volume of garbage failed, in September 1971 the Koto Ward Assembly passed a resolution halting the flow of other wards' garbage into the Koto system. The resolution stated that every ward should dispose of its own garbage, and that the Koto Ward would refuse the import of garbage from other wards. It stipulated that the reduction of the flow of garbage into Koto should be achieved in a timely fashion.

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[6] Description of this case is based on Suginami-shouyoukinen-zaidan (1983) and my own fieldwork.

The Koto resolution created a crisis for the disposal of garbage in Tokyo. The reformist Governor Minobe declared combat against waste in Tokyo and set up a special office called the Headquarters for Waste Combat. In neighboring Suginami, residents opposed incineration and declared they were ready to use force if the Tokyo prefectural office expropriated Suginami land for an incinerator. Faced with two powerful residents' movements opposing incineration or dumping site, the Tokyo prefectural office introduced a radically new philosophy of waste management, namely "waste disposal in one's own ward," and a new decision-making method that assured the participation of residents. It went back to the old drawing board. With residents' participation, it reset the procedure to choose the site of Suginami incineration plant. It declared also to take all possible measures to prevent pollution by incineration plant.

However, during a period of difficult negotiation from 1971 to 1974, Tokyo Prefecture had difficulty in obtaining the needed agreement and social consensus. In December 1972 and in May 1973, enraged by stubborn oppositions on the part of Suginami Ward, assembly members from the Koto Ward blockaded the import of waste from Suginami Ward, aiming to push forward the construction of Suginami incineration plant. In May 1973, a special committee including residents of Suginami Ward decided to choose once more the Takaido area as adequate site for Suginami incineration plant. After one and a half years of conflict and negotiation, an agreement was reached in November 1974 between the Governor of Tokyo and the association of Takaido area residents in Suginami Ward .

The solution to the waste disposal impasse was beneficial to all parties involved. Residents of Suginami Ward agreed to sell land for the construction of the Suginami garbage incineration plant. However, they obtained the right to participate in the decision-making process at meetings concerning the construction and the operation of the incinerator. Through inclusion in decision-making process residents' of the Suginami Ward radically altered the original plan. As a result, strict environmental standards protecting neighborhoods were instituted and the incineration plant was partially constructed underground. As a result of these resident's demands, the construction cost increased several times.

The results were also beneficial for the Tokyo Sanitation Bureau. The bureau increased its waste disposal capacity, established a new policy principle of "waste disposal in one's own ward," and elevated the overall public priority of the sanitation system.

The Koto Ward received public approval for reducing the volume of garbage disposed within the ward's boundaries and for pushing other wards to construct incinerators. As a result of the Koto waste reduction effort, the Tokyo Sanitation Bureau set up a new sanitation policy that would avoid the over-concentration of garbage in Koto Ward. By battling against environmental inequality, Koto Ward achieved success in equalizing the social costs of waste disposal.

Process of Cooperative Problem Solving By Opposing Actors

These reforms brought about a radical transformation of Tokyo's sanitation system. Utilizing the theoretical framework of the dual character of social systems, the case of the Tokyo Garbage War illustrates the process of cooperative reform-oriented problem solving. Koto Ward and residents of Suginami Ward tried to solve a problem of deprivation and victimization; the Tokyo Government approached this as a management problem. The outcome demonstrates the increase of capacity of the management system on prefectural level for resolving conflicts.

The Tokyo prefectural office, as leader of the management system, was sensitive to the management problems of waste disposal. The Koto Ward was the first group to recognize the unequal impact of waste disposal on their neighborhoods as a problem of inequality and a problem of victimization, and demand solutions to the problems of the garbage disposal system. Next, the residents of Suginami Ward criticized the undemocratic decision-making process of the Tokyo prefectural office and organized to resist the degradation of their environment. They experienced a fear of the victimization problem. Figure 4 presents the structure of opposition between them. In this situation, the management leader had to achieve three management tasks: (1) dispose of the city's garbage (Tgd); (2) protect the environment in Koto Ward (Tpk); and (3) protect the environment in Suginami Ward (Tps).

The obvious and intended or manifest demand (Dmk) of Koto Ward was to reduce the garbage carried in from other wards and to improve the quality of its environment. The manifest demand (Dms) of the second contestant, Suginami


Fig. 4 Structure of opposition in the "cooperative problem solving by opposing actors"

Ward, was to protect its environment by stopping the construction of a Sugi-nami garbage incineration plant. But these two wards had hidden or unintended latent demands including the demand for regular garbage disposal in their area (Dgdk, Dgds). These three demands correspond to three management tasks for the government leadership.

At the initial stage (t_1) the leader has two choices, alpha and beta. If the leader chooses either one, it will not accomplish all three of its tasks. If the leader chooses alpha, Koto Ward will be served but Suginami Ward neglected. If the leader chooses beta, the latter will be satisfied, but the former refused. The conflict culminated in the final stage (t_2), and led the Tokyo prefectural office to alter its sanitation system so that it could satisfy all three necessary management tasks. This type of conflict proved fruitful in addressing the environmental problem of waste disposal in Japan and satisfying all of the stakeholders.

Implication of This Type of Problem Solving

Cooperative problem solving by opposing actors implies innovation in the governmental management system. When citizens actively demand changes, an enlightened leadership may respond innovatively. The political process of protest demands and systematic reform demonstrates a viable approach to solving social problems through social conflict. The conditions necessary to enable creative problem solving include: (1) the contestants must present their demands effectively to the leader-ruler and impose new constraints on management; (2) the leader-ruler must be sensitive to the demands of its contestants and be willing to redefine management tasks and to reform the management system; (3) open dialogue between the leader-ruler and the contestants must continue in spite of the opposition between them.

Comparison of the Three Problem-Solving Process

The three types of problem-solving processes were situated in different social contexts. In the case of garbage separation in Numazu, the garbage workers tried to resolve a management problem within the management system on municipality level. The role of the workers' movement was to redefine cultural values surrounding garbage collection, to trigger changes in garbage management tasks, and to provide adequate measures for attaining these changes. In the case of Niigata Minamata disease, the conflict situates entirely in the domination system. In this context, the social movement demanded that the system be more democratic, egalitarian, and responsive to the needs of the victims. In the case of the Tokyo Garbage War, the conflict surrounded a prefectural management and domination system. Here, the role of a residents' movement was not only aimed at reforming the domination system but also to stimulate innovation in the management system by imposing new constraints on it.

Furthermore the scope of the problems and solutions varied. The Niigata Minamata disease case was characterized by inequality of power in a domination system between a perpetrating firm and victims, requiring that the victims also use power to solve the problem. On the other hand, the garbage separation case in Numazu demonstrated innovation in the management system. Innovation was achieved because Numazu municipal office was willing to redefine management tasks, and to be persuaded by research findings. The municipal office as leader in the management system effectively garnered social acceptance and public cooperation, successfully achieving reform. In addition, as demonstrated in the Tokyo Garbage War case, the following factors were also important: adequate constraints posed by the contestants on the management system, the ability of the leader to mobilize resources and reorganize the system, and opportunity for dialogue between opposing actors.

Finally, the structure of conflicting interests differed in the three types of problem-solving processes. On the one hand, in the Niigata Minamata disease case, a victory in one camp meant a loss for the other. On the other hand, behind the Numazu garbage collection reform, as well as the Tokyo Garbage War, the actors shared a common interest surrounding the need for environmentally sound waste disposal management. This common interest provided the basic condition enabling cooperation between residents and sanitation workers in Numazu and facilitating cooperative problem solving between opposing actors in Tokyo.

Setting the Three Cases Within the Longer Historical Transformation

The history of postwar Japanese environmental problems can be divided in four periods, further dividable into two grand periods (Funabashi 1992) (Table 2).

These four periods have seen an evolution of the environmental control system in Japanese society (Funabashi 2004). The environmental control system consists of government offices charged with environmental policies and various environmental movements that also have influence. In contrast, the economic system consists of the market system and the governmental agencies that control economic activities. In my view, the macro trend of contemporary social change consists of the deepening intervention of the environmental

Table 2 Historical periods of Japanese environmental problems

I Period of pollution caused by economic development (1945–1985)

1. (1945–1963) postwar rehabilitation and the first period of rapid economic growth
2. (1964–1973) establishment of effective anti-pollution policy in the late 60s and early 70s, i.e. the second period of rapid economic growth
3. (1974–1986) stagnation and retrogression of reform under stagflation

II. Period of universalization of environmental problems (1987–)

control system into the economic system. I distinguish four logical stages of this intervention, namely, (A) Lack of constraints on the economic system, (B) Imposition of constraints on the economic system, (C) Incorporation of environmental concern as a secondary management task, and (D) Incorporation of environmental concern as a primary management task.

In order to resolve various environmental problems and to construct a sustainable society, it is necessary to push our society from stage A to stage B, to stage C, and finally to stage D. One crucial task for environmental sociology is to clarify the channels and factors that can push society from one stage to the next. From this viewpoint, we should analyze how environmental movements can contribute to foster these transitions.

In 1950s and 1960s, Japanese society was in stage A. Despite the outbreak of environmental problems caused by the rapidly growing economic system, there were no effective anti-pollution constraints on economic system. In this stage, the production system produces the deprivation and subordination of pollution victims, as shown by the two Minamata disease cases discussed in this paper.

In order to resolve environmental problems in stage A, effective environmental regulations which prohibit environmental destruction must be introduced and imposed on economic activities. Imposition of such regulation indicates transition from stage A to stage B. In Japan, this transition occurred in early 70s. Fourteen environmental laws were enacted in December 1970 and the Environment Agency was founded in July 1971. Anti-pollution movement played a definitive role to push this transition.

Stage B results from the demands of anti-pollution movement to control and reduce pollution. It is in stage B that a governmental office charged with effective environmental regulation begins to work for the first time and imposes constraints on the economic system. The main character of transition from stage A to stage B is a change in the domination system. As the victims' movement in Niigata Minamata disease case shows, the aim of the environmental movement in this transition is defined as problem solving in the context of domination system. In this type of problem solving, success depends on the power relationship between victims and perpetrators.

In Japan, transition from stage B to stage C began in the 1970s. The case of separated collection of waste in Numazu and the case of the "Garbage War" in Tokyo occurred in this period.

Transition to stage C implies that not only a change in the domination system but also a change in the management system is necessary to resolve environmental problems. In stage C, faced with intervention by an environmental control system, economic ministries and firms begin to incorporate environmental concerns as a secondary management task in the economic system. They mobilize resources and innovate technologies to accomplish new tasks posed by the environment. Typical action is an increase in anti-pollution investment. This situation implies that the environmental problem not only constitutes the focus of conflict in domination system, but also becomes a management problem in the management system. The introduction of separated collection system of garbage

in Numazu as well as the case of Tokyo Garbage War imply innovations in the management system and are situated in this stage.

Since the mid 80s, Japanese society entered into a new period, the period of universalization of environmental problems. The fundamental factor that opened this period was appearance of various global environmental problems such as climate change by greenhouse effect, depletion of ozone layer, desertification, decrease of rain forest, international transportation of harmful wastes, creeping exhaustion of various natural resources, etc. Universalization of environmental problems means that all kinds of production and consumption must be reexamined from the viewpoint of their environmental burden and their long-run accumulative effect, which will be catastrophic. This situation requires a deeper intervention of environmental control system into the economic system, namely stage D.

Stage D is characterized by incorporation of the environmental concern as a primary management task. It is distinguished from stage C by giving primacy to environmental concern. In stage C, environmental concern is incorporated only as a secondary position. For a firm in stage D, economic prosperity can coincide with action for the protection of the environment. Typical practices in this stage are introduction of renewable energy such as wind power plant, organic agriculture, and zero-emission project in certain group of firms. Actually, it is only limited part of firms that reach stage D. However, in order to construct a sustainable society under universalization of environmental problems, it is necessary to push the society as a whole into stage D.

In the 1990s, efforts to seek the way toward stage D appeared clearly in various domains. In Japan, the Basic Environment Law enacted in 1993 is the first step toward stage D. Transition to stages C and D implies the redefinition of the management task in the economic system and consequently reorganization of management system on the level of the firm as well as on the level of economic control system. This viewpoint has an affinity with "ecological modernization" theory (Spaargaren et al. 2000). When universalization of environmental problems appears and transition to stages C and D become necessary, not only countervailing power in the domination system but also innovative efforts in the context of management system become important for the environmental movement.

As to the relation between environmental movements and business world in the course of transition to stages C and D, we find a general tendency from conflicting relations to more cooperative ones. In stage C, the two camps can share environmental value at least to certain degree. In stage D, two camps can have a more totally shared environmental value and a common policy goal priority. Dialogue and partnership became possible when environmental values are shared among different actors. However, transition to stage C and D can be possible only when the pressure toward a sustainable society surmounts the resistance derived from vested interests in the economic system. For example, introduction of ecological tax can become possible only as a result of power struggles in the domination system.

Although the theory of ecological modernization may be persuasive when it explains changes in the context of management system, we must point the importance of changes in the aspect of the domination system. As Garbage War in Tokyo shows, demand, confrontation, negotiation, and countervailing power can redefine the framework for functioning of the management system. These processes in the domination system ultimately define the possibility of a society's transition to stage D. So, the model of "cooperative problem solving by opposing actors" is very important to bring about stage D.

Conclusions

We can analyze the characteristics of the Japanese environmental movement from our theoretical viewpoint of the dual character of social systems. The various environmental problems in postwar Japanese society exhibit three basic types of problem-solving processes: reform in the management system, change in the domination system, and cooperative problem solving by opposing actors. These three types are represented by three typical cases: the separated collection of garbage in Numazu, the Niigata Minamata disease, and the Tokyo Garbage War. These three cases represent the difference between and the interrelation of change in the domination system and management system.

In order to grasp social change concerning environmental problems, the theory of environmental control system presents four stages model. This article showed how the relationship between environmental movements and authorities differed by historical stage. We are now in the period of universalization of environmental problem, which requires total reorganization of our system of production and consumption to attain the sustainability. The progress toward a sustainable society can be defined as the deepening intervention of the environmental control system in the economic system, which leads finally to stage D, namely "incorporation of environmental concern as a primary management task."

This four stages model give us useful framework to understand characteristics and historical change of diverse environmental movements as well as the position of various environmental policy. Environmental movements and environmental policy must push the transition of whole society to stage D through all effective channels. This situation requires that the Japanese environmental movement promote changes in the domination system as well as in the management system.

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A Comparative Study of Social Movements for a Post-nuclear Energy Era in Japan and the USA

Koichi Hasegawa

In contrast with skepticism about nuclear energy in the USA and most advanced Western countries from late 1970s to early 2000s, Japan, South Korea, and China have shared a pro-nuclear energy policy during these years. These differences partly reflected the strength, influence, and the success of the anti-nuclear movement in the USA and Western countries like Germany, compared to its weaker Japanese counterpart. Using data from case studies of anti-nuclear movements in Japan and the USA, this study explains the different outcomes using the author's "triangular model of social movement analysis (TRIM)[1]." As a theoretical framework, the TRIM compares the two countries on three major factors: (1) political opportunity structure (openness of political system to popular input); (2) resources, actors, and major support base; and (3) framing based on culture and attitudes (for example, public confidence in technology).

In the USA, movements took a more instrumental and policy-oriented strategy due to: (1) a more decentralized and relatively open political system; (2) the presence of environmental NGOs with financial base and professional staffs; and (3) a public skepticism about nuclear energy. Environmental groups in California and across the nation collaborating with state regulatory and electric utilities had exercised major influence on setting a post-nuclear direction

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[1] Comparative sociological study on nuclear issues among western countries has been already initiated: Jasper (1990) dealt with the nuclear energy policies of the USA, France and Sweden, and Joppke (1990, 1992) discussed the anti-nuclear movements in the USA and West Germany. I believe the original version of this paper (Haegawa 1995) was the first comparative sociological analysis focusing on the differences on the anti-nuclear activities of Japan and the USA with stress on "the post-nuclear phase".

until mid-2000s. This post-nuclear policy agenda stressed energy efficiency, exploring renewable energy resources like wind and solar energy and providing green electricity to general customer.

This paper explores a variety of factors that contributed to the stability of Japanese pro-nuclear governmental policy since the mid-1960s including: (1) a centralized one-party-dominant political system, closed to external social movement influence; (2) the electrical utilities monopoly control over the energy market for several decades; (3) relatively weak anti-nuclear groups lacking resources; and (4) the utilities framing of energy policy issues in terms of resource shortages and Japanese external energy dependency, along with a strong faith in technology.

Pro-nuclear and Skepticism: East Asia and Western Countries

During the early 2000s, Western countries remained largely skeptical of nuclear power with exception of France.[2] This nuclear skepticism was based on the nuclear industries' unsolved problems including nuclear waste, safety issues, security threats, and the possibility of serious accident such as the Chernobyl and the Three Mile disaster. A central concern was the skyrocketing financial costs for construction and operation, the loss of economic merits, the political risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the social cost raised by opposing environmental groups. While this was occurring, Japan embraced nuclear power. What accounts for the difference in nuclear policy found in Japan and the USA during this period? While the abundance or scarcity of energy resources like oil might be an important factor, more critical are energy policies reflective of the influence of social movements and citizens' activities. A comparative study of Japanese and US national nuclear policy and social movement mobilization can help to shed light on this question.

Theoretical Scheme and Data of the Comparative Study

Anti-nuclear movements have emerged as a response to nuclear energy issues. Social movements can be defined as "collective actions oriented toward change that are based on grievances and discontent with the status quo or an anticipated state of affairs" (Hasegawa 2004, 38). "Discontent" refers to the motivations for people to participate in a movement. "Orientation for change" refers to

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[2] Since 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol on global warming gas reduction was enacted, in Western countries, especially in the USA, the nuclear industry has boosted a "nuclear energy renaissance" and has tried to get orders to construct new reactors. US electric utilities have a plan to construct 8 new reactors under the strong financial support of Bush and Obama administration as the end of 2009.

a movement's aims, goals, and values. "Collective action" is a social action by a 'collective actor.'

This research is guided by a "triangular model of social movement analysis (TRIM)." This model integrates McAdam et al.'s "synthetic model" including opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes (McAdam et al. political 1986). This model provides a comprehensive framework appropriate for the comparative study of social movements by integrating the political process model, resource mobilization theory, framing analysis, and new social movement theories. This scheme is utilized here in a case study of the Maki and Rokkasho nuclear power opposition (Hasegawa 2004, Ch 9).

The key terms in the TRIM model (Fig. 1) include: (1) the structures of political opportunities, (2) mobilizing structures, and (3) cultural framing (McAdam et al. 1996). Cultural framing refers to the shared world-view of the participants that justifies collective action and engagement in social movements. The "structure of political opportunities" is an alternative explanatory framework that integrates the political sociological version of the resource mobilization approach developed in the USA as articulated by Tilly, Obershall, McAdam, and Tarrow, with the inter-state comparative analysis of social movements developed by Kitschelt (1986) and Kriesi et al. (1995). Each author has a different view about which conditions to focus on but, as McAdam (1996, 27) explains, these can basically be synthesized into the following four categories: "(1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression." "Mobilizing structures" refer to a set of variables at the resource level as defined by the economical sociological version of the resource mobilization approach. Here, the focus is on what resources can be mobilized and under what conditions (Zald and McCarthy 1987).

"Framing" is the conscious and strategic process by which a frame is formed. "Cultural framing" is a non-static process that mediates dissatisfaction and orientation for change. Snow and others focus on the interaction between an


Fig. 1 The triangular model of social movement analysis (TRIM)

organization and its members, and the processes through which the interests, values, and beliefs of the individual participants, on the one hand, and the aims and activities of the social movement organization on the other are adjusted and brought into alignment. Framing analysis then provides the analytical framework for explaining the motivation underlying participation and commitment (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). Frames provide the motivation for participants to become involved in a social movement by providing a "image of the world" and a "self-image" for the social movement.

In this model, the structure of political opportunity mediates between orientation for change and collective action, and mobilizing structures mediate between collective action and discontent. Cultural framing mediates between discontent and orientation for change. The expansion of all three factors can promote and facilitate the rise and development of social movements. The effects of this expansion are cumulative and sequential.

The following observation and hypothesis were obtained from field surveys on nuclear energy issues in Japan and the USA conducted since 1989. The Japanese cases include two conflicts concerning nuclear fuel cycle facilities and nuclear power plants. The first involves a reprocessing plant, a Uranium enrichment plant, a low-level radioactive waste burial center and a high-level radioactive waste temporary storage facility in Rokkasho Village, Aomori Prefecture, close to the northern point of the mainland Japan (Funabashi et al. 1998). The second case is the Onagawa Nuclear Power Station, three reactors in operation in Miyagi Prefecture (Hasegawa 2003), the case of the abandoned program of the Maki Nuclear Power Station in Niigata Prefecture based on the public referendum in 1996 (Hasegawa 2004, Ch 9) and the case of upheaval of anti-nuclear power movement by housewives in late 1980s affected by the Chernobyl incident (Hasegawa 2004, Ch 8).

The American cases include the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant of Sacrament Municipal Utility District (SMUD) in California (Hasegawa 1996). This was the first reactor in operation in the USA and the world to be shut down by public vote on June, 1989; and the case of the nuclear debates in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Hasegawa and Broadbent 2005). The TRIM model of social movements will be utilized in a comparative analysis of the success and failure of social movements in halting nuclear power installations in Japan and the USA.

Movements Against Nuclear Energy in the USA

In the USA, in spite of the pro-nuclear positions of Republican dominated administrations in 1981–1992 and 2001–2008, until 2005 there had been no new orders issued for nuclear reactors since 1979, the year of the Three Mile incident. The main reasons for halting the construction of nuclear power plants is the loss of economic merit of nuclear energy, as well as the problem of nuclear waste disposal. During the 1980s the direction of energy topics shifted from

disputes over the construction of new reactors to a policy of promoting cheaper, environmentally sounder, and more efficient energy resources. The new areas of energy policy focus were aimed at increasing the use of natural gas, developing cogeneration plants utilizing combined resources, developing new technologies aimed at utilizing renewable energy resources like wind, solar, and biomass, and increasing energy efficient utilization of energy resources.

While the economic merits of efficiency and technological problems of nuclear waste disposal are obvious factors in this shift toward nuclear skepticism in the USA, the role played by the anti-nuclear movement in this shift is the key. Table 1 highlights the transformation of the anti-nuclear energy movement

Table 1 The two phases of the nuclear energy problem in the USA

	First stage(Anti-nuclear phase)	Second stage(Post-nuclear phase)
Time period	1970s to late 1980s	Late 1980s and 1990s
Movement goal	Preventing the construction of nuclear energy facilities and obstructing operations.	Increasing energy efficiency. Increasing the use of renewable energy sources.
Strategies and tactics	Confronting the nuclear power industry and electric companies. Exposing hidden agendas of nuclear facilities and close relationships between the nuclear power industry and electric companies. Criticizing, staging demonstrations and non-violent protests (sit-ins and the like) and filing lawsuits.	Civic participation and control of the management process of the electricity supply system, least cost planning, regulatory reforms, collaboration, economically appropriate usage and normalization of electric company management.
Contentious issues	Safety of nuclear energy facilities, disposal of radioactive waste.	Diseconomies of nuclear energy, nuclear waste management problems, closure of dilapidated facilities.
Movement consequences	Estrangement from the greater populace, isolation of the movement, loss of influence and engrossment in public concerns.	High level of financial risk for investors in nuclear energy.
Values	Affinity with a protest culture lifestyle, orientation toward change to a simpler lifestyle, criticism of industrial civilization, distrust of the market.	Multifaceted support of new energy policy and efficiency, improved regulations and their philosophies, maintaining current standards of living and developing manufacturing standards of market economy that is compatible with denuclearization.
Representative examples	Battles to prevent the establishment of nuclear power station in Diablo Canyon, California and Seabrook, New Hampshire.	Reconstruction of SMUD following shutdown of nuclear operations. Practical activities of A. Lovins, NRDC and UCS.

in the USA from the first stage of "anti-nuclear phase" to the second stage, "post-nuclear phase." The results of social movement demands have halted plant construction. In California for example, since 1976, the state has prohibited the authorization of nuclear plant construction until the federal government approves "a documented technology for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste" (Takubo 1996).

In the mid-1970s, anti-nuclear groups were critical of state regulatory agencies as well as the utilities. However, confrontation and conflict between anti-nuclear groups, environmental groups, state regulatory agencies, and electrical utilities subsided in the 1980s. Following the shutdown of the Rancho Seco Plant in 1989, six reactors across the nation were closed due to plant aging, escalating costs, and technological questions. The denuclearizing process starting in 1989, continued for 16 years until 2005 when some utilities announced plans to start constructing new reactors. Currently, 104 reactors are in operation across the USA, producing about 20% of the nations' electricity needs.

After the late-1980s, nuclear opponents, state regulators and utilities formed a new type of coalition called "collaboration" based on shared basic interests in securing "cheap, safe, and secure energy resources." This pragmatic approach to energy security encouraged the exploration of renewable resources and increased energy efficiency. Environmental leaders such as Amory Lovins and groups such as the Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) considered outsiders in the 1970s, were now players in energy policy and taking part in the decision-making process. Serving as consultants, advisors, or collaborative partners inside state agencies and major utilities, activists were involved in energy policy in the State of California. The Lovins' once radical idea of a "soft energy path" became part of the mainstream of new management policy of electrical utilities and other industries. A soft energy path entailed the new direction of "energy efficiency," "least-cost planning," (Lovins et al. 1992) and "demand side management (DSM)" embraced in California during the 1990s. The possibility of a post-nuclear energy era emerged through the institutionalization of the environmental social movement as collaborative partners in developing energy policy.

Nuclear Reactors and Movements Against Nuclear Energy in Japan

Presently Japan has 54 commercial nuclear reactors in operation at seventeen sites. In 2008, 25% of Japan's total electrical needs were supplied by nuclear energy (Source: IAEA). Japan had the third largest nuclear energy productivity following the USA and France. After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, Japan succeeded in starting 23 nuclear reactors, the highest start-up rate in the world. During this period in other advanced countries, nuclear plant start-ups were limited with only one for the USA, Germany, the UK, and

France. Japan has the most aggressive nuclear power and plutonium utilization programs of all countries worldwide (Yoshioka 1999).

History and Stages of Anti-nuclear Movements in Japan

The history and main characteristics of the Japanese anti-nuclear movements fall into four stages. These stages can best be explained by focusing on three factors of the TRIM model including: (1) the structure of political opportunities (POS); (2) the mobilizing structures (resources), main actors, and support base; and (3) the cultural framing, as well as the basic three elements of movement goals, and varying levels of collective action and discontent. The historical stages include an early stage of the anti-nuclear arms movement (up to 1973); followed by a second stage called the pre-Chernobyl stage (1973 through 1986), involving the blockage of construction of nuclear power plants. The second stage of activism was followed by the post-Chernobyl stage (1986 through 1992). This stage was characterized by grassroots activities in metropolitan areas. A fourth stage, the anti-plutonium stage (1992 to present), involved a deadlock of nuclear policy and anti-plutonium activities. I discuss each stage, in turn.

Anti-Nuclear Arms Movement: The Early Stage (up to 1973)

The anti-nuclear arms and peace movements have been among the major social movements in post-war Japan due in large part to the tragedy of atom-bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The famous address in 1953 by the US President Eisenhower, "atoms for peace" served to trigger the direction of nuclear energy policy in Japan. In December 1955, the Atomic Energy Basic Law was passed, establishing the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan.

Sharp divisions emerged in Japan over nuclear arms and nuclear energy during this period. During the early stage of anti-nuclear mobilization, the left-wing political parties and trade unions were united in their opposition to nuclear arms and nuclear energy for civil use. Left-wing political parties including the Japan Socialist Party (now the Social Democratic Party) and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo, now Japanese Trade Union Confederation, RENGO) took the lead in opposing commercial use of nuclear energy. Furthermore, they opposed the idea of "atoms for peace," which they linked to the race of nuclear armaments between the USA and the USSR. The socialists' sector was the main sponsors of the movement against nuclear energy in the early stage, providing core activists, staff, supporters, and financial aid. Another critical movement backed by the Japan Communist Party approved of the "atoms for peace" idea, advocated the strict maintenance of three government principles regulating the commercial use of nuclear energy: "independence, openness, and democracy," and criticized existing nuclear energy policy led by

a coalition of the LDP government, utility companies, and nuclear industry. The communists' sector regarded nuclear energy itself as a symbol of techno-logical progress. This moderate viewpoint has been widely embraced by the media and ordinary citizens over the last 60 years.

Left-wing parties including the JCP and affiliated trade unions took the lead in the anti-nuclear movement and critical movement, taking advantage of the political opportunity structure in the context of the aftermath of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the emergence of a cold war. Left-wing parties and affiliated trade unions provided the main support base and resources and they framed the anti-nuclear issue by closely linking anti-nuclear power to anti-nuclear arms movement. The early anti-nuclear movements' main goal was to abolish the government's policy of nuclear promotion. Anti-nuclear groups fearful of the outbreak of nuclear war held mass rallies and worked to alter nuclear policy through the upheaval of public criticism and the result of general elections.

Blocking Construction of Nuclear Power Plants: The Pre-Chernobyl Stage (1973 through 1986)

The oil crisis in 1973 exerted a heavy toll on Japanese society in both economic and psychological terms. Japan's huge dependence on foreign oil mainly from the Middle East accelerated a pro-nuclear energy policy. At this point, Japan had only five commercial reactors in operation. By the pre-Chernobyl Russian nuclear power plant accident, nuclear reactor construction in Japan prolifer-ated and within 14 years, 28 new reactors were placed in operation, an average addition of two reactors per year. With the oil crisis of the 1970s, left-wing politics declined serving to isolate the anti-nuclear energy movement.

In contrast with other anti-pollution residents' and citizens' movements during this period of 1973–1986, the anti-nuclear movements were limited. While major anti-nuclear activities were held in towns or villages where nuclear power stations were sited, the movements failed to develop beyond borders of these towns and villages. Nuclear plants in Japan were usually located in remote coastal areas with small populations and low agricultural and industrial pro-ductivity. The protesters' goal was the abandonment of the construction plan and the major actors were fishermen and farmers around the site. They were motivated by concerns of nuclear plant accidents along with the release of radioactive emissions and waste that would impact the market price of their products. Fishermen took the lead in blocking construction of the plants and were joined by trade unions, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and some grassroots activists. During the pre-Chernobyl stage, opposition to nuclear power was absent among ordinary citizens in metropolitan area, who remained either indifferent or supportive of nuclear energy.

In most cases, such anti-construction movements were defeated after long fights lasting 10 years or more. Conservative leaders around the construction sites argued that nuclear facilities would bring government subsidies, and trigger economic development in the villages. These pro-nuclear power plant leaders included the town manager, village heads, members of the local assembly, major officers, men of distinguished families and so on. In 1974, Japan was the first country to offer governmental subsidies for nuclear facilities in the name of "promoting local development." Government subsidies were welcomed in economically distressed areas, and decreased the power of the anti-construction movement.

The second stage of the anti-nuclear movement was characterized by a decline in left-wing politics after the oil crisis and the effective adoption of subsidized pro-construction agenda by conservative leaders in economically depressed areas. Local fishermen and farmers around the site mobilized resources in opposition to plant construction. Nuclear-plant opponents framed their opposition in terms of protecting their livelihoods. Protesters were fearful of damages to their agricultural or marine products due to actual or rumored radioactive release. The basic goal of the movement was blocking the process of construction through the use of boycotts, pickets, sit-ins, and other means of direct action.

Grassroots Activities in Metropolitan Areas: The Post-Chernobyl Stage (1986 through 1992)

After the Chernobyl disaster on April 26, 1986, the general public in Japan started to fear the possibility of a serious nuclear accident. Before the Chernobyl accident, the issue of nuclear safety and the possibility of radioactive pollution were abstract and remote from daily life. The Chernobyl disaster instilled fear in Japanese society since Japan depends on imported foods from European countries including wheat and beans. This fear served to revitalize and reenergize the anti-nuclear movement with new styles and new actors including concerned women in urban or metropolitan areas (Hasegawa 2004: Ch 8). These new opponents were mainly highly educated, unemployed housewives with pre-school- or school-age children. Many of the women activists had experience in the student struggles in late 1960s, opposition to the LDP government, the Vietnam War, and many had supported the feminist movement. These new recruits were largely Japanese baby boomers, born in between 1947 and 1950. They were politically socialized in this tumultuous context and referred to as "Japanese raging generation."

Women nuclear-power opponents intentionally stressed a "women's point of view" and effectively linked ecological issues with personal concerns of family safety. Many activists framed their activist identities as "concerned mothers" and utilized the symbol of motherhood to mobilize other women and securing

the support of their husbands and other family members. This was effective in garnering public support for opposition to nuclear power and served to deflect negative public reactions.

The grassroots activities in metropolitan areas during the post-Chernobyl stage resemble new social movements (Touraine 1985; Melucci 1989; Offe 1985), emphasizing self-determination, self-control, and self-expressiveness. In Touraine's terms, the new social movements involve struggles against fixed lifestyles or technocratic controlled society. Concerned mothers recognized nuclear energy was symbolic of a mass consumption society and that plant construction was largely supported by the manipulation by government technocrats. Grassroots anti-nuclear activities during this period were characterized by performance-oriented mass meeting and rallies. Housewife activists utilized Japanese symbolism, giving catchy soft-voiced names to their groups and news letters, such as "Apple Blossom Group" in Aomori Prefecture named after the top local fruits, and "Grapes Anti-Nuclear Energy Group" in Miyagi Prefecture.

However, during this wave of activism, they failed to garner nationwide public attention or gain political influence over government or members of Parliament due to the lack of political strategy to accomplish their goal and organizational base to recruit new members. Thus, the movement was temporary and conditional in the few years immediately following the Chernobyl accident.

The third stage was characterized by increased public skepticism of nuclear power in the wake of the Chernobyl accident. Protesters were afraid of radioactive pollution of imported foods from Europe and severe accident of domestic nuclear reactors. Activists were largely drawn from highly educated, unemployed concerned housewives in urban or metropolitan areas. Anti-nuclear issues were framed around issues concerned to mothers including a desire to protect their children from radioactive pollution. The basic goal of the movement was stopping the operation of risky nuclear reactors. During this period, the movement stressed self-expressiveness.

Deadlock of Nuclear Policy, and Anti-plutonium Activities: The Anti-plutonium Stage (1992 to the present)

A final stage of anti-nuclear mobilization was sparked by the "Akatsukimaru Incident," which lasted from November 1992 to January 1993. The Akatsukimaru was a ship returning from France and carrying 1.4 tons plutonium extracted from spent fuel. This plutonium-laden ship was refused at various Pacific ports of call, as foreign countries and international environmental groups were closely monitoring Japan's plutonium utilization policy. Other advanced countries, including the USA, UK, France, and Germany, abandoned the program to develop breeder reactors by the mid-1990s due to the

loss of economic accountability and technological problems. In spite of facing almost the same problems, though, Japan has stayed with the policy to explore and develop breeder reactors and utilize plutonium. Foreign countries came to suspect the intention of Japan's government. They were afraid that Japan would become a nuclear armed country in the near future.

Following this incident, the main targets of the anti-nuclear movement shifted to the issue of excessive stockpiling of plutonium (relating to the operation of a prototype breeder reactor Monjyu, and the start-up of the operation of a nuclear fuel reprocessing factory in Rokkasho village). Anti-nuclear groups in Japan joined transnational opposition activities in holding international conferences and stressed placing international pressure on Japan's government.

In August 1993, the ruling party over 38 years, the Liberal Democratic Party split and lost the office of the cabinet for the first time since 1955. However, the new non-LDP coalition cabinet failed to survive 1 year. In order to regain control, the LDP had to construct a coalition government. For its coalition partner, the LDP selected a previously unimaginable party, its long-year rival the Japan Socialist Party (the JSP, current the SDP), and gave the Prime Minister seat to the chair of the JSP. In its coalition, the LDP also included a party that had split from the LDP, the New Party Sakigake. These political tactics succeeded. When the JSP–LDP–Sakigake coalition cabinet ended in January 1998, the LDP came back to run the cabinet. But the unstable political situation continued to the present except five years when Junichiro Koizumi run his cabinet since 2001 to 2005.

Critical incidents surrounding nuclear power in Japan proliferated during this period including the fast breeder reactor Monju's fire due to a sodium leak (December 1995), the planned nuclear reactor defeated in a public referendum in Maki town (Niigata Prefecture, August 1996), the criticality accident in the nuclear fuel plant in Tokai village that killed two workers and polluted the surrounding residential area with neutron radiation (September 1999, see Hasegawa and Takubo 2000), and the damage of the Kashiwazaki-Kariha nuclear power plants by a huge earthquake (July 2007). Public trust in the nuclear safety administration and the risk management ability of electric utilities was seriously damaged during this period. The national government still has an aggressive pro-nuclear policy but a lot of problems remain to be solved, including finding locations for the final radioactive waste dump site, reduction of excessive plutonium stockpiles, earthquake protection, falsification of official record and data of nuclear power station by utilities, restructuring of safety regulation system, economy and so on.

But deadlocks were observed in the movement side as well as in policy side. Although protest activities were held in almost all of the above nuclear incidents, during these 15 years (since 1992) generally speaking anti-nuclear movements have tended to be isolated, with their membership fixed or even decreasing. Most "concerned mothers" went to other environmental issues or NPO activities like social welfare services or community building. Many anti-nuclear activities were continued by people over 50 years old. Recruiting new comers,

especially younger generations, has been encouraged but not succeeded. The long-time political partners of the anti-nuclear and critical movements, the Socialist (DSP) and Communist (JCP) Parties and trade unions, were also declining in political influence. The Democratic Party of Japan, the leading opposition party, is mainly pro-nuclear but includes some skeptical politicians. Internationally, global warming issues are main targets for major environmental NGOs like WWF, Friends of Earth, and Greenpeace in other western countries, where nuclear issues are regarded as almost defunct.

The final stage was characterized by a political opportunity structure in which a deadlock both in policy side and movement side has been reached. The basic goal of the movement was blocking the use of excessive plutonium for reactor fuel. Urging public referendum and stressing transnational appeal and contact are typical current strategies and tactics. The anti-nuclear movement has experienced a lack of new actors of younger generation to replace concerned housewives. A lack of trust of nuclear safety regulation still frames anti-nuclear concerns; protesters remain fearful of serious incidents at nuclear facilities and attack the secrecy of the government and utilities.

Backgrounds Factors: Japan and the USA

According to the TRIM model, I should add three major points as background for each historical stage concerning (1) political opportunity structures, (2) mobilizing structures, human resources, major actors, and support base, and (3) cultural framing. These three points clearly separate the Japanese situation of nuclear energy policy and the anti-nuclear movement from the American situation.

(1) Surprisingly, Japanese government policy to promote nuclear energy has been very stable and coherent since mid-1960s regardless of so many changes in related spheres and other countries. Why? The one-party dominant system (except mid 1993–94 and after 2009) is a main reason. METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) has been strongly protecting the utility's interest. Nuclear energy policy is a typical example of bureaucrat-led policy. Japan has a highly centralized political structure. A triadic structure of politicians–bureaucrats–business elites at both the national and local level easily explains the secret of stability in the Japanese politics (Broadbent 1998). The national administration, in particular, has many formal and informal authorities for supervision and approval. Local government is financially and institutionally controlled by national government. This is especially true for nuclear energy, and local government retains only very small legal authority on this issue. So local government, whether reluctantly or positively, instead of trying to refuse national planning to promote nuclear energy, tries to negotiate for economic-side benefits.

Other major difference is the dominant power of electrical utilities over the local economy and politics. Japan has ten private utilities, including the

Tokyo Electrical Power Corporation, the biggest private utility in the world and the Kansai Electrical Power Corporation, the second biggest private utility. Electrical companies are the most important key actors in the local economy.

Japanese anti-nuclear activists tend to stress the self-expressiveness and self-transformation of their lifestyles rather than proposing alternative energy policies. This was especially true in the post-Chernobyl stage, as I mentioned above. In my view this is structurally determined by the centralized and relatively closed Japanese political structure and the decision-making process surrounding nuclear energy policy.

(2) After 1998 NPO law which enabled to provide citizen group legal entity, many environmental NGOs acquired legal entity as certified NPOs (Hasegawa 2005, Hasegawa et al. 2007). But in case of anti-nuclear groups, very few acquired such legal status. Generally speaking, the membership and annual budget of anti-nuclear groups is too small to make it advantageous to become a certified NPO. Also, NPO certification requires public disclosure about group membership and financial base. Since the anti-nuclear groups are in conflict with the local government – which supports the nuclear power plant and the electrical utility – they fear such disclosure would be detrimental. As a result, anti-nuclear groups have remained small and decreasing in influences. In contrast, some other environmental NPOs are developing their financial base by collaborating with local governments and industry, by acquiring government subsidies or by being nominated as a government contractor. Anti-nuclear groups are keeping their distance from local governments and industry. In many cases they lack stable financial sources and professional staffs. In order to activate the anti-nuclear movements, it would require new actors and groups and a new style of movements as in case of "concerned housewives" after the Chernobyl incident.

(3) Japan lacks oil, so it imports almost all of its oil from the Middle East and other countries. This is the main framing and reason behind the strong support for nuclear energy by government, utilities, and industry. Sweden also has poor oil resources and depends upon nuclear energy for nearly half of its electrical generation capacity. But based on a 1980 public vote after the TMI nuclear incident, the Swedish government decided and kept a program to close all 10 nuclear plants by the year 2010. Already two reactors have been closed. Thus, strictly speaking, scarcity of energy resources isn't always a sufficient independent variable to define government policy and public opinion.

In general Japanese citizens have public confidence in the progress of technology and the "techno-fix" in nuclear issues. Japan experienced Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so historically people used to be very nervous of concepts like "nuclear," "atomic," and "radioactive pollution." However, thereafter, since the 1960s, their confidence in the progress of technology became dominant and a driving force for economic growth.

How About in These Three Factors in the USA?

(1) The USA has become more decentralized and the system has become relatively open. This has turned the anti-nuclear movement in an instrumental direction, for instance, toward a legalistic strategy, with a campaign focusing on economic cost. This accords with the hypothesis of resource mobilization theorists such as McCarthy and Zald (1978) and fits observations of European social movement theorists, Klandermans (1986), and Klandermans and Tarrow (1988).

In both the USA and European countries, public referenda are typical opportunities for movements and citizens to decide on their energy future. The Rancho Seco power plant, mentioned above, is the only successful case of such a referendum in the USA (Hasegawa 1996).

The influence of electrical utilities is much smaller in the USA than in Japan. There are more than 3,000 electrical utilities, mainly privately owned and very small, although some are public or large. The smallest are owned by cooperatives in rural areas (data from the Energy Information Administration of the USA).

In case of private utility companies, the Public Utility Commission (PUC) at the state level strictly regulates customer fees and listens to the voices of stockholders. Customer groups can effectively affect utilities through pressuring the PUC. Although Japanese utilities enjoy autonomy and exert strong power, American utilities have much less of both. In Japan the private sector opponent of the anti-nuclear groups is not the nuclear industry per se, but the electrical utilities, and behind the utilities, big companies such as Toshiba, Hitachi, and Mitsubishi that lead the opposition. In the USA, in contrast, the main opponents of the anti-nuclear movement have been the companies that make nuclear power plants, such as Bechtel, Westinghouse, and General Electric, not the electrical utilities.

(2) In the USA, most specific community-based anti-nuclear groups like Abalone Alliance in 1970s and 80s disappeared or maintained a nominal existence, because many local nuclear energy struggles had already concluded, except for the case of nuclear waste and some other general problems. Rather, the top ten and other major environmental NGOs deal with environmental issues in general, and are critical players for local governments, state governments, and federal governments. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Greenpeace USA, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Critical Mass, Rocky Mountain Institute are typical major environmental NGOs in national and transnational arenas which focus on nuclear and energy issues with professional staffs.

(3) The USA has an abundance of fossil fuels: oil, natural gas, and coal. The percentage of imported energy resources per total energy is 27%. While the percentage of imported oil of the US petroleum demand has increased, it was 58% in 2007. By contrast, in Japan the former figure is 96% and the latter is

99.6%. The states on the West Coast have been especially aggressive in pushing post-nuclear energy policy, partly due to the abundance of natural gas and oil in these areas. California's location is suitable for wind, solar, and geothermal power. Mid-west states like Iowa and Minnesota are also suitable for wind power generation. Such abundant energy resources provide a variety of opportunities for experimentation with alternative resources.

American people also hold public confidence in the progress of technology and expressed a "techno-fix" for nuclear issues. However following the Vietnam War, baby boomers became more skeptical of the possibility of the progress in science and technology. This generation has kept positions of power in the business and political world since late-80 s.

Conclusion

Using my scheme of TRIM based on McAdam et al.'s "synthetic model" including political opportunity structure, resource mobilizing and framing processes (McAdam et al. 1986), and qualitative data from case studies in Japan and the USA, I have analyzed the main characteristics of nuclear energy issues and anti-nuclear movements in both countries.

Two phases in the USA and four historical stages of the anti-nuclear energy movement in Japan have been analyzed focusing on (1) political opportunity structure; (2) human resources, main actors, and support base; and (3) framing of issues, value orientations. The US phases consist of anti-nuclear phase until mid-80 s and post-nuclear phase since late-80 s. The Japanese historical stages include (A) the early stage (up to 1973), (B) the pre-Chernobyl stage (1973 through 1986), (C) the post-Chernobyl stage (1986 through 1992), and (D) the anti-plutonium stage (since 1992 to the present). I examined the socio-political reasons in Japan for the anti-nuclear movement failing to gain more wide-spread political influence during the last three stages. The Chernobyl disaster was a major turning point and produced concerned women and mothers as a new actor in the metropolitan area. They sought to protect the values of self-determination and self-expression, fitting hypotheses generated by the theories of new social movements. The recent focus in nuclear energy has been Japan's plutonium utilization policy, where activists have utilized transnational activities and appeals as tactics to achieve positive effect.

In the USA, a more decentralized and relatively open system has increased the social and economical costs of nuclear energy for electrical utilities, thus turning utilities toward denuclearization in spite of the pro-nuclear policy of both Bush presidencies up to 2005. Recently, California exemplifies a transforming post-nuclear society, stressing energy conservation and efficiency, and exploring renewable energy resources.

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Collective Recognition and Shared Identity: Factors Behind the Emergence and Mobilization Process in a Referendum Movement[1]

Yuko Hirabayashi

Introduction

On August 4, 1996, the town of Maki, Niigata Prefecture, made headlines throughout Japan. Hundreds of reporters descended on this community of 30,000 people to provide live national coverage of what the locals were doing and thinking on this particular day. The occasion was a referendum on the proposed construction of a nuclear power plant in Maki by the Tohoku Electric Power Company. Virtually every eligible voter in Maki (excluding those who were ill or out of town) participated in this referendum, producing a final voter turnout of 88.29%. The tally was 7,904 in favor of building the nuclear plant, and 12,478 opposed. Upon learning the results, Maki Mayor Takaaki Sasaguchi announced, "We will not sell the municipal land [on the site of the plant]," effectively making it impossible to build the plant for the time being. This event was the culmination of 2 years of stormy controversy following the formation of the Association for Holding the Referendum (Juumin touhyou wo jikkou suru kai), a group of Maki townspeople whose sole demand was to have the construction of the nuclear plant decided by a citizens' vote. It also represented the attainment of the Association's ultimate goal.

The case of the Maki anti-nuclear protests demonstrates how a handful of residents of this small town became founders of a unique movement, and then how the townspeople joined them to form a movement that turned out to be extremely effective and successful. The historical and regional context will be explored in order to gauge the emergence of the protest and the reasons why the Maki nuclear plant was not built during the 25 years prior to the formation of

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[1]This paper has its basis on my previous article written in Japanese (Takubo 1997a), but is restructured with different focus.

the Association. The processes of the emergence and growth of the movement will be examined and issues that merit further study will be explored.

Pre-referendum: Why the Maki Nuclear Plant Had Not Been Built

With the holding of a "Citizen-Administered Referendum" (jishu kanri juumin touhyou) in January 1995, tensions over the question of whether to build the nuclear plant and the process by which that decision would be made erupted into a dispute that attracted nationwide attention. For the 26 years preceding this referendum, however, no one in town but a handful of anti-plant activists had anything to say about the Maki nuclear plant. The average citizen lived with the vague apprehension that someday the plant might be built, but was content with the status quo as long as construction had not actually begun.

The townspeople of Maki first began discussing the plant among themselves in the summer of 1994, when Kanji Sato was elected mayor for a third term. Unlike the victors in previous mayoral elections, who had all won on a "nuclear plant freeze" platform, Sato declared that he would preside over construction of the "best nuclear plant in the world."

The events leading to the emergence and growth of the Association for Holding the Referendum, which played a critical role during this period, can only be understood in light of the characteristics of the town of Maki that gave birth to, and indeed necessitated this movement.

Two questions in particular need to be addressed. First, what prevented the construction of the nuclear plant in Maki for over 20 years after the project was first announced? Second, what form did protests against the project take before the advent of the referendum movement, and how were they different from the referendum movement? These questions will be addressed through an overview of events associated with the Maki nuclear plant up to 1994.

Historical sources were garnered through interviews with townspeople who were involved in these events as well as newspaper articles, documents produced by activist groups and other organizations, and journalists' notes [Kobayashi 1983; Joint Landowners' Association Against the Maki Nuclear Plant [Maki genpatsu hantai kyouyuu jinushi kai], 1987; Kuwabara 1995; Nakagawa 1996].

A local newspaper first broke the news of plans to build a nuclear plant at Kakumihama in Maki in 1969. Tohoku Electric Power did not formally announce the project until May 1971, 2 years later. The first public hearing on the project was held in August 1981, after anti-plant demonstrators had been ousted from the meeting hall. In November of the same year, the Japanese government's Electric Power Development Council added the 825-megawatt Maki nuclear power plant no. 1 to its Electric Power Development Plan. With submission of the

formal application for the project following in January 1982, it appeared as if construction might begin at any time.[2]

Yet in 1983, Tohoku Electric Power asked the national government's safety inspection be halted, and the Maki plant project came to a complete standstill. The reason was simple: not enough land had been acquired on which to build the plant. The property sought included 9,090.7 square meters of municipally owned land[3] adjacent to the site for the reactor. Without this parcel in hand, any further safety inspection would be moot.

Was it the power of the anti-plant forces in the town that prevented the construction of the Maki plant? The townspeople, including the anti-plant activists themselves, say otherwise.[4]

Allowing for some variations in nuance attributable to the personalities and political relationships of different mayors, the Maki town government itself consistently took a pro-plant stance from the time the construction project first came to light during the term of Mayor Ebata. The town assembly, too, formally approved construction of the plant in December 1977. Subsequent to the announcement of the project, however, not a single mayor was reelected until Sato won a second term in 1990.

In mayoral elections from 1976 on, a curious cycle repeated itself: a new candidate advocating reexamination or outright freezing of the project would win election, switch to a pro-plant position in the course of his term, then lose his reelection bid to a another newcomer running on a "go-slow" or "freeze" platform.

Fueling this cycle was a dispute between two conservative factions (both part of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party at the time) that divided the town. The two factions were affiliated with different national Diet members representing the district. Local businessmen, notably those in the construction industry, would vie to get a mayor from their particular faction elected in order to divert more contracts to their side. As a result the mayor's office continually alternated between the two factions.

While both were clearly pro-plant, they were not unified on the issue insofar as each wanted to be the faction that would build the plant. Meanwhile the voters continued to elect "freeze" candidates. In other words, both pro-plant factions were well aware that to win an election, it was to their advantage to espouse the "freeze" position.

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[2] From an interview with MN, the secretary-general of Council Opposing Construction of the Maki Nuclear Plant (Maki genpatsu setchi hantai kaigi). The interviewees are indicated with their initials.

[3] The owner of this piece of land belonged to was not clear around this time. There was an old cemetery on the land, and it was not clear if it was the town or the temple that owned this. Through a lawsuit, it was finally made clear in 1992 that it belonged to the town.

[4] From interviews with MT, SO, TT, KA and TE, all of whom are the core members of the Association.

Even in the seventies, Maki was known as a hotbed of "money politics" and a place where "elections were until recently decided by land and blood ties" (in the words of a conservative town assembly member). A candidate's position on the nuclear plant was hardly the sole criterion for deciding whether or not to support him or her. But the town's peculiar election cycle suggests that the nuclear plant persisted as a real, albeit hidden, point of contention. MT, one of the founders of the Association for Holding the Referendum, declares that "[a nuclear plant freeze] was the will of the townspeople," and that ultimately, "since the plant couldn't be built, there was no particular need to [publicly] oppose it."[5] In this sense, construction of the Maki plant was not prevented by an anti-plant movement per se.

During this "freeze" period, anti-plant efforts persisted, carried forward by a handful of activists. When the referendum was held, Maki had six different anti-plant organizations. Two were affiliated with political parties, the Social Democratic Party-linked Council Opposing Construction of the Maki Nuclear Plant (Maki genpatsu secchi hantai kaigi), and the Communist Party-linked Council of Citizens Against the Maki Nuclear Plant (Maki genpatsu hantai choumin kaigi).

The non-affiliated groups each consisted of a few dozen members, usually with a core of fewer than ten active members with limited resources at their disposal. One, the Joint Landowners' Association Against the Maki Nuclear Plant (Maki genpatsu hantai kyouyuu jinushi kai), had been active since the very early years in the history of Maki nuclear power plant, dating back (if one includes its predecessors) to 1969. Overlapping somewhat in membership with the Landowners' Association was the Society to Build a Better Maki (Sumiyoi Makimachi wo tsukuru kai), which began as an election campaign group when an anti-plant activist attorney ran for mayor in 1982.

Two other groups were relative newcomers – the Paper Crane Network (Orizuru network), and the Society for a Blue Sea and Greenery (Aoi umi to midori no kai) – which emerged from the election campaign group that ran an anti-plant candidate in the 1994 mayoral election.

While the first two groups were led by college-educated males with student movement experience who were still in a university when news of the Maki plant project first broke, the latter two groups consisted mostly of young housewives and were more typical of the anti-nuclear power groups, usually led by college-educated urban housewives, that sprang up throughout Japan after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

In the early days of the Landowners' Association (then known as the Association to Stop the Maki Nuclear Plant [Maki genpatsu wo tsukurasenai kai]), its members made frequent trips to the village of Kakumihama (now no longer in existence) and purchased 51 tsubo (about 200 square yards) of land inside the nuclear plant construction site from the villagers. For years this piece of land

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[5] From an interview with MT.

remained an activist stronghold, coveted but unobtainable by the pro-plant forces, until Tohoku Electric Power finally began contemplating a modification in their site plan that would render this property "off-site."

Even during the eighties, when the anti-plant movement came to a virtual standstill and even the party-affiliated groups were barely active, the Society to Build a Better Maki continued to print monthly leaflets that discussed nuclear power and called for opposition to the Maki plant. These leaflets were inserted in the local newspaper and distributed to every household (some 8,000) in Maki.

The money and labor for this undertaking came from a few core members, whose actions are all the more remarkable in view of the fact that their efforts could not be expected to yield any tangible results at that point. However, they were seen as "different" from the townspeople who kept silent on the issue.

Kanji Sato, who would later be the target of a recall campaign by the Association for Holding the Referendum, was first elected mayor in 1986. What is noteworthy is that Sato did not follow the usual mayoral pattern of switching to the pro-plant side and then losing the next election. In his first reelection campaign in 1990, Sato publicly committed himself to a "nuclear plant freeze," but so did his opponent. Thus both candidates were ostensibly anti-plant.

Once reelected, however, Sato began taking steps to clear the way for construction of the plant, which his one-term predecessors had been unable to do. In 1992, halfway through Sato's second term, Tohoku Electric Power purchased the private land that remained unsold, and the town began removing a cemetery from the municipally owned lot that now held the key to construction of the plant.

In 1993, Sato opened his third election campaign by declaring an end to the "freeze" and announcing himself as a pro-plant candidate. Of his two opponents, one was an avowed anti-plant candidate, while the other took the position that he would decide whether or not to support the plant after "hearing the opinions of the people."

Sato won a third term and indicated that he viewed his victory as a mandate from the townspeople to support the plant. However, this declaration proved to be unpersuasive for two reasons. First of all, the two other candidates together drew more votes than Sato. Second, the anti-plant candidate, a political amateur lacking the standard prerequisites – a base of support, name recognition, and deep pockets – made an impressive showing with 4,382 votes, nearly half the number garnered by Sato.

Many of those who had been involved in the anti-plant movement were caught off guard by these results. "I had no idea that citizen awareness had reached that point. I felt like I hadn't really understood the townspeople, and I regretted that."[6] But it was too late. Despondent over Sato's victory for a third term, most anti-plant activists were at a loss about what to do next.[7]

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[6] From an interview with TT.

[7] From an interview with MN.

However, there was another group of townspeople who had not been involved in the anti-plant movement up to that point but now began talking about the plant. Drawing a sharp contrast to the anti-plant activists, they had suspected even before the election that "everyone else must be against the plant, too," and thus, having their suspicions confirmed by the election results, began to wonder "if there wasn't something we could do."[8] These are the people who founded the Association for Holding the Referendum.

The Emergence, Rise, and Success of the Maki Referendum Association

The Association for Holding the Referendum (hereafter referred to as the Association) was officially founded on October 19, 1994, as an organization of Maki citizens whose objectives were to (1) hold a referendum to ascertain the will of the townspeople regarding construction of the Maki nuclear plant, and (2) convince the town government to abide by the results of the referendum.

With one exception, none of the founders of the Association was a member of any of the anti-plant groups in Maki. All were self-styled "conservatives" who "conducted business with Maki" – shop owners, company presidents, farmers, and other self-employed entrepreneurs, most of who belonged to the post-war baby-boom generation and thus were around 50 years of age at the time of the referendum. Association representative Takaaki Sasaguchi, who later became mayor, typifies this group.

By contrast, most of the active members of the anti-plant groups were teachers, housewives, or office workers who commuted to nearby Niigata City – in other words, people who did not "do business in Maki." Unlike the latter group, Association members counted supporters of the plant, including Tohoku Electric Power itself, among their valued customers. They therefore tended to support one of the two conservative factions, and did not associate with the anti-plant movement ("in other words, we were pro-plant," laughed one interviewee).[9]

The core members conducted business with one another and were personally close as is shown in their description "we always visited each other on daily basis and had tea together," thus forming a tightly-knit network. Members of this network tacitly and accurately knew each other's opinions on various issues including nuclear power and the planned power plant, although the topic hardly ever surfaced in their conversation. The group also included the scion of a prominent sake-brewing family and other members of the town's elite.

The Maki Association members were a closely-knit group of people who could be described as typical representatives of the townspeople in terms of

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[8] From an interview with MKi (member of the Association), and an interview with MT.

[9] From an interview with MT.

occupation and personal networks in the town. This profile is different from that of the anti-nuclear groups and was crucial in the growth and the success of the movement that was formed in Maki.

Collective Recognition and Seizure of Political Opportunity

When social movements are viewed in a macro context and acknowledged as major actors in the political process, the concept of political opportunity proves central to the analysis of this process. Political opportunity was indeed crucial in the case of Maki, but as has been stressed by many scholars of social movements, we need to examine the actual process in which actors recognized and took advantage of the opportunity.

The founders of the movement recognized the opportunity to garner political leverage. As Gamson and Meyer put it, "an opportunity unrecognized [by a movement] is no opportunity at all" (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 283). In the case of the Association, unique circumstances – i.e., the town's ownership of land inside the nuclear plant site – provided the town with the actual power to decide the fate of the plant. The Association founders recognized this opportunity, and the timing of their formation of an organization to take action on this issue was determined by the approach of a threat, i.e. the end of the freeze period.

The founders of the Association say that the nuclear plant was rarely a topic of debate until the mayoral election of 1994.[10] For 26 years, doubts about the plant grew with every news report about a nuclear accident. The view that Maki might be better off without a nuclear plant gradually took root – yet was never articulated. No doubt people were afraid that they would lose customers, or that personal relationships would be adversely affected. Moreover, as long as the ongoing factional struggles in town politics prevented the construction of the plant, "there didn't seem to be a problem."[11] It was Mayor Sato's declaration to go forward with the plant that signaled these people to voice for the fist time, their common concerns about the nuclear power plant and its decision-making process.

Collective recognition of the opportunity and the threat led the Association founders to finally speak out on behalf of typical townspeople. Change in the political opportunity structure was the factor that determined the timing of the emergence of this movement. While maintaining that they were not "anti-plant," the Association was critical of the decision-making process and the "devious manner" of officials forwarding plant construction without putting the question directly to the townspeople.

The first action taken by the Association members was to formally request a referendum on Maki nuclear power plant. However, Sato turned it down,

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[10] From an interview with MKi, MT and Takaaki Sasaguchi, Association representative.
[11] From an interview with MT.

saying the town had no ordinance providing for referenda. Here the protesters found themselves in a situation where both stable/institutional and volatile avenues of political opportunity were closed to them: policy was "closed" to citizen access by the lack of a system permitting direct legislative proposals by citizens, while the town authorities also adopted a "closed" stance against the citizens' demands.

The Association began with a clear objective of implementing the referendum, founders having a collective recognition of the following political opportunity structure: the town had rejected their proposal for a referendum; they could expect no help from elected officials as the town assembly rejected an ordinance requiring a nuclear plant referendum by a vote of 17 to 5 in late 1995; there was no institutionalized system that would enable citizens to submit binding counter-proposals; action would have to be taken now or it would be too late. While the anti-plant groups could not sponsor the referendum, which was neutral in nature, they might achieve their goal of stopping the plant if a referendum was held.

This recognition gave rise to an extremely bold and original idea: if the town would not conduct a referendum the Association would conduct one. The stance of the town government determined not only the beginnings of the Association but the course it would subsequently follow. The Citizen-Administered Referendum that was conducted from January 22 through February 5, 1995 drew the participation of 45% of the electorate. Of 10,378 votes, 9,854 were against the plant. In other words, close to half of the town's eligible voters supported the Association.

At the negotiations sought by the Association in the wake of these results, however, Mayor Sato dismissed them out of hand, saying that the Citizen-Administered Referendum had "no legal basis" and therefore was of no relevance to administrative policy. This first effort thus "failed to achieve our second objective of persuading the town government to abide by the results of the referendum."[12]

Consequently the Association, which had intended to dissolve itself once negotiations with the mayor were underway, resumed its activities in an effort to achieve its second objective. The mayor's declaration that the referendum had no legal basis was enough to define the next specific goal of the Association: a referendum that would be considered legitimate.

Table 1 summarizes the major events associated with this second referendum from the founding of the Association up to August 1996, when the referendum was actually held. Actions undertaken by the Association appear in boldface. The table shows how, through an assembly election and a mayoral recall, the Association began engaging in activities within an institutionalized arena. The Association's choice of strategies was thus defined by the posture of the town officials in refusing to recognize a referendum that had "no legal basis."

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[12] From an interview with Takaaki Sasaguchi.

Table 1 Time line of events in the Maki case

1994	
10/14	*Association founded; Association demands that Mayor Sato conduct a referendum on whether or not to support the nuclear plant* (the mayor refuses, saying he cannot because there is no ordinance on referendums).
11	*Association decides to conduct a "Citizen-Administered Referendum" (jishu kanri juumin touhyou).* Six anti-plant groups unite to form the Liaison Council for Stopping the Maki Nuclear Plant with a Referendum [Juumin touhyou de Maki genpatsu wo tomeru renrakukai].
12	Mayor Sato criticizes the Citizen-Administered Referendum campaign as a "challenge to democracy" and refuses to rent the municipal gymnasium to the Association as a venue for the referendum.
1995	
1/22	*Association conducts the referendum at eight locations in Maki, drawing 10,378 voters, or 45.4% of the electorate; 474 support the plant and 9,854 oppose it.*
2/9	*Association demands that Mayor Sato change his nuclear plant policy in accordance with the referendum results.* Sato refuses, declaring that the referendum "has no legal basis."
2/10	Tohoku Electric formally offers to purchase the municipally owned land on the plant site.
2/20	Special town assembly session to approve the land sale is called off due to a blockade by anti-plant activists.
4/23	*Town assembly election; of 22 seats, supporters of a referendum ordinance win 12 and opponents win 10. The top three vote-getters are pro-ordinance women.*
6/26	Town assembly passes a referendum ordinance by an 11-10 vote, decreeing that a referendum will take place by October 15.
8/7	Pro-plant faction petitions for an amendment to the ordinance.
9	Mayor Sato appends a supporting opinion to the amendment petition and submits it to the town assembly.
10/3	Town assembly passes the amendment (assembly chair breaks a 10–10 tie), changing the ordinance to state "the referendum shall be implemented by the mayor with the consent of the assembly" without specifying a deadline.
10/10	In negotiations with plant opponents, Mayor Sato declares that the referendum will have no bearing on sale of the town's land on the plant site.
10/27	*Association responds to this declaration by demanding the recall of Mayor Sato.*
11/15	*Recall petition drive begins.*
12/8	*Recall petition is submitted with 10,231 signatures.*
12/15	Mayor Sato resigns.
1996	
1/16	*Mayoral election announced. Association representative Takaaki Sasaguchi declares candidacy.* Former mayor Sato declines to run.
1/21	*Sasaguchi is elected mayor.*
3/21	Town assembly approves implementation of the referendum.
8/4	*Referendum takes place with 88.29% of the electorate voting; 7,904 support construction of the nuclear plant and 12,478 oppose it.*

Choice of Strategies

Following the town government's decision to ignore the Citizen-Administered Referendum, the Association appeared to be defeated, but the opportunity to achieve its goals was renewed, thanks to another citizens' movement in Maki. Immediately after meeting with the Association, the mayor accepted a formal offer from Tohoku Electric Power to purchase the municipal land on the nuclear plant site, and called a special session of the assembly to approve the sale. However, anti-plant activists blockaded the hallway of the assembly building and forcibly prevented the session from taking place.

If the assembly had been able to meet, it would have most likely approved the land sale and, for all practical purposes, there would have been no further opportunity to halt construction of the plant. Literally placing themselves on the line in a last-ditch attempt to stop the plant, the anti-plant forces created the opportunity for a new round in the struggle over Maki's nuclear policy.

This next round took place in an arena of conventional politics, the town assembly election of April 1995. The sole issue in this election was whether the candidates supported or opposed a referendum ordinance. The Association waged a fierce campaign, fielding three candidates of its own and working closely with the anti-plant groups, who also supported the ordinance. The pro-ordinance forces won a 12–10 majority, but immediately after the election, two assembly members switched to the anti-ordinance side, reversing the balance to 10–12.

Nonetheless, the ordinance "accidentally"[13] passed that June, but now the pro-plant, anti-ordinance camp directly petitioned the assembly to amend the ordinance so as not to specify a deadline for holding the referendum. The mayor and assembly responded by amending the ordinance in September to read: "The date of implementation of the referendum shall be set by the Mayor." Needless to say, the Association regarded this amendment as a change for the worse.

Although the amendment to the ordinance foreshadowed the Association's next strategy, a mayoral recall, the immediate impetus for the recall was a political statement by the mayor. Despite the ordinance's stipulation that the town "respect" the results of the referendum, Mayor Sato, in the course of his negotiations with plant opponents, declared that "even if we hold a referendum, the results will have no bearing on the sale of the town's land."

Though probably intended to dishearten the forces seeking a referendum, this declaration had the opposite effect: it gave them the just cause for a recall, which was exactly what they needed. The anti-plant group representative who extracted this comment from the mayor remarked, laughing, "I remember thinking he'd done us a big favor by saying that!"[14] The mayor's declaration

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[13] The referendum ordinance reportedly passed because one anti-ordinance (i.e. pro-plant) member of the assembly erroneously voted "YES" instead of "NO".

[14] From an interview with MKu, representative of Society to Build a Better Maki (sumiyoi Maki machi wo tsukuru kai).

provided the anti-plant movement with the perfect ammunition with which to strategically frame their demand for a recall as a fully justified response to the mayor's disregard for the law.

Subsequently, a successful petition drive by the Association culminated in the resignation of Mayor Sato. When Sato declined to run in the election to fill the seat he had just vacated, the Association's political opportunity to reach its objective had never been so great. And indeed, Takaaki Sasaguchi, a candidate representing the Association, was elected mayor in January 1996, practically achieving the Association's final goal.

This process demonstrates that the interactions among the various actors – the Association, political institutions such as the town government and assembly, pro- and anti-plant groups, the media – constantly created and recreated the political environment faced by the movement, and that defined the choice of strategies. Simultaneously, the Association was constantly a goal-oriented movement, as it began at the recognition that they had an actual chance of winning. Their strategies were chosen based on the sole judgment of the effectiveness with regard to achieving their final goal, but it was not difficult for them to make a choice, as they were repeatedly led by their opponents who made fatal flaws which would obviously be the next target for the movement.

Affinity-Based Mobilization

The Association's success was brought about by its extraordinary mobilizing capacity. When the anti-plant movement in Maki reached an initial peak with the first public hearing on the project in 1981, plant opponents demanded a referendum, but it never took place. How did the Association manage to succeed where its predecessors had failed? Key factors behind their success are the affinity-based mobilization and skillful framing.

Resource mobilization theorists have shown that the extent of activity by a social movement is a function of the resources controlled by that movement (McCarthy and Zald 1977–1989, 32). One of the founders of the Association for Holding the Referendum touched on this point when he was asked why the Association was able to accomplish what previous anti-plant groups could not, i.e. successful implementation of a referendum (in this case the Citizen-Administered Referendum): "We had money. We had land. We had that prefab [building erected by the Association]."[15]

The Association got its start with several million yen in donations, loaned land, and a prefabricated building on the land. Both the money and land were provided by the founders of the Association, who numbered only seven at the outset. By demonstrating their willingness to gamble a large sum of money on

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[15] From an interview with MT.

their undertaking, they sent a message to every citizen of the town that they fully intended to make the Citizen-Administered Referendum a reality.

However, though the Association may have voluntarily provided the townspeople with an opportunity to express themselves, but the effort could not be unilateral. The Association could hold events on its own, but if no one participated, nothing would come of them. As a resource, people are even more difficult to mobilize than money.

To add to the challenge, the hurdles faced by the Association "grew higher and higher."[16] At the time of the initial Citizen-Administered Referendum, the pro-plant camp announced a "boycott," and would-be participants experienced pressure not to vote. However, the balloting itself was secret and the organizers made arrangements to let people vote at night, when they could do so "under cover of darkness." Thus, aside from the fact that it was their first effort, the hurdles faced by the Association at this point were relatively low. The arena for the next round, however, was a conventional one: the town assembly elections. Consequently, pressure from family members as well as external forces grew more intense. Supporters of the Association no longer found it so easy to provide support in secret, as they were now expected to aid to the extent possible the campaigns of the 16 pro-referendum candidates. Then, in the subsequent mayoral recall campaign, people had to sign their names to a petition. Getting people to sign on to something as unpleasant as firing the mayor was a serious hurdle, and Association members say they worried that their supporters might not be willing to go that far. Yet the mobilizing power of the Association did not diminish.

The strong mobilizing capacity of the Association was substantiated by the close network based on trust and affinity. The crucial factor was the sense of solidarity the Association was able to exploit. The Association was built on an existing set of relationships, including ties by blood or marriage, networks of former high school classmates, and mountaineering clubs and other local organizations. But what enabled the Association to attract other townspeople from outside this circle were the name recognition, trust, and affinity fostered by its founders in the course of doing business in a town of 30,000 people.

This priceless resource, which previous anti-plant activist groups had lacked, was the wellspring of the Association's solidarity. In the words of a member of one of the anti-plant groups that had failed to recruit "ordinary" citizens despite its best efforts, "the strongest asset of the Association was the trust it inspired in the townspeople, who saw people they knew taking action."[17] Similar to the anti-pollution movement in Oita studied by Broadbent (Broadbent 1998), social networks of trust played the crucial role in mobilization also in Maki. In this case, however, it was not the vertical leader–subordinate relationship but more a parallel relationship and affinity based on "they are like us" feeling. A group

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[16] From an interview with TT.
[17] From an interview with KA.

with high solidarity will have greater mobilizing ability than one with low solidarity (Oberschall 1978–1989, 82). The "ordinary" citizens whom the Association sought to mobilize perceived the Association's founders as people like themselves, thus reinforcing the sense of solidarity.

Another factor that contributed to the mobilizing capacity of the Association is the cost of participation which was kept relatively low. The only actions required of those who supported the goals of the Association were to vote or sign a petition. Moreover, some of these actions would take place within the context of a regular election. No special commitments of time, labor, skill, or knowledge were needed, nor were these actions the sort that could not be undertaken by the "average person," as direct action might be. The monetary cost was zero. Donations were naturally welcomed, and in fact came to exceed the operating expenses of the Association, but were not indispensable thanks to the generous resources provided by the group's founders.

In other words, the Association was able to achieve its goals without expanding its constituents (McCarthy and Zald, 1977–1989, 32), needing only to gather adherents. This is borne out by the fact that the Association had no membership list and charged no dues. Adherents are, of course, far easier to recruit than constituents; moreover, the Association's adherents were able to express their will without incurring any costs whatsoever (aside from the possible emotional costs). The Association was more a "host" that took in people's will than a movement that sought to lead the townspeople, in the words of one observer.[18]

The third factor that contributed to the exceptional mobilizing capacity of the Association has to do with the concept of framing, which is discussed below.

Framing: A Mobilizing Process

"Framing" consists of strategic efforts by the movement to create shared understandings of the world. Through these efforts the "real world" is interpreted in a manner that legitimizes a movement. The newly created frame serves to expand and mobilize support for the movement. The ability to attract attention in public arenas, particularly the media, is yet another variable that will determine the fate of a movement (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). In the case of the Association, framing was an important part of the mobilizing process.

By consistently articulating its goal as "a decision based on the will of the townspeople" and declaring itself to be "neutral on the question of the nuclear plant" per se, the Association succeeded in framing itself as a movement demanding the proper implementation of a public decision-making process, not a movement pursuing a specific political end. A clever "frame transformation" (Snow et al. 1986) of the issue at hand was accomplished, into "a once-in-a-century problem facing our town." Thus an old controversy – whether or not

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[18] From an interview with MKu.

to approve the Maki nuclear plant – was reconstructed as a "my backyard" issue for every citizen, no longer just a routine question of supporting or opposing nuclear power. From there it was a very short step to the notion that "we should be in charge of this decision."

Other forms of strategic framing that spread the image among the towns-people of a movement "open to everyone" included the Association's self-definition as a *movement* established by "ordinary people," its policy that anyone could visit its prefab headquarters at any time, and the low profile kept by anti-nuclear activists working with the Association, enabling it to position itself as an undertaking completely separate from the anti-plant movement.

The Association also engaged in effective framing vis-à-vis the media. The argument that "democracy means letting the people decide" resonated well with the media. One leader of the pro-plant camp says that a major reason his side could not stop the referendum was that the media bought into the premise that "referendum = democracy = a good thing"; consequently plant proponents who argued that the referendum was not an appropriate means of resolving this particular issue were perceived as "enemies of democracy."[19]

Skillful framing enabled the media to consistently portray the controversy as a familiar tale of a showdown between ordinary citizens seeking a democratic decision-making process and a dismissive, high-handed cabal of government and big-business interests.

Summary and Discussion

The trajectory of the Maki Referendum Association can be summarized as follows. The Association emerged on an existing closely-knit group of people, who typified the citizens of Maki in terms of occupation, personal network, and political stance. Although they had never been active, not even articulate about the nuclear power plant issue, they shared among themselves and with a large proportion of the townspeople, a dissent toward the plant and its decision-making process. We might be able to say that they had a hidden collective identity as the silent opponents to the plant.

When an avowedly pro-plant mayor won a third term in office, it meant a clear and present threat to the town: the plant project would move forward if nothing was done about it. This threat defined the timing of the actual forma-tion of the referendum movement. The founders of the Association recognized not only the threat but the opportunity for their success. They would never have ventured to start up a movement unless they were confident the will of the townspeople was the same as theirs and thus they had a chance of winning.

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[19] From an interview with a member of the pro-plant group "Maki genpatu wo kangaeru kai (Association to Think about Maki nuclear power plant)."

Collective recognition on their part of the de facto veto power in their hands was the beginning of this outcome-oriented movement.

The founders of the movement had been very close friends and business partners since years before this movement began. It was not the movement or the issue at hand or a particular ideology that drew them together, but to the contrary, a threat posed to a group of people who mutually knew what was on each other's mind initiated the movement.

As we have seen, the striking contrast in the mobilizing capacity of the Association and the preceding anti-nuke groups indicates that in the social context of the small town in Japan, it was "who" called for the movement that had the strongest effect on its mobilizing capacity. This was true also in other referendum movements that sprang up in the following years (Takubo 1997b). Referendum movements in Maki, Mitake, and Kushima were all lead by a group of "typical townspeople," with whom the majority of the townspeople could identify. The founders were not obvious leaders, but were "ordinary, albeit little better-known or better-off, respectable townspeople" whom the others categorized as "same as us." This sense of solidarity was the crucial, but a never-attainable resource for the preceding anti-plant movement.

Throughout the entire process, the plant opponents and the Association were allies in all but name. Yet the existence of the anti-plant camp benefited the Association by allowing it to highlight the distinction between the two groups, positioning itself in the eyes of the townspeople as the more accessible alternative. This dynamic resembles the "radical flank effect" (Haines 1984) whereby the presence of extremists in a social movement helps legitimize the moderates. Such rhetoric as "unlike the anti-nukers, we're not political" and "unlike the anti-nukers, we're run by ordinary citizens" functioned as a type of framing that enhanced the image of the Association as "normal" and "legitimate."

The character of the Association, at least at the stage when its immediate goal was to hold the Citizen-Administered Referendum, was less that of a social movement than that of a small enterprise set up to carry out this particular event. The referendum's supporters, with the founders of the Association at their core, served as the fundraisers, planners, and promoters of the event. The townspeople whose participation they sought were essentially their guests at the event. However, when the town government ignored the results of the event despite participation by nearly half the town's eligible voters, the Association failed to achieve its second objective and was forced to carry the fight to a second and third round. Skilful framing by the Association that the town's decision-making process was "non-democratic" heightened their solidarity and transformed the Association from an enterprise into the core organization of a democracy movement by "ordinary citizens."

Without achieving its second objective of "convincing the town government to abide by the results of the referendum," the efforts of the Association would have been in vain. Consequently, the group chose its tactics based on a single criterion: whether they would have a real effect on town policy. As Association

members emphasized, "there would have been no need for the Association if the town had held a referendum in the first place."[20] As an utterly outcome-oriented movement, Association's choice of strategies was defined by the actions and reactions of their counterpart and other actors in the political arena. The movement always chose a path where they would be able to give the hardest blow to their counterpart. Many times the right answer for them was clearly pointed out by their counterpart.

Drawing on the unique referendum movement in a small town in Japan, we have highlighted the emergence and mobilization process of a goal-oriented, destined-to-succeed movement. Whether similar process takes place in other, less goal-oriented type movement or in different social context should be the questions to be answered by further case studies, especially comparative ones.

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The Long-Term Effects of Political Socialization During Late-1960s Student Protest

Nobuyoshi Kurita

Confrontational Politics of Late-1960s Japan

In the late 1960s radical and violent political protests by youth occurred on most universities in Japan. This time period is often referred to as the age of confrontational politics (Kurita 1987, 1989, 1993, 1994a; Ohno 1990).[1] The focus of student protest was anti-Vietnam War and anti-Anpo (opposition to the Japan–US Security Treaty).[2] Protests were mounted by students in many places. For instance in January 1968 over the presence of the US Navy in Sasebo naval port, from May 1968 in the campus conflict and mass bargaining at Nihon University, and in January 1969 with the occupation of Yasuda Memorial Hall of Tokyo University, in which students demanded democratization of the university. The umbrella student protest organization known as the All-Campus Joint Struggle Committee (abbreviated in Japanese as Zenkyoutou) was a loosely structured coalition consisting of a variety of new left political sects (Kurata 1978; Nakajima 1968; Takagi 1985).

Beginning as moderate demonstrations and political meetings, youth protests developed into riotous demonstrations, sit-ins, and occupation of buildings, often resulting in violent clashes with riot police (Takahashi 1968). According to Backman and Finlay's (1973) cross-national study of seventeen nations where student protest occurred in the late 1960s, the level of radicalization and violence in Japan's protests was among the highest. Police intervened

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[1] Social movements take two stances toward the political system, participation or confrontation. (Mirowski and Ross 1981).

[2] The original Japanese term is *daigaku toso*. The sociological translation is university conflict, while the literal translation is university struggle.

in 89.2% of the university protests, second only to Korea;[3] 69.7% of student activists were arrested, second only to Korea; 64.5% of activists were wounded, which is fourth following Colombia, Chile, and Korea (Backman and Finlay 1973). This severe confrontation in late 1960s Japan gave Japanese youth an opportunity for acquiring, particularly, intense political faith. The following statement aptly represents their circumstances, "Freshmen matriculating since 1967 are aware that they are exactly the university students who are potential protesters against the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1970" (Akiyama and Aoki 1968). In terms of political socialization, the youth generation in late 1960s learned rebellious political culture through their shared experience of youth movements and campus conflicts as contemporary political events.

Long years after the age of confrontational politics this research examines the subsequent political engagement of these young activists and their continuing political legacy.[4] This study will analyze the continuance and transformation of political socialization on the late-1960s generation up to the present.

Research on Generational Political Socialization

Sociological studies of youth rebellions follow two theories of generations (Braungart 1974; Yoshida 1977). Eisenstadt (1956) exemplifies the theory of generational alienation. The process of generational alienation occurs in the context of modernization under which the traditional process of production and life based upon primary groups becomes disorganized. In a modernized industrialized society youth become alienated from the activities of production and reproduction and form a segregated generation. Age segregation causes intergenerational gaps (Eisenstadt 1956, pp. 307–323). Student movements are protests by discontented youth who are not integrated into the social system due to these inter-generational gaps.

In contrast, the theory of the generational unit focuses on the positive role played by youth in advancing social and cultural change. According to Mannheim (1952), the study of youth dealing with cultural and historical challenges

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[3] The nations in the survey include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, USA, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, France, [West] Germany, Spain, and U.K.

[4] Answering these questions is equivalent to research on the continuance and transformation of the political attitudes and behavior of the 1970 "Anpo generation," as it is called. A number of activists belong to the 1970-Anpo generation. The Sanrizuka conflict, a vehement protest which developed after the 1970-Anpo in Japan (Apter and Sawa 1984), is one example. Steinhoff (1989) analyzed some new left sects of the 1960-Anpo generation, before the 1970-Anpo. Fendrich and Krauss (1978) give another theoretical orientation to this domain of study by applying quantitative methods.

is indispensable in understanding social and cultural movements. A cohort sharing contemporary political and social experiences is crystallized into a generational unit that embodies the Zeigeist of the age. In this way, a generation evolves from a simple age cohort to its final stage as a generational unit. Thus youth as a group transform into generational units and youth rebellions take place (Mannheim 1952, p. 292, pp. 302–304).

The theory of generational alienation and the analytical focus on generational units have been unified in the concept of political socialization. The concept of political socialization serves as the intervening variable signifying the transmission and sharing of political culture.[5] Political socialization involves both the value transmission between generations and the value sharing within a generation. Political sociologists have utilized this concept to explain the causes of youth rebellions in and after the 1960s in the USA (Braungart 1971, 1974; Fendrich 1974, 1976, 1977; Fendrich and Krauss 1978; Fendrich and Tarleau 1973). These key concepts are useful in analyzing youth rebellions.

Sociological and psychological studies of youth have been central to research on generational political socialization. Flacks (1967) argued that parent's liberal attitudes helped to create a "liberated generation" of youth who supported the civil rights movement in the 1960s. Keniston (1967) also argued that student activists were socialized by the preceding generation with tolerance and intelligence. Liberal argumentation and relationships in the families helped to promote youth activism.

Since 1970s, the researchers on generational political socialization have engaged in extensive data collection and statistical analysis. Braungart (1974) analyzed the process of intergenerational political socialization in a sample of 1,246 US college students. The path model utilized in this study included seven variables concerning students' political participation and their parents' social characteristics. The results confirmed positive relationships among social class, parents' religious affiliation, parents' political affiliation, family discussion, and student political group membership and identification. College students whose parents belonged to the middle class, believed in no religion, identified themselves with radical or leftist beliefs, and discussed social and political issues frequently with their children, tended to participate in radical political groups (Braungart 1974, pp. 115–117, 120–123). The research findings of Braungart (1974) supported some of the propositions presented by Flacks (1967) and Keniston (1967) concerning the impact of family socialization.

Fendrich (1976, 1977) focused upon Mannheim's theory of the generational unit and analyzed the political socialization process within generations. Through data analysis, using causal modeling on a sample of 100 former activists in the civil rights movement before 1965, Fendrich verified the following three propositions of the generational unit: (1) People who were active in

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[5] To put it simply, political socialization is the learning process of the belief system about the political world. See Dawson and Prewitt (1969).

protest politics when they were college students continued to engage in leftist politics as adults after 10 years. (2) People who committed ideologically into protest movements in their youth sustained commitments beyond interest politics. (3) Although people who sustained strong ideological commitments to social reform choose to enter graduate school or other courses of professional education, they did not expect to earn higher income nor to occupy a prestigious status. Rather they engaged in human service, for instance, as social workers, journalists, or teachers, in order to keep their radical faith and to secure the liberty for protests (Fendrick 1977, pp. 150–155). The adult political socialization of former activists remained a continuous reinforcement and transformation of their youthful value and belief system through expanded and varied experiences in social and political life (Fendrich 1976, p. 84).

In these two contrasting approaches to political socialization, Braungart (1971) surveyed the youth's political socialization mainly within the family, while Fendrich (1976, 1977) investigated their secondary political socialization through protest experience, career choice after college, and so on.

Methodology

Since 1980s political sociologists have made remarkable progress in research on generational political socialization. The preceding studies by Braungart and Fendrich during 1970s provided a good stimulus to other scholars (See Table 1). Others have discussed the long-term effects on activists' socialization from the point of view of intra-generational value sharing.

The methodology utilized in this research tries to emulate a panel survey by using a follow-up survey.[6] In a follow-up survey, researchers identify former activists by some information, such as old gazettes of the university, and sent questionnaires to respondents or interviewed them (Abramowitz and Nassi 1981; Braungart and Braungart 1990a; McAdam 1989; Whalen and Flacks 1989). McAdam (1989) effectively utilized this approach when he found copies of applications for rejection, participation, and withdrawal of applicants in the US civil rights era 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer campaign. However in these studies, the small size of the sample prevented the use of statistical analysis. Although Abramowitz and Nassi (1981) conducted a statistical analysis of thirty cases, generalizations from such a small sample was unacceptable. Researchers have to deal carefully with small samples. In panel surveys, researchers were able to attain a relatively large number of initial cases (Dunham and Bengtson 1992; Jennings 1987; and Marwell et al. 1987). However, these initial samples tended to include many non-activists because the

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[6] Although, generally speaking, a follow-up survey in the broad sense includes panel surveys, follow-up methods which are not rigid panel methods are called follow-up methods in a narrow sense here.

Table 1 Recent studies of long-term effects on activists' socialization

Publications	Year of Protest	Year of Survey	Sample (N)	Survey
Abramowitz and Nassi (1981)	1967	1977	30	Follow-up
Braungart and Braungart (1990a)	1960s	1988	$13 + 11^a$	Follow-up
Dunham and Bengtson (1992)	1960s	1971/85	$129 + 301^b$	Panel
Fendrich and Loboy (1988)[c]	1960–63	1971/86	$23 + 30 + 32^d$	Panel
Jennings (1987)	1960s	1965/73/82	$106 + 259^e$	Panel
Marwell et al. (1987)	1965	1965/65/84[f]	145	Panel
McAdam (1989)[g]	1964	1983–1984	$212 + 118^h$	Follow-up
Whalen and Flacks (1989)	1970	1979–1983	$18 + 14^i$	Follow-up

[a] 13 are activists, and 11 are non-activists

[b] 129 are activists, and 301 are non-activists

[c] Fendrich (1993) as a refined book is based on the data of Fendrich (1974, 1976, 1977), Fendrich and Krauss (1978), Fendrich and Lovoy (1988), Fendrich and Tarleau (1973)

[d] 23 are radical activists, 30 are moderate activists, and 32 are non-activists.

[e] 106 are activists, and 259 are non-activists

[f] The first wave of panel survey was questioned in spring 1965, the second was in fall 1965, and last was in 1984

[g] McAdam (1988), a valuable book in this field, and McAdam (1989) are based on the same date-sets

[h] 212 are participants, and 118 are no-shows

[i] 18 are activists, and 14 are non-activists

respondents were selected from ordinary students. Distortion of analysis is likely to result from the large ratio of non-activists to activists.

A panel survey on activists would be preferable but impossible since the first wave of the panel would have had to be administered when the activists protested in late 1960s. In light of the absence of panel-based data, a follow-up method with a large sample size will be utilized in this study. The data in this paper were gathered from two cities, Toyota and Toyoake, located in the suburbs of Nagoya in central Japan. This area is one of Japan's largest industrial and commercial cities. The data were collected by standardized mail survey. The sample was drawn from subscribers of periodicals whose editors were the chief leftist and post-materialist movement organizations. The two samples were similar in ideological and demographic characteristics. Not all of the subscribers had been activists, but we assumed that they were sympathetic to the late-1960s social movements. These protest constituencies were an important source of social movement mobilization. In the subsequent analysis of the data collected, these samples are named protest constituencies A (Toyota City) and B (Toyoake City) in 1985. Protest constituency A contained 160 cases, and B contained 186 cases.[7]

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[7] The rate of returned questionnaire for protest constituency A is 42.6%, B is 49.0%.

A Sociometrical Model of Generational Political Socialization

In this analysis of the subsequent activism of youth socialized in the 1960s, a sociometrical model of generational political socialization inclusive of following four variables was employed. The first dummy variable identifies the needed age cohort (x_1), those respondents who were just college age during 1968 and 1969 when Japan's campus conflicts were at a peak. The second variable, contemporary political events (x_2), identifies respondents for whom campus conflicts during the 1968–69 era had provided significant political experiences. The third variable, social movement participation (x_3), identifies those respondents who were members of the student movement or other social movements. The final variable, protest engagement (x_4), identifies those who engaged in actual protest behavior, for instance, demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, and so on. The statistical technique of path analysis was utilized for an estimation of causal relationships. The following structural equations represent the theoretical model on generational political socialization (Fig. 1).

This model ties four variables with six logical paths. It is completely recursive, which has the virtue of giving a better estimation of total variance (Asher 1976). Three paths, p_{21}, p_{32}, p_{43}, within the model correspond to the following hypotheses, about effects: H1 of the generational unit, H2 of contemporary political events, and H3 of the experience of social movement participation. These hypotheses represent the core of the sociometrical model of generational political socialization.

H1: Hypothesis on generational unit:
People belonging to the 1968–69s generation tend to form their political faith during the period of radicalized campus conflict.
H2: Hypothesis on contemporary political events:

Fig. 1 Theoretical model of generational political socialization

People who attained their political faith during the period of radicalized campus conflict tend to participate in later social movements.
H3: Hypothesis on experience of social movement participation:
People who participated in social movements tend to engage in radical protest behavior.

The first hypothesis refers to the process in which people belonging to 1968–69 generation shared the common political events and experiences and consequently were crystallized into generational units. The 1968–69 generation was assumed to have been socialized into confrontational politics more than other age cohorts because of the radicalized campus conflict during their youth. The use of political generation as a concept is useful in analyzing politicized generational units. The political socialization of each generation is dependent upon a period when its generation experienced a critical and momentous political event. Therefore, political generations or generational units derive from their historical situation (Braungart and Braungart 1986). If people belonging to the 1968–69 generation tended to form their political faith during that period of radicalized campus conflict, the 1968–69 generation may be not a simple age cohort, but a politicized and crystallized generational unit.

The second hypothesis on contemporary political events refers to the process by which people attain their political orientation during periods of radicalized campus conflict. Lang and Lang (1978) found that people who attained their political faith by chance exposure to events related to confrontational politics (such as clashes with the police, or taking part in sit-ins) were more radical than others.

The third hypothesis focuses on the experience of social movement participation and refers to the process in which people who participated in social movements engage in actually radical protest behavior. It is assumed that in general, people who gain membership of social movement organizations tend to engage in radical protest. For example, the youth who participated in the high-risk events of the Mississippi Freedom Summer of 1964 were politically socialized to engage in protest by contact with activists and through networks of protesters (McAdam 1986, 1988, 1989). Hypothesis three thus focuses upon the process of political socialization through participation in social movement organizations.

Operational Definition of Variables

1968–69 Generation (x_1)

The 1968–69 generation contains people who were 18–21 years old in 1968–69. During 1968 and 1969, 400 cases of severe campus conflict including student occupations and lockouts occurred, as did 942 cases of riot police intervention on campuses (Marsh 1982). The number of colleges and universities involved in campus conflicts exceeded one hundred in June of 1969. The magnitude and radicalization of Japan's university conflicts reached a peak during 1968–69.

Presumably, people belonging to the 1968–69 generation were politically socialized by this radicalized campus conflict. Operationally, in the variable x_1 (the 1968–69 generation), people who were 18–22 years old in 1969 are given one as a numeric value, and others are given zero.

Contemporary Political Events (x_2)

Contemporary political events refer to campus conflicts experienced by the 1968–69 generation (of 18–21 years old), as significant experiences where the respondents had a chance of learning their political faith. This variable focuses upon the situation in which the late-1960s confrontation politics became the agent of adult political socialization for 1968–69 generation. Operationally, the variable in contemporary political events (x_2) is coded as follows: respondents who answered that they obtained their political faith when the late-1960s campus conflicts became radicalized receive a numerical value of one, and others are given zero.

Social Movement Participation (x_3)

Social movement participation refers to the experience of participating in leftist or post-materialist movement organizations, for instance, student movements, feminist movements, ecological movements, and so on. Operationally, for this variable, respondents who have, or had, membership in a social movement organization receive one as a numeric value, and others are given zero.

Later Protest Engagement (x_4)

Protest engagement refers to engaging in radical protest behavior with risk. This variable concerns only engagement after the 1970s, in order to remove reference to the 1960s' protests. Two factors with sufficient contribution were extracted (by the execution of varimax rotation in principle factor methods) from seven types of political participation: contacting local or national officials, actively work for party or candidate, writing letters to newspaper editors, attending political meetings, joining in public street demonstrations, engaging in political strike, engaging in sit-in. In these variables, participation was indicated by a value of one and non-participation by zero (See Table 2). The first factor loaded high on values of attending political meetings, joining in public street demonstrations, engaging in political strike, and engaging in sit-in for both protest constituencies A and B. The first factor is named "protest behavior" since these four items are related to a strong commitment to confrontational politics. Operationally, these four items sum up the variable later

Table 2 Factor analysis for political participation (varimax rotation)

Variables	Protest behavior (Factor I)	Civic voice (Factor II)
[Protest constituency A] $N = 160$		
1) Contact local or national officials	0.005	0.694
2) Actively work for party or candidate	0.153	0.754
3) Write letters to newspaper editors	−0.027	0.624
4) Attend political meetings	0.509	0.538
5) Join in public street demonstrations	0.818	0.112
6) Engage in political strike	0.797	0.030
7) Engage in sit-in	0.878	0.067
Cumulative contribution	37.7%	58.6%
[Protest constituency B] $N = 186$		
1) Contact local or national officials	0.212	0.660
2) Actively work for party or candidate	0.370	0.577
3) Write letters to newspaper editors	−0.082	0.726
4) Attend political meetings	0.616	0.530
5) Join in public street demonstrations	0.735	0.380
6) Engage in political strike	0.811	−0.222
7) Engage in sit-In	0.643	0.262
Cumulative contribution	41.6%	57.4%

protest engagements (x_4). Therefore, the maximum of this variable, when respondents engaged in all activities, is four as a numeric value, and the minimum, when the respondents engaged in none, is zero.

Verification of Hypotheses

Bivariate Analysis

In order to test the statistical validity of the three hypotheses, bivariate analysis was executed by the use of Pearson's correlation coefficient before multivariate analysis (See Table 3). The validity of H1, H2, and H3 is tested, according to the values of r_{12} (correlation coefficients between x_1 and x_2), r_{23} and r_{34}. Maximum of these correlation coefficients is 0.567, and minimum is 0.218 in both protest constituencies A and B. Their statistical significance level is 1%. According to these findings, the construction of H1, H2, and H3 is evaluated as statistically valid and effective.[8]

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[8] There is a shortcoming that x_1 can indicate only two values because it is a dichotomous variable. Therefore, by the use of x_c as a strict age cohort variable which has nine categories, x_c and x_2 were cross-tabulated. In protest constituency A, the value of χ^2 on this cross-tabulation is 15.56 (d.f. = 7) and is significant in 5% level. In B it is 40.09 (d.f. = 8) and significant in 1% level. Of course, on each table, the row percentage of 1968–69'' generation category is greatest in all categories. These findings also may guarantee the statistical validity on construction of H1.

Table 3 Zero-order correlation matrix

	(x_1)	(x_2)	(x_3)	(x_4)
	1968–1969s Generation	Contemporary Political events	Social movement Participation	Protest engagement
[*Protest constituency A*] $N = 160$				
(x_2)	0.265**			
(x_3)	0.131*	0.223**		
(x_4)	0.254**	0.273**	0.559**	
Mean	0.206	0.075	0.306	0.450
[*Protest constituency B*] $N = 186$				
(x_2)	0.410**			
(x_3)	0.171**	0.218**		
(x_4)	0.140*	0.225**	0.567**	
Mean	0.188	0.108	0.538	0.812

**p <0.01 *p<0.05

Path Analysis

Path analysis is executed under the condition in which all coefficients between variables within structural equations are significant statistically, in order to verify the theoretical model of generational political socialization (See Table 4 and Fig. 2).

H1 is tested by the use of the estimated value of p_{21} (standardized partial regression coefficient between x_1 and x_2). The value of p_{21} accords with r_{12} obviously through structural equation (1). In protest constituency A, the value of p_{21} is 0.265 (t-value is 3.46), and in B, it is 0.410 (t-value is 6.10). Both of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore H1 is confirmed.

H2 is tested by the use of the value of p_{32}. The estimated value of p_{32} through the execution of multiple regression analysis is 0.202 (t-value is 2.51) in protest constituency A, and in B, it is 0.177 (t-value is 2.25). H2 is weakly confirmed since both of the coefficients are significant at the 5% level.

H3 is tested by the use of the value of p_{43}. The estimated value of p_{43} is 0.512 (t-value is 7.77) in protest constituency A, and it is 0.544 (t-value is 8.73) in B. Therefore H3 is confirmed.

Path analysis confirms that findings in two data-sets A and B support three hypotheses, H1: hypothesis on generational unit, H2: hypothesis on contemporary political events, H3: hypothesis on experience of social movement participation. Although there is a weak point in that the estimated values of p_{32} are relatively low in each data-set, the theoretical model of political generational socialization is valid and effective by virtue of relatively great

Table 4 Regression analysis for generational political socialization

<Dependent variable> (Independent variables)	β	B	t-value	R^2	F-value
[*Protest constituency A*] N = 160					
<Contemporary political events>				0.070	0.97**
(1968–1969s Generation)	0.265	0.173	3.46**		
<Social movement participation>				0.055	4.57*
(Contemporary political events)	0.202	0.354	2.51*		
(1968–1969s Generation)	0.077	0.088	0.96		
<Protest engagement>				0.358	29.03**
(Social movement participation)	0.512	1.023	7.77**		
(Contemporary political events)	0.118	0.411	1.74		
(1968–69 s Generation)	0.156	0.355	2.34*		
[*Protest constituency B*] N = 186					
<Contemporary political events>				0.168	37.21**
(1968–1969s Generation)	0.410	0.325	6.10**		
<Social movement participation>				0.055	5.35*
(Contemporary political events)	0.177	0.285	2.25*		
(1968–1969s Generation)	0.098	0.125	1.24		
<Protest engagement>				0.333	30.26**
(Social movement participation)	0.544	1.240	8.73**		
(Contemporary political events)	0.105	0.387	1.57		
(1968–1969s Generation)	0.004	0.012	0.06		

** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$

values of coefficients of determination. In protest constituency A, the value of R^2 is 0.358, and in B it is 0.333.[9]

Conclusion

This research focused on two questions: have people who were politically socialized by confrontational politics in late 1960s continued to engage in the radical movement; and at present, are social movements supported by their protest energies? This analysis found continued political engagement of the generation shaped by late-1960s Japanese confrontational politics. Both data-sets from protest constituencies A and B confirm that people belonging to 1968–69s generation formed their political faith during the period of radicalized campus conflict. People who attained their political orientation during this period participated in later social movements. Finally this analysis of genera-tion protest among Japanese youth in the late 1960s confirmed that people who

[9] Braungart (1971) as another theoretical model of generational political socialization reports an R^2 of 0.288, 0.230 is reported in Fendrich (1977) and 0.189 is reported in Wood and Ng (1980).

Fig. 2 Path diagram for generational political socialization

participated in social movements engaged in radical protest behavior. Although the data-sets are limited to particular protest constituencies, they strongly confirm that people who were politically socialized during late-1960s confrontation politics kept their radicalism by sharing contemporary political events and participating in social movements in the process of generational political socialization. Also, their protest energies are great in current protest constituencies as the source of social movements, since they tend to engage in protest behavior with high risk. People who were politically socialized during late-1960s confrontation politics are still the core of protests at the present.

This paper demonstrates the continuance and transformation of political socialization through the formation of the generational unit in contemporary Japanese political society. Future research on political socialization can

continue to specify the unique social and cultural factors that account for continuity of protests across specific generations.

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Young Koreans Against Ethnic Discrimination in Japan: A Case Study of a Grassroots and Networking-Style Movement (*Mintôren*)

Yasunori Fukuoka and Yukiko Tsujiyama

Introduction

Japan is often described as a homog eneous society free of ethnic discrimination. In fact, Japan has its share of ethnic minorities, among them the Ainu, an indigenous people centralized in Hokkaido in northern Japan, and over a million ethnic Koreans who were brought to Japan during its colonization of Korea.[1] All experienced discrimination in Japanese society.

This paper focuses on young Koreans in Japan who have combated ethnic discrimination since the 1970s. It examines their struggle in relation to the *Mintôren* (the National Council for Combating Discrimination against Ethnic Peoples in Japan), a grassroots and networking-style social movement.[2] The Mintôren movement has been the primary leader of movements for human rights in Japan. This movement became prominent after the 1970s. Crucial to the mobilization of this movement has been the struggle for self-identity by second- and third-generation Korean youth raised in Japan. It is possible for

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Korean and Japanese names are given in traditional East Asian order, family name first.

[1] In addition, as a result of the colonization of Taiwan there are several hundred thousand Chinese, and Okinawans may also be viewed as an ethnic group. There has also been a rapid increase in foreign workers, primarily from Asia and South America.

[2] The Japanese name for the National Council for Combating Discrimination against Ethnic Peoples in Japan, *Mintôren*, is itself an abbreviation for *Minzoku Sabetsu to Tatakau Renraku Kyôgikai*. It was launched in 1975, and, in 1995, changed its name to the "Human Rights Association for Koreans in Japan" (*Zainichi Korian Jinken Kyôkai*). At the same time, the group's informal networking style of organization was replaced by one with a strong central executive. Some members were unhappy with these changes, and are now hoping to rebuild the old Mintôren movement. Thus, the Mintôren movement has effectively split into two different groups. Nevertheless, the three groups that will be discussed in this paper – the *Mukuge* Society, the *Tokebi* Children's Club, and the Blue Hill Association – continue to be leading grassroots organizations within their respective communities.

Korean youth to "pass" as Japanese in everyday life. Many choose to do so, but suffer identity conflict as a result. Some youth, however, consciously opt to reveal their Korean identity, suffer the inevitable prejudicial treatment by Japanese schoolmates. These youth become the backbone of movements for changing the monolithic ethnic culture of Japan.

Social movement theory stresses the importance of "cognitive liberation" (McAdam 1982), new framing (Snow and Benford 1988), and the formation of collective identity (Melucci 1995) for protest mobilization to occur. This paper will examine how under oppressive cultural conditions a subjective transformation of deeply socialized identity may be necessary for movement mobilization to occur. Only with such a subjective transformation can some oppressed people identify and "frame" their situation an as injustice, and hence feel justified in mobilizing against it. Also, this paper demonstrates the variety of potential selves possible under oppressive social and cultural conditions, only some of which support protest activity.

Prior to 1970, movements opposed to ethnic discrimination in Japan were few. This is not to suggest that there were no organized movements that helped Koreans survive in Japan. As early as October 1945, such organizations had been formed. Following the partitioning of the Korean peninsula, Koreans in Japan established two organizations reflecting that division: the Korean Residents Union in Japan (*Mindan*) founded in 1948, backs the Republic of Korea in the south. In contrast, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (*Chongryun*) founded in 1955, supports the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north. The leaders of both organizations, who were first-generation ethnic Koreans, strongly desired to return to their homeland and considered Japan merely a temporary home. They gave priority to Korean reunification rather than to the problem of discrimination in Japan. Consequently, these movements never developed into full-fledged, radical movements to fight discrimination and to demand civil rights.

Today, second- and third-generation ethnic Koreans are the majority of Koreans in Japan. Born and raised in Japan, most of them attend Japanese schools, speak only Japanese, and lead fundamentally Japanese lifestyles. Nevertheless, as a result of anti-foreign government policies, many of them are not naturalized Japanese and have been denied the rights and status of full citizenship.

During the 1970s, consciousness of international human rights increased in Japan. Movements against discrimination toward Burakumin (descendants of Japan's former outcasts), the disabled, and women proliferated. Dissatisfied with their unfair treatment and experiences of racism, young ethnic Koreans began to organize a movement to eliminate discrimination in Japan. They called this movement *Mintôren* (the National Council for Combating Discrimination against Ethnic Peoples in Japan). In contrast to the two earlier and larger Korean organizations mentioned above, the Mintôren movement was started by individuals and small groups, and eventually spread across the entire country.

In 1970, a landmark case of symbolic importance occurred. This case provided the spark that led to the formation of the Mintôren movement. A young ethnic Korean, using an assumed Japanese name, passed a company test for Hitachi. However, when the company learned he was Korean, he was refused employment. He appealed in court, winning the case in 1974. At the time, some ethnic Korean organizations criticized his action, saying that by working for a major Japanese firm he was trying to assimilate. However, during the court battle the base of support for his case spread among both Korean and Japanese youths. The case galvanized the youth to form the Mintôren movement with the objective of fighting ethnic discrimination in Japan. Subsequently, ever since the 1970s, the Mintôren movement has been the leading grassroots organization promoting the human rights of Koreans in Japan. It has a number of local chapters throughout Japan, which will be described further in the section on the life histories of Mintôren members.

This paper will first provide a brief historical background and an examination of the present conditions of Koreans in Japan. Next, the life histories of three young Korean members of the Mintôren movement will be detailed and their activist motivations examined. Finally, the varying attitudes toward discrimination among both the Mintôren movement members and other young Koreans in Japan will be examined. This will shed light on the special qualities of the Mintôren movement, and on the interaction between identity and movement activity, a subject of much theoretical interest. What causes some members of a stigmatized minority to overcome the effects of the stigma and protest against it? Also, what effect does identity have on strategy?

Social scientific research on Koreans in Japan has developed rapidly since the 1990s. In particular, the study of identity formation in Korean communities has made significant progress with the publication of seminal works based on comprehensive fieldwork within large sectors of the community. Sonia Ryang's *North Koreans in Japan* is based on a participant-observation study of Chongryun members across generations (Ryang 1997). Also, research that Fukuoka conducted with Kim Myung-Soo in 1993 is based on a quantitative analysis of young South Koreans in Japan (ranging in age from 18 to 30) (Fukuoka and Kim 1997). Finally, our previous research on the identities of young Koreans in Japan is based on over 150 interviews, ranging from 3 to 5 h in duration, that we conducted from 1988 to 1991 (Fukuoka and Tsujiyama 1991a, b; Fukuoka 1993, 2000). These interviews encompass the life-stories of Korean youth of South Korean, North Korean, and Japanese nationalities.

The materials in this paper are drawn from our previous research and also based on extensive interviews. The life history method is especially important for uncovering the critical moments of an individual's identity formation, particularly as it relates to his or her participation in social movements against discrimination.

Past and Present

In 1910, Japan annexed Korea. While the Japanese government made all Koreans into "subject-citizens" of Japan, Japanese colonial policy against Korea was extremely cruel.[3] From 1910 to 1918, Japanese authorities created a list of all Korean landowners and confiscated their lands. From 1920 to 1934, Japan initiated a project to increase Korean rice production and much of the rice Koreans produced was appropriated and exported to Japan. As a consequence, many Korean farmers attempted to escape the wretched conditions that Japanese colonial policy imposed on them by seeking employment in Japan. They often brought their families and, by 1938, there were about 800,000 Koreans in Japan. From 1939, many Koreans were brought to Japan to serve as forced labor in Japanese mines and factories. By the end of World War Two in 1945, there were an estimated 2,300,000 Koreans in Japan (Park 1965).

Thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule brought an intensification of discrimination against Koreans in Japan. Two major events characterize the nature of this rule: (1) Japanese authorities and private citizens massacred thousands of Koreans at the time of the Great Kantô Earthquake (1923) on groundless rumors that Koreans had poisoned wells; and (2) under the imperial assimilation policy, Koreans were forced to assimilate and adopt Japanese identities (Hatada ed. 1987; Kim 1997).

With the war's end in August 1945, Koreans were liberated. Most who had been forced to come to Japan returned to their homeland. But among those who had come to Japan earlier with their families and relatives to seek employment, about 600,000 Koreans chose to remain. Although most of them also desired to return to their homeland, they had already lost any socio-economic base for life in Korea. The partitioning of the Korean peninsula and economic turmoil further gave them little choice but to remain in Japan (Fukuoka 1993, 2000).

The postwar Japanese government adopted numerous contradictory policies toward un-repatriated Koreans that aimed primarily to control their activities. Following the GHQ's (General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) definition of Koreans as persons of a "third country" who were neither victors nor vanquished, the Japanese government stripped Koreans of their rights as both Japanese citizens and as foreigners. From August 1945 to April 1952, Koreans in Japan were still officially Japanese nationals. However, in December 1945, Japanese authorities began to disenfranchise un-repatriated Koreans because they were not "true" Japanese according to the claim that their family registry, or *koseki*, did not exist in

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[3] In addition to engaging in economic exploitation of the Korean peninsula, the Japanese government also forced its Korean subjects to adhere to its cultural assimilation policy. In particular, during World War Two, Japan's colonial rule over Korea showed an obsessive concern with thoroughgoing, comprehensive assimilation that involved forcing Koreans to use the Japanese language, worship the Japanese emperor, and adopt Japanese names.

Japan. Eventually, in 1947, they were made to register under the Alien Registration Ordinance. At the same time, in 1948, the government suppressed Korean schools that had been established in the postwar period on the grounds that it was ludicrous for Koreans to receive education as foreigners (Fukuoka 1993, 2000).

On April 28, 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was promulgated and the Japanese government unilaterally stripped Korean residents of their Japanese nationality. It stated that "until their status was decided legally, they could remain residents in Japan without having obtained resident qualification," thus placing their status in legal limbo. The Alien Registration Law forced Korean residents to submit to fingerprinting, a procedure not required of Japanese citizens. Viewed by the Japanese government as a potentially dangerous and subversive element, they continued to be the targets of security regulation.

The Republic of Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty (1965) granted "permanent resident" status to Koreans who had resided in Japan prior to the end of the war. The Japanese government does not officially recognize the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north and it was only after 1982 that Japan granted "exceptional permanent residence" to North Korean nationals. Under intense international pressure, the social welfare system was extended to cover foreign permanent residents during the same time. In 1991, a new law was passed, cumbersomely entitled the "Special Law for the Handling of Immigration Affairs of Persons Who Have Divested Themselves of Japanese Nationality on the Basis of Peace Treaties with Japan." This unified all of the previous treaties under which residents of former Japanese colonies were treated, giving them uniform status as "special permanent residents." Finally, in 1992, a partial reform of the Alien Registration Law removed from permanent residents the hated fingerprinting requirement (Hirowatari 1994).

Currently, the number of ethnic Koreans in Japan is estimated to exceed one million or about 1% of the population of Japan.[4] Discrimination against them continues and Japanese society has yet to recognize their human rights.

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[4] At the end of 1996, there were 657,159 registered foreigners in Japan with North or South Korean nationality. They accounted for 46.4% of the total of 1,415,136 foreigners registered in Japan. Of course, among them are South Korean newcomers who have come to Japan to work or study, but the majority are Koreans who live in Japan for the aforementioned reasons, most of whom today are second-, third-, and fourth-generation Koreans in Japan. The Japanese Nationality Law is not based on place of birth but on bloodline, so even if one is born in Japan, one does not automatically acquire Japanese citizenship. From 1952 to 1996, the number of "naturalized" Koreans holding Japanese citizenship was just over 200,000. Naturally, their children also hold Japanese citizenship. Others have acquired Japanese citizenship as the offspring or descendants of "international marriages" between Japanese and Koreans. Thus, we can estimate that the total ethnic Korean population in Japan exceeds one million.

Patterns of Discrimination

In the area of education, most school-age Koreans in Japan attend public or private Japanese schools,[5] the majority adopting Japanese names in place of their real ethnic Korean names. Hence, they receive their education not as Koreans but as "Japanese," are raised without the least knowledge of the Korean language, and are exposed to Japanese prejudices and discrimination in school and society. As our interviews demonstrate, Japanese schools often cultivate a negative image of Koreans. Among our interviewees that attempted to "pass" by adopting Japanese names, when their Korean identity surfaced, their friends and, in some cases, even their teachers discriminated against them (Fukuoka and Tsujiyama 1991a).

Some Korean students attend ethnic Korean schools. Most of these schools are sponsored by Chongryun (pro-North Korea). As of 1993, there were 81 ethnic Korean elementary schools, 57 middle schools, 12 high schools and 1 university. There are just four schools run by the South Korean community. Although Korean ethnic schools were suppressed by the Japanese government in 1948, they were rebuilt largely through the financial support of individual Koreans in Japan. The Ministry of Education, however, does not officially recognize these schools. Consequently, until 2004, graduates of ethnic high schools could not take the Japanese college examination for entry into national universities or, in the cases of private and regional universities, without the special permission of the university authorities (Fukuoka 1993, 2000).

Private firms have often discriminated against Koreans in their employment practices. Koreans have also been excluded from holding civil service positions because such positions have required Japanese nationality (Fukuoka and Tsujiyama 1991a, b). Although in recent years employment discrimination has lessened somewhat in the wake of movements against discrimination, histori-cally, most Koreans have been limited to low-level occupations like day-laborers, or self-service jobs such as *pachinko* (pinball) parlor managers, Korean barbecue house proprietors, scrap collectors, and small family subcontractors.

Mixed marriages between Japanese and ethnic Koreans remain a compli-cated issue. In cases where a Japanese youth announces intent to wed a Korean, opposition has been expressed by parents and relatives on both sides. The objections of Korean parents often stem from strong anti-Japanese feelings based on their experiences of discrimination. Koreans may also oppose such marriages because they wish to preserve bloodlines. On the other hand, there have been many cases where marriages have been opposed by Japanese because the prospective spouse was an ethnic Korean. Nevertheless, exogamous

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[5] In 1986, the number of Korean children of North or South Korean nationality attending primary and secondary schools was about 150,000, among which 130,000 (86%) attended Japanese schools and the remaining 20,000 (14%) attended Korean ethnic schools: 13% in ethnic schools run by Chongryun and 1% in those run by Mindan. However, the numbers have decreased consistently over the years.

marriages to Japanese have been increasing steadily.[6] Except for those Koreans who live in Korean communities, attend ethnic schools, or participate in anti-discrimination movements, most young Koreans are unable to make friends among their ethnic cohort because most Korean communities are scattered and it is often impossible to determine who is a Korean among those using assumed Japanese names. Consequently, many young Koreans choose Japanese as their marriage partners (Fukuoka 1993, 2000; Fukuoka and Kim 1997).

Koreans in Japan continue to encounter housing discrimination and have often been turned down for apartments by real estate agents. In 1989, a Korean in Osaka filed the first legal suit against a real estate agent for unjustly refusing to lease him an apartment and against Osaka authorities who were reluctant to become involved in cases of ethnic discrimination (Fukuoka 1993, 2000). The Korean population in Japan continues to encounter discrimination in virtually all areas of life in Japan.

Life Histories of the Mintôren Movement Members

Unlike Mindan or Chongryun, the Mintôren movement has not been a single, hierarchic organization. Although established as a result of the Hitachi employment discrimination case, it created small groups to battle ethnic discrimination on a regional level throughout the country. Indeed, it was by means of such small groups and solidarity networks that the Mintôren movement was established. Accordingly, it fits the decentralized model of a social movement organization.

Three central core groups which form the Mintôren movement include: (1) the *Mukuge* Society in Takatsuki City, Osaka, (2) the *Tokebi* Children's Club in Yao City, Osaka, and (3) the Blue Hill Association (*Seikyû-sha*) in Kawasaki City, Kanagawa.[7] The life history of a typical member of each group demonstrates the member's commitment to the movement and the importance of a shared Mintôren movement collective identity.

Case 1: Lee Kyung-Jae (Founder of the Mukuge Society)

The Mukuge Society conducts its activities among small, ethnic Korean villages in Takatsuki City, Osaka. Its founder, Lee Kyung-Jae, established the

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[6] In 1995, of 8,953 total resident Korean marriages, 1,485 (16.6%) were between Koreans and 7,363 (82.2%) were between Koreans and Japanese. However, the latter includes marriages between Koreans in Japan and ethnic Koreans who hold Japanese nationality, and those between Japanese men and Korea-born women, a growing trend in recent years.

[7] It is extremely rare for organization combating discrimination against Koreans to receive public funds from local governments. The three cases introduced in this paper are examples where funding was obtained from local governments as a result of negotiation.

organization immediately upon graduating from high school in 1972, as a means of supporting Korean boys and girls in their struggle against racism.[8]

Lee Kyung-Jae was born in Nariai in Takatsuki City in 1954. He is a second-generation Korean resident with South Korean nationality. Nariai is a village composed of only about 35 Korean households. It was here that the Japanese army assembled over 10,000 Korean laborers, forcing them to dig tunnels through the mountainside in order to construct secret military factories. After the war, the site of the worker's quarters became the center of the Korean village. The area is far more impoverished than the surrounding Japanese villages, and it has become an object of prejudice.

Both of Lee's parents were born in Korea and came to Japan during the colonial period. Their life was a poor one. Lee's father was a day-laborer and scrape collector; his mother worked in a quarry. Both parents spoke Japanese at home because his mother, who had come to Japan at the age of three, could no longer speak Korean. Neither parent received an education nor are they able to read and write Korean or Japanese.

Lee attended Japanese public schools under the name "Ri Keisai," the Japanese reading of his Korean name. During his school days, Lee saw Korean students bullied by their Japanese classmates, and witnessed that only Korean students including himself were unjustly searched by teachers when some money mysteriously disappeared in school. Because of these experiences he began to hate Koreans and wanted to become Japanese. The fact that his family was poor reinforced his hatred toward Koreans.

During middle school, hoping to conceal his Korean ethnicity, Lee adopted the Japanese assumed name, "Takayasu Keisai." His desire to pass as Japanese was so strong that, at school, he even refused to play with Korean friends whom he had known since childhood. After his first year, bored by school, he and two Korean friends hopped a freight train and ran away from home. The incident shocked a number of his Japanese teachers, who thought it important that Korean children receive an education that makes them aware of their Korean identity. Eventually, he returned to school. One of Lee's teachers, Y.H., raised the Korean problem in class. It was from her that Takayasu Keisai, who blamed his family's poverty on his father's "laziness" and who "hated Koreans," learned that the real culprit was discrimination. Through her efforts and the support of his Japanese friends, a gradual revolution occurred in Lee's self-concept. He asserted his Korean ethnicity to his classmates (*Chôsenjin sengen*), and at his middle school graduation ceremony, declared Lee Kyung-Jae his real name (*honmyô sengen*).[9]

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[8] Our interview with Lee Kyung-Jae was conducted on December 18, 1989.

[9] "*Honmyô sengen*" is the act of telling friends one wishes to be called by one's real ethnic name. At such times, Koreans relate their experiences of discrimination and seek Japanese understanding of the Korean problem. There are many cases where this is carried out by Japanese teachers who teach anti-discrimination classes. Such declarations are thought to be the first step toward creating children who will resist discrimination.

Lee advanced to a private high school that did not deal with the Korean issue. Completely disappointed, he resumed the use of his assumed Japanese name "Takayasu Keisai" and concealed his Korean identity from friends. When he graduated from high school in 1972, his teacher refused to help him find a job. Graduating without any job prospects, Lee was inevitably forced to support himself with part-time work.

The same year, Lee called upon the Korean youths of Nariai to join him in forming the Mukuge Society. Lee knew that the Korean students were prone to violence and delinquency, but he thought that responsibility for raising Korean children who would resist discrimination rested not only with Japanese teachers but also with Koreans themselves. He chose the name, the Mukuge Society, because he had heard that during the Japanese colonial period, the *mukuge* (althaea) flower was a symbol of Korean resistance against Japanese colonial aggression. From the group's inception, Lee resolved to use his Korean name.

At first, the organization was unable to attract members and experienced several setbacks. But Lee overcame these problems. The organization began to take off in 1978 when it started a club for the local children of Nariai. At the same time, Lee and his friends began negotiations with the city office of Takatsuki and, in 1985, the Takatsuki Board of Education established the "Division of Resident Korean Education" as a section of the city board of education. At the time of the interview, of six full-time staffers of the Mukuge Society, two held official positions as civil servants and two as part-time employees. Despite the fact that they did not have Japanese nationality, they were able to become civil servants by successfully eliminating the Japanese nationality requirement for Takatsuki City employees.

The objective of the Mukuge Society and the Division of Resident Korean Education is to raise Korean children free of self-hatred, to fight ethnic discrimination, and to take pride in their identity as Koreans in Japan. Today in Takatsuki, the Mukuge Society is actively carrying out this objective. It has organized children's clubs in three elementary schools, four middle schools, and three regional offices, and has helped Korean children to learn about themselves. It has also established a high-school students' club where both Korean and Japanese students discuss the problems of Koreans in Japan. In addition, the Mukuge Society offers Japanese language classes for the first-generation Koreans who have difficulty in reading and writing Japanese.

After working as an active full-time member of the Mukuge Society from 1979 to 1988, Lee Kyung-Jae eventually started to work at a Korean-managed real estate agency while acting as a the Mukuge Society representative.[10]

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[10] In 1982, while continuing these activities, Lee Kyung-Jae renewed his passbook, but refused to be fingerprinted because he felt impermissible any system that violated the human rights of Koreans in Japan. As a result, he was arrested by the police in 1985 and indicted for violating the Alien Registration Law. However, with the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989, the Supreme Court granted Lee an official pardon. Many Mintôren movement members refused to be fingerprinted. Later Kim Soo-Il also refused.

This brief biography shows that, despite several setbacks, Lee continued, sometimes by himself, to combat ethnic discrimination. Based on our interview we suggest three factors that account for his activism. First, Lee reconsidered his hatred of himself and his parents for being Korean. He told us, "I hated the fact that I was Korean and hid it. I thought we were poor because we were Koreans. I hated the fact that I was born to Korean parents. If I had hated my father because he beat me, that would have made some sense. But if my hatred toward him came from the fact that I was born Korean because of him, this hatred cannot be justified. I first became aware of this when I was a middle-school student. It took a long time, but I finally realized that discrimination was the real culprit." This awareness gave Lee an inner drive to continue his battle against discrimination. Lee reflexively reconstituted his culturally constructed identity.

Second, Lee felt a strong sense of responsibility as a leader to help younger ethnic Koreans not to give up the struggle. "I keep telling the younger kids, 'If you become delinquents and do bad things, then the Japanese will think that all Koreans are bad. Don't give up your struggle against discrimination.' My words would come back to haunt me, if I didn't live up to them." His driving ethic of responsibility indicates his strong sense of collective identity with the entire Korean community.

Third, Lee fully realized that, in order to battle discrimination in Nariai, one must fight the battle oneself, without relying on others. In advancing his movement, Lee visited local chapters of Mindan and Chongryun. "I said to them, 'I'd like your cooperation to make our Nariai a good community.' But they ignored me, saying, 'Lee, you shouldn't concern yourself with such trifles. We've got a wonderful homeland, Korea.'" This experience convinced him that only the residents of Nariai could attack the problem of ridding the community of discrimination. In this situation, Lee could not be a "free rider" because no national movement existed that would pursue his goals. He had to start organizing a grassroots movement within the community of Nariai itself.

Case 2: Son Soo-Gil (Active Member of Tokebi Children's Club)

In 1974, Suh Jung-Woo (b. 1954; second-generation ethnic Korean) established the Tokebi Children's Club with the aim of creating a society in which Koreans and Japanese could live in harmony without discrimination and to foster self-pride among Korean children. The organization's name derives from *Tokebi*, a humorous, heroic spirit that appears in Korean folktales.

The organization is based in Yasunaka in Yao City, Osaka. Yasunaka is a Burakumin section of Yao City settled by Japanese who were classified as outcasts under Japan's feudal system of social stratification. Today, the area is populated by their descendants who remain targets of Japanese social discrimination. Scattered throughout Japan, there are several areas where

Koreans reside in Burakumin villages. Buraku residents have accepted Koreans as fellow victims of discrimination. Yasunaka is one such community.

Son Soo-Gil, a third-generation Korean holding South Korean nationality, was born into this community in 1966.[11] He grew up with the Tokebi Children's Club and currently participates as one of its graduates. Both Son's parents were born in Japan, neither receiving an education. Although they can speak Japanese, they can neither read nor write it. Son's father worked as a manual laborer, his mother as a part-time worker. Their jobs provided for daily expenses, but their home was a barrack-like hut amidst the wretched poverty of the community.

As a child Son Soo-Gil attended a Japanese public elementary school under the assumed Japanese name, "Yamamoto Hideyoshi." After classes, he attended the Buraku Children's Liberation Club (*Kaihô Kodomo-kai*). There, he was taught about the Buraku problem and learned that his community was a Buraku area. At this time, his self-image was as a Japanese and a "child of the Buraku."

Son began his activities with the Tokebi Children's Club as a third-grader. It was at this time that he first realized he was Korean. "The first thing I realized was that I had two names. Yamamoto Hideyoshi and Son Soo-Gil. When I asked my adviser, 'Why do I have the name Son Soo-Gil?,' he said, 'Because you're Korean.'" Son was ashamed of the name. "At the time I didn't know why, but I thought that Koreans were bad." But the Tokebi Children's Club instilled in him the necessity of using one's Korean name. "They told me, 'We, Koreans, are forced to adopt Japanese names. Yet we are still discriminated against. Use your real name and fight discrimination.'"

When he was a fifth-grader at the recommendation of his school teacher, Son Soo-Gil and a classmate, Lee Chang-Jae, announced their Korean names over the school's closed-circuit television system. "I was worried that I would lose my Japanese friends if they knew I was Korean," he said. But the Buraku children were especially very warm and supportive. Still, some friends ridiculed his Korean name and teased him because its pronunciation resembles that of *son*, a Japanese word meaning "disadvantage," "handicap." At that time he argued with them: "I am determined to use my real name. Don't poke fun at me!"

As a middle-school student, Son's relationship with Buraku children grew even deeper. "I continued to play with Buraku children," he recalled. "We had discussions. There were times when we'd stay up all night, talking, sharing our tears. It wasn't the kind of superficial discussion that says, 'Discrimination against fellow human beings is wrong.' We'd think about Buraku and ethnic discrimination together, as Koreans different from the Japanese. We could really relate to one another."

Son and Lee advanced to different high schools. When he was a high school senior, Son began to consider the kind of job he would like after graduation, but although his teachers helped his Japanese classmates find a job, they would not

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[11] Our interview with Son Soo-Gil was conducted on December 16, 1989.

help Korean students. The Tokebi Children's Club's Suh Jung-Woo recommended that Son and Lee apply to take the exam for a position at the post office. The position of a postal delivery boy, with its promise of steady employment and guaranteed sick-leaves, was attractive to both boys. However, because the position was a national civil service position, the nationality clause prohibiting non-Japanese nationals from sitting for the examination remained an obstacle. Despite these difficulties, the boys were determined to fight such discrimination for the benefit of those who would come after them. On September 1, 1983, they picked up examination forms at the Osaka Central Post Office. But their applications were rejected. Marshalling the support of fellow Koreans and Japanese, they continued to negotiate with the postal authorities. As a result, the following year the nationality clause for postal delivery boys was eliminated. The two studied hard and passed the examination. In April 1985, a year after they graduated high school, both were hired by the Osaka Postal Service.

The same year, five Koreans, including Son and Lee, were hired as delivery boys. This did not mean, however, that ethnic discrimination within the postal service ceased with their employment. "Koreans Go Home," "Kill the Koreans" were some of the graffiti occasionally scrawled on office walls. In response to this discrimination, Son and Lee formed the "Association of Korean Postal Workers to Consider the Problems of Koreans in Japan." At the time of the interview, its membership had increased to sixteen, of which thirteen were working under their Korean names. Their hope is to create a discrimination-free workplace where Koreans can work in peace of mind under their Korean names. The case of Son Soo-Gil shows how contact with earlier social movements, can provide alternatives to the dominant discriminatory ideologies and provide the impetus for future organizing.

Case 3: Kim Soo-Il (Core Member of Blue Hill Association)

The Blue Hill Association is located in the Sakuramoto neighborhood of Kawasaki City, near Tokyo. From Ikegami neighborhood to Sakuramoto neighborhood resides a large ethnic Korean community. It is an area where many Korean laborers were brought to build military factories during the war. In 1974, the Blue Hill Association, whose parent body is the local Korean Christian Church, began to urge Korean kids to use their real names, learn about their Korean heritage, and resist discrimination. This association was named, *Seikyû-sha* (*Seikyû* means Blue Hills, or, in Korean, Ch'ong-gu), since it is another name for Korea, meaning beautiful green mountains and rivers.

Kim Soo-Il, a second-generation Korean, was born in 1961 in Ikegami-cho, Kawasaki City.[12] Today he works on the staff of Fureai Hall, a community

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[12] Our interview with Kim Soo-Il was conducted on February 17, 1990.

center, which was established in Sakuramoto in 1988 by the city in response to the demands from the Blue Hill Association. The word *fureai* is Japanese and means "opening one's heart to others," reflecting the hall's aim of fostering exchanges between foreign residents, particularly Korean residents, and Japanese as fellow citizens of Kawasaki.[13]

Kim Soo-Il's parents were born in Korea and came to Japan during the colonial period. His father attended school but dropped out because of poverty. Unable to find a job, he supported the family by collecting and selling scrap metal. His mother, who was employed at a Korean barbecue house, died at age 62. As a child Kim adopted the Japanese assumed name, "Kaneyama Hidekazu." Kim recalled, "I remember it clearly. My elder brother laughed at me when I told him, 'I'm Japanese.'" It was then that Kim realized he was Korean. From his third year of elementary school, Hidekazu was full of self-hate, loathing his Korean ancestry: "I hated myself. I mean really despised myself, you know. Myself and the fact I was Korean. I wanted to be Japanese. There was nothing pleasant about being Korean. We were poor. Dad would drink a lot and become violent."

Hidekazu, a large but quiet child, was often bullied by his classmates until fourth grade. His teachers also treated him badly. There were other ethnic Koreans in class but, he said, "They all looked Japanese to me. I looked at people from the point of view of self-preservation." As a middle-school student, in the eyes of his teachers, "Kaneyama Hidekazu" was a model student. He was active as a committee member on the student council, and also as a member of the Judo club. However, his feelings of self-hatred intensified inside himself; he desperately concealed the fact of his Korean ethnicity from friends. Indeed, whenever his mother prepared a boxed-lunch containing *kimchi* (Korean pickles) for him to take to school, he would refuse to eat it, fearing that if someone were to notice, his secret would be revealed.

This was also a time when he saw his elder brother and sister encounter the barrier of discrimination. His elder brother graduated from technical high school, but was the only student in his class not to find a job and was eventually forced to take a job as a truck driver. His elder sister, a graduate of a commercial high school, worked in a department store but burst into tears when she learned she was singled out for a warehouse assignment. These setbacks made the atmosphere at home oppressive.

In high school, M.T., Kim's teacher, told him the school had a Korean problem study group and invited him to participate. Upon learning this, Kim thought he had come to a ridiculous school. But M.T., a Japanese, taught passionately about the history of Japan-Korean relations, and continued to urge Kim to attend. Kim finally came to trust M.T. One day a student in class

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[13] At first, local Japanese residents opposed Fureai Hall and its opening was delayed a year. However, its achievements came to be looked on favorably by Japanese. In 1990, the Japanese director was replaced by one of the Mintôren movement's most able leaders, Bae Jung-Do (b. 1944), himself a second-generation Korean.

said, "Koreans are scary." Kim gathered up his courage and blurted, "I'm Korean." Early in his sophomore year of high school, at the suggestion of M.T., Kim proclaimed his Korean name in class. However, of ten teachers, eight continued to refer to him by his assumed Japanese name, "Kaneyama," and friends who called him by his assumed name increased. Ironically, although he had resolved to use his real name, few would call him by it.

As a result Kim came to think that Japanese could not be trusted. What enabled Kim to overcome this setback was a Japanese friend who, during a class discussion, said, "I respect Kim. It's important to recognize him as a Korean." Kim wanted to become friends with such people. "As a Korean I want to live with my real name and fight discrimination."

Kim advanced to a vocational school, participating in the Blue Hill Association as a volunteer. During the first year, he put in three nights a week, and the second year every night as a volunteer in charge of teaching middle-school Korean students. "I have a very strong attachment to Kawasaki. I wanted to help younger kids as someone who has himself experienced the pain of being a Korean in Japan." Busy with his activities for the Blue Hill Association, it took Kim 8 years finally to graduate from vocational school. "I've given my youth to the Blue Hill Association," he said. When he was 21 years old, he began to learn how to play the *jang-gu* (a Korean drum) at the Blue Hill Association because he wanted to carry on the legacy of his ethnic heritage.

In 1988, Kim married a Japanese. Until a few years before that time, he had only considered marrying a Korean. But one day he noticed that there was a contradiction between his public advocacy of integration and his private life. "Nationality isn't everything. The problem isn't whether one is Korean or Japanese, but the way one lives."

Under Japan's Nationality Law, citizenship is based on "blood," not birthplace. In 1984, the Nationality Law was revised to permit children to acquire Japanese nationality through either parent, not just through the father. Consequently, Kim's child acquired Japanese nationality through her Japanese mother. Nonetheless, the couple decided to give their child a Korean name and to cultivate in her an awareness of her Korean identity despite her Japanese nationality.

Kim's story illustrates the effect of local social mobilization – that of the Kawasaki Fureai Hall – upon reflexive cultural agency. Rather than simply strengthening and legitimizing his own ethnic identity, Kim also adopted and came to live by a "human identity" that has enabled him to work in cooperation with various members of his local community.

General Schema

From these three life histories of the Mintôren movement members, one can construct a general schema of their identity crises and the strategies they employed to resolve these crises. The general schema is as follows:

As second- and third-generation Koreans, the three activists share the same experience in their upbringing: on the one hand, they have assimilated into Japanese society; on the other, they have more or less retained their Korean ethnicity and have been aware of ethnic discrimination by Japanese. This is true not only of the Mintôren movement members but of young Koreans in general. That is, born and raised in Japan, they have been socialized as Japanese, absorbing the language and culture of Japan. Many adopt assumed Japanese names, attending school and receiving education as "Japanese." Pervasive prejudice and discrimination forced them to assimilate. Conversely, young Koreans in Japan still maintain a degree of knowledge of their ethnicity. While the degree varies with each individual, in their values and lifestyle, they have internalized that they are "essentially different" from the Japanese around them and most have tasted the bitter pill of discrimination. Consequently, many grow up feeling they are "different" from and "inferior" to the Japanese majority and suffer a crisis of identity (Fukuoka 1993, 2000; Fukuoka and Kim 1997).

Lee Kyung-Jae, Son Soo-Gil, and Kim Soo-Il overcame such self-doubts and established stable, self-respecting self-identities. Here, we would like to suggest some characteristics of the Mintôren movement that account for their identity transformation. First, they all came to the realization that the problem lay not in the fact that they were Koreans, but in the reality of discrimination against Koreans in Japanese society. Second, their source of their moral motivation was not anchored to the concept of Korea as a homeland. Rather, they all had a strong attachment to their communities in Japan and desired to establish their ethnic identity there. Third, in their struggle against ethnic discrimination they focused on their personal experiences in daily life. Fourth, they all stressed the importance of living in harmony with Japanese. This pattern of collective identity formation was common among young Korean activists forming the Mintôren movement in Japan. In the next section, we will discuss how the orientation of the Mintôren movement members differs from that of other young Koreans in Japan.

Identity Types of Young Ethnic Koreans and the Mintôren Movement Members

Many young Koreans in Japan experience the same difficulties as those of the informants described above. Among them are those who overcome their difficulties and who aim for a healthy self-identity. Members of the Mintôren movement are representative of this group. But the resolve to overcome adversity and to seek self-liberation is by no means limited to the Mintôren movement members. Indeed, there are also young Koreans who have internalized a strong sense of ethnic identity through attending ethnic schools from early childhood.

When we categorize the orientations of young Koreans in Japan based on their attitudes toward ethnic discrimination, we arrive at the following four types. These are ideal types; their definition stresses their distinct characteristics (Weber 1904). In as much as they are ideal typical, a single individual may in fact

**Interest in the history
of oppressed Koreans**

High

2. Nationalist	*1. Pluralist*

**Attachment
to the Japanese
communities**

Low ─────────────────────────── **High**

3. Individualist	*4. Assimilationist*

Low

Fig. 1 Classificatory framework for the construction of identity by young Koreans in Japan

combines features of the various types. Nonetheless, through this discussion one may better understand the characteristics of the Mintôren movement members.

The four ideal types of identity of young Koreans in Japan emerge from two axis (see Fig. 1). The vertical axis measures the strength and/or weakness of their interest in the history of oppressed Koreans; the horizontal axis measures the strength and/or weakness of their attachment to the Japanese communities in which they were born and raised. The resulting figure distinguishes the following four identity types: (1) Pluralist; (2) Nationalist; (3) Individualist; and (4) Assimilationist (Fukuoka 1993, 2000).

Pluralist Type

The words "mutual cooperation" symbolize the mentality of the pluralist type, whose core agenda is the realization of a society based on the recognition of ethnic differences but free of ethnic discrimination. That is, their aim is to solve the problem of social discrimination through "social change," accomplished at the local level, starting with their own communities and neighbors.

One observes the pluralist type primarily among the Mintôren movement members. A review of their life histories reveals that most adopted assumed Japanese names in their school years and, as a result of Japanese prejudice, grew up with a negative image of their identity as Koreans in Japan. However, in one form or another, they happened to learn about the history of Koreans in Japan, came to realize that the source of their problems was not the fact that they were born Korean but the reality of Japanese discrimination, and eventually came to take pride in their identity as Koreans in Japan. They strongly believe that they do not have a "homeland," but that their real home is the community in Japan

in which they were born and raised. They neither seek to return to the homeland nor advocate complete identification with the Japanese state. Rather their degree of attachment to their place of birth in Japan is quite strong.

Moreover, they maintain that in order to combat ethnic discrimination, one must use one's real ethnic name. They view the use of assumed Japanese names as merely a temporary escape from discrimination, not a solution. Whether intentional or not, individuals who adopt an assumed Japanese name conceal their Korean identity and lose the opportunity to meet with Japanese who show a willingness to understand anti-Korean discrimination.

A review of their life histories also reveals that many cannot speak Korean and lack a full appreciation of Korean culture. But they do not view this fact as shameful since it is merely the result of the circumstances over which they had no control. Still, they believe that it is "desirable" to be able to speak Korean and many have made efforts to do so.

In sum, for the pluralist type, there is still no fixed "model" lifestyle. They neither identify with Koreans in the homeland nor with Japanese, but are attempting to create their own identities and lifestyles as "Koreans in Japan."

Nationalist Type

"Overseas national" is the expression that represents the mentality of the nationalist type. Their core agenda is to contribute to the "development" and "reunification" of Korea. Consequently, they do not seek to assimilate into Japanese society, but define themselves as overseas nationals who feel compelled to support the resident Korean community. They attach tremendous importance to the preservation of their organization against Japanese government policies that attempt to violate their rights as overseas nationals. However, having taken this position, it is difficult for them to transcend their position as overseas nationals and demand various rights. Consequently, they generally evince a strong element of "self-isolation" in their battle against ethnic discrimination.

This type can be seen in the young Koreans who compose the active members of Chongryun. Typically, they attended Chongryun-sponsored ethnic schools and Chongryun's Korea University where they learned Korean history, language, and culture. As a result they have internalized a strong sense of pride in their Korean roots. In this sense, they have not experienced an ethnic identity crisis. Although they are often the targets of right-wing Japanese when en route to ethnic schools, they are proud, and display no self-hate based on their Korean ethnicity. They assert the unity of Korea. As a result of having learned of Japanese aggression against Korea, they are strongly critical of Japan and feel no attachment to it. For them Japan is "merely a foreign country." Their model is the native Korean and there are even those who say that they will return to Korea when it is reunified.

Through family, community, and the media, they have easily mastered the Japanese language, as well as Korean at ethnic schools. They view the ability of Koreans to speak Korean as totally natural, regarding those who cannot as "pitiful and no longer qualified to call themselves real Koreans." In principle, they believe they have only one real name: their given Korean one. However, in order to pass in Japanese society and escape the inconvenience that a Korean name would impose, several in fact do adopt Japanese names. Believing they already possess a strong sense of ethnic consciousness, they do not see the use of Japanese names for the sake of convenience as weakening their self-identity.

Those belonging to the nationalist type also have a tendency to restrict their activities to the ethnic Korean community. There are even those whose close friends are all Korean. One youth told us, "Although I have some Japanese acquaintances, I don't have any close Japanese friends." In work as well, most are employed at organizations and institutions affiliated with Chongryun, and there are many cases where they work for their parents. Believing that it is impossible to gain employment with Japanese firms, they do not even consider it. Compared with the pluralist type, due to this kind of self-isolation from Japanese society, the degree of personal experience of social discrimination is relatively low.

Individualist Type

"Self-realization" best represents the mentality of the individualist type, whose core agenda is the realization of self through the assertion of individualism. Their chosen response to social discrimination is to liberate themselves through social mobility.

The bearers of this identity type are mainly young people who aspire to attain an overseas education in the United States, work for multinational corporations, or achieve an elite life in Japan by going to a first-class college and joining a first-class company.[14] Typically, their life histories resemble those of the pluralist type, in that they feel a sense of incongruity at living in Japan as ethnic Koreans. But, unlike the pluralist type, they do not embrace a negative self-image, viewing the problem as one of the environment. In this sense, they are confident in their abilities and believe that they can change their circumstances by traveling overseas or by advancing themselves in Japan. One can probably describe their outlook as "cosmopolitan."

Because they aspire toward social mobility, their sense of community attachment is weak, and they are not particularly concerned with ethnic Korean history. Nor do they feel an attachment to either Japan or Korea in their relation as

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[14] During the course of interviews we met several young Koreans who were employed by major Japanese firms. We feel certain that the Mintôren movement method of combating ethnic discrimination played a vital role in enabling their attainment.

individuals to the state. Nor do they pay much attention to the question of whether they should use Korean names or Japanese ones. In interpersonal relationships, they feel a sense of liberation with strong individualists, who are not preoccupied with affiliation, but who value individual achievement instead. In terms of language, rather than Korean they are passionate about English, believing that mastering it will help advance their careers and opportunities for social mobility.

Assimilationist Type

The word which best symbolizes the mentality of the assimilationist type is "naturalization." Their core agenda is to "become Japanese." They believe that by assimilating they can exist without experiencing ethnic discrimination.

The bearers of this type are those young people who naturalize. Typically, they are raised in an environment surrounded only by Japanese, the entire family itself adopting a Japanese name and concealing their Korean ethnicity. Even at home, it is rare that ethnicity is preserved. However as they mature, they begin to internalize the negative image of Koreans embraced by Japanese. They are pained when they discover that they are ethnic Koreans. They attempt to cope with this incongruity by adapting to Japanese society.

It is a common characteristic that they have close Japanese friends only. They desire to become the same as their Japanese friends and take the attitude of escaping their Korean ethnicity, asserting that their home is Japan, not Korea. Their attachment to their communities is strong. They feel uncomfortable with their Korean names, believing their Japanese names to be their real ones. On the issue of language, they feel the fact that they are unable to speak Korean is natural and unavoidable, and view the history of Japanese aggression against Korea as a thing of the distant past about which they can do nothing. They attempt to cope with social discrimination by eliminating difficulties through adapting themselves to the world around them.[15]

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[15] The naturalization procedure is unique to Japan. It is permitted by the discretion of the Minister of Justice which determines whether the applicant has become sufficiently Japanese. In other words, it requires that Koreans, the targets of Japanese oppression, bow their heads and ask to be made Japanese. In this sense, naturalization requires that the applicants abandon their ethnic identity (Fukuoka 1993, 2000). Moreover, in as much as Japanese society tends to exclude those of different ethnic heritage, naturalization does not result in complete elimination of discrimination. For no matter how determined one is to assimilate, one can never truly become "Japanese." In reaction to this, there is a movement among Koreans who have acquired Japanese citizenship to live as Korean again by abandoning their Japanese names and using their Korean ones. The group calling themselves the "Society for Winning Back Ethnic Names" (*Minzoku-mei wo Torimodosu Kai*) operated in conjunction with the Mintôren movement. From 1987 to 1997, there were thirteen cases in which members of the Society applied to family courts to legally change their forenames, all of which succeeded. Twelve of the cases involved Koreans and one Chinese.

The identities carried by these four types affect their behavior toward social change. The identity type of the Mintôren movement participants corresponds to Type 1. Of course, not all movements against ethnic discrimination are carried out by the Mintôren movement. For example, Mindan and its youth organization, Korean Youth Association in Japan (*Zainichi Kankoku Seinen-kai*), have been fighting discrimination. Their identity appears to lie somewhere between the pluralist and nationalist types. We can call them the "ethnic solidarity type" and place them between Types 1 and 2 (see Fig. 2). The key concern of these people is mutual assistance among Koreans in Japan.[16] Chongryun and its affiliated associations have also played a significant role in combating ethnic discrimination, and the young members of these organizations are categorized as Type 2. What these various groups have in common, however, is the strong desire to be aware of the history of oppressed Koreans. The core members of these movements display strong elements of character-

**Interest in the history
of oppressed Korean**

High

5. Ethnic Solidarity

2. Nationalist   *1. Pluralist*

**Attachment
to the Japanese   Low ——————————————— High
communities**

3. Individualist   *4. Assimilationist*

Low

Fig. 2 Classificatory framework for the construction of identity by young Koreans in Japan

[16] We have placed the Korean Youth Association in between types 1 and 2 because, as "ethnic solidarity types," the members of this group often feel an attachment both to South Korea, their "homeland," and to Japan, their country of residence. Pluralist types value relations with people of any ethnic background, Korean or Japanese, who will join them in the struggle against racism. Nationalist types construct a living space that has almost no room for relationships with anyone other than fellow Koreans. It is not uncommon for them to have no Japanese friends at all, through they may have a few Japanese acquaintances. In the case of young ethnic solidarity types, their principal relationships before becoming involved in the Korean Youth Association activities were with Japanese friends. But whereas the Mintôren movement carries out various activities in consort with Japanese sympathizers, the Korean Youth Association only allows Korean members to take a central role in its activities.

istics associated with Types 1 and 2 shown in the upper two quadrants of Fig. 1. Those displaying Types 3 and 4 characteristics, on the other hand, tend to see ethnic discrimination as a matter resolved through individual efforts.

Although all these groups (the Mintôren movement, Mindan and Chongryun) are opposed to ethnic discrimination in Japan, their approaches differ. First, one of the differences between the Mintôren movement and other groups lay in how they express ethnic consciousness. Members of Chongryun express this consciousness in terms of a feeling of solidarity with native Koreans in the north. Even though most of them were born and raised in Japan and have absorbed Japanese culture – a fact which has made them somewhat different from native Koreans in outlook – they conceive of themselves as essentially the same. They have no doubts about their Korean nationality. On the other hand, younger members of Mindan recognize the fact that they live a different existence from Koreans at home but they positively embrace their Korean nationality. The Mintôren movement members, in contrast, are not concerned with concepts like "homeland" or "the state." They prize their Korean ethnicity, but do not stress nationality.

Second, while at first glance it appears that the anti-discrimination demands of these groups are similar, they differ significantly in how they conceptualize the problem. The Mintôren movement, Chongryun, and Mindan are unified in their demand that the Japanese must apologize to and compensate Koreans in Japan for Japanese colonial aggression and atrocities, and that it must also resolve the legal status of Koreans in Japan by establishing their rights and guaranteeing ethnic education. However, in the case of Chongryun, the reunification of Korea and the development of the homeland are given priority. Thus, they treat the problems of ethnic Koreans as a matter of guaranteeing them their rights as "overseas nationals." They insist on nothing that falls beyond this demand. For example, although the Mintôren movement and Mindan demand the right to vote in local elections, Chongryun does not, since it believes it would only further the assimilation of Koreans in Japanese society. The current movement of Mindan seeks to correct the inadequacies of the Republic of Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty. Consequently, although Mindan generally views the problems of ethnic Koreans as a domestic issue that should be resolved through negotiations between ethnic Koreans and the Japanese government, in reality, it tends to advocate cooperation with the South Korean government to achieve this goal.

On the other hand, the Mintôren movement is organized on the grassroots level, a characteristic that distinguishes it from Chongryun and Mindan. The Mintôren movement was formed to improve the position of Koreans in Japan. Concerned with the question of what to do with the negative image of Koreans, the Mintôren movement strives to strengthen the resolve of Korean youth to resist discrimination. It began as an organization to confront the employment discrimination problem faced by young Koreans disqualified from positions because of the nationality clause and to help them achieve their desire for stable employment. The Mintôren movement has adopted an ad-hoc approach to

realize these goals. It gives priority to the battle against social discrimination. In this sense, the Mintôren movement has a strong tendency not to get caught up in dogmatic ideological questions such as support for North or South Korea, which have tended to dominate the ethnic Korean community.

Third, there are differences in the type of members who comprise the Mintôren movement and the other movements. Chongryun and Mindan are organized by ethnic Koreans only. In contrast, the Mintôren movement's approach sees the struggle as a joint project, involving the combined efforts of both Japanese and Koreans in Japan. As the three case studies illustrate, participants in the Mintôren movement involve not only leadership from the Korean community in Japan but also the support of Japanese teachers and friends who attempt to raise consciousness about the injustices of ethnic discrimination. The slogan of the Mintôren movement is "Living Together in Harmony (*Tomo ni Ikiru*)." The aim of the movement is to create a society where all people, regardless of ethnic differences, can live together in mutual cooperation. The fact that members of the organization themselves come from different backgrounds but have joined forces to battle discrimination has tremendous value. And, in fact, many Japanese have participated in the Mintôren movement groups.

Conclusion

This paper has presented a general overview of Koreans in Japan, focusing on the mentality and characteristics of the Mintôren movement. We would like to conclude by placing the Mintôren movement at the center of the movement in the struggle against ethnic discrimination. The Mintôren movement started as a grassroots movement by young Koreans in Japan at a time when the "myth of repatriation" embraced by first-generation Koreans who wanted to return to Korea was beginning to crumble. As a result, it adopted an ad-hoc approach to the struggle against discrimination, viewing joint action with Japanese positively. Since the 1970s, the Mintôren movement has contributed greatly to eliminating ethnic discrimination against Koreans in Japan, but it has only recently begun to receive such justified recognition in the Korean community in Japan. Even now it merely occupies a third place position behind such large and powerful organizations as Mindan and Chongryun that still support the homeland. Nonetheless, in introducing Korean social movements in Japan, we have focused on the Mintôren movement because we believe that its ideal of "Living Together in Harmony" shows the potential for bringing about a tremendous change in Japanese society which, at present, continues to suppress ethnic minorities under the illusion of "ethnic homogeneity" (See Table 1).

The life histories have also illustrated some interesting points concerning general social movement theory. They show how a dominant ideology can so shape the minds of a discriminated minority as to greatly reduce the incidence of

Table 1 Major ethnic Korean organizations in Japan

Original name	English translation	Founding mission
Chongryun	General Association of Korean Residents in Japan	Supports the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Mindan (including its youth organization, Korean Youth Association in Japan, *Zainichi Kankoku Seinen-kai*)	Korean Residents Union in Japan	Supports the Republic of Korea (ROK)
Mintôren (including local branches of Mukuge Society, Tokebi Children's Club, and Blue Hill Association)	National Council for Combating Discrimination Against Ethnic Peoples in Japan	Ideologically neutral grassroots organization promoting the human rights of Koreans in Japan

protest. This principle has been as important to the history of African Americans in the United States as it has to Koreans in Japan. Despite their diverse settings, for both groups, the reflexive transformation of identity through cultural agency has played a key causal role in the mobilization of their liberation movements.

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Part II
Introduction to Korean Society, Culture, and Politics

Chulhee Chung and Jeffrey Broadbent

Korean society grows from ancient roots, as shown by Choson pottery from 1500 BCE, bronzes from the 8th century BCE, and continuous kingdoms from that era until colonization by the Japanese in 1910 (to 1945). Korea first imported Confucian philosophy from China as a basis for statecraft in 600 BCE (about 2000 years before Japan imported it for that purpose in the 1600s). During that long history, Koreans practiced Confucian teachings much more thoroughly than their Chinese counterparts (De Bary 1988, 60). Confucian values encouraged fulfillment of social obligations, patriarchy, and obedience to authority. Koreans had a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, except in regional identities. Several regional Confucian-based kingdoms often co-existed in Korea, establishing long-standing regional cultures and political loyalties that last until this day (De Bary and Haboush 1985). In 1910, the Japanese colonial takeover destroyed the last Korean kingdom. In its place, Japan tried to convert Koreans to Japanese culture, including worship of the Japanese Emperor and suppression of the Korean language. This bitter colonial experience imbued the populace with a strong distaste for both Japan and for authoritarian rule.

With Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, Korea received an unearned liberation from Japanese colonial rule. However, the country had to pay a dear price for its gains. Within a month of liberation, the US Army occupied Korea South of the 38 parallel, and the Russian Army began to occupy the North. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union split the peninsula into South and North Korea at the 38th parallel. Heartfelt distress over this split has been at the center of South Korean concerns ever since, affecting most political issues and movements.

The USA had its own interests in Korea that did not necessarily meet the aspirations of most Koreans. The USA intended to have an anti-communist and pro-American government in Korea. Accordingly, the US Military Government regarded the grassroots People's Committees that had fought Japanese colonialism as actually or potentially Soviet-controlled communist cells and dissolved the organization by force. This move helped the Syngman Rhee faction to dominate Korean politics, a move that revisionists and

progressive Korean historians suggest eventually called forth the Korean War (An 1989; Chin 1989; Song 1989).

The first national election (ever) south of the 38th parallel inaugurated Syngman Rhee's regime on August 15, 1948. Rhee, closely following the ideologies of Pro-Americanism and McCarthyism, then embarked on a relentless repression of any nationalist leftist movements. This oppressive First Republic, literally the first republic in Korean history, lasted through the Korean War (1950–53) until 1960. South Korea thereafter experienced a series of authoritarian regimes until democratization in 1987. The Korean people had an ambivalent relationship to the authoritarian state.

But even paternalistic authoritarianism never sat easily with the Korean people. Both Confucian family-centered ideology and socially active Christian denominations resisted this kind of imposition. Byng-Kook Kim argues that the legacy of Confucianism remains very important in Korean politics. He says that the fundamental assumptions of Confucian thought constitute the taken-for-granted conditions of Korean political culture (Kim 1998, 120). As Kim says, the Confucian tradition rejected both the atomistic individualism of Western political culture as well as its orientation to a single transcendent concept of God. Instead, the Confucian ideal centered moral behavior in the family; personal placement in the society spread out through particular social ties from the family (Kim 1998, 121). In this view, the state should be an extension of familistic ties and obligations, not an impersonal dictatorial force.

Delegitimized by such values, the authoritarian regimes experienced frequent popular criticisms and uprisings of protest. A series of student protests starting in Taegu and Masan in February and March 1960, followed by student and popular demonstrations in Seoul on April 18 and several days following, toppled the Rhee regime. This so-called 4.19 Uprising broke the social movement doldrums and ushered in three decades of ever-escalating pro-democracy, nationalist, and leftist insurgencies. As the new government tried to consolidate, it succumbed to a military coup by Park Chung Hee and military officers on May 16, 1961, who established the Yushin Regime.

Sharing the vision of colonial Japanese military officers, the Park Junta leadership put extreme emphasis on state-led economic development similar to that of Japanese colonial government in Manchuria or Korea itself (Cumings 2005; Eckert 1990). These leaders directed resources into rapidly industrializing the country, in this sense reflecting paternalistic Confucian values (Vogel 1991, 55). Park's administration launched new "Plans for Economic Development" every five years and put the highest economic priority on exports. As a result, GNP per capita more than tripled between 1962 and 1971. Successful economic take-off strengthened popular support for the Yushin Regime. A referendum during that period approved authoritarian constitutional amendments by 91.4% (Wright 1975), allowing the government to control presidential and representative elections and granting Park the de facto presidency for life. However, one must doubt the validity of this referendum as reflecting popular values. Riots in Pusan and Masan against Park's hard-line authoritarian tactics

had raised specters of massive bloodshed. The Yushin Regime came to an abrupt end on October 26, 1979, when the Chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Chae-gyu, assassinated Park. Although Park's death was presented as an accident, mounting dissident pressure on the regime probably played a role.

The sudden death of Park Chung Hee injected great unpredictability into the Korean political environment that did not necessarily favor the revival of democracy. Chun Doo Hwan, often compared to Napoleon III in nineteenth century France, was Park's protégé (Cumings 2005). Chun's ambition to retain central power drove him into increasingly severe clashes with restive civil society that peaked in Kwangju, one of the historic battlegrounds against Japanese colonial rule. Chun's suppression of the Kwangju uprising was the single bloodiest confrontation between the state and protesters after the Korean War. Despite continuing vehement challenges from campuses, the Chun regime remained stable until 1985.

In the February 1985 Congressional election, the three-week-old opposition New Korea Democratic Party won 29.3% while ruling party won only 35.3%. This unexpectedly strong showing energized the entire opposition block; its members staged frequent mass street gatherings and demonstrations for constitutional revision and direct Presidential election. Students, Christians, and *chaeya* movements became more organized and launched numerous challenges against regime until they eventually created a nation-wide umbrella organization that led the June Uprising in 1987. This united front forced the Chun regime to declare for democratic transition on June 29.

The democratic transition ushered in the election of Noh Tai Woo and after him, Kim Young Sam. Both were transitional on the way to full democracy. Following, the election of famous anti-Park dissident Kim Dae Jung brought fulfillment to the maturing democracy. Under Kim and his successor, progressive NGOs were invited into government and helped shape policy. However at the end of these terms, the Korean people elected a former leader of the Hyundae Cement Company as their new president. His government shut out the progressive NGOs and began a more arbitrary policy-making process that produced a massive public works plan, the LCGG or Low Carbon Green Growth plan. While sounding good and receiving international praise, the real content of the plan would do much damage to Korea's environment.

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Democratization and Social Movements in South Korea: A Civil Society Perspective[*]

Sunhyuk Kim

Democratic Consolidation in South Korea

The year of 2007 marked the 20th anniversary of South Korea's democratic transition. Over the past two decades, South Korean politics has witnessed crucial changes. South Korea suffered from two military coups, one in 1961 and the other in 1979–1980, which temporarily halted the transition to democracy. In democratized South Korea today, military coups are unthinkable, and elections have become free, fair, and clean. Civilian control of the military is considered integral to the survival and prosperity of a democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991). This transition has enabled the elections of Kim Dae Jung, a former political prisoner sentenced to death, and Roh Moo Hyun, a former labor rights lawyer devoted to pro-democracy movement, to South Korean presidency.

Civil liberties, such as the freedoms of expression and association, have expanded considerably. Press censorship and media control have been overhauled, and the state intelligence agency has pledged to discontinue the surveillance of opposition politicians and dissident activists. A number of previously outlawed labor organizations and movement groups are now legalized. The Korea Democratic Labor Party (KDLP, *Minnodang*), which is based on the organizational support of a previously outlawed labor confederation, successfully gained legislative seats in the 2004 National Assembly elections. Local autonomy, which had been postponed by the preceding authoritarian regimes, has been fully restored. In brief, South Korea today stands as an indisputable democracy, decisively making "Score 1" according to Robert Dahl's "Polyarchy Scores" (Dahl 2006, 121).

In accounting for democratization in South Korea in 1987, most scholars have rejected the "pacted" transition paradigm, which centers on the fatal split

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[*]Parts of this chapter are drawn from chapter 2 and chapter 6 of kim (2000a).

between hardliners (*duros*) and softliners (*blandos*) within the authoritarian ruling bloc. The "pacted" transition paradigm was built upon the empirical cases from Southern Europe and Latin America. Instead, most scholars in and outside of South Korea have agreed that one of the most important determinants of Korea's democratic transition in 1987 was the emergence, ascendance, and prominence of civil society and social movements (Kim 2000a, b; Choi 1993a, b, 2002; Song 1993; Sin 1995).

Throughout the multiple stages of Korean democratization social movements played critical roles, discrediting and delegitimating the authoritarian regime. Social movements were instrumental in building and developing a formidable pro-democracy alliance, mobilizing and waging intense anti-government campaigns, and effectively rendering the democratic transition irreversible. In the case of South Korean democratization, social movements continue to play crucial and positive roles in the process of democratic consolidation (Kim 2003). In sum, social movements have been essential in *both* South Korea's democratic transition and consolidation.

The civil society perspective can shed new light on South Korean democratization and social movements in three respects. First, the civil society perspective, rather than viewing democratization as a product of elite-level strategic interactions, views South Korean democratization as a product of intensive mass-level social movement mobilization. Second, the civil society perspective analyzes not only the causes but also the consequences of democratization. Thus a civil society perspective sheds light on the continued importance of the ties between democratization and social movements. Third, the civil society perspective places South Korean social movements in a broader picture. The civil society perspective examines how the various groups and movements in civil society as well as the state and political parties interact with each other during the process of democratization.

Civil Society: A Conceptual Overview

The concept of civil society is highly elusive, subject to multiple interpretations, thus making it difficult to define. In conceptualizing civil society, three dimensions of civil society will be identified along with three defining characteristics of civil society. These three dimensions of civil society will be utilized in analyzing state–civil society relations during the post-transitional period in South Korea.

Conceptually, civil society refers to the *organizational* dimension of social life. Although specific forms of organization may vary – planned or spontaneous, enduring or fleeting, formal or informal – civil society comprises diverse interacting human collectivities such as groups, organizations, and associations. Hence, analysts define civil society as "the realm of organized social life" (Diamond 1994), "a range of social groups" (Gold 1990, 20), "the

organization of interests" (Arato 1981), and "an associational realm" (White 1993, 65).

This organizational dimension focuses on the *internal* configuration of civil society, including organizational scope, density, and shape of civil society and the intra-organizational structure of governance and operation. What defines civil society in the organizational dimension is that civil society is self-organized and largely voluntary. Civil society consists of "self-organized groups" (Schmitter 1997, 240) and is "the self-organization of society, the constituent parts of which voluntarily engage in public activity" (Weigle and Butterfield 1992, 3).

Second, civil society forms and maintains a set of relationships with other societal arenas. This is the *relational* dimension of civil society. This dimension specifically concerns civil society's *external* relations with the state and political society.

Most importantly, civil society is almost invariably defined in terms of its relation to the state. Civil society is separate from and often in conflict with the state. Scholars define civil society as an arena which is "outside the state in an increasingly independent social sphere" (Arato 1981, 23), "in confrontation with the state" (Bayart 1986, 111), "resisting the incursions of the state" (Fatton 1991, 84), "not regulated, dominated, or controlled by the ruling regime" (Ngo 1993, 3), "beyond formal state structures" (Woods 1992, 77), or "engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities" (Keane 1988, 14).

Civil society is also differentiated from political society. Political society, defined as "the arena where various political actors compete to gain control over public power and the state apparatus" (Stepan 1988, 3), is composed of political parties, affiliated networks, organizations, and campaigns (Diamond 1994). Even though civil society and political society may be intimately interconnected through multi-level channels and forums, the two entities should be conceptually distinguished. Above all, civil society, unlike political society, "is not seeking to replace state agents" (Schmitter 1997, 240).

What defines civil society in terms of the relational dimension is that civil society is relatively autonomous from the other two societal arenas. Civil society is "distinctly different from the state and largely in autonomy from it" (Shils 1991, 3). Civil society groups may form alliances with political parties, but "if they become captured by parties, or hegemonic within them, they thereby move their primary locus of activity to political society and lose much of their ability to perform certain unique mediating and democracy-building functions" (Diamond 1994, 7).

Third, civil society is engaged in collective actions according to a certain set of shared norms and rules. This is the *normative* dimension of civil society. This dimension involves both *internal* and *external* aspects of civil society: the shared norms and rules apply not only to the relations among civil society groups themselves but also to civil society's external relations, particularly with the state.

What defines civil society in terms of this normative dimension is that civil society respects pluralism and self-governance. First, in interacting with other

groups within civil society, civil society groups act according to "a widespread pattern of refined or civil manners" (Shils 1991, 4), eschewing violence and appreciating diversity. Groups in civil society honor diversity and partialness and do not seek to represent the "whole" of a person's or a community's interests: different groups represent different interests. To the extent that an organization – such as a religious fundamentalist, ethnic chauvinist, or revolutionary movement – seeks to monopolize the entire civil society, claiming that it represents the only legitimate path, it contradicts the pluralistic nature of civil society (Diamond 1994, 6–7). Respect for pluralism, diversity, and partialness is the irreducible condition that makes a civil society "civil."

Regarding civil society's external relations with the state, there exist two different possibilities. On one hand, when state authority is based on the rule of law, and the state respects the self-governance of civil society, actors in civil society agree to act "within pre-established rules of a 'civil' or legal nature" (Schmitter 1997, 240) and "within the context of a legally defined state–society relationship" (Weigle and Butterfield 1992, 3), where "civil society and the state are bound together by the constitution and by traditions which stress the obligations of each to the other as well as their rights vis-à-vis each other" (Shils 1991, 4). In this case, civil society, "legally guaranteed" (Keane 1988, 14) and "bound by a legal order" (Diamond 1994, 5), legitimates state authority.

On the other hand, when the state itself is lawless and contemptuous of the self-governance and autonomy of civil society, civil society often does not consent to the legitimacy of the existing order but attempts to alter or annul the norms and rules themselves, either by crafting informal arrangements invisible to the authorities or by substituting the existing state-society relations with new ones. In this case, "civil society is potentially a highly subversive space, a space where new structures and norms may take hold to challenge the existing state order" (Fatton 1991, 86).

Synthesizing the above three defining characteristics in the organizational, relational, and normative dimensions, I define civil society as "a set of self-organized groups and movements in society that are relatively autonomous from the state and political society, and engaged in collective actions according to the principles of pluralism and self-governance."

Civil Society in South Korea After the Democratic Transition

Three major actors constituted South Korean civil society in the immediate aftermath of the democratic transition in 1987: newcomers, old radicals, and converts. "Newcomers" were the "citizens' (*simin*) movement groups" that emerged afresh after democratization and proliferated throughout the 1990s. Citizens' movement groups, whose members typically included intellectuals and middle-class citizens, addressed new movement issues and eschewed violent

movement methods. "Old radicals" were the "people's (*minjung*) movement groups" that had played crucial roles in facilitating the authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition in 1987. The people's movement groups included a number of prominent national umbrella organizations of labor, peasant, and student organizations. These groups continued their "pro-democracy" movement, criticizing that the ongoing democratization was inadequate and slow. "Converts" were the ex-state corporatist organizations that had been consistently supportive of the authoritarian regimes in the past. These groups typically included pro-government trade unions and agricultural cooperatives. Now, they avidly disavowed their pro-authoritarian past to join civil society.

Among the "newcomers," the most salient were environmental organizations. In 1988, the Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association (KAPMA, *Kongch'uryon*) was established through merging two existing environmental organizations. KAPMA organized conferences, round-the-country slide shows, and picture exhibitions, pressuring the business community to spend more on pollution control as well as raising awareness among the general public. It was composed of thousands of dues-paying members, including many working journalists, academics, lawyers, doctors, farmers, housewives, workers, students, Roman Catholic priests, and protestant ministers. On April 2, 1993, together with seven other environmental organizations, KAPMA created the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM, *Hwan'-gyongnyon*). With 5,000 or so members, it was the biggest environmental movement group in South Korean history. Since its inauguration, KFEM has initiated and led various environmental campaigns against the government and big business groups, and has now grown into an organization of about 80,000 members and 80 permanent staff workers.

Another citizens' movement organization campaigning with comparable vigor for a broader range of social, economic, and political reforms was the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ, *Kyongsillyon*). It was founded in July 1989 by five hundred or so academics, lawyers, and church activists. Under the banner of "economic justice through the power of committed citizens," CCEJ has supported the independence of the central bank from government control, revision of tax laws to discourage land speculation, regulation of the rental system in favor of the poor, introduction of a real-name bank transaction system to remove collusion between politicians and businesspeople, and *chaebol* reform and restructuring. Some of its major programs, including the Economic Injustice Complaint Center, Legislature Watch, and Research Institute for Economic Justice, have received wide public attention (Lee 1993, 364). Conducting research into dozens of policy sectors covering practically all aspects of South Korea's social, economic, and political life, CCEJ assumed a commanding position as the voice of all middle-class reformists during the 1990s. CCEJ has now grown into a national organization of about 24,000 members and 43 permanent staff workers, with dozens of local offices.

Whereas the citizens' movement was rapidly expanding, the people's movement underwent crucial changes. There still existed a national organization for people's movement groups. But as compared with the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (*Mint'ongnyon*) that played a critical role in the democratic uprising of 1987, both the Korean Movement Coalition for Nationalism and Democracy (*Chonminnyon*) in 1989 and its successor, the National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification of Korea (*Chon'guk yonhap*) since 1992, have been far less visible and influential in South Korean politics. Most people's movement groups, whose leaders spearheaded the pro-democracy movement in 1987, have been trying to distance themselves from their old images. They announced that they would abandon the militant style of their past movements and adopt a "softer" style, promoting and sponsoring public policy debates and waging peaceful campaigns instead of violent demonstrations.

Student groups, another vital component of the past pro-democracy movement, have also undergone significant changes. In March 1993, the National Association of College Student Representatives (NACSR, *Chondaehyop*) officially announced its disintegration. Established in 1987, NACSR was a central impetus behind the authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition in the same year. Although it was succeeded by another national organization, namely the Korean Coalition of College Student Councils (KCCSC, *Hanch'ongnyon*), more and more student leaders lament that they can no longer organize and mobilize students in massive demonstrations as they did in the past. New students do not care much about broader issues such as political democracy, economic equality, or national reunification. Instead, they are far more concerned about intra-campus issues such as skyrocketing tuition, expensive books, poor service at campus restaurants, inaccessible computer facilities, and crowded soccer fields.

In terms of the labor movement, against the existing Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU, *Han'guk noch'ong*), which had consistently been loyal to the previous authoritarian regimes, the movement for a new democratic federation was initiated by a national organization called the Korea Council of Labor Union Representatives (KCLUR, *Chonnodae*). KCLUR finally launched a second national peak labor organization, Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU, *Minju noch'ong*) in November 1995. The Roh Tae Woo government (1988–1992) and the Kim Young Sam government (1993–1997) refused to recognize the new labor association, but the Kim Dae Jung government (1998–2002) officially acknowledged and sponsored KCTU, making it an integral participant in the tripartite negotiation between the government, labor, and business. In 2000 KCTU created its own political party, KDLP, which gained ten seats in South Korean legislature in the 2004 National Assembly elections.

Seriously threatened by the emergence and vigorous activities of KCTU, FKTU has been struggling to reform and transform itself. FKTU has carried out numerous internal reforms, strengthening the existing institutions, creating new committees, introducing fairer elections for officers, and guaranteeing more decision-making rights for rank-and-file members. Moreover, in an

attempt to shed its state corporatist past, FKTU has been trying to show autonomy from – and even conflict with – the state, by refusing to accept the government's recommendations and participating in anti-government activities. Through these independent actions, FKTU has been seeking to compensate for its dark past during which it basically functioned as an indispensable accomplice in authoritarian politics.

The Roh Tae Woo administration (1988–1992) was characterized by the uneasy coexistence and competition between the "newcomers" and the "old radicals." Whereas the new citizens' movement groups such as KFEM and CCEJ certainly increased their influence, the old people's movement groups also held on. One of the most important reasons why the "old radicals" could maintain and even expand their movement for democratic reform relatively easily consisted in the continuity the Roh government had with the previous authoritarian regime. Being a close friend of Chun Doo Hwan and deeply involved in the military coup of 1979–80 and the subsequent consolidation of the authoritarian political order, Roh had been groomed and eventually anointed as an official successor to Chun until the last minute, when the ruling bloc decided to yield to popular pressure by proclaiming the June 29 democratization package. Roh was the greatest beneficiary of the past authoritarian regime and therefore constrained in parting with the authoritarian past. To most of the people's movement groups that had led the June Uprising in 1987, the Roh regime was viewed as a mere extension of authoritarian rule, namely a *dictablanda* (liberalized authoritarianism). As a result, the need to continue the pro-democracy struggle appeared vital. This was why the people's movement groups remobilized themselves and resumed their pro-democracy campaign with a vigor comparable to or even stronger than that of the 1985–1987 period.

Furthermore, the grand party merger in 1990 offered another piece of evidence that the Roh Tae Woo regime was just a continuation of the past authoritarianism and the opposition parties were unreliable. In early 1990, Roh, who as leader of a minority party had been seriously concerned about his political vulnerability in the National Assembly since his inauguration, succeeded in merging his ruling Democratic Justice Party with two opposition parties. The two opposition parties were the Reunification Democratic Party led by Kim Young Sam and the New Democratic Republican Party led by Kim Jong Pil. The three were merged into a Democratic Liberal Party (*Minjadang*), a conservative coalition clearly modeled on Japan's long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and which left Kim Dae Jung's Democratic Party small and isolated. This party merger via closed elite negotiations was seen by many people's movement groups as a frontal attack on the consolidation of democracy in their country; consequently, civil society groups had no choice but to intensify their pro-democracy movement.

It was ironically the election of Kim Young Sam in 1992, the first genuinely "civilian" president (i.e., not a general-turned president) in more than three decades, that provided the greatest challenge to people's movement groups and their mobilization. Immediately following his inauguration and especially

during the first 2 years of his tenure, Kim designed and implemented a series of sweeping political and socioeconomic reforms, waging intensive anti-corruption campaigns, introducing a "real name" bank transaction system, legislating political reform bills, and consolidating the civilian control of the military. Kim's soaring popularity left people's movement groups, which had been so skilled at criticizing unpopular and repressive governments, bewildered, demobilized, and demoralized. In a word, people's movement groups were no longer able to find a common target.

The crisis of the people's movement groups abated somewhat with two later upsurges of national movement. One was the nationwide controversy in 1995 over the "liquidation" of the authoritarian past. The Kim Young Sam government announced in July 1995 that it would not pursue insurrection charges against Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, two former general-turned-presidents involved in the military coup in 1979–1980, because of the statute of limitations and to avoid damage to "national unity." This announcement gave rise to a series of intense protests led by people's movement groups. In the end, yielding to the popular pressure that had engulfed the whole nation for several months, the government prosecuted both Chun and Roh in early 1996 on multiple charges of bribery, insurrection, and treason.

Another high tide of civil society activism during the Kim Young Sam government came in late 1996. On December 26, 1996, the ruling New Korea Party (successor to the Democratic Liberal Party) passed several labor-related bills and a reform bill regarding the country's intelligence agency. These bills had been intensely debated and contested among South Koreans. Labor unions had opposed the proposed labor reform bills, because the bills, if legislated, would weaken labor unions and facilitate massive layoffs. Civil society groups had also disputed the proposed intelligence agency reform bill, because the bill would expand the investigative power of the powerful state agency. Despite these concerns and criticisms from labor unions, civil society groups, and the opposition parties, the ruling party rammed the bills through the National Assembly, at 6 a.m. of December 26, without the presence of opposition legislators. This railroading of the controversial bills profoundly outraged civil society groups and led to a series of anti-government protests and labor strikes.

Although the people's movement groups succeeded in continuing their pro-democracy movements, what was more prominent during the Kim Young Sam government (1993–97) was the gradual but steady expansion of the citizens' movement groups. South Koreans found "pro-democracy" movement to be obsolete, and it was more and more difficult for the people's movement groups to justify and continue their "democratic struggles" against an obviously "democratic" government. Meanwhile, new issues such as the environment and economic democratization, those issues emphasized and pursued by citizens' movement groups such as KFEM and CCEJ, received far greater public and media attention.

In response to the visible expansion of the citizens' movement groups and the relative decline of the people's movement groups, a movement to combine the

two camps finally emerged. On September 10, 1994, the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD, *Ch'amyo yondae*) was established by approximately two hundred young professionals such as professors, lawyers, doctors, and so on. This organization under the slogan of "progressive citizens' movement," intended to link the citizens' movement to the existing people's movement. PSPD pledged that it would put the citizens' movement and the people's movement in a unified perspective. Running several "centers" such as the Legislative Monitoring Center, the Judiciary Monitoring Center, the Whistle-blower Support Center, the Human Rights Center, and so on, PSPD began to effectively stem the growing dominance of new citizens' movement groups such as CCEJ.

The year of 1997 proved a crucial year for South Korea. Beginning with the collapse of one of the *chaebol* groups, Hanbo, several big business conglomerates became insolvent and fell into court receivership. Foreign banks and investors pulled their funds out of South Korea, quickly leading to a foreign exchange crisis. Despite efforts by the government and the Bank of Korea, the exchange rate and stock market plummeted, placing South Korea virtually on the brink of defaulting on its foreign debt obligations. On December 3, 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to provide $57 billion package to South Korea, which was the largest in the IMF's history by that time.

On the other hand, for the first time in South Korean history, an opposition candidate, Kim Dae Jung, was elected in the 1997 presidential elections. The victory of the opposition was historic because Kim Dae Jung had been a long and strong supporter of democracy and human rights in South Korea. He had been one of the most progressive politicians in South Korean politics and had, for that reason, often been labeled and suppressed as a leftist or a communist sympathizer. More significantly, Kim Dae Jung was based in the Cholla region of southwestern Korea, a region that had been systematically discriminated against throughout the entire process of industrialization under the preceding authoritarian regimes. His election to the presidency demonstrated that a genuinely horizontal transfer of power, an important indication of democratic consolidation, had finally occurred in South Korea.

The activities of civil society groups during the Kim Dae Jung government (1998–2002) continued to focus on political and socioeconomic reforms. In pushing for various reforms, civil society groups tried to formulate and present viable policy alternatives to the state, forging and nurturing a constructive engagement with the state. What is prominent during the Kim Dae Jung government was the rapid rise of PSPD. PSPD, as a citizens' movement organization with an indisputable people's movement pedigree, became the most powerful civil society organization in South Korea.

On January 13, 2000, about 3 months before the National Assembly elections, PSPD led 412 civil society groups to establish the Citizens' Solidarity for the General Elections (CSGE, *Ch'ongson yondae*). At its inauguration, CSGE envisioned two different stages of its movement. The first was to generate a list of politicians who should not be nominated by political parties to run for the

National Assembly elections (the *Nakch'on* movement). Second, if some of those "blacklisted" candidates were nominated anyway, the movement was to campaign against their actual elections (the *Nakson* movement).

On January 24, CSGE disclosed a list of 66 politicians who should not be nominated as candidates for the April National Assembly elections. The selection criteria included involvement in previous bribery and corruption scandals, violation of the election laws, lack of legislative activities (e.g., too many absences in national assembly sessions), destruction of constitutional order (e.g., cooperation with Chun Doo Hwan's authoritarian regime in the early 1980s or involvement in military coups), failure or refusal to sign anti-corruption laws, instigation of regionalism, and so forth. CSGE announced the final *Nakson* list of 86 unfit candidates on April 3. The final list included 64 candidates who had been on the original *Nakch'on* list but were nominated by parties and 22 more candidates selected according to the criteria of anti-human rights backgrounds, tax evasion, inappropriate remarks and behaviors in the national assembly, and so on. In the national assembly elections held on April 13, 2000, 59 out of 86 candidates listed by the CSGE failed to be elected.

In addition, PSPD and many civil society groups strongly demanded economic reforms, particularly reforms of the *chaebol*. PSPD concentrated on the "minority shareholders movement (*soaekjuju undong*)" as a specific method of achieving corporate restructuring and economic democratization. They used lawsuits and physical presence at shareholders' general meetings to promote minority shareholders rights and to fight against the dominance of *chaebol* owner-chairpersons and their families. On December 12, 1997, PSPD represented 100 minority shareholders of the First Bank (Che'il Bank) in a lawsuit to contest and annul a decision passed at the March 1997 stockholders' general meeting. The Seoul district court made a ruling in favor of PSPD that it was unlawful for the Bank to ignore the right of expression of the minority shareholders and to proceed with revision of the statutes and election of the board members and auditors without voting. On March 4, 1998, PSPD submitted a proposal to revise corporate statutes to appoint external auditors, strengthen the power of the board of directors, and prevent internal transfer of funds among *chaebol* companies of the same group. On September 10, 1998, PSPD launched a campaign to acquire ownership of ten shares of stock of each of the five *chaebol* group companies: Samsung Electronics, SK Telecom, Daewoo, Inc., LG Semiconductors, and Hyundai Heavy Industry. After acquiring the stocks, PSPD's plan was to inquire about the responsibility of the management and to demand effective *chaebol* reform. Since 1999, PSPD has been tenaciously leading a movement to hold economically powerful actors in South Korea more accountable to the law and the general public.

In the 16th presidential elections held on December 19, 2002, South Korean voters elected Roh Moo Hyun as their new president. Roh, who had once been a labor lawyer and human rights activist, was a political novice compared with the three Kims (i.e., Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong Pil) and other seasoned party politicians in South Korea. Born in 1946, he represented a

new, younger, post-liberation generation. Since Roh's election, progressives have entered the political establishment *en masse*. The successful entry of the KDLP into the National Assembly in the April 2004 elections marked the culmination of the recent ascendance of progressives in South Korea. What took place during the Roh Moo Hyun government (2003–08) was the gradual but unmistakable shift of power from older and conservative to younger and progressive political actors. Government agencies, civil society groups, business firms, and many major social institutions were increasingly occupied and operated by younger and progressive actors.

Two elements were conspicuous about the activities of civil society groups during 2003–08. First, civil society groups gradually expanded their issue areas to include foreign policy and international relations. In 2003, for example, civil society groups waged intense nationwide protests against the Roh government's decision to send South Korean soldiers to Iraq to help the USA. The anti-war movement was facilitated by a comprehensive alliance of diverse civil society groups, politicians (especially progressive legislators in the National Assembly), and even some public officials in the government agencies such as the National Human Rights Commission. Furthermore, in waging the anti-war campaign, civil society organizations also explored and employed new movement methods, such as one-person demonstration, candlelight vigil, lawsuits, and cyber protests.

Another foreign policy issue that brought about significant civic activism is the South Korean government's agreement with the USA to relocate US military bases in the cities north of Seoul such as Tongduch'on and Uijongbu to those south of Seoul such as P'yongt'aek. On March 15, 2005, 606 residents in P'yongt'aek and 1,033 other citizens representing various civil society groups filed a lawsuit, arguing that the agreement between the Roh Moo Hyun government and the Bush administration about the relocation and expansion of the US military bases would seriously infringe upon their rights to ensure survival and pursue happiness and equality, as well as violating the Republic of Korea's sovereign principle to refuse a war of aggression.

Second, civil society groups challenged and opposed state-sponsored large-scale construction projects. Since 2001, for instance, major civil society groups including KFEM and PSPD waged protests against the government's Saeman'gum reclamation project. The Saeman'gum project began in 1991 during the Roh Tae Woo administration to reclaim land and increase water supply in the Kunsan-Pu'an area, Chonbuk. From the outset, however, the project was intensely contested and challenged by a number of civil society organizations for the possible damages it would cause to the surrounding environment. In response to the protracted and ever-intensifying protest activities by civil society groups, the Seoul administrative court in the end decided on February 4, 2005, that the mega project, with 85% of the construction already completed, should either be cancelled altogether or significantly changed due to its potential environmental, ecological, and financial harms to the region and the residents. Although the Supreme Court later overturned the decision, the case

demonstrated that citizen participation was essential in ensuring smooth implementation of government policies.

Another state-sponsored mega project that was acutely contested, challenged, and opposed by civil society groups was the plan to locate and build a nuclear waste dump site. When the county chief of Pu'an, Chonbuk, without adequate consultation with residents, submitted an application to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy in July 2003 to accommodate a nuclear waste dump site, various environmental groups in the area and the vicinity launched an intensive anti-nuclear campaign against the action. Faced with a series of violent demonstrations by residents and environmental organizations, the plan to locate the nuclear waste site in Pu'an was completely abandoned. The Roh government instead pledged to make the policymaking more transparent and democratic, incorporating sufficient input from the local residents themselves. The site was finally decided through a direct popular referendum in four competing cities in November 2005. As a result of the vote, Kyongju was selected as the site for a nuclear recycling center.

Analyzing Changes in South Korean Civil Society

In terms of the organizational dimension, what South Korean civil society has been undergoing since democratization in 1987 is organizational expansion and internal diversification. The expansion of civil society is occurring mainly for two reasons. First, some of the previously unorganized and latent segments of civil society are becoming organized and visible. The middle class is an example. Although it did not have its own organizations, the middle class – white-collar workers, professionals, small- and medium-sized factory managers, technicians, independent business people, low-rank public servants, and so on – played an important role in bringing down Chun Doo Hwan's dictatorship in 1987, actively supporting students, workers, and churches (Lee 1988, 13). As democratic consolidation proceeded during the Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam administrations (1988–97), the middle class began to form a variety of "citizens' movement groups" to express its concerns and pursue its interests.

Second, many groups and organizations that were previously under explicit or implicit state corporatist influence are becoming independent of the state and newly entering the civil society sphere. Past authoritarian regimes created, sponsored, monitored, and controlled numerous societal groups that looked like civil society groups but were in practice manipulated by the state. With their umbilical cord to the state cut, these ex-corporatist groups face either extinction or metamorphosis. Many ex-corporatists are choosing transformation, striving to distance themselves from the state and join civil society. They may not be welcomed as legitimate part of civil society overnight, but their entry will gradually but significantly broaden civil society.

Meanwhile, South Korean civil society stands internally diversified. In the past, civil society groups, although limited in scope and constrained in activity due to the harsh repression by authoritarian regimes, were tightly united under the banner of democracy. "Civil" society was in an intense confrontation with the "uncivil" state (Lemarchand 1992). Now the situation is not so dichotomous. As shown above, the division and competition between people's movement groups and citizens' movement groups was particularly prominent in the immediate aftermath of the democratic transition, although they tended to converge through the activism of PSPD in more recent years.

In terms of the relational dimension, South Korean civil society is reconfiguring its relations with the state and political society. First, during the authoritarian periods and well into the stages of authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition, civil society was in constant conflict with the state, reprimanding authoritarianism and demanding democracy. But such fierce confrontation between civil society and the state is being incrementally diminished. The new democratic regimes, particularly beginning with the Kim Young Sam government, have been willing to contact and listen to civil society group leaders, seriously considering their ideas and policy options.

Second, the relationship between civil society and political society is no longer one of pro-democracy alliance or solidarity as it was in the past. Rather, different parts of civil society are trying different strategies to forge a new relationship with political society. Some leave civil society and join political society, formally participating in either the opposition or ruling party. Others compete with political parties, nominating and supporting candidates for local and National Assembly elections. Still others selectively cooperate with political parties, depending on specific issues. In sum, the relationship between civil society and political society is becoming one of cooperation and competition.

In terms of the normative dimension, South Korean civil society is gradually switching from a black-and-white extremism to a multi-color view. Under the authoritarian regimes, civil society groups and political parties were always judged by whether they were democratic or state corporatist – no middle ground existed between "us" and "them". Moreover, supporting "non-essential" issues other than democracy were regarded as a luxury or waste. The battle between civil society and the state was too tense to allow any room for diverse interests and multiple causes; all elements in civil society concentrated on the issue of democratization. But now, this is no longer the case. In dealing with other groups and political parties, groups in South Korean civil society are being sensitized to the fact that democratic forces can and had better assume different colors.

Also in interacting with the state, South Korean civil society is slowly moving from the norm of violent resistance to the norm of nonviolent check and balance. In the past, the primary mission of civil society was to reproach the dictatorship and call for an immediate transition to democracy. Because the state itself was neither democratically elected nor based on popular support, violating state orders and disregarding laws were considered not only

democratic but also heroic. Today, however, such unconditional resistance is no longer a virtuous panacea. Rather, avoiding violence and engaging the state is becoming a new rule. The issue now is how to control, constrain, and influence the government by formulating, organizing, and representing various social interests.

Conclusion: Civil Society and the Future of South Korean Democracy

Civil society affects democratization, and democratization alters civil society. The movements for democracy are rooted in the growth of civil society (Diamond 1992, 12) and civil society's "politics of protest" plays a decisive role in the struggle for democratization (Fatton 1991, 89). In turn, democratization accelerates the "resurrection of civil society" and the subsequent "popular upsurge" where "human rights organizations, relatives of the victims of prison, torture, and murder, and often churches . . . speak out against the . . . repulsive facets of the authoritarian regime" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 48–56).

Such a relationship of reciprocal influence between civil society and democratization applies to the case of South Korea. During the authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition, South Korean civil society played pivotal roles in expelling authoritarian regimes and advancing democratic reforms. Democratization in South Korea, in turn, brought about the reconstitution of civil society: new groups are mushrooming, and the existing groups are undergoing drastic transformation. How might South Korean civil society contribute to further consolidation of South Korean democracy?

First, in terms of the organizational dimension, South Korean civil society could become even more expansive and institutionalized. Civil society serves democracy better when it is broad and dense, enabling individuals to participate in plural groups and organizations at multiple levels. "The more associations there are in civil society, the more likely it is that they will develop specialized agendas and purposes that do not seek to swallow the lives of their members in one all-encompassing organizational framework" (Diamond 1994, 12–13). On the other hand, a highly institutionalized civil society stabilizes expectations within social groups and presents the state with more aggregated, reliable, and actionable information with which to govern, thereby greatly contributing to the stability, predictability, and governability of a democratic regime (Schmitter 1997, 247).

Second, in terms of the relational dimension, South Korean civil society could diversify its relationship with the state. In the past, there was only one type of relationship between the state and civil society in South Korea: constant confrontation characterized by an endless cycle of harsh repression and fierce resistance. The mission statement for civil society always remained constant: "down with the dictatorship!" But now, the state, democratic and legitimate, is no longer something to overthrow: it is instead something to affect, engage,

control, check, and balance. South Korean civil society should recognize that the state–civil society relationship can "run a gamut from mutual disengagement on the one hand to direct confrontation (conflictual engagement) or close collaboration (congruent engagement) on the other" (Bratton 1989, 430). Civil society in South Korea, accustomed to criticizing and assailing the previous authoritarian regimes, could now learn to constructively engage the democratic regime with concrete policy options and through appropriate mediating mechanisms and procedures.

South Korean civil society could also redefine its relationship with political society. In the past, the relationship was largely one of a "united front" against the authoritarian regimes. The specific division of labor between civil society groups and political parties was neither clear nor essential. Today, however, there is no longer any common enemy to confront. Rather, at the current stage of democratic consolidation, the relationship between civil society and political society could be one of selective cooperation and peaceful competition in detecting and collecting public opinions, in articulating and representing popular interests, and in developing and delivering policy prescriptions to the state.

Lastly, in terms of the normative dimension, South Korean civil society could promote and respect greater internal pluralism and diversity. Under the past authoritarian regimes, different groups and movements in civil society rallied around the banner of democracy. Functional associations in civil society were always guilty of projecting and seeking their own sectoral interests. Movement groups in civil society were constantly hesitant to espouse and support goals other than democracy. Civil society groups intentionally presented and pursued very inclusive and highly abstract aims. However, in the stage of democratic consolidation, no goal is intrinsically superior to others. Branding some issues as trivial and instead imposing "greater" or "more fundamental" goals is merely the mirror image of the authoritarian past to which South Korea should not regress. Now, groups in South Korean civil society should be allowed and encouraged to concentrate their efforts on clarifying, concretizing, and articulating their respective and diverse concerns and interests.

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Mesomobilization and the June Uprising: Strategic and Cultural Integration in Pro-democracy Movements in South Korea

Chulhee Chung

Introduction and Theoretical Perspectives

In June 1987, South Korea witnessed one of the largest demonstrations in its history, resulting in the introduction of limited democratic measures. In the major cities of Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Kwangju, and Inchon as well as in small cities virtually all over the country numerous demonstrations were staged. Galvanized by then President Chun's abrupt announcement of a prohibition of discourse on constitutional revision, tens of thousands of people poured into the streets inspired by the leadership of the national alliance, the National Council for the Democratic Constitution (or NCDC). The central slogans of the protests were "down with the dictatorship" and advocating constitutional revision (Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development 1987b).[1]

After the military crackdown on the massive riot in Kwangju in 1980, pro-democracy movements in South Korea fell into a lull and remained silent until in 1983 when the Youth Alliance for Democracy, along with several "Civil Movement" organizations, was established. "Civil Movement" participants included dismissed reporters, writers, renowned anti-government figures, lawyers, former politicians, and feminists as well as dissident youths. This group did not include the student and Christian movement sectors. After the unexpected victory of the opposition party in the election of National Assembly in 1985, the entire oppositional block gained momentum staging frequent on-street mass demonstrations.

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[1] New York Times, 11–13, 15–17, 19–22, 24–27, 29 June 1987.

However, the riot in Inchon in May 1986 by the civil movements, labor movements, and student movements provided the regime a pretext to repress movement organizations. The radical elements of student movements were temporarily debilitated after the regime's repression of students' riot at Konguk University in November 1986 (Dong 1987; Kang 1988; Kim et al. 1988). However, pro-democracy movements bounced back as a Catholic movement organization divulged to the press a case of torture to death in January 1987.[2] Furthermore, President Chun's abrupt announcement against constitutional revision provoked public grievances. While both the revelation of torture to death and prohibition of constitutional revisions were direct motives for the June Uprising, more importantly there were enduring social forces serving to challenge the authoritarian regime which aided in the massive mobilization.

Assuming that the coalition of social movement organizations (or SMOs) was responsible for the magnitude and effect of the uprising under South Korea's authoritarian regime in 1987, the question of how coalitions are formed under these conditions despite their differences in the lines of strategy, ideology, and goals is central. The answer will be sought within the theoretical discourse of *mesomobilization* which refers to the activity of integration among individual social movement organizations. Whereas *micromobilization* involves the mobilization of individual and informal groups by SMOs, mesomobilization includes mobilization of SMOs by coordinating groups (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). Although the term mesomobilization has been rarely used, there has been a substantial amount of research on the coalition, competition, and conflict among SMOs (Barkan 1986; Klandermans 1989, 1992; Fernandez and McAdam 1989; Lofland 1985; McCarthy and Wolfson 1989; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Staggenborg 1986; Zald and McCarthy 1980; Zald and Ash 1966; See also Zald 1992).

It is generally recognized that the growth of movement potential is contingent upon the formation of an alliance among movement organizations (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Klandermans 1989; Rule and Tilly 1975; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Zald and McCarthy 1980). That is, successful mesomobilization heightens the movement potential by collecting more resources and integrating diverse movement groups with various movement causes under a unified communication networks and a common issues (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). In order for mesomobilization to take place, there should be mesomobilization actor(s), groups in charge of the coordination of the activities of SMOs.

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[2] Chong-chul Park was a student of Seoul National University tortured to death in the investigation of whereabouts of a wanted activist friend of Park's. The autopsy result reports that Park was choked while his head forced to plunge into a bath water. The regime attempted to cover up this incident but a doctor who was in charge of the autopsy disclosed the cause of death. Also, The Catholic Priests Council for the Realization of Justice and Peace closely followed the case of torture and gave public account of it(CISJD 1988). New York Times, February 8, 1987.

Mesomobilization needs to be assessed in both structural and cultural terms. Structural integration involves organizational and technical matters of inter-organizational coalition. The SMOs strive for coalition with other movement organizations, contacting members of other groups and formulating platforms for joint actions (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). On the other hand, SMOs are involved in persuasive communication, attempting to gain legitimacy for their movement from the public. In other words, the movement organizations propagate their cause and struggle for adherents (Ferree and Miller 1985; Klandermans 1988; Snow et al. 1986). At the inter-organizational level, SMOs attempt to integrate the interpretive frames of micromobilization groups (Gerhards and Rucht 1992).

Gerhards and Rucht (1992) apply the concept of frame alignment to the analysis of consensus mobilization among SMOs. They stress the need of the formation of cultural integration or the fusion of movement-specific ideology into a common frame for successful mobilization. They explain the coordination of interpretive frames or cultural integration among organizations by drawing on Snow and Benford's work (1988, 1992) on frame alignment. Snow and Benford (1992) suggest the concept of a master frame which is the shared belief system among integrated movement organizations. The establishment of the master frame is contingent upon the capacity for the mesomobilization actor to suggest the identification and solution of problems as well as to motivate the potential actors into protest (Snow and Benford 1988).[3]

Once the force of the SMOs is structurally and culturally integrated, the nationwide alliance is able to wage a massive uprising in an organized and effective way. The establishment of nationwide organizations increases the chance of success of the movements because, apart from its movement potential, its role as a control tower over movement sectors enables movement actors to have dialogue and negotiation with the regime. The nationwide organization lessens the chance of the unnecessary reliance on violence for both sides – protesters and the regime (Coser 1956).

An Overview of the Mesomobilization Actors in the Democracy Movements

Social movements typically take place within multi-organizational fields in which each SMO has a different strategy, goal, and political ideology. There were three representative movement sectors including civil movements, Christian movements, and student movements. Major SMOs in each sector are as illustrated in Table 1.

Successful movements depend on the extent to which SMOs are integrated for common goals. In the pro-democracy movements of the eighties,

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[3] The two students conceptualize the cultural integration by mesomobilization actor diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing.

Table 1 Major movement types, issues, and organizations in the 1980s

	Human Rights	Populism or Leftist ideas
Civil Movement	The Council of Movements for Democratic Press The Council of the Dismissed Reporters in 1980	TheYouth Alliance for Democratization Movements The Council of Movement for the People and Democracy The National Council for Democracy and Unification The United Popular Movements for Democracy and Unification
Christian Movement	National Catholic Priests' Corps for the Realization of Justice The Council of National Priests' Practice of Justice and Peace Human Rights Commission of the National Council of Churches in Korea The Council of Christian Youth and the Middle-Aged for a Popular Democratic Constitution	Catholic Farmer's Organization Urban Industrial Mission The Council of Catholic Social Movements Jeunes Ouvrier Catholique Catholic Student Coalition Korea Student Christian Federation
Student Movement		National Federation of Students National Alliance of Student Associations The National Nationalist Democratic Student Council of struggle for Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Facism (Minmintu) The Council of Democratic Struggle for Anti-Americanism, Independence, and Anti-Facism (Chamintu) Council of Student Representatives of Universities in Seoul Preliminary Council for the Honam Student Federation Council of Student Associations in Pusan

mesomobilization actors promoting the integration of movements, emerged in the civil movement (*chaeya*) sector. There were several mesomobilization actors, both formal and informal, which coordinated joint action among SMOs. The formal ones included the civil movement (*chaeya*) organizations of the Youth Alliance for Democracy Movements, the United Popular (Minjung) Movements for Democracy and Unification, and a series of Countermeasure Committees formed in opposition to torture and regime's procommunist charge against activists.

Within the South Korean context, the informal networks of mesomobilization actors were critical in social movement group formation. During the early eighties, as each civil movement organizations emerged, a group of activists formed informal meetings. The participants consisted of core members from the Youth Alliance for Democracy Movements, Protestant, Catholic, and other civil movement groups. These informal groups met occasionally to discuss ways to enhance movement effectiveness through coordination among SMOs in the multiorganizational field (Interview No.18; Cho 1992).[4]

Several conditions supported the emergence of the networks in the civil movement (*chaeya*) sector. The activists in the civil movement were more experienced than students as well as more interested in coordinated movements than Christian movements, which often procrastinate in order to forge alliances with students as well as other radical elements. From an ideological standpoint, the civil movement adhered to more moderate realistic tactics than to the idealism of students and Christians. The civil movement had all dealings with the student movement underground in order to avoid being charged as "background agitators" by the regime (Interview No.16, 18).

The activities of the civil movement sector became manifest after 1971 when the National Council for the Protection of Democracy was established in order to maintain fair elections. The national council was composed of professors, religious leaders, journalists, lawyers, and writers. Transient organizations with similar formation were established in 1974, 1978, and 1979 for the restoration of democratic institutions (Lee 1984).[5]

The civil movement (*chaeya*) organizations established in the 1980s were quite different from their predecessors in regard to their organizational formation and ideological orientations. Whereas the national alliances during the seventies were predominantly composed of prominent opposition leaders, the civil movement organizations in the eighties were made up of former student and Christian activists along with men and women of repute. Unlike previous civil movement organizations, the eighties counterparts included middle-level executive members with substantial organizational bases, whose existence made enduring movements possible. As illustrated in Table 2, the growth of organizational bases of civil movement can be inferred from the increase of political prisoners (Yangshimsu) who belonged to movement groups in the eighties compared to the previous decade.

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[4] The participants were Keun-tae Kim and Minhwa Choi from the Youth Alliance for Democracy Movements, Chong-ryol Pae, Insong Hwang, Hyong-gyu Park, and Tong-whan Kim from Protestant, Se-Woong Ham and Seung-hoon Kim from Catholic, and Ki-pyo Chang, Ik-hwan Moon, Chong-chul Kim, Tae-soon Park, and Pu-yong Lee from various Civil Movement groups.

[5] National Congress for the Restoration of Democracy, National Alliance for Democracy, and National Alliance for Democracy and Unification had been established in 1974, 1978, and 1979, respectively.

Table 2 Political Prisoner (Yangshimsu) by their occupations

	1970–1974	1975–1979	1980–1985
Student & youth	457	740	678
Workers & peasants	130	112	490
Priests	16	66	6
Members of religious groups	6	44	23
Reporters & writers	23	61	35
Teachers	15	37	53
Politicians	30	40	46
Businessmen and researchers	7	26	16
Soldiers & public service	3	2	31
Employer and self-employed	15	20	27
Unemployed	14	29	6
Poor people	0	0	17
Members of movement groups	0	0	23
Others	50	775	57

Source: *Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development* (1986, pp. 2066–67)

The younger activists had more actual know-how in strategy, tactics, and mobilization (see McAdam et al. 1988). Also ideologically, the newer members aimed at popular (Minjung) movements, while the civil movement activists in previous decades stressed human rights and political freedom. It is from the newer members that the substantial mesomobilization networks were constituted (U.Park 1987; Choi 1987).

The first enduring civil movement (*chaeya*) organization was the Youth Alliance for Democracy Movements established in 1983. It became the archetype of the civil movement organizations in the eighties, which typically consisted of experienced movement activists and an enduring organizational structure. The Youth Alliance aimed to mobilize opposition to the regime, to join in coalition with other social movement organizations, as well as to provide research on the direction and strategy of social movements (Oh 1988).[6] Members of the Youth Alliance were made up of former student and Christian activists under the Yushin regime, such as Keun-tae Kim, Min-hwa Choi, Yong-dal Chang, Woo-sop Park, In-song Whang, and Chong-nam Kim.[7] The history of pro-democracy movements reveals that the youth organization was the first non-Christian organization that could support itself financially. Its members were provided with regular paychecks until the organization was under severe repression by the regime in 1985. The money was secured through

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[6] Youth Alliance for Democracy Movements, "Kugminege Ponaeneun Message," October 20, 1984 and "Minjuhwaeui Kil," March 25, 1984.

[7] Youth Alliance for Democracy Movements, "Minjuhwaeui Kil," March 25, 1984. The Yushin regime emerged in 1972 as the new constitution was approved by a referendum. The regime is often characterized as a typical case of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism which invites authoritarian measures for a state-led economic development (Cumings 1989; Han 1988).

sales of the periodical, *The Road to Democracy* (Minjuhwaeui Kil), membership fees, and donation from sponsors (Interview No.14, 17).[8]

A central aim of the Youth Alliance for Democracy Movement was to launch a coalition of various open and covert allied movements including students, workers, religious activists, etc. (Interview No.14, 18). In December 1983 the organization participated in the united movement for the workers that protested for the abolition of "blacklists."[9] The dismissed workers in Inchon were arrested under the charge of instigating a hunger strike of workers of the Tae-chang Corporation in Eri, a city in Cholla Province. In response to this incident, the youth organization dispatched its director to the local office of the Department of Labor in Eri for mediation. It also participated in several meetings to organize protest such as hunger sit-ins by the Jeunes Ouvriers Catholiques, a Catholic labor movement organization, by the dismissed workers in Inchon, as well as in services for the workers and an overnight sit-in held by the Jeunes Ouvriers Catholiques. In addition, the representatives of sixteen Christian and youth organizations met and agreed to have prayer service, public hearing, and signature-collecting campaign concerning the labor incidents.[10]

The civil movement (*chaeya*) organizations avoided forming an overt coalition with the students in order to avoid being blamed as background agitators of campus disturbances. Yet, the civil movement closely cooperated with the student movements. Student movement organizations had "federation lines" that took care of relation with other movement sectors, while the Youth Alliance had a branch that took charge of its involvement with student movement sector. For example, the occupation of the US Cultural Center by student activists on May 23, 1985, was a cooperative act of the Youth Alliance. The Youth Alliance dispersed leaflets with anti-government slogans from the top of buildings near the Cultural Center in order to divert the attention of the authorities (Interview No.16, 18). In addition, the Youth Alliance held a meeting with the National Alliance of Student Associations, and the Council of Christian Youth on May 29, 1985. Undoubtedly, this secret collaboration established between students and civil movement in the early eighties facilitated the mesomobilization processes of the June Uprising (Interview No.17; Kang 1988).[11]

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[8] A single, married without child, and married with children were paid 150,000, 200,000, and 250,000 won respectively (Interview No.12).

[9] Blacklists included dismissed labor activists in order to prevent them from gaining employment.

[10] op, cit, "Minjuwhaeui Kil," March 25, 1984.

[11] The activities of the Youth Alliance suggested a possibility of insurgent activities even under the repression by the state. Encouraged by the insurgent activities of the Alliance, several movement organizations were established such as the Federation of Minjung Culture, Council of Korean Workers Welfare, Council of Minjung Buddhism, Council of Democracy in Chungnam, Council of Democratic Youth Movements in Chunnam, and the Federation of Social Movements at Inchon (U.Park 1987; Interview No.14).

For the sake of efficiency, the coalition of groups was suggested and facilitated by the mesomobilization groups. Less than a year after the establishment of the Youth Alliance, two different coalition networks of popular (Minjung) movements were inaugurated. The Council for People (Minjung) and Democracy Movements, founded in June 1984, aimed at united Popular (Minjung) Movements by workers and peasants. The informal mesomobilization group mentioned above met occasionally and established the Council, composed of youth, workers, farmers, and the religious movement organizations (Choi 1987).[12] In October 1984, another coalition movement organization, the National Council for Democracy and Unification, was established. Contrary to the Council for the People (Minjung) and Democracy Movements, the National Council was mainly composed of eminent figures who worked to further pro-democracy movements since the seventies.[13]

The weaknesses of the two organizations seemed to complement each other, so that in 1985 the two movement organizations united as the United Popular (Minjung) Movement for Democracy and Unification. The absence of eminent figures within the Council resulted in problems of leadership over subordinate organizations. On the other hand, the National Council lacked sufficient activists to launch an actual movement (Choi 1987; U.Park 1987).

It must be mentioned that there was some dissension among groups during the processes of integration, something common to SMOs in the multi-organizational fields. Many of the Christian movement organizations refused to join the new coalition network and even the Youth Alliance did not at first join the United Movements. The Protestant movement sector attempted to put burgeoning civil movement (*chaeya*) organizations under the direction of Christian movements, whereas non-Christian movement forces hoped to wage national democratic movements independent of Christian causes and leadership. Also, the Council for People and Democracy Movements, especially the National Council of Churches in Korea, was suspicious that members of the National Council might take advantage of their movement position as a springboard for their own political ambitions (Choi 1987; Oh 1988; Interview No.18).

Ever since the Youth Alliance for Democratic Movements made a call for coalition among movement associations, there had been a growing effort toward the formation of a united movement organization. This crystallized in the United Popular (Minjung) Movement for Democracy and

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[12] In an attempt to overcome a movement dependent on personalities, membership to the Council was restricted to a movement organization not an individual.

[13] The National Council attempted to collect and report the unbiased national opinion with members who represented each class and sector of society, believing that the issues of student, youth, labor, or Christian movement sectors were subjected to particular opinions. In fact, the Council attempted to be a kind of civilian Parliament with a nationwide representation. See National Council for Democracy and Unification, "Minju Tongil" [Democracy and Unification], No.1.

Unification, established in 1985. Although the organization failed to include many of the Protestant movement organizations led by the National Council of Churches in Korea, it became one of the most comprehensive organizations in the Korean history in term of both the varieties of movement organizations and the region that it covered. The organizations joined to the United Movements were those of Catholics, labor, peasants, youths, and dismissed reporters.[14] The United Movement also managed to provide a regular stipend for its staff, as much as 150,000 won each month. This was a crucial factor in their being as systematized and enduring movements (Interview No.14). The United Movement was not built all of a sudden. Rather, overtime collective efforts of the movement organizations established the open mesomobilization group.[15]

The inauguration of the United Movements bore historical significance both in magnitude and durability. While previous coalitions were ephemeral and single-issue oriented, this organization lasted more than 3 years until it was integrated into a larger national organization in 1989, developing the Popular Movements (Institute for National Democratic Movements 1989). This popular (Minjung) movement organization established a covenant and a platform for a systematic movement. The organization consisted of the Delegation, Central Committee, Central Executive Committee, Committee of Regional Movements, Committee of Movement Sectors, and the Executive Office, etc.

However, the United Movements could not always hold sway over every movement sector. An incident at a port city dramatically illustrated that pro-democracy movements in South Korea occurred in multi-organizational fields where each movement organization raised a different voice with different interests and causes. Civil movement (*chaeya*), labor, and student movement organizations gathered at Inchon on May 3, 1986, where some of activists staged violent riots. This resulted in a massive backlash against the Popular (Minjung) Movement forces from the government and mass media. The failure of organized activities was partly due to insufficient cultural integration that was accomplished 13 months later. In the incident, movement organizations failed to employ consistent slogans or to demonstrate in a unified way. Their slogans involving anti-Americanism and "liberation of workers" were too radical to be accepted to the public. Also, due to the low level of coalition

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[14] Geographically, the organizations ranged from the Provinces of Chonbuk, Chonnam, Chungbuk, Chungnam, Kangwon, Kyungbuk, Kyungnam to the cities of Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, and Inchon.

[15] The objectives of the United Movement were democracy, improvement of life for the people (Minjung), development of Popular Movements, and autonomous unification (Choi 1987; Oh 1988). See also United Popular (Minjung) Movements for Democracy and Unification, "Minju Tongil Minjung Undong Yonhap Kyuyak." enacted in March 29, 1985, revised in June 7, 1988; United Popular (Minjung) Movements for Democracy and Unification, "Minju Tongil Minjung Undong Sonon." May 10, 1985.

among organizations, organizations within each sector failed to overcome group interests (W. Park 1987; Park et al. 1987).

After the riot in Inchon in 1986, so-called 5.3 incident, the organizations came under severe repression and were ordered to disband in November of that year. The organizational system that the United Movement had built was not demolished however, and it revived in the June Uprising, providing a communication network that ran through the nation (Institute of the Movement for Nation and People [Minjung] 1989). One of the reasons why the United Movement survived the repression of the regime was that the organization was backed by a wide network of indigenous organizations across various sectors and regions. Because the United Movement was operated by many mid-level activists, the arrest of prominent figures could not destroy the organization as it did in the seventies. Whereas the "5.3 Incident" in Inchon provided the regime with the pretext for repression against the civil movement, student, and labor organizations, it furnished the SMOs with a cause for rearranging and strengthening their coalition network (Interview No.14; Park et al. 1987).

Structural Integration

A series of countermeasure committees facilitated the structural and cultural integration, elevating the level of mobilization in June. While the United Movements performed the role of a mesomobilization actor, a new mesomobilization actor emerged through joint action with the civil movement (*chaeya*) coalition and other movement sectors. The mesomobilization actors, in the end, contained wider networks of movements than the United Movements (U.Park 1987).

The temporary coalition among civil movement and Christian movement organizations dated back to August of 1985 when they formed a preparatory countermeasure council against the government's attempted enactment of the Campus Stability Act (Choi 1987). Thirty-five movement organizations including Protestant and Catholic associations as well as the United Movements and Youth Alliance participated in the council. In October 1985, another allied council was launched in protest against torture. The Council included thirty-one Protestants, twenty-four Catholics, ten Buddhists, sixty members of the United Popular (Minjung) Movements for Democracy and Unification, twelve families of the arrested, and fifty-one representatives of New Democratic Party. Similar temporary coalitions were formed several times up to early 1987 on the issues of torture, the Asian Games, and economic invasion by the USA and Japan, etc. After the ins-and-outs of a series of countermeasure councils, a new council was reborn as the strengthened National Coalition for Democratic Constitution (Institute for National Democratic Movements 1989; Moon 1989). These gatherings provided opportunities for the leaders of SMOs to contact each other and attempted to narrow their differences in political ideology and movement strategy (U.Park 1987; See Gerhards and Rucht 1992).

Among the coalitions, the United Countermeasure Committee against Torture and Procommunist Charge served as a preparatory network for the nationwide coalition organization, the NCDC. The Countermeasure Committee contained every opposition force including the United Popular (Minjung) Movement for Democracy and Unification, Council of the Promotion of Democracy, and the New Democratic Party as well as Christians, monks, and the families of the arrested. The Countermeasure committee actually led demonstrations on February 7 and March 3, in commemoration of the tortured student, Chong-chul Park, an event that was used to further the organization of the NCDC in the June Uprising (Lee 1988; Park et al. 1987).[16]

The members who had inaugurated the Countermeasure Council met and negotiated a plan for a nationwide oppositional organization. The NCDC was largest nationwide coalition in Korea since liberation from the Japanese. This was not a highly formalized movement organization, but a coordinating network of movement organizations. The alliance had 67 representatives under eight advisors with 22 branches in the provinces and cities. Representatives consisted of the leaders of regional movements, Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists, United Popular (Minjung) Movements for Democracy and Unification, politicians, writers, artists, women, families of the arrested, farmers, workers, urban poor, and youth (Choi 1987; CISJD 1987b).[17]

The NCDC managed to accomplish the basic requirement for structural integration by opening an "on-line" account for the collection of money and formulating a platform that would encourage joint action. The money collected through the account was more than sufficient for the operation of the coalition network (Interview No.14). The platform included detailed directions for joint action and was distributed to the branches of the NCDC throughout the nation for simultaneous, unified nationwide protests. The program announced a planned national meeting at the Episcopal Church in Seoul on June 10, protesting torture to death and urging constitutional revision. This program suggested other publics to sing the national anthem at 6 p.m., followed by mass honking the horns by drivers. The NCDC also called for a mass turning off of televisions, and having a power blackout for ten minutes beginning at 9 p.m. in protest against the government party convention, including a celebration of its presidential nominee, Roh Tae Woo. Overnight "fasting sit-ins" in churches and temples were ordered in case the authorities broke up the meeting. The announcement suggested that the entire nation telephone one another in order to mobilize participation in the demonstration.[18]

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[16] Hoking the horn as a protest by the drivers has been practiced in the demonstration of March 3, which was more widely practiced in the June Uprising.

[17] It needs to be noted that the constituents of NCDC were registered as an individual without representing the groups they belong to.

[18] National Coalition for Democratic Constitution, "6.10 Kugmindaehoi Haengdongyo-gang," June 1987.

Cultural Integration

Along with structural integration, cultural integration among SMOs played a significant role in bringing about the massive uprising in South Korea in June 1987. In this mesomobilization processes, the actors attempted to establish a consensual frame to which each SMO subscribes. It was not until the issue of constitutional revision was raised that the movement organizations began to merge toward a common denominator. The political symbol of constitutional revision was not created all of sudden, nor out of any social context. It was the outcome of lengthy efforts by each SMO to find an effective way to persuade the public to subscribe to its movement cause (CISJD 1986; Klandermans 1992).

Emergence of a Common Political Symbol

The opposition New Korea Democratic Party effectively raised the issue of constitutional revision for the direct Presidential election. After the opposition party won a substantial number of seats in the National Assembly in February 1985, they proceeded with their election campaign promise to push for a constitutional revision for the direct Presidential election. The opposition party concentrated on the constitutional revision issue by proposing the establishment of a Special Committee for the Constitutional Revision in parliament (CISJD 1986).

In early 1986, the opposition party held several public gatherings in major cities – Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Kwangju, and others, mobilizing tens of thousands of people.[19] The proposed constitutional revision suggested by the opposition party emphasized the reform of political institutions rather than economic reforms. The party assumed that the present indirect elections, or the proposed parliamentary government would be abused to prolong dictatorial rule. In a 1985 press conference in Japan, Kim Young Sam, warned of a possible coup or revolution if constitutional revisions were delayed (CISJD 1986).

Another equally prominent opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung, argued for a presidential system over a parliamentary government. Parliamentary system government, he believed, could lead to virtual military rule.[20] In sum, the opposition party supported a constitutional revision based upon the ideal of liberal democracy that guarantees freedom of expression, loyal opposition, and free election. However, some radical groups proposed more drastic changes in the constitution to guarantee the right of the people (Minjung).

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[19] For instance, about twenty thousand people protested in Pusan on March 23 to demand direct Presidential election. One prominent opposition leader, Kim Young Sam said, said "People power and the people's will for democracy finally deposed the dictator [in Philippines]. I hope President Chun will not be a loser, but a winner in the rising tide of the people's demand for democracy. I hope he will not be a second Marcos." New York Times, March 24, 1986. See also March 12 and April 6 of the same year.

[20] The Secretary's Office of Kim Dae Jung. *Uri Soshik* 6. October 20, 1985 in CISJD (1986).

As public attention grew, the issue of constitutional revision emerged as the central issue of the movement sectors as well (CISJD 1986). The enthusiastic support of the public for constitutional revision provoked debates among movement activists.[21] Moderate and radical proposals for constitutional revision were offered. One proposal forwarded by the opposition party called for direct Presidential elections. Another proposition, suggested by the radical student alliance, the National Nationalist Democratic Student Council of Struggle for Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Fascism (or NNDSC, Minmintu), completely denied the legitimacy of all of the five constitutions since independence from Japanese rule. This proposal demanded a new constitution. In between these moderate and radical views on constitutional revision, Civil, Christian, student, labor, and peasant movement sectors raised other versions of constitutional revision.

Although the movement sectors agreed to focus on the issue of constitutional revision or replacement, they did not reach a consensual proposal for the revision within a year. However, by May of 1987, through persistent persuasive communication and compromise, SMOs finally came to a shared proposition for constitutional revision.[22] In the processes of cultural integration, the informal and formal mesomobilization networks played important roles. The civil movement (*chaeya*) organizations were able to suggest a unified frame through their coalition movement network, the United Popular (Minjung) Movement for Democracy and Unification (See Institute for National Democratic Movements 1989). Also the informal networks, consisting of civil movement and Christian movements, facilitated opportunities to narrow the differences among the SMOs.

Constitutional Revision and Cultural Integration

South Korean SMOs did not reach a seamless fusion of frames. In other words, they failed to build a perfect overarching master frame that would encompass the frames of Sammin, Minjung Theology, and liberalism. This does not mean there was no cultural integration among the SMOs. In the case of the June Uprising, SMO cultural integration needs to be assessed in terms of the connection between SMO frames and the common political symbol, rather than a totalizing master frame. The SMOs agreed upon the importance of constitutional revision both as a movement goal and a tool for consensus mobilization. Although the majority of movement organizations did not reach consensus in terms of a detailed agenda, they succeeded in relating their movement's issues to the common goal of the coalition networks – constitutional revision.

Persuasive communication and frame alignment had taken place not only between potential participants and SMOs, but also among SMOs themselves

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[21] New York Times, March 12 and 24.

[22] The cases of torture promoted the cultural integration among movement sectors.

when they aimed at united activities (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). On the brink of the June Uprising, various movement organizations succeeded in establishing cultural integration under which SMOs could collaborate toward common goals. The common slogan involved constitutional revision and "withdrawal of military dictatorship" (CISJD 1988).

The theme of democratic constitutional revision embraced the issues and demands of diverse movement organizations, including Christians, farmers, lawyers, artists, reporters, etc. The relatively radical SMOs failed to persuade the public to follow their original idea of revision, so they compromised and adopted the public's moderate line of revision.

The resolution issued by the National Council of Churches (NCDC) on May 28 suggests cultural integration among various SMOs (Snow and Benford 1988). The group-specific interpretive frameworks were connected to the common goal of constitutional revision. Although the majority of SMOs raised more than one issue for constitutional revision, only the linkage between the central issues of each SMO and their common goal will be examined below.[23]

1. The resolution calls for the investigation of water and sexual tortures, which have been the prime concern of the human rights groups in the National Council of Churches in Korea as well as the United Countermeasure Committee against Torture and Procommunist Charge.[24]
2. The termination of the repression of the workers, farmers, and the urban poor is demanded, which is the concern of the United Popular (Minjung) Movements for the Democracy and Unification as well as student activists and some progressive Christian organizations which have protested for the welfare of the people (Minjung).[25]
3. The proclamation denounces the political propaganda of the media, reflecting the viewpoint of dismissed reporters and Christian SMOs.[26]

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[23] National Council for Democratic Constitution, "Kyoleuimun," May 28, 1987.

[24] The United Countermeasure Committee against Torture and Procommunist Charge, "Komunmit Yonggongjojak Choji Kongdong Taechaek Wiwonhoi Palgimun," November 4, 1985; The National Priests Corps for the Realization of Justice, "Komunsalineui Chongshikeul Wihan Urieu Sonon," January 24, 1987.

[25] The United Popular (Minjung) Movements for Democracy and Unification, "Minju, Tongil Minjung Undong Sonon," May 10, 1985; The Christian Council of the Mission for the Urban Poor, "Pyonghwaeui Ilkuneuro Urideuleun Ilosopnida," April 30, 1987; The Alliance of Labor Movements in Seoul, "Seoul Nodongundong Yonhap Changrip Sonon," August 25, 1985; The Catholic Farmers' Organization, The Alliance of Christian Farmers Organization, and Catholic Female Farmers' Organization, "Hyonshiguke Taehan Chonman Nongmineui Chujang," May 13, 1986.

[26] The Council of the Dismissed Reporters in 1980, " '80nyon Haejikonroninhyobeuihoi' Kyolsonge Jeueumhan Urieui Ipchang," March 24, 1986; The Headquarters for Christian Nationwide Movements for the Refusal of the Viewing KBS-TV, "KBS-TV Shichongryo Kobu Kidokkyo Pomkukminundong Ponbureul Palchokhamyonso," February 11, 1986; The Council of the Democratic Press, "Onronjayueui Hwakponeun Hyon Shitjomeso Kajang Chungyohan Kwajeda," July 4, 1987.

4. Claiming that the unification of the South and North can be facilitated by the establishment of civilian governments, the resolution reflects the cause of the civil movement (*chaeya*) and student movement organizations.[27]

5. The declaration calls for massive national movements for the liquidation of "the wicked laws" enacted under the authoritarian regime, which conscientious lawyers have emphasized through their collective activities in Korean Barristers' Association and the Human Rights Committee of the NCCK (Suh 1986).[28]

Each movement sector has not adopted a master frame in light of the definition of Snow and Benford (1992). It appeared to be virtually impossible for SMOs ranging from radical populism (Minjungism) to classical liberalism to agree to a common master frame. While the mesomobilization actor succeeded in drawing agreement upon constitutional revision and the termination of political repression, it failed to establish a master frame that every SMO would share. What resulted was the connection between each SMO's frame to the issue of constitutional revision. The consensus on specific signifiers, constitutional revision, and a subsequent agenda, enabled each SMO to launch integrated protests with a focused slogan.

Once the movement sectors were both structurally and culturally integrated under the direction of the mesomobilization actor, the NCDC, the mobilization potential of the pro-democracy movements dramatically escalated. During the uprisings in June the police were overwhelmed by the number of participants and the widespread demonstrations. According to official data on Table 3, during the month of June alone there were 3,362 demonstrations with one million participants across the nation. On June 10, people joined in the massive demonstration staged in 22 different major cities throughout the country (CISJD 1988). In Seoul, the same day, under the direction of the NCDC, car horns were honked for 25 minutes around the City Hall. Throughout the night, protests continued in various places in Seoul and other cities, despite the house arrest of about seven hundred opposition figures.[29]

The protest in Pusan was no less fierce than in the nation's capital. On June 10, students of several universities including the Pusan University, Tonga University, and Pusan Industrial University, etc., took to the streets and dispersed among the public, resulting in a confrontation with the police downtown. Following NCDC protest tactics, protesters were to sing the national anthem at six o'clock in the afternoon. The protesters continued to demonstrate overnight, applying hit-and-run tactics. Numerous demonstrations in the port city included stone throwing at a

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[27] "Saron." *Minju Tongil* 4, 1986; The National Patriotic Student Alliance for the Anti-Foreign Power and Anti-Dictatorship, "Chogugeui Chajujok Pyonghwatongil Chokjineul Wihan Tujaeng Sononmun," October 28, 1986.

[28] The Human Rights Committee of the NCCK, "Hananimeui Popkwa Inganeui Pop," June 5, 1985; The National Council of Human Rights in 1986, "Inkwon Sonon," June 4, 1986.

[29] New York Times, June 11, 1987.

Table 3 Number of demonstration and participants from January through August 1987

Month	Number of demonstrations	Number of participants
January	61	3,400
February	53	1,600
March	131	15,000
April	425	119,400
May	856	200,000
June	3,362	1,000,000
July	427	101,000
August	3,037	566,000

Source: Kukjong Kamsa Naemuwi Yogu Charyo
Requested by Representative Nak-do Choi, 1988, p. 187

regional headquarters of the ruling party, at police stations, and at the station of Korean Broadcasting System as well as the disarmament of a platoon of riot police. As a result, on the first day of the series of nationwide uprisings, 3,854 people were taken into custody and 768 people were injured (CISJD 1987b, 1988).[30]

During the period of the June 10th to the 27th, the intensity of the protests continued. On June 18th, when the NCDC called for protestors to rally against the excessive discharge of tear gas by authorities, 247 demonstrations were held in sixteen cities, resulting in 1,487 arrests throughout the nation (Park et al. 1987). In the major cities, impromptu street gatherings and discussions were held to debate the constitutional revision, the injustice of military dictatorship, and the abuse with tear gas by the police. The demonstrations were especially fervent in Pusan where twenty police stations and three riot buses were set on fire or damaged. The protests in that Southern city continued throughout the night and into the day of the 24th.[31]

The nationwide demonstration on June 26th forced the regime to accept the demands of the dissident groups. The NCDC finding that no substantial agreement had been made at the meeting on June 24th between the President and the opposition leader, Kim Young Sam, organized a nationwide protest. This protest was called a "grand peace march for democracy" and was staged in 34 cities and four towns.[32] The mobilization by the NCDC gathered over 200,000 protesters across the nation. The cities were once again filled with tear gas as the protestors engaged in hit-and-run tactics until late into the night and into the next morning. The seriousness of the demonstrations on the 26th was evidenced by the spread of protests to even the smaller cities. The resonance of the movement cause was felt in virtually every corner of the nation, signaling a grave threat to the regime. The protesters claimed the streets in once quiet cities such as in Chinhae, Kochang,

[30] New York Time, June 12, 1987.
[31] New York Times, June 21, 1987.
[32] New York Times, June 27, 1987.

Muan, Wando, and Kwangyang. In Kwangju, the city where the June uprising began, the largest number of people took to the streets. (CISJD 1987b, 1988).

The series of demonstrations in June went beyond police control. It forced the regime to choose between reconciliation with the opposition forces or military intervention. At last, on the June 29th, the chairman of the ruling party, Roh Tae Woo declared a plan for a constitutional revision including direct presidential election along with the restoration of basic human rights, freedom of the press, and local autonomy.[33]

The fierceness and magnitude of the demonstrations can be gauged from the numbers of tear gas shots. During 1987 alone, 673,588 shots of tear gas shot, costing 12,428,851,000 won (approximately 14,621,824 dollars), were discharged in an attempt to contain demonstrations. Table 4 reports the amount of tear gas discharged in the nation. It is also notable that the second highest amount of tear gas was fired in the Chonnam province which has relatively few large cities. This indicates a pattern of regional grievances resulting from the government's crackdown on the Kwangju Uprising in May 1980.

Throughout the nationwide demonstrations, each movement sector effectively enhanced the overall movement potential. The religious movement sectors contributed to the protests via their nationwide networks. They mobilized people through numerous religious services held throughout the nation. Also, the church provided spaces where protesters could prepare for the next demonstration. Although the participation of the various sectors of society enhanced the legitimacy of the movements, the administrative work of the alliance was executed by the members of civil movement (*chaeya*) sectors. The student organizations were not accepted into the NCDC in Seoul; however, they collaborated with the alliance. In other regions, student organizations officially joined the NCDC to

Table 4 The types, shots, and costs of tear gas discharged in 1987 (Cost: in thousand won)

	KM-25	SY-44	Repeating firearm	Total shots	Cost
Seoul	155,626	111,026	396	266,652	4,909,029
Pusan	36,271	28,559	110	64,830	1,212,528
Taegu	19,832	15,246		35,078	622,976
Inchon	13,713	10,151	63	23,864	455,550
Kyonggi	18,703	19,810	6	38,513	710,194
Kangwon	6,388	5,757	15	12,145	227,230
Chungbuk	8,320	8,995	58	17,315	349,270
Chungnam	19,170	23,328	53	42,498	819,271
Chonbuk	17,088	14,327	7	31,415	566,680
Chonnam	55,455	40,220	60	95,675	1,720,738
Kyongbuk	7,671	9,114	19	16,785	321,807
Kyongnam	14,165	10,835	6	25,000	446,942
Cheju	2,456	1,362	2	3,818	66,636
Total	374,658	298,730	795	673,588	12,428,851

Source: Kukjong Kamsa Charyo requested by Representative Yong-gwon Lee, 1988

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[33] New York Time June 29, 1987.

wage protests in collaboration with the alliance (CISJD 1987b; Lee 1988). Joint action with the opposition party propagated movement causes to a much broader public because the mass media covered the party activities more than those of extra-institutional organizations (Interview No.14).

It should be emphasized that the coordination of movements by the NCDC played a vital role. As Table 5 illustrates, the movements were most active when the NCDC officially called for nationwide struggle on the 10th, 18th, and 26th. Depending on the region, the leaders and participants in movements were different. In Seoul and other large cities, the NCDC, its incorporated SMOs, and students led the demonstrations. Where the NCDC was weak, the college students, Christian SMOs, and branches of the opposition party directed the movements.

Judging from newspaper accounts and other statistics, students seemed to constitute the major portion of the protesters. However, the substantial numbers of the older population joined the rallies, a very rare occurrence in the history of social movements in South Korea.[34] In industrial cities such as Inchon, many workers participated in the demonstrations, while in rural towns such as Muan, peasants took part in the protests guided by the Christian farmers associations (CISJD 1987b). Table 6 shows the occupational composition of the arrested, which reflects both the high proportion of student participants and the diversity of participant's social backgrounds.

The Aftermath

After Rho's Declaration on June 29th, the middle class lost interests in taking to the street. They did not support the massive workers' protest in July and August. The workers' protests were largest since the advent of Yushin Regime in 1972 (CISJD 1988). Since the June 1987 uprising, the popular-based Minjung movements and the middle-class-oriented civil movements (shimin undong) have been at odds each other.

In the political sphere, the National Assembly agreed to revise constitution that was later approved by a referendum. In December 1987, Roh Tae Woo, the key member of the military coup in 1979 and 1980, was elected with 35.9% of popular votes. During the Presidential campaign, the pro-democracy activists were divided into three sections: supporters of Kim Dae Jung, the Single Candidate line, and the Independent Candidate Line that promoted Minjung (popular) candidate. These sectarian divisions and electoral compromises contributed to a decline of activism (Cho 1997; Yi 1997).

After the Declaration on June 29th, the NCDC failed to seize attention from the public and the organization disintegrated. The United Popular Movements for Democracy and Unification also disappeared and the Minjung (popular) movement organizations became realigned under the United National Movement Council for Nation and Democracy in January 1989.

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[34] New York Times, June 19, 20, and 22, 1987.

Table 5 The distribution of protests from June 10 through 27 in major cities. (Y = One or more occurrence of demonstration)

| | Date (in June 1987) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Seoul	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Inchon	Y					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y
Suwon	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y							Y	
Songnam	Y	Y						Y	Y	Y							Y	
Ansan				Y		Y		Y		Y								
Pusan	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y
Masan	Y		Y			Y		Y	Y								Y	
Chinju						Y	Y	Y									Y	
Ulsan	Y							Y		Y							Y	
Chinhae																	Y	
Kochang																	Y	
Kimhae								Y										
Taegu	Y					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y		Y	
Pohang	Y																Y	
Andong	Y																Y	
Kyungju		Y				Y		Y										
Kimchon																	Y	
Youngchon																	Y	
Taejon	Y	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y				Y	
Chongju	Y		Y			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y					Y	
Chonan	Y																Y	
Kongju								Y									Y	
Chechon																Y	Y	
Kwangju	Y				Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Mokpo	Y									Y	Y					Y	Y	
Sunchon									Y	Y	Y	Y					Y	
Yosu														Y	Y		Y	
Muan																	Y	
Wando																	Y	
Kwangyang																	Y	
Chonju	Y	Y			Y					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Eri	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	
Kunsan	Y					Y			Y	Y							Y	
Namwon															Y			
Chunchon	Y		Y						Y	Y	Y							
Wonju							Y	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	
Cheju													Y	Y	Y			

Source: *Christian Institute for the study of Justice and Development* (1987b)

Student movements were divided into "NL" (National Liberation) and "PD" (People's Democracy) lines since mid-eighties. The PD line follows orthodox Marx-Leninism and the NL line is tantamount to Mao or Kim Il-Sung's line that puts more stress on anti-Imperialism than class struggle. Since 1987 the NL line has overwhelmed the movements and after the June Uprising, student

Table 6 The arrested and detained at Seoul from June 10 to 13 and at Kwangju June 20 to 21, 1987

	Seoul	Kwangju
Student	171	19
Business person	6	9
Worker	6	4
Members of SMOs	2	
Service	3	16
Merchant	1	9
Unemployed	4	21
Farmer		1
Other	3	2
Total	195	81

Source: *Hanguk Ilbo* June 13 and 16, *Tonga Ilbo* June 16. Quoted from *Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development* (1987b)

activists exerted themselves on reunification movements. However, after the fall of the Socialist regimes and the rise of the Kim Young Sam government, student activism sharply declined. Christian movements, another axis of the pro-democracy movements, also shifted its focus from issues concerning the lower classes in South Korea, to humanitarian aid to North Korea. Many Korean intellectuals believe the Minjung movements have declined and disappeared from South Korea's political landscape, which however, may be a middle class illusion. The movements "for" Minjung obviously perished but the movement "by" Minjung themselves is still vibrant. The Minjung have acquired the ability to self-organize, and a oppositional culture in the form of popular chants, songs, and arts remains intact at the juncture of possible workers' and farmers' protest sites.

Obviously, the democratization brought differentiation of the social movements. Nancy Abelmann (1996, 226) summarizes the situation in the late eighties as "...the demise of the cold war challenged the long-standing military authoritarian rhetoric and control. Likewise, socialism's devalued currency unsettled the rationales and visions of dissent." The focus of civil society has shifted from politics to culture, production to consumption/lifestyle, laborers to middle class, restraint to indulgence, homogeneity to diversity (Cho 1994; Abelmann 1996). Under these circumstances, civil movements, comparable to Western New Social Movements, began to seize the media and public. These movements grew up rapidly and by 2005 the total number of voluntary organizations amounted to 5,556 including 736 environmental movement organizations, and 296 feminist movement groups (NGO Times 2006). The landscape of civil movements continues to transform. New trends of civil movements are challenging earlier centralized ones that exclude laypersons from the decision-making processes. After 2000, what is noticeable is the emergence of Internet-based, loosely networked, popular-based protest networks (Ha 2005).

Conclusion

This research demonstrated that the study of mesomobilization elucidated one of the important dynamics of the June Uprising in South Korea. The Uprising turned out to be a consequence of the cumulative and collaborative efforts of SMOs to enhance movement potential, not simply a spontaneous uprising of the middle class.

The concept of the mesomobilization actor was useful to explain the role of civil movement (*chaeya*) organizations in the later stage of pro-democracy movements. Actually, the concept of the mesomobilization actor helps to explain to some extent why social movements in the eighties were more effective than those in the previous decades. In short, it helps to explain what difference the emergence of the civil movement sector made. Because the civil movement organizations had activists with experience, know-how, and well-established personal networks with activists in various groups and because they were strategically and ideologically more flexible than Christian or student movement organizations, they served as the most appropriate coordinating centers of the various SMOs and facilitated the establishment of nationwide insurgent networks.

The study of master frame does not seem to be always necessary to explain cultural integration. It is doubtful that various SMOs could reach a seamless fusion of their frames. Even if they had, such a master frame may have been too general to instigate actual movements. It seems that the study of cultural integration can be legitimately done without recourse to the concept of master frame. Rather, it requires the investigation of the link between a common political symbol and a movement specific frame, as suggested in this research.

The explanation of the massive uprising should not be completed without explaining the micro-processes of participation of individuals. In the future, it would be meaningful to conduct research dealing with these matters, neglected in this research due to a focus on the activities of SMOs.

Furthermore, future research should focus on the activities of social movement sectors outside of Seoul. Whereas Seoul had been the center of movements, many regional movement associations arose in provinces and cities. In the industrial cities, pro-democracy networks mobilized along the lines of labor movements. The peasant movement organizations led the democracy movements in the rural towns. Further studies on movement activities outside of Seoul should be conducted for a fair understanding of social movements in South Korea. Finally, more research on the informal network of mesomobilization is required by means of more in-depth interviews with the relevant figures, in order for fair understanding of the entire processes of mesomobilization.

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Mapping South Korean Women's Movements During and After Democratization: Shifting Identities

Song-Woo Hur

Introduction

Korean women's movements emerged in the late 19th century as resistance against Confucian patriarchal politics and culture. Following the period of Japanese colonialism (1905–1945) and later dictatorships, the women's movement continued to grapple with women's human rights and social and political freedom. This historical trajectory shows how Korean women's movements shaped and were affected by the political context. Since the onset of democratization in the early 1990s, women's movements have experienced significant changes and challenges. Over time, the subjects, issues, and political spaces of women's movement discourses have widened. Through this process, the identities of the women in the movements have been changing too. In the 2000s, a new generation of feminists came into the movement and deepened its theoretical perspectives on unequal gender power relations.

In spite of the growth of feminist studies in Korea, feminist scholarship on women's activism is not abundant (Shim 2000, 263; Kim 1998, 18). Research on the Korean women's movement tends to focus on large organizations and progressive women's activism at the national level. Conservative groups and small groups, mainly based on the local level outside the mainstream groups, are excluded (Hur 2006a). Only a small number has focused on young feminist groups since 2000 (Chun 2001; Lee 2002, 2005; Kim 2003, 2007; Song 2003). In addition, there is a paucity of research on different women's groups in the early stage of women's movements, particularly from the late 1930s to 1970s, which shows a lot of gaps between different historical stages. It was not until the 1980s that feminists seriously carried out research on women's movements.

Recently, Korean sociologists and feminists have utilized New Social Movement (NSM) theories to understand the rise of women's movements among the

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civic movements in Korea (Chang 1996; Cho 1998; Yoo 2001). While NSM
theories provided important insights into recent social movements, they are
inadequate for exploring the dynamics of the women's movement after demo-
cratization in South Korea. The NSM approach is not a unitary theory, but a
composition of diverse elements. The theories are rooted in European traditions
of social theory and political philosophy "as a response to the inadequacies of
classical Marxism for analyzing collective action" (Buechler 1995, 443). Repre-
sentative theorists include Manuel Castells, Allen Tourain, Jurgen Habermas,
and Alberto Melucci. In common they assume that "their societies have moved
into a distinct social formation" of "postindustrial, advanced capitalism" and
"that the structural features of their societies have shaped the kinds of collective
action as decisively as the structural features of liberal capitalism shaped the
dynamics of proletarian protest" (op. cit, p. 447).

   NSM identity politics uncovered the different experiences of women from
men. But the concept ran into trouble since it "homogenizes and naturalizes
social categories and groupings, denying shifting boundaries and internal
power differences and conflicts of interest" (Yuval-Davis 1997, 131). Identity
politics tends to produce divisional or hierarchical relations within the women's
movement (Yuval-Davis 1997, 127). The concept of *transversal politics* devel-
oped by Nira Yuval-Davis, which can incorporate the shifting boundaries
between sub-groups within a movement, is understood among Korean femin-
ists as a useful alternative to identity politics to analyze emerging movements in
Korea (Chung 2005; Hur 2006a, 2007; Kang 2005; Moon 2004; Roh 2003).

   This paper assesses these NSM propositions in the light of historical analy-
sis of the Korean women's movement. In doing so, it examines the limits of
NSM theories to explore the complexity of new emerging movements in
countries like South Korea. Especially, the changing natures and shifting
identities of the Korean women's movements after democratization call for a
new paradigm of analysis going beyond NSM approaches. This paper critiques
the treatment of identity in the new social movements (NSM) perspective, in its
place favoring the concept of transversal politics for understanding identity
transformations.

Historical Context of the Korean Women's Movements

Women's movements have a long history in Korea. Before democratization,
women's movements were a part of larger social movements, i.e. national
liberation movements during the colonial regime and social democratization
during the military dictatorships. Within these movements, women's move-
ments represented the homogenous category of women with a single collective
identity, as a group member of the nation, the state, and/or working class. After
democratization, though, and especially with the emergence of new feminism in
the 2000s, the women's movements begin to recognize that women are not a

united group but composed of unique individuals and different social with multiple identities. These included marginalized women such as irregular workers, migrant workers, sexual minorities, and disabled women.

The early Korean women's movement emerged in the late 19th century struggle against Japanese colonization. This early wave of activism utilized education as a tool to challenge traditional Confucian ideology and to modernize society. The early activists viewed women's educational equality as essential for women's participation in the national independence movement. After the first autonomous women's organization, *Chan-Yang-Hoe*, formed in Seoul in 1898 to build girls' school, many women's organizations for education were created under the influence of Western Christian women missionaries (Lee 1996). Women leaders of the national liberation movement and so-called new women were educated in these schools. These early women's organizations aimed to abolish the traditional Confucian patriarchal social system of the Yi Dynasty (1393–1910). This patriarchal social system served to reinforce traditional social and cultural norms and values and developed legal and political institutions to control women's behavior (Han 1985). Providing women with formal education, the early activists attempted to modernize the traditional culture and society.

A second wave of women's activism emerged after Japan's 1905 annexation of Korea. Women's activism in the national independence movement can include participation in the movement to repay the national debt, and participation in guerrilla activities against the Japanese army in addition to the movement for enlightenment through education (Kim 1996). The most important and largest resistance movement against Japanese colonialism was the Independence Declaration Movement organized on March 1, 1919, in which women activists from the modernization movement joined their male counterparts in a failed effort to gain independence. After the 1919 struggle, the women's movements underwent dramatic changes and a third wave of women's activism emerged.

In the 1920s, the Japanese industrial revolution based on the rapid development of the textile industry had an impact on the Korean economy. Japanese textile companies moved into Korea utilizing the cheaper labor of women, who moved from the declining rural farming sector and traditional fabric production. Women's socialist groups such as *Chosun-Yeosung-Dongwoohoe* (1924) and women's trade unions responded to the plight of workers and began to organize frequent strikes, opposing low wages, inhumane work environments, and sexual harassment from male officers (Henderson and Appelbaum 1992; Lee 1996). *Kunwoohoe* (1927) was the largest and the most influential women's group, which was a wide coalition under the initiative of socialist women activists, during this period. However it was dismantled in 1933 due to the arrests of its core members and internal ideological disagreements. Remaining intact was the liberal nationalist women's movement which survived until independence in 1945.

Although socialist women's activism was temporarily revived after independence as part of socialist movement groups, the Cold War ideology of the American military government (1946–1948) played a crucial role in the

eradication of left-wing social movements and the proliferation of right-wing movements (Sohn 2001). Jayawardena (1986a) notes that women activists in working class and revolutionary left-wing movements in the South Korea were crushed by repressive political regimes and disappeared from history.

In the context of left wing repression, right wing groups proliferated under the nation-building government of Lee Seung Man (1948–1960). One example of a women's group that Korean feminists deemed conservative was the KNCW (Korean National Council of Women) which encompassed various women's professional groups, philanthropic groups, and a few intellectual groups concerned with women's issues. KNCW was a successor of the liberal women's movements formed during the national liberation movement. Among the KNCW's membership were women's groups of both the education movement and the liberal reformist movement. The member associations increased to 15 in 1967, 27 in 1992 (KNCW 1993), and 48 in 2004, which represents over 2 million members (KWDI 2004a).

KNCW was based on the politics of *Yeosung-Baljun* (Women-Development) (KNCW 1993), which simply combines the words "women" with "development." This agenda of women and development grew from the UN women's conferences from the 1970s and 1980s. The UN proposal focused on equality between women and men, and the advancement of women's political and social status (Newland 1991). KNCW's politics of women and development is characterized as a WID (Women in Development) approach, which emphasizes women's integration in development process of the state (Hur 2006a: 107). KNCW petitioned the state and lobbied institutions for women to deal with women's participation in social and economic development (KNCW 1993). Also it was involved in activities for modernizing traditional housework, advocating family planning, and supporting community development. The group was also concerned with environmental and youth problems.

The agenda of KNCW of women and development coincided with the developmental state policy in Korea during this period. KNCW supported the Park Jung Hee government (1961–1979) during the period of unprecedented economic growth with rapid social change, and continued to support the Chun Doo-hwan's military government's development policy (1980–1987) (KNCW 1980, 56). This uncritical attitude toward the military authoritarian developmental state was the major reason why early Korean feminists considered the KNCW a conservative and pro-government women's movement.

Despite the diverse trends in the movements, the women's movements before democratization seem to assume women as a unitary collective member of the nation and the state. The early three trends of women's movements of education movement for women, reformist anti-Japanese colony, and women's activism in socialist national liberation movement (Jayawardena 1986b) stood on the identity of women as members of the nation in their attempt for securing the nation-state from the colonial rule. The KNCW with its focus on women and development was also upheld by the strong identity of women as a member of

modern state which aimed to achieve social and economic development for the nation-building.

The Women's Movements and Democratization (The Late 1980s–1990s)

This section explores the *Minjung* women's movement along with social democratization movement and its changing natures and identities after the democratization.

The Birth of Minjung Women's Movements and KWAU (Korean Women's Association United)

The Park Chung-hee regime (1960–1979) was characterized as a developmental military authoritarian dictatorship. Under its anti-communist and developmental policy, the regime had a specific political, economic, and cultural structure in which the state mobilized and controlled people (Cho 1998). The state's political groups originating from Korea's developmental policy and economic monopoly groups (*Chae-bol*), originating from the distribution of the land and property formerly occupied by the Japanese colony were unified (Koo and Kim 1992). The developmental state was highly dependent on significant political support as well as massive financial aid from America and international agencies, such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund) to build its basic structure (Henderson and Appelbaum 1992; Minns 2001). In addition, the Park regime used nationalist ideology and anti-communism as a means to urge people to move toward the goal of economic development. This linkage between the development state and domestic capitalist groups, and their usage of anti-communist nationalism, triggered the predominance of the state over civil society and of capital over the labor market and workers (Cho 1998).

After President Park was assassinated in 1979, Chun Doo-hwan, a military general, assumed political power through a military coup. In the *Kwangju Massacre* during May 1980 the push for democratization was challenged by the Jun military regime when thousands of innocent people participating in street demonstrations were killed.

This massacre became the starting point of the *Minjung* movement. The *Minjung* movement had three distinctive political principles of *Sammin-Jooui* (Three *Min*-ism). The three political principles included *Minjok*-ism (Nationalism) targeting neo-imperialism, *Minju*-ism (Democracy) or opposition to the military authoritarian developmental dictatorship, and *Minjung*-ism (Populism) promoting independence from neo-colonialism and advocating the establishment of democracy (Kim 1998, 100). *Sammin-Jooui* reflected the rejection of

the political, economic, and cultural repression of the military developmental authoritarian state by democratization and the usage of civil power.

Within the *Minjung* social movement, *Minjung* women's groups emerged. The concept of "*Minjung* women" meant women who were oppressed. Women of all social groups joined including workers, farmers, the urban poor, students, and intellectuals who were conscious of unequal class/gender stratification and repressive social structures of the 1980s. Women's labor and human rights issues were central to the concerns of *Minjung* women. During the 1970s, the numbers of women workers increased dramatically with the state-driven, labor-intensive, and export-led industrialization policy. This economic development plan relied on the cheap labor of young girls who were responsible for supporting their families. Young Korean women's wages were only half of male's. The working environment was very poor, with women the frequent targets of sexual discrimination and sexual violence (Chung 1997). The existing trade unions were pro-government and were not concerned with human rights issues.

At first women workers attempted raise their concerns in existing unions in an attempt to democratize the workplace. When this failed they sought to organize new trade unions. Student movements joined the workers' movement and female students joined in advocating female workers' human rights. Women student groups on campus started to organise autonomous groups with the goal of supporting female workers and transforming the conditions of labor. The women's student movement challenged universities to introduce Women's Studies courses within the university curriculum. This close link between the female students' movement and Women's Studies/feminist theory is important in the history of the women's movement in Korea (Chang 1997).

The first intellectuals who introduced Western feminism to Korea were primarily involved in the Christian Academy (CA). The CA was founded by progressive Christian intellectuals. The CA organized women's consciousness-raising programs for groups of workers, farmers, students, intellectuals, and professionals in the early 1970s. Korean women intellectuals read Western feminist theories, translating them into Korean and adapting feminist theories to the Korean context. The IYW (UN International Year for Women) and the first International Conference for Women in Mexico (1975) also inspired Korean feminists. As a result, the "Declaration of Women as Human Beings" was produced and it was the first clear pronouncement of the women's liberation movement (Han 1993). During the 1980s, Korean feminists of the KWAU were critical of the existing women's movement of KNCW for its narrow focus on the advancement of women's status and middle-class women's experiences. They argued that KNCW was not a genuine women's movement and had failed to push for the necessary social structural changes (Choe 1978; Shim 1985).

By 1987, the KWAU was organized as a national coalition of 23 *Minjung* women's groups. The leadership of the KWAU included female workers, students, intellectuals from academia and other progressive individual women (Nam 1999). The founding 23 associations included women's chapters from

other *Minjung* movement organizations including workers, farmers, environmentalist, painters, youth, Christian and Buddhist groups, etc. Association membership grew from hundreds of women to around 24,000 members by 2004 (KWDI 2004b).[1] Initially the KWAU aimed at achieving democratization, independence from the American intervention, and equality between women and men. The KWAU also recognized that the Korean women's movement would not achieve these goals without working to transform the social structure, which was producing condition of women's oppression (KWAU 1987). The KWAU with its focus on democratization, anti-western interventionism, and gender equality constituted a new women's movement and contrasted sharply with the old women's movement of the KNCW with its more conservative agenda (Cho 1993; Chung 1997).

The KWAU joined the nation-wide *Minjung* social movements' struggle advocating democratization and opposing the military Jun government. The June 1987 Struggle was the culmination of the *Minjung s*ocial movement and resulted in direct elections and the resignation of the military President Chun Doo-hwan. During this period of upheaval women in KWAU wore hemp cloths in their hair, symbolizing the death of the dictatorship. Women of the KWAU joined in street demonstrations blowing whistles, and spray painted political slogans on the streets including "SECURING A DIRECT ELECTION," "HIP, HIP, HURRAH DEMOCRACY," and "OVERTHROW THE DICTATORIAL GOVERNMENT". Other KWAU activities included a campaign to inform the public of the extremely harmful impact of tear gas used by the police. This powerful campaign drew broad public outrage and support (Lee 1998, 25).

After the June Struggle expelled the Chun military regime, the Roh Tae Woo regime took over power. Roh Tae Woo himself was a former military colleague of Chun Doo-hwan and the new government was not democratic. Under the Roh regime's policy of liberalization, the *Minjung* women's movement weakened.

In spite their different social positionings, *Minjung* women's groups represented the oppressed women, particularly women workers. Discovering identity of women as workers, an agency for struggle against the military dictatorships, was crucial for women's movements themselves and the democratization process. However, the identity politics based on women as women workers and poor women also contributed to silence many other women's identities and needs.

The Emergence of the Civic Movement and Changes of KWAU

The establishment of democratic government (1993) led the *Minjung* movement to halt the political struggle against the military state. The first democratic

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[1] Joining the association were autonomous women's organisations such as Korean Women Workers Association, Korean Women's Hot Line, the Korean Women's Association for Sisterhood and Equality, Another Culture, Research Group for Women and Society, Korean Women's Association of Women Theologians, Korean Association of Christian Women etc.

government of the Kim Young-Sam regime began to provide new political oppor-
tunities to civil society. The initial concern of the *Minjung* movement was how to
utilize newly opened political spaces. These new opportunities came in the form of
direct democratic elections for the president, parliament, local mayors, and coun-
cils. Other opportunities emerged through individual entrance into state politics.[2]

The demise of socialist regimes in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the
strong impact of global structural adjustment policies had an impact on the
politics of the socialist leaning *Minjung* movement. The demise of the socialist
regimes left activists in the *Minjung* movement, questioning their political
identity and the legitimacy of Marxist ideology. As the movement of globaliza-
tion based on neo-liberal politics intensified, the structural adjustment policy
eroded and destroyed the existing industrial structure resulting in the bank-
ruptcy of small-sized industries that employed many female workers. Global
pressure to allow unrestrained foreign imports and investment in Korea's
domestic market altered the country's industrial sector, resulting in widening
class divisions and unstable employment, especially for female workers.

In this context, *Minjung* movement organizations were split into two groups:
the workers' movement critical of global intrusion in the domestic labor market,
and a "new social movement" sector focusing on democratic participation (the
Symin-undong which means civic movement). The workers movement main-
tained its focus on the struggle against the neo-liberal state and capital globaliza-
tion, which they viewed as a highly developed form of imperialism. The priority
of civic movement was participation in the democratic state including organiza-
tions such as Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and People's
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD). The PSPD criticized the weak-
ness and limitations of the *Minjung* movement, accusing it of radical politics and
strategic rigidity, and claiming that it's focus on class issues would not solve the
various social problems facing Korean society (Choe 2000).

The democratization strategies of the KWAU national coalition changed
between the 1980s and the 1990s. After the military Jun regime, the Roh Tae-
Woo regime partially liberalized state policies and facilitated state-led democrati-
zation (Park 1998). In response to state-led democratization, the KWAU created
women's political spaces within democratic state institutions. Abandoning street
demonstrations and campaigns, women opted to participate in institutionalized
policy-making and administration to achieve women's rights. Since the late 1980s
the KWAU has lobbied for legislative reforms and legal amendments including
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act in 1988, the Family Law (1989), the
legislation of the Child Care Act (1991), the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
(1989), the Punishment of the Crime of Sexual Violence Act (1993), the Prevention
of Prostitution Act (1993), the Assistance of the Livelihood of Women Forced into
Sexual Slavery by the Japanese Military Act (1995), the Basic Act for Women's

[2] Both Presidents Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung were members of the social democra-
tisation movement during the 1970s and the 1980s, and there were close connections between
the democratic ruling parties and activists in the *Minjung* movement.

Development (1995), the Prevention of Sexual Violence Act (1997), the Prevention of Family Violence Act (1997), the Punishment for Procuring Prostitution and Associated Act (2002), and the Abolition of Family Registration System (2003). These legislative reforms were aimed at women's issues of employment, maternity leave and protection, sexual and domestic violence, and affirmative action. Affirmative action was implemented in political institutions, political parties, educational institutions, science, farming, and fishing.

As a result, the increase of women within political parties, state institutions, and local councils was notable. The ratio of women in national parliament rose from 3% in the late 1990s to 13% in 2004 (Kim 2005, 27). The number of elected women politicians from KWAU increased during the 1990s. Together with increased women's participation through elections, individual feminists' entrance to state institutions has been growing. Women's entry into national and local political organizations has widened their influence. The budget and size of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family was increased compared to the budgets of former equivalent institutions; the Presidential Special Committee for Women's Affairs (1998–2002) and the Ministry of Gender Equality (2002–2005). Many feminist activists and scholars from the women's movement served as ministers and staff in these institutions. Finally, in sharp contrast to their position as dissident illegal groups during the 1980s, women's groups of the KWAU registered as legal women's associations during the 1990s and were funded by the government.

KWAU's policy of nationalism and stance against neo-imperialism was altered to support women's issues related to peace and unification of the peninsular. The KWAU supported unification between the North and South Korea, and supported a subsequent reduction of the military budget and the reallocation of military budget funds to women's welfare. The KWAU opposed the Gulf war (1991), American missile imports (1994), and raised the issue of prosecution of American military crimes against civilian populations within S. Korea. Organizing meetings between North and South Korean women with a vision of reunification were major activities supported by the KWAU (Gee 2002).

A third policy of populism was changed too. Expanding its early focus from issues confronting women workers to broader issues of sexual violence, education, environmental issues, peace and unification between North Korea and South Korea, and military sexual slavery during the colonial period etc. means that women involved in the movement became more inclusive. The emphasis on women workers' identity shifted to the women as a homogeneous group encompassing women workers, middle-class housewives, and other women. KWAU's efforts at representing diverse women's issues led them to assume women as a homogeneous group. In this, the KWAU became to advocate on behalf of middle-class women's interests rather than those of female workers or poor women's (Cho 1996a).

Among diverse issues, the central concern of sexuality to the KWAU was the question raised by Korean feminists addressing women's daily needs (Cho 1997). By that time, issues around women's sexuality was silenced in the public due to the traditional Confucian patriarchal culture as well as the predominance

of Marxist social movement culture over the women's movement in the 1980s. After the democratization Korean feminists' emphasis on the importance of exploring women's experiences of sexual violence and sexual identity obviously had a major impact on the agenda of the progressive women's movement of KWAU as well as culture of Korean society (Cho 1997).

In short, KWAU shifted from dissident political resistance to institutionalised political activism in state politics, lost its radical opposition to the world capitalist structure, and started to encompass women's diverse needs instead of an exclusive focus on female workers' issues. In this process, KWAU gradually appeared as a "civic movement" organization becoming a mainstream women's organization to some extent resembling the KNCW. Identities of women in the movements have shifted from *Minjung* women to women as a homogeneous group as citizens after democratization.

The New Feminist Groups and Challenges of Korean Women's Movements in 2000s

The 2000s saw the emergence of new feminist groups and their criticism of KWAU. Their activities widened the scope of women's issues and reshaped identities of women in the women's movements. The challenging issues in the 2000s show the changing natures of the women's movements in the process of consolidating democracy.

The Emergence of New Feminist Groups

As the KWAU criticised KNCW as old and pro-government women's movement at its outset, other new women's groups have begun to be critical of the KWAU since the late 1990s. Who are they and where are they from?

Younger feminists since the late 1990s are referred to as a third wave of the contemporary Korean women's movements following the progressive women's groups of KWAU and the conservative women's groups of KNCW (Chung 2005). However, the label "Young feminism" has been criticized by members of these groups because it tends to misrepresent their political stance and activism and tends to exaggerate their youth and immaturity (KS 2005). Furthermore in the context of Korea, where respect for the elderly is a very influential cultural standard, the contributions of the young are sometimes minimized. Finally, the label assumes that "Young feminists" are a homogenous young generation failing to note the diversity of participants. I rather call these groups the 2000s New Feminist Groups (hereafter NFGs) according to Kim Sooki (2007).

They were products of the 1990s' socio-political and cultural environment. Korean society experienced a dramatic change after democratization. This third wave of feminists first appeared among female students in universities,

mainly in Seoul. On campuses in the middle 1990s they challenged male-centerd student movements and built autonomous feminist groups (Kim 2003, 279). Newly emerging campus feminists were critical of social movements which focused exclusively on economic and political issues and served to maintained patriarchal culture. They attempted to separate feminist issues from the old Marxist paradigm of social movements (Chun 2001). The NFGs began to incorporate the theoretical challenges of post-modernism, post-Marxism, and post-colonialism into the feminist perspective (Young Feminist Project Group 2000). More importantly, they are under a strong impact of women's studies programmes, which were successfully institutionalized within universities throughout the 1990s. The progressive politics of the 1980s was replaced by the discourse of sexual violence and sexuality in the 1990s. Feminist researchers and scholars have offered theoretical tools for reinterpreting the sexual politics of male-centred student and social movements (Kim 2003, 2007, 22).

Among the members of the NFGs was a clear feminist identity (Chung 2005). These groups are the first women who define themselves as feminist in Korean women's movement history.[3] Critical of hierarchical bureaucratic organizations, new feminist groups tend to organize activities in small groups. These groups actively encouraged equality among their membership and avoided traditional Korean language and honor bond culture (Lee 2005). They have adopted new technology and integrated this into their organization. Most women's groups have their own web sites throughout the 1990s. Particularly, the NFGs have developed expanded feminist cyber spaces including chart rooms. This adoption of new cyber technology represents the younger generation's desire to speak out beyond a specific geographical boundary and outside of formally controlled capitalist institutions (Jo 2004, 105).

Despite common features, the NFGs are not homogeneous. Apart from the campus feminists, another group was female activists involved in social movement organizations of the late 1990s who were critical of male-domination within social movement organizations and of a sexually violent culture. They organized women led subgroups to challenge patriarchal social movements (Chun 2001). The last group consisted of female activists who were active in labor movements. Female activists were critical of the existing union's patriarchal leadership and culture and viewed this as a stumbling block for empowering female workers. They subsequently organised the women-only union in the late 1990s (Kim 2007, 23–24).[4]

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[3] Even though women activists in *Minjung* women's movements and KWAU were and are influenced by feminist ideas, they do not define themselves feminists until recently.

[4] These groups include Seoul Women's Trade Union, Korean Association of Women's Unions, Menstruation Festival Project, Women Against War, disabled Women's group Sympathy, Feminist Journal IF, feminist Online Journal Ilda, lesbian groups and a feminist webzine Unni-network etc.

Challenging Issues and Shifting Identities of Korean Women's Movements in 2000s

There are new issues arisen in the women's movements in 2000s: how to view the negative effects of the KWAU's political engagement with the state; how to include the politics of the personal within feminist politics; how to consider differences between women; and lastly how to create coalitions among women with considering differences.

In the very late 1990s and the early 2000s, the progressive women's groups were enjoying political gains resulting in the introduction of gender equal policies and quota systems in political parties and state institutions, women's entry into political office and public service, and the overall enhancement of feminist influence on gender equality discourse (Gee 2002). Yet, while accepting the reform efforts of KWAU, some NFGs strongly criticised progressive women's groups' political engagement in the democratic state, arguing that the successful legislation was only a partial step in transforming gender relations in Korean daily life (Kim 2007). The NFGs criticized that KWAU has become established mainstream institution, losing its autonomy from the state and depending on government funds and conservative for maintaining its power in institutions.

As a result, the KWAU has lost it radical criticism on state policy (JI 2006) and has become a part of the political mainstream and a partner of the state (Kim 2003, 282). Others also viewed feminist politics in the engagement in the democratic state as de-radicalized and de-politicized in the process of implementation of gender equal policies (Kim 2004). It was concerned that the KWAU was, to some extent, beginning to resemble the KNCW during the dictatorship (Lim 2004). Activists in KWAU throw self-questions about the danger of losing autonomy from the state and feminist individual co-option by the state too (Kang et al. 1999).

The good example of problematic relations between the women's movements and the state is seen in the growing concern about feminist response to the state's neo-liberal policy. The democratic Korean state succeeds the development policy of the developmental state and adapted neo-liberal globalization policy (Choe 2005). Despite the country's economic growth and the gradual increase of women's economic participation, female poverty has been increasing for the last 20 years. After the economic crisis in 1997 as a result of structural adjustment policies, the number of unemployed female heads of household increased 2.5 times and women's employment became profoundly unstable (Chung 2000, 177). Although KWAU resisted the structural adjustment policies, it showed limited concern for the negative impact of globalization on women's lives, delivering social services of state welfare benefits but failing to address the broader structural global issues (Chung 2002). The percentage of irregular female workers increased to 67.6 in 2006 (Cheo 2006, 63) from 57.5 in 1995, compared to 46.7 from 32.2 for men from 1995 to 2002 (Choe 2004).

The poverty rate of female-headed household is three times of male's and women are discriminated in social welfare benefit distribution. Among low-wage earners women are 2.7 times of men. Further, there is an increasing wage gap between men and women (Choe 2006, 63–65). While demanding gender-equal social services through political reforms, KWAU resists against neo-liberal economic policy including structural adjustment policy and free trade policy. Nonetheless, comparing its radical opposition to the dictatorial state influenced by US-led world power in 1980s, there is a lack of radical criticism and resistance against the state's policy for globalization (JI 2006; Hur 2006b).

As some recognize the NFGs as a radical feminism (Chung 2005), the NFGs consider the politicization of the personal in everyday life as a priority. "The personal is the political" is from the Western second wave feminist principle. It is distinguished from the KWAU's concept of politics focused on the formal public politics of state. For the NGFs, women's collective identities based on class, nation, and state are not main concerns. Rather, women's body in where patriarchal power is inscribed is the crucial political space of struggle for achieving feminist goals. Dominant power is dispersed in individual bodies and every layer of daily life and cultural practices. Therefore, changing patri-archal culture and individual life style, rather than getting institutionalization of gender, is to transform gender power relations for the new feminist move-ment (Young Feminist Project Group 2000). KWAU's women's movement focused on legislative reforms and legal amendments is challenged by this new feminist agenda; how to deal with women's personal experiences while pursuing its liberal reformist gender politics (Hur 2007).

Recently, feminists have viewed as problematic the notion of Korean women as a homogeneous group (Cho 1996b). The NFGs criticize that KWAU's activism did not represent "all" Korean women (JI 2006). Legislation and amendment of laws in regard to maternity protection and women's labor rights proposed by KWAU were targeted at regular women workers, able women, and those in heterosexual families. The legislative agenda of the KWAU failed to address the needs of part-time, temporary irregular women workers, disabled women and lesbians, representing only rights of regular women workers, able women, and those in heterosexual family. As a result the 2000s' new women's groups defined themselves as minorities including lesbians, transsexuals, urban poor people, disabled women, women irregular workers, and gays and male feminists alienated from the mainstream women's movement (Kim 2007, 26–7). Particularly, sexual minorities lacked representatives and were unable to com-municate their agenda within the KWAU.

Another issue dividing Korean feminists was the issue of prostitution. While the KWAU's led legislation efforts to abolish prostitution, some prostitutes calling themselves sex workers claimed that the mainstream women's move-ments treated them as simply victims of the society. Sex workers demanded the decriminalization of sex work and called for legislation mandating labor pro-tections. The NFGs recognizing a diversity of women's concerns joined in coalition with other social minorities including sex workers (Kim 2007, 62–4).

Considering differences between women comes to the fore of Korean women's movements.

The final challenge of the Korean women's movements is how to create common ground for achieving gender equality and justice at local, national, and global levels considering differences between women, particularly in the context of globalization (Hur 2006b). Creating dialogues with recognizing differences becomes a central concern for Korean feminists. They are then aware of the urgent need for inclusive coalitions in which differences are accepted and maintained transcending beyond identity politics on which many women's groups are seemed to be based.

Korean feminists use the concept of transversal politics to understand current women's movements in Korea (Chung 2005; Hur 2006a, 2007); As noted above, identity politics is inadequate because it "homogenizes and naturalizes social categories and groupings, denying shifting boundaries and internal power differences and conflicts of interest" (Yuval-Daivs 1997, 131). As a result, identity politics tends to produce divisional or hierarchical relations within the women's movement (op. cit, p. 127).

In contrast, transversal politics emphasizes the need for communication within and between different women's groups and seeks to intersect the boundaries of feminist groups for solidarity and dialogue. It celebrates the specific value and historical roots of diverse groups and rejects the homogenization of these groups. Rooting her own situation but at the same time to shift herself in a situation of exchange form of dialogue is transversalism (op. cit, p. 130). In addition, transversal politics attempt to overcome the either/or approach to universalism vs relativism and modernism vs postmodernism, accepting differences but questioning "how and with whom" feminists work for common projects (op. cit, p. 125). Even though how to practice transversal politics remains as a question, the attempt to include and intersect multiple identities and different positionings of women in Korean feminism opens a bright future.

In the 2000s, identity formation of Korean women's movements meets a significant change with the emergence of NFGs and their critique on KWAU. Women's identity in Korean feminist context was assumed as collective and unitary from the Japanese colonial period to the time of democratization in the early 1990s. In this, women appeared a collective subject as a part of class, nation, and the state as well as a universalized homogeneous group. However, the emphasis on "the personal" and the exploration of different minority women's experiences offer to see new identities of women as an individual agency and differentiated and heterogeneous groups. While the recent female poverty issue seems to revive the interest in class conflict among feminists, this interest in class does not necessarily returns to the old Marxist paradigm. Women in poverty are intersected with other social cleavages of race, sexuality, disability, and locality and so on. Hence, women's identities have shifted from the collective and unitary one to the individual, inclusive, and multiple formation.

Is New Social Movement Theory (NSM Theory) a Useful Model of Analysis?

So far, we have seen the historical trajectory of Korean women's movements with their changing natures and shifting identities. This has been a broad map that cannot explore diverse women's voices, experiences and struggles. Still this history illustrates the limit of NSM theory for analyzing the changing natures and identities of Korean women's movements.

Debates in Western NSM Theories

All the NSM points have their critics and debates. Some argue that there is no clear-cut boundary between new and old movements in the Western context, that NSMs are defensive but progressive for democratization of society so defensiveness and progressiveness can be understood as complementary. The question of whether NSMs are political or cultural implies a more complex implication. The cultural approach can be included into politics in a broad sense. Cultural movements based on identity politics in which "the personal is the political" have implications for transforming conventional politics. Lastly, whether NSMs have their own distinct class basis or not remains in question. Although there is no agreement which social classes are main actors in NSMs, it can be said that the working class and other social classes based on gender, ethnicity, race, sexuality, and age are not exclusive categories in NSMs (Buechler 1995, 447–456).

These four debates are true of the Korean women's movements context too. First of all, there is no distinct shift from old social movements to the new social movements. The newness of the movements after the democratization can be seen in the opposition to the patriarchal culture, the institutionalization of gender equal agenda, and diverse cultural practices such as menstruation festival, feminist magazine, feminist camp, feminist writing, and lesbian café, etc. They are distinguished from women workers' issues before democratization. Yet, the movements face the ongoing and even worse economic injustice of working class women as seen in increasing female poverty, which shows a continuity between before and after democratization.

Therefore, applying western NSM theory to the Korean context is inappropriate (Chang 1996) and the distinction between the old and the new social movements is a false dichotomy (Cohen and Rai 2000; Shaw 1994) in the South Korean context. Regarding the topic of "defensiveness or progressive," the progressive women's movements cannot be understood as either defensive or resistant. Although the women's movements engage within the state as a partner in governance and tend to be conservative, yet they are critical to the state politics too. Their activism simultaneously maintains the politics of resistance as well as that of defensiveness (see KWAU 2005). Since South Korean

society is still experiencing non-democratic rules and culture, women's groups remain critical of state power. Also, the cultural practice of the women's movements cannot be explored in the way of either political as old social movements or cultural. The cultural activities based on "the personal is the political" are cultural but at the same time political. Feminist personal politics calls for the reconstruction of the male-centered notion of the politics biased on public sphere. The cultural practices of the women's movements are not apolitical in regard to the feminist goal of changing political consciousness and institutions of dominant social and the political power structure (Lee 2005). At last, in Korean context, it is difficult to see an obvious shift from working-class women to middle-class women and other groups. It is true that middle-class women have begun to be integrated and have become main participants in the movement during the 1990s after the democratization. Yet, the political concerns about women workers' issues have remained on the important agenda. Since the late 1990s, female workers' movements have gained new organizations and identified new issues in the face of the economic crisis and the negative impact of globalization (Choe 2004).

Limits of NSM Theories from the Korean Feminist Perspective

The additional weakness of NSM theories for analyzing Korean women's movements is found from the perspective of Korean feminist.

In the theories, NSMs are construed as aiming to change the social domain of civil society instead of struggling against the market economy or the state and raising issues concerned with the democratization of everyday life. Yet, civil society is not the locus of the Korean women's movements. While civic movements including women's movements emerged after the democratization attempt to create and broaden civil society, their activities are heavily concentrated on reformation of state politics too. As seen above, gender politics of KWAU was focused on liberal legal reformist activities within formal public state institutions. Social scientists have already referred to the Korean civil society's lack of interest in everyday life politics or any "social" level including local society and its over-concentration on the public political system (Song 1999). Theories of civil society can be characterized as "political-centerd civil society theory" associated with the state apparatus (Yoo 1995, 245). Korean women's movements after the democratization can be a new social movement. However, it cannot be understood as the same NSMs in Western context since the Korean women's movements work for not only building civil society but also rebuilding the state. Korean women's movements' involvement in transforming the military dictatorial state to the democratic state is of different nature from Western feminist movements explored in NSM theories.

The key concept of civil society in NSM theories maintains the division of public and private. But the personal politics of the Korean women's movement

cannot be completely analyzed from this view. Especially, an influential NSM theorist Jurgen Habermas developed the theory of system and life world and NSMs are located between system and lifeworld (Buechler 1995, 445). The system means "a world where the medium of power and money is operating with the consequence of instrumental reason and purposive-rational action," including the state and the economy. The lifeworld is a civil society and the public sphere, which means a world where communicative action is operating through the modes of action based on values, norms, and symbolic interaction (Shim 2000, 244).

Habermas' theory of the system and lifeworld has gathered feminists' attention since they view this framework allows for the inclusion of women's lives in the private sphere (Cohen 1995; Fraser 1997). However, feminists find the theory gender-blind and androcentric because that system/lifeworld separation mirrors a false distinction between women's unpaid childrearing work and other forms of work and represents the misleading institutional separation of family and the official economy in capitalist societies (Cohen 1995; Fraser 1991). Feminists have observed the limits of civil society theory and questioned the adequacy of public/private division for explaining women's lives. Pateman (1989, 35–6) reveals that the private sphere in male-dominated civil society theory is not the same concept as the private sphere in feminist theory. In the former theory, the "public" means state and market, and the "private" means classes and corporations of private, namely, civil society.

Yet, the civil society theory utilized in Korea focuses on public and formal political domains and does not include women's personal experiences in the private sphere at the level of everyday life. Moreover, NSM theories stress the collectiveness in which the personal experiences can easily be immersed. Feminist principle of "the personal is the political" does not necessarily assume "collective" identities for "collective" action. For feminists, individuals' personal experience itself can be a political practice and resistance. From this view, the 2000s' NFGs denounce the politics of progressive women's movements, which treat women as a unitary group with a "collective" identity in their "collective" action. Social movements are not only a collective action for transforming social structure but also a dialogue between individuals in transforming their personal lives for feminists (Chung 2005, 19). NSM theories need to be reconstructed in the ways in which women's personal experiences in the private sphere are included.

NSM theories fail to examine the recent focus of Korean feminist groups on transversal politics that transcends identity politics. While the KWAU was based on the identity politics of progressive socialist feminism (Hur 2006a) and the 2000s' new women's groups are based on the identity politics of radical feminism (Chung 2005; Kim 2003), recent feminists attempt to transcended identity politics by proposing a transversal politics of coalition building among different groups. Korean feminists perceive the need for cross-cutting boundaries of different social groups and for creating dialogues and coalitions. In this, individuals and different groups' identities need to transcend borders of their

own identities in which identities are "rooting" and "shifting" and never fixed in a unidimensional way (Yuval-Davis 1997, 130).

However, NSM theories seem to be stand on the identity politics (Buechler 1995, 446), which attempt to achieve collectivity based on gender, ethnicity, race, sexuality, and age that are socially constructed, simultaneously experienced, and mutually influenced (op. cit, p. 456). Yet, there is no clear recognition of shifting boundaries between different identities in the theories. Hence, NSM theories are inappropriate to explore Korean feminist need for crossing borders of different identities to pursue common feminist goals while accepting differences between them.

Conclusion

We have seen that the Korean women's movements have undergone profound development during and after the democratization. The progressive women's group of KWAU contributed to democratization with its advocacy of female workers' human rights and challenge to the existing power structure of the dictatorship supported by capitalist development system. The KWAU has also played a role in democratization by institutionalizing the feminist agenda within the state politics. This has resulted in increased public influence of Korean women's movements.

Democratization has provided the critical moment to alter the natures and identity formation of the women's movements. Before democratization, the women's movements were a part of social movements, i.e. national liberation movements during the colonial regime and social democratization during the military dictatorships. In this, the movements represented women as a member of the nation, the state, and/or working class in which Korean women seem to be appeared as a homogeneous group with their collective identity. However, after the democratization, the women's movements begin to recognize that women are not a united group but composed of unique individuals and different social with multiple identities, which is largely diffused by the new feminist groups emerged in the 2000s. The movements realized that, in an attempt to represent all women in legislative reformist activities, assuming Korean women to be a unitary group tended to exclude experiences of marginalized women such as irregular workers, migrant workers, sexual minorities, disabled women, those outside the formal political and economic system, and women of social minorities.

There were new challenging issues to the movements at present. The first is how to be critical to the neo-liberal state policy while the women's movements engage in the state politics to deepen democracy and enhance gender equality. Particularly, the increase of female poverty resulted from the state's economic policy adapted globalization is critical for Korean feminists. Related to the women's movements coalesced with the state, the second issue is how to reframe the movement's focus on formal state politics. The new radical feminist groups

stress the importance of politicizing the personal, aiming at transforming individuals' consciousness and culture of everyday life at the micro-level. Considering differences between women and at the same time creating common coalitions between them is the most challenging issue in the current Korean women's movements. Korean feminists tend to view that boundaries between different women's groups need to be blurred and cross identity borders, moving beyond identity politics toward transversal politics.

The last question was that with what kind of theoretical tools Korean feminists can fully explore the changing natures and shifting identities of the women's movements. Although the NSM theories were utilized to analyze the movements after democratization in Korea, they do not seem to explore the specific nature of the movements. Firstly, the movements attempt to develop civil society like Western NSMs but simultaneously they are centered on activities for democratizing the state as was in old social movements. Secondly, the new feminist groups argued for the politicization of women's personal experiences. However, the NSM theories that contain the public/private division are not able to fulfill the feminist need.

At last, Korean feminists' interest in transversal politics was to create common political practice between different women's groups. For example, the issue of female poverty is not just for women workers'. It was rooted in the intersection of different identities such as women workers both regular and irregular, migrant women, sexual minority, and the disabled and so on. Yet, the NSM theories based on identity politics do not seem to have a space for transversal politics of Korean feminists.

If the NSM theories want to include women's movements in post-colonial countries like South Korea, they should take account the specific formation of the state and civil society, the different meaning of personal politics from the Western society, and the intersection of different identities of women and other social cleavages occurred in the post-colonial context. For full exploration of Korean women's movement experiences, Korean feminists need to see limitation of Western social movement theories and to seek a reconstruction of the theories in a post-colonial feminist perspective.

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The Korean Environmental Movement: Green Politics Through Social Movement

Dowan Ku

The Korean environmental movement, which began as a part of the democratization movement under authoritarian government, went through rapid development and institutionalization after an opening in the political opportunity structure with the beginning of democratization in 1987. By skillfully framing environmental issues to attract broad popular support, the movement mobilized sufficient resources to further expand the democratic opening and change the political structure. As sociologist Lee See-jae once remarked, the establishment of the Korean environmental movement can be summarized as a double-edged process of institutionalization and empowerment.[1] Despite steady institutionalization, however, the environmental movement has exercised radical influence on changing institutions and structure without being co-opted into the established system. It has experimented with green politics through social movements, although it has not developed into party politics.[2] This paper analyzes the process by the Korean environmental movement for socially constructed environmental "problems" making the best use of openings in the political opportunity structure.

This paper will first address the question of what lay behind the rapid development of the environmental movement in Korea. Do its origins lie simply in Korea's severe environmental pollution, or are there other factors involved? Rejecting the linear "reflection hypothesis" supposing that environmental problems lead to environmental movements, this paper stresses the importance of an environmental movement as a process of socially constructing environmental issues.

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[1] See Lee (2000) for analysis of the institutionalization and empowerment of the environmental movement in Korea.

[2] In this paper, I define green politics as a politics that emphasizes life, ecology, and the environment, while at the same time promoting democratization.

Second, the paper will address the question of what structural conditions and actions formed green politics through social movements, the most outstanding character of the Korean environmental movement. It will answer the question by examining both the characteristics of a political opportunity structure and the resource mobilization capabilities of environmental movement organizations. To answer these questions, the paper will review and compare a few exemplary cases of the environmental movement that demonstrate typical traits of each time period. These will include the outbreak of Onsan disease, the phenol contamination of the Nakdonggang river, campaigns against the construction of the Donggang Dam (hereafter the anti-Donggang Dam campaign) in Yeongwol, and the anti-Saemangeum reclamation project campaign. It will then analyze the unique characteristics of the Korean environmental movement by comparing it with the cases of the USA, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and China.

Research Questions

This paper will first address the question of why the environmental movement developed so rapidly in Korea. The key theoretical issue is whether the rapid development of the movement or growth of environmental awareness is a reflection of serious environmental problems in Korea, or whether it is a result of social, political, and cultural processes construction. According to materialist theory, or the "reflection hypothesis," the aggravation of environmental problems is a major reason for the growth of environmental awareness and the environmental movement. Riley Dunlap and others emphasize that the environment is an important, independent variable influencing social change, a key tenet of environmental sociology (Catton and Dunlap 1978, 1980). They have criticized sociologists focusing on the environment for failing to understand the influences and limitations that the environment places on society. According to them, the fact that the earth is experiencing environmental problems such as the destruction of the ozone layer or rapid climate change is important in itself in explaining the recent rise of environmentalism. Materialists insist that conventional sociologists are so focused on social processes that they ignore human dependence on nature. This conceptual trend is meaningful in that it encourages sociologists to recognize the importance of the physical environment and its limits on the process of mobilizing for social change. But it is also pregnant with the danger of reducing the analysis of social processes to changes in the physical environment.

The social construction approach emerged in the 1990s as a reaction to the reflection hypothesis. Social constructionists such as Steven Yearly and John Hannigan do not deny the independent, causal force of nature, but focus on the importance of social, political, and cultural processes within which environmental problems are constructed as problems as such. Problems do not become part of the social agenda by themselves, but through a specific social process, with certain problems designated as being of greater importance, less importance, or

no importance at all (Hannigan 1995, 30). According to Hannigan, the following conditions are required for the successful construction of an environmental issue:

1. Scientific authority behind, and validation of, claims
2. Existence of a "populariser" who can bridge environmentalism and science
3. Media attention in which the problem is "framed" as novel and important
4. Dramatization of the problem in symbolic and visual terms
5. Economic incentives for taking positive action
6. Emergence of an institutional sponsor who can ensure both legitimacy and continuity

According to Hannigan, the concept of environmentalism is a multifaceted construction that welds together a clutch of philosophies, ideologies, scientific specialties, and policy initiatives. Although the social constructionist perspective well illustrates the importance of the social process, it is limited in explaining which factors play more important roles than others. In addition, while the social constructionist perspective is useful in identifying medium-range variables, it is limited in analyzing changes of greater scale, such as those in the political structure itself.

In order to cope with these limitations, a second question will address the structural conditions and resource mobilization processes of "green politics through social movements," a prominent characteristic of the Korean environmental movement. To address these processes, it is necessary to examine the change of the political opportunity structure in Korea and the dynamics of the actors, ideologies, goals, activities, issues, and processes involved in the environmental movement.

The political opportunity structure theory posits that structural factors such as political opportunity and political power relations condition the emergence, strategy, and dynamics of social movements (Eisinger 1973; Tarrow 1989; Jenkins 1987). In a comparative study of anti-nuclear power movements in four European nations, Kitschelt claims that differences in the political opportunity structure determined the strategies and effects of the anti-nuclear power movements (Kitschelt 1986). More specifically, the degree of openness of political regimes and their policy implementation capabilities explains the varying results of the strategies and effects of social movements. This proposition can be very useful for explaining the formation and progress of the Korean environmental movement as well.[3]

However, this approach only provides a partial explanation of the impetus of change in social movement. The Korean environmental movement developed

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[3] A political opportunity structure is comprised of structural factors, such as the degree of openness of political regimes and the characteristics of political power relations. The degree of openness of political regimes is related to the issue of how well the political institutional apparatuses of a nation respond to the (new) demands of the populace. The characteristics of political power relations are determined by the existence of allied groups of social movement organizations, the stability of political alliances, and the dominant group's support for social movement organizations.

rapidly with the opening of the political opportunity structure, and has grown into a political force capable of changing that structure after securing its own resource mobilization capabilities. Korean society continues to experiment with green politics through social movements via such interplays of structure and action.

What follows is a brief history of the environmental movement in Korea, a comparison of four cases of conflict over environmental pollution that illustrate the stages of change in that movement and its context, and a comparison of the Korean movements with those in the USA, Japan, Germany, Taiwan, and China. This analysis clarifies the social factors producing the relative empowerment of the Korean movement.

Historical Currents in the Korean Environmental Movement

The environmental movement in Korea began during the period of industrialization. While it is true that rapid economic growth brought about economic affluence, it also exacerbated environmental pollution. Koreans enjoyed increased material wealth, but they also desired a cleaner environment, and this desire influenced the development of the environmental movement (Ku 2000, 113–116).

The 1960s–1970s

In the 1960s and 1970s, there were few environmental organizations equipped with an environment ideology or organizational structure. This early stage of the Korean environmental movement began through the collective actions of victims of environmental aggravation. Their actions can hardly be described as those of a social movement because they lacked organization and continuity. Nevertheless, they laid the foundation for the contemporary environmental movement. After the government's economic development plan was executed in the 1960s, pollution in and around industrial sites such as Ulsan, Onsan, and Yeocheon became a serious problem and the residents of these areas began campaigning for damage compensation.

With the worsening pollution of the 1970s, campaigns for damage compensation intensified and a few environmental movement organizations were formed but they did not have the resources to support victims' movements. In fact, during this period, the only force that was able to raise concerns over environmental issues among the public and represent the victims was the press.

The 1980s

The period of the 1980s was an era of anti-pollution movements. After the democratization movement, the "Spring of Seoul" in 1980 was suppressed by

military power and temporarily withdrawn; soon, a new democratization movement developed. The anti-pollution movement became active alongside democratization, and later became a part of it. In 1982, progressive Protestant and Catholic clergymen established the Pollution Research Institute (PRI, Gonghae Munje Yeonguso). This institute made great efforts in supporting pollution victims, researching pollution problems, and educating the public about the environment.

Anti-pollution movement organizations led by college students and graduates, which were different from those of grass-roots environmental organizations, strongly identified themselves as part of the democratization movement. The anti-pollution movement organizations recruited student and anti-government activists with democratic inclinations. The declaration published during the anti-pollution campaign led by the PRI around the Ulsan and Onsan industrial sites demonstrates just such inclinations:

> The pollution that is forcing voluntary migration is not limited to Ulsan and Onsan, but is a matter concerning the quality of life of the whole nation. It is important to realize that a few government-supported conglomerates and military dictatorships created the pollution problem. Thus, not only the residents in industrial sites such as Ulsan and Onsan, but people all over the nation have to commit themselves to a broader anti-pollution movement in order to bring down anti-nationalistic and anti-social conglomerates, as well as the military dictatorial regime causing these problems (CISJD 1986, 164–166).

Because of its resistant inclinations, the ruling power regarded the anti-pollution movement as anti-governmental and tried to prevent local residents from allying with professional environmental organizations (Ku 1996a, chap. 6). In 1988, the Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association (KAPMA, Gongchuryeon) was established with Choi Yul as its co-president. KAPMA's ideology was oriented toward leftist environmentalism, urging environmental justice and the abolition of the monopoly capitalist system.

The 1990s to the Present

The period from the 1990s to the present has been an era of "new environmental movements." As Korea underwent a process of democratization, diverse social movement organizations formed, made progress, and explored new ideologies and strategies. Indeed, the environmental movement has changed with the progress of democratization since the collapse of the Chun Doo-hwan regime, and up through the June Uprising of 1987. In this period, organizations in civil society – such as the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ, Gyeongsillyeon), the YMCA, and the YWCA – actively joined the environmental movement. They criticized the anti-pollution movement's radical strategies and insisted upon more professional and public-oriented activities.

The United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 was a turning point for the Korean environmental

movement. A new environmental movement replaced the anti-pollution move-
ment. The anti-pollution movement organizations represented by KAPMA had
regarded huge corporations and the government as the violators, and the people
as the victims, while defining the environmental movement as a struggle
between the two. After the UNCED, however, reformers began to pay attention
to global environmental issues and modest environmental movements.

There were five important changes that took place during this period. First,
citizens became major participants in the environmental movement. In the 1990s,
diverse professional environmental organizations were established under the
expanded political opportunity structure, and organizations from civil society
began to actively join the environmental movement, whereas in the 1980s, direct
victims of pollution and members of the lower classes were the main constituents
of anti-pollution movements. Second, the victims' movement exercised greater
overall social influence. It expanded not only in size but in quality as well, as
campaigning for damage compensation expanded to include damage prevention.
Third, the interests of the environmental movement moved beyond the interests
of local residents to the general issue of life and health of all citizens. Fourth, the
ideology changed from leftist environmentalism into a realist environmentalism
that accepted institutional reform and environmental managerialism. On the
other hand, environmental movement organizations experimented with various
ideologies such as deep ecology, eco-anarchism, and communitarianism. Fifth, in
the 1990s, the big national environmental organizations, namely, the Korean
Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM)[4] and Green Korea United
(GKU) were institutionalized and stabilized as national NGOs. They also
adopted modest methods of resource mobilization.

The political mobilization of the environmental movement was accelerated
in 2000. The environmental movement actively participated in the Citizens'
Alliance for the 2000 General Elections (CAGE), which was initiated by a civil
society movement to reform corrupt politics. Major environmental organiza-
tions such as KFEM and GKU participated in the campaign against the
impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004, which had been initiated
by conservative, opposition party lawmakers.[5]

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[4] In 1993, KAPMA, based in Seoul, united with seven local environmental groups to launch
the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), Korea's largest environmental
organization. It became a member organization of "Friends of the Earth International" in 2002.

[5] Conservative lawmakers allied to impeach the relatively progressive President Roh for a
minor election law infraction, but various social movement organizations, including citizen
organizations and labor unions, and an overwhelmingly large number of people organized an
anti-impeachment campaign. In the end, the pro-president party secured a majority of seats in
the general election held on 15 April 2004, and President Roh was reinstated on May 14.

The Roh administration, inaugurated in 2003, has pushed forward progressive policies to
eradicate corruption in politics and enact political reform, but has not been very active in the
environment. Despite this, however, major environmental organizations led the anti-
impeachment campaign to protect democracy, which is an essential value of green politics.

So the Korean environmental movement has not strictly confined itself to the issue of environment. It has positioned itself as a leading force of green politics, pursuing goals positive to preservation of the environment, life, and democracy.

Case Studies

Case studies are useful in analyzing the dynamics of the environmental movement. The cases examined here are major events in the history of the movement that involved a great number of people and media attention, and played a large role in effecting social change (Ku 1996a, b, 2003b).

The Onsan Disease Outbreak (1983–1986)

The Park Chung-hee administration, which lacked political legitimacy after having taken power through a military coup in 1961, sought an economic growth policy financed by foreign capital. As part of the government plan to build a heavy and chemical industry in the 1970s, the Ulsan and Onsan areas in Gyeongsangnam-do province were developed as industrial complexes. In particular, Onsan was designated a non-ferrous metal industrial complex and began to show signs of heavy metal wastewater and air pollution in the late 1970s.

Compensation for damage done by the factories began in the late 1970s. But pollution worsened in those areas, and residents began to show symptoms of neuralgia and skin irritation. Despite harsh political oppression, residents engaged in collective action, rallying to defend their right to live. When the government suspended people's fishing rights because of pollution in 1983, people protested, occupying the streets.[6] As the conflict continued, environmental organizations such as PRI, began to get involved.

In January 1985, the PRI claimed, "Over 500 people in Onsan suffer from pollution-related cadmium contamination – 'Onsan Disease' – which was similar to the *itai itai* disease in Japan." With media coverage that elevated the Onsan Disease case to the status of a full-blown social issue, the Environment Administration (EA) began testing residents of Onsan people for the ailment. In April 1985, the EA issued an official statement saying that the plague that had made many people in Onsan sick was not a pollution-related disease, and announced plans to move the residents. The residents and the PRI refuted the test results and organized group protests that expressed their dissatisfaction with the government's proposed dislocation compensation funds and its method of dislocation. The conflict over the Onsan Disease fell apart after

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[6] Caught up in the ideology of economic growth, the residents of these areas demanded their own migration rather than the closure and transfer of the factories.

Table 1 Stages of the Korean environmental movement

Category	Prehistory of the environmental movement (1960s–1970s)	The anti-pollution movement (1980s)	The new environmental movement (1990s–present)
Accidents and events	• Mercury contamination by pesticide (1978) • Disease caused by air pollution from industrial sites (late 1970s)	• Onsan disease (1985) • Tap water contamination (1989)	• Tap water contamination (1990) • Phenol leakage incident (1991) • Annyeondo, Buan Anti-nuclear Waste Dumping Campaign (1990, 2003–2004) • Anti-Donggang DamCampaign (1991–2000) • Saemangeum (1998–present)
Environmental movement organizations	• Not applicable	• PRI • KAPMA	• KFEM • GKU • CCEJ • YMCA/YWCA
Types of movement	• Grass-roots victims movement for damage compensation	• Grass-roots victims movement • Radical NGO movement	• Grass-roots victims movement • Modest NGO movement
Ideology		• Leftist environmentalism	• Realist environmentalism • Environmental managerialism • Ecologism
Issues	• Pesticide • Air and water pollution near industrial sities	• Air and water pollution near industrial sites • Pollution Disease	• Air and water pollution in large cities • Nuclear power plant and waste disposal siting • Conservation/preservation (Donggang river) • Global environmental problems
Activists	• Farmers and fishermen near industrial sites	• Farmers and fisherman near industrial sites • Intellectuals • College students	• Farmers and fisherman near industrial sites • Intellectuals • College students • Middle class • Housewives

1986 and the villagers began to move to adjacent areas in several phases. But those areas were again occupied by pollutant-generating factories that increased the total amount of pollution in the area.

In the case of the Onsan Disease outbreak, its victims led a compensation movement under a repressive political opportunity structure. At that time, public environmental awareness was low and few environmental policies were in place. Despite the lack of ideological construction of environmentalism, the movement was significant in that the discourse on pollution-related disease grabbed the attention of a broad spectrum of people. In addition, voluntary environmental organizations such as the PRI had an opportunity to gain practical experience through this movement, which later was to serve as an important impetus for the development of the environmental movement. The Onsan case illustrates how the forces of a weak environmental movement, which had formed an alliance with victims, were able to socially construct environmental problems even within a repressive and closed political opportunity structure.

The Nakdonggang River Phenol Contamination Incident (1991)

The Nakdonggang phenol contamination incident was a historical incident that marked a turning point in both the Korean environmental movement as well as environmental policy. In March 1991, Doosan Electro-Materials, located in Gumi, Gyeongsangbuk-do province, leaked phenol extract into the Nakdonggang river, contaminating the source of tap water for the citizens of Daegu. A few days later, the Prosecutors' Office said that, "The company has secretly leaked a total of 325 drums of phenol waste to the river since November 1990," touching off a frenzied movement to condemn the Doosan Conglomerate and boycott Doosan products. President Roh Tae-woo castigated it as an unforgivable, antisocial crime. In the face of mounting criticism, Bak Yong-gon, chairman of the Doosan Group, pledged a 20-billion won donation to the local government along with a public apology. Daegu citizens demanded monetary compensation and refused to pay their water bills. A civil organization handling tap water contamination was formed in Seoul, and the Korea Supermarket Alliance decided not to buy Doosan Group merchandise. Rallies and protests against the Doosan Group erupted all over the country.

As of April 1991, the government and Doosan Electro-Materials Co. claimed that the factory should resume its operations in order to address the problem of slackening exports. Doosan resumed operations on April 18, 1991, after the government shortened its suspension period. The government then suppressed the anti-Doosan merchandise campaign, calling it a violation of the Fair Trade Act. However, a mere 5 days after resuming operations, Doosan once again leaked phenol into the water, an act that resulted in the removal of both the environment minister and vice minister. The incident greatly

influenced the development of the environmental movement in Korea. It provided momentum for the formation of many environmental movement organizations in Daegu, Masan, and Changwon, and promoted the participation of civil movement organizations in the environmental movement.

The phenol contamination incident illustrates how an environmental accident gave impetus to the formation of a social movement. At that time, environmental pollution expanded from areas adjacent to industrial sites to urban cities, and thereby raised public attention about environmental pollution. The wide media coverage of tap water contamination in 1989 and 1990 was particularly instrumental in raising widespread discontentment with tap water. Sensational, full-blown reporting of such incidents by the media also helped to trigger an explosion of public grievances. Also, during this period, the political opportunity structure was much more relatively open, thanks to the democratization movement of 1987. The Roh Tae-woo administration employed exclusionary tactics for the labor movement, but utilized an inclusive one toward the environmental movement.

Unlike the Onsan Disease case, which focused on the interests of victims living near the industrial sites, the phenol contamination incident expanded its focus to concerns over the health of urban dwellers, and more broadly, the general public. In particular, riding on anti-*jaebeol* (conglomerates) sentiments, the unethical practices of firms, as well as government irresponsibility and ineptitude, became issues. The phenol contamination incident showed how the forces of the environmental movement, which were primed to flourish under the open political opportunity structure after democratization, were able for the first time to successfully position the environment as a part of the national agenda. After this incident, the environmental movement amassed strength through organizational expansion and internal institutionalization.

The Anti-Donggang Dam Campaign (1991–2000)

The 1990 floods in Yeongwol and Jeongseon, Gangwon-do province inflicted great damage on the area. In response, the government announced its plan to construct the Yeongwol Dam[7] in January 1991. Upon this announcement, residents of Yeongwol living downstream from the dam stood in favor of the government's decision, whereas residents of Jeongseon, whose lands were to be flooded by the dam's construction, were against it (Jeong 2001). However, once the government began to implement its plan, residents in submerged areas

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[7] The official title of this dam is Yeongwol Dam, but environmental organizations renamed it "Donggang Dam" in order to illustrate the ecological importance of the Donggang river. The fact that the dam – as "Donggang Dam" – received wider publicity than it did as "Yeongwol Dam" shows that the symbolic tactics used by environmental organizations were more effective than those utilized by the government.

changed their positions in light of the possibility of receiving government compensation for lost land.

The issue changed in 1998 from a local to a national one as KFEM launched the anti-Donggang Dam campaign to protect the natural ecosystem. In April 1998, the Three-County Struggle Committee to Scrap the Yeongwol Dam Construction Plans was formed. This committee focused its activities on drawing public attention to dam safety and environmental destruction by launching a petition, sending open inquiries to the authorities, and organizing protests and rallies. In December 1998, the governor and the county council assembly of Yeongwol issued statements opposing the dam's construction.

The Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT), the Korea Water Resources Corporation (KOWACO), and other experts continued to claim that a dam was necessary to prevent floods and supply water resources. Some residents of the submerged area supported it out of expectations of compensation. Confrontations between the two sides were serious, with the dam construction plans driving once-quiet mountain villages into division and conflict.

On a national level, the anti-dam construction forces steadily expanded their ideological legitimacy. Television broadcasts of the beautiful scenery and the unique ecosystem of the Donggang river had a sizable impact on public opinion. As tourists swarmed to the river to view the astonishing beauty on the verge of submersion, the anti-Donggang Dam campaign garnered popular support. The campaign succeeded in stimulating people's empathy to nature by combining cultural symbols such as the Jeongseon *arirang* and log rafts with ecological symbols such as rare species of *eoreumchi* (*Hemibarbus mylodon*) and otters.

The Kim Dae-jung government allowed the Office of the Prime Minister to form a citizen–government joint investigation panel to carry out joint research on the dam's construction. After a year of research, the panel reached the tentative conclusion that the ecosystem of the Donggang area had irreplaceable value and importance, and that therefore, construction of the dam should be abandoned. On Environment Day, June 5, 2000, when the research was coming to an end, President Kim announced the New Millennium Vision for the Environment, and promised to repeal the Donggang Dam construction plans to protect the beauty of the area. With that announcement, the 10-year campaign ended with the victory of the environmental movement forces.

The anti-Donggang Dam campaign, which attracted nationwide public attention, was an important turning point in the history of the Korean environmental movement. Through this campaign, environmental organizations successfully invoked an admiration of life and nature. The public at large, including cultural groups, religious organizations, the press, local residents, academia, and ordinary citizens, now had an understanding of the intrinsic value of living creatures such as mergansers, *eoreumchi*, and otters living in the Donggang river. This was a crucial turning point in correcting the government's supply-based water management policy.

   The Donggang Dam case demonstrates how a new political process managed to stimulate among the populace altruistic interests in the ecosystem and democratic participation beyond personal health issues. This is the essence of green politics. In the Donggang Dam case, the object of ecological protection was extended not only to future generations but also to living creatures other than human beings themselves. In addition, participation by diverse groups accentuated the importance of participatory democracy and solidarity. Environmental organizations and the Ministry of Environment actively deployed water conservation campaigns and water demand-side management policy to solve the water shortage problem, which was the original impetus behind the construction of the Donggang Dam. This case attests to how green solidarity was able to change a seemingly immutable "development coalition."[8]

   In the Donggang Dam case, a strong environmental movement was victorious within the democratic government system. Through the process of institutionalization in the 1990s, the environmental movement forces gained the power to alter already-fixed government plans. They laid the stepping-stones to transform society's view on the environment by bringing about the conceptual change that preservation of the ecosystem was then more important than the prevention of floods and water supply.

The Anti-Saemangeum Reclamation Project Campaign (1998–2006)

The Saemangeum Project, planned in 1987 and begun in 1991, is the world's largest reclamation project. Its purpose is to reclaim 401 km^2 (283 km^2 of land and 118 km^2 of freshwater lake) of tidal flat through the construction of a massive 33 km seawall in the West Sea off Jeollabuk-do province. The project is conceived of as an environmental issue and constructed as a social issue because of the severe pollution of Lake Sihwa, a man-made lake that was the product of a reclamation project similar to Saemangeum. Since the completion of the seawall construction project in Sihwa in 1994, the water quality of the lake has deteriorated rapidly. In the floods of 1996, KOWACO released lake water to lower the water level, resulting only in the pollution of the seawater outside the lake. Environmental organizations criticized the lack of consideration for the environment in the government's development plan and staged protests in the sea. This case clearly demonstrated the limits of

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[8] A "development coalition" is comprised of developmental state, capital, international organizations seeking the globalization of capitalism, and development-oriented media. It produces and reproduces a strong network based on the shared economic and political interests of development. Meanwhile, green solidarity is defined by a loose network mediated by green values and identity but can exert great influence, depending on the situation. Its solidarity structure is not fixed, but rather changes depending on the political opportunity structure and the issues at hand.

environment management capacity for man-made ecosystems and the bureau-cracy's lack of responsibility.[9]

Since the pollution of Lake Sihwa became known, people thought that the Saemangeum reclamation project might cause a similar ecological disaster and began to perceive it as an important environmental issue. With the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration in 1998, environmental organizations launched a large-scale campaign to repeal the Saemangeum project. In reaction, Yu Jong-geun, then governor of Jeollabuk-do province, proposed the forma-tion of a citizen–government joint investigation team to extensively review the project in January 1999. The Citizen-Government Joint Investigation Team to Assess the Environmental Impact of the Saemangeum Project was formed in May 1999. Experts recommended by the government and environmental groups conducted research for over a year in three sections – there was an economic cost-benefit analysis, along with assessments about water quality and the environment – but nothing much came out of it, mainly because each of the experts had a different philosophical, theoretical, and methodological approach to the problem at hand. In particular, the two sides failed to see eye to eye in the economic cost-benefit analysis section of their respective reports, and failed to reach a consensus, crippling the operation of the Joint Investigation Team. Without reaching an agreeable conclusion between the opponents and the advocates, the chief of the Joint Investigation Team submitted a report to the government in August 2000. Thereafter, severe confrontations mounted between the anti-Saemangeum movement, which was led by environmental groups, and the pro-Saemangeum camp of Jeollabuk-do province. Conflicts over environmental issues continued until May 2001, generating debates orga-nized by the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD), heated media reports, and the religious Saemangeum Eco-Peace Movement.

On May 25, 2001, the Kim Dae-jung administration decided to continue with the Saemangeum project, but delayed the development of the Man-gyeonggang area, which suffered from low water quality, until the situation improved. On the same day, the Korean People's Alliance for the Life of Saemangeum announced the "Declaration of Our View on Saemangeum" and resolved to fight to the end. With this declaration, many environmental activists and intellectuals decided to withdraw from government committees such as PCSD. In October 2001, scholars convened to found the Korean Society for the Life of Saemangeum in order to study and address the Saemangeum problem. Environmental organizations addressed the damage of Saemangeum in international forums, including the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 2002, and the 8th Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands in Valencia, Spain, in November 2002.

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[9] In December 1998, the government scrapped its original plan to make Lake Sihwa a fresh-water lake and decided to continue circulating seawater. This decision illustrates that some government-led development projects had structural problems.

   The Roh Moo-hyun administration, having assumed power in February
2003, decided to continue the Saemangeum reclamation project and explore
ways to change the project goals, now that the rice production promotion policy
had been stopped under the preceding administration.[10] In response, a Catholic
clergyman, a Protestant minister, a Buddhist monk, and a Won-Buddhist monk
launched a "three-steps-and-a-bow" (*sambo ilbae*) march – a Buddhist practice in
which one prostrates oneself with every three steps – or the length of 305 km from
Seoul to Saemangeum between March 28 and May 31, 2003, under the slogan of
"Save the living creatures in the Saemangeum tidal flat." The news of the
sacrificial, life-risking march to protect life in Saemangeum touched many peo-
ple, which helped garner support for the anti-Saemangeum campaign. On July
15, 2003, the Seoul Administration Court (SAC) ruled to suspend the Saeman-
geum project by approving the petition by environmental groups to stop con-
struction. The Court sustained their assertion that water would be polluted if the
seawall were completed. The move to suspend a government-initiated develop-
ment project to protect the environment was highly unusual. Yet, contrary to the
SAC ruling, the Seoul High Court ruled on January 29, 2004, to continue
construction, based on the MOAF's appeal. Finally, the Supreme Court ruled
on March 16, 2006, to continue the construction. The basic dam construction was
completed on April 21, 2006. However, Anti-Samangeum campaign is still going
on. Environmental issues such as water contamination and destruction of eco-
system can provoke long-lasting environmental conflicts.
   The development coalition and green solidarity have engaged in severe
confrontation and conflict over the Saemangeum case for a long time. The
development coalition mobilized all possible resources under the slogan of
economic growth and development, whereas green solidarity vied for sustain-
able development, environmental preservation, and respect for life.[11] Unlike
the Donggang Dam project, the Saemangeum project has completed all the
legal procedures necessary for construction, and construction has been going
on for 10 years at a cost so far of roughly one trillion won (approximately
0.8 billion US$). Thus, the development of coalition's political and economic
interest with regard to the project seems extremely strong, making it more
difficult for green solidarity to intervene. Yet environmental movement forces
are attacking the limits of the developmental state and changing the terrain
of politics and policy by emphasizing the ecological importance of tidal flats
at the mouth of the river, probably the only one of its kind in South Korea.
The Saemangeum case illustrates that the Korean environmental movement
has become a political force capable of reformulating the political terrain in

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[10] In August 2001, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MOAF) made an official
statement to abandon the rice production promotion policy due to rice surplus. This change
in policy shook the foundation of the Saemangeum project, which was to reclaim land to
produce more rice for national grain security.
[11] Religious groups, which started to actively participate in the anti-Donggang Dam move-
ment, began to take a central role in the anti-Saemangeum movement.

the sense that it has turned an ongoing massive development project into a policy agenda, and it has changed public awareness of the environment and ecosystem.

Case Comparison

The four cases reviewed above have such typical characteristics that make them representative of different eras in the history of the Korean environmental movement. These four cases confirm that since the 1980s the main issues of the environmental movement expanded from self-interested concerns to ones more altruistic, universal, and ecological. Moreover, the main actors of the movement extended from pollution victims and forces for democratization, down to ordinary citizens, workers, the middle class, religious groups, as well as artistic and cultural communities. The goals of the movement changed from those centering on direct compensation and collective relocation to the improvement of policy and systems of ecological values and culture. The scope of influence has also expanded from the said compensation and relocation to putting pressure on corporations and government to make substantial policy changes. Particularly, in the case of the anti-Donggang Dam campaign, a large-scale construction project already approved by the government was scrapped due to problems posed by green solidarity, marking a representative case of empowerment of the Korean environmental movement.

Perhaps the most important change is seen in how the empowerment of the Korean environmental movement brought the government to make reforms at the policy level, albeit passively, in order to lessen conflict over environmental issues. This tendency can be observed in the gradual improvement of the environmental impact assessment system as well as the active participation of civil environmental organizations in policy making. As a consequence of the environmental movement having become empowered, some ministries of the developmental state, such as the Ministry of Environment, create partial fissures within the developmental state apparatus and are incorporated into green solidarity. In the case of the Donggang Dam project, the Ministry of the Environment forced the MOCT to remedy its environmental impact assessment for an extended period of time, delaying dam construction. In the case of the Saemangeum project, the Environment Ministry publicly predicted that the water quality of Lake Man-gyeong would be below satisfactory level, impeding the smooth implementation of the project.

In conclusion, a comparison of the four cases shows that the environmental movement has come to have enough broad and influential power to bring about change in both the political terrain and the cultural system of Korean society. Green solidarity has expanded its ideological legitimacy and practical resource mobilization capacity within a developmental state in which a development coalition holds dominant power.

Table 2 Comparison of cases of the environmental movement

Case Category	Onsan disease	Phenol contamination incident	Anti-donggang dam campaign	Anti-saemangeum campaign
Time period	1982–1985	1991	1991–2000	1998–present
Political opportunity structure	Closed	Relatively open	Open	Open
Main issues	• Health of residents in industrial sites (Pollution-related disease from heavy metal contamination)	• Concern with citizens health concern • Immorality of *jaebeol*	• Flood and shortage of water • Dam safety • Ecosystem of nature	• Water contamination • Protection of tidal flat ecosystem • Life • Peace
Type of reaction	Reaction after the incident	Reaction after the incident	Precaution	Precaution
Main actors	• Victims • Democratization movement forces (Anti-pollution movement)	• Victims • Citizens • Environmental organizations • Civil organizations	• Citizens • Environmental organizations • Religious groups • Art and culture communities etc.	• Citizens • Environmental organizations • Religious groups • Art and culture communities • Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, etc.
Movement goals	• Compensation for damages and collective relocation • Democratization	• Compensation for damages • Improvement of environmental policy	• Preservation of nature • Improvement of dam policy • Diffusion of ecosystemic value	• Protection of nature • Fundamental correction of development oriented policy • Diffusion of ecosystemic value

Table 2 (continued)

Case Category	Onsan disease	Phenol contamination incident	Anti-donggang dam campaign	Anti-saemangeum campaign
Time period	1982–1985	1991	1991–2000	1998–present
Movement outcomes	Collective relocation	• Partial compensation • Policy improvement • Reinforcement of environmental movement • Spread of environmental conscious values	• Withdrawal of dam construction • Introduction of water demandside management policy • Spread of ecovalues	• Intensified confrontation between development coalition and green solidarity • Diffusion of ecosystemic value
Media coverage	• Disclosure of damage with a focus on victims	• Sensational report • Negative labeling of the coporation (*Jaebeol*)	• Heavy reporting on the importance of the Donggang ecosystem	• Division of media coverage between development and preservation
Main interest	Self-interest in health	Self-interest in health	Altruistic interest in future generations and the ecosystem	Altruistic interest in future generations and the ecosystem
Movement characteristics	• Environmental justice movement	• Health-oriented environmental movement	• Nature preservation movement • Water resource change movement	• Nature preservation movement • Green life movement

Discussion

The Korean Environmental Movement: The Reflection Hypothesis vs. Social Constructionism

Is the Korean environmental movement a reflection of environmental problems? Or is it a product of social construction? Aggravation of environmental pollution is a primary condition of the environmental movement. But as illustrated in the four cases above, the way the problem is socially constructed is actually more important than the environmental problem itself.

In Onsan, cases of sickness erupted in large numbers from 1982, but the problem began to be constructed as a social issue only in 1985, when it received wide media coverage. In particular, the sensational reports that the ailment had similar symptoms to the itai itai disease contributed to the government's decision to speedily begin collective relocation. The disease, once called "the Onsan plague," earned the new moniker "Onsan disease," which became a major driving force behind the environmental movement, combined with the fear of pollution-related diseases.

In the case of phenol contamination, even though the contamination was accidental, the public statement by the Prosecutor's Office that the immoral *jaebeol* conglomerate deliberately dumped industrial waste into residents' water source gave the incident new meaning. Extensive media reports placed the firm and the government in a quagmire after having enabled the development of a discourse powerful enough to incite public anger and greatly influence governmental and corporate policy toward the environment. If the incident had been defined as simply an accident, this would have not been so. An environmental accident, combined with the significance of being an immoral crime involving an unethical *jaebeo*l, produced a new social outcome: an explosion in the environmental movement.

In the Donggang Dam case, a large-scale public development project initiated by the government in the name of the public interest turned out to be environmentally harmful. Starting with this case, a general concern with life and nature as irreplaceably valuable took precedence over human-oriented problems such as flooding or water shortages. A social consensus was reached that in order to prevent flooding and water shortages, methods other than dam construction needed to be explored, while protecting the environment itself. This case was also significant in that the movement included not only local residents, but also various social groups such as environmental organizations, civic groups, and religious organizations, all working together under a banner of green solidarity.

The Saemangeum case is an even more dramatic example. Thanks to the environmental movement, a largely-ignored tidal flat earned new meaning as a place teeming with life. People had very limited knowledge about the ecological value of tidal flats when the Saemangeum project was launched in 1991. The

term itself had negative associations with things dirty and messy. But after witnessing the pollution of Lake Sihwa, the public learned that a large-scale development project could have a negative impact on the ecosystem. Expanding their knowledge through this experience, people recognized mudflats as coastal wetland and assigned them positive meaning as virtual treasure houses of the natural ecosystem. Within 10 years, the environmental movement redefined "the great history of transforming useless mudflats into precious farmland" as "a nature-destroying, uneconomical project." Although physical actions have not changed, the social construction of these actions has changed dramatically.

Based on these four cases, the Korean environmental movement can be explained better by the social construction theory than the reflection hypothesis. The cultural system in the field of the environment has changed swiftly through social change characterized by rapid economic growth and democratization. The value of life beyond the environment is, at least ideologically, now considered to be as important as development and the creation of economic value. Through this change, environmental problems are socially constructed in a dynamic fashion.

The Political Opportunity Structure and Empowerment

Environmental movements cannot develop under conditions in which the regime is too closed to respond to public demands and resistance forces have little solidarity. Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s to the 1970s and China in the 1950s through the 1990s are prime examples of this fact.

The Korean environmental movement of the 1980s developed slowly, dependent on the limited resources of the democratization movement under a repressive political opportunity structure. After the democratization of 1987, environmental movements expanded their resource mobilization capacity and in the 1990s became a central force in a newly formed civil society. Significantly, the environmental movement acquired the power to play a leading role in opening up the political opportunity structure. This is well demonstrated by examples of nationwide resource mobilization, such as the Citizens' Coalition for the 2000 General Elections and the candlelight vigils opposing the National Assembly's decision to impeach President Roh in 2004. Also worthy of note is the fact that the Korean environmental movement has the characteristics of new social movements, which are based on values and identity, unlike old social movements, which were based on economic class interests. In this sense, a prominent characteristic of the Korean environmental movement is empowerment through new green politics.

For an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of the Korean environmental movement, it is necessary to compare it with those of other nations. The following is a comparison with the USA and Germany, which are quite different from Korea in terms of political, social, and cultural structures, as well as with

Japan, Taiwan, and China, which are geographically close and culturally similar to Korea (Yang et al. 2002). The comparisons will focus on the political opportunity structure and the characteristics of the environmental movement.

The environmental movement is highly developed in the USA and Germany, but in different ways. In the USA, which has a pluralist political structure, the environmental movement focuses on lobbying for policy change. Thanks to the advanced legal system of the USA, environmental organizations rely on legal suits rather than direct engagement in political movements. Beginning initially as a nature preservation movement led by the upper class in the early twentieth century, the environmental movement in the USA developed after the 1960s in response to modern environmental problems. At the same time, the environmental justice movement for the lower class developed in reaction to environmental discrimination and racism against people of color. The US environmental movement began to engage in national and global NGO activities, but failed to become politically empowered.

Meanwhile, the environmental movement in Germany developed as a new social movement struggling against then-existing institutionalized politics, based on the changing political opportunity structure in 1968. With a less open legal system but more open political system than the USA, the environmental movement in Germany developed into a form of party politics with the establishment of the Green Party. The overflowing energy of environmental movement politics enabled its resources to expand into party politics. As an "anti-party party," the Green Party today experiments with new politics, putting into practice the four principles of ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, and nonviolence.

Compared with the above-mentioned examples, the environmental movements in Asian countries outside of Korea are politically weak in terms of their capacity to create new systems. The Japanese environmental movement began as a victims' movement in a conservative political culture. Until the 1960s, the Japanese government repressed this movement, just as the Korean government in the 1960s and the 1970s repressed all aspects of civil society as part of the mobilization of all available resources behind the goal of economic growth. The victims' movement developed into an environmental movement through both the filing of legal suits and the launch of a reformative autonomy movement. In the 1960s and 1970s, pollution was the main environmental issue in Japan, but with gradual improvements in the system and technological advances, it made a transition into a cooperative movement in the 1980s. A noticeable feature of the Japanese environmental movement is visible in the contrast between inactive national organizations and quite active local grass-roots organizations. Local environmental organizations are better equipped to engage in activities that save communities than those that might be deployed by an ideology-charged national resistance movement.

In Taiwan, the environmental movement was thwarted under the martial law enforced by the Guomindang (Nationalist Party), which controlled the government until 1987. The main focus of the movement was on the

Table 3 Five-nation comparison of the characteristics of their respective environmental movements

Country Category	United States	Germany	Japan
Political opportunity structure	• Open structure • Weak opposition • Advanced legal system	• Open structure • Multi-party politics • Formation of alternative political structure to corporatism	• Open structure • Conservative central political structure
Main issues	• Nature preservation • Water, air, and soil contamination • Environmental health • Environmental justice and environmental racism • Global environmental problems	• Nuclear power • Climate change and renewable energy • Air pollution • Forest destruction • Ecological tax reform	• Pollution-related disease • Co-op • Air pollution from incinerators • Climate change, etc.
Resource mobilization method	Legal suits, lobbying, and direct action by national and local movement organizations	Party politics and grass-roots social movement	Reformative local government campaign, grass-roots movement, legal suits, and co-op movement
Characteristics of change	Reform within the system	Structural change through new politics	Reform within the system

Country Category	Taiwan	China	Korea
Political opportunity structure	• Democratization in a repressive, closed political structure (the late 1980s)	• Repressive, closed political structure • Impermissible coalition of opposition forces	• Democratization in a repressive, closed political structure (1987) • Strong and dynamic coalition of resistance against dominant power
Main issues	• Nuclear power and nuclear waste • Contamination of industrial sites, etc.	• Contamination of industrial sites. • Water quality, etc.	• Waste contamination of industrial sites • Environmental health • Water, air pollution, and waste • Nature preservation • Nuclear power and nuclear waste, etc.
Resource mobilization method	Residents' movement and relatively weak national movement organizations	Sound resource mobilization based on environmental education	Nationwide large-scale movement organizations and nonpartisan movement politics
Characteristics of change	Reform within the system	Reform within the system	Structural change through movement politics

compensation of residents in industrial sites for harm experienced from environmental pollution. Several incidents incited public discontent with environmental pollution, and the environmental movement developed rapidly with changes in the political opportunity structure, including the lifting of martial law. Although the Taiwanese environmental movement does not have much societal influence when compared to Korea, it has successfully formed alliances with political parties and forced them to adopt an anti-nuclear power generation policy.[12]

In China, the environmental movement has not yet developed, despite serious environmental problems, because the country's economic growth is recent and its political opportunity structure is still repressive. Several NGOs, including Friends of Nature and the Global Village Cultural Center, operate in China, but they are mainly involved in organizing moderate environmental education programs within the system.

By contrast, the Korean environmental movement is similar to Germany in the sense that it pursued and achieved political empowerment as a way of playing a leading role in institutional reform. However, while the German environmental movement has grown into a viable political party, the Korean movement remains one of movement politics under the structural condition of weak party politics (Lee 2000). The environmental movements in the USA, Japan, and Taiwan seem to seek institutional reform rather than a fundamental transformation of social institutions and structures. The US and Japanese environmental movements effect change mainly as the result of movement politics, whereas the Taiwanese are deeply engaged in party politics through the Green Party and the Democratic Progressive Party.

Table 4 compares six countries in terms of political opportunity structure and the empowerment of environmental movement. It is difficult for an environmental movement to develop under a repressive and closed political opportunity structure. Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s, like China in the present, had weak environmental movements in a closed political opportunity structure. At present, Taiwan, Japan, and the USA have an open political

Table 4 International comparison of political opportunity structure and empowerment of environmental movement

		Political opportunity structure	
		Closed	Open
Empowerment of environmental movement	Strong		Germany Korea
	Weak	China	USA Japan Talwan

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[12] The Democratic Progressive Party, which took over in 2000, pushed for an anti-nuclear development policy, but had to withdraw from this stance after it confronted objection of diet.

opportunity structure but weak empowerment of the environmental movement. Meanwhile, the environmental movement in Korea and Germany succeeded in empowerment, turning "green values" into a new political agenda, which has contributed to the even further opening of the political opportunity structure.

What are the reasons behind these differences? From the discussion in this paper, it can be inferred that the differences depend on the strength and dynamics of the power and sustainability of solidarity between social movement forces. The Korean environmental movement succeeded in becoming politically empowered by achieving institutional reform through movement politics. But this does not mean that it has succeeded in transforming social, political, and cultural systems into those based on an ecologically oriented paradigm. Korea is still a developmental state, as it still invests resources in economic growth and development. Unlike Germany, the Korean environmental movement has not developed into party politics, but is rather defined as a new social movement seeking institutional reform to create an ecological value system and social system based on new ideology and a new movement format. This change has been possible because of the change in the political opportunity structure facilitated by democratization. Moreover, the environmental movement has succeeded in achieving a state of political empowerment with the purpose of changing social structure. The Korean environmental movement can be summarized as a politics of green solidarity that seeks to transform the old paradigm of the development coalition.

Conclusion

The Korean environmental movement developed because of environmental problems from rapid industrialization. However, it was not the automatic result of mere societal reflection on environmental problems, but rather the outcome of specific political and social processes related to popular reaction to environmental problems. This paper analyzed the process by which the environmental movement socially constructed environmental problems, making the best use of openings in the political opportunity structure. In the Onsan case and phenol incident, the construction of meaning by environmental organizations and the media in response to the resulting environmental damages was crucial. In the Donggang Dam and Saemangeum cases, in which potential damage was predicted before any real damage was done, the sociocultural dispute was at the center of the conflict over the environment and then constructed into a sociopolitical agenda. From these examples, it can be argued that environmental problems are only a precondition of environmental movements and that scientific, social, and political processes are more important. In other words, it is the process that frames the problem.

The Korean environmental movement made rapid growth in a short period of about 20 years. Starting off as a part of a long-standing political movement

for democratization, it pursued "green" values such as environmental preservation, respect for life, and grass-roots democracy in the existing social structure. The environmental movement expanded the breadth of green solidarity, engaging in intense struggle against the development coalition. It underwent institutionalization by actively participating in advisory bodies of the government and broadening the adherents of green solidarity within the government. While the German environmental movement employs an institutional reform strategy through the Green Party in an advanced system of party politics, the Korean environmental movement practices its own green politics seeking democracy, environment, and a better quality of life through nonpartisan movement politics under an outdated party politics system. Green politics as expressed through social movements, which is a new phenomenon clearly distinct from an old politics based on class and interest, has significant practical and theoretical implications for the future of the Korean society.

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Part III
Introduction to Taiwanese Society, Culture, and Politics

Ming-sho Ho and Jeffrey Broadbent

Taiwan, also known as Formosa, is an island off the southeastern coast of China. It was originally inhabited by aboriginal, hunting, and gathering tribes. Migrants from the nearby Chinese mainland, such as the province of Fukien and Kwangtung, began to settle the island in the 1600s and drove the aboriginal people back into the mountains, where some still survive (Shepherd 1993). Today's population of 23 million consists about 70% of descendants of the southern Chinese immigrants, who now consider themselves ethnic Taiwanese. Most of the rest of the population are from central and northern China and came over with the defeated and retreating Nationalist Army in the late 1940s. The Taiwanese think of these newcomers as a distinct ethnic group, mainlanders. The ethnic split between Taiwanese and mainlanders underlies many of Taiwan's domestic political tensions (Gates 1981; Jacobs 2005).

Since the end of World War Two, Taiwan's unique political situation has been a central issue for China, the USA, and other Pacific countries, and of course Taiwan itself. In 1945, the Chinese Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) took control of Taiwan and in 1949, after defeat by the Chinese Communist Army, the Kuomintang and its military fled to Taiwan. There, they established their own Chinese government-in-exile aimed at retaking China in the future and regarding Taiwan as no more than a small province. To establish control, the Kuomintang ruled Taiwan very harshly. Taiwan's postwar era began with the bloody suppression of an island-wide social protest. In 1947, the Kuomintang ruthlessly crushed the natives' call for political reform and greater autonomy (the February 28 Incident) (Kerr 1965).

After the military massacre, the émigré Kuomintang regime embarked on a white-terror reign that consolidated its hold over the society. The regime conducted a systematic social engineering of native society, first for anti-communist war mobilization and later for export-led industrialization. It imposed martial law that forbade any protest movement or suspicious gathering. In its economic development policies, the regime favored its compatriots from the mainland and put them into leadership of new industrial enterprises. The Taiwanese had to content themselves with starting small businesses to serve or as subsidiaries to the influx of foreign manufacturing industry (Johnson 1992). This economic

inequality intensified ethnic tensions between the ruling mainlanders and the suppressed native Taiwanese, with oppositional political movements forming among the latter. In the 1970s, Taiwanese intellectuals began to voice their criticism of the dictatorial regime and published a journal, Formosa Magazine, to publicize their views. They demanded democratic reforms and fairer treatment for peasants and workers. The opposition began to form movements and groups to give stronger voice to their demands. But the government's 1979 crackdown and arrest of the dissident intellectuals publishing Formosa Magazine hastily concluded that brief period of intellectual fermentation (Jacobs 1981).

Scholars have debated the effect of traditional Neo-Confucian values on the KMT party state and its governance of Taiwan. Some scholars see a strong effect of Neo-Confucian values, arguing that in general the KMT state exercised relatively loose control over society and was efficient in promoting economic growth (Vogel 1991; King 1996; Gold 1996). Other interpretation contends that the KMT systematically tailored out a conservative cultural policy out of the traditional cultural elements. Chinese nationalism, political loyalty, and Chiang's personal cult were thoroughly propagandized through state-controlled communications and education channel in an effort to combat the twin threats of cosmopolitan liberalism and local popular culture (Winckler 1994).

The KMT's official ideology is Sunism, or the political philosophy developed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the early twentieth century. Sunism advocated for Chinese nationalism, a gradual evolution to democracy, and state socialism for the benefit of people's livelihood. Baptized as a Christian and trained as a modern medical doctor, Sun admired the western science and liberalism, but he cherished the cultural legacies of Chinese Confucianism. Upon the death of its founder in 1924, the KMT was internally divided by rightwing and leftwing forces, both claiming to be the legitimate interpretation of Sunism – a schism that was aggravated by the rise of communists. The rightwing was cultural traditionalists who envisioned a national unity under a tutelary state (Dirlik 1975), while the leftwing aimed at national liberation through worker and peasant movement (Chesneaux 1968). Although Sunism largely underpinned the 1947 Constitution, its ideological ambiguities never ceased to exist. In Taiwan, the KMT made a pragmatic use of Sunism to justify its anti-communist crusade and domination of native society. Thus, nationalism became submission to the US-imposed Cold War world order. The gradual evolution to democracy meant electoral procedures could be indefinitely postponed. And the claim of people's livelihood justified state ownership and land reform which decimated the native class of industrialists, managers, and landlords. The ideological incoherence prevented the KMT from embracing the totalitarian attempt to "remake human beings according to a political blueprint," but Leninist organizational control was installed in Taiwan (Hood 1997, 28–29). During its mainland period, the KMT was faction-ridden and exercised ineffective and uneven rule over a vast tract of war-torn territory, but once in Taiwan, it underwent a tremendous Leninist transformation by building

party-state infrastructure into every sphere of native society under its tutelage (Dickson 1993; Ho 2007).

Under the dictatorship, Taiwan experienced rapid economic growth and the development of a middle class (Gold 1986; Vogel 1991). The early-1980s witnessed the rise of middle-class movements for consumer rights, gender equality, and environment conservation, as the chapter by Michael Hsiao relates. Building on this momentum, the political opposition reorganized and in 1986 founded the first successful opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). By this time, the original leader Chiang Kai Shek had died in 1975. His successor and son, Chiang Ching Kuo, was less ardent about the goal of taking back mainland China and more concerned about the situation in Taiwan. However, its authoritarian stance was more a product of the KMT desire to have the autonomy from society to someday launch an invasion of the Chinese mainland and retake control. As this dream faded, so did the internal rationale for martial law. Moreover, the corruption that arbitrary rule occasioned ran against the Confucian paternalism still admired by some state officials (Vogel 1991, 18; King 1996, 243). Thus, aside from other pressures, the state was going through an internal process of self-transformation (King 1996, 242).

The USA was also putting increasing pressure on the regime to democratize. This crumbling of the regime's inner resolve led it to lift martial law one year later in 1987. The unmistakable signs of liberalization released pent-up discontent (Ho and Hsiao 2010). Social mobilization reached high tide in the late-1980s and early-1990s. Social movements sprang up from many groups with different issues, including peasants, students, workers, aboriginals, pollution victims, Hakka minority, teachers, and political prisoners (Hsieh 1994; Hsiao 1992; Wright 2001; Weller 2006). During 1990–92, larger scale demonstrations clashed violently with the police. The Kuomintang government tried to suppress such movements by incriminating and arresting their members, but to no avail. Civil society had escaped its former confines and mushroomed rapidly. The growth of civil society and democracy in Taiwan fundamentally challenged the authoritarian governance practices of the KMT party-state.

Hoping to mollify this unrest by compromise, in 1988 the teetering Kuomintang government allowed a native Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, to become president. But this move only hastened the process. President Lee Teng-hui, by ousting conservative mainlander hardliners from their posts and promoting Taiwanese political consciousness, set Taiwan on a course of further democratization. Social movements in the 1990s were noticeably more peaceful (Chen and Lin 2006; Ho 2006; Lu 2002; Wong 2004). While some movement demands (women, education reform, and environment) began to be incorporated into policies, movement activists continued to find new niches to sustain their activism. Community movements, movements by marginal persons (gays, licensed prostitutes and urban squatters), and reform movements in professional areas (judicial reform, medical reform, and journalistic reform) were new developments in the mid-1990s. During this period the Democratic Peoples' Party gradually detached itself from social movements and shifted its primary

focus to the Taiwanese nation-building process. In 1996, the Kuomintang regime finally allowed free and fair elections with party competition for the presidency and all the legislative seats – the first democratic election for state office in China's many millennia of history (Chu 1998). Lee Teng-hui won the first election. But in the second election (2000), DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won and became president.

During his presidency (2000–2008), Chen Shui-bian had a relatively weak government since the KMT still dominated the legislature body. Social movement organizations gained influence in the decision-making processes and helped design and implementing new public policies. But social welfare, labor, and environmental activists became frustrated by the DPP's centrist turn. Counter-movements (teachers against taxation and opponents of education reform) rose to exploit the political opportunities present in a weak administration (Ho 2005). The heightened partisan conflict led to the reemergence of large-scale political mobilization by both camps. Demonstrations occurred in 2005 against a law prohibiting Taiwan's secession from China, in 2006 against President Chen for alleged corruption and in 2008 against China itself. In the 2008 election, a Nationalist Party candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, recaptured the presidency and opened a new period of conservative shift. Its impact upon social movements remains to be observed.

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Social Movements in Taiwan: A Typological Analysis

Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao

Introduction

Since the 1980s, three waves of social movements have taken place in Taiwan's civil society. These waves played an important role in bringing about the end of martial law and political liberalization. Some scholars have questioned the direct effects of protest movements upon the transformation of authoritarian regimes but others maintain that organized social movements have great impact on pushing and persuading the authoritarian regimes to opt for democratization (Hsiao and Koo 1997). The evidence for the Taiwan case supports the latter view.

This paper classifies social movements in Taiwan utilizing both an objective typology based on capacities and a typology of the public's subjective acceptance of social movements. The term "public acceptance" refers to both public awareness of and support for different social movements. The analysis of public awareness and support generates a different subjective typology of social movements. A comparison between the objective and the subjective typologies will be made. These two typologies will help to clarify social movement dynamism in Taiwan in the 1990s.

The first wave of organized social movements took place between 1980 and 1986 before martial law was lifted in July 1987, thus before political liberalization. There were seven social movements including: the consumers movement (1980–), the anti-pollution protest movement (1980–), the nature conservation movement (1982–), the women's movement (1982–), the aborigines movement (1983–), the students' movement (1986–), and the new testament church protests (1986–).

The second wave of the organized civil protests and social movements began in 1987. This year the ruling Chinese National Party (the Kuomintang Party,

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KMT) finally took steps toward liberalization and democratization by lifting martial law, granting the formation of new political parties, and permitting the establishment of new vehicles of the press. These changes interacted with the emergence of another seven social movements, including the labor movement (1987–), the farmers' movement (1987–), the teachers' movement (1987–), the handicapped and disadvantaged welfare group protests (1987–), the political prisoners' human rights movement (1987–1990), and the Mainlanders home-visiting movement (1987–1989).

Finally, the third and most recent wave arose in the decade after the lifting of martial law, when the government further restructured Taiwan's political institutions. During this post-authoritarian period of political transformation, a total of six new social movements arose: the Taiwanese home-returning movement (1988–1993), the Hakka (indigenous people's) movement (1988–), the anti-nuclear power movement (1988–), the non-homeowners "shell-less snail" movement (1989–), the judiciary reform movement (1990–), and the journalists' autonomy movement (1993–).

In this eighteen-year period of Taiwan's post-war era (1980–1997), these twenty social movements signify the rise of a demanding civil society (Hsiao 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995; Hsiao and Liu 1997). The majority of the social movement organizations were formed by different sectors or groups in civil society and were initiated before or at least simultaneously with political democratization. The social movements and political democratization had a dialectical or contradictory relationship. The pressures coming from the first and second wave of social movements forged subsequent political transformation. Once political control was relaxed, this change in turn accelerated further mobilization and the formation of the third wave of social movements. In other words, the KMT's democratizing stance did not come about from its own initiative. Rather, the KMT conceded to the increasing demands from the mobilized civil society. Though political opposition had long existed, even under authoritarian rule, it alone could not account for the acceleration of intensive pressure from organized social movements.

It is equally important to point out that only six social movements were organized in the ten years of the post-martial law era (up to the end of 1997). This may reflect the saturation of demands, issues, and resources that could be mobilized by civil society. Although each of the twenty social movements had specific objectives, all demanded change in the long-lasting state–society relationship of authoritarianism. Most social movements, such as the labor, students, and judiciary movement, demanded more autonomy from the state's tight control. Others, such as the consumers', environmental, welfare, shell-less snail, and farmers movements, requested more active and proper policy intervention from the state.

Moreover, by the end of 1997, fifteen social movements were still in existence. The other five social movements, i.e. the new testament church protests, the veterans, the political victims, the Mainlander home-visiting, and Taiwanese home-returning movements, had dissolved because either their immediate

objectives were accomplished or because their causes had been absorbed by state policy response. The five social movements that dissolved all shared the following distinctive characters: their key participants and organizers were clearly defined, their capability to mobilize internal resources was high, their causes and objectives were specific, and their immediate pressures or threats were easily felt by the state. The state responded to these factors when it increased the monthly allowance and compensation for veterans, cashed in the land certificates given to veterans in the 1950s, permitted ethnic Mainlanders to visit their hometowns and relatives on the Mainland, and relaxed control over the return of overseas dissident Taiwanese. Finally, the state granted civil rights to former political prisoners and let the New Testament church members settle in a previously prohibited mountain area.

The twenty social movements in Taiwan in the 1980–1997 period can be classified into four types in terms of (1) their capacity to mobilize internal resources, and (2) their degree of immediate pressures or threats to state policies (see Table 1). The five social movements that completed their life cycle belong to Type-1 social movements with a high level of internal resource mobilization and a high degree of pressure on the state, so that the state had to respond quickly to their demands.

Table 1 Typology of social movements in Taiwan since the 1980s

Degree of immediate pressure on the state	Level of capability to mobilize internal resources	
	High	Low
High	Type 1 Veterans' movement (1987–1992) Mainlander home-visiting movement (1987–1990) Taiwanese home-returning movement (1987–1993) Political prisoners' human rights movement (1987–1990) New testament church protest (1986–1989)	Type 3 Labor movement (1987-) Farmers movement (1987-)
Low	Type 2 Consumers movement (1980-) Environmental movement (1980-) Students movement (1986-) Teacher's right movement (1987-) Hakka movement (1988-)	Type 4 Women's movement (1982-) Aborigines movement (1983-) Handicapped welfare movement (1987-) Non-homeowner movement (1989-) Judiciary reform movement (1990-) Journalists' autonomy movement (1995-)

Type-2 social movements include the consumers', environmental (anti-pollution, conservation, and anti-nuclear power movements), student, teachers' rights, and Hakka movements. Though they had a high level of internal mobilization capacity, they posed no immediate threat to the state.

Type-3 social movements, of which the labor and farmers' movements are the typical cases, exerted a high threat to the state, but had low capacity to mobilize internal resources.

Finally, Type-4 social movements aborigines', handicapped welfare, women's, judiciary reform, and non-homeowners' movements, all had a low capacity for resource mobilization and a low degree of immediate threat to the state.

In retrospect, the KMT state in Taiwan in the 1980s responded effectively to Type-1 and Type-3 social movements by changing existing policies or laws. But the state's reaction to Type-2 and Type-4 social movements was rather reluctant and slow.

This typology is based on a resource mobilization framework, and is useful in identifying the objective characteristics of different social movements and in predicting the possible reaction of the state to each. Moreover, the effectiveness of social movements in achieving their stated objectives can also be determined. In Taiwan from the 1980s, the preceding twenty social movements clearly emerged as a new social force in the transformation of state–society relations.

Public Opinion and Social Movements

The data on public perception of social movements were drawn from two consecutive island-wide surveys in February 1991 and August 1992 from the ongoing General Social Attitude Surveys conducted by the formerly Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy (ISSP), Academia Sinica, and supported by Taiwan's National Science Council. These samples of adults aged 18 and older were selected in three stages from 328 townships that were stratified according to administrative level, degree of urbanization, and socio-economic development indicators. A total of 1,605 and 1,523 adult respondents were interviewed in 1991 and 1992, respectively.

The questions on social movements in both surveys were designed by this author and reviewed by a panel of sociologists participating in the project. In order to examine the respondents' self-reported awareness and support of each of the listed social movements, twelve social movements were included in the 1991 survey, while eleven social movements were listed in the 1992 survey. Not all of the twenty movements mentioned above were included because some had already ceased to be active, such as the five movements of Type 1. Furthermore, some social movement organizations were unknown to the general public (such as the teachers' rights movement, the journalists' autonomy movement, and the Hakka movement). Others shared a common theme and could be classified as

one general movement (such as the environment-related anti-pollution, conservation and anti-nuclear power movements). The ten social movements chosen for the two surveys included the consumers' movement, the environmental movement, the aborigines' movement, the students' movement, the labor movement, the farmers' movement, the handicapped welfare movement, the women's movement, the judiciary reform movement, and the non-homeowners' movement. These ten social movements are included in Types 2 to 4 of Table 1

To measure the positive level of public awareness of this newly emerging phenomenon of social movements, the responses "very aware" and "somewhat aware" were used in both the 1991 and 1992 surveys. A high degree of public awareness was noted if 50% or more of respondents answered that they were "very aware" or "somewhat aware" of a specific social movement. But for the negative level of awareness, "never heard of," "only heard about," and "not very aware of" were listed in 1991, while in 1992 "not very aware of" and "only a little aware of" were used. Also, in the 1992 survey, the respondents were asked first if they had ever heard of each of the social movements. Therefore, only the positive answers have been used for the actual analysis. To measure the degree of support for the movements, the following three reply options were used in both surveys: "support," "no opinion," and "do not support." However, for actual analysis, only the "support" answers were used.

The Public's Unfamiliarity, Awareness, and Support of Social Movements: 1991–1992

The Public's Knowledge of Social Movements

Before analyzing the public awareness of the ten social movements, it is helpful to examine the level of unfamiliarity with this emerging social phenomenon among the general public. The indicator is measured by the answer "never heard of" from the respondents (see Table 2).

This table shows two contradictory trends – a rise in public awareness for all the movements, but at the same time, for some of them, also a rise in "never heard of." The most noticeable change can be found in the increased percentage of respondents answering "never heard of" in relation to seven social movements between the 1991 and 1992 surveys. The greatest increase of public unfamiliarity was with the consumers' movement, followed by the judiciary reform movement. The remaining five social movements that were also relatively unfamiliar to the respondents were the aborigines', handicapped welfare, farmers', women, and students' movements. On the other hand, the environmental, non-homeowners', and labor movements were the only three social movements that registered as being more familiar, though the change is insignificant.

Table 2 Public awareness and support of social movements, 1991–1992

	1991			1992		
	Awareness (%)	Support (%)	Never heard of (%)	Awareness (%)	Support (%)	Never heard of (%)
Consumers' movement	51.8	73.8	18.5	57.4	78.5	41.8
Environmental movement	68.3	82.4	21.8	79.5	87.7	17.5
Aborigines' movement	36.9	35.2	44.9	47.8	41.0	50.3
Students' movement	45.4	26.8	29.2	56.9	27.4	31.8
Labor movement	52.2	46.1	24.2	66.2	48.2	23.6
Farmers movement	40.1	29.5	30.0	59.1	54.4	34.1
Handicapped movement	34.8	66.2	32.1	59.4	71.9	37.1
Women's movement	45.7	51.9	34.0	64.6	65.4	37.0
Judiciary reform movement	42.9	55.7	40.0	53.2	65.6	53.1
Non-homeowners' movement	61.3	58.4	26.7	76.8	71.6	22.7

Note: Both awareness and support are measured by the positive responses from among only those who have heard of the specific social movement

Second, by using the "never heard of" response as the superficial measure of public unfamiliarity, it is found that between 1991 and 1992, the overall public unfamiliarity with most of the listed social movements increased. Such change can best be interpreted as an immediate reflection of the decline of these social movements and consequently the decreased mass media coverage. It is important to point out that between June 1990 and May 1992, under the premiership of General Hau Pei-tsun, the KMT state began to adopt a tougher stance toward the demands of the labor and environmental movements. Both were perceived to be threatening business interests and the states' pro-growth strategy. The criminal code was applied to suppress organized social protests.

Moreover, the economic recession confronting Taiwan after 1990 also created a new conservatism in Taiwan, which in turn often suppressed social movements. Within social movements, the available resources required for organizing and strengthening their activities gradually dried up and new resources had to be found. Against the background of these unfavorable external and internal conditions, social movements as a whole experienced a temporary yet obvious setback in the first few years of 1990s.

Finally, it is quite clear that among the ten social movements (for both survey years), the public were most unfamiliar with the judiciary reform and the aborigines' movements. On the contrary, in both years, respondents were

most familiar with the environmental movement, followed by labor and non-homeowners' movements. Less than one-quarter of the respondents in both years showed unfamiliarity with these three movements.

Changes in the Public Awareness of Social Movements

Given this decline in general familiarity with movements, how can we explain the overall increase between 1991 and 1992 in the awareness score? In 1992, all social movements received an awareness score of over 50%, except for the aborigines' movement. Moreover, in both 1991 and 1992, more than 50% of the public reported a better awareness of the non-homeowners', labor, environmental, and consumers' movements. In other words, these four social movements can be regarded as the movements most well known by the general public in Taiwan society in the early 1990s.

Second, the handicapped movement gained the highest increase (25.6%) of public awareness between 1991 and 1992, followed by the farmers' movement (19%), the women's movement (18.9%), and the non-homeowners' movement (15.5%). The remaining five movements (labor, students', environmental, aborigines', and judiciary reform) all gained an increase above 10%. Only the consumers' movement received less than a 10% of increase in public awareness over the two-year period. It seems that the consumers' movement has made no headway at all in gaining more popular public awareness.

Third, the rank order of public awareness for the movements also reveals that in both years, the environmental movement, the non-homeowner's movement, and the labor movement scored higher than the other seven movements, while the consumers' movement dropped in rank from fourth in 1991 to seventh in 1992. Such rank order statistics highlight the sharply declining position of the consumers' movement in the eyes of the public between 1991 and 1992.

These trends show that even though seven of the ten movements were regarded by more respondents as unfamiliar in 1992 than in 1991 (see Table 2), all ten movements nevertheless gained an even better awareness from sectors of the concerned public. In short, the superficial familiarity of the so-called public visibility did not increase for most of the social movements. However, among the general public, there has been a steady increase of specific interested groups who have expressed a better awareness. The coexistence of increases of public unfamiliarity and higher level of sophisticated awareness for social movements may seem ironic. The explanation may lie in the fact that Taiwan's social movements have not attracted the general public to learn about their causes, but they have indeed inspired the more concerned sectors of the public to gain a deeper awareness of them. The question emerges as to why did the public awareness of social movements increase so dramatically from 1991 to 1992? Many great political transformations occurred between 1991 and 1992 serving to heighten public awareness of social movements including the impact of lifting of the ban

Table 3 Rank order of changes in public awareness of social movements, 1991–1992

| | Awareness | | |
	1991	1992	Differences
Handicapped movement	34.8	59.4	+ 25.6
Farmers movement	40.1	59.1	+ 19.0
Women's movement	45.7	64.6	+ 18.9
Non-homeowners movement	61.3	76.8	+ 15.5
Labor movement	52.2	66.2	+ 14.0
Students movement	45.4	56.9	+ 11.5
Environmental movement	68.3	79.5	+ 11.2
Aborigines movement	36.9	47.8	+ 10.9
Judiciary reform movement	42.9	53.2	+ 10.3
Consumers movement	51.8	57.4	+ 5.6

on political parties and on the press. These changes helped to shape public discourse and served to increase political debates over constitutional amendments raised by opposition party and social civil society groups (Table 3).

Changes in Public Support for Social Movements

Table 4 sets out the percentages of support response; the rank order for each year; the difference between them; and the rank order according to the measure of change.

First, by looking at the rank order of support ratios for each year, the first six movements (environmental, consumers', handicapped, non-homeowners', judiciary reform, and women's movement) not only received more than 50% of public support, but their ranking also topped the others and there was no change in this respect over the two years. The students' movement, in both surveys, received the lowest support. By contrast, the environmental movement was supported by more than 80% of the respondents, and the consumers' movement received more than 70% support in both years.

Table 4 Rank order of public support of social movements, 1991–1992

	1991 (%)	Rank Order	1992 (%)	Rank Order	1991–1992 Difference	Rank Order
Environmental movement	82.4	1	87.7	1	+ 5.3	6
Consumers movement	73.8	2	78.5	2	+ 1.7	9
Handicapped movement	66.2	3	71.9	3	+ 5.7	5
Non-homeowners movement	58.4	4	71.6	4	+ 13.2	3
Judiciary reform movement	55.7	5	65.6	5	+ 13.2	3
Women's movement	51.9	6	65.4	6	+ 13.5	2
Labor movement	46.1	7	48.2	7	+ 2.1	8
Aborigines movement	35.2	8	41.0	8	+ 4.8	7
Farmers movement	29.5	9	54.4	9	+ 24.9	1
Students movement	26.8	10	27.4	10	+ 0.6	10

Second, it is clear that public support for all social movements increased over the two years. Among the ten movements, the farmers' movement gained the highest increase of support (24.9%) between 1991 and 1992, followed by the women's movement (13.5%), the non-homeowners' movement (13.2%), and the judiciary reform movement (13.2%). In both surveys, less than 30% of the public gave their support to the students' movement, and there was almost no increase in public support at all over the two-year period.

Social Attributes and Public Attitudes

In the initial multiple regression analysis, six independent variables are used to determine their relative significance in marking the different attitudes toward social movements as a whole and toward each individual movement. Since income and class identification have a high correlation, subjective class identification was adopted along with sex, age, education, and ethnicity as the five social attribute variables. The dependent variables are the mean scores of public awareness and support for the social movements as a whole.

Table 5 is the result of the multiple regression analysis of the five independent background variables and the aggregate public awareness and support of the ten social movements as a whole.

During 1991 and 1992 considerable changes in the regression scores are evident, indicating an increase in public awareness of social movements. This year was marked by considerable political transformation in Taiwan including the lifting of a ban on political parties and newspapers. This helped to provide a climate of open political debate over constitutional amendments and helped to contribute to increasing public awareness of social movements.

Judged by the results of a statistical significance test, the five background variables explained better the variations of overall awareness and support of the ten social movements in the 1991 survey than in the 1992 survey. Especially in the case of public awareness, the five variables in the 1992 survey did not explain well the differences.

Second, among the five social attributes, education is the best discriminating background variable in differentiating the degree of overall awareness of social movements as a whole, followed by subjective class identification, sex and age.

Third, in the 1991 survey, after controlling other variables, male, younger, higher education, middle- to upper-middle class respondents tended to have a greater awareness of and support for the emerging social movements. By contrast, female, older, lower educated, and lower-class respondents tended to view the social movements with less awareness and lower support.

On the other hand, in the 1992 survey, though the above general pattern holds true for support measures, it does not explain the differences in public awareness of the ten social movements as a whole.

Table 5 Regression analysis of public awareness and support of all social movements, 1991–1992

Independent Variable	1991		1992	
	Awareness	Support	Awareness	Support
	B	B	B	B
Sex (M)	2.8465 to 0.1312***	1.4721 to 0.0749**	0.4744 to 0.0867	0.4229 to 0.0682**
30–39	1.2465 to 0.0558*	0.2369 to 0.0117	0.7048 to 0.1247*	−0.1315 to −0.0149
40–49	−0.1212 to −0.0046	−1.3930 to −0.0585**	0.7316 to 0.1079	−0.4392 to −0.05846*
50–64	−3.8893 to −0.1354***	−4.8394 to −0.1861***	0.5290 to 0.0584	−1.3545 to −0.1774***
Middle School	5.0425 to 0.1719***	4.8371 to 0.1822***	0.7007 to −0.0902	0.9076 to 0.1086***
High School	9.7658 to 0.3964***	8.4270 to 0.3779***	0.4029 to 0.0710	1.5954 to 0.2294***
Junior College	13.2628 to 0.3625***	10.2542 to 0.3096***	1.0145 to 0.1543*	2.1948 to 0.2297***
Above University	13.1976 to 0.3523***	10.7165 to 0.3161***	1.8734 to 0.2749***	2.7300 to 0.2448***
Taiwanese (Minnan)	−0.1212 to −0.0704**	−1.3827 to −0.0577*	0.0902 to 0.0155	−0.0680 to −0.0095
Taiwanese (Hakka)	−0.7475 to −0.01933	0.7776 to 0.0222	0.1006 to 0.0116	0.1113 to 0.0116
Upper Class	6.7573 to 0.0439*	1.3978 to 0.0100	0.0300 to 0.0012	1.6384 to 0.0489*
Upper-Middle Class	4.6553 to 0.1250***	3.9983 to 0.1186***	−0.3167 to −0.0453	0.7215 to 0.0680**
Middle Class	2.5344 to 0.1169***	2.7390 to 0.13950***	−3.840 to −0.071276	0.3676 to 0.0592*
Lower Class	−0.8988 to −0.0219	−0.7201 to −0.0194	−3.608 to −0.1483**	−0.3006 to −0.0233
(Constant)	9.2130			
R^2	0.4407***	0.4025***	0.1220***	0.2131***

Key – B: regression coefficient R^2: standardized coefficient
$*P < 0.05$, $**P < 0.01$, $***P < 0.001$

Turning to the social attributes and public awareness and support of each individual social movement, the logistic regression analysis is applied. From the analysis, the following observations can be made.

First, for both 1991 and 1992, the education variable is once again the most useful indicator in differentiating the respondents' awareness and support of each social movement. This is especially true for the differences in public awareness: that is, better educated people had a greater awareness. The gender variable is the second best indicator in explaining the different degrees of public awareness of each social movement: it indicates that the male respondents possessed a greater awareness than the female ones. Other social attributes have much less differentiating power in this respect. It seems clear that those with a higher education, of a younger age, and male tend to have a better awareness of every individual movement, though their support is not necessarily so clear.

Second, among the ten social movements, the following tendencies should also be pointed out for the 1991 survey:

- The environmental movement was less understood by the Minnan Taiwanese than by the Mainlanders.
- The aborigines' movement received greater support from the Hakka Taiwanese, another ethnic minority group in Taiwan.
- The women's movement received less support from the Minnan Taiwanese than by the Mainlanders'.
- The non-homeowners' movement also received less support from the Minnan Taiwanese than the Mainlanders.
- Males tend to give significantly less support to the women's movement.
- People aged between 50 and 65 also tend to understand less and give less support to the non-homeowners' movement and labor movement, compared to the under-30 age group.

Third, for the 1992 survey, the following results came to light.

- The students' movement was less understood by the Minnan Taiwanese and less supported by the 40–49 age group and by high school graduate respondents.
- The farmers' movement gained much greater support among the Minnan and Hakka Taiwanese.
- The Minnan and Hakka Taiwanese also tended to give less support to the handicapped movement.
- Males had a poorer awareness of the women's movement than did the females.
- The Minnan Taiwanese expressed a lower awareness of the women's movement.
- The older the respondents, the less support they rendered to the non-homeowners' movement.
- Males exhibited much greater awareness and support of the judiciary reform movement than did females.
- The middle class was quite reluctant to give support to the labor movement.

Constructing a Typology of Social Movement based on Public Awareness and Support

The foregoing analysis of the self-reported public awareness and support of the ten emerging social movements in the early 1990s, reveals that these movements are perceived and received differently by various segments of the Taiwanese society. However, in both surveys, two emerging types of social movements are found.

The Type A social movements are the ones where public support is greater than public awareness. These include the consumers', environmental, handicapped, women's, and judiciary reform movements. The Type B social movements, on the other hand, consist of movements where public awareness has been greater than public support: the aborigines', students', labor, farmers', and non-homeowners' movements. The difference between public awareness and support for each movement of the above two types also varies (see Table 6).

Table 6 Rank order of the difference between public awareness and support of social movements: 1991–1992

Type A: social movements where public support is higher than awareness

	1991 Support/ Awareness	Difference	Rank	1992 Support/ Awareness	Difference	Rank
Consumers' movement	73.8/51.8	22.0	1	78.5/57.4	21.1	1
Handicapped movement	66.2/34.8	21.4	2	71.9/59.4	12.5	2
Environmental movement	82.4/68.3	14.1	3	87.7/79.5	8.2	3
Judiciary reform movement	55.7/42.9	12.8	4	65.6/53.2	12.4	4
Women's movement	51.9/45.7	6.2	5	65.4/64.6	.8	5

Type B: social movements where public awareness is higher than support

	1991 Awareness/ support	Difference	Rank	1992 Awareness/ support	Difference	Rank
Students' movement	45.4/26.8	18.6	1	56.9/27.4	28.5	1
Farmers' movement	40.1/29.5	10.6	2	59.1/54.4	4.7	5
Labors movement	52.2/46.1	6.1	3	66.2/48.2	18.0	2
Non-homeowners' movement	61.3/58.4	2.9	4	76.8/71.6	5.2	4
Aborigines' movement	36.9/35.2	1.7	5	47.8/41.0	6.8	3

The following observations can be drawn from Table 6: first, it is found that Type A social movements are in general not only more supported by the public, they are also more readily understood by the public than Type B. It seems reasonable to assert that the public tended to support those movements that concerned the reform of the overall society, such as environmental, consumers, judiciary reform, and women's movements. They also supported social movements organized mainly by socially recognized disadvantaged groups such as the handicapped. Moreover, the demands and objectives of the Type A social movements are generally easily understood by the public and have enjoyed higher visibility through media over the years.

Second, except for the non-homeowners' movement, the social movements of Type B have been less supported and understood by the public, compared to Type A. The demands and objectives of these movements are more or less narrower than Type A movements, as they are organized by specific groups in protest such as students, farmers, laborers, and aborigines. They are also more controversial in their cause, easily raising anxiety and unease among the public by their claimed demands and protest activities. In other words, Type B social movements can be more easily misunderstood by some segments of the public and they in turn, hold non-supportive attitudes toward these social movements.

Third, the cases of consumers' and handicapped movements in Type A and the case of the students' movement in Type B are rather special. The consumers' and handicapped movements have enjoyed much greater support from the public, even from those who might not have really understood them. It seems quite clear that the public in Taiwanese society hold special and favorable attitudes toward movements that have either depoliticized reform objectives such as consumers' movement, or that have objectives of helping the obviously disadvantaged, such as the handicapped. On the contrary, the public tends to distrust and disapprove of the students' movement, even among those who claim that they understand it. Obviously, the students' movement can be characterized as one of the most controversial social movements in present day Taiwan society. Such sharp inconsistency between public awareness of and support for the students' movement might well reflect the paternalistic ideology that still dominates the adult population in Taiwan. Lastly, the aborigines' movement is probably the most neglected social movement of them all. The public has apparently lacked a genuine concern for the ethnic minority.

In order to further illustrate how the social movements are subjectively constructed by the public, an emerging typology of all ten movements is developed in Table 7. The ten social movements are grouped according to either high or low public awareness and support they have received from the public in each year. The dividing line between high and low classification is set at the 50% mark. The following four new types of social movements can then be constructed, as according to their public evaluation in 1991 and 1992.

Type I are those social movements with both high public awareness and high public support, where the latter is greater than the former. Included in this type are consumers' and environmental movements for both years. The

Table 7 A typology of social movement by levels of public awareness and support

	Support higher than awareness		Support lower than awareness	
	High support level (above 50%)	Low support level (below 50%)	High support level (above 50%)	Low support level (below 50%)
High awareness level (above 50%)	Type I Consumers movement (1992.1991) Environmental movement (1992.1991) Handicapped movement (1992) Women's movement (1992) Judiciary reform movement (1992)		Type II Non-homeowners' movement (1992.1991) Farmers' movement (1992)	Type III Labor movement (1992.1991) Students' movement (1992)
Low awareness level (below 50%)	Handicapped movement (1991) Women's movement (1991) Judiciary reform movement (1991)			Type IV Students' movement (1991) Farmers' movement (1991) Aborigines' movement (1992.1991)

handicapped, women's, and judiciary movements also qualify for this type in 1992, as their public awareness increased between 1991 and 1992. Public support for Type I movements is largely unreserved. It is safe to say that they are probably the favorite social movements in Taiwan.

Type II includes social movements also with both high public awareness and high public support, but where support is lower than awareness. For both years, the non-homeowners' movement qualifies for this type. The farmers' movement also belongs to this category in 1992, as it apparently gained much higher public awareness and growing support better in 1991 and 1992. Though the public also treated such movements with enthusiastic support, their keen awareness is even greater.

Type III consists of social movements with high public awareness and low support (where support of course is lower than awareness). The labor movement belongs to this group in 1992, because its public awareness increased while its low public support remained unchanged. Obviously, these two social

movements are understood well by the public yet meet with suspicious and mistrust. They have not been successful to attract more support.

Type IV can be called the lonely social movement in pot-authoritarian Taiwan. It receives both low awareness and low support. As pointed out earlier, the aborigines' movement faced this fate in both 1991 and 1992. In 1991, the students' and farmers' movements were also of this type. The Type IV social movement receives little awareness from the public and public support is even lower.

This typology of social movements also reveals the continuity or change in public attitudes. The public have apparently held consistently favorable attitudes toward the consumers' and environmental movements (Type I), while they have constantly thought of the aborigines' movement rather negatively (Type IV). Nor have they changed their attitudes toward the non-homeowners' movement (Type II) and labor movement (Type III), though the pattern is different. However, the public attitude has varied toward the remaining five social movements. For the handicapped, women's, and judiciary reform movements, the public has increased their awareness yet their support has been unchanged. The public also gained a better awareness of the students' movement, but their low support has remained static.

Finally, the public has radically altered its attitude toward the farmers' movement with both higher awareness and support, though public support is still lower than public awareness.

Conclusion: A Comparison of the Two Typologies and Their Implications

This paper has presented two comparative typologies of emerging social movements in Taiwan. The first typology is constructed in terms of the objective characteristics of different movements as manifested by their capacity for mobilization of internal resources and their immediate impact on the state (see Table 1). The second typology, on the other hand, is constructed mainly from the subjective public perceptions of and attitudes toward different social movements (see Table 7).

The two typologies of social movements are constructed by different theoretical thinking and empirical grounds. They provide different ways of looking at Taiwan's emerging social movements from the 1980s to the early 1990s. As already pointed out, the typology in Table 1 is derived from the resource mobilization model: the empirical observations on which the typology is based are the different objective performances of each social movement since its emergence. The analytical purpose of this typology is to assess how successful different social movements have been in exerting pressure on the state so as to accomplish their stated objectives. Such a typology is useful in characterizing different social movements and in evaluating their respective trajectories of development in Taiwan's mobilized civil society.

However, the classification scheme of the typology in Table 7 is mostly based on the social constructionist perspective (Hsiao and Chang 1998) and with empirical investigation of how different social movements have actually been received by the public in civil society. Such a typology is also useful in characterizing different social movements by assessing their relative status in the civil society of Taiwan.

One might assume that public attitudes toward different social movements might derive from public awareness of how successful these social movements have been. One could also hypothesize that more favorable attitudes from the public would give a social movement greater legitimacy in civil society to press the state for specific reforms. Those two hypotheses certainly deserve further empirical verification. For the present, the two typologies presented here provide some preliminary assessment of the above two assertions.

By comparing the different locations of each respective social movement as classified in both the objective typology in Table 1 and the subjective typology in Table 7, one is tempted to conclude that the objective performance of a social movement in bringing about significant impact on the state might reflect its relative subject position in the public's mind. In other words, the public's favorable or unfavorable attitude toward a specific social movement might determine its relative power relations with vis-à-vis state. However this would be an erroneous assumption: the public and the state perceive social movements quite differently.

For example, even though the consumers' and environmental movements have been most favored by the public, they did not exert great immediate impact on the state in changing its pro-business and pro-growth ideology and policies. The same is for the non-homeowners movement. On the other hand, while the labor movement might not have enjoyed great support from the public, it did present an immediate pressure on the state in pressing for a response. The same is also true for the students' and aborigines movements.

A further analysis of the two typologies provides some insight into the possible future course of development of Taiwan's different social movements. As the KMT state is being greatly democratized and becoming more and more responsive to demands of civil society, the role of the public opinion is to augment its influence on the state's policies and behavior: the social movements that have high public legitimacy might as well increase the public's political influence. It is likely that the consumers', welfare, women's, and judiciary reform movements will increase their influence in the future policy making process, as these five social movements have been enjoying sufficient awareness and support from the public in civil society. To a lesser extent, the non-homeowners' and farmers' movement might reach a similar status as well. On the other hand, the labor, students', and aborigines' movements could face increasing difficulties in gaining higher legitimacy from the public in their effort to bring about further changes in the state's policies. In other words, how to redirect the subjective collective sentiments from the public will become an increasingly important task for the organizers of these social movements. In

short, the legitimacy issue will be critical to them and, therefore, it will be crucial for them to mobilize public acceptance and support in the future.

Epilogue

Since this paper was completed, Taiwan has had experienced unprecedented changes that have significant impacts on the state–society relations in general and the social movements dynamics in particular. In 2000, Taiwan witnessed a historic party rotation, with the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) winning the presidential election for the first time. KMP lost power after more than five decades of single party authoritarian rule. Once again, in 2004, DPP won the election with a very small margin. Such great change have also impacted relations among allies during the periods of political liberalization and democratization between 1980 and 2000 – the DPP and social movements organizations. In the past, especially before 1996, many social movements groups under examination in this paper developed a strategic partnership with the DPP on various protest issues ranging from labor, social welfare, women's, and minority's rights, to environment and nuclear power controversy. They formed a political coalition and supported each other on many fronts vis-à-vis the authoritarian KMT regime.

However, since the DPP gained the state power, the unavoidable compromising nature of party politics and executive–legislative contention soon occupied its attention as it moved toward consolidating state power. The former opposition and now ruling DPP was forced to de-radicalize itself and reprioritize its policy options and that changed the relations between the DPP and its former allies. The DPP state was criticized by social movements' advocates for no longer committing to the causes that it had promised before gaining the state power.

In other words, some social movements and the new democratic DPP regime have experienced difficulties in adjusting to each other's new position and expectation. Among the social movements that are still active in today's Taiwan's civil society, the labor movement, social welfare movement, and the environmental movement have become more and more critical to the performance of the DPP government in the past few years. The past "partnership" relations between them have given way to a new "guardianship" for these three social movements serving as guardians for the DPP administration. Such new role of guardianship for labor, environment, and welfare movements has certainly created substantive degree of tension and conflict between them and their former ally, now the ruling government.

The most striking common characteristics in such precarious new relations has been that there exists a "new adversary" between each of the three social movements and the government. To be specific, the DPP government has to deal with the new demands and pressures from the common competitive and

adversarial interest groups. This has been the business interest which the DPP state cannot afford to ignore once it is in power. Besides, the above three social movements, such as the women, human rights, and the aborigines, have seemed to develop a better relations with the DPP state for exactly the opposite reason, there has been no obvious adversary group between them and the state.

The DPP government has been quite conscious about this challenge from certain type of social movements and has attempted to renew its progressive alliance with them by accommodating their demands without jeopardizing its political interests that lie in other sectors (especially the business) of society. The emerging political landscape in which social movements and a new democratic state interact is still in the making. Both the state and social movements need to realize the new challenges and adjust accordingly to co-manage the unprecedented situation of democratic governance. And such newly emerging political landscape could significantly affect the dynamics of social movements and their respective influence on the state as well as their relative status in the civil society. The typological analytical framework is believed to be valid and useful in understanding Taiwan's social movements though a new political factor, i.e. regime change should be brought into the picture. And that deserves further deeper and closer observation on the social movements and state relations in Taiwan since 2000.

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"Rosy Periwinkle": The Politics of the Licensed Prostitutes Movement in Taiwan

Mau-Kuei Chang and Yufen Chang

Licensed prostitutes in Taiwan were referred to as *Gong Cang* (or public prostitutes) working in the confines of *Gong Cang Guan* (the house of *Gong Cang*, or the brothels). Before the system was banned, brothels and *Gong Cang* were licensed by the city government and overseen by local police.[1] By law a prostitute license was granted only to "voluntary" prostitutes hired by brothels with licenses.[2]

Supporters of the *Gong Cang* system argue that consensual prostitution has no victims and poses little threat to public. And, for women under a severely distressful situation, selling sexual services has been considered as something like the last resort to survive. They also believe that the licensing system can offer prostitutes better protection and working conditions through regular government inspections. The licensing system thus allows prostitutes to work with less fear and harassment.[3] However, citing from previous studies, others

do not share this stand. They argue that prostitutes' services are often "mort-gaged" in lengthy contracts until loans advanced to them or their families are paid up. Also, *Gong Cang Guan* operates in a gray area, affiliated with orga-nized crimes and protected by corrupted officials. The system is exploitative while prostitutes are very vulnerable because of financial or family burden despite of government's regulations. For instance, in many cases, prostitutes could first work as underage prostitutes in the brothels and then continued to work as *Gong Cang* "legally" when they reached 20 years old.

In late 1996, when the City Council proposed harsh measures to clean up the city, licensed prostitutes from Taipei City's red-light district went to petition for extension of the system. Their protests eventually erupted in public in 1997 when City Hall, under pressure from the City Council, agreed to outlaw all prostitution. The system was eventually banned in year 2002 for Taipei City and for entire Taiwan. As the paper will show, in the beginning, the protest was really about survival of several dozen unorganized and nearly despairing pros-titutes who were mostly middle-aged women with little formal education. They were mostly financially stressed though not always poor. They were shy to speak in public, and had little self-esteem for having probably the least respected and the most stigmatized job. But in the following years, along with the changing of larger political context, veteran prostitutes and movement activists successfully transformed their initial protest movement into a vocal sex workers' rights movement.

The movement has attracted public attention and stirred nationalistic nerves in Taiwan. Our research question emerges from this puzzle: how could a group of no more than two hundred underclass women – originating from the dark corner of the margin of the society, hidden under the glossy urban life, appear-ing to be inexperienced with citizen politics, with little organizational support, with little resources, social network, or any other kind of matters that have been found to be important for social movement and movement organization – successfully become politically active and influential in Taiwan since 1997?

Reading from a variety of commentaries on this movement, we find strongly disagreeing opinions on this issue. Some attempted to categorize the prostitute's protests and sex workers' rights movement under the larger umbrella of the Taiwan's women's rights movement. But women's rights activists have been divided in their views about whether to abolish the *Gong Cang* system and about its implications for gender relations and women's status.[4] Table 1 contains a list of almost all important women's groups that have been active in contemporary Taiwan. They are split into two camps as will be discussed later. Also, compared to other women's groups, the pro-prostitutes' rights groups have stronger ties not with women's groups but with labor movement and human rights groups in their movement activities.

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[4] For instance, Hwang (1998) and Lin (1998) wrote about opposing prostitution, while Ka (1998) criticized women's movement that opposing prostitution.

Table 1 Women groups' positions on prostitution in Taiwan

Groups that oppose prostitution	Groups for rights to prostitutes
Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation	*Ri Ri Cuen* (Collective of sex workers and supporters)
Garden Hope Foundation	Alliance of Pink Collar Workers
P.W.R. Foundation	United Front of Women Workers
Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women's Rights (TAPWR)	Gender/Sexuality Rights Association
Taiwan Feminist Scholars Association	Center for the Study of Sexualities, National Central University
ECPAT Taiwan (Taiwan 547)	
(Awakening Foundation)[a]	

[a]The General Secretary of the Awakening Foundation *Wang* had once actively supported the prostitutes' protests for a period in 1997. But soon she was dismissed from the Foundation because the board of the Foundation disagreed with her.

On the one hand, to ban or not to ban the *Gong Cang* system has been very politically controversial and charged with accusations and counter-accusations. It was not just widely covered by media published for domestic readers, but also internationally known media, like the *BBC World News*, the *Guardian*, and *The New York Times*. But the lack of scholarly study of the prostitutes' movement has been also noticeable. As the paper will show, the prostitutes' movement shattered the united image among feminist advocates of different camps. The points that have been hotly debated include: "what does this mean for equal status of the sexes," "what are women's proper sexual roles," and "body autonomy," an important concept for the feminist movement. Feminist scholars found themselves in dispute with each other on this particular movement.[5]

Prelude to the Protests

One of the reasons which prompted the prostitutes to go protesting in public was the decision to ban the *Gong Cang* system in September 1997. At that time the city government was led by the rising star of the Democratic People's Party (DPP), Mayor *Chen Shui-bian*.[6] He was in conflict with the opposing City Council dominated by the DPP's archrival Nationalist (*Kuomintang*, or the) party.[7]

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[5] The issues and splits of the women's movement in Taiwan are discussed in Huang (1998), Lin (1998), and Fan (2003).

[6] DPP stands for Democratic Progressive Party, which came into existence in 1986 as a movement force opposing the authoritarianism. The DPP has had been the ruling party of the government (but a minority party in the Congress) during the years between 2000 and 2008.

[7] The KMT party had been the ruling party of the authoritarian regime of Taiwan from 1949 until 1999. During this time, the KMT enforced martial law until 1987, when it ended under serious challenge from the DPP.

The Council pushed the mayor to come up with a more effective plan to suppress the spread of sex-related businesses, and mentioned the *Gong Cang* system as a "shame," or "double-standard" practice of the government actually issuing licenses to sell sex. At first Mayor *Chen* was not willing to bow to the pressure, but under the advice from his staff and the Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women's Rights (TAPWR), a women's rights group close to the City Hall, he modified his earlier position. On September 1st, the City announced that after serious evaluation and preparation, it would end the *Gong Cang* system by September 9. What they had never anticipated was the eruption of strong protests and the sustaining high level of sympathy for the prostitutes from the general public. Even the Council wittingly reversed its former position so that they could criticize the Mayor for his bluntness. And, perhaps by contingency, as no one could predict in advance, the prostitutes and Taiwan's most active labor movement group, the Committee on Action for Labor Legislation (CALL hereafter) and its network, the Alliance of Pink Collar Workers (Pink Collar), and the United Front of Women Workers (United Front) began to form a movement alliance.[8]

What was the social–political conjuncture that induced these political reversals in positions and created movement alliances between the otherwise masculine CALL and poorest women? How did this unexpected "coalition" evolve later? Are feminists' concerns of different camps the only foci of the movement? Could there exist other political agendas that might have helped to contribute to the burst of support for the movement?

Proposing an Embeddedness Approach

Compared with existing social movement perspectives, such as various resource mobilization approaches, identity-based approaches, or the dominant political process model, this paper inclines toward a political process model that emphasizes the importance of political conflicts and the opportunity structure for sustaining movement actors. But the paper also proposes an "embeddedness approach" for understanding the contingency of identity making and strategy planning. Here we borrow the concept of the "embeddedness" of social actions, which has been crucial to understanding economic behavior by economic sociologists,[9] and the network analysis of social movement organizations and collective actions suggested by Diani.[10] The concept of embeddedness helps us to think of social movement, whether its cause, identity, or strategy, led by active social organization, as not emerging or acting in isolation, but as

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[8] The CALL has been an active organization for laborers and other social-political causes in Taiwan since 1988. Further explanation will follow. More details will follow in next sessions.

[9] Here we refer to the influential work by Granovetter (1985).

[10] See Diani (1992) and Diani and McAdam (2003).

constrained by existing social–political context in an arena of conflicts, and in turn acting on contingency. Movements are embedded in a particular time and place, influenced by past structures, current events, and punctuated by existing salient social–political conflicts of the time and place. They are thus influenced by political and social movement agendas and organizations already present. Because they are enmeshed with other movements and political actions/actors, movement strategies or directions are not always planned in advance like "single-issue" movement study tends to assume. Part of the reason is that newly emerging social movement and new organization often lack the credibility or ability to draw public support and attention. It is always a "late-comer" joining the arena full of evolving, inter-connecting, conflicting civil groups, political parties, and movement competitors struggling to increase their own support. The new movement must find its own place, persuade others to give support, and become recognized as a legitimate issue in an existing pattern of social relations. Its relations to previous existing agendas and groups and issues, whether that might be associating or conflicting, allying or opposing, thus become important in its identity shaping and strategy making. The late-comer needs to orient itself and reacts to the external environment for the purpose of self-differentiation and recognition. In brief, social movement and movement organization are not made up by deliberate choice or strategic planning from the outset, but by their contingency with the larger social and context along their development.

Putting it from another angle, when responding to conflicts, events, and adversaries, the movement and organization navigate their own path in a constellation of contested actions and creates their own life course (e.g., a chronology). A social movement, from this perspective, can be defined as a cluster, or a chronology, of interrelated, conflictual actions and events embedded in the midst of other social conflicts and movement causes. It defines itself in a dialogical relationship to other existing socio-political causes and actions. The paper defines this interpretative framework an "embeddedness" approach, and uses it to examine the origins and subsequent transformations of the prostitutes' movement in light of contingencies and contexts throughout the period 1997–2006. In the following, we will first provide a short summary of the emergence of protests, the movement scenes in the early period and in more recent years, and then provide an analytical interpretation of the transformation of movements.

Some Protest Scenes in Late 1997

On September 1, 1997, about one hundred *Gong Cang* women, their faces hooded with large baseball caps and sunglasses in fear of revealing their identities, broke social taboos and went public. Like other "ordinary" protesting citizens, they visited the Taipei City Council and then tried to find Mayor *Chen Shui-bian* in City Hall. Demanding the respect and the right to their occupation, they appealed

for the continuation of the *Gong Cang* system of legalized prostitution, which the City had threatened to abolish in less than 2 weeks.

This protest and the following events drew extensive media coverage. Existing women's organizations were divided in response to the prostitutes' protests. Some were sympathetic to *Gong Cang* but decided to side with the city's policy, while others supported *Gong Cang* in challenging the city's decision aggressively. In less than 1 week, the *Gong Cang* grievance group and protest movement began to form.

On two other occasions, September 6 and 11, 1997, *Gong Cang* and their supporters numbering in dozens returned to Taipei City Hall and demanded to meet with Mayor *Chen Shui-bian* (again) to present their petition. When the authorities refused to meet with them, they held up cardboard signs with slogans such as, "Right to Live, Right to Work, Help the Prostitutes but no Charity." On these two occasions, the protestors clashed with police; protesters were pushed and bruised.

The prostitutes' protests surprised many people. Many got the chance to look at the prostitute for the first time in public life, though largely in media coverage, instead of only in news about police raids. Their protests revealed the harsh lives that some middle-aged prostitutes had gone through. Sympathy mounting as people watching their grievances mixed with stigmatization, discrimination, fear, anger, frustrations, and the deprivation reported. And the public were taken by further surprise by their petition goal: to be allowed to continue to work as prostitutes while turning down the government's offer of a transition relief program, which they said could do little to relieve their financial burden. Even their most important ally, the labor activists who worked closely with the prostitutes almost immediately after the protests erupted, admitted later that they had little prior knowledge about the prostitutes and what their work meant to them.[11]

As the events unfolded, the mayor and the city government became the primary targets of protests and were accused of "bullying the poor and ridiculing the prostitute."[12] One protest strategy that served to draw media and public attention, while causing much embarrassment for Mayor *Chen Shui-bian* was called "under prostitutes' shadows." This strategy was to tag along *Chen Shui-bian* like his "shadow" and to disgrace him when he made important public appearances in official ceremonies, meetings with the President, or receptions with foreign dignitaries.

Since 1998, the main organization of the movement has been the Caring and Mutual Help Association (or the *Ri Ri Cuen* for short).[13] *Ri Ri Cuen* literally means "spring time every day" in Chinese and is the name of a flower, in English

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[11] See *Hsia Lin-ching's* post, "A Journey of Social Learning with Prostitutes' Protest," http://coswas.org/archives/01coswas/6essay/post_6.html, accessed on January 15, 2007.

[12] Pink Collar and United Front (1998).

[13] Its formal English title has been "Collective of Sex Workers and Supporters," or COSWAS. The name is different from its Chinese name, which has been *Ri Ri Cuen* Association. We elect to use *Ri Ri Cuen* because it is much more well-known in Taiwan.

the "rosy periwinkle." The flower was chosen to symbolize the prostitutes' toughness and determination in their struggle for survival against extreme adversity. The organization was formed jointly with veteran prostitutes as the main constituency and labor activists as the strategists during the height of protests. One of the main speakers for prostitutes was *Guan Xiu-qin*, or *Guan Jie* (elder sister *Guan*).[14] She had enough courage to tell the entire society in her true identity that she took pride in her job as a prostitute for her family. She took part in early protests at City Hall and in 1997. Her courage in breaking social taboo and publicly telling her life story as a prostitute with dignity inspired many others, including young students and activists, to join their cause. She led other sisters to form a *Gong Cang* self-help organization, and encouraged them to engage in public protest while she herself elected to continue to work as a prostitute despite the government ban. *Guan Jie* rejected the government's welfare offer with dignity, viewing prostitution as a self-sustaining profession. This protest strategy gained strong public support as documented in *Ri Ri Cuen*'s own activity report. The prostitutes' protests created 147 major mobilizations and 326 episodes or action events during the period between September 1997 and March 1999.[15] These demonstrations involved intense internal training sessions, dialogue actions with women's movement groups and labor movement groups, dialogue actions with general citizens and the media, and waves of protests and petitions. In sum, the movement was devoted to a self-empowering process that featured dialogical interactions with diverse groups culminating in confrontations with the city government and with Mayor *Chen Shui-bian*.

Movement Scenes in November 2006

By 2007, after 9 years of protest, the outlook of the movement and campaigns had become rather different.[16] What follows are some descriptions of a recent, major event involving *Ri Ri Cuen* in December 2006.

On November 25–27, 2006, *Ri Ri Cuen* held its fifth international conference, the International Cultural Festivals for Prostitutes and Action Forum, which was partially funded by the Taipei city government. The organizer invited domestic and foreign activists, feminist scholars and writers for sex workers' rights. The attendees came from the United States, Australia, Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands. The conference drew around one hundred participants each day, not including administrative staff and voluntary helpers. A handful of domestic sex workers attended who were veteran *Gong Cang*

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[14] A version of the story about Guan Xiu-qin can be found in Wikepedia: http://zh.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title = %E5%AE%98%E7%A7%80%E7%90%B4&variant = zh-tw

[15] Ibid, http://coswas.org/archives/01coswas/6essay/post_6.html accessed on January 15, 2007.

[16] These following descriptions were largely based on a field report written by a graduate student, Chen Shu-han. Additional sources from the media also were included when necessary.

women. These women had engaged in a long series of protests during 1997–1999 and had worked as *Ri Ri Cuen* activists since its founding in 1998.

Other participants included the two organizations that founded *Ri Ri Cuen*, (the Pink Collar and the United Front), and Taiwan's only human rights association for sexuality and gender issues (the Gender/Sexuality Rights Association). In addition, there were church-based service groups for international migrant workers in attendance. One common characteristic of these groups is that they were either founded by or had close relations with CALL. Even the voluntary staff at the conference site were from a community college (*Ludi* Community College) managed by members of the CALL. Notably absent from the conference, however, were Taiwan women's movement representatives or academic scholars, despite *Ri Ri Cuen*'s invitations. Lack of attendance from other groups signaled the divisiveness among women's activists that still persists today.

Toward the end of the conference, a round-table session concluded with a presentation of *Ri Ri Cuen's* draft of the "2006 Declaration of the International Conference on Sex Industry and Policy." Its contents addressed current issues in Taiwan and elsewhere in the world, such as the suppression of the sex industry and pressures to impose stricter sanctions on human trafficking in the context of the rising trend of global migration. The declaration included the following statements:[17]

1. Opposition to human trafficking should not be equal with opposition to sex work, nor should it be equal opposition to immigrants/guest workers.
2. All forms of the movement against human trafficking movement that also suppresses prostitutes and immigrants should be opposed.
3. All humans should have the freedom to migrate and the freedom to work.
4. Sex work is like any job. Sex workers are workers entitled to the protections of laborers' rights, social rights, and human rights.
5. Sex trade is consensual behavior between a buyer and a seller; sex workers are not victims, and no parties should be penalized.
6. Illegal entry is not human trafficking, and a marriage resulting from cross-country arrangement is not human trafficking.

The declaration advocated rights for sex workers and articulated opposition to more stringent control of international immigrants, including sex workers, as long as they were not victims of global human trafficking. The groups' concerns for immigrant women engaged in sex work followed the labor movements' interests (as represented by CALL, the Committee on Action for Labor Legislation) in aiding and organizing guest workers in Taiwan, and in joining the coalition of groups in international labor movement organizations.[18]

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[17] Readers are cautioned that the organizer said that the wording of these statements needed to be polished at a later stage for formal release, which the authors have failed to obtain despite of attempting. And the translation provided here is based on our interpretation.

[18] Most of international activities are mediated through CALL's network to Taiwan International Worker's Association (TIWA).

The "carnival" part of the conference involved embracing the culture of the sex industry. Singing and "hot" dancing routines were performed by sex workers and a movement dance troupe during conference breaks. In the evening the festivities were held in *Guisui* Park, a small community park near the old red-light district. The highlight of the festivities was the street parade day on December 27.[19] A ceremony held before the parade commemorated the death of *Guan Jie*, the outspoken sister and movement initiator. *Guan Jie*'s body was found on August 3, 2007, by the seashore near Keelung Port in northern Taiwan. The news shook the network of movement activists. Police theorized that *Guan Jie* committed suicide out of despair about her financial situation. But activists argued that *Guan Jie* was forced to end her life due to the unbearable burden caused by increasing government and police suppression.

When activists gathered outside of the Presidential Palace in memory of *Guan Jie*'s death, they directed their protest at the former Mayor *Chen* of Taipei, who by then had become the President of Taiwan. Though President *Chen* had no direct authority over city affairs, the movement still wanted to identify him as the original and still primary target after almost 9 years. In addition, *Ri Ri Cuen* also used the occasion to press current Taipei mayor, *Ma Ying-jeou*, to fulfill his campaign promises made 8 years earlier when he defeated Chen in 1998. AT his campaign, *Ma* had promised to revise the laws on the sex industry, to legalize consensual sex trade, and to re-zone special districts for sex related business but he never really pushed for their passings.

The 2006 conference fielded public parades with *Gong Cang* women in the lead vehicles. A large photo of *Guan Jie* was placed in front of the parade. Movement leaders including veteran *Gong Cang* sister *Li-juan*, *Ri Ri Cuen*, and over 30–40 activists and supporters, some spicily dressed to attract public attention. In addition, there were perhaps one or two hundred other participants or interested bystanders riding on motorcycles following behind. But compared to earlier parades, far fewer *Gong Cang* women participated. If they had survived the repression, they had either gone "underground," left the profession, or simply lost contact after 9 years of protests because chances to revive the *Gong Cang* seemed remote.

The theme of the 2006 conference was "honest politics: de-criminalizing sex work," and called for the following actions:

1. Relax law enforcement against the sex industry and revise article 80 of Bill to Maintain Public Order Bill (because it criminalizes prostitution and sex industries of all kinds).
2. Oppose punishment against sex clienteles of sex workers, an amendment to Bill to Maintain Public Order proposed by some women's groups.

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[19] The first one was held during the International Cultural Festival for Sex Workers in December 2002. The parade was joined with the campaign for Council member by *Ri Ri Cuen*'s leader Wang Fang-ping.

3. Encourage sex workers to form cooperative and self-governing organizations.
4. Provide help to NGOs to set up a temporary "Relief Center for Women in a Special Kind of Business."[20]

As in past conferences, the sex workers' slogans, speeches, and action performances were full of satirical rhetoric, mixed with mocking and angry protests. They criticized the hypocrisy of partisan politics, social morals, and the public order. More important, the conference was scheduled deliberately when Taipei was in the midst of a mayoral campaign at the end of *Ma's* second term. Conference participants seized upon the timing as a political opportunity to advance their agenda.[21] A parade of conference participants stopped at three campaign offices of major candidates to present their demand for decriminalizing the sex industry.[22] Judging from the varying degrees of support they received, and the way each candidate treated them, there seemed to be a negative correlation between the popularity of the candidate and his or her sympathy for the movement. The strongest candidate, who eventually became Mayor in December 2006, *Hao Lung-bin*, refused to receive them and turned down their appeals almost rudely.[23] Police interrupted the activists at least twice on this particular visit to *Hao's* campaign office and threatened to charge them with violating the Assembly and Demonstration Act, while they received the warmest support from two candidates who scored the lowest number of votes in the election.[24]

The parade lasted for a few hours and folded quickly. As the streets returned to normal, the activists and *Gong Cang* members went to an old brothel house on *GuiSui* Street of the *Datung* District. Here, *Gong Cang* veterans would make a special "healthy vinegar" supposedly good for women, along with other "sex" stuff for sale to earn some income and for movement promotion. The house, known as The W*en-Meng Lou,* used to be a popular brothel during the Japanese period and has been owned by Taiwan Bank. The prostitutes have turned the house into a protest center, with *Guan Jie's* photos on display and also an exhibition on sex.

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[20] "Special kind of business" is a technical term employed by the government. The term defines eight kinds of sex-related businesses which require government inspections and licenses for special administrative purposes.

[21] For the same reason, to generate public attention for the movement cause during election time, one of the key members of *Ri Ri Cuen*, *Wang Fang-ping*, had run for electoral office twice. Once she ran in 2000 for a council member seat, and the other time in 2004 for a legislator member seat. She had received less than one thousand votes each time, a very poor showing.

[22] "To pay the candidate a visit" is a commonly used movement tactics. Other social protest groups have used this tactic also. This could be so because the "visits" are always good "stories" that news media will not miss, and because the visits could force politicians who were relatively vulnerable to make some kind of commitment or concessions at the moment.

[23] *Hao* Lung-bin is a *Kuomingtang* member who won the campaign eventually and was sworn in office in December 26, 2006.

[24] The bottom one was Ms. *Zhou Yu-kou*, the only female candidate, and the next lowest was Mr. *Song Chu-yu* (or James Soong) of the People First Party.

The 2006 conference, protest and public parade appeared peaceful, normal, and routinized. Yet previously in late 1997, many prostitutes had felt angry, some were ready to fight, and several committed suicide out of desperation. At that time, there was a clear-cut villain, the then-Mayor *Chen Shui-bian* who had made the prostitutes unite into a self-help group to fight for their survival. The organizational goals of the prostitutes movement in 1997 was immediately close to prostitutes' daily lives, while the movement repertoire was much more confrontational. By 2006, the movement had redefined itself. The other women's groups were calling for more restrictive regulation on immigrants to prevent human trafficking and to protect women immigrants from falling into sex industry. The *Ri Ri Cuen* took an opposing view. It lobbied against the amendment of the penal code. The *Ri Ri Cuen* could be described as pro-sex workers rights, pro-immigrant rights movement organization.

Comparing Scenes from These Two Periods

During the period between September 1997 and December 2006, several important events marked the "chronology," or life course of the movement. First, *Chen Shui-bian* lost his bid for a second term to his KMT challenger *Ma Ying-jeou* in the 1998 election. The regime of Taipei City Hall changed hands accordingly. The voting results were so close that the *Gong Cang'*s criticisms of *Chen* may have made the difference. The deteriorating relationship between City Hall and the Council involving the conflicts over abolishment of the *Gong Cang* system definitely had a negative impact on *Chen'*s re-election attempt. At the same time, as a candidate, *Ma* appeared to be more sensitive and reasonable on a variety of issues, including the abolishment issue. He had promised to offer *Gong Cang* a 2-year extension during his campaign and agreed to review the policies on a special zoning plan for sex-related business if elected.[25] And, to the surprise of many, not only did *Ma* succeed and revive the *Gong Cang* system for 2 years, but he also appointed the CALL's founder, *Cheng Chuen-chi*, to be his Commissioner of the Labor Bureau.[26] A subtle change of the alliance between social groups and the incoming KMT's City Hall was also happening at the juncture.

When the movement began as a grievance protest, highly mobilized, and charged with prostitutes' anger and frustration, the prostitutes' aim was simple. Their goal was to protect their daily business and to make a living while getting a minimum amount of respect. In doing so, they also had to strive for their

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[25] None of the promises was actualized except for the two-year extension. Not only did he outlaw the licensing practices following Chen *Shui-bian'*s decision, but he also pushed the Taipei municipal police to clamp down on prostitution throughout his term.

[26] Since the CALL has been known as the movement force behind prostitutes' protests, Cheng's appointment through Ma's victory helped substantiate the anti-Taiwanese nationalism social movement's conspiracy theory about the sacking of *Chen Shuibian* through *Gong Cang'*s grievances.

dignity, admitting trauma but not admitting shame, since exposing themselves in public was essential for their cause.

After the initial extension of the licensing system under *Ma*'s administration, the response of the *Ri Ri Cuen* after 2001 was to gradually become a vocal advocate for granting rights to sex workers in general, including those who cross the border using different names to make a living or work "illegally." The aim of the movement was to advocate for the rights of underclass sex workers. They proposed that the sex industry be legalized, the sex trade de-criminalized, and international women immigrants be accepted. Sex workers organizations have become "knowledge centers" for educating prospective movement activists and the general public and countering prejudice against women who sell their bodies. Finally these knowledge centers seek to recognize the system's unfairness toward women sex workers.

Another notable development in 1998 was the movement's relation to the city government. In 1997 the city government was clearly enforcing an anti-prostitute agenda, forcing prostitutes to lose their relatively safe jobs and income, and compelling them to fight back. After *Ma*'s election victory and his subsequent approval of a 2-year extension, by the end of 2006 the sex workers relations with the City were congenial if not warm. On the one hand, Mayor *Ma* and his police commissioner continued to suppress the sex trade in practice in the name of law and order. This restrictive atmosphere may have contributed to the death of elder sister *Guan* indirectly. But on the other hand, the Commissioner of the Bureau for Social Affairs of the City was instructed to fund the sex workers' international conference and cultural festival.[27]

Just what socio-political contexts are important for these developments? How can one make sense out of the change in this movement from 1997 to 2006? We now turn to the contingencies of the movement, meaning the social, legal, and political factors that are external but related to and influencing the prostitutes, activists, movement associations, and political actors.

Bring in Social and Political Contingencies: Prostitutes, Sex Work, and Politics in Taipei

"Legal" versus "Illegal" Prostitutes: Dilemmas for Governance

Most of the *Gong Cang* sisters had long careers in prostitution and lacked other job skills.[28] Most became prostitutes when the men in their families who were

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[27] The new Taipei Mayor, *Hao Lung-bin*, had refused rather firmly and somewhat rudely to meet with movement activists or to accept the movement's appeal during his campaign. This relationship between the City and the movement will continue to evolve.

[28] One of the activists described them in the following: "Their mean age was 36, 50% of them were single parent, 95% were under nine year's education, they have long experiences of prostitution, and every one of them has heavily-laden life stories" (Taipei *Ri Ri Cuen* 2000a, p. 17).

supposed to be responsible for providing income, whether they were fathers, elder brothers, or husbands, became suddenly unable to do so, plunging the entire family into a desperate economic situation. It also could happen to a woman with little education or skills who was abandoned, or who managed to escape from domestic violence, to raise very young children. Most prostitutes in Taiwan shared an ethnic *Han* background, though a small number had an aboriginal background (ethnic Austronesian).

Other kinds of sex-related work and prostitution also existed in Taiwan. By law, women who prostitute illegally are generally called as *An Cang*, or illegal/ private prostitutes. Illegal prostitution is a crime penalized for violating public order, and is sanctioned with fines and possible prison terms without exception.[29] In reality, either as matter of cover-up or as a cluster effect, prostitutes tend to work either inside legal brothels together with *Gong Cang*, or in illegal brothels hidden near neighboring legal brothels (and sometimes even in the same buildings as the legal brothels). This "mixing problem," almost irresolvable, has contributed to the government's determination to abolish *Gong Cang* practices.

The practices of controlling prostitution in cities originated in the first half of twentieth century, when Taiwan was still a colony of Japanese Empire and Taipei was Taiwan's most upscale city. During the period of Chinese (Republic of China) rule of Taiwan beginning in 1945, prostitution was first banned for several years, and then *Gong Cang* and brothels were restored in 1956. Authorities deemed prostitution "practical" and necessary because of an imbalanced sex ratio. This demographic gender imbalance was created by an influx of soldiers and male refugees who had fled Communist China.[30]

Local politicians and mainstream media sought to minimize and conceal the policy matters surrounding prostitution from public scrutiny and official responsibility. The official and moral reasons to criminalize prostitution and sex related businesses included the practical concern of public health and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. Religious groups and police organizations have opposed prostitution for traditional based moral and humanitarian concerns. Prostitution has been constantly regarded as a social problem, a plague that endangers the public order. It also has been viewed as inhumane and deviant because prostitutes often were portrayed as being forced into the sex industry as sex slaves, victims, or criminals, who needed to be "saved" and "corrected" by authorities, and to become "good" or "normal" women.

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[29] But men who purchase sex services are not prosecuted for their conduct. The penalties mostly involve fines. Female frequent violators can be sent to correcting institution for moral lessons and job training courses.

[30] Hong Wan-chi (2001).

Nationalistic-Partisan Conflict Between the City Government and the City Council, with Gong Cang Caught in the Cross-Fire

A unique characteristic of the *Gong Cang* movement is that it unexpectedly emerged in the midst of internal political conflict in Taiwan's nationalistic and partisan politics. The political context of the conflict between the city government and the city council, and the events surrounding the abolishment of the *Gong Cang* system is critical in gauging the trajectory of the prostitutes' movement.

Before the late 1980s, Taiwanese nationalism was considered a serious offense and was heavily suppressed. The ruling KMT Party considered itself the governing body of all of mainland China, not just of a separatist new nation on a small island. On the other hand, the opposing Taiwanese nationalists argued that Taiwanese and Chinese belonged to two different race/nations and struggled for democratization and Taiwan independence. After decades of political confrontations beginning from 1980s, Taiwan embarked on a process of political liberalization and democratization creating an opportunity for Taiwan's independence movement to grow. Two major political parties embraced this nationalistic independence cause, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP, founded in 1986), and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, founded in 2001). This rising Taiwan independence tendency, as both a political force and a movement, faced strong resentment and political attacks from the KMT and its allies, such as the Chinese New Party (founded in 1993) and the People First Party (founded in 2001).[31]

In 1994, 8 years after Taiwan lifted martial law, the pro-Taiwanese independence DPP scored a major victory in Taipei's mayoral election, led by rising political star and former active legislator (equivalent to a congressional representative in the United States), *Chen Shui-bian*. The victory marked a significant step in Taiwan's electoral politics. This victory was important not only because Taipei City had been a strong-hold of the pro KMT bases, but also because *Chen's* opponent was a reputable, long-time political celebrity, a staunch anti-Taiwanese nationalism hero, and a Chinese nationalist supporter from the Chinese New Party, *Zhao Shao-kang*. The 1994 election was intense and charged with nationalistic fervor, with name-calling, reputation-smearing, and accusations, not only between candidates and parties, but also among ordinary citizens like taxi drivers who supported different candidates and parties. The political mobilization was so intense that one scholar stated that the city was "split" in two.[32] The 1994 victory of *Chen* and his party constituted a major blow to the old political liners in Taiwan. But this "victory" was only partial because the DPP party failed to win the majority of seats in Taipei City Council. The old liners still controlled the Council, holding 60% of the seats, more than enough to challenge the Mayor's administration.[33]

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[31] On electoral politics, democratization, nationalism in Taiwan, see Chang (2005).

[32] Wang Fu-chang (1998).

[33] There was a total number of 52 Council Members, while the Kuomintang and Chinese New Party together had 31 seats, and the Democratic Progressive Party had 20 seats.

Just what prompted mayor *Chen* to take an action against this legitimate but neglected profession of licensed prostitutes, which had existed since the Japanese period and that the general public had almost forgotten about? The emergence of the sex workers protests were directly related to furious tug-of-war between the Taipei City Government and the City Council, and between the incoming new Mayor from the pro Taiwanese Independence DPP and the firmly established KMT interests in City Council. The city government authorities did not initially target *Gong Cang* women. *Gong Cang* women were largely of Taiwanese ethnic background, were not politically active, and posed little threat to *Chen* and the DPP. In addition, the number of *Gong Cang* women was insignificant compared to that of other forms of sex workers.

But heavy pressure from KMT dominated city council compelled the mayor and the police to impose stricter regulations on the widespread sex-related businesses in Taipei. In February 1997, a few months before the official abolishment of *Gong Cang*, a well-known prosecutor made himself a public hero by "televising" his raid on the red-light district to rescue illegal underage and forced prostitutes.[34] Though controversially, his actions served to expose and publicize the existence of illegal prostitution rings. Wide range media reports stirred up public outrage against forced prostitution, the sex trade, and police corruption. However, the public made no distinction between legal and illegal prostitution. The media stories all implied that some real owners of *Gong Cang* brothels (not the official, registered ones) were expanding their highly profitable businesses, running illegal brothels, and housing illegal prostitutes.

The illegal sex-related businesses and social pressures for more government actions, accompanied by a spiraling of political confrontations, led to the eventual ending for *Gong Cang*. The *Gong Cang* registered brothels were caught in the midst of this political confrontation and social atmosphere. The following is a chronology of the events that led to clashes over abolishing *Gong Cang*.

As the events unfolded in late 1996 and early 1997, the KMT caucus of the City Council criticized *Chen Shui-bian* for failing to control the spread of sex-related business in the city. *Chen* and his police chief were caught off-guard when opponents ridiculed them for issuing "state-endorsed licenses" to brothels and prostitutes. After a few rounds of political maneuvering, *Chen* decided to reverse his position and abolish the *Gong Cang* system as his next step.

Chen was also influenced by his Commissioner on the Bureau for Social Affairs, a long-term comrade and former dissident, *Chen Chu*.[35] *Chen Chu* was put in charge of providing social services to the *Gong Cang* women, with the goal of bringing them back to "normal" lives. She was working with advice from the Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women's Rights (TAPWR), whose members had aided *Chen's* campaign and were mostly DPP supporters with ties

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[34] *United* Daily, 1997, Feb. 05, sec. 7. The televised raid was led by district prosecutor *Liu Cheng-wu*.

[35] She was elected as the new Mayor of Taiwan's second largest City, Kao-hsiung, in 2006.

to the early women's movement. Some at the TAPWR viewed all prostitutes as being forced sexual slaves. They held the view that the sex industry exploited women and served as a financial resource for criminal organizations. According to their argument, sex work is not normal and should never be encouraged nor tolerated as an "ordinary" career.

In March 1997, in a report and statement delivered to the City Council, *Chen* denounced the "evils" of the prostitution business and resolved to abolish *Gong Cang* system. His declaration was embraced by media and supported even by some of the opposing Council members. But some other opponents of *Chen* in the Council disagreed with the ban, went to the brothels and the red-light district, and helped *Gong Cang* form the first early organization as a "self-help" and grievance group.[36] In just a few weeks, sympathetic media and activists began to help mobilize the prostitutes to engage in protests.

In response to this mobilization in the beginning, *Chen* agreed to offer more welfare services and employment placement services. He staunchly rejected the Council's resolution for "reconsideration" when *Gong Cang* women appealed aggressively. At the same time, the *Gong Cang* women's self-help association quickly turned down *Chen*'s new package for social services on the grounds that it was useless and hypocritical.[37] In April 1998, the Council took another vote, reversing itself from its previous position by passing a new resolution calling upon the mayor to withdraw the ban entirely. The resolution mandated for the licensed prostitutes a 2-year period to transition into "new" livelihoods. Along with the prostitutes' protests and sympathy for them, the relationship between City Hall and the City Council had deteriorated by the end of 1998 over the issue of the abolishment of the *Gong Cang* system.

Chen's move could be viewed as a "rule by law" action, like sticking to the possibilities provided by due process, but opponents depicted him as a self-righteous mayor with middle-class biases who deliberately forced the poorest women out of work while refusing to make any political compromises. The negative image persists today, when ever there were tragic events occur to *Gong Cang* veterans or to "illegal" prostitutes elsewhere in Taiwan. Activists remind the public of *Chen*'s policy to dismantle the *Gong Cang* system and *Chen* is regarded as being responsible for the disastrous fates of *Gong Cang* sisters.

To single out Mayor *Chen* as the primary target is undoubtedly political action. The accusation cannot be said fair since it does not consider *Chen*'s

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[36] The first one who helped the prostitutes was Council Member Li Cheng-lung, who has no party affiliation. He won his council seat with the nickname "Hit *Bian* Hero," meaning a strongman to "hit" Chen *Shui-bian*. The other one was Council Member *Yang Zhen-xiong*, a member of the Chinese New Party. Neither participated actively after the movement started up with the help of the CALL labor organization.

[37] One of the arguments made by them was: "We do not need your money; we just want the extension of two years. We will turn into illegal prostitutes anyhow, regardless, because we have no other means. Why does the City choose to waste taxpayers' money? But some prostitutes took the offer (and possibly continued to be "illegal" prostitutes).

policy to ban *Gong Cang* was contingent on political pressures from the KMT caucus of the City Council. And, as one researcher indicated, the Council members, though siding with the prostitutes after self-reversal, were not concerned about the women at all; they were only opportunitists interested in fighting against the mayor along partisan lines.[38] The Council's support for the prostitutes was only temporary, limited to offering a 2-year extension, and motivated by political gain from opposing the mayor. Their involvement with *Gong Cang* dissipated quickly after *Chen* stepped down, replaced by *Ma* in December 1998.

What made the *Gong Cang* protest and the prostitutes' rights movement sustainable throughout the years? Why, in late 1998 after *Ma* approved the extension period, did the self-help organization of *Gong Cang* cease to exist and transform into a genuine social movement? Where did the main organization *Ri Ri Cuen* come from? What networks or movement trajectories were evident during the emergence of the prostitutes' rights movement? In order to answer these questions, we must explain first why other women's groups failed to support the prostitutes in 1997. Some of these groups supported Mayor *Chen* and even advised him on the abolishment policy. Only by comprehending this larger scenario can we gauge why *Ri Ri Cuen*, from a different movement lineage and past, came into existence and to support prostitutes' rights. We thus turn to explain another contingency that shaped and constrained the prostitutes' right movement.

The Early Women's Movement and its Opposition to Prostitution

There have been several explanations for why the women's movement did not join the prostitutes in their protests and instead sided with the DPP's Taipei city government to end prostitution. The first obvious one is "class difference."[39] Most members of Taiwan's women groups are from professional and urban backgrounds, including lawyers, writers, and college professors. They may be advocates for gender equality and even feel sympathetic toward the under-class prostitutes' situation, but not to the extent that they support legalized prostitution. "It is not "proper" for the younger generation to think of prostitution as a career choice" as *Chen Shui-bian* once quoted from TAPWR's position statement. But this "class" based explanation is not sufficient to explain Taiwan's women groups' opposition against the prostitutes' movement. The movement has in fact drawn sympathetic scholars from similar professional and social class backgrounds of the middle class.

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[38] Hong Wan-chi (2001,161).

[39] For instance, Weng and Fell suggested that Taiwan's women movement activists have not developed strong, grassroots support because their class backgrounds led them to adopt an elitist movement strategy (2006,152).

From our framework of social movement embeddedness (refer to Table 1), we find that groups that opposed prostitution can be traced to the mid-1980s, or even earlier, as in the case of the Awakening Foundation. These organizations were "embedded" in a larger socio-political context. Social movements during this period by their very existence challenged the authoritarian regime and the KMT's one-party rule.[40] After the end of martial law in 1986, with the forming of the DPP and the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, women's organizations began weakening their ties to the DPP while claiming they were neutral and independent of partisan politics.[41]

Another important factor for women's groups to oppose prostitution related to the convergence of early phase women's movement with the DPP's political movement. The DDP had established a branch committee on women's affairs, which was elevated to the Woman's Department in 1996. The Department has been successful in working and coordinating with other women activists and NGOs in lobbying for amendments and revisions of existing laws against gender equality, and providing more welfare aid to needy women. Another event impacting mainstream women's organizations was the abduction and disappearance of the first Director of the DPP's Women's Department, *Peng Wan-ru*,[42] in November 1996. This tragic event shook the network of women activists and united them against violence targeted at women. The most significant issue the women's movement focused on between 1986 and 1995 concerned rescuing underage prostitutes. During these years, feminist groups and more conservative church-based women's groups worked together. They marched into red-light districts several times to protest the government corruption and for doing little to protect young girls from minority backgrounds and poor families. They targeted pimps and the brothels that forced young women into prostitution. In some cases, they helped coordinate police raids on red-light districts to "rescue" young girls. Some church-based women's groups provided young girls with halfway shelters. As the movement evolved, and as the church-based organizations

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[40] *Chang* Mau-kuei (1991).

[41] This intricate, historical connection between the women's movement and political movements, is exemplified by works on *Lu Hsiu-lien* and *Lee Yuan-chen's* account and it also was depicted by Fan (2003). See Rubinstein (2004) and Lee (2002). *Lu Hsiu-lien* was a long-term political dissident between the late 1970's and the early 1980's. But before she became involved with the opposition movement, she helped launch the first wave of the equal rights movement for women in Taiwan in early 1970s. She has served as the Vice President of the country from 2000 till 2008. *Lee Yuan-chen* was a literature professor who started *Awakening Magazine*, and then became the President of the Awakening Foundation in 1987, a women's organization that has existed the longest in Taiwan since 19980's; and it is still one of the most influential group on gender issues.

[42] *Peng* Wan-ru had been an activist before heading the Department. She was last seen riding in a taxi back to her hotel from a DPP meeting that evening. Police suspected that she had been abducted, and the case is still unresolved. Peng's disappearance thus illustrates one of the many forms of violence committed against women. A foundation named after Peng Wan-ru (the P.W.R. Foundation) was created in 1997 to commemorate her life and work.

gained more recognition from the authorities and the media, the movement focused solely on rescuing the "underage" prostitutes and ignored other larger social issues such as gender inequality and adult consensual prostitution. By 1995, the mainstream women's movement was successful in lobbying for the passing of two acts to fight against under-age prostitution: the Child Welfare Act and the Child and Youth Sexual Transaction Prevention Act.

But along with issues related to rescuing underage prostitutes, a more progressive branch of the women's movement emerged. This new wave of activism tackled the basic issue of gender inequality and focused on the trafficking and commodification of women. It was not just about rescuing poor, young girls that fell into prostitution, but about ending prostitution, pornography, and sometimes even advertisements appealing to explicit sex. Its purpose was to elevate women's status from a submissive position that could be "consumed" for male entertainment or pleasure. It aimed to challenge social inequality and men's domination. In this regard, prostitution and the sex industry were manifestations of the problems of a patriarchal society, and thus voluntary prostitutes could never be as "voluntary" as they appeared to be.[43]

Taiwan's women organizations throughout the late 1980s were pro-human rights and pro-democratization, being part of Taiwan's liberalization movement. These organizations maintained political ties to DPP as the main opposition party against the authoritarian government. It is no surprise that some came to work closely with *Chen Shui-bian's* campaign for City mayor and continued to advise the city government after *Chen's* victory in 1994. Their previous positions in 1980s against trade in women and prostitution and approach to gender equality defined prostitution as debasing to women; this stance in late 1990s prevented them from supporting prostitutes' rights and lead them to approve the abolishing of *Gong Cang* system in 1997. As a result, when *Gong Cang* protests began to erupt, and when to people's surprise self-proclaimed "voluntary prostitutes" started to show up to demand to hold on to the profession, these anti-prostitution feminists could not just reverse their previous positions and support the prostitutes.[44] For this reason, pro-prostitutes' rights activists attacked them as being either middle-upper class or "self-righteous" feminists, who were perhaps too "noble" (read hypocritical) to really understand and help women in extreme adversary conditions.

If most of the existing women's groups could not play a part in the emerging prostitutes' movement because they were constrained by their political ties and their previous movement positions, where did *Ri Ri Cuen* come from? What is its relationship to the CALL labor organization? And what about the CALL could have led this organization to play a significant role in helping the prostitutes and launching the sex workers' rights movement?

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[43] Hwang and Beford (2003, 2004)

[44] A public statement issued by women's rights groups opposing prostitution can be found on pages 36–38 in Ri Ri Cuen Caring Association (2000). In that statement, these groups want to "bar sex-related businesses, require compulsory education for men who pursue sex services, help prostitutes, and prevent sexually transmitted diseases."

The CALL and the "New Opposition": Subverting Taiwanese Nationalism with Libertarian Feminism and Under-Class Grievances in Taiwan

At the beginning of protests in 1997, the main movement group of *Cong Cang* had been the Self-Help Organization. However, the Pink Collars and the United Front organizations played a central role in providing assistance in strategic planning and mobilization.[45] In December 1998, *Ma Ying-jeo* of the KMT succeeded in defeating *Chen Shui-bian*, but his 2-year extension of licensing prostitutes ended in 2001. The *Ri Ri Cuen* Association came into existence with broader movement objectives, such as pushing for legalizing the sex industry and advocating human rights for sex workers in general. The origin of the *Ri Ri Cuen* and its role can illustrate the "embeddedness" picture of social movement.

The labor organization United Front was formed in 1991 to mobilize mostly female factory workers to fight against employment discrimination and barriers. Pink Collar was formed in 1994 for similar objectives, but its main aim was to mobilize women workers in the service sector. Both groups were led by a psychology professor at *Fu-jen* Catholic University and labor activist associated with CALL, *Hsia Ling-ching*. Leaders of these two groups, *Wang Fang-ping* and *Zhou Jia-jun*, were students of *Hsia*, and had worked as factory workers as part of their training advised by *Hsia* and the CALL. The primary goal of these groups could be described as fusing gender thinkings with those of the labor movement. The organizational ties of Pink Collar to other labor movement groups were directly mediated through the CALL.[46] As groups, they constituted the feminist wing or network of CALL, which was otherwise led by and disproportionately represented by male workers.

Before CALL's formation in 1992, during the mobilizing process of the independent union movement era (1988–1993), there had been a series of clashes with big companies and government officials. According to the Union Law of Taiwan, as a rule of principle, unions can exist exclusively in factories and worksites, or on a one-factory-one-union basis. This means that workers in small factories with less than 30 workers are excluded automatically. Unions could exist legally but lacked the organic bonds that could link workers from different factories and sectors together. When the cracks in the authoritarian regime widened in 1986, most of the two thousand registered unions were still controlled or influenced by pro-managerial unions and pro-KMT members, and there was no effective "national" or even "regional" union that could link and represent them.

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[45] Supposedly, the Self-help Organization would have evolved into a self-governing association of prostitutes, as the activists had hoped or planned. But its work and functions were never clearly stated.

[46] In addition to working together, *Hsia* and the CALL's founder *Cheng Chuen-chi* were also a married couple.

Against this background, CALL aiming to bridge different and separate unions, began to form in 1992. Most of the CALL's work was about educating union activists, recruiting young students, mobilizing workers to collectively protect their legal entitlements against biased employers, and pressuring legislators and the government to revise polices and legislatures in favor of fuller employment and social equality to working- and lower-class people. In recent years, CALL's "trademark" has been the "Autumn Struggle" (*qiudou*) – street marches and protest gatherings held in early November every year. The best way to describe the CALL's function is to think of it as the baseline group that networked with and facilitated the growth of other unions and movement groups. Throughout the years, the CALL has been one of the most influential movement associations advocating the collective interests of working people, international migrants, college students, and low-income populations in general.

In addition to the union movement, CALL was also engaged in building a "New Opposition Movement" with anti-Taiwanese Independence and Libertarian Feminism activists and intellectuals in early 1990s. The term "New Opposition" was used to differentiate the movement from other social movements that had previous group or personal ties to Taiwan's rising nationalism and DPP. The New Opposition saw the DPP and Taiwanese nationalism as a political fiasco for regime domination, stealing the common goods accumulated during the democratic movement in late 1980s and threatening progressive social causes. In general, the New Opposition belonged to the younger generation of scholars and activists who had ideas close to the Old Left,[47] but shied away from advocating the Old Left's intent for the outright unification with mainland China. The New Opposition also was attuned to radical theories born in the 1960s and Western Marxism, and it was more sophisticated in its postmodern critique of state power and the nation-state.

The year 1991 marked another attempt to strengthen the New Opposition discourse, this time in the magazine *Margin of the Isle* (*daoyu bianyuan*). In this magazine, the New Opposition set out to re-configure Taiwan's resistance movement or opposition strategy against the DPP and its Taiwanese Nationalism's ascent to legitimate political power. They criticized the DPP as becoming the "monopoly" of social progressive power in the name of nation-building and "love for Taiwan" (Taiwanese patriotism). Their discourse aimed to challenge mainstream politics and electoral partisanship, and to discredit

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[47] The "Old Left" existed in the 1950s in Taiwan. It bore a birthmark of Chinese Communism and patriotism for an eventually unified China. The majority of the "Old Left" was composed of progressive writers, teachers, reporters, and intellectuals of the early days. Many of them were imprisoned and suffered a great deal during Taiwan's White Terror Era (roughly during the 1950s–1960s). Those who survived began to re-surface in the public arena after political liberalization in late 1980s. Their movement at that time was about supporting and organizing the farmers' and workers' movements, and they took part in electoral politics in the name of the *Laodong* Party (or Labor Party).

Taiwanese nationalism as capitalist-oriented, heterosexual hegemony, as ethno-Taiwanese-Chauvinism, and as a hidden attempt to revive Fascism.

Against the idea of being confined within a nationalist boundary, *Margin of the Isle* set its agenda to link with international progressive groups and to "cross all boundaries." It had claimed that it would include all possible outcastes in Taiwan, including farmers, workers, aborigines, gay and lesbians, the old veterans, sexual libertarians, the homeless, and so on. The magazine was for these outcastes who had been excluded from or ignored by other social movements, and by rising Taiwanese Nationalism and mainstream politics.

The magazine existed for only a short time (1991–1994). While its political analyses generally would be viewed as purely political rhetoric today, its satiric and radical styles were well tuned to the younger generation, which had few ties to previous social movement organizations and political movements and to the DPP in general. Within this reconfiguration of this particular political position of social–cultural critique and radicalism, the themes having the most to do with our study on prostitutes' rights concerned sexual liberation, including elements of sex-positive feminism, libertarian feminism, and lesbian rights. Their positions are complicated, but best illustrated in two major books: Josephene Ho's *Gallant Women* (*Haoshuang nyuren,* 1994) and *Sex Work, a Prostitute's Rights Perspective* (Center for the Study of Sexualities 1998). Their strategy and arguments for gender equality are based on sex liberation discourses that affirm sexual desire, especially for women. For instance, Ho argues that women should have the right to express and satisfy their sexual desires, including the desire for lesbian love (Ho 1994, 205, 207).

Before the *Gong Cang* protests erupted, libertarian feminists, siding with those who advocated human rights to gays and lesbians, already had been at odds with other mainstream women groups on a variety of issues. These differences basically centered on views about sex and choices. *Ho* and others argued that sexual repression and the patriarchal system actually complement each other. Only when the problems associated with the repression of women in relation to the repression of sex become fully recognized and tackled, can women truly enjoy equality with men. *Ho* was advocating sex feminism from a libertarian perspective also, meaning that individual woman could and should be empowered to pursue their own pleasure and desire, and that they should be entitled to choose not to follow moral standards, like chastity, prescribed in patriarchal societies. Other feminist groups do not agree that sex liberation (or inhibition) is *the* most fundamental issue, but regard violence and discrimination against women, as well as the commodification of women in the system, as the fundamental issues. In their view, the sex industry is the core of these problems and should not be tolerated, and women's "choices" could never be real "choices" unless true gender equality is obtained first.

The Encounter: When Feminist Labor Activists Met Desperate Prostitutes

The stage for feminist conflict had been set before September 1997: There were nationalistic conflicts and partisan politics feuds, and hence emerging new political opportunity structures for movement activists. Some became associated with the new DPP administration, while others elected to oppose it such as the New Opposition. Differentiation and frictions emerged within the feminist camp and women's groups over issues related to sex and equality. The conditions for the fusion of the energies for the movement to develop were present except for the spark to ignite the explosion. And it indeed occurred at the first meeting between young feminist labor activists and prostitutes. That occasion has been fully recounted and repeated several times by *Ri Ri Cuen's Wang Fang-ping* and *Hsia Lin-Ching*.[48] For instance, *Wang Fang-ping* recalled:

It was September 3, 1997, at a "Forum on *Gong Cang's* Existence and Abolishment" organized by Awakening. Attorney *Shen Mei-zhen*[49] spoke to support abolishment as it was the only means to save *Gong Cang* from the "fire hole" (meaning a miserable and painful condition for women). And there was Elder Sister *Guan* who stood up in face of scholars and well-educated feminists and spoke with nervous voice and with emotion to question this position. As a *Gong Cang* representative, she "reminded" everyone of the realities that she was facing, and expressed her discontent forcefully as a member of the underclass. It was because of this anger that we, the United Front and Pink Collars, immediately decided to join them for protest.

Wang continued, on that spot where Elder Sister *Guan* was first seen and heard, as she spoke red-facedly:

Mrs. *Shen* you came from hardship also. Equally are we all women, will you consider for our women. . . ? Now you have your education diploma, your family must have supported you through becoming an attorney. My father was a coal miner, because we did not finish school so we became what we are today. It is not that we love to, but we have had no choices. If my father had left me with an inheritance, I say I could attain the same degree as you have. I wish I could sit in an air-conditioned room just like you. I wish you could support us, because within 2 days we will have nothing to feed

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[48] In Wang's other personal account, she said she was deeply moved by that scene and by *Elder Sister Guan*. It took her almost two years before she was finally able to grasp the connection between her own past and her work on prostitutes' rights. She remembers when she was a young child when her father died, and her mother was facing similar economic stress to raise three children along, similar to the difficulties many prostitutes had to dealt with. Her mother chose to get remarried to solve the crisis. And her previous experiences working with female workers made her even more susceptible to help prostitutes.

[49] She was a leader of the TAWPR and also an advisor to Chen Shuibian.

ourselves, and must die. I mean it, pressured by our family burdens, we really must die.[50]

And then she ran away from the forum crying before the dialogue ended. *Wang Fang-ping* recalled that although she did not know anything about prostitutes, this scene reminded her of a female factory worker with whom she had worked before, who had been oppressed by her family's financial burden and social class when choosing to enter sex industry. And *Wang* remembered that she was helpless to help her or to stop her.[51]

The CALL soon endorsed Pink Collar and the United Front's decision to work with the prostitutes. Three prostitutes were invited to attend the planning meeting for "1997s Autumn Struggle" and then to other national and regional unions allying with the CALL. In that year until the end of 1998, prostitutes and workers participated each other's protesting activities; the CALL's performance troupe and volunteers also cheered for the prostitutes' protests.[52] The union between the most influential labor organization and the most stigmatized women with so little resources, through the medium of feminist pro-sex pro-worker activists, and through the opposition against prostitution of mainstream women's groups, became accomplished. And the dynamics of prostitutes' protests, nationalist politics, and differences within feminist movement thus began to intertwine and unfold.

Conclusions

It is fair to say that many western countries' women's organizations also seem to have difficulties in reaching a consensus on their positions on prostitutes and prostitution. Some are for decriminalization of prostitution, such as libertarian feminism; and some oppose prostitution either from a conservative point of view, or from anti-patriarchal society point of view. As the paper has described, in Taiwan we observed a similar divergence of debates. However, how a social movement emerges and develops in the settings of domestic politics and culture is contingent. This chapter has provided a narrative and an interpretation of Taiwan's controversial sex workers' rights movement. Looking at the movement as it is embedded in the contingencies, networks, and opportunity structures, we have argued that a movement's options are frequently shaped by external conditions, whether that might be state policies, electoral competitions, nationalistic conflicts, or activists' ties to past movement actions and networks. As we have explained, the public had tolerated licensed prostitution for some

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[50] Before *Guan Jie* chose to end her life in 2006, she tried to commit suicide earlier in 1999 when the DPP City Council Members attempted to boycott and delay Ma's plan to issue a two-year extension to the prostitutes.

[51] Wang (2000, 126–27). See also Chen (1997) for bakground of the story.

[52] Their cooperation took many forms and can be found in their chronology listed in *Ri Ri Cuen* (2000, 184–222).

time. The drive for its abolishment and the defense of its existence were first situated in the context of Taiwan's nationalistic politics and partisan competition, which both emerged through a democratization process. The licensed prostitutes' movement was really an unexpected social movement that was first stimulated by the tug-of-war between political archrivals Mayor Chen and the Taipei City Council. Second, the movement was shaped by the contradictions between two larger movements at particular times: first, the women's movement to save underage prostitutes formed at the earlier political stage, as a part of larger political movement when the KMT authoritarian rule was the primary target; and second, the emergence of the New Opposition, in responding to the Taiwanese nationalism promoted by the DPP, which blended pro-sex feminism, the labor movement, and anti-Taiwanese nationalism into one movement and ridiculed and debased the rising political power of DPP. Political rivalries and movement differences thus converged. Their convergence could not be comprehended unless we looked into the contingencies in democratization period, and the organization networks that link social movement organization and political parties.

Today the controversy is still unresolved. Feminist groups and women's groups do not all share the same position on sex and sex work. Without the support from other women's groups, the difficulties for the *Ri Ri Cuen* to overcome in pressuring the government for decriminalization of sex work are thus very high for a forseeable future. And the *Ri Ri Cuen* is not without other challenges also. It is constrained by its own relatively "successful" past, ironically.

As an action group the *Ri Ri Cuen* has shown its ability in skillful strategic planning in making movement cause understood while ridiculing political hypocrisy, especially the DPP. But its social base is relatively small, and diminishing. It could not reach other cities nor did it appeal to most women's groups. Its movement directions and resources, especially the non-tangible kind of resources, are influenced heavily by its alliance with the CALL. Its recent attempt in 2006 to combine issues on sex workers' rights with immigrants' rights illustrates how it is influenced by the CALL, which has developed concern about the well-being of international migrant workers for some time. What has constrained the CALL is expected to constrain the *Ri Ri Cuen* also. For instance, the CALL focused on organizing workers of the underclass, helping them become organized to fight exploitation and discrimination. *Ri Ri Cuen* tried the same strategy with *Gong Cang* veterans though only a handful had participated throughout the years. This primary movement strategy and workers' position really prohibited them from working with established business interests for lobbying for widening sex industry. It should, and must support sex workers, not the business. But unless the association could persuade and mobilize many more underclass sex workers, including those who entered the country without proper documentation, to participate, it would be hard for them to persist and remain influential.

Today's sex industry has become well-adapted to business and leisure needs. Young girls are not like the *Gong Cang* veterans who had worked as if prostitution were their last resort or a life-long career. Young girls have many means

and "disguises" to engage in the sex trade other than becoming the most stigmatized "illegal prostitutes." They may be in the "business," but they have no need to admit it in public or to become organized as a co-op, just to protect their dignity and maintain the option of becoming "good" women, or returning to an "ordinary" life in the future. In other words, *Ri Ri Cuen* might soon have a scenario in which the sex industry is expanding with urban and commercial growth, with more young women, including new women immigrants, become employed "flexibly," but very few of them would come forward to support the organizing drive. In the end, the organization will be more likely to remain a vocal pro-sex group aiming to help underclass sex workers, pushing for legalizing consensual sex trade, but will be far from organizing a general sex workers cooperative movement.

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Environmental Movement in Democratizing Taiwan (1980–2004): A Political Opportunity Structure Perspective

Ming-sho Ho

Environmentalism in Taiwan

Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, for the past 20 years, Taiwan has been riding on the global wave of democratization. In place of single-party dominance by the Kuomintang (KMT) over 50 years, a genuine system of party politics and contested elections gradually took root, with the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) victory in the 2000 presidential election as the climax. Past scholarship on Taiwan's transition tended to stress its controlled gradualism and the willingness to reform on the part of KMT leadership (Huntington 1991, 125–140). Newer studies have focused on the role of civil society, or "popular contentions" involved in the political transition (Diamond 1999, 235).

While "bringing civil society back in" is important in order to understand Taiwan's transition toward democracy, a crucial question of how social movements act upon as well as are influenced by the shifting political terrain between civil society and political elites. This chapter analyzes the more-than-two-decades development of environmentalism in Taiwan in order to understanding the social movement dynamics in the political transition toward democracy.

Simply put, environmentalism is a collective pursuit of better living quality. This definition, however, overlooks the fact that environmentalism comes in "many varieties." Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997, 16–21), argue that the Northern environmental movement has focused on preserving the wilderness, while their poorer movements in the South have evoked themes of justice and

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human rights. While Taiwan as a developing nation witnessed both streams of environmentalism, focusing on the livelihood-centered environmentalism in Taiwan can help to shed light on the relationship between social movement and political transformation for following two reasons.

First, after tacitly giving up the militarist pledge to retake mainland China in the late-1950s, the KMT sought to build its legitimacy upon economic growth. To this end, the KMT claimed the need of strong leadership to suppress political dissents. As Taiwan successfully embarked upon export-oriented industrialization after the 1960s, prosperity became a convenient excuse to postpone the agenda of returning to constitutional democracy (Castells 1992, 56). To use Przeworski's (1991, 58) phrase, there was "a tacit barter" in which political acquiescence was obtained through economic affluence. The single-minded pursuit of economic strength without democratic accountability led to environmental degradation (Arrigo, 1994; Chi, 1994). In fact many popular anti-pollution protests in the 1980s targeted the much-touted Ten Great Construction Projects (*shih ta chienshe*). These projects included the construction of nuclear power plants and the development of the petrochemical industry. These projects were used by leaders to magnify the image of Taiwan's economic helmsmanship in the turbulent 1970s when diplomatic setbacks and succession crisis violently shook support for KMT authoritarianism. Since growth was taken to be the proof of "Great and Capable Government (*tayuwei te chengfu*)," pollution victims blamed their misfortunes upon the KMT incumbents. The rise of environmental protests demonstrated the existence of discontents under developmental dictatorship. Environmental grievances easily give rise to "a demanding civil society" (Hsiao 1990) that could have wider political reverberations during democratic transition.

Second, among advanced democratic countries, ecological questions constitute a *sui generis* site that cannot be squarely placed in the right-left ideological spectrum (Beck 1997, 148–151; Paehlke 1989, 184–193). As a new political issue, environmentalism challenged the hitherto pro-growth consensus shared by capital and organized labor. Offe (1990, 233) takes the emergence of widespread environmental protests as an indication of the decline of absorbing capacity of "normal politics," such as political party, parliament, and judicial system. However, in the case of late-democratizing Taiwan, nascent environmentalism encounters a declining authoritarianism. With the avenues of normal politics in the process of opening up, environmentalists found ample opportunities to form political alliance, lobby elected officials, and even run for political offices. Environmentalism inevitably becomes a political issue of contention between the DPP and the KMT.

Taiwan's environmentalism was thus "politicized" and played an important role in Taiwan's democratic transition. The political opportunity approach is a useful tool in understanding how movement activists in emerging democracies have responded to the shifting political atmosphere and how they have helped to build a more democratic political order.

   The development of Taiwan's environmentalism is closely synchronized with successive stages in transition to democracy. Environmentalism came into being during the so-called soft authoritarianism period (1980–1986), as grassroots, intellectuals, and political opposition began to notice the severity of environmental degradation. The 1987 lifting of martial law ushered in the period of liberalization (1987–1992) when environmentalism was rapidly radicalized with more disruptive tactics and more overt alliance with the DPP. In the democratization period (1993–1999) environmentalism, using both protests and newly opened institutional venues, became institutionalized as a vital component of political life. After the 2000 power transfer, environmentalists were incorporated into the regime as a junior partner, though still critical of the DPP's conservative turn.

Democratic Transition as Shifting Political Opportunity Structure

Scholars on social movements during political transition have utilized the notion of political opportunity structure (Ekiert and Kubik 1999; Hipsher 1998a, 1998b; Kubik 1998; Oxhorn 1991, 1994, 2001). Political opportunity structure (POS) is a set of state-related variables that enable or constrain collective actors by either reducing or enhancing the cost of action. POS is a useful tool to measure the extent of shifting relationship between state and civil society in times of political turmoil. The POS approach in examining the trajectory of social movements can help to specify the casual mechanisms that either facilitate or hinder political transformation.

   In order to understand the environmental movements' role in Taiwan's political transition POS is conceptualized as the combination of the following components:

(1) *State autonomy*. State autonomy is the capacity with which incumbents formulate and promote policy independently of the dominant sectors or classes. Ruling elites with high-degree autonomy are not easily persuaded by social movements. But under emerging democracies incumbents, with the consent of ruling elites, can become a powerful instrument to promote movement goals. On the other hand, weaker states can be effortlessly penetrated by movements, but they are also less effective in realizing their promises (Jenkins 1995, 24). Generally, an insulated system of authoritarianism is more autonomous than an open democratic regime; hence, democratic transition predictably reduces state autonomy. In Taiwan the KMT's long incumbency helped it maintain power during transitional uncertainties with relatively few concessions in autonomy. The DPP's coming to power in 2000 drastically changed the hitherto familiar political terrain by weakening the state autonomy.

(2) *Policing of protests*. This term "policing of protest" refers to whether policing agencies repress or tolerate street protest or crowd behavior (della Porta 1995, 55–58). Democratic states tend to tolerate popular protests.

But in the case of Taiwan, the policing of protest under the transition to democracy is far from straightforward. Before liberalization in 1987, unauthorized gatherings were outlawed. Liberalization served to restore some of the frozen civil liberties, which easily leads to the escalation of protests. After a brief spell of repression in the late-1980s, there is a clear trend to routinize and localize the policing decision as the political incumbents holding power become more tolerant of protests.

(3) *Policy channel*. The availability of policy channels encourages environmental groups to adopt an assimilative strategy, rather than a confrontational one (Kitschelt 1986). The assimilative strategy is evident when activists garner routine access to policy decision-making, and can influence the incumbents, thus gaining an "insider" status with guaranteed leverage to promote desired policy outcome. Democratization, in a sense, entails what Dryzek (1996) calls political inclusion, or granting institutional representation to the excluded interests. In this regard, obtaining new policy channels is a concrete form of inclusion. Taiwan's environmentalists have struggled in the political wilderness for many years until the regime shift in 2000 when they finally became an established, albeit junior and frequently disillusioned, insider.

(4) *Political ally*. The presence of established allies helps social movements to gain political influence. Elites' support comes in many forms, such as introducing legislative bills, championing movement causes, and protecting protestors from repression. With incumbents' sympathy, movement demands have a greater chance of becoming policy initiatives and activists are more likely to be granted access to decision making. On the other hand, opposition elites' support is also vital for a social movement to gain political visibility. In Taiwan's case, environmentalists' alliance with the DPP begins shortly after the lifting of martial law in 1987. Repression in the late-1980s unifies the alliance; however, the DPP's centrist turn in the mid-1990s brings occasional conflicts. After 2000, with the DPP's conservative orientation and the opposition parties' indifference, the environmentalists are further deprived of political allies.

State autonomy, policing of protest, policy channels, and political allies are specific factors that affect how environmental groups organize their constituencies and present their political claims. The analytical utility of these factors help us to locate and specify the interaction between environmentalism and government.

Periodization of Democratic Transition and Environmental Protests

A series of critical events punctuated Taiwan's transition toward democracy. In December 1979, authorities ruthlessly cracked down on an opposition-led human rights demonstration. The *Formosa Magazine Incident* led to the

imprisonment of many opposition leaders and marked the end of the first wave of political mobilization since the establishment of authoritarian regime in the 1950s. The lifting of martial law in June 1987 was a decisive concession by the KMT government and signaled tolerance toward political activities and protests within certain prescribed limits. Bans on public assembly, association, expression, and publication were loosened so as to accommodate the rise of civil society. The first open election for Legislative Yuan in December 1992 served as was the precursor to subsequent top-level elections. These elections included races for the Provincial Governor and Municipality Mayors in 1994 and President in 1996. These elections helped to constitute the new rules of democratic game. In March 2000, an unprecedented regime shift took place as the DPP's Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election. The DPP's coming to power, ending the KMT's protracted rule, was nothing less than the crowing achievement of Taiwan's democratization.

These events divided the democratic transition into four periods. The years between 1980 and 1986 can be characterized as a time of "*soft authoritarianism*" (Winckler, 1984). Despite the 1979 setback, the opposition was not vanquished and continued to challenge the KMT's rule by mobilizing electoral campaigns and publishing dissent magazines (Moody 1992, 162–166). In September 1986, the opposition gathered to proclaim the birth of DPP in defiance of the KMT's repeated warnings. During this period, partly due to the resilience of opposition, the KMT government did not revert to the previous "hard authoritarianism," that is, coercive rule of security forces and threat. A greater degree of societal pluralism was tolerated and electoral seasons became "political holidays" when control was not fully enforced.

The second period (1987–1992) is *liberalization*, or "the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 7–8). The 1987 decision to dismantle martial law entailed extending civil liberties. Right of public assembly and demonstration were partially restored in 1988 and right of association in 1989. The lowered cost of collective action encouraged various social movement sectors to use radical and politicized tactics, inevitably leading to a showdown with the KMT government. The interlude of Hau Pei-tsun's premiership (1990–1993) represented a backward-looking attempt to crack down on social and political protests. However, Hau's failure to curb the DPP's persistent electoral growth as well as the diffusion of protests pushed Taiwan's transition beyond the point of returning to the status quo.

Democratization (1993–1999) requires "open contestation over the right to win control of the government, this in turn requires free competitive elections, the results of which determine who governs" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 3). While liberalization removes restrictions on citizenship, democratization establishes a new rule of the game. In Taiwan, democratization begins with the convocation of popularly elected Legislative Yuan in early 1993, in which the DPP consolidated its status of the opposition party by gaining more than one-third of

seats. Contested elections in the mid-1990s signified the coming of age of party politics, which was largely aligned along the cleavage between the DPP and the KMT. By this time, the DPP was already poised to become the ruling party in Taiwan.

The fourth period of the DPP government occurred under the first term of Chen Shui-bian (2000–2004). During this period, polarizing conflicts between pan-blue and pan-green camps flared up. The DPP promising political reforms was first crippled by inexperience and then resisted by the stronger opposition parties in the parliament. Finally, the party was abandoned by the DPP incumbents themselves. A deep sense of disappointment arose because of "the regime's failure to live up to its often extravagant election pledges" (Fell et al. 2006, 17). Nevertheless, the regime shift still produced far-reaching effects on civil society, including environmentalism.

The close relationship between the POS and environmental protests over the past two decades is clear. Figure 1 utilizes the above political periodization and the distribution of environmental protests from 1980 to 2002.

It is clear that protests grew steadily during the soft authoritarianism period, from four cases in 1980 to 30 cases in 1986. Evidently, popular discontents accumulated and occasionally burst out even under highly unfavorable condition. Secondly, the termination of martial law gave an impetus to the nascent protest wave. While the average annual case number in soft authoritarianism was 17.9, the figures for the first 3 years in the liberalization period were 29, 67 and 122. As the KMT's harsher stance toward environmentalism took shape in 1989, the ascending tendency was temporarily bought to a halt before reaching

Fig. 1 Environmental protest cases in Taiwan (1980–2002)
Note: My data are mainly based on journalistic reports. For detailed methodological discussions, see Ho (2006, appendix)

the all-time peak in 1991 with 215 cases. Hau's repression certainly curbed the diffusion of protests, but only with momentary effect. More importantly government's crackdown backfired and incurred stronger responses from environmentalists.

Furthermore, during the 7-year period of democratization, protests reached a high point, with the annual average of 153.9 cases, much higher than that before the mid-1980s. The persistence of protests indicated that democracy raised the propensity to engage in protest among the populace. The frequency of protests during this period no longer varied as in the liberalization period. As the democratic rule of game were progressively established, environmental protests went beyond the turbulent climax and generated a more predicable pattern. In this sense environmentalism was institutionalized.

Although the data in Fig. 1 is limited to 2002, it is apparent that the DPP government brought about an additional downward trend in environmental protests. The first 3 years under the DPP saw 134, 73, and 96 cases respectively, significantly lower than that in the mid-1990s. With much weaker state autonomy, the DPP government did not and could not repress environmentalism. Rather, the POS was further opened as environmentalists were partly incorporated into the new regime. As a result, rule-breaking protests were more and more replaced by rule-following negotiations.

In sum, a longitudinal survey of Taiwan's environmental protests confirms that the frequency of protests is politically mediated (McAdam 1982, 40–43). Successive stages of democratic transition illustrate different combinations of facilitation and constraint that influence the frequency of protests. Taiwan's case is in congruent with Eisinger's (1973, 12) observation: protests are most likely to happen with a mixture of openness and closeness. In extreme repression (the soft authoritarianism is an approximate case) fear discourages private grievances from converting into public discontents. In extreme openness (the DPP government period) less demanding forms of collective action are chosen over protest.

Moreover, a cyclic pattern of "parabola of protest" (Tarrow 1989) is discernable. But it should be noted that authoritarianism is not the direct opposite of democracy just as two opposing curves of protest parabola are not perfectly symmetrical. Authoritarianism suppresses autonomous articulation of interests and thus any relaxation of control is bound to kick off a sharply ascending wave of protests. On the other hand, democracy guarantees basic rights of association and public assembly and, as a result, no matter how fully an interest is politically incorporated, protests are going to take place anyway. Hence, the descending curve of environmental protests is obviously more protracted and, arguably, unlikely to fall below the pre-1987 level. A more detailed analysis of the interaction between environmentalism and state in four periods can help demonstrate the complex wave of protest dynamics in the transition to democracy.

Fermentation Under Soft Authoritarianism (1980–1986)

Policy Channel: Exclusion by Official Environmentalism

In the late-1970s, the KMT government began to embrace the idea of national parks and recruited conservation experts and literary writers for planning and communication purposes (Huang 2002, 144–157). This occasion served as an important avenue through which conservation scholars exerted broader influences beyond their professional sphere. Beginning in 1980, these scholars grew more vocal in their opposition to some ecologically questionable projects, such as a housing project that endangered the mangrove along Tanshui River (1980), a proposed highway across the precipitous Jade Mountain region (1983) and a hydropower plant in Liwu River (1985). Though opposing these governmental projects, conservation scholars still enjoyed good relationship with some KMT officials, especially those who were younger, better-educated, and moderate in political outlook, whose patronage was vital in their campaign against economic technocrats. In 1982 these conservationists founded a quasi-official Society of Nature, Ecology, and Conservation with an ex-Minster of the Interior as the chairperson.

Due to the promotional effort by conservationists, the KMT government was more aware of the problem of environmental degradation. A sub-cabinet level Environmental Protection Board (EPB) was established in 1982. Its first director frankly acknowledged the severity of pollution and attributed its cause to the previous "development-first" orientation (Chuang 1984). Even President Chiang Ching-kuo mentioned the need to cultivate the "sense of law-obeying as a duty among businesspersons and general populace" in order to protect environment better (Chang 1984).

The cooperation between conservationists and KMT liberals gave rise to what could be called "official environmentalism" (Hicks 1996, 76–78). Voluntarily or not, pro-regime conservationists' scope of action refrained from mentioning politically sensitive issues (ex. nuclear energy and industrial pollution). The KMT was willing to tolerate the criticisms of conservationists as long as they could provide professional advice to aid in modernizing environmental administration.

Another group of academic scholars raised questions concerning nuclear power. Since the energy crisis in the 1970s, the KMT government stepped up the use of nuclear technology and had built three nuclear power plants by the end of the decade. Nuclear energy remained a sensitive issue because the KMT government was believed to be involved in covertly developing atomic weapons. In the early-1980s, environmental scholars, best exemplified by Lin Jun-yi (Edgar Lin), a biologist and Chang Kuo-lung, a physicist, became more and more vocal in their opposition to nuclear energy. These America-trained professionals were galvanized by the aftershock of Three Mile Island Incident in 1979 and were dismayed to find lack of discussion back home in Taiwan.

They wrote anti-nuclear articles in the beginning, and then as a series of domestic nuclear incidents and the 1986 Chernobyl disaster heightened the salience of nuclear issues; they were invited to participate in nationally telecast debates (Ho 2003, 688–690).

As the proposed Fourth Nuclear Power Plant project underwent budgetary review, its inflated cost and other management issues raised eyebrows among politicians and officials. In 1985, fifty-five KMT legislators as well as six opposition legislators moved to suspend the controversial project. The executive branch finally agreed to this suspension. This unexpected victory boosted the morale of anti-nuclear activists. Later that year, they launched the publication of the environmental magazine entitled *New Environment* [*shin huanching*]. Choosing the organizational form of a magazine publication was an expedient way to get around the martial law regulation which outlawed more than one public association aimed at a specific issue.

Political Ally: The Political Opposition as a Bystander

As environmental issues received more public attention, the opposition took note of the political opportunities available to the movement. Taiwan's opposition movement was stimulated by the electoral victory in 1977 (Gold 1986, 116). Following the election were 2 years of intensive mobilization leading to an inevitable showdown with the KMT regime. During this period the opposition leadership became bolder and ready to challenge the KMT's political hegemony. In 1979, the opposition coalesced into a magazine publisher that served as a de-facto party organization. At that time, no other political parties aside from the KMT and its two puppet parties were allowed. On December 10, the opposition staged a Human Rights Day parade that resulted in violent clashes with police. The KMT government launched a nationwide round-up and court-martialed opposition leaders. The so-called Formosa Magazine Incident brought about an abrupt halt to the escalating opposition movement (Jacobs 1981).

In the early-1980s, the opposition gradually recuperated from the Formosa Magazine incident. Aside from challenging the regime during elections, the opposition also published dissent magazines aimed at exposing and criticizing the KMT's wrongdoings. With the senior leadership in prison, the younger generation of activists advocated a more broadly based perspective to guide the opposition movement. For young activists, Taiwan's environmental troubles were not only proof of dysfunctional authoritarianism, but also could serve as a useful leverage to mobilize a popular front against the KMT. One of the opposition's publications during this period, the *Life and Environment Magazine* [*shenghuo yü huanching*] (1981–1982), was a short-lived attempt to merge political criticism and ecological awareness. In another publication, the writers and editors from *Forward Weekly* [*ch'ienchin*] (1983–1988) introduced ecological thought and

Table 1 Environment-related articles in dissent magazines (1981–1986)

Year	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Number of articles	4	5	5	30	59	61

argued for a German green party model of domestic opposition. Environmental awareness was not limited to these two publications. From a content analysis of the ten leading dissent magazines published from 1980 to 1986, a total of 164 articles touched on environmental topics (see Table 1).

This content analysis clearly demonstrates the progressive attention that the opposition paid to the burgeoning environmental problems all over Taiwan. While 45% of the articles dealt with nuclear energy and 36% with pollution, politically "harmless" conservation issues only took up 5%. The opposition's political focus on the tangible grievances of the pollution and nuclear waste fueled the growing anti-KMT public sentiment.

However, oppositional leaders maintained the role of bystander instead of as participants in anti-pollution protests that began to mushroom during this period. Perhaps the political oppositional leadership refrained from environmental protest because before 1987 the opposition was simply too weak to offer patronage to protestors. In 1986 the political opposition with limited seats of elected officials and representatives, low media attention under martial law censorship, and no bona-fide national-level organization until the founding of the DPP, had few political resources to offer to the environmental movement. Second, the opposition was under greater surveillance than anti-pollution protests. The environmental movement was less vulnerable to government repression since their mobilizing networks were localized and their protests unpredictable. Under this situation, environmental protest activists had little need for outside assistance from the oppositional leadership. Finally, even though opposition leaders and activists were sometimes involved in environmental protests, their high political profile was often in conflict with the majority of victims whose protest were aimed at targeting polluters rather than challenging the authoritarian nature of the KMT regime.

The Emergence of Environmental Movement

The emergence of the environmental movement in Taiwan was marked by protest against a chemical plant of Sunko Ink Co. in Taichung County (1982–1986). Local villagers complained about the poisonous gas emitted by Sunko since 1982 but their constant petitions to higher authorities were ignored.[1] Several times angry farmers broke into the factory compound and sabotaged production facilities. In 1985 Sunko owners formally agreed to

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[1] *China Times* 1986/4/28.

relocate their production within 1 year. Strong grassroots pressure forced the factory owner to keep his promise.[2] Liao Yung-lai, the opposition activist who later became the first DPP Taichung County Magistrate (1998–2001), was an important figure in the Sunko protest. Originally a local schoolteacher, Liao joined the writing staff of a dissent magazine before he turned his attention to Sunko pollution. His opposition background raised suspicions among local protest leadership who kept a good relationship with the KMT Magistrate. The magistrate could play a vital role in mediating and securing the 1985 relocation agreement. After the factory's successful relocation, pragmatic leaders wanted to redevelop the polluted land with the government's assistance. And this redevelopment proposal gave rise to a fractional fracas that ended in Liao's ousting in 1988 (Liao 1989, 92–94).

The Sunko protest was significant in that it gave birth to the first grassroots-based environmental organization in Taiwan, the Taichung County Pollution Prevention Society formed in 1984. In addition this protest also served as a model for the Lukang protest against DuPont (1986–1987) (Reardon-Anderson 1992). Lukang was a seaside commercial town in Changhwa County, also located in central Taiwan. In early 1986 a nonpartisan candidate for town mayor staged a mass petition against a government-approved investment plan by the American corporation DuPont. The electoral success of this nonpartisan candidate led local opposition to form a bona-fide environmental movement. In June 1986 an unprecedented mass demonstration was held in Lukang. Though police intervention kept the marching crowd from completing their planned route, the movement instantly became a national sensation. In December Lukang townspeople staged a guerrilla-style protest in front of the Presidential House in Taipei. On their 200-kilometer route to Taipei, their buses were intercepted and harassed by military officers. They were granted permits to continue travel only after a lengthy negotiation (for details see Nien 1997, 26–35). These episodes clearly demonstrate the limited space for public assembly under the martial law regime.

Like the Sunko case, the oppositional leadership and activists only played a marginal role despite their effort to take the credit after DuPont decided to pull out its investment in March 1987. During the 1986 Legislative Yuan election, an opposition candidate staged a campaign rally in Lukang with an explicit anti-DuPont message. But this move was rejected by local movement leadership because the opposition candidates were seen as unabashed political opportunists (Lin M. 1989b: 180). Lukang's environmental leadership wanted to stay away from the troubled water of partisan politics. When some guest speakers tried to raise criticism on the KMT government, they were quickly hushed and asked to step down the podium.[3] Despite the failure of environmentalist to form

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[2] *Chunghwa Daily* 1985/6/6.
[3] Interview with the Chairperson of Hsinchu City Pollution Prevention Society (1987), 1999/4/20.

coalitions with opposition leaders, grassroots environmental activism continued to grow during this period. Inspired by the Sunko protest, Lukang activists also organized a Changhwa County Pollution Prevention Society in 1986 to mobilize local opposition.

From a historical perspective, Tilly (2004, 52) saw special-purpose association and special-purpose public meeting as two defining characteristics of social movements. By using this criterion, we can safely date the birth of Taiwan's environmental movement back to the mid-1980s. The Sunko protest gave rise to a special-purpose association in 1984, while the Lukang townspeople demonstrated the power of special-purpose public meeting in 1986. In other words, the period of soft authoritarianism could be seen as long and gradual fermentation for Taiwan's environmentalism.

Radicalization in Liberalization (1987–1992)

Policy Channel: Exclusion by Preemptive Response

Facing the mounting domestic pressures, the KMT government decided to lift the martial law in July 1987. This reform was a means by which the government sought to preempt the growing demands of the environmental movement. According to Gamson (1975, 29), preemption meant that officials acknowledged the validity of movement claims and readdressed the grievances, but refused to accept the legitimacy of movement organization and their protests. A cabinet-level Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) was formed in August 1987, and many regulatory laws concerning waste, wildlife, and pollution were speedily enacted or revised (Yeh 1993, 28). At that time, officials were confident in their policy initiatives as evidenced by Premier Yu Kou-hua's pronouncement to "preserve environmental qualities even at the cost of economic growth."[4]

Officials' optimism did not entail their tolerance or acceptance of environmental protests. Grassroots environmentalism were still viewed with suspicion, thus when some Legislators suggested to incorporate environmental groups into the 1992 Public Nuisance Disputes Mediation Act, the EPA officials were adamant in their opposition. An earlier inside document revealed such bias in that the general populace were said to be "too emotional to be rationally negotiated with" (EPA 1988, 13). In fact the first EPA Director once deplored the fact that while environmental consciousness was widespread, environmental knowledge was limited to a few.[5] Under this situation, meaningful policy participation was out of the question for environmentalists.

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[4] *Independent Evening Post*, 1987/9/7.

[5] *Independent Evening Post*, 1987/9/8.

Policing of Protests: From Tolerant to Repressive

The demise of martial law regime also necessitated a more liberal style of policing of protests. A system that specified advanced application and police approval as requirements for legal public gathering was decreed immediately and formally enacted in 1988.[6] In addition to opening the space for public assembly, officials were also uncharacteristically lenient toward environmental protests. Less than 2 weeks after the lifting of martial law, Houchin community in Kaohsiung City organized a blockade against an expansion project by the China Petroleum Company. For more than 3 years, Houchin protestors prevented the state-owned refinery from using one of its main entrances. Though local policemen sought to break local opposition by force to no avail, several minor violent clashes did not lead to prosecution (Ho 2005a: 239).

With sharply rising environmental protests, the tolerant style of policing during the early liberalization period underwent considerable strains. In September 1988, the whole Linyuan petrochemical zone was shut down by angry fishermen for 3 weeks. Since that industrial complex was a key upstream provider, the conflict evolved into a severe crisis of Taiwan's petrochemical industry. During lengthy negotiation, economic officials threatened to use police force to disperse the crowd. After the government and companies agreed to pay an unprecedented compensation of NT$ 1.3 billion to local victims, the crisis was finally settled.[7]

The Linyuan incident demonstrated the explosive disruptiveness of the anti-pollution issue. Alarmed, Taiwan's capitalists began to voice their impatience with these "non-economic factors" which they viewed as damping investment incentives (Wang 1993, 84–85). For officials, the Linyuan incident was also an embarrassing lesson. It exposed the fact that they did not possess any guideline or procedure to deal with these aggressive claims for compensation. After the incident, there was a visible shift in the official attitude. The initial tolerance was gradually replaced by a more repressive stand. In 1989 the EPA explicitly stated that the government would never accept violence as a legitimate means for monetary compensation, legal impunity, plant relocation, and other demands (EPA 1994, 40).

The authoritarian turn culminated in the appointment of Hau Pei-tsun as Premier in May 1990. During his tenure, Hau viewed the rise of popular protests as a deplorable consequence of weakened public authorities. Thus he adopted a repressive stand by branding environmental activists as "bullies [*liumang*]" and beefing up the police force.

Hau espoused a zero-tolerance attitude toward disruptive anti-pollution protests. In May 1992 Talinpu residents in Kaohsiung City staged a blockade against one China Petroleum Company refinery. In many ways the Talinpu

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[6] *China Times* 1987/7/15.

[7] *Central Daily* 1988/10/13, 15.

incident was similar to the Linyuan incident 4 years ago. Talinpu and Linyuan were adjacent, and both communities suffered from petrochemical pollution since in the late-1970s. Like its predecessor, Talinpu people demanded immediate compensation in regard to an industrial accident. Hau visited the besieged plant and denounced the protesters vehemently. Four days later, police broke up the blockade, brutally beat up the local people, and as a result prosecuted thirty-nine participants.[8]

Political Ally: Alliance with the DPP

Liberalization also brought about closer relationship between the opposition and environmentalism. When the DPP was founded in September 1986, the party charter was enshrined with an anti-nuclear clause and a pro-environmental platform. More specifically, the DPP sought to build working ties with environmentalists through both its party organization and individual politicians. The DPP set up a Department of Social Movements with the explicit purpose of maintaining liaisons with other movement organizations. The DPP's New Tide faction that originated from a coterie of dissent magazine writers in the early-1980s, advocated a more radical approach against the KMT. The New Tide was instrumental in the founding of the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) in November 1987, a federated environmental organization with local chapters, with Liao Yung-lai as its first secretary-general. Finally, DPP's elected politicians possessed all kinds of resources important for environmentalists. Many TEPU local chapters shared the same office space with DPP politicians for the sake of rent.[9] Politicians' campaign vehicles were loaned to environmentalists during public protests.[10]

Obviously the DPP played a vital political role in shepherding the emerging environmental protests. For the DPP, environmental protests invariably weakened the KMT's entrenched local base. While the DPP's calculation was largely responsible for the pull factor in forging a political alliance with the environmental movement, the push factor came from the KMT's repression since 1989. In order to resist Hau's imposition of martial law, environmentalists visibly tilted toward the DPP camp. As an activist put it, DPP politicians' participation came with "the right to be exempted from being beaten up in the street."[11] In other words, the KMT's tougher stance on public protest resulted in a tighter alliance between the opposition party and environmentalism.

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[8] *China Times*, 1992/7/28.

[9] Interview with the Chairperson of Hualien County TEPU (1990-1992), 1999/8/19.

[10] Interview with an Executive Director of Northern Political Victims Foundation (1988), 1999/7/15.

[11] Interview with the Vice-chairperson of TEPU (1999), 1999/3/3.

Radicalization

The combined effect of tolerant policing, a preemptive policy response by political authorities and a political alliance bridging the DPP with environmental groups, radicalized the environmental movement during this period. The lifting of martial law immediately triggered a climbing protest wave. One discernible trend was the diffusion of mass demonstration tactics by various activists across the political spectrum. Beginning in 1989 the anti-nuclear demonstration became an annual event to highlight popular opposition to the controversial Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Even among more moderate conservationists street politics was an irresistible *zeitgeist*. Middle-class conservationists held a mass rally to preserve Taiwan's forest in 1988,[12] and another to expedite the ratification of Wildlife Conservation Law in 1989.[13]

Another sign of radicalization was the rapid political shift of environmentalists toward a pro-DPP stance. Taiwan's anti-nuclear pioneer Lin Jun-yi obtained DPP membership and won a position in the Legislative Yuan election in 1989. Li Jun-vi explained his motive for shifting to electoral concerns: "Deplorably, all big and small problems in Taiwanese society for the past more than 40 years came from the anti-democratic politics. If this anti-democratic original sin cannot be eradicated, civil society and intellectuals will not be effective..." (Lin J. 1989a)

More environmentalists followed the trend by jumping on the election bandwagon. According to Lin's assessment, as the KMT stepped up its repression of social movements, political solution became the only choice. Another anti-nuclear academic scholar Chang Kuo-lung was active in the students' movement against the KMT government in March 1990. Later he was recruited by the newly elected DPP Taipei County Magistrate to serve as a privy aide.

Likewise, the TEPU (Taiwan Environmental Protection Union) had seventeen members who joined the 1989 election[14] and twelve for 1991 election.[15] The fact that all these TEPU candidates were of the DPP membership is no surprise since that organization was pro-DPP from the onset. Nevertheless the TEPU's approach to election gravitated toward more direct involvement. The TEPU utilized the slogan "Don't Vote the KMT, If You Are Anti-Nuclear" and endorsed eight DPP mayor and magistrate candidates in 1989. In the following elections of 1991 and 1992, the TEPU joined hands with other movement organizations and spoke at campaign events nationwide.[16] Scantily disguised partisanship was a tolerable risk for environmental activists because they had

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[12] *China Times* 1988/3/13.

[13] *Minsheng Daily* 1989/4/15.

[14] *Taiwan Huanching* [Taiwan's Environment] 19(1989): 3.

[15] *China Times* 1991/11/22.

[16] *Taiwan Huanching* [Taiwan's Environment] 42(1991): 8-11.

no access to the KMT-controlled media, but could use the DPP's electoral campaign to broadcast their messages.

Taiwan's anti-nuclear movement rode the radicalizing wave during these years. While the nuclear debate was largely a "gentlemen's disagreement" among scholars, experts, and politicians prior to the liberalization, within less than 6 months after the end of martial law, mass rally and grassroots organizing came onto the stage. Residents of Kongliao whose hometown was the designated construction site for the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, were mobilized and became the vanguard of the recent anti-nuclear camp (Ho 2003, 692–696). Further the anti-nuclear movement established a solid alliance with the DPP. While the DPP's long tenure in Taipei County Magistrate (1990–2005) provided Kongliao activists a reliable ally to fight the pro-nuclear central government, the KMT's crackdown on a local blockade in October 1991 pushed them closer to the DPP.[17]

The KMT's reinforced political repression failed to curb the growth of environmentalism. First as stated in the above, the majority of Taiwan's anti-pollution protests were locally embedded. When dealing with a formalized social movement organization, a repressive regime could round up the movement leadership, confiscate physical property, and deprive organizations of their legal status. However the highly decentralized nature of anti-pollution protests stultified a concerted repression from above. There was simply no way to single out the targets unless the incumbents were willing to risk the political ramifications of indiscriminate violence. Consequently when the government concentrated its attention on the major cases, such as Houchin (1990), Kongliao (1991), and Talinpu (1992), protest activity escalated.

Second, the issue of environmental protests touched a sensitive nerve in the liberalizing KMT regime, which was then largely composed of two potentially conflicting sectors of bureaucratic technocrats and elected politicians. Unlike officials in the central government, local representatives and executives were directly accountable to their constituencies, whose voice often spoke louder than their partisan superiors. As democratization made elections more competitive, politicians had more incentives to support the pollution victims in their district. Thus even local KMT politicians would endorse protests in defiance against their national leadership. During the 1991 election, four township mayors in northern Taoyuan County took the lead to demand compensation from a nearby power plant. They claimed the power plant had damaged fishery, farms, and public health and thus deserved instant compensation.[18] This incident precipitated a wave of compensation demands, as politicians in Taipei County and Taichung County sought similar demands at the site of their local power plants.[19] What was especially embarrassing for Premier Hau was the fact the political leadership was

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[17] *United Daily* 1991/10/4.
[18] *China Times*, 1991/11/1.
[19] *China Times*, 1991/12/1.

mostly of KMT membership. Clearly environmental grievances succeeded in driving a wedge in the KMT ruling bloc and as the rift between bureaucrats and politicians widened, the effect of repression was greatly cushioned.

Last, Hau's premiership ended with the KMT's debacle in the 1992 election, in which the DPP obtained more than one-third of the seats in Legislative Yuan. While it was certainly impossible to precisely assess, many analyst contend that the contribution from environmentalism as well as other movement sectors was significant in the election outcome. The DPP was a net gainer from the alliance with environmentalism since it had succeeded in monopolizing the political market of pollution victims and the environment-conscious middle class.

Institutionalization in Democratization (1993–1999)

Democratization by definition means a process of establishing new political institutions that enable peaceful contestation for power through elections. It also involves what Foweraker (1993, 145) calls "linkage politics," or the realignment between civil society groups and political institutions. This section is going to show how changes in policy channel, policing of protests, and political alliance affected Taiwan's environmentalism in the 1990s.

Partially Open Policy Channel

Compared with the earlier period of liberalization in Taiwan, policy channels opened in the mid-1990s. Two newly formed institutions, the wildlife conservation advisory committee and the environmental impact assessment (EIA), were critical in shaping the relationship between environmental groups and government.

Taiwan's Wildlife Conservation Law was passed in 1989 and substantially revised in 1994. This modification was partly a defensive response to the international criticism aimed at Taiwan's alleged rhino horn trade that erupted as a scandal 1 year earlier (Chen 2001, 632). The law was also a result of extensive domestic environmentalists' lobbying efforts. During this period, there was confluence between anti-pollution protests and conservationism. Both sectors joined forces since many developmental projects were located in ecologically sensitive areas. Environmentalists began to pay attention to the wildlife issue and successfully obtained the official agreement to incorporate their participation.[20] In 1996–1998, twelve out of the twenty-five wildlife conservation advisory committee members were recommended by NGOs, including eight activists and four independent experts.[21]

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[20] *United Daily* 1995/7/2.

[21] This information was provided by Ecological Conservation Alliance (1999/12).

During this period of democratization, environmentalists were officially invited to join the governmental decision-making process. Needless to say, NGO advisory committee members were eager to promote the establishment of conservation areas to forestall some ecologically unsound projects. These projects included the Hsiangshan industrial zone, the Pinnan industrial zone, and the Meinung dam.[22] As a result of the political inclusion of environmentalists, these controversial projects were immediately suspended. Yet, officials in charge of these projects did not take these advisory committee decisions seriously. As a participant on one committee put it, "It is one thing how we argue in the meeting and another how they make it after the meeting."[23] Officials could simply cite a host of reasons to ignore the committee's recommendations.

The EIA in Taiwan underwent a period of development involving the process of experimenting, training, and promoting environmental assessment before it was finally enacted as a law in 1994. During the legislative process from 1990 to 1994, democratization continued, a newly elected parliament with a substantial block of seats occupied by the DPP, supported the TEPU-led lobbying effort to boast the EIA's regulatory power. As stipulated in the 1994 law, the EIA was granted an enlarged scope of review and empowered to veto developmental projects. Another EIA reform involved detailed specifications outlining the procedures for public participation in EIA hearings. All these changes were made in defiance of economic officials who suspected that a more powerful EIA would delay their capital investment projects (Ho 2004, 240–244).

These environmentalists' victories in the EIA legislation clearly demonstrated the extent of Taiwan's democratization (Tang and Tang 2000). However, these reforms constituted partial victories for environmentalists since they were still barred from meaningful participation in the EIA review process. Citing the precedent of wildlife conservation advisory committee, environmentalists requested the EPA for the right to recommend EIA reviewers.[24] The EPA Director resolutely turned down this suggestion by characterizing environmental groups as "extreme" and "biased."[25] Consequently, environmentalists were prevented from gaining an officially recognized place in EIA, though this did not preclude environmentalists from testifying at public hearings during EIA meetings. By the use of friendly politicians' pressure, environmentalists could still force the reluctant EPA officials to accept their testimony and to publicize embarrassing facts about controversial projects.[26]

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[22] *United Daily* 1996/12/7.

[23] Interview with the secretary-general of New Environment Foundation (1994-1996), 1999/4/21.

[24] *Independent Morning Post* 1995/8/25.

[25] *Minsheng Daily* 1995/7/14.

[26] Interview with the chairperson of Taiwan Greenpeace (1999), 1999/2/9.

In sum, policy channels were slightly opened for environmentalists under a period of democratization in Taiwan. Once opened, environmentalists became disillusioned with the policy-making process when they were granted the right to participate in inconsequential official public hearings, and to help in redesigning a critical institution to which they were formally denied access. Yet, democratization certainly improved the status of environmental activists in the eyes of officials. In addition these partially opened avenues had the effect of reshaping the strategy of the environmental movement.

Policing of Protests: Routinization and Localization

During the period of democratization in Taiwan, environmental movements were institutionalized. As protests were routinized, they became less threatening to the regime. Two trends in policing of environmental protests took place in the mid-1990s. First, the politicized policing promoted by Premier Hau gave way to the routinized policing that treated protest as an orchestrated event. Second, localized policing meant that command was delegated to the lower level of police system, rather than controlled by the central government. EPA officials acknowledged that the direct intervention of central government "was viewed with suspicion and even had the potential to intensify public nuisance conflicts" (EPA 1994, 52).

These reforms involving the routinization of protest and localized policing were tested and proved effective in a series of protest incidents. In April 1993, the polluted Tashe petrochemical industrial zone was blockaded and shut down by residents. In a fashion similar to the 1988 Linyuan Incident and 1992 Talinpu Incident, Taiwan's petrochemical industry production was seriously disrupted. During the month-long negotiation, newly appointed Premier Lien Chan threatened to halt the blockaid declaring the tactic "the illegal method."[27] Meanwhile the besieged companies declared "their nostalgia for Premier Hau," or more explicitly, advocated the active deployment of the police force by the central government.[28] Nevertheless it was the local government of Kaohsiung County that mediated the dispute and maintained public order in the protest scene. The peaceful conclusion of the Tashe Incident established the precedent for the new style of policing.

In 1995, two environmental disputes related to the Taiwan Cement Corporation and the Formosa Plastic Group prompted the KMT government to reconsider its hitherto tolerant attitude. Since the two companies were well-endowed with political and economic resources, they were able to exert tremendous political pressure on government officials. In a vehement denunciation of environmental protests, the Minister of Economic Affairs likened

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[27] *Economic Daily* 1993/4/8.
[28] *United Daily* 1993/4/13.

environmental protests to "amphetamine addiction."[29] Nevertheless the government finally came to a formal decision not to "interfere in the local affairs which should be processed by local governments according to the legal procedure."[30] Yet, in the following year the Executive Yuan submitted an amendment proposal to the Public Nuisance Disputes Mediation Act that would require local executives to direct the police force to remove protestors exhibiting "violent behaviors."[31] During the legislative review, the DPP Legislators opposed this addition and their insistence dissuaded the officials from advocating this restriction on pubic protest.

The power shortage crisis after the 1999 earthquake likewise threatened to curtail routinized and localized protesting. The KMT government issued an emergency decree to expedite the review process of some controversial power plants and use police force to suppress popular opposition. When opposed by politicians and the general public, the KMT government agreed to limit the scope of emergency decree and sought approval from the Legislative Yuan.[32] Thus, routinzed and localized policing was established as the official policy around the mid-1990s and was maintained even after the power transfer in 2000.

Political Ally: Estranged Alliance with the DPP

As the DPP consolidated power throughout the 1990s, its political alliance with the environmentalists suffered from growing estrangement. In the past few if any DPP elites envisioned electoral victories over the KMT, but now with more seats in Legislative Yuan and local executives, the more confident DPP was ready to looking for broader constituencies beyond the social movement sector. By championing environmental protests since the late-1980s, the DPP were often branded as "anti-business [*fan shang*]," an unsightly label which the DPP now desired to quickly whitewash.

The estranged political alliance between the DPP and the environmental movement was clearly evident in three instances. First, the DPP remained silent on new environmental controversies. The 1994 Pinnan Industrial zone project included an ambitious land reclamation that would destroy an ecologically sensitive wetland in Tainan County. The project was fiercely opposed by environmentalists. The DPP, however, was internally divided since its County Magistrate was in favor of it, while one of its locally elected Legislators, Su Huan-chi, led the opposition movement. Environmentalists once petitioned the

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[29] *Commercial Times* 1995/11/29.

[30] *United Daily* 1995/9/13.

[31] *Chunghwa Daily* 1996/1/23.

[32] *Independent Evening Post* 1999/10/21.

DPP national office but only got an equivocal answer.[33] Thus the national office distanced the party from local environmental issues.

A second example was the DPP's reversal of promises made to the anti-nuclear movement. In May 1996 a motion to terminate all nuclear power plant construction was co-sponsored by the DPP and another opposition party, the New Party. Since the KMT Legislators, were divided, the anti-nuclear proposal successfully passed three readings.[34] In October the KMT government in an attempt to overturn the anti-nuclear proposal, utilized the constitutional tool requiring only one-third of the Legislators to pass "re-consideration." Anti-nuclear activists asked the DPP to resist the re-consideration of the anti-nuclear bill from being placed in the agenda. However, the DPP leadership tacitly made a deal with the KMT and publicly projected opposition to the reconsideration bill in order to satisfy the anti-nuclear camp. On October 18, as startling news of the DPP's betrayal was divulged to the anti-nuclear crowd outside the Legislative Yuan, they vented their anger at the DPP Legislators and a violent clash ensured. This unhappy incident further aggravated the already tenuous relationship between the DPP and environmentalists (Ho 2003, 701–703).

A third example of the DPP's distancing from the environmental movement, occurred when the DPP sought to cultivate friendlier relations with business. A relevant case here was the Bayer investment proposal in Taichung County in 1996–1998. The DPP politicians played an important role in organizing local opposition to this project which was showcased by the KMT government.[35] Things took a drastic turn as the anti-Bayer leader, Liao Yung-lai, was elected as County Magistrate in December 1997 vowing to put the Bayer case on a local referendum. The prospect of a local referendum on the investment proposal frightened business leaders, the KMT, as well as the DPP national leadership.[36] Facing mounting pressure, the DPP chairperson overrode its local executive by arguing for a public hearing instead of a referendum.[37] This unprecedented move triggered a factional in-fight, which was abruptly ended by the Bayer's decision to pull out the investment. Though initially firm on environmental ground, Liao also had to concede as the Bayer incident set off a national wave of criticism. As a result of the political pressure, he personally visited the Bayer Company in a gesture of apology and expressed his welcome for less hazardous investment.[38] These three cases demonstrated an increasing centralist turn on the part of the DPP, whose political alliance with environmentalists became strained. As the DPP elites set their eyes on the ruling position, environmentalists found it harder and harder to obtain their support.

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[33] *United Daily* 1994/11/3.

[34] *China Times*, 1996/5/25.

[35] *Liberty Times* 1997/12/20.

[36] *Commercial Times* 1997/12/6.

[37] *United Daily* 1997/12/11.

[38] *Central Daily* 1998/4/11.

Institutionalization

Institutionalization refers to a "self-activating" regular pattern whose persistence does not rely upon mobilization from external resources (Jepperson 1991, 145). An institutionalized social movement relies on its own resources, rather than depending on an external political ally. For a movement to become institutionalized, a supportive environment is necessary where opposition is at least minimally tolerated, and social movement organizations no longer have to fight for their survival (Kubik 1998, 137). Meyer and Tarrow's (1998) notion of "a social movement society" captured the essence of institutionalization. Social movements are viewed as becoming an element of normal democracy, characterized by regular, predicable, and even mundane way of raising political claims.

Taiwan's environmentalism showed signs of institutionalization, as quantitatively evidenced by the plateau of environmental protests in the mid-1990s (see Fig. 1). The institutionalizing trend was also discernable in the co-existence of mass demonstration and professionalism and declining partisan identification. Environmentalists were not satisfied with the partially opened policy channel; nevertheless, the latter could still be used as a vital leverage to oppose certain controversial developmental projects within legally stipulated process. Professional capacity, such as the ability to present a convincing argument in the EIA review meeting, now might have a comparable effect with a successful mass demonstration. To oppose the Pinnan industrial zone project, activists set up a division of labor in studying its EIA reports in order to raise as many questions as possible. Opponents made an effort to attend every site inspection, public hearing, and review meeting of EIA. Their well-prepared professional arguments helped to highlight many potential impacts that were originally slighted or muddled through, and as a result, the EIA took almost 5 years to complete (Ho 2004, 247).

However this should not be taken as a proof that environmentalists had abandoned the tactic mass demonstration, which characterized the environmental movement in the late-1980s. Opponents still needed to create political pressure by mobilizing local opposition and garner support of officials at the EIA. The DPP Legislator Su Huan-chi led a highly dramatized march throughout Tainan County to underscore the imminent threat of industrial pollution in August 1996.[39] In October the local movement also bused more than five thousand supporters to take part in a rally in Taipei.[40] Environmentalists hailed this successful mobilization as critical in halting the Pinnan developer from obtaining the EIA permit in a timely fashion as promised by economic officials.[41]

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[39] *China Times* 1996/8/12.

[40] *Liberty Times* 1996/10/5.

[41] Interview with an Assistant of Legislator Su Huan-chi, 1999/12/30.

According to the DPP legislator, Su Huan-chi's, the anti-Pinnan movement was a special combination of "armed struggle" (*wutou*) and "civilized struggle" (*wentou*).[42] Su believed that the EIA would approve environmentally threatening projects if opponents failed to pressure officials through public demonstration and participation in public hearings. Su's remarks aptly demonstrate the dual strategies of environmentalists during the period of democratization. This resulted in a dilemma for the environmental movement. While anti-pollution protests were no longer repressed by authorities, environmentalists were excluded from exercising power as decision-making insiders.

As a consequence of an estranged political alliance with the DPP, environmentalist adopted a nonpartisan identity. The 1994 election of Provincial Governor and Municipality Mayors was the last race in which environmentalists endorsed the entire DPP slate. From that point environmentalists adopted a cautious approach to political endorsements, closely reviewing the individual candidate's environmental positions regardless of party affiliation. As a result of these efforts, environmentalists decided to support two ex-KMT candidates in the 1996 Presidential election who deviated from the KMT's avowedly pro-nuclear stand.[43]

The formation of the Taiwan Green Party (TGP) in 1996 was also an indicator of environmentalists' detachment from the DPP. Beginning in the late-1990s, the TGP took part in elections with explicitly pro-environment demands, but with minimal success in winning political positions. This attempt by the TGP to outflank the DPP on environmental issues demonstrated the extent of environmentalists' disillusionment with the DPP (Ho 2003, 703–704).

Another movement strategy to circumvent the DPP's diminishing support of environmental issues was to cultivate linkages between environmentalist and other social movements. Through these coalition-building efforts the Meinung anti-dam movement successfully broadened its appeal to many audiences, including community organizers, Hakka cultural activists, and even the independent rock artists. By broadcasting their anti-dam messages through diverse channels, Meinung activists demonstrated the power of coalition building for environmentalists throughout the 1990s. Central to these coalition-building efforts was the idea "not to repeat the lesson of anti-nuclear movement and the cooptation by the DPP."[44] Consequently, the insistence on movement autonomy from the DPP paved the way for a brand-new movement strategy.

During this period of democratization, the environmental movement was characterized by a steady generation of protests. The co-existence of mass and professional strategy, along with the declining partisan identity constituted the new contour of environmentalism. As activists struggled to make their voices heard, environmentalism was institutionalized as a solid sector in Taiwan's civil society.

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[42] Interview with Su Huan-chi, DPP Legislator (1999), 1999/12/30.

[43] *China Times* 1996/5/25.

[44] Interview with the Executive Secretary of Meinung People's Association, 1999/6/2.

Incorporation Under the DPP Government (2000–2004)[45]

In 2000 Taiwan underwent a political transition when power was transferred to the DPP's President Chen Shui-ban. While this unparalleled peaceful and democratic regime shift was exhilarating, political leadership would prove to be a daunting task for the inexperienced DPP elites who were constantly beleaguered by hostile media and merciless rivals. For environmentalists, the political terrain under the DPP government proved equally treacherous. While environmentalists were incorporated into the new regime, they saw their influence eclipsed by rising business power. Several dimensions of the political opportunity structure were transformed after the 2000 elections impacting social movement mobilization.

State Autonomy: Weakened State

Transition away from authoritarian rule results in reduced state autonomy since incumbents have to face the pressure of periodic re-election. Yet, long-time government parties such as the KMT managed to retain power and state autonomy in decision making throughout the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, criticisms of "money politics" were frequent, but failed to discredit the KMT's skills in economic management (Rigger 2001a: 948). The challenge of taking the helm of a KMT-inherited state proved to be a formidable task for the DPP. Under the DPP, the state capacity to formulate and implement its policy independently was deeply undermined. As the DPP was forced to make concessions to the powerful opposition parties, the state itself became more penetrable to a plethora of interests.

   DPP's vulnerability came from three sources. First, the DPP was unable to possess a comfortable parliamentary majority. When Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated as the new President in May 2000, the DPP had less than one-third of the seats in Legislative Yuan. Elections in 2001 and 2004 improved the DPP's standing, but the pro-government pan-green alliance was still below the threshold of a majority. Second, there were visible problems of policy coordination within the DPP government. The DPP was accustomed to a democratic culture of open debate and disagreement, which constantly disclosed factional infightings to the public (Wu 2002, 632). Furthermore, DPP politicians encountered resistance from bureaucrats who were predominately appointed by and supportive of the KMT. For example, economic officials sought to undermine the DPP's environmental reforms either by leaking unfavorable information to the press or taking a passive stand on the issue. Finally, when a severe economic recession hit Taiwan in 2001, rising unemployment constrained the DPP's

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[45] This section is mainly adapted from Ho (2005b, 2005c).

policy options. The reforms promised by the DPP were cast aside as the economic agenda became the central focus.

The weakness of the DPP's government was vividly demonstrated in the nuclear controversy in 2000–2001. As promised in Chen's campaign, the DPP resolved to terminate the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant project. This resolution immediately provoked all-out resistance by the opposition-dominated Legislative Yuan. As a result, the DPP was forced to backtrack on its decision and construction on the nuclear power plant resumed in February 2001. The seemingly innocent issue of redwood forest conservation turned out to be contentious as well. In a defeat for both environmentalists and the DPP, the budget for the Makao National Park was suspended in January 2003 when aboriginal movement activists and the KMT pan-blue camp joined forces to oppose conservation measures. These failures showed the DPP government's limited capacity to uphold their environmental platform.

In addition to the problem of a weak and unstable state, counter movements fought further extension of environmental regulations. Forces mobilized to oppose EPA regulatory polices in 2000–2004, included the electrical scooter industry, pork producers, illegal scrap metal refineries, and the plastic business (Ho 2005b: 348–349). Such intense anti-environmental lobbying was new to Taiwan under the DPP government. Though these anti-environmental efforts did not necessarily succeed in fully realizing their goals, their high-profile presence made the policy process more protracted and complicated.

In sum, the state under the DPP was severely strained in carrying out environmental reforms. It was also unable to resist the growing encroachment of business pressure. As a result, the state was constantly caught in a tug of war between environmentalists and business.

Policy Channel: Gained Procedural Participation

Continuing a trend emerging in the mid-1990s, the DPP government closed the gap between environmentalists and the state by further opening policy channels. President Chen appointed Lin Jun-yi as his first EPA Director (2000–2001). With Lin's anti-nuclear stance and his environmental movement experience, he appointed many environmental activists to positions in the EPA. Many former activists obtained the opportunity to work with the national administration and gained precious first-hand knowledge of government decision-making.[46] Aside from recruiting individuals to governmental office, the DPP also opened up many decision-making committees for environmentalists. In 2001, the EPA made an important change in the rules for selecting EIA reviewers. The EPA Director no longer handpicked all the committee members,

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[46] Interview with an Assistant to Legislative Yuan Society for Sustainable Development, 2001/12/21.

but allowed professional associations, academic institutions, and civil groups to submit their recommendations. Applicants with environmental experience in non-governmental organizations were encouraged to apply.[47]

The top advisory committee for environmental policy in Taiwan became the National Advancement for Sustainable Development Committee. This group, originating in 1997 to tackle the policy challenges of global environmentalism, was an exclusive club of officials and scholars with no input from environmental NGOs. In 2002 the DPP broke this tradition by appointing eight "representatives of social groups," who were mostly veteran environmentalists.[48] The Nuclear-Free Homeland Communication Committee was a newly formed official organ to propagate the anti-nuclear message after the DPP's 2001 debacle to terminate the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant project. As a concession to disgruntled environmentalists, this Committee was designed for the participation of anti-nuclear activists. This was the first time that the anti-nuclear camp had the chance to make use of national state committees in order to counterbalance the one-sided pro-nuclear education promoted by the previous KMT government.

Despite the fact that environmentalists gained an insider status with increased access to decision making, their influence did not directly translate into pro-environmental policy outcomes. There were many reasons to explain their limitation. First, environmentalists obtained access to the environment-related agencies such as the EPA, but these agencies proved relatively powerless in the face of the pro-development economic officials. Second, the predominantly KMT officialdom was not enthusiastic about the initiatives these ex-activists promoted. Consequently procedural participation did not mean a radical change in overall policy under the DPP. However, increased participation in governmental agencies and committees expanded the ways in which environmentalists promoted their agenda.

Political Ally: The Collapse of Political Alliance with the DPP

Environmentalists' political alliance with the DPP was visibly strained during the 1990s. The DPP's political rise and subsequently pro-business turn further led to the collapse of its political alliance with environmentalists.

After cursorily concluding the nuclear controversy, the DPP moved toward a more conservative orientation emphasizing economic recovery rather than social reform. The Economic Development Advisory Conference held in August 2001 attempted to build a national consensus on economic matters. Testifying at this conference were business leaders arguing that environmental regulations, such as the EIA, and the ban on developing hillside slopes and forestland impeded

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[47] *Liberty Times* 2001/6/20.

[48] *Commercial Times* 2002/6/6.

economic growth. This testimony became part of the official records that the DPP avowed to uphold. Environmentalists excluded from this conference were naturally frustrated and highly critical of the anti-environmental outcome.[49]

In accordance with the conclusions reached at the Conference, the EPA in August 2001 began to improve the EIA's "efficiency" by simplifying its legal procedures and standardizing its decision-making processes.[50] In September the EPA also revised the pollution standard for wastewater in order to convince the dyeing industry to stay in Taiwan.[51] Clearly, the DPP had sacrificed its environmental commitments, and adopted a pro-business agenda of less environmental regulation to stimulate economic growth.

As the 2004 presidential election approached, the DPP began to play the "construction trump" to attract votes in economically stricken rural area. In a local by-election in 2003, the DPP government re-initiated the controversial proposal to build the Suao-Hualien highway in the mountainous eastern region. This massive construction project was overwhelmingly opposed by environmentalists. Later the DPP put forward the ambitious "New Ten Great Construction Projects" to boost Chen's re-election campaign. In the past construction projects were utilized by the KMT as a campaign tactic, but now the DPP had adopted the KMT's development-first ideology and practice. Not surprisingly, the "New Ten Great Construction Projects" proposal incurred a nationwide protest by environmentalists.[52]

The DPP's conservative turn dissolved their lingering alliance with environmentalists. After losing its ruling position, the KMT had adopted an opportunistic approach to social protests. Eager to embarrass the DPP, the KMT-led pan-blue camp endorsed protest issues, such as rising college tuition fees, schoolteachers' right to unionize, and unemployment, as long as these issues targeted the government (Ho 2005c: 416–418). However, the KMT preserving its conservative position avoided environmental issues including nuclear energy, forest conservation, and highway construction (Rigger 2001b: 39). Accordingly, environmentalists maintained an aloof, if not distrustful, attitude toward the KMT.

Incorporation

The DPP government triggered a change of status of environmentalists from distrusted outsider to government insider. Though environmentalists lost the DPP as political ally in the Legislative Yuan, the administrative reforms initiated by the DPP helped to incorporate environmentalists into government positions in a non-partisan and institutional basis. Figure 1 shows the drastic decline of

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[49] *United Daily* 2001/8/25.

[50] *Minchung Daily* 2007/8/22.

[51] *Economic Daily* 2001/9/5.

[52] *United Daily* 2004/5/31.

environmental protests after 2000. Incorporation necessitated a shift of movement tactics, as mass demonstration gave way to negotiation, lobbying, and institutional advocacy. For example, the redwood conservation movement won an initial victory in securing the government's promise to enlarge the area of Makao national park and to invite aboriginal people into the governing mechanism in 2001. To obtain these concessions, activists did not stage demonstrations, but rather lobbied "high-ranking government officials until they agreed to these demands."[53]

With more open institutional accesses, opponents of nuclear energy underwent a metamorphosis to become advocates for renewable energy. In July 2001 an international conference on new energy sources was held with wide attendance from government officials. As an organizer put it, this conference was based on the idea that officials could be "reeducated" by exposing them to newer information to counterbalance their pro-nuclear prejudice.[54] One year later, these activists succeeded in organizing a quasi-official association with participants from industry, government, and academics with the goal of making renewable energy a viable industry.[55]

A more cooperative relationship emerged between environmentalist and the state resulting from increased access to policy makers and procedural transparency. Activists were no longer viewed as disruptive protestors by officials, but reliable partners in environmental governance. For instance, a group of activists was commissioned by the EPA to popularize the latest information of soil pollution regulation among industrial producers.[56] Arrigo and Puleston (2006, 172) also documented the fact the TEPU was contracted by the Ministry of Education to provide on-campus training and educational programs nationwide.

Though the environmentalists' role in the DPP government was never friction-free, incorporation brought about a new way of raising environmentalist claims. To use a term by Charles Tilly (1978, 52), environmentalists increasingly became a "polity member" who enjoyed routinized and low-cost access to governmental resources.

Conclusion

This chapter traced the development of Taiwan's environmentalism over the past two decades with the central question of how the environmental movement was linked to the overall democratic political transition. Analytical focus on the political opportunity structure enabled us to locate the concrete sites where

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[53] Cited from a speech by the Director of Ecological Education Center of Kaohsiung Teachers' Association, 2003/5/6.

[54] Interview with an Assistant to Legislative Yuan Society for Sustainable Development, 2001/12/21.

[55] See http://e-info.org.tw/news/taiwan/ta02061301.htm (2005/10/17).

[56] Interview with the Vice-chairperson of Environment and Disaster Policy Association, 2001/12/21.

Table 2 POS and environmentalism in Taiwan (1980–2004)

	Soft authoritarianism (1980–1986)	Liberalization (1987–1992)	Democratization (1993–1999)	DPP government (2000–2004)
POS				
Policy channel	Closed	Closed Preemptive policy response	Partially open	Open
Political allies	None	Alliance with the DPP	Estranged alliance with the DPP	Collapse of alliance with the DPP
Policing of protests	Highly repressive	From tolerant to repressive	Tolerant	Tolerant
		Politicized and centralized command	Routinized and localized command	
State autonomy	Strong	Strong	Mildly strong	Weak
Environmentalism	Fermentation	Radicalization	Institutionalization	Incorporation
Exemplar cases	Sunko Protest (1982–1986)	Houchin Protest (1987–1990)	Meinung Anti-Dam Movement (1992–2000)	Makao National Park Controversy (2000-)
	Lukang Anti-DuPont Movement (1986–1987)	Linyuan Incident (1988)	Tashe Incident (1993)	
		Talinpu Incident (1990)	Anti-Pinnan Movement (1994-)	Suao-Hualien Highway Controversy (2003-)
		Anti-nuclear Movement (1988-)	Anti-Bayer Movement (1996–1998)	

protestors faced state power and to understand how their subsequent interactions shaped the trajectory of environmental movement. Table 2 summarizes the political opportunity structure of environmentalism.

It should be noted that environmentalism was not a passive weathervane merely reflecting the direction of political wind. Rather, environmental protests played a critical role in shaping elites' decisions that had wider political consequences. An early wave of environmentalism prior to the mid-1980s served to arouse oppositional politicians. This mobilization pushed the nascent DPP to adopt a more pro-environmental stance. Increasingly, radicalized and politicized protests in the late-1980s persuaded the KMT reformers to reverse their initially tolerant approach. Finally, environmentalists' support for the DPP was among the contributing factors that helped the latter to secure the consequential electoral victory in 1992. This led to the fall of KMT hardliners. These cases illustrate how social protest exerts an often unanticipated impact upon the larger political environment.

Clearly the environmental movement served a critical role in the democratic transition in Taiwan. After 2000 environmentalists gained legitimacy and were appointed to government positions. However, this did not mean the process of incorporation was irreversible. With the recent conservative turn on the part of DPP, a likely regime shift could occur in 2008. Other unforeseeable political factors might tip the current balance of forces and thus affect the insider status of environmentalists. The analytical framework of the political opportunity structure employed here will continue to provide a useful tool in accessing the latest evolution of Taiwan's environmental politics.

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Part IV
Introduction to Hong Kong History and Society

Stephen Chiu

Hong Kong, currently with population of 7 million, occupies an island and small strip of land (total land area, 426 square miles) on the southern coast of China. It was a British colony from 1842 to 1997, when it returned to Chinese control.

While a British colony, political power in Hong Kong was formally concentrated in hands of the Governor appointed from England. The Governor was advised by a nominated Executive Council, and an appointed Legislative Council served as the law-making body. During this period, the government developed a symbiotic relationship with key Hong Kong business leaders by co-opting them into consultative policy-advisory networks and the Legislative Council. The trade union movement was marginalized in this political set-up. Observers considered Hong Kong to be the model of a self-regulating market economy in which the state imposes few restrictions. Unable to participate in government, many residents threw themselves wholeheartedly into economic pursuits. As an extension of the family, some scholars argue, these enterprises expressed a dynamic adaptation of social Confucian values to new circumstances (King 1996, 275). While the government minimized intervention in matters of trade, the movement of capital and labour, and business decisions, it nevertheless promoted services supportive of business activities (Vogel 1991, 69). After World War Two, the state greatly expanded its role in the provision of land for development, general and vocational education, and investment in social infrastructure (hospitals, various types of schooling, housing, social welfare) that bore on the maintenance and development of HK. The Legislative Council expanded and began to include members by popular election.

In the run-up to decolonization, social movements sprang up along with the demands for faster pace of democratization (Chiu and Lui 2000; Sing 2000). As observed in Chiu's paper in this volume, the labour movement remained numerically weak but new repertoires of actions developed to align with the more politicized social life and pushed for democratization (Scott 1989; So 1999). Union leaders joined forces with political parties and participated, with considerable success, in elections to the Legislative Council (Chiu and Levin 2000). With the blessing of the colonial government, public sector unions

continued to expand and took up quasi-bargaining position with their employer, that is, the government (Levin and Chiu 2000). Some forms of social movement that emerged in earlier decades such as the student movement waned in the countdown to 1997, but new forms of movement also appeared, just like the environmental movement (Chiu et al. 1999) and the women's movement (Lee 2000). Nevertheless, as Chiu and Lui (2000) argued, the dominance of the twin political processes of decolonization and democratization ensured that other forms of communal and social mobilization were being eclipsed or absorbed into the movement for political democratization.

The year 1997 marked a significant turning point for Hong Kong in two respects: regime change and financial crisis. First, after 150 years of British colonial rule, Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Given China's policy of "one country, two systems" the political transition left the existing government system largely intact, except that the ruling power became China instead of the UK. The Chinese Central Government appoints the top level executive positions while seats in the legislature are elected by a combination of popular one-person-one-vote method and group constituencies with varied sizes ranging from a few hundreds to tens of thousands. But in post-'97 Hong Kong, demands for fuller democratization intensified (Chan and So 2002). The popular democratization movements crystallized into political parties championing the democratic cause. But conservative forces also quickly mobilized on the side of the government that was still only partially open to democratic accountability. The first Chief Executive did not serve through his term of service and resigned amidst a chorus of opposition. Coupled with this political turmoil, several major challenges threatened Hong Kong's largely continuous economic growth over the post-war era: the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the SARS epidemic between 2002 and 2003 and the most recent global financial crisis in late 2008.

In the late 2000s, increasingly it is evident that besides the old social movements directed toward the political democratization or the Chinese government, new forms of social movements could be observed. In particular, in the last years of the decade, a string of conservationist mobilizations broke out to protest against developmental projects. Urban renewal projects were rejected for their destruction of urban heritages. For example, in 2006, a plan to move the century-old Star Ferry to a new location in the Central District was bitterly fought by conservationists. Earlier in 2003, the project to redevelop the so-called Wedding Card street in the Wanchai District home to a large number of printing workshops was pushed through after considerable mobilization by the local residents (Lee forthcoming). In the last month of 2009, a plan to build a high speed railroad linking up Hong Kong and the mainland that required the demolition of a rural village in the New Territories led to the "blockade" of the Legislative Council building by a few thousand people while it was deliberating the plan. In these movement episodes, it is apparent that an ideology is emerging akin to the Western version of post-materialism that emphasized conservation and sustainable development rather than the Hong Kong brand of

development at all costs (Inglehart 1981). Activists have also sought to link up conservation with the further opening of the political system, as they regarded the undemocratic mode of decision-making as the main culprit for the alleged destruction of heritages and local community. New forms of mobilization are also evident as the diffusion of information technology and the various Internet-based modes of communication such as Facebook and newsgroups have come to play a significant role in the recent protest episodes.

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The Reign of Market: Institutional Setting, Business Cycle, and Strikes in Hong Kong

Stephen Chiu

Introduction

How market forces shape social actions has always been an important theme in social analysis. Since the "long sixteenth century," the capitalist market has ushered in a new era of human history. Spreading from the capitalist core of Northeastern Europe, commodification and accumulation have become the organizing principles of the modern world (Wallerstein 1974). The advent of the market has given rise to new forms of collective action such as strikes, or the temporary withdrawal of labor power by workers. Strikes have been the most direct form of protest of the working class against the perceived injustices arising from the operation of a market economy. Although in many places strikes now only occur infrequently, they have developed from a novel tactic used by disgruntled workers into a feature of our everyday life. Strikes have indeed come to be the modal form of working class collective action in a market society (Tarrow 1994).

Economic and industrial relations analysts have devoted considerable effort to the study of the impact of market forces on the frequency and intensity of strikes and industrial conflicts. Most of these researchers view strikes from a managerial perspective – as a problem disrupting normal production and thus to be ameliorated (cf. Hyman 1988). Yet a few important analysts have discussed the relationship between the market and strikes in the context of social movement theories. They consider strikes as a form of collective action, in which a group of people act collectively in order to achieve their common interests (Snyder 1975, 1977; Shorter and Tilly 1974). In this study, I shall use this literature and make another attempt to apply social movement theories in to the study of strikes. A longstanding debate within the literature on social movements has been between the resource mobilization approach and the

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deprivation theories (Turner 1981; Eckstein 1980; Klandermans 1988). The primary objective of this paper is to test the resource mobilization approach against the relative deprivation models implicit in most economic studies of strikes. Moreover, in the concluding discussion I will attempt to move beyond the resource mobilization–deprivation antimony and relate my findings to the new social movement theories now current in social movement research.

The case of Hong Kong under British colonialism offers a unique institutional setting for the re-examination of the relationship between market forces and strikes, as it is perhaps the closest example on earth to a textbook case of laissez-faire market society.[1] Not only were political institutions conspicuously detached from the operation of the market mechanism, but other institutional intermediation of market forces, like trade unions and industrial relations systems, were also relatively underdeveloped and had no significant impact on the occurrence of strikes. In such an institutional context, how did workers react to market fluctuations? Were variations in the business cycle likely to be an important determinant of strikes? How could we account for the specific relationship that existed between the market and strikes in Hong Kong? By answering these questions, hopefully we can gain more insights into the inter-relations between institutions, market forces, and collective actions.

Theoretical Perspectives on the Market and Industrial Conflicts

One major focus in strike studies has been the impact of business cycles on the frequency and intensity of strikes. From Hansen's (1921) classic study of the correspondence between business cycles and fluctuations in the aggregate frequency of industrial conflicts, a tradition of applying economic models to the analysis of strikes has emerged. Most of the results from these studies have pointed to a positive relationship between market prosperity and strike activity. While most of these studies are concerned with the context of industrial relations rather than collective action, the positive correlation between market fluctuations and frequency of strikes can actually be recast in terms of the theories of collective protest. For example, Rees (1952) suggests that the tightness of the labor market increases the propensity for workers to strike because improving labor market and business conditions offer them a variety of strategic advantages.

The resource mobilization perspective suggests a different mechanism linking market fluctuations and strike activity (cf. Franzosi 1995). Such a view, as Tilly maintains, sees strikes and social movement as a product of rational strategic

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[1] Political changes after the return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 do bring about changes in economic policy, with the state playing a more active role in the economy. As it is too early to assess the impact of the return to Chinese sovereignty, I shall limit the scope of this paper to the colonial period. I shall briefly address the post-1997 situation in the concluding section.

calculations among the contending parties. "Therefore the incentive of the weaker party to attack generally declines with the relative strength of the other party; conversely, the closer two antagonists come to equality, the greater incentives they both have to attack" (Tilly 1989, 434). Thus while the labor market puts the workers at an inferior position vis-à-vis the employer, a tight labor market narrows the power differential, encouraging the workers to wage protest actions. Rees' argument assumes that labor's stock of grievances is relatively constant, but that market conditions affect the timing and frequency of the translation of these grievances to collective action. This is a familiar assumption in the resource mobilization approach, most eloquently expressed in McCarthy and Zald's (1977) classic statement of the resource mobilization theory.

Another strand in the studies of strikes utilizes the relative deprivation approach by relating the miseries and deprivations of workers to their collective protests. One example is the economic model of strikes, exemplified by Ashenfelter and Johnson's (1969) bargaining theory of strikes. They propose to explain the incidence of strikes by an "expectation-achievement" function. In this model, workers' readiness to strike is determined by whether there is a discrepancy between their expectation of wage increase and the ability or willingness of the firm to pay. Thus a strike situation occurs when workers are experiencing a gap between their expectation and its satisfaction, or in short, relative deprivation. They then posit a negative relationship between real wage changes and strike frequency, using the former as an indication of whether workers' expectation has been satisfied.[2] This is basically the opposite of the collective action perspective, which conceives real wage increase as a sign of improvement of the labor market position of workers. Besides the effect of a real wage, the deprivation perspective also predicts that price increases should lead to more strikes because inflation would accentuate the sense of deprivation among workers who see their wages being eaten away by inflation.

Although the resource mobilization and deprivation approaches differ in their underlying conceptions of, and the critical mechanism generating, collective actions, recent studies suggest that they are not necessarily incompatible with each other (see for example Kerbo 1982; Klandermans 1997; Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995; Piven and Cloward 1991). Here I will follow this line of reasoning and seek to synthesize the two sets of conditions into a more comprehensive explanation.

In addition to the divergent approaches to the relationship between market forces and strikes, many discussions have been couched in terms of the relative salience of "economic" versus "institutional" or "political" determinants of strike activity. As Polanyi argues, institutional regulations of market forces

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[2] Ashenfelter and Johnson model the extent of which workers' wage expectation has been satisfied by the moving averages of previous real wage changes in a distributed lag form (1969, 40). Nevertheless, as Skeels (1982) points out, empirically it makes no difference whether a distributed multi-period lag or a single-period lag is used. Here for simplicity sake I report only results using single-year wage changes.

tend to develop in society to contain the self-destructive thrust of the unfettered market (1957). Strikes become embedded in a wide ranging array of institutions and "web of rules" devoted to the regulation of industrial relations (Kerr et al. 1973). Consequently, studies of strikes are often directed not toward the effect of the market per se but to the assessment of whether the market or the institutional context is the primary determinant in accounting for strikes.

Snyder (1975) criticizes the "economistic" approach to the study of strikes, arguing that the economic model of strikes is theoretically incomplete because it neglects the workers' organizational capacities to press their demands and the influence of the political environment in which bargaining occurs. He contends that "hypotheses concerning behavioral consequences of aggregate economic shifts and the empirical findings which justify them depend on assumptions about the institutional context of labor relations" (1975, 264). He formulates two ideal types of such institutional setting. The first type is the "institutionalized" industrial relations system, where employers and unions have formal bargaining channels, while union membership is large and stable. Workers and unions are also regarded as legitimate interest groups in society, and possess secure positions in the polity. The second type is the "poorly institutionalized" bargaining system, with small and unstable union membership, and the working class lacking legitimate and secured political positions in the political system. The offshoot of this distinction is that only under the former, an institutionalized setting, should industrial conflicts respond to market fluctuations. Under such a setting, Snyder argues, trade unions and employers will bargain over the terms of their employment according to labor market situations, without the risks of "spilling over" to political conflicts. In the poorly institutionalized system, on the other hand, economic variables would become poor predictors of strike activity and strikes would be more closely linked to organizational and political variables like union membership and the character of political parties in power.[3]

While Snyder's revamping of the assumptions underlying the studies of strikes is useful, the specific links he posited between institutional setting and the sensitivity of strikes to market forces are problematic. If we see strikes as collective action, which Snyder concurs with, it can be argued that changing economic conditions may affect strikes regardless of the institutional setting, since market fluctuations will affect the power position of workers in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized settings (cf. Kaufman 1982, 479). Moreover, we should expect "a tendency for strike decisions to be more sensitive to labor market conditions in settings characterized by less developed bargaining institutions and politically weak labor movements, since it is precisely in these settings that workers' capacity for industrial action is most directly dependent on their market situation." (Shalev 1983, 428)

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[3] For another example along this line, see Edwards (1983), who examines the link between industrial conflicts and state policies.

Drawing on these insights from both strike studies and social movement theories, I pose two research questions about the relationship between the market and strikes in Hong Kong. Firstly, since colonial Hong Kong approximated the ideal type of a poorly institutionalized system of industrial relations (as demonstrated below), does it follow that economic variables are poor predictors of strike activity as Synder argues, or significant determinants as Shalev contends? Secondly, if linkages do exist between economic fluctuations and strike activity, then do these relationships fit better the expectations deprived from the collective action perspective, or those derived from theories of relative deprivation?

Hong Kong: A Case of Unfettered Market Society

According to Polanyi (1957), parallel to the formation of the self-regulating market society in the nineteenth century, there was the movement toward the self-protection of the society against the perils of the market, with two main methods of social protection. In England, it was the development of the labor movement that kept market forces in check. On the continent, political means and actions of the state were workers' principal source of protection. Both would lead to a more institutionalized relationship between the sellers and buyers of labor power in the market. When capitalist development spread to the Third World, similar tendencies toward the institutionalization of industrial relations were evident, though more in the continental manner than the English pattern. State interventions in the labor market have set the main parameters of industrial relations in the Third World. Due both to the demonstration effect from the advanced countries, or the overriding concern with economic growth, states in the developing world usually seek to institutionalize and regulate strikes in the fairly early phase of industrial development.

In this light, the case of Hong Kong becomes especially interesting. By any standard, colonial Hong Kong, often deemed as the "last bastion of laissez-faire," was closer to the pure model of a market economy than any other contemporary capitalist economy. The government's guiding philosophy was "positive non-interventionism" which connoted a benevolent neglect of the operation of the market mechanism. Therefore, not only was the tripartite coordination of corporatist societies absent in Hong Kong, but so were the normal macroeconomic management policies evident in many other market economies. Hong Kong was also unique among developing or newly developed countries in that the government employed no active industrial policy or developmental strategy to aid or direct the process of industrialization (Haggard 1990; Chiu 1996).

My earlier attempts to study Hong Kong's industrialization, characterize Hong Kong as a case of unorganized industrialism (Chiu and Lui 1996; Chiu et al. 1997). The structure of the Hong Kong economy, especially in the

manufacturing sector, is reminiscent of a perfectly competitive market. The industrial sector, which had been the largest employer for much of the postwar decades, is populated by a multitude of small and medium-sized firms competing against each for the export markets (England 1989). The state, though playing an important role in the provision of land and social services, has restrained itself from "picking winners" or rescuing dying industries. The economy is thus deeply affected by fluctuations in the world economy, and has experienced dramatic boom and bust cycles.

While political mediation on the operation of the market was absent in Hong Kong, within the market, there were also few "artificial" institutional arrangements that affected its allocation of resources. There was a very low degree of organization among both employers and employees. Trade and industrial associations had a very small membership, and except in a very small number of traditional guilds, such associations had little influence on the management and decisions of individual member firms.[4] Trade union laws were permissive but not conducive. The colonial state had installed few restrictions on the formation of unions, but similarly it had offered little positive assistance toward union organization (Chiu and Levin 1999; Ng 1982). It maintained the "voluntarist" tradition in British industrial relations and did not mandate the compulsory recognition by employers of trade unions. As a result few employers recognize trade unions and most tried to resist unionization in their enterprises, but these remained free of state interference.

Strikes were not legally proscribed, but there was no legal protection of workers' jobs once they went on strike.[5] The state assumed only a mediating role in strikes and other industrial disputes, trying to arrange for a peaceful resolution between workers and their employers. On their part, the employers also preferred to deal with the trade unions individually rather than forming a "united front" or through their trade associations. The state's other involvement in labor affairs has been limited to keeping a statutory floor of the terms and conditions of employment. Although this "floor" has been lifted considerably in recent years, wages and job security are still not included in the state's regulatory purview (Levin and Chiu 1994). Unemployment benefits are also being kept at a stingy level.[6]

The post-World War II industrial take-off was also accompanied by the diminishing significance of trade unions in industrial relations. The union

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[4] Saying this is not to deny the influences of the state on the market. As Polanyi (1957) points out, there can never be a completely uninstitutionalized market. The "market-dominated" nature of Hong Kong can best be viewed from a comparative perspective, in that Hong Kong is closer to the pure market economy than any other economies in the level of political and other institutional regulations of the market.

[5] As England (1989, 191) points out, strike action "is almost invariably a breach of contract justifying dismissal without notice".

[6] Much of the labor market policies have remained in tact after the return to Chinese sovereignty.

movement has been divided along political lines, between unions loyal to the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party. Today, while the union movement still constitutes an active pressure group (without real decision-making power) in the political arena, by and large it has not had any significant effect on industrial relations. Collective bargaining, even in a loose sense, covers only a very small fraction (less than 5%) of the labor force (Levin and Chiu 1993).

The insignificance of unions is perhaps most revealing in strike activities. Almost all strikes in Hong Kong are now "wild-cat" and spontaneous strikes. Union organizations are close to nonexistent at the shop floor, and consequently there are no shop-stewards who would act as the catalyst to strikes as in other countries (Levin and Chiu 1993). Union involvement is usually limited to being the adviser to workers, or the middleperson between the management and labor in the resolution of the conflicts *after* the outbreak of strikes or industrial disputes (Chiu 1987). No union sanctioning or ballot is required for a strike to happen, only the decision of a group of workers at the shop floor.

What we have here is the closest case to a pure market society without the protective institutions against market forces normally found in other market economies, or in short, a market-dominated society. This offers us a unique control case to decipher the effect of market forces on the mobilization of working class collective actions without having to worry about confounding the market and other influences on strikes. The theoretical potential of the Hong Kong case can be seen against the background of existing studies of strikes.

As Snyder and others have pointed out, institutional regulations of capital–labor relations can fundamentally modify the operation and effects of the market. A corporatist arrangement between the state, labor, and capital is perhaps the most prominent example. Therefore, in many advanced market economies, the market has become embedded in so many industrial and macro-economic institutions that the interpretation of those multiple regression analysis of strikes can only be done very carefully.[7] The coefficients of economic variables, such as real wages and price, are not really measuring the direct effect of market forces, but the effects of market relations as *mediated* by the institutional framework.

The "institutionalized" nature of strikes in modern market economies simply does not allow us to separate the effect of the market and other determinants. Therefore, we have not really tested theoretical propositions regarding the relationship between the market and strikes, save in a mediated way. What we have got are in fact the interactive effects of market relations and institutional variables. For example, one anomaly in Shorter and Tilly's

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[7] For example, as Shalev (1983) and Paldam and Pedersen (1982) observe, even the commonly asserted impact of unemployment on strikes is empirically unstable and depends on the kind of institutional settings studied. In Sweden, full employment in most of the 1960s and 1970s was associated with a very stable and low level of strikes.

(1974) path-breaking study of strikes in France is that they are not able to confirm their hypothesized relationship between economic changes and variations in strike activity through regression analyses. One explanation of the inconclusive findings, then, is the presence of other political and organizational factors that "mediated" the pressures and stimuli emanating from the marketplace.[8] Essentially, even Tilly and Shorter have not been able to test propositions regarding the direct linkages between the economy and strikes.

Strikes in a Market-Dominated Society: 1968–1989

Here I do not subscribe to the usual "logic of industrialism" assumption about the evolution of industrial relations from being governed by pure market forces to governance by a "web of rules" and formal institutions. Instead, the triumph of market forces in Hong Kong is a product of history, not a "'state of nature." For example, I have mentioned the fact that unions and traditional guild determinations of conditions of employment were once more pervasive in the pre-industrial period than in the period of industrialization that began more or less from the mid-1950s (Leung and Chiu 1991; Turner et al. 1980).

This is not the place to account for the failure of the union movement to keep up with the tremendous pace of industrial growth (but see Levin and Chiu 1993). Suffice it to say that the growth of the manufacturing sector was accompanied by very slow growth of union membership and within that sector, union participation rate or union density (union membership over total employed population) quickly dwindled. After the late 1960s, union density fluctuated between 15 and 25%, and stayed at below 20% for most of the 1980s. Union participation rate in manufacturing has been even lower, staying at less than 10% (Levin and Chiu 1994). Despite their declining significance, unions remained a key actor in industrial relations by clinging on to a politicized strategy (Turner et al. 1980; Levin and Chiu 1994). The political "general" strike of 1967, engineered by left-wing unions whose allegiance was to Communist China, however, marked the final chapter of major union involvement in industrial conflicts.[9] After the defeat in 1967, many unions, especially the left wing ones, adopted a low profile and retreated from active involvement in

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[8] For example, they find a fairly strong negative relationship between the number of strikes and real wages. They therefore modify their argument to include the interaction effect between organization and short-run declines in real income, so that over the long-run, increases in the well-being of workers make more resources available for labor organizations, and therefore increase the capacity of workers to strike; but short-run declines in real income bring that capacity into action. See Shorter and Tilly (1974, 102).

[9] In 1967 the left-wing unions, affected by the radicalism unleashed by the Cultural Revolution in China, called for a general strike against the colonial state. In the end, only a minority of workers in the public utilities participated. For the details of the 1967 political strikes and riots, see Leung and Chiu (1991).

industrial conflicts. Although a number of new unions were formed in the 1970s among the white collar and professional occupations in the public sector, employment relations in the private sector by and large remained void of union mediation.

As such, almost all strikes from 1968 onward could be regarded as the result of pure market relations. Involvement of unions was found in a few cases, but as mentioned, normally in a reactive rather than an initiating role. Most strikes were waged over "bread-and-butter" issues of wage, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment. Organizational strikes fighting for the union recognition and sympathy strikes are rare. Political strikes disappeared altogether. With the detente between China and the Western world, and the subsidence of radical fervor in China after the Cultural Revolution, left wing unions have been concerned with maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong (which has been the major contributor to China's foreign exchange reserve), rather than generating militancy by confronting the government and the employers (Leung and Chiu 1991, 54–5). Other unions, on the other hand, are simply too weak and detached from the workplace to have a significant impact on the incidence of strikes.

As shown in Figs. 1 and 2, in the 1970s there were significant fluctuations in the level of strike activities. The number of strikes rose sharply after 1969, reaching the first peak of 47 in 1970. It stayed at about 40 a year until 1973, and then dove from 49 in 1973 to 20 in 1974. The lowest recorded strike frequency in the 1970s was in 1976, with only 14 strikes. After that, strikes increased steadily to another peak in the late 1970s, spanning the period from 1978 to 1981. In terms of the absolute strike frequency, the late 1970s was indeed the all-time high during the period considered here (1968–1989), with

Fig. 1 Number of strikes per 100,000 Employees, 1968–1989
Source: Unpublished Labour Department Records

Fig. 2 Number of strikers and working days lost per 1,000 Employees, 1968–1989
Source: Unpublished Labour Department Records

about 50 strikes each year. Nevertheless, since the labor force also expanded during the 1970s, the propensity to strike (as shown in Fig. 1 and measured by the number of strikes per 100,000 employees) was lower than the peak in 1973. The same pattern of fluctuations with two peaks in the 1970s is also observed in the other two measures of strike propensity (strikers and days lost per 1,000 employees).

Into the 1980s, a long-term trend of declining strike activities was apparent. All three measures of strikes started sliding from 1982, reaching the all-time low in 1985, when only 5 strikes were recorded. Strike activity revived a little subsequently, but still at a much lower level compared with that in the 1970s. In the period of 1968–1982, the average numbers of strikes, strikers and days lost were 39, 7,585, and 22,772 respectively, while during 1983–1989, the corresponding figures were 11, 1,967, and 2,924.

Business Cycle and Strikes

How might we account for the year-to-year variations in strikes? Are market forces, as manifested in the business cycle, a poor or an important predictor of strikes in Hong Kong? Of the different hypotheses regarding the precise relationship between the business cycle and strikes derived from theoretical approaches in the study of social movements, which one receives the greatest support?

I shall attempt to gauge the relationship between strikes and market fluctuations through three variables: real wage movements, gross domestic capital formation (GDCF), and price changes. They measure different aspects of the

hypothesized correlation between prosperity and strikes, and bear different theoretical significance.

Resource mobilization and relative deprivation approaches are divided in their view of the expected direction of the effect of real wage changes on strikes. Resource mobilization theorists such as Tilly regard the effect to be positive, as wage increases indicate improvement in workers' market position, and the availability of more resources to workers.[10]

Ashenfelter and Johnson, however, hypothesize a negative relationship between real wage movement and strike activity. GDCF, as a measure of employers' prosperity and their commitment to the continual expansion in production, is also an important predictor in Shorter and Tilly's model of strikes.[11] Price changes, on the other hand, are an indicator of workers' hardship or short-run deprivation. Capital formation is more important in collective action studies and inflation in collective behavior theories, while both are expected to have positive effects on the variations of strikes.

The same set of variables measuring the effects of market fluctuations is included in equations predicting the different dimensions of strikes. The exclusion of the unemployment rate, which is a common variable in economic models of strike, is motivated by both practical and theoretical considerations. First, statistics on unemployment are available only from 1975 onward, so that including it in our equations will cut the number of cases considerably. Second, theoretically, "the link between business activity and strikes is less direct than the use of the unemployment rate implies; strike activity may reflect only broadly the impact of economic conditions, with a small change in unemployment having little effect, but with a large change having a disproportionate impact." (Edwards 1978, 326)

Yet as a fast-growing economy with a small population, Hong Kong has always had near full-employment after the 1950s. As a matter of fact, since 1975 when data became available, the unemployment rate showed little variation, except for a trough (1974–1976) caused by the Oil Crisis of 1973, and never rose above the so-called natural unemployment rate of 4%. Thus in Hong Kong's context, unemployment statistics is not a reliable measure of market position or bargaining power of workers. Rather real wage movement is a better measure of workers' market power since it indicates the general well-being of workers which allows them to sustain walkouts, and also a possibility of finding an alternative employment of comparable or higher wages if employers resist their demands. Real wages and capital formation,

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[10] Shorter and Tilly (1974) posit the positive relationship between workers' prosperity and strikes in terms of the collective action approach. They stress that real wages increase strikes by increasing resources available to labor organizations. Nevertheless, there is no reason why we cannot argue that there is a relatively direct relationship between workers' prosperity and strikes independent of labor organizations.

[11] Instead of capital formation, they use index of industrial production in their study.

then, are a better measure of the variations in the changes in workers' bargaining power in the Hong Kong context.[12]

As for the construction of the dependent variables, there is considerable danger in employing only a single indicator of strikes (Evans 1976). Following the now common practice among researchers to use a multidimensional analysis, three alternative measures of the aggregate strike activity are used: strike frequency, total number of strikers, and the total number of person-days lost in strikes, all controlled by the number of employees.[13] We use the natural logarithmic transformation of all strike measures as dependent variables in order to blunt the effects of a few extraordinary years and correct for the skewed results of the strike measures. A trend variable is also included in the equations to remove secular time trends in strikes.

Table 1 reports the regression results of predicting the three measures of strike activity by economic variables. The standardized data of the regressors and their level of significance are reported, along with the coefficient of determination (R-square) corrected for degrees of freedom and the Durbin-Watson statistic of serial correlation. All the equations include a constant term, which is not reported for the sake of simplicity.

Table 1 Estimated regression coefficients for economic and organizational determinants of strike indices, 1968–1989

Dependent variable	T	P	W	I	U	R^2	D.W.
Economic determinants only							
Strikes	-1.95^a	0.30^b	0.26^b	1.22^b	–	0.80	1.81
Days lost	-1.30^b	0.30^b	0.31^b	0.57	–	0.67	2.43
Strikers	-0.83	0.45^a	0.35^b	0.15	–	0.61	2.35
Both economic and organization determinants							
Strikes	-2.40^a	0.20^b	0.22^b	1.66^a	0.24^a	0.85	2.31
Days Lost	-1.40^c	0.28^b	0.30^b	0.67	0.06	0.65	2.44
Strikers	-1.02^c	0.41^b	0.33^b	0.34	0.10	0.63	2.37

T = time; P = Annual Change in Price; W = Annual Change in Real Wage; I = Level of Real Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation; U = Lagged Union density (%). R^2 = Coefficient of determination; D.W. = Durbin Watson Statistics.
[a]Significant at 0.01 level (one-tailed test).
[b]Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed test).
[c]Significant at 0.10 level (one-tailed test).

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[12] Measures of the independent variables are obtained from Census and Statistics Department, *Annual Digest of Statistics*, various years. Real wages changes are measured as annual percentage change of nominal wages deflated by the consumer price index. Capital formation is measured as the level of gross domestic capital formation in gross domestic product statistics.

[13] Strike data are obtained from the unpublished records of the Labour Relations Service of the Labour Department. Strike statistics published by the Labour Department excluded small scale or short-duration strikes "involving fewer than ten workers or lasting less than 1 day, unless the aggregate of working days lost exceeds 100." (Census and Statistics Department 1990, 30)

The models resulted in high R-square, particularly for the equation on strike frequency. This shows that market forces are important in accounting for variations in strike activity, strike frequency in particular. Thus Snyder's thesis concerning the effects of a poorly institutionalized environment on the relationship between market and strikes is not supported.

Workers are sensitive to market pressures even without institutionalized collective bargaining relationships with employers. Indeed, if the high coefficients of determination tell us anything about the linkage between market forces and strikes, it is that in Hong Kong's poorly institutionalized setting workers' propensity to strike is highly conditional upon market fluctuations, testifying to the validity of Shalev's argument. In Hong Kong, when workers know that there is an upward cycle in the economy through, for example, a general rise in real wages and more orders for their firms, they know that the time is right for a strike to advance their interests. For it is when their employers are most dependent on existing workers to meet order deadlines and have the most difficulty to find strike breakers or replacements. They know that their employers, in the middle of a boom, are more willing to concede to their demands. Conversely, when workers sense a depression, they will figure that the resistance from employers will be strongest, for the latter might simply fire them and hire a new batch of workers from the market. Strategic calculations like these largely contributed to the sensitivity of Hong Kong strike to the business cycle.

It turns out that real wage and price movements are the most significant predictors of strike activity in all the models. Real wage increases do contribute to a higher level of strikes, as expected by the resource mobilization perspective.[14] Ashenfelter and Johnson's relative deprivation theory does not seem to work in Hong Kong, as the positive sign of real wage changes contradicts its specification.

Nevertheless, deprivations are not altogether irrelevant, as the rate of change of prices resulted in the expected positive and significant sign. It seems that workers' perception of short-run deprivation (price inflation) does combine with their improved market position (increase in real wages after discounting for price inflation) to induce strike actions. Gross domestic capital formation is significant and has a positive relationship with strike frequency, which is also the aspect of strikes that is most sensitive to market forces.

In order to further explore the Snyder thesis regarding the efficacy of the organizational variable in explaining strikes as against that of market forces, union density is included as a regressor in our economic model. A lagged measure of union density (defined as total union membership divided by all

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[14] This model postulates that the effect of price and wage movements will affect strikes within the same year. This is because given the sensitivity of workers to market signals and the absence of collective bargaining, there is no reason to assume that workers will react to *last year's* market situations rather than this year's.

employed population) is used in order to avoid the simultaneous effect of strikes on union membership. Also reported in Table 1, union density is a significant and positive predictor of the number of strikes but not for the other two dependent variables. An interesting finding is that once union density is entered in the equation, the coefficient of price changes dropped by one-third.[15] This shows that at least part of the effects of price changes on strikes are due to the reaction of unionized workers to the threat of price inflation to their living standard. Therefore, an increase in deprivation and collective resources combine to produce more strikes in Hong Kong. Furthermore, the fact that union density is only significant at predicting strike frequency but not the other strike indices also illustrates the market-dependent nature of strikes in Hong Kong. Because of the weakness of unions in Hong Kong both numerically and organizationally, the organizational variable is a less powerful determinant of strikes than the economic variables.

Finally, we want to know whether there was really a qualitative shift in the level of strikes after 1982 (as shown in Figs. 1 and 2), independent of the short run variations in the economic variables and the linear time trend. We add a dummy variable, called PERIOD, with the value of 1 for 1983–1989 and 0 for all other years into the regression models in Table 1. The PERIOD coefficient is negative in all three equations predicting number of strikes, strikers, and days lost, confirming that the shift in strikes after 1982 cannot be explained solely by short-run changes in the economic variables. The significance of the "period effect," however, varies across different measures of strikes.[16] More importantly, the relationships among the economic variables are relatively stable with or without the PERIOD variable. This indicates the validity of the relationship between market forces and strikes even when the sharp turn in strike trends is taken into consideration.[17] Both PERIOD and union density, however, became statistically insignificant when they were included in the same model predicting number of strikers, suggesting that there might be collinearity between the two variables. Plotting both strike frequency and union density

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[15] The two-tailed level of significance of price changes changed from 0.02 to 0.08, while its Beta coefficient diminished from 0.3 to 0.2, for almost 35%.

[16] The beta coefficient for the PERIOD variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in the model predicting number of strikes, and at the 0.1 level in the number of strikers model. In the model predicting number of strikers, adding PERIOD causes the time trend model to be insignificant. In the model predicting days lost, both PERIOD and time trend are insignificant. Leaving out the time trend variable, however, yields a coefficient of PERIOD significant at the 0.05 level, suggesting there might be problem of collinearity between the two variables in the last two equations. Substantively, this means that the "period effect" is strongest on strike frequency, while in the case of strikers and days lost, the decline is more continuous and less abrupt.

[17] All economic variables that are statistically significant at least at the 0.01 level in the models in Table 1 have the same sign after PERIOD is included. Their levels of significance decline a little, since adding another variable compounded the collinearlity problem.

Fig. 3 Strike frequency and union membership controlled by employment, 1967–1989
Source: Unpublished Labour Department Records

against time also reveals an observable downward trend for both variables in
the 1980s (see Fig. 3). We shall return to this later.

The Long-Term Decline in Strike Activities

In view of the sensitivity of strikes to short-run fluctuations in the market, we
can also posit a linkage between market forces and the secular trend of decline
in strike activities evident in the 1980s. The culprit was a process of structural
transformation in the Hong Kong economy unleashed in the 1980s. There have
been three very important dimensions of the structural change: the slackening in
economic growth and investment, and de-industrialization. The trigger for the
overall deceleration of Hong Kong's economy was the drifting of the western
economies into recession. The weakness of the US economy in the 1980s, Hong
Kong's largest market, posed the biggest hindrance to the expansion of the local
economy. Increased competition from low-cost industrializing countries in the
region also added to Hong Kong's troubles.

In the 1980s, the hyper-growth record of the 1960s and 1970s was a matter of
history. In Fig. 4, the 3-year moving averages of growth in real GDP and
GDCF are charted, clearly showing a downward trend for both indicators.
Another dimension is the contraction of manufacturing. In the 1980s, the share
of manufacturing industries in both total employment and national product
declined relative to other sectors. The tertiary sector also overtook manufactur-
ing as the high-growth sector. Even in absolute terms, the number of workers
employed in manufacturing establishments was dwindling in the 1980s. Work-
ers engaged in private manufacturing establishments peaked in 1980 at 907,463
and then declined steadily to 791,519 in 1989, by 12.7%.

Fig. 4 Trends in the Hong Kong economy. 1979–1989 (3-year moving averages of growth rates)
Source: Census and Statistics Department, various years

The linkage between these structural changes and the "withering away" of strikes in the 1980s can be interpreted with the resource mobilization perspective.[18] Had the relative deprivation theories been correct in this instance, economic stagnation and uncertainties in working class lives would have created deprivations and other psychological strains, providing fertile soil for protests. For example, a trend toward greater inequality in the distribution of income has been observed. There was an increase of the Gini ratio from 0.43 in 1971 to 0.46 to 1986. The ratio of profits to employee compensation in national income statistics also showed a long-term increasing trend, indicating that employees' share of Hong Kong's total income fell steadily over the last decade (Turner et al. 1991, 16).

The decline in strike frequency can in fact be linked to the deterioration in the market bargaining power of workers against the backdrop of structural change. The stagnation of real wage growth was a vital sign of the decline in workers' market position despite official full employment. In the 1970s, annual growth in real wages for all employees averaged at 4.2%, despite the severe depression caused by the Oil Crisis. In the 1980s, real wage increased only 1.5% each year (see also Fig. 4). There were other signs of qualitative changes in the Hong Kong economy as well. While the average annual numbers of company liquidations and dissolutions were, respectively, 52.7 and 542.3 in the 1970s, they jumped up to 221.6 and 1767.4 in the 1980s (Registrar General, various years). Economic

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[18] This is in line with Shorter and Tilly's proposition on the different explanatory power of the perspectives on collective protest and the time-scale of the problem. They have argued that collective behavior theories will be more plausible in the short-run, while collective action explanations will be most effective in the medium to long-run (1974, 7).

instability inevitably affected the lives and experiences of workers. The growing insecurity of employment can be seen in the fact that the most common cause of industrial disputes other than strikes in the 1980s was a cluster of issues connected with employment security, including dismissals, redundancies, lay-offs, and claims against bankrupt employers (Turner et al. 1991, 71). The number of industrial disputes caused by company insolvency and closure shot up from 21 in 1981 to 59 in 1982. It increased further to 88 in 1983 and stayed over 80 per year afterward.[19]

The impact of the structural transformation was most acutely felt in the manufacturing sector. After three decades of rapid growth, manufacturing witnessed a real decline in the 1980s. This period witnessed the beginning of a trend of plant relocation to the South China region or neighboring Southeast Asian countries where labor power is many times cheaper than in Hong Kong. Consequently, many manufacturing firms in Hong Kong have either closed down their production facilitates or were planning to do so (Lui and Chiu 1993; Chiu et al. 1997). While de-industrialization accelerated rapidly in the 1990s, in the preceding decade, both the number of workers employed and number of firms had already dropped in absolute terms. Manufacturing employment dropped 11% in the 1980s, which means that over 100,000 workers had been forced out of this sector either by plant closure, retrenchment, or low wages.[20] De-industrialization thus led to massive disruption among workers. Although most displaced workers could normally find new jobs in other sectors, such disruptions generated a sense of deterioration in their market position among workers which had a dampening effect on strikes. Since manufacturing still employed the largest number of workers and had traditionally been the most strike-prone industry, the chronic sense of insecurity among manufacturing workers is the prime reason of the decline in overall strike activity.

Here, the drop in strikes beginning in the 1982–1983 period can be readily interpreted as a result of the ushering in of the period of stagnation.[21] In 1982, Hong Kong's export value suffered a decline in real terms, the first time after the Oil Crisis. This induced a sharp drop in real gross domestic fixed capital formation from HK$ 50,414 million in 1982 to HK$ 46,197 million in 1983 (Census and Statistics Department 1990, 115). At the same time, there was a slide in the exchange rate of the Hong Kong dollar, causing major financial

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[19] Data on industrial disputes are taken from unpublished records of Labour Department.

[20] The number of workers who actually had to change jobs from manufacturing to other sectors must be higher, since over the decade, a large number of immigrants from China entered manufacturing, filling up part of the vacancies left behind by the departure of local residents. See Ho et al. (1991).

[21] It should be noted that the plunge in strike activity actually started in the latter half of 1982. Out of 35 strikes occurred in 1982, about 29 happened in the first 8 months. 11 strikes broke out in July and August alone. In the last 4 months of 1982, therefore, only 6 strikes occurred (one, happened in December, was included by the Labour Department to the tally of 1983). This clearly showed that the impact of the economic crunch was beginning to be felt by workers during 1982.

chaos. The plummeting in business confidence was all the more apparent in manufacturing, when the number of manufacturing establishments, which had been increasing every year since the 1950s except in 1974, reduced from 47,089 in 1982 to 46,817 in 1983. While manufacturing employment still increased slightly in 1983, suggesting most of the workers affected by the plant closures were able to find jobs elsewhere, this also suggested unprecedented experience of insecurity among workers. As a consequence of the economic dislocations, real wages for lower level production workers dropped by 3.5% in 1983, a very rare experience for Hong Kong's workers except during the slump following the Oil Crisis.[22]

Nevertheless, one popular account of strikes in Hong Kong is that the link between the business cycle and strikes existed only up to the late 1970s (Turner et al. 1991, 70; England 1989, 222–3). It has been asserted that the link was severed in the 1980s, as revealed in the coexistence of low incidence of strikes with prosperity and a labor shortage. Instead, a political explanation was proposed regarding the dramatic decline in strike activity. The alleged key was in the change of the pro-China FTU's (Federation of Trade Unions) approach to industrial relations. It is argued that as a result of the reconciliation between the China and Britain, the FTU, the largest union federation, switched from supporting labor militancy to a more conciliatory approach toward the capitalist and colonial system in Hong Kong. Hence, a change in union strategy was attributed to be the cause of the secular decline of strikes in the 1980s.

This explanation is problematic, however, because it exaggerated the extent of the "support" and "guidance" given by the FTU to striking workers in the 1970s. As argued earlier, union involvement in strikes has generally been reactive rather than initiating. The political argument thus overestimates the presence of the FTU (and union organizations in general) in the workplace. It also overstates the willingness of the FTU to initiate strikes *in the 1970s*.[23] For example, the public utilities, which have been the stronghold of the FTU unions, had one of the lowest incidence of strikes in the 1970s (and the 1980s) (Chiu 1987). Within manufacturing, the most strike-prone industry, FTU membership was relatively insignificant. In cotton spinning, where a FTU affiliate had a more significant presence, there is also no evidence of the active FTU sponsorship in the series of strikes that broke out in the late 1970s.[24]

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[22] Both employment and real wage statistics are from Census and Statistics Department (1990). The real wage figures cited here differ from that of Fig. 1 in that they exclude supervisory, technical and clerical non-production workers.

[23] In interviews conducted by this author, non-FTU union activists recalled incidents in which the FTU cadres adopted a more conciliatory approach as early as in the mid-1970s. See also Leung (1994).

[24] The timing of the FTU's change in strategy in Turner et al.'s account does not concur to the ebb in strike activity. Their argument can be questioned on two accounts. Firstly, they mention that tensions had actually grown after the UK Prime Minister Thatcher's visit to Beijing in 1982, when she asserted the validity of the unequal treaties signed between China and Britain in the nineteenth century which provided only for the return of the leased

In fact, our regression analyses suggest an alternative interpretation of the linkage between unions and strikes. As mentioned, including union density in a model predicting strike frequency along with the PERIOD variable resulted in both variables becoming statistically insignificant, which means that they might be both accounting for the same portion of variance in strike frequency. Inspecting the graph plotting strike frequency and lagged union density indicates that both union density and number of strikes were substantially lower in the 1980s than in the 1970s. We can interpret this finding in two ways. On the one hand, the decline in strikes may be a result of the decline in union density in the 1980s. On the other hand, both the decline in strikes and union density could be construed as a result of the same underlying structural changes in the economy specified earlier. Without further analyses of the determinants of union density, we are in no position to arbitrate between these two positions. In any case, even if there is a link between unions and the decline of strikes in the 1980s, we can locate this link in the declining numerical strength of unions, rather than some apparent changes in union strategies from militancy to conciliation (see Fig. 3).

Furthermore, the inference of economic prosperity in the 1980s hardly squares with the reality of an overall slackening in economic growth. Unemployment rate, as argued above, is hardly a reliable indicator of prosperity, let alone workers' prosperity in Hong Kong. Although the official unemployment rate remained low[25], it did not necessary indicate an improvement in the market position of workers. Firstly, real wages continued to grow only slowly, refuting any claim that there was continual prosperity for workers in the 1980s. Secondly, employment statistics masked considerable variations within the labor force. Behind the mask of full employment, there was actually an accentuated internal segmentation of the working class. As Turner et al. (1991) remarks, we

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peninsular of 'New Territories' in 1997, instead of the whole colony of Hong Kong (which include New Territories, Kowloon and the island of Hong Kong). The Sino-British accord on the future of Hong Kong was reached in 1984 via the UK-PRC Joint Declaration, and in their words, it was after this exchange that "the FTU leadership effectively discouraged strikes, in the interest of HK's prosperity and stability." (Turner et al. 1991, 70) On the other hand, the sharp drop in strikes was already evident in 1983, or even the last quarter of 1982 (see note 21 and Fig. 1). Thus according to Turner et al. the FTU leadership discouraged strikes after the Joint Declaration of 1984, while the plummeting in strikes began in 1983. Secondly, as argued earlier, it should also be noted that the change in the attitude of the FTU was actually a gradual process culminating for almost a decade rather than a sudden reversal of tactics and objectives. For example, England reports that declarations 'in favor of negotiation rather than confrontation were made at the Federation's biennial General Meetings' from as early as 1980 (1989, 222). We can actually trace this change in attitude from the decline of extreme leftism in China marked by the Nixon visit to Beijing and the Shanghai Communique in 1973. The downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976 accelerated the process. Thus by the mid-1970s, there were already signs of a gradual moderation of the FTU's approach to industrial relations (see Leung and Chiu 1991, 54–5).

[25] There is a controversy between unions and the government over the reliability of the unemployment statistics and the validity of the picture of full employment.

can now more clearly distinguish a relatively privileged upper crust from the rest
of the labor force. Due to the different requirements of labor power in the rising
(service and finance) and the declining (manufacturing) sectors, there is a
certain rigidity of labor mobility across different sectors.[26] Thus in the expand-
ing sectors, employers complained about a severe shortage of labor, while in
contracting ones, workers had to endure underemployment and job insecurity.
Skill and education levels also divided the workers; the labor shortage applied
more to the more skilled and educated workers than to the majority of the
unskilled ones. Consequently, real wage growth for the mostly unskilled or
semi-skilled manufacturing workers lagged behind the overall wage trend.

   The differentiation of the market situation of the privileged and the under-
privileged members of the working class led to different market coping strate-
gies. For the latter, passivity seems to be the norm. Even when they engaged in
collective action, it was more likely to be directed toward protecting their jobs
and severance compensation, but not in the form of strikes. As most manufac-
turing employers are either contemplating relocation or have already decided to
do so, any work stoppages will only speed up the process, and should have no
effect in advancing workers' interests. This sense of insecurity thus deters any
plan to resort to strike actions. When workers are suffering from underemploy-
ment and worrying about whether their job will remain in the next month, they
would rather look for a new job in other sectors than to try to improve their lots
in the factory through strike. On the other hand, skilled and managerial work-
ers could more or less secure favorable rewards to their labor through market
means due to their scarce supply. For both the privileged and the underprivi-
leged working classes, the consequence of the labor market restructuring was a
drop in collective protests through striking.

   A stark illustration in the "disciplinary" effect of market forces can be found
in the inter-sectoral variations in strikes. In the 1970s, the majority of the strikes
broke out in the manufacturing and construction sectors, with relatively few
strikes in the services industries. In the 1980s, however, while strike frequencies
in all sectors had dropped, now the services industries had relatively more
strikes than in manufacturing.[27] It is no doubt that manufacturing workers,
worrying about losing their jobs, are hesitant in taking up the strike weapon,
while workers in sectors with burgeoning labor demand are relatively more
confident in resorting to collective actions. Union participation also dovetailed
with the sectoral differentiation in labor market conditions. Manufacturing
unions suffered major setbacks in its numerical strength in the 1980s, while
other growing or stable occupations like civil service, transportation, and the
professions had observable increase in rates of union participation (Levin and

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[26] The commercial and personal service sectors need young workers, while the financial sector
wants highly trained and educated ones. Manufacturing workers who are facing job insecurity
are normally middle-aged and less educated.

[27] Chiu (1987) has a detailed analysis of inter-industrial differentials in strike propensity.

Chiu 1994; Chiu and Levin 1995). Again this confirms my earlier remark that both unionization and strikes appeared to be shaped by market forces.

Thus in a market-dominated society such as Hong Kong, while the ebb and flow of strikes cannot be accounted for by the attitudes or strategies of a weak union federation, the impact of market forces is evident in the "withering away" of strikes in the 1980s.[28] In short, the depressed and unstable state of the economy and the labor market imposed a "disciplinary" effect on workers and sharply reduced their capacities and hence willingness to strike.

Comparatively, Hong Kong is similar to the case of the United States in which, as Shalev points out, the onset of economic crisis in the mid-1970s induced a sharp downward turn in strike activity. The trend subsequently continued almost without interruption even when the business cycle recovered. In one sense, the United States is closest to Hong Kong among advanced capitalist economies in that there are few institutional mediations of market forces (e.g. marginal position of labor in the polity and the concentration of organized labor in a few oligopolistic sectors). In Hong Kong as in the United States, there is a high susceptibility of strikes to the business cycle and qualitative shifts in the marketplace. Shalev's conclusion on the case of the United States seems to be equally applicable to Hong Kong: "The evidence to date is that economic decline has succeeded in significantly stilling worker militancy and throwing organized labor [in Hong Kong, unorganized labor as well] onto the defensive." (1983, 457)

Discussion

Making use of a unique case of almost pure market society, this paper has attempted to test various hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between market and strikes. Unencumbered by the complex interactions between the market and other institutional forces, we can discern in a most transparent way the direct impact of market relations on strikes in Hong Kong. In the absence of social and political institutions devoted to the mediation of market forces customarily found in other capitalist economies, workers in Hong Kong have been subjected to the sway of market forces. With extremely low level of institutionalization of employment relations as in Hong Kong, workers' strike activity is highly dependent on and sensitive to their changing market position. As we have seen, de-industrialization and downturns in the business cycle had a significant depressing effect on strikes. It should be stressed that, however, I am not dismissing the role of unions in individual strikes. Far from it, the role of

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[28] I am not suggesting here that organizational factors do not matter at all, but only that unions were too weak and demoralized after 1967 to override the pressures emanated from the market. If, however, we take a longer time perspective and compare the pattern the strikes before and after 1967, the influence of the collective organization of workers had been critical. See Chiu (1986) and Leung and Chiu (1991).

unions, where they are numerically stronger, are salient in a number of large scale strikes in the services industry.[29] What I am arguing is that on the whole unions played no direct part in the organization of the majority of strikes.

In general, propositions derived from the resource mobilization approach performed well in explaining both the short-run variations and secular trends in strike activity. As resource mobilization theories predict, cost-benefits calculations and expectations of success figured prominently in decisions to strikes (Klandermans and Tarrow 1988). Theories stressing the incidence of psychological stress are found to be complementary to the collective action perspectives in the short-run, when price inflation is likely to induce strikes.

In the case of explaining strike frequency, we also have reason to believe that union strength does combine with a tight labor market and the threat of price increases leading to more strikes. On the other hand, the deprivation theory fares badly in accounting for the long-run shift in pattern of strikes against theories stressing the balance of power between labor and capital as well as resources available to workers.

We should not confine ourselves, however, to the question of whether workers are reacting positively or negatively in their strike decisions to real wage changes or inflation. Taking the analysis a step further, I will round off my paper by addressing the question of why workers in Hong Kong are so *sensitive* to the business cycle and changes in their market position. I believe that the new social movement theories offer some useful pointers in this respect. One theoretical strand of new social movement theories highlights how structural changes in capitalist society lead to new forms of social movements – their values, action forms, and constituency (cf. Johnston et al. 1994). The changing locus of collective identities, for example, can shift the loci of social protests from the arena of production to consumption, from the political arena to the civil society, from class and nation to other, multifarious social contradictions previously marginalized. From this vantage point, if there has been the "colonization of life-worlds" by the spread of technocratic administrative rationality in advanced European societies, what we have seen in Hong Kong is the triumph of market rationality. Workers' sensitivity to market forces is thus only a manifestation of this market rationality.

This sensitivity, I will argue, reflects a culturally dominant instrumental orientation to work that is rooted in the structural and institutional constitution of the Hong Kong society and economy. While cost-benefit calculations might be universal, where market relations are mediated by the collective organization of the working class or state policies, institutional variables might mitigate or enlarge the labor–capital power differentials. This in turn induces fluctuations in levels of working class collective action by shaping the perceptions of the likelihood of success. In Hong Kong, however, the market reigns supreme;

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[29] Unions were, for example, instrumental in mobilizing for the recent strikes in China Motor Bus, a transport company, in 1990 and Cathy Pacific Airways in 1993.

workers have to confront the market directly. There is no minimum wage policy, no protection against unfair dismissal, and only meager unemployment benefits. In other words, the state has not offered much institutional sheltering against labor market fluctuations compared with other industrial countries.

Furthermore, as discussed above, unions became largely ineffective after the 1960s in offering protection to workers due to their small size, their organizational fragmentation, and their detachment from the shop floor. The Hong Kong labor market, especially in the manufacturing sector, has also not been conducive to the formation and maintenance of workplace solidarity. Most rank-and-file industrial workers are female, whose attachment to work is often secondary to their family obligations (Lui 1992, 112). Others argue that familism is a dominant normative orientation of Hong Kong workers, irrespective of sex (Lau 1982). A high rate of labor turnover is also inimical to the forging of strong cohesive workgroups on the shop floor. While survey data show that Hong Kong workers have a high level of awareness of socio-economic inequality, class does not form a salient basis for the formation of collective identity (Wong and Lui 1992).

The net result of the structural constitution of the Hong Kong economy is a high level of instrumentalism and materialism among workers, in the sense that "they emphasize material rewards and underplay the intrinsic qualities of work" (Lui 1992, 122; Lau and Kuan 1988). In other words, Hong Kong workers have a high level of instrumental commitment to their work (as a means to personal and familial advancement) but low moral commitment. These cultural values not only shaped workers' perceptions of work, but also their propensity to engage in collective actions over workplace issues.

Since the work orientation in Hong Kong is essentially instrumental and calculative, the impact of market forces on strike decisions can be readily comprehended. Strikes are perceived in terms of their consequences for personal advancement. Hong Kong workers are not therefore culturally predisposed to avoid strikes or other forms of conflicts, as some have argued, but when they do strike they need to be sure that it is to their advantage to do so.[30] As Levin (1990, 100) puts it, in practice, "they may be prepared to adopt both individual or collective means for protecting or advancing their status, depending on what seems to be the most effective strategy in the circumstances."

Labor market conditions have an overwhelming influence on the probability of strike success in Hong Kong since workers could rarely rely on unions, sympathetic strikes by workers in other firms, and the state to come to their assistance. As a corollary of instrumentalism and materialism, preference for job security is another salient value among Hong Kong workers (Turner et al. 1980; Ng and Levin 1981). Since the job and its earnings are so important to them, a strike that might result in the loss of their job is unpalatable.

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[30] As working class studies in western societies have shown, instrumentalism is not necessarily incompatible to collective actions. See Goldthorpe et al. 1968, Goldthorpe 1978, and Lui 1992.

A depressed economy therefore poses an insurmountable peril to most would-be strikers.

A buoyant labor market, rising real wages, and brisk product demands augment the bargaining power of labor vis-à-vis employers, remove psychological barriers to protest, and increase the strategic appeal of strikes. Conversely, slackening economic growth, decline in employer propensity to invest, stagnant real wage growth, and low job security foster passivity and tilt the balance of power decisive to the capital's favor. During the 1990s, labor organizations and popularly elected legislators have striven to widen the social regulation of the employment relationship, most notably in the form of a retirement benefits scheme. At the same time, the Hong Kong government has openly "requested" employers to restrain pay increases in order to combat the high rate of inflation. It has also acted on behalf of employers to approve the importation of foreign workers into selected sectors at a regulated wage. Unions naturally protested, and threatened to call a general strike.[31] But the opposition frizzled out when the general strike failed to materialize; unions could stage but a few petitions to the legislature and the colonial Governor. The scheme affected mainly less skilled workers whose market position had in fact been most depressed by the restructuring. They were simply too preoccupied with making ends meet and keeping their jobs to strike and their participation in union activities had been marginal.

Up to the mid-1990s and the reversion, the state was still trying to stay away from intervening in the labor market except via the training and retraining of workers; wages and job security remain a managerial prerogative. Not surprisingly strikes stayed at a relatively low level in the 1990s, testifying to the continual reign of the market on working class collective action in Hong Kong.[32] This relationship holds true even after the major economic depression triggered by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, as strikes continued to be insignificant as a response of workers to the turbulence in the labor market (Chiu and Levin 2003). Certainly I am not suggesting that workers in Hong Kong are completely incapable of responding to employment changes collectively, just that the institutional setting in Hong Kong has more or less preempted strikes as the primary form of workers' collective action. Instead, trade unions assumed more "social movement" like characters and have increasingly sought to work through the political channels in realizing their objectives (Chiu and Levin 2000a, 2000b).

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[31] See *Hong Kong Times* 17 Jan., 1992; *Ming Pao* 12 Jan., 1992 reproduced in *Labour Movement Monthly* (95, 2, 27). All in Chinese.

[32] The average annual number of strikes between 1991 and 1995 was 7.5. The number of strikes per 100,000 employees was around 0.3 per year, about the same as the late 1980s.

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Social Movement as Cognitive Praxis: The Case of the Student Movement and the Labor Movement in Hong Kong

Benjamin K.P. Leung

Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives

The study of social movements has until recently been concerned mainly with their causes, their course of development, and their demise. The major theoretical positions have been classified by Doug McAdam (1982) into three models: the classical model, the resource mobilization model, and the political process model. The theoretical advancement has proceeded from a focus on the social structural causes of social movements (classical model), to an emphasis on the resources and mobilization of challenger groups (resource mobilization model), culminating finally in an approach which perceives social movements as the end product of the confluence of political opportunities, the organizational strength of the challenger groups, and the cognitive liberation of the prospective movement participants (the political process model).

According to the classical model, social movements are triggered by frustrations and discontents with a malfunctioning social-political system; in short, social movements rise when the aggrieved population's tempers flare. This interpretation of movement participants and movement action as essentially non-rational was eclipsed by another theoretical orientation – the resource mobilization model – which analyses social movements as rational, planned, and calculated attempts to wrestle concessions from some established authority. The emphasis in this "rational" approach is on the challenger group's resources and capacity to mobilize resources in maneuvering against an established, often much stronger, opponent. In other words, the resource mobilization model sees a social movement as a challenger group's exercise of muscles to safeguard or advance its interests.

The political process model goes a step further. It brings in the context of political opportunities as incentives or disincentives for social movements. Movement leaders assess this context and give the signals to the prospective

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participants that the time is right for action. Thus, the political process model is explicating the point that it takes the "brain" to interpret the environment and send cognitive cues to the "muscles" for appropriate maneuvering.

What has been lacking is a focus on "sentiments" and "aspirations" which can be found by focusing on the subjective cognitive processes of activists. McAdam makes reference to "cognitive cues" in the context of the political environment. These cognitive cues may be as favorable or unfavorable for insurgent collective action. Justifying the importance of cognitive cues for the study of social movements, McAdam writes

> One of the central problematics of insurgency ... is whether favorable shifts in political opportunities will be defined as such by a large enough group of people to facilitate collective protest. Challengers experience shifting political conditions on a day-to-day basis as a set of 'meaningful' events communicating much about their prospects for successful collective action (1982, 48).

McAdam's cognitive cues are messages to guide the launching and planning of prospective collective political action. They are part and parcel of the political strategies which are the defining feature of the political process model. Eyerman and Jamieson's (1991) cognitive approach goes further in conceptualizing the cognitive aspects of social movements, as their following statements indicate:

> Social movements are --- best conceived --- as movements of collective creation that provide societies with ideas, identities, and even ideals. --- Our approach thus focuses upon the process of articulating a movement identity (cognitive praxis), on the actors taking part in this process (movement intellectuals), and on the contexts of articulation (political cultures and institutions) (Eyerman and Jamieson 1991, 4).

In perceiving social movements as collective creations of social identities and ideals in the contexts of political cultures and institutions, Eyerman and Jamieson reconceptualize social movements as innovative or revitalizing visionary processes. In this process, the movement participants, especially the movement intellectuals, often draw on national or cultural traditions to articulate new identities and ideals. This means that social movements cannot be understood solely as planned collective actions to confront an established authority to wrestle concessions and bring about changes. What inspires and motivates a social movement is not necessarily a favorable political opportunity. It can be a commitment to an idea or ideal, or a sentimental attachment to a cherished national or cultural value. In Weberian language, we can say that a social movement is not only rational goal-oriented action; it is often also rational value-oriented or even affectually oriented action. This provides a renewed focus on the importance of "sentiments" and "aspirations."

One main contribution of the cognitive approach is the thesis that our knowledge of what a social movement is about can be advanced by examining the movement within its historical and cultural context. Movement organizations and political opportunities remain crucial in determining the genesis and

development of social movements. But social movements are endeavors to realize collective aspirations or to uphold some cherished values and sentiments that are rooted in specific historical and cultural contexts. This context varies on the international level, constituting the basis for the comparative study of social movements in diverse society. As Eyerman and Jamieson observe in the US case, "social movements in the U.S. have been colored by a kind of religious and moral fervor that is largely absent in Europe, where the historical struggle between the "main class antagonists" has been central for the past as well as the contemporary movements" (1991, 37). Thus, the cognitive approach provides a valuable theoretical orientation in the study of the relation between social movements and their social-cultural contexts. It suggests the need and importance of theorizing social movements as the product of deep-rooted national traditions and prevailing social sentiments. It also highlights the fact that it is often such cultural values and social sentiments which give a social movement its character and content. The cultural content is the "script" of a collective drama; organizational resources and political opportunities are the stage props and facilities.

The present case study of the student and labor movements in Hong Kong is based on the insights I have derived above from Eyerman and Jamieson's cognitive approach. Social movements are conceptualized here in terms of their patterns of cognitive praxis – a term central to the cognitive approach – which refers to the process of articulating and putting into practice a collective vision or ideal. In examining the student movement and labor movement in Hong Kong, I will examine the input from historical and cultural contexts into their ideals as well as the truncation and demise of those ideals. While not attempting to dislodge the political process model, this comparative case study approach will demonstrate that a better understanding of social movements can be gained by viewing them as value-rational rather than instrumental-rational action.

The Study

The study of movement ideals not only helps explain the movements, but also gives valuable insight into the collective ethos of the community. This study of the student movement and labor movement as cognitive praxis has two objectives: the primary objective of investigating how historical and cultural contexts impact on social movements; and the secondary objective of showing how the movements' ideas and ideals reflect the major concerns and cherished values of society.

The student movement and the labor movement in this case study represent two very different social categories with divergent concerns and perspectives. On the whole, students in Hong Kong come from the upper classes and are not burdened with the problems of making a living or of negotiating for higher

wages and better working conditions. Free from mundane daily concerns, they at times could be more inclined to the pursuit of higher values and ideals, or as a cliché puts it, to be "the conscience of society." In contrast, workers can be expected to have relatively more pragmatic and parochial interests and perspectives focusing on work-related matters. These very different movements do, however, exist within the same larger historical and cultural context. It would strengthen my argument for impact of these contexts on social movements if I could identify common characteristics in the ideals of these two otherwise very different movements.

My study will cover the post Second World War period of 1946 to the late 1980s. The end of the War was immediately followed by the Civil War in China between the Guomindang (the Nationalist Party) and the Communist Party. The eventual victory of the Communists and the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 led to a large influx of refugees from the Mainland to Hong Kong. The attitude of these refugees as well as of the original inhabitants toward Hong Kong was ambivalent. They cherished it as a safe haven. Yet it was also a legacy, a monument of the transgression of Chinese territories by the western imperialist powers. Hence if the "don't rock the boat" refugee mentality was the main factor contributing to Hong Kong's stability, that mentality was also tinged with undercurrents of nationalism and anti-colonialism. For the Hong Kong Chinese, China under communism thus evoked ambivalent, contradictory feelings and sentiments. Most of them regarded communism with apprehension and even aversion, yet many also took pride in the New China with its bold stand against western capitalist imperialism.

This double ambivalence of the Hong Kong Chinese– toward the Colony as well as toward Communist China – has been a major underlying feature of the ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese. For most of Hong Kong's post Second World War history, and for most of the Hong Kong Chinese, that ambivalence has tilted in favor of the refugee, anti-Communist mentality. Yet the other side of the ambivalence – sentiments of nationalism and anti-colonialism – though so often eclipsed by Hong Kong's economic prosperity, also retained a mobilizing potential for collective action. For reasons stated above, before the 1997 return of Hong Kong to China, China remained the main factor fueling or dampening nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments and contingent collective actions in Hong Kong.

Major events and developments in China, and its relation with the West and in particular with Britain, constituted important cognitive cues for collective opposition actions in Hong Kong. Such cognitive cues, which have to be understood in the peculiar political and cultural contexts of Hong Kong, provide us with fresh insights into the genesis, development, and nature of the student movement and the labor movement in Hong Kong. To understand these movements as cognitive praxis is to comprehend how movement participants articulated these cognitive cues and put them into practice.

The Student Movement as Cognitive Praxis

The Awakening

The student movement in Hong Kong, which involved mainly university students, did not take off until the late 1960s. Commenting on the long period of student non-involvement in social and political activities since the founding of the first university in Hong Kong in 1912, a student leader wrote:

> (The students) had no sense of belonging to Hong Kong, and only adopted the attitude of an indifferent observer on events in China. --- A stagnant, totally uncritical and despondent atmosphere pervaded the whole university campus. Material satisfaction and degenerate personal honor and status were what the students looked for --- (Chuek 1978, 144).

The impetus of change came, not from within the student body, but from an incident that forced the Hong Kong people, colonizers and colonized alike, to rethink seriously the political status and political future of Hong Kong. This event was the 1967 riots, which lasted from May till the end of the year and were undoubtedly the most traumatic social-political disruptions in Hong Kong's post-war history. These riots were inspired by the Cultural Revolution in China, which was gathering momentum in early 1967. They began as two minor industrial disputes in April. The left-wing trade unions and communist sympathizers were quick to seize the opportunity to escalate the disputes into a territory-wide confrontation against the colonial government and capitalist enterprises in Hong Kong.

The 1967 disturbances with their strong nationalist flavor thus poignantly reminded the Hong Kong people of the uncertainty of Hong Kong's political future. They also awakened the university students from their habitual indifference and silence. At the height of the riots, for instance, the student publication of the University of Hong Kong, the Undergrad (13 July issue), published an article with the title "Has Hong Kong a Future?" This article, which was just one of many others of a similar nature appearing in student publications and public magazines, exemplified the first change of mood and concern among university students. "If we accept that it is we who have to decide our future," this article stated, "... we will have to strive to achieve more active participation in politics, we will have to campaign for the allegiance of our youth, ... we need to reform our educational system ..." At the end of the year, both as a retrospect to the causes of the riots and a prospect for what to do in the future, the Undergrad[1] (December issue) published an article entitled "The Riots, Public Opinions, and the Adoption of Chinese as an Official Language." The article represented one of the first attempts among university students to analyze the 1967 riots in terms of the national and cultural identity of the Hong Kong Chinese, and of the glaring inequality in the community and lack of

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[1] A later section in this paper provides a fuller account of these riots.

communication between the colonial government and the Chinese community. Thus, the seeds of student involvement in social-political issues were sown in the political overtones and nationalist sentiments of the 1967 riots.

The seeds came to their first fruition in February 1969, when the students of the University of Hong Kong started the University Reform Movement. Student participation in university administration was the theme of the Reform Movement, and though the students' gains were modest – the most important of which being student representation in the University's Senate Board – the Movement had far-reaching effects. Several months later, around fifty students, mostly from Hong Kong's two universities, staged a 2-day sit-in outside a post-secondary college, the Chu Hai College, in protest against the college authorities' dismissal of twelve students who had allegedly attacked the college authorities in student publications. While hardly a significant issue in terms of the number of participants and the duration of the protest, this was the first time university students took to the streets to protest about an issue not directly related to their own university; it was also the first time students of different academic institutions cooperated in protest action. A student movement was in the making.

The High Tide

Issues on campus and in the larger society continued to occupy the students, but the one issue which spurred the burgeoning student movement to its zenith and contoured its development up to the mid-1970s had no direct bearing on the welfare of the indigenous community. This was the claims from both the Chinese Government and the Japanese Government in 1970 to territorial right over the Tiao Yu Tai Islands.[2] Students in Hong Kong viewed the Japanese claim as a revival of Japanese militarism and this brought back memories of Japan's invasion of China during the Second World War. Nationalist sentiments soared among the Hong Kong students as they marched in protest against Japanese imperialism and in defense of the integrity of Chinese territory.

In some of these protest demonstrations, there were clashes between the students and the police in which the police resorted to brutal force against the student protesters. Scenes of students with blood running down their faces and of the police, often headed by British officers, raising their truncheons against the students, side-tracked the protesters' attention to what they now experienced and felt as repression in a colony. Nationalist feelings were already rampant in the Tiao Yu Tai Protest, and these now quickly encompassed

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[2] The Tiao Yu Tai Islands, located near the northeast coast of Taiwan, were originally part of the Taiwan Province, but were included in the Okinawa Territory under the mandate of the United States after the Second World War. When the US Government announced in 1970 its decision to return Okinawa, together with the Tiao Yu Tai Islands, to Japan in May 1972, the Chinese Government protested.

anti-colonialism. The Tiao Yu Tai issue faded by May 1972, but nationalist sentiments and their off-shoot anti-colonialism continued to fuel the student movement in the next few years.

The growth of these sentiments, and hence the development of the student movement, was contingent both on the march of events relating to China and on the students' ambivalence toward the existing regime in China. Events occurring on the international scene helped to foster the students' nationalist dispositions: China's readmission into the United Nations in 1971, President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, and China's table-tennis diplomacy in the early 1970s boosted its international status. These developments, in addition to the students' recent experience with colonial repression, contributed at least temporarily to an "ambivalence bias" in favor of pro-China sentiments.

To many of the most committed student activists of the time, Hong Kong's future lay in its reunion with China, and their job was to prepare the Chinese people of Hong Kong for this reunion through educating them about contemporary China. To equip themselves for this mission, university students organized and undertook "China Tours," and set up China Study Groups for university and post-secondary college students. For the first half of the 1970s, the student movement in Hong Kong had a strong nationalist pro-China flavor. Almost every issue of university student publications during that time contained some introduction to the socialist development in China or reports about happenings in China.

But there was also a group of university student activists who did not identify with the communist regime in China and were critical about China's policies. These students attacked the Pro-China students as blindly accepting and following China's directions. The student movement in its heyday was thus split between a Pro-China Faction and another faction labeled the Social Action Faction.[3] Following China's policy of peaceful co-existence with the western capitalist regimes, the Pro-China Faction by and large refrained from direct confrontation against the indigenous colonial authorities. They considered their main mission to be socialist education in preparation for reunion with the motherland. The Social Action Faction, on the other hand, took a broad view of nationalism which they did not consider to be necessarily coterminous with following the current regime in China. They expressed their nationalist sentiments in protest actions against the indigenous colonial order. While the two factions pursued their respective missions in the larger society, they also battled with each other on campus to gain control of the student union and student publications. The pro-China faction, however, remained the dominant force within the student movement in the first half of the 1970s. With the pro-socialist China students attempting to purge the allegedly renegade elements

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[3] In Chinese, this faction was called literally Social Faction or Society Faction. I have translated the title to Social Action Faction to reflect the group's orientation. This group was also sometimes referred to as the Liberal Democratic Faction.

within the student body, the student movement was to some extent a miniature copy of the concurrent Cultural Revolution in mainland China.

It was thus natural that the demise of the Cultural Revolution brought a drastic turn in the development of the student movement in Hong Kong. The death of Chairman Mao and the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976 dealt a fatal blow to the pro-China faction. In identifying with China's policies in the past few years, the Pro-China faction had quite naturally associated themselves with the policies of the then dominant political figures, and now the pro-China faction found to their surprise and embarrassment that those figures had fallen and were discredited within China. Many students came to think that those figures had unwittingly misled and misguided the student movement in the past. Disgraced and disoriented, and no longer able to justify themselves as leaders of the student movement, they receded from the scene. From 1976, if there was still a pro-China faction in the universities and post-secondary colleges, they kept a low profile in the political life of the students. But as they had been one of the main carriers of the student movement, with their retreat, the student movement lost much of its drive and momentum.

Lacking a well-defined long-term objective like that of the pro-China faction, the student movement now became issue-oriented. At the same time, the Social Action Faction gradually disintegrated. It had been, after all, a loosely organized group of students held together through their opposition to a rival faction. A number of social issues, the most important of which was the Golden Jubilee Secondary School Protest Issue of 1978, sustained the momentum of the student movement for a few more years.[4] But from the beginning of the 1980s, the student movement remained low-key and inconspicuous. Its glorious days were over.

The Eclipse

The 1980s were a time of important changes in Hong Kong. Margaret Thatcher's visit to Beijing in September 1982 and the ensuing Sino-British negotiations turned the attention of the Hong Kong people to the issue of Hong Kong's future. The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, which confirmed the sovereignty of China over Hong Kong after 1997, ushered in a number of major developments bearing on Hong Kong's future. The preparation for self-government by the Hong Kong people became the predominant concern of the local community. Various social groups in Hong Kong actively expressed their different, often conflicting views about what sort of government would be most appropriate for the post-1997 Hong Kong. The drafting of the Basic Law (which began in 1985 and took almost 5 years to complete) for the

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[4] Some examples are the Anti-Corruption Campaign of 1973, the Anti-Inflation Campaign of 1973-4, and the protest against the Queen's visit, 1975.

future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region similarly provoked contro-
versies and heated arguments both within the indigenous community, and
between segments of the local population and the Chinese government. Then
there came the historic 1989 student protests and pro-democracy movement in
China. An estimated two million Hong Kong people took part in March
demonstrations in support of the ongoing protest movements on the Mainland.
In the aftermath, a pro-democracy movement emerged in Hong Kong with the
objectives of providing continuing support to the pro-democracy activists in
China and furthering democracy in Hong Kong. Indeed the momentous events
of the 1980s would lead one to expect a resurgence of the student movement in
Hong Kong.

This did not occur. Throughout the 1980s, student activists continued to play
an active role in social and political issues, but the student movement per se was
insignificant. This insignificance has to be understood not so much in terms of
the organizational strength or the ideological commitment of students as in the
socio-political context of Hong Kong at the time. The aforementioned devel-
opments in the 1980s had politicized the entire society. Commenting on this
phenomenon, Louie writes

> The traditionally apathetic Hong Kong people suddenly became very sensitive and
> alert to politics. A wide spectrum of views and opinions surged. --- New organizations
> were formed with the clear objective of contributing to the preparation of the territory's
> future. --- These organizations were collectively called, by the media as well as by
> themselves, 'groups of political commentary'. --- The 'groups of political commentary'
> soon gave way to 'groups of political participation' (Louie 1991, 58–59).

Concurrent with this social politicization was an upsurge of interest among the
Hong Kong Chinese in nascent developments in China – an interest generated
by China's economic reforms and open-door policy since 1976. The Hong Kong
Chinese acquired substantial knowledge of their motherland as many of them
went to the Mainland on sightseeing tours and as the mass media in Hong Kong
increased their coverage of events in China. This and the rapidly expanding role
of newly formed political groups in indigenous social-political matters meant
that the students had lost their pioneering and leading role of the 1970s. On the
one hand, their function as the educator on socialist development in China had
now become obsolete and superfluous. On the other, their role in local issues
had been gradually eclipsed and superseded by the mushrooming political
organizations. To the extent that a social movement is identified by its distinc-
tive ideal and the attendant collective action, the student movement's identity
was submerged in the sea-change that was sweeping the community in the
1980s. In this respect, a former student leader comments with insight on the
eclipse of the student movement:

> The large-scale exhibitions, talks and other activities organized by the students in the
> 1970s to introduce happenings in China have now lost much of their significance and
> value ---.

In the major social actions before 1997, the student body played only a sub-ordinate role in the joint efforts of various pressure groups. The hard truth is "the student body is now no more than just a target for mobilization by other activist groups" (Chan 1987). In the 1980s, in Eyerman and Jamieson's terms, the student movement had lost its "cognitive territory" to larger, stronger activist forces.

The Labor Movement as Cognitive Praxis

A Historical Profile

Union membership is an indicator of the numerical strength of the labor movement. The level of strikes is a reflection of the willingness and capacity of workers to act collectively to confront and wrestle concessions from management. Strikes are therefore an expression of the unity and political strength of working people, and of their determination to defend and advance their interests and rights. For this reason, strikes are the single most important indication of the strength and nature of the labor movement.

To indicate the level of union membership, I use the figure for trade union density (i.e. union membership as a percentage of total employees) rather than the absolute number of union members. The number of union members may rise and fall with the expansion and contraction of the labor force. Union density, in taking into account the changing size of the work force, is hence a more reliable indicator of the strength of the labor movement relative to an existing work force. The level of strikes, however, is more difficult to measure. It can be gauged by the number of strikes, the duration of strikes (in number of days), or the number of participants in strikes. A composite index, which takes into account all these measures, is the number of working days lost, calculated as follows:

$$Number\ of\ working\ days\ lost = Number\ of\ strikes \times Duration\ of\ strikes \times Number$$
$$of\ strikers\ (in\ a\ particular\ period)$$

As in the case of union density, the level of strikes will be expressed as number of working days lost per 1,000 workers.

We can construct the following periodization of the labor movement in Hong Kong[5]:

Several features emerge from the analysis so far. First, it is only in the period 1946–1950 that union growth coincided with high industrial conflict. The

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[5] This periodization is based on Joe England's (1979, 82–83). I have modified and updated the classification for the present discussion.

second period of union growth, 1970–1976, was a period of low industrial conflict. This suggests that in the Hong Kong case, union growth is not necessarily conducive to the workers' propensity to strike. This also suggests that we need to look for different explanations for the two aspects – trade unionism and industrial strikes – of the labor movement in Hong Kong.

The last observation is buttressed by the anomaly of 1967, the year of the highest industrial conflict in Hong Kong's post-war history, and yet also a year falling in a period of union stagnation. Then there are the periods of "coincidence or consistency" between union stagnation and low industrial conflict: 1951–1966 and 1978–1989.

In the following sections, I shall examine these features and the trend of the labor movement from the perspective of the cognitive approach. My intention is not to present a comprehensive explanation, but rather to highlight the contributions which the cognitive approach can make to our understanding of the Hong Kong case.

1946–1950: Union Growth and High Industrial Conflict

The background of the labor movement in the immediate post-war years and indeed in subsequent years was described by Joe England in his seminal work (1989) on industrial relations in Hong Kong:

> . . .a by-product of the Japanese occupation (of Hong Kong) was the emergence of a strong Communist influence in immediate post-war Hong Kong . . . The chief anti-Japanese guerrilla force in Guangdong province during the occupation was a Communist-dominated band . . . Many people from Hong Kong slipped out of the colony to join these guerrillas and a number in time became convinced Communists. . . . (By the end of the war), many returned to Hong Kong and it was these men, dedicated and battle-hardened, who formed the solid core of Hong Kong's Communists in the post-war years. They began to organize the workers.(England 1989, 109–110).

There were other factors contributing to union growth, but the above is undoubtedly of the most long-lasting significance in Hong Kong's post-war trade union movement. The civil war in China and the advancing success of the Communists consolidated and expanded the group of Communist sympathizers in Hong Kong, culminating in the founding of the pro-Communist Federation of Trade Unions in 1947. At the same time, the anti-Communist, pro-Guomindang forces were mobilizing support in the Colony for their cause. They founded in 1948 the pro-Guomindang Trade Union Council. The competition of these two rival factions for support and membership led to an upsurge of trade unionism. But in respect of strikes, a substantial number was instigated and organized by the left-wing unions, who apparently intended to match the success of the Communists on the Mainland with a similar success in the Colony. The Commissioner of Labor at the time described these strikes as "labor disputes where politics dominates economics" (Annual Report ending 31 March 1950, 50) and stated that many of the behind-the-scenes advisers in these

strikes "were suspected to have been in close touch as to policy with labor bodies in Canton and on the Chinese mainland generally"(Annual Report 1950, 49). From the beginning of the post-war period, the labor movements' political orientations were shaped by developments in China and union rivalries in Hong Kong. It was natural that the tide of union activism in Hong Kong subsided when China entered into a new phase of development after the turmoil of civil war and revolution.

1951–1966: Union Stagnation and Industrial Peace

This period began in the aftermath of Britain's recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1950 and in the context of a tacit understanding between Britain and China over the status of Hong Kong. It ended at the dawn of the Cultural Revolution. In this decade and a half, the left-wing unions by and large refrained from direct involvement in industrial disputes. England (1979) attributes this to the left-wing unions' "desire to maintain the economic stability of Hong Kong from which China derived a substantial proportion of her foreign exchange" (1979, 30). In addition, it was also a time when refugees continued to flood into Hong Kong from across the border. The "don't rock the boat" refugee mentality was the prevailing climate. The larger objectives of the two rival union factions – the objectives of building a favorable image and consolidating their influence in the community – disposed them to act in consonance with the prevailing mood of the populace. Thus both sides concentrated on providing welfare benefits for union members and, when the opportunity arose, attacked the industrial action of the rival faction as irresponsible and detrimental to the interests of the community. As an illustration, the rhetoric of the two factions in the 1954 strike of left-wing tramway workers is illuminating. The right-wing unions launched their attack:

> ... We know well that in calling a strike, these people are trying to safeguard the position of a few so-called union leaders and not serving the interests of workers.... We are determined to stand firm in our dedication to lead the just and free Tramway workers to perform their duties responsibly. We will not take part in any action that for selfish motives would jeopardize the workers' employment (Wah Kiu yat Po, 10 October 1954 issue).

The left-wing unions responded in a press report: "In the interests of the public, tramway workers have decided to resume work from today" (Man Wui Po, 11 October 1954 issue)

In a situation where the two factions which dominated and controlled the labor movement were pre-occupied with mutual denigration and were apparently guided more by partisan political orientations than by a commitment to safeguard the workers' interests against management, the workers understandably became cynical of trade unionism and recoiled from union activities. But the Cultural Revolution was soon to provoke many of them into an outburst of

nationalist sentiments in the many industrial strikes and terrorist acts that made 1967 the most traumatic year in Hong Kong's post-war history.

1967: The Colony in Conflict

In terms of its impact on industrial relations in Hong Kong, the Cultural Revolution is reminiscent of the Communist Revolution of the late 1940s. They both infused labor disputes with a nationalist anti-colonial orientation. It seems that revolutionary fervor on the Mainland inevitably had its repercussions on the colonial capitalist enclave just across the border. The initial episodes – two minor labor disputes in April – of the 1967 disturbances already bore the imprint of that fervor. John Cooper's description of the reaction of the strikers on their arrest by the police provides some evidence:

> As they were led away to police vehicles the arrested men hurled abuse, shouted communist slogans, and a few of their number banished aloft copies of Mao Tse-tung's quotations (Cooper 1970).[6]

The intervention of the police readily transformed the industrial disputes into a political confrontation against the colonial government and its alleged ally, capitalist management. Originating as a dispute between labor and management, the conflict now rapidly escalated into a territory-wide nationalist anti-colonial struggle. In May, the Federation of Trade Unions and several other left-wing organizations established two struggle committees (the All Trades Struggle Committee and the All Circles Struggle Committee) to "struggle against Hong Kong British persecution, to strengthen unity, ... to denounce Hong Kong British bloody atrocity ... " (Ta Kung Po, 13 May 1967 issue). The formation of struggle committees was soon followed by a wave of some 18 short strikes in the last week of May. By the beginning of June, a left-wing press in Hong Kong was proclaiming "a widespread mass movement to oppose national oppression and defend national honor" (Man Wui Po, 6 June 1967 issue). Meanwhile, encouragement came from China in the form of an important editorial in the Mainland Chinese *People's Daily* (3 June 1967 issue) which called upon the Hong Kong compatriots to form a broad revolutionary front and be "ready at any time to respond to the call of the motherland and smash the reactionary rule of British imperialism."

The struggle continued with three territory-wide coordinated strike actions launched by left-wing trade unions in June. At the height of the struggle, the New China News Agency in Hong Kong proclaimed a total of 500,000 industrial workers on strike, and asserted that "politically, the arrogance of British colonial rulers in Hong Kong has been deflated and their real nature, that of a

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[6] Reported in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3971 (30 June 1967, 22).

paper tiger, has been completely exposed."[7] These large-scale strike efforts were followed by a number of sporadic strikes in July. By late July, the period of unrest in which industrial action played a prominent role came to a close. Thereafter, the leftists resorted to terrorism and bomb attacks, which increasingly alienated the local community from the pro-Communist groups. The turmoil finally faded by the end of the year amidst signs of improvement in Sino-British relations.[8]

1968–1990: Industrial Peace

The level of strikes dropped drastically in the aftermath of the 1967 disturbances. The declining trend continued with minor fluctuations through the rest of the period. Union membership as reflected in union density, however, exhibited a less consistent trend. It started an upward climb in 1970, but after reaching a zenith in 1976, reversed in a downhill direction. Once again these ups and downs of the labor movement bore a close relationship to major developments in China. China's advancement in international respectability and status, as evidenced by the US relaxation of travel and trading restrictions with China in 1969, the resumption of full ambassadorial meetings between the United States and China in 1970, China's entry into the United Nations in 1971, and President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, boosted the image and standing of the left-wing trade unions in Hong Kong. Union growth in these few years owed much to the increase in left-wing union membership. As an illuminating aside, it is worth mentioning that this union growth coincided with the economic recession of 1974 and 1975, which is one of the worst recessions in Hong Kong's post-war economy.[9] That the level of industrial conflict remained low in these years is a testimony to the fact that in Hong Kong, factors other than union strength and economic hardship were more significant in shaping industrial relations and the direction of the labor movement. Explaining industrial peace in these 2 years, Joe England observed:

> The left-wing unions as 'transmission belts between the party and the masses' were under instruction from the mainland to maintain a stabilizing influence rather than to protest at workers being made the victims of a capitalist crisis (1979, 95)

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[7] Reported in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3969 (28 June 1967, 18).

[8] Historian John D. Young wrote: "... it became apparent that by the fall of 1967, the Cultural Revolution leaders were intent on going back to a more peaceful relationship with China's neighbors ..." "By late September, ... China had already ceased its contribution to the strike fund ..... In early October, the annual contract between China and Hong Kong for the sale of water was renewed...." (Young 1981, 168).

[9] The annual growth rate of real gross domestic products, which stood at 14% in 1973, dropped to a record low of around 2.5% in 1974 and 1975. Unemployment also rose to very high levels in these recession years. The index of real average daily wages for industrial workers, which stood at 159 in 1973, fell to 141 and 137 in 1974 and 1975 respectively.

The death of Mao Zedong and the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, however, had a disruptive impact on left-wing union growth as they had on the Pro-China Faction of the student movement. Membership in left-wing unions, for instance, dropped from 228,313 in 1979 to 169,647 in 1981, and 168,550 in 1987. This contributed to the fall in union density in the overall industrial work force. At the same time, China's economic reforms and open-door policy from the late 1970s, and the concomitant expanding capital investments from Hong Kong in China, increased Hong Kong's economic value to China. Indigenous developments in the 1980s in light of Hong Kong's post-1997 status also brought about a profound change in the orientations and policies of the trade unions in Hong Kong. The pro-Taiwan Trade Union Council and its affiliates now realized that to continue in their antagonism against the pro-China Federation of Trade Union would be fighting a lost battle. Union rivalry, in any case, was not congenial with the prevailing concern of the labor community, which was co-operative preparation for the historic transition in 1997. The emerging stance of the labor movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s is well represented in a statement from the chairman of the FTU at its 1988 General Meeting:

> We are willing to foster closer unity and co-operation with all workers, trade unions, labor organizations, and people from other strata of the society and make common contributions to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.[10]

It is evident that with the politicization of the society in the 1980s, the working class was becoming increasingly concerned with defending and advancing its interests in juxtaposition to the claims of other social groups. Trade unions of different political persuasions were aware of the importance for labor to establish a political niche for themselves in the future Special Administration Region. The labor movement faced new challenges in the 1990s up to the 1997 reversion, as its factions attempted to resolve their differences in order to strengthen the position of the working class, and as its leaders tried to maintain the balance between China's interests and the interests of labor in Hong Kong.

Conclusion

My theoretical focus in this paper has been on the cognitive dimension of social movements. I have opted for this cognitive approach because most previous theories of social movements, including the influential resource mobilization theory and political process model, were by and large explanations of "how social movements come about," and not so much explanations of "what social movements are about." The theoretical interest, in short, has been on the "mechanics" rather than the "meaning" of social movements. Such a theoretical

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[10] Quoted in Joe England 1989, 13.

orientation assumes either that people will rebel when they are dissatisfied with an existing social-political order (the classical model), or that they will strike when they think their chances of winning are high (the resource mobilization model and the political process model). What these theories tend to overlook is the possibility that social movements could be sparked off and sustained by sentiments unlike the rebel's anger or the strategist's rational calculation.

These sentiments may be rooted in the larger contexts – in a people's collective history, and in events and developments that evoke memories of that history or that impact on the collective consciousness. To understand social movements, one therefore has to take into account the larger contexts of culture, history, and major ongoing developments. In my above descriptive accounts of the student movement and the labor movement, I have tried to show that these movements to a large extent derived their ideas, values, and identities from these larger contexts. I have also tried to demonstrate how these movements changed in nature and significance upon changes in the larger contexts. In both movements, the participants articulated from major ongoing events a meaning which then became the orientation or the ideal of the movement for a period of time. The two movements developed and changed as new meanings were articulated from current events. It is my contention that such changes in the cognitive praxis of the two movements provide the key to understanding their development. For, as Eyerman and Jamieson write

> Social movements express shifts in the consciousness of actors as they are articulated . . . in historically situated political and cultural contexts (1991, 4).

My study also shows that China has been the main source of meanings or cognitive cues for the two social movements in question. This substantiates a point I made in the introductory section about the ambivalence of the Hong Kong Chinese toward the Colony and toward the People's Republic of China. Thus when revolutionary, anti-imperialist, and nationalist sentiments soared in China, Hong Kong's colonial status came to the fore in the collective consciousness of the Hong Kong Chinese and triggered off collective actions with a strong nationalist anti-colonial fervor. In this sense, the student movement of the early 1970s and the labor movement of the late 1940s and in 1967 were miniature cognitive praxis of the revolution in the motherland. But the other side of the ambivalence also gave rise to a faction within both movements which was opposed to the Pro-China Faction. If the rivalry between the two factions characterized the student movement in its heyday, it remained the dominant feature of the labor movement until the late 1980s. In both movements, the Pro-China Faction suffered a major set-back when the Cultural Revolution came to its ignominious end in 1976. When China embarked on a new path of development in 1977, so did the student movement and the labor movement in Hong Kong. When the rhetoric of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism faded in China, it also subsided in the two movements in Hong Kong. These are the common denominators between the student movement and the labor

movements. They reflect, I think, an important aspect of the collective consciousness of the Hong Kong Chinese.

In the 1980s, that collective consciousness was pre-occupied with the issue of 1997. As the Hong Kong Chinese prepared themselves for self-government, the labor movement was carving out for itself a new cognitive territory – the ideal of uniting labor into a solidary political force. The student movement, however, was unable to find its identity when its cognitive territory was taken over by more powerful forces and movements. The student leaders were there; the student organizations were there; and student activism continued. But lacking a unique cognitive territory, the student movement was hardly at all recognizable. This last testimony to the importance of conceptualizing social movement as cognitive praxis also brings my discussion to its conclusion.

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The Development of Post-Modernist Social Movements in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Alvin Y. So

When Hong Kong was handed over to mainland China in 1997, its status changed from British colony to Chinese Special Administrative District. With this regime change, a surprisingly strong new post-modernist mode of social movement has emerged with distinct characteristics. Compared to previous forms of mobilization, this new type of movement relies more on media and social networks supported by information technology (Chan 2005, 1). It exhibits post-modernist qualities in its goals, participants, organization, strategies, and patterns of mobilization. This paper argues that the July 1, 2003 protest, the largest indigenous social movement in Hong Kong history, and subsequent movements illustrate these post-modernist qualities and explain the conditions for their emergence.

In the political transition from British colonial rule to Chinese Special Administrative Region (SAR) during 1984–1997, the predominant form of social movement in Hong Kong was the democracy movement, focusing on the rate and the scope of democratization. This is because before the 1997 handover, there was deep anxiety in Hong Kong society that the mainland communist state would intrude into Hong Kong affairs. Democracy movement was therefore being seen as an effective means to build up a highly autonomous Hong Kong to safeguard its own interests and lifestyle. In this regard, most of the pre-1997 conflicts were around such issues as the direct election of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR, the number of seats in the Legislative Council that should be directly elected, and the setting up of the Bill of Rights and the Court of Final Appeal. The Democratic Party was riding high on this democratic, anti-mainland sentiment and had become the most powerful party in the Legislative Council during the last phase of the colonial era.

However, the pattern of social conflict suddenly shifted from political to economic after the handover between 1997 and 2003. The shift occurred

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because the mainland Chinese state generally upheld the principle of "One Country, Two Systems" and avoided interfering into the Hong Kong SARS affairs before 2003. Subsequently, when the anxiety of mainland intrusion faded away, the Democratic Party lost its main cause and experienced a decline in importance in electoral politics. On the other hand, a new kind of economic conflict rose to the forefront right after the 1997 transition. During the late 1990s, Hong Kong people were worried about the worsening of their economy, the growing size of their state budget deficits, rising taxes, increasing unemployment, falling stocking and real estate prices, etc.

The Asian financial crisis arrived in Hong Kong in 1997 right after it became a Chinese Special Administrative Region (SAR). As Francis Lui (2002, 242–256) reported, stock prices plummeted by as much as 60% from the peak in July 1997 to the bottom in August 1998. The property market was also in deep trouble. The sharp decline in real estate value exceeded the 50% mark in many instances, effectively causing investors to revise their long-held belief that the property value in Hong Kong could only appreciate upward. On the income side, the real-term GDP per capita went down by 7.8% in 1998, a negative growth phenomenon almost unknown to Hong Kong, which had never experienced a year of declining GDP in its recent history.

During this economic recession, the negative impacts of industrial restructuring (from labor-intensive industry to service industry) and industrial relocation (from Hong Kong to the Pearl River Delta in South China) were brought to the forefront, as Hong Kong experienced its highest unemployment rate of 7.8% in decades. Suddenly, the labor market had become very tight and there was a closing up of job opportunities. The number of unemployed rose drastically from 71,200 in 1997 to a record-high figure of 275,800 in July 2002. In the garment industries, for instance, the number of factories dropped from 3,000 in 1997 to only 1,500 in 2002, a drop of 50% (Hong Kong Catholic Commission for Labour Affairs 2003, 6–7).

Middle-aged manual workers were hit the hardest, as their factories had moved out of Hong Kong and they were too old to be retrained to work in the service sector or in the high-tech industries. Instead of boasting about their vacations in other Asian cities or the decoration of their homes, HongKonger's main concerns in this period were how to find a job and keep it, how to cover their children's tuition, and how to payoff credit card debts, rents, and mortgages on time. There was an expansion of the number of people that were bankrupt, homeless, unemployed, or on welfare. Social inequality was increasing, as the poor were getting poorer in terms of income distribution.

What is new in the post-1997 era is that unemployment and job insecurity has also expanded to the middle-class sector, including white-collar office workers, civil servants, managers, and professionals. They too are facing the threat of losing their jobs, cutting back their salaries and fringe benefits, and reducing their promotion prospects in the midst of downsizing the government and corporate restructuring. Many middle-class managers and professionals have

become "new poor," as the property bust turned them into negative asset holders, wiping out their life-long savings (Lee 1999, 236–237).

The situation facing the PCCW (telecommunications company) workers in 2002 aptly illustrates the plight of Hong Kong workers after the handover. On November 19, 2002, it was announced that PCCW workers would face pay cut of at least 10% in the latest move by the telecom giant to reduce costs. The plan was outlined to 3,000 staff following the announcement that a new subsidiary would be formed next year to take over support and management work. Under the plan, 75% of workers would have to take a pay cut of at least 10% if they wanted to join the new company, Cascade Limited. Unionists claimed that there would be a cut of 20% for some of these workers. Those who rejected it would be laid off in January. Then, a day later PCCW suddenly made another announcement to fire 529 staff, concluding a massive lay-off program that cost almost 1,900 jobs over the previous 12 months. "We are shocked," said PCCW staff association chairman Terry Ip, "Just yesterday they founded a new company and promised a good future, but today they slashed 500-plus staff" (South China Morning Post Nov. 21, 2002, 1).

The Hong Kong state quickly followed suit and implemented public sector reform to trim down the size, to cut cost, and to increase the productivity of the civil servants. The growing budget deficit in the early 2000s provided the Hong Kong SAR state a strong rationale to carry out such reforms as restructuring, consolidation, subcontracting, and privatization, especially under the slogan of enhancing the competitiveness of the Hong Kong state and economy in the global market.

The "Hong Kong Dream" thus was shattered in the post-1997 era. Hong-Kongers began to doubt the belief that Hong Kong was full of opportunity, because no matter how hard they worked they still could not avoid experiencing downward mobility. There was a decline of HongKonger identity too, as they had nothing to be proud of in being a HongKonger in this depressing situation. Instead, a deep-rooted anxiety emerged in Hong Kong society, worrying whether Hong Kong would be out-competed by Shanghai and Singapore, whether Hong Kong could find a way to get out of the economic recession, and whether Hong Kong would lose its global city status in the near future.

What makes the post-1997 situation worse than before is that a legitimation crisis of the state was superimposed onto this economic recession. Although the colonial state had experienced a crisis of legitimacy because of its lack of determination to push for democratic reforms (Scott 1989), the colonial civil bureaucracy generally enjoyed a high reputation for efficiency and integrity before 1997. However, Anthony Cheung (2002, 166–189) points out that after the handover the Hong Kong SAR bureaucracy quickly lost its legitimacy.

First, there was the incompetence and the scandals of some civil servants as revealed in the chaos of handling the "bird flu" in December 1997, the disorder during the opening of the new Chek Lap Kok international airport in July 1998, and the "short piling" scandals in public housing construction in July 2000. Agnes Ku (2002, 343–362) shows how the myth of administrative capacity of

the Hong Kong state has become so badly shaken since the handover that the once highly praised civil service is now re-characterized and even publicly taunted as incompetent, arrogant, inefficient, unresponsive to popular sentiments, and lacking real public accountability.

Second, SAR Chief Executive C.H. Tung, as Hong Kong's first home-groomed leader, took personal blame for the poor performance of his administration. While a decent and honest person, Tung's own dubious democratic legitimacy as the non-popularly elected SAR leader was further weakened by his overtly pro-Beijing slant on sensitive political matters and very narrow, pro-big business sympathies on domestic socio-economic policies. When people demanded decisive leadership during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, Tung failed to take charge decisively and did not respond with effective counter measure to relieve the suffering populace, especially the grassroots.

Third, the Tung government was plagued by its wavering on key public policies. For example, the Tung government first promised to offer 85,000 units of public housing annually in order to solve the problem of housing shortages, but it quietly withdrew such policy without letting the Hong Kong public know about it. Then it declared to slow down the selling of public housing units in order to revive the depressing private housing market. The government then further revealed that it had no intention to continue the construction of public housing units. After the public housing policy was shifted back-and-forth several times, Hong Kong society began to lose trust of the government because it was hard to tell what exactly the government's stand was on critical issues.

Damaging scandals, the lack of strong leadership, and the wavering on key policies had greatly weakened the Hong Kong state. Instead of providing an effective organization to bring Hong Kong out of recession, the Hong Kong state itself had become part of the problem.

Furthermore, since the Hong Kong state had been dominated by neo-classical economists, its plan to rebuild Hong Kong consisted mostly of cutting expenditures (like the cut on welfare and education), increasing the productivity of civil servants, increasing revenue through raising the prices of social services (like on medical care), privatizing public utilities companies like the MTR (public transportation), subcontracting social services, etc. These economic policies may save costs and cut expenses, but how they would affect the social well being of the HongKonger and the social cohesion of Hong Kong society was seldom taken into consideration.

In order to provide a justification for the cut in budget or a policy of exclusion, the Hong Kong state put a negative label onto the group that is affected by the policy. For example, CSSA (Comprehensive Social Security Assistance) recipients were said to have abused the system so their social security benefits should be cut in order to push lazy people into the job market. Civil servants were said to be over-spoiled and it was time for them to work as hard as their counterpart in the private sector. Secondary school teachers were said to be outmoded in their knowledge, so they needed to take an English test

to prove their worth. New working-class immigrants were said to have created a heavy burden on Hong Kong's welfare system, and their immigrant quota should be cut in order to make room for professional immigrants who could take up high-tech jobs. As a result, whenever a budget-cutting or exclusive policy has come into being, a new negative group was singled out to be condemned in the Hong Kong society. Needless to stress, this strategy of negative labeling was highly detrimental to social cohesion and social solidarity, for it had created a new politics of resentment through which one social group after another became a scapegoat to take turn being blamed for causing the problems of Hong Kong.

Economic recession, downward mobility, social polarization, anxiety about Hong Kong's future, the de-legitimation of state, and socially divisive policies had prompted various kinds of public demonstrations and social movements in the SAR. A unique characteristic of the protest in this phase was that it was society-wide. Not only did protest include the protests of students and political activists (like they did in the pre-1997 era in its democratic campaign), it now expanded to include the protests from such groups as the workers and grass-roots population (factory workers, construction workers, restaurant workers, the elderly, and welfare recipients, the unemployed), civil servants (office workers, policemen, and firemen), new middle-class professionals (doctors, lawyers, social workers, teachers, journalists, and professors), old middle-class (small factory owners, property owners), and new immigrants.

The five protests that took place on June 25, 2000, epitomized the explosion of social protests in Hong Kong society. The first protest involved more than 1,000 doctors, who staged the biggest protest of its kind in a decade against the state's reform to revamp the medical profession's grading structure. The protesters said the reform would waste resources and undermine morale and quality of service provided to patients. The group staged an hour-long silent protest at the headquarters of the Hospital Authority in Argyle Street, Kowloon City.

The second protest was waged by about 1,300 frontline social welfare workers. They marched from Wan Chai to government headquarters in Central to protest the new lump-sum financing system for non-government organizations.

The third protest involved 300 residents, who marched along Nathan Road in Yau Ma Tei against the soon-to-be-established Urban Renewal Authority, saying its land resumption power would be too great and its compensation unfair.

In the fourth protest, the pro-business Liberal Party led more than 2,000 people in the so-called Save Our Assets march in Central. The march was aimed to highlight the plight of flat owners and entrepreneurs in small and medium-sized companies whose assets had depreciated by up to a half since the financial crisis hit Hong Kong in late 1997. Some carried placards accusing Executive Council convener Leung Chun-ying, a vocal defender of Tung's policy of producing 85,000 new flats each year, of shattering the property market.

Finally, in the fifth protest, about 1,200 people, including many mainlanders and students, demonstrated over the right-of-abode issue. A hardcore group of the protesters stayed overnight outside the Court of Final Appeal. When they

refused to move out of the government headquarters at 6.45 a.m., violence broke out and 12 protesters were hurt.

It is amazing that there could be as many as five large-scale protests on one single day in 2000! The five protests from doctors, social workers, community residents, property owners, and new immigrants epitomized the spread of conflict to various social forces in the Hong Kong society. A further disturbing sign was that conflict was getting more violent. As Lee (1999, 238) reported, unionists have warned of social instability in the face of worsening economic situations. "The seeds of unrest have been sown," said the Confederation of Trade Unions. When angry construction workers seeking unpaid wages stormed a site office in Yau Tong in July 2002, their violent clash with the police set alarm bells ringing in the corridors of power. Also, there was the well-known arson attack of the Immigration Office, killing two and injured over 50 persons.

With the expansion of economic conflict right after the 1997 transition, with the first SAR government becoming part of the problem, with the trend toward more violence-prone conflict, these accumulations of conflict finally led to the large-scale July 1, 2003 protest and raised Hong Kong social movements to a higher level.

July 1, 2003 Protest Against National Security Bill (Article 23)

The protest against the National Security Bill in Hong Kong led to the largest indigenous social movement in Hong Kong history (Ma 2005). On July 1, 2003, half a million people, about one-tenth of the adult population in Hong Kong, took to the street for over 6 h under very hot and humid weather to protest the impending legislation of the National Security Bill which many saw as detrimental to the civil liberties of Hong Kong.

The proposed law to protect the national security of the People's Republic of China (PRC) had its constitutional foundation in the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong. Article 23 of the Basic Law reads

> The Hong Kong Special Administration Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.

The aim of putting Article 22 into the Basic Law was to prescribe a wider range of activities so that "subversive" acts in Hong Kong could be outlawed.

From a social movement perspective, the July 1, 2003 protest is significant not only because it is the largest indigenous social movement in Hong Kong history nor because it led to a revitalization of democracy movement in Hong Kong, but because it signifies the emergence of a new *post-modernist* mode of social movement in Hong Kong.

Chan Kin-man may be the first social scientist who used the label of post-modern style of mobilization to characterize the July 1, 2003 protest. Chan (2005, 1) explains "unlike the traditional mode of mobilization, the post-modern style of mobilization in Hong Kong relies more on the media and social network supported by information technology. Civic organizations, especially those with professional backgrounds, play crucial roles in shaping public discourse so that media messages can be framed according to the movement's rationale and objective. ... The result is a livelier, spontaneous, and creative style of protest ..."

Building on Chan's insight, the following is a more systemic attempt to use the case of July 1, 2003 protest to spell out the general characteristics of a post-modernist mode of social movement in Hong Kong:

Goal

In terms of goals, post-modernist movements tend to focus on general societal-wide values (like promoting civil rights/social justice/environment for the whole society or for other societies) and go beyond the confine of narrow economic, self-interest (like wages/salary increase for a particular industrial sector or occupation). For example, the July 1 protest was aimed to protect the civil rights of all the people in Hong Kong, not just for the demonstrators.

Participant

In terms of participants, post-modernist tend to be more inclusive, more open, more diversified, and appeal to different classes, sexes, ethnicities, nations. Thus the participants of a post-modernist movement come from different backgrounds. For example, the participants of the July 1 protest include Catholics and Protestants, journalists, academics, librarians, social workers, lawyers, human rights activists, actors, artists, secondary school teachers, university students, negative-equity homeowners, welfare recipients, and the various civic organizations which represent them.

Organization

Whereas modern movements (like labor movements) create hierarchically organized mass organization, post-modern movements tend to be anti-bureaucratic, anti-authority, and loosely organized. Thus, post-modern movement organization is small, highly autonomous, and independent from one another. For example, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), which organized the July 1 protests, was composed of 30 diversified social activist organizations including

4 human right groups, 10 political parties/groups, 3 professional unions, 7 feminist, gay, and lesbian groups, 6 religious groups, 4 labor groups, 3 student groups, and 3 groups in support of labor and democracy movement in China.

Strategy

Needless to stress, post-modern organizations, being so diversified, could have a problem in formulating a long-term coherent strategy and tactics for the movement as a whole. For example, during July 1 protest, the membership view of CHRF held different views on Article 23 legislation, with April 5th Movement (a local Trotskyite group) wanting a more radical action and confrontation while the moderate Democratic Party preferred having more consultation and discussion.

Pattern of Mobilization: Planned or Spontaneous?

Therefore, post-modern movements are seldom planned or tightly organized. Instead, they are characterized by spontaneous, creative action. Each participant and each organization decides on its own mode of demonstration. For example, the signboards and banners in the July 1 protest were made by the participants, not by the organizers. There were also music bands, dramas, dances, and even a funeral march, making the protest a joyful and festive event.

Pattern of Mobilization: Information Technology

With the movement organizations so small, independent, and disorganized, how could they mobilize such a large turnout as 500,000 in the July 1 protest? A distinctive trait of the post-modern movement is that it relies on the Internet or new communication technology to mobilize participants. In the case of July 1 protests, beside the usual discussion on bulletin boards and personal e-mails, a large number of political jokes, commentaries, and information about the National Securities Bill were circulated on the Internet before the July 1st, 2003, urging the Hong Kong people to bring their friends and family members to join the public demonstration before it is too late.

Pattern of Mobilization: Mass Media

Since post-modern movements are small and disorganized, they do not have many resources to mobilize for action. But post-modern movements usually have mass media supports, helping them to articulate their goals and to

communicate their ideas with the general public. The July 1 protest was supported by *Apple Daily* (one of most popular newspapers in Hong Kong) and by the popular Commercial Radio phone-in programs which help to shape public discourse and provide a platform to debate civil right issues.

It is the superimposition of economic conflict and political conflict that triggered the massive turnout of 500,000 people in July 1, 2003 protest. In early 2003, the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) hit Hong Kong, leading to the closing of schools, widespread screening for fever in airports and at other checkpoints for travelers, the strict isolation of infected cases, and the quarantining of those exposed to known cases. Restaurants, cinemas, and hotels were turned into empty places during SARS, and the WHO (World Health Organization) imposed a travel advisory for Hong Kong in April 2003, further bringing Hong Kong's economy to a new low. This SARS crisis was aggravated due to incompetent management by the Tung administration. Thus one protest banner called for an independent enquiry into the SARS crisis, and another asked for the Hong Kong government to account for the 297 persons who had died from SARS. Lee and Yun (2006, 146) remarked that "without the epidemic, it would have been hard to mobilize half a million HongKongers on the street."

In response to this large-scale protest in Hong Kong, mainland Central Government changed its non-intervention stand and adopted a more active role in influencing the Hong Kong economy and politics since 2003. First, the Central Government extended various economic packages to strengthen the integration between Hong Kong and the mainland. These economic packages included (1) an individual traveler scheme so mainland residents could visit Hong Kong on a personal basis without having to join official tours. This scheme is a means to revive Hong Kong's travel industry after the SARS crisis; (2) expanding the CEPA (Closer Economic Participation Arrangement) which provided better-than-WTO-entry terms for 18 service sectors to do business in China, including law, accountancy, medical, banking, insurance, transport, and tourism. The CEPA also provided 1,087 Hong Kong-made products with tariff-free entry into the mainland China market; (3) a Pan Pearl River Delta (Pan-PRD) Regional Cooperation and Development Forum between Hong Kong and Macao plus nine Chinese provinces. As a result of these economic packages, Hong Kong has experienced an upturn in its economy since 2003. The growth of Hong Kong's GDP was around 8% in 2004, 7% in 2005, and 5% in 2006. In the fiscal year of 2005–2006, the Hong Kong government experienced a huge surplus of HK$4.8 billion (US$744 million).

Politically, the mainland government through its National People's Congress (NPC) ruled out direct election by universal suffrage for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR in 2007 and direct election for all members of the lawmaking Legislative Council (Legco) in 2008. These rulings are aimed to dampen or slow down the democracy movements in Hong Kong (Zheng and Tok 2007).

   Socially, the mainland government wanted to promote a stronger national identity for the Hong Kong people. The "leftist" organizations are promoting patriotic education in school, organizing exchange trips between mainland and Hong Kong students, inviting the Chinese Olympic medalist to visit Hong Kong, installing a short clip on Chinese national song and culture just before the evening news program.

Social Movements after July 1, 2003

Economic recovery and the increasing economic, political, social integration with mainland China after July 1, 2003, has led to the following social movements in Hong Kong:

The Movement to Share the Fruits of Prosperity

In 2007, construction workers, nurses, teachers, and social workers launched strikes to demand better terms amid a booming economy. The protesters were disgruntled that wages had not risen in tandem with the good economic news, as many had started off with low pay and shortened contracts, having become employed only after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1980s. The issue was exacerbated by a recent civil service pay rise of around 5%, which did not apply to some of those employed after the crisis as a result of different employment terms. Thus the strikers demanded higher wages, more benefits, and better employment conditions so they could share the fruits of prosperity in the booming economy.

The Movement to Preserve Cultural Heritage

Also, Hong Kong's social movement took a cultural turn. In 2006 and 2007, a new group called "Local Action" tried to prevent the Hong Kong government from demolishing such historical sites as the Star Ferry Terminal and the Queen's Pier. Since these public places are very popular among the Hong Kong people, they are full of collective memory.

   For the movement participants, culture doesn't mean *national* cultural but *local* culture; it is the local, community culture that Hong Kong people had experienced that the movement participants want to preserve. Using the discourse of cultural preservation, the movement participants also want to "reclaim the public space" from the Hong Kong government and the developers, to promote people's participation in community and societal planning, and to nurture community autonomy, so the grassroots people can preserve the local lifestyle and want to identify Hong Kong as their home. In this respect,

this movement to preserve cultural heritage can be seen as a *local* reaction to the increasing rate of socio-economic integration with mainland China after 2003.

The Movements Concerning Mainland and Global Affairs

Apart from having a new movement to address local, community issues of Hong Kong, there are also new movements to protest against the sweatshops on mainland China as well as to protest against the WTO holding its ministerial meeting in Hong Kong.

In 2005, a new organization called Students and Scholars against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM) was formed. Its aim is to monitor corporate behavior and to advocate for worker's rights in China. Before the opening of Hong Kong Disneyland in 2005, SACOM identified themselves as "Disney Hunter" and launched the "Looking for Mickey Mouse Conscience Campaign" to accuse Disney of letting its toy subcontractors to violate workers' rights on mainland China. The mainland workers making Disney toys are overworked, underpaid, exposed to dangerous toxins and forced to live in filthy conditions. SACOM release a survey of Disney suppliers every month and collected signatures from consumers around the world in support of workers' rights in mainland China.

In addition, a new Hong Kong People's Alliance (HKPA) on WTO was formed to protest at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong during mid December 2005. The HKPA include regional groups like Asian Student Association, Asia Monitor Resource Center, Christian Conference of Asia, and Korean Farmers Organization as well as many local organizations. The HKPA held marches, sponsored cultural events at night, and opened public rallies at the WTO ministerial meeting. The WTO protests ended up with a violent clash between Hong Kong police and the protesters, left 137 people injured and 944 demonstrators arrested. The clash was described by the international media as the worst in Hong Kong in 30 years (Lo 2006).

Toward a Post-modernist Mode of Social Movements?

Although July 1, 2003 protest showed traces of post-modernist social movements, it is only through the above post-2003 protests that many post-modern characteristics of social movements came to the forefront.

First, the post-2003 movements are much more dependent on high-tech to spread their messages and to mobilize participants than before. Their websites are much better designed: full of attractive photos and video clips, commentaries, discussion articles, local new reports. The news reports, photos, and video clips are constantly updated so the audience can keep up with the latest events and join the latest activities. They even have their own online media such as *People's Radio Hong Kong* and *Hong Kong In-media Web*. These websites

served as bulletin boards for the activities and as a forum to clarify issues, to plan tactics and strategies, to network with friends, to appeal for actions, and to evaluate outcome. These websites have become a new mode of communication and mobilization among activists and ordinary network Internet users for collective action.

Second, the post-2003 movements are much more disorganized and spontaneous than before. For example, the following passage was posted in one of the website: "Local Action is a loose alliance emerging out of the struggle of the Star Ferry Pier. It is hardly called organization. Membership is not stable but we are all kind and active people despite difference in action style." Ip Iam Chong (2007, 7), an activist, also comments that "most actions were planned right at the site without very clear rules or regular procedures, although those having communication online might have some sort of consensus. The civic groups in support of them felt confused but also amazed by their strong motivation to take action. Some more moderate or conservative groups saw the activists as unorganized mobs without strategies."

Third, the post-modernist mode is distinguished by its lack of a grand narrative or lack of a single and unifying ideology (like modernization or globalization). In particular, post-modern activists do not seek solutions from modern science, experts, or the state offices but depend upon the local community, and the grassroots to solve the problems. In this respect, the cultural preservation movement fits the post-modern description very well, for it includes many more discourses than the preservation of cultural heritages (like the reclaiming the public space, participatory democracy in city and policy planning, universal suffrage in 2012, improvement of people's livelihood, etc.). It could be seen as a local movement to defend local culture, local community, and local autonomy from mainland intrusion and Hong Kong developers who want to build turn these sites into modern high rises and modern shopping malls.

Finally, while Hong Kong's social movements in the past were pretty peaceful and tended to use a moderate strategy (including petition, negotiation, press conference, rally, etc.) to appeal to the government, a new mode of protest emerged in the post-July 1, 2003 period. The movement to save the Star Ferry and Queen's Pier, for example, showed that the participants, although they still will not provoke confrontation, are not afraid to engage in direct confrontation with the police if necessary. They are also not inclined to work with the existing pressure groups, political parties, and other formal channels. In this respect, the post-2003 social movements are more radical because they distrust the established movement organizations and the existing power structure, and they do not hesitate to go outside the existing channels to push for their causes.

What explains the emergence of new social movements along the post-modern mode in the post-2003 period? Apart from the structural reasons like increasing integration with mainland China and economic recovery, it may be due to the emergence of a new generation of young activists. According to Ip (2007, 13), these young activists are "marginal members in most civic or community organizations, they explored the possibility for a new brand of politics

on the street and the Internet." They are exposed to post-modern writings when they study in the universities, they are usually very familiar with information technology and tend to rely on this virtual platform for networking and mobilizing people not affiliated with any civic groups. The career of young generation of marginal middle class is threatened by the influx of mainland students and professionals into Hong Kong after 2003. They use the discourse of cultural heritage to protect their local communities and their life styles.

Conclusion

This paper studies the changing pattern of social conflict and social movements in Hong Kong between 1997 and 2007. It shows that during the first few years after Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, the dominant pattern of social conflict in Hong Kong was economic. This is because of the negative impact of the Asian financial crisis and the non-intervention policy of the Central Chinese government on Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the first SAR government made a mistake in pushing for the passing of the National Security Law, leading to the protest of 500,000 Hong Kong people on July 1, 2003. The July 1, 2003 protest is significant as it signifies the birth of post-modern form of social movement in Hong Kong. The social movements since 2003, for example, are characterized by anti-modern values like the preservation of cultural heritages, informal and loose movement organizations, relying on Internet and other information technology for mobilization, and spontaneous tactics and strategy. This post-modern turn since 2003 is a result of economic recovery, the quickening of economic integration between Hong Kong and mainland China, the increasing intervention of Hong Kong political affairs by the mainland government, and the birth of a new generation of young, marginal middle class. As such, what is the implication of a new mode of post-modern social movement?

This post-modern mode of social movement helps to induce a new wave of political activism into Hong Kong society. It has opened up new frontiers of social movements (like the preservation of cultural heritage movement and the cross-border labor movements on mainland China), raised new slogans (like anti-collusion between government and big business), and helped a young generation into the movements.

The future of this post-modern mode depends very much on whether it can cooperate with the existing social movement organization (like the Democrat Party), with the existing power structure (like the legislative councilors), or with the existing social movements (like the democracy movements). Since this type of post-modernist movement emerged only after 2003, it is too soon to tell whether they will be grown to a powerful political force to shape the history of Hong Kong.

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Part V
Introduction to Chinese Society, Culture, and Politics

Dingxin Zhao and Jeffrey Broadbent

China is of course the most ancient continuous civilization in East Asia, and indeed in the world. As a result, its culture and institutions have attained a palpable reality in the minds of its people, even as its institutions were variously twisted and overturned in the course of many historical events. The contemporary effect of these legacies must be considered when studying movements in contemporary China (Wasserstrom and Perry 1994; Zhao 2010). China's guiding Confucian philosophy developed from around 500 BCE through various retrenchments, reforms and revisions until the modernizing and revolutionary changes of the 20th century (Bol 1992; De Bary 1983, 1988). The same may be said for other traditional Chinese orientations, such as Taoism and Buddhism (e.g., Ch'en 1973; Hymes 1986; Welch 1957; Wright 1967). Politically, over these millennia, China developed through kingdoms conquering each other, gradually forming a central Imperial state (Zhao 2006). As the Imperial State expanded it incorporated different ethnic groups, making China the multi-ethnic society it is today. Imperial control over the periphery waxed and waned, allowing for the rise of protest movements, rebellions and invaders that sometimes conquered the center and formed their own ruling dynasties. Thus, though seeing long periods of peace and prosperity, social turmoil, heterodox ideologies and religions, and resistance to the Imperial center have also always been recognized parts of Chinese civilization (Fairbank and Goldman 2006).

When the British arrived in the mid-1800s, the Manchu Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) was already in a decline. The British was thus able to take the advantage to establish a colony in Hong Kong and forced the Chinese to accept opium in exchange for silk and tea. Other European countries soon established their own trading concessions in port cities. These abrasive encounters deeply affronted the Chinese sense of Confucian ethics and centrality, pushed Chinese first to implement limited reforms without undermining the Confucian order, and then after China's fiasco defeat by the Japanese in 1894, to stage more and more radical reforms that ended in the 1911 Revolution (Esherick 1998; Gray 1990).

The Revolution ended the Qing Dynasty but did not save China. China was as weak as before and Japanese aggression was pending. This triggered the 1919

May 4th Movement and the rise of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and Communist Party (CCP) (Chow 1967; Benjamin 1972). While the members of both parties were nationalistic, they had different attitudes toward the Chinese culture and different visions of a good society. While the nationalists believed that the Confucian-centered Chinese culture was still valuable for modern China, the communists were much more critical toward Chinese culture and saw Communism as the future for China (even though their understanding of Communism and their mentality were still strongly molded by the Chinese culture). The two parties were united in the early 1920s in fighting with the warlords and again between 1936 and 1945 against the Japanese during which the CCP growing stronger (Chen 1986; Johnson 1962; Selden 1971). Japan's defeat in 1945 left the two Chinese sides to battle it out, resulting in the 1949 Communist victory on the mainland, and the Nationalist Party, under Chiang Kai-Shek, fleeing to Taiwan.

The Chinese Communist Party thoroughly reorganized and transformed Chinese society, culture, economy and political institutions based on communist ideologies. In rural areas, the CCP redistributed land and then organized Chinese villages into commune systems with collective ownership of land. In cities, the CCP ended the private ownership of firms, constructed many state-run factories and initiated the state-led industrialization. In social control, the CCP set up a nation-wide Communist Party apparatus that penetrated all local organizations to ensure ideological conformity (Whyte 1974). Mao and the CCP enjoyed tremendous support from the Chinese people in the 1950; faith in Communism attained wide-spread quasi-religious fervor and inspired heroic dedication. But as the CCP pushed forward policies with devastating consequences, uncertainty and dissention arose. The most devastating policies were the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 (over half million intellectuals were labeled as rightists and had their lives ruined), the Great Leap Forward between 1958 and 1960 (ending in a 3-year famine and over thirty million deaths), and the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976 (which induced regional civil wars, endemic factionalism and prolonged succession crisis) (Lee 1978; Teiwes and Sun 1999). By the time of Mao's death in 1976, China's economy was on the verge of collapse, Chinese lived in poverty, and grievances mounted. Amidst these crises in 1978 the new leader Deng Xiaoping adopted a policy of economic reform that allowed more capitalist initiative, while trying to exercise tight political control.

During the Mao era, what mass social movements existed were state-initiated political campaigns. Sometimes those campaigns, such as the Cultural Revolution, ran out of control and acquired the characteristics of social movements. In post-Mao China, declining popular belief in communism reduced the effectiveness of state political control and made social movements possible.

The development of social movements in post-Mao China is closely correlated with the changing state-society relationship and can be roughly divided into three periods. Most social movements during the first period between

1976 and 1989 were large scale and expressed grievances against the state (Schell 1988; Seymour 1980; Zhao 2001). They were reactions against unpopular Maoist policies that affected an entire category of the population. Students sent to the countryside wanted to go home; cadres dismissed during the Cultural Revolution and intellectuals who were labeled as rightists demanded rehabilitation. These complaints among the educated led to calls and protests for greater democracy, culminating in the 1989 student democracy movement protest in Tiananmen Square (Calhoun 1994; Zhao 2001). After considerable hesitation, the Chinese state violently suppressed this movement and tried to wipe it from popular historical memory.

After 1989, the CCP refused to implement an Eastern European style *glasnost* political reform. However, it nevertheless pushed forward market-oriented economic reform with great success. The growth of capitalist and quasi-capitalist firms brought about new social problems ranging from corruption, growing inequality, massive worker layoffs, over-taxation of farmers and environmental degradation. New types of protests slowly gained momentum in the mid-1990s (Hurst 2004). During this second period, protests tended to be of smaller scale, focus on economic issues, and target local businesses and local government. When the central government was involved, it often acted as an arbiter instead of providing the target as in the 1980s. If the state acted properly, the protests actually enhanced rather than undermined the state legitimacy among the populace. This second period lasted into the early 21st century and gradually faded into the third period.

Several new developments facilitated the rise of the third period. The Chinese government, especially the Hu Jintao administration, placed more restrictions on local government use of violence against protests and adopted policies favoring China's disadvantaged populations. These policies created opportunities for local activism. The rights consciousness of the Chinese people has grown rapidly in recent years (O'Brien et al. 2006). Facilitated by the growing use of Internet, cell phone text messages, and other technologies in communication and mobilization, proactive social movements and middle class movements have quickly developed, and populist movements have also gained momentum. Local religions and cults are also coming back and sometimes stage protest movements (Aminzade and Perry 2001), the most well known being the Fa Lun Gong protests (Tong 2002). In addition, since the mid-1990s, Chinese protests have taken the form of riots. A rumor or a minor incident will trigger a riot with tens of thousands of participants, resulting in huge damage to public and private property. The protests and riots have not turned revolutionary due to three factors: lack of an overarching anti-establishment ideology, strength of the state's social control apparatus, and third, the booming economy has allowed the state to mitigate social conflicts by money. On the other hand, the regime's authoritarian nature has hindered it from channeling protests into highly institutionalized associations that could be easily controlled. Large-scale turmoil and revolution remains a possibility in China (Zhao 2009).

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State Legitimacy and Dynamics of the 1989 Pro-democracy Movement in Beijing

Dingxin Zhao

On the morning of April 22, 1989, 7 days after the breakout of the 1989 Pro-Democracy Student Movement in Beijing, a state funeral was held for Hu Yaobang inside the Great Hall of the People, west of Tiananmen Square.[1] The night before, around 50,000 students went into the Square in order to be part of that funeral. Throughout the morning of April 22, the students inside the Square staged various protests, the themes of which were mostly irrelevant to Hu's funeral. Among the protesting activities, the one that aroused most students' emotions was the kneeling of three students in front of the Great Hall of the People. They knelt there for over half an hour with a petition in their hands, insisting that premier Li Peng comes out to receive the petition and meet with the students. Yet Li Peng did not appear. The students were distraught; some cried like babies, while others shouted anti-government slogans. The students were so upset that they initiated a citywide general class boycott the following day. The action of kneeling in conjunction with Li Peng's failed appearance greatly mobilized the emotions of students and changed the course of the movement.

The 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement lasted about 7 weeks from April 15 to early June. During that period, both the students and the government had tried to reach some compromises. Unfortunately, their efforts were futile and the movement ended with repression. This paper demonstrates how an approach analyzing the patterned symbolic interactions between movement activists and their opponents can improve our understanding of this movement. The development of the 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement was shaped by different understandings of state legitimacy on the part of the top state elites and the general public. During

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[1] Hu Yaobang was the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) between 1981 and 1987.

the late 1980s, while the majority of top state elites still hung on to communist ideology, most students and Beijing residents evaluated the state by its economic and moral performance. Thus when the government was challenged ideologically and morally, the challenge resonated widely, whereas when the government invoked ideological or legal dimensions of state authority to control the movement, its measures only antagonized people. Such a pattern of interactions contributed to the movement's tragic ending. To adopt a game analogy, the whole situation was such as if the state elites treated the game as chess and the people took it as CHINESE chess. Since the chessmen for the two games are similar, each side remained unaware of the situation. Therefore, each player kept making moves that violated the other player's expectation of the game, as if continuously applying Garfinkel's "breach experiments" to each other (Garfinkel 1967). Both sides became increasingly emotional; eventually, the chessboard was overturned.

In what follows, I make a critical evaluation of two alternative interactive approaches in the studies of the 1989 Movement. Second, I define the concept of state legitimacy. Third, I evaluate the perception of state legitimacy of relevant social groups in Beijing during the late 1980s and explain how legitimacy problems reduced the effectiveness of state control measures. Finally, I present a case study to show how major Beijing populations' differentiated perceptions of state legitimacy shaped the development of the 1989 Movement.

Game Theory and Factionalism Model on the 1989 Movement

Recent studies have examined the interactions between movement activists and their opponents from a game theoretic approach. Although the study has led to a number of interesting developments (Gartner and Segura 1997; Goldstone and Opp 1994; Lichbach 1995; Oberschall 1994; Opp 1997), applying game theoretic models in analyzing complicated empirical cases tends to have problems. Deng (1997), for example, argues that the tragic ending of the 1989 movement was an unintended outcome due to incomplete information exchanges between the students and government. Nevertheless, we know that the 1989 Movement was largely spontaneously developed, with a quick turnover of movement leaders who actually could not control the movement. The government also did not have a coherent as how to deal with the movement (Zhao 2001). Finally, even after the government decided to exert military repression, state authorities still communicated to the students their intentions in order to get students out of Tiananmen Square without bloodshed. Therefore, Deng's model is limited in the fact that the student protesters and state authorities were not unified actors engaging in effective negotiation during the movement.

Deng's model rightly "predicts" the military crackdown because it is easy to establish many different game theoretic models to predict a known empirical outcome. For example, for the 1989 Movement, we could assume in our model that while the government did not try to hide information, the two actors lacked

trust. We could also assume that there were games between hardliners and moderates within both the government and movement activists, and eventually the hardliners won. In other words, we could construct many models to "predict" the same tragic outcome, but it is possible that none of these models actually captures the essence of the empirical reality.[2] Therefore, the quality of an empirically oriented game theory model depends less on how well the model "predicts" a social outcome, than on how well empirical data are incorporated in the model. Yet, it is generally the case that the more empirical data are added to the model, the less analytical rigor a model has. Mathematically, it is also the case that the more empirical details are included in a model, the less likely one is able to find an analytical solution for that model. Therefore, complex game theory model that aims to simulate a social outcome is generally not very useful.[3]

Chinese scholars also explain the 1989 Movement's tragic ending in terms of factional struggles among the top state elites, which in essence is also an interactive explanation. They argue that students' protesting activities induced struggles between reformers and hardliners within the Chinese government (Chen 1990a; Cheng 1990; Dittmer 1990; Kristof 1990; Nathan 1990). The eventual imposition of military repression was a signal that hardliners gained the upper hand in the power struggle, bringing an end to China's reform. This explanation has merits in a society where political conflicts are organized around clientelist ties rather than through formal organizations (Nathan 1990). Yet, when a factionalism model is used to explain the dynamics of the 1989 Movement, we face problems.

First, by the late 1980s, China's state–society relations had reached a stage of what has been called a "defensive regime" (Zhao 1994a). At this stage, most of the urban population no longer believed in communist ideology and the state had to rely on economic and moral performance to survive. Under this type of regime, although there were no checks and balances from opposition parties, extra-institutional pressures from the society have narrowed the regime's policy choices. The factionalism model carries more validity in analyzing Chinese politics during Mao's era, when the state could make policy choices relatively free from the society (Dittmer 1974; MacFarquhar 1974; Teiwes 1990), but has difficulty in explaining political development after the people stepped forward to challenge the state such as during the 1989 Movement.

The factionalism model also has two empirical problems. First, it cannot explain the timing of some important events. For example, it is believed that

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[2] For example, it is common sense that the provincial governments in China did not have much impact on the state policy toward the 1989 Movement. However, starting with a central-local government factionalism assumption, Shiu and Sutter (1996) are able to construct a game theory model that also predicts the final crackdown of the movement.

[3] The criticism here should not be taken as suggesting that the game theory is not a useful tool in sociology. It is a very useful tool to develop formal theories (e.g., Axelrod 1984; Olson 1965). It can also be useful to build "artificial societies" in the computer to generate insights on possible social outcomes under a set of rules and conditions.

Zhao Ziyang, the general secretary of the CCP, was the head of the reformer camp and that the repressive April 26 *People's Daily* editorial was made possible because Zhao had left for North Korea (Chen 1990a, 152–3; Chen 1996, 206–7). However, the state shifted back to a concessive strategy on April 27, immediately after a successful student demonstration that defied the editorial. By April 29, the government had held the first dialogue with students. Zhao visited North Korea between April 23 and April 30. If he was not responsible for the April 26 editorial, he should also not take credit for the state concession. Second, what happened after 1989 was not what the model had predicted. There was no extensive purge of the so-called reformers in the CCP. Most importantly, China's economic reform actually gathered new momentum after 1992.

Weaknesses of the factionalism model would be clearer if we ask a hypothetical question: Would the state have acted differently if factionalism had not been the driving force of state policy change? The answer is no. During the 1989 Movement, the state had dealt with the movement through the following steps: It first tolerated the movement. When tolerance did not work, the government threatened the students by a *People's Daily* editorial. The editorial still did not work, which pushed the government to adopt limited concession. When limited concession could not co-opt the students, the state adopted martial law and deployed troops to Beijing. The soldiers were initially brought in for intimidation. It was only when the show of force was unable to end the Tiananmen Square occupation that the government ordered repression.

Therefore, the state had tried every control measure in its repertoire to no avail. In the end, the state leaders were left with only two choices, either to repress or to face an eventual abdication as in the case of the communist leaders in Eastern European countries. However, since most top leaders during the late 1980s had joined the revolution long before the communists took power in China, it was almost impossible for them, "reformers" and "hardliners" alike, to give up the power for which millions of their comrades had died. Repression thus became the only choice. This analysis does not justify the killing during military repression, an action in itself unjustifiable in any sense. However, it shows that by over-emphasizing the role of factionalism during the 1989 Movement, we may have underestimated the problems that an authoritarian state like China has confronted in time of major political crises.

State Legitimacy as the Basis of Student–Government Interactions

Ranging from Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, Goffman's frame analysis, to Turner's emergent norm theory, most microsociologists see or at least imply social interactions as a ritual chain and that persons act on the basis of their definition of the situation. Strong feelings of frustration will be induced when the ritual chain is broken down (Collins 1990, 1995; Shibutani 1986), and such a breakdown often occurs because the two parties engaged in social interactions have different definitions of the same situation. Microsociologists, however,

mostly focus on small-scale human interactions rather than larger political processes. Little empirical work has been done on how social structures pattern the interactions between the people and authorities, which in turn shape the dynamics of a social movement.

My analysis shares similarities with the frame analysis in our common focus on the role of meaning in social movements.[4] However, there are important differences between frame analysis and my approach. First, frame analysis focuses on the strategies of movement organizers. Their reasoning "tend(s) to work backward from successful mobilization to the framings activists proffered and then posit a causal linkage between the two." (Benford 1997). I am interested in how social structures shape people's "schemata of interpretation" and consequently political behavior. My analysis has a macro-micro linkage. Second, frame analysis assumes rational actors. Most scholars in this tradition have treated participant mobilization as "simply a matter of movement activists pushing the appropriate rhetoric button" (Benford 1997). In my analysis, emotions play a crucial role. Finally, frame analysis focuses on the relationship between movement organizers and potential participants, while I am interested in the interactions between the movement and the government.

Among various macro concepts, state legitimacy is the one that most closely links state power with micro individual perceptions. People will feel antagonized or even challenge a state when they perceive the state power as illegitimate. However, the Chinese state did not simply loose its legitimacy. Rather, during the later 1980s we saw in China the existence of conflicting understanding of state legitimacy between top state elites and the urban population. While the majority of top state elites were still committed to the ideological and legal legitimacy of the state, most students and Beijing residents evaluated the state by its economic and moral performance. As a result, when the government was challenged ideologically and morally, the challenge resonated widely, but when the government invoked ideological or legal dimensions of state authority to control the movement, its measures only antagonized people. It is such a pattern of interactions that contributed to the tragic ending of the movement.

Legitimacy is, however, a poorly defined concept. Until recently, scholars have continuously used phrases such as "limits of legitimacy" (Wolfe 1977), "legitimation crisis" (Habermas 1975), or "lack of legitimacy" (Oberschall 1996), to explain the rise of a social movement or the downfall of a regime. Without specifying what kind of legitimacy crisis a state is facing and which population has experienced a legitimacy crisis, the analysis is not very meaningful.

A useful starting point in conceptualizing legitimacy is the work of Weber. According to Weber, habit, affection, and rational calculation are three bases of human compliance. Correspondingly, he proposes three types of authority

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[4] See Evans (1997), Snow et al. (1986), Snow and Benford (1988, 1992) and Zuo and Benford (1995), among others, for the concept and research on frame analysis.

relations: traditional, charismatic, and rational (Weber 1978, 28; Bendix 1962, 290–7). Although the typology has been criticized in various ways (Blau 1963; Eckstein and Gurr 1975), critics still accept Weber's typology. Weber's classification, when used to analyze the state power, has two problems. First, legitimacy mobilizes solidarity and loyalty and delegitimacy leads to anger and opposition. State legitimacy is thus manifested in social processes. In other words, Weber has placed too much emphasis on the typology of legitimacy while neglecting its longitudinal interactive aspect (Collins 1995, 1566). In this analysis, the role of state legitimacy in the 1989 Movement will be examined in a longitudinal interactive process between the state and the people.

Second, not only in modern times, but also in the past, people's perception of state legitimacy always involves some degree of rationality regardless of the ways in which a state has tried to legitimize itself. In historical China, for instance, an emperor was legitimized as "the son of the heaven." However, dynasties were frequently challenged and overthrown when the heaven's son failed to provide basic services. In this analysis, sources of state legitimacy are not classified in terms of basic types of human compliance, but by the ways that state power can be justified: by a commonly accepted procedure, by public goods that a state provides, and by current value congruence and/or future promises. Correspondingly, I define three types of state legitimacy: legal-electoral, performance, and ideological. Along the three dimensions, one can further distinguish the perceptions of the people and the state elites themselves.

A state is based on legal-electoral legitimacy when it takes laws as the binding principles for all social groups, and when top leaders are popularly elected on a regular basis. Performance legitimacy means that a state's right to rule is justified by its economic and/or ritual performance, and by the state's capacity in territorial defense. Ideological legitimacy means that a state justifies its rule by a grand vision to which a government is committed.[5] When citizens tie their hope on one or a few state leaders, the state enjoys charismatic legitimacy. Charisma can be supplementary to any kind of state legitimacy, but it tends to be an extreme form of ideological legitimacy.[6] The above definitions are not mutually exclusive. Never can a state secure its survival on a single source of legitimacy. However, in one country at a particular time,

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[5] Readers may find similarities between legal-electoral and ideological legitimacy since legal-electoral legitimacy has democracy as its ideological base. However, they are different in two aspects. First, democracy only promises a procedure to select leaders, not a utopian future. Most importantly, my definition of legal-electoral legitimacy emphasizes the procedure, not the ideological aspect. Although democracy is the base of legal-electoral legitimacy, over time it is the commonly accepted procedure of leadership selection, not the value system behind, that legitimizes a state.

[6] Defined this way, people's perception of state legitimacy can be measured by probing into their views on a state's ideological claim, their satisfaction with a state's major performance and their image of top state leaders.

one source of state legitimacy dominates.[7] The dominant source defines the behavior of a state as perceived by different sectors of a population, including state elites themselves.

Methodology

Information on activities of students and Beijing residents was mainly from interviews conducted between late 1992 and early 1993. The informants were recruited through a snowball method. At the time of the 1989 Movement, of the 70 informants that I have interviewed, thirty-seven informants were undergraduate students, eleven were graduate students, sixteen were political control cadres or teachers, and six worked in various cultural and academic institutions. They were from eighteen universities and four cultural and academic institutions. For details of the interview's methodology, see Zhao (1997, 1998).

The data on activities of state elites were mainly from secondary sources. Hong Kong based newspapers and magazines contain many materials, but the existence of a substantial quantity of unreliable materials in these publications means that they are not suitable sources for a scholastic analysis. Fortunately, we know a few things for sure. First, after the 1989 Movement, the Chinese government published many books containing speeches of government leaders and inside views of the CCP's activities. Although their views were biased, we could still probe into what took place within the government from these publications. Second, we have now a few authentic descriptions of what had happened within the government. One is written by Xu Jiatun, former chief-of-staff of Xinhua News Agency's Hong Kong Branch, who fled to the United States in 1990. Another is a letter that Zhao Ziyang presented to the CCP Central Committee to defend his doings during the movement. Most importantly, we know the exact chronology of the Chinese government's action during the movement. In a word, even if we do not have a complete knowledge of what was going on inside the "black box" of Chinese politics, we can infer its nature from the output.

Legitimacy and State Control

Before examining how state legitimacy had shaped the 1989 Movement, we need to evaluate the sources and levels of state legitimacy as perceived by state elites and relevant populations and discuss how legitimacy problems reduced the effectiveness of state control during the 1989 Movement. I focus on four groups: top state elites,

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[7] For example, during Mao's era, the dominant source of state legitimacy was ideology. However, the state legitimacy was also based on Mao's charisma and some public goods that it had delivered to the former lower classes in society.

intellectual elites and radical students, university students, and Beijing residents. This does not suggest the existence of four cohesive actors. Rather, it is based on the assumption that the majority of individuals in each group had a perspective of state power that was quite distinctive from individuals of other groups.

Top State Elites

This group included most politburo members and a few veterans who joined the communist movement before the Long March in the 1930s. The CCP politburo had 17 members in 1989.[8] It consisted of both CCP veterans and those of younger generations. The veterans joined the communist movement in the 1920s. Among them, the most powerful ones were listed in Table 1 (most names of the top state elites that appear in this article are listed in Table 1). In 1989, except for Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun, none of them held formal positions within the CCP. However, because of their legendary revolutionary experiences and the fact that most current leaders in the government and the army were their subordinates and promoted through the ranks by them, they still enjoyed a great deal of influence – even veto power over state policies.[9] The first eight individuals in the list, sometimes called the octogenarians, played a crucial role during the 1989 Movement (Cheng 1990, 209–21).

Most writings have emphasized this group's factional nature. What is neglected is that the majority of the group had one thing in common – they were absolutely loyal to the CCP. During the movement, the senior leaders, especially the octogenarians, repeatedly expressed their loyalty to the CCP. For example, in a meeting with the CCP Central Advisory Commission Standing Committee, Chen Yun (1990b) declared that: "Everyone knew that the Chinese revolution went through decades of hard struggle and saw the sacrifice of more than twenty million people, and only then was the People's Republic of China founded. The victory has not come easily." This is obviously because most state elites listed in Table 1 started their revolutionary career in the 1920s or 1930s, long before the communists took power. They had fought hundreds of battles and witnessed the deaths of many of their comrades. Their distinctive experience had certainly shaped their views and strengthened their loyalty to the CCP.

Individuals in this group knew China's poor economic performance when compared, for example, with Taiwan and South Korea. They were also aware of widespread corruption and high inflation. However, they tended to attribute China's poor performance to inexperience and Mao's personal mistakes (Deng

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[8] A few of them were not very active during the 1989 Movement. However, since I explore the political nature of the leadership as a whole, a slight change of the list should not significantly affect my analysis and conclusions.

[9] The top military elite also played an important role in the final military repression. Most top military commanders during the late 1980s joined the CCP between the 1920s and 1940s. This group is similar to the top state elites in terms of their loyalty to the CCP.

Table 1 Time when the politburo members and some of the most powerful veterans joined the Communist Revolution

Politburo members[1]	Year joined the revolution[2]	Veterans	Year joined the revolution
Yang Shangkun	1926	Yang Shangkun	1926
Qin Jiwei	1929	Deng Xiaoping	1922
Hu Yaobang	1930	Peng Zhen	1923
Zhao Ziyang	1932	Deng Yingchao	1924
Yao Yilin	1935	Chen Yun	1925
Wan Li	1936	Bo Yibo	1925
Song Ping	1937	Li Xiannian	1927
Wu Xueqian	1938	Wang Zhen	1927
Qiao Shi	1940	Nie Rongzhen	1922
Li Peng	1941	Lu Dingyi	1925
Tian Jiyun	1945	Song Renqiong	1926
Jiang Zemin	1946	Liu Lantao	1926
Hu Qili	1948	Xi Zhongxun	1926
Li Ximing	1948	Xu Xiangqian	1927
Yang Rudai	1952		
Li Tieying	1955		
Li Ruihuan	1959		

[1]They were the seventeen politburo members immediately before the rise of the 1989 Movement
[2]The year when the individual joined either the Communist Party, the Communist Youth League, or the army led by the communists

1983, 291–301). Their overall evaluation on the state performance was still positive. Also, since ideology tends to be a higher-order legitimation basis than legal-electoral legitimation, although the top state elites were not popularly elected, they insisted on the right to command the whole society by legal and constitutional means. My estimation of this group's perspective on their ideological and legal mandates as well as the state performance is listed in the first row of Table 2.

Table 2 State legitimacy as perceived by different sections of Beijing population during the late 1980s[1]

	Ideological legitimacy	Performance legitimacy (economic)	Legal-electoral legitimacy
Top state elites	+	+/−	+
Intellectual elites and radical students	−	−	−
Students	−	−/+	−
Beijing residents	0	−/+	0

[1]Here, +, +/−, −/+ and −, respectively, represent positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, and negative perception of state legitimacy, and 0 is entered when the dimension of state legitimacy was not very important to that population

Intellectual Elites and Radical Students

This group included dissidents and liberal intellectuals. Some individuals, such as Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan, Yan Jiaqi, and Wang Dan, and their views, are well known in the West, thanks to the writings of China scholars. I will only summarize their major characteristics and views. Most of the people in this group were once true believers of communism and Mao. Due to the disastrous outcome of the Cultural Revolution and unpleasant personal experiences, by the end of the 1970s, they had different levels of skepticism about Marxism and China's political system (Seymour 1980). The size of this group increased to include some young students, and their ideas crystallized during the 1980s. By the late 1980s, they believed that all the tragedies during Mao's era resulted from the lack of human rights, an independent legal system, and above all democratic politics. They also believed that China was still one of the poorest countries in the world after 40 years of communist rule, and that China's backwardness was a result of the rigid planned economy and the political system. Finally, they insisted that China's reform had experienced a deep crisis due to the slow pace of political reform (Chen 1990a).

Most individuals in the group did not consider the regime as ideologically and legal-electorally legitimate. They also had a negative opinion of the regime's economic performance (Table 2).Their difference was mainly in their views on how to bring changes to the country. The core of this group was small, probably no more than a few hundred in Beijing. However, since most of them were professors, writers, journalists, and students in major universities, they controlled a great amount of communication resources. By the late 1980s, as China's economic crisis deepened, their ideas became a dominant intellectual discourse. The 1989 Movement was initiated by a few radical intellectuals and students who had actively engaged in this discourse (Zhao 1997).

University Students

While the radicals initiated the movement, the rank-and-file students sustained it (Zhao 1998). This is also the group with whom I had a substantial amount of interviews. I asked the informants about their views on the Four Cardinal Principles back in 1989.[10] Their views are used to index their acceptance on the state's ideological legitimation. Among the 60 informants to whom I had posed the question, 21 (35%) were strongly against these four principles, only 9 (15%) accepted them, and the remaining 50% accepted them with various reservations. Moreover, for those who had conditionally accepted the Four

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[10] The Four Cardinal Principles are the adherence to socialism, adherence to the leadership of the party, adherence to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and adherence to the dictatorship of the proletariat. They are written in the preamble of the Chinese Constitution.

Cardinal Principles, many of them qualified their answer by saying that they only believed in socialism and not the other three principles, or that they accepted them only because they believed that the government was still effective in leading the economic development. However, socioeconomic crises during the late 1980s greatly eroded students' confidence. It is safe to conclude that the state did not enjoy very strong ideological and legal-electoral legitimacy among students, and that by 1989 students also had a growing dissatisfaction with the regime's performance (Table 2).

Beijing Residents

The 1989 Movement began as a student movement. However, during mid-May, Beijing residents were also involved in the movement. They played a crucial role in stopping the martial law troops in late May. Some of them fought street battles when the troops advanced to Tiananmen Square.

Individuals with poor education tend to have a low capacity to understand and articulate an ideology (Converse 1964), but it does not mean that poorly educated individuals are unable to have opinions on the state based on their daily economic experiences. During the late 1980s, when China's socioeconomic crisis deepened, it immediately became a major grievance of all urban populations. Like the students, during the late 1980s, Beijing residents were also somewhat unhappy about the state's economic performance (Table 2).

More importantly, in its long history, China had developed an important moral dimension of state legitimacy centered on the Confucian political theory of "governing by goodness" (Creel 1953). That is, rulers must fulfill certain material and ritual obligations, and in exchange the subjects should offer conformity and loyalty. After the ideological legitimacy of the state declined, moral and ritual performance re-emerged as a popular criterion for the people on which to judge their government. In the 1980s, many novels became best sellers in China because they featured upright officials as their protagonists. Similarly, popular sayings such as "if an official is not able to stand up for his people, he should go home to sell sweet potatoes" became the voice of the time. The same logic also made official corruption a major point of contention of the urban population toward the government.

Based on the above discussion, Table 2 summarizes the level and type of state legitimacy as perceived by different sections of the urban population during the late 1980s. The scales in the table, from positive (+) to negative (−), describe qualitative distinctions in the perception of state power by different sections of the urban population that I have analyzed above. Unfortunately, the moral aspect of performance legitimacy is not included in Table 2. People's perception of a state's moral performance during a movement mainly depends on how the state treats a social movement. The highly interactive nature of the moral aspect

of state legitimacy made it difficult to be included, even though, as I am going to show, it was extremely important to the 1989 Movement.

Table 2 shows that while state elites had a strong ideological and legal claim to their power, intellectual elites and radical students, and to a lesser extent the students and Beijing residents, did not see it that way. The discrepancy has two consequences. First, except for the ruthless killing, most control measures need an understanding and some sort of cooperation from the target population. The discrepancy suggests that the people were less likely to cooperate with the state if a control measure carried ideological or legal claims. Thus, the government had very limited effective control measures to use when dealing with the movement. Second, with a strong sense of the ideological and legal dimensions of state legitimacy, top state elites were not going to hand over their power as the state elites in Eastern European countries had done. Thus, if protestors confronted head-on with the state, they were going to face repression.

More importantly, during the late 1980s there was also a great discrepancy between the top state elites and the people in terms of their perceptions of the moral dimension of state legitimacy. While top state elites often too easily dismissed moral challenges from the society, Beijing residents and students took the moral and ritual performance of the state seriously. This does not mean that top state elites wanted to leave an image of an immoral government. However, their loyalty to the Party made communist ideology a higher order morality in comparison with the traditional moral and ritual observance. The consequence was disastrous: the government's ideological and legal claims only irritated the people because they viewed them as illegitimate. On the other hand, the people strongly urged moral responses from the government, which they would not get because the state elites' moral base lay in the ideology to which they were committed. Therefore, the conflict between the state and the people deepened as the movement proceeded.

State Legitimacy, State Behavior, and Dynamics of the 1989 Movement

The top state elites and other Beijing populations' held a variety of perspectives on state legitimacy. The following case study illustrates how the state behavior and dynamics of the movement were shaped by this cognitive structure.

The State Hesitation and Movement Development

On April 15, 1989, Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the CCP died. Hu had been forced to resign from the position for his soft treatment of a smaller scale student movement in 1986. He had since won great respect among students. After Hu's death, spontaneous mourning and protesting activities burst out

immediately. Students demanded the state to re-evaluate Hu and to change the verdict of his 1987 dismissal.

The government reacted to the protest very cautiously. However, its caution was not the result of struggles among top state elites, as many tend to believe. At this stage none of the top state elites seemed to have a clear picture of the movement, and for several reasons the movement was not repressed. First, Hu was still a politburo member upon his death. Since mourning a top leader was a legitimate action that the state had to carry out itself, it was very difficult to repress a movement under the disguise of mourning activities. Second, there were widespread rumors about Hu's death. It was said that Hu had a heart attack when Li Peng accused him in a politburo meeting. Others even believed that Deng Xiaoping's bodyguard shot Hu. The government wanted these rumors to be cleared up. Finally, the movement started when China was experiencing high inflation and widespread official corruption. While mourning Hu, many individuals also expressed grievances over such problems. The government certainly did not want the public to be further antagonized.

As a result, the government tolerated the protests and highly praised Hu in the media, but they were unable to directly admit that Hu's 1987 dismissal was a mistake. Doing that would also mean acknowledging the legitimacy of the 1986 student movement and the pro-democratic demands of the current movement.[11] These are hardly demands under a democracy, but they were indeed challenging to the regime's ideological legitimacy, and their acceptance would mark the beginning of the regime's collapse. Naturally, the top state elites would not concede. By April 23, the students had staged many demonstrations, initiated a citywide class boycott and established several movement organizations. In the end, the government's limited concession only encouraged movement mobilization.

The April 26 People's Daily Editorial

The government's patience ran out after Hu's state funeral. On April 26 the *People's Daily* published an editorial that denounced the movement as anti-revolutionary turmoil. It is generally believed that the editorial was published because the Beijing government had fed the politburo with distorted information, which led to its tough decision. It is also believed that the editorial was a conservative backlash happening while Zhao Ziyang was away (Chen 1996, 204–6). However, these interpretations cannot explain the following facts. First, although the Beijing government's briefing to the politburo was indeed full of hardline rhetoric (Zhonggong Beijing shiwei bangongting 1989, 41–2), it was not the only source of information. Since the movement started, Qiao Shi and Hu Qili

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[11] By April 18, the students had come up with seven demands to the government centered on prodemocratic claims. See Wu (1989, p. 8) for the seven demands.

were the two standing politburo members (both were regarded as reformers) at the front line in dealing with the movement. They had other sources of information. For example, they held meetings with some school authorities before listening to the report of Beijing government (Zhonggong Beijing shiwei bangongting 1989). Second, such an interpretation also cannot explain why the same government (still without Zhao's presence) resorted to concession after the April 27th demonstration successfully defied the *People's Daily* editorial.

Chen Xitong (1989, 967), mayor of Beijing, has claimed after the repression of the movement that individuals who participated in these meetings all believed that they "had confronted a planned, organized anti-party, anti-socialism political struggle." This may have been overstated. However, it does indicate that top state elites were not that divided during this period. They favored a hardline strategy mainly because the earlier concession failed to contain the movement. The problem stemmed from the huge gaps between the top state elites and the people in their perspectives on state legitimacy. What students demanded was not what the government could give.

The state elites suspected of the existence of a small but well-organized force behind the students. The suspicion was possibly derived from the fact that the CCP itself started from well-organized underground activities. It was also possible that state elites simply did not have proper information to understand what was going on inside the movement.[12] With no adequate information and a rigid mindset, many movement activities could only be understood as conspiracies. Yet, by labeling the movement as anti-revolutionary turmoil, the top state elites underestimated a strong sympathy that the radical students enjoyed among the rest of the students and Beijing residents.

Once the state no longer enjoyed a high level of ideological legitimacy among most urban populations, a claim of rights based on ideology merely led to antagonism. In the end, the editorial could not but remind the people of the totally outmoded Cultural Revolution rhetoric. The consequence was only natural – while the government's counter mobilization during April 25 and 26 was ineffective, a massive April 27 demonstration went on successfully.

The Government Concession

Trying to stop the April 27 demonstrators from entering Tiananmen Square, the state deployed all the mobilizable Beijing police forces. They also called in 5,100 soldiers to act as a reserve of the police force. However, when it became clear that a large-scale demonstration was inevitable, the top state elites only ordered the police

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[12] For example, the government did not even know who the organizers of the hunger strike were when it started (The hunger strike, a crucial development of the movement, will be discussed below). Hurriedly, the government called student activists from the Autonomous Student Union, the Dialogue Delegation and the Hunger Strike group for a dialogue.

to block the demonstrators without using violence. Given the size of the population and the spatial layout of the campuses, the task was simply impossible (Zhao 1998).

Scholars have attributed the government's restraint to the lobbying efforts of some "reformers" (Kristof 1990, 174; Liu 1990, 513). In fact, at this stage, the government was still deeply concerned about the negative consequences of repression because they did not see it as the only way for the regime to survive. Imagine, would the "reformers" still be able to lobby for a peaceful solution during late May? Certainly not. On April 25, Deng Xiaoping told Li Peng and Yang Shangkun that "we must do our best to avoid bloodshed, but we should foresee that it might not be possible to completely avoid bloodshed" (Oksenberg et al. 1990, 204). Deng's speech should be understood literally – the government would try to avoid bloody repression, but between repression and a possible loss of power, they would choose the former without hesitation.

After the April 27 demonstration, whatever had been said in the April 26 *People's Daily* became hollow rhetoric. Beyond repression, the only solution was concession. On the noon of April 27, while students were still marching on the street, the State Council spokesman Yuan Mu expressed the government's intention to hold a dialogue with students. The next day, the *People's Daily* and other major official newspapers reported the demonstration. On April 29 and April 30, government started to hold dialogues with students. Therefore, by the time Zhao Ziyang returned from North Korea, concession was well under the way.

Zhao did carry the concession further after his return. In the following days, Zhao made two public speeches. The first was made on the evening of May 3 in a meeting to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the May 4th Movement, and the second was made on May 4 in a meeting with the delegates of the 22nd Asian Development Bank Meeting (Zhao 1990). The second speech made a big splash. In that speech, Zhao said that the majority of students "by no means oppose our political system" because their basic slogans were "Support the Communist Party!" "Support Socialism!" "Uphold the reforms!" "Push Forward Democracy!" and "Oppose Corruption!" Zhao mentioned that some people were using students to create turmoil, but he added that "this is only a tiny minority, but we must always be on guard against them. I believe that the majority of students understand the point as well." Based on this evaluation, Zhao predicted that "At this point, some students in Beijing and a few other cities are still demonstrating, but I firmly believe that the situation will gradually quiet down. China will not run into a large-scale turmoil." Although the speech also used the word "turmoil," its basic tone was totally different from the April 26 *People's Daily* editorial.

The Rise of the Hunger Strike

Zhao's May 4th speech has been treated as a sign of open conflict among top state elites. After the repression, Li Peng and Chen Xitong also accused Zhao of encouraging the student movement, and emphasized their own struggles with

Zhao (Chen 1989). There is no doubt that different opinions and conflicts existed among top state elites. However, this should not lead us to deny the fact that Zhao's May 4th speech at the time was well received among top state elites, including those who were commonly identified as conservatives. For example, Yang Shangkun praised Zhao's speech in front of Xu Jiatun (1993, 373). According to Zhao (1994b) himself, even Li Peng was positive about the speech: "After the speech was made, it was widely praised for a period of time. . . . Comrade Li Peng also told me that it was a very good speech and that in his meeting with the Asian Bank delegates he would make a speech concurrent with mine." Li (1989) did as he had told Zhao he would. The next day, when he met with the Asian Development Bank delegates, he made the following comment: "(Our) government has adopted certain correct, proper, and calm measures in dealing with the movement, which prevented its further development. This is the result of mutual efforts of the government and students, including both those who did and those who did not participate in the demonstrations."

Despite their differences, the top state elites still had a certain consensus at this stage. They had the consensus because on the one hand none of them wanted to see military repression to happen, and on the other hand the success of the April 27 demonstration had made any verbal intimidation useless. Between military repression and verbal intimidation, the only choice was concession. At this stage no top state elites were very clear about the consequences of halfway concession. Therefore, most of them, including Deng Xiaoping, at least wanted to put up with Zhao if his move could bring an end to the movement.[13] Yet, the top state elites did clearly differ over how much they were willing to compromise. While Zhao inclined toward going as far as to openly change the verdict of the April 26th *People's Daily* editorial, the majority of state leaders definitely were not willing to take that step.[14] The nature of the consensus made Zhao's action a gamble. Zhao lost badly because of the hunger strike.

There are two opposing views on the origin of the hunger strike. After the repression of the movement, the government asserted that Zhao's May 4 speech encouraged radical students and induced the hunger strike (Chen 1989). On the other hand, some activists insisted that it was the government that provoked the hunger strike. They claimed that government leaders including Zhao only intended to buy the time to let the movement die out and then take revenge on students. In reality, neither was the case. Zhao's May 4 speech in itself certainly did not escalate the movement. Nor did most Beijing students think that the government was provoking them.

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[13] As it was revealed in Zhao's letter (Zhao 1994b, p. 10), Deng still supported Zhao when Zhao and Yang Shangkun reported to Deng on May 13. According to Dittmer (1989, p. 7), Zhao went to see Deng in May and Deng was reported to have said that "the most important thing you should do is to stabilize the situation. . . . If the situation is under control, you can implement your plans if they prove feasible, disregarding whatever I have said."

[14] For example, on May 4, when Zhao Ziyang discussed with Li Peng on the change of the verdict of the April 26 *People's Daily* editorial, Li rejected the idea (Zhao 1994b, p. 11).

In fact, most Beijing students were satisfied with Zhao's speech. The view that the government concession was a conspiracy was actually created by a few activists in order to see the movement last.[15] After May 4, all the universities in Beijing, with the exception of Beijing University and Beijing Normal University, gradually resumed class. Even in these two universities, the movement was no longer a major concern. By May 9 and 10, in Beijing University the radical students needed to picket in front of classrooms to stop other students from attending classes (Wang 1992, 77). An informant who was also a hunger strike initiator told me that they had to start the hunger strike to boost the movement because the movement had lost its momentum while they were still not satisfied with Zhao's speech.[16] In short, the government's concessive measures, including Zhao's speech, were highly successful and the hunger strike was a reaction to that success.

The fact that government concession pushes a few activists to act more radically is not news, but a routine. In the United States during the 1960s, after limited state policy adjustments for civil rights, the Vietnam War, and student campus life, the majority also turned away from the New Left Movement. This drove a few radicals (e.g., the Weathermen) to adopt more radical strategies. But in the United States, when a few students went radical, the whole society further turned away from them (Braungart and Braungart 1992; Gitlin 1980). In China, however, an originally highly unpopular hunger strike soon drew the support of almost all the urban population.[17] Why?

Again, the key lies in the perception of state legitimacy by students and Beijing residents. As conditions to end the hunger strike, the hunger strikers set two demands, i.e. to hold substantive and concrete dialogues with the Dialogue Delegation and to render a formal positive evaluation of the student movement. The first demand was easier to accept. Before the hunger strike was announced, the Dialogue Delegation and the government already had many contacts (Huigu yu Fansi 1993, 82–3). Before the news of the hunger strike spread out, Xiang Xiaoji, the head of the Dialogue Delegation, also told one of my informants that a dialogue between the government and the Delegation had been scheduled for May 15. The problem was the second demand. On the surface, it seems that Zhao's May 4th speech almost had done what the students demanded, but the radical students also wanted the government to formally denounce the April 26th *People's Daily* editorial, which the government would

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[15] For example, one teacher went to Chai Ling and told her (Huigu yu Fansi 1993, p. 90): "I am a party member. I have received many letters from friends outside Beijing. We are all worried that you will be confused by Zhao Ziyang's talk. The government just wants to calm you down and then to catch you in one net."

[16] Chai Ling had a similar account on the origin of the hunger strike (Han and Hua 1990, p. 197).

[17] The hunger strike advocates eventually only mobilized around 300 hunger strikers (compared with the 200,000 students in Beijing). Most students, including most leaders of the newly emerged Autonomous Student Union, were all initially against the idea of a hunger strike.

not do. Most top state elites knew that although most students joined the movement out of grievances against various social problems, the central theme of the movement was pro-democracy and anti-establishment. Therefore, to formally acknowledge the movement would immediately give a "disloyal opposition" a legal status. When the force of "disloyal opposition" operates on an aggrieved population, the only outcome is a domino effect – the government makes one concession after another until it totally collapses, similar to what had happened in Eastern European countries. Since most top state elites were still strongly committed to the ideological legitimacy of the regime, there was no way that they would concede to the second demand.

A hunger strike is unlike other forms of demonstration, such as a class boycott. The state can tolerate a class boycott without accepting the boycotters' demands. For a hunger strike, people are going to die if their conditions are not met. As mentioned before, the Chinese during the late 1980s cared a great deal about the regime's moral and economic performance, not its ideological commitment. Moreover, their hearts were naturally inclined toward the students due to their grievances with the recent economic crisis. The people cared much less about what demands the hunger strikers made than about how the state would deal with the hunger strike. They would be very upset to see the hunger strikers' health conditions deteriorating. Therefore, the hunger strike also posed a moral challenge to the regime. Since the only way that the state could end this hunger strike was to concede to students' demands, which the state would never do, the hunger strike cornered the state. The hunger strike was a highly effective action because it challenged the regime ideologically as well as morally, and thus fundamentally. The hunger strike also turned the movement into a zero-sum moral crusade.

Intensification of Power Struggle Among Top State Elites

Before May 15, government officials tried to negotiate with students and even directly appealed to students at Tiananmen Square to end the hunger strike for the sake of the Sino-Soviet summit. The hunger strikers, however, refused to leave. On May 15, Gorbachev arrived in Beijing. Many activities of this historic visit had to be cancelled because of the Tiananmen Square occupation. Meanwhile, the number of hunger strikers expanded to over 3,000. As students' health conditions deteriorated, more and more people went to the Square to show moral support and to urge the government to negotiate with the hunger strikers. Even the traditionally loyal elements of the regime, such as the All China Federation of Trade Unions and the Communist Youth League Central Committee, joined the demonstrations. By May 17 and 18, the number of demonstrators was well above a million on each day.

The interruption of Gorbachev's state visit made Zhao Ziyang's strategy increasingly unpopular among top state leaders. Moreover, since students would

not go away without an acceptance of the two demands, the top state elites had to make a clear-cut decision right away. Now, the leadership conflict intensified.

On the night of May 16, the standing members of the politburo held an emergency meeting.[18] In that meeting, Zhao argued for a direct change of verdict of the April 26 *People's Daily* editorial. On the other hand, Li Peng and Yao Yilin insisted that further concession would only lead to more demands and chaos. The meeting lasted till early the next morning with no decision. The only result was a written speech read by Zhao Ziyang in the May 17 morning news. The speech positively evaluated students' patriotic enthusiasm. It appealed to students to stop the hunger strike for the sake of their own health, and to withdraw from the Square. It also promised that the government would never punish movement leaders, and that the government would still hold dialogues with students after their withdrawal. However, students were not moved.

Since the first meeting was inconclusive, another meeting was scheduled at Deng Xiaoping's home late at night on May 17. Yang Shangkun and Li Xiannian attended the meeting as well. Deng Xiaoping started with a very brief remark: "The situation can no longer last like this.[19] What should we do? Do we still have some leeway, and how much concession do we still need to make?" After Deng's remark, Yang Shangkun added (Wu 1989, 390): "This is the last dam of a reservoir. The government would collapse if we make further concession." When Zhao Ziyang started to talk, he still advocated further concession. At this point Yao Yilin took out a note and started to accuse Zhao. Zhao fought back with his own reasoning. The meeting again lasted for several hours. Eventually they had to take a vote to decide whether or not to employ martial law. Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili were against the idea while Li Peng, Yao Yilin, and Qiao Shi supported it.[20] Therefore, the motion to employ martial law was approved.

A comment must be added that martial law might have been employed even if the standing members of the politburo did not endorse it. After the hunger strike, almost all of the veterans that I listed in Table 1 rushed back to Beijing. They were all strongly against further concession. With their power and influence in the CCP, they would be able to mobilize the troops anyway without the politburo's approval. Yet, a formal approval certainly gained great legitimacy for the action among state elites.

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[18] Old veterans, mainly Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen and Wang Zhen, had urged the Central Committee to hold this meeting. They all believed that any further concession would inevitably lead to a total collapse of the regime (Yang 1990). Their view had a strong influence on the meetings of standing members of the politburo in the following days.

[19] Here, the situation may refer both to situations at Tiananmen Square and the divided opinions among the standing members of the politburo.

[20] This chapter adopts Gao Xin's account on the meeting (Gao 1995). Chen Yizi (1990a, p. 161) and Yang Shangkun (1990) had slightly different accounts on the vote. Zhao disappeared from the scene after May 19.

What can we conclude from this section? First, the struggle among top state elites did intensify in this period. However, the conflicts were less between two factions than between Zhao Ziyang and the rest of top elites. Therefore, Zhao was easily defeated. Secondly, the struggle was not so much between conservatives and reformers than between different estimates over further concession. While Zhao still believed that by further concession the movement could be contained as a "loyal opposition,"[21] the rest of top state elites, including many of his early supporters such as Yang Shangkun and Qiao Shi, thought that the regime would collapse with one more concession.[22] Finally, the state's shifting back to hardline strategies (even though achieved through a power struggle) reflected more of the nature of the state and state–society relations in China than of the factionalist nature of the government. Differently put, the state turned to a hardline approach because it lacked a mechanism to institutionalize elements of loyal oppositions while marginalizing the radicals.

Martial Law and Military Crackdown

On the night of May 19, over 100,000 soldiers started to move to Beijing. Most Beijing residents were extremely upset by martial law. They believed that the soldiers were going to hurt the students when they reached Tiananmen Square. Thus, they started a popular resistance to protect students. However, at this stage both the top state elites and the troops were actually not ready for military repression. The top state elites still hoped to end the movement without bloodshed,[23] and the soldiers, except for the 38th and 27th group armies from

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[21] Loyal opposition has been considered a key to the stability of democracy. However, the essence of the idea is that the stability of any political system lies in the fact that rival political forces accept the same set of value system and compete only along normative aspects of politics. The concept is an extension of the British idea of "Her Majesty's opposition." See, for example, Linz and Stepan (1978, chap. 2).

[22] In a meeting on May 22, Qiao Shi said (Wu 1989, pp. 392–393): "For over a month, the movement is continuously escalating. In the process, we have been restrained and tolerant. We have accepted all that the student leaders had demanded so long as the concessions did not forfeit our basic principles. . . . In short, at every step they had many opportunities to extricate themselves from the situation. I have for a long time believed that we can no longer concede. The only problem is to find a proper way to end the situation. If one more concession can solve the problem, we have made the concession already. It is indeed a no-way-out situation."

[23] Two pieces of information support this argument. First, Qiao Shi's speech at the May 22 emergency meeting more or less told the top state elites' hope for an ideal solution at this stage (Wu 1989, pp. 392–3): "We do not want conflict and bloodshed. . . . Right now, the most ideal way to evacuate Tiananmen Square was to use the army as a deterrent force, and then to rely on the coordinated effort of police, school authorities and parents. This is the best solution if it works. The reason that this movement has lasted so long is exactly because we do not want to end it by using force and do not want bloodshed." Second, at this stage most soldiers were unarmed. They also did not attempt to force their way through when stopped by Beijing residents.

Beijing Military Region, were deployed in a hurry. Most soldiers did not even know the purpose of the whole action. As a result, the Beijing residents easily stopped the incoming troops. On May 22, after 2 days of stalemate, the government ordered the troops to withdraw.

Since the troops were unable to enter Beijing peacefully, the only solution available except for accepting students' demands was to order the troops to advance at any cost. The order did not come early mainly because things were not quite ready. First, at the early stage of martial law, although most senior military commanders generally supported the decision, the majority of lower level commanders and soldiers were definitely not ready to fight their way into Tiananmen Square by force. The government had to further unify them. Second, the top state elites also needed to gain support and understanding of other state officials for military repression. After May 22, Yang Shangkun, Chen Yun, and Peng Zhen respectively met with military leaders, veterans, and non-communist elites. With powerful figures speaking in concert, more and more lower level leaders openly expressed their support for martial law in newspapers.

During this period, the state officials through various channels also frequently contacted student leaders to persuade (or threaten) them to withdraw from the Square voluntarily. Let me list some accounts by student leaders as examples. Deng Pufang, son of Deng Xiaoping, sent his associates to Beijing University. They told student leader Chang Jing that if students withdrew voluntarily from the Square and no longer insisted on going against martial law and openly denouncing the April 26 *People's Daily* editorial, Deng Pufang could persuade Deng Xiaoping to resign after everything was over (Huigu yu Fansi 1993, 265, 292). Also, according to Li Lu (1990, 179), on May 26 a representative of Li Peng and the whole Politburo went to Tiananmen Square to persuade students to leave. According to Zhang Boli (1994), another major movement leader, the last contact between student leaders and the government was made on the afternoon of May 30 at Beijing Hotel. Li Lu and Zhang Boli went to the meeting. No agreement was reached. Eventually, the government representatives warned that students must return to the university as soon as possible because the army was going to clear up the Square very soon. These efforts show that even after martial law, the government still tried to avoid bloody repression. This was not because some of them were reformers, but rather because everyone knew the potential cost of military repression.

By late May, less radical students felt exhausted and left Tiananmen Square, but new comers from outside Beijing continuously filled in. The whole process, therefore, allowed the Square to be constantly controlled by a group of radical students who refused to leave (Zhao 2001, ch.6). Thus, the Martial Law Headquarters ordered the second advance. Again, the army met with strong resistance from Beijing residents. The whole process was disturbingly violent. However, with a resolute order from the central government, the troops, which were now better prepared, fought their way to Tiananmen Square. More than four

hundred people died during the repression and thousands more were wounded (Brook 1992, chap. 6; Ding 1994). The movement ended tragically.

Why would students and Beijing residents ignore harsh warnings from the government and risk their lives to resist the martial law troops?[24] Many factors came into play. For example, during the movement the state had used hardliner strategies several times. Each time, however, the government backed off when movement participants defied them. Since one has already played chicken several times, one tends to be expected to play it again. Several informants told me that even after some people in the crowd were shot down, they still believed that the government dared not to repress the movement by bloody means. They believed that those people who fell down around them were hit by rubber bullets and thus showed no fear for a while. But the key here is not that the government had tried to hide the repression as private information as Deng (1997) has argued. In fact, as I have described before, the government had tried very hard to convey to students that repression was pending. However, students and Beijing residents simply did not respond to the message. Now, again, I shall explain it by state–society relations centered on sources of state legitimacy.

As stated before, when Zhao Ziyang's concessive strategies failed to work, the government had to go back to a hardline approach. However, this time they could not use ideological means because the April 26 *People's Daily* editorial had proved not only useless, but also provocative to the students. Between ideology and military repression, the only measure that the government could rely on was to sanction the movement by legal means, this time martial law. The problem is that, in the past, top state elites treated laws not as part of the social contract to which they were also subject, but as a tool that could be used to advance ideological programs or even for personal purposes. Therefore, legal practices and interpretation of laws were frequently changing according to ideological current, and the authority of laws diminished when the ideological legitimacy of the state declined. Understandably, under this legal tradition martial law was neither able to convince the people nor convey a clear message as the basis for opposition forces to make a rational calculation. In the end, it was as counterproductive as the *People's Daily* editorial.

By now, all the control measures that the government had tried failed. The only measure left was brutal military repression. There was hardly anyone among the top state elites, be they the so-called reformers or conservatives, who wanted to see it happen. Yet, ironically this appeared to be the only effective method that the regime could use to stop the wave of large-scale mobilizations with an anti-establishment core. It could still be implemented because by the end of the 1980s most top state-elites, including most senior military commanders, were still committed to a revolution they had fought for decades, and in the meantime were still able to put soldiers under their firm control.

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[24] Before repression, the government continuously broadcast warnings that urged Beijing residents to stay at home for their own safety.

Summary

During the 1989 Movement, the government initially tolerated the movement and meanwhile tried to confine it to Hu Yaobang's mourning activities. After Hu's state funeral, the government policy shifted to a more hardline approach as indicated by the April 26 *People's Daily* editorial. When students successfully organized the April 27 demonstration that defied the editorial, the government came back with a soft strategy and tried to contain the movement through limited concession. However, on May 19, a week into the hunger strike, the government announced martial law and brought a mass of troops to Beijing, trying to scare the protestors away. When this did not work, military repression followed.

Hitherto, these policy changes and the consequent development of the movement have been explained as outcomes of factional struggles between reformers and conservatives in the Chinese government or a rational game between students and the state. Rather, an alternative interpretation better explains of the same process. I argue that while the existence of a power struggle among top state elites is a truism, the key factor underlying the state policy changes was the ineffectiveness of various state control measures as a result of conflicting perceptions of state legitimacy in the minds of top state elites, the movement activists, and the rest of Beijing populations. The logic of this chapter is that each state control measure needs a legitimacy base in order to be effective. During the 1980s, while the majority of top state elites still believed in the ideological legitimacy of the regime, most students and Beijing residents evaluated the state mainly on the basis of its economic and moral performance. During the movement, the students challenged the government ideologically and morally, and society sympathized with the challenges. On the other hand, the government relied either on ideological or legal dimensions of the state authority to deal with the movement, which only antagonized Beijing students and residents, or on a limited concession to contain an essentially "disloyal opposition," which could not satisfy the radicals. In the end, the only viable alternative appeared to be military repression, on which the government could still rely because most top state elites including military leaders had joined the CCP between 1920s and 1940s and still perceived the state power as ideologically legitimate.

This paper also intends to make two contributions to the analysis of social movement in general. First, a social movement develops in continuous interactions among the movement participants as well as between the movement activists and the state. The dynamics of a movement and its final outcomes, as this paper shows, are often shaped by some patterned interactions between movement activists and the state. However, after the 1970s most writings on social movements and revolutions tend to explain their rise and outcome in terms of some categorical differences such as the strength of organizations, amount of resources and availability of structured opportunities. Although

studies of collective actions in North America started with interactive approaches (Blumer 1946; Turner and Killian 1987), few recent works have tried to understand a social movement through the patterned interactions between movement activists and their opponents. This paper tries to move the focus of our analysis into this direction. Second, social movement frame has been one of the most important sub-fields in the collective action studies. Yet, while most frame analysis scholars so far tend to focus on the strategic framing of movement organizers, this paper emphasizes the importance of emotions in the framing process and shifted the focus from the framing activities of movement organizers to how structural conditions shape people's "schemata of interpretation" and make some framing activities more effective than others. We believe that this shift of focus is absolutely necessary for the analysis of social movements in regimes where people are still poorly organized and social movements are more likely to proceed in a more spontaneous fashion.

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Institutionalized Official Hostility and Protest Leader Logic: A Long-Term Chinese Peasants Collective Protest at Dahe Dam in the 1980s

Jun Jin

Since the Reform started in 1978 China has witnessed a dramatic rise of grassroots resistance. The state has responded with considerable urgency to contain the spread of grassroots protests (General Office of CCP Central Committee & General Office of the State Council 1998). Researchers have explored the scale, social range, and geographic distribution of protest (Diao 1996; Tanner 2001). Scholarship of Chinese grassroots resistance examines the incidence and nature of violent protest and the traditional resources available for collective action (Perry 1984, 2001), the state's strategies in handling expanding grassroots protests (Tanner 2001), the institutional structure systematically transforming individual behaviors into collective actions (Zhou 1993), the spatial arrangements for urban mobilization (Zhao 2001), and policy-based contentions and rightful resistance in rural area (Rightful resistance is a concept created by O'Brien) (O'Brien and Li 1995; Li and O'Brien 1996; O'Brien 1996). However, scholarship has failed to conduct case studies and to explore the local political environment and internal dynamics of grass root activism. Knowledge of the local political environment is the key to understanding the emergence of activism across China. Important issues must be addressed including the factors shaping the attitudes of local officials toward protest in the 1980s and how the response of officials shaped the goals, strategies, repertoires, and internal organizational structure of grassroots protest organizations.

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The Politics of Grassroots Protest in Post-Mao China

The timing and fate of collective actions are largely dependent on the shifting national political opportunity structure as well as the local cultural context (Tarrow 1996; Broadbent 1998). In order to understand the dynamics and trajectories of grassroots collective action in contemporary China, we have to first explore its unique political opportunity structure.

After rising to power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) transformed China's political, economic, and social structure. Based on a redistributive economy the state distributed and controlled scarce resources. The Chinese state dominated its citizens' everyday life during the Mao era through rural agricultural collectivization and the establishment of urban work-unit (*danwei*) system (Sun 1994). There was no the "public" as a check on the states behavior.

During the Mao-era it became impossible to challenge the exploitive policies or abusive officials through the juridical system.[1] With the establishment of the "People's Democratic Dictatorship," China did not have independent juridical system (Liu 1998). Mass political movements initiated by the central government – such as the Great Culture Revolution – provided opportunities for individuals to express their discontents relatively freely (Zhou 1993; Liu 1998), but once these movements ended, individuals lost their rights to criticize. In Maoist China, appealing to higher authorities within the government was the only legitimate means for citizens to express their discontent against an official. However, this approach was not institutionalized and in most Chinese administrative agencies there was no exclusive office to handle grassroots grievances.

The Institutionalized Approach in Lodging Complaints

With the reforms in post-Mao China, the opportunity to voice grievances changed significantly. At the end of 1970s, the CCP established a "Complaint Office" (*xingfang bangongshi*). These offices were established at the levels of both party and governmental administrations (except commune, the lowest formal administration unit at that time) to deal with grassroots grievances and complaints resulting from the Cultural Revolution.[2] The Institution of People Lodging Complaint (*renmin xinfang zhidu*) permitted citizens a legal

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[1] Administrative Procedure Law became effective in 1990.

[2] There are five levels of government in China top-down: central government, province, prefecture, county, and township. Before the administrative system reform in rural China in the early 1980s, commune was the equivalent of township authority.

channel to voice their grievances against higher-level authorities and even the central government (Diao 1996; General Office of the CPC Central Committee 1992). Through this institution, the state attempted to control grassroots discontent by normalizing and standardizing the grievance process.

According to the regulations of the complaints office (*xingfang tiaoli*) (State Council 1995), there are two ways to formally lodge complaints including letters (*xinfang*), or visiting a complaint officer (*zoufang*). These complaints could be filed individually or collectively (Diao 1996). In general, complaint offices give priority to visit-complaints over letter-complaints and collective complaints over individual ones. Most complaints are lodged by individuals in contemporary China. Collective complaints of over one hundred people are more effective in pressuring authorities and are taken more seriously by state officials. The most effective complaint is a mass collective complaint with the methods of visiting complaint offices (Ying 2001).

The institution gathering complaints not only attempts to categorize complaints, it also standardizes the strategy for both for complainants and officials. Complainants are first required to lodge complaints with supervisors and officials who have authority over the targeted official and to make subsequent appeals to higher officials. This procedure enables the state to control the process of lodging complaints. In reality many complainants violate this regulation by directly appealing at higher-level authorities. That is called "bypass the immediate leadership to lodge complaint (*yuji shangfang*)." Both processes of collectively lodging complaints and bypassing the immediate leadership impinge on the state's effort to normalize and routinize grassroots grievance. Both central and local authorities view these types of complaints as a potential threat to local stability (General Office of the CPC Central Committee 1992). The central government has been more supportive of this process than local authorities.[3]

In most cases, higher officials will either ask for the results of the investigation or reopen the case. Because of the prevalence of this response, most complaints are settled by the immediate higher authority of the accused officials.[4] In the small number of cases that officials deem a priority to settle, they send an investigation work team, led by its own officials, to the field to reinvestigate accused local officials and finalize a solution.

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[3] Ying (2001) implies that central government would welcome grassroots lodging complaints under some circumstances. For example, involvement in a grassroots complaint provides the central government a unique opportunity to penetrate into local politics, especially in Reform era where local authorities become more and more autonomous so that central government has more difficulties to directly intervene into local issues. Kuhn (1990) also discusses how the central government (in his case, the emperor) tried to control local officials more effectively by deliberate balancing routine and exception in the operation of bureaucracy.

[4] That is one reason why many protesters always get the similar, unsatisfied results even if they lodge their complaints to central government.

Local Officials' Institutionalized Response

According to the Chinese Constitution and the Institution of People Lodging Complaints, individuals have the right to lodge complaints against the alleged wrongdoing, corruption, and incompetence of local officials. Higher-level authorities have the obligation to protect complainants from any possible retaliation for filing their grievances. However, people face difficulties in filing complaints. Local officials generally hold a hostile attitude toward grassroots' efforts to lodge complaints and view collective complaints as particularly threatening (Ying and Jin 1999). In many cases, local officials have utilized all methods to stop lodging complaints and silence grassroots voices in their jurisdictions (Diao 1996). Local officials' hostility to lodging complaints has been institutionalized.

Local officials fear that higher authorities will send teams to formally investigate the complaints. If the accusation is proven, local officials may face punishments ranging from administrative disciplinary measures to removal from office, or even imprisonment. While the official investigations of local officers rarely occur, the filing of complaints and the prospects of investigation remain threatening to local officials. In post-Mao China, a principal concern of local officials is to maintain local stability. Various forms of grassroots resistance, such as collectively lodging complaints, are viewed by local officials as elements that undermine local stability. The state treats grassroots lodging complaints as serious social problem (General Office of CCP Central Committee & General Office of the State Council 1998). When local complaints are lodged, local officials are frequently criticized by their supervisors for incompetent performance and their subsequent promotions are threatened. Supervisors often utilize the frequency of grassroots complaints as one important gauge to evaluate local officials' proficiency (Diao 1996). Grassroots collective lodging of complaints against local officials therefore seriously threatens these local officials' political career, even if the accusation is proven false.

Lodging local complaints can also be viewed as a threat to the administrative system as a whole. Both local and higher-level officials are afraid that the success of previous lodging complaints will encourage more in the future (Ying 2001). In rural China where the state overpowers peasants and social check on officials' behaviors hardly exists, filing grievances is particularly threatening. Failed grassroots lodging of complaint might serve as a deterrent to prevent future complainants. If the cost of lodging complaint is considerably high and the probability of success is relatively low, many discontented peasants might choose not to voice their grievances. A failed lodging complaint therefore could decrease the likelihood of complaints in the future. Consequently, local officials are unwilling to be cooperative in dealing with lodging complaint. Increasing the cost of lodging complaint became a routine strategy for local authority to discourage grassroots protest.

Officials typically use two strategies to increase the cost of lodging complaint: delay in response and deterrent (directly or indirectly) on complainants. Officials'

deliberate delay, or so-called crossing the ball (*ti piqiu*), namely sending the protester from one office to another without any substantive response. This delay significantly increases the cost of protest, thereby decreasing the frequency of grassroots protests. Consequently, protesters have to invest additional energy, time, and resources. The high cost effectively dissuades many potential complainants from action (Ying and Jin 1999). This official strategy works well in halting single complaints, but is less effective in collective mass complaints.

Collective complaints are more urgent and more noticeable. While local officials can try to halt complainants through the use of threats and punishment, these deterrent strategies face two limitations: local officials must abide by the governments administrative procedures in filing complaints, and they cannot punish all participants. When employing a deterrent strategy, local officials must be prudent in selecting the target, methods, and timing.

Isolating complainants and negatively sanctioning them are strategies routinely utilized by local officials when dealing with collective complaint. Generally, in each grievance, there are several activists acting as initiators and organizers. Without them, the collective lodging complaint would not function. Punishing these initiators and organizers therefore is an efficient approach to deter or halt collective action. In many cases, removing protest leaders through punishment will end collective action immediately (Li and O'Brien 1996). This official strategy of isolating complaints coincides with the populist discourse that has been constructed by the CCP (based on Marxism ideology) favoring collectivist efforts over individual grievances. According to the populist discourse, the state should be in harmony with the people and conflict should not exist. Once grassroots resistance appears, it constantly results from intentional actions of a small group of individuals, which are called "evildoers" ("*huai fenzi*", the literal meaning is bad elements). Equipped with the populist discourse, local officials can label these complaint initiators and organizers as evildoers and isolate them from the majority of "good people." This strategy of stigmatizing complaints as "evildoers" is deemed by government officials as legitimate and therefore totally legal.

While effectively isolating people who pursue grievances, local officials still have trouble sanctioning them for their involvement in lodging complaints. Violating the government mandated means for lodging complaints could be deemed as a severe offense by local officials. Instead, local officials usually choose to punish complainants on other charges. Local official's advantaged position within the political and social structure often makes this strategy possible.

In post-Mao China the state continues to effectively penetrate into the everyday lives of individuals. Compared to peasants, local officials are in powerful positions, controlling scarce resources. Moreover, during the Reform period, the state attempts to "tackle a social problem in a comprehensive way (*shehui wenti zonghe zhili*)." This systematic state project to solve social problems required the cooperation of all administrative agencies (Ying 2001). In practice, this policy entitled local authority to mobilize all resources, including police, court, and prosecutor, to deal with one collective complaint. This policy

strengthens local officials' already advantaged position. They could easily sanction these "evildoers" for seemingly unrelated offences. For example, the birth control (or family plan) policy could be utilized to target individuals filling grievances against public officials. Birth control policy is only one of numerous justifications which local officials could take advantage of in negative sanctioning important complainants.

With right target and feasible justification, local officials are prudent in regard to the intensity of their deterrent strategy. The relation between the intensity of official repression and the frequency of collective resistance is not a linear one. Within a certain range, increased repression could not decrease, but boost the frequency of resistance.[5] A cruel repression, such as throwing few complainants into prison, could dismiss one collective action immediately without any counteraction. Nonetheless, this operation is too risky for local officials, because good local officials should not be too aggressive and too hasty. Facing this limitation, local officials have to choose softer methods. However, a softer punishment on resistance leadership might not stop, but escalate the conflict and resistance activity. Escalation of grassroots resistance is more likely when the leadership of protesters is unified and competent. Escalation would be a big failure for local officials for destabilizing the local community.

The timing in implementing a deterrent strategy is crucial for local authorities. Given the possibility of escalation, the safest strategy for local authorities is to immediately halt major grievance complaints by targeting the concerns of a select number of minor grievances and separating them from the community. In this strategy of providing concessions, local officials concede to protesters to resolve some "real problems (shiji wenti)". Once the majority of protesters are partially satisfied, it becomes easier to isolate protest leaders from their followers. Protest leaders could then be selectively targeted and punished after the protest has disintegrated. Escalation is impossible when resistance does not exist and grievances filed against local officials disappear.

Selective compromises offered by local officials are frequently regarded as acceptable solutions. Compromises with select groups or individuals serve to halt a collective grievance. "To balance the books after the autumn harvest (qiu hou suan zhang)" is one old Chinese saying, implying officials do not settle accounts with the leadership or the masses until one political movement ends. For local officials, one way to prevent future protests is by offering compromises to stop the current protest and then to deter the local people from raising further grievances by subsequently punishing protest leaders.

In reality, the effectiveness of local official strategy to halt grievances also depends on the interaction between complainants, activists, and the concerned public. Because the government actions to repress activists often seem disconnected to the grievance, its impact of future activism depends on the capacity of

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[5] Western research indicates that, "the relationship between repression (x-axis) and the extent of political violence (y-axis) corresponds to a reversed U-curve." (Opp and Roehl 1990, pp. 522)

the activists to mobilize and organize their followers in the concerned public. When the protest leadership is effective, it is more likely to convince protest participants that government officials are working to undermine collective action.

Collective Protest at Dahe Dam[6]

An example of grassroots collective protest illustrating the local governments' response to collective action occurred in Sichuan Province. At the end of 1960s, Wanshan Prefecture government planned to construct a hydroelectric dam on the Pengxi River with a generation capacity of 12,000 kW. Shanyang Commune was chosen as the construction seat. The construction began in 1970 and was completed in 1978, 3 years after its targeted completion date. The project was mired in design problems and cost overruns.[7] The actual cost of this medium-size hydroelectricity plant was about 40 million yuan (8 million US dollars), while the original budget was only 12.5 million yuan. When the dam was completed, a new reservoir appeared upstream, inundating more than 4500 *mu* (about 1,920 acres) of cultivated land, which effected about five thousand peasants, most of them belonged to three communes: Shanyang (downstream), Puxi, and Xunlu (upstream) (Jin and Ying 1998).

Like the ill-planned construction, the resettlement was problematic. In Maoist China, these relocatees, as individuals, had no right to negotiate with the state about the compensation for their land loss. All they could do was to accept the compensation set by officials, which was insufficient to recover their loss.[8] Moreover, the designers of Dahe Dam project had underestimated the impact on the flooded area upstream. Over the years this area has deteriorated with heavy sediment deposits. Government officials overlooked the probability of land loss downstream from the dam where farmland along riverbank actually

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[6] From 1997 to 1998, with Xing Ying, I conducted in-depth interviews with 15 protest activists and 9 former officials who dealt with the protest. In our fieldwork, we also gained access to official documents from three levels of authorities: townships, counties, and prefecture authority. Moreover, we also acquired copies of hundreds of grassroots documents kept by several protest activists, including the petitions, minutes of protest leadership meetings, and one activist's working dairy, which recorded the protest's activities in 2 years in details.

[7] Like many Chinese dams and reservoirs constructed in Cultural Revolution, Dahe Hydroelectric Dam project was not well planed. During the Culture Revolution, many intellectuals, including the experts of hydroelectric dam, were sent down to countryside. The qualified engineers were replaced by the workers of construction projects and inexperienced young students who were studying in colleges or even high school. According to the first director of this construction project, in the beginning of the construction, there even was not a completed blueprint of this project. One popular slogan in that time was "(workers are) constructing while (engineers are) designing as well as (the hydroelectric plant are) operating." As a result, the design of this project had been modified several times during the 8-year-construction.

[8] Some Chinese scholars call this type resettlement as "administrative migration" to distinguish it from the resettlement in 1990's in which relocatee could get much more compensation. The latter is called "compensation migration" (Cheng 1996).

was severely flooded. Officials did nothing to avoid or alleviate the damage and did not plan for any compensation to peasants and communities adversely impacted downstream. The relocatees' living standard degraded significantly due to the loss of land and insufficient compensation. In some villages, the average land loss accounted for almost two-thirds of all the land. The grain yield of the remaining land was not sufficient to make a living. The shadow of famine haunted these villages.

Adding to the difficulties of the Dahe Dam relocatees was the government's policy of allocating the limited relocation funds to communes, rather than direct compensation to relocatees. Commune authorities, responsible for the distribution of compensation, misappropriated more than one-half the funds to public investment, such as small factories, shops, and transformer substations. The official explanation for these misappropriations was that the funds were communal resources because the flooded land was collective property. Since the Dahe Dam relocatees were only a small proportion of the peasants in the whole commune, they had to share the relocation fund with others.

In general, the two most crucial problems in the resettlement of Dahe Dam were (1) the land loss was underestimated by the prefecture authority and the actual compensation for land loss therefore was even lower than state's tight-fisted standard; and (2) even the inadequate compensation was not fully distributed to relocatees. Most relocatees believed that serious corruption transpired among commune officials.

The Emergence of Collective Protest

There were two periods when the relocatees' of the Dahe Dam expressed their grievances: from 1975 to 1981 when relocatees informed village cadres and asked supervisor officials for help; and from 1982 to 1990 when relocatees collectively protested against local officials. In the first period, after the rise of the river and flooding of the dam, relocatees began to ask village cadres, leaders of production team, and production brigade,[9] to solicit supplementary compensation for their land loss. The organizers wrote reports and visited higher-level authorities. By the end of the 1970s, the prefecture administration recognized the "unresolved problems,"[10] and decided to compensate the relocatees

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[9] In Maoist administration, two levels of organizations were under commune's control: production brigade and production team. The leaders of the two organizations are called "cadres." However, they are not formally officials, but still peasants. The most significant difference between leader of production team and commune official is that the former has no career advancement in general.

[10] "Unresolved problems (*yiliu wenti*)" mean problems that should have been resolved during, not after the settlements. Many "unresolved problems" become the direct or indirect origins of collective protests (Ying 2000; Jin 1998). Resolving "unresolved problems" became a semi-routine approach for government to run the country.

living upstream as well as downstream. Unfortunately, this compensation package was not distributed directly to every relocatee and commune officials misappropriated most of compensation. Relocatees were unaware of the compensation or concerned with official misappropriation until several years later.[11]

In 1982, a calamitous flood in the summer literally destroyed all the land around Dahe Dam and forced a good number of relocatees to become temporary beggars around the neighbor counties. Grassroots collective protests emerged separately in three communes: Shanyang, Puxi, and Xunlu. From 1982 to 1990, dozens of demonstrations took place at Dahe Dam and communes, counties, and prefecture governments. Hundreds of relocatees joined in collective protests and engaged in petition drives delivering dozens of copies of petitions to various administrative levels of the government.[12] In 1984, two protest delegates from Shanyang went to Beijing to lodge their complaints of the commune officials' corruption.[13] In early 1985, protesters in the three towns met to explore the possibility of lodging collective complaints. One year later, ten protest delegates from the three towns returned to Beijing where they unsuccessfully tried to demonstrate in Tiananmen Square. After a major compensation package in 1986, protests in the two upstream towns stopped, while protesters in Shanyang begun to plan a larger action. In 1987, after a half-year preparation and deliberate planning, more than two hundred protesters engaged in a sit-in at the Dahe Dam plant, occupying the dining hall for 3 days. Prefecture and county officials rushed to the site and were surrounded by hundreds of relocatees. County government mobilized armed police to disperse protesters and release the officials. Protest leaders deliberately orchestrated all activities to avoid breaking any laws and no one was arrested. After this event, collective protest gradually subsided in Shanyang. However, grassroots collective protests at Dahe had a dramatic ending in 1990, when a group of peasants from Shanyang illegally entered the hydroelectric plant and interrupted its operation. Seeking to repress the action, local authorities took a hard line approach and jailed three activists.

The goal of collective protests changed significantly during the second wave of activism in 1982 to 1990. During the first wave of protest, village cadres demanded extra monetary compensation for land loss, while collective protests after 1982 called for the investigation and punishment of corrupt commune officials.

All three protest groups were fairly successful in attaining government funded compensation packages for residents impacted by the dam. Under the pressure from collective protests the Wanshan prefecture authority repeatedly

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[11] Different interviewers confirmed that commune officials had not publicly announced the size of the compensation.

[12] We do not know the exact numbers of lodging complaint letters from Puxi and Xunlu. But we did collect around fifties petitions wrote by protesters in Shanyang in our fieldwork.

[13] Interview with Wang Xuping on December 14 and 21, 1997.

sent work teams to solve relocatees' problems. By 1984 and 1985 the prefecture authority had compensated relocatees twice. In early 1986, the Wanshan Prefecture authority sent out another work team led by a senior prefectural official. After 3 months of on-the-spot investigation, the work team finalized a compensation package that was the largest rewarded in the history of Sichuan Province. After the collective protests of the mid-1980s, relocatees' living standard increased significantly.

The focus of protesters changed significantly during the second wave of protest to target commune officials. Activists taking advantage of a favorable political opportunity structure were able to lodge formal complaints against local officials. Consequently, the tension between local officials and protesters turned into open confrontations between individual officials and protest delegates. However, in terms of successfully prosecuting corrupt local officials, all three protests failed. Authorities in the Wanshan Prefecture investigating local government officials' role in the resettlement of the Dahe Dam, failed to find evidence of individual corruption among local officials of the three communes and no prosecutions were garnered.

Protest Repertoires

Protestors at the Dahe Dam utilized three major protest repertoires: filing complaints through letters at the Institution of People Lodging Complaints, visiting officials, and the disruption of routine industry and government functions. The first two institutionalized repertoires surrounding the filing of complaints were used by the Dahe protesters in novel ways. The first repertoire was to simultaneously send numerous petitions to government agencies. For example from December 26th to 30th, 1982, six petitions were mailed to Yun County, Wanshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province, and the central government, requesting compensation for land loss and demanding criminal corruption investigation of commune officials.[14] The second innovative repertoire would file collective grievances in which several dozen protesters went to the prefecture authority together. In addition protest delegates went to central government authorities twice to forward their collective demands.

Among the three repertoires of collective actions, the third involving disruption of industry operations and official government functions proved to be the most effective strategy warranting a quick response from local authorities. This repertoire targeted both local authorities with agricultural tax evasion and the Dahe hydroelectric plant with sit-ins, occupation of the plants dining hall, and sabotaging of plant equipment or operations. With this highly effective tactic, protestors risked arrest and their fate was in the hand of local authorities. The Dahe case also shows that the boundary between illegal and legal action was

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[14] Register of lodging complaint office at Yun County, December 26, 27, 29, 30, 1982.

flexible and determined by the local authorities. Protestors occupied the Dahe hydroelectric plant and interrupted its operations in 1987 and 1990. While the government suppressed the protest in 1990 and jailed its leaders, no single protestor was arrested in 1987. Two factors – the national political context and the strength of each protest – contributed to the difference of official responses. First, in the wake of 1989 student movements, local authorities had stronger incentive to crash a collective action in 1990. Second, the protest in 1987 was better organized and orchestrated than the latter. Arresting its leaders was more likely to escalate the protest in 1987 than in 1990. The strength of protest depended on how well it was organized.

The Organization of the Protest Delegate Meeting

While the village cadres' appealed for financial compensation in first period, the new collective protests in the three communes had one crucial difference: the leadership. Instead of production team cadres, peasants came to the center of collective actions. (Footnote 10 explains the difference between production team cadres and commune officials. The former are still villagers, not formal officials and they do not have the similar opportunity of career advancement as commune officials). Moreover, an informal protest organization – Protest Delegate Meeting (*shang fang dai biao hui*) (PDM) – appeared in each commune and organized the protests. Composed by relocatee delegates, the structure of the PDM gradually became formalized.

Protest Leaders

Starting in 1982 in each of the three communes, several dozen peasants became delegates of relocatees and engaged in collective protest. Relocatee delegates took part in Protest Delegate Meeting. Three to five relocatee delegates became the core of leadership of the PDM. These protest leaders set goals and strategies for each collective action, drafted petitions, negotiated with officials, and distributed new compensation if any.[15] Most protest leaders were ordinary peasants with few exceptions (one primary school teacher and one retired worker). Some protest leaders were marginalized in their villages due to their activities during the Great Culture Revolution or their class background.[16]

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[15] In the fieldwork of Dahe, we found that almost every adult in relevant villages knew the chief leaders and their roles in the protest.

[16] At least two protest leaders (one in Shanyang, one in Xunlu) were important activists of Red Guards movement in Cultural Revolution. Another protest leader of Shanyang was born in a rich peasant family and lost his chance to join the CCP and enter college.

The first crucial goal of protest leaders in the Dahe Dam case was to link the unresolved problems of relocatees to the corrupt actions of commune officials. While the famine in 1982 caused great misery and hardship to the relocatees of the Dahe Dam project, protest leaders effectively attributed the miseries of suffered relocatees not to bad weather, bad luck, or bad personal fate, but to local officials' misappropriation and corruption. According to one protest leader of Shanyang, "Peasants became awakened at that time."[17] This successful attribution was developed by one of the most important protest leaders in Shanyang, Teacher Xu:[18]

> Why was your land flooded? Dahe Dam and Wanshan Prefecture aren't responsible for that. They have given our commune money to construct a dike (in the river) to protect our land. But commune officials didn't use the money to construct the dike. There was no dike to protect your land, and so your land was flooded. You should ask the commune officials to be responsible for your loss. And they will continue to steal your additional compensation, if any. So, in order to eradicate this crime, we have to accuse those corrupt rats.

This effective "framing" of grievances was replicated in the two upstream protests, following the collective protest in Shanyang. In the subsequent upstream protests occurring in 1983, Xie Mingquan, a protest leader from Xunlu, after hearing of the collective lodging complaint in Shanyang, decided to initiate protests in Xunlu (Jin and Ying 1998).

Two Types of Participations

Two different types of participants emerged in the collective protest at Dahe Dam: protest leaders who were conspicuous participants and followers who were inconspicuous participants.[19] Conspicuous participants were involved in face-to-face interaction and negotiations with the officials and demonstrating at the seats of local governments or at the Dahe Dam. The inconspicuous participants were not involved in face-to-face interaction with officials, but attended large rallies and donated to the protest organization. The inconspicuous

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[17] See interview with Wang Xuping on December 21, 1997. Also see meeting minutes of Shanyang Commune CCP committee on Jan 6, 1984.

[18] Teacher Xu's participation in collective protest seemed relatively by chance. After the flood, there was a rotation of cultivated land in his village. Teacher Xu believed his family should get more land than the village head actually gave him. Then he ploughed the reserve land of the village without any permit[18]. Many peasants followed him. The village head found the rotation of cultivation impossible under this situation. Therefore, he asked Shanyang commune authority to punish Teacher Xu. When relocatees asked for more compensation for their land loss resulting from Dahe Dam, commune officials told them the real cause of insufficient farmland was not flood but Teacher Xu's misbehaviors. It was one of the biggest mistakes commune officials had ever made.

[19] Jeff Broadbent suggested that I use the two concepts, conspicuous and inconspicuous participation.

participants were not subject to the institutionalized hostility from local officials, where as the conspicuous participants were much more likely to engage in conflicts with local officials.[20]

As high-risk participants, protest leaders had their own incentives and constraints, impacting their participation in collective protests. These incentives resulted in one particular action logic: protest leader logic, which influenced the internal dynamics of collective protests at the Dahe Dam, and consequently shaped the trajectories of these protests.

"Accusing an Official Means Fighting a Tiger"

Although the state institutionalized a process for lodging complaints, protesters still faced negative sanctions and numerous obstacles, such as local official's delay and deterrent strategies. In interviews of the Dahe protests protest leaders they recognized these risks, repeating an old Chinese saying, "Accusing an official means fighting a tiger (*gaoguan dahu*)." Several members of the ten-member delegation traveling to Beijing in 1986 prepared last will documents before their departure. In complaint letters filed with government officials, protest leaders aware of the obstacles and difficulties they faced stated, "If corrupt officials were not dismissed, our relocatees will never have peaceful day."

Facing this real threat, the protest leaders had two choices to protect themselves from potential negative sanction: (1) removing the accused officials from their offices; (2) mobilizing protesters to protect them. The first strategy would eliminate the ability of hostile officials to revenge protest leaders. However, in the Dahe case it was extremely difficult to persuade higher-level authorities to dismiss local officials. The first strategy was unfeasible because the prefecture authority denied any official corruption in the resettlement process.

Consequently, in Dahe Dam, protest leaders enlisted relocatees to help protect each other from official negative sanctions. By providing protection to the demonstrators against legal and bureaucratic sanctions, the Dahe Dam protest leaders believed that they could mobilize a larger number of peasants to fight against official threats. This would signal to local officials that arbitrary and capricious sanctions would lead to an escalation of local protest.

This second protest strategy proved effective in Shanyang when local officials selectively targeted protest leaders for violations of Chinese stringent birth control policies. The most important protest leaders in Shanyang, Teacher Xu,

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[20] Doug McAdam (1986) suggests that researchers should distinguish high-risk participation from low-risk participation. The two types of participations have different recruitment model and participants have different incentives. One inference from this theory is that in recruitment of high-risk participation, prior activity and strong and extensive personal ties play the most important role. We could say in the Dahe case, protest leaders were high-risk participants while inconspicuous participants were low-risk ones. We will explore protest leaders' special incentives in collective actions.

who since 1982 had played a key leadership role in the Dahe Dam protest was targeted by local officials. Teacher Xu was the father of four (or five) children,[21] and only two of them were legal according to government policy. This violation of birth control policy provided local authorities with a pretext to heavily fine him with the mount nearly half of his annual income.

On the afternoon of October 1983, Teacher Xu's wife was handcuffed in public by commune officials under the orders of the party secretary of the Shanyang commune and was forced to undergo tubal ligation surgery in the commune hospital. Despite her suffering from severe anemia, doctors rushed her into the operating room where the surgery only lasted 8 minutes, much less than the average time. Following the forced tubal ligation, Xu's wife lost more than 30 pounds and could not work for 3 years. Another doctor at the hospital later told Teacher Xu that the medical staff would be subject to sanctions including physical punishment if they refused to perform the surgery on the activist's wife.[22] When Teacher Xu wife was forced to have a tubal ligation, the dam relocatee protest in Shanyang had occurred for less than 1 year. Protesters had not fully developed the capacity to mobilize and organize relocatees or to respond to local officials efforts to selectively target protest leaders.

Two years later on November 21st, 1985, local officials again targeted Teacher Xu by utilizing the same pretext. The birth control work team from Shanyang Township went to Teacher Xu's home at about 5:00 pm seeking to impose a fine for violation of the states population control policy. Dozens of peasants from the dam relocatee movement with steel bars in hand surrounded the birth control work team. In half an hour, the work team was encircled by more than 300 peasants from several neighbor villages. Women and children threw small stones at and spit on these officials, while men cried, "Kill them!" One protest delegate presented the group's demands to the work team: "All the peasants come to protect Teacher Xu. He wrote petitions for us. He represents the interests of all of us. You cannot hurt him." The work-team leader was forced to write a letter guaranteeing that the team would halt these official efforts to penalize to Teacher Xu. Finally, 4 hours after the encirclement, the work team was allowed to leave. As the frightened officials withdrew from the village relocatees cried, "Prepare firelocks (a weapon for hunting birds in this area) and drill steels. If they come back, shoot them as robbers."

After this clash between protest supporters and local officials, any effort to collect fines for birth control policy violations in this village was impossible. Moreover, local officials lost control in the whole village, including agricultural tax collection (an important symbol of government control). Local officials reported difficulties in carrying out minor government functions. Shortly after

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[21] Different official documents have different information of the number of Teacher Xu's children. Teacher Xu admits he has four.

[22] See the interview with Teacher Xu and his wife on December 14, 1997.

the confrontation, one frightened local female official who was asked to direct the tree planting in this village immediately broke into tears.[23]

This crash indicated that a group of well-organized peasants had successfully confronted local authorities and prevented governmental sanctioning of protest leaders. The official report of the birth controls work team failed attempt to sanction Teacher Xu noted that "peasants' seizing the work team was not spontaneous, but well-planned and well-organized. In the noon of the day, Teacher Xu held a meeting to plan the action in the afternoon." The protest leaders' sufficient capacity to mobilize peasants thwarted the possibility of officials' revenge and repression. Two weeks later, in the standing committee of CCP committee of Yun County, the main topic was how to handle the collective protest in Dahe Dam. One senior official signaled a warning to local officials, "If we punish the leaders, the masses will make more trouble for us."[24]

Not all of the protest leaders in Dahe Dam were as lucky as Teacher Xu in the second birth control work-team challenge. After the collective protests ended in 1986, upstream protest leaders were sanctioned. In 1990, Xie Mingquan, the chief protest leader in collective protest in Xunlu, was convicted on harboring stolen goods for his son and was sentenced 3 years in prison. Xie's son received a 15-year sentence for stealing 10,000 yuan (about 2,000 US dollars). This sentence was harsh compared to the sentence the deputy director's son from Yun County, which was 1 year for 30,000 yuan. Xie's wife believed that real reason for her family members' harsh sentences and imprisonment was Xie's role in the Dahe Dam protest.[25] Unfortunately, the local villagers did not come to the protest leaders' aid this time.

Other protest leaders in the two upstream townships experienced negative sanctions from local officials. One leader in Puxi lost his Party membership in 1987 for a trivial reason.[26] Another protest leader in Xunlu could not transfer his daughter's household registration to her husband's village, although this operation was legal and considerably common. Moreover, in 1989, township officials confiscated his boat, which was the biggest income source of his family, for a violation of the transportation regulation. The dam protest leader was selectively targeted, since several of his neighbors had also violated the regulation and were not punished.[27] Living in the shadow of revenge during our interviews in 1998, protest leaders were hesitant to show us important documents because one former official stood outside the door.[28]

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[23] Shanyang Township government and CCP committee, "Emergency Report." November 23, 1985.

[24] Yun County CCP committee office, "Minutes of CCP Standing Meeting," December 6, 1985.

[25] Interview with Miss. Xie on March 11, 1998.

[26] Interview with Pan Guiyu on March 13, 1998.

[27] Interview with Yu Daoqi on March 12, 1998.

[28] That happened in interview with Xie's wife and interview with Liu Yicheng on March 11, 1998.

These upstream protest leaders' failed to mobilize community support to halt local officials from sanctioning the leadership. When the Dahe dam protest ended, protest leaders' capacity to mobilize and organize the community weakened dramatically. When the mobilization potential with relocatees ended, the protest leadership was vulnerable to the sanctions inflicted by authorities.

One precondition of keeping mobilization capacity is that the collective protest must continue. If the collective protest ends, the protest leaders' capacity to mobilize relocatees will reduce rapidly.[29] Consequently, the primary strategy and logic of protest leaders at Dahe dam was not to gain maximum compensation for relocatees, but to garner the dismissal of local officials. If dismissal of corrupt officials was impossible the protest leadership aimed to continue the collective protest as long as possible, thus maximizing the capacity for mobilization. When collective actions subsided, the tension between relocatees and local authorities was replaced by feuds characterized as personal between protest leaders and local officials. In the Dahe Dam protests, concessions were the last strategy protest leaders would choose.

In contrast to the protest leadership, the inconspicuous participants were most concerned with attaining maximum monetary compensation for the hardships they had endured. Although ordinary relocatees condemned official corruption, as inconspicuous participants of collective protests they were not exposed to potential negative sanction for their marginal role in the protests. Their primary concern was not protection from local corrupt officials, but to increase their living standard. During the onset of the protests, protest leader's strategy and logic were compatible with ordinary protesters logic. However, when authorities offered a compromise of additional compensation, the two action strategies and logics conflicted. An example of this clash occurred in 1986 in Wanshan when the prefecture authority proposed a generous compensation package and dismissed charges of corruption among local officials. In exchange, relocatees would cease their protests. This compromise catalyzed the conflict between the protest leaders and dam relocatees. Protest leaders feared that if the protest stopped, irritated local officials still in power, and they would be in danger because they had lost their mobilization capacity. The upstream township authority had successfully co-opted several protest delegates by promising them money or jobs.[30] Protest leaders refused to support this compromise, while the protest delegates eagerly accepted this deal. As a result, the upstream protest leaders failed to convince relocatees to continue protests and the two protests were halted right after the compromise. Facing a similar situation, downstream protest leaders attempted to persuade their delegates

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[29] In collective protest, protest leaders could use the framing process to interpret any negative sanction on themselves as the threats to the whole collective protest. But this framing will be futile once the collective protest ends. Without the context of collective protest, it will be much more difficult for protest leaders to mobilize followers.

[30] Interview with Liu Yicheng on March 11, 1998.

and followers to continue their actions. One protest leader of Puxi Township recalled the situation in interview:[31] "I told them (relocatees) that we couldn't stop (our struggle). The corrupted officials were still in power. They would steal our compensation again. We had to put them into prison. But no one listened to me. Once (peasants) got money, they didn't want struggle anymore. Everyone knew how dangerous accusing official was!" This persuasion was successful and the downstream protest continued. Ironically, because of the continued protest in Shanyang after the upstream monetary compromise, Sichuan province authority intervened in 1987 and criticized local Wanshan government officials for what they viewed as an excessively generous compensation standard. The final compensation package (both for downstream and upstream) was much less generous than that in 1986.[32]

Unfortunately, this time the leadership failed to persuade the relocatees and protest delegates that the government's compensation package was inadequate and that they could attain a better settlement. With the upstream withdrawal from protest, protest delegates meeting ceased. Although protest leaders still wanted to continue the protest, their effort was jeopardized by the paralyzed Protest Delegate Meetings (PDM).

Centralization of Collective Protest

It became clear to the protest leadership that their strategy and logic conflicted with inconspicuous participants' compensation interests. Utilizing democratic modes of persuasion was difficult in a cultural context where citizens were accustomed to centralized government authorities allocating scarce resources. Protest leaders in this political and cultural context relied on a centralized protest organizational structure in setting protest strategies and in the decision-making process.

In the Dahe case, although all the three collective actions were in the name of all relocatees, most crucial decisions were made by a small number of protest leaders. In Shanyang, collective protest was highly centralized. Teacher Xu along with two or three protest leaders controlled the organization of the protest. Initially, this leadership was fairly effective in the birth control event and in occupying the worker's dining hall in 1987. Relocatees eagerly participated in the dining hall occupation with every family in flooded area sending one adult to take part in the action. Moreover, almost every household head signed every important petition over a 7-year period.

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[31] Interview with Yu Dehui on March 14, 1998.

[32] One deputy director of Yun County told relocates, "You get less because we were criticized by the province authority (for the high compensation standard). If you did not insist on lodging complaints, province officials could not know it and you could get more."

   Protest leaders mainly employed two strategies to control relocatees: positive sanction and negative sanctions. Protest leaders created selective incentives for relocatees to encourage participation and to avoid the problem of free riders. In the 1987 actions, according to the minutes of the standing CCP committee of Yun County, each family had to send one adult to occupy the dinning hall. If the adult went there, his/her family would get 2 yuan (0.4 US dollar) per day. If no family member took part in, this family would be fined 5 yuan (1 US dollar) per day by the Protest Delegate Meeting.[33] More importantly, protest leaders from both downstream and upstream held the power in distributing any new compensation. Most relocatees accepted this protest leadership power structure and believed that new compensations were impossible without protest leaders. When allocating compensation to families, protest leaders based the level of the distribution on the family's level of performance in collective action.

   Another form of control was at the level of protest leaders' control of the protest discourse and demands. In Shanyang, Teacher Xu and other protest leaders dominated protest discourse and were in charge of interpreting almost all protest related events. Protest leaders became the voice of all relocatees while individual relocatee's voices were consequently silenced. More importantly, protest leaders utilized "traitor" discourse as a negative sanction to anyone who did not follow protest leaders' order. As a traitor a relocatee could be isolated from his/her community and this carried a heavy penalty in rural China. Protest leaders warned one so-called traitor who had handed a petition destined to higher authorities to local officials, that relocatees would destroy the roof of his house if he had betrayed relocatees again.[34]

Semi-formalized Protest Delegate Meeting

The best indicator of the centralization of collective protest was the formalization of the Dahe protest delegate assembly. Protestors first met informally and around 1984 the Protest Delegate Meeting at the Dahe site became formalized.[35] It took several years for the PDM to develop its organizational structure. By 1986, the PDM in Shanyang was surprisingly sophisticated in regard to its internal division of labor and formalized procedures. For each production team in the flooded areas of the river, the cadre and two relocatee delegates became members of the PDM. In Shanyang, the PDM had around 30 members. After 1986, a standing committee emerged within the PDM with a membership of ten relocatee delegates. According to Teacher Xu, the standing committee proposed action plans to the PDM. Once the PDM passed the plan, PDM members would communicate the decision to the relocatees of their production team.

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[33] Yun County CCP committee office, "Minutes of CCP Standing Meeting," August 7, 1987.

[34] Interview with Yu Dezheng on December 25, 1997.

[35] We do not know the exact date of the first emergence of PDM.

PDM members were also responsible for implementing decided plans.[36] The members of the PDM could be awarded generous subsidies for attending meeting and being away on collective protest (Jin and Ying 1998).

The Dahe Dam protest organization can be best described as semi-formalized organizations that were grassroots and not-officially-registered organizations. These protest organizations were not legally sanctioned or officially approved organizations. The division labor was fairly developed and its membership, especially the membership of standing meeting, was considerably stable. Organizational costs were low. Finally, these organizations had adequate organizational capability to mobilize relocatees successfully, to mount effective protests, and to engage in effective negotiations with local officials.

The existence of semi-formalized and hierarchal organization in Shanyang Township was viewed by protest leaders as an appropriate organizational structure in the rural Chinese setting in three regards. First, the establishment of the PDM was an effort to centralize collective protests and provide the leaderships with the authority to engage in effective negotiations with government officials. The PDM legitimized the protest leadership as the representatives of all relocatees. With a delegate assembly supporting the protest leadership, hostile local officials were less likely to isolate the leadership from the rest of relocatees. Secondly, this semi-formalized organization enhanced the protest leaders' capacity to mobilize and organize inconspicuous participants. Through the PMD members in each production team, protest leaders could more tightly control relocatees. Without the participation of dozens of PMD members, the well-planned and well-organized action of occupying the worker's dining hall in 1987 would have been impossible. With a well-defined division of labor and responsibilities protest leaders in Shanyang could effectively implement the PDM's decisions. Thirdly, and even more importantly, the semi-formalized protest organization efficiently controlled PDM members. In Shanyang, the protest organization's effective control over the delegates largely eliminated the possibility that local officials could bribe protest leaders. Shanyang officials unsuccessfully tried to implement a compensation package to relocatees. When three protest leaders supported the package and argued that protest in Shanyang should stop, they were immediately expelled from the PDM and labeled "traitor."[37] In the dam protests, when protest organization had enough power to sanction leaders who had been bribed, local officials' efforts to undermine the movement failed.

Compared to the downstream protests, the upstream protests did not develop a semi-formalized and centralized PDM. There were no regular meetings of the PDM. The PDM's control over its members was looser than that downstream. At one protest site in Xunlu, not all protest delegates were

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[36] Interview with Teacher Xu and Rao Hongshi on December 17, 1997.

[37] Interview with Teacher Xu on December 14; with Wan Xueping on December 21, 1997; and with Yu Dehui on March 14, 1998.

willingly to follow Xie's leadership.[38] As a result, without solitary within the Xunlu PDM, upstream protest leaders could not prevail over dissenting opinions, especially when the protest leader logic conflicted with the financial interests of relocatees.

Ending of Protest in Shanyang

The Shanyang Dahe dam protests came to a dramatic ending in 1990. One group of relocatees from a nearby village occupied the hydroelectric plant.[39] However, the leadership of this action was inexperienced and lost control over the participants of the occupation. The strategy of occupation aimed at exerting pressure on local officials resulted in physical confrontation between plant workers and culminated in injuries to several peasants. Consequently, several outraged young peasants destroyed the water intake of Dahe hydroelectric plant and the plant's operation was interrupted for 10 hours. Official estimate of the monetary loss was of plant sabotage at more than 700,000 yuan (about 140,000 US dollars). As a result, local officials considered this protest a "political event," legitimizing the legal prosecution and jailing of protest leaders.[40] Three dam protest leaders were imprisoned for half a year.

Collective protest led by Teacher Xu also subsided around 1990. The hard line taken by state officials against protestors terrified many relocatees in Shanyang and made it more difficult for protest leaders to mobilize relocatees. In 1989, another important change in local politics contributing to the end of Shanyang protest was a routine reshuffling of township officials in Yun County. As a result, all crucial officials either retired or transferred to other townships. Most new officials had nothing to do with the collective protest in the past. The possibility of official revenge on protest leaders therefore decreased significantly. In one meeting of the PDM in 1989, protest leaders discussed how to build a good relationship with new township officials.[41] Once the danger of local officials inflicting negative sanctions on the protest leadership disappeared and the protest leaders' goal of removing corrupt local officials diminished, the protests in Shanyang soon ended.

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[38] Interview with Liu Yicheng on March 11, 1998.

[39] This village had not participated the collective protest of Shanyang in mid-1980s because its villagers had gotten better compensation than all other relocatees in that time. However, comparing to the final package other relocatees got through collective action, this village's solution was not juicy anymore. They wanted to follow other resisters' experience in occupying the dinning hall in Dahe Dam.

[40] This accident happened on April 15, 1990. It coincidently was the anniversary of the death of former General secretary Hu Yangban. Yun authority therefore had one more justification for this suppression.

[41] Shanyang PDM meeting minutes on October 6, 1988.

Conclusion

In the Dahe dam case, a well-organized collective protest was the key for relocatees to successfully secure sufficient compensation for their land loss. Facing authorities' deliberated delay, protesters employed strategies of filing letter-complaints, visiting-complaints, interrupting official routines, and occupying the Dahe hydroelectric plant in an attempt to urge local authorities' to quickly respond to the protesters demands. Interruptive protest repertoires in the Dahe dam case involved demonstrating before local government offices and occupying the dining hall of the hydroelectric plant. These disruptive repertoires were more effective in demanding quick official responses. However, they were risky too. Any careless act such as hurting an official or disrupting the plant's operation would give authorities justification to halt the protests. Protest leaders would be arrested and jailed. In deploying these risky repertories, careful planning and well orchestration were indispensable. That requires the collective protest to be centralized.

However, in a centralized collective protest, the domination of protest leader logic and agenda seems inevitable. In rural China, local officials often are hostile to grassroots collective protests. They routinely halt collective protests by isolating protest leaders and punishing them individually for unrelated offenses. Thus protest leaders become conspicuous participants while their followers are inconspicuous ones. In this context, protest leaders often mobilized protesters to protect themselves. A punishment on one protest leader might lead to an escalation of the whole collective protest. That would deter local officials from punishing individual protest leaders. The two birth control events vividly demonstrated the effectiveness of this strategy. The success of this strategy depends on the centralization of the collective protest. The effective control over inconspicuous participants facilitates protest leaders to halt local officials' attempts to co-opt protest leaders and help maintain the collective protest's solidarity. At the same time, because official punishment selectively target conspicuous participants, conspicuous participants' interests significantly differ from that of inconspicuous participants. Individual safety is protest leaders' first concern, while inconspicuous participants want to maximize official compensations. Through the centralized internal structure, protest leaders actually dominate the collective protest and override inconspicuous participants' demands.

Due to the domination of the protest leaders, compromise as a solution is the last strategy protest leaders would choose. This resonates with the unique cultural characteristic of Chinese politics: total victory or complete failure, no concession, no other way out (Zou 1994). Once a collective action emerges, protest leaders and local officials are locked in their non-negotiable positions. More interestingly, in instances of grassroots collective protest in the name of marginalized peasants, the voice and demands of peasants are largely silenced. Protest leaders hold all discourse power and utilize official governance

techniques to control their followers. Some researchers have argued that Dahe-like grassroots collective action actually reproduces the existing political system of authoritarian domination with only one difference: the dominator is not the authority, but the protest leadership (Ying, 2001). Questions remain for gauging the future prospects of grass roots collective action in rural China. What is the long-range significance of grassroots collective protest like the Dahe dam case? Will grassroots resistance in rural China lead to significant social change, or just reproduce the existing system of domination? Finally, will grassroots resistance lead to compromise with the authorities? These questions should be examined in the future research on Chinese grassroots resistance.

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The Routinization of Liminality: The Persistence of Activism Among China's Red Guard Generation

Guobin Yang

The long-term biographical consequences of political activism raises two questions: What remains of the political passions after social movements subside and why does this occur? Scholars have pointed to the transformative power of participation in social movements. Some participants may experience a transformation in values and beliefs, while others have formed enduring social networks and sustained social activism (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Fantasia 1988; McAdam 1988, 1989; Calhoun 1994; Whittier 1995, 1997; Lichterman 1996; Robnett 1997). Such transformation is related to the liminal features of movement experience (Yang 2000). The greater the contrast between pre-participation structural embeddings and the leveling effects unleashed in collective action, the bigger the liminal effect, and the deeper the transformative power of participation. Similarly, the deeper the level of activist involvement, the stronger the liminal effect and the greater its transformative power (Yang 2000). In Griffin's words, "highly charged events" shape consciousness and memory particularly strongly (2004, 544).

Presumably, the stronger the immediate liminal effects of movement participation, the more powerful its long-term impact will be, and the higher the level of persistent activism. Nevertheless, in the long run, personal biographies will confront historical forces. New historical conditions may complicate the impact of an early experience. Thus to explain the long-term biographical impact of movement participation requires an extension of the theory of the routinization of liminality.

If all social movements are liminal to varying degrees, they also will undergo a process of routinization. In this process, former participants continue to engage in activism, but activism takes different forms. The experience of movement participation, the social ties built during the movement, and new historical conditions intermingle to influence the persistence of activism. I use this approach to examine sustained activism among the Red Guard generation in China.

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Routinization of Liminality and the Persistence of Activism

A central theme in Weber's analysis of charismatic authority is its routinization. For Weber, charisma is inherently unstable and impermanent. To achieve a degree of permanence, charisma often undergoes routinization. By routinization, Weber refers to the process whereby "a unique, transitory gift of grace of extraordinary times and persons" is transformed into "a permanent possession of everyday life" (Weber 1968,1121). Simply put, routinization refers to the process of settling down to the conditions of everyday life.

As charisma undergoes routinization, so does liminality. A liminal social movement is impermanent and transitory. Whether it achieves or fails to achieve its manifest goals, it will face a stage of decline. The liminal conditions of a social movement will give way to new structural conditions. When this process occurs, what happens to those who have experienced the movement? What of the liminal movement will become the "permanent possession" of everyday life?

Liminality means threshold. Victor Turner's theory of the ritual process consists of the three stages of separation, liminality, and reaggregation. The first stage, separation, separates the ritual subject from previous structural conditions. The second stage, the liminal, is antistructural, where the ritual subject redefines his/her identity. In the reaggregation stage, the ritual subjects settle back to the social structure where they are expected to behave again in accordance with customary norms and ethical standards. But Turner stops short of showing exactly how ritual subjects fit back into new structural conditions.

Weber's analysis of the routinization of charisma can help to formulate an explanation.

With the routinization of charisma, Weber argues (1964, 367),

> Only the members of the small group of enthusiastic disciples and followers are prepared to devote their lives purely idealistically to their call. The great majority of disciples and followers will in the long run 'make their living' out of their 'calling' in a material sense as well. Indeed, this must be the case if the movement is not to disintegrate.

Weber's notion of the routinization of charisma refers to a shift from charisma-based legitimacy to one based on traditional or rational-legal authority. His starting point is that the morphological metamorphosis of orientations of legitimacy presupposes a preexisting basis of legitimacy. Thus, in the case of a revolutionary movement, the transformation of its charismatic form of authority to a traditional or rational-legal form takes place either when the revolutionary movement is about to succeed or after it has succeeded. The transformation of forms of authority is presumed to take place through legitimate channels.

This notion contradicts with the reality of most social movements. Social movements often "fail" in the sense that their specific goals and demands cannot

be achieved. They neither realize "new advantages" for their members nor gain them "acceptance" in the political arena (Gamson 1975, 1990). The trajectory of routinization poses formidable challenges to movement activists. Under what conditions do social movement participants sustain activism?

This is where the concept of the routinization of charisma can help to explain the biographical consequences of activism. Weber emphasizes the centrality of economic interests in routine life in the process of routinization: "For charisma to be transformed into a permanent routine structure, it is necessary that its anti-economic character should be altered" (1964, 369). Again, "The process of routinization of charisma is in very important respects identical with adaptation to the conditions of economic life, since this is one of the principal continually operating forces in everyday life" (1964, 372).

Adapting to the conditions of economic life is an "affirmation of ordinary life" according to Charles Taylor (1989). "Ordinary life" refers to the productive and reproductive activities of individual persons, in contrast to the Aristotelian "good life" deemed morally superior to mere "life." Daily labor and family life are among the concerns of an "ordinary life." The affirmation of ordinary life is thus the affirmation of the values of everyday existence.

Weber speaks of the affirmation of "worldly life" (1968, 1197) developed as an unintended consequence of a religious movement and its associated set of doctrines. Weber's analysis of this transformation was couched in the framework of the routinization of charisma. He pointed out that the rational achievements of Occidental monasticism were seemingly irreconcilable with its charismatic, anti-economic foundations, although in fact it followed the same logic of the routinization of charisma: "Asceticism becomes the object of methodical practices as soon as the ecstatic or contemplative union with God is transformed, from a state that only some individuals can achieve through their charismatic endowments, into a goal that many can reach through identifiable ascetic means" (1968, 1169).

This same logic of the routinization of charisma was evident among China's Red Guard generation. The difference was one of content, not of logic. The Red Guard Movement was at least in part the result of an idealism underwritten by beliefs in charismatic endowments.[1] This idealism was linked culturally to the Confucian vision of an autonomous moral self, and historically to the nationalistic aspirations of China's twentieth-century revolutionary youth. It affirmed ideals similar to those embodied in the Aristotelian concept of "good life," and held in contempt, if only implicitly, the values of ordinary life. A major development in the routinization of the Red Guard Movement was the transformation of Red Guard idealism into an affirmation of ordinary life.

To analyze this process is to turn from explicitly political activism to the existential struggles in daily life, the values attached to these struggles, and the

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[1] Guenther Roth's (1975) study of charismatic communities provides support for viewing the Red Guard Movement itself as involving an ideological charismatic community, whose members, not just leaders may be regarded as charismatic virtuosi.

cultural expression of these values. Under specific conditions, ways of making a daily existence that deviate from the officially prescribed methods constitute political action. It may be considered as economic activism. Similarly, expressing these values in cultural forms also constitutes political action, which may be viewed as cultural activism. Indeed, the notion of political activism needs to be reconceptualized.[2] Thus in the routinization of liminality, a history of political activism may diverge in many directions. Activists may remain politically committed, be burdened with materialistic struggles, turn inward toward moral concerns, or engage in cultural and social activism. No less political than political activism, these alternative forms are forces of social change.[3]

Economic Activism

Since the Red Guard Movement ended in July 1968, members of the Red Guard generation have persisted in four types of activism. The first is economic activism. The growth of economic activism among the Red Guard generation was a function of the routinization of liminality. In the second half of 1968, with the dismantling of the Red Guard Movement, the vast majority of the Red Guard generation were sent to the countryside where school life ended and subsistence struggles began (a process referred to by leaders as rustication). They began to take on a new identity as sent-down youth or "educated youth" (Bernstein 1977 and Pan 2002). This transition was abrupt and fundamental. A former Red Guard/sent-down youth expressed her understanding of the transition in this way:

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[2] In social movement literature, activism is usually taken to mean political activism. Thus when scholars study sustained activism among former movement participants, they ask whether these former activists are still involved in movement-related activities (McAdam 1988; Friedman and McAdam 1992). Such an approach assumes that the persistence of activism is manifest only in the continual involvement in explicitly political and often organized and directly confrontational activities. However, sociologists have begun to rethink activism (Abrahams 1992). Social movements may exist as "submerged networks" and "invisible laboratories" (Melucci 1989, 205). Many activities are not explicitly political challenges, but involve the display of unorthodox lifestyles, the uses of new symbols, and the adoption of cultural practices which jar with the tastes and values of the mainstream society. Some scholars study everyday life (Taylor and Whittier 1992) and cultural politics (Taylor and Rupp 1993) as political activism. Almanzar et al. (1998), for example, have examined everyday behaviors of conserving energy and water as environmental activism. Whittier argues that the persistence of the radical women's movement should be seen "not just through the organizations it establishes, but also through its informal networks and communities and in the diaspora of feminist individuals who carry the concerns of the movement into other settings" (1995, 23).

[3] Data for the analysis consist of media materials, eyewitness accounts of historical events, biographical and autobiographical materials such as diaries and letters, and in-depth interviews with former Red Guards and sent-down youth.

From heaven to earth, from fantasy to reality, from speculation to confrontation, from self-being to self-consciousness. Knowing the peasants, knowing the countryside, knowing China, knowing the world – in this process, I knew myself. In a worn-out cotton-padded coat, with a belt made of straw, I bid farewell forever to the "delicate girl" (*jiao xiaojie*) that I had been. From then on, I began to learn "life as a struggle" (Personal correspondence 3/30/2000).

For a long time after this, members of the Red Guard generation struggled with their new identities. Among the fruits of their activism was the discovery and affirmation of personal interests and ordinary life values. A former Red Guard/educated youth wrote that the day after he and a few other "educated youth" settled in their designated village, the village party committee convened a welcoming meeting. The party-secretary of the village opened the meeting by saying, "From now on, you will be the educated new peasants in this village. You should remember: farming is for yourself." As this individual recalled, this statement came as a shock to a generation accustomed to being told to "study for the sake of revolution" (Jin 1994, 117). It was hard for them to understand what it meant to farm for oneself.

In addition to a sense of shock, many educated youths felt contempt for what they initially perceived as local peasants' pursuits of personal interests. One person sent to the Inner Mongolian region, where herding was the main job, wrote

I still remember that in the first year of rustication, educated youths did not take part in the shearing labor. We all stayed inside our yurt and indulged in overblown and empty talk. Some talked about the big affairs of the world. Others suggested transforming the broken walls on the river into a stone model of Tiananmen rostrum. . .. When educated youths saw the herdsmen shearing in the heat of the sun, they laughed at them and said all these people had in their mind was money. In this way, the educated youths indicated how pure and how unconcerned with "self-interest" they were. It was only later when educated youths experienced the hardships of shearing themselves that they gradually abandoned their empty talk (Xin 1994, 209).

While participating in daily labor, members of the Red Guard generation abandoned their initial contempt for personal interests and affirmed the values of ordinary life. This affirmation marked the continual transformation of identity, a process at variance with their experience in the Red Guard Movement. Not only did educated youths eventually relinquish their contempt for personal interests, but they began to actively pursue them. As Xu Huiying recalls, "In our confusion and pain, we eventually embarked on the road in search of our own personal interests. Many educated youths who had initially made up their mind to dedicate themselves to the rural revolution later left the countryside and went back to the cities, joined the army, entered the factory or went to college" (Jin 1994, 123).

Throughout the 1970s, the pursuit of personal interests intensified. Many sent-down youths began to defy sent-down policy and resorted to illegitimate means to return to the cities. By early 1978, they began to protest for the right to return, forcing the government to relax and finally suspend its policy of

rustication. As a consequence, China's urban unemployment became a serious problem in the late 70s and early 80s (Feng and Zhao 1982). Sent-down youth who had returned to the cities constituted a large proportion of the unemployed population (Gold 1990). By 1979, the typical age of the Red Guard generation had reached mid-life, and many were married and unemployed (Liu 1998).

Many of the Red Guard generation then were among the first to go into private business, in effect becoming the pioneers of the market transformation. Private business practices had existed before, but came under attack during the Cultural Revolution. In the early days of economic reform, state actors had ambivalent attitudes toward private business (Hershkovitz 1985; Solinger 1993, 233), because official recognition of such practices would have far-reaching implications for interpreting the nature of Chinese socialism. The acute problems of unemployment raised serious doubts about the efficacy of China's existing economic structure. The analysis of these problems led to the conclusion that other forms of economic activities, market-oriented rather than centrally controlled, must be encouraged to deal with these problems (Feng and Zhao 1982; Liu 1998).[4] Under these circumstances, semi-private or private business practices[5] began to be endorsed by the state as legitimate economic practices in a socialist economy.

Cultural Activism

While trying to make a material living during the sent-down period, members of the Red Guard generation were engaged in various forms of underground cultural activism. Their activities ranged from letter and diary writing, to various forms of literary writing including the secret reading, copying, circulation, and discussion of hand-copied manuscripts and forbidden books. Because

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[4] Chinese social scientists argued, for example, "we must give full play to the initiative of the unemployed in solving their own job problems;" "with the socialist economy playing the leading role, we must adopt more liberal policies and develop non-exploitative individual commerce and industry" (Feng and Zhao 1982, 133; 134). Recent studies by Western social scientists have also drawn attention to this issue. For example, Gold (1990, 162) suggested, "... urban private business offered one way to help the newly established reform elite solve inherited problems and thereby stabilize society and stimulate the economy while consolidating its own power." Shirk (1993, 42) made a similar point when she wrote: "The reform-minded CCP leadership actively encouraged collective and private enterprises after 1978. The main rationale for this policy was the need to provide for jobs for millions of unemployed urban youth."

[5] By semi-private business, I refer mainly to what is called the *minban qiye* (collective-run enterprises). Thomas Gold defines them as "cooperatives formed by young people waiting for work who raised their own funds" (1990, 162, note 9). By private business, I refer to what Solinger calls practices of the "petty private sector." This sector consists of "the very small-scale commercial activity that individual peasants, peddlers, young people without state-sector jobs, and retired persons engage in at fairs, on city streets, or as itinerant hawkers in the rural areas" (Solinger 1993, 250).

of the personal dangers these activities could bring, they took place behind closed doors. Many activities, such as reading forbidden books, were personal and private. Others took place in social settings, such as informal study groups and reading groups.

One way of estimating the scale of these underground activities is to look at the cultural products consumed and produced by sent-down youth. One category of cultural products includes Chinese and foreign literature published before the Cultural Revolution as well as "internal publications" of foreign literature, philosophy, history, and social sciences.[6] Among the most influential was modern Western literature. Also important were books on the international communist movement and "Soviet revisionism" including Soviet "thaw" writers like Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn. A dominant theme in these books involves a critical examination of the international communist movement. Ironically, most young people probably had their first exposure to the works of Soviet "thaw" writers during the Red Guard Movement, when the blossoming Red Guard press carried denunciatory commentaries on these works, often with synopses of the originals.[7] Many people read these works in search of a better understanding of the Chinese communist revolution.

A second category of cultural products included what Perry Link (1989) referred to as "entertainment fiction" such as detective stories, anti-spy stories, modern historical romance, modern knight errant stories, triangular love stories, and pornographic stories. Except for a few books written by Red Guard members and the sent-down youth, the authorship of most of these works is unknown. Of the estimated one hundred titles, fewer than half remain today (Zhou 2002).[8]

The third and most important category of cultural products covers works about or written by sent-down youth, including poetry, songs, stories, essays, diaries, and letters. The output of letters and diaries was large, because diary and letter writing were prevalent.[9] Letters were not only for private communication, but also for sharing ideas. Some letters went into underground circulation because they contained serious discussions about social and political issues.[10] The output of poetry was similarly large. Exchanging a self-composed

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[6] "Internal publications" (*neibu shuji*) were published for a limited readership, usually cadres and professional researchers. From 1949 to 1979, 18,301 titles of "internal publications" were published. See *Quanguo neibu faxing dushu zongmu: 1949–1979* (1988). Also see Link (2000) and Kong (2002).

[7] For example, the newspaper *Tianjin New Literature and Arts* (Tianjin xin wenyi) carries a special issue titled "Open Fire against Soviet Revisionist Literature and Arts" in its March 1968 issue. See Yuan Zhou (ed.), *A New Collection of Red Guard Publications* (Xin bian Hong wei bing zi liao. (Oakton, VA: Center for Chinese Research Materials 1999), Vol. 13, p. 6096.

[8] Attesting to the historical (and commercial) value of these stories was the publication in 2002 of a collection of seven manuscripts of entertainment fiction (Bai 2002).

[9] See, for instance, Shi Weimen (1996a), Shi Weimin.

[10] One letter collected in *Minjian shuxin* runs up to 10 pages in print. See Xu (2000, 223–233).

poem was as common among sent-down youth as among the Confucian literati in earlier times. Many poems were a way of expressing friendship, not literary aspirations. However, fine poetry did emerge, as evidenced by the volumes of "misty poetry" (*menglong shi*) later published in the post-Mao era.[11] There were fewer stories, songs, and political essays, but they were widely circulated. Dozens of "educated youth songs" (*zhiqing gequ*) were in underground circulation.[12] The best known was probably "A Song of Educated Youth from Nanjing" (*Nanjing zhiqing zhige*). Other examples include "A Song of Guangzhou Educated Youth" (*Guangzhou zhiqing zhige*), "A Song of Educated Youth Leaving Home for Shanxi" (*Shanxi zhiqing lixiang ge*), and "Alone to Inner Mongolia" (*Yiren zouxiang Neimenggu*).

Innocuous as it might appear to be, engagement in cultural activities such as reading a novel was a political act in the Cultural Revolution. Love stories were considered as "yellow" (porn) and read in secrecy (Duan 1996). In times of cultural nihilism and ideological domination, cultural pursuits were political. Circulating a forbidden book or singing a forbidden song was a political act. So was the voicing of critical opinions and ideas, not to mention more explicit expressions of dissent. Many activities involved personal risks from public humiliation to imprisonment. Some authors suffered political persecution because of their cultural pursuits. For example, Ren Yi was arrested on February 19, 1970, and sentenced to 10 years in prison under the charge that he had written a "counter-revolutionary" song.[13] Zhang Yang, the author of the novel *The Second Handshake*, was also persecuted. For these reasons, these cultural activities constituted an amorphous underground cultural movement.

Political Activism

As political opportunities opened up, members of the Red Guard generation were also engaged in explicitly political protests. From 1978 to 1989, four popular movements happened in China, namely, the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978–1979, student protests during the campus elections of 1980, and the student movements of 1986 and 1989. Members of the Red Guard generation were involved in all these movements. Yet because of their history and political experience, state authorities monitored their activities closely, which influenced their degree and forms of participation. As one former Red Guard puts it,

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[11] See, for example, Bei Dao (1988), and Morin et al (1990).

[12] A CD album of educated youth songs, titled *Zhiqing laoge* (Old Educated Youth Songs), was issued in 1998 in Guangzhou.

[13] See Ren Yi, *Sheng si bei ge*.

> The government always kept an eye on us. Each time there were signs of some social unrest, the government took special measures to stop us from getting involved. They know how dangerous we could be, given the history of our political involvement [in the Red Guard Movement] (Interview #14, April 1998.)

New political opportunities and constraints thus shaped the process of routinization. While persisting in political activism, their roles as political activists underwent change under new historical conditions. Members of the Red Guard generation were the main participants in the Democracy Wall Movement. A legacy of the Red Guard Movement, this was a movement utilizing the cultural tools of wall posters and unofficial publications. The editors and chief contributors of the most influential unofficial publications during the movement were former Red Guards. Table 1 shows the names of these magazines and the editors.

The state's repression of the Democracy Wall activists was quick and decisive, with long-term consequences for activists' subsequent involvement in protest activities. Wei Jingsheng, editor of the influential magazine *Explorations*, was arrested on March 29, 1979, and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment on October 16. In September 1980, the article that protected individuals' rights to use wall-posters was removed from the Constitution. In the meanwhile, other core activists of the Democracy Wall Movement were arrested. Lin Muchen, editor of *The Petrel*, was arrested in 1981 and imprisoned for 4 years. He Qiu, who was involved in publishing *People's Road* and *Duty*, was arrested in 1981 and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in 1982. Wang Xizhe was arrested in April 1981 and sentenced to 14 years in prison in May 1982. All the members of the Enlightenment Society were also arrested (Huang 1999).

With the imprisonment of these core activists, public protest became a dangerous channel of political activism. Under these conditions, some people began to turn to institutionalized means of political action through involvement in elections. After the revolutionary committees that set up in the Cultural Revolution were terminated in 1979 and replaced by people's congresses, procedures were instituted for the first time to elect representatives to the local people's congress in the fall and winter of 1980. In previous elections, voters could only vote on officially approved candidates. Public concern

Table 1 Unofficial magazines of the democracy wall movement edited by former red guards[a]

Magazine	Editors
Exploration	Wei Jingsheng, Yang Guang
Beijing Spring	Han Zhixiong, Li Zhousheng
Today	Bei Dao, Mang Ke
The Thaw Society	Li Jiahua, Lu Mang
The April Fifth Forum	Xu Wenli
Enlightenment (Beijing, Guiyang)	Huang Xiang
People's Road (Guangzhou)	He Qiu, Wang Xiang
The Future (Guangzhou)	Wang Min
People's Voice (Guangzhou)	Liu Guokai
The Petrel (Shanghai)	Lin Muchen

[a]Unless otherwise noted, all magazines were edited and produced in Beijing.

focused on the democratic implications of these first time popular elections. In Beijing University, debates among candidates focused on the nature of socialist democracy (Benton 1982, 87). The candidate who eventually won the elections at Beijing University was a former member of the Red Guard.

Students in other universities showed similar enthusiasm toward the elections. In 1977 official university enrollment was resumed after the Cultural Revolution. Of the 680,000 college students enrolled in 1977 and 1978, 350,000 or over 51% were educated youths (Liu 1998). In other words, many of the students involved in the campus elections in 1980 were members of the Red Guard generation.

The most influential protests during the campus election period occurred at Hunan Teachers' College, Changsha city. The two leading candidates, former Red Guard members Tao Sen and Liang Heng, organized forums and put up wall posters, as Red Guards had done earlier. Liang announced that he no longer believed in Marxism-Leninism, but favored democratic socialism (Benton 1982, 106). Tao advocated legal reform, the separation of the party from the government, and "all rights to the people" (Tao 1980). When the vice-president of the college denounced these campaign practices as illegal, Tao and Liang organized demonstrations and hunger strikes to protest against official interference. In a move that linked the protests of the election period directly to the Democracy Wall Movement and the Red Guard Movement, Tao Sen and a few others even traveled to Guangzhou, in the fashion of the Great Linkup popular during the Red Guard Movement, to seek counsel with other Democracy Wall veterans.

Compared with the Democracy Wall Movement, the student unrest during the campus elections in 1980 was limited in scale. Its significance lies in the attempt to carry on the struggles for democratic political reforms through institutional means. Also important was the fact that the small-scale struggles in this period would later become an indirect influence on the student movement in December 1986. The triggering event of that movement was the illegitimate election procedures instituted at the China Science and Technology University in Hefei, Anhui Province.

In a sense, the political activism of the Red Guard generation has been sustained up to the present day. Some former Red Guards provided intellectual influences on the 1989 student movement, but their main role had changed from that of direct participants to behind-the-scene advisors (Black and Munro 1993). The repertoire of protest perfected by the Red Guards, such as the use of wall posters, continued to be used in the student movement in 1989 (Calhoun and Wasserstrom 1999) and in popular protests in contemporary China (Perry 2003).

Social Activism

Social activism refers to socially organized activities, in contrast to state-organized activities. Voluntary organizing has always been a political activity in China because of political limits imposed on such organizing. In the 1990s,

even after the Chinese government began to recognize the existence of nongovernmental organizations, voluntary organizing continued to be highly political, because the state remained wary of the growth of such independent social organizing (Saich 2000).

Members of the Red Guard generation have organized voluntarily in many ways. In the 1990s, for example, they organized many public events commemorating the sent-down movement (Yang 2003). They have established voluntary associations and built web sites (Yang 2007). During my fieldwork in Beijing in 1999, I gained first-hand understanding of their social activism. The hidden web of activists was invisible to outsiders, but once inside a system with recognizable functions is evident. The functions included mutual help and emotional support

While doing field research in Beijing I accidentally stumbled across this network when I came across a book of reflective essays written by former educated youth. One author named Wang agreed to an interview at her home. We talked for 2 hours about her personal experience and as I was about to leave, I asked whether she could introduce me to a couple of her friends to interview. Wang directed me to a 282 page book published in 1998 that listed the names and addresses of her sent-down friends. Distribution of this book was limited to fellow sent-down activists.

Wang arranged an interview with her friend Liu. That afternoon Liu squeezed the interview into her busy family and work schedule. Liu looked as if she had just recovered from an illness, yet she was remarkably enthusiastic and eloquent. During the interview, Liu recounted the wonderful days of her youth and focused on the hardships of the present:

> My health is better. My elder son has just graduated from a vocational school and found a job. My father is in bad shape [Liu lives in her father's house], but he can still take care of himself. The only thing is that my husband is still in Beidahuang. He cannot visit me often. It's too far. But I have lots of friends in Beijing, like her [pointing to Wang]. During the spring festival [China's most important holiday], they often give money to my children to help them with school. At other times, they visit me or call me up. It would be hard without them (Interview #16, July 1999).

Later when I expressed concern over Liu's current circumstance, Wang explained to me that Liu had a strong character. Wang than introduced me to another activist friend named Dong who worked as an accountant in a nearby hospital. We dropped by her office, a short 10 min walk away, and we found her busy with telephone calls. I arranged for an interview 2 days later, and Dong lent me another book listing former sent-down youth from a different farm. She gave me the name of a person to contact to obtain a personal copy of the listing. I called the two men in charge of the books and requested an interview with each. One was a researcher at a university, and the other was a restaurant manager. The restaurant manager was at work when I visited him. He was supportive of my research on the history of the activists, and he gave me a copy of the address book, refusing to let me pay for it. He spoke of a network of veteran activists engaged in mutual support:

There are lots of things you could study about our generation. We are a remarkable group – we stick together through bad times or good times. Some people among us are very poor – the recent wave of *xiagang* hit them hard. So what do I do? I call up people in our circles and raise funds for the children of the difficult families among us. Each year, before the Spring Festival, a few of us drove around the city and stopped by every family that was in a difficult situation. To each child of the family at school, we gave 1,000 yuan. We got to see them through school. They are like our own children (Interview #23, July 1999).

What are the activist elements of these networks? As the restaurant manager said, some members of their generation took it upon themselves to help others in their circles. The social context in which this happened must not be ignored. The image of the hotel manager driving around the city during the Chinese New Year visiting families experiencing economic hardship was reminiscent of earlier times under the planned economic system when, on the same occasion each year, work-unit leaders would visit members of their unit to deliver New Year presents. With the transition to a market economy, employees became less bound to the work-units, were left on their own, and no longer had the job security of the past. The Red Guard generation was among the hardest hit by the new waves of market-induced unemployment (Chen 1999). Under these conditions, the networks among members of the Red Guard generation sustained mutual help. The existence of closely knit webs of networks shows that members of the generation are well organized. Moreover, it is organized outside the purview of the state, across professions, and across geographical regions. It is a remarkable form of informal organization based on the social ties of the past.

While members of the Red Guard generation were engaged in new forms of social activism in the late 1990s, workers invoked Cultural Revolution experiences and slogans in protesting against job loss (Lee 2003). Biographies of movement participation in the Red Guard Movement and Cultural Revolution "prepared" pensioners to protest against the loss of pensions (Hurst and O'Brien 2002). The generational experiences of former Red Guards continue to shape today's intellectual debates (Sausmikat 2003; Xu 2003). A wave of nostalgia among the Red Guard generation constituted a powerful cultural critique of the dark side of China's market transformation (Yang 2003). All evidence suggests that as China entered a new era of economic transformation in the late 1990s, members of the Red Guard generation began to reassert themselves in new ways.

Theoretical Discussion

Analysis of the four types of activism above shows that in the process of routinization, a level of activism was sustained among the Red Guard generation. Routinization did not mean the demise of activism. Rather, it was a process whereby highly confrontational forms of activism were transformed

into new forms, more mundane in nature, but no less political. What factors explain such sustained activism in the process of routinization?

I have argued that in considering the liminal effects of social movements, it is important to understand that social movements transform identities. However, these changed identities will encounter new social and political conditions. In explaining the persistence of activism, therefore, it is essential to understand how identities intermesh with new social conditions to shape action.

Because of its historical experience, the identity of the Red Guard generation underwent an "inward turn" and an "outward turn" (Yang 2000). The inward turn was a turn to reflexivity, self-introspection, and independent thinking. It was an embracing of the self. As such, it represented a reversal of the official ideology of self-sacrifice in the interest of the party-state. The outward turn was a turn toward the people. It means reaching out from the self toward a more collective source of identity. Consequently, it indicated a growing identification with democratic ideals embodied by the people. Seemingly two antithetical developments, the inward and outward dimensions of a new identity among the Red Guard generation in fact had the same origin: the first-hand experience in the Red Guard Movement (Yang 2000, 395–397).

This analysis of the four types of activism among the Red Guard generation demonstrates that these two dimensions of Red Guard identity continued to shape action in the decades following the Red Guard Movement. For example, economic activism, as the pursuit of personal interest, resulted from the "inward turn" of Red Guard identity, inwardness here indicating a new notion of the self that redeemed personal happiness from the ideology of self-sacrifice. Similarly, the cultural and political activism that characterized the Democracy Wall Movement, in celebrating the values of individualism and demanding democratic change, exemplified the "outward turn" in Red Guard identity.

A second factor that sustains activism among the Red Guard generation is the social ties built in their earlier experience. Scholars of American women's movements and student movements have revealed the importance of the social networks to their sustained activism (Rupp and Taylor 1987; McAdam 1989; Whalen and Flacks 1989; DeMartini 1992; Whittier 1995). This is evidently true of the Red Guard generation as well.

The generation location of the Red Guard generation provided a crucial social basis for its sustained activism. A generational location refers to the cluster of life chances that constitute the "fate" of a generation (Mannheim 1952).[14] It provides the basis for shared historical experience and a sense of collective identity. Without it, for example, the underground cultural activism among the sent-down youth would not have been possible. As Anita Chan (1985, 187) observes, "The policy of sending most of their generation to settle in

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[14] James Scott, an astute analysis of forms of resistance, similarly argues that a generation is a "community of fate" whose members "are all under the same authority, run the same risks, mix nearly exclusively with one another, and rely on a high degree of mutuality." (Scott 1990, 134)

the countryside had broken up the city-wide Rebel Red Guard network, but by dispatching them to the villages in clusters of classmates, friendship groups often remained intact. Some of these members organized themselves into study groups, to facilitate free exchange of ideas to which they had become accustomed in the days of the Cultural Revolution."

The common generational location provided social ties for forming reading groups or study groups under repressive political conditions. Scattered in the vast countryside, these small groups were like so many "islands" of underground culture. As one former educated youth remarks, they "were like coral reefs scattered in the tropical ocean. ... Some were smaller, some were bigger, with some overlapping connections among them."[15] The participants in these groups were most likely from the same city and even the same school. Some became friends during the Red Guard Movement. For example, one group of sent-down youth had been friends in the Red Guard Movement. In the village, they edited and published an underground magazine with skills learned in school as Red Guards. As one of them recalls

> First we talked about it among a few friends. Then we wrote to friends in other places to ask them to contribute. After receiving their contributions, we selected some articles and poems and mimeographed them into a magazine. Then we sent the magazines to other places – educated youth in the neighboring counties, in Beidahuang, in Northern Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia, etc. (Ji 1998, 19)

Finally, new historical conditions influence the persistence of activism. The 1970s saw the transfer of the Red Guard generation from school to rural life. Subsistence struggles became a foremost concern. Sent-down youth not only had to farm, but they learned that farming was for themselves, not for others. Economic activism developed in this process. Organized political protest declined due to the reassertion of political control by government authorities, but informal forms of protest and dissent never stopped (such as seen in the underground cultural activism).

Sent-down youth returned to the cities in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The political and social changes incurred by the transition provided political opportunities for explicitly political protest, as was evident in the Democracy Wall Movement. With the suppression of core Democracy Wall activists and subsequently the implementation of an official policy aimed at purging former Red Guard radicals from official positions (Dittmer 1991), public protest became a dangerous channel of activism. In 1989, some members of the Red Guard generation contributed to the student movement mainly by providing intellectual and moral support to the younger generation (Black and Munro 1993; Calhoun 1994; Chen and Jin 1998).

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[15] Correspondence to author from Ji Liqun, May 12, 2000. Ji is the author of "Chadui shengya" (Life in the Countryside), in Xin Qun (ed.), *Wuhui nianhua–baiming zhiqing hua dangnian* (Years of No Regret: One Hundred Educated Youth on Their Past) (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe 1998), pp. 12–21.

Into the 1990s, as a consequence of the economic reform, China had undergone great transformation. Many large state-owned enterprises went into bankruptcy, causing large numbers of employees to be laid off (Liyan 1998). Large proportions of the unemployed were members of the Red Guard generation (Chen 1999). Under these conditions, members of this generation turned to social activism as a means of providing mutual support. Cultural and political activism revived in response to the new conditions.

Conclusion

Prior research demonstrates that social movements transform participants' identities because of the liminal experience they offer (Yang 2000). This research focused on the long-term impact of movement participation. Combining Turner's concept of liminality with Weber's concept of the routinization of charisma, I have argued that the long-term effects of movement participation may be conceptualized as a process of the routinization of liminality. In this process, participants who have been deeply involved in a liminal movement struggle to settle back to routine life. The process of routinization, however, is by no means a process of dissolving activism. Struggling to settle back to daily life may constitute a form of activism in its own right. Such activism may take on different forms under different social and political conditions.

Four forms of activism have been sustained among members of the Red Guard generation in the decades following the Red Guard Movement. The identities formed as the liminal effects of the Red Guard Movement continued to shape the action of the generation. The different forms of sustained activism, however, were related to the changing historical conditions as well as its historical experience and generation-based social networks.

The theoretical perspective utilized here may be used to study the long-term biographical consequences of other social movements. Social movement scholars have long been concerned with these issues. Many insights have been offered, particularly on the role of organizations in the diffusion of movement cycles (Minkoff 1997) and of social networks in sustaining activism and identity (Rupp and Taylor 1987; McAdam 1988; Whittier 1995), and of the socialization effects of movement experience (Fendrich 1977; Fendrich and Krauss 1978; Braungart and Braungart 1980; Ross 1983; Schneider 1988; Downton 1997; Robnett 1997; Griffin 2004; O'Brien and Li 2006). My earlier argument about the liminal effects of social movements supports these endogenous explanations. The concept of routinization provides a broader conception of activism and an emphasis on both endogenous and exogenous factors. Furthermore, this approach underscores the explanatory power of identities as well as changing social conditions.

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Part VI
Introduction to Singapore Society, Culture, and Politics

John Clammer and Jeffrey Broadbent

Singapore, a tiny city-state with a current population of about 5 million, occupies a small island (274 square miles) in the Straits of Malacca off the southern tip of Malaysia. Most of the world's sea traffic between the Indian Ocean and points east flows through this Strait, making it of hugely important strategic value. For this reason, the British colonized the sparsely inhabited island in the early 19th Century as their Empire expanded into South-East Asia. They used Singapore as a safe haven for their trading and banking operations in the region, and brought in people from India, China and Malaysia to work as clerks and laborers in these enterprises. As a result, Singapore has little culture that could be called indigenous. It became an immigrant and ethnically divided society, with Chinese as the majority group, all ruled by the authoritarian colonial government. The Japanese Imperial Army drove out the British in February 1942, but after the end of World War Two, they returned for two decades. In a peaceful transition pushed by domestic political movements, Singapore achieved independence in 1965.

Some of the new leaders had been schooled in the anti-colonial struggle against Britain during their studies in Britain, where they associated this cause with the socialist left (Vogel 1991, 75). People's Action Party under Lee Kwan Yew, following a socialistic program but also imbued with a Confucian paternalism, aspired to bring progress and prosperity to Singapore by instilling discipline and social order. The PAP continued its unbroken political dominance of Singapore from independence to the present. It rules through a "soft authoritarian" style that draws the leadership of local associations under the paternalistic guidance of the state (Means 1998). This social corporatism effectively neutralizes and smothers the buds of political opposition.

The very strong and centralized state apparatus poured its considerable energies principally into economic development, physical infrastructure (housing and transport in particular) and "nation building." For its economy, the government fostered the island's colonial role as a business hub for the region, welcoming and supporting multi-national companies' regional headquarters in

a safe and secure environment with a willing and competent workforce. As a result, the Singapore economy flourished.

To instill public order, the state embarked upon a program of moral education designed to produce conformity with social order (Wong 1996, 288). This program had a Confucian spirit behind it, as understood by the ethnic Chinese political leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew (Kuo 1996, 308). But the program could not overtly proclaim Confucian ethics as the guiding morality for a multi-ethnic society, so it promulgated education in "shared values" (Wong 1996, 292). At the same time, the regime very strictly and rigidly enforced laws ranging from death to drug dealers to severe fines for spitting in the street. In its social program, the government provided good housing, education and medical care for its citizens, creating a well-functioning welfare state. It worked head to overcome the ethnic differences among the people and create a new unified Singaporean cultural identity.

Singapore now stands as something of an anomaly in South East Asia: a tiny, well-armed, effectively totally urbanized and economically highly successful city state with a diverse population of Malays, Indians, Europeans, Arabs and Southeast Asians, but with very large Chinese majority (itself divided by dialect, religion, and places of origin). Singapore has seen remarkable economic and infrastructural growth and has achieved an enviable record of inter-ethnic harmony despite its culturally and religiously diverse population. Its high level of economic success and string investment in social infrastructure have allowed it to overcome many of the problems of poverty, gross social inequality, homelessness and social and religious strife that have afflicted many other Southeast Asian nations. In that sense, the state is successfully realizing its socialist and Confucian paternalistic ideals. As an ethnically majority Chinese city state with a large military, though, Singapore is regarded with suspicion by its neighboring and principally Muslim countries.

For social movements, then, Singapore is not a conducive or permissive context. Its diverse population has little tradition or experience of social activism, nor many independent local associations around which to coalesce. The state has reduced many of the domestic social problems such as unemployment and ethnic friction that could produce discontent. Any remaining problems the state blames on "outside forces." At the same time, tight political control has removed protest from the political scene. Singapore's geographical position at the center of Southeast Asia would make it an excellent base for regional movements. But the state has clamped down on any kind of group that might criticize or advocate protest on domestic or foreign issues for any reason, social or religious. This suppression extends even to moderate domestic social movements oriented to unmet social welfare such as domestic violence, as the chapter by Clammer shows. This leaves social movements with apparently few issues around which to organize systematic, coherent, or for many Singaporeans, realistic, protest.

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Solidarity from Above: State Ideology, Religion, and the Absence of Social Movements in Contemporary Singapore

John Clammer

Introduction

More recently, the theoretical insights and methodological techniques of social movement studies, which have flourished in Europe and North America, have begun to spread to the "South." East Asia, an area which has grown to a position of economic and political dominance in the modern world system, has, as even a cursory examination suggests, a "density" of social movements quite comparable to those in Western or Eastern Europe: environmental, labor, ethnic, political, consumer, and religious examples abound. "People's movements," often related to basic issues of underdevelopment, exist in large numbers (Wignaraja 1993) and NGOs of many descriptions form an important part of the fabric of many South and East Asian societies.

But this picture is not uniform. Some East Asian societies, especially those that have taken the capitalist path (South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, or Japan for example) accommodate a wide range of social movements. In others where the struggle for democratization is far from over (Indonesia, Taiwan, Cambodia or Burma (Myanmar) for instance) social movements do indeed exist, but often take religious forms or appear as movements of cultural or ethnic revitalization, framed as they are by the absence of genuine political participation and an underdeveloped sense of civil society (Yamamoto 1996). The socialist countries (China, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos) form a third variant in which "social movements" (again with the partial exception of some underground religious activities such as the "house church" movement in China and the occasional example of peasant or ethnic minority unrest) are actually initiated and managed by the state.

In the midst of this complex and rapidly changing region however there is situated a paradox: a society that has taken the capitalist path, yet manages it according to socialist principles; one in which formal democracy exists within a

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highly authoritarian framework; a city state at the hub of Asian financial, commercial, and communication networks in which the media is totally managed and where censorship is rife. This paradoxical place is of course Singapore, a tiny society which in capitalist terms has been a major international success and which for decades has enjoyed ethnic and social stability at home and peace and cooperation with its regional members. Yet for the student of social movements this new, ethnically complex and religiously plural society (surely the formula for social fluidity and unrest?) apparently proves to be the most fruitless of all.

For there do not in fact appear to be any social movements of a recognizable kind: no student movement, no labor movement, no women's movement, not even a tenants' movement in this most highly urbanized of societies (for historical and sociological background on Singapore see Drysdale 1984; Chew and Lee 1991). And this first impression is indeed largely accurate. Except for the occasional government orchestrated mobilization of civil defense volunteers, promotion of residents' committees in government-controlled constituencies or protest against some alleged outside interference in Singapore affairs, the social scene is uncannily quiet. Few NGOs exist within or even operate from Singapore (the few that did have mostly migrated, usually to Bangkok). The last real examples of major social protest other than the rare ethnically inspired ones such as the Maria Hertog riots of 1950 (Maideen 1989) were the labor and student movements of the independence struggles when the issues were a mixture of anti-colonialism and resistance to the erosion of Chinese culture and language (Clutterbuck 1984). But to the contrary while Singapore constitutes an important case of the absence of overt social movement activity, it poses critical questions for the explanatory frameworks currently available in this area of sociological analysis.

This essay examines why social movements have not emerged in post-independence (i.e. since 1965) Singapore, or have been successfully co-opted or repressed by the state. The rapid economic growth in Singapore, as well as massive urbanization and attendant social changes have in fact been managed by a range of political, cultural, and social mechanisms. These mechanisms form an evolving but consistent pattern of ideological hegemony. The ruling People's Action Party has consistently rejected an ideological means in maintaining dominance, in favor of a more pragmatic approach (Chua 1997). The dialectic of social discontent and the methods of overt social control used to dampen or deflect this discontent will be examined. In the case of Singapore, a major way in which the populace manages this logic of authoritarianism is through the attempt to channel discontent into a variety of religious and cultural channels. In this context, social movements fail to mobilize and subtle and subterranean forms of resistance emerge.

Two closely related theoretical models are useful in explaining the subtle forms of resistance in the Singapore case. One model focused on ideological control in supposedly democratic societies, and the other on the mechanisms through which opposition to such control is covertly expressed. The broad

historical arguments about the structure and political processes of hegemonic systems are helpful here (Gramsci 1971).

Gramsci's ideas in fact have a great deal of contemporary relevance for Singapore. His celebrated notion of hegemony emerged from his reflections on why the supposedly "inevitable" success of the Marxist revolution had not (yet) occurred. His analysis led him to the notion that in entrenched capitalist systems, control is not only maintained through coercion, but also ideologically through a cultural form in which the values of the dominant class are posited as being the "common sense" values of all. The maintaining of this cultural hegemony is as significant as the political control that was assumed by other Marxist activists such as Lenin to be primary. While the power of the state ultimately relies on coercion, it masks this by its cultural domination and when a crisis of authority occurs it rapidly acts to shore up its cultural hegemony lest its real face (of force) be revealed. The capitalist state thus rules by "consent" as well as by force, that consent being in the form of its cultural hegemony. This viewpoint has later echoes in the work of Foucault in which he characterizes modernity as a disciplinary order which depoliticizes social discontent not only by incarcerating non-conforming individuals, but more especially through its constant activities of surveillance and psychological management (Foucault 1979).

In addition, the current debates about democratization, the debates about East Asian "exceptionalism" are relevant in the case of Singapore (Schaeffer 1997, 149ff). Furthermore, in light of the absence of social movements in Singapore, an analysis of corporatism internationally (Williamson 1985) in Southeast Asia (Deyo 1981; Brown 1993) and of what has been termed "state monism" will be considered. Each of these relevant factors will be examined in the Singapore case.

Singapore Society and Political Culture

In 1963 the British colonial era ended when Singapore became a constituent state of Malaysia. Two years later, as a result of ethnic and political tensions, Singapore became an independent country. As a British colony Singapore was a central trading hub in Southeast Asia and served as the location of several large military bases. As the British bases were gradually decommissioned after independence, Singapore faced a potential economic crisis further exacerbated by separation from Malaysia. The new government addressed this crisis with a series of policies designed to rapidly expand export-oriented industries, to stimulate employment, and economic activity. The Singapore state sought loyalty through a massive program of public housing, and to take advantage of Singapore's geographical location by making it a hub of regional communications and financial activities. Other state policy initiatives sought to rapidly expanding the educational and technical skills of the immigrant population (Hassan 1976; Chen 1983).

Three abiding social features of the post-independence period have continued into the present. These include the ethnic pluralism of Singapore with Chinese, Malays, Indians, Eurasians, Arabs, Jews, and numerous smaller groups and many subdivisions of the major ones all represented (Clammer 1977.) A second social feature is the domination of social and political discourse by economic forces. Finally, the case of Singapore demonstrates the persistence of an authoritarian mode of government, with an "ideological one party state" (Brooker 1995).

The political culture of Singapore provides the key to the "problem" of the non-emergence of social movements in Singapore. This culture stresses a highly managerial and paternalistic approach to running the country. It utilizes a wide network of mechanisms of social control, including a tightly controlled local media and censorship on foreign media, and the continuous monitoring of the majority of the population. Other means of control occur through the administrative body controlling public housing and the ethnic mix of individual neighborhoods, the HDB (the state run Housing Development Board). Furthermore, a strong emphasis is placed on economic growth through an interesting local formula of highly state-regulated capitalism. Control of dissent is garnered through government-controlled trade unions. Finally, a technocratic and bureaucratic approach to the solution of human problems, in education or health care helps to lessen social tensions (Wilson 1978). Social, political, and economic alternatives that do not fit the preconceptions of the political managers are effectively screened out.

Despite the democratic rhetoric, opposition politics is severely repressed through a variety of means including government control of the courts, the media, and access to permits to print and publish material. The state in February 1998 effectively banned the right of opposition parties to make films disseminating their point of view or otherwise commenting on Singapore politics. The result is a highly administered society where spontaneous innovation in almost any area (including the artistic) is almost impossible.

For a social movement to appear at all, several factors must be present: a political environment that permits the emergence of contending groups – what Sidney Tarrow calls the "political opportunity structure" (Tarrow 1996); an issue or issues; at least a modicum of organization within the embryonic movement that permits not only the identification of potential resources, but also their mobilization (Zald 1987, McAdam 1983); and an ability on the part of the movement to deflect the inevitable pressures that will be brought to bear on it by the existing sources of social and/or political power. In Singapore the political environment is the key element in the continued life of any social movements, a point born out by the comparative study of social movements elsewhere (McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1998).

The People's Action Party (PAP) has been in power from independence and holds a virtual monopoly on Parliamentary seats – opposition held seats having fluctuated in numbers between two and four in a Parliament of over eighty seats (the number itself varying from election to election as the PAP has constantly

adjusted constituency boundaries). As a result, few alternative political forums were available to express political dissent (with the exception of coffee shops and private homes). Close control is still exercised over all non-political organizations through the Registrar of Societies who was empowered to permit or deny legal status to organizations. In reviewing organizational registrations, the Registrar can demand changes in the constitutions and by-laws of organizations, deregister offending organizations, and demand annual reports from all registered organizations (including financial accounts and lists of committee members). Business organizations are similarly regulated through the Registry of Businesses. No organization may involve itself in political activity unless it is formally registered as a political party. Any unregistered group engaging in political activity is considered a "pressure group" and viewed as "undemocratic" (i.e. outside of state administered political processes) and liable for suppression (Richardson 1993).

Such tactics were employed against Singapore's professional body of lawyers, the Law Society in the late 1980s. Singapore's constitution was changed to exclude the Law Society's role in reviewing existing or proposed legislation. At the same time, the Law Society's president with oppositional political ambitions was forced from office, arrested and tortured. He was finally forced to flee the country (Seow 1994).

The management of "dissent" both proscribes political activity outside of approved channels and sanctions oppositional activity. As a result political pluralism as characteristic of British or the US systems does not exist in Singapore. The only real political competition, kept out of sight of the public, is between factions of the PAP itself. This monopoly of political power has bred arrogance, reflected in the constant demeaning of oppositionists as morally inadequate, uneducated, naïve, or secretly propelled by sinister or self-serving motives. Political power is legitimated in a national ideology based on Confucianism. The definition of "just men" or suitable leaders, reflects the role of cultural legitimacy in Singapore politics and PAP's maintenance of political power. Culturalist explanations and self-orientalizing images serve as a strategy for eliminating oppositional ideas (Clammer 1993, Chua 1997), or for suppressing "decadent" Western cultural tendencies including alternative sexual preferences (Berry 1996). The promotion of Confucianism as an ideological basis for national unity in Singapore has quite specifically identified the "West" as the source of not only individualism, but more particularly of decadence – something seen as a uniquely Western problem (Lim 1992.)

Political hegemony is created through a combination of monopoly of the means of ideological production and dissemination. It is maintained through the educational system, the media, and a set of institutions including the aforementioned Registry of Societies, and the courts. It is enforced through the Internal Security Act inherited paradoxically from the British that allows detention without trial. Compulsory military service for males also serves a legitimizing function. As a result civil society is undermined as intermediate

groups or mediating structures between the state and the mass of the population are monitored and controlled.

Resource mobilization theory recognizes that intermediate groups are necessary in order for social movement organizations to emerge (Banaszak 1996). In Singapore these mediating organizations fall into one of two categories. The first are the government-sponsored nationwide constituency committees, including the Citizen's Consultative Committees or the network of Community Centers. These committees are not supported or utilized by the bulk of the population who are aware of their political roles in collecting information and dispensing government propaganda. The second are interest-based organizations which occasionally influence representatives in government including the women's group AWARE (focused on sexism in advertising), the Malayan Nature Society (focused on destruction of natural habitats), or the Singapore Heritage Society (focused on matters of urban conservation). Interest-based organizations in the business and religious communities include the Chambers of Commerce (divided along racial lines into Chinese, Malay, Indian, the International Chambers, the Automobile Association, and the National Council of Churches).

Members of these elite organizations are often closely associated with political elites rather than civic-based organizations. They carry little political weight, unless their objectives have been officially endorsed by the government. The ideas generated within such organizations are simply co-opted and assimilated into bureaucratized social or cultural policy.

Singapore's economy has remained relatively stable during the last 30 years. The country has benefited from full employment, rising wages, and standards of living, the provision of affordable education and housing, and until the recent expansion of privatization, affordable medical care. Singapore has maintained a healthy public infrastructure including an efficient public transportation system, parks, zoos, shopping centers, and a sophisticated communication network. Low-crime rates have made Singapore relatively safe and secure. For the population of migrant origin coming from poorer or authoritarian countries, Singapore is viewed as a haven of democracy, offering the illusion of freedom of association and speech.

Social problems have been effectively contained. Those living in poverty have been moved to HDB housing (Clammer 1987). This was achieved through the destruction of traditional neighborhoods and urban redevelopment. With the virtual disappearance and marginalization of many traditional industries and occupations workers with low skills were retrained in new industries. As a result families utilized survival strategies that resulted in the reorganization of traditional patterns of family life (Salaff 1988).

The government of independent Singapore had succeeded in developing a consumer society in the heart of Asia. When modern forms of social control are discussed in purely structural terms, a consideration of the socio-psychological elements are frequently ignored. As some critics from the Frankfurt School of sociology have observed, hyper-consumption is often accompanied by political

and psychic repression (Adorno and Horkheimer 1994), a point that builds on the comments on Gramsci discussed above.

Social theorists have begun to note the significance of geographic space (Lefebvre 1994). In high-density urbanized Singapore (25 miles long by 15 miles wide, with a population of five million people, 90% of who live in government built and administered high-rise housing) considerations of space and size become paramount. Urban density may lead to an increased probability that social exclusion, as well as public humiliation, accusations of incompetence or moral turpitude will be very damaging to dissidents. A heavy cost is incurred by oppositional groups, who do not command the social resources via an authorized organization, or access to government sanctioned media.

Petty criminals can be seen sweeping the streets in brightly colored vests announcing their criminal status. Evidence publicly surfaces of the minor misdemeanors of opposition politicians. Examples include parking violations or poor academic records uncovered by the secret police. Singapore has numerous examples of ex-PAP members (including former cabinet members) who fell from favor with the top leadership, or who displayed political independence, and were ruthlessly pushed from public office.

The Fate of a Social Movement

In 1987 the whole country was galvanized by the announcement that the government had discovered a "Marxist plot" to violently overthrow the regime and usher in a communist administration. In this absurd fantasy, a number of Catholic social activists, socially conscious drama group members and some of their defending lawyers were detained under the Internal Security Act and accused of a whole range of subversive activities. No public trial was ever held, but the alleged ringleader (the secretary of the local Catholic Justice and Peace Commission) "confessed" in a heavily edited television interview. Detainees were tortured and their families and friends were intimidated.

The Singapore government later announced that the local media had mischaracterized the social activists as a full-fledged social movement with international links to Marxist and liberation theology groups. Government officials instead characterized the activists as a childish, immature, and uninformed group of people, who posed no threat to the state and had long been under security surveillance.

The government's action against political opposition signaled to unauthorized challenging groups the barriers and limits to political mobilization. In a system characterized by hegemonic control, activists did not have access to state-controlled media and were unable to "re-frame" their detention by government authorities (Snow and Benford 1988).

Power and Elitism

Since access to political resources is severely restricted by the government of Singapore, a movement for change has only two choices. First, it can join the elite and attempt to alter policy from within on a gradualist basis, while leaving the fundamental political structure largely unchanged. Another option is to enhance participatory democracy and attempt to enlarge "free spaces" where groups might be strengthened (Evans and Boyte 1992). Here again the Singapore case raises an interesting issue for social movements theory. While many social movements are indeed threats to the existing political order, they need not necessarily be so. They can be either gradualist and reformist in their demands, or they can be "elite displacing", where one elite succeeds another outside of the formal structure of the system (Gamson 1990).

In Singapore an interesting variation on this idea occurs. The structuring of political life since independence has effectively insured that there is no alternative political elite to challenge those already in power. The business elite (the only other group with real power) is kept beholden to the political elite for the maintenance of the right kind of business environment. As a result, those attracted to the promotion of social or political change like an academic critic of the PAP (one Aline Wong, a former sociology teacher at the National University of Singapore) selected as an MP and later a Minister of State, are more likely to join the existing elite voluntarily or through cooptation, rather than to attempt to displace it.

Another enticement to party participation is that hand-picked party members may become MPs after only a few months of membership. New MPs sometimes become ministers almost immediately and without any visible political or even professional competence in the area of responsibility. MPs salaries are high, and those of ministers astronomically high.

Entry into the elite is not only via Parliamentary election but also through government sponsorship. The government sends scholars every year to leading universities abroad (most frequently Oxford). On their return these scholars are absorbed through extremely rapid promotion into high-level bureaucratic positions, which they are ill equipped to occupy. The key government positions in the judiciary, state-run corporations, statutory boards, armed forces, and universities are controlled by state authorities.

Another aspect of elite dominance is that in Singapore there are grievances, but no social movements. This happens not only because of the institutional control and cooptation, and the fear and self-censorship which often accompanies authoritarian control, but also because of the critical role that the state plays in defining political reality. The state in Singapore has effectively constructed political reality through control of the educational system including textbooks, training of teachers, and the monitoring of the classroom (especially in higher education). Another means of defining political reality is through the control of the content of the local media through censorship of foreign publications, and

the suspending of offending ones such as the Asian Wall Street Journal and the Far Eastern Economic Review. Singaporeans have been prohibited from access to satellite TV making it impossible for the average citizen or researcher to gain information and global news. Government officials exert strong influence on the awarding of local literary prizes, and the control of local printing and publication through ownership of the major bookshop chain in the country. The definition of the ethnic categories and the designation of official languages are likewise controlled by officials.

This virtual monopoly on information and expression makes it difficult for the opposition to articulate a serious and informed critique or to pose alternatives. Opposition leaders like MP Chee Soon Juan who dare to publish a detailed critique of Singapore society and political culture (Chee 1994) pay a high price. The Chee case resulted in his dismissal from the National University on trivial and unsubstantiated corruption charges. Hegemony then, as characterized in the Gramscian model, extends not only to institutional domination, but to the production of intellectual thought as well.

The Singapore dilemma has been how to build an open economy for foreign investment and tourism, while maintaining absolute rule or political autarky at home. The resulting political stress has led to an underlying sense of crisis. In order to maintain the current political and economic arrangements, the elite must constantly create issues, imagine plots, and reassert new state-supported ideologies. These state-enforced cultural campaigns combine elements of Confucianism and an array of Asian shared values in support of the status quo. Official state-sponsored campaigns include directives to speak the Mandarin language, to contribute to civil society by giving blood, and to avoid spitting in public. Citizens are called to consume more frozen fish. Marriage-promotion campaigns are directed at college graduates, and pro-natal policies are stressed. Programs promoting declining local cultures such as that of the Babas or Peranakan Chinese are implemented.

But elite involvement in any project, while guaranteeing resources and patronage, serves to co-opt culturally related movement leaders. This has happened in the case of the acceptance of Christianity in Singapore. Christianity is a minority religion practiced by about 15–18% of the population. During the 1980s and early 1990s Christianity had a rapidly growing social profile, largely due to its association with the highly educated (including not a few MPs). This attracted both government-sponsored research and implicit state acceptance and encouragement (Kuo et al. 1988). Christianity was deemed to be supportive of moral values shared by the state.

Yet the so-called Marxist plot of 1987 demonstrated the government's limited tolerance of Christianity. The government attempted to censor Catholic activists advocating social justice and espousing "liberation theology." Likewise, the government was critical of Pentecostal protestant missionaries who were proselytizing members of other faiths (including the politically sensitive Malays), and were spreading an ideology of spiritism incongruent with the government's deeply materialistic worldview (Clammer 1991). To silence

religious-based activism emerging from both Catholic liberation theology and Pentecostal fundamentalism, the state expelled the liberationist Christian Conference of Asia which was headquartered in Singapore. The activities of the conference were under surveillance as were cooperating local Christian organizations such as the tiny Student's Christian Movement (SCM). A Parliamentary Act was passed during this period entitled the "Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill" which served to restrict aggressive evangelization, but also to establish an absolute separation between religion and politics. Faith-based activism was thus prohibited in Singapore in the late 1980s.

Ultimately, any social movement to succeed must create a mass base. The intense difficulty of doing this in Singapore should by now be apparent. Structural pressures, the framing of debates, the dangers of cooption, the fear of public ridicule on the part of would-be leaders or members and the very real dangers of retaliation in the form of sudden investigations for alleged tax evasion, lack of career advancement, invasion of privacy through phone tapping and mail tampering, all ensure the unwillingness of the average Singaporean (economically well-off and enmeshed in a consumer society) to engage in politics other than the (compulsory) trip to the ballot box once every 4 years.

Ironically, this has led to the erosion of civic participation and served to dissuade talented people from pursuing public office. Powerful political pressures work strongly against any challenging group or individual, operating both through both institutional and ideological controls. The "development cycle" of any movement is thus successfully aborted at a very early stage.

The intensity and moral earnestness of officials in the pursuit of the political or moral deviant suggests a deeper psychic and cultural structure in Singapore that supports the status quo. Elsewhere I have argued that this mode of behavior is reflected in the Singapore management of crime (Clammer 1997), and here this pattern can be further extended to the analysis of the lack of success in forming social movements.

Deviance is feared, not only because it threatens property, but because it signals the presence of what Bauman (1995) calls "proteophobia" or "the apprehension aroused by the presence of multiform, allotropic phenomena which stubbornly elude assignment and sap the familiar classificatory grids" (Bauman 1995, 181). A process of classifying social movement participants narrowly as deviants is undertaken by government leaders and serves to maintain elite political power while calming societal anxiety over deviance.

This suggests that the basic component of a model for the collapse of social movements in Singapore is one of the differential accesses to power, and the elites' ability to define and enforce its own exercise of power (as legitimate and proper). Foucault's (1986) notion of diffused power made to seem "natural" or taken for granted is evident in Singapore. A monolithic and very efficient system of social control serves to maintain social stability and circumvent ethnic-based or religious challenges to those holding power.

Managing Everyday Life in Singapore

Everyday life in Singapore is something of a paradox: most people agree that the system delivers all sorts of benefits – mainly of a material kind – while grumbling constantly that it is boring, lacking in freedom or true creativity, too expensive, and unequal in its treatment of minority ethnic groups. Many would like to leave and many, especially professionals, do, often citing educational pressures on their children as a principal reason. The shortfall in talent is made up by recruiting from abroad, especially of ethnic Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, or even North America, although skilled and highly educated Indians, Sri Lankans, and others are welcome usually on a short-term basis (the Chinese are encouraged to settle).

The opportunity for this transitory labor force to express itself politically is limited. While the economic and material pressures on first generation of Singaporeans may have receded, new pressures have emerged including the privatization of basic services, rising educational expectations and escalating costs, and large currency and economic fluctuations in the global market context.

Responses to these pressures take a variety of forms – from joining the PAP, to political apathy, to gradualist attempts to create at least some changes through organizations, to attempting to redefine reality in transcendent religious terms. Religion has attracted a large number of Singaporeans, including many of the well educated and professionally secure. Religious organizations are the dominant form of civic participation and religious activism can be linked to a genuine social movement in the country.

More recently in the west, sociologists have examined the role that religion has played in social movements (Smith 1996). Concern with social change in East, Southeast or South Asia can hardly ignore the question of the role of religion in politics. Islamic fundamentalism, Hindu fundamentalism in India, Hindu/Buddhist struggles in Sri Lanka, the so-called New Religions of Japan, the Muslim Dakwah movement in Southeast Asia, Pentecostalism in the Philippines, and a host of other examples all underscore the continuing energy of religious forces. Singapore, with its interesting blend of Asian and Western influences and its ethnic complexity, has despite its formal secularity, been no exception to this pattern.

The religious picture in Singapore reflects the country's ethnic mosaic. The religious spectrum covers varieties of both Therevada and Mahayana Buddhism, many forms of Chinese spirit mediumship and other expressions of "folk religion," assorted schools of Islam, Hinduism in some of its myriad expressions, adherents of Japanese New Religions such as Soka Gakkai, a tiny Jewish community and numerous sects and denominations of Christians, to say nothing of state-sponsored varieties of Confucianism (Clammer 1991, 1993; Tham 1984).

Most of these religious groups have not concerned the government and they are viewed as promoting desirable moral values. Confucianism is viewed not as

a practice, but as an ideology sharing the values and political agenda promoted by the elites in Singapore. Islam constituting 15% of the Singapore population, and the majority religion of neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia, has been treated with sensitivity. This is not surprising since the Malay minority is often critical of the policies of the PAP. Singapore has responded to the concerns of the Islamic population by instituting a large program of mosque building, providing assistance to followers undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Haj), and instituting various social programs and benefits. Political calm is maintained with Islamic groups through the Maintenance of Religious Harmony act, keeping fundamentalists under control. Soka Gakkai, which began as a movement among Singapore's sizeable population of Japanese expatriates, and has since spread rapidly amongst mainly Chinese speaking blue-collar and lower middle-class white-collar workers and their families, has been largely co-opted and utilized as a socially conservative force (Clammer 1998).

Christianity was initially viewed by authorities as socially conservative, moralistic, and pietistic in its local forms of expression. Many members of the government were Christian. During the 1980s, a variety of fundamentalist American missionary organizations were permitted to operate in Singapore. These missionary groups targeted students and young people. Two countervailing Christian forces were gathering. One entailed the spread of a social-justice oriented liberation theology that had spread to Singapore largely from the Philippines. Liberation theology originating in Latin America focused on empowering the socially disadvantaged (Nunez 1985; Pieris 1992). Mostly concentrated amongst Singapore Catholics and those associated with the multi-denominational Christian Conference of Asia headquartered in Singapore, liberation theology embraced a prophetic vision of social justice rooted in Judaism.

Another trend occurring simultaneously in Singapore was the embrace of the "Charismatic" or the Pentecostal movement by people of both Catholic and Protestant persuasions. Spreading largely from Britain and North America, Pentecostalism was concerned with direct spiritual experience. Gatherings were highly emotional and participants were deeply attracted to the practices of prayer, tongue-speaking, ecstatic movement, and faith healing (Csordas 1994). These practices and world-views were at variance with those cultivated by the government over the previous 20 years. Pentecostalism with its anti-materialistic focus demanded a strong sense of commitment to the ecclesiastical group. This focus was at variance with the low-emotion/high bodily order of the majority culture in Singapore (Zito and Barlow 1994). Followers of Pentecostalism denied "divine-right" or a mandate to heaven for the secular leadership. Government leaders were according to this view placed in power by God's favor and were subject to divine scrutiny and removal if they failed to operate in accordance with a Pentecostal reading of Biblical principles.

The Pentecostal church attracted thousands of Christians from the affluent social elite including professionals, university students, and government officials as well as the socially disadvantaged. Adherents contributed large sums of

money engaging in the practice of "tithing" or contributing 10% of their incomes for church related purposes.

Religion has become an important factor in social movement emergence for three reasons. First, in countries like Singapore, direct political action is impossible. Religion, while not an overt political form in Singapore, certainly was a crucial variable challenging the elite form of political domination. Secondly, the government recognized that religion advocated social and political change. Thirdly, the place of religion and faith as a social force helps to locate religion itself in the wider context of social change in Singapore: as a significant factor in the culture and social structure of the tiny nation.

With the rapid pace of social change occurring in Singapore (continuing urbanization in an already intensely urbanized state, rapid changes in media and communications, economic shifts from manufacturing to services and finance, constant shifts in government policies on population, education, and many other issues, shifts in personal values toward the very individualism so criticized by the government and its Confucian supporters, the massive spread of the Internet to now over 70% of all households, religions that offer the strongest sense of community (especially Soka Gakkai and Charismatic Christianity) have grown at the fastest rate. More importantly, religion provides an alternative understanding of reality, and serves to fulfill the genuine desire of followers to apply religious ethics in promoting certain forms of social change. In the political situation of Singapore of de-facto authoritarianism, the redefinition of alternative realities is the key to subverting hegemony and may serve as a progressive force in promoting social change.

While the potential for creating real change is undoubtedly present, activism has been stifled not only because of political pressures, but also because of the failure on the part of the religious leadership to develop a social praxis – a clear articulation of the links between their religious beliefs and the expression in practice of a social and cultural program. Another obstacle has been the close relationships between many of the religious elite and the state. The tendency of the state is to manage religion through pressing for a form of "tripartism." This form of support and agreement prevails in the trade union sphere (i.e. that government, management, and workers all really have identical interests). In regard to managing religious-based discontent in Singapore, "the government, God, and the various religious establishments" are in agreement. It consequently becomes hard to engage in resistance. The temptation for many religious people is to stay away from social involvement altogether, or at best to engage in some form of social work or charity activity, and to adhere to an individualistic and pietistic mode of religious observance. The ability to undermine the sole legitimacy or the moral superiority of the PAP, while potentially present, has failed to emerge in practice.

Despite political pressures, organizational fragmentation and moral temporizing, religion will continue to be a major social force and is already the main challenger to the government's positions. Different beliefs imply different realities and promote cognitive liberation from the official "reality." Catholic

supporters of the detainees in the "Marxist plot" sported tee-shirts bearing the biblical slogan "The Truth Shall Make You Free," recognizing the important role of religion in speaking "truth to power" and promoting emancipatory alternatives.

The Meaning of the Singapore Case

The Singapore case poses a number of major theoretical questions for the sociology of social movements. First, it brings the analysis of the role of religion in social activism into the centre of debate regarding the emergence or state repression of social movements and suggests that the issue of the relation of religion to politics is very important. Secondly, in the case of a country dominated by an authoritarian government where potential activists are co-opted and grievances contained, structural, political, and psychological factors are important in explaining the failure of social movements to emerge.

Thirdly, I would argue against viewing social movements primarily as organizations (Dunleavy 1980), "organizations standing outside the formal party structure which bring people together to defend or challenge the provision of urban public services and to protect the local environment" (Lowe 1986, 3). This view is partial and it fails to incorporate the analysis of the cultural and political context which frames the possibility of certain kinds of social activity evolving into fully fledged movements.

In the Singapore case specifically, where the political opportunity structure severely limits the emergence of most kinds of social movements, religious-based activism emerges as a possible alternative. The first signs of "New Age" thinking in Singapore suggest that this tendency may accelerate and deepen in unexpected ways, especially given the common cause between ecologists, social justice activists, and Buddhists in other Asian countries such as Japan and Thailand (Sulak 1992).

Following Castell's early writings (1977), the theorizing of the role of the state must take a critical, if not the central place. As the major generator of ideology, the state is the agency with the mechanisms to enforce conformity to the dominant ideology. But outward conformity does not necessarily mean internal consent. Together with the analysis of the state, we must examine the free spaces within the state.

Discussion of the potential and emergence of social movements in Singapore, such as the feminist movement or the brief student movement in the Singapore Polytechnic in the early 1980s, should be taken seriously whether or not they succeeded in "taking off." While these movements were rapidly co-opted or suppressed, they successfully articulated real societal grievances and demonstrated successful mobilization around social issues. Another important case is the consumers' movement in Singapore. While a broad-based consumer movement is absent in Singapore, the vigorous Consumers' Association of Penang,

and the Malaysian social analysis group Aliran, have become prominent actors on their own local political scenes. Their views, methods of analysis, and dissemination of findings are well known in Singapore. These local organizations might serve as potential models for larger consumer and environmental-based activism.

In the early 21st century pressing social concerns continue. Issues such as the transition to a new generation of leaders and shifts within the Party itself, the challenges of an uncertain international economic environment, increased regionalization in Asia, a shifting class structure and especially the emergence of a new middle class put pressure on the old order (Rodan 1993). Concern continues regarding over consumption, environmental degradation and successive manufactured "crises" (Birch 1993). All are signs of new forms of social strain emerging, despite attempts to dub them as indicators of "success" (Sandhu and Wheatley 1990). These can also be seen as precursors to new and unexpected forms of change. The penetration of the Internet in particular is making Singaporeans aware of issues suppressed in the local press and of international events that have a direct influence on Singapore and its stability.

Such changes also suggest that the state will attempt to reconfigure it's ideological response (Chua 1997) and will attempt to adapt itself. New forms of cooptation will evolve, and attempts will be made to undermine emerging forms of social solidarity. The state is likely to rely on well-tested methods as described above.

Sociologists have focused on the role of the state in creating an opportunity structure for collective action of which movements take advantage (Tarrow 1996). But in the case of authoritarian governments (like the case of Singapore), state building suppresses opportunity structures making the emergence of spontaneous movements all but impossible. It is precisely through the control of access (to social goods and resources) and opportunity structures as well as through imposing ideological hegemony that state control has been successfully achieved in Singapore. Both the power and attraction of the elite, and the fact that in such a small society elites substantially overlap, makes organized social opposition difficult. At the same time the suppression of the symbolic life through a public culture based on pragmatism, positivism, and consumerism (Douglas 1982) leaves religion as pragmatic, conservative, and serving as a substitute for those societal resources and services and providing an arena of freedom and self-expression that the state does not provide.

The Singapore case suggests that research on social movements needs to maintain a balance between detailed empirical analysis of movements in specific locations and a comparative perspective. The first by itself contributes little to theory unless linked to the general issues of movement research, and the second by itself generates abstract typologies without rooting in the realities of specific contexts. Research that attempts to combine the two can help to generate wider linkages. Sociologists must incorporate the insights garnered by urban sociology, and the analysis of modernity and post-modernity and of the forms that social protest is taking in "post-industrial" societies. Singapore is in many ways

a "modernist" society committed to rational planning, bureaucracy, order, and systematic and positivistic ways of thinking. The main challenge may not come from direct modernistic means, but from the influence of global postmodernism with alternative ideologies and practices (Turner 1994), including primarily forms of consumption, entertainment, and electronic communications that undermine highly managed state-based hegemonies. With the absence of broad-based transnational social movements, sociologists must examine the conditions under which human ingenuity finds new modes of self-expression, and investigate the cases where the powerless are engaging in activism.

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Part VII
Conclusion

Conclusion: Learning About Social Movements from East Asia

Jeffrey Broadbent

Besides being fascinating accounts of social movements, what lessons for social movement theory do these chapters offer? Do they tell us anything about the role of culture in social movement theory? Do they introduce new concepts and theories that can expand our analytical toolkit? The concepts of culture and relationships challenge the dominant structural-instrumental-mechanism school of social movement theory. Let us first review the origins and content of that challenge. Then we can assess what new tools may be emerging from East Asia.

Theory and Reality

At the core of studying social movements lies the thorny question of *power* – social power that holds in place the social order and decides whose voices give direction to society. Some scholars assume that social power is essentially based on the mailed fist – naked instrumental coercion. Others, though, argue that power, whatever its exact mode of rule, depends upon a broad social consensus, upon legitimacy, and cannot last long without that. Naked coercion by the sword or the gun have a certain universality – people tend to run from such bloody agony in any culture. But as Gandhi showed, in the face of strong moral purpose, sometimes even such bloody universals fail. Legitimacy is another matter. Max Weber argued that people give rulers the right to rule for many reasons: tradition, following the agreed upon laws, or the spiritual awesomeness of a charismatic leader. All these modes of rule are formed and defined by culture in locally specific meanings. From this dichotomy of coercion and culture arise many intermediate states of power, mediated through social institutions and imagined communities. Questions of power remain central to long-standing debates about politics and social change.

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By asking what factors bring about change in the social formation of power, the study of social movements takes us directly into the heart of this perennial debate and provides a distinct, advantageous vantage point. We can learn more about what constitutes power by learning what can change its obdurate order. The field of social movement studies has burgeoned into an enormous enterprise popular among young scholars. Through ongoing theoretical controversy and methodological innovation, the field has developed a toolkit of analytical concepts that enable the closer examination of the change process from a movement-centric point of view. These analytical concepts direct us to look closely at the social movements, but also need expansion to better grasp the context and constitution of social movements.

The introductory chapter posed a central causal question bequeathed us by theoretical debate: How and to what degree do specific local cultural and relational factors affect the interaction of movement and context in contentious processes? Could the empty analytical structures and mechanisms (resources, opportunity structures, diffusion, identity shift) presented by structural-instrumental-mechanistic theory accommodate cultural content and fully explain movements? Or were these mechanistic concepts, born in the West, necessarily specific to their own culture and hence limited to use therein? Does an essential instrumentalism pervade all political relations around the world, with culture no more than a fig leaf to hide or justify exploitation and domination? Or are instrumental relations and mechanisms actually cultural products in themselves, especially prominent in Western cultures, and hence quite likely to be different or absent elsewhere? What have the studies in this book taught us about these big questions? The following section replays with this focus the evolution of social movement theory sketched in the introduction and introduces the concept of ontology as context, based on the East Asian experience. The final section pulls these threads together into some reflections on the implications of the cultural ontology concept for social movement theory in general.

The Evolution of Social Movement Theory in the West

The Western toolkit of social movement concepts has itself evolved through protest – scholarly protest against dominant ideas. In the years after World War Two, the 1950s and early 1960s, the dominant *structural-functional* school of theory assumed that the power context was functional, that institutions and their leaders would in time respond to solve social problems. Any problems were thus temporary and would eventually work themselves out to everyone's benefit. In this light, social movements were seen as irrational, as actions of impatient people acting in panic. Groups unnerved by sudden social change were led by fantastic beliefs "akin to magic" to act in unruly ways that only brought harm on themselves and society (Smelser 1963). The favorite example was the superstitious cargo cults of post-World War Two Melanesia.

Starting in the 1950s, though, the rise of the US Civil Rights Movement contradicted this irrationalist image of social movements. The Civil Rights Movement impressed new researchers that protest movements could be reasonable, justified, and perhaps the only way to change oppressive social conditions. These new theorists began to argue that power was essentially unjust, exploitative, and oppressive. Accordingly, among the common people, grievances were always present aplenty. The only real hope of amelioration lay in protest by the victims and their supporters, and hence movements were rational and realistic. However, mobilization had to await a propitious combination of internal resources and external opportunities to make it worth the risk. By the 1970s these new views had coalesced into what can now be called a *structural-instrumental* theoretical paradigm.

These two theoretical packages could not have been more distinct. They constituted two opposite seamless paradigms built on radically different assumptions about how the world worked. In the first, movements represented utterly subjective, lunatic disruptions of a benign world. In the second, movements represented realistic, heroic attempts to blunt the depredations of a predatory world. In the latter, the subjective orientations of movements were limited to developing a more accurate cognitive grasp of the objective opportunities present in the context. Backed by the example of the Civil Rights Movements, the structural-instrumental group attained theoretical dominance in the 1970s, obliterating the rationales of the structural-functional group.

This fundamental shift in perspective raised the question – if movements were agents of justified and reasonable change, what factors besides irrational panic determined when and where they would emerge? Various detailed theories began to emerge. McCarthy and Zald argued that the 1950s Civil Rights movement in the South was able to mobilize due to an influx of funding from northern white support groups and churches. They generalized this principle into *resource mobilization theory*. Grievances, they said, are constant – for example segregation had continued for almost a century. Mobilization against it awaited the arrival of sufficient resources, financial but also the presence of social groups that would help. Applying micro-economic theory, the authors likened activists to business entrepreneurs launching a new product (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Although their explanation of the importance of external financial resources from Northern liberal groups was mistaken, the concept of mobilizing resources greatly stimulated social movement studies.

Other theorists applied a similar rationalism to explain the context of protest. Far from functional, society was split into harshly contending groups, with injustice enforced by threats of coercion. Dominant actors controlled and exploited those beneath them, treating people as mere instruments for their purposes. Government and elites, like organized crime, pursued domination and exploitation over weaker social groups (Tilly 1992). The decision to mobilize and protest awaited good external *political opportunities* (Tilly 1978). Tarrow defined this *political opportunity structure* as: "consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment

that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people's expectations of success or failure (Tarrow 1998, 76–77). The essential relations composing structure were instrumental, calculated attempts to control the other (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994). To succeed, a movement had to calculate the odds and use their resources and allies instrumentally to attain their ends (Hunt 1984, 250).[1] Strangely, these structuralists ignored the *locus classicus* of structural power – the power of business (the capitalist class) to exploit the populace, influence the policies of the state, and determine political opportunities (Paige 1975). Instead, they adopted a Weberian focus on state power for its own sake.

In sum, resources and political opportunities described a structure – an objective hierarchy of power composed of instrumental relations of control among actors. In this objectivist world, subjective motivations had no bearing (Tilly 1998). As noted in the Introduction, Zald recognized that all instrumental theories, including his Resource Mobilization theory, could not address the implications of meaning systems for social movements (Zald 1992, 341). At most, the subjective orientation of the actor is only relevant as the means by which the actor can understand the objective circumstances. These structuralists minimized the independent effects of subjective motivations and of accumulated cultural orientations upon the purposes and means of contention (McAdam et al. 2001).

However, the question of subjective meaning kept raising its head. Even the structuralists allowed that movements needed an accurate cognitive grasp of the objective reality. McAdam argued that in order to take action, Southern African-Americans had to first attain *cognitive liberation* from their old expectations of the need for submission. Similarly, structuralists adopted the concept of *frame* as an instrumental social movement tactic to convince wider audiences (Benford and Snow 2000). In its origin, the concept of frame referred to a strategic presentation of self to help the presenter (Goffman 1974). When the frame veered very far from instrumental power relations, structuralists criticized the concept of frames for having its head in the clouds (Gamson 1992). By the mid-1990s, the structural-instrumental school, adding the instrumental use of frames by movements, touted a three concept toolkit: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and frames (McAdam 1996).

But the structural-instrumental paradigm did not satisfy all social movement researchers. Scholars began to notice that in mobilizing against power, groups of people went through changes more profound than mere cognition. Mobilization involved identity, emotion, morality. As they looked more deeply into the motivations of participants, they realized that in forming a social movement, people first had to build some kind of common identity – a "we" feeling among themselves based on *collective identity* with a common cause. At the same time,

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[1] Under criticism, Tarrow first weakened his claims for the explanatory power of POS structuralism without explicitly acknowledging so (Kurzman 2004), and then finally published a rejection of the approach titled "Confessions of a Recovering Structuralist" (Tarrow 2005).

the idea of social networks injected a new dimension into the debate, that of the pattern of relations among actors as important for their behavior. This insight moved toward a relational view of social movements.

Structuralist-instrumentalist-mechanists did their best to absorb both new concepts, collective identity and relational views, into their paradigm. For instance, they identified local friendship networks as important in movement recruitment of new members (McAdam 1988). Tilly absorbed the concept of networks to produce a theory of *relational realism* (Tilly 1999). But Tilly cut off the feet of networks in order to fit them into his structuralist bed. To him, relationships carried mainly domination and exploitation, or resistance in kind. In like manner, Tilly reduced collective identity to the reflection of a social category (i.e., race, ethic group) (Tilly 1998). His instrumental-mechanistic school decried attention to subject motivations as phenomenology, a term of approbation (McAdam et al. 2001, 21). Here, Tilly agreed with Harrison White, who also assumed meaning and identity to arise from the social configurations of instrumental relations of control (White 1992).

By absorbing such critiques and feinting toward meaning the structural-instrumental school morphed into the instrumental-mechanisms school. As detailed in the Introduction, they specified a set of mechanisms that related collective actors bearing power and protest. These mechanisms included identity shift, brokerage, diffusion, and others. They claimed that these mechanisms could be combined in various ways to explain protest movements at any place and time (McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007).

The Challenge of Culture and Relations

In taking this position, the structural-instrumental-mechanism paradigm was confronting some very basic sociological orientations. Since its inception, most of sociology had developed precisely as a critique of instrumental reductionism. Weber and Durkheim showed how beliefs specific to a culture – manifesting respectively as personal motivations and as social facts – could shape motivation and drive behavior. Max Weber compared the effect of culture to that of a railroad switchman. With a slight effort, the switchman can send the juggernaut of the locomotive hurtling down a different track to a new destination (Weber 1946). In like manner, a certain set of culturally defined subjective orientations could alter the course of economic development.

Weber specifically showed how beliefs about predestination led Calvinist Protestants to save their money and reinvest it, while Confucian social obligations led Chinese to give their wealth away to their relatives (Weber 1951). Weber focused on motivational impulses located in the heads of the actors (phenomenology), but these came from the broader culture. Similarly, Durkheim showed why Catholics had lower suicide rates than Protestants due to social practices (confession, prohibition of divorce) that reduced social

detachment (*anomie*) (Durkheim 1966). Weber is a progenitor of motivational studies, while Durkheim started the view that culture is located in relationships and collective culture, as social facts beyond individual will. Groups identify with (cathect) collective symbols. In Durkheim's view, culture exists as relationships mediated by meaning (intrinsic motivators) as opposed to bodily welfare (extrinsic motivators) (Etzioni 1975; Broadbent 2003).[2]

For most sociologists, the concept of collective identity derives from foundational symbols. Coming out of the Weberian motivational emphasis, the concept of identity developed through the phenomenology of Schutz and Husserl who elaborated how the mind interpreted, rather than just reflected, reality. Mead then showed how the mind internalized the moral judgments of others to form a personal identity. Expanding this view, group acceptance of common symbols formed a collective identity. Social psychologists applied this view to the study of movements (Melucci 1996). African-American students in the South disgruntled with racism, for instance, built up their collective identity as activists through discussion long before they launched their lunch-counter sit-ins (Turner 1981). Southern black churches taught the religious morality of equality long before resources or structural opportunities came along to assist protest (Morris 1984). The "we-feeling" around a common moral identity heightened personal willingness to sacrifice for a common purpose (Melucci 1995; Touraine et al. 1983; Poletta and Jasper 2001). Accordingly, common and deeply felt but socially constructed conceptions of collective purpose play a crucial role in energizing people to participate in risky protest activities (Jasper 1997; Whittier 2002). These collective identities do not simply reflect social category (i.e., race, ethic group) as structuralists would have it (Tilly 1998). They also reflect the available ideas in the culture and the dynamics of the social category as it forms groups (Broadbent 2005). These views coalesced into a *motivational* school of social movement studies.

Table 1 summarizes the discussion up to this point. The horizontal dimension distinguishes social movements as actors, their main kinds of relationships, and their contexts. The other dimension represents the difference between structural-instrumental versus socio-cultural perspectives. The theoretical

Table 1 Categories of social movement theory

		Locus		
		Movement	Relationship	Context
Key factor	Structural-instrumental	Resources	Control	Political opportunity structure
	Socio-cultural	Motivations	Meanings	Ontology

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[2] Tilly's article "Useless Durkheim" illustrates how structuralists reject out of hand ideas of the effect of collective values on social movements (Tilly 1981).

orientations discussed above occupy four cells of the table. The fifth and sixth cells, meaning and ontology, are discussed below.

The fifth cell, meanings, indicates that relations can carry a huge range of motivational stimuli, ranging from material through social to subjective (emotional, moral, cognitive). The sixth cell indicates that the socio-cultural context *constitutes* all the actors and events, including the movements. Ontology produces a holistic, all-encompassing but not necessarily homogenous collective field. Ontology argues that protest movements are contingent upon the social and cultural content of their society, that their tensions arise in respect to that formation. These factors constitute not just movement motivation, but also emergent structures and mechanisms, and movement trajectory and outcome. Ontology is not outside the movement; it points to a fundamental common reality that constitutes both movements, relations and contexts – in a word, a collective permeating habitus. In this view, the categorical distinction between movement and context is untenable; ontology shapes both movement and context, protest and power, together as an dynamic gestalt. The effective and operating units, motivations and relations arise out of this cultural ontology. Power and protest are two sides of the same coin. The immediate logic or rationality of contention must navigate the immediate socio-cultural topology, producing specific forms of contention. Due to this effect, there can be no cross-culturally consistent pure mechanisms or structural logic of contention. People grow up, orient their lives, and reproduce their mutual behaviors within and constituted by their *habitus*, their existing patterns – albeit with degrees of tension and segregation in any society (Bourdieu 1990). Relations therefore enact the wide variety of situational pressures coming not only from inter-actor engagement but also from a variety of penetrative configurations.

Development of the Cultural Ontology View

The author was brought to this ontological view, and to the recognition of aligned theoretical developments, by long years of fieldwork on environmental movements and power in a community in southern Japan. Attempts to make sense of the voluminous ethnographic, participant and interview data drove the author to this conception of ontology after exhausting all the conceptual alternatives (Broadbent 1982). The movements were protesting industrial pollution in a hinterland but developing region of Japan. In this research, the author sought to understand both the subjective orientations and objective structures that affected the course of protest. Fluent in the language, he conducted hundreds of interviews and extensive participant observation. As in the Japanese movie *Rashomon*, actors interpreted the situation in very different ways. Domination and exploitation played their part, with large firms seeking to exploit the area's locational advantages to build a huge petro-chemical and synthetic fiber complex. But the new Constitution and political freedoms reduced the authoritarian

tendencies of the local state, pushing the battle between the protest movements and the developers onto the informal social terrain.

Discourse and social relations meshed together to form a distinct local ontology. Powerful conservative actors used their power over local networks to undercut the movement's local networks of support (Broadbent 1986; Broadbent 1998; Broadbent 2003). Different moral discourses supported each side. Conservative Japanese elites judged the environmental movements as unthinkably selfish because they gave higher value to protecting the health of their own communities from pollution rather than to supporting industrial growth that would serve the needs of the entire society (Broadbent 1998; Broadbent 2003).

This elite value judgment rested on traditional Japanese-style Confucianist and Imperialist teachings that the individual should sacrifice for the state (*messhi houkou*). But movement activists, disillusioned by the now obvious falsehoods of Imperial ambition that resulted in World War Two, no longer accepted that rationale. They distrusted the state and legitimated their own protest activities by reference to a new moral code – the liberal democratic morality that justified citizens acting on behalf of their own immediate interests. This new pluralist world view was anathema to the beautiful virtues (*bitoku*) of traditional loyalty. Structuralist theory would explain this case by reference to the clash of material interests: profits from industrial development versus fear of damage to local public health. But attention to the new formal political institutions, as well as tensions between opposed informal social networks and moral discourses, must be included to explain the process and outcomes.

Contemporary theory has been opening to this ontological space and giving us the analytical concepts to explore it. Symbols and relationships exist in a social field where they take on meaning, not in isolation, but in relation to each other (Bourdieu 1999). These meanings manifest in the taken-for-granted reality (*doxa*) and patterns of relationships and discourse among actors. The degree to which common meanings determine the self, its relations, and social behavior is much debated, defining weak to strong versions of cultural theory (Alexander 2003). In a weaker version, actors use existing meanings and relations as cultural and social capital to advance their interests (Bourdieu 1983; Giddens 1983; Lin 2001). In the stronger version, actors and behavior are the products of their social and cultural fields – even to the extent of reproducing the power relations that oppress them (Foucault 1972). Bellah refers to the latter as a theory of *symbolic realism* (Bellah 1967) – an apt riposte to Tilly's *relational realism*. Examining the role of networks and discourse in the dynamics of protest and power is at the cutting edge of theoretical questions. (Broadbent 2003).

In the social movement field, critiquing instrumental-structuralist arguments as noted in the Introduction, newer theorists argue that culture permeates "all social relations" (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 23). However, as also noted, culture may not just permeate but rather constitute such relations. Moreover, culture is not necessarily uniform, integrating or harmonizing; many variations arise on the common theme, some in conflict with others (Hall 1992, 278) as cited in

(Poletta 2004, 109). Culture exists both as internalized motivations as well as realtionships – accepted norms and practices that force actors to conform (Whittier 2002, 305). Culture can define the motivations of both the benefited and the victimized. The subjects of power can absorb the rationales for their domination and cooperate in its production (Foucault 1982). At the same time, the decisions of power-holders are "rooted in changing conceptions of what the state is, what it can and should do" (Friedland and Alford 1991, 238) as cited in (Poletta 2004). Culture also exists in more stable forms: language, texts, moral teachings, expected roles, and normative rules – collective public symbols and institutionalized ways of doing things (Swidler 1995, 27). These impose their weight on actors even if they do not gain their heartfelt acceptance. Within themselves, movements cope with these cultural effects. Sometimes they create new moral codes as collective identities justifying protest and change (Melucci 1996). If they can inject these new orientations into the larger society, they can foster larger scale change (Eyerman and Jamieson 1991).

Social relations however constitute and shape the action field, as relational sociology argues (Emirbayer 1997). "Actors' . . . attempts at purposive action are . . . embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations" (Granovetter 1985). However network studies and structural social movement studies have tended to conceptualize social networks as "structures" without consideration of their meaningful content. But in-depth fieldwork in contentious communities melts this reification. Relationships exist through the exchange of meaningful symbols (Sandstrom et al. 2003). Therefore, as the fieldworker readily senses, in social reality meanings and relationships are fused into a composite amalgam.

If culture is constitutive, it opens up a wide range of potential modes of relationships among actors. The different social movement theories reviewed above each build on an unstated assumption about the modal power relationship. Instead of assuming one mode, such as instrumental, the constitutive view urges us to look within the relationship for the sanctions that bind its members. Then we have to look for instances of those modes in the actual relationships unearthed by the case studies. Where one participant treats another as an abstracted, impersonal *other* to be exploited or dominated, this is an instrumental relation as posited by structural-instrumental theory. In social relationships, in contrast, participants treat each other as members of a group where the primary sanction is inclusion or exclusion. As a third dimension, cultural relationships require that the participants all be oriented to a common abstract symbol that can be communicated, discussed, agreed, or disagreed upon and adhered to or rejected as a collective motivator (Broadbent 1998; Broadbent 2003). This orienting symbol can be linguistic and cognitive (signs and categories), or endowed with emotional or moral significance (Sandstrom et al. 2003).

Contemporary theories of power reflect this cultural constitutive view. Relationships convey not simply of instrumental sanctions, but deep meanings that draw actors in and weld them to the relationships. The social formations that arise from such relations are institutions, not structures (Scott 2001; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The idea of structure implies an objective force controlling the

subordinate actors; the concept of institution implies a greater mutuality in acceptance of respective roles and duties. In the institutional view, all actors are socialized into their respective roles and relational norms. This implies that actors, by learning to disbelieve those roles and norms, will have greater power to change the institutions – than they would have if they were under structures. Under institutions, symbols have more power. Actors can bring new and unexpected meanings to bear in order to create change (Sewell 1992).

Conclusion

So far, social movement scholars have only given scattered attention to the pervasive socio-cultural ontology. Why? The vast majority of social movement studies and theories have occurred within the one ontology – Western civilization. Without a profound change in the socio-cultural ontology, cultures remain taken for granted. Their effects on protest movements and power are hard to perceive (Broadbent 2003). Secondly, the instrumentalist assumptions of structuralist social movement theory may explain fairly well the actual instrumentalist moralities and practices of modern Western societies. In Western civilization, migration, capitalism, and market relations have narrowed and instrumentalized the content of cultural meanings. Accordingly, there may be a good fit between structuralist theory and Western society. If, however, the theory that protest and power are shaped by their socio-cultural ontology is correct, then the validity of Western structural theory should decrease the further it travels away from the Western setting and into societies that do not operate on those practices.

Whether or not existing Western social movement theory can explain events in a non-Western setting remains an open question. At the same time, whether or not East Asia still retains a sufficiently distinct socio-cultural ontology to provide the needed cultural differences to conduct this natural experiment also remains an open question. Perhaps the spread of Western culture is making structural-instrumental-mechanistic theory the most apt explanatory model around the world. Or perhaps civilizational ontologies still differ enough to profoundly alter the interaction of power and protest. To this editor's mind, the chapters in this book say 'yes'–East Asian cultures do shape power and protest in distinct ways. But as these chapters often employ structural-instrumental concepts from the Western social movement theory toolkit, the answer remains tentative and debatable. We have a lot of work to do. The theoretical perspectives in Table 1 provide investigatory hypotheses; initially they are distinct but when used in actual explanatory, they merge in various combinations. As the papers in the book indicate, understanding how culture shapes and guides relations and processes of contention is crucial to the development of adequate explanations. This approach will increasingly define the coming research agenda on social movements. And yet in terms of our theoretical toolkit, culture

exists in an ambiguous tension with instrumental and coercive relations that constitute structures. Domination and exploitation continue their pervasive devastation of vulnerable groups throughout the world. But what they really mean for resistance, mobilization and change really depends profoundly upon the interpretive twists given by culture.

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