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Simone Tulumello

# Fear, Space and Urban Planning

A Critical Perspective  
from Southern Europe



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*This book is dedicated to the memory  
of Alberto, my father, who taught  
me the necessity, and possibility,  
of change.*

# Foreword

The intention—and the value—of this book is to foreground the more opaque instances of fear in the urban dimension, opaque, i.e., from a mainstream or media perspective, the instances which do not make the news or are taken for granted as part of the routine of public debates. In order to do so, the author adopts a critical perspective on fear and urban planning, raising significant issues and questions about a wider range of theoretical implications and drawing on his research and his experience of living in Southern Europe.

Given the context-based research field and the places in which he lives and has lived, the author experienced difficulties in applying normative principles that are nurtured by promises on behalf of deliberative democracy. These principles are somehow inappropriate for those contexts that are in some ways ‘extreme’<sup>1</sup> but not irrelevant, and those which are exposed, for example, to violence and to hidden and illegal abuse, as is the case with organised crime. The contents of the book and its reflections uncover further, and broader, issues in the field of planning theory. It is worth highlighting that, according to the author, the cases should be considered ‘explicit’ more than ‘extreme’ (see, for instance, the conclusions in Chap. 3). This, it will become evident, is the point at which the perspectives of this foreword and of the book are partially divergent. In a nutshell, the goal of this foreword is to make use of a slightly different perspective as a way of complementing and furthering the discussion of the issues of planning theory explored in this book.

The ‘denied citizenship’ represents the *fil rouge* of the book and still remains an open question. If we assume the notion of citizenship as the theoretical and political sphere where the inclusive or conflictual relations between ‘different’ subjects are defined (Bobbio 1990), the contents of this book can be read in the light of the relation between inclusive and exclusive forms of citizenship, and the recognition of these forms in urban planning. According to Zolo (1994, 4), the notion of citizenship puts into perspective individual subjective rights and pre-judicial

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<sup>1</sup>Here the expression ‘extreme contexts’ refers to conditions in which organised crime, corruption and ‘disorder’ (as a result of ‘conflicting orders’) are structurally concentrated.

reasons and conditions for political inclusion or exclusion. Consequently, the notion of ‘substantial’ citizenship can be considered an indicator of the functional level of democratic institutions in providing fair and equal access to public life and activities, including the urban ones (Zolo 1994, 4). In other words, to analyse democratic institutions and their activities, planning included, under the perspective of substantial citizenship allows us to measure and evaluate the level of democracy of political systems *ex parte populi*, as it adopts a double perspective: the entitlement of rights and the endowment of rights (Barbalet 1988).

Contrary to that which Healey (2012: 34) properly highlights about the benefits of strong local governance institutions in developing interactive, inclusive approaches to rethinking the relations between the civil society and the state, the contexts we are referring to differ in two main aspects: (a) the weakness of local institutions; (b) the interference, and in some cases predominance, of ‘third parties’—and not just organised crime, but also family and/or religion, or a mix of all three!—in the relations between civil society and the state. In fact there are some orders, processes and actions that are beyond or out of the state’s control. Most policy and planning analyses consider the state area of intervention, underestimating the role of other institutions, such as family, religion or illegal crime organisations.

The effects on planning as well as on urban dynamics are significant: in areas where there is a strong presence of organised crime, their powers are capable of bending local governments to support real estate investments, encouraging phenomena like unauthorised building, corruption and political patronage. The most insidious causes of these phenomena reside in the ability to:

- defend, reconcile and promote particular private interests, deliberately jeopardising the public ones; and
- de-legitimise the public administration, the politicians and professionals, by hook—corruption—or by crook—violence/intimidation—or guaranteeing a general condition of inertia/inaction/inefficiency/mistrust (De Leo 2011, 2013).

The rhetoric of fear is one of the instruments being used to enhance mistrust as well as to influence public opinion. As a consequence, the right to the city is ignored or neglected. From Lefebvre (1968) to Mitchell (2003), many scholars (see Friedmann 1992, 1999; Harvey 2000, 2003; Purcell 2003) have discussed how the right to the city must be defended if we want to live in a diverse, just society, as the very idea of citizenship rights is fundamental to protecting the ideals of liberal democracy. Consequently, citizenship is the theoretical and political sphere where conflicting relations between different subjects are defined. Whatever the explicit or implicit aims of any planning decision—whether favouring functional, economic or aesthetic reasons—every planning initiative contributes to a redefinition of the boundaries of citizenship, consequently shaping spatial or non-spatial forms of social control (Lefebvre 1974; Yiftachel 1998; Hillier 2002). This continuous process of redefinition by means of planning initiatives and decisions may occur directly or indirectly, with intentional or unexpected effects, either wittingly (often) or unwittingly (rarely). A redefinition of the boundaries of citizenship, in other



words, the rights to use the city, will always exist as an effect of the redistribution of resources derived from planning decisions, whether or not it is a matter of economies, spaces or rights.

The possible ‘extensive’ or ‘restrictive’ interpretations of the concept of citizenship—as they are described by Kymlicka (1995) and Held (1989)—have some relevant consequences, because they show, theoretically and practically, what citizenship may include or exclude (Lo Piccolo 2010). The recognition of the differences and the guarantee of an effective equity both imply a reconsideration of the idea of citizenship. Nowadays, the characteristics of citizenship status, both legal and political, prevail due to a paradox in history and a process of involution.<sup>2</sup> If compared with the political civil struggles and juridical recognition of the 1970s, democratic rights and justice claims are much more threatened by neo-liberal capitalist globalisation and its effects upon the development and planning of cities (Routledge 2010). In other words, the recognition of citizenship by institutions has recently ignored most of the capacity or, indeed, the potential willingness to encounter and engage with differences.

While a static concept of citizenship, considered as a guarantee of the acquired rights, is widely prevalent, a dynamic concept of citizenship, considered as an activity and a political practice where recognition, defence and plural articulation of the rights are taken into consideration (Kymlicka 1995), is rarely promoted. Citizenship as a status thus creates new geographies, distinguishing between centres and peripheries of the right holders (Roche 1992); and in this way juridical inclusion/exclusion has repercussions for spatial inclusion/exclusion.

Healey and Gilroy (1990) highlight, as one of the critical ingredients of people-sensitive planning, the importance of an ethical consciousness, but how to nurture and defend such consciousness still remains an open question. In the Habermasian theoretical framework to which they refer, rationality and ethics rely on accuracy, integrity, accountability of and sincerity in what participants say during communicatively rational discussions, and on a planner’s duty of responsibly constructing dialogues and knowledge according to truth and rigour. This requires planners to be aware of the nature of the knowledge they use, how it relates to the knowledge used by others, and the kind of ‘validity claims’ brought forward (Healey and Gilroy 1990, 26). But there is an additional problem and one peculiar to some undemocratic contexts. When individuals and/or groups are not substantially recognised, there is no longer room for representation, as in the metaphorical

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<sup>2</sup>Bobbio (1990), describing the increase in the number of the spheres of rights, highlights how now more than ever rights cannot be ascribed to an abstract category—the generic human being—but rather to different and peculiar categories—the specific human being—according to the characteristics and the privileges of the various social statuses. As status, e.g. family status, the status of the free citizen, the status of the legitimate child, etc. was in the past. Today citizenship is an instrument for the differentiation—and consequently the separation and the discrimination—of some subjects within the social body from others; hence, the status of citizenship is a privilege. This phenomenon is more evident in the urban dimension, especially if we consider the inability of the contemporary welfare-state to cope with ‘a more demanding citizenry, more conscious of our multiplicities’ (Healey 2012, 23).

figure of *homo sacer* used by Agamben (1998) in order to describe those circumstances when hegemonic power suspends the law with the intention of excluding, depriving of rights and marginalising within the juridical order.

Agamben (1998) in his book *Homo Sacer: Sovereign and Bare Life* examines the relation between the exception and its devastating consequence on human life, which occurs under the guise of the law. He describes the status of *homo sacer* in ancient Rome: persons that may be killed (without this act being considered murder) but not sacrificed. Agamben uses the metaphorical figure of the *homo sacer* in order to signal the existence outside the law, in terms of exclusion and deprivation of rights. Agamben traces this history to theorise the continuous production of the status of *homo sacer* in contemporary societies; although the *homo sacer* phenomenon disappeared, it can be found nowadays when hegemonic power suspends the law: this implicates exclusion and marginalisation within the juridical order. The point that Agamben (1998) wanted to highlight is that those who are banned from juridical considerations, are consequently the embodiment of the *homo sacer*; Agamben also highlights that the ban (suspension of juridical order) allows bare life to exist and to be maintained in contemporary society.

In such circumstances, conflicts can arise or just remain hidden, when, as in most of our experiences, there is no moral shock, there is no room for representation, 'local voices' are disappearing, powerlessness is not contested by the powerless, and protests are latent. It is not just a matter of imbalance of powers (Hillier 2002; Hoch 1994), or of progressive and radical urban movements involved in resisting the assaults on their life worlds and working for better living conditions (Routledge 2010). Rather, it is a matter of making conflicting positions clear and visible in order to have the opportunity to deal with them. Whether on the side of collaborative planning or of the agonist (Hillier 2003; Gunder 2003; Pløger 2004), what about the contexts where conflicts are eluded, implicit or drained, i.e. devoid of their oppositional power?

One solution can be to move towards a more diverse and, often, less-formalised governance activity, as suggested in the 'network governance' idea (Healey 2012), though some pre-conditions are necessary:

1. The existence of the space of democracy, according to Arendt (2005), to have a space in which to be allowed to talk and to be listened to, to enable and foster those qualities that Healey (2012, 31) individuates as some of the essential requirements for moving towards more people-centred governance and politics.<sup>3</sup>
2. The adoption of a normative perspective to make latent or hidden conflict as visible and as publicly debated as possible, instead of just relying on merely technical knowledge and expertise.

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<sup>3</sup>Recognition of multiple identities; respect for different arguments, positions and feelings; 'intelligent' multi-sided discussion of issues-learning and reasoning in public; rich, responsive and respectful interactions.

In a blatant or a hidden conflict situation of opposing interests, the role of values is fundamental; we agree with Watson (2006, 44) that, ‘introducing questions of value into deliberative processes is not necessarily contrary to a recognition of multiple and conflicting rationalities’. It is not easy to bring the ‘irreconcilable’ opposition between different and divergent values back to a level of democratically lawful and operationally possible discussion. The reference parameter can be found in the ambit of rights and their acknowledgement, in their spatial declination and how this translates into being ‘operational’: in other words, citizenship rights (Lo Piccolo 2010; Lo Piccolo and Thomas 2001) in their substantially extensive interpretation as described and explained by Kymlicka (1995) and Held (1987, 1989). This book, though investigating a specific urban phenomenon, gives some insights into the predominant value of citizenship rights as a key issue in the effort of moving from professional-technical knowledge to a socio-political and ethical dimension of planning knowledge.

When considering the issues of citizenship and status, we should highlight the political role that planning may have for minority groups and individuals, representing a potential political arena for them through the micro-practices of democracy-in-action: ‘small struggles which hardly seem to make a difference may sometimes, if built on in the flow of time, lead to major changes in political cultures’ (Healey 2012, 20). The appropriation of spaces and the construction of new uses for and practices in them, in ‘institutional’ or ‘insurgent’ forms, provide a guarantee of the claims of those rights of citizenship that often are denied at the political and/or juridical levels. Local actions of participation, formal or informal practices of coexistence in urban space, as well as inclusionary planning initiatives, become all-significant for a redefinition of the category of citizenship with respect to the substantial changes (and plural articulation) of the social corpus in the contemporary city (Lo Piccolo 2010). According to Healey (2012, 28), ‘this, however, demands a changing ethos and practice from those working in the public sector’.

The Habermasian (1981, 1989) substantive norm, which is at the base of Patsy Healey’s work, sometimes fails not just because of the gap between its theory and practice (Gunder 2003) or because it represents a restrictive model that does not apply to most decision-making processes (Hillier 2003). In some cases, such as those referred to in this book, it also fails due to the absence of a basic level of access to citizenship rights that are the indispensable ingredients—as we would say, pre-conditions—for Arendt’s (and hence Habermas’) space of democracy, which is the physical and metaphorical arena where ‘reasoning in public’ practices can really take place and flourish. According to Arendt (2005), the public space of democracy can be defined as the ambit where all the discursive issues can show their many-sidedness and people can freely show their own plurality by acting on and expressing their plural opinions. Thus, the public space of democracy coincides with the political space of freedom. The sense, but not the aim, of politics is the freedom of plurality. Therefore, understanding a political situation means acknowledging a large framework of different viewpoints and positions from which the situation can be considered and judged.

We previously highlighted (Bonafede and Lo Piccolo 2010) the need for the existence of political spaces where conflicts can take place fully and agreements emerge through discursive and dialogic approaches, using some concepts as developed by Arendt (1958, 2005). In this approach, a substantial precondition for any form of ‘public reasoning’ is the existence of political spaces such as Arendt’s idea of a discursive and active ‘infra-space’: the tangible space of the *agora* and the metaphorical space of democracy. This exists among equal individuals freely debating. Wherever this active and conversational freedom is lacking, a proper political space does not exist (Arendt 2005). The case studies of this book strengthen the above-mentioned assumption, being the rhetoric of fear an obstacle to free and independent debates.

Accordingly, citizenship rights do not only represent a framework of reference that is predominantly theoretical, or an abstract body of principles to which to rhetorically appeal, but are a litmus of daily analyses/assessments (Zolo 1994), debates, choices and deliberations that in our ambit of thought and intervention are all specific, minute, practical and tangible. This commitment, however, assumes recognition of an ethical dimension to the planning discipline that is neither obvious nor automatic. Healey (2012, 28–29) suggests a changing ethos and practice from those working within the public sectors, in the face of the current weaknesses of elite democratic practices and the protests and/or challenges against the ‘technocrats’ as the source of authority.

The role of informal networks is consequently a major issue, but in which ways do the formal and the informal levels cope or clash, even frequently, with the other, especially in very latent conflicting and substantially undemocratic contexts? According to Arendt (1958), without the existence of a common space—both physical and metaphorical—initiatives fail or do not even take place. In planning terms, without a common and sincere place of debate, there is no space that is also efficacious for informal networks, because of the patronising attitude of the political actors and the subjugated condition of all the other subjects. Also for this, fear is the first threat to be fought, and this book offers a number of reasons and reflections for achieving this goal.

Francesco Lo Piccolo  
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# Abstract

Western citizens live in the safest societies ever, and yet are more concerned with crime and violence than ever. What are the relationships between recent socio-spatial phenomena and the growing relevance of discussions about security/safety? Is urban fear an unavoidable consequence of contemporary urban life? Or does some political use of it exist? Are discourses of fear used as instruments of power in urban policy? And how can planning practice act to counter fear? In order to answer these questions, the book explores urban fear, (misinformative) discourses of fear and their relations with space and the practice of urban planning—focussing on Southern European cities and using empirical data from Palermo and Lisbon. The book has two objectives: to set out a comprehensive, critical, exploratory theory of fear, space and urban planning, unravelling the paradoxes of their mutual relations; and to contribute to recent studies about urban geopolitics, taking them from the space of global cities and enriching them from the perspective of ordinary cities. In short, the book debates whether, and to what extent, the production of ‘fearscapes’, the contemporary landscapes of fear, constitutes an (emergent) urban political economy. To do so, it explores the (re)production of urban fear around: (global) misinformation about, and paradoxes of, security (Chap. 2); the role of otherness, together with its political construction (Chap. 3); the spatialisation of fear in urban space (Chap. 4); and the way urban planning, as a practice and a discipline, is informed by, and has been shaping in turn, urban fear (Chap. 5). In conclusion (Chap. 6) the book adopts a forward thinking approach, envisaging how two radically different (if not opposite) futures are embedded in the present: a dystopian city in which the political economies of fear have become dominant; and some seeds for a practice of urban planning/action capable of facing the political economies of fear.

# Chapter 1

## Living in a Fearscape?

**Abstract** This book has two objectives: to set out a comprehensive, critical and exploratory theory of fear, space and urban planning, while unravelling the contradictions and paradoxes of their mutual relations; and to enrich recent studies about urban geopolitics and the geopolitics of fear, taking the research done from the point of view of global cities and looking at it from the perspective of ordinary cities. We shall thus use the term ‘fearscapes’, or landscapes of fear, as a linguistic trick with the aim of taking a critical approach to the spatial transformations directly/indirectly connected with, or produced by, discourses and feelings of fear. In short, the book debates whether, and to what extent, the production of landscapes of fear constitutes an (emergent) urban political economy. This chapter sets out the objectives, conceptual background and empirical context of the book. The introduction outlines the object of study, research questions and structure of the book. This will be followed by the summary of some theories about recent socio-spatial urban transformation, before focusing on the transformation in the institutional practice of urban planning, and more especially on the changing patterns of consensus building. The concept of misinformation is introduced as the main instrument for the inquiry of relations between discourses of fear and planning policymaking. In conclusion, the reasons for the election of Southern Europe as a field of study are presented, together with some notes about methodology and the empirical objects of study (the cities of Lisbon and Palermo).

During the autumn of 2007, urban security<sup>1</sup> became an ‘emergency’ in public discourses in Italy.<sup>2</sup> Towards the end of October, in the days following a rape and murder committed by a Romanian citizen on the outskirts of Rome, mass media and politicians—mainly from centre-right parties, at the time the opposition in the national parliament—promoted a campaign, which tied together criminality and immigration, and lasted for several months. Italy appeared overwhelmed by ‘fears’: fear of crime, fear of violence, fear of violent ‘others’—especially Eastern Europeans, Romanian citizens and the Roma people. The rhetoric boosted factual consequences. A provision for the expulsion of Communitarian citizens approved by the centre-left government and according to Human Rights Watch (2007) targeted against Romanian citizens may well be the first ethnic-targeted public measure after Fascism. Following the collapse of the centre-left government in early 2008, the outvote of the centre-right coalition brought about robust popular support for the new Ministry of Interior, his ‘emergency’ security policies and provisions for clearing hundreds of camps where thousands of Roma had been living, in many cases for several decades.

Albeit with strong national peculiarities, this story is a global one. As a matter of fact, similar events have been recurrent in Western countries since the 1990s<sup>3</sup>: fears of, and discourses about, crime, violence, terrorism, together with moral panics of several sorts, have been taking up more and more space on public agendas.<sup>4</sup> I started working on the PhD research, which forms the foundation of this book, in 2009 when Italy was starting to forget the fear it had felt some months before. My curiosity was aroused: was violence actually increasing when Italy felt so? Having figured out that at the same time Italians felt unsafe violence was decreasing—as it had done during the previous couple of decades (cf. Chap. 2)—I looked beyond Italy. I soon estimated that, although contemporary Western societies are probably the most fearful they have ever been, they are indeed the safest they have ever been (Bauman 2005) and they are becoming more and more secure (cf. van Dijk et al. 2007; ICPC 2012).

The decision to carry out this research therefore had two roots, a civic and political one, and an academic one. The citizen wanted to contribute to the deconstruction of the rhetoric and help overcoming the fear that stemmed from it. The aspiring scholar wanted to understand, on two complementary grounds, whether these facts relate to planning theory and practice, and, if so, what effect they have on

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<sup>1</sup>English is probably the only language to distinguish between ‘security’ and ‘safety’ and, as far as urban security and safety are concerned, there is some conceptual vagueness in the use of the two terms (Tulumello and Falanga forthcoming in 2016). Throughout the book, I will use the terms according to the definition by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC 2012, 3), according to which urban security is a ‘public good delivered by the state under regular circumstances’ and urban safety a ‘subjective feeling of being secure as experienced by citizens’. Put in other words, security will refer to a policy/practical dimension (i.e. *reducing* actual danger), safety to perceptions (i.e. *feeling* safe).

<sup>2</sup>See Sect. 2.2 for a detailed account.

<sup>3</sup>The term ‘Western’ will be used to refer to Northern America, Europe and Oceania, which have experienced similar trends in crime trends and security policymaking.

<sup>4</sup>And immigration is often tied with security concerns well beyond Italy (Feldman 2013; Hasselberg 2014).

these practices. First, I wanted to question whether, and to what extent, contemporary feelings of urban fear, and the capacity of public discourses to enhance these feelings, are shortcomings of mainstream conventions and policies of urban planning implemented during the last few decades. To come back to the Italian example, the discourses which followed the rape and murder in October 2007 also addressed issues of decay and the decline of ‘peripheries’ in Rome and, more generally, Italy<sup>5</sup>: poor urban management (lighting, refurbishment, quality of urban space), absence of public services and, more generally, the spatialities typical of low-cost post-second world war residential districts. Is there a role of urban planning policy (land-use, design, management...) and of urban spatialities in the generation of spaces of fear (and conflict) in the urban outskirts of Italy and beyond?

Second and complementarily, I wanted to explore whether, and to what extent, discourses of and about fear are capable of shaping and twisting planning practice, nowadays—e.g. has the institutional practice of urban planning in Italy been influenced by the campaign of 2007 and 2008?

The hypothesis was that some of the sociopolitical processes and spatial practices characterising the last few decades, in the Western world and beyond, have been, and are, using fear and urban fear instrumentally for agendas that are placing the civic and public gist of urban spaces worldwide into a state of crisis. As a result, fear, together with the geopolitics of security stemming from it, has been producing exclusion, affecting especially marginalised minority groups (Pain 2010). If this is the case, putting fear at the centre of planners’ agendas is, nowadays, inescapable.

## 1.1 Object of Study and Objectives of the Book

I shall now define the terms used in the title of the book and, with them, the object of study, the aim and the conceptual approach. The object of study is urban *fear*, that is, the fear of being a victim of violent crime in an urban *space*. The book addresses urban fear from two converging perspectives: the influence of fear on the perception of urban environments, on the one hand, and the way the generation of individual and collective feelings is capable of shaping consensus around public policies and practices, on the other.

Beyond feelings per se, the book explores the ‘discourses of fear’, that is, those texts—either political, journalistic, media or fictional—about themes directly or indirectly linked with the generation of feelings of fear (e.g. reports about violent crimes, statistics about criminal trends, political discourses around urban security,

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<sup>5</sup>More recently, the appearance of discourses about immigration and violence, used instrumentally by right wing political parties, has characterised again the Italian public debate. In November 2014, the discourse was generated around the case of a peripheral district of Rome, a council housing district where a centre for under-aged asylum seekers was created a few years ago. In this case, there had been no violent crimes at all, but an allegation of attempted sexual violence by the young asylum seekers, allegations admitted false later on by the ‘victim’ herself.

narratives of urban decay). Within the discourses of fear, special attention is devoted to the ‘rhetoric of fear’, that is, discourses used as instruments to boost individual and collective feelings of urban fear.<sup>6</sup>

Although it draws on a number of disciplinary insights and methodological perspectives, the core of the book is the study of the institutional practice of *urban planning*. The conceptual approach draws on that of *critical urban theories*, it aims at revealing contradictions rather than employing mainstream assumptions, exposing forms of power, inclusion/exclusion and justice/injustice patterns (cf. Brenner 2009; Marcuse 2010): in other words, it seeks to question the ‘prevailing order’ of things (Morton 2007, 111).

Hence, we shall use the term ‘fearscape’, or landscapes of fear, as a linguistic trick for a critical approach to what I term the processes of ‘spatialisation of urban fear’ (Tulumello 2015b). In other words, it includes the spatial transformations directly or indirectly connected with, or produced by, discourses and feelings of urban fear—e.g. fortification, privatisation of public space, spaces of exclusion and seclusion, control over urban space, all of which will be explored in-depth in Chap. 4. The concept of landscape, like fear, is generated at the ‘intersection of the practical and the reflexive, the natural and the cultural, and the affective and the rational’ (Gold and Revill 2003, 36). Landscape is a conceptual category that stems from the distance between an observer and an observed space (Desportes 2005). Suggesting that it would be often enough to live within alleged ‘spaces of fear’, rather than experiencing them through descriptions and representations, in order to figure out that they are not spaces *of* fear, the underlying idea is that several contemporary feelings of fear are subproducts of policies and discourses rather than inescapable presences in contemporary urban life—*pace* who suggests the latter (e.g. Bannister and Fyfe 2001; Kitchen 2002; Cozens 2011). The central theme of the book is thus to debate whether, and to what extent, the production of landscapes of fear constitutes an (emergent) urban political economy (cf. Sandercock 2002).

The book will show how existing literature and mainstream theories about the relationships between fear, spatialisation of fear and urban planning have tended to rely on cases occurring in global cities or in cities experiencing situations of conflict. This book, on the contrary, applies theories about urban fear to ‘ordinary’ urban contexts (cf. Amin and Graham 1997; Robinson 2011). This is why, although the general space of inquiry is that of contemporary (especially Western) cities, the theoretical and empirical focus is on urban territories of *Southern Europe*, whose specificities will allow for the building of more nuanced critical theories, with a balance between global discourses and local relations of power in the daily practice of urban planning. Examples from the cities of Lisbon and Palermo, where case study analysis has been carried out during the PhD research and beyond, are used throughout the book.

To summarise, the book has two objectives. The first, acknowledging that ‘the issue of fear is still highly marginal to the main stages of theoretical development in

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<sup>6</sup>Rhetorical speech ‘aims not to reach understanding with others, but only to manipulate their thought and feeling in directions that serve the speaker’s own ends’ (Young 2000, 63).



**Fig. 1.1** The field of exploration of the book

planning theory' (Abu-Orf 2013, 159), is to set out a comprehensive, critical and exploratory theory of fear, space and urban planning, unravelling the contradictions and paradoxes of their mutual relationships.<sup>7</sup> The second objective is enriching recent studies about urban geopolitics (see, among others, Graham 2010; Rossi and Vanolo 2010) and the geopolitics of fear (see Pain 2010), taking the research done from the point of view of global cities and looking at it from the perspective of ordinary cities.

The field of exploration (i.e. the background of research questions) of the book is summarised in the connections among the vertices of the triangle represented in Fig. 1.1—i.e. (1) contemporary urban spatialities, (2) feelings of urban fear and (3) discourses of fear—and the relations of these with (4) the practice(s) and policy/ies of urban planning.

## 1.2 Structure of the Book

The reminder of this chapter sets out the contextual and conceptual background, as well as the research questions, together with the reasons for the election of Southern Europe as the focus of analysis. Some readings of recent socio-spatial urban transformation are summarised, before focusing on the transformations of the institutional practice of urban planning, and especially on the changing patterns of justification for, and consensus building in, urban policies. The concept of misinformation is introduced as a main instrument for the inquiry of relationships between discourses of fear and planning policymaking. The conclusion of the chapter summarises some of the

<sup>7</sup>See Abu-Orf (2013) and Tulumello (2015a) for some first steps in this direction.

common characterisations of Southern European urban territories and includes some notes about methodology and the empirical objects of study.

The following four chapters set out the arguments of the book, progressively approaching a debate about the institutional practice of urban planning. In each chapter, theoretical concepts are presented and then reconsidered from a Southern European perspective, making use of examples. These chapters (especially Chaps. 2, 3, and 4) are structured so that they can be read independently—they have an introduction that sets out the main problems and goals, a core text and short conclusions. Longer examples, which are more narrative and make larger use of quotations and empirical material, are set in ‘boxout’ sections, so that the hurried reader interested in grasping main concepts could skip them. However, the book is structured with the aim of building a conceptual framework detailed in Chap. 5, and all parts converge to this goal.

Chapter 2 debates the relationships between crime, perceptions of insecurity, and political and media reports about crime and security. The chapter starts with the acknowledgement that feelings of fear have become predominant in the Western public debate in the last couple of decades, at the same time as Western cities have become less and less violent. It is therefore debated how discourses about crime, violence and terrorism have been capable of influencing public feelings and how they create support for specific sets of policies. The chapter also describes two media and political campaigns about crime and immigration, which were carried out in Italy and Portugal between 2007 and 2008, together with their effects on public feelings of, and national policies for, urban security.

Chapter 3 engages with the role of diversity and otherness in the generation of feelings of fear and patterns of exclusion in urban space. A debate about encounters in public space and the psychological implications thereof opens the chapter. Then, it argues that the social construction of groups is not a neutral practice and implications of the processes of marginalisation and exclusion are debated. The case of Italian Roma is then presented as an example of an especially ‘extreme’ version of urban exclusion processes.

Chapter 4 provides a taxonomy for the debate of the fearscape, the urban spatialities generated by, or in relation to, fear and discourses of fear. It encompasses: Enclosure, the spaces of exclusion and seclusion, either hetero- or auto-produced; Barrier, the role of networked infrastructures in the fragmentation of urban space; Post-Public Space, processes of privatisation, thematisation, fortification, and even militarisation, of public space; and Control, the politics of surveillance over urban and public space. Examples from Palermo and Lisbon are presented for each spatial form as a way of furnishing evidence for advocating, as is done in conclusion of the chapter, for more nuanced theory making.

Chapter 5 focuses on the institutional practice of urban planning with the aim of setting out a critical exploratory framework to unravel the relationship between planning practice and fear. This chapter reviews the existing critiques of mainstream urban planning paradigms while unravelling their implications for urban fear. It also looks at the tendency of the modernist paradigm, whose specific spatialities dominate the structure of most Western cities, to create places where the encounter is problematic or fearful and reviews the new forms of urban exclusion



entrenched in planning mainstreams emerging in the last few decades. The histories of two council housing districts in Palermo and Lisbon are used to apply and test the theoretical discussions. The conclusion of the chapter reconsiders the research questions and summarises a threefold exploratory framework around: (geo)politics and spatialisation of fear; (modernist) spatialities and fear of otherness; and the (neoliberal) political economies of fear.

As a conclusion to the book, Chap. 6 suggests some ways forward from two opposite perspectives, a dystopian prefiguration of an urban space wherein fear is dominant and some insights for the planner who aims at overcoming fear.

### 1.3 Urban Space

The recent history of urbanisation in Western countries is characterised by three major ‘episodes’ (Scott 2011), one following the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, another resulting from the consolidation of the Fordist system of mass production, and the last stemming from the transition towards a post-Fordist economic system. Western urbanisation shows the first radical qualitative and quantitative transformation after the industrial revolution: at the same time as the city became a place of confrontation and conflict between the emerging bourgeois and working classes, walls were torn down and the distinction between city and fields blurred. In the decades that followed, economic development on one hand, and class struggle and conflict on the other produced better working conditions and higher wages, which allowed for the emergence of the middle class: most of the twentieth century was marked by the consolidation of a Fordist economy grounded on the mass consumption of durable goods. The domination of private transport and detached homes, the latter especially in the US, fostered a new phase of urbanisation marked by suburbanisation and sprawling of residential developments. Workers’ districts were progressively replaced by a centripetal system of peripheries, and infrastructural networks became a fundamental asset of cities (Graham and Marvin 2001).

With the decline in and outsourcing of heavy industry, the post-Fordist transition characterised the last three decades of the twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries. The *grande trasformazione* of Western cities followed (Martinotti 1993; see also Scott 2011): traditional urban cores experienced a decrease in population for the first time in centuries, with people taking advantage of moving to nearby quasi-metropolitan areas. Terms such as ‘exopolis’ (Soja 1992), ‘edge city’ (Garreau 1988) and ‘post-metropolis’ (Soja 2000) are attempts at describing the multiplicity of emerging spatialities. The traditional urban hierarchy, with the dominance of centre/periphery relations is, at different times, sent into crisis by centrifugal forces and reaffirmed by centripetal ones, that is, by counter urbanisation and reurbanisation trends (Champion 2001). At the same time, great global cities have been emerging as places of accumulation of capital, power and human resources (Sassen 1998).

The new urban fabric is defined by the economic logic of accumulation, inasmuch as the unitary logic at the basis of historic cities was replaced by the



**Fig. 1.2** Schematic representation of the research questions

competition of multiple urban rationalities (Flusty and Dear 1999). The traditional system of growth in European cities was characterised by the addition of complete parts, built once the potential for urbanisation within the former perimeter had been saturated (Sica 1991 [1970], 58). This process consisted of a series of founding acts, which emphasised the common and public value of urban space (de Spuches 1995). The new city is not established as such, it arises from the will of a multiplicity of actors, acting towards satisfying the needs, and wills, of different populations or categories of clients (Amendola 1997). Emergent urban spatialities have in common the replacement of vertical differentiation of uses with horizontal specialisation (Ellin 1996). The result is a complicated patchwork, a fragmented continuum made of infrastructural networks, sprawling territories, diffused industry, real estate operations and speculations (cf. Gausa et al. 2000, 369).

Against this dynamic background, the first research question, explored in Chap. 4, concerns the relations between the vertices (1) and (2) of the field of exploration (Fig. 1.2): what are the relationships between contemporary spatial transformations and growing feelings of fear in the urban space?

## 1.4 Planning Space

The spatial transformations of the last few decades have been accompanied by major social and political changes, understood by some as the postmodern transformation (see, among others, Foster 1985 [1983]; Jameson 1984; Fillion 1996), by others as the advent and hegemony of neoliberal trends (see, among others, Soja 2000; Jessop 2002; Harvey 2005; Blyth 2013). On one hand, flexibility, uncertainty, precariousness and growing social polarisation characterise changing labour market and

socio-economic relations. On the other hand, the fiscal stress following the decline of the Fordist industry limited the capacity of a State to plan and intervene (Shaktin 2002). The space of decision-making, all around the Western world has been restructured by contradictory trends. It has shifted from a linear process towards a multiplicity of practices of social interaction (Vigar et al. 2000), with continuous mediation and conflict among different instances: top-down versus bottom-up, global versus local, private versus public, particularistic versus common.

Theories about new institutionalisms have been debating the changing relations of power, stressing the role of construction and reconstruction of social relations (Healey 1999). Information is key: the availability and reliability of information and hence the capacity to manipulate the truth lie at the core of power in contemporary political arenas (Innes 1998; Hillier 2002). It is around the uneven access to strategic information that the prevalence of powerful stakeholders is reproduced (Moulaert and Cabaret 2006). Formal decentralisation and participation are therefore interpreted, in critical studies of neoliberal governmentalities, as the construction of a political arena in which (hegemonic) power is pursued through a (perceived) structure of inclusive governance (Miraftab 2004; Deas 2013).

A changing political arena is reflected by a changing planning practice, namely in the shift from a mainstream modernist paradigm towards a plurality of approaches. It is within the framework of this transition that, especially in Chap. 5, the relationship between fear and urban planning will be explored. Although the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ paradigms is indeed blurred in the coexistence of conflicting patterns of permanence and change (Tulumello 2015c), I shall summarise the central characteristics of such a duality.

The modernist/rationalist paradigm in urban planning has its conceptual grounds in the Illuminist ‘belief in the perfectibility of the social order’ (Sandercock 2003, 29). Planning human settlements from this perspective is a way for the State to perfect individuals and society through a technically driven, top-down, linear process. The planner establishes order through norms and fosters the ‘necessary’ transformations with scientific plans protected by the authority of the State (Scandurra and Krumholz 1999). This model, thrown into crisis by the transformations in political arenas, was reframed and supplemented by new ideas and approaches—Talvitie (2009) enlists the communicative model; the New Urbanism, inspired by Jane Jacobs’ thought; the Just City, which builds on the relationship between spatialities and justice; and the normative, proactive, political non-Euclidean approach. Planning, rather than being a linear process driven by public actors, is now understood to be a social process, encompassing a plurality of actors (Healey 1997). New instruments therefore supplement the planners’ tool kit: from regulatory towards strategic planning; from formal presentations towards informal meetings; from technical guidance towards mediation. The emerging institutional fragmentation wherein planning processes take place is seen as fostering a transition from welfare policies towards market oriented approaches (Gualini and Majoor 2007), as is evident in (neoliberal) practices such as urban marketing, public-private-partnerships, outsourcing of public services, privatisation and liberalisation (cf. Sager 2011).

## 1.5 Fear, Discourses of Fear and Urban Planning

If we agree that security/safety is a product of culture at the same time as it concerns policy (Araujo 2008/2009) and that urban fear is (also) the result of the discursive (re)production of the social realm rather than a neutral component of such a realm (Sandercock 2002), there is a need to look at the political economies stemming from these production. The book analyses the landscapes of urban fear from the perspective of the strategic production of feelings and, keeping in mind the aforementioned transformations for planning practice, it does so using the concept of structural misinformation. The concept of misinformation, and especially of ‘systematically distorted information’ was introduced by Habermas (1970) and applied to planning theory by Forester (1989). Forester understands the systematic use of misinformation as a structural instrument in the reproduction of socio-economic relations. If we think of the planner as an author of texts (plans, models, reports), we can understand how technical expertise, that is, the possibility to decide what and how to communicate to non-expert audiences, gives the planner the capacity to shape attention and consensus (Throgmorton 2003).

Exploring urban fear from the perspective of information and misinformation is shown in the field of exploration by the relations between the vertices (2) and (3) (Fig. 1.2). Hence the second research question, addressed in Chaps. 2 and 3: is fear an inescapable characteristic of urban life or is there a political economic production and use for it?

The following step is to explore whether the relationship between (2) and (3) has the capacity to shape, and be shaped in turn by, (4), that is, whether and how misinformation of fear is embedded in institutional policies and practices of urban planning. The third research question, addressed in Chap. 5, is: are discourses of fear used as means of power in contemporary planning practice?

It will be debated throughout the book how mainstream paradigms for planning practice have tended to neglect both structural and discursive relations in the generation of urban fear. This is a shortcoming due to a neglect of the political gist of planning and, more generally, public policy and organisation in an attempt to overcome issues of conflict and power.<sup>8</sup> The book will show that a purely technical approach to urban fear, that is, a neglect of the paradoxes of urban fear, can have two kinds of shortcoming, either by boosting the failure of planning intentions or acting as a cover up for instances of exclusion and oppression. More generally, within liberal democratic arrangements, ‘technicality’ and ‘neutrality’ may well be the means of exclusion of minority groups in the name of a universality/equality designed for the majority (Young 1990). The acknowledgement of the essential political gist of planning practice is thus crucial to the aim of putting power relationships and instances of domination at the core of the debate (Forester 1999, 9):

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<sup>8</sup>The technical/political duality of planning, as well as the centrality of power in its process, has been recently put to explicit debate (cf. among others, Young 1990; Hillier 2002; Flyvbjerg 2002, 2004; Moulaert and Cabaret 2006; McClymont 2011; Lo Piccolo 2013; Metzger et al. 2015).

‘the philosopher is always socially situated, and if society is divided by oppressions, she either reinforces or struggles against them’ (Young 1990, 5).

However, doubts about the possibility of engaging effectively against social injustice with the instruments of deliberative democracy have been put forward (Mouffe 1999; Young 2001; Moulaert and Cabaret 2006): in a world dominated by misinformation and uneven power relationships, the deliberative arena is influenced by discourses that preclude the possibility of criticising core characterisations of socio-economic relations. As far as planning practice is concerned, there is a need for creating bridges with the world of politics, joining forces with sociopolitical movements, fighting speculation and environmental destruction, supporting specific, and different, governmentalities, conceptions of justice and development paradigms (Albrechts and Denayer 2001; Moulaert and Cabaret 2006; Harvey 2012). The fourth research question, addressed in Chap. 6, concerns all vertices of the field of exploration of the book (Fig. 1.2): how can planners push their practice towards the overcoming of spaces and feelings of fear?

The idea underlying the book is that the phenomena to be explored have been throwing into a crisis the public and the common gist of contemporary cities. The uncovering of the misinformation of fear, and of its consequences, is thus a piece of the wider call for reclaiming the city: ‘we need to recognise as problems those aspects of life of which you might be unaware, particularly if you happen to be white, adult, male, and middle class, but which contribute to the oppression of others’ (Sibley 1995, x).

## 1.6 Global Cities and ‘Ordinary Cities’ in Southern Europe

A recent (re-)flourishing of post-colonial studies (see, among others, Chakrabarty 2000; Santos 2010) has had a strong impact on planning research and urban studies. Looking at cities, governance patterns and insurgent practices in the Global South, some scholars have advocated for a de-provincialisation and de-parochialisation of urban and planning theories (Roy 2009; Meagher 2010). This is because mainstream urban theories tend to be produced on the grounds of specific cases, that is, the experiences of Western and/or global cities, and then ‘travel’ without adaptations to local characterisations (Amin and Graham 1997; Robinson 2011; Healey 2012; Baptista 2013).

This is especially true for studies about urban geopolitics and the spatialisation of fear, as will be evident throughout the book. Examples and cases explored are often, when not exclusively, those of global cities or cities in a conflict situation. Cities such as London, probably the most video-watched city in the world, Los Angeles as depicted by Davis (2006 [1990]), global Northern American cities as restructured after the terrorist attacks of 2001, Jerusalem and the Israeli–Palestinian territory, to name the most prominent examples, have been at the core of theory

building. The big picture emerging from mainstream theories is thus one of extremely powerful, global processes, which are replicated without major alterations in cities worldwide. Although these approaches have been capable of uncovering large-scale effects and horizontal global connections, they tend to miss the in-depth exploration of how feelings of fear are produced/reproduced on a local scale and how they get embedded in micro-practices of urban planning.

This is the reason for, on one hand, the election of the institutional practice of urban planning, rather than socio-spatial dynamics per se, as the ultimate object of analysis and, on the other, the quest for different contexts of empirical exploration and theoretical production. Baptista (2013) has recently explored the travels of urban theories, employing a case at the ‘borderlands’ of urban theory, in Portugal, Southern Europe. Baptista suggests that ‘current efforts at epistemological renewal within urban studies would benefit from taking up these European cities as relevant cases in their own right because their urban condition is dissimilar (but not exceptional) from that reported in the “heartlands” of urban theory’ (ibidem, 592). Being at the borderlands of urban theory, and because of the specificities of their recent urbanisation processes, the study of Southern European cities—going beyond a West/South divide and looking at a peculiar, still Western, context—is capable of providing fresh insights.

Southern Europe is historically considered as a ‘marginal’ or ‘peripheral’ part of Europe. This because of the relatively weak economic development and rhetoric about its alleged ‘backwardness’ with regard to globalisation processes: King (1982) labelled Southern Europe as part of the ‘Third World’ not so long ago and recent mainstream discourses about the economic crisis are replicating some of the dimensions of such rhetoric.

As a matter of fact, processes of globalisation and neoliberalisation in Southern European cities have had peculiar characterisations, when compared to those in other Western regions. Historical path dependencies have slowed down the trends that have restructured urban governance in Europe over the last few decades, despite recent trends of Europeanisation (Giannakourou 2005; Seixas and Albet 2012). Formal processes of public participation in decision-making have relatively low rates of implementation, with some exceptions, such as recent developments of participatory budgeting in Portugal (Alves and Allegretti 2012). From a spatial perspective, the ineffectiveness of formal planning regulations is associated with disorganised urban fabrics, nowadays hybridised by late metropolisation, suburbanisation, counter urbanisation, polarisation, fragmentation and social stratification trends (Malheiros 2002; Laino 2012; Seixas and Albet 2012; Salvati et al. 2016).

The examples employed throughout the book are the outputs of case study research carried out between 2010 and 2014 in two Southern European cities, Lisbon, in Portugal, and Palermo, in Italy. The case study has been identified as the most appropriate approach for its suitability in pursuing in-depth analyses and deconstruction of complex processes (Yin 2003 [1994]; Flyvbjerg 2006; Zaidah 2007), namely the need to unveil the interlinks between spatial practices, feelings of fear, their (re)production and planning processes. Empirical data has been collected through a set of different techniques: mapping of spatial entities extended to the

municipal territories; analysis of media production for understanding discourses and rhetoric; analysis of planning and policy documents; interviews and focus groups with key informants; review of available literature and statistical data. The use of examples from two different cities is useful to support theory building through a 'replication logic' (Yin 2003 [1994], 47) from two opposite perspectives: the similarity of outputs in dissimilar contexts versus diverging outputs with predictable reasons.

### **Boxout 1. Lisbon and Palermo: setting the context**

Lisbon, capital and main city of Portugal, is home to around 550,000 inhabitants in the municipal area, which covers around 80 km<sup>2</sup>. Lisbon is the central city of a metropolitan area that extends across the northern and southern banks of the river Tejo where 2,800,000 inhabitants live within a territory of around 2900 km<sup>2</sup>. Metropolisation and suburbanisation trends arose towards the end of 1960s and affected municipalities surrounding Lisbon to the North, in a first phase, and coastal municipalities on the southern bank of the River Tejo in a second phase. Lisbon city itself has lost almost 40 % of its population to suburbanisation since the early 1980s when it was home to around 900,000 inhabitants. The inclusion of Portugal in the European Community in 1986 was a decisive moment for the country and Lisbon: during the 1990s, foreign investment and the growth of the private banking system boosted the real estate market, further residential suburbanisation and sprawling of big tertiary, retail and leisure developments. The construction and real estate boom, together with a lack of effective planning regulations before the late 1990s, were accompanied by socio-spatial polarisation in the metropolitan region, characterised by extreme contrasts between wealthy, often gated, suburbs, dilapidated public housing districts and even few informal settlements built during the 1960s and 1970s (Ferreira 1997). In recent times, Lisbon has been consolidating its role of growth engine of Portugal at the same time as emerging as a global/regional metropolis, especially in connection with its historical relations with Southern America and Africa. Complex and contradictory trends of reurbanisation, regeneration and gentrification, as well as growing socio-spatial polarisation boosted by economic crisis and austerity policies, characterise recent years (Mendes 2013; Seixas et al. 2016).

Palermo, the main city of the region of Sicily and fifth largest Italian city, is home to around 700,000 inhabitants in the municipal area, which cover around 160 km<sup>2</sup>. Palermo is the central city of a metropolitan area, extending along the northern coast of Sicily, home to around 1,100,000 inhabitants in a territory covering around 1400 km<sup>2</sup>. The recent urban evolution of Palermo is marked by several peculiarities. The power of criminality and corrupt politics up until the 1980s is well known (Pedone 2013): this caused an absence of regulation of the urban growth and decisively influenced the labour market. This influence was characterised by the usage of public jobs to build political consensus and social acquiescence, resulting in poor economic development and the absence of strong industrial businesses. The 1990s were the 'spring' of the city, that is, of the popular

reaction to the violent escalation of the Mafia in the late 1980s, a decade of centre-left uncorrupt administration and the regeneration of the historic centre and other areas (Lo Piccolo 1996; Azzolina 2009). The year 2001 saw a new reversal in the political equilibrium, bringing a decade of centre-right administration. A deregulation season for spatial planning began, consisting of complex programmes used to justify speculation and public action directed towards ‘big interventions’, which often failed.<sup>9</sup> Palermo is still one of the least economically developed areas in the county, experiencing some of the highest rates of social exclusion and poverty. Moreover, the economic crisis, which is reinforcing trends of national and regional polarisation, is affecting Sicily and Palermo with reinforced strength (Fondazione Res 2014). From a socio-spatial perspective, the last two decades have been characterised by peculiar versions of metropolisation and globalising trends (D’Anneo 2013; Tulumello 2015b): late suburbanisation trends, germinal gentrification in some districts of the historic centre, fragmentation and polarisation of the urban fabric.

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<sup>9</sup>See Palermo poster in Inura’s New Metropolitan Mainstream project (available at [www.inura.org/nmm\\_posters2.html](http://www.inura.org/nmm_posters2.html); accessed 15 Nov 2015).



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## Chapter 2

# Western Paradoxes of Security and Fear

**Abstract** Something has been happening since the early 1990s: it is not necessary to be a scholar to have noticed that, in cities, in the media or in public and political discourses—in contemporary Western societies, in short—the use of the terms safety and security is becoming more prevalent everyday. Western citizens are more concerned with security than members of most other societies, both present and past. This chapter questions why citizens feel unsafe and constantly under threat despite living in the safest societies ever. Some recent trends in the global and Western arena are debated with the aim of unpacking the connections between security as a social demand and a political goal, and the ways these may have been boosting public fear of crime and violence. Specifically the role of political and media discourses (and misinformation) for growing perceptions of insecurity is unravelled—and two examples of discourses that have been making use of fear to influence urban and social policies are presented (Charles Murray’s ‘underclass’ theory and the discourse on the decline of the American city). Finally, the chapter discusses the cases of Italy and Portugal, describing the processes that have recently brought about a restructuring of the security policymaking in these countries, and suggests a reconsideration of Western trends from a Southern European perspective.

*Americans have been overtaken by fear* (Friedmann 2002, 237)

Western citizens seem to be more concerned with security than members of most other societies, both present and past (Bauman 2005): why, despite living in the safest societies ever, do these citizens feel unsafe and constantly under threat?

Something happened during the last quarter of the last century, that is, after the early 1990s. It is not necessary to be a scholar to have noticed that, in cities, in the media, or in public and political discourses—in short, in contemporary Western societies—the use of the terms ‘safety’ and ‘security’ is becoming more prevalent everyday. Several phenomena remind us, on a daily basis, of security issues: the omnipresent discourses about terrorist attacks, and especially those of 11 September 2001, after which, it has been repeated and repeated, ‘nothing will be like it was before’; urban conflicts and uprisings, recurring more and more frequently,

especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and in times of recession; the multiplication of mega-events, with the concentration of human and economic flows they funnel and subsequent potential threats; above all, the growing presence of reports about violent crime in media and mass communication.

Whilst contemporary societies acknowledge personal safety and security as fundamental individual rights—as stated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—people seem to feel they are living in a world where institutions are less and less able to guarantee these rights. However, as far as the danger of becoming victims of violence and crime is concerned, this is not completely true. On the contrary, in large areas of the world, and with more evidence in the Western world, this is false, as we will show.

We need to overcome a simplistic understanding of security as an individual right and look at two further dimensions with the aim of exploring Western paradoxes of security. On one hand, security is a social demand interlinked with perceptions of safety—which often do not correspond with actual dangers and risks—and with media and mass discourses surrounding security, often not based on factual evidence. On the other hand, security is a goal of political discourses and practices, which are interlinked in complex and multifarious ways with the previous two dimensions.

In this chapter, we will debate some recent trends in the global, and especially Western, arena with the aim of unpacking the connections between security as a social demand and a political goal, and the ways in which these may have been boosting public fear of crime and violence. We will unravel the role of political and media discourses (and misinformation) for growing perceptions of insecurity and fear—and present two examples of discourses (Charles Murray's 'underclass' theory and the discourse on the decline of the American city) that have been making use of fear to influence urban and social policies. Finally, we will discuss the cases of Italy and Portugal, describing the processes that have recently brought about a restructuring of the security policymaking in these countries, and suggest a reconsideration of Western trends from a Southern European perspective.

## 2.1 Fear, Crime, Mass Media and Democracy

'Measuring' fear of crime and violence is a complex task. The capacity of quantitative surveys to assess absolute levels of fear of crime and feelings of safety has been questioned in-depth (Koskela and Pain 2003; Gray et al. 2008)—for example, the way questions are designed can influence findings. However, the existence of sets of similar surveys replicated in different periods will help us grasp temporal trends and understand how feelings of fear experienced by Western citizens have been changing over the last few decades. The case of the United States seems crystal clear, in this respect. During the 1980s, few American citizens (5 %) considered crime as the main national problem (Roberts and Stalans 1998, 32). Public priorities were completely changed in the following decade and, in 1994, the

majority of American citizens picked crime as the problem number one, while four citizens out of five picked it as the main threat to individual rights and freedom (*idem*). According to Glassner (1999, xi), during the mid 1990s, over 60 % of Americans declared they were ‘truly desperate’ about criminality. A rapid growth in feelings of fear about crime similarly characterised European countries during the 1990s (McClain 2001, 225). Since the new millennium, trends have become less homogeneous and feelings of safety vary from country to country, with a general stabilisation in these trends (van Dijk et al. 2007). In Europe, since 2007 with the persistence of the economic crisis, fear of crime has tended to be replaced by economic insecurity and related issues (employment, pensions, government’s debts...) on the list of most pressing concerns.<sup>1</sup>

Whilst we would expect that increasing or decreasing perceptions of individual safety would correspond, respectively, to decreasing or increasing violent crime, available figures of crime trends tell a different story.<sup>2</sup> In fact, reported violent crimes—those that determine danger in urban space—in American cities were increasing during the 1980s and rapidly decreasing during the 1990s (Tonry 1998, 11; Heath et al. 2001; Arvanites and Defina 2006; Baumer and Wolff 2014).<sup>3</sup> Similarly, since the early 1990s, the rate of reported violent crimes has tended to be stable or in decline in European cities (McClain 2001, 228–229). Data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (available since 2000) shows a drop in the rates of intentional homicide rates throughout the Western world.<sup>4</sup>

We must be aware that trends in reported crimes (with the exception of intentional homicide) may be influenced by factors other than variations in the actual number of crimes committed, such as police priorities or the likelihood of victims to report crimes. This is why criminologists complement institutional data with victimisation surveys, which assess the percentage of citizens that have been victims of crime(s) in a given time frame. The most reliable comparative victimisation surveys confirm general trends, showing dropping victimisation rates from the early 1990s for most types of crime in most Western countries (van Dijk et al. 2007; van Dijk 2010).

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<sup>1</sup>See data Eurobarometer (2003–2015), questions on ‘most important issues’ faced by individuals and countries (available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en); accessed 15 Nov 2015).

<sup>2</sup>It is important to emphasise how trends in crime, and especially violent crime, being determined by complex and multifarious reasons, should always be analysed in the medium to long term (Dipartimento di Pubblica Sicurezza 2007, 11). This is especially true for extremely violent categories of crime, which are extremely rare: in this case, given the small numbers of occurrences, yearly variations may be pronounced but not significant to grasp trends.

<sup>3</sup>It is widely acknowledged that the rise of most typologies of violent crime in the second half of the 1980s in the US has been propelled by the ‘crack epidemics’ (cf. Baumer and Wolff 2014). Baumer and Wolff (*ibidem*) add that some categories of crime (like burglaries) may have started decreasing already during the 1980s.

<sup>4</sup>Available at <https://data.unodc.org/>. Accessed 15 Nov 2015.

We have depicted a paradoxical picture: during the 1980s, when crime was increasing, Western citizens were not that concerned with crime; and, since the 1990s, at the same time as they were becoming more and more secure, people have started to worry. One is tempted to assume that the perceptions of safety are not correlated with the actual trends in the danger of being a victim of violence. How can we explain this? For instance, we know that most people ignore actual crime trends. When asked whether crime had grown in the previous year, vast majorities of citizens believe so, irrespective of actual trends (Cordner 2010, 2; Osservatorio Europeo sulla Sicurezza 2014).

When we look at the relationship between crime trends and security policies, further paradoxes emerge. The case of the United States is paradigmatic of a repressive approach to urban security (cf. Simon 2007), with especially high rates of imprisonment.<sup>5</sup> Between 1971 and 1996 the rate of inmates quadrupled, growing constantly without any correlation with crime trends (Tonry 1998, 11). During a period of 25 years, a same policy approach (repression and imprisonment) has been implemented with neither a check on its effectiveness (its effects on crime) nor any modification. A further paradox is the fact that such an approach, despite the absence of evidence of its effectiveness,<sup>6</sup> has always been widely supported by public opinion (Tonry 1998). We will similarly show how, in Italy and Portugal, albeit at different times and with different trends, there has been public support of the shift towards repressive policies (cf. Sect. 2.2).

In summary, the big picture is made of trends of perceptions of safety incongruous with, and with widespread ignorance of, actual crime trends and, especially in the US, public support of repressive policies irrespective of their actual effectiveness. As far as crime and fear of crime and violence are concerned, factual evidence seems capable of shaping neither individual feelings nor policymaking.

Tonry (1998) suggests two possible causes of the confusion surrounding crime and perceptions of security: ‘mass media have learned that crime pays in terms of a mass public fascination with the darker sides of life’ at the same time as ‘conservative politicians have found it in their interest to keep voters’ attention focused on an issue about which liberals are reluctant to disagree’ (ibidem, 24).<sup>7</sup>

As for the role of media, we are aware how hard it is to determine the simple, direct effects of media reportages on the way the public audience perceives issues of security (Heath and Gilbert 1996). Some generalisations are nevertheless possible. To start with, the world depicted by media, and especially television, is much more violent than the actual one (idem; Osservatorio Europeo sulla Sicurezza 2014): in the US, between 1990 and 1998, at the same time as homicide rates declined by

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<sup>5</sup>With roughly 5 % of the world population, US have around one quarter of all prisoners (Atlanta 2013).

<sup>6</sup>Economic trends explain US crime trends much better than policy trends (Arvanites and Defina 2006).

<sup>7</sup>The term ‘liberal’ is used by Tonry, in its American English fashion, in opposition to ‘conservative’ and associated with centre-left (radical, progressive and/or moderate) politics.

20 %, the number of journalistic reports on homicide, not counting news on the Simpson case, grew by 600 % (six hundred percent!) (Glassner 1999, xxi). Moreover, misrepresentations are common in the way crimes are reported, especially in the depiction of the typical criminal and victim: in the US, for instance, whilst Black Americans, especially young men, are more often victims than perpetrators of violent crimes, their victimisation is widely under-represented (*ibidem*, 113).

We know that media (mis)representations act as mediators, that is, people perceive crime and violence primarily through the reports, and that such mediation is capable of influencing at least some people in some circumstances (Heath and Gilbert 1996). The permanence of high levels of fear of crime in times of declining crime can thus be due to the over-representation of especially violent crimes: ‘perhaps the public views the entire crime pie as shrinking but the random, senseless violence piece growing exponentially’ (Heath et al. 2001, 12)—and we also know that most people see the whole pie growing. The existence of the role played by media in the generation of fear is emphasised by the fact that fear of violence tends to be lower in relation to one’s own space: people are concerned with crime in general (e.g. crime ‘in the country’), which they experience through media, but much less by crime in their neighbourhood, which they experience directly.<sup>8</sup> In other words, ‘we believe the streets are violent not because we are in the streets experiencing that violence, but because we see the violence on television’ (Mark Wigley interviewed in Lang 1995, 72).

Finally, the misrepresentation of typical victims and perpetrators may explain the existence of some ‘myths’—of women and elderlies as likely victims; of men as not in danger; of youths, homeless and ethnic minorities as threats—often not justified by actual data (Shirlow and Pain 2003).

With regard to the role of political discourses of fear in building public support of (repressive) security policies, racist discourses of fear are crucial, for example, in the building of constituencies of extreme right parties (Schuermans and De Maesschalck 2010). The most paradigmatic example is the role of political discourses that followed the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001 in the building of consensus for breaking international rights and for the reduction of civil rights in the US, Europe and beyond. The discourses—exacerbated by the media—were grounded on a dichotomy terror/patriotism (Oza 2007): on the one side, people, dwellings, homes hanging out the national flag were represented as patriots; on the other side, any critical voice was labelled as anti-patriotic and thus a potential threat. Muslim citizens were labelled as suspects and the Islamic religion itself was located at the extreme of the spectrum of representations of mistrust. The rhetoric was capable of demarcating the ‘us’ (the patriots) in opposition to ‘them’

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<sup>8</sup>Percentages of people believing that crime is growing in their neighbourhood are significantly lower than those of people believing that crime is growing in their country and feelings of safety in one’s own neighbourhood are stronger than general feelings of safety (van Dijk et al. 2007; Corder 2010, 2; Osservatorio Europeo sulla Sicurezza 2014, 17).



(those not hanging out the flag, Muslims)—a fundamental process in the justification of wider sets of (neoliberal) policies (cf. Chap. 3). Misinformative processes were crucial for this construction: ‘time and the very understanding and construction of history are distorted, collapsed, and twisted such that revenge for alleged past atrocities and the threat of future ones are used to justify preemptive military action’ (Oza 2007, 12).

Such political representations have had as their main goal the creation of a state of ‘permanent anxiety’ (Graham 2004, 17), which effectively helped create support for a wide set of policies: the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (the justifications for which have since been demonstrated as false); the Patriot Act, which suspended several constitutional rights of American citizens; the construction of illegal detention camps (of which Guantanamo is the most famous), where suspects of involvement in terrorist networks could be detained indefinitely without formal charges, without the right to legal assistance, and where physical and psychological coercion (if torture) are practised; and kidnappings of suspected terrorists (the so-called ‘rendition program’) organised by CIA in Europe with the collaboration of European governments (Hakimi 2007). More recently, after the terrorist attacks in Paris of November 2015, France has imposed a national state of emergency, which, at the times of writing (April 2016), has not yet been revoked (cf. Agamben 2015).

Post-11-September and similar discourses can be correlated with specific transformations of urban life in the US and beyond (Marcuse 2004): limitation of public and collective use of public spaces; reduction of mobility rights, especially of non-White citizens; reduction of participatory practices in urban planning and decision-making; fortification within urban cores and of new developments.<sup>9</sup>

How can we explain the fact that these events were opposed by sporadic public protests? In fact, after some mass global protests against the war in Afghanistan, public contestation has been losing pace and was not capable of bringing about either the abrogation of unconstitutional laws<sup>10</sup> or the collapse of governments involved in illegal actions. This suggests that the support of repressive policies is still strong in the US and Europe.

With the aim of understanding how this support is shaped, we need to recall recent transformations of decision-making processes in Western political arenas (cf. Sects. 1.4 and 1.5), namely the generalised processes of (formal) democratisation and the opening up of decision-making. Sibley (1995, 3) reminds us of the power of feelings and their effects on social relationships, particularly evident in instances of racism and oppression. Misinformation about crime, terror and violence, being capable of influencing public perceptions of safety and thus feelings

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<sup>9</sup>See Chap. 4 for a comprehensive debate on the spatial transformations interlinked with discourses of fear.

<sup>10</sup>For instance, the US Patriot Act has been in force until 2015, until the Freedom Act restored and renewed its main sections.

(of fear), is an especially powerful instrument for shaping public opinion: a ‘culture of fear’ seems to have been carefully crafted since the early 1990s all around the Western world (Glassner 1999).

Hutta (2009, 251) depicts how the growing political role in feelings of safety, or lack thereof, and fear is strictly tied to the emergence of neoliberal governmentalities<sup>11</sup> grounded on ‘discursive regimes’ created by the construction of dichotomies such as ‘safety’/‘fear’, ‘order’/‘disorder’—in the next chapter, we will debate in-depth the construction of such discursive regimes in urban space.

We will now discuss two cases of structurally misinformative processes with the aim of exemplifying how rhetorical discourses of fear are enacted. We have selected two discourses that differ in genre and style (cf. Farrelly 2010), context of deployment and explicitness of the political goal: one case of scientific production explicitly aimed at influencing the debate about the welfare state; and a vast array of academic, media and fictional output, which produced a persistent background noise capable of influencing the overall debate about urban policy. The decision to include fictional output in the analysis is grounded on the belief that the boundary between scientific works, archival records (journalistic reports, statistical data, photographic report, etc) and fiction is especially fuzzy and permeable as far as the description of urban space is concerned: archival records (re)produce the city as an object of knowledge—and thus governmental practices—while the migration of images between narration and ‘science’ produces the symbolic instruments to describe and understand the city (Donald 1997). The projection of desire and anxieties, that is, the production of feelings, seems to be located at the intersection of science and fiction.

The relation between the novel and the city, then, is not merely one of representation. The text is actively constitutive of the city. Writing does not only record or reflect the fact of the city. It has its role in producing the city for a reading public (ibidem, 187).

## **Boxout 2. Charles Murray’s ‘underclass’: fighting welfare state through fear**

The first example of a misinformative discourse of fear is made of two texts by the American conservative ideologist Charles Murray who was among the advocates of the concept of ‘underclass’<sup>12</sup>: a scientific essay dated 1999 and an outreach article published in 2005 in *The Sunday Times*, a British weekly newspaper.

The problem is the growing number of children who have no father and who live in areas where hardly anyone has a father. Girls without fathers tend to be emotionally damaged. Among other things, they tend to search for father substitutes among young males, which in turn increases the likelihood of repeating their mother’s experience. Boys without fathers tend to grow up unsocialized. They tend to have poor impulse control, to be sexual predators, to be unable to get up at the same time every morning and go to a job. They tend

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<sup>11</sup>Governmentality (Foucault’s *gouvernementalité*) refers to the sets of organised practices through which institutions govern subjects.

<sup>12</sup>The concept of ‘underclass’, a culturalist explanation of (alleged) relations between extreme poverty and social behaviours, is widely diffused in the American debate, including among ‘progressive’ thinkers (see, for an example, Anderson 1999).

to disappear shortly after the baby is born. These are not the complaints of a conservative lamenting the lost good old days. They are social science findings that are as robust and unambiguous as social science findings get (2005).

According to Murray, the relation of causality between poverty, high incidences of children growing up without a father and deviant behaviours is a matter of fact, robustly based on ‘social science findings’. The concept of underclass follows:

Most members of the underclass have low incomes, but its distinguishing characteristics are not poverty and unmet physical needs. The underclass is marked by social disorganization, a poverty of social networks and valued roles, and a Hobbesian kind of individualism in which trust and cooperation are hard to come by.

[...] the habitual criminal is the classic member of an underclass, living by preying on his fellow citizens. High crime rates also create a milieu, demoralizing the law-abiding elements of the community and establishing a predatory ethic that spreads beyond the criminals. Of the various types of crime, violent crime is the most directly indicative of an underclass (1999, 2).

What substantiates such claims is unclear, inasmuch as Murray does not provide any evidence to demonstrate the relations of correlation and causality he labels ‘social science findings’. He further adds that ‘it is obvious that jobs are available for anyone who wants to work, even if more than a third of young black males do not have jobs’ (1999, 29).

If you happen to have no job, says Murray, it is because you do not want one—especially if you are a Black young man. Murray forgets, however, that the advent of neoliberal trends, the transition towards a post-Fordist economic system and industrial outsourcing have been fostering all around the Western world a reduction in stable jobs, especially for low-skilled workers, who have faced an increasingly precarious job market, one characterised by periods of unemployment.<sup>13</sup> In the US, Murray’s object of analysis, inequalities in access to education and the job market for Black men and women, as well as correlations between welfare cuts and increases in poverty, are especially evident (Goldsmith and Blakely 2010 [1992]; *The Economist* 2015).

Building on this fragile framework, Murray engages with the issue of crime and its perception, putting forward further unfounded claims.

America has dealt with its crime problem. The crime rate has dropped by about one-third since the early 1990s. It has dropped even more in the better parts of town. People walk the streets of New York and Chicago without taking the precautions they used to take. Triple-locked doors and bars on the windows are not as necessary as they used to be. People feel safer and are safer (2005).

It is true that crime dropped in the US during the 1990s but we have also shown how fear of crime was growing, in those same years (cf. Sect. 2.1). The point is that Murray is writing for a British audience, depicting as a success what he calls the

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<sup>13</sup>As the work of authors like Soja (2000), Harvey (2005), Piketty (2014 [2013]) substantiates from a variety of different perspectives.

‘custodial democracy’, that is, the American repressive approach. This approach ‘takes as its premise that a substantial portion of the population cannot be expected to function as citizens’ (1999, 37).

If the underclass cannot ‘function as citizens’, then ‘lock ‘em up’ (ibidem, 32). According to Murray (2005), ‘the social segregation of the underclass has been nearly perfected’ in the US, which were able to get rid of the underclass—and their behaviours, including graffiti—by locking them up in prisons and ghettos.

However, advocating for custodial democracy is not the final goal.

Britain, like the United States and Western Europe, is locked into a welfare state that by its nature generates large numbers of feckless people. If we are unwilling to prevent an underclass by giving responsibility for behavior back to individuals, their families, and communities, custodial democracy is the only option left (idem).

The circle is closed; the ultimate cause of crime is the welfare state.

Make it easier to behave irresponsibly and more people will behave irresponsibly. The welfare state makes it easier for men to impregnate women without taking responsibility for them, easier for women to raise a baby without the help of a man and easier for men and women to get by without working (idem).

What is the only alternative to locking large portions of the population behind bars?

Ending all government programs that subsidize having babies (idem).

In other words, offer no support to women who decide to go through with a pregnancy without being sure that the father will take on paternity—irrespective of what this may imply for abortion rates.

In summary: a welfare state fosters promiscuous sexual behaviours and laziness, and, in doing so, produces the underclass; the underclass is characterised by deviant behaviours and produces violent crime. How is it possible to get rid of the underclass, hence crime and fear? Either through segregation or, more effectively and economically, by removing the welfare state.

The main weakness of Murray’s syllogisms is probably the way he forces a comparison between the US and Europe. Before pointing out his target (the welfare state) he claims that the US abolished crime through custodial democracy—while, allegedly Britain and Europe did not. However, he forgets to note that, despite a significant reduction during the 1990s and 2000s, US currently have rates of violent crime that are much higher than Europe (e.g. homicide rates in the US are still two to three times those in European countries). In fact, using the simplistic causal approach of Murray, one could agree that crime is much lower where the security policy is less repressive and welfare is stronger, that is, in Europe.

To conclude, Murray’s line of thought, which is grounded on unproved (if false) claims and fallacious syllogisms, constitutes a perfect example of misinformation which uses discourses and feelings of fear to build consensus over specific political economies—i.e. the neoliberal idea that the welfare state must be reduced or even abolished.

### **Boxout 3. Dead and renaissance: discourses on decline and the American cities**

The second example of a misinformative discourse of fear is a wide strand of academic, media and fictional narratives, which influenced the evolution of American cities during the second half of the twentieth century: the discourse on the decline of the American city—to which Beauregard has devoted an inspiring book (2003 [1993]). This discourse is ‘more than objective reporting. It functions ideologically to shape our attention, provide reasons for our actions, and convey a comprehensible, compelling, and consistent story of the fate of the twentieth century US City’ (ibidem, xi).

Beauregard distinguishes three phases in the recent history of US cities. During the 1930s and 1940s, characterised by the great depression and the Second World War, cities were scarcely growing. The period between the 1950s and 1970s, on the contrary, sees the explosion of the American city, while the economic boom is accompanied by sprawling suburbanisation: the discourse on decline emerged and reached its peak during those years, becoming one of the propellers of urban sprawl. Finally, since the 1980s the discourse on decline has accompanied and shaped processes of reurbanisation.

To start with, after the Second World War suburbanisation became the dominant element of urban change (cf. Champion 2001, 148–150). At the same time,

a migration counter to suburbanization was in progress. [...] they were mainly African Americans from the South, and even though rural minorities had traveled to cities in previous decades, their expanding presence (made visible by continued segregation and the shrinking number of white householders) was cause for alarm. Decay and race would be thrown together in a discursive unity, and this flow of people to the cities, despite the glaring need to replace the loss of the white population, was not cause for celebration on the part of civic booster (Beauregard 2003 [1993], 79).

A spatial process—demographic contraction of urban cores partially balanced by inflows of mainly Black populations—was associated discursively with the process of urban decay.

African Americans were situated at the core of physical deterioration, white flight, anemic capital investment, crime, poverty, poor schools, and unemployment. Binding these core themes together was fear, fear that centuries of racism and inequality would finally culminate in insurrection (ibidem, 130).

Fear has a crucial role in the discourse on decline, inasmuch as racialisation is concealed behind the feelings of White, middle class households experiencing a ‘racial’ mix.

Whatever the practical advice listeners and readers took away from discourse, the clear recommendation was to avoid living or investing in these cities. For now, if not for a long time to come, the suburbs were the safe belts (ibidem, 132).

Cities, and especially inner areas, are the places of crime and fear, hence moving to the suburb is the way to seek safety: ‘a major consequence of the discourse, then, is to feed anti-urbanism by connecting general fears and anxieties to conditions,

events, and people within cities' (ibidem, 243). The discourse and the 'White flight'<sup>14</sup> thus acted as mutual propellers. How was the discourse enacted?

Commentators aim to create comprehensible stories that give meaning to urban decline without undermining widely shared beliefs or the ideological underpinnings that support dominant interests. Generally, they wish to tell a story of progress. Their strategy is to displace people's deep-seated insecurities onto the cities. The city becomes the symbol and the scapegoat for the destitution, alienation, oppression, decay, and fears engendered by a flawed political economy (ibidem, 244).

In short, everything began after Second World War, with suburbanisation trends boosted by powerful economic interests that could build on the American dream for home ownership—cars and houses filled with durable goods being the 'backbone' of the Fordist economy (cf. Filion 1996). Suburbanisation brought about demographic decline in urban cores and, subsequently, repopulation by immigrant populations. The discourse on decline, built on the presence of such populations, used discourses of fear and fostered further public disinvestment to the very areas where an economically and socially disadvantaged population was living.

The inversion of main urbanisation trends characterised the 1980s and the discourse on decline made a geographic and cultural U-turn, becoming an engine of gentrification. New rhetoric makes use of terms such as 'revitalisation', 'recycling', 'upgrading' and 'renaissance', suggesting that central urban areas were (culturally, economically, socially) moribund (Smith 1996, 32). Again, a culture of fear was crucial for regeneration strategies, as Kern (2010) shows through the analysis of advertising of new condominiums in urban cores. The urban core is still the place of crime and deviancy but it is no longer a place to escape from. It has become a new 'frontier' (Smith 1992), which, like the old Western frontier, must be conquered, one block after another, and occupied with a new fortified environment.

The contradictions of the actual frontier are not entirely eradicated in this imagery, but they are smoothed into acceptable paradox. As with the old West, the frontier is idyllic but dangerous, romantic but ruthless (ibidem, 70).

The rhetoric of the frontier is especially powerful, insofar as it builds on the myth of the US foundation, emphasising differences between past and present, and between the present and an idyllic future. The discourse builds on a dichotomy between 'us' (the new civilised urbanites) and 'them' (the poor, the destitute) focusing on specific groups: racialised youths (Wilson and Grammenos 2005) and the homeless.

In short, the discourse on urban decline, transformed into a discourse on the city as a frontier, supported reinvestment in city centres—fostering fragmentation, fortification and polarisation in the name of regeneration. To make a long story short, 'U.S.-style capitalism requires decline. There is no growth without decline, and no investment without disinvestment' (Beauregard 2003 [1993], 241).

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<sup>14</sup>A term commonly used to refer to mass migration of White, middle class households towards suburbs.

Discourses about race are omnipresent, but disguised behind discourses of fear, which make large use of misinformation—they equalise socioeconomic marginality with crime and danger—to support exclusionary policies embedded in the alternation of disinvestment and investment.<sup>15</sup>

Movie and fiction industries played a primary role in the construction and diffusion of the narrative of decline—and death—of the American city, especially during the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. A prominent example is *Taxi Driver* (1976; directed by Martin Scorsese) where the main character, former marine and Vietnam veteran, wanders about a corrupt New York. This journey takes a dive into urban decay, until the climax, an act of violence after which the hero is transformed from an alienated and antisocial character into a symbol of the fight against crime.

Dystopian descriptions of futures of urban alienation and destruction are copious. Among the most famous cases, *Blade Runner* (1982; directed by Ridley Scott) takes place in a futuristic, polluted Los Angeles abandoned by mankind and populated by replicants and people not suited to move to off-world colonies. In *Escape from New York* (1981; directed by John Carpenter), in a not so distant 1997, US crime rate has risen by ‘four hundred percent’ and Manhattan, surrounded by concrete walls and guards 24/7, has become the national open-air prison. Curiously but tellingly, *Escape from New York*, in Carpenter’s ideas, was a critique on conservative discourses about security, exhibiting the paradoxes of custodial democracy (cf. *Boxout 2*). However, public audience and media do not seem to have realised the critical tone: the movie, together with the sequel *Escape from L.A.* (1996), ended up reinforcing background noise about the decline and death of the American city—as reviews and surrounding debates make evident. Davis (1998) has screened the fictional production that has narrated, during the twentieth century, the destruction of Los Angeles, listing 145 movies and novels in which the city is victim of all kind of catastrophes, such as nukes, earthquakes, plagues, monsters, pollution, terrorism, flooding, pestilence, to name a few. ‘In contrast to their limited syntax of story types, such novels and films have managed to destroy Los Angeles in a remarkable, even riotous, miscellany of ways’ (ibidem, 281).

May (2010) and Pinto (2014) focus on the genre of zombie films to show how the corporal ambiguity of the undead—not dead, not alive—is reflected in the construction of an urban space without hierarchies. The underlying theme of the relationship between bodies—bodies of zombies and bodies of survivors—and urban space is a paradigmatic, albeit extreme, version of the discourse on decline: see, for instance, the dichotomy between inner space (safe space, home) and outer space (the place of zombies, where the slow migrations of alien bodies take place).

Abbott (2006) provides a useful generalisation in positing that, among recurrent themes in movies and novels about the destruction of cities, the most frequent is the representation of the city as a place of corruption and sin. Urban destruction,

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<sup>15</sup>See Chap. 4 for an in-depth debate of spatial transformations stemming from these and similar processes.

justified by the immorality of citizens, is the ultimate chance for regeneration, that is, the (re)construction of a post-urban, or non-urban society.

## 2.2 The Years of Fear Revisited: Italy and Portugal

The Italian and Portuguese versions of the phenomena described in this chapter are not only necessary to set out the context of examples in the following chapters. They will help us understand better the intersection between global processes and contingent (in this case national) explanations. We will focus our attention specifically on the political and media campaigns about security that characterised 2007 and 2008 with the aim of unpacking the way politics are embedded in the generation of urban fear and how discourses of fear are enacted in contexts less (or differently) exposed to global pressures.

As far as crime trends are concerned, Italy adheres to the global trends described. Most categories of violent crime have dropped significantly since the early 1990s.<sup>16</sup> In comparison with international rates, Italy shows crime rates in line with or below European averages, with the exception of robberies, which are historically higher than in other European countries (Barbagli and Colombo 2011, 40–61).

With regards to feelings of safety, stable concerns about crime and violence characterise the period between the early 1990s and 2005.<sup>17</sup> Apparently, Italians have not been affected by the boom in feelings of fear during the 1990s or by discourses following terrorist attacks in 2001. Peaks of concern about crime characterise the years between 2007 and 2009,<sup>18</sup> in the same years as a huge and

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<sup>16</sup>Elaborations of the author on data National Institute for Statistics (available at <http://dati.istat.it/>) (see also Dipartimento di Pubblica Sicurezza 2007; van Dijk et al. 2007; Barbagli and Colombo 2011). Significant reductions were measured in the rates of homicide (dropping by around two thirds), violence, thefts and muggings. Robberies show contradictory trends, growing until 2006 and dropping since then. The only type of violent crime, which has continued to grow during the period, is sexual violence, but we must consider two issues. First, Italian law only acknowledged sexual violence as a crime against the person in 1996—it was previously a crime against morals—and the growth in the number of reports is probably due to an increased public acknowledgement of the gravity of this crime. Second, sexual violence is almost exclusively committed by acquaintances of victims—in Italy, this is the case for 90 % of violence and 99 % of rapes (Dipartimento di Pubblica Sicurezza 2007, 132)—, that is, despite commonplace thinking, it is a crime connected with familiar and personal relations and not with urban space and otherness.

The significance of the reduction in reported violent crimes is confirmed by a growing tendency to report crimes—i.e. a drop in reports is not caused by a drop in reporting—and by a drop in victimisation rates (van Dijk et al. 2007; ISTAT 2010).

<sup>17</sup>Elaborations by the author on data: Dipartimento di Pubblica Sicurezza (2007), ISTAT (2010), Osservatorio Europeo sulla Sicurezza (2011, 2014); Eurobarometer (years 2003–2015; available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en); accessed 15 Nov 2015).

<sup>18</sup>In October 2007, a unique case in the period 2003–2015, crime is pointed out as the most important issue facing Italy (data Eurobarometer, see previous note).



misinformative national campaign (see below). More recently, the economic crisis and connected issues have progressively occupied the centre of concerns of Italian citizens.

The over-representation of crime in mainstream media is especially evident in Italy, where, furthermore, immigration is commonly presented as an issue of public security.<sup>19</sup> Unsurprisingly, Italians show a generalised ignorance of crime trends, and large majorities believe crime is rising when in actual fact it is dropping, with peaks in the late 2007 (88.2 %) and early 2008 (86.6 %) (Osservatorio Europeo sulla Sicurezza 2011, 23). Italians wrongly believe most immigrants are illegal and are extremely concerned by their presence (Transatlantic Trends 2014).

Since the victory of a centre-left coalition in the national elections of 2006, centre-right parties have been putting issues of (in)security at the centre of their agenda. The political discourse became a media campaign as a result of the fact that three national television channels and two of the most popular newspapers are directly or indirectly owned by the former leader of the main centre-right party, Silvio Berlusconi. The campaign progressively spread throughout mainstream media, building on the alleged connection between the ‘growth of crime’ (which did not happen) and illegal immigration—this allegedly boosted by a weak security policy. Eastern Europeans, Romanian citizens and the Roma people were the main target of the campaign, which peaked after the summer of 2007.<sup>20</sup> The comedian-politician Beppe Grillo, commenting on a car crash provoked by a Romanian citizen, said: ‘time bomb from Romania’ (La Repubblica, 06.10.2007). The climax followed a rape and murder committed on 30 October in Rome by a young Romanian citizen. During November, *Il Giornale* declared the ‘security emergency’<sup>21</sup> with appalling titles: ‘Sicuri da morire’<sup>22</sup> (01.11.2007); ‘We, citizens of Rome, live in a cage for the fear of beasts’ (interview to the actor Carlo Verdone, 01.11.2007; my translation). Unsurprisingly, several events of racist violence in Rome characterised the following months.

The centre-left government, ‘forced’ to act by public opinion, approved a provision for the expulsion of communitarian citizens, which, according to Human Rights Watch (2007), was indeed targeted against Romanian and Roma citizens. In January 2008, when the government lost parliamentary support and collapsed, the campaign lost intensity. A new impulse followed the outvoting of the centre-right coalition.

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<sup>19</sup>E.g. length of time for news reports about crime and immigration in TG1, main national newscast, is two to three times the time allocated in main European newscasts (Osservatorio Europeo sulla Sicurezza 2011).

<sup>20</sup>I have reconstructed the campaign through the analysis of newspapers *La Repubblica* (September 2007–June 2008) and *Il Giornale* (November 2007–December 2007), and online news.

<sup>21</sup>Appearing on first page 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 25 November.

<sup>22</sup>Untranslatable wordplay. *Sicuro* means both ‘safe’ and ‘sure’, while *da morire* translates both into ‘to death’ and ‘really’. A tentative translation would be ‘we are so safe that we may die’ with an underlying message like ‘we are sure to be about to die’.

La Repubblica opened on 10 May with a sentence of the new Ministry of Interior, Roberto Maroni: ‘Immigrati: stop ai romeni [sic]’<sup>23</sup> (Immigrants: no more Romanians)—introducing the idea that specific nationalities are not welcome in the national territory.

The power of the campaign is made evident by its capacity to bring robust support to the new Ministry of Interior and his ‘emergency’ Pacchetto Sicurezza (Security Package):

- Urgent Decree-Law 92/2008, which introduced the Centri di Identificazione e Espulsione<sup>24</sup> (CIE, Centres for Identification and Expulsion) for undocumented immigrants, as well as the possibility of expelling European citizens, and assigned 1000 soldiers to urban patrols;
- Decree of the Ministry of Interior 5 August 2008, which increased the area of application of municipal by-laws to cases of ‘behaviour that allegedly disturbs or annoys citizens’ (Moroni and Chiodelli 2014, 2);
- Law 94/2009, which introduced the crime of illegal immigration (cancelled in 2015) and regulated citizen neighbourhood patrols.

In short, in the name of ‘security emergency’, immigration regulations were tightened up, security policy was shifted towards repression and contradictory processes of centralisation/decentralisation were enacted—local governments and communities were entitled to repressive competences at the same time as the *patti per la sicurezza* (security agreements) between state and municipalities (among the output of the 1990s decentralisation reforms) were de facto terminated.

Portugal seems to constitute a partial exception to Western crime trends and since the early 1990s two phases have existed.<sup>25</sup> Overall, rates of crime against the person and property increased until 2004 because of the growth of thefts and robberies or, more likely, due to the number of thefts and robberies reported—while during the same period, victimisation rates were dropping.<sup>26</sup> Since 2004, violent crime has dropped significantly and steadily.<sup>27</sup> In summary, despite being among

<sup>23</sup>Being used as a noun, ‘romeni’ should have capital ‘r’.

<sup>24</sup>Which substituted the Centri di Permanenza Temporanea (CPT, Centres for Temporary Sojourn).

<sup>25</sup>Elaborations by the author on data Sistema de Segurança Interna (in yearly reports available at [www.parlamento.pt/Fiscalizacao/Paginas/RelatoriosSegurancaInterna\\_XIIL.aspx](http://www.parlamento.pt/Fiscalizacao/Paginas/RelatoriosSegurancaInterna_XIIL.aspx); accessed 15 Nov 2015) and UNODC (available at <https://data.unodc.org/>; accessed 15 Nov 2015) (see also Ferreira 2003; van Dijk et al. 2007; Tulumello 2014).

<sup>26</sup>The increase in rates of theft and robbery (by around one-third) was concentrated between 1997 and 2004 at the same time as the proportion of reported crimes was growing (by around a quarter) (van Dijk et al. 2007).

<sup>27</sup>E.g. assault (−39.2 %), theft (−9.2 %), robbery (−22.1 %), burglary (−18.3 %) (2004–2013, data UNODC, available at <https://data.unodc.org/>; accessed 15 Nov 2015). Exceptions are sexual violence (+30.0 % in the same period, see considerations for Italian case above) and intentional homicide, which grew until 2007 (from 1.1 to 1.8 each 100 thousands inhabitants) then dropped in 2008 and remained stable (1.2–1.3).

the countries with the lowest violent crime rates in the entire world, Portugal has shown a temporal shift to Western trends (i.e. a delay of a decade in peaks)—Ferreira (2003) suggests that the late democratisation of Portugal (in 1974) may have played a prominent role in this delayed shift.

Despite living in a safe country, Portuguese citizens are among the most concerned about crime and violence in the world (Almeida 1998; van Dijk et al. 2007, 133; Tulumello 2014). This may be the result of (idem): an especially aged population; the visibility of criminal or antisocial behaviour not being connected with the risk of being a victim of crime, such as drug dealing, prostitution and vandalism; and a general feeling of insecurity as regards to the future.<sup>28</sup> These peaks of concerns about crime marked 2008 and 2009,<sup>29</sup> in the aftermath of a media campaign that we will discuss below. Since then, and especially after the external bailout in 2011 and the implementation of austerity policies, concerns about the economic crisis have occupied the core of public and media agendas.

During the summer of 2008, the newspaper *Correio da Manhã*<sup>30</sup> focused on a concentration of some violent crimes in the Lisbon metropolitan area to proclaim the existence of a ‘crime wave’. The newspaper targeted the centre-left government, allegedly too indulgent of violent criminals.<sup>31</sup> Tones were dramatic:

Violence is here. It came to stay and, in my opinion, to gain effect and frequency. [...] the main mistake in this area was that political power has been mercenary [*venal*], condescending and even fearful (Francisco Mota Flores, 07.09.2008; my translation).

The campaign, creating a ‘public drama’ (Santos and Machado 2009), advocated successfully for a ‘political programme’,<sup>32</sup> that is, a more repressive approach to security policy. In fact, the government soon approved a new Internal Security Law (53/2008) that envisaged: more weapons and technological equipment for police forces, patrolling in ‘critical’ neighbourhoods, CCTV in public spaces, local security contracts—in which, however, local governments simply provide information to police forces. After summer, whilst the ‘wave of crime’ was forgotten, the shift of Portuguese security policy towards centralisation and repression was a matter of fact.

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<sup>28</sup>See Dammert and Malone (2006) and MacKenzie et al. (2010) on how general insecurities affect fear of crime.

<sup>29</sup>See data Eurobarometer (2003–2015), questions on ‘most important issues’ faced by individuals and countries (available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en); accessed 15 Nov 2015).

<sup>30</sup>A daily sensationalist tabloid, which tops Portuguese newspapers selling ranks, with almost three times the copies of the second most sold (*Diário de Notícias*). I have analysed the editions of 2008.

<sup>31</sup>This was the main subject of six editorials from August 2008.

<sup>32</sup>This is the title of the editorial of 7 September above quoted.

## 2.3 Conclusions: Global Rhetoric Revisited

This chapter has provided a longitudinal analysis, taken from available data and examples, with the aim of unpacking the way media, fictional and political discourse are, and have been, capable of shaping concerns about crime, violence and terrorism in the Western world. In other words, we have looked at the way political and media powers have been boosting, often with political purpose, public feelings of fear. This, we have suggested, can have and has had consequences. It has shifted public policies towards repression and even justified the suspension of basic rights. From a global perspective, the creation of a climate of permanent anxiety seems structural to the implementation of a ‘biopolitics of terror’ (Debrix and Barder 2009), hence of specific (neoliberal) governmentalities—a theme further debated in the next chapter. This may help explain the generalised confusion existing in public audiences between actual crime trends and perceptions of crime: ‘more than violence, *fear of violence* is among the new organisational principles of contemporary cities’ (Amendola 1997, 220; my translation; emphasis in the original)—we will debate the spatial implications of this in Chap. 4.

However, what seems simple at a global level may be more complex on a smaller scale. We have thus explored the national scale in two Southern European countries. On one hand, we found further evidence of the capacity of discourses of fear to shape public concerns—and how structural misinformation is the main tool of discourses of fear. At the same time, we showed the ‘post-political’ gist of discourses of fear. In both countries, once conservative parties and media had instrumentally created a climate of fear, social democratic parties and progressive media did not deconstruct the fallacies of discourses of fear (e.g. promoting information campaigns to explain that crime was not growing). On the contrary, centre-left governments have moved towards conservative positions. Within this context, critical positions tend to be labelled as ‘extreme’, ‘radical’, when not ‘suspect’, shrinking the very space for political confrontation.

On the other hand, we have seen very specific ways in which discourses of fear were enacted. In both states, in a context of low crime, the global climate seems not to have boosted feelings of fear: Italians were not especially concerned about crime until 2007; whereas the Portuguese feelings of insecurity have different, and historically/contextually grounded, reasons—hence they were not capable of shaping consensus for the transformation of security policies. In both countries, thus, the restructuring of security policies (towards repression) followed, and was justified by, public dramas created through carefully crafted media/political campaigns. This constitutes the first (more will follow) warning against the tendency to consider issues of fear and security as purely global.

We now turn to the local scale with the aim of starting to explore the micro-scale of (re)production of urban fear at the intersection of urban space and otherness.

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## Chapter 3

# Us and Them: Otherness and Exclusion

**Abstract** Urban fear is imbued with rational and irrational dimensions, some interlinked with, others independent from, urban life or the discourses of fear analysed in the previous chapter. This chapter, acknowledging that fear is not a simple ‘effect’ of specific ‘causes’, deepens the understanding of fear: it looks at the way fear is generated at the intersection of urban space and otherness, to build a theoretical framework supported by the work done by David Sibley on the geographies of exclusion and Iris Marion Young on the politics of difference. Diversity in urban (and especially public) space is debated, exploring encounters within contemporary, multicultural cities, with the aim of unpacking the role of feelings in the creation of relations between identity and otherness. Then, the chapter debates that the way the creation of such relations is necessary for the self-representation of societies and how the politics of exclusion are embedded in the construction of dichotomies such as ‘we’ versus ‘the others’ and the misrepresentation of (minority) groups. In conclusion, the chapter links such themes with urban studies and policy: it critiques Jane Jacobs’ theories on urbanism and exemplifies the processes of stigmatisation/removal through the case of ‘nomad camps’ in Italy.

*I remember the city as a chain of places—a topography of memories—some exhilarating, some boring, and still others fraught with fear. [...] there are places that I, having become a woman, will not go. [...] I fear violation—of my materiality, of my un/conscious, of my self. This fearing is learning. It is [...] a cartography constructed within an identity*  
(Epstein 1998, 209).

Dora Epstein reminds us of the paramount role of feelings in the construction of personal geographies, that is, the way in which spaces are categorised by an individual for the degree of trust and pleasure they inspire. Issues of gender, social and ethnic backgrounds, as well as physical and mental health, are crucial for this construction—see Pain (2000) for a comprehensive review. Epstein thus posits that ‘city inhabitants are actively and continually produced (and reproduced) by the form of the city and that the form of the city is actively and continually constructed (and de/reconstructed) by its *city-zens*’ (1998, 212; emphasis in the original). In other words, urban spatialities influence individual life, at the same time as



selfhood—which is made of rationality and feelings—constructs one’s own city within the wider city.

Fear is among the feelings involved in these processes and is powerfully capable of shaping one’s geographies, for instance removing from them some places considered dangerous or terrorising. Fearing is learning, thus, especially for those individuals and groups who are, or feel they are, more likely to be victims. We must be aware that such learning is at the same time a practice of awareness and a set of perceptions connected with memories, representation of others and, ultimately, relationships of power.

City fear is rapid, dynamic, lingering, passionate, deadening, and always contingent on the ways in which planning interventions have described and informed the ways in which we *should* fear the city.

It is my contention that although city fear inhabits the daily life of inhabitants, it is also a phenomenon constructed in part and then mistreated by the social sciences—planning, sociology, psychology, criminology, and so on (ibidem, 214; emphasis in the original).

In short, urban fear is imbued with rational and irrational dimensions, some of them interlinked with, others independent from, the condition of urban life. We learned in the previous chapter how urban fear is strangely linked, often in a contradictory manner, with crime and violence. At the same time, discourses of fear alone can only partially determine the complexity and role of fear in (contemporary) urban space. In other words, fear is not a simple ‘effect’ of specific ‘causes’ and must be more than a subproduct of global/national hegemonic discourse.

In this chapter, we will deepen our understanding of fear, looking at the way it is generated at the intersection of urban space and otherness, in order to build a theoretical framework supported by the work done by David Sibley on the geographies of exclusion and Iris Marion Young on the politics of difference. We will debate diversity in urban (especially public) space, exploring the concept of encounter within contemporary, multicultural cities, with the aim of unpacking the role of feelings in the creation of relations of identity and otherness. We will debate how the creation of such relations is necessary for the self-representation of societies and how the politics of exclusion are embedded in the construction of dichotomies such as ‘we’ versus ‘the others’ and the misrepresentation of (minority) groups. We will then link such themes with urban studies and policy, using as examples Jane Jacobs’ theories on urbanism and the processes of removal of ‘nomad camps’ in Italy.

### 3.1 Public Space, Encounter and Difference in the Multicultural City

To start with, we need to set out some considerations about the gist of urban public space—which we will consider at the intersection of the physical and social dimensions (cf. Bonafede and Lo Piccolo 2010; Cassegård 2014). Public space is, by

definition, that which is open and accessible (Young 1990, 199). The concept of exclusion, and thus of social homogeneity, does not (or should not) apply to the category of public space: as long as public space is accessible to everybody, then living in this space implies being faced with a diversity of people, faces, experiences, mutual relationships. The ontological difference between private, individual (or privately collective) space and public, open space is that the latter is, or should aim at being, neutral, that is, adaptable to the needs and wills of all individuals and groups. When entering public space, we are forced to renounce some certainties, like the one of being in a space tailored to our needs and wills—because it is ‘ours’, because it is owned by someone we feel is similar to us, because we paid to get into it. Living in public space means encountering, on a relation of parity, its heterogeneity.

‘The encounter—which in so many ways can be said to define and distinguish city life—is at once exciting and stimulating, apprehensive and fearful’ (Epstein 1998, 217). The encounter in public space lies in between possibility and threat. What did we feel the last time (today, yesterday, everyday) we stare back at an unknown? What fantasies did that gaze inspire within us? Curiosity or maybe sexual attraction? Discomfort, maybe concern for that evil, sick gaze? We feel such sensations altogether on a daily basis, the desire to be addressed by that unknown being balanced by the fear that they, or another, could in fact approach us. In other words, the encounter in public space pushes us outside of our comfort zone.

Crossing boundaries, from a familiar space to an alien one which is under the control of somebody else, can provide anxious moments; in some circumstances it could be fatal, or it might be an exhilarating experience—the thrill of transgression (Sibley 1995, 32).

In this sense, the encounter makes a peculiar kind of frontier of public space, especially in contemporary cities, which are every day more complex and fragmented. The new city is the space of concentration and visibility of practices of citizenship: some of them are new (like those stemming from immigration flows), some of them have been historically silent and are raising their voices (Holston and Appadurai 1996). New social movements that emerged during the 1970s and 1980s have been shifting the centre of political debate from issues of class and economic relationships towards issues of ethics, ethnicity, language and citizenship rights (Benhabib 1996). The multiplex (multicultural, multi-ethnic, multifaceted) gist of the contemporary city intensifies the role of differences in the generation of individual geographies. New citizenships bring about new ideas, new instances, new ‘struggles’—the right to difference, the right to a voice—adding further layers to the encounter in public space. At the same time as new encounters happen, new fears are generated. We know that the presence of ‘strangers’ is among the causes of perceptions of a lack of safety in urban space (Schuermans and De Maesschalck 2010, 255). More generally, we experience ‘fear of change, of the changing face of the neighbourhood, of the new neighbours. I want to argue that such fears are increasingly becoming constitutive elements of planning practice in cities of

difference' (Sandercock 2000, 21)—it must be noted that some studies have found that ethnic differences per se are not especially relevant when quantitatively comparing feelings of urban fear in different contexts (Pan Ké Shon 2012).

Healey (1999, 116) thus suggested that spatial planning and urban governance should be intrinsically and explicitly multicultural in order to effectively pursue communicative and participatory practices, as well as to cope in positive terms with differences in public space. Such a normative ideal, however, must face the fact that laws and regulations, in the Western world and beyond, are deeply imbued with values and norms of dominant cultures (Sandercock 2000). In the tradition of modern national states, laws and regulations, grounded on the concept of equality, hardly acknowledge the positive role of differences, leading to the reproduction of (unequal) social relationships. Young (1990) has explored in-depth the relationship between equality and justice, showing how the former does not automatically imply, and often prejudices, the latter. For instance, evidence exists that formally equal political and normative arrangements may produce specific typologies of socio-spatial (e.g. racial) exclusion (Heikkila 2001; Carr et al. 2009)—and policies of positive discrimination, like the introduction of quotas for minority groups, are often accused of being not equal, hence discriminatory (of dominant majorities ...).

The domination of equality over justice, together with the difficulty in acknowledging the positive role of differences, is grounded on an understanding of otherness as a neutral concept. On the contrary, we shall now debate the way in which individuals and society need to construct discrete categories to understand differences and, in doing so, unravel the social construction of otherness. We must acknowledge that the 'self', rather than a given, static entity, is a cultural construction (Sibley 1995, 7) in relation to and opposition with individual and social otherness. And, as long as differences—of gender, ethnicity, age, class, status, sexual orientation and so forth—matter for self-identification, they matter for social life, affecting one's behaviours.

According to Sibley (1995) the 'boundary question', the construction of the dichotomy self/otherness, and of the boundaries between them, is at the core of geographies of exclusion. To start with, spatial and mental boundaries guide us through space.

On the one hand, boundaries determine belonging: which spaces are familiar to us, which spaces do we appropriate? On the other hand, boundaries also make distinctions: which spaces do we avoid, which spaces are inaccessible to us? Serving several functions, boundaries sometimes connect, sometimes separate. [...] we perceive something as real only if it exists within the boundaries familiar to us (Davy 2008, 314).

At the same time, most cultures, and more evidently Western cultures, ground their self-representation in the categorisation of the elements of the social world around the use of crisp sets of the type A/not-A (Sibley 1995, 32). In doing so, social groups can univocally define what does and does not belong to them.

Unfortunately, however, most components of social life do not fit within one, or another, set. The construction of discrete categories is in fact an attempt at breaking what is naturally continuous—or, that is, what is characterised by the existence of liminal spaces where defining what is A or not-A is impossible. As long as individuals and cultures are used to believe that splitting the social world into discrete groups is necessary and desirable, the existence of liminal space produces anxiety (ibidem, 33): the construction of dichotomies like ‘us’/‘the others’ is an endless, albeit fruitless, effort of most cultures—and especially dominant ones—at creating homogeneity out of heterogeneity, producing misrepresentations of the social world.

Ethnic boundary-making and the category of stranger are two examples of the fallacy and pitfalls of the cultural production of crisp social sets. Wimmer (2008) highlights how ethnicity cannot be understood as an issue of relationships between given and static groups, suggesting a focus on the endless movement of ethnic boundaries. This movement is made up of political movements, as well as daily interactions among individuals, and is organised by Wimmer into five main categories: expansion of ethnic boundaries; contraction of ethnic boundaries; transvaluation, that is, changing normative principles of ethnic stratification; individual positional moves (boundary crossing and repositioning); and blurring of boundaries.

The category of stranger can be understood within the fluid (re)making of ethnic boundaries. Beck (1998) debates the history of German cities under the Nazism when, abruptly, some neighbours became ‘Jews’ and, thus, strangers.

To grasp the category of the stranger one must grow accustomed to contradictions. In a general way, the category of the stranger *breaks open from the inside the established categories and stereotypes of the local world (the world of the locals)*. Strangers do not fit into any of the neat containers that they are supposed to fit into, and therein lies an extreme irritation.

[...] strangers are locals (neighbours); and they are at the same time in certain respects [...] also not locals. Put generally: the category of the stranger is *the counterconcept (or contrary concept) to all concepts of social order* (ibidem, 125–128; emphasis in the translated version quoted).

The stranger places the opposition ‘us’/‘the others’ in the local space but, rejecting crisp separations, generates anxiety and fear. The stranger lives within us, making the ‘us’ problematic, if not impossible (Kristeva 1991 [1988]). The stranger is thus more dangerous than the enemy, inasmuch as it does not abide by stereotypical orders, threatening cultural self-representations: the resulting anxiety can easily turn into hysteria and mass hatred.

### 3.2 ‘Us’ Versus the ‘Others’: The Politics of Exclusion

Who is a foreigner [*étranger*]?<sup>1</sup>

The one who does not belong to the group, who is not ‘*one of them*’, the *other*.  
The foreigner, as it has often been noted, can only be defined in negative fashion  
(Kristeva 1991 [1988], 95; emphasis in the translated version quoted).

We can now unpack the way the processes of sociocultural boundary-making emphasised in the previous section lie at the base of the political construction of otherness. Young (1990, 42) maintains that group distinctions (of gender, age, race and ethnicity, religion, and so forth) are deeply embedded in ordinary social discourse. But, what is a social group? It is ‘a collection of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life’ (idem).

Cultural boundary-making, we posited, is a practice of simplification, necessary for the construction of the individual identity (the ‘self’) and of group identity (the collective version of the ‘self’). Group identity, the ‘us’, is constructed in opposition to the ‘others’ (groups different from our own) and the ‘other’ (the individual not pertaining to our group).

Processes of racialisation—the inscription of racial identities to relationships, social practices or groups—exemplify this construction. The category of race—which, having no scientific ground (mankind is one race), is a sociocultural production—is one among the categories that structure social interactions. Racialisation offers tools for an understanding and rationalisation of the world (Thomas 2000, 24) grounded on the existence of racialised ‘others’. At the same time, the racialisation of urban landscape, that is, the construction of racialised social groups in urban space, together with the perceptions of insecurity caused by the presence of strangers, brings about a spatialisation of feelings of fear: fear is produced by the racialised urban space, much more than by the threat of violence itself (Schuermans and De Maesschalck 2010, 256).

The opposition ‘us’/‘others’ is conceptualised around the realm of morality, which is a ‘philosophical realm concerned with the regulation of human behaviour’ (Williams 2004, 95). Proper behaviour is ascribed in the realm of morality, which, in modern Western societies, is defined around three values: family, home and the nation (Sibley 1995, 41). Such values are given as absolutes: the traditional (some say ‘normal’) family made of a father, a mother and their children; the home inhabited by such a family; and the Western liberal democratic state.

National space is an abstract entity and an imaginary, ‘which is, actually, literally, embodied in the real local spaces’ (Sandercock 2002, 16), in the faces and behaviours of those who share ‘our’ habitat. The decline of national states and the transformation of the urban realm produced by immigration, mobility and insurgent

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<sup>1</sup>*Étranger* means both ‘stranger’ and ‘foreigner’. The translator used ‘foreigner’ here because this quotation is from a section about the legal definition of the status of foreigners.

practices have thus thrown into crisis one of the pillars of modern morality. At the same time, a stable definition of morality is made complex by the decline of modern values, the decline of the traditional family and the arising of new (or newly visible) types of family. Boundary-making is thus made harder for dominant cultures, hence it is increasingly grounded on the definition of (not-moral) 'others'.

The conceptualisation of marginality is paramount to such a definition. Whilst the word 'margin' is defined through space and measure—a margin is the blank space around a page, an edge, an excessive amount of something—marginality is defined at the intersection of spatial and sociocultural assumptions, as is the case of 'periphery'. Peripheries are defined by spatial attributes—periphery is at the edge of city—and social attributes: their social fabric is located at the opposite side of the (cultural, power) centre, that is, at the 'margin'. Such intersection of spatial and social meanings is crucial in the political construction of otherness.

Marginality is essentially a concept of exclusion and inferiority. It is about hierarchy and order and has to do with the mainstream society's view of those who are considered.

[...] in another sense, the social construction of marginality is based on prescribed decorum, norms and ideologies. Boundaries, markers and thresholds become important devices to separate the outside from the inside. Those who do not conform or those who defy the rules or refuse to join are considered outsiders, i.e. marginals (Banerjee and Verma 2001, 144).

In short, the production of marginality is a sociopolitical practice through which dominant cultures—in liberal democracies often the majorities—define the boundaries of what is moral, hence socially acceptable, and, in opposition to this, what is immoral, that is, deviant behaviour.<sup>2</sup> In other words, the political and cultural practice of construction of the dichotomy 'we'/'others' is regulated by dominant groups because of unequal power relationships. The 'us' in Western liberal democracies is an instance of domination, centred on the values and needs of the adult, White, heterosexual, middle class *man*. The 'others' are marginal groups, the 'other' is an individual affiliated to such groups or excluded by any affiliation. Often, dominated social groups come to exist on the basis of labels given by dominant groups insofar as 'those labeled come to understand themselves as group members only slowly, on the basis of their shared oppression' (Young 1990, 46).

Young maintains that, once a group is identified as 'other', its members are 'imprisoned' in their bodies (ibidem, 123). Dominant discourse depicts individuals for their bodily characteristics and the bodies of marginal groups are described as 'ugly, dirty, defiled, impure, contaminated, or sick' (idem), in opposition to the image of the 'normal' body—i.e. the body of White, healthy, heterosexual, adult man or woman. The opposition between 'us' and 'others', for the sake of social boundary-making, can be expressed in the dichotomy purity/defilement (Sibley 1995, 36). This is evident, for instance, in the Western rejection of bodily smell and obsession for personal hygiene.

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<sup>2</sup>We will discuss the 'active marginality', the conscious decision to place oneself at the margin to challenge existing power relations, in Chap. 6.

Washing and deodorizing the body has assumed a ritual quality and in some people can become obsessive and compulsive. This kind of observation raises issues about the role of dominant social and political structures in the sublimation of desire and the shaping of the self (ibidem, 4).

The body of the ‘other’, (allegedly) not perfectly washed and deodorised, is depicted as filthy and animal like, as is the case for discourses about illegal migration at the US–Mexico border. Here, the militarisation of the border has been pushing illegal crossings towards inaccessible regions, some of them natural protected areas. This has brought about, on the one hand, increasing casualties among migrants<sup>3</sup> and, on the other, a new instrument for US media and political communication to blame immigrants: undocumented migrants are not a threat to national security only, they are a risk for the contamination for protected areas as well (Sundberg and Kaserman 2007). An obsessive interest with concrete marks of their presence (especially bodily leakages) conceals the construction of a racialised binary: ‘we’, civilised Americans, versus ‘them’, alien, abject bodies.

The discourse is particularly powerful when the filthy ‘other’ is also contagious, that is, when the deviant or racialised minority is also described as a threat of infection. An example of this was anxieties about AIDS during the 1980s and 1990s, which reinforced homophobic and racist anxieties—‘AIDS as the gay disease, AIDS as the black African disease’ (Sibley 1995, 25).

What is the role of (urban) fear, in this process? As long as the obsession for purification is faced with the impossibility of achieving and maintaining a homogenous social space, the visible presence of threatening others in urban, and especially public, space generates anxiety and fear, which, in turn, justifies the need for ‘immunisation’ (Lorey 2015 [2012], 59). According to Lorey (idem) (neoliberal) governmentalities pursue such immunisation in a twofold way: ‘the integration of those “others” who can be neutralised, in other words domesticated, as well as through the exclusion or rejection of the “foreigner” who cannot be integrated’.<sup>4</sup> In other words, the political construction of otherness does not play a role in extreme cases of oppression only, but it tends to become embedded, to different degrees, in a wide array of neoliberal governmental practices and urban policies.

We have already suggested that this is the case in post-11-September discourses (cf. Sect. 2.1). This is the case in Murray’s concept of underclass—with its goal of attacking the welfare state—which we can now revisit (cf. Boxout 2). Underclass is not just the cause of crime, it is an infection that is contaminating the ‘lives of mainstream America—or, more simply “us”’ (Murray 1999, 30). According to Murray, there are four main ways of contagion (ibidem, 30–31): ‘busing sent children of the black underclass into our schools’, ‘the homeless physically invaded our public spaces’, ‘public order deteriorated’ (graffiti is the classic example of this) and

<sup>3</sup>The Chilean artist Alfredo Jaar has devoted a moving and powerful project, *The Cloud*, to people who die while trying to cross the US–Mexico border. (see <http://www.alfredojaar.net> accessed 15 Nov 2015)

<sup>4</sup>See Phillips (2009) for a comprehensive critique of the concept of integration and Sect. 4.3 on the practices of exclusion from public space.

'crime made fear a chronic part of urban life'. What is at stake, according to Murray, is a 'cultural spillover', a propagation of underclass culture, that is, of a culture 'that celebrates a bastardised code duello, predatory sex, and "getting paid"—a euphemism for forcibly extracting money from someone else' (ibidem, 33).

To turn to our specific goals, the political construction of otherness plays a powerful role in urban policy and planning practice. Thomas (2000, 46) discusses, for instance, how racialisation, when imbued with the use of technical regulations, can be used to prevent the construction of facilities for ethnic groups.<sup>5</sup> We shall now present two examples of how the political construction of otherness is embedded in urban studies and policy: one among the most prominent and famous theory books about urbanism and the processes of removal of 'nomad camps' in Italy.

#### **Boxout 4. What kind of 'diversity' in Jane Jacobs' city?**

The *Death and Life of Great American Cities* by the American anthropologist Jacobs (1994 [1961]) is popularly considered to be the ultimate praise of urban diversity. In fact, its second section makes the case for 'diversity' in neighbourhoods, centred around four conditions: mixed primary uses, small blocks, aged buildings and concentration. The absence, in this list, of social diversity stands out.

We need to look at another chapter, devoted to the role of sidewalks for safety, to make sense of this absence. The role of otherness is central to Jacobs' understanding of urban insecurity. Jacobs maintains that cities are places where 'strangers' meet and that the presence of strangers is interlinked with both threat and fear. Jacobs thus advocates for overcoming a concept of security as the exclusive competence of police surveillance and in favour of natural surveillance. The role of streets is as follows:

The streets must not only defend the city against predatory strangers, they must protect the many, many peaceable and well-meaning strangers who use them (ibidem, 45).

Jacobs acknowledges that not all strangers are a threat, but all threats are associated with strangers. This is confirmed by the way natural surveillance is enacted.

There must be eyes upon the streets, eyes belonging to those who we might call the natural proprietors of the street (idem).

Who are the natural proprietors of the street? People living in a given area, especially inhabitants and retailers: the local community in other words—unsurprisingly, Jacobs' thought is among the main references of neo-communitarian movements like New Urbanism.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>The case of Switzerland, where, the construction of new mosques was recently banned de facto through the adoption of land-use regulations that made minarets unlawful, is well known. At the times of writing (April 2016), the Italian region of Veneto has just changed land-use and planning regulations to introduce citizens' referenda to decide on new constructions of mosques.

<sup>6</sup>See the 'Charter of New Urbanism' promoted by the Congress for the New Urbanism (available at [www.cnu.org/who-we-are/charter-new-urbanism](http://www.cnu.org/who-we-are/charter-new-urbanism); accessed 15 Nov 2015) and, for a critique of neo-communitarianism, Harvey (2000, 164–170).



Sudjic comments that Jacobs' position on the problems of the city is one of nostalgia and that the underlying message she is conveying is one of 'unblinking paranoia' (1992, 23). But where are the roots of nostalgia and paranoia?

Nor is it illuminating to tag minority groups, or the poor, or the outcast with responsibility for city danger. There are immense degrees in the *degree of civilization* and safety found among such groups and among the city areas where they live (Jacobs 1994 [1961], 41; emphasis added).

Not all minority groups have responsibility for urban danger, but danger is associated with some groups, depending on their (given?) 'degree of civilisation'.

This is what makes her neighborhood vision seem pastoral: it is the city before the blacks got there. Her world ranges from solid working-class whites at the bottom to professional middle class whites at the top. There is nothing and no one above; what matters more here, however, is that there is nothing and no one below—there are no stepchildren in Jacobs' family of eyes (Berman 1988 [1982], 324).

In short, Jacobs' understanding of safety is grounded on the construction of a basic oppositional relation between an 'us' and an 'other'—which, according to Berman, is a racialised one. In short, Jacobs is proposing to 'eliminate strangers' (Epstein 1998, 214), hence diversity, from sidewalks, streets and, ultimately, the city—and at the same time reinforcing the discourse on the decline of the American city (cf. Boxout 3).

### **Boxout 5. The living conditions of Roma in Italy and the removal of 'nomad camps'**

Roma have been historically discriminated all around Europe and they still face extreme levels of social exclusion, as well as prejudice and intolerance. In Italy, a population of around 140,000 Roma is estimated—around half are Italians, a quarter hold another EU citizenship and a quarter are from third-countries or are stateless (Strati 2011). Between 40,000 and 50,000 Roma reside in camps—which in Italy are commonly named *campi nomadi* (nomad camps)—where living conditions have been defined as 'appalling' (FRA 2009, 72). This is also the result of an historical absence of national policies, especially with regard to housing policy—existing good practices are the result of efforts undertaken by local governments, NGOs or sectoral public services, such as local health and education authorities (cf. IREF 2010; Laino 2012).

The Italian Roma were strongly affected by the media and political campaign about security and immigration in 2007 and 2008 (cf. Sect. 2.2). On the one hand, the campaign built upon, and reinforced, commonplace thinking, the most (in)famous example being the alleged attitude to kidnapping children, and other such misconceptions—Roma are often referred to with improper labels, like *immigrati* (immigrants), *nomadi* (nomads) and *zingari* (gipsies, with a disparaging connotation) irrespective of their actual status.<sup>7</sup> In doing so, the campaign reinforced

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<sup>7</sup>The confusion between *Romeni* (Romanian citizens) and *Rom* (Roma) is common as well.

historical xenophobic sentiments and Italians are nowadays among the Europeans expressing the most unfavourable views of Roma.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, the 'emergency' policies of the centre-right government in charge since 2008 have directly affected Roma. The restrictive shift of immigration policy forced thousands of non-Italian Roma—both Europeans (mostly Romanians) and non-Europeans—to leave the country, in most cases after decades of permanence. More specifically, the government decided to 'solve' the issue of camps by their removal, that is, hundreds of demolitions (FRA 2009; Iacona 2009), without implementing any housing policy at the same time—often producing perennial displacement from camp to camp, from city to city. Beyond the governmental policy of demolition of 'illegal' camps, their removal occurred in different ways, as two cases in two Southern Italian cities exemplify.<sup>9</sup>

The first case concerns the violent destruction of the camp of Ponticelli, a peripheral district of Naples, in May of 2008. The official history is that, following an attempted kidnapping by an underage Roma girl residing in the camp, there were spontaneous riots and Italian citizens ended up setting the camp on fire, forcing its inhabitants to leave—a young Roma was in fact later condemned for the crime. However, the story seems to be rather more complex. On the one hand, riots continued throughout the night, without any police reaction (why did police not intervene to block the riots?). On the other hand, journalistic reports (Iacona 2009; Mora 2008, 2009) raised several doubts about the dynamic of the kidnapping and revealed that the grandfather of the victim was known to judicial authorities as a member of Camorra with significant 'experience' in public works. Moreover, it was revealed that the land of the camp had been recently included in a vast regeneration programme, a public–private-partnership worth approximately 215 million euro of total investment. A city councillor from a right wing minority party had exposed the project as 'one of the biggest speculations in the history of Naples' (Andrea Santoro interviewed in Mora 2009). In February 2008, a few months before the fire in the camp, the municipal council had set August as the deadline for the work to start in order for public funding not to be revoked. Was it a coincidence that the municipality of Naples, in 2009, suspended the licence of the builder that had won the tender, alleging possible connections with the Camorra (the suspension was cancelled in 2010 by the regional administrative tribunal)? 'Saying it was not the Camorra [to lead the destruction of the camp] would be a lie', commented a citizen of Ponticelli who preferred to remain anonymous (interviewed in Mora 2008).

The case of the 'nomad camp' in Palermo, on the contrary, exemplifies how removal can be enacted through non-action of public policy. The camp, established in 1992 as a temporary solution, still exists. However, it was never formally acknowledged—on the city master plan, the area is a park—and thus constitutes a legal void zone. For instance, in 1994 a municipal provision envisaged the

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<sup>8</sup>In 2014, 85 % of Italians, against 66 % of French, 50 % of British, 42 % of Germans and 41 % of Spanish (Pew Research Center 2014, 30).

<sup>9</sup>See Tulumello (2014) for a detailed account.

construction of basic services (sewage system and electric network) but this was never applied because of the informal existence of the camp. This state of suspension also implies that the camp's inhabitants live in perennial threat of possible eviction. In fact, after 2008, in the aftermath of the national campaign, the municipality repeatedly suspended the water supply and waste collection, and informal threats of demolition were recurrent.<sup>10</sup> As a result, the camp was abandoned by most its inhabitants—rendering futile the previous efforts to integrate children from the camp into local schools (cf. IREF 2010).

### 3.3 Conclusions: Learning from the Extreme

This chapter has set out a theoretical framework for understanding the generation of, and the politics of, fear of the 'other' on the local scale at the intersection of urban space and otherness. We have presented two main ideas. First, as far as the practices of boundary-making are necessary for self-identification of individuals and societies, the relations and encounters with diversity in urban (public) space are filtered by group affiliations and the perceptions of what is considered 'other'. This is especially relevant in the contemporary and turbulent social and urban space. Second, the construction of the otherness, far from being a neutral process, is a powerful instrument to reinforce affiliations among, and build consensus within, dominant groups. The political construction of the otherness is thus a powerful instrument of exclusion—we have shown this could happen in the most unsuspected cases, like in Jane Jacobs' theories of urban diversity. According to Soja (1996, 87), 'hegemonic power universalises and contains difference in real and imagined spaces and places', as a way of supporting the reproduction of power relationships.

This has two implications for urban fear. On the one hand, the process of boundary-making itself boosts fear insofar as the desire for homogeneity and purification can never be met. At the same time, feelings of fear are at the very core of the spatialisation of injustice. Fear, which is attached to threatening others (individuals and groups), then spreads to (urban) space, territorialising stigma.

As such, 'territorial stigma has become nationalised and democratised, so to speak: in every country, a small set of urban boroughs have come to be universally renowned and reviled across class and space as redoubts of self-inflicted and self-perpetuating destitution and depravity' (Wacquant et al. 2014, 1273).

We can easily agree with this. However, the case of the removal of 'nomad camps' in Italy helps us advocate for a careful approach to such universalisation. The events we have described, in fact, constitute extreme examples of exclusion enacted through, and justified by, a rhetorical construction of otherness, and

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<sup>10</sup>As a social worker, who attempted to introduce me to the camp in 2010—unsuccessfully, because of the growing suspicion of its inhabitants—, informed me.

specifically a practice of labelling some populations as ‘threats’ (‘Roma kidnapers of children’). The peculiar characters of such processes lead us to two conclusions. First, removal of dangerous others can operate in very different fashions, through state violence, through ‘spontaneous’ violence, through non-action of public policy—or through a mix of these. Whatever the operative fashion, removal and exclusion operate through states of ‘emergency’ and legal or policy ‘exception’ (cf. Agamben 2003)—e.g. the Italian ‘security emergency’ of 2007/2008, a mob taking the law into its own hands, or the formal inexistence of a settlement.

This leads us to the second conclusion. The implementation of politics of exclusion is strongly embedded in contextual conditions (national, local), such as multilevel/multi-scalar institutional arrangements, policy/political frameworks, cultural and societal assumptions—e.g. local removal can take advantage of a national media campaign about security, exclusion can be produced by state power, ambiguous power, or complete suspension of power. In this respect, the study of some processes that we may at a first sight consider ‘extreme’ is especially enlightening. In fact, when we rethink of cases such as the US–Mexican border or the use of spatial regulations to ban religious buildings, we may consider the removal of Italian ‘nomad camps’ as an ‘explicit’, rather than extreme, version of processes which, elsewhere, are implicitly embedded in formal (and equal) regulations.

In summary, we posit that we need to study the relations between global trends of neoliberal restructuring and local policy/practice/action if we wish to understand in-depth how contemporary processes of urban exclusion function at the intersection of hegemonic and discursive practice. And, as far as our aim is that of further understanding the role of fear in these and wider trends of the restructuring of urban space, in the next chapter we turn to an analysis, and systematisation, of the variety of processes connected with the spatialisation of urban fear.

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## Chapter 4

# Fearscapes: Urban Space and the Landscapes of Fear

**Abstract** This chapter focuses on concrete urban space with the aim of exploring the spatialities interlinked with feelings and discourses of fear. An impressive amount of scholarly work has recently depicted processes of fortification, privatisation, polarisation, exclusion, segregation and control. Several attempts have been made to produce comprehensive theoretical understandings of such processes: ‘geographies of fear’, ‘military urbanism’, ‘end of public space’, ‘integral urbanism’, ‘divided cities’, to name some. This chapter sets out a fourfold taxonomy of the spatial processes connected with feelings and discourses of fear, with the aim of organising the knowledge available in literature from the perspective of macro-scale effects over urban territories. Each category is characterised by a specific spatial effect of urban restructuring: Enclosure, spaces of exclusion/seclusion; Barrier, infrastructural nets, with their longitudinal ‘splintering’ effect; Post-Public Space, privatisation and fortification of public space(s) and buildings; Control, the politics of surveillance over urban space. The theoretical discussion of each category is followed by the exemplification of a case from Palermo and/or Lisbon. The conclusions of the chapter, building on findings from Southern Europe, suggest a reframing of mainstream theories and advocate for a conceptual approach to the spatialisation of urban fear more attuned to local characterisations.

What are fearscapes, the contemporary urban landscapes of fear, made of? What are the spatialities interlinked with feelings and discourses of fear? Let us now move to concrete urban space in order to explore such spatialities.

During the last few decades, an impressive amount of scholarly work has been depicting what can be referred to as an out-and-out ‘attack’ on urban space, that is, processes of fortification, privatisation, polarisation, exclusion, segregation and control. Several attempts have been made to produce comprehensive theoretical understandings of such processes: Mike Davis’ ‘geographies of fear’ (1998), where the city of Los Angeles is seen as the global prototype of permanent urban conflict (cf. Davis 2006 [1990]; Soja 2000); the geopolitics of ‘military urbanism’ (Graham 2004, 2010); the ‘end of public space’ stemming from its ‘thematization’, privatisation and fortification (Sorkin 1992); the ‘integral urbanism’ stemming from the

**Table 4.1** A taxonomy for the spatialisation of fear in the urban space (based on Tulumello 2015a, 259)

	<i>Enclosure</i>	<i>Barrier</i>	<i>Post-Public Space</i>	<i>Control</i>
<i>Definition</i>	Spaces of exclusion; secluded residential forms	Splintering infrastructural nets	Exclusionary/privatised public spaces/buildings	Politics of surveillance
<i>Characteristic spatial shape</i>	Enclosed shape	Edge	Enclosed shape; not-spatial	Networked/sprawled
<i>Socio-economic processes</i>	Compelled/voluntary seclusion/exclusion	Reduction/polarisation of mobility rights	Privatisation/reduction of access rights	Constraint of (active) citizenship
<i>Impact on urban fabric</i>	Clusterisation	Fragmentation	Fortification	Surveillance
<i>Means</i>	Physical barriers; security means	Physical barriers	Physical barriers; security means; regulations and norms	CCTVs and sensors
<i>Prototypes</i>	Gated community; camp	Israeli–Palestine military urbanism	Shopping mall	Panopticon



opacity, self-referentiality and impermeability of (postmodern) architecture and urban design (Ellin 2006); debates on ‘divided cities’ (Allegra et al. 2012).

This chapter sets out a fourfold taxonomy<sup>1</sup> of fearscales, that is, of the spatial processes connected with feelings and discourses of fear, with the aim of organising the knowledge available in literature from the perspective of macro-scale effects over urban territories—which, in fact, is a blind sport of existing studies.<sup>2</sup> Each category is characterised by a specific spatial effect of urban restructuring: Enclosure, spaces of exclusion/seclusion; Barrier, infrastructural nets, with their longitudinal ‘splintering’ (Graham and Marvin 2001) effect; Post-Public Space, processes of privatisation and fortification of public space(s) and buildings; Control, the politics of surveillance over urban and public space. Table 4.1 outlines the main features of each category.

The theoretical discussion of each category is followed by the example of cases from Palermo and/or Lisbon. The conclusions of the chapter, building on findings from Southern Europe, suggest a slight reframing of mainstream theories reviewed throughout the chapter and advocate for a conceptual approach to the spatialisation of urban fear more attuned to local characterisations.

## 4.1 Enclosure

The concept of Enclosure is grounded on, and coincides with the literal translation of, that of *clôture*, included by Foucault (1977 [1975]) among the disciplinary practices adopted in modern times to distribute individuals in space. *Clôture* is ‘the specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself’ (ibidem, 141). This kind of practice, whilst traceable throughout all epochs of urban history, has assumed a dominant role in contemporary cities. We will focus on what we have termed Enclosure, which includes those spatialities with a double characterisation: the seclusion of individuals/groups in spaces specifically destined for them and, at the same time, the exclusion of those individuals from collective spaces and rights. We will explore the paradoxical coexistence, in these spatial processes, of two very different socio-economic processes: the production of spaces of forced seclusion for ‘marginal’, ‘dangerous’ others<sup>3</sup>; and the voluntary seclusion practiced in (affluent) residential developments. Processes of compelled and voluntary seclusion/exclusion have in common the large-scale spatial effect, that is, the clusterisation of urban fabric in spatially enclosed, socially excluded locations.

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<sup>1</sup>Expanding and updating a preliminary version, which did not include the category of Control, set out in Tulumello (2015a).

<sup>2</sup>Roitman et al. (2010, 9) maintains that the literature on gated communities has given limited attention to the way such developments transform urban fabrics by ‘segmenting the physical city [...] and creating physical and emblematic barriers’. This can be said for most studies reviewed in this chapter. See De Duren (2006) and Tulumello (2015a) for two exceptions.

<sup>3</sup>See Sect. 3.2 for a debate on the sociopolitical construction of otherness.

The prototype of contemporary spaces of urban exclusion can be traced within the modern version of the ‘camp’, as being implemented between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in European colonies in Africa (Petti 2007, 121). Such concentration camps had as a formal purpose that of ‘protecting’ populations forced into them. In fact, ‘the preventive custody, a special legislation used by Nazis to legitimate the creation of concentration camps, was not invented during the Third Reich, but by the British, who used it to subdue the Boer revolts in South Africa’ (idem; my translation). Such spatial form was born in exceptional contingencies and found its justification in the state of war or civil war, together with the absence of a national state. In short, the spatial processes were justified because of a suspended legal state.

The specificities of the camp can be traced outside war zones, to the daily production of urban space. It is not by chance that the name used in Italy to define the spaces where some ‘nomad’ populations live is that of ‘camps’ (cf. Boxout 5): plots of land, usually located in largely inaccessible ‘marginal’ urban areas, which are generally delimited by fences, walls, road infrastructures. Other examples are the ‘grey’ spaces of informality (Yiftachel 2009; cf. Sect. 5.2) or the containment of ‘problematic’ urban areas (Aksoy and Robins 1997; Petti 2007). The effects of exclusion brought about by intervention of powerful actors, more often than not, the state, have been called *effets de lieu*, ‘site effects’ by Bourdieu (1993), to highlight the spatialisation of relations of power. It is important to highlight how, in the spaces of exclusion, the seclusion of specific populations is inherently interlinked with, and produced by, processes of legal suspension—like those we debated in the Italian ‘nomad camps’ (cf. Boxout 5; Petti 2007).

We shall now turn to the other side of the Enclosure, that is, from compelled exclusion to self-produced seclusion. In the recent past, some populations have been pursuing the production of ‘safe spaces’ (Epstein 1998), where they can be protected from (perceived) threats of the urban realm.<sup>4</sup> The creation of safe spaces works by including members of a homogeneous population in a given space through a sense of communitarian resistance. Paradoxically (or not?) this inclusion is mirrored by exclusion from the collective space, that is, the voluntary relinquishing of one’s own rights to access public space. The prototypes of such processes are gated communities, a typology of residential development born in the US during the 1970s, in which common spaces are enclosed and access is controlled by security systems and fortifications. US-style gated communities have self-governing systems characterised by regulations about social organisation, admitted activities, lifestyles and behaviours, modalities for accessing by guests (and kinds of guests to be admitted). Real estate promoters are responsible for writing these regulations

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<sup>4</sup>Fortification is becoming an essential architectural apparatus of residential developments for affluent classes (Ragonese 2008), like the creation of panic rooms, fortified rooms for self-protection in case of home assault, show. The movie *Panic Room* (2002; directed by David Fincher) explores the paradoxes of such developments. The thriller takes place in a luxury home in New York and the pathos is produced by the fact that the assaulters are seeking something that is hidden inside the panic room where the main character is seeking protection.

and, in most cases, once all properties have been sold, it is almost impossible for residents to modify such regulations (Petti 2007). To ‘get into’ a gated community, one accepts a series of restrictions on their own rights, such as being allowed to receive certain types of visitor and only at specified hours of the day, or being prohibited from distributing leaflets and publications in common spaces. In short, the inclusion in a desirable community is paid for by a set of restrictions that one would not otherwise accept. Petti (2007) and Raposo (2008) show how states of legal exception characterise most gated communities—some are legally independent from the surrounding municipal territory, others include formally public areas.<sup>5</sup> ‘Off-shore urbanism’ is the frontline of self-Enclosure (Petti 2007): in such developments, the will of secession from urban territory is pushed to the extreme in the creation of artificial islands such as Jumeirah Palm Island and The Palm Jebel Ali in Dubai.

Gated communities have become a global, and in some contexts mass, phenomenon: according to Petti (2007, 68), 45 million Americans were living in a gated community in 2006, while other cases have been documented almost everywhere.<sup>6</sup> The success of gated communities seems to be grounded on a threefold offer (Low 2003): spatial amenities, a homogeneous society and a residential environment free from violent crime and the dangers of the ‘outer world’. The social production of gated communities is intertwined with the processes of political construction of otherness in contemporary urban spaces: gated communities offer a socially homogeneous space for some social groups (from middle classes to affluent groups) that see the explosion of diversity in the urban space as a threat. In this respect, the availability of natural amenities and services, as well as the architectural symbolism—there are communities for all tastes, in modernist, country, neoclassic, postmodern styles—, contribute to the social production of a ‘utopic’ vision of suburban space (Le Goix 2004, 59).

Other than the safety issue, just a kind of separating ourselves from the great unwashed, shall we say (young mother living in a US gated community, interviewed in Low 2003, 150).

What are the common elements in opposite realities such as ‘nomad camps’ and gated communities, the spaces for the exclusion of the ‘others’ and those of inclusion among ‘us’? Of course, ‘there is a substantial difference between being secluded and shutting oneself up: this is what distinguishes a camp from a luxury

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<sup>5</sup>The movie *La Zona* (2007; directed by Rodrigo Plá), which takes place in a Mexican gated community, is an extreme example of the legal suspension characterising such developments: three youths from an informal settlement intrude into the community to steal and end up being hunted and killed by security guards and residents, while police cannot intervene because of the legal independence of the community.

<sup>6</sup>In the Americas: Argentina (De Duren 2006), Brazil (Caldeira 2000), Canada (Walks 2014), Mexico (Glasze et al. 2006), Uruguay (Álvarez-Rivadulla 2007); in Europe: Poland, Romania, Hungary (Kováks 2014), Portugal (Raposo 2008), Spain, UK (Glasze et al. 2006); in Africa: South Africa (Lemanski and Oldfield 2009); in Asia: China, Lebanon, Russia (Glasze et al. 2006), Israel (Monterescu 2009), Turkey (Akgün and Baycan 2012).

residence' (Petti 2007, 22; my translation). However, the same discourses of fear, the same constructions of otherness are at the grounds of both forms of Enclosure. The processes of exclusion are never made explicit, they (paradoxically) stem from the production of 'community', as Young (1990, 12) helps us understand.

Community represents an ideal of shared public life, of mutual recognition and identification. [...] [however] the ideal of community also suppresses differences among subjects and groups. The impulse to community often coincides with a desire to preserve identity and in practice excludes others who threaten that sense of identity.


The emphasis on 'local community' is politically correct and capable of blurring ethnic concerns (Wimmer 2008, 1041): while discourses and rhetoric of fear create the background noise, community becomes an 'emotional withdrawal' from a dangerous society and a 'territorial barricade' within the city (Sennet 2002 [1977], 301).

The movie *Edward Scissorhands* (1990; directed by Tim Burton) offers a powerful symbolic representation of such production of community. The main character, a sort of contemporary Frankenstein, has scissors instead of hands. His story develops around his integration in a 'normal' family in a 'normal' suburb and the impossible cohabitation with the local community. In conclusion, Edward is forced to return to the castle where he had been living in isolation at the beginning of the movie. The movie has been shot in a small suburb in Florida and the director requested that all homes be painted in pastels with the aim of emphasising the contrast between the community and the stranger (who is dressed in black). The result is a perfect architectonic order in which the ordered organisation of social relationships mirrors the social conventions of the middle-class, bourgeois community, producing a sensation of uneasiness and highlighting the 'otherness' of the main character.

The use of the terms 'exclusion' and 'inclusion' we have used to outline the space of Enclosure has general implications: according to Lapeyronnie (1993), in fact, the present society is characterised by a shift from the distinction between dominant and dominated towards the distinction between included and excluded, a society defined by its internal frontiers.

### **Boxout 6. Gated communities in Italy and Palermo?**

The Italian case is often considered an exception to global trends of self-seclusion: according to Ciulla (2011), Cascina Vione, near Milan, is the very first gated community in the whole national territory. The historical civic and public dimension of Italian cities (cf. Petrillo 2000) is often used to explain the absent social construction of gated communities. This has been contested, however: Porcu (2011) argues that the creation of physical barriers and surveillance devices to restrict access to urban areas, thereby producing divisions between different social groups, are growing realities boosted by a desire to separate an interior and 'safe' space from the dangerous and 'degraded' outside; Chiodelli (2010) analyses cohousing in Italy, including it within the 'family' of residential private community—and comparing it to gated communities.



**Fig. 4.1** Self-Enclosure in Palermo: walled housing developments. *Source* author

The empirical work carried out in the city of Palermo confirmed such contradictory national trends. On one hand, the case confirmed the absence of real estate developments advertised as ‘gated communities’—this can also be explained by a real estate and construction industry dominated by small-to-medium-size, family-run firms, which rely on informal networks for advertising. On the other hand, however, the existence of a relevant clusterisation and polarisation of the built environment in secluded housing developments was found. The decision was thus that of mapping those ‘residential developments [...] provided with common spaces, roads, parking and services and designed to be secluded from the surrounding urban fabric’ (Tulumello 2015a, 261). An impressive number of such developments was found in the urban territory, 177 walled villa developments—spatially similar to US-style gated communities—and 1058 walled block developments (Fig. 4.1). An estimate of the number of people residing in such developments could be around 100,000, accounting for around one seventh of the municipal population. As far as security measures are concerned, walls, fences, CCTV systems and entrance guard posts are common, whereas 24 h patrols are rare. From a historical perspective, it was evident how such developments tended to dominate urbanisation since the late 1970s (mostly block developments) and especially in the 1980s and 1990s (also villa developments).

This suggests that the pursuit of a socially homogeneous habitat may happen under less explicit discourses of fear. It implies that processes of urban fragmentation and clusterisation may be boosted by the absence of effective land-use regulations, which in turn have permitted a disordered urban growth characterised by

the creation of enclosed developments. At the same time, we must be aware that such developments effectively fragment the urban fabric and in so doing jeopardise territorial cohesion.

## 4.2 Barrier

The second spatial form of fearscales is, at first glance, a by-product of the rationalist planning paradigm. In the functionalist city, at the same time as land-use zoning has been increasing distances between urban functions, infrastructures have become the backbone of necessary commuting flows. For decades, most urban investments have been allocated to the construction of railways, motorways, tunnels, viaducts and underpasses (Martinotti 1993, 145). What is the role of infrastructural networks in reshaping temporal distances in the urban space?

On certain scales (regional, national, global), it is clear that infrastructures have been reducing temporal distances and at the same time completely modifying the personal geographies of their users. Ideas such as space-time ‘convergence’ (Janelle 1969) and ‘compression’ (Harvey 1990, 240) have been used to conceptualise the global shrinking of temporal distances as a consequence of the accelerated pace of travel. Such representations, however, do not take into consideration the fact that physical variables, such as distance, are not absolute entities, but that they depend on the point of observation and, moreover, on the resolution used for measurement (Mandelbrot 1984 [1975]). As such, the concept of space-time compression is useful in describing phenomena on certain scales but loses precision when the scale of inquiry is that of urban space or neighbourhood space and the object of enquiry extends to social issues: for some populations and on some scales, infrastructural networks may in fact increase space-time distances. We shall thus consider the ‘potential aspect’ of mobility (Uteng 2009), that is, the trips that are not made because of constraining factors. ‘The space of mobility and flows for some always imply the existence of barriers for the others’ (Petti 2007, 83; my translation). We will use the term Barrier to describe the physical space emerging from the conscious or subconscious use of infrastructural networks that reduce rather than increase mobility rights.

To start with, building on Weizman (2004), the spatiality of (infrastructural) networks is illustrated by a reticulum, made of nodes—points of access and commutation—and connections between the nodes. The geography of a reticulum is characterised by the placement of nodes and the available connections between them. The distance between two nodes depends on two factors: the kind of route (more or less direct) imposed by the geography of the reticulum; and the speed and reliability of available connections. The placement of an infrastructural reticulum in physical space produces a geography of ‘privileged’ points, that is, those points from which the system is accessible. It stems from this that space-time compression is not two-dimensional and homogeneous, it is longitudinal (point to point) and dependent on the placement in real space, because infrastructures actually reduce

distances between access points and the areas they serve. Moreover, infrastructures are characterised by selective accessibility because of tolls, the need for ‘proper’ transport means (you cannot access a motorway with a bicycle) and control of access: in cities such as Los Angeles, Toronto, Melbourne, privately owned bypass roads selectively connect certain urban functions and populations (Holmes 2003). The urban space produced by infrastructures is thus deformed rather than compressed: some places and populations get closer at the same time as other places and populations are not affected.

Furthermore, infrastructures are unidimensional entities in the diagrammatic representation of the reticulum, but actual infrastructures are not and, depending on their design, they can disconnect points in physical space. Motorways and railways often separate and distance territories previously contiguous. While such disconnections cannot be represented on a regional or national scale, on the small scale they can be more relevant than connections. When we look at the scale of urban space daily crossed by citizens with slow means of transport, infrastructure space appears different from what we were expecting: it is a deformed space where some distances have tremendously increased, a space characterised by ‘deep asymmetries of temporal geographies’ (Corbellini 2007, 17; my translation).

But what produces such asymmetries? We shall debate two kinds of process. First, asymmetries can be by-products of technically driven transport policies, such as the history of Cross Bronx Expressway shows. Not everyone knows how the decline of the Bronx—the borough of New York that during the 1980s became one of the global symbols of urban decay and crime<sup>7</sup>—started in the 1950s with the construction of the motorway, which literally broke the borough in two and required some 60,000 people to be moved.

Apartment houses that had been settled and stable for twenty years [were] emptied out, often virtually overnight; large and impoverished black and Hispanic families, fleeing even worse slums, were moved in wholesale. [...] at the same time, the construction had destroyed many commercial blocks, cut others off from most of their customers and left the storekeepers not only close to bankruptcy but, in their enforced isolation, increasingly vulnerable to crime (Berman 1988 [1982], 293).

Almost every city, in fact, has been affected by demolitions, evictions, erasure of neighbourhoods and collective memory in the name of the speed of movement promised by infrastructures: often, ‘mobility beats community’ (Richard Ingersoll in Angelillo 2004, 150).

Second, cases exist in which asymmetries in the infrastructured space are the explicit production of spatial politics, as the case of Israeli–Palestine conflict exemplifies. Since the 1980s, the Israeli military politics have evolved towards an ‘elastic geography’ based on the fragmentation of the Palestinian territory through

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<sup>7</sup>The opening scene of the movie *The Bonfire of Vanities* (1990; directed by Brian de Palma) is a perfect exemplification of the commonplace depiction of the Bronx. The main characters end up inside the Bronx after a wrong turn (ironically, at one of the several motorways used to cross the area without getting into it) and the growing anxiety reaches its climax when they are ultimately assaulted by two Black men.

colonial settlements and a system of bypass roads accessible by Israeli citizens only (B'Tselem 2004; Weizman 2007). Such a system constitutes a regional plan designed for an agenda of spatial manipulation rather than being based on 'normal' criteria such as economic or ecological sustainability, efficiency or provision of services (Weizman 2007). Road infrastructures here play a double role: they create differentiated speeds between the occupying and the occupied and at the same time they force the Palestinian population into an 'archipelago' of enclosed enclaves (*idem*), an out-and-out 'matrix of control' (Halper 2005).

We must be aware that the explicit use of infrastructural systems as a means to constraining mobility rights is not limited to exceptional situations of conflict. The way infrastructures have been used to locally disconnect 'marginal' urban populations has been debunked (Aksoy and Robins 1997; Graham and Marvin 2001; Holmes 2003). The stark racial segregation of most US cities is reinforced by infrastructural systems (Badger and Cameron 2015). A powerful map by Lambert (2015) shows how the 35-km-long Boulevard Péripérique acts as a symbolic wall for the inner municipality of Paris (that he calls Fortress Paris) and how the different means of crossing it are in fact indicative of a system of discrimination between wealthy and poor suburban districts.

In short, we have been depicting the paradoxical transformation of instruments born to reduce distances into their very opposite. The emerging spatial forms of contemporary cities—among them, the safe spaces of Enclosure (*cf.* Sect. 4.1)—tend to be structured in a spatiality made of nodes connected by infrastructural networks, a Barrier that finds a twofold justification in discourses of fear: it protects the user of the infrastructure from the invasion of 'others' and secludes some urban areas considered dangerous. The decline of national states and their borders seems to be balanced by the emergence of a new system of flexible frontiers, placed 'in the points of access to the network, [...] made of the codes of a new language that, however, resembles old-fashioned passwords' (de Spuches 1995, 23; my translation). In other words, the mobility as a right to move (how to move and with what conditions) is among the fundamental issues of the current era (Cresswell 2009, 37).

### **Boxout 7. Modernism and fragmentation in Lisbon**

Lisbon is a paradigmatic example of how the dominance of technical approaches to transport planning may bring about urban fragmentation. Two factors have contributed to this: on the demand side, since the 1960s there has been extensive suburbanisation and metropolisation due to the absence of an effective means of regional planning; and, on the supply side, the enormous investment opportunities available since Portugal joined the European Community in 1986. In Portugal, during 25 years of access to Structural Funds, motorway density has increased to 14 times, and highway density six times, their original sizes (Mateus 2013, 397).

The mapping of infrastructures carried out in the city of Lisbon was thus used to understand to what extent infrastructural networks might have fragmented a concrete urban territory. Forty-nine infrastructures limiting or impeding mobility in the direction perpendicular to their paths have been mapped (Fig. 4.2), 43 motorways




or highways and six railways—highways and motorways have been included in the map when, due to their design, size and/or for the way they are used, crossing is impossible or extremely dangerous for pedestrians and slow means of transport.

The system of motorways and highways, in effect, splinter the whole urban territory, with exception of historical districts—the historic centre and the western districts of Belém and Alcantara. For the construction of one such motorway, the CRIL (Circular Regional Interna de Lisboa), 50 houses have been demolished in the social housing neighbourhood Bairro da Santa Cruz: after a year-long legal dispute, the residents received, on Friday 15 August 2008, the order to abandon their homes before the following Monday (!).

As far as railways are concerned, the most relevant case is that of the two coastal lines (Linha de Cascais and Linha de Azambuja), which separate the city from the river Tejo—with the exception of a few hundred metres in correspondence with the historic centre. The former mayor António Costa has repeatedly highlighted, in public meetings, how this is due to the centralisation of the Portuguese state (railways are propriety of a national public company), emphasising how the Lisbon government does not have the competencies to make such decisions for urban development.

To give a better idea of the kind of fragmentation brought about by the infrastructural network, we shall mention a historical characteristic of Lisbon. Lisbon is formally subdivided into *freguesias* (parishes), but the social and cultural image of the city is grounded on a further subdivision into *bairros* (neighbourhoods): among several possible definitions, Lisbon is also *uma cidade de bairros*, a city made up of neighbourhoods (Cordeiro 2003). Neighbourhoods have a strong identity both in the historic city and in the modern one, almost completely built by the addition of planned and designed neighbourhoods. We thus decided to survey all those



**Fig. 4.2** Barrier in Lisbon: splintering infrastructural networks and *bairros* (neighbourhoods) secluded by infrastructures. *Source* author

neighbourhoods completely separated by infrastructural networks from the remaining urban fabric. Twenty-two neighbourhoods were mapped (Fig. 4.2), among them almost all council housing districts in the northern–eastern part of the city. This is a hint of the use of infrastructures as a way to disconnect from some ‘uncomfortable’ issues. In one case, the district of Chelas, we will debate how the infrastructural system has been crucial to reinvestment strategies since the 1990s, allowing new spatial entities—gated communities, private schools and other facilities—to be connected to the rest of the city without being contaminated by the ‘marginal’ Chelas (cf. Boxout 10b).

### 4.3 Post-Public Space

This section reviews and systematises existing accounts of the processes of fortification and privatisation of urban public space, building on a critical perspective that intertwines such processes with the success of the prototypical form of collective private ‘safe space’ (cf. Epstein 1998), that is, the shopping mall. Public spaces that tend to assume the characteristics of private spaces, such as controlled and selective accessibility or restrictions over practices allowed, will be termed Post-Public Spaces.

The prototypes of the contemporary shopping mall, the *passages couvertes* (covered passages), were created in Paris during the nineteenth century. According to Benjamin (2002 [1982]), the *passages*, rather than being simple technical instruments for simplifying retail, were dispositives designed to give value to the act of buying per se. In doing so, they wished to replace the collective function of urban space: *passages* were temples of commodified capital (ibidem, 931), spaces inherently made of consumption. Benjamin’s discussion, as we shall detail, fits with contemporary shopping malls, which were born in the US during the 1950s, at the same time as the American city was experiencing its demographic and spatial boom. The concentration of commercial and leisure facilities, the proximity to road junctions, as well as the availability of parking, allowed the suburbanites to easily access the plurality of facilities previously scattered across wide urban territories (Goss 1999): the malls took advantage of the lack of public spaces in suburban America, offering themselves as the new public spaces and imitating the spatial configuration of a compact city (Crawford 1992). The typical architecture of malls is a reproduction of urban spaces, fictional spaces, natural spaces, most often eclectic pastiches of styles and epochs. A threshold, a symbolic line marks the access to an ‘outer’ space (cf. Foucault 1984).

The mall’s claim to being the new public space has been contested. Only one type of guest is admitted to malls, the consumer (Amendola 1997, 175). If we acknowledge that public space is inherently made of differences (cf. Sect. 3.1), then places where access is controlled and some social groups are excluded should not be considered as public. Furthermore, malls, and more generally privately owned

collective spaces, employ several features for controlling behaviours (Németh and Schmidt 2011). A number of architectural tricks are used to produce, at the same time, stimulation ('buy!') and sedation ('stay!'), with the aim of transforming the destination buyer into an impulse shopper (Crawford 1992). In short, the shopping mall seems to be a powerful social tool able to manipulate shoppers' behaviour (Goss 1993) in order to make them buy more. The metaphor of threshold often becomes that of fortress<sup>8</sup>: in fact, the success of malls is also guaranteed by social filtering aimed at creating a collective space free from city dangers and unpleasant encounters (Crawford 1992; Amendola 1997). Davis (2006 [1990]) summed up such a debate terming malls 'pseudo-public spaces'.

Critical geographers have been emphasising how pseudo-public spaces offered by malls and, more generally, privately owned, leisure and retail parks have been capable of 'competing' with central urban areas, draining them of visitors and finance. Local governments, especially since the 1980s, have tended to react by offering 'protected public spaces' (Orillard 2008), which reproduce most characteristics of malls: they are sheltered and air-conditioned; they are enclosed and controlled, to be safe; they are designed for economic and retail purposes only. We can identify six categories of practice regarding public space emerging in recent decades as a response to the success of malls.

First, policies and by-laws are used to exclude from public spaces some groups considered dangerous or annoying (cf. Hubbard 2003): policies all around the US, like the Safe Street Act issued in Seattle in 2004 (Kern 2008) or the 'No-Panhandling Zones' created in 2010 in Memphis (Mid-South Peace and Justice Center 2010), have been banning begging in affluent neighbourhoods<sup>9</sup>; in cities like Seattle or Los Angeles, various regulations have been used to fight the presence of the homeless in public spaces, for instance banning food-sharing in public space (Mitchell and Heynen 2009; Davis 2006 [1990]); in Las Vegas, regulation and privatisation of sidewalks have been employed as strategies of social control, with the aim of constraining practices of active citizenship (Blumenberg and Ehrenfeucht 2008; cf. Sect. 4.4).

Second, existing public spaces are fortified. Amendola (1997, 222–223) describes the strategies used in the US: 'stealthy space', public hidden spaces; 'maze space', public spaces which are inaccessible to strangers in a certain urban area; 'armoured space', fenced and kept under watch to filter access; 'uncomfortable space', where design tricks make it difficult or impossible to sit, lie or linger<sup>10</sup>; 'anxiety-inducing space', made awkward by the emphasised presence of control—we shall debate in-depth the role of Control over public space in the next section.

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<sup>8</sup>See, for instance, the Olgiate Shopping Plaza near Rome, which resembles a militarised space and was nicknamed, by its designers, 'Stealth', like the American fighter. See some pictures at [www.lad.roma.it/html\\_version/?page\\_id=218](http://www.lad.roma.it/html_version/?page_id=218). Accessed 15 Nov 2015.

<sup>9</sup>Even a 'progressive' think-tank, the Urban Institute, has released a guide on how to prevent panhandling (La Vigne et al. 2007), including it in a series about 'safe cities' and 'crime prevention'.

<sup>10</sup>Recently, the installation of anti-homeless studs in London caused much debate (Batty 2014).



**Fig. 4.3** The university looks like a prison: building designed by Vittorio Gregotti (*photo* author)

Third, new public spaces are designed as shopping malls, like the Peachtree Center in Atlanta (Amendola 1997), Les Halles in Paris (Orillard 2008) or the systems of skyways in North American cities such as Minneapolis, Saint Paul, Dallas or Calgary (Boddy 1992; Yoos and James 2016).

Fourth, public buildings are fortified. Davis (2006 [1990], 239) depicts the Frances Howard Goldwin library, designed by the starchitect Frank O. Gehry in Hollywood as an out-and-out fortress. In Palermo, the university building designed by Vittorio Gregotti (Fig. 4.3) inspired the novelist Santo Piazzese to write a revealing dialogue about the paradoxes of such processes (Piazzese 1998, 194; my translation).

- Was he imprisoned at the Ucciardone [old prison of Palermo]—I asked, as it could have had any importance.
- No, at the new Pagliarelli prison.
- Are the new prisons those grey, concrete, windowless buildings in via Ernesto Basile?
- No, those are new university departments. The prison is the white, Mediterranean style, blue-windows, yellow-fenced development.

Fifth, streets or neighbourhoods are privately managed with restrictions on allowed practices, patrols to deter undesirable individuals and groups, and the omnipresence of CCTVs. Often, such processes concern central commercial streets—which are especially affected by the capacity of malls to drain visitors from urban centres—and are implemented through the realisation of so-called BIDs,

Business Improvement Districts. Minton (2012 [2009]) offers a systematic account of how BIDs have recently started to sprawl out around English cities.

Sixth, and the most extreme version of Post-Public Space, large urban areas are fortified. Nowadays, big events are commonly accompanied by temporary fortification—the London Summer Olympics in 2012 or the Rio 2014 World Cup are among the most recent examples. In some cases, entire districts are fortified in their very design: in Bunker Hill, the main business district in Los Angeles, a system of underground tunnels connects private buildings and skyscrapers, allowing a total secession of this district in case of riot (Davis 1998); Canary Wharf, a business district in a former docklands area of London, was made entirely terrorist-proof during its regeneration in the 1990s (Williams 2004); the City of London is enclosed with systems of control and fortification, the so-called Ring of Steel, which allow for the recording of any attempted access and the locking down of the entire perimeter of the district in case of emergency (Coaffee 2004).

It has been debated how these practices, together with the discursive marginalisation/stigmatisation we have discussed (cf. Chap. 3), are becoming omnipresent in urban regeneration and gentrification processes. In institutionally driven urban regeneration, such practices are often accompanied by discourses of fear and stigmatisation of specific populations: see, for instance, regeneration strategies for the Glasgow Commonwealth Games of 2014 (Gray and Mooney 2011) or the Inner City Regeneration Strategy for Johannesburg (Winkler 2009). In gentrification processes, the core trend is the transformation of urban centres into spaces for homogeneous populations, spaces designed for retail, tourists, business activities, at the same time excluding any ‘otherness’ (Kern 2010).

Paradoxically, shopping malls, faced with the new competitiveness gained by urban centres through privatisation and fortification, mimic the urban space in turn: in new generation ‘lifestyle centres’ and outlets, collective spaces are constructed in open air spaces and designed to resemble streets and squares of historic centres (Kern 2008).

The spatial forms emerging from the competition between urban centres and large private spaces have in common seclusion—achieved by being located in remote places or thanks to fortifications—from the urban fabric and the selective accessibility through checkpoints or infrastructural systems (cf. Sect. 4.2). Graham and Marvin (2001) use the labels ‘secessionary/networked’ spaces to describe such trends. At the same time as such competition in simulation and fortification happens, urban public spaces progressively lose their public and civic role. Emerging urban fabrics tend to remove and surrogate any trace of public life. In such an ‘analogous’ city (Boddy 1992), local governments appreciate the ‘tourist-citizen’, who spends money but is alienated from local culture, does not participate in politics and is ultimately easily controlled (Richard Ingersoll in Angelillo 2004, 151). Urban space is thematised, thus, while Disney parks become the prototype of desirable urban space (Sorkin 1992; Zukin 1995).

The processes we have depicted in this section help us understand what events such as the riots of Los Angeles in 1992, revolts in French *banlieues* in autumn 2005 and the English urban guerrillas in summer 2011 have in common with each other. Ethnic, economic, social issues alone do not explain why rioters were physically destroying the same spaces in which they live. We maintain that, among the processes of definition and restructuring of global metropolises, the emergence of Post-Public Space constitutes an especially visible expression of the unequal production of rights to the city, in between the pressures of the urban elite and the attempts at self-achievement by lower classes (cf. Sassen 1998). If we acknowledge this, we can understand the increase in acts of vandalism and revolt in connection with the failed self-identification with an urban space believed to be not communally owned.<sup>11</sup> As long as public space is valued for its economic rather than civic role, those who feel excluded by the socio-economic mainstream have fewer scruples when reacting against emerging economic landscapes: in a sense, revolts can be understood as ‘unarticulated justice movements’ (Dikeç 2007).

Let us conclude the debate on Post-Public Space with a cinematographic image. The zombie movie *Dawn of the Dead* (1978; George Romero) is an ironic critique of contemporary societies. In one scene, zombies are powerfully attracted to a shopping mall. Two survivors, observing the undead wandering around the empty galleries, comment:

- What are they doing? Why do they come here?
- A kind of instinct. Memory, of what they used to do. This was an important place in their lives.

### **Boxout 8. Mall ‘effects’ on the centre of Palermo?**

As far as the effects on urban cores of Post-Public Space are concerned, Palermo constitutes an exception to the history we have been relating, for a very simple reason: until 2009, it was probably the only medium-sized/large city in the Western world without a single shopping mall—the main reasons being the late economic development of the city, the lack of interest from powerful national and global investors, as well as the absence of building land as a consequence of the turbulent urbanisation in recent decades (Tulumello 2015b). As such, the process of reinvestment in the centre began in a different fashion. The historic centre had been basically abandoned by public policy, as well as real estate and construction industries—which found it more profitable to invest in the wild urbanisation of the outskirts (Cannarozzo 2000). The refurbishment of historic buildings was launched in the 1990s, in conjunction with the political ‘spring’ of the city. The 2000s were characterised by a new centre-right government and a season of ‘big projects’.

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<sup>11</sup>A powerful picture of this is offered by the movie *La Haine* (1995; directed by Mathieu Kassovitz), which depicts the daily life of a group of youths in Paris’ *banlieues*.

A significant number of developments were launched or carried out alongside the riverfront<sup>12</sup> and in central urban areas,<sup>13</sup> while the refurbishment of dwellings in the historic centre proceeded. Reinvestment processes were not accompanied by discourses on the centre as a ‘frontier’ for several years—during the 1990s mainstream discourses were centred around the civic society regaining control against the Mafia, during the 2000s on the need to modernise the city. In this context, around the year 2006, the projects for the first shopping malls to be built in the city were approved. We have elsewhere debated the planning procedures necessary for the construction of the three malls inaugurated between 2009 and 2012, highlighting the existence of several anomalies and a bargaining attitude by local politics (Tulumello 2015b). The ‘shopping mall era’<sup>14</sup> was followed by a rapid transformation of rhetoric over the centre. In November 2009, a few days after the grand opening of the first mall, via Ruggero Settimo, the main commercial street of the urban core, was pedestrianised for the first time during opening hours.<sup>15</sup> The pedestrianisation was a success and became a regular event, replicated in further commercial streets.

The success soon attracted street vendors—most of them immigrants from Northern or Central Africa. Soon, some local associations and retailers complained about the presence of these vendors. In the local blog *MobilitaPalermo*, terms used by authors and commenters were the usual rhetoric: ‘peddlers’ are ‘rustling’ the city centre, making ‘a dirty bazaar’ of the city’s ‘*salotto buono*’ (living room used to receive visitors), Palermo is ‘becoming barbarous’, a ‘no-man’s land’, a ‘filthy’ place.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, the reaction by the local government was something we have already talked about, with increased police patrolling and crackdowns against street vendors. One municipal policeman gained notoriety during the following months for his determination in confronting street vendors and was ultimately nicknamed ‘Bruce Lee’ by the local media.

Those who saw him in action, saw him jumping from the van and running to kick immigrants’ booths in order to prevent them from running away with their goods enveloped in sheets (La Repubblica Palermo, 19.02.2011; my translation).

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<sup>12</sup>To name the most relevant, the renewal of the historic port La Cala, the creation of a park in the Foro Italico, the restoration of the historic fortress Castello a Mare, the renovation of the cruise terminal.

<sup>13</sup>To name the most relevant, a parking in public–private partnership and several retail facilities of national and global firms.

<sup>14</sup>Declared by some local media.

<sup>15</sup>In the past, similar attempts by local governments failed after having been strongly contested by local retailers, concerned about losing customers who were accustomed to driving up to the shop entrance.

<sup>16</sup>From the post and thread, 7 December 2009; my translation (available at <http://palermo.mobilita.org/2009/12/07/isola-pedonale-e-ambulanti/>; accessed 15 Nov 2015).

It may not come as a surprise that, despite the following judicial enquiry, ‘Bruce Lee’ has been neither fired nor punished, in the silence of local government: in the ‘shopping mall era’, the presence of the ‘peddlers’ terror’—another nickname given to the policeman by local media—may not seem that awkward.

#### 4.4 Control

The fourth category of fearscales, whilst it does not spatially alter the urban fabric, is extremely diffused in urban space. We will move from Foucault’s (1977 [1975]) reading of the Panopticon to discuss how contemporary urban space, characterised by omnipresent surveillance systems, is becoming what Ragonese (2007, 24) has called a ‘voluntary panoptic’.

The Panopticon, imagined and designed by Bentham (1791), is a circular prison in which a single guard can overlook all detainees from a central tower. Such spatial organisation has a double capacity: it makes control possible, at the same time preventing detainees from interacting with each other. Power is visible but not verifiable: thanks to blinds, the detainee does not know whether the guard is actually looking in his direction or not, turning the tower into an impersonal source of control, omniscient and inescapable.

If the inmates are convicts, there is no danger of a plot, an attempt at collective escape, the planning of new crimes for the future, bad reciprocal influences; if they are patients, there is no danger of contagion; if they are madmen [sic, in the translation quoted] there is no risk of their committing violence upon one another; if they are schoolchildren, there is no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time; if they are workers, there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those distractions that slow down the rate of work, make it less perfect or cause accidents. The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities (Foucault 1977 [1975], 200–201).

The Panopticon is a brand new, powerful spatiality, which can be applied to numerous contexts to manipulate the social and psychological sphere of those who are submitted to it. Nowadays, the Panopticon, thanks to cameras and sensors, has been relieved from its architectural design: a visible but unverifiable power can be sprawled through economical and simple devices. The possibility to record and store data gives further effectiveness to the guard and any individual can, theoretically, be observed endlessly, their actions recorded and verified at any time. Finally, surveillance can be crowd-sourced thanks to Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), such as the Virtual Community Watch system, launched in 2007 on the US–Mexico border by the Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition. Twenty-nine cameras (of 200 planned) installed at strategic locations along the border were connected to a centralised system and their images screened in real time on a dedicated website. Any person, with a simple login and from any



place in the world,<sup>17</sup> could visualise one or more webcams and report suspect activity: cheap technological devices and the collaboration of any ‘good citizen’ can theoretically implement surveillance systems more effectively and cheaply than patrols and physical barriers.<sup>18</sup>

We maintain that, and shall debate how, the evolution and diffusion of technological surveillance devices constitutes the contemporary urban version of Panopticon, the spatialisation of Control. To start with, the use of technological security devices is a structural component of the processes we have described as Post-Public Space (cf. previous section). During the last three decades especially, CCTVs and sensors have been permeating urban space. Such trends have been fostered by two main causes: on the one hand, rapid technological evolution on a daily basis has been making devices cheaper, smaller and more efficient; on the other hand, the discourses of fear, especially after the terrorist attacks of 2001, have provided the justification. In fact, CCTVs in public spaces already existed before 2001, but terrorist attacks provided public authorities and private contractors with motivations and widespread public support. In Europe, a large majority of citizens is in favour of increasing video surveillance in public spaces (Hempel and Töpfer 2004; Doyle et al. 2012). CCTVs in public spaces are nowadays taken for granted and considered necessary devices for any ‘self-respecting town’ (Gold and Revill 2003)—even global debates about the right to privacy following the NSA scandal<sup>19</sup> did not concern surveillance in urban and public spaces.

In some parts of the world, the urban Panopticon is almost a reality. In several cities in the US, escaping the gaze of CCTVs is almost impossible (Mitchell and Heynen 2009). The City of London is likely to be the most video-watched place of the world: in 2003 there were already about 15,000 cameras covering all corners of the district (Coaffee 2004). In Italy, a massive implementation of CCTV systems characterised the new millennium, with the implementation process accelerating after the ‘security emergency’ was declared (cf. Sect. 2.2). Most medium-sized and large cities own networked CCTV systems managed by national or local police—in Rome, a system made up of around 5000 cameras exists.

The central question is, what are the effects of spreading surveillance—hence the extinction of privacy (Mitchener-Nissen 2014)—in urban spaces, public spaces and the public sphere? Is it true, as argued by Ryberg (2007) that the CCTV gaze is

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<sup>17</sup>I registered myself on the website from Italy in 2010.

<sup>18</sup>Ironically, the system was shut down in 2014 after fund cuts by the national Department of Homeland Security, in part because of criticisms about issues of civil liberties, but more importantly because of dramatic drops in web traffic after the enthusiastic participation of thousands of ‘virtual deputies’ during the first months (Grisson 2009).

<sup>19</sup>In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a former contractor for CIA, leaked documents about illegal surveillance programmes over private communications implemented by the US and UK governments.

innocuous, insofar as it can be compared to a little old lady gazing out onto the street below?<sup>20</sup> Or, as others argue, CCTV surveillance poses a significant threat to the exercise of political freedom (Goold 2010)?

There is evidence that the use of video surveillance, especially in semi-private spaces, is associated with increasing processes of social exclusion and control (Hempel and Töpfer 2004). For instance, CCTVs are capable of eroding the geographies of the homeless, closing off spaces necessary for sleeping and performing bodily functions (Mitchell and Heynen 2009). Control, being crucial to practices of urban branding in business improvement areas, is one component of the creation of differentiated urban geographies and marginalisation of areas without video surveillance (Bookman and Woolford 2013).

More generally, the Control has influence on one of the core qualities of urban public space, that is, the provision of the physical, symbolic and democratic space (cf. Bonafede and Lo Piccolo 2010; Cassegård 2014) necessary for the self-representation of individuals/groups and for practices of active and passive citizenship (Benton-Short 2007).<sup>21</sup> The forms of Control, because of their capacity to modify individual psychological relations with space, together with the spatial transformations of public space in the name of securitisation, can indeed harm and limit practices of active citizenship (*ibidem*). Moreover, Control can boost individualisation and cause retreat from the public sphere, reinforcing the idea that watched spaces (i.e. most urban spaces) are dangerous, fostering reciprocal suspicion and shifting the role of the urban encounter towards fear (cf. Epstein 1998). In short, the growing relevance of surveillance, together with practices of fortification, is throwing into crisis the concept of urban space as we know it, fostering privatisation of public spaces and pushing social life towards enclosed (and private) spaces.

The panoptic schema, without disappearing as such or losing any of its properties, was destined to spread throughout the social body; its vocation was to become a generalized function (Foucault 1977 [1975], 207).

We shall now debate how the Control is embedded in governmental practice. Foucault (*ibidem*) has shown how the Panopticon, being a powerful regulatory and disciplinary instrument in a vertical, top-down conception of power, was a crucial dispositive in the implementation of modern governmentalities. However, we have seen how the Panopticon is ultimately permeating the urban (and social) fabric in times of neoliberal governmentalities. The spreading of CCTVs can be understood in relation to contradictory patterns of neoliberal restructuring: the neoliberal state puts security at the very core of its discourse (cf. Chap. 2) at the same time as, through budget cuts for public sectors and the spreading of Control, promoting

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<sup>20</sup>Goold (2008) and Lever (2008) have responded to such arguments on the same journal, *Res Publica*.

<sup>21</sup>Passive citizenship is characterised by those practices that do not explicitly question social relationships, whereas protests, as well as civic and political activism, constitute practices of active citizenship.

conflicting processes of privatisation (and even crowdsourcing) of security practices (cf. Trémon 2013).

Furthermore, Control is becoming an autonomous form: de Lint et al. (2007) suggests that ‘control’ and ‘security’ are replacing justice, law and sovereignty as guiding elements of governing. Once we acknowledge that there is no evidence of their capacity to effectively prevent crime and increase citizens’ feelings of safety (Hempel and Töpfer 2004; Doyle et al. 2012), we shall ask, what are CCTVs for? Control turns into ‘simulation’ (de Lint et al. 2007), while technology is used as a (simplistic) response to the crisis of modern societal models.<sup>22</sup> One simple paradox—experienced by everybody without noticing—is useful to emphasise the simulation in contemporary practices of Control. After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, travellers have not been allowed to bring small knives, scissors, razors—all of which had been used by the terrorists of 11 September—in hand baggage. However, such measures do not apply to the ‘right to buy’: travellers, once having passed security checks, can buy drinks and alcohol in glass bottles that, when broken, can become weapons much more dangerous than nail files. This shows quite clearly how the ban of small metallic items is useful to reassure passengers rather than actually increase security.

Justice and security are often simulated, but discrimination and exclusion become real through the acquisition and management of large sets of data allowed by the dispositive of Control. In airports, systems of security have been implemented that, through profiling of behavioural and facial expressions, make the biological and bodily characteristics of the individual an object of suspicion (Adey 2009; Maguire 2014). Such trends, and the fact that airport security is often a prototype of practices to be applied in urban space, suggest some considerations. On the one hand, personal data is collected without any consent. On the other, what would be the effects of the spreading of these practices towards public space? How would we behave with the awareness that our faces can be interpreted, knowing that our emotions are under scrutiny? Unsurprisingly, when bodily characteristics become the objects of suspicion, discrimination tends to ground policing, as the case of Jean Charles de Menezes shows. Menezes was killed in the London underground by police in 2005. The police mistakenly suspected Menezes to be a fugitive involved in the previous day’s failed bombing attempts. Officers decided his face was compatible with that of the fugitive and judged his movements as being suspicious. After a short chase, officers sentenced Jean Charles on the base of such data and ultimately executed him with seven shots in the head. The officers were not prosecuted for the killing, implicitly assuming that having the ‘wrong’ face and behaving in the ‘wrong’ way may be proper reasons for being killed in a pre-emptive strike.

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<sup>22</sup>See Maguire (2014) for a similar argument grounded on a critical anthropology of airport security and technologisation thereof.

According to Lyon (2004), an urban biopolitics composed of four types of measure—biometrics, ID cards, CCTV and communications interception—is emerging. As such, Control tends to permeate all spaces of freedom (Petti 2007, 80), at the same time throwing into question individual rights. Against this background, the growing use of ‘predictive’ policing instruments—e.g. the use of spatial crime data to predict probable patterns of future crime (cf. Fittered et al. 2015; Townsend 2015)—turns the vision of the movie *Minority Report* (2002; directed by Steven Spielberg), where future criminals can be arrested before having committed any crime, into a possible reality.

It is a trend which, if unchecked, could become a serious threat to human rights. [...] the effect of increased algorithmic surveillance is to deepen the process of social sorting, of categorization for various purposes. It is a means of inclusion and exclusion, of acceptance and rejections, of worthiness and unworthiness (Lyon 2004, 309).

### **Boxout 9. Control over Palermo and Lisbon**

What actually constitutes the Control in cities outside the core of mainstream global trends? We shall now briefly present the cases of Palermo and Lisbon to give a Southern European answer to such a question.<sup>23</sup>

Publicly managed CCTV systems exist in both cities. In Palermo, in addition to systems for the control of specific areas and events,<sup>24</sup> two systems exist: one, composed of 43 cameras, was installed during a UN event in 2000, has been managed by municipal police since 2006 and has recently been expanded with an additional 54 cameras; the second, made up of 128 cameras and automatic number plate recognition systems, is managed by the national police. Both systems, as well as a network of CCTVs in 80 municipal schools, have been cofunded by European Structural Funds under two National Operational Programmes (Programmi Operativi Nazionali, PON) concerned with ‘Security and Development’ for Southern regions (2000–2006 and 2007–2013)—in fact, both PONs were primarily allocated to the implementation of dozens of CCTV systems throughout city centres, motorways, rail stations, ports and airports all around Southern Italian regions. What is peculiar about this case, and is true of Italy as a whole, is that no public or political debate was ever made, either at the national or on a local scale, about the implementation of CCTV systems.

The case of Lisbon exemplifies national trends more widely. The national legislation allowing the implementation of video-watching over public spaces was issued in 2005 (Law 1/2005), despite, at that time, the very idea of surveillance on

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<sup>23</sup>See Tulumello (2013) for an in-depth account.


<sup>24</sup>Monitoring: the city airport motorway, the areas surrounding the football stadium during sport events, the recently renewed public space in the historic port of La Cala, an industrial zone in the southern district of Brancaccio and a restricted traffic area (in this latter case, cameras have not been functioning since 2008, but have not been removed so far).

public space being quite absurd in a country in which the word ‘surveillance’ (*vigilância*) still reminded the political police of the dictatorship in power until 1974 (Frois 2013). According to Frois (*ibidem*, 3), the national CCTV programme designed in the following years by the centre-left government was part of the ‘implementation of a specific political programme heavily centred on the idea of “modernization”, which, going far beyond mere video surveillance, was based on the crucial role played by technological innovation’. In Lisbon, despite the presence of some systems for traffic monitoring, until 2007 the centre-left mayor had considered CCTVs in public space a violation of civil rights.<sup>25</sup> However, since 2008, in the aftermath of the national media campaign about security (cf. Sect. 2.2), the same municipal government collaborated on the projects for two systems in the historic centre, one in function and another still in the design phase. In both cases, the projects were preliminarily rejected by the National Authority for Protection of Personal Data (Comissão Nacional de Protecção de Dados, CNPD) because of low crime rates—however, a centre-right national government recently issued a law (9/2012) to make the authority’s opinion not binding as it had been previously.

As far as the presence of CCTVs in urban central areas is concerned, we have selected and mapped two districts, extending for around 70 hectares, for having a similar role in civic, leisure, commercial and directional poles of attraction. In 2011, we counted 419 cameras watching public spaces in Palermo (of these, 33 managed by 6 public departments and 386 managed by 243 private entities) and 184 in Lisbon (of these, 29 managed by 12 public departments and 158 by 90 private entities) (Fig. 4.4). The difference in density between the two cities can be explained by contextual specificities concerning urban space and national legislation. In Palermo, the area studied is characterised by a very dense fabric of dwellings and street retailers, whereas in Lisbon the urban fabric is made up of big mono-functional tertiary blocks: as a result, in Palermo we found a number of microsystems composed of one or two cameras, mainly managed by small retailers, whereas in Lisbon we also found big systems for the protection of corporate and bank headquarters. As far as legislation is concerned, while in Portugal any data handling, including CCTV, must be authorised by the CNPD (Law 1/2005), in Italy neither authorisation nor notification of ongoing data handling is required: whilst the national Authority for Protection of Personal Data recently highlighted the need for a specific legislation on CCTVs (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali 2010), a legislative void still exists in this area. Such a void can help explain the proliferation of cameras in Palermo and, in the absence of any enforcement, the fact that most systems (around 95 % of those mapped) do not conform to the Authority’s regulations.

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
<sup>25</sup>The president of the Association of Retailers in the Bairro Alto district stated in an interview that this was the mayor’s reaction to the association’s request to implement a CCTV system in their district.



**Fig. 4.4** Control of public space: CCTV cameras in the centre of Palermo and Lisbon (adapted from Tulumello 2013)

## 4.5 Conclusions: Southern European Fearscales

This chapter addressed our exploration of the fabric of urban space, questioning the socio-spatial effects of the paradoxes of urban fear in contemporary cities. We set out a taxonomy for the processes described in available literature with the aim of discerning the multifarious forms of, and assessing the relevance on urban fabrics of, the spatialisation of urban fear. Once we reconsidered the literature reviewed in this chapter, as well as the map of Control in two central urban areas (Fig. 4.4), we can confirm that the fearscales are not extreme, scattered, marginal events. On the contrary, they have been acquiring a dominant role in the way the city is



**Fig. 4.5** Fearscape in Palermo: map of Enclosure, Barrier and Post-Public Space (*black on white and its inverse to emphasise the effect of spatial fragmentation/clustering*) (adapted from Tulumello 2015a)

constructed and reconstructed. The cumulative map of Enclosure, Barrier and Post-Public Space in a concrete municipal territory, that of Palermo (Fig. 4.5), shows us how ‘infrastructural systems create longitudinal fractures while clusters of secluded areas break the continuity of the urban fabric’ (Tulumello 2015a, 266). It seems that the processes of inclusion/exclusion of the Enclosure, the fragmentation produced by the Barrier, the attack on the civic realm launched by Post-Public Space and a ‘flexible and fluctuating network’ (Petti 2007, 80; my translation) of Control, all together, are reconfiguring contemporary cities: the illusion of a modern, open society/city is being replaced by visions of fear and individualisation.

However, the examples we have provided of two Southern European cities, Palermo and Lisbon, have shown that such a noir vision of global, overwhelming trends could be adequate to describe places at the core of neoliberal transformations—such as the global cities of the US and the UK or places in the Global South under the influence of global institutions and NGOs (cf. Baptista 2013)—but less adequate to explore places at the margins of them. In fact, in urban contexts characterised by complex patterns of formality/informality, integration/segregation and diversification/fragmentation, like Southern European ones (Malheiros 2002; Laino 2012; Seixas and Albet 2012; Salvati et al. 2016), global rhetoric and powerful interests seem to clash with very specific institutional, social and urban arrangements. We shall thus suggest a reframing of mainstream theories, following the outlined taxonomy.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup>This is an updated and extended version of the debate in Tulumello (2015a, 267).

First, contemporary processes of exclusion should be understood through the paradoxical symmetry of the forms of Enclosure: the fact that millions of people all around the world decide to commit ‘social suicide’ (Monterescu 2009) in gated communities and similar entities needs to be theoretically interlaced with its very opposite, that is, the processes of forced seclusion/exclusion. Such processes can then be debated through a complex combination of issues: exclusive concepts of ‘community’, territorial stigmatisation, creation of states of normative exception, but also local aspirations of middle-to-affluent classes or the effectiveness of local/national planning systems in regulating and orienting urban production.

Second, infrastructural systems can, and do, reshape urban space-time geographies, often expanding, rather than shrinking, them: the Barrier stems from a mix of side effects of technically driven spatial planning and explicit exclusionary intentions. This calls for the need to question the socio-spatial dimensions of technical and transport planning and, at the same time, the political significance of mobilities (cf. Ureta 2008).

Third, the variety of processes in Post-Public Space have in common a trend towards the erosion of common rights to the city. However, as far as procedures and practices are concerned, each case is unique and inherently multifaceted. Contextual and justification patterns thus need to be explored in relation to the specificities of planning arrangements and temporal peculiarities.

Fourth, the existence of Control over urban and public space seems to be taken for granted in almost every Western city (and beyond), making this the most depoliticised fearscape—surveillance over urban and public space is accepted by citizens and mainstream political parties despite its powerful capacity to influence (political) urban life. The infrastructure of Control is composed of two types of system: networked ones, managed by public actors, and sprawled ones, mainly managed by private actors. As such, the completion of the urban Panopticon would necessitate the connection of sprawled systems to a centralised network<sup>27</sup>: this would be technically easy and cheap but would need systematic changes in national legislations, if not constitutions. The paradox of Control is thus that of a post-political form that, to be completed, would need a strong political decision.

Fifth, the relationship between fearscales and discourses of fear is a complex, contradictory one. On the one hand, the spatialisation of Enclosure, Barrier, Post-Public Space and Control has been reinforcing urban anxieties and fears. On the other hand, discourses of fear are crucial to the justification of fearscales but, in specific cases, they can be replaced by specific discourses like, as we showed in Southern Europe, the calls for ‘modernisation’, for ‘being more akin to the others’—ironically, we call for a deprovincialisation of urban studies building on evidences of political provincialism.

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<sup>27</sup>Examples of such hyper-connected networks of control can be found in fiction, like in the movie *Enemy of the State* (1998; directed by Tony Scott) or the TV series *Person of Interest*.



All in all, we obtained some evidence that ‘more nuanced theories are needed in order to unmask the urban “spaces which entail fear”: they should be critical, multilayered, and well balanced across global processes and local power-relations’ (Tulumello 2015a, 267). The spatial exploration of this chapter needs thus to be complemented by the in-depth analysis of the micropolitics of fear in urban planning policy and practice. This is the goal of the next chapter.

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## Chapter 5

# Planning, Fear and Power

**Abstract** This chapter critically questions how urban planning as a practice and a discipline, and as a political and technical *praxis*, is informed by, and has in turn been shaping, urban fear. This is done through two arguments stemming from the multiplex way in which the dimensions of (geo)politics, otherness and (urban) space interrelate: (modernist) spatialities and the encounter, at the intersection of space and otherness; and the political economies of urban fear, at the intersection of otherness and (geo)politics. These arguments are used to explore the role of mainstream paradigms of planning practice: the modernist/rationalist paradigm and the variety of paradigms emerging in recent times from post-Fordist/neoliberal restructuring. Rather than outlining a conclusive and universal definition of the way fear operates, the chapter builds an exploratory theoretical framework, based on the critical evaluation of the discussions presented in the previous chapters, which can be used to unravel the relationship between fear and planning in specific cases at the intersection of global trends and local contextual characterisations. To do this, the chapter reviews existing critiques and then uses them to reconsider the histories of two council housing districts in Palermo (the Zen) and Lisbon (Chelas)—i.e. it sets out, and then tests, a theoretical/exploratory framework.

*Planning and urban management discourses are, and always have been, saturated with fear. The history of planning could be rewritten as the attempt to manage fear in the city*  
(Sandercock 2002, 15)

So far, we have unravelled the way fear is capable of shaping, and is shaped in turn by, the lived (political, social, urban) space, taking into account (global) misinformative discourses about, and paradoxes of, security (Chap. 2); the role of diversity and otherness, together with their political construction (Chap. 3); and the spatialisation of fear in urban space (Chap. 4). To cut a long story short, the previous three chapters have emphasised the role of (geo)politics, otherness and (urban) space.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Similarly, Abu-Orf (2013) bases his theory about fear and planning in cities that are experiencing conflict and war on a threefold understanding of fear: the individual (which emphasises the role of space), the feminist geography (which emphasises the role of difference and otherness) and the globalised.

In doing this, we have been unpacking the way fear, rather than being merely a simple effect and a neutral component of urban life, is a complex (re)production, deeply imbued with discursive/misinformative processes and (unequal) relations of power.

Turning to the micro-politics of urban policy, we can now critically question how urban planning as a practice and a discipline, and as a political and technical *praxis*, is informed by, and has in turn been shaping, urban fear. This can be done by setting forth two arguments that unveil the nature of the relationship between planning and fear. These arguments stem from the multiplex way in which the three dimensions of (geo)politics, otherness and (urban) space interrelate: (modernist) spatialities and the encounter, stemming from the intersection of space and otherness; and the political economies of urban fear, stemming from the intersection of otherness and (geo)politics.

In the next two sections, we will set out a discussion of these arguments, exploring the role of mainstream paradigms of planning practice: the modernist/rationalist paradigm and the variety of paradigms emerging in recent times from post-Fordist/neoliberal restructuring (cf. Sect. 1.4). Rather than outlining a conclusive and universal definition of the way fear operates, we seek to build an exploratory theoretical framework, based on the critical evaluation of the discussions presented in the previous chapters, which can be used to unravel the relationship between fear and planning in specific cases at the intersection of global trends and local contextual characterisations, and of hegemonic and discursive power relations.<sup>2</sup> To do so, we will review existing critiques of planning paradigms and then use them to reconsider the histories of two council housing districts in Palermo and Lisbon—in short, we will set out a theoretical/exploratory framework and then exemplify its use, at the same time as testing it. All in all, we adopt an approach that is opposite to that of mainstream debates about security/safety in planning practice—which tends to take urban fear for granted and hence suggests ways where urban planning can reduce crime.<sup>3</sup>

## 5.1 Modernist Space and the Encounter

Let us start by looking at the intersection of space and otherness. We have described the urban encounter (with urban diversity, especially in contemporary cities) as a complex experience at the border between pleasure and fear (cf. Sect. 3.1). From this perspective, we need to understand how planning practice, while it shapes urban spatialities, is capable of pushing the encounter towards one side or the other. And, if we acknowledge that the spatialities typical of modernist planning shape the

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<sup>2</sup>This is an extended and updated version of the framework set out in Tulumello (2015a).

<sup>3</sup>This is the approach, for instance, of environmental paradigms to crime reduction: Cozens (2007, 187, 2011, 481) stresses ‘the ubiquitous issues of crime and the fear of crime’ (see also Kitchen 2002; Atlas 2008).

majority of spatial configurations in contemporary Western cities,<sup>4</sup> we shall now turn to a critical analysis of such a paradigm.

Foucault, in his study of modern power relations, maintains that, since the nineteenth century, sovereign relations have been substituted with ‘disciplines’, a set of methods that ‘made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility’ (1977 [1975], 137). The first operation of the disciplinary state, for Foucault, is the distribution of individuals through four techniques (*ibidem*, 141–145): the enclosure (*cloture*), ‘the specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself’ (cf Sect. 4.1); the elementary location or partitioning (*quadrillage*), ‘each individual has his [*sic*]<sup>5</sup> own place; and each place its individual’; functional sites (*emplacements fonctionnels*), which ‘correspond not only to the need to supervise, to break dangerous communications, but also to create a useful space’; the rank (*rang*), ‘the place one occupies in a classification, the point at which a line and a column intersect, the interval in a series of intervals that one may traverse one after the other’.

Would we be surprised to find such categorisations among the theoretical grounds of modernist/rationalist urban planning and urbanism? That is to say, may we consider the horizontal, functional specialisation of the modernist city—produced by land-use zoning—as an instrument for the implementation of the spatial distribution (of individuals, of groups) required by the disciplinary state? To start with, it has been debated how modernist planning is grounded on an idea of spatial planning as a tool to observe and modify, that is, to improve, individuals and society (Young 1990; Scandurra and Krumholz 1999; Sandercock 2003a). From this perspective, the very emergence of urban planning practice can indeed be understood as a spatial instrument for the implementation of disciplines, as Pløger contends.

As Foucault makes clear, the emergence of this politics of urban health and its subsequent spatial mechanisms, is not due to care for the population, but a matter of maintaining power through socio-spatial order; that is security. The city was seen as a threat to politics, because of the existence of a poor population, or proletariat, that increased tensions in cities. The regime of health illustrates this point. The city had become a dangerous environment to society and to power regimes, not only because of a concentration of poverty and tensions, risk and illness, but also to a society that needed a stable, healthy work force and population growth (2008, 64).

We shall thus reconsider four specific characterisations of the modernist/rationalist urban planning paradigm—land-use zoning, the use of

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<sup>4</sup>Martinotti (1993) suggested that the ‘new’ city—which resembles the networked archipelago of safe spaces and enclosed spatialities described in the previous chapter—is an emergent reality in the frame of the modernist city. Scott more recently described the ‘third wave’ of global urbanisation in post-Fordist times, also stressing how it is ‘begin[ning] to move beyond its incipient stages of formation’ (2011, 292).

<sup>5</sup>Foucault uses *sa place*, where ‘sa’ is feminine because in French it agrees with the noun ‘place’, whereas, in the English translation consulted, ‘his’ agrees with (a male) ‘individual’.



models, technical approach, top-down power relations—to set the grounds for an understanding of the implications for urban fear.

First, land-use zoning, probably the core convention of modernist urban planning, at the same time as it creates spaces for homogeneous uses—hence homogeneous social groups—creates the conditions for the ‘other’ to be an intruder. De Carlo (1965 [1964], 17–18) was among the earliest scholars to debate the ‘rigidity’ of land-use zoning and enlist its socio-morphologic consequences: limitation of formal types available in urban design, fragmentation of urban fabric, segregation of social groups and their exclusion from the collective construction of public space. As such, Young (1990) debates how zoning regulations can be, and have been, used to enforce class and racial segregation—according to Fischler (1998, 400) zoning should be understood, at a same time, as ‘a means to facilitate the setting of adequate standards to increase the efficiency of the city and of planning itself’ and ‘a tool of spatial segregation’.

Second, modernist instruments, especially the deterministic model, keep dominating the analysis and comprehension of urban space even when the land-use plan is replaced by more flexible planning instruments.

In transportation, land-use, and housing the valiant search to measure, model, tame and manipulate the city continues. Although the models themselves are more sophisticated than before and are able to handle many more variables than their predecessors, they continue to systematically undervalue and ignore some of these vexing pluralities and ambiguities emphasized by theorists (Banerjee and Verma 2001, 133).

The model, ‘like the proverbial blind men trying to describe an elephant’ (idem), can grasp just a small part of the complexity of (contemporary) cities and in doing so fails to take into consideration the role of daily experience and personal feelings in the (re)production of urban space.

Third, the use of the model as the main instrument of analysis is mirrored by the use of technical discourse as the main instrument for the justification of institutional policymaking. Sandercock (2003b) maintains that the dominance of technical discourse is often a cover up for political instances that cannot be made explicit, such as those of exclusion or segregation.

Fourth, and more generally, the instruments (of analysis and intervention) typical of the modernist/rationalist paradigm have been criticised for their tendency to ‘legitimise and reproduce existing order’ (Dematteis 1995, 84; my translation), that is, often, to maintain the dominance of top-down power relations—in Fordist times and liberal democracies, this means keeping the decision-making power at the intersection of the national state and powerful economic actors.

They decide the most rationality and efficient investment from the point of view of their portfolio and their centralized office operations, but not necessarily from the point of view of the locales in which they invest. Too often this bureaucratic rationality and efficiency results in a deadening separation of functions with oppressive consequences (Young 1990, 243).

All in all, critical scholars understand the modernist paradigm of urban planning as driven by a desire for certainty, as an attempt to establish order through

regulations (Allmendinger and Gunder 2005; Pløger 2008; Harris 2011). One could ask, will human beings passively accept being forced to conform to the enlightened vision of the planner? In the real world the clash between the planner's desire for order and the real desires of people often brings about the failure of social engineering intentions (Aksoy and Robins 1997; Davy 2008).

We need to explore whether the implications of modernist urban spatialities on fear stem from such a failure. According to Epstein (1998, 211), the specificity of the modernist/rationalist paradigm of planning can be based on the 'implicit belief that built environments and social interactions can be "made right", resolved, through "correct" actions'. The modernist planning toolkit thus neglects to reflexively address the role of feelings in the urban realm. Fear is not understood for its sociopolitical construction; on the contrary, it is, at most, seen as a problem to be solved—through technical devices. Moreover, it has been suggested that fear can be produced by two typical spatial conventions of modernist planning, the spatial dispersion and the ideally continuous public space.

On the one hand, spatial dispersion, resulting from land-use zoning and necessary for the implementation of the 'city-machine', has a dark side, that is, the geographic isolation of working classes as a means of control (Harvey 1993)—in a process that reinforces vicious circles of isolation, production of 'dangerous' otherness and further individualisation of public life. On the other hand, the ideally continuous public space—as theorised by Le Corbusier—was based on the idea that open architectural forms would automatically bring about an 'open' city (Pope 1996, 91). On the contrary, the transparency of the ground floors of buildings ends up isolating them from the outer space, in fact preventing the existence of those functions necessary to the vitality of public space (Sennett 2002 [1977], 12).

To cut a long story short, Sorkin (1992, 212) has effectively—if provocatively—summed up modernist urban planning by referring to 'an enormity of regimentation plopped at regular intervals across a verdant landscape'. In other words, once the actual planning histories are analysed, the illuminist vision at the basis of the rationalist paradigm is strongly contrasted with the real world: often, planning creates problems rather than solving them (Aksoy and Robins 1997). This seems to be especially relevant as far as the production of feelings of fear is concerned. Returning to the question that opened this section, regarding the capacity of urban planning to push the encounter towards pleasure or fear, we have had hints of the fact that 'modernist urban planning interventions [...] have focused more on the violent fantasy (i.e. focus on crime prevention) and have thus elided the possibilities contained within the enactment of pleasurable fantasy on the urban terrain' (Epstein 1998, 219).

### **Boxout 10a. Zen and Chelas: from modernism to fragmentation**

As stated at the start of this chapter, the framework we are setting out, rather than being a definitive explanatory theory, aims to be an exploratory tool, which can be used to analyse the relationship between fear and planning practice in specific cases. In this boxout and the next two we will employ the framework to reconsider two




**Fig. 5.1** Aerial view of the Zen, Palermo (*source and image* Google, 2015)

planning histories, testing the framework itself at the same time. These histories are those of two council housing districts in Palermo (*Zen*) and Lisbon (*Chelas*), both planned and built from scratch through processes that consisted of different phases and lasted decades.<sup>6</sup> The planning of *Zen*, a district for around 20,000 inhabitants (Fig. 5.1), was launched during the early 1960s and the construction almost completed by the 1990s. A masterplan for a housing district for around 55,000 inhabitants, *Chelas* (Fig. 5.2), was designed in 1964, updated in the 1990s—another revision is ongoing—and the construction still not complete (to date, the district houses around 30,000 residents). The study of two council housing districts will allow us to reconsider commonplaces normally associated with such developments. Although cases like these are widespread around the urban globe, some specificities of these two histories are useful to highlight ‘the mutable relations of fear with different paradigms of intervention, political/policy phases and approaches, urban spatialities and architectural typologies’ (Tulumello 2015a, 483).

In this boxout we shall question the relation between (modernist) spatialities and otherness. In fact, what *Zen* and *Chelas* have in common is the urbanistic

<sup>6</sup>Detailed accounts of the two histories can be found in: Bonafede and Lo Piccolo (2007, 2010), Picone (2011), Lo Bocchiaro and Tulumello (2014) for the *Zen*; Heitor (2001), Tulumello (2015a) for *Chelas*.



**Fig. 5.2** Chelas, Lisbon, the masterplan. *Source* plan and the reality. *Source* Google; *image* DigitalGlobe, 2007

conception, that is, the modernist/rationalist effort to create spatialities capable of shaping and improving social relations.

Zen, for which a masterplan was never designed, is characterised by the juxtaposition of two rather different parts, termed Zen 1 and Zen 2. Zen 1 (built during the late 1960s) is composed of high-rise, linear dwellings organised around semi-public courts. Zen 2 is more evidently characterised by a utopian design grounded on an ideological conception of urban space. The project is based, as the designers made explicit, on a ‘reference grid to measure the natural environment [*griglia di riferimento di misurazione del fatto naturale*]’ (Amoroso et al. 1975, 6; my translation) rather than on an analysis of urban and natural contexts. As a result, the missing relationship between the neighbourhood and the urban/natural context was solved by a park that ‘could join’ (ibidem, 25) the neighbourhood to the surrounding road system. The neighbourhood is composed of the repetition of the *insula*, a mixed typology made up of linear dwellings raised on *pilotis* enclosing a pedestrian street raised from the ground floor—with the aim, in the words of the designers, of creating a ‘partial transparency of the ground floor’ (ibidem, 17; my translation), well in line with Le Corbusier’s ideally continuous public space. However, the result is the creation of a situation that reinforces social control over women and children (Triolo 2008)<sup>7</sup> and, at the same time, the exclusion of visitors from the spaces designed for social encounters and pedestrian circulation. According to Quartarone (2008, 264; my translation), the *insula* is an ‘ideological invention’, which has been producing ‘the depletion of the civic value of public streets’. The designers made explicit their intention to reproduce social practices of

<sup>7</sup>Reinforced, that is, in the context of an already patriarchal environment characterising significant parts of Southern Italian society.

the city's historical centre—whose populations Zen 2 should have rehoused—but hybridising them for a ‘*predictable* [...] growing projection [of social life] toward the exterior’ (Amoroso et al. 1975, 20; my translation; emphasis added). However, the inhabitants of Zen 2 did not passively accept the kind of social practices the architects imagined for them and a set of spatial practices has been transforming the ground floors of *insulae*: some have been fenced—and de facto transformed in blocks—while unauthorised volumes have popped up in other *insulae* to obviate the lack of retail or garage spaces.

In Chelas, a different process has resulted in a similar output. Here a detailed master plan was grounded on technical considerations, on one hand, and a careful study of the natural and landscape context, on the other—neglecting, however, any consideration of the possibility of creating relations of spatial proximity with the surrounding urban fabric. The district was designed around an oversized infrastructural network—the only means of connection with the surrounding urban fabric—resulting in a hybrid version of the rationalist city (land-use zoning, concentration of high-rise dwellings, separation of vehicular and pedestrian routes): a ‘Mediterranean modernism’<sup>8</sup> for the linear organisation of housing neighbourhoods located on the ridges of the hills and surrounded by green areas.

Among the commonalities between Zen and Chelas, the most relevant for the relationship between spatialities and encounters with otherness is an urban design that denies the enclosed block/street pairing—which historically characterises the fabric of Palermo and Lisbon—‘together with the hierarchization of unbuilt spaces, functional mix and proximity relations between the spaces for residents and visitors it is able to create’ (Tulumello 2015a, 491). On the contrary, the result is a dichotomy between public spaces and semi-public spaces: the latter, despite being designed as spaces for social meetings, are, in fact, not welcoming to visitors.

In both cases, the construction process has been lengthy and has brought about further problems. With regard to Zen, the project of Zen 2 had to be modified several times because of gross technical mistakes<sup>9</sup>; the slow procedures of construction and assignment were mirrored by the squatting of most housing units (in most cases not yet regularised); and public services and facilities in Zen 2 have never been built. As for Chelas, the operation was diluted with time and different designs for the various neighbourhoods resulted in the fragmentation of the plan; squatting occurred as a consequence of slow assignment procedures, especially after the Carnation Revolution of 1974 (cf. Santos 2014); and the plan has not yet been concluded, 50 years after its launch. A mix of causes can be found: in Palermo, the ineptitude of institutional actors, the pressures by Mafia to control the housing assignments and building works, and the deficiencies of the projects; in

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<sup>8</sup>Definition given in the 1992 update of the master plan (DCH-CML 1992).

<sup>9</sup>For instance, some *insulae* were located in areas not suitable for building—one in a lot occupied by a prosperous factory, another in an historical *villa*. The designers ultimately disavowed the modifications and abandoned the process during the construction phase.

Lisbon, incorrect strategic decisions, an excessive reliance on technical approaches to planning and the excessive dimension of the operation.

## 5.2 Planning and the Political Economies of Fear

The last argument for a theoretical understanding of the role of fear in urban planning lies at the intersection of (geo)politics and otherness. We shall question how the politics of fear—grounded on the construction of threatening ‘others’ (cf. Chap. 3)—can be used, and have been used, to restructure planning practice, as a result fostering new forms of exclusion. We will focus the question on contemporary cities undergoing processes of socio-spatial transformation (cf. Sect. 1.3), within political arenas restructured in times of post-Fordism and neoliberalisation (cf. Sect. 1.4).

To start with, the concept of ‘insurgent citizenship’ (Holston 1998, 2008) helps us understand how changing social practices challenge established relations of power. According to Holston, in the contemporary multiplex urban space, at the same time as new (or newly vocal) groups have been raising their voices (cf. Sect. 3.1), new citizenships and sites of insurrection emerge. These citizenships are as different from each other as possible, including, ‘the realm of the homeless, networks of migration, neighborhoods of Queer Nation, constructed peripheries in which the poor build their own homes in precarious material and legal conditions, ganglands, fortified condominiums, employee-owned factories, squatter settlements, suburban migrant labor camps, sweatshop, and the zones of the so-called new racism’ (1998, 48). What these citizenships have in common is the fact that, all together, they bring established identities into crisis. The spaces of insurgence bring about new challenges for planning, as evident in very different practices such as women’s vigilantism in the Global South (Meth 2010) or LGBTQI movements (Doan 2015). Sandercock (2000) enlists the specific challenges stemming from the difficulty for planners—and institutional arrangements—to adapt to a multicultural society.

The values and norms of the dominant culture are usually embedded in legislative frameworks of planning, in planning by-laws and regulations.

[...] the norms and values of the dominant culture are not only embedded in the legislative framework of planning, but are also embodied in the attitudes, behaviour, and practices of actual flesh-and-blood planners.

[...] a third challenge [...] concerns situations in which the xenophobia and/or racism within communities and neighbourhoods finds its expression or outlet through the planning system, in the form of a planning dispute.

[...] a fourth challenge arises when (Western) planners come up against cultural practices that are incommensurable with their own values (ibidem, 15).

Further new challenges stem from the new fears emerging at the microscale of changing urban and local space (cf. Sect. 3.1)—and we already know that the

traditional toolkit of planners does not help much in tackling such feelings of fear (cf. previous section).

A changing social space is mirrored by a changing political space, hence changing practices of exclusion. According to Holston (1998, 2008) dominant classes react to the insurgence of troublesome citizenships with new strategies of segregation. Still, ‘troublesome’ groups and spaces of informality have always existed: the news is that a more fragmented sociopolitical space (cf. Sect. 1.4) has created the conditions for their representation (Sassen 1998) and then resistance. Justifying the violent removal of unwanted sites and groups is thus made harder, hence the need to create delegitimising and criminalising discourses, as well as (spatial, moral, social) borders useful for discriminating against urban groups for their ‘statuses’ (Yiftachel 2009a).

We shall now question the implications of such changing political space for the institutional practice of urban planning. To start with, the flourishing of new models for, and paradigms of, planning has been a way of updating the modernist/rationalist planning for an epoch in which the power of central states has been progressively replaced by a double tendency towards polarisation within multinational (economic) interests and decentralisation in local governments and urban political regimes (Shaktin 2002).

We shall thus explore connections between global geopolitics of fear and the local (and discursive) generation of exclusionary fear (of dangerous others), for the way they are entangled in the specificities of urban governance as restructured by neoliberalisation trends. According to Seymour (2014, 7; see also Blyth 2013; Blokker 2014), neoliberalism is ‘an authoritarian reconfiguration of liberalism [...] specifically designed to meet the challenge of mass democracy’. It has been thus debated how neoliberal governance pursues structures of perceived inclusion centred on the use of concepts such as partnerships, networks, participation or empowerment (see, among others, Jessop 2002; Miraftab 2004; Davoudi and Madanipour 2013). The role of fear—of crime, of violence, of ‘otherness’—emerges within the discursive practices of construction of consensus and policy-justification embedded in neoliberal governmentalities. We have debated how the construction of oppositional categories like ‘we’/‘others’, ‘safe’/‘dangerous’ can powerfully shape neoliberal governmentalities at the global (cf. Sect. 2.1) and local (cf. Sect. 3.2) scale, and how these governmentalities work in specific urban policies—disinvestment/investment phases in urban centres (Boxout 3), removal of Italian ‘nomad camps’ (Boxout 5). To put it bluntly, in times of neoliberal restructuring, ‘discourses of fear are potent. They have potency’ (Sandercock 2002, 19).

We still need to understand how political economies of fear have become embedded in the micro-practice of planning policy—this being necessary to understand the enactment of the wider spatial restructuring of fearscales (cf. Chap. 4). In order to do this, we can look at structural specifics of new planning instruments and approaches emerging in recent times, from two perspectives. Firstly, in the shift from

‘land-use regulation’ towards ‘spatial planning’ (cf. Vigar 2009), statutory instruments and land-use zoning are accompanied by, or replaced with, new practices for which consensus building and the debate of policies is crucial—urban marketing, strategic planning, participatory practices, public–private partnerships, planning through projects, to name a few. How can we understand the fact that the formal opening of planning procedures, rather than empowering local communities and fostering a political construction of shared visions of common good, often results in favouring market interests and existing power relations (see, among others, Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Sager 2011; Deas 2013)? For instance, new methods of planning are designed as replications of business administration practices, which explicitly ‘target’ specific groups and this is especially evident in urban marketing practices.<sup>10</sup> As a result, the identification of ‘stakeholders’ to be involved in decisional processes is generally based on economic considerations rather than sociopolitical ones.<sup>11</sup> More generally, participatory processes, when not questioning structural issues, cannot help but reproduce existing relations of power (Alfasi 2003; MirafTAB 2004; Falanga 2014). All in all, the rhetoric of fear can intervene in the (discretionary) design of forms for, and actors to be invited to, decisional processes—for instance, in the case of the ‘nomad camp’ of Ponticelli, when the regeneration programme was designed, it occurred to no one that the people actually living in that area (the ‘threatening’ Roma) could be considered ‘stakeholders’ in the planning process (cf. Boxout 5).

A second generalised specificity of new planning instruments is the discretionary field of action. This is to say, while traditional planning practice has regulated land-use and urban growth/form within a specific administrative boundary (mainly through town master plans), new approaches, such as strategic planning or planning through projects, are designed to discriminate where and what is to be planned/designed. This generalises the possibility of systematically excluding specific areas or issues from public action.

Urban plans design the city’s ‘white’ spaces which usually create little or no opening for inclusion/recognition of most informal localities and populations, while their discourse continuously condemns them as a chaotic danger to the city. Under these circumstances we must of course consider selective non-planning as part of planning, and as a form of active or negligent exclusion. In these pervasive settings planning is far from a profession promoting just and sustainable urbanism; it is rather a system managing profound societal inequalities (Yiftachel 2009b, 93).

Yiftachel has termed ‘grey’ spaces the objects of non-action, of selective non-planning. From this perspective, the politics of inclusion/exclusion act through two opposite dynamics, the ‘whitening’ and the ‘blackening’ (ibidem, 92). The former is the process of ‘laundering’ those grey spaces created by powerful interests

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<sup>10</sup>See, for specific debates of urban marketing practices, among others, Williams (2004); Bookman and Woolford (2013).

<sup>11</sup>At the end of the day, the very term ‘stakeholder’, commonly used to refer to interested actors, comes, in fact, from the realm of finances and designates those who have economic participation.



—like, for instance, the creation of parallel legal systems in gated communities (cf. Sect. 4.1) or the dispossession of common goods in the privatisation of public space (cf. Sect. 4.3). The ‘blackening’ is the violent destruction, expulsion, removal of troublesome issues—like, for instance, the removal of ‘nomad camps’ in Italy (cf. Boxout 5). More often, the two processes act together, when the removal of informality is the way of creating the preconditions for laundering specific interests. All in all, such processes are embedded in the contradictory processes of neoliberal state reduction/restructuring (cf. Brenner et al. 2010; Wacquant 2012)—the former being the retrenchment from social policy, the latter the enforcement of state power to privilege economic or powerful interests. According to Yiftachel (2009b), the two dynamics of whitening/blackening make a system of ‘creeping apartheid’ of planning.

Why ‘creeping’? Because in most cases, the discriminatory ‘apartheid’ order is obviously not officially declared, and at times not even desired. Yet, given structural constraints, it is ‘creeping’ into the daily governance of urban society and gradually changing its regime through incremental regulation and institutionalization (ibidem, 94).

The role of discourses about ‘order’/‘disorder’, of rhetoric of fear is that of allowing apartheid to ‘creep’ into liberal democratic institutional arrangements, inasmuch as they permit the creation of wide consensus over exclusion, an exclusion formally presented as ‘purification’, ‘securitisation’, ‘normalisation’ or ‘integration’.

#### **Boxout 10b. Zen and Chelas: from disinvestment to the new city**

Turning back to the (planning) histories of Zen and Chelas, we debated how the modernist/rationalist planning and design of the two districts were mirrored/followed by the fragmentation—or failure—of planning intentions during the construction and implementation phases. As such, a phase of disinvestment followed the previous (economic, cultural) investments: public actors progressively divested themselves of their responsibilities, while private interests remained far from the two districts. In Chelas, this also stemmed from political decisions, which did not create the grounds for private investment to happen—e.g. after the democratic revolution in 1974, only people evicted from informal settlements were settled in Chelas, resulting in a mono-class social fabric. In Zen, the role of politics is crucial, around different dynamics, in different temporal phases.<sup>12</sup> During the 1980s and again in the 2000s, the ‘social need’/‘political promise’ duality has been used as an instrument to maintain social problems and manipulate consensus.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup>The following considerations stem from interviews with politicians and social actors active in the district, as well as insights from previous works (Bonafede and lo Piccolo 2007, 2010; Fava 2008 [2007]; Lo Bocchiaro and Tulumello 2014).

<sup>13</sup>The case of water provision in Zen 2 exemplifies such processes. The procedures of regularisation of several housing units squatted during the early 1980s are still pending because of a buck passing between two authorities (cf. Lazzaretti 2006, 2008): the regional entity that owns the dwellings requires from residents a contract from the water authority, whereas the municipal water

During the 1990s, the ‘spring’ of Palermo, Zen, to the contrary, was put at the ‘centre’ of governmental action, but in the absence of long-term strategies for development—hence setting the grounds for the step backwards during the 2000s.

The phase of disinvestment and divestiture is mirrored by two socio-spatial processes that we have already discussed: seclusion and stigma. Zen and Chelas experience both spatial and social seclusion, on different scales. As regards spatial seclusion, the urban design and the infrastructural networks *de facto* physically separate the two districts from the surrounding urban fabric and, internally, their various parts. In Lisbon, this is the result of a technical approach to urban planning. In Palermo, beyond the design options taken, there is a bypass road built during the late 1980s (see Fig. 5.1).

[The road], in my opinion, was used to circumscribe the Zen, because of the decision to allocate residential developments all around. [...] this is, the road would have worked as a fence’.<sup>14</sup>

In fact, the road is hardly justifiable from a technical point of view: it is oversized for the flow of traffic it carries and it has worsened pre-existing flood risks. In short, this road reminds us of the infrastructures used in some global cities to delimit marginal urban areas (cf. Sect. 4.2)—in this case from walled villas development built during the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Boxout 6). Unsurprisingly, most new developments and private facilities built in the reinvestment phase that followed were located around this road (cf. below and Fig. 5.3). As regards social seclusion, during participatory observation I could sense a coexistence between communities that do not interact: in Chelas this is most evident among populations settled during different phases and with different tenure systems (council housing in earlier phases, cooperative/social housing since the 1990s); in Palermo, this is especially evident among the two parts of the district and among residents in assigned or squatted houses. The social seclusion of the two districts towards the wider city acts in two complementary directions. On the one hand, social seclusion is the internal absence of facilities and opportunities, as well as feelings of mistrust and inadequacy with regard to the ‘outside’ world, especially evident among youths.

If, during decades, you keep telling people they have no abilities, they are poor devils, there is no way out, they live in a degraded neighbourhood, people end up believing it, they accept such a situation without reacting.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, the social seclusion towards the outside is a product of the emergence of stigma.<sup>16</sup> In Palermo, the stigma over Zen emerges during the 1980s

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(Footnote 13 continued)

authority requires a housing contract before providing water. As a result, an informal system of water provision has been provided for a long time by affiliates to criminal clans.

<sup>14</sup>From the interview with a former councillor; my translation.

<sup>15</sup>From the interview with an activist in Zen; my translation.

<sup>16</sup>The following remarks are mainly based on the analysis of media and journalistic production.




**Fig. 5.3** Private developments around the Zen since the year 2000: 1 shopping mall Conca d'Oro; 2 other large commercial facilities; 3 projects of further private facilities, including the project of the new stadium of Palermo Football; 4 private facilities included in the Integrated Intervention programme (adapted from Lo Bocchiaro and Tulumello 2014)

and is made of the representation of a 'jungle', a 'hell', a 'frontier' (Fava 2008 [2007]), but also of political rhetoric discourses about the 'control by the Mafia over social fabric', used, for instance, to block public participation to planning practices (Bonafede and Lo Piccolo 2010, 366; Lo Bocchiaro and Tulumello 2014, 86). In Lisbon, Chelas, albeit showing low rates of crime (Esteves 1999; Barros and Alves 2005; João 2009), is described as a 'dangerous' and 'violent' place in media and political discourses because of specific situations delimited in time and space (Tulumello 2015a, 489–490). All in all, in both cases stigmatising discourses are shaped around confusing the perception of danger with 'marginality'.

We shall now debate how the phases of disinvestment, seclusion and stigma have created the preconditions for a new phase of investment, which have resulted in the forms of the 'new' city we have been debating (cf. Chap. 4). In doing so we shall question the way new forms of urban production and planning policy have been shaped at the intersection of (geo)politics and (fear of the) otherness. In Palermo, the new city emerges all 'around' Zen and is made of the explosion of walled villa developments from the late 1980s (cf. Boxout 6) and the investments in shopping malls and private facilities from the 2000s (Fig. 5.3). A precondition for such investments is the weakness of planning regulatory frameworks, while the

procedures rely on the use of land-use variances to create profit through an increase in land values. Paradigmatic examples are a shopping mall built in an area appointed by the city master plan to provide Zen with a civic centre, a park and neighbourhood services (Tulumello 2015b); and an Integrated Intervention Programme, officially designed to provide Zen with ‘services’, but made up of private facilities for affluent classes (Giampino and Todaro 2007). The discourse about stigmatisation grounds the justification of such practices, inasmuch as any given development is publicly presented as an opportunity for ‘regeneration’—in so doing ‘whitening’ the speculation through the rhetoric of decay.

In Lisbon, the new city is made using Enclosure (two gated communities, fortified cooperative housing, but also fortified private facilities) and Post-Public Space (shopping malls, and walled and fortified public facilities) (Fig. 5.4). In comparison with Palermo, we have seen how Chelas is a strongly ‘planned’ territory. Here, the new city grew ‘inside’ the district, thanks to the voids provided by the modernist design. The infrastructural system is key, allowing the new ‘secessionary’ entities (cf. Graham and Marvin 2001) to be connected to the rest of the city without being contaminated by the local context—as a telling example, brochures and websites of



**Fig. 5.4** Fortified and/or walled private and public developments in Chelas (my elaboration; source of background: Google; *image* DigitalGlobe, 2007)

gated communities do not mention Chelas, whereas they highlight highways as the way to reach the centre of the city in few minutes. Within the institutional practice of planning, the dominance of top-down, blueprint planning conceptions is still evident, for instance in the detailed plan (during the design phase) for a large hospital plan, which has been characterised by the conception of a mega-structure as a regeneration instrument and of urban design as a solution to social problems—e.g. through the densification of the residential fabric.

We should not forget that the new city is also the place of insurgence of new citizenships and practices. In Zen this is evident in the existence of strong social and parental relationships, as well as in some phases of powerful political mobilisation (cf. Bonafede and Lo Piccolo 2007), and in a dense fabric of social and civil action with no comparison in other parts of the city (cf. Lo Bocchiaro and Tulumello 2014); whereas in Chelas practices of socioeconomic promotion are accompanied by civic activity (cf. UPC 2008). In this respect, it is important to highlight another misinformative level of stigmatising discourses, which shape homogeneous descriptions of the two districts, removing the complexity, vitality and contradictions of the actual social fabrics.

### **Boxout 10c. Multiplexed fear and planning crisis in Chelas**

In the previous boxout, we explored the way the images (of perceived danger and of marginality) projected towards the outside by the two council housing districts have been shaping urban production in relation to the specifics of local practices of urban planning. We shall now question, on the contrary, the internal production of fear and its relations with planning policy, taking advantage of the results of a survey recently carried out in Chelas (Viver Marvila 2010).<sup>17</sup> In doing so, we must remember once again that (quantitative) surveys can hardly assess absolute levels of fear of crime (Koskela and Pain 2003; Gray et al. 2008). Our goal, thanks to the fact that the results of the survey are broken down for the various neighbourhoods of Chelas, is that of comparing varying perceptions—among neighbourhoods and in relation to different issues—and confronting them with further characterisations. Furthermore, the survey is accompanied by a qualitative enquiry that confirms the variations of quantitative findings among the neighbourhoods.

All in all, the survey confirms how Chelas is a complex reality, with significant variations of indicators of satisfaction among the neighbourhoods—Zonas (zones) I, J, K, M, N1 and N2 in the technical names. According to residents, the best features of Chelas are the quality of dwellings<sup>18</sup> and community life, whereas security and public facilities are considered the main problems. However, the average satisfaction rate for security is 5.85 out of ten, that is, in the field of ‘neither satisfied nor unsatisfied’. Again, we are interested in variations more than in absolute values, but this suggests the inhabitants are not ‘overwhelmed by fears’. This is confirmed by the qualitative study, according to which residents feel that

<sup>17</sup>This is a synthesis of the findings in Tulumello (2015a; Sect. 6.2).

<sup>18</sup>We should not forget that most of these residents were previously living in shacks.

meaningful achievements have characterised the last decade, with reduction of crime and drug dealing—while we know that Portuguese people in general tend to see crime as a rising problem (cf. Sect. 2.2).

Against this background, we compared the results of the survey for each neighbourhood with averages for the entire district—with the aim of emphasising variances over absolute values—and five further dimensions (Table 5.1): other indicators of satisfaction from the same survey; timing; social mix; seclusion/exclusion; modernist spatialities and ‘control of space’ (a qualitative indicator based on the work in Heitor 2001).

First, higher levels of satisfaction with security are accompanied by better evaluations of further dimensions. This confirms that broader societal factors and (social, ontological) security perceptions influence urban fear (Dammert and Malone 2006; MacKenzie et al. 2010).

Second, there is an evident correlation between more recent phases of construction and reduction of perceptions of safety. This suggests how perceptions of safety are connected with the length of time needed for the consolidation of social fabrics, especially in urban areas built from scratch.

**Table 5.1** Indicators of satisfaction compared with averages for the entire district (1.00) and further neighbourhoods’ features. *Source* Tulumello 2015a

	<i>I</i>	<i>J<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>L<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>M</i>	<i>NI</i>	<i>N2</i>
<i>Construction</i>	70s	80s–90s	00s	90s	80s	Late 70s
<i>Housing ownership</i>	Council	Council + Coop	Council + Coop	Council + Coop	Council	Council
<b><i>Satisfaction with security<sup>b</sup></i></b>	<b>1.10</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>0.92</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>1.10</b>
<i>Satisfaction with dwellings<sup>b</sup></i>	1.02	1.00	1.00	1.01	0.92	1.02
<i>Satisfaction with public space<sup>b</sup></i>	0.97	0.92	0.92	1.04	0.96	1.11
<i>Satisfaction with community<sup>b</sup></i>	0.98	1.01	1.01	1.08	0.90	1.04
<i>Satisfaction with public facilities<sup>b</sup></i>	1.02	0.85	0.85	1.01	1.10	1.04
<i>General satisfaction with neighbourhood<sup>b</sup></i>	1.06	0.97	0.97	0.99	0.94	1.04
<i>Control on space<sup>c</sup></i>	+	+	N.A.	N.A.	–	–

<sup>a</sup>The survey considered Zonas J and L together following the most recent toponymy (Bairro do Condado)

<sup>b</sup>Ratio to district average. Elaborated from Viver Marvila (2010)

<sup>c</sup>Qualitative indicator, elaborated from Heitor (2001). See main text for definition of ‘control of space’. Zonas L and M had not been constructed at the time of the analysis

Third, ethnic differences were found not to be significantly relevant: on the one hand, the overall presence of non-native Portuguese inhabitants is low in Chelas<sup>19</sup>; on the other hand, different results are found in the two districts (Zona J and Zona N1) where most people originate from former Portuguese colonies in Africa. After all, the Lisbon metro is characterised by a relative absence of ethnic conflict (Malheiros and Mendes 2007). Still, social mix appears relevant to perceptions of safety in relation to changing housing policy: the lowest feelings of safety were found in the neighbourhoods where both cooperative and council housing exist (Zonas J, L and M). This confirms doubts about the fact that *mixité* alone is sufficient to contrast segregation (cf. Arbaci and Malheiros 2010). In fact, during participant observation, we found several hints of a lack of integration between housing residents and cooperative tenants—the existence of communities living separate lives in spaces alongside one another helps explain why satisfaction with community is the only indicator not coherent with feelings of safety.

Fourth, the neighbourhood that shows greater satisfaction in general and with security (Zona I) is also the one best served by public transport—being the only one directly served by an underground station—and the one felt to be livelier and less spatially secluded (Viver Marvila 2010; qualitative enquiry). This suggests that the way social seclusion mirrors spatial seclusion (cf. Boxout 10a), as well as feelings of mistrust and inadequacy, may have a role in the production of fear inside Chelas.

Fifth, Heitor's analysis (2001) on the levels of 'control on space' helps us understand the role of spatialities in the generation of fear. We shall term control on space the degree of relevance that a space has in relation to those spaces that are contiguous as a place of transit. From this perspective, the urban configurations with the highest and lowest control on space are, respectively: the regular grid of enclosed blocks, inasmuch it creates a space in which each visible place is a point of transit; and the continuous public space of modernist planning, where everything is visible but most spaces are not used for transit. The fact that visible places are also 'used' (not used) provides higher (lower) feelings of control—in space syntax analyses, the measure of control on space is considered to be among the main features of a lively and safe space (Nubani and Wineman 2005). According to Heitor, none of the neighbourhoods analysed (I, J, N1, N2) show a clear hierarchy of open spaces—this was expected because of the modernist design. Furthermore, the places where most control is achieved—inner pedestrian paths and courts—are also those less accessible to visitors and are thus chosen by youths and/or for illegal activities. This confirms the dichotomy between spaces chosen by visitors (vehicular streets and their pavements) and by inhabitants (cf. Boxout 10a). But the existence of control of space alone seems to be insufficient for improving perceptions of safety and the highest degree of control is found in two neighbourhoods that performed in different ways. In Zona J, a low sense of safety is mirrored by the fact that the space with the most control was a 'sheltered' pedestrian path, imagined by the architects as the place for social life, in reality a perfect location for illegal

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<sup>19</sup>3.26 % of residents, against 5.81 % in Lisbon, according to 2011 census.

activities—it was nicknamed ‘corredor da morte’ (passage of death). In Zona I, a high degree of control exists as a result of an open pedestrian path where several commercial activities occur, and this is mirrored by higher feelings of safety.

In conclusion, an anecdote helps us further highlight the complex—if paradoxical—relationship between urban fear and designers/architects/planners’ ambitions (in Chelas and beyond). Zona J, where almost exclusively people evicted from shacks were settled, where the highest perceptions of insecurity are found, where a sheltered pedestrian path turned into the ‘corredor da morte’, became during the 1980s ‘synonymous with the dangerous and marginal area that all big cities “must” have’ (Alves et al. 2001, 24; my translation)—and the main reason for the stigmatising discourses surrounding Chelas. In the early 2000s the designer of the neighbourhood, architect Taveira, suggested the municipality paint the housing blocks with intense colours in order to build self-identification, hence social control. However, the result was just a new nickname given by the inhabitants to the neighbourhood, ‘United Colours of Benetton’—the ‘corredor da morte’ was demolished during the early 2000s.

### 5.3 Conclusions (?): Fear Follows Form Follows Fear

This chapter has set out two arguments useful for unravelling relations between urban fear, as a (re)production, and urban planning, as a *praxis*. We reviewed existing critical studies to question the specificities of mainstream paradigms—the modernist/rationalist and emerging paradigms in post-Fordist/neoliberal times. We then reconsidered the planning histories of two Southern European council housing districts, looking at the multiplex relations of fear with planning paradigms, architectural conventions, sociocultural and politico-economic dimensions. All in all, findings provided us with evidence in support of existing critiques (as we will summarise in this section) but, at the same time, warned us to have a more cautious approach (which we will detail in the next section).

Let us start by emphasising some conventions of the modernist/rationalist paradigm, which we have found to be pushing the urban encounter towards its dark side, hence boosting urban fear: the fragmentation of the urban fabric into mono-functional parts; a design that seeks to establish the ‘proper’ conditions for social relationships; and the creation of self-referential urban areas. In short, the dominance of technical and technocratic approaches to planning seems to be incapable of coping with feelings in general and especially feelings of fear. At the same time, we emphasise how the new politics of exclusion are embedded in new planning instruments and how they make use of the rhetoric of fear to find justification in times of neoliberal state restructuring and (at least formal) opening of planning and urban policy. In short, misinformation of fear—and the processes of stigmatisation, marginalisation and peripheralisation they entail—are hegemonic



instruments of power, capable of shaping planning practice, and in so doing producing spaces marked by exclusion (cf. Abu-Orf 2013) in ordinary cities such as Lisbon and Palermo.

From such a perspective we are tempted to set out some (preliminary) conclusions. According to Perulli (2009, 97; my translation), urban space is the ‘physical space where actors with different economic, social and symbolic capital are placed and positioned [*si situano e si posizionano*]. [Actors] capable of excluding other [actors]’. If we acknowledge (social) space, hence urban space, is production and reproduction (Lefebvre 1974), we can understand how space is engraved with the marks of (powerful) actors—Bourdieu’s *effets de lieu* (1993). From this perspective, the built environment is a ‘landscape of domination’ (Sibley 1995, 76), where the action of marginal individuals and groups is labelled as deviant, threatening or subversive. Discourses of fear have the powerful role of identifying what is ‘marginal’, what is ‘other’, of shaping planning practice, hence the institutional production of space. To put it bluntly, ‘form follows fear’ (Ellin 1996, 145). At the same time, the very spatialities stemming from such processes reinforce fear: fear follows form.

That is to say, *fear follows form follows fear*. The history of planning and fear can be read as the history of a vicious circle where fear is at the core of the alternation of investment and disinvestment necessary for capitalist accumulation: fear, ultimately, is an instrument of reproduction of socioeconomic relationships.

## 5.4 Conclusions Revisited: Multiplexing Fear and Planning

Against the hegemonic/vertical dimension of (global) fear in urban planning emphasised in the previous section, the histories of two council housing districts in two ‘ordinary’ urban settings—i.e. Western but not really global, characterised by contradictory patterns of transformation and path-dependency (cf. Sects. 1.6 and 4.5)—have prompted us to be more cautious.

To start with, for the sake of simplicity and structure, we employed an exploratory framework designed to discern between the specificities of modernist/rationalist and more recent mainstreams of planning. However, we found some evidence of the fact that a clear-cut distinction between temporal phases dominated by the former or latter paradigms would be unattainable: for instance, similar processes of spatialisation of fear operate through very different planning means in Zen, where they are driven by negotiated, strategic planning (a regeneration programme, public–private partnerships), and in Chelas, where they are still driven by blueprint planning. In this respect, our findings reinforce recent studies that have criticised the dominance of paradigms in comparative planning studies, suggesting on the contrary to take into account the national/local sociocultural assumptions

underlying planning practice (Sanyal 2005; Getimis 2012; Knieling and Othengrafen 2015). From this perspective, we have advocated elsewhere that ‘more nuanced theories would rather understand ongoing transformations in terms of hybridization of [planning] practices and conflictual coexistence of change and permanence patterns’ (Tulumello 2015b, 386). This seems to be especially relevant when setting out, around two dimensions, planning theories informed by critical thinking about urban fear.

First, once we unpacked the external perception of what constitutes danger stemming from Chelas and, at the same time, the variation of concerns with security within Chelas, we produced evidence of how fear is a complex (re)production, resulting from the multiplexing of several dimensions: urban spatialities, and media and political discourses; and, at the same time, the simple flowing of time, different phases of policy, social mix and issues of social cohesion, and wider concerns with individual and societal security, to name the most relevant. All such dimensions, in one way or another, are relevant to planning policy and they suggest how planning practice is shaped by, and is capable of shaping in turn, fear at the intersection of global (hegemonic) and local (discursive/contingent) dimensions. Second, if we want to avoid falling into the same trap of discourses of fear, which erase the social and cultural complexity of places such as Chelas and Zen, we need to remember that the production of space is shaped by local practices. This adds a further layer to the (re)production of fear at the intersection of institutional practice of planning and insurgent action.

Two (cautious) concluding remarks, and warnings, can be outlined. First, there seems to be no simple/technical solutions for urban fear—and urban fear can be an unintended effect of the more well-meant intentions, for instance when social cohesion and integration are pursued via a simple change in housing policy (in the case of Chelas, from council to cooperative housing). This is a warning for all those approaches to urban security and safety in planning where the application of ‘appropriate’ spatial devices is considered the way to reduce crime, *hence* reduce fear—while we know that reducing crime (admitting it possible through spatial means) does not inherently imply increasing feelings of safety. This is to say, a critical approach is paramount if planning practice and research intend to understand, and cope with, urban fear.

Second, whether the production of fear, and of its paradoxes, is an effect of planning conventions or of discursive relations, of global pressures or local relations, we must be aware that fear is capable of throwing urban and planning policy into crisis—as exemplified by the feelings of guilt experienced by the architect/planner desiring to mitigate fear through coloured façades (cf. Boxout 10c). This is a warning for all those technically driven planning approaches that refuse to engage with issues of fear. This is to say, we must acknowledge urban planning as an appropriate, and much needed, arena for coping with fear in ordinary urban settings.

## 5.5 A Critical Exploratory Framework for Fear in Urban Planning

Blatant as it may sound at this point, let us stress again how, in between the (preliminary) straightforward and (revisited) cautious conclusions we have set out, we should now be aware of the ‘complexity’ of the task that this book has engaged with. This is the reason our objectives were (cf. Sect. 1.1): to build a comprehensive and critical theory, which is, at the same time, exploratory, rather than outlining ‘a clear definition’ (cf. Abu-Orf 2013, 159) of fear or of the way fear shapes planning; and to focus on ‘ordinary’ cities to add some nuances to theories about urban geopolitics based on the study of global cities. This is to say, the structure of this book should ultimately be considered an exploratory framework useful for fostering further studies—which, for example, could focus on different geographical contexts, or emphasise the role of specific dimensions, or connect our analysis with studies of policies of urban security.

It is thus worth remembering the three research questions we posited and the exploratory framework we have been building in the search for answers. We asked, first, and provided answers in Chap. 4, what are the relations between contemporary spatial transformations and the growing feelings of fear in urban space. Second, we asked, and provided answers in Chaps. 2 and 3, whether fear is an inescapable characterisation of urban life or whether there is a political economic production and use of it. Third, we asked, and provided an answer in this chapter, whether, and how, discourses of fear are used as means of power in contemporary planning practice.

We have highlighted (at the beginning of this chapter) how we had to emphasise three dimensions to search for the answers to such questions: (geo)politics, otherness and space. We can now summarise the exploratory framework of the book,<sup>20</sup> composed of three arguments produced by the multiplexing of these three dimensions:

- spatialisation of fear, stemming from the intersection of space and (geo)politics, which we have presented in Chap. 4;
- modernist spatialities and encounter, stemming from the intersection of space and otherness, which we have presented in Sect. 5.1;
- and the (neoliberal) political economies of urban fear, stemming from the intersection of otherness and (geo)politics, which we have presented in Sect. 5.2.

The exploratory framework is summed up in Fig. 5.5, where the three dimensions are the vertices and the three arguments are the edges connecting them. With regards to the relations between the exploratory framework and the first three research questions (cf. Fig. 1.2), the framework summarises how we had to multiplex further dimensions to answer our questions:

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<sup>20</sup>A preliminary version of which was set out in Tulumello (2015a).




Fig. 5.5 The exploratory framework of the book

- to understand the relations between feelings of fear (of otherness) and urban spatialities (Q1), we had to consider the role of (geo)politics as well;
- to understand how (geopolitical) discourses of fear influence feelings of fear (of otherness) (Q2), we had to explore how feelings are reproduced in urban space;
- and, crucially, we had to multiplex the three dimensions to understand how discourses and feelings of fear influence urban planning policy and practice (Q3)—and how this is linked to the global/local spatialisation of urban fear.

We are aware that we are offering a framework in support of comprehensive research about themes that will require, in addition, specific, in-depth analyses. We are also aware that more nuanced studies about specific dimensions may, and indeed would, throw into crisis the overall structure of such a framework. Still, I believe this construction, deconstruction and reconstruction process is crucial to a critical understanding of scholarship. A call is thus made for scholars and activists to critique and improve, use and misuse, turn upside down and distort such a framework, with the ultimate aim of improving the construction of knowledge to answer our fourth research question: how can planners push their practice towards the overcoming of spaces and feelings of fear?

Providing some preliminary, theoretical answers to such a question, and in doing so questioning future, that is, ‘thinking’ futures, is the goal of the next, and final, chapter.

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## Chapter 6

# Thinking Future

**Abstract** Throughout the book, hints have been provided which indicate that the future of cities and urban planning will be shaped by the intersection of disciplinary/hegemonic and insurgent/resistant instances. The goal of this chapter is to look at the futures embedded in the political economies of fear and in their counter politics. With such a goal, this chapter adopts a forward-thinking perspective, envisaging how two radically different (if not opposite) futures are embedded in the present, that is, looking at their ‘seeds’ within the current state of affairs. First, a dystopian city, embedded in the present landscapes of fear, in which the political economies of fear have become dominant, is envisioned. Second, some ideas for a practice of urban planning and action capable of facing the political economies of fear are set out: polyrationality and creativity; towards a radical counter-discourse; active marginality. In doing so, rather than outlining foreseeable futures, the chapter sets out some conceptual methods of envisioning, and theoretical grounds for, a critical pragmatism capable of ‘countering’ fear. The chapter is concluded with a call to action for planners.

*The pessimistic would say that the direction of new segregation and the extension of social separation already achieved would make impossible the engagement of a variety of social groups in a political life in which common goals and solutions would have to be negotiated. In this view, citizenship in cities of walls is meaningless. [...] however, the boom of social movements in Sao Paulo after the mid-1970s suggests a cautious optimism. Where excluded residents discover that they have rights to the city, they manage to transform their neighborhoods and to improve the quality of their lives. That fortified enclaves in part counteracted this process should not make us abandon this qualified optimism. The walls were not able to totally obstruct the exercise of citizenship, and poor residents continue to expand their rights*  
(Caldeira 1996, 326).

Both Teresa Caldeira and Holston (2008) remind us of the extreme (from the perspective of the 1990s and early 2000s), yet paradigmatic, case of Brazilian cities, where the politics of exclusion moved towards the core of urban production and planning at the same time as the emergence of insurgent practices paved the way for a renewed action capable of unmasking, hence contrasting, the political economies of fear. We have had evidence of the fact that the future of cities and urban planning will be shaped by the intersection of disciplinary/hegemonic and insurgent/resistant instances. Looking at the various futures embedded in the political economies of fear and in their counter politics is the goal of this chapter.

Cole (2001) called, in a seminal article, for a systematic collaboration between futurists and planners, suggesting that the role of futurists is supporting societies in envisioning desirable futures and that of planners is helping those visions become reality. Listening to such a call, we shall now adopt a forward-thinking perspective, envisaging how two radically different (if not opposite) futures are embedded in the present, that is, looking at their ‘seeds’ within the current state of affairs (cf. Curry and Hodgson 2008). First, we will envision a dystopian city, embedded in the present landscapes of fear, in which the political economies of fear have become dominant. Second, we will look at some possibilities for the practice of urban planning and action capable of facing the political economies of fear: polyrationality and creativity; towards a radical counter-discourse; and active marginality. In doing so, rather than outlining foreseeable futures, we will set out some conceptual methods for envisioning, and theoretical grounds for, a ‘critical pragmatism’ (Forester 2012) capable of ‘countering’ fear. We will conclude by asking the question ‘what (urban) future do we want?’ and calling planning, and planners, to action.

## 6.1 Thinking Dystopia: Void

A fifth spatial form, already embedded in most extant urban spaces, helps us envision a dystopian city where feelings, discourses and spaces of fear have become dominant: the Void, the space in between fearscape, the space of *omisión* (neglect) (Gausa et al. 2000, 605), of absence of structure and meaning. Looking into the Void—through some keywords such as dilution, detachment, solitude, uricide, absence—we will emphasise how the ultimate end of fearscape is the destruction of the very reason for urban life, the dream of a collective life and the meeting of bodies and minds.

To start with, the modernist/rationalist idea of space is that it is a raw material, available in an unlimited quantity, a neutral ground for any modification (Corboz 1993), that is, the *tabula rasa* theorised by Le Corbusier, necessary for the illu-minist ideal of progressive, infinite development—an idea which is very much alive, for instance, in the urbanism of flagship projects or in the desire of starchitects

to mould ‘raw space’.<sup>1</sup> According to Holston (1998, 44), the modernist spatial logic is grounded on specific ‘solid/void-figure/ground’ conventions that are turning upside down the relations between built-up and un-built space. Whilst, in the pre-modernist city, voids are interruptions in the built-up continuum, the Void frames the new city; whilst urban voids ‘give meaning’ to the compact city, the Void is ‘consumed’ and ‘banalised’ in the dispersed city (Perulli 2009, 111). In this respect, more recent waves of urbanisation have been boosting contradictory processes of ‘modernisation’ and ‘banalisation’ of wider metropolitan regions, on the one hand, and simultaneous counter-urbanisation, on the other (cf. Chap. 4; Scott 2011). New ‘urbanised landscapes’ are made up of territories with varying degrees of urbanity, in a progressive *dilution* of urban space.

The modernist dream of *tabula rasa* and leaking neoliberal/postmodern fearscape have in common the quest for homogeneous, blank space where intervention is possible, such as deserts of Nevada where thousands of Las Vegas can grow.<sup>2</sup> The question is, through what processes can deserts be created in an actual urban territory, which is not at all prone to being designed from scratch? First, a conception of what is (formally) un-built as inherently buildable; then, the ‘post-modern political vacuum’ filled by ‘privatised proto-governments’ (Flusty and Dear 1999, 30); and, finally, the neglect or brutal removal of existing informalities (Yiftachel 2009b; cf. Sect. 5.2).

What is the destiny of urban space in such an unnatural desert filled with ‘pieces, fragments, remnants, contiguous yet discontinuous’ (Gausa et al. 2000, 369)? Let us turn back to the extreme territoriality of Palestine, with its double segregation (Weizman 2007): Israeli settlements are fenced to be protected and Palestinian cities are locked up to prevent any potential ‘threat’ from leaking out. Such a territory can be interpreted through the ‘contrast between two shapes: the *archipelago* (the unstriated space of flow) and the *enclave* (the space of exception)’ (Petti 2007, 22; my translation; emphasis in the original). The archipelago of islands connected by infrastructures sums up the condition of urban dilution: urban space is replaced by a ‘soup’ (Sudjic 1992, 305) of ‘urban things’ floating in the Void.

Above the striated space of dilution—where Post-Public Space erodes the public sphere, while space is fragmented, through specialisation, by Enclosure and Barrier—technological/social networks of ‘absolute surveillance’ (Mitchener-Nissen 2014) and Control foster social purification. At the same time as ‘safe spaces’ (Epstein 1998) spread, public space becomes an interstice placed in between the islands of (post-)modernity (Ragonese 2008), a Void permeated with fears: urban fabric becomes neutral space, and the connecting tissue becomes chaos (Muschamp 1995, 104).

What are the implications of urban dilution for human routes in and among cities of the Void? As long as individuals use infrastructural networks to move from one ‘urban thing’ to another, old routes within urban space are replaced by paths within

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<sup>1</sup>See the interview to Rem Koolhaas in Chaslin (2001).

<sup>2</sup>See Learning from Las Vegas (Venturi et al. 1977), visionary manifest of postmodern architecture and urbanism.

circuits. This is the case for metropolitan businessmen, who travel ‘from city to city without ever leaving their social environment, [...] liv[ing] *through* cities rather than *in* cities’ (Martinotti 1993, 170; my translation; emphasis in the original). The trend for living *through* city/cities can be extended to all the inhabitants of the dispersed city: they travel—albeit more slowly and less comfortably than businessmen—*among* ‘urban things’ rather than *in* urban space.

Take the case of travelling by car. Amendola emphasises, at the intersection of urban fears and the privatisation of transportation in the dispersed city, the emergence of the ‘car-bubble’ (1997, 69), the spreading indifference necessary for peaceful travel and permitted by a set of technologies that ‘prevent passengers from having any visual contact with the exterior’ (Ragonese 2007, 25; my translation). Unsurprisingly, in many Californian cities, where infrastructural systems are the only means of relation(ship), pedestrians are either ‘mad, bad or from out of town’ (Sudjic 1992, 208).

According to Desportes (2005), in contemporary space, urban routes of all types are dominated by frontal vision and devices (either signals or physical barriers) guiding the subject through space. This brings about a *detachment* (ibidem, 329) from (surrounding) urban space. The infrastructural user and the monadic pedestrian in the Void pay little attention to either physical or human components of space. As a result, urban life is, on a daily basis, becoming less dependent on the physical urban environment (Richard Ingersoll in Angelillo 2004, 150). At the same time, citizens experience an increased distance from their fellows, seeing them as different and distant others: ‘as such, processes of “dissociation”, that is, those behaviours entailing increased social distances or estrangement between individuals and social environments, are more likely and frequent’ (Bonomi 2004, 20; my translation).

As long as routes in the space of encounter (the street, the square) are replaced by infrastructural circuits or detached/dissociated walks, *solitude* is the psychological gist of the Void.

It is the realm of territorial absent-mindedness, of a neglect composed of yards, detached houses, even villas and sometimes mansions; carved out in a patch of land of a hundred, two hundred, even one or two thousand square metres; but never isolated enough not to be contiguous. An impossible solitude, which glorifies solitude as a quality (La Cecla and Lazzarino 2004, 125; my translation).

At the same time as consumption becomes identity and personal integrity (Crawford 1992, 12), the new forms of ‘compresence’ in malls and Post-Public Space are tied to a ‘sense of indifference’ (Edoardo Marini in Angelillo 2004, 149), rather than encounter. The other face of solitude is the displacement of public life away from open, public space. ‘In several US cities [and beyond, as we have shown,] one can live quite easily without ever encountering the other’ (Richard Ingersoll in Angelillo 2004, 150; my translation).

Alienated from and fearful of the no-man’s land of outdoor public space that results, people stay inside. But the consequent displacement of social life from the outdoor public ‘rooms’ of street and squares to the indoor rooms of malls, clubs, homes, and cars does not merely reproduce the outdoor city public and its citizenry in a new interior setting. Rather, this interiorization encourages a privatizing of social relations (Holston 1998, 44).

To cut a long story short, solitude, indifference and the interiorisation/privatisation of urban life are the future aspects of the social trends we have been debating throughout the book. In the spaces of fear, the concept of community itself becomes anti-urban and, at the extreme, ‘home becomes a shell’ (Benjamin 2002 [1982], 234).

What is the image of the city of dilution, detachment and solitude? Paolo Sica already maintained some decades ago (Sica 1991 [1970]), that the media has been offering a ‘hypertrophy of images’, useful for replacing the fading urban image. What would Sica write of the city and media of the new millennium, where ‘urban things’ are replacing urban spaces? We have suggested that the thematisation, that is, a kaleidoscope of fake urban images in the absence of social life and diversity, is at the forefront of the spatialisation of fear: ‘Disneyzone’ is urbanism without a city (Sorkin 1992, 231), it is a space replete with information but lacking any meaning (Baudrillard 1970). While the city is replaced by a virtual version of itself, if we are ‘rooted in the “absence of any place”’ (Perulli 2009, 111; my translation), then the ultimate dimension of the Void is *absence*: rather than empty territories to be moulded, ‘dematerialisation of social relations’ (idem).

In conclusion, at the same time as the social structure of the city is eroded, space is simultaneously attacked. If we acknowledge that the city is the place of concrete socioeconomic processes in a globalised world (cf. Sassen 1998), how can we be surprised by the fact that the city itself is the target of contemporary wars? Let us remember the elastic geography of Israeli-Palestinian war; or the urban dimension of recent social riots; or the ‘smart bombs’ for ‘exporting’ democracy, smart enough to keep hitting markets, religious buildings, hospitals; or the destruction of symbols of urban civilisation by the self-proclaimed Islamic State. What do the military destruction of cities and the militarisation of public space have in common? Bombings and the anti-urban ideology of (American) fiction? Nuclear destruction and the rhetoric on the ‘death’ of the city? It is not by chance that most modernist utopias were based on the end of the city: take Broadacre City by Frank Lloyd Wright, where the city is replaced by a regional dispersed (sub)urbanisation; or the Plan Voisin by Le Corbusier, which envisaged the replacement of the centre of Paris with a grid of cross-shaped towers, an (involuntary?) epitaph of the city as place of encounter. While the spaces and landscapes of fear break urban regions into fragments, the destruction of public space fosters an urban space as a ‘carceral archipelago’ (Soja 2000; see also Wacquant 2002): annihilation of place, planned devastation as the dark side of urban planning and production, a side rarely acknowledged, barely analysed (Graham 2004). The ultimate goal of fearscape, of the rejection of diversity, of the removal of (insurgent) citizenships from urban and public space, is thus the ‘urbicide’ (Coward 2004), the end of the city as a space and place of, and for, democracy.

## 6.2 Thinking Change: Fear Not

*Let's us stop rediscovering that power corrupts, and let's start figuring out what to do about corruption*  
(Forester 1999, 9).

We are now aware of the enormous challenges stemming from the rhetorical use of discourses of fear and of their effects in terms of inequality, injustice and human suffering. How can urban planning 'think change' against fearscape? The first issue concerns the scale of action of planning practice: can a local practice cope with challenges generated on the global scale? In fact, one of the core arguments of the book highlighted precisely how the local scale is crucial in the actual implementation of global discourses of fear, through planning practice—this often being neglected by mainstream theories about urban geopolitics, surveillance and the like. Furthermore, since power is everywhere, it has to be challenged 'point by point in a plurality of resistances' (Hillier 2002, 55). As such, the action on a smaller scale gives the planner (at least) two opportunities. On the one hand, the microanalyses of power relations and socio-spatial trends—that is, of issues which from a bird's eye view are diluted in the ocean of mass communication—provide the instruments to deconstruct effectively misinformative processes. On the other, it is through face-to-face contact with social and individual worlds that the deconstructed processes can be 'reported' to the public. This is to say, it is only from below that we can build an awareness of misinformation of fear, and of its effects. In this section, we will present three arguments for a future practice of planning (and urban action) capable of challenging spaces and landscapes of fear from a local perspective: seeking polyrationality and creativity; taking steps towards a radical counter-discourse; embracing an active marginality.

In our first argument, acknowledging that fear and its rhetoric act on a plurality of levels, we will build on Davy (2008) to advocate for a collaboration of a plurality of rationalities. Contemporary cities can hardly be understood using linear and simple frameworks. As a result of the complex knowledge we need to mobilise, we risk being 'impregnated or infected by a turmoil of influences not fitting our own minds' (ibidem, 303). Monorationality is a 'condom', shaped by our own way of thinking/sensing, which we use to prevent our categories of analysis from being infected by any doubt. Unhappily, however, 'monorationality allows us to perceive only *our* city or *our* region (whatever it is that constitutes the *our* in "our" city or "our" region)' (ibidem, 304; emphasis in the original). Monorationality thus ends up being the 'keystone of blissful ignorance' (idem). Polyrationality is opening as opposed to monorationality, which can be seen as closure: polyrationality is an invitation to listen to different voices and embrace the rationalities of others—that is, being willing to give up some of one's own. Dematteis' *progetto implicito* (tacit project) is a way towards a practice capable of embracing polyrationality: it is grounded on the idea that the geographer's work is creative when it is located at the border between the 'realm of light', the use of reasoning and knowledge to make sense of what 'is', and that of 'shadows', where infinite possibilities are waiting to

disclose what ‘may be’ (1995, 27). The toolkit of the tacit project is made up of metaphoric inference, because causal deterministic inference can barely understand the complexity of territories<sup>3</sup>; reticular representations, open and contradictory instruments useful for integrating aerial analyses, which are closed and defined; critical listening and exploration.

Polyrationality also has the capacity to imagine, that is, ‘the faculty of transforming the experience of what is into a projection of what could be, the faculty that frees thought to form ideals and norms’ (Young 1990, 6). The experience of neo-institutionalism helps us bridge the realms of imagination and planning practice. From this perspective, places are above all social constructions, that is, the concrete spaces of networks of relations (Healey 1999, 118); people are active agents and their interactions the space where change can happen (Vigar et al. 2000; Beauregard 2005); and the potential for change to happen is on the flow of reasoning, action and interaction (Healey 1999, 119). As far as spatial practice is concerned, two dimensions stem from this perspective: creativity, that is, ‘refus[ing] to accept that the current way of doing things is necessarily the best way and [...] break[ing] free from concepts, structures and ideas that are only there through the process of continuity’ (Albrechts 2005, 253); and the use of storytelling, necessary if planning wishes to foster a societal (more than individual) creativity in complex urban societies (Sandercock 2003b). These dimensions are of paramount importance if planning aims to cope with feelings and their sociopolitical construction—and we can envision the role of planner as author of technical texts and stories capable of bridging the realm of rationality with that of emotions (Throgmorton 2003).

A further dimension linked to polyrationality is the ‘pace’ of change. The act of planning—and designing—is the creation of a ‘threshold between the present and the future’ (Gonçalo Byrne in Angelillo 2004, 156; my translation), within an urban space made of the stratification of human history. Transformations must thus be inscribed on the existing material so as not to erase such stratification. Whilst the logic of fear is necessary for those turbulent transformations which, in the name of capital accumulation, ‘progress’ or ‘purification’, tend to erase histories and cultures, only slow transformations seem to be socially sustainable (Lo Piccolo 1995).<sup>4</sup>

In our second argument, we shall move beyond the framework of communicative rationality, which characterises the concepts we have just discussed. Building on recent critiques of, and attempts at widening, deliberative theories (Mouffe 1999; Young 2001; Bond 2011; Mouat et al. 2011), we shall advocate for the construction of a radical discourse capable of ‘countering’ fear and its political economies. Such a discourse is grounded on two dimensions. On the one hand, Albrechts and Denayer (2001) suggest that it is necessary to incorporate some cultural postmodern objections with the aim of renovating the toolkit of planning

<sup>3</sup>See also Dematteis (1985) and Fall and Minca (2013) for a debate in English.

<sup>4</sup>This is also substantiated by the case of Chelas (cf. Boxout 10c), where fear of crime is lower in those neighbourhoods built during the earliest phases and which had, thus, more time for social fabrics to settle.

practice and urban action: against the conception of universal ‘progress’ we need to acknowledge the existence of multiple interests and values, as well as both communicative and agonistic political communities (Sandercock 2003a; Lo Piccolo 2013). In this regard, there is a need to shift from a ‘postmodernism of reaction’ towards a postmodernism that questions the status quo (Foster 1985 [1983], xi).

Part of the work of postmodernity as a set of discursive practices over the last two decades has been to fragment and sever connections. In some instances this proved a wise, important, and useful strategy to try unpack matters (such as those of sexuality or the relation to nature) that would otherwise have remained hidden. But it is now time to reconnect (Harvey 2000, 16).

On the other hand, while the incorporation of a plurality of interests and values is necessary for the deconstruction of feelings of fear on a local scale, a politicisation of practice is the only instrument capable of digging further into vertical misinformative processes—this is why Young (2001) puts forward a call for embracing an activist perspective and Harvey (2012) advocates for anti-capitalist movements to focus on the transformation of daily urban life. We need new and subversive ideas to cope with, and resist, power relations (Sibley 1995, 183). I use here the concept of resistance because I believe that the instruments necessary to ‘resist’ the politics of exclusion are already out there, in the richness of the public sphere and space that mankind has been building during its history. This means giving public space the instruments to surrender to neither the modernist ambition to eradicate complexity nor the postmodern/neoliberal ambition to enclose and filter it. Graham and Marvin (2001) suggest that one should ‘place’ splintering urbanism, acknowledging the porosity of urban space, reclaiming the publicity of city and showing the inevitable failure of disciplinary attempts.

A narrative from the desert of Negev/al-Naqab<sup>5</sup> is useful to exemplify how a radical counter-discourse can be enacted. In 1948 an Israeli law was passed that defined the procedures for the acquisition by the state of the *mawat*, lands operated under common property regimes since the Ottoman Empire. The law disregarded the fact that about 90,000 Bedouins had been living in villages in the *mawat* of the Negev/al-Naqab desert since ancestral times. The conventional planning discourse, through the creation of a narrow stereotype of ‘Bedouinness’, was used to erase the fabric of local histories (Meir 2009b) and ban the complex system of land-use historically adopted by Bedouin groups, an informal ‘quasi governance’ rejecting concepts such as land tenure (Meir 2009a, 833)—the final goal was the incorporation of Bedouins in urban settings. Against forced urbanisation, a set of radical practices emerged (Yiftachel 2009a, 249–253): *sumood*, an Arabic term meaning patience, perseverance and quiet determination, a set of tactics useful for survival in criminalised areas; memory-building, as a way of contrasting stereotypes; and autonomous politics, the creation of the Regional Council of the Unrecognised Villages in 1997 against the practices *divide et impera* by the Israeli power. The council produced, through a long process of bottom-up negotiation and

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<sup>5</sup>Respectively, the toponym in Hebrew and Arabic language.



empowerment, an alternative ‘plan’ for the area, grounded on four goals (Meir 2009b): the acknowledgement of existing villages; the creation of a municipality, on the model of Israeli regional councils; the right to vote at municipal elections; and the provision of public services to villages, according to Israeli law. Although at first Israeli authorities had labelled the plan as ridiculous, it ultimately achieved the recognition of most villages and an incorporation of rights for their inhabitants. Interestingly for us, the preconditions for the radicalisation of practice and the creation of alternative projects of identity-making were provided by the ‘grey space’ created from above (cf. Yiftachel 2009a, b). As for the discourse, the creation of a mixed language, which partially acknowledges the technical discourse of power and contaminates it with new cultural categories, was the way to ‘shift’ mainstream discourse toward a new level, hence blocking the categories of acknowledgement/removal and creating new citizenships. ‘This struggle is made of thousands of small movements in spaces of survival and stealth, neither fully coordinated, nor fully articulated, but cumulatively significant to upset the pre-vailing urban order’ (Yiftachel 2009a, 243).

In summary, the case of the alternative plan of Negev/al-Naqab makes explicit the possibility of creating a planning counter-discourse—based on local radical politics, cultural mediation and the deconstruction of stereotypes—capable of enacting resistance and leaking into the cracks of a technical/spatial geopolitics that, once analysed out of rhetoric, is exposed as unjust and, in the long term, unsustainable (cf. Weizman 2007).

In our third argument, we will advocate for turning upside down some concepts we have already put forward, with the aim of embracing marginality as a category of action.

For me this space of radical openness is a margin—a profound edge. Locating oneself there is difficult yet necessary. It is not a ‘safe’ place. One is always at risk. One needs a community of resistance. [...] this is not a mythic notion of marginality. It comes from lived experience (hooks 1991, 149).

In the dystopian understanding of the ultimate ends of secessionary trends in contemporary urban space, we have used the term Void to describe what is left ‘outside’ (cf. Sect. 6.1). However, the latter is true from the perspective of discourses of fear only. From a different perspective, what is excluded by the spatial entities of the new city is the space where more freedom from disciplines is found. At the intersection of such perspectives, in short, the ‘outside’ can be seen as a space of border.

As far as the border belongs to the structure of semiosphere, we need to get within the border so as not to be faced with marginal cultural experiences. [...] being on the edge means feeling the vertigo of the border between order and disorder, complementary dimensions of any semiosphere; or experiencing the riskier, yet more innovative, adventure, the exploration of further semiotic worlds and the foundation of new semiotic acts; in doing so we may become aware that the inside is not as plain-coloured as we thought before (de Spuches 1995, 22; my translation).

**Fig. 6.1** Old city suit—street surveillance camera series. Jerusalem 2006. Idea, realisation and copyrights: Desiree Palmen. *Photography* Jutta Tränkle and Desiree Palmen. [desiree@desireepalmen.nl](mailto:desiree@desireepalmen.nl). Reproduced with kind permission of the author



As long as border space is the central place of cultural interaction, the margin is the space where ‘everything become possible’ (Zanini 1997, 15), where new (id)entities can arise (Clement 2004). The acknowledgment of citizenships and rights is made possible by porous borders, after all (Benhabib 2004, 221). It is thus in crevices and interstices between practices of power that one can carve out of, and jam, Control—the work *Surveillance Camera Camouflage* by the artist Desiree Palmen is a powerful metaphor of this idea (Fig. 6.1).<sup>6</sup>

At the same time as the space of marginality becomes bigger and more pervasive every day, it also becomes a ‘silent majority’<sup>7</sup> (De Certeau 1984 [1980]) and new oppositional practices can arise within such a space through the mobilisation of new and diverse identities. The experience of Black American writer/activist bell hooks<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup>More images and videos from the work of Desiree Palmen are available at [www.desireepalmen.nl/images.php](http://www.desireepalmen.nl/images.php). Accessed 15 Nov 2015.

<sup>7</sup>Let us stress that this use of the concept of silent majority is inherently inclusive and grounded on a positive understanding of differences, and is thus radically different from that, ultimately exclusionary and xenophobic, made by conservative politicians (like Nixon or Trump) and movements (see Lassiter 2006) in the US.

<sup>8</sup>The pen name of Gloria Jean Watkins, not capitalized by her express will.

sums up the conception of marginality as a space of resistance. In *Yearning* (1991), hooks reconsiders her personal experience as a Black woman in the US, and as a feminist activist and academician, through the lenses of a radical postmodernism made up of empathy and mutual recognition among those groups sharing with ‘Black folks’ perceptions of alienation, precariousness and loss. The life of marginalised groups are dependent on the capacity to create alternatives, to build a ‘community of resistance’, where marginality is a means of self-representation and at the same time the foundation of emancipation.

De Certeau’s distinction between ‘strategy’ and ‘tactic’ (De Certeau 1984 [1980]) helps us highlight the space of action for radical marginality. While strategy is the relationship of power characterising those subjects with the ability to isolate themselves from the surrounding environment, tactic is the action of those who cannot count on their ‘own’ space.

[Tactic] has at its disposal no base where it can capitalize on its advantages, prepare its expansions, and secure independence with respect to circumstances. [...] a tactic depends on time—it is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized ‘on the wing’. Whatever it wins, it does not keep (ibidem, xix).

The space of action for active marginality is made up of continual mobilisations, of precarious successes, it is an ‘art of the weak’ (ibidem, 37). As far as academic practice is concerned, the construction of a space of marginality is made listening voices from the ‘borderlands’ (Sandercock 1995), that is, through the narration of stories excluded from mainstream histories (cf. Sandercock 1998, 2003b) and the acknowledgement of multiplex forms of, and meanings for, citizenship (cf. Holston 1998, 2008). Whilst the strategy of domination is to label insurgent action as a losing battle or as marginal, the tactic of counter-discourse is to tell the history of insurgency achievements, hence giving them strength. At the end of the day, shifting marginality to the centre is about turning rhetoric upside down, as exemplified in the proposal by Hage (1998) to rethink White supremacy and racism. Hage claims that it is time to ask ourselves: ‘are Whites still good for Australia? Have they been living in ghettos far too long? Are they dividing Australia? Do we need to have an assimilation program to help ease them into the multicultural mainstream?’ (ibidem, 247). In doing so, the mainstream viewpoint about the ‘problem’ of integration of minority groups is jammed: what happens once we debate the ‘problem’ of sick fantasies of power?

### 6.3 Thinking Next: A Call for Action

Coming to the conclusion of this book, it is time to highlight two recent trends, once again looking at them through the lenses of future threats and the opportunities they entail. First, the pervasiveness of Information and Communication Technologies

(ICTs), and with this the pace at which personal information and data travels and is shared, is growing exponentially, shifting the place of Control towards everybody's own home, pockets, clothes and soon body, at the same time as extending the time of Control to the continuum of '24/7' (Crary 2013).

Here, therefore, more than ever, one should insist that the proper answer to this threat is not to retreat into islands of privacy, but an even stronger socialization of cyberspace. One should summon up the visionary strength to discern the emancipatory potential of cyberspace in what we (mis)perceive today as its 'totalitarian' threat (Žižek 2002 [2001], 256).

This is to say, ICTs have been creating a space for tactics that De Certeau could not even imagine, hence making unprecedented room for the coordination of resistances and the emersion of the marginal(ised) majority—consider, for instance, the role of 'tweets' for the coordination of revolts during the recent so-called 'Arab spring'.<sup>9</sup>

Second, the global recession and (especially European) crisis of political economies and liberal democracies, originated by (or in consequence of) the financial crisis of 2007/2008, have been producing effects destined to last for decades to come, further tearing down certainties and securities. Central governments (and the European Union) have been reacting through austerity, further attacking the welfare state, as well as civic and mobility rights—the European responses to the 'crisis of refugees' still ongoing at the time of writing (June 2016) is dramatic evidence of this—and alienating democratic power to economic instances.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, the crisis has brought about a renewed attention to issues of economic and social justice that had been previously covered up by discourses of fear. Southern Europe is at the forefront of such contradictory trends: it is the place where austerity has hit hardest and post-democratic (if authoritarian) instances have been especially evident<sup>11</sup>; but it is also the place where most new

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<sup>9</sup>However, Crary (2013, 48–49) is adamant in denying that ICTs can have any transformative potential as long as their deployment will be led by global corporations and conglomerates. Moreover, Crary adds, 'the myths of the egalitarian and empowering nature of this technology have been cultivated for a reason. Police agencies of the global order can only be gratified by the willingness of activists to concentrate their organising around internet strategies, by which they voluntarily kettle themselves in cyberspace, where state surveillance, sabotage, and manipulation are far easier than in lived communities and localities where actual encounters occur' (ibidem, 121). Whether this or a more optimistic, such as Žižek's, vision should, and will, prevail is probably one of the defining questions of our times.

<sup>10</sup>It is impossible here to argue in-depth on the critical understanding of crisis as the product of long-term paths of uneven development driven by neoclassic economics and the use of austerity as full-scale deployment of neoliberal stances (see, among others, Brenner et al. 2010; Hadjimichalis 2011; Blyth 2013; Seymour 2014; Tulumello 2016).

<sup>11</sup>The Spanish 'gag law' is the perfect example of the criminalisation of dissension in the name of the need for consensus over 'reforms' (see Vicente and Goicoechea 2015).

democratic experiments have been conducted, in national politics, local political regimes, social movements and urban action—and connections between such levels.<sup>12</sup>

All in all, new voids are arising, that can be filled with new and more powerful disciplinary tensions or by a renewed capacity for spatial, social and political radical engagement—indicating the importance of the renewed engagement of actors in spatial transformation. If, at the end of this journey, we acknowledge that debunking misinformation, spaces and landscapes of fear is a priority for the future of planning, we must be aware of the kind of challenge facing us. It is a daily action, which needs to be based on the capacity to look at the world from a different perspective. We must be aware that it is a fight against enormous powers, a fight where taking a stance may bring us to failure. Still, we must be aware that the enormity of the powers of fear is their limit too: from a bird's eye view one may control everything but will miss all those microscopic cracks of the actual, extant world. It is in the space of marginality that cracks can be forced to become chasms.

The geography of pre-modern society understands the frontier as a boundary between order (inside) and disorder (outside). [...] the geography of modern society has learned to understand the frontier as the place of contact between two or more cultural universes. However, it keeps rejecting otherness, because it cannot, or does not want to, acknowledge the limits of its own culture; and it tries to force otherness into a universal language that would give it access to 'other' worlds. The geography of postmodern society, finally, has learned to acknowledge the edge and appreciate its value but has not learned—and is not aware of—the games of identity and otherness. It stays on the edge, hesitating about whether to take the step that would take it somewhere else (de Spuches 1995, 25; my translation).

Taking such a step means accepting the daily hardship of unpredictable communication, played in between comprehension and misunderstanding. It means making an experiential process of daily action, working toward the creation of cultural categories where 'tolerance' is replaced by curiosity and open confrontation. If we believe that the right to the city, the right to a public space where encounter, negotiation and conflict are the gist of democracy, the right to feel 'safe' and 'secure', the right to an open and just urban space are basic rights, we must take a stance, becoming activists against misinformation and landscapes of fear.

Davis (1998, 2006 [1990]) has told the story of how an urban space, that of Los Angeles during the 1980s and 1990s, has become a social battlefield. We know that, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, the centre of such a fight is skewed towards

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<sup>12</sup>For national politics, consider the blossoming of new formations (Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Tempo de Avançar and Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal), which are restructuring the political landscape through the introduction of new practices of party organisation. For local policies, the case of Lisbon municipality is especially revealing of (contradictory) changing political regimes (see Seixas et al. 2016). For social movements, consider the case of 15-M movements in Spain (see Díaz-Cortés and Sequera 2015) or the cycle of anti-austerity protests in Portugal (see Accornero and Pinto 2015). For urban action, consider the Spanish Platform for People Affected by Foreclosure (Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca, PAH; see Lamarca 2013) or the fine grain of neighbourhood organisation in Athens (see Vaiou 2014).

the struggle between a smaller, closed minority and a marginal(ised) majority suffocated by rhetoric and the retrenchment of rights. Civil war is not the condition of our cities. Not yet. Still, throughout this book we have been showing how Davis' Los Angeles may well be a prototype of the future of the city. But we have also shown how the space for change is already there, in the actual material make-up of cities. So, what is the future we want? Do we want a city as the space of democratic interaction and representation of plural identities, or are we going to accept an urban desert criss-crossed by economic flows and where social ones are banned? In the fight between an open city and a city of fear (cf. Friedmann 2002), are we going to take a stance?

If we do not want a battlefield to be the field of our future practice, it is the time for us, enthusiasts of the city and of its public space, to 'devote our abundant emotional and social energies to creating the kind of world in which fear is rendered ineffective as a technology of power and control' (Jeffries 2015).

It is the time to stare directly into the face of fear and assert that we are not afraid.

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