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MIGRANT INTEGRATION IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC CRISIS

Policy Responses from European and North American Global Cities

Patrick R. Ireland

Europe in Crisis

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The current crisis in Europe has often been depicted as an economic/currency crisis that poses a danger for European economic unity and its common currency, the Euro. Monetary union, it has been argued, has outrun fiscal union, depriving the EU of an important means of dealing with the pressures on the currency. It has also been understood as a crisis of governance, of institutions with the decision-making capacity to deal with the crisis. Finally, the impact of the economic emergency has altered the political landscape in different EU countries in different ways. The crisis appears to be creating changes that will endure, but cannot yet be predicted entirely. This series fills an important gap in scholarship by supporting a level of analysis that is more thoughtful than the periodic media coverage and less complicated than much of the deep theoretical analysis. These books are timely and concise with the promise of a long lifetime of relevancy.

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Migrant Integration in Times of Economic Crisis

Policy Responses from European and North American Global Cities

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Series Foreword

This new study by Patrick Ireland is a remarkable tale of five cities in four countries (two in Canada), in Europe and North America. It is a story of how global cities tried to navigate the Great Recession. It is also an attempt to understand the impact of the Great Recession on ethnic segregation and integration patterns over time.

The most important contribution of this study is both its focus and its level of analysis. The focus on segregation and integration of immigrant groups provides us with a rich comparison over a crucial period of time. The focus on cities that are similar in many ways accentuates the differences that emerge. Within each city, class and race appear to matter. Migrant groups from Asia, and especially from Africa, have generally fared worse, and improved less over time, than those from Europe; upper-class Asians fared better. Among the cities, both the measures of segregation and those of integration indicate sharp differences between European cities and those in North America, with worse indices for the three cities in North America (Chicago in particular). For all five cities, nothing much changes over time.

There are no easy answers here. We might have expected that the recession would have its greatest impact on recently arrived ethnic groups, but, generally speaking, that was not the case. We might also expect that public policy would either diminish or accelerate that impact. However, the most important conclusion of this study is that municipal policies were clearly varied, but had relatively little impact on ongoing patterns, which in turn remained remarkably stable among the migrant or ethnic groups in question.

Patterns of spatial segregation and structural integration did not change very much, nor did the relative relationship among the cities in this study. “Local efforts to fight spatial polarization and to narrow the migrant integration gap mattered around the edges at best,” Ireland argues. This does not mean that public policy was not important for easing the burden of the recession; it just had relatively little impact on making a difference for segregation or integration.

These conclusions should be seen in the context of Patrick Ireland’s previous work, in which he contends that structures and policies, including the kinds of welfare programs that deal with immigrants, as well as policies toward the level of immigrant settlement permitted in a given area, are the determining factor in integration progress (Ireland 2004). The difference in this study is his focus on change over time, rather than cross-national comparisons at a single point in time.

This study should be required reading for scholars and students who are interested in how immigrant groups are integrating into urban space in Europe and North America. By comparing cities, Patrick Ireland gives us new insights into those arenas in which the impact of public policy can be seen and understood over time.

Martin A. Schain
New York University

Reference

Ireland, Patrick R. 2004. *Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Preface

The idea for this book was planted after I had returned to the USA from the Middle East in 2007 and moved to Chicago. Despite regular visits to its museums and ballparks during my youth spent a few hours away in Michigan and my undergraduate years in South Bend, the Windy City outside of its main tourist haunts was largely a mystery to me. It did not take long to understand that residents and municipal officials alike decried Chicago's segregation into white, African American, and Latino zones and saw it as a prime source of many ills, including the violence wracking neighborhoods on the south and west sides. Precious little was being done to alter the status quo, however, and investment was clearly pouring primarily into downtown areas. A newcomer was repeatedly advised to head out to ethnic neighborhoods where "you would swear that you were in China/India/Mexico/Poland/Puerto Rico"—enclaves that might speak to diversity but not to an integrated, truly multicultural cityscape. Enjoying ethnic cuisine seemed to be enough to mark a person as a cosmopolitan global citizen. And such status was important, as the city fathers and mothers sang the praises of cultural variety and were keen on telling residents that Chicago's future would be dim if it were not recognized as a "global city." That term and the adjective "world-class" liberally peppered public discourse, suggestive of deep civic insecurity over the city's standing.

Personal and conference trips to Toronto subsequently familiarized me with another big, powerful, wealthy metropolis that was less divided and far less violent than Chicago yet, if anything, even more self-doubting

about its global stature, more concerned about socio-spatial and ethnic polarization, and more obsessed with celebrating ethnic cultures and marketing ethnic enclaves. How could all of the seeming contradictions be explained and reconciled? Was the general perception correct that the post-2008 economic crisis had worsened the situation for migrants in terms of their integration and residential segregation? Above all, I wondered how diversity was being lived at the neighborhood level, what multiculturalism (if it did exist) looked like on the ground in global cities, behind all the statistics coming out of urban research.

A sabbatical year in 2014–2015 gave me the opportunity to explore those issues in depth, both to satisfy my own intellectual curiosity and to contribute to the literatures on migrant integration and global cities. Starting with Chicago and Toronto, I looked for several more cities to compare that shared the same general global positioning and had migrants from several of the same countries but differed with respect to their social welfare policy context—widely seen as a critical factor affecting how newcomers fit into receiving societies. Barcelona, Hamburg, and Montréal emerged as the most suitable additional cases by those criteria.

Besides sabbatical support, my home institution, the Illinois Institute of Technology, funded several earlier research trips to Canada and Spain. A Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) Research Visit Grant enabled me to spend 3 months in autumn 2014 in Germany. Bernd Simon, Jürgen Golz, and their colleagues at the Institute of Psychology at the University of Kiel provided me with a warm, supportive home base from which to explore nearby Hamburg. Thanks to a Council of Overseas Research Centers (CAORC) Multi-Country Research Fellowship, I was able to spend much of early 2015 in Barcelona conducting research for an ongoing project on West African migrants and local-level integration policies there and in Tangier and Dakar. Late spring and part of the summer were spent working on a curriculum project on interculturalism and migration on a Québec-United States University Grant from the Government of Québec. An American Political Science Association Small Research Grant then financed wrap-up visits to Montréal and Toronto. As migration studies have undergone "professionalization" in recent years, it has become far easier for an American researcher to obtain backing to sit for a year at a research center in New York or Washington, crunching numbers and pondering migration, than to spend time on site actually meeting and observing

migrants where they live. I am just that much more grateful for the financial sponsorship that I received for my fieldwork.

I am also thankful for the people and institutions who assisted in the development and writing of this study. The Statistische Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein (above all Nicole Sehnert), Secretaria d'Igualtat, Migracions i Ciutadania and Departament d'Estadística (Barcelona), Harold Washington Library and Newberry Library (Chicago), City of Toronto Archives, Toronto Reference Library, Grande Bibliothèque (Montréal), and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (Ottawa) were invaluable sources of data and guidance. Useful comments were provided by fellow panelists and audience members at the International Studies Annual Convention in Atlanta in March 2016, the Securitization of Migrant Integration/Patterns of Mobilization Conference at Sciences Po in Paris in June 2016, and the International Political Science Association World Congress in Poznań in July 2016. William L. Ascher of Claremont McKenna College and, especially, Martin Schain of New York University gave me valuable input and encouraged me to submit the original manuscript to Palgrave Pivot for consideration. Important moral support was also provided by my family, Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, Anthony Messina, Michel André Otis, Simon Reich, Rebecca Steffenson, and the staff and regulars at Galway Bay Pub. Peter A. Hall of Harvard University has been my mentor since graduate school, and his advice and friendship have meant the world to me.

Armour Square, Chicago
March 2017

Patrick R. Ireland

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Introduction

How have migrants been faring since the Great Recession? When immigration has figured in discussions of the post-2008 global economic crisis and its aftermath, it is migration flows that have been the focus. Apart from employment levels, the effects on migrant integration have not attracted as much sustained attention (see Castles et al. 2014). A trend toward greater social inequality and polarization, which was evident across OECD countries before the financial collapse, has intensified since then (OECD 2015). Migrants have been counted among the victims of this development in the relevant academic literature, including the prominent research on global cities that was among the first to draw attention to the social forces at work. A number of analysts have questioned the polarization thesis, however, as well as the widespread belief that residential segregation is inimical to migrant integration. That segregation–integration relationship has incited heated debate, in fact, with contextual factors like welfare-state institutions put forward as playing a critical structuring role. In the process, the efficacy of municipal policies designed to combat segregation and promote integration is thrown into question. Across the post-industrial West, the spatial concentration of migrant residents has come to characterize certain urban and suburban neighborhoods, and it is primarily in them that diverse societies are either being built or rendered unworkable.

This book attempts to unpack and disentangle these debates and to add to our understanding of how the economic crisis has affected migrant-origin populations and everyday life in global cities in

Europe and North America. After a review of the relevant theoretical debates and a discussion of this study's methodology and methods, five national groups will be compared across five carefully selected second-level global cities by means of quantitative and qualitative analysis. The urban case studies will show that migrants' ethnic segregation levels did not rise and their integration levels in terms of employment, social assistance, and poverty did not fall significantly over the first decade and a half of this century. Socioeconomic (or socio-spatial) polarization did occur, cementing the disadvantaged status of particular neighborhoods and their non-migrant and migrant residents and maintaining (but not worsening) the position of the latter near the bottom of the heap. It was more and more the case that recent non-professional migrants could be found in the lowest-cost, lowest-quality housing in the most affordable, lowest-status sub-neighborhoods of any urban area. Those pockets were the legacy of past (non-)decisions at multiple levels of government pertaining to social housing, transportation, schools, public libraries, open spaces, and other vital components of the urban habitat.

Municipal policy responses were not able to reverse the deeper forces at work. Then again, they could have an impact on how diversity was experienced on the ground. When local officials reacted skillfully to circumstances and developments that were only partially of their own making, they could bring real improvements to life citywide and in heavily migrant neighborhoods. Smaller adaptations often yielded more unambiguously positive and meaningful changes than major projects and plans, and they contributed more to peaceful coexistence. The ongoing deep socioeconomic transformations, because they are in effect unassailable at the local level, therefore provide an opportunity to rethink the city. Policymakers should see the value of concentrating on what happens at the scale of the neighborhood as well as of the global city system and on meeting the needs of all of their residents, irrespective of their background, and not just on appealing to highly skilled professionals, economic investors, and tourists.

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CHAPTER 1

Integration, Polarization, and Segregation in the Global City

Abstract Analyses of the Great Recession following the 2008 financial crash have neglected its effects on migrants and their integration into Western societies. This section disentangles the relevant theoretical debates and sets up the subsequent empirical analysis. Global cities scholars expect serious economic crises to widen socio-spatial polarization, sharpening inequalities and leaving neighborhoods with greater concentrations of residents with similar ethnic and social class backgrounds. Cities must resist the negative effects on migrants' structural and residential integration to secure long-term stability and prosperity. At the same time, cultural diversity, particularly its manifestation in ethnic neighborhoods, is a valuable asset for a "creative" city in the competition with other urban centers. This celebration of ethnicity runs counter to worries about the disintegrative effects of spreading socio-spatial divisions.

Keywords Structural integration · Socio-spatial polarization
Ethnic segregation · Global cities · Creative cities

Integration

Typically, integration has been envisioned in ways that put the accent on migrants' participation in all aspects of a society and the reduction of disparities between their situation and that of the native-stock population, in other words, the achievement of "parity of life chances" (Alba 2005, p. 21). In European research on migrant integration, there has been a

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persistent bias toward national-level analysis. Support for that focus has derived from the nation-state's position at the heart of the influential kindred literatures on citizenship—which, as Philip Kasinitz (2003) has put it, "for all of its many virtues, tends to be highly theoretical and abstract" (p. 18)—and on admissions policies, which in most places fall under the purview of central governments. Each receiving society has devised its own mix of integration policies and non-policies; even if they do not add up anywhere to a truly systematic, coherent approach, these integration "regimes" have habitually been taken to represent national models (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). In Europe, integration policies have been linked tightly to welfare systems, which are still almost always seen as implying nation-states.

In North America's liberal welfare states the national level has held less sway. In Canada, formal agreements between the federal and provincial governments have outlined the responsibilities of each level in the field of migrant integration (and as regards aspects of migrant selection). Since the Americanization movement before and after World War I, the USA has distinguished itself by adhering to a "non-model": it has followed "a virtual hands-off approach to immigrant integration by federal and most state authorities" (Ray 2004, p. 5).

Cities often have their own distinctive strategies, however, and their importance and room for maneuver have continued to grow on both sides of the Atlantic. Over the past few decades, responsibilities for migrants' well-being across Canada and Europe have devolved downward to officials at the local level and have been delegated to non-state actors in the private and non-profit sectors—yielding complex combinations of social and political actors and institutions operating within national regulatory frameworks (Ireland 2004; Gunn 2012). Even in the USA, migration-related concerns have prompted a new willingness to reconsider the meaning and path to integration (Waldinger 1996), and the task of crafting policy responses has fallen first and foremost to American cities.

Within important constraints, authorities at subnational levels have been able to put their spin on migrant integration strategies. Like the scale and composition of migrant-origin populations and the challenges associated with them, policies have differed across regions, cities, and neighborhoods, just as they have across time and national boundaries. Starting in the early 1990s, the first series of scholarly studies to surpass the status of descriptive policy reports engaged in comparisons of migrant political integration across countries and cities.

By now, much scholarship has emerged to elucidate local integration dynamics in Europe, Canada, and the USA. There has been a clear "local turn" in academic research (see Cinalli and El Hariri 2011), with the city becoming "an ever more attractive and frequently adopted prism of observation"; urban and suburban neighborhoods, where most migrants live, have served as "high-visibility testing grounds of integration" (Pastore and Ponzo 2013, pp. 1, 5). In them, the complementarities and contradictions between national and local integration approaches become visible, as well as the strains occasioned by the recent financial crisis and the attendant budget woes. Well-constructed urban analyses can go farther toward distinguishing between the intended objectives of policies and their actual impacts than those undertaken at the national level, where merely tentative steps have been taken in this direction (see Huddleston et al. 2013; Alba and Foner 2015).

Polarization

The globalization thesis first laid out by Saskia Sassen (1991) has strengthened the case for seeing migration as an urban phenomenon. The argument is that global cities—critical post-industrial production sites for the specialized and producer services that make the globalized economy function—have become decoupled from their national contexts and have more in common with each other than with other areas in the same nation-states. Many, albeit not all of these global cities are major destinations for internal and/or international migrants, who both replenish aging populations and can be associated with ethno-cultural frictions.

Migrants' division on the basis of skill levels, meanwhile, reflects the deeper processes of social polarization that are playing out among all populations in these nodal points of the capitalist world economy. The coteries of highly skilled, well-paid executives and professionals take in a share of migrant and migrant-origin residents, if not to the same degree as the ranks of low-skilled workers in the leisure and hospitality, personal and business services, healthcare, and other sectors existing on meager wages. Cities have thus "become the political place where the dirty work of globalization is being done" (Boudreau et al. 2009, p. 23).

While the global cities literature has been criticized for paying too much attention to economics and not enough to other dimensions of globalization (Hu 2015), consideration of post-Fordist realities has led to assertions that in order to attract new-economy industries, successful

cities need to recast themselves as centers not only of finance but also of knowledge, innovation, recreation, culture, and tourism. Cultural diversity (including its manifestation in "ethnic" neighborhoods) thereby becomes a commodifiable asset in the race with other centers, a vehicle for urban prosperity (Aytar and Rath 2012) and a potentially fundamental element in the construction and maintenance of a "creative" city (Florida 2005). Although strong evidence remains to be presented that "soft" factors enhancing the quality of urban life do act as strong pull factors (Bereitschaft and Cammack 2015), they are celebrated in neoliberal urban development practice for their presumed appeal to talented workers, their employers, and tourists. Upgrading these factors can give rise to gentrification pressures that can aggravate polarization.

"Top-down" municipal campaigns to stage ethnically branded commercial districts that assume a common identity among migrant groups have a mixed record of success; initiatives organized by migrants themselves sometimes run up against zoning ordinances and other bureaucratic difficulties (Schmiz 2016). Conversely, there are cities that have built on migrant-related projects to advance policies that put the accent on empowerment, inclusion, and heightened feelings of belonging and connectedness (MacKinnon and Derickson 2012). Community backlash against "elitist and simplifying branding" can trigger a search for richer, more complex alternative narratives (Rius Ulldemolins 2014). In grassroots struggles in pluralistic urban areas, some researchers have seen the type of civil society shifts that "eventually shape the big institutions and discourses of contemporary nation-states" (Nicholls and Uitermark 2016, p. 10).

Diversity, in sum, can represent a competitive advantage, a factor sharpening inequalities and the related social tensions, and a possible source of sociopolitical change from below. Global cities must devise ways to attenuate the apparent contradictions if they want to secure long-term economic prosperity (Ranci 2011). The embrace of multiculturalism has been one such tactic. Academic debate may continue over whether migration-related diversity erodes interpersonal trust in a society—American studies have mainly answered in the affirmative; European and Canadian research mainly in the negative (Stolle et al. 2013)—but officials in many cities tout their ethnic neighborhoods and proudly proclaim the number of countries and cultures of origin represented in their resident population. The higher the figure is, the better, despite fears expressed by some social scientists about the difficulties of dealing with situations of "hyper-diversity" (Price and Benton-Short

2007) or "super-diversity," whereby "a complex set of moving boundaries develops in cities around gender, age, religion, ethnicity, culture, language or other signifiers, actualized in local interactions and informed by global discourses" (Vertovec 2007, p. 2). Increasingly, for example, research is finding that policies designed to ensure equal respect for the various cultures present in a society or even to promote the maintenance of cultural diversity can improve social outcomes (e.g., Siddiqi et al. 2013). They may work better in defusing conflict when migrants "come from many source countries rather than coming overwhelmingly from just one" (Kymlicka 2012, p. 23).

Segregation

The economic and ethnic polarization described in the global cities literature has a physical, spatial aspect: inequalities are made visible in patterns of segregation within cities, with globalization's "winners" concentrating in the cores and the losers being relegated to the margins (Sassen 1991; Jacobs 1996). This socio-spatial and ethnic polarization is normally presented as a geography in which neighborhoods become home to greater concentrations of residents with similar social class and/or national/ethnic backgrounds and grow more isolated from each other (see Bischoff and Reardon 2014; Pitter 2016). In contradistinction to the Fordist era, nowadays social stability is no longer as important as flexibility. Top global cities specialize in facilitating the flows of people, capital, and information. Central neighborhoods are refurbished to draw in affluent new-economy professionals, while working- and middle-class families—particularly ethnic minorities and others with larger families—are pushed to peripheral, less expensive areas.

Still, cities cannot do without a modicum of social integration ensuring that the system functions efficiently and that ethnic and other groups contribute to instead of detracting from economic development. One objective of urban policies is thus to counteract the more damaging features of polarization. Space and place interact with migrant integration policies both as the settings in which they operate and as objects of their influence (Creswell 1996). Cities play a part in territorializing their populations' diverse elements, even as they in turn leave their architectural and other imprints on the urban landscape (Becci et al. 2017).

The spatial polarization described in the global cities literature dovetails with an older subject of urban analysis, residential ethnic

segregation. Since the Chicago School of Sociology first developed its ethnic succession model and continuing under the "Los Angeles model" of the fragmented post-industrial city, a high degree of segregation has been associated with a lack of migrant integration in the USA and in many corners of Canada and western Europe (Hatziprokopiou et al. 2016). Policymakers and public opinion (including that of both migrants and non-migrants) have regularly identified segregation as one of the principal barriers to successful integration (TNS Qual+ 2011; see Gidley and Caputo 2013). Segregation can jeopardize social cohesion and, when correlated with deprivation, harden situations of social inequality (Bolt et al. 2010). Improvements in linguistic ability, cultural adaptation, and economic status have been seen in the USA as instigating migrants' dispersal from inner-city gateway neighborhoods to more mixed suburbs with access to better private and public amenities, among them schools (Massey 1985). Residential integration, in other words, becomes an indispensable stage in what is still referred to in the American literature as the assimilation process (Vang 2012).

In Europe, though, ethnic segregation levels have been lower than in the USA, and "dissimilarist" voices have also been heard (again, see Gidley and Caputo 2013). This approach has produced evidence that the various domains of integration can be relatively autonomous and that it can be beneficial for migrants to live among their compatriots (e.g., Simpson et al. 2007; Siebel 2013). Ethnic residential clustering often proves dynamic and unstable. More than spatial distribution per se, it may be the concentration levels of a particular group and the duration of residence that matter for integration outcomes (Musterd 2003; Musterd et al. 2008). Ethnic enclaves can nurture social networks and entrepreneurship and, in any event, argue for assessing residential segregation according to its actual local effects and against its "being sweepingly viewed as a symptom of social discrimination" (Qadeer 2003, p. 4).

In Canada, ethnic segregation has normally reached levels in between those found in the USA and Europe. Canadian cities were long considered to lack both the legal authority and fiscal capacity to handle migrant settlement, yet urban-level initiatives and research on them have been growing and following a dissimilarist course (Leloup and Apparicio 2010; Gunn 2012; Good 2014). The spatial patterns observed differ from those found in the USA, as many "visible minorities" (in effect, non-white, non-Aboriginal persons) maintain significant levels of concentration even in suburban areas—frequently having moved there

directly from abroad. The implication is that cultural preferences may account for some of their residential choices (Balakrishnan et al. 2005), even as rising income inequality within as well as between minority groups shunts their poorer members into the cheapest, least desirable neighborhoods and tends to keep them there (Walks and Bourne 2006).

Canadian urban sociologists have joined American and European critics in questioning whether neighborhoods still matter as much to people's lives as they once did and in expressing misgivings about "the shortcomings of social mix utopias and … the inherent paternalism of arguments put forth to promote the exposure of lower-class residents to better ways of life through contact with middle-class individuals" (Germain 2000, p. 4; see Bolt et al. 2010). When aggregation proceeds from "a logic of cultural comfort," it may not imperil the "harmonious coexistence of different groups" (Germain 2011, p. 6). At the same time, awareness has grown in Canada that settlement in the suburbs may create a spatial mismatch with the migrant resources located primarily in central-city neighborhoods (Walks 2014). Suburbanization of migrant populations in the USA has been generating analogous concerns (Panchok-Berry et al. 2013).

It remains nonetheless true that the European and Canadian research has been more attuned than American scholarship to the differentiated, ambivalent impacts of segregation. Its relationship to integration appears increasingly to be context dependent. In much of the global cities scholarship, the socioeconomic and ethnic dimensions of segregation have been confounded and presented as following automatically from macroeconomic developments, irrespective of local history and realities and policy responses (Maloutas and Fujita 2012). Critics of the polarization thesis have similarly taken its proponents to task for "overlooking the role of contingent factors that may modify, intensify, or reverse the expected socio-spatial outcome in individual cities" (Ismail 2014). The response has been a succession of studies considering the effects on residential segregation of the welfare state, housing systems and housing geography, and, more recently, other historically inherited patterns and spatial contexts (see Tammaru et al. 2016 on the socioeconomic dimension).

Where fears of segregation's negative ramifications have been strong, various policies have been put into place to narrow spatial disparities. Tim Cassiers and Christian Kestleloot (2012) have divided such strategies into three general types: (1) those aiming to address the perceived problematic consequences without altering the spatial patterns

themselves (e.g., by improving public transportation accessibility, economic opportunities, or other services), (2) those aiming to foster a better social mix (e.g., by drawing high-income residents into poor neighborhoods or by moving poor residents out of them), and (3) those aiming to pull a targeted disadvantaged neighborhood more completely into the "urban economic tissue" (p. 1915). These policies, introduced separately and in combination in cities across North America and Europe, have all drawn fire for achieving limited results and for resting on debatable assumptions about what or who needs to be integrated, who will benefit from efforts to promote geographic or territorial inclusion (the poor or the middle classes and developers), the feasibility of attempting to counter powerful underlying economic forces, the stability of targeted segregation patterns, the ethical appropriateness of programs that smack of enforced dispersal or risk stigmatizing particular populations or areas, and the reduction of social distance even when exposure is not consciously and freely chosen. Some researchers have found that levels of spatial segregation have been stable or even decreasing in a number of cities and for a number of migrant/ethnic groups—or that even when high and persistent, they have not prevented advances in social integration (Germain 2000; Musterd 2003; Duyvendak and Veldboer 2005; Musterd and Ostendorf 2009; Musterd 2011).

Migrant integration, socio-spatial polarization, and segregation, therefore, interrelate in complex and at times contradictory fashion in global cities. The celebration of "authentic" ethnic neighborhoods seems to run counter to worries about the disintegrative effects of spreading social, economic, and spatial divisions. Assessments that are more sanguine about their negative consequences need to be reconciled with the general scholarly consensus that the recent global economic crisis has been "everywhere eroding the primary economic and political foundations of integration, namely, a sufficient degree of labour market inclusion of immigrant workers and a sustainable … level of welfare consumption by those workers and their families" (Pastore and Ponzo 2016, p. 195); and spawning inequalities in income, housing quality, health care, access to city services and public transportation access, and the like that threaten urban sustainability and competitiveness and perhaps even social peace (see Tammaru et al. 2016).

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CHAPTER 2

Methods

Abstract Comparative studies of migrant integration, polarization, and segregation have favored various research designs and a range of qualitative and quantitative methods. This section assesses those approaches and explains how the analysis here plays off their strengths and attenuates their weaknesses through triangulation. Five carefully selected global cities are compared: Hamburg, Barcelona, Chicago, Toronto, and Montréal. Migrant concentrations and the most straightforward segregation indices were calculated across the most apposite sub-city units in each city for which relevant data were available between 2000 and 2015. Changes in the most critical aspects of migrants' structural integration have been gauged as well. Extensive fieldwork in the five case cities made it possible to have discussions with migrants and policymakers and to observe public spaces in key migrant neighborhoods.

Keywords Segregation indices · Multiculturalism · Ethnic enclaves
Public spaces · Neighborhoods

Existing Approaches

The literatures on migrant integration, polarization, and segregation have favored different research designs. Establishing levels of migrants' structural incorporation has entailed both objective and subjective appraisals of the labor market, income, unemployment, educational and housing

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conditions, and crime rates. Political and cultural incorporation has been weighed with reference to inclusion within host-society organizations, patronage of recreational and cultural offerings, rates of naturalization and dual citizenship, levels of intermarriage, use of homeland media, degree of fluency in the dominant local language, and formal and informal involvement in political activities (Ireland 2014). In this field, both qualitative and quantitative approaches have been deployed, with the latter typically preferred when scrutinizing the structural dimension—which is more relevant to discussions of socio-spatial segregation and arguably more central to the processes that give rise to satisfactory migrant integration outcomes (see Ireland 2004; Hellgren 2016).

Comparative urban research poses a variety of serious challenges, particularly when equivalent quantitative data are required, and qualitative integration studies have predominated (Ireland 2008). At the local level, several ongoing trends have combined to reduce the impact of this research. Migrant integration is a continuous social and political process of balancing and negotiation, which is impossible to grasp without paying attention to the intended and unintended effects of policies and non-policies. Above all in Europe, there has been a focus on the discursive framing of policies, with heavy reliance on ideal typologies and unsystematic content analysis. This scholarship "often ignores the way in which these frames translate—or not—into concrete practices" (Gebhardt 2015, pp. 4–5). Even then, practices (outputs) are not outcomes, which go largely unexamined (e.g., Falge et al. 2016; Hellgren 2016; Schiller 2016), even at the neighborhood level (e.g., Pastore and Ponzo 2013, 2016). Investigations that refer to civic integration programs alone and conclude that policy convergence is occurring have failed to consider whether the policies in question have the same impact on integration in different national and local contexts (e.g., Caponio et al. 2016; Gebhardt 2016). Policymakers might be interviewed in qualitative integration studies, yet few migrants are, apart from those attending focus groups or active in migrant associations, noteworthy for their limited degree of representativeness.

Weak case selection further blunts the impact of much current urban-level work on integration in North America as well as Europe. Migrants are unevenly distributed across receiving countries in terms of overall numbers and national and class backgrounds, but it is possible in carefully selected cities and neighborhoods to hold intervening variables constant and test hypothesized cause-and-effect relationships. Yet for every instance

of a strong explanation for why case cities were chosen (e.g., Ranci 2011), many more are lacking. A surprisingly large number of cross-city comparisons offer up little or no case defense at all (e.g., Sidney 2014; Becci et al. 2017; De Graauw and Vermeulen 2016) or one that is vague or not clearly geared toward testing the declared hypothesis (e.g., Caponio et al. 2016; Pastore and Ponzo 2016). Cases are regularly selected on the dependent variable, meaning in this case integration and segregation outcomes (e.g., Musterd et al. 2015; Mollenkopf and Pastore 2016).

Casual case defense plagues the literature on global cities, too. Those at the very top tier—London, New York City, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Paris—still receive due scholarly devotion. As the concept has been stretched and academic researchers, consulting groups, and journalists have come up with competing lists of global cities, precision and consistency have been sacrificed (see Leff and Petersen 2015). Arguments that all cities are globalizing in important ways (Amen et al. 2006) and that "global cities are not all global in the same way" (Moore 2016, p. 373) have opened the door to consideration of almost any urban center. Applying the "global" label to each of a pair of cities, no matter how disparate, can be presented without further justification as authorizing comparisons between them on nearly any subject: see, for example, Velasco Caballero and De los Ángeles Torres (2013) on Chicago and Madrid; Foner et al. (2014) on Amsterdam and New York City; Marr (2016) on Detroit and Lagos. Edited volumes (e.g., Amen et al. 2006; Crul and Mollenkopf 2012; Tammaru et al. 2016) not infrequently present either loose grab-bags of city cases or collections not resulting from scientifically defensible or entirely convincing calculations.

Nina Glick Schiller and Ayse Çağlar (2009) have made the case that migrants act as urban scale-makers and that "pathways of migrant incorporation" both affect and are affected by a given city's position in the "networks of capital" that comprise the global system (pp. 191–192). Underplayed in their discussion is the fact that in any city, certain places and activities are more globalized than others; it is misleading to treat urban centers as somehow bounded. This perspective has nonetheless been influential in encouraging researchers at least to keep issues of comparable global positioning in mind when constructing their research designs.

The bulk of the work dealing with socio-spatial polarization and segregation relies on resolutely quantitative methods. A raft of measures and indices has been concocted to assess the five identified dimensions of residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1988), augmented with

geographic information and mapping. The types of data that must be amassed render comparative (especially cross-national) studies problematic. The most popular segregation measure is the dissimilarity index (the level of spatial inequality between population categories in a given area). The values change depending on the scale of the neighborhoods, enumeration districts, boroughs, postal codes, or census tracts used (known as the modifiable areal unit problem) and say nothing about the causes of the observed patterns or their differing meanings for members of the minority and majority populations (Lloyd et al. 2015). The isolation index (the likelihood of meeting someone of one's own category in one's own area) and the exposure index (the likelihood of meeting someone of the other category in one's own area) also vary with unit scale (Musterd 2011).

These and other more intricate statistical measures only estimate chances of encounters, not actual contacts or their quality: "interaction suffuses these studies as an imputed variable" (Duneier 2013). As illuminating as this body of work has been, it has not been able to impart insight into how people of different backgrounds live together or how diversity works on a day-to-day basis in urban centers. Some prominent segregation scholars now acknowledge that statistical analyses "simply fail to fully consider the rich reality of contemporary cities, with all their different historical layers and contemporary diversity in their key institutions," and they have begun to experiment with ways to incorporate the "unique characteristics of place (the genius loci)" into their projects (Tammaru et al. 2016, pp. 10–11).

They might want to consider looking for that spirit in public spaces. New Urbanists and advocates of "smart growth" and sustainability have all championed urban designs that encourage mixing by income and household type in housing. The accent has been on physical and functional fit with surrounding areas, diverse unit types, and the provision of shared open spaces (Thibert 2007). A parallel line of analysis has started with the observation that residential spaces are not the only sites in which social integration occurs. Even in those with mixed populations, interactions occur primarily when people have similar backgrounds or interests and are direct neighbors (Phillips 2007). Schools, workplaces, local markets, recreation and sports facilities, parks, community centers and gardens, public libraries, language classes, and other public spaces may be even more consequential as spots where encounters take place (Amin 2008; Audunson et al. 2011; Kalandides and Vaiou 2012; Morén-Alegret and Wladyka 2016).

Scholars have explored what makes for effective projects and management of public spaces and collective facilities (e.g., Borja 1998; Peña Astorga 2003; Koutrolikou 2012) and what causes others to fail (e.g., Vedrédi 2014). The exchanges that occur in those areas are not of the same depth, ranging from superficial contact to the more durable connections captured in network analysis (Creswell 1996). Even everyday meetings and practices shape and are shaped by the urban context and "can be regarded as the main element from which people derive their representations of cities and neighbourhoods" (Pastore and Ponzo 2016, pp. 183–184). In this "[e]thnic mixing in public life," tolerance is learned; "ethnic pluralism becomes visible" (Hellgren 2016, p. 163); and people who have "few opportunities for such interaction elsewhere can relax, imitate, and experience a sense of civility" (Duneier 2013). At issue, in other words, is cosmopolitanism: "when does living side by side … lead to creative, 'real' intercultural conviviality alongside everyday, taken-for-granted forms of cosmopolitanism, and when does it lead to antagonisms and separations?" (Werbner 2015, pp. 569–570).

Spatial issues are generally explored at the level of the neighborhood or sub-neighborhood. Depending on the research question, it can make sense to shift the focus to the city as a whole, since the "overall sociospatial structure or lay-out of cities has a major impact on the functioning of the urban public sphere" (Cassiers and Kestleloot 2012, p. 1910). The "spatial imaginary" of a city or urban area can contribute to fragmentation or to a shared sense of spatial ownership (Mitchell 2011, p. 418). For logical reasons, researchers interested in public spaces have been more likely to adopt covert and overt observational and low-reliability ethnographic techniques (e.g., Anderson 2012) than statistical ones.

Multiple Methods and Defense of Cases

This study endeavors to pull together several of the various strands of research on local-level migrant integration, segregation, and public spaces, playing off their methodological strengths and attenuating their weaknesses through triangulation. The goal is to explain how the relationship between the spatial and social segregation/integration of migrants has played out so far in the twenty-first century. Have patterns of residential settlement changed in tandem with migrants' structural integration, and has socio-spatial polarization worsened during the recent hard economic times? What, if anything, can global cities really do

Table 2.1 The case cities

City	*Total city population*	*Metro region population*	*Non-national share of total city population (%)*
Hamburg, Germany	1,800,000	5,000,000	13.4
Barcelona, Spain	1,600,000	4,900,000	17.7
Chicago, USA	2,700,000	8,700,000[a]	18.0
Montréal, Canada	1,700,000	3,900,000	11.3
Toronto, Canada	2,700,000	5,500,000	15.0

[a]In Illinois only. *Source* National and local statistical offices (2011, 2012)

to counteract the effects of powerful social and economic forces that feed exclusion, social dislocation, and disorder and to reconcile the contradictions associated with ethno-cultural diversity?

Answers are sought here through comparison of developments in five North American and European cities: Hamburg, Barcelona, Chicago, Toronto, and Montréal (see Table 2.1). Each is the economic hub of its region and a recognized first-tier global city, although clearly below Saskia Sassen's (1991) and others' very top centers and laboring in the shadow of a more powerful neighbor: Berlin for Hamburg, New York City for Chicago and Toronto, Madrid for Barcelona, and Toronto (and New York City) for Montréal. All of the cases are globally integrated to an equivalent degree, positioned similarly enough in pertinent rankings of world centers to be considered peers. Chicago and Toronto habitually place a little higher than the other three in purely economic and financial standings; the cultural, creative, and regional weight of Barcelona and Montréal and Hamburg's status as a preeminent transport and media hub level the playing field (see Kotkin et al. 2014).

Most of the five case cities have been compared to each other, e.g., Barcelona and Montréal (Tremblay and Battaglia 2012); Chicago and Toronto (Eidelman 2016); Hamburg and Barcelona (Clark 2012); and Montréal and Toronto (Sancton 2004; Grenier and Nadeau 2011). Several of them regularly share ideas on migration (Lunn and Vonk 2014), and Chicago has "sister city" relationships with Hamburg and Toronto. Hamburg's emerging HafenCity neighborhood will have a Chicago Square in honor of the connection. The City of Toronto's 10-year "Culture Plan for the Creative City," adopted in 2003, referred

directly to Barcelona, Chicago, and Montréal (along with Milan and San Francisco) as its competitors (Boudreau et al. 2009).

Besides their similar overall and non-national populations, these urban centers all have shares of foreign-born residents ranging from a third (Hamburg) to a half (Toronto) and have gained reputations for being welcoming of migrants. Importantly, among those residents in each are members of five national groups: Poles, Romanians, Serbs, Pakistanis, and Ghanaians. They represent a combination of traditional/ongoing and newer migration inflows. They take in both Muslims and sub-Saharan Africans, albeit not simply lumped into multinational collections or assumed to be defined solely by their religion or regional origins, as is too often the case (e.g., Vang 2012; Koenig 2015). The migrants' backgrounds are not always identical: distance and admissions policies have resulted in the migration of people with skill levels and educational qualifications that tend to be lower on average in Europe than in the USA and lower in the USA than in Canada (Maruszewska 2007; CMM 2013; Siddiqi et al. 2013).

Another present-day trend in migrant integration studies is a forceful reaction against treating ethnic groups as bounded entities. When they become the unit of analysis, goes the criticism, the heterogeneity of both the city's social fabric and migrant populations is obscured (Schiller and Çağlar 2009), distinctions based on migration status and ethnicity come to seem natural and immutable instead of socially constructed (Dahinden 2016), a label is imposed that prevents genuine mutual understanding (Pitter 2016), and the forces and processes that produce identities and boundaries are ignored (Falge et al. 2016). As valid as such observations may be, it is not clear that starting with social classes, neighborhoods, cities, or other standard social science categories does not merely shift the problem instead of resolving it.

It has long been recognized that whereas some people migrate already equipped with clear senses of ethnic, national, and/or regional identity, others develop them only in the settling-society context (see Ireland 1994). To understand micro-level, bottom-up boundary formation, it would be necessary to conduct full-fledged cohort studies with freshly arrived migrants—not the content analysis, policymaker and activist interviews, participant observation, focus groups, and social network analysis presently favored. Another tack, the one taken in this study, is to address "both the patterns characterising country of origin migrant groups in different spatial contexts and the multiple migrant and non-migrant groups who share space in residential neighbourhoods, in order

to understand the constitutive role of both country of origin factors and of settlement sites" (Gidley and Caputo 2013, p. 25). As Andreas Wimmer (2007) reminds us, "there is no reason why a study design should not start by taking individuals from a particular country as the unit of observation," so long as one avoids the "fallacy of assuming communitarian closure, cultural difference, and strong identities" (p. 28). A migrant's country of origin—which is not the same as his or her ethnicity—factors into the legal status and rights that he or she enjoys in North American and European receiving societies, and settlement patterns as well as official monitoring of them both reflect and reaffirm the import of their original nationality.

Quantitative and qualitative methods were adopted here. Microsoft Excel 2013 enabled computation of migrant concentrations. The most straightforward, most commonly used indices of segregation were calculated using STATA 13 with data made available by local statistical offices: the dissimilarity, isolation, and exposure indices. Even though the latter two indices are probabilistic complements in this context, discussing both of them reinforces what is learned about segregation in the case cities. All of the indices were constructed across the smallest units in each city for which useful data were available across the study period and which have sociopolitical meaning for residents and policymakers (i.e., neighborhood, district/borough, community area, or ward).

At those levels, it was statistics on non-nationals (that is, migrants) that were available across the cases (see Rechel et al. 2013). It seemed reasonable to posit that these people would have been the component of migrant-origin populations most vulnerable to and illustrative of the forces of polarization and segregation. Wherever feasible, changes in the most critical and visible aspects of their structural integration (namely, in the areas of employment, poverty, and social assistance rates) have been gauged across the relevant sub-city units and not in blanket figures (compare Musterd 2003). Less systematic analysis has been provided concerning migrants' health status and the socio-spatial polarization and integration of naturalized and second-generation residents—as well as of migrant-origin populations in the suburban areas surrounding each case city. Extensive fieldwork was conducted in all five of them, which made it possible to have discussions with migrants and policymakers and to observe public spaces in key neighborhoods. The goal was not to compare results directly across the case cities but to assess fluctuations in each of them between 2000 and 2015. Structural integration deficits and levels of segregation could

remain significant and troubling, occasionally to an even greater degree in a city where relatively smaller declines were registered than in another city. Given that the integration process relates to shrinking the disparity between the migrant and non-migrant populations, what are under consideration here are the positive and negative trends over time.

As comparable and comparably positioned global cities, Hamburg, Barcelona, Chicago, Toronto, and Montréal could be expected to see their migrant populations (in general and their Polish, Romanian, Serbian, Pakistani, and Ghanaian ones specifically) experience similar pressures toward socio-spatial polarization—which should be relatively strong across the board, given each city's high global ranking and thus exposure. Research on such forces has been underscoring the modulating impact of welfare-state policies on residential segregation and, by extension, migrant integration (see Friedrichs et al. 2003; Gidley and Caputo 2013). It has been maintained that migrants fare worst overall under liberal welfare regimes (with the US variant less encompassing than the Canadian, and Ontario's less so than Québec's) and better under more comprehensive ones (and best under continental corporatist regimes like Germany's, then the Mediterranean variant as found in Spain) (Musterd and Deurloo 2002; Musterd 2011; Ranci 2011; Ireland 2014). This study's operating hypothesis was thus that ethnic segregation and socio-spatial polarization should have escalated and structural integration should have deteriorated more between 2000 and 2015 under the more liberal welfare regimes: the corresponding order would thus be Chicago, Toronto, Montréal, Barcelona, and then Hamburg.

In the end that sequence did not hold up. Only Hamburg maintained its expected status as the city in which migrants overall and from the five case nationalities experienced the fewest negative social and spatial effects from the latest economic crisis. Migrants in Barcelona fared worse than hypothesized. Those in Montréal fared better. More striking than those findings was that neither residential segregation nor structural integration indicators (that is, the gap between migrants and native-stock residents) worsened noticeably in any of the cities over the study period. Where integration levels underwent a modest dip (Toronto and Chicago) or even a sharper drop (Barcelona), pre-downturn conditions had returned for the most part by 2015. What mattered more was where migrants were moving and how their relocations fit in with broader trends toward socio-spatial polarization. Cities and national welfare states

appeared to have minimal bearing on outcomes, and it was often small, adaptive urban policies that did the most to improve the quality of life and social relations for migrants and the unintended consequences of their more ambitious actions that did the most harm.

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CHAPTER 3

The Global City Cases

Abstract This section analyzes Hamburg, Barcelona, Chicago, Toronto, and Montréal in turn. They were chosen in part because their migrant populations include members of five national groups: Poles, Romanians, Serbs, Pakistanis, and Ghanaians. The same topics are covered for each city, namely, the concentrations of those migrants and their residential movements between 2000 and 2015; their dissimilarity, isolation, and exposure indices of segregation; and key indicators of their structural integration (in terms of employment, poverty, and social assistance rates) over the same period. The author also considers local policy responses in each case, highlighting trends in migrant integration strategies, housing, transportation, and neighborhood development and their effect on the shared lived experience and multicultural public spaces.

Keywords Migrant integration · Segregation · Polarization
Public spaces · Urban revitalization (regeneration) · Germany
Spain · Canada · USA

Hamburg

Germany's second-largest city and Europe's second-largest port, Hamburg substantiates this book's general conclusions about the factors having the most to do with migrants' place in the global city. The transportation and housing systems—including social housing—and the economic and

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employment structure stood as the bequest of previous decisions and non-decisions, establishing the degree of vulnerability to economic shocks and the parameters of realistic and affordable future expansions, defining settlement patterns and access to services, and interacting with local geography to determine the degree of connectedness that areas of migrant concentration enjoyed with the rest of the urban area. In Hamburg, as in the other four case cities, the displacement of migrants from central neighborhoods undergoing revitalization out to undesirable, disadvantaged inner- or outer-suburban neighborhoods that had begun before the 2008 crash persisted after it. However, the phenomenon was more contained in Hamburg—where the drift was from central areas toward the east, south, and to some extent west—than anywhere else but Montréal. Those two cities had public transportation infrastructures that kept almost all areas of migrant concentration within reach of the main employment, shopping, entertainment, and governmental centers.

The case of Hamburg demonstrates that residential proximity and reasonably good transportation linkages are not always enough on their own to guarantee lively, prosperous migrant neighborhoods. Modest enhancements made to the built environment and public spaces can do more to bring them about than large-scale redevelopment. A local government has limited capacity to mitigate the effects of global economic forces, least of all when it is doing its best to position its city to profit from them. When it comes to migrants' structural integration and segregation and socio-spatial polarization, the more effectual initiatives may be those directed at boosting their ability to navigate urban labor, housing, and other markets and bettering their quality of life.

With respect to its migrant population, the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg displayed few signs of migrant spatial polarization or worsened structural integration resulting from the latest economic turmoil. On the whole, the trend was for more recently arrived migrants to join more established migrant-origin populations in moving from the gentrifying city core out to eastern, southern, and western peripheral areas. Endowed with a substantial supply of social housing units, they were wrongly referred to even by their promoters as "ghetto" suburbs (Open Society Institute 2010, p. 81).

Migrant Concentrations

The city-state was divided into 7 boroughs and 107 quarters or neighborhoods. In the Hamburg-Mitte borough, inner-city neighborhoods

like St. Georg, adjacent to the main train station just east of the center (Hamburg-Altstadt and Hamburg-Neustadt), and the St. Pauli neighborhood just west of it on the north (right) bank of the Elbe River were traditional migrant gateways, in company with areas on islands across from the port in between the waterway's northern and southern anabranches (yet usually referred to locally as being "south of the Elbe") such as Wilhelmsburg and Veddel. Hamburg contained modest stretches of ethnicity-specific cultural and shopping institutions yet no ethnic neighborhoods as such. Areas where migrants were strongly represented were culturally diverse.

St. Georg's reputation among locals and tourists alike as the fulcrum of multiculturalism in Hamburg was coming under threat before the financial crash of 2008. The neighborhood had developed into a colorful and bustling but also rough and rowdy neighborhood replete with major cultural institutions, cafés, ethnic restaurants, gay clubs and shops, migrant-run grocery and convenience stores, prostitution, drug dealing, beer-fueled brawls in the Hansaplatz, public clashes between rival Kurds and Turks, mosques both large and small, and the New St. Mary's Cathedral that served as the spiritual home for Catholics of all backgrounds in the culturally Lutheran city. Regeneration pressures radiated out from the Altstadt in all directions into adjoining areas, St. Georg included. It lost half its migrant population between 2002 and 2007, with more than 70% of the freed-up apartments being converted into high-end residences (Petzen 2008).

In 2001, the highest shares of migrants were in the small neighborhoods of Billbrook (78.3%) in the east and Veddel (68.4%), abutting much bigger Wilhelmsburg across the Norderelbe from the core. They continued to hold those positions in 2011, but the foreign share in each had declined (to 62.1% and 46.8%), as it had in the city-state overall (from 15.6% to 13.4%). In absolute terms, the foreign population fell almost 12% (from 267,410 to 235,499). The shrinking of the non-citizen population was attributable in part to naturalizations. Each year, roughly 1–2% of Hamburg's migrants took on German citizenship, with Turks, Afghans, and Iranians representing the largest contingents affected. Between the end of 2009 and the end of 2014, the share of people with a migration background grew in Billbrook from 65% to 74%. In Veddel, meanwhile, the share remained stable at around 70% (Statistikamt Nord 2015, p. 2). The absolute and relative decline in

the number of migrants in Hamburg also varied across national groups (Statistikamt Nord 2004, 2006, 2014).

Several of the five target groups of this study featured among the largest in the city-state: at the end of 2003, people with Polish citizenship (7.7%) ranked second after those with Turkish citizenship (23.0%) and ahead of their counterparts from Afghanistan (7.6%) and Serbia and Montenegro (7.5%). The order was same at the end of 2011, although the share of Poles (9.3%; up from 19,825 to 21,764 in ten years) was higher, and those of Turks (20.8%), Afghans (5.0%), and Serbs and Montenegrins (4.1%; down from 22,929 to 9246) were lower.

Poles had a lengthy history in the city-state, from the docks and factories of the nineteenth century to the forced labor camps of World War II. Post 1945, ethnic Germans leaving recovered Polish lands and political refugees entered from the east. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc and before Germany's borders were opened to Polish migrants in May 2011, low-skilled seasonal and undocumented workers in the construction and agricultural sectors constituted the lion's share of arrivals from Poland. Over the period 2001–2011, the three neighborhoods with the most Poles were in the eastern inner suburbs (Billstedt, Rahlstedt) and traditional working-class neighborhoods south of the Elbe (Wilhelmsburg, Kleiner Grasbrook). Many also moved into a large housing development from the 1980s in the southeastern suburb of Neuallermöhe. Apart from a thinly settled area around the port, no neighborhood had a Polish concentration of more than 3.4% of its total population. Talk among associational leaders of developing a local "Polish lobby" never resulted in concrete action (Jono 2010).

More Serbs began the decade in traditional gateways like St. Pauli and Wilhelmsburg but as well in eastern suburban neighborhoods (Billstedt, Horn). The eastward movement progressed even as their ranks were falling by 60% over the decade. Some but not all of that attrition was due to a change in classification of the country of origin: from "Yugoslavia," which pulled in some non-Serbs in 2001, to "Serbia" and "Serbia and Montenegro" in later years' tallies. In the meantime, the Serbian Orthodox community had moved from St. Georg to the Eilbek neighborhood in the northeastern Wandsbek borough. Serbs' highest concentration was in a heavily industrial eastern area (Billbrook), where 42% of residents were Serbs—many of them Roma—in 2001. That share had dropped to 10.4% by 2011.

Many Romanians, a newer, smaller nationality that likewise included many Roma, started out in central-city neighborhoods (St. Georg, St. Pauli). Further movement toward the northeastern suburbs (e.g., Rahlstedt) was already evident in 2001 and persisted over the ensuing decade and into adjoining neighborhoods (e.g., Hamm) and those to the south (Harburg, Wilhelmsburg). The size of the Romanian population had nearly tripled by 2011 (from 1153 to 3276). Whereas no neighborhood had earlier been even 1% Romanian, by 2011 both Hammerbrook and the redeveloping HafenCity quarter by the free port on the north bank had concentrations of around 3%. By 2015, after years of borrowing space to worship from other local denominations, followers of the Romanian Orthodox Churches had two modest churches in the Farmsen and Wandsbek neighborhoods in Wandsbek borough. Hamburg officials expected and feared rapid growth in the local Romanian and Bulgarian populations as they gained free access to the German labor market in 2014 (Balasko et al. 2013).

Hamburg's Pakistani population was only a little larger than the Romanian one in 2001 (1943) and had shrunk by 4.3% by 2011 (to 1135). It contained many adherents of the liberal Ahmadiyya Muslim Community from Punjab, harshly persecuted in their homeland after 1974, who settled near major affiliated mosques in northwestern suburban neighborhoods (Lokstedt, Schnelsen) (Lokstedt 2015). Less educated and with a weaker organizational network, many of the remaining local Pakistanis were asylum-seekers with a flimsier chance of having their applications accepted. Some dispersal of Pakistanis to the eastern suburbs (e.g., Billstedt) was already evident in 2001, and they had begun crossing the Elbe into southern areas (Wilhelmsburg, Sinstorf) by 2011. The ongoing relocation of the Al-Nour mosque from gentrifying St. Georg eastward to inner-suburban Horn was symbolic of the wider changes that were underway. No neighborhood's residents were more than half a percent Pakistani in 2001, and the highest concentration in 2011 was only a third of 1% (Sinstorf). Pakistanis' settlement pattern, like those exhibited by European migrants, bore witness to the complex interplay of both choice and constraint.

The same applied to Ghanaians, more of whom have resided in Hamburg than any other city in Germany. In Ghana, the word "booga" or "boga," derived from "Hamburg," has become slang for "expatriates" (Schmelz 2009, p. 12). Hamburg's Ghanaians saw their non-naturalized

members (half of them married to someone with German citizenship) ebb by 3.3% between 2001 (5591) and 2011 (5413). Predominantly Ashanti and Abron, Christian, and from middle- and upper-class backgrounds, their most important areas of settlement were, like other migrants', in the eastern (Billstedt, Rahlstedt, Horn) and northeastern (Dulsberg, Jenfeld) suburbs and south of the Elbe (Wilhelmsburg). Across the decade, their highest concentrations were in the latter zone (Veddel, Wilhelmsburg)—putting aside the sparsely populated Hammerbrook neighborhood just south of the main train station and a few subway stops from a strip of Ghanaian shops and restaurants along the busy Wandsbeker Chaussee in up-and-coming Eilbek, where few African migrants lived. This so-called heterolocalism—ethnic commercial districts forming organically to serve widely dispersed compatriots as well as diversity tourists—has heretofore been observed in suburban areas (see Brettell 2008). Other more urban examples could be found among Romanians in Barcelona and Pakistanis in Toronto. They are not to be confused with heritage ethnic districts left after a national group has departed an area and nurtured by municipal authorities (e.g., Chicago's Greektown).

Segregation

Table 3.1 shows that segregation across Hamburg's 107 neighborhoods remained more or less stable between 2001 and 2011 for migrants in general, as for Poles and Romanians. It ticked down slightly for Serbs and up for Pakistanis and Ghanaians. The exposure indices for all migrants moved from just below 0.80 to just above it; the isolation indices moved from 0.20 down to 0.17. Because of the modest dimensions

Table 3.1 Segregation in Hamburg (107 neighborhoods)

Population	*Dissimilarity index*		
	2001	*2006*	*2011*
All migrants (re: rest of population)	0.23	0.22	0.22
Poles	0.25	0.23	0.24
Romanians	0.27	0.23	0.29
Serbs	0.30	0.28	0.27
Pakistanis	0.30	0.33	0.37
Ghanaians	0.32	0.31	0.35

and concentrations of the five case groups, it is not surprising to see them all score above 0.96 (and above 0.99, except for Poles and Serbs) for exposure and below 0.04 (and below 0.01, except for the same groups) for isolation: they were ensured of contact with other groups and of not having contact only with members of their own group.

Structural Integration

Beginning in 2010, Hamburg put its faith in an inclusive Social Monitoring System (www.hamburg.de/sozialmonitoring) to fight social polarization and reduce spatial inequalities by identifying which of the city-state's 941 census tracts suffered from an accumulation of structural problems ("status") and were experiencing a downward trend (over 3-year periods, as of 2007). Stability was the general rule across the city-state up through 2015 (GEWOS 2016). The minority of tracts that consistently turned up as the ones requiring particular intervention were in areas containing more migrants: the eastern, southeastern, and western peripheries and neighborhoods south of the Elbe River and just east and west of the city center. Of course, one of the seven indicators of status and one of the six indicators of "dynamics" over time was the share of first- and second-generation migrant children and youths; the higher it was, the more troubled the census tract. Hamburg borrowed this measure from a forerunner program in Bremen, "which considered the share of the resident population with a migrant background to be the most meaningful indicator of structural problems" (HCU and UH 2010, p. 10). The Social Monitoring System's designers portrayed the socio-spatial "polarization of 'rich' and 'poor'" as occurring alongside debate "fed principally by the media over the division of the city according to ethnic characteristics," framed as the potential precursor of "parallel societies" (HCU and UH 2010, p. 67).

Separating cause from effect, it is possible to observe that key markers of structural migrant integration did not in fact undergo dramatic changes after the onset of the economic crisis or as a result of it. The *Statistische Jahrbuch Hamburg*, published by the Statistische Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein (2004–2015), reported that the unemployment rate in 2001 for Hamburg was 9.1% overall and 17.6% for non-Germans; by 2006, those numbers had climbed to 12.6% and 25.4%; but they were down to 7.8% and 15.7% by 2011. One in every five employers was then non-German.

By the end of December 2005, a year after the Hartz IV reform had brought together and tightened former long-term unemployment and welfare benefits, there were 198,168 people on the new social assistance program, a quarter of them (50,590) non-Germans. By December 2009, the total had gone down by 0.5% globally (to 197,191) but was up by 6.5% (to 53,858) for non-Germans. By December 2013, there had been an additional 9.3% drop in total yearly cases (to 178,824) and a 4.7% drop (to 51,308) for non-Germans. Non-citizens and their families were more likely to occupy social housing, although that situation was due in no small measure to their preference for larger units in less appealing complexes spurned by German-stock families. Between 2005 and 2011, over 100 bilingual health mediators had been hired; the share of migrant-origin children undergoing early medical checkups increased from 50% to 53%; and immunization coverage for measles, mumps, and diphtheria rose from 82% to 88% (BASFI 2013, pp. 50–51).

Table 3.2 provides ecological evidence that in the neighborhoods in which many of the target migrant groups and others resided, unemployment and social assistance rates and the share of social housing were all lower after the height of the economic crisis than before it. The reduction in social housing represented a double-edged sword: contracts ran out in many developments with such units over the decade, returning them fully to the private market, and Germany had underinvested in the sector for years. It was the manner in which social housing was financed and allocated in the country that had promoted the emergence

Table 3.2 Social indicators in Hamburg

	Unemployment rate (%)		*Social assistance (Hartz IV) rate (%)*		*Social housing share (%)*	
Neighborhood	*2004*	*2013*	*2006*	*2013*	*2003*	*2013*
Billstedt	9.7	9.4	24.0	22.8	48.2	30.9
Horn	10.0	8.4	20.5	17.8	20.9	11.7
Kleiner Grasbrook	14.9	8.1	28.7	18.3	0	0
Rahlstedt	6.8	5.4	11.8	10.4	27.1	11.8
Veddel	12.6	10.2	30.5	25.5	34.4	20.0
Wilhelmsburg	11.2	10.0	25.5	23.6	37.6	29.1
CITY-STATE: Hamburg	7.3	5.6	11.9	10.1	16.4	10.4

Source: Statistikamt Nord 2004, 2006, 2011, 2014

after World War II of working-class neighborhoods in which migrant and German families lived next to each other (Ireland 2004). It is important to note, too, that as migrants moved from inner-city areas like St. Pauli to neighborhoods on the eastern periphery and south of the Elbe, they were going from a seriously socioeconomically disadvantaged but gentrifying setting to a seriously socioeconomically disadvantaged but non-gentrifying one.

City Policy Responses

Hamburg distinguished itself in Germany by recognizing the importance of migrant integration and becoming active in using local social policy to promote it as early as the 1980s. Activity slacked off when a string of administrations led by the center-left Social Democrats gave way to several headed by the center-right Christian Democrats from 2001 until 2011, yet a full-scale plan was in place by 2007. It was reworked in 2011, when the city-state government embraced the view of migrant integration as a cross-sectoral task. In addition to the job training, educational, and counseling initiatives and emphasis on equal participation in all aspects of local life that have been typical of such municipal efforts in Germany, Hamburg also stressed German language acquisition, cultural sensitivity and outreach in the health sector, and the hiring of more civil servants from migrant backgrounds. By 2011, they accounted for 15% of mid-level trainees, up 10% over 5 years (Clark 2012). Otherwise, most migrants reported finding jobs chiefly through acquaintances and relatives (Open Society Institute 2010).

An Integration Council (a majority of whose members were appointed) was to assist officials in devising policy responses. "Integrated neighborhood development" constituted a primary theme, entailing measures to stimulate migrants' social and political engagement and contracts with the city-state's boroughs to contribute to creating 6000 new apartments a year, 30% of them reserved for low-income tenants. (These agreements helped explain the presence of Romanian and other migrants in the brand-new HafenCity neighborhood built on Grasbrook Island on the grounds of the abandoned free port). Money was forthcoming to enable each borough to fashion its own integration plan (BSFGV 2007; Demirel 2012; BASFI 2013).

The official commitment to meeting the integration challenge was asserted in no uncertain terms. In the words of the responsible state minister, Detlef Scheele, "We see ourselves as open to the world and

consider our city and harbor as the 'Gate to the World.' That is correct! Today Hamburgers hail from almost 180 nations and just about every second child living here has a migrant background. This diversity is a great enrichment for our city!" (quoted in BASFI 2013, p. 5). His ministry began its presentation of the city-state's integration concept by stating, "The coexistence of people from various countries is and was of decisive importance to Hamburg as a global metropolis" (BASFI 2013, p. 8).

This claim fit into a broader urban planning vision whose objective was to enhance Hamburg's international reputation and competitiveness. Its status as a global city was a source of insecurity, in spite of its huge port and its role as a major media center, a destination for numerous international congresses and conventions, and the seat of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Frankenfeld 2012). Policymakers resolved "to heighten the city's global competitiveness by means of a flourishing economy and high quality of life" (BSEU 2007, p. 3). The blueprint adopted by the Senate to ensure Hamburg's future as "a growing metropolis with international standing" showcased development projects along both banks of the Elbe River, which was seen as the region's unique asset. In its form and function, this urban regeneration was to take into account "the cosmopolitan character of the city and its distinctive features" (BSEU 2007, p. 4).

In the Neighborhoods

Occupying the largest island in the river, to illustrate, were Wilhelmsburg and adjacent Veddel and Kleiner Grasbrook. They were home to people from at least 60 countries. Public spaces had always been at a premium. Housing consisted of four- to five-story red brick buildings (*Rotklinkerbauten*) from the 1920s and 1930s—many of them rebuilt after wartime bombing and under historic preservation protection—that were built for workers in factories in many cases long gone. Veddel, once a rollicking workers' settlement famed as "Little St. Pauli" (Thal 2012), in its twenty-first-century manifestation was small, lacking in amenities, and squeezed in between bridges, highways, train tracks, and shipping container stockpiles. It was nevertheless well served by its S-Bahn rapid mass transit railway (and a private harbor cruise line). The station there and the next stop south served sections of the Wilhelmsburg neighborhood, although reaching other parts required a bus connection.

Out-of-town journalists reported on the shock felt when after leaving Hamburg's thriving downtown, they arrived after only a few minutes at Veddel in a "different world," a "cheap and shabby migrant neighborhood" with "only innumerable tearooms and a supermarket" (Stock 2014). Such a description did not do justice to the area: the New Hamburg Theater in the Immanuel Church mounted popular, locally relevant productions, and the neighborhood association (*Stadtteilladen*) had been active since 1987. The beautifully restored emigration halls of the BallinStadt Museum, opened in 2007, were a short walk away. The brick rental housing blocks, tree-lined streets, lively and diverse pedestrian traffic, and proximity of the river lent an open, airy feel to the neighborhood—and much of Wilhelmsburg. Even if that bigger neighborhood had its share of housing developments from the 1970s, a toxic waste dump, one of Europe's largest copper smelters, port facilities, and plentiful abandoned industrial sites, it also contained beloved parks, agricultural land, a nature protection area, and even a nineteenth-century smock windmill.

Out of early organized opposition to a planned incineration center, intercommunal conflicts over the siting and building of mosques, and a populist political movement against the "over-foreignization" of Hamburg's "Bronx," there eventually grew dialogue, cooperation, and united mobilization by the early 2000s (Groß 2012). Heavy truck traffic, train noise, and plans for a highway crossover above parts of the island and a waterway junction offshore acted as the catalyst for a residents' movement for a "livable Wilhelmsburg." Looser protest events broke out in Veddel, known for high levels of neighborhood identification but lower levels of citizen involvement. The participation of migrants in Hamburg was ordinarily higher in informal, spontaneous activities than in formal organizations and committee work (Aehnelt et al. 2011), and they were an unmistakable presence at demonstrations and meetings in Wilhelmsburg and Veddel.

Not in response to those local communities' specific pleas and without meaningful input from them, the city-state embarked on a massive renewal effort that directly implicated them. In 2004, Hamburg announced its intention to make a "Leap across the Elbe" and thoroughly revamp the built, social, and cultural offerings in Wilhelmsburg, Veddel, and a section of heavily migrant Harburg. Some 70 projects were organized between 2006 and 2013 through the agency of the specially created, state-owned International Building Exhibition (*Internationale*

Bauaustellung—IBA). (The Leap was envisioned as the pendant to the erection of HafenCity, Europe's largest inner-city redevelopment venture, which was orchestrated by a counterpart organization across the river, HafenCity GmbH.) A billion euros—two-thirds of them from private and non-profit sources—were invested in an up-to-date neighborhood center, new and refurbished housing, expanded educational and cultural infrastructure, jobs for the low skilled, business and energy parks, grounds for the International Garden Show in 2013 that then became a network of parks, and other public spaces configured so as to "appeal to different cultures and ethnic groups in equal measure," to "cater to a wide range of cultural backgrounds and different outlooks on life" (IBA-Hamburg 2013).

A flagship project was in Wilhelmburg's so-called World District (*Weltquartier*), where 750 of the 820 cooperative housing units were remodeled or rebuilt under the aegis of their owner, the municipal housing corporation. Just north of the development lay the Stübenplatz, a large square that had a venerable history of working-class rallies and multicultural mingling. The area had been successfully modernized in the 1980s and 1990s, welcoming new park space, playgrounds, schools, and renovated housing units. The square itself had received a new roof, offering partial covering for one of Hamburg's best-attended weekly food and clothing markets—and on early weekday mornings by the 2010s, one of its best-known gathering spots for eastern European day laborers (from Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania and including many Roma). Their presence, acknowledged and tolerated by local officials, was nonetheless a warning to them of the shadow economy emerging across urban Germany. More in keeping with their intentions for the neighborhood were the generous rental subsidies that they extended to encourage 400 university students, viewed as the harbingers of creativity and innovativeness—"the avant-garde of high earners in the *latte macchiato* 'hood'" (Kleinhubbert 2008)—to settle in Wilhelmsburg and Veddel.

All of the changes drove up costs for and drew criticism from existing residents, as did the perceived lack of opportunities for them to participate significantly in the process. The IBA was accused by social workers active with migrant populations of consulting exclusively with "uncritical civil society organizations, prominent among them religious organizations like the mosque associations or the Turkish parents' federation"; meanwhile, political groups with a more critical take on the IBA project were "constantly shut out of the dialogue" (Lasarzik 2013).

Long-expressed complaints over noise and particulate pollution, factory closings, cultural spaces too costly to rent, and persistent city attempts to route heavy traffic through the neighborhood were not silenced (Ulrich 2014). Official hopes of turning the area into a trendy, creative district (Interkulturelle Planungswerkstatt 2007) began to look less and less realistic. Skeptics pointed out that a “scene” needed daily foot traffic, not just sporadic incursions for scheduled events, and that the city-state’s newest hip centers in the Altona borough north and east of central Hamburg-Mitte borough (Schanzenviertel, Ottensen) had, like St. Pauli and St. Georg before them, developed from the “bottom up” (Luger 2008).

Another “social hot spot” that drew attention was Billstedt on the eastern edges of Hamburg. Formed in the late 1920s from three outlying Prussian villages, which retained some of their original identity, the neighborhood was a mix of massive high-rise complexes with abundant social housing from the 1960s and 1970s (most notably Mümmelmannsberg in the east) and pleasant blocks of older single-family homes. An influx of refugees and first- and second-generation migrants began in the 1980s and further fragmented the social structure. The neighborhood became known as a focal point of social work in Hamburg. Its core, what was once the village of Schiffbek, surrounds the Billstedt S-Bahn stop (opened in 1969 and one of four serving the neighborhood) and contains an indoor shopping mall, called the “Billstedt-Center.” Dating from 1977, it was modernized 20 years later. In response to residents’ demands, the surrounding area was overhauled just over a decade thereafter, receiving an enlarged pedestrian zone where a celebrated multiethnic weekly market made its appearance. It was linked by a broad pathway and open spaces leading to the well-used culture center (*Kulturpalast Hamburg*), which was the most sizable one in the central Mitte borough since opening in 1993 a stone’s throw away in the former waterworks (Bezirksamt Hamburg-Mitte 2012).

Far less renowned for collective mobilizations than hotbeds of activity like St. Pauli and Wilhelmsburg, Billstedt did have a dedicated core of community activists. Pleading a lack of funds, the city-state repeatedly rejected many of their modest requests, such as for a pedestrian overpass over the B5 federal highway separating the Bille River from its namesake neighborhood. Still, its accessibility to the center, ample green spaces, and heterogeneous, unassuming cityscape seemed to be appreciated by residents of all backgrounds. While migrant-origin youths came

off as histrionic when speaking to reporters with deep cynicism about life in the “ghetto,” the neighborhood’s poor image could indeed loom as a daunting challenge (Bille-Vue 2002; Brück 2015). When asked in which neighborhood they would least like to live, Hamburgers regularly named Wilhelmsburg and Billstedt as their clear “least favorites” (Die Beliebtheit 2013). By responding to (some of) Billstedt residents’ calls for small- to medium-level upgrades that enriched neighborhood life, the city-state arguably did more to counter social dislocation and advance multicultural harmony than through its grand, image-enhancing redo of Wilhelmsburg.

Barcelona

Similar lessons were drawn from the other European global city figuring in this comparison, Barcelona. Segregation did not increase there for migrants of the five target nationalities in the first decade and half of this century: it grew minimally for certain groups but declined sometimes significantly for others. Movement toward outlying zones was evident, as gentrification in the core compelled migrants and migrant-origin populations to join in a sorting out of neighborhoods along socioeconomic lines. Intra-urban migration could represent a move up in terms of housing quality and size, but migrants still occupied the lowest rungs of the market. Wherever migrants set up house, the surrounding area’s layout, physical and social infrastructure, and transportation connections deeply affected their quality of life. It could be more readily raised when a city government addressed deficiencies in those factors than when it redid entire neighborhoods.

There was a more pronounced drop in migrants’ structural integration levels during the economic crisis in Barcelona than in the other case cities. The discrepancy with the non-migrant population had essentially returned to the status quo ante by the close of study period: negative social indicators ended up bouncing back both for them and for their native-stock neighbors in parallel fashion. City officials’ policy responses did not seem able to modulate trends dictated by structural economic change and the sudden collapse of the construction industry. The push to make Barcelona a globally prominent creative city, however, led to development that stoked the gentrification and mass tourism that aggravated the challenges associated with migration and socio-spatial polarization.

Migrant Concentrations

Spain is thought of as a relatively recent country of migration (Castles et al. 2014). Catalonia, where industrialization arrived first and most intensely on the peninsula, is not as new to the phenomenon as much of the rest of the country. Many migrants were drawn to the region from Andalucía and Murcia in the south, Extremadura in the west, and Galicia and the Basque County in the north and northwest. Internal migration was already substantial in the nineteenth century, and it was also a feature of the "Spanish Miracle" that began in the 1950s under the autocratic regime of Generalissimo Francisco Franco (Cabré 1999; Morén-Alegret and Wladyka 2016).

It could be argued that the workers moving to Catalonia from elsewhere in Spain necessitated as much adaptation and were in certain ways as culturally dissimilar from the indigenous population as the international migrants whose numbers did not reach noteworthy levels until the economic boom of the late 1990s that extended into the early 2000s. In southern European cities like Barcelona, these newcomers, both legal and undocumented, filled jobs in construction (men), domestic work and child and elderly care (women), and the hospitality and tourism industry (Arbaci and Malheiros 2010). According to statistics provided by the Departament d'Estadística of the municipality of Barcelona (www.bcn.cat/estadistica), non-Spaniards comprised only 4.7% (72,784) of Barcelona's population in 2001, a proportion that quickly expanded to 15.3% (244,988) in 2006 and 17.2% (278,269) in 2011. While the percentage increase over those years was 73.8%, the city's non-citizen population peaked in 2009 (at 294, 918) and grew smaller thereafter.

In the mid-1980s, Barcelona was divided into ten administrative districts, in accordance with sociocultural and historical criteria that highlighted their internal cohesion and individual histories and personalities. Neighborhoods (*barris*) did not receive municipal recognition until 2006, and drawing the borders of 73 of them was a process that provoked widespread upset among residents angry at seeing several traditional communities split up and several small ones failing to gain official acknowledgement. The historic city center, the Ciutat Vella (Old City), has long served as the primary gateway district. The oldest part of the city, appropriately enough, filled with atmospheric corners and entertainment options, it has always been the epicenter of touristic Barcelona. In 2001, it housed 21.0% of Barcelona's migrants, who accounted for

18.7% of its residents. As they began to spill out of the crowded center into other areas, Ciutat Vella's share of the city's migrants fell to 15.7% by 2006—below that in nearby Eixample (17.1%)—even as its migrant concentration had soared to 42.9%. That same year, the share of migrants in the other districts' populations reached from just over 10 to 17%, a range that by 2011 had held steady in central districts but had shifted upward by several points in more peripheral ones. It should be noted that there were outlying areas in the Province of Barcelona that industrialized even before Barcelona proper, and cities like Sabadell and Terrassa in the county (*comarca*) of the Vallès Occidental had always been migrant gateways in their own right. The agricultural sector pulled workers from overseas directly into rural Catalonia as well.

Barcelona city welcomed migrants from a host of countries, none of them representing an especially hefty share of the total or forming any true enclaves. The top three nationalities in 2001 were Ecuadorians (11.1%), Moroccans (9.7%), and Peruvians (9.3%). As Latin Americans grew less numerous and South Asians and newer national groups more numerous, that order had shifted by 2011, when the largest contingents were Pakistanis (8.0%; up to 22,125 from 3305 in 2001), Italians (7.1%), and Ecuadorians (6.5%). Most migrant groups spread out across the city, and of the five target groups in this study, only Pakistanis presented any meaningful concentrations: 2.6% of the total population in Ciutat Vella in 2001, 5.7% in 2006, and 6.8% in 2011. Romanians in the Sants-Montjuïc district in 2006 and 2011 were the only others who ever constituted more than a half percent of a local total.

Migrant concentrations varied across the neighborhoods in Barcelona's districts. Thus, El Raval in Ciutat Vella—with a strong, centuries-old sense of place—alone housed 41.5% of local Pakistanis in 2004, for the most part from middle-class backgrounds and from Punjab. Many ran small businesses (barbershops, fast-food stands, mobile phone boutiques, internet cafés, travel agencies, and mini-marts), with others in agriculture, construction, skilled and semi-skilled trades, and the professions. Pakistani and Indian migrants could be seen in public squares in El Raval and elsewhere selling beer from coolers for less than half the going price in local bars. While family reunification was underway, the population was still predominantly male. The share of the Pakistani total was down to 23.6% in El Raval by 2011, as dispersal took place from the core northward along the shoreline to neighborhoods like El Besòs i Maresme in the Sant Martí district (8.6%) and southward to Poble Sec in Sants-Montjuïc district (7.6%).

Some headed north to neighborhoods in the upper Sant Andreu (4.3%) and Nou Barris (3.9%) districts filled with large housing projects. The city's Municipal Housing Board had first built such estates after World War II in closer-in districts on land formerly occupied by shantytowns. They were needed to house migrants coming from other regions to work in Spain's principal manufacturing center. More considerable complexes popped up from the 1950s to the late 1970s on Barcelona's northern edge around a new ring of textile factories and heavy industries. Products of collaboration between the city and several national housing organizations, the apartment buildings were characteristic of the chaotic urban development that occurred during the Franco era. The housing blocks in areas like Nou Barris ("New Neighborhoods") were not well-connected to the rest of the city or their immediate surroundings, and their poor construction became evident before too long (Walker and Porraz 2003). Migrants from eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Philippines joined Pakistanis in gravitating toward these zones with relatively cheap housing.

With very diverse origins, Romanians (397 in 2001; 6574 in 2011) were less concentrated than Pakistanis from the start. Only 7.2% of them lived in El Raval and 13.7% in the Ciutat Vella district in 2004, another 8.7% in Sants in the Sants-Montjuïc district, and 8.1% in the Roquetes/Verdun neighborhoods in Nou Barris. Around 3.5% of what was a more sizeable Romanian group in 2011 was in the latter *barri*, with another 5.4% in El Raval (8.8% in Ciutat Vella), 3.8% in Sagrada Família, 3.6% in Sants, and 2.9% in Poble Sec. To a certain extent, distribution across a wide range of neighborhoods reflected class differentiation within the Romanian and other national groupings—notwithstanding the heterogeneity of housing quality to be found within a single area and many migrant families' penchant for larger apartments regardless of their income.

Neighborhoods offered disparate opportunities for people of different backgrounds to mix, work together, or even engage in the type of competition over public spaces that could on occasion wind up generating the solidarity seen in Hamburg's Wilhelmsburg. To illustrate, a recent ethnographic investigation concluded that whereas working-class Poble Sec in the Sants-Montjuïc district had an animated and diverse street life and a "well-knit network of social organizations," in lower-middle-class Sagrada Família in the more central Eixample district, "both cooperation and conflict between groups are rather scarce, and they are not as important to the neighbourhood's life and to the residents' perceptions"; it was primarily in the combined library and cultural-civic center

next to the neighborhood market that "everyday interactions, albeit often superficial," transpired (Morén-Alegret and Wladyka 2016, pp. 103, 116–117). Suggested causes were Sagrada Família's more limited access to public spaces, busy through traffic, hordes of tourists, and more individualistic, middle-class population.

Another 3.1% of Romanians lived in La Nova Esquerra neighborhood in the Eixample district. There, a several-block stretch of Romanian travel and shipping agencies, groceries, restaurants, and other businesses had formed serendipitously along the Carrer de Provença facing one wall of the recently closed Model Prison and along nearby blocks. Another instance of urban heterolocalism, the businesses were patronized by Romanians from across the city, who hailed from all corners of their homeland. They bristled when confused with the Roma from Romania and other countries squatting in camps on empty plots and abandoned factories across Barcelona, above all in the industrial area of Poble Nou in San Martí district northeast of the center. References to Transylvania and the Dracula paraphernalia that competed with traditional country decorations in the restaurants and shops seemed in part intended to resonate with the strongest iconic images, however kitschy, that Spaniards had of the country.

Poles (236 in 2001; 2091 in 2011) and Serbs (140 in 2001; 399 in 2011) were less numerous and even more scattered than Romanians. Small clusters were found in El Raval and in Eixample neighborhoods like La Nova Esquerra and Sagrada Família, which were becoming known as poles of the new eastern European migration. The city's handful of Polish institutions and shops were located in the Sagrada Família neighborhood, such as the Polish Information Point, the Polish Library run by the Polish-Catalan Association, and the modest yet well-stocked Krakoviak market steps away from Gaudí's unfinished cathedral. The few Ghanaians in Barcelona in 2001 (107) largely congregated up in the northern inner suburbs, as was also true of this growing national group in 2011 (682): just over half of them were then in Roquetes/Verdun (Nou Barris) and the nearby neighborhood of Trinitat Vella in the northern Sant Andreu district. As a rule, therefore, migrants did not settle solely in certain areas, but they did form distinctive communities.

Segregation

Consideration of Table 3.3 makes it apparent that segregation levels across the districts (for which the most reliable data exist for the years

Table 3.3 Segregation in Barcelona (10 districts)

Population	*Dissimilarity index*		
	2001	*2006*	*2011*
All immigrants (re: rest of population)	0.21	0.17	0.14
Poles	0.18	0.18	0.14
Romanians	0.27	0.15	0.12
Serbs	0.24	0.23	0.28
Pakistanis	0.66	0.48	0.31
Ghanaians	0.42	0.56	0.50

2000–2015) declined slightly for migrants overall and for Poles, moderately for Romanians, and dramatically for Pakistanis. Levels were up slightly for Serbs and oscillated for Ghanaians, who had become the most segregated of the five groups—typical of sub-Saharan Africans in Barcelona and the other case cities. The exposure index was very high (0.92), and thus the isolation index was very low (0.08) for the entire migrant population in 2001, as would be expected given their small extent and low concentration levels at the time. In 2006 and 2011, the exposure scores were lower (0.81, 0.80), and the isolation scores were higher (0.19, 0.20). For most of the target groups, these two sets of scores were above 0.99 and under 0.02 in 2001, 2006, and 2011. The one exception was Pakistanis, for whom the exposure score in 2001 was 0.98, and the isolation score was 0.02. Those figures were 0.97 and 0.03 in 2006 and 2011—still indicating near certainty of meeting non-members and of not meeting only group members.

City Policy Responses

More than was the case in Hamburg and more reminiscent of Montréal, the municipality of Barcelona underscored the city's role as a global center of culture, creativity, and tourism. That push commenced when Barcelona was awarded the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in 1986, under one of the mayoralties led by the Socialists' Party of Catalonia that governed the city first alone and then in various coalitions after the return of democratic elections in the late 1970s. The drive for global recognition did not flag when the Catalan nationalist and centrist Convergence of Catalonia (*Convergència i Unió*—CiU) electoral alliance took over control from 2011 to 2015 or when the Barcelona in

Common (*Barcelona en Comú*) citizen platform won a simple majority in the city council election in May of the latter year. "Barcelona has always been a Catalan city with a cosmopolitan, universal vocation," began the new municipality's Municipal Action Plan for 2016–2019. "The fact that it is an open, mixed city has enabled it to attract visitors, talent, investments, technological and scientific innovations, and avant-garde cultural design" (Ayuntamiento 2015, p. 8).

Barcelona adopted its first Municipal Immigration Policy in 2002, and it laid the groundwork for subsequent responses. Even the CiU-led municipal government, marked by an ambivalent attitude toward migration that reflected its preoccupation with the issue of Catalan independence, did not change course appreciably. Policies and programs were to be cross-sectoral (or "transversal"), dealing with migrant-related needs in the areas of education, the school-to-work transition, job training, social services, economic promotion, culture, housing, health (notably sexual health), security and prevention, women and youth, sports, and international cooperation. Parallel structures were not forthcoming; services for migrants were to be mainstreamed into general ones.

Likewise recalling Québec, the model followed was interculturalism (dubbed *conviviencia*), whereby support for interaction between the diverse components of local society was to be rooted in a common Catalan culture and organized around the fundamental principles of equality, recognition of diversity, and positive contacts. (A separate Intercultural Plan came along in 2009, building on efforts in the 1990s.) The city insisted on the value for migrants of learning the Catalan language and for local anti-segregation projects of operating on a territorial basis (Ayuntamiento 2008).

Under CiU leadership, there was a shift in emphasis from dealing with new arrivals to promoting integration, inclusiveness, and social cohesion within the framework of *conviviencia*. The Municipal Immigration Council, created in 1997 as part of a European Union (EU)-inspired initiative with the appointed participation of migrant associations and other social actors, was to be better integrated into the decision-making process. Not by accident, the progressive drop in the migrant population was lowering both demand for the city's welcoming and orientation services and language courses and the volume of applications for family reunification; assistance for voluntary repatriation was added to the offerings (Ayuntamiento 2012).

Structural Integration

The Great Recession hit Spain hard, above all the construction industry that had been driving its growth. An uncommonly strong, diversified service sector did aid Barcelona in resisting better than cities like Madrid. City hall rationalized public spending, raised prices for city services, sold off municipal assets, and postponed public works projects. It also moved to foster transparency, neighborliness (viz., the "Do We Stay in the Neighborhood?" program), and social participation, making a special outreach to more fragile, marginalized populations (Rodríguez Álvarez 2016). Migrant involvement in associational life was as low across the board in Barcelona as in the other case cities (see Montagut 2013).

The municipality acknowledged in 2015 that economic indicators suggesting recovery from the economic crisis notwithstanding, an impoverishment of the middle class and a widening of the gap between rich and poor were a reality in Barcelona (Ayuntamiento 2015, p. 10). The city's relative social and interethnic harmony, compared to the situation elsewhere in Europe, was attributed by local and Catalan officials to the "Mediterranean lifestyle," the "spontaneous mixing of people in streets and squares," creating a context in which the policies and programs associated with *conviviencia* were catalyzed (Hellgren 2016, p. 155).

Records from the municipal register (*padrón municipal*), obligated to include anyone habitually resident in the city regardless of legal status, were assumed to omit a goodly number of undocumented migrants. Their ranks, estimated at over 19% of the total migrant population, were not believed to have expanded excessively after the crash of 2008. Some unemployed migrants did lose their residence and work permits, after which they either turned to irregular employment or left the country. When Spain restricted even registered undocumented migrants' access to free primary health services, if not other basic social services in 2012, Catalonia refused to go along, while adding stipulations to the receipt of care. Barcelona's city council reacted to the changes by offering counseling and by widely disseminating information on how to obtain a health card (Rechel et al. 2013).

Between 2007 and 2010, the economic participation rate in the city decreased from 72.9% to 66.2%, although the informal economy flourished. The unemployment rate was 5.8% in 2007 and 15.4% in 2009; for migrants, the share was 12.9 in 2007 and 30.6 in 2009 (Montagut 2013, pp. 4–5). Rates were significantly lower for migrants from

elsewhere in the EU than for third-country nationals. Moroccans and sub-Saharan Africans were most afflicted, followed by eastern Europeans like Romanians chiefly employed in the construction industry (Bellester 2014). As a percentage of total unemployment, the figure for migrants at first spiked and then returned to near pre-crisis levels: 12.9% in 2006, 17.4% in 2008, 22.4% in 2010, 18.8% in 2012, and 16.4% in 2014. Migrants were thus not much worse off relative to native-stock residents in 2011 than a decade earlier.

Furthermore, the city's Anti-Rumor Campaign has noted that in 2012, migrants were 17.5% of Barcelona's population and 17.8% of those receiving basic municipal social assistance services. That year, 27.7% of migrants lived under the official poverty line, yet the share receiving minimum income support was only 23.8%. (All permanent residents in Catalonia having spent at least 2 years continuously in the country could claim the benefit). Far fewer migrants (7.6%) depended on social transfers as their main income source than Spaniards (32.7%). Migrants, finally, scored higher on self-rated health in 2011—84.3% choosing the "very good" or "good" option—than their native neighbors (77.7%).

That said, the districts with the most migrants suffered most from the economic crisis. In terms of disposable family income, with the Barcelona average set at 100, the figure in 2007 for Nou Barris was 70.8; for Ciutat Vella, 73.5; for Sants-Montjuïc, 82.5; and for Sant Andreu, 84.3. By 2014, those scores were down to 53.7 for Nou Barris, 75.8 for Sants-Montjuïc, and 73.0 for Sant Andreu, but up for slowly gentrifying Ciutat Vella (79.9). Those results paralleled citywide differences in life expectancy and the Urban HEART (Health Equity Assessment and Response Tool), a summary index of 12 socioeconomic and health indicators formulated by the World Health Organization's Centre for Health Development in Kobe, Japan, in 2008 (Ayuntamiento de Barcelona 2015).

A joint regional-municipal responsibility, Barcelona's social and cooperative housing programs were minimal, and the construction of new units fell after 2011 from 1000 flats to 300 yearly. Social housing accounted for only 1.3% of all stock, compared to the 15% average for European cities. Over 80% of migrants rented their home in 2007, overwhelmingly in the private sector, compared to only a quarter of Spanish citizens; that ratio did not improve during the recession (Montagut 2013, pp. 12–31). In April 2013, only 126 migrants owned

social housing apartments. As in the other case cities, concentrations of migrants were linked to the availability of affordable, usually undesirable residential stock. A housing survey conducted by researchers at Barcelona Tech in three neighborhoods in the Ciutat Vella, Eixample, and Nou Barris districts revealed that in Barcelona, as in Hamburg, even modest levels of spatial segregation could conceal processes of spatial marginalization: migrants occupied lower-value, lower-quality housing; Africans and larger families faced the most barriers to accessing housing; and in buildings without elevators, a nineteenth-century pattern was reestablishing itself, whereby the wealthier lived on the lower floors (Gutiérrez Valdivia and García Almirall 2011, p. 8). As in other sectors, no specific projects were launched for the migrant-origin population. Equal treatment was seen as the key to preventing spatial segregation and to facilitating interaction between Barcelonans.

In the Neighborhoods

Urban policies with a territorial focus have typified what has become acclaimed as the "Barcelona model." Instead of comprehensive city planning, urban "projects" were favored: medium-scale interventions in specified areas that were intended to rebuild the urban fabric and craft a sense of place and identity, spatial equity, an even distribution of public facilities, and mixing across social and cultural boundaries (Illas 2012). The impetus was given by preparations for the 1992 Olympic Games, and one of the neighborhoods most altered as a result was El Raval. An overcrowded, dilapidated, ancient district, it had been the birthplace of Barcelona's working class. Its central location and cheap accommodations made it a magnet for migrants and transients. Once officially labeled District V, its southern half nearest the port was a hot spot of petty crime and the sex trade. A local journalist, after seeing a film about the underworld in San Francisco's Chinatown, had given its southern zone a nickname in the 1920s that stuck—'*Barri Xino*' ("Chinatown")—despite its lack of any Chinese connections. Criminality became a more serious menace when the heroin epidemic hit in the late 1970s, and the neighborhood was undergoing rapid decay.

District V's rehabilitation was a top-down affair choreographed by the Socialist-run municipality. Such undertakings engaged actors at other levels: "without the contribution of the European Commission through the Structural Funds, for example, it is impossible to imagine how

transformative city planning projects on the magnitude of the Central Plan of El Raval could be realized" (Blanco 2005, p. 9). Beginning in 1986, it entailed renovation of existing housing stock and the erection of new complexes; the introduction of upgraded social service agencies; the construction of student residences, a new police station, and major cultural institutions (the Center of Contemporary Culture of Barcelona or CCCB, the Museum of Contemporary Art or MACBA, and the Film Archive of Catalonia); and the carving out of a central plaza (the Rambla del Raval) that necessitated the removal of blocks of apartment buildings and the relocation of their residents, 95% of them elsewhere in the neighborhood. Loss of the area's heavy industrial base left it dominated by small workshops. Trendy cafés, tapas bars, and nightspots appeared alongside the halal butcher shops, Pakistani-run convenience stores (referred to colloquially as "el paki" and popular for being the only ones in town open on Sunday), hawala agents, mosques, a Sikh temple, and Filipino restaurants.

The neighborhood had become both more mixed ethnically and socioeconomically and more marked by stark inequalities. Migrants continued to arrive in El Raval, Romanians and other eastern Europeans among them. Pakistanis and other began to leave for districts with better and cheaper living conditions. Still gritty in spots, El Raval (the Medieval name replacing the stigmatized administrative and vernacular ones) was being gradually absorbed into "brand Barcelona"—'*Barcelona Marca Registrada*', the city as trademark or as model, perhaps even a "top model" (Deleyto and López 2012, pp. 158–159)—attracting private investment and tourists roaming over from the "real" Rambla nearby in search of "authenticity" (Riol Caravajal 2003). Artists and other creative workers added to the influx, responding not so much to city officials' cultivation of iconic cultural images as to the accent that local denizens put instead on their neighborhood's rough-and-tumble version of multiculturalism and its messy, multi-leveled history (Rius Ulldemolins 2014).

Complaints soon grew among residents who felt underserved by government, driven out of public spaces, and forced to deal with bad public behavior. Banners declaring "We Want a Decent Neighborhood" became a common sight on balconies in El Raval and other parts of the Ciutat Vella. At first, the targets of such ire included migrants. If interethnic tensions did persist over use of the Rambla del Raval, which Pakistanis were accused of monopolizing by some of their neighbors, the real focus of concern shifted to foreign visitors (López 2015).

In 2004, Catalonia passed a Neighborhood Law that led to hundreds of Integral Intervention Projects in Neighborhoods across Barcelona. They involved coordination among the central government, Catalonian officials, and the municipality and frequently received financial assistance as well from the EU and private investors. Neighborhoods in the Nou Barris—the district in which migration rose the most between 2001 and 2012 (by 454%)—were prime objects of revitalization efforts. Launched in the late 1990s in the gray, ramshackle La Trinitat Nova neighborhood, a new urban plan aimed to unify the sprawling area and its diverse inhabitants and link them better to the rest of Barcelona. Neighborhood groups (with more than a few migrant members) compelled the municipality to heed their concerns and include them in the process, in contrast to what happened in El Raval.

The outcome was greater inclusiveness in a context of less thorough transformation (Blanco 2005). The city's second largest park appeared on what had been the grounds of a mental institution. Housing a public library and the district's administrative offices, the cubism-inspired Parc Central won the International Urban Landscape Award as an exemplary public space (Fundación Bertelsmann 2012). Apartments infamous for their association with high rates of restrictive lung disease were gradually renovated or razed and replaced (Castilleja et al. 2001). The subway was extended to part of the Roquetes (Nou Barris) and Trinitat Vella (Sant Andreu) neighborhoods in the early 1980s, and by 2008, additional stations and expanded bus service had rendered the districts well-connected—even though deindustrialization had left many local residents with long commutes to what manufacturing and service-sector jobs were available to them.

More than in Hamburg, furthermore, the challenges associated with and confronting migrant populations extended beyond the city borders. Barcelona and 35 adjacent municipalities founded the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona—AMB) in 2010. Replacing three earlier entities, the AMB was to oversee urban, housing, and territorial planning and related forms of infrastructure in the conurbation (those related to mobility, parks and natural areas, and beaches, for example) (Rodríguez Álvarez 2016). The implantation pattern of industries, tourism, and the continuing significance of agriculture in peri-urban areas produced heavy migrant concentrations in many smaller cities in Barcelona's *comarca* of Barcelonès. Rising rents in central-city

zones drove migrants and other poor residents to the urban fringes and beyond.

Data from the *Anuaris Estadístics* compiled by the Statistical Institute of Catalonia (www.idescat.cat) point to the important regional spread of certain groups: only 67.0% of Poles, 44.7% of Romanians, and 64.4% of Serbs in Catalonia lived in the Province of Barcelona (of which Barcelona proper accounted for less than a third) in 2001; those percentages had fallen to 61.0, 35.2, and 64.2 in 2011. By contrast, most Pakistanis (94.8% in 2001; 90.4% in 2011) and Ghanaians (88.1% in 2001; 80.3% in 2011) were in that province and most of them in Barcelona or its inner suburbs. In recognition of such contrasting patterns and their implications for integration and social cohesion, city hall highlighted in its most recent municipal plan its search for "synergies in diversity management policies" across the Besòs River separating Barcelona from its eastern neighbors, including migrant-heavy gateways like Sant Adrià de Besòs, Santa Coloma, and Badalona, as well as to its immediate southwest in L'Hospitalet de Llobregat (Ayuntamiento 2015, p. 9).

Chicago

Built by waves of migrants in the nineteenth century, Chicago stands as another example of a global city left more spatially polarized by social class yet not by nationality in the wake of the Great Recession. Referenced as a model of urban socio-ethnic dynamics since the early twentieth century, the Midwestern metropolis, once the Fordist city par excellence, came to constitute a laboratory of post-industrial economic and social restructuring (Bereitschaft and Cammack 2015). The gulf between wealthier and poorer neighborhoods clearly widened over the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century. The city began and ended the period as the most ethno-racially segregated of the case cities, its white, Latino, and African-American residents (each representing around a third of the total) concentrated in neighborhoods in which they represented the plurality or the majority. Migrants of the five target nationalities had lower segregation scores, partly owing to their smaller numbers, and they did not rise over the study period. To a greater degree than in Barcelona, albeit less than in Hamburg, the gap between migrants' structural integration levels and those of other residents held steady. The levels themselves did suffer.

In spite of its status as one of the most proactive American cities in acclimating migrants to local society, Chicago did little to counteract the effects of globalization. In striving to raise the city's global profile, local officials attended to the needs and desires of high-level service industries and the neighborhoods where their employees worked, lived, and played. Less privileged residents and neighborhoods received rather short shrift. Thorough reworking of the municipal approach to social housing aggravated socioeconomic polarization and fueled the drift of poor people, both migrants and native minorities, to the suburbs. For better-off migrants, too, areas well outside of the Chicago city limits began to share the gateway function played by more central neighborhoods, much as in Barcelona and Toronto.

Migrant Concentrations

Comparison of data from the 2001 US Census and the American Community Study's 5-year estimates for 2008–2012 indicates that Chicago's non-citizen population fell in absolute terms by 9% (as the city's population subsided by 6.7%) and as a portion of the total from 21.7% to 21.2%. In the late 1920s, the University of Chicago's Social Science Research Committee divided the city into 77 community areas, officially recognized and comprised of varying numbers of both strongly and loosely defined neighborhoods. Armour Square—a south-side community area taking in one of the USA's few expanding urban Chinatowns, residual Croatian and Italian communities, the Chicago White Sox baseball park, and the Wentworth Gardens housing project—had the second highest share in 2001 (52.0%) and the highest one in 2008–2012 (53.0%). Next-door Bridgeport, (in)famous as the hidebound stronghold of working-class Irish and Lithuanian Chicagoans and the Daley dynasty, had become home to enough Mexican and Chinese migrants to make it one of the city's most diverse community areas. Other high migrant concentrations (from percentages in the middle 40s to the low 50s) across the period were found on the west (South Lawndale, Lower West Side), southwest (Gage Park, Brighton Park), and far-north (West Ridge, Albany Park, Edgewater, O'Hare) sides. A collection of neighborhoods in the latter array of community areas were the foremost ports-of-entry for newcomers, a role that had traditionally fallen to near-west and near-south-side districts, and had become unequivocally multicultural (Greene 1997; Paral 2003).

As for the target groups, according to census figures adapted by demographic consultants Rob Paral and Associates (www.robparal.com), Poles resided in the greatest numbers on the far-north and northwest sides, where they had gradually migrated after forming ethnic neighborhoods in denser inner neighborhoods. Their presence was most conspicuous in Dunning (19.9% in 2001; 19.5% in 2008–2012), Portage Park (19.7%; 10.9%), and O'Hare (15.5%; 15.9%). Dispersal toward the northwest suburbs (ongoing for decades), changes in US migration laws, and defensive naturalization led to a 37.2 decline in their ranks in Chicago over the decade (from 69,537 to 43,679). The three community areas with the most Poles remained the same (Dunning, Portage Park, Belmont Cragin) and accounted for 41.9% of them in 2001 and 42.7% in 2008–2012. Another sizable Polish community was traditionally based on the southwest side, where one of the country's few measureable populations of Polish Highlanders (*Górale*) had settled along Archer Avenue. Polish institutions and small businesses were situated there, and over time further out into the southwest side (Garfield Ridge) and adjacent suburbs.

On the north side, a string of "Polish Villages" or "Polish Patches" had first emerged in core working-class neighborhoods and later spread out to the northwest in tandem with patterns of settlement and initial entry: from the "Polish Triangle" in West Town, up along Milwaukee Avenue (the "Polish Corridor") to the "Polish Village/Jackowo" in Avondale, almost to O'Hare International Airport, and then into the adjacent suburbs. Remnants of the once-thriving Polish communities associated with the steel industry on Chicago's far southeast side existed across the state line in northwest Indiana. Neither the wealthiest nor the neediest migrants, Poles had effectively adhered to the classic ethnic succession model (Paral 2004).

Romanians continued to migrate to the Chicago area, but many of them were also either moving to the northwestern suburbs or settling there directly. The city's Romanian population fell 5.9% between 2001 and 2008–2012 (from 5774 to 5435). These migrants lived in a number of community areas, in particular on the far-north (West Ridge, Edgewater) and north (Lincoln Square) sides. Even there, they represented but a small fraction of the population, never more than just over 1%. That pattern was replicated among Pakistanis, who experienced a decline in their non-citizen members in Chicago proper of one-third (from 8740 to 5831) and whose highest concentration was 5.6% in 2001 (in West Ridge) and 3.6% in 2008–2012 (in O'Hare). The story was similar for Serbs, who dropped

in number by over a third (from 12,088 to 7947), except that their modest population shares (not more than 3.8% anywhere) peaked both on the far-north (Edgewater, O'Hare, West Ridge) and far-southeast (Hegewisch, East Side) sides. Romanians and Serbs were evenly distributed across the northern areas where they were most numerous. Pakistanis, on the other hand, were notably concentrated in the middle-class West Ridge community area (46.8% of them in 2001; 46.1% in 2008–2012). It was the site of the "Desi Corridor" along West Devon Avenue (a section of which was renamed Mohammed Ali Jinnah Avenue), which was lined with Indian and Pakistani shops and restaurants—next to pockets of others serving smaller Arab, Assyrian, Croatian, East Asian, Greek, Iranian, Jewish, Mexican, and Russian migrant communities.

Ghanaians constituted a small community, albeit one that grew 46.3% over the decade (from 1970 to 2883). The far-north areas of Edgewater and Uptown accounted for 36.8% of their number in 2001 and still 30.1% in 2008–2012. They were also present on the near-south and south sides: whereas concentrations elsewhere rarely reached 1%, the diminutive Oakland community area there was 2.6% Ghanaian in 2008–2012. Settlement was continuing southward into Kenwood, South Chicago, and Calumet Heights—all areas with clear African-American majorities (in the case of Oakland and Calumet Heights, over 90%). In the far north, however, Ghanaians lived in areas whose black population share ran from only 14.9% (Edgewater) to 28.5% (Rogers Park). Aside from a handful of community areas in the southwest (Gage Park, Brighton Park) and north and northwest (Belmont Cragin, Avondale) with established clusters of Poles, no neighborhoods heavily populated by Latinos had many members of the five target groups either. The aforementioned community areas all contained ample European-American residents. Such a pattern contradicted studies finding that African and other black migrants live in "majority-minority inner-city neighborhoods … and have little opportunity for contact with white Americans" (Vang 2012, p. 223).

Segregation

With reference to dissimilarity indices, Table 3.4 paints a picture more or less familiar from the other case cities: one of mildly easing segregation for most target groups and at least stability for Ghanaians. Despite ongoing improvements, Chicago still stood among the most ethno-racially and economically segregated big cities in the USA. Even so, Polish, Romanian,

Table 3.4 Segregation in Chicago (77 community areas)

Population	*Dissimilarity index*	
	2001	*2008–2012*
All migrants (re: rest of population)	0.43	0.38
Poles	0.69	0.66
Romanians	0.56	0.50
Serbs	0.64	0.57
Pakistanis	0.71	0.65
Ghanaians	0.63	0.64

Serbian, Pakistani, and Ghanaian migrants could not help but have contact with American citizens. Exposure indices were 0.66 in 2001 and 0.68 in 2008–2012 for all migrants; isolation indices were 0.34 and 0.32. For Poles, exposure was 0.88 in 2001 and 0.91 in 2008–2012, and isolation was 0.12 and 0.09, reflecting their clustering and greater numbers in certain northern and northwestern areas yet far from suggesting any true separation from the rest of the local population. Scores were above 0.99 (exposure) and below 0.01 (isolation) for Romanians and Ghanaians, and only slightly below 0.99 and above 0.01 for Serbs and Pakistanis. Members of those four groups tended to reside in mixed neighborhoods and were not plentiful enough to form encapsulated communities.

Structural Integration

Migrants' social and economic position had gradually been progressing overall, while the disparity between them and those of native stock remained stable (Paral 2003). Given their personal projects for economic betterment and willingness to work more than one job, migrants tended to suffer from lower poverty and unemployment rates. The poverty rate for migrants was 12.1% in 2000, down from 13% in 1990, and ranged from 2.2% among Filipinos to 23.1% among Bosnians. In 2013, the percentage of native-born residents with income below the federal poverty level was 23.7%; the percentage of the foreign born was only 20.3%.

Unemployment rates were also lower for migrants. Among such workers, blacks, be they African or Caribbean in origin, exhibited the highest unemployment, but certainly lower than African Americans (see Mason and Austin 2011). According to the Chicago Department of

Public Health, there was a higher share of migrants without health insurance in 2008 compared to other residents, with over half falling into that category in several northern community areas (Albany Park, Avondale) and nearly as many in a few others (Rogers Park, Logan Square, Belmont Cragin). "Lawfully present immigrants" became eligible for coverage under the Affordable Care Act of 2010, and while detailed assessments are not yet available, one may reasonably assume that that record had received a boost in subsequent years (www.healthcare.gov). Researchers have observed that heavily migrant neighborhoods in Chicago were less plagued by family disruption, joblessness, and poverty than other neighborhoods (Kubrin and Ishizawa 2012).

Examination of the community areas that were home to many of the target migrant groups reveals a wide sweep of poverty rate changes between 2001 and 2008–2012 (see Table 3.5). On the north and far-north sides, the spans for the foreign born across census tracts within community areas could be significant (www.city-data.com/poverty/poverty-Chicago-Illinois.html):

- from −10.4% to +7.1% in Albany Park
- from −7.5% to +17.6% in Dunning
- from −4.9% to +9.3% in Rogers Park
- from −4.4% to +17.8% in West Ridge
- from −2.5% to +12.8% in North Park
- from +2.5% to +11.2% in O'Hare

The recession wreaked havoc on some heavily African-American areas with a Ghanaian presence, such as on the south side in Oakland, where the change for foreign-born residents was from +13.0 to +51.0, whereas the trend line was negative in the community area generally. Once consisting almost entirely of the row houses and mid- and high-rise apartment buildings of the Ida B. Wells, Clarence Darrow, and Madden House Homes, it was a tiny community area of 5900 people in 2010, when those public housing complexes were being torn down (2002–2011). In other community areas, like South Chicago, the poverty rate declined in some tracts by over 30%, while in others, it was up by virtually as much. Given migrants' lower starting points in terms of poverty and unemployment, even a larger increase for them did not usually eradicate the pre-existing gaps in their favor.

Between 2000 and 2010, inequality among Chicago's community areas deepened, with some growing richer, others growing poorer, and

Table 3.5 Share of residents below federal poverty level and unemployment rates in Chicago

Community area	*2008–2012 Poverty rate (%)*	*Change since 2000 (%)*	*2013 Unemployment rate—Age 16+ (%)*
Dunning	9.8	+89.1	10.0
North Park	12.5	+18.9	9.9
O'Hare	17.8	+122.6	7.3
West Ridge	19.9	+39.1	8.8
Albany Park	21.4	+21.1	10.0
Uptown	25.2	+0.9	8.9
Rogers Park	26.9	+26.4	8.7
Oakland	40.6	−22.6	28.7
Chicago	22.1	+12.9	12.9

Source: Clary (2014, pp. 6–7, 22–23)

the middle-class ones receding. During the last few years of the decade, those corresponding to the height of the economic crisis, upper-class residents grew more clustered in a smaller clutch of neighborhoods, as more neighborhoods grew poorer (NVCNCI 2014). Neither the disinvestment associated with deindustrialization nor the reinvestment associated with responses to globalization and economic restructuring was meted out evenly across the Chicago metropolitan area—referred to locally as Chicagoland. Ann Owens and Robert J. Sampson (2013) have determined that Chicago community areas with higher initial proportions of foreign-born residents experienced greater unemployment increases during the Great Recession and that, more broadly, disadvantaged and minority neighborhoods bore the brunt of the economic downturn. For the five groups that are the focus of this study, however, the recession effect looks more like a form of those analysts' "equal-sharing outcome," whereby absolute differences widened across areas of the city, while inter-group differences remained essentially unchanged.

City Policy Responses and the Neighborhoods

Meanwhile, Chicago responded to the decline of its heavy industrial base by highlighting its key position in the global financial system (the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade) and continental railroad network (Hudson 2006) and by promoting the city as a tourist,

business, and conference destination. Under Mayors Harold Washington (1983–1987) and Richard M. Daley (1989–2011), son of the legendary Democratic Party machine boss Richard J. Daley (1955–1976), investments were made in the Navy Pier entertainment complex, a rebuilt convention center, showcase and "pocket" parks, concert venues, and sports arenas in (near-)core community areas to draw both visitors and professional-managerial workers back into the city. The very name of the overarching Central Area Plan, adopted in 2003, betrayed its geographical focal point. Public and private sector actors operated under the auspices of a new governing structure: an "intergovernmental triad" including the mayor and municipality, the state government, and "state-created special purpose authorities" (Smith 2013, p. 133).

Ethnic neighborhoods were redeveloped and geared toward cultural tourism, and the city trumpeted its diversity. The officially designated neighborhoods were sometimes commercial heritage districts, their "ethnic" residents having left for the suburbs (Greektown, Little Italy). Others were vibrant communities encouraged by city hall and/or their own business leaders to market and package their culture in a way that had not been customary (Saclarides 2009). In the latter category were Chinatown (Armour Square), New Chinatown/Little Saigon (Uptown), Swedish Andersonville (Edgewater), Germantown (Lincoln Square), Polish Village, the Desi Corridor, and Pilsen. The Pilsen neighborhood, in the Lower West Side not far from the downtown core (known as the Loop), was one of Chicago's original ports-of-entry. German and Irish migrants had given way to Czechs and other central and eastern Europeans in the late 1880s. Succeeding them in the 1960s were Mexicans, some of them displaced by the construction of the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle campus that also pushed out the original Greektown and decimated Little Italy. To attract white-collar workers, developers by the 1990s were emphasizing "local culture" and marketed Pilsen as "an authentically Mexican neighborhood" and "a true Chicago Barrio" (Wilson et al. 2004, p. 1177). Gentrification was slowly driving the Mexican-origin population to the south (Bridgeport) and southwest (Little Village, McKinley Park, Brighton Park, Archer Heights) and into suburban areas.

Spurring all of these phenomena were a zoning process dominated by ward aldermen and special Tax Increment Financing districts, within which future property tax revenues were diverted to fund community improvement and beautification projects. Gentrification in

ethnic and lakeshore neighborhoods occasionally drove residents into areas lacking "social supports or culturally appropriate public services" (Saclarides 2009). Such demographic churn was not unprecedented, of course, having been evident in migrant-origin and working-class communities and Chicago's series of gay villages for decades (see Howard 2015).

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2011), a think tank founded in 1922, expressed the consensus of local political and economic leaders when it declared "our belief, our conviction, that immigrants play an integral role in each of the dimensions that make a city globally competitive and are therefore key to Chicago's future as a top-tier global city" (p. 79). By means of an executive order, Mayor Harold Washington had declared Chicago a "sanctuary city" for immigrants and refugees in 1985, guaranteeing all residents access to city services and ending municipal agencies' cooperation with federal immigration authorities. The policy, which became law in 2006, was used to exert a pull on migrants, who were considered crucial to sustaining the local labor force and economy.

In 2005, the state of Illinois started the New Americans Initiative, the first statewide effort to integrate migrants. The politically connected, non-profit Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR), chosen to administer the program, sent outreach workers to assist with applications for citizenship and voter registration. In 2012, a year after Mayor Rahm Emanuel, President Barack Obama's former chief of staff, assumed office, the Chicago New Americans Initiative and Mayor's Office of New Americans (ONA) were inaugurated. "This comprehensive plan is the first of its kind for any major city in the country," Emmanuel observed. "The plan will help Chicago establish its place as a leader in the 21st century global economy" (Office of New Americans 2012, p. 1) and the world's "most immigrant-friendly city" (quoted in Lunn and Vonk 2014, p. 5). Chicago was an early acceptor into the Building Welcoming Communities Campaign partnership among The White House Task Force on New Americans, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the national non-profit organization Welcoming America in 2015 (www.welcomingamerica.org).

The ONA ended up serving as a loose coordinator of sorts, and many of its projects were delegated to the ICIRR, local chambers of commerce, public schools, health care facilities, and public libraries. English language, civic skills, and employment training services and

support for undocumented children and youths were central concerns, as were actions to reduce the insurance gap and ameliorate preventative health access for migrants (Office of New Americans 2012, p. 38). Most striking about Chicago's integration efforts, however, was the prominence of business- and economic-related objectives in driving them. "I want our city to be the first destination for immigrants because they are going to create the jobs, create the new companies, the businesses of the future," the mayor proclaimed (quoted in Reeder 2013). The promotion of entrepreneurship, exports from migrant-owned businesses, and sightseeing in migrant neighborhoods featured markedly in ONA materials.

When it came to housing and segregation, Chicago opted primarily for dispersal. Subsequent to a 1966 class action lawsuit initiated by Dorothy Gautreaux against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), the city embarked on a desegregation program under which 7100 African-American families were moved from public housing projects to private apartments in mixed-race or white suburban and city neighborhoods between 1976 and 1998. Policymakers' hope was that the new context would bring more opportunities and yield higher employment rates and wages, less dependence on welfare, bolstered educational achievement, and intergenerational advancement. Positive evaluations of the Gautreaux Project's impact on those fronts inspired the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to mount the Moving to Opportunity randomized social experiment in the mid- to late-1990s that tested the strategy in five cities, Chicago among them, focusing exclusively on social class. The CHA would begin a second Gautreaux Project in 2002 (Duncan and Zuberi 2006). Criticisms of such policies' effectiveness multiplied as the years passed. Irrespective of that debate, the programs were touted by local and federal officials as providing vindication of dispersal strategies.

That logic underlay the HUD's HOPE (Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere) VI model, as filtered through the prism of New Urbanism and defensible space theory, which commenced in 1992 and gained legal recognition in 1998. Fortified by HOPE VI block grants, Mayor Daley and the CHA announced a Plan for Transformation in 1999. Over 10 years, $1.5 billion was invested in demolishing 25,000 public housing units and replacing them with mixed housing. The families forced out of their homes—93% of them African Americans—enjoyed a "right to return": they could live permanently in the new or

rehabbed apartments. The likelihood of more than a minority of them ever doing so was slim, and the Plan for Transformation did not replace all of the units it had eliminated in any case. With subsidized public housing accommodation (project-based Section 8) having shrunk, far more of the social housing burden was transferred to the Housing Choice Voucher subsidy program (tenant-based Section 8). It pays the balance of a fair market rent payment exceeding 30% of a renter's monthly income and in most cases moves with the recipient.

Permanent resident migrants and refugees could apply for either type of Section 8 program. Comparatively little is known about the residential choices and locations of migrant beneficiaries, but existing studies have suggested that on average between 6% and 7% of those eligible receive housing assistance—a slightly higher proportion than among non-migrants but still a small share. Migrants employing vouchers have been shown to rely more heavily on social connections to find housing and settle in neighborhoods with higher migrant concentrations and worse economic and living conditions (Basolo and Nguyen 2009, pp. 101–119).

Heightened demand and cuts in funding threw Chicago's voucher system into crisis. The waiting list was long and closed periodically for long stretches of time. When it did open, hundreds of thousands of applications were filed, and a random lottery decided which small number of families would be added. Many others were ending up either in inner southern suburbs, where more apartments accepting vouchers were available, or cheaper private-sector units around the southern and western fringes of the city (Moser 2014). As early as 2002, Chicago's Cook County and a group of suburban counties were collaborating in a Regional Housing Initiative. They were pooling a fraction of their voucher funds to subsidize the construction of affordable housing in attractive areas with transit options, "recognizing that the segregation of low-income residents in the urban core was holding back the region's economy" and later that the recession had left numerous parcels of unused and abandoned land in their communities (Semuel 2015).

Chicago itself became the largest US jurisdiction with an inclusionary zoning program in 2010. It was adopted over the objections of the mayor after a multi-year lobbying effort by a broad coalition of community organizations (Wellesley Institute 2010a). The city had had two earlier programs utilizing regulatory incentives to add to the stock of affordable housing. The new Affordable Requirements Ordinance

required residential developments of ten or more apartments to supply 10% of them at affordable prices if they were on municipal-owned land and 20% if the city had furnished any financial assistance. The ordinance likewise applied if an approved zoning change increased project density or allowed a residential use not previously sanctioned or if a planned development in the downtown area was at issue. Nearly all of the affected accommodations would be subject to regulation for 99 years and all of them for at least 30 years. Developers were permitted to make payments to an Affordable Housing Opportunity Fund in lieu of providing affordable units. This scheme, like the Regional Housing Initiative, could do no more than put a dent in the demand for new units.

Some migrants from Africa on the south side, whether dislodged from housing projects or not, were following the same outward trajectory as African Americans. On top of the discrimination that faced all people seeking and living in subsidized housing, migrants had less familiarity with the voucher system and fair housing laws and often required larger apartments, which were not always easy to find in the most convenient locales. Moreover, migrants could be exploited by members of their own ethno-cultural group. Migrant-origin landlords, accustomed to renting to compatriots by referral, commonly provided low-quality housing in connection with low-wage, possibly illicit employment. The housing market crash and the foreclosure crisis, finally, fell disproportionately hard on minority and migrant households (AREA 2016).

Most of the migrant families affected by the transformation of the (social) housing market were trading one disadvantaged neighborhood for another as they moved to Chicago's fringes or suburbs, where concentrated poverty was emerging in parallel. Entire tracts on the city's south and west sides were being hollowed out, left just as poor or poorer "and even less appealing as a destination for new residents" (Moser 2014). The mayor-appointed Chicago Board of Education shuttered 50 public schools there in 2014, the country's largest ever one-time closure. The focus was decidedly on individuals and families and not on neighborhoods, a tack not taken in Europe or Canada. Cities like Hamburg and Barcelona eschewed dispersal for area-based policies, as observed above; and when faced with the dysfunctions of previous housing decisions, Toronto would choose to repair instead of razing.

Chicago's far-south and south suburban areas were normally farther from employment and educational opportunities and ill-served by public

transportation. A Brookings Institution study in 2011 concluded that 79% of working residents lived near a transit stop but that only 24% of all jobs were reachable by public transit within 90 min (Tomer et al. 2011). South siders and minorities faced the longest commutes, and theirs were more likely to involve buses. The Chicago Transit Authority was accused of underfunding inner-city bus and subway/train service outside the Loop for the benefit of suburban commuter lines in well-off zones, thereby reducing transportation access for minority populations in "transit deserts" (Noonan 2009). Funding shortfalls in 2010 necessitated layoffs and service cuts that hurt bus commuters on the west and south sides unduly (Freemark 2010). Earlier cuts had made entire neighborhoods (including Kenwood and Oakland) inaccessible by public transit at night, impacting those in the lowest paid jobs and least able to pay for other forms of transit (Lutton 1997). Repeated promises to extend the most-traveled rail line, the Red (or Howard-Dan Ryan) Line, south to the city limits went unfulfilled. Besides the cost factor and prioritization of affluent areas, fears that the trains could render those wealthier neighborhoods more easily accessible to criminals figured in the debate (O'Neil 2011).

By 2000, fewer migrants in Chicagoland lived inside the city than outside, and it was apparent that west and northwestern suburban areas were gaining substantial concentrations as well. A string of residential suburbs running north and northwest of O'Hare Airport outside of Chicago yet still in the selfsame Cook County (Wheeling, Rolling Meadows, Prospect Heights, Mount Prospect) were becoming migration gateways in their own right. Close-in Cicero, together with areas around other older satellite cities (e.g., Aurora, Elgin, Joliet, and Waukegan) in the so-called collar counties, were likewise becoming major destinations (Paral 2003). The trajectory of employment and migrant growth followed "axial sectors established early on in the development of the Chicago region" (Greene 1997, p. 190). The relocation of certain manufacturing jobs to such areas, as firms seized on the chance to exploit a non-unionized workforce and more inexpensive real estate, gave a fillip to the exodus. So did the availability to migrants of work in the housing industry as construction workers, landscapers, and realtors—making them vulnerable in the downturn (NVCNCI 2011).

Poles, Romanians, Serbs, and Pakistanis were among the migrants dispersing in that direction, as had many of the same migrant origins before them. Between 2000 and 2010, the Romanian migrant population grew by 130%, the most of all migrant nationalities in the northern suburbs

(NVCNCI 2011, p. 21). Some newly arriving members of all four groups were bypassing the city and moving there directly. Ghanaians, Eritreans, and Ethiopians who had migrated to the upper-north side joined others who were leaving for the northern suburbs after they had achieved a measure of material success. Migrants heading outward were characterized by higher socioeconomic status than those settling in town (Paral 2004). As a sanctuary city, Chicago also offered a more secure environment for the undocumented of all national backgrounds than most outer suburban areas and contained 183,000 of the state's estimated total of 511,000 in 2011—with 124,000 more in the rest of Cook County, which was declared a sanctuary county that same year (Tribune Graphics 2017).

Security of another kind was the burning issue back on the south and west sides of the city. Gun violence rocked many of the very neighborhoods there that were being left behind. If the city's murder rate did not place it among the most dangerous of American cities, it did gain special national and international notoriety from a sharp uptick in homicides, occurring just as New York City and Los Angeles were registering far fewer of them and doing a better job of curbing violent crime. Mayor Emanuel downplayed the severity of the challenge and portrayed Chicago's problems as part of a nationwide trend (Spielman 2017). Derided by critics as "Mayor One Percent" for his close ties to the financial industry and his pro-business agenda, he set a goal of attracting 55 million tourists annually to Chicago by 2020 and having it ranked among the five American cities most visited by foreign travelers (up from ninth) as part of the quest for enhanced global status (Lydersen 2014). Barcelona revealed that the tourism associated with such standing could have a negative impact on local quality of life. Chicago suggested the perils of fixating on knowledge workers and cultural and diversity tourists while neglecting the neighborhoods outside the center hurt by structural economic change and policy decisions. With new forms of inequality and exclusiveness "being built into the urban environment" (Noonan 2009), the social fallout risked robbing the city of its attractiveness to the creative labor force, investors, and outsiders viewed as pivotal to success in a globalizing world.

Toronto

Municipal leaders in Hamburg and Barcelona applauded the diversity of their cities and saw in it a valuable selling point. Neither metropolis contained migrant concentrations of the size and consistency or the levels of segregation to compose ethnic neighborhoods like those strewn across Chicago. Its policymakers highlighted those enclaves' distinctiveness, not their multicultural mix, and marketed them as an opportunity to tour the world and sample its sundry cuisines without crossing the city limits. That stress on consuming cultures instead of on achieving strictly multicultural outcomes epitomized Toronto, which was founded at about the same time and had a similar spatial layout and historical migratory experience.

The Ontario capital was not as segregated by ethnicity or social class or as violent as Chicago, even so. Toronto operated in the context of a more selective federal migration policy that yielded more skilled and economically advantaged "designer immigrants" (Murdie and Ghosh 2010, p. 304), a relatively more developed welfare state, and smaller native minority communities. Toronto pursued global prominence as intently as Hamburg, Barcelona, and Chicago. It favored many of the same means to that end as Chicago but did more to compensate for the side effects. As gentrification in downtown neighborhoods drove migrants and other poorer people into unappealing housing towers in Toronto's periphery, the city adopted a multi-pronged response and experienced pitched internal battles over how and how much to extend the public transit system. More well-heeled migrants migrated directly into suburban "ethnoburbs," feeding concerns in some quarters about enfeebled social cohesion.

Compared to the other metropolitan areas, even Chicagoland, the suburbanization of migration was more advanced in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). The city of Toronto witnessed increased socio-spatial polarization that exacerbated migrants' structural integration difficulties—while not adding tangibly to their relative deficit vis-à-vis non-migrants or upping their segregation levels. There was ambiguity in this respect, due in part to statistical challenges. Discussions in Toronto revolved around the foreign-born population and recent migrants, in particular those belonging to visible minorities. They were talked about in terms of broad racial and geographical categories (Blacks, East Asians, South Asians, West Asians/Arabs, Latin Americans, Pacific Islanders). The

"immigrant" population, on the other hand, encompassed three generations, and complete statistics on the national components of its non-citizen members, especially smaller European ones, could be difficult to track down. Nor could the meaning of an increase or a decrease in the size of a national group be easily deduced: it could signify more or fewer new arrivals, migration outside or into the city, and/or changing naturalization rates.

Canada conceived of formal citizenship as a catalyst for integration, rather than its consecration, and made concerted efforts to naturalize all eligible non-citizens. After Liberal governments under Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin from 1993, Conservative Stephen Harper took over as federal prime minister in 2006. Declaring a commitment to encouraging naturalizations, his governments simultaneously made the process more rigorous in 2009, 2012, and 2015 (Forcier and Dufour 2016). After the Liberals had won the October 2015 general election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's government moved to reverse many of its predecessors' actions. Throughout this period, non-newcomer, non-citizen residents were viewed as unfortunate, troubling aberrations (see Black 2015). Canada's geographical location made for a relatively modest population of undocumented migrants, and it took a while for them to garner focused attention. Toronto did not become a sanctuary city until 2013. (Montréal did not join it until 2017.)

Migrant Concentrations and Segregation

In 2011, the 5-year Canadian census was divided into a mandatory short-form questionnaire and a voluntary National Household Survey (NHS). Very controversial, this alteration made it difficult to compare results on national origins (asked in the NHS) with those from previous censuses. Migration researchers complained that non-responses to the NHS (one in four in Toronto and one in five in Montréal) were liable to come from the disadvantaged, vulnerable, and non-native, thus artificially bettering segregation scores (Hulchanski et al. 2013). As per Table 3.6, dissimilarity indices revealed the same general stability for migrants in Toronto seen in the other case cities. The foreign born had about even odds of exposure to out-group and in-group members in their home ward.

The surest way to assess developments affecting the five target groups was to combine analysis of available statistical data with those presented in

Table 3.6 Segregation in Toronto (44 wards)

All foreign born (re: rest of population)	*Dissimilarity index*	*Exposure index*	*Isolation index*
2001	0.18	0.47	0.53
2006	0.20	0.45	0.55
2011 *	0.21	0.46	0.54

* 2011 figures imperfectly comparable with earlier results

the Toronto Social Atlas compiled by the municipal Social Policy Analysis and Research Unit (www1.toronto.ca). The maps in the atlas employ census tracts or dissemination areas (small areas composed of one or more neighboring blocks with a population of 400–700 people), which represent consistent, continuous areas of study allowing for comparison over time.

The city of Toronto (or Old Toronto) made its migration-related responsibilities more complicated and researchers' task of uncovering complete statistical information a bit easier when it merged with its immediate neighbors Etobicoke, East York, North York, York, and Scarborough in 1998 to form the amalgamated City of Toronto. Those erstwhile inner suburbs had grown less homogeneous as inner-city migrant residents relocated in response to the spatial decentralization of manufacturing and low-level service jobs and the gentrification of urban-core neighborhoods. Eventually, new migrants began skipping over the more expensive areas and opting for inner suburbs and then also those outside the new city limits. Persisting as in-town destinations for the least advantaged were the original Chinatown (now one of at least six in the GTA), social housing complexes, and the least covetable of the 1960s-era apartment towers sprinkled across Toronto, filled with affordable units spurned by locals (Murdie and Ghosh 2010). Economic restructuring, overcrowding, and neglect conspired to turn those "tower towns"—or "isoburbs" (Walks 2014)—into deprived zones associated with gangs, crime, and substandard housing.

In 2001, Poles in Toronto lived mostly in the southwest end in the lower Etobicoke district, with other concentrations running southwest into the suburbs (Mississauga, Oakville); in central areas north of the core in the North York district; and north of the city proper (Vaughan, Markham, Richmond Hill, Newmarket). That pattern had only been reinforced by 2006, with evidence of even greater northward and (south)westward movement, and except for far less representation in central areas, was replicated in the distribution of people whose primary

home language was Polish in 2001 and 2006. In 2011, those whose mother tongue was Polish (27,870) were found overwhelmingly in areas to the west of the ethnic institutions and restaurants still located in the traditional Polish neighborhood of Roncesvalles Village. Other eastern European institutions were established in the vicinity as well.

Romanians and Romanian speakers (13,290 in 2011) resided in the same northern suburbs where those of Polish-origin had settled, together with north and far-north central areas in Toronto's North York district. A substantial segment of those Polish- and Romanian-born Torontonians were Jewish. Other Romanians lived in several buildings down in Crescent Town on the East York–Scarborough district line. That development-cum-neighborhood, built to take advantage of a new nearby subway stop in 1968, had long housed many eastern Europeans. As more South Asian and Caribbean migrants moved in, there was a waning of the Romanians' presence there, as they dispersed around the city and as movement intensified into more northerly areas and the adjacent suburbs. Toronto's Romanians, like those in the other case cities, were far from cohesive (see Visan 2012).

Serbs and speakers of what were separately denoted as Serbian (13,410 in 2011) and Serbo-Croatian (1725) dwelled in many of the same southwestern, central, and northern areas as Poles and in a number of suburbs to the southwest (Milton, Oakville) and north (Vaughan, Markham, Richmond Hill, Aurora). They also lived in several neighborhoods with major apartment towers in Downtown Toronto (North St. James Town), Old East York (Broadview North and Crescent Town), and North York (Victoria Village and Flemingdon Park, where towers had risen on a former horse racing track in the early 1960s). Other clusters were in scattered neighborhoods in the Scarborough district. By 2011, concentrations of Serbs were higher in a smaller number of areas, which were widely distributed across several sectors of the city and metro area.

Pakistani quarters dotted Toronto. The Gerrard India Bazaar—a strip of South Asian shops, groceries, restaurants, and cafés that arose east of downtown in the early 1970s—never drew many migrant residents and stood as another example of heterolocalism. Pakistanis did collect in several core and east-end areas like the Regent Park public housing project in Downtown Toronto and Thorncliffe Park in North York, as well as several neighborhoods in Scarborough (Agincourt, Bendale, Malvern, Woburn) and to its north and east in the cities of Markham, Pickering, and Ajax. Yet, they were also present on the opposite, west side of

Toronto in the upper Etobicoke district (Humberwood, Rexdale), across the city limits from suburban centers of settlement in Brampton, Mississauga, and Vaughan.

Pakistanis of different linguistic backgrounds gravitated to somewhat different corners of the GTA, which reflected the distinctive residential patterns that could be detected within many national groups and which were reinforced by social class factors (Qadeer 2003). Many Punjabi speakers (22,995 in 2011) lived in the western suburbs, especially Brampton, and the northwestern Toronto neighborhoods in Etobicoke next door to them; Sindhi speakers (2570), in projects in East York (Crescent Town), North York (Flemingdon Park, Victorian Village), and Scarborough; and Urdu speakers (37,990), in many of the same apartment complexes (Thorncliffe Park, Crescent Town) and in North York (Jane and Finch). Between 2001 and 2011, Pakistanis' center of gravity kept shifting to outlying areas, where ethnic commercial districts and shopping malls appeared. The Tehrik-e-Jafaria Shia sect constructed a non-profit cooperative townhouse complex for its members in Richmond Hill (between Markham and Vaughan north of Toronto). Thanks to adjustments in Canadian migration policies, there were even more middle-class migrants (by Canadian standards, that is, since they often belonged to elite strata in their homelands), and more of them were coming straight from elsewhere in Canada or overseas to Brampton or Mississauga. Traditional inner-city enclaves, meanwhile, still acted as gateways for their more working-class compatriots.

In 2001, Toronto's Ghanaians had a propensity to reside in Brampton and adjoining neighborhoods in the northern Etobicoke and western North York districts (Jane and Finch, Maple Leaf, Rexdale) stretching north of the Lester B. Pearson International Airport. Additional favored spots were a few blocks north of Little Italy in Downtown Toronto and Toronto's northeastern corner in Scarborough (Malvern, Rouge). A decade later, most members of this growing group were in Brampton, Etobicoke, and North York. Ghanaians over in Scarborough crossed into suburbs like Markham and, less typically, added to the migration of ethnic professionals into Ajax farther east. In 2011, speakers of Asante Twi and related Akan dialects (4770)—prevalent among the southern Ghanaian Christians constituting the vast majority of this group—lived almost exclusively in the northern Etobicoke district, the North York district (Clanton Park, Downsview), Brampton, and Mississauga. They had become linked in the public mind with several particularly

Table 3.7 Segregation in Toronto in 2011 (44 wards)

National group	*Language*	*Speakers*	*Dissimilarity index*
Poles			0.43
	Polish	27,870	0.42
Romanians			0.30
	Romanian	13,290	0.33
Serbs			0.35
	Serbian	13,410	0.41
	Serbo-Croatian	1725	0.35
Pakistanis			0.39
	Urdu	37,990	0.42
	Punjabi	22,995	0.56
	Sindhi	2570	0.47
Nigerians			0.47
	Twi (Akan)	4770	0.60

problematic and violent sub-neighborhoods in Toronto's northwest corner: Smithfield and Jamestown (dubbed "Doomstown") in Rexdale, Rustic in Maple Leaf, and Black Creek in Jane and Finch.

Table 3.7 bears out the fact that Twi speakers were more segregated than the other target groups. Dissimilarity indices were moderate for all of them, however, and were comparable to those derived from the NHS for immigrants by country of origin. (Figures for Ghanaians were not forthcoming, so those for another, somewhat more evenly distributed "Anglophone" West African group, Nigerians, have been computed.) Exposure scores were high and isolation scores were low. Punjabi and Urdu speakers and Pakistanis as a whole had a slightly greater chance of being exposed solely to other in-group members (6%, 4%, and 3%, respectively).

Available evidence, in sum, suggests no meaningful uptick in segregation levels for the target groups as a result of the financial crisis. The global economic downturn was later, shorter, and milder in Canada than in the USA and most of Europe. The federal government initially responded with counter-cyclical spending in 2008, not introducing austerity budgets and reductions in social spending and transfer payments to provinces and territories until 2012 (Labonté et al. 2015). At any rate, with so much recent migrant settlement spreading out toward the suburbs, spilling over into them, or starting there, it becomes hard to gauge segregation accurately in Toronto and to put it into proper perspective.

Outlying middle-class ethnoburbs were more apt to contain (sub-)neighborhoods with a dominant ethnic minority group, whereas that was the case only in certain buildings or blocks in isoburb housing projects within Toronto. The level at which segregation was assessed could thus matter a great deal.

Structural Integration

The GTA's rating on overall socioeconomic segregation—income, educational, and occupational—was modest (0.37). It was a little less segregated than Montréal (0.41) and far less so than Chicago (0.87) or New York City (0.89) (Florida 2015). That appraisal and the relative absence of economic turmoil did not change perceptions that powerful processes of spatial and social polarization had been at work for decades (UWGT and CCSD 2004; Hulchanski 2010; McDonough et al. 2015).

Examination of the evolution in the numbers of people unemployed, on social assistance, and suffering premature mortality from the 2008 reference period (2005–2009) to the 2011 reference period (2010–2014) presents a mixed picture (www.map.toronto.ca/wellbeing). Eight of the ten neighborhoods scoring worst on those indicators were the same at both data points, and two of those in 2008 ranked 12th and 13th in 2011. Those dozen disadvantaged neighborhoods lay along the northwestern, northern, and eastern peripheries of the city in the Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough districts and in several areas just out from the downtown core (Moss Park, South Parkdale, Church-Yonge Corridor)—many of the areas with the highest share of low-income households and of members of this study's target groups. The neighborhoods formed a U shape that spoked out from downtown to the northeast and northwest through the areas with the most affordable housing: both social housing units, including projects in the inner suburbs dating from the 1980s, and privately owned rental apartment buildings. The private units comprised 90% of the high-density stock (SPAR 2011).

Over the period, the selected social indicators all worsened in one neighborhood (Moss Park), all improved in two (Woburn in Scarborough and Parkwoods-Donalda in North York), and were mixed in the remaining eight. More indicators were higher in 2011 than were lower. The results echoed those of the Urban HEART project's estimation of neighborhood well-being in Toronto (CRICH 2014). Migrants' low average

wages were a contributing factor to the boost in income inequality (McDonough et al. 2015). Underemployment had become rife, a function of rapidly evolving labor markets, a migrant selection system that privileged human capital over specific employer demand, discrimination, and non-recognition of educational and professional credentials from a fluctuating constellation of sending countries. Migrants' overqualification rate nationally in 2015 was over 40%, 12 points higher than for the native born. The narrowest gulf (7.9%) was in Ontario—compared to 14.9% in Québec (Boulet 2016, p. 15). Fully three-quarters of migrants were working in occupations unrelated to their education and qualifications, irrespective of when they had arrived in Canada (Aydede and Dar 2016).

Escaping from poverty had become a longer, more difficult proposition, especially for first-generation migrants. They were gaining more second-generation and native-stock company, though, and it was not easy to ascertain whether the disparity between them and the rest of the population had been aggravated. Recession-related job losses were most serious in manufacturing and construction, sectors where migrants were overrepresented. The unemployment gap between recent migrants and Canadian-born workers widened more in Toronto than in Montréal or Vancouver, but that outcome depended on the start and end years chosen and on educational levels. Established migrants were faring much better (Kelly et al. 2011; Paperny 2014). For those with at least 10 years' residence in Canada, the 2015 rate was only 0.1% greater than for the native born in Toronto (5.4–5.3%), compared to 1.9% (8.0–6.1%) in Montréal. Even at that, migrants' share in Toronto's economically active population had stagnated, while it had risen in Montréal by 7% from 2006 to 2015 (Boulet 2016, pp. 8-13).

City Policy Responses

Outside Québec, Canadian multiculturalism and diversity policy has concentrated on the settlement and incorporation of new arrivals and on ethnic diversity management, without ignoring aspects such as gender, sexual orientation, disability, and age. Depending on one's perspective, the absence of an overarching, unifying national myth could be a problem or a boon. Accentuating the positive, Prime Minister Trudeau declared after his electoral victory in 2015 that "[t]here is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada.... There are shared values" (quoted in Lawson 2015). Migrants and refugees had benefited from settlement

services during the first three years after their arrival in Canada, even though the integration process was regarded by the federal government itself as lasting a decade (Cappe 2011).

Toronto had been the first city to step into the breach. The amalgamated city adopted "Diversity Our Strength" as its official motto in 1998 and forged policies that were most concerned with newcomer integration, social cohesion, public health, and socioeconomic opportunity and mobility. Migrant numbers in Toronto were high enough to support services for people from a host of regions and countries, unlike Montréal, where smaller numbers often hindered the delivery of such specialized offerings—which as in Hamburg and Barcelona were explicitly rejected on philosophical grounds anyway.

Toronto's pioneering work only belatedly won federal recognition and backing. The 2005 Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement sanctioned municipal governments' involvement in integrating migrants. The next year, Toronto, Ontario, and Canada signed an intergovernmental memorandum of understanding that acknowledged the city's stake in migrants' structural integration and civic participation and set up a "framework of triple consultation" (Boulet 2016, p. 45). Also in 2006, Ontario's parliament passed the City of Toronto Act, which represented the first time that limits were put on a province's powers when it came to municipal affairs. Not coincidentally, the city was gaining extensive control over its own multicultural and integration projects during a phase of federal and provincial cuts in social spending. With Canadian cities unable to collect many taxes that their counterparts could in the USA and many European countries, Toronto's officials were forced to rely heavily on property taxes and fee income.

The "instrumental" federal-level approach to pluralism, with new arrivals "seen as assets and evaluated on the basis of their potential contribution to the economy," helped lay the foundation for city-level approaches toward diversity in Toronto (Ahmadi and Tasan-Kok 2014, p. 15). In a city that found little to commemorate in its past manifestations as the sectarian "Belfast of Canada" (Ireland 2012) and then earnestly dull "Toronto the Good," sociocultural diversity became the sine qua non of local identity, the closest it had to a "state religion" (Siemiatycki 2012, p. 30).

Even more than the other case cities, Toronto exhibited insecurity about its global ranking. City planners worshipped growth, "now framed in terms of global competition among urban regions," and joined with

boosterist political leaders "in a campaign to sell Toronto to the world" (Boudreau et al. 2009, p. 114). Migrants and multiculturalism became exploitable assets: Toronto's reputation as an integration "innovator" raised its global profile, as, for example, when groups of experts and practitioners toured Germany with their "'Good Ideas from Toronto' Roadshow" (Broadbent 2011). At their worst, these Canadian multicultural champions could turn into "insufferable preachers, spreading the word internationally about their own success and its status as paradigm and model for everyone (a trait that ironically, is what irritates us most in Americans)" (Taylor 2013).

To a greater extent even than in Chicago, migrants were valued for their economic and branding usefulness, not least in the form of ethnic quarters for high-skilled workers and tourists to experience. The Toronto Official Plan, adopted in 2002 and officially operational in 2006, applauded the city's cultural diversity and called for the promotion of both specialty retail districts downtown to attract tourists and residents and a variegated consumer sector in general. The municipal Economic Development and Culture Division administered Business Improvement Areas (BIAs): associations of commercial property owners and tenants whose levies were distributed to pay for "street and sidewalk beautification, marketing and promotional campaigns, street festivals, clean street/graffiti-removal campaigns, and crime prevention strategies" (Schmiz and Zhuang 2016, p. 4). Migrant-origin groups figured in the names of some of the dozens of BIAs (e.g., Little Portugal BIA, Gerrard India Bazaar BIA, Greektown BIA), even though their members and local residents were fairly heterogeneous. Others with a more geographic label were strongly identified with a certain community.

In the Neighborhoods

Closer-in ethnic neighborhoods were being transformed to varying degrees into tourist attractions by gentrification and residents' departure for the suburbs: Corso Italia, Greektown, Little Portugal, Koreatown, and Roncevalles Village (Polish). As noted, the downtown "Old" Chinatown, situated in what was once a Jewish district, retained its migrant gateway role, and adjacent, multicultural Kensington Market managed to hang onto much of its working-class character. Newer concentrations had emerged in the inner suburbs: Little Ethiopia (Scarborough), Little Iran (North York), Little Jamaica/Eglinton West (York), and Little Manila (North York). The Gerrard India Bazaar/Little Pakistan had supplanted a onetime working-class Ulster-Scot neighborhood and was being in turn

pushed by redevelopment and pulled by South Asian migrants' preference for the suburbs. Enclaves had been popping up across the outer GTA, with different sections of cities like Brampton, Markham, Mississauga, and Vaughan becoming closely associated with South Asians, Chinese, Italians, Poles, Romanians, and so on (Keung 2013).

The rapid multiplication of ethnic enclaves touched off heated debate, with the preponderance of analyses concluding that any drawbacks of what critics condemned as self-segregation were outweighed by the advantages for appropriately targeted service delivery and ethnic businesses and other institutions (Qadeer and Agrawal 2009; Hiebert 2015). Migrants living in Toronto's enclaves were not isolated, nor were they socioeconomically marginalized, monolithic, or differentiated only by social class: regional, ethnic, and other distinctions within national groups could take on a spatial manifestation, as commented on above with respect to Pakistanis. Small-scale clustering could characterize particular neighborhoods, blocks, apartment buildings, and entryways. Thus, Bosnian Serbs and other Serbs settled in different parts of the city, and the families of Pakistani migrant workers away in the Persian Gulf (called "Begums") occupied specific complexes in Mississauga to which they would migrate directly. These "ethnically distinct sub-markets" were small enough to rule out seclusion and entrenchment, appearing "to be largely expressions of preferences, common interests, social networks, and the cultural and/or religious needs of their residents" (Qadeer 2003, p. 25).

Ethnic clustering did still provoke anxiety in connection with the "tower town" isoburbs, referred to not infrequently in media reports as "high-rise ghettoes" (Qadeer and Agrawal 2009). Paradigms of 1960s urban planning along the lines of Le Corbusier's Towers in the Park concept—with their high concentrations of similar housing types, separation of retail and residential functions, and car dependency—these self-contained developments had been built with swinging young singles and childless couples in mind. Some of them maintained that function: a complex implanted around the intersection of Yonge Street and Eglinton Avenue in Midtown Toronto did not shed its local moniker "Young and Eligible" until families began to show up. Many more of the buildings became undesirable to well-heeled residents and home to migrants drawn there out of "constrained choice" and the working of social networks—a testament to the need to take local circumstances like labor and housing market conditions into account when trying to understand

segregation patterns (Murdie and Ghosh 2010, pp. 306–307). The spatial mismatch in migrant services was greater in certain isoburbs and suburbs than others (Lo et al. 2010).

Torontonians sometimes describe their city as San Francisco turned upside down, because its neighborhoods are divided not by steep hills but by deep ravines and river valleys. They could turn even a central area into a peaceful, traffic-free oasis (Rosedale) or cut residents off from access to urban services and opportunities (Thorncliffe Park, Flemingdon Park). Transportation was always one of the chief bones of contention. The first mayor of post-amalgamation Toronto, Mel Lastman (1998–2003), advocated construction of a subway under North York, the former suburb of which he had been the final mayor. His successor, David Miller (2003–2010), put his weight behind buses, light rail, and downtown waterfront renewal instead. Replacing him was Rob Ford (2010–2014), the controversial city councilor for the majority-migrant Etobicoke North ward. Globally ill-famed for a series of substance abuse incidents in and out of office, he ran on a platform of fiscal conservatism and subway expansion.

For every tower neighborhood with good subway access (Crescent Town, Victoria Park), more were cut-off transit deserts (Jamestown, Jane-Falstaff, Rustic, Smithfield, Malvern). Northern Etobicoke, northwestern North York, and much of Scarborough in the east remained poorly served by public transit. The Crown agency overseeing transportation in the wider Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (the "Golden Horseshoe") had plans to expand transit in low-income neighborhoods in the inner suburbs; its immediate priorities lay in the more prosperous belts in the urban region (Pitter and Lorinc 2016). In 2015, areas where incomes were climbing the quickest enjoyed four times the transit service of areas where incomes were dropping (Spurr 2015). The city's swelling low-income, heavily migrant areas claimed but 19 of the system's 68 subway stations (Hulchanski 2010). It could take more than twice the time to commute to downtown from those areas than from more distant Markham or Brampton (Walks 2014), and residents needing to travel from one suburban zone to another at irregular hours were hard-pressed.

As Roger Keil, a researcher at the City Institute at York University, pointed out, "the subway system is a fairly good indicator of wealth" (quoted in Spurr 2015). Few issues sparked fiercer political debates in Toronto than proposals to extend subway lines to such locales. Exclusion, disadvantage, and ethnic composition melded

together as discounted areas of the city gained unsavory reputations. Hence, it was not by chance that Scarborough picked up the nicknames "Scarberia" and "Scompton."

Tower neighborhoods, not surprisingly, figured prominently in the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy that the City of Toronto and United Way of Greater Toronto devised in 2005. Thirteen priority areas—later rechristened Neighborhood Improvement Areas (NIAs)—were earmarked not for demolition as in Chicago but for enhanced service coverage, community facilities, and funding for community organizations (Ahmadi and Tasan-Kok 2014). Another battery of 31 NIAs was named in 2014. A separate Tower Renewal program got underway in 2008 and was rebooted in 2011; its objectives were to oversee multi-use rezoning, repairs, and green renovations. By 2015, it became a permanent city government program with a stronger emphasis on partner collaboration and effective policy implementation.

The elimination of "vertical inequity" and the bolstering of "vertical communities" through area-based interventions were accompanied by other efforts that encouraged social mixing. The Toronto Community Housing Corporation started on the herculean task of repairing its buildings, housing more than 100,000 tenants in 2200 structures that were on average over 40 years old. As a rule, public housing projects such as the Jane and Finch corridor in the northwest end, Regent Park and nearby Moss Park and the non-private buildings in St. James Town in the core, and cooperative housing anywhere had more diverse residents than the far more numerous private rental buildings. The latter type occasionally accommodated mono-ethnic concentrations of poor migrants. Social housing had been on the decline for years across Canada, starved of funds by both federal and provincial governments.

Besides the revitalization of social housing, several additional measures would have aided in the creation or preservation of mixed neighborhoods. A Conservative provincial government had introduced loopholes into rent control guidelines in the late 1990s that allowed rents to climb rapidly, and attempts to close them fell short. Provincial legislation would have been necessary to institute Chicago-style inclusionary zoning programs, yet Ontario lawmakers did not comply (Oved 2015). Legal challenges had delayed implementation of the Toronto Official Plan, on account of its "large sites policy" that imposed affordable housing obligations on developments of a certain size. Convoluted language and missing implementing regulations prevented it from being deployed.

As in Hamburg, the city settled for negotiating payments from developers who built luxury properties and then using the funds to construct or rehabilitate social housing and inexpensive rental units (Wellesley Institute 2010c).

Toronto did adopt a top-down planning approach in some neighborhoods. Successful in turning the downtown St. Lawrence area into a purpose-built mixed-income neighborhood with public social and private housing in the Jane Jacobs (1961) mold, the strategy was retooled to rely on private funding in the redevelopment of social housing in Regent Park and Lawrence Heights ("the Jungle" in North York). The 69-acre Regent Park project was the city's oldest, dating from the 1940s and originally intended as a transitional community. Immediately south of the beautifully restored, upscale Cabbagetown neighborhood and east of the blighted Moss Park isoburb, Regent Park was one of Toronto's roughest sections and home to low-income native-stock Canadians (including First Nations people) and large numbers of migrants from the Caribbean, China, South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and eastern Europe. Open spaces were few and far between, but the eponymous park was where the ethnic and other divisions plaguing the residential spaces were surmounted (Pitter and Lorinc 2016). Residents of Regent Park and Cabbagetown had little to do with each other.

In 2005, the city inaugurated a C$1 billion renewal and rebuilding endeavor that began turning Regent Park into a blend of subsidized housing, condominiums, retail shops, and new community amenities. Prior residents enjoyed a "right to return" that appeared to have some teeth. A state-of-the-art aquatic center rose in the park, funded in part by a C$2 million grant from Donald Trump in exchange for zoning permission to build his controversial 65-floor luxury hotel and tower downtown. Such facilities were attracting affluent non-residents to the neighborhood, causing some observers to speak of an inspiring "model of inclusion" (Levin 2016). Professionals in the swimming pool did little to allay others' fears of imminent gentrification. Escalating inequality in the city and region tore at the social fabric and had serious negative social consequences. If the trend continued, "Torontonians could face the cruel realities of cities across the United States—marginalized neighbourhoods, growing rates of unemployment and high-levels of crime" (McDonough et al. 2015, p. 10).

Montréal

In Montréal, the final case city, greater polarization—as regards worsening ethnic segregation and structural integration—did not characterize migrants' experience during the Great Recession any more conclusively than in the other four cities. The negative results of globalization in terms of socioeconomic polarization were less obvious in Greater Montréal than elsewhere. In fact, the suburbanization of migration was less pronounced, and there were more lively multicultural neighborhoods with a greater socioeconomic mix that were better integrated into the urban landscape. By the same token, Montréal was a poorer city to begin with, more of whose residents, migrants and non-migrants alike, had low average incomes than in the other cases, even Barcelona. In absolute, quantitatively assessed terms, migrants' segregation levels were by most accounts higher and their structural integration levels lower there than in the European case cities and Toronto.

Until quite recently, Montréal officials were distracted by fights over metropolitan (de-)amalgamation and, like Chicago, corruption. They were not very exercised by their city's global status or intent on profiting from ethnic diversity or combating the fallout from globalization. Montréal, where it could be argued that multiculturalism was lived more authentically on a daily basis than in the other case cities, had done the least consciously to bring about that outcome. Past decisions (and non-decisions) about transportation (both public transit and highways) and other public infrastructure, housing, neighborhood development, zoning, and the like were far more responsible.

Migrant Concentrations

In contrast to Hamburg, Barcelona, and certainly Chicago and Toronto, firstly, migrants were undergoing far less suburbanization in Montréal. Around 88% of Québec's migrant-origin population lived in Greater Montréal in 2015, and around that same percentage lived in the city, which occupied much of the eponymous island. The province had instituted a new municipal authority to take responsibility for such matters as regional planning, economic development, and infrastructure and social housing in 2000 and, two years later, amalgamated the communities on the Island of Montréal.

Unlike in Toronto, that merger did not stick. Mayor Gérald Tremblay (2002–2012) rode to power on his opposition to the merger but then switched sides. He opposed referenda in June 2004 that resulted in the separation of 15 municipalities from the megacity in 2006. A new City of Montréal emerged, with authority over areas like urban planning and public security. Regional planning and economic development, social housing, and public transit were among the services entrusted to a regional body, the Montreal Metropolitan Community (*Communauté métropolitaine de Montréal*—CMM), chaired by the mayor of Montréal (Sancton 2004). Significant room for maneuver on community development, culture, and parks and local planning and development approval was maintained for the 19 constituent city boroughs (*arrondissements*).

It was in central boroughs that the vast majority of migrants to Greater Montréal had settled and continued to settle. Historically, the port-of-entry was a several-block strip in the Plateau neighborhood flanking the Boulevard St.-Laurent ("The Main"), running northwest–southeast through the near center of the island and dividing the Anglophone west and the Francophone east. "Founding" neighborhoods of European and Chinese migrants appeared at the turn of the twentieth century and were fortified after World War II. Montréal's "little homelands" grew multiethnic after Canada's migration policies opened up in the 1960s and were periodically overhauled thereafter (Germain 2013b). Haitians, Vietnamese, and Latin Americans joined the Italians who had already put down roots in the French-speaking east end and eventually continued up toward the northeast. Over time, the borough of Côte-des-Neiges–Notre-Dame-de-Grâce (CDN–NDG) on the opposite, northern and western sides of the Mont Royal, developed into a major new migration gateway.

The largest numbers of Poles, Romanians, and Serbs lived in that incredibly diverse borough. The greatest concentrations of the first two groups were in independent (geographic) enclave municipalities immediately to the east (Westmount) or west (Côte-Saint-Luc, Hampstead, Montréal-Ouest) or on-island suburbs farther west (Dollard-des-Ormeaux)—all with heavily Jewish neighborhoods. To the north, many other Romanians located themselves in the Francophone boroughs of Ahuntsic-Cartierville, Saint-Laurent, and the suburb of Laval. It was a varied group, divided by generation, time of migration, and religious squabbles rooted in the relationship between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the state back in the homeland during the Communist era.

The borough of Pierrefonds-Roxboro, occupying the northwestern corner of the island, was home to many Poles; a critical mass of Polish institutions existed on the other side in the Sainte-Marie neighborhood in the central Ville Marie borough near the intersection of Rue Frontenac and Rue Ontario Est: the Polish-language Our Lady of Czestochowa parish on Gascon Avenue, the Polish White Eagle Society (an auditorium and dance academy), Saucisses Polonaises, and Patisserie Polonaise Wawel. The more scattered and less conspicuous Romanian equivalent was in the Côte-des-Neiges neighborhood.

The depicted settlement patterns had changed little between 2001 and 2011. The number of Poles grew by 30.5% (from 29,935 to 39,075) and that of Romanians by 80.5% (from 13,325 to 24,045) over that period—as the migrant population was rising by 24.8%, the migrant share on the island from just over a quarter to just under a third, and the city's total population by only 4.3%. Serbs, whose population was receding by more than half (down to only 735 from 1614) over the decade, formed few clusters outside of CDN–NDG. They were the only target group with almost as many members in Québec outside of Greater Montréal, in their case in Sherbrooke and Gatineau (Ottawa). As an older migrant nationality experiencing very modest replenishment, Montréal's Serbian-born were outnumbered by those of Serbian descent, and cities in Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia were far more popular destinations.

Pakistanis and Ghanaians and Twi speakers were inclined to live in the same boroughs: north-central Villeray–Saint-Michel–Parc-Extension (VSMPE)—in particular the Parc-Extension neighborhood, once part of Montréal's Greektown—and Ahuntsic-Cartierville. In 2011, those areas still housed about four in ten members of both groups: 39.5% of Pakistanis and 44.4% of Twi speakers. The Organisation Inde-Canada in Parc-Extension assembled Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis of various religious confessions. Its Parade of Unity, held in the neighborhood every August since 2003 to celebrate the independence days of India and Pakistan, brought together thousands of South Asians, including Sri Lankans, and not a few local Africans, Latin Americans, Haitians, and Greeks. Over 85% of the neighborhoods' residents had a background other than French or British by 2000.

Migrants from Pakistan, working in the retail sector and as skilled workers, were present in smaller numbers in a range of boroughs and were undergoing a minor degree of dispersal. Working-class Pakistanis established themselves in Parc-Extension; their more comfortable countrymen and -women, often naturalized or Canadian born, were somewhat more

prone to settle in more peripheral boroughs or on-island suburbs (Fiore 2013). This development was quite novel in Montréal for any national group, apart from Chinese and other East Asian migrants across the St. Lawrence river in suburban Brossard (see Balakrishnan et al. 2005).

Ghanaians could also be found in the southwestern LaSalle and Sud-Ouest boroughs, which had a significant Black Canadian population, and the far northwestern and northeastern sections of the island, site of some of the city's remaining factories. While the Pakistani national group expanded by 53.1% over the decade (from 6178 to 9461), though, the Ghanaian population stood between 1500 and 2000 and was not growing, the effect of out-movement to the bigger Anglophone African communities of Toronto and Québec's migration and language policies that limited the attraction of Montréal. Whereas nearly half of Montréal's Ghanaian-origin inhabitants had a maternal language other than French or English in 2006, almost as many spoke English at home (ICC 2011, p. 8).

Segregation

Table 3.8 reveals that Ghanaians and Pakistanis had the highest segregation scores in the city, but they were as stable as those for the European groups. With its ethnically mixed neighborhoods, Montréal did not have a polarized migrant population—something that could not always be said of its French Canadian majority and British-origin minority (Germain 2000). In line with the most commonly employed indicators and units of comparison, Montréal often looked more segregated on paper than Toronto or Vancouver (not to mention western European cities).

That conclusion did not always square with other aspects of the city's socio-ethnic landscape. For example, ethnic enclaves (defined as census

Table 3.8 Segregation in Montréal (19 boroughs, 15 on-island cities)

Population	*Dissimilarity index*		
	2001	*2006*	*2011*
All immigrants (re: rest of population)	0.18	0.16	0.14
Poles	0.30	0.31	0.32
Romanians	0.34	0.32	0.32
Serbs	0.40	0.33	0.41
Pakistanis	0.47	0.45	0.43
Ghanaians (Twi speakers in 2011)	0.51	0.51	0.49

tracts whose populations were 70% or more visible minorities, with one group twice the size of any other) were smaller, even less monocultural, and less numerous than in Toronto. They did not multiply between 2006 and 2011 as they did there and in Vancouver. Indian Hindus and Sikhs were more liable than others to cluster in such spaces in Montréal. A combination of cultural preferences, housing market dynamics, majority behavior, and discrimination explained the greater propensity of migrants from some nationality groups and socioeconomic backgrounds to settle in enclaves compared to others (Hiebert 2015).

Thus, the Chameran neighborhood in Saint-Laurent borough flanking the Lebeau industrial zone was a Lebanese (and more broadly Arab) stronghold, christened "Little Beirut" (Bitran 2013); the Norgate neighborhood had complexes playing that role for several Southeast Asian groups; and Haitians predominated in some quarters in the Montréal-Nord and Rivière-des-Prairies–Pointe-aux-Trembles boroughs and the Saint-Michel neighborhood in VSMPE. Apparent exceptions to the general rule of ever greater diversification, such concentrated settlements were nevertheless far from bereft of contact with the non-migrant population or other migrant groups. Xavier Leloup and Annick Germain (2012) have concluded that diversity evolved in Montréal along no obvious trajectory, was comprehending areas previously not very diverse, and concerned groups that were not undergoing any definite move toward socioeconomic mobility or participating in any detectable neighborhood-level process of succession.

Exposure index scores were extremely high and isolation index scores were low for Serbs, Pakistanis, and Ghanaians. The situation was a couple of percentage points different for Poles and Romanians, whose results were skewed by those who were part of the Jewish population highly concentrated in specific areas like the on-island cities of Côte-Saint-Luc (62.2% Jewish) and Hampstead (75.2%) (see Hiebert 2015). Boroughs like largely middle-class Saint-Laurent and even off-island suburbs like low-density Brossard, described by some observers as having become an Asian ethnoburb, arose as ports-of-entry in their own right (Germain 2000). This spreading out was occurring later than in the other case cities, however, and central island zones retained their status as preferred entry points. In-migration was ongoing even in central districts facing gentrification pressures and housing big university student populations. For the most part, therefore, it was relatively easy for Montréal's migrants to get around on foot or with public transportation.

Extensions were in the works to several subway and bus lines, which would better connect migrant-filled neighborhoods in the Anjou, Saint-Léonard, and outer Saint-Laurent boroughs, yet existing service was already quite strong.

Structural Integration

Places where migrants—above all non-Europeans—constituted a prominent component of the population were, generally speaking, socioeconomically marginalized. Indicators of structural integration point to a migrant population facing deficits that were greater in Montréal than in Toronto yet did not deteriorate as much during the Great Recession. Québec weathered the economic crisis even better than most of the rest of Canada, and migrants' employment situation did not worsen appreciably. Their unemployment rate actually ticked down slightly between 2006 and 2011, from 12.8% to 12.4%. The number would be 10.5% by 2015. The gap between the rate for all migrants and that for native-born Canadians (which held rather steady) was 6.8% points in 2006 and 4.5% points in 2015. The discrepancy had widened in 2008 and 2009, narrowed in 2010, widened again in 2011, and then narrowed again thereafter (Boulet 2016, pp. 7–8). Migrants in Ontario and British Columbia did not fare as well, although the divergence with the native born remained wider in Québec (IRIS 2012).

As noted above, migrant underemployment was more prevalent in that province as well, albeit perhaps not at the level of Greater Montréal as compared to the GTA (see CMM 2013). Language-based challenges and discrimination loomed larger in the labor market in Francophone Montréal (Grenier and Nadeau 2011). The underlying economic conditions were yet more troubling. The 1976 Summer Olympics had left a hangover of debt and corruption in succeeding decades, battles over language and sovereignty helped provoke the drift of major players in the financial industry to Toronto, and a flood of cheap imports hurt local factories. Montréal was still bleeding manufacturing jobs into the twenty-first century—another fifth of them between 2006 and 2011 alone—with the protracted downsizing of the textile and clothing industry hitting migrant employment harshly. Growth in the aerospace, pharmaceutical, and other sectors replaced only a portion of the losses. Areas of heavy migrant settlement were evident not far from the city's remaining factories in boroughs to the southwest (Lachine, next to the

Montréal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport in the on-island suburb of Dorval), northwest (Saint-Laurent), and northeast (Anjou, Montréal-Nord, Rivière-des-Prairies) (Labonté et al. 2015).

For Montréal's migrants and those of migrant origin, north-end boroughs like VSMPE, Montréal-Nord, and Ahuntsic-Cartierville normally had the most elevated jobless rates. In a few on-island suburbs (Baie-D'Urfé, Beaconsfield, Montréal-Est, Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue), native-born unemployment was higher. The unemployment rate for migrants who had arrived recently (that is, within 5 years) and who comprised the best-educated cohort was far superior to that for more established foreign born—whose rates were converging with those of Canadian-born adults (DAEI 2010).

Debate flared over the rise in the fraction of migrants on social assistance. According to the Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity, they represented 20.5% of adults receiving benefits in Québec but 47.3% in Montréal in January 2011, when they comprised around a third of the population. That was up marginally from 44.3% in July 2005. For assistance to people able to work, the migrant proportion was 56%, up from 53% in 2007 (Dubuc 2011).

The federal government and most researchers argued that social assistance served as a transition measure principally for qualified migrant workers, in contrast to the unskilled workers who predominated among native-born recipients. Eight of ten foreign-born people on social assistance had undertaken post-secondary studies, compared to the three-quarters of "natives" having no more than a secondary education. Half of migrants left the program within 1 year; only 20% were in it after 3 years. Economic migrants and refugees were among the fastest to get off benefits, while those arriving under the category of family reunification were more dependent on them for a longer time. Certain nationalities were more apt to go onto assistance during their first year in Canada, moreover: 78% of Algerians, 60% of Moroccans, and 55% of Romanians, yet only 5% of Chinese or French (Dubuc 2011). VSMPE was the borough with the highest share for all population groups in 2011 at 11.4% (Table de concertation 2011).

The number of beneficiaries declined as the economy recovered, returning to pre-crisis levels. Figures in the *Rapports statistiques sur la clientèle des programmes d'assistance sociale* published during the first quarter each year by the statistical office of Québec's Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity show that the migrant percentages of

Montréal's recipient total were falling steadily: 45.2% in 2013, 43.5% in 2014, and 43.0% in 2015. The overall numbers for the city were moving in the same direction. The diminution in those cases ran counter to the augmentation in the population of working poor, evidence of the lower volume of benefits being distributed across Canada.

City Policy Responses

While the province of Québec had been selecting the economic migrants and some of the refugees it welcomed since 1978, it entered into a formal agreement with Canada (the Canada-Québec Accord) relative to permanent and temporary migration in 1991 (Rose et al. 2006). The federal government was to determine migration categories, conditions of entry; and grounds for deportation; the provincial government, to control migration levels and to oversee newcomer integration. The city of Montréal had no formal powers in this area yet entered into the first of a series of triennial agreements with the province to develop projects assisting migrants in 1999. Intercultural relations, the upgrading of living conditions, and the fight against discrimination were the three pillars of the 2011–2014 "understanding" (Boulet 2016, p. 50). The provincial Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities, which had been founded by a Liberal government in 2005, was renamed the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity, and Inclusion after another Liberal prime minister took charge in 2014 from a two-year minority Québec nationalist government.

Outreach to ethnic associations in an initial phase of municipal activity between 1987 and 1992 gave way to support for multiethnic ones. The city government, casting itself as an "important actor" in the integration of new migrants, subscribed to and was guided by the provincial government's evolving intercultural approach (Direction 2011). The eminent Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (2013) has boiled down the contrast between interculturalism and Toronto-style multiculturalism to the stories that Québécois and other Canadians tell about themselves and that color interpretations of the changes occurring in their societies: "the 'multi' story decentres the traditional ethno-historical identity, and refuses to put any other in its place. …The 'inter' story starts from the reigning historical identity but sees it evolving in a process in which all citizens, of whatever identity, have a voice, and no-one's input has a privileged status." Although interculturalism had never been adopted

officially in Québec, it was reflected in certain programs and prominent in the debate over ethno-cultural diversity (Rocher and White 2014).

Pragmatism and local adaptation were the rule, and the tactics espoused in a city like Laval—which was swayed by critiques of multiculturalism and stressed the rights of individual citizen-residents—could diverge from those practiced in its more populous neighbor across the Rivière des Prairies to the south. As in Barcelona, which implemented an analogous model, the watchwords in Montréal were language training, anti-discrimination, intercultural communication, social cohesion, policy mainstreaming, cross-sectoral interventions, and area-based interventions (Direction 2011; Gunn 2012). As in Toronto, wellness was a focal point, as the health advantage that most newcomers enjoyed faded with longer periods of residency in Canada (Université de Montréal 2015). Group representation was accepted in policy formulation and on two successive appointed advisory committees on intercultural relations (Fourot 2013).

Besides the eternal linguistic issue, the question of religion and its place in the public sphere grew into key sticking points across Québec to a degree surpassed in the other case cities only in sporadic, albeit more dramatic fashion: in Barcelona, when the Tariq ibn Ziyad Mosque was raided in 2008 to foil a terrorist plot; and in Hamburg, when the Al-Quds Mosque in St. Georg was closed in 2011 by officials amid suspicions that it was serving as a meeting and recruiting place for extremists. In Montréal, it should be noted, religiously tinged conflicts began not with Muslims or Sikhs but with ultra-Orthodox Jewish Hasidim. The municipal and provincial governments were well aware of the demographic and economic arguments in favor of additional immigration. More than their counterparts in Toronto, they worried more generally about the ramifications for local social relations and Québécois cultural identity.

Their fears were stoked when protests against police killings sparked riots in August 2008 that shook a Montréal-Nord neighborhood with concentrations of Haitians and Latin Americans (Leloup and Apparicio 2010). (Tellingly, perhaps, a more destructive riot downtown a few months earlier following a Montréal Canadiens' playoff victory had not elicited comparable anxieties about hockey fans.) Presaging the city's 2011–2014 agreement with the province, antiracism and inter-group relations were given greater weight, and policy was devolved down further than before to the more accessible borough level. Backed by the local chamber of commerce, the Québec government stabilized the volume of admissions for the period between 2012 and 2015, in the name

of integrating newcomers more completely and ensuring their ability to function in French (Chambre de Commerce 2011).

In the Neighborhoods

The city of Montréal's programs for integrating migrants and fighting poverty were subsumed under an Integrated Urban Revitalization approach adapted in the 1990s from one in Lyons, France, and tried out in cities as disparate as Boston and London. Priority intervention zones were identified for socioeconomic interventions that implicated all relevant services (Mackrous 2000). As regards housing policy, too, migrants, albeit not usually targeted, were among the beneficiaries of the city's programs and activities in the sector. Montréal's market was marked by a preponderance of renters and the small size of the subsidized housing sector, which represented 8% of the total stock (comparable to Toronto's 7%) and a fifth of rental units. Known as low-rent housing (*habitations à loyer modique*—HLM), the program emerged from an agreement between Canada and Québec in 1969, a time of social turbulence and residential displacement generated by urban renewal.

The HLM projects themselves were mostly of medium density and on a smaller scale than in Toronto. Montréal entered later into public housing construction, which gave its policymakers the opportunity to learn from the shortcomings of that example and to opt for "closer integration into the traditional urban fabric" (Vaillancourt and Ducharme 2001, p. 12). HLM were widely disseminated across the city and its neighborhoods, save for in the gentrifying La Petite-Bourgogne neighborhood in the Sud-Ouest borough, a black founding neighborhood where 40% of units were amassed in a sprawling social housing complex. The heart of an English-speaking (originally African American), working-class black neighborhood since the late nineteenth century, its 1500 publicly subsidized units accommodated Caribbean and African migrants living cheek by jowl with middle-class homeowners in brand-new townhouses and condominiums (Germain 2000, pp. 8–9).

Montréal's central neighborhoods were dominated by the pre-war "plex," two or three stacked flats, each with direct street access—traditionally, via an outside iron staircase. Versions of the plex also existed in Scottish cities and in Chicago ("three-flats") and Boston ("triple-deckers") in the USA, yet not to the extent seen in Montréal. Preferred by the Francophone working and middle classes, they were customarily

owner occupied. After World War II, many southern and eastern European migrants rented upper-floor plex apartments, sometimes eventually buying the buildings when their owners retired to Florida or moved to the suburbs and becoming in their turn landlords to other migrants from their own or different ethnic backgrounds.

Non-European migrants arriving a bit later ended up in less popular, medium-density walk-up apartment buildings constructed after the war in inner suburbs like Côte-des-Neiges, Saint-Laurent, and VSMPE. Public housing regularly took the same form. Migrants, the elderly, and people with disabilities became heavily overrepresented in HLM after the so-called maximum rents (*loyers plafonds*) comparable to those set by the market were prohibited in 1982, forcing out many working-class Québécois. Other restrictions favoring the inflow of the most economically disadvantaged populations were introduced in 1990 (Mackrous 2000). In addition to being pricier, newer private rentals had fewer rooms and less space.

The Municipal Housing Office's fight against "social isolation" included an ongoing project to foster connections between migrant tenants in social housing and the surrounding neighborhoods, called "Living Diversity" ("*Habiter la mixité*"), that began in 1999 (Gunn 2012). In 2002, the Affordable Housing Québec (*Logement abordable Québec*—LAQ) program came along to produce new housing for people with moderate incomes. Construction costs were subsidized at around 70% by the federal and provincial governments and by the CMM (which also reimbursed the city for its social and community housing initiatives). The apartments, expected to be self-financing once built and offered first to HLM tenants and households on HLM waiting lists, had rents that were below market yet not proportional to the household's income.

LAQ was a run-up to Montréal's Inclusionary Housing Strategy, which debuted in 2005 to accelerate the development of low-cost housing for renters and first-time homeowners. A guideline was introduced recommending that all new private and community (that is, self-managed cooperative) residential developments of 200 or more units provide a minimum of 30% as affordable stock, half in social housing. The non-profit organization responsible for managing and funding the city's affordable housing since 1988, the Montréal Society of Housing and Development acted as an intermediary in projects that involved the public sector. Except for public housing, none of the economical apartments

that resulted were rentals. Prevailing rents in the city were too low to prompt developers to construct them (Wellesley Institute 2010b).

When Mayor Tremblay evoked a "vision of a city whose diversity is its strength," the desired social mix and equity that would give it "an undeniable competitive advantage" related to income rather than ethnicity (quoted in "Habiter Montréal" 2005, p. 3). Other provincial and municipal programs had existed and would be launched to achieve that very goal. Since Québec law did not allow for (mandatory) inclusionary zoning, Montréal's efforts were exclusively incentive based and relied on the boroughs for implementation. Migrants' disproportionate presence in social housing and the low end of the private rental market was attributable to poverty, discrimination, inadequate knowledge about alternatives, social networks, and the need for larger units for larger families. The municipality's housing action plans focused on the creation of more public and community housing, interventions to rehabilitate private-sector units, and measures to facilitate access to home ownership; and they set great store by an inclusive social climate and close collaboration with neighborhood stakeholders (Wexler and La Ferrière 2010).

Montréal had more zones of poverty inhabited by both migrants and non-migrants than other major Canadian cities. The contrast remained stark between the homogeneous, outlying suburbs populated by the Québécois-origin middle classes and the highly diverse island and inner suburbs with many low-income residents in high-density multi-family housing—resisting the trajectory being traced in the other four case cities. Montréal had a "varied urban tissue," even so, "where one could pass easily from one milieu to the next, where people of different socioeconomic statuses often coexisted on a very small scale" (Germain 2013a, p. 3). Those people were of different national backgrounds, too, and territorial boundaries were more fluid than in the era of the "little homelands." An area like the Mile End, in the Plateau-Mont-Royal borough just north of the original ports-of-entry along The Main, only burnished its reputation as one of the city's most cosmopolitan neighborhoods when Latin Americans, South and East Asians, and Arabs added to its European ethnic mix. Gentrification slowly pushed poorer residents up the few blocks into La Petite-Italie and Parc-Extension (Tremblay and Battaglia 2012).

The sheer variety of Montréal's migrant-origin populations and their moderate size seemed to ease day-to-day integration and interethnic interaction. The frictions that could arise when one group was

preponderant—“[c]ases of over-appropriation of space”—were absent, even if other places in these neighborhoods were “more dominated by specific ethnic groups, such as cafés” (Germain 2000, p. 12). City hall could hardly claim to have been the conscious creator of that textured, broadly harmonious state of affairs. In its Strategic Plan on Ethnocultural Diversity (2007–2010), the city affirmed that “[i]n the actual context of competition between major world cities to welcome and retain an increasing number of immigrants, Montréal’s major issue is to distinguish itself,” which meant needing “to be capable of continuing to offer adequate municipal infrastructure, effective community services, and a renowned quality of life” (Chiasson and Koji 2011, p. 171).

Ethnic neighborhoods and their heritage did not receive a mention. “While in Toronto and Vancouver diversity is seen as a motor for development and is at the heart of municipal discourse,” Annick Germain (2011) has remarked, “in Montréal it is sometimes passed over in silence–and sometimes seen as a problem” (p. 13). Partly thanks to a greater share of refugees in its foreign-born population, Montréal contained migrants from more countries than Toronto, whose leaders were wont to repeat an apocryphal UN designation of their city as the most multicultural in the world (Rose et al. 2006). Perhaps because Québec’s French heritage was its major touristic and cultural calling card in otherwise chiefly Anglophone North America, Montréal did not crow about its diversity as much as the other global cities compared here.

Its officials dropped some of their reticence on that score as their anxieties mounted over the city’s economic future and competitive position. An attempted “pasteurization of difference” ensued, as the municipality pushed neighborhood ethnic festivals to the site of the Expo 67 World’s Fair on an island in the St. Lawrence River, ostensibly to “facilitate intercultural exchanges” and appeal to outsiders (Germain 2013a, p. 5). Many of them gradually relocated to the Quartier des Spectacles, an arts and entertainment district in eastern Downtown Montréal and the Latin Quarter that was functional by late 2010. Complementing but not replacing bona fide street festivals, similar tourist-geared galas appeared during the summer season in popular gathering spots in Chicago (Navy Pier, Millennium Park, Daley Plaza) and Toronto (Nathan Phillips Square). In Barcelona and Hamburg, by way of comparison, such events were either citywide affairs organized around themes (art, film, food and drink, music, a saint’s day) or street festivals that could take on a

multicultural air when held in particular neighborhoods (e.g., the Festa Major del Raval, Stadtfest St. Georg).

Migrants were not well represented in the "Maple Spring" anti-tuition student protests that roiled Montréal and cities across the province during much of 2012. Mayor Tremblay, who expressed upset at the effect of the movement on tourism, resigned due to corruption scandals that November. After four brief interim mayorships, several of them likewise ended by scandal, Denis Coderre was elected mayor of Montréal in November 2013. He was a driving force in 2015 behind the International Observatory of Mayors on Living Together, a curious, motley collection of 35 African, East Asian, European, Middle Eastern, and North American cities whose leaders resolved to "put in place innovative, sustainable practices that both promote social and economic inclusion and provide an opportunity to live safely" (www.observatoirevivreensemble.org). Mayor Coderre's numerous voyages to sell Montréal as an eclectic global metropolis with an unbeatable lifestyle and *joie de vivre* garnered him the jokey nickname "Code Air" yet along with it harsh criticisms that he and other policymakers were not doing enough to build the local knowledge-based economy. Montréal had been as lackadaisical about globalization as it had about commodifying ethnic cultures.

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CHAPTER 4

Conclusions

Abstract This study shows that the Great Recession accelerated pre-existing trends toward spatial polarization along socioeconomic lines. The distance between wealthy and poor neighborhoods widened, as it did between those residents with high and low incomes. Many migrants fell into that latter category, but not all of them. The analysis likewise shows that migrants in general and the five target groups more specifically did not experience any unequivocal tendencies toward greater ethnic segregation or worsened structural integration. Cities' efforts to fight spatial polarization and to narrow the migrant integration gap mattered around the edges at best. What they could do, the author concludes, was to enrich the local quality of life, facilitate constructive social interactions, and recognize and safeguard successful multicultural spaces.

Keywords Socio-spatial polarization · Multicultural spaces
Social housing · Public transportation · Urban policy

In Hamburg, Barcelona, Chicago, Toronto, and Montréal, the Great Recession accelerated pre-existing trends toward spatial polarization along socioeconomic lines. That process had been in motion well before 2008, instigated by global economic changes and social policy restructuring. Thus, the distance between wealthy and poor neighborhoods was widening, as it was between those residents with high and low incomes. Many migrants were in that latter category, but not all of them,

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especially in Toronto and Chicago and to a certain extent in the other cities. There were fewer areas or individuals in the middle. The distinctive settlement patterns of Romanians—fairly dispersed across the cases—and of Poles and Serbs suggested significant room for settlement choice, at least for certain groups. The higher segregation levels of Ghanaians and Pakistanis in most of the case cities pointed toward both group-specific preferences and discrimination against non-Europeans. Well-to-do South Asian and East Asian ethnoburbs indicated that social class had to be considered a potent factor as well.

Spatially, migrants in general and the five target groups more specifically did not experience any unequivocal tendencies toward greater residential segregation as a consequence of the recent economic crisis. Their structural integration also either held comparatively steady (Hamburg, Montréal), slipped on balance (Toronto, Chicago), or deteriorated more decidedly (Barcelona) before returning at least close to pre-crisis levels. The order was thus not as hypothesized: only Hamburg—which, as predicted, ended up with the smallest losses—ran true to corporatist welfare-state form. Nevertheless, none of the cities saw the gap between migrants and "natives" widen durably. On occasion, migrants even fared better.

It bears emphasizing once more that the trend over time is at issue here, not absolute levels of residential segregation and structural integration. On those scores, the European cities remained more spatially integrated, and the Canadian cities more so than Chicago. The structural integration picture looked comparable, although migrant unemployment could be extremely elevated in Spanish cities like Barcelona, and a country with a liberal welfare state and a passive approach to inclusion like the USA could offer the prospect of both strong labor market absorption and a high risk of poverty (Ireland 2014). "Better" integration has consistently, albeit not always explicitly, been understood in the literature as the narrowing of the gap between migrants and native-stock residents. By that measure, migrants' integration may not have improved on the whole in the case cities, yet it did not worsen. To be certain of that assessment, it would be useful to have reliable neighborhood-level statistics on migrant-origin as well as non-national residents in all of the cases and to move the systematic analysis beyond city borders into the suburbs.

Migrants were in most cases moving toward deprived outer neighborhoods and suburbs, where their poorer cohorts lived among native-stock residents in nearly identical straits. Most of the non-citizens had been on the bottom socioeconomic rungs and retained that position when they

moved outward. In Montréal, where such suburbanization was least pronounced, closer-in neighborhoods that still contained the bulk of the metropolitan area's foreign-born population had numerous impoverished areas before the recession. During and after it, socioeconomic polarization proceeded apace in those central areas, even if the differently positioned areas remained more porous than in other locales. In Hamburg, Barcelona, and Chicago, non-citizen numbers dipped over the study period. They were depressed by a combination of naturalizations, moves outside city limits, and the return migration of unemployed low-skilled workers and even higher-skilled workers who enjoyed more promising opportunities back home during the crisis (as in Poland).

Globalization, in effect, was being felt in greater spatial polarization according to social class rather than citizenship status or national origins. The sorting out of rich and poor proceeded more quickly and extensively in cities that had larger financial districts (Chicago and Toronto), operated within more liberal welfare state contexts (Chicago and Toronto), and were more active in raising their global exposure and tourism (Barcelona, Chicago, and Toronto). Changes in migrants' structural integration indicators were governed by the strength with which the economic crisis hit a city (more strongly in Barcelona and Chicago than the other cases) and which economic sectors were most shaken. Where migrants dwelled and what that meant for their access to viable employment and municipal/suburban services, as well as the social protections for which they were eligible and targeted local integratory initiatives, represented contextual factors that influenced lived experiences more than the overall statistical picture.

This research has demonstrated that as significant as migrants' national origins could be in defining their receiving-society experiences, they were subject to modulation by a range of other factors, such as language, religion, region, social class, and ethnicity. Such divisions, mediated through social networks and the actions of sending-country institutions like religious communities and regional and hometown associations (Gidley and Caputo 2013), shaped choices about where to live and what type of employment to seek out. Working-class migrants—especially, yet not only non-Europeans—wound up everywhere in the most inexpensive and least sought-after housing in low-status neighborhoods, be they in core neighborhoods or displaced to inner or outer suburbs. The stigmatization of areas with a high density of new migrants engendered a phenomenon of "postal code" or geographic employment

discrimination (Labonté et al. 2015), which was already manifesting itself in Toronto and Hamburg. Patterns of economic growth and job creation and the cost and availability of housing seemed to trump policies.

Local efforts to fight spatial polarization and to narrow the migrant integration gap mattered around the edges at best. Cities appeared "unable to affect the main causal factors pushing immigrants into … peripheral, deprived or stigmatized areas" (Cucca 2012, p. 483). Municipal councils lacked control over critical economic policies and institutions; they could do little on their own to counter national-level fiscal and social transfer policies, a society's failure to eliminate discrimination, or structural changes in housing and labor markets (Pitter and Lorinc 2016). The root causes of gentrification and inequality were globalization and technological change. Despite the role of national government and EU policies in initiating and feeding those processes—in such areas as trade and trade adjustment, research and development, and tax expenditures—they were portrayed as inexorable, uncontrollable, natural forces (see McDonough et al. 2015). And even for major global cities, they might as well have been, given their limited capacity to alter the course of such powerful phenomena.

It was not that municipal governments resisted globalization, even in more indifferent Montréal. An antagonistic stance was impracticable in an era of market-centered development, sharpened international and inter-urban competition, and public resource scarcity (Saclarides 2009). Catering to global investors, tourists, and the financial sector did not always bear the desired economic fruit. It certainly did nothing to discourage the socio-spatial polarization that worked against integration and social mix. Poor coordination, duplication and contradiction of effort, inconsistent political backing, and temporary and uncertain financing blunted the impact of initiatives to improve migrants' difficult employment situation (Boulet 2016). As evidenced in the five preceding city cases, where migrants settled depended to a large extent on the legacies of past social and economic developments and policy (non-) responses to them: the siting of factories and other job suppliers, the supply and distribution of social housing and low-cost rental apartments and their dimensions and quality, and the public transportation infrastructure. The network of highways and major surface roads could matter, too, because they were critical to an urban area's spatial development and mobility mix (Perl et al. 2015). Proximity to such arteries factored into decisions about subway lines and bus routes, market perceptions

of neighborhood desirability, and (as seen in Hamburg and Barcelona) access to waterways, open spaces, and other local amenities. This multifaceted inheritance set firm parameters on what present-day city officials could accomplish.

What they could do was to enrich the local quality of life and facilitate constructive social interactions. Municipal integration policies, urban planning and social/public housing interventions, apartment rehabilitation, recreation facilities, quality schools, culturally sensitive health care and social assistance programs, subway extensions, expanded bus service, and user-friendly transport hubs could bring real amelioration to heavily migrant areas. The danger came when they risked raising costs in a context of weak protections for low-income tenants. Attempts to attract middle-class residents into "priority" zones could backfire (Hamburg, Chicago), as could dispersal policies that concentrated on giving disadvantaged residents an apparent choice without removing structural barriers to their movement to more advantageous locations (Chicago). Inclusionary zoning, which represented a potentially valuable tool, was available only in Chicago and in an imperfect form; negotiated versions existed in Hamburg, Montréal, and Toronto.

Crucial to the viability of global cities and the reconciliation of the cross-pressures operating within them were public spaces and public life—the "combination of places more exclusive in use and others better suited for at-large public sociability"—both of which could "tame differences" (Germain 2000, p. 12). Parks, plazas, markets, public pools, community centers, playgrounds, and neighborhood and street festivals were all relevant in this regard. In each of the five case cities, furthermore, the critical role of public libraries in providing information and local contacts to migrants was striking.

The centers of all five global cities came off as exceedingly diverse. In them, of course, it was impossible to distinguish the tourists, business travelers, and commuters from the denizens. Increasingly, those locals were themselves knowledge workers and consumers of "exotic" cultures in their own right. It was in the residential neighborhoods where the social mixing and rubbing of elbows that counted either did or did not take place. There were colorful, multicultural corners in each of the case cities, such as central Billstedt and Wilhelmburg's Stübenplatz in Hamburg; the Parc Central de Nou Barris and Poble Sec's Plaça del Sortidor in Barcelona; West Devon Avenue in West Ridge and along West Lawrence Avenue in Albany Park in Chicago; Mile End and Rue Jean-Talon Ouest in the Parc-Extension neighborhood of Montréal; and Kensington Market and west from it along Bloor Street in Toronto.

Proximity to downtown made for severe gentrification pressures in those latter Toronto locales, which was not as much the case in Montréal. For sheer cultural variety, authenticity, and urban texture, its highly multiethnic, walkable neighborhoods not far from the center were hard to rival. In the other three cities, such milieus were farther flung and outside the usual tourist circuits. As in Hamburg, most neighborhoods with migrant concentrations in Barcelona were markedly multiethnic. Many of those in peripheral areas were high-rise suburbs with small-scale segregation by housing bloc or floor (e.g., Bèso i el Maresme in the Sant Martí district and Sant Roc in Badalona). Multicultural spaces were not as common in Toronto's suburbs as those dominated by a specific group, and even in the inner ring, more genuinely diverse areas veered toward the residential and unremarkable (e.g., Victoria Park Village and Henry Farm and Don Valley Village in North York). Analogous suburban Chicago ports-of-entry in Cook County, welcoming migrants both of many nationalities and of the more affluent origins associated with Canada's newcomers, were just as likely to be animated and possessing an unmistakable sense of place (e.g., Mount Prospect and Skokie). Each city, additionally, had its own culture of conviviality that guided the tenor of public interactions. It was "peaceful but distant cohabitation" that tended to prevail in places of multicultural encounter (Germain 2000, p. 11). Perhaps not the stuff of urbanist fantasies, it would be difficult to expect more between people who were not engaged in a joint activity or working toward an explicit, common goal.

Those ultimately positive outcomes were not normally produced through conscious planning (with the inclusive process in Nou Barris in Barcelona the exception proving the rule) or the large-scale spatial projects favored by politicians. "Despite the normative claims of social engineers and egocentric architects," geographer Katharyne Mitchell (2011) argues, the built environment and urban, housing, and multicultural policies "are, on their own, never sufficient to explain the presence or absence of events such as rioting or peace" (p. 419). Tastes and needs change: the exhilarating urban experiments of yesterday become today's regretted vertical ghettoes. Successful spaces of diversity are fragile and subject to transformation. Top-down initiatives, however well-intentioned, can devastate them. The manipulation of migrant cultures in the interests of the globalized economic sector and its workers' tastes can fuel processes that finish by tarnishing a city's appeal and threatening social peace.

Instead of making the "big plans" championed by famed Chicago architect and urban designer Daniel Burnham, municipal governments would do well to strive for flexibility, adaptability, and sensitivity. They should

take note of the neighborly scale, learn from what works there, and recognize the need for employment-generating activity that does not directly service the core. They need to be willing to make the adjustments necessary to respond to and perhaps nudge spatial and economic developments not usually of their making and to defuse tensions and bottlenecks. The odds of their presiding over the vibrant, diverse urban environments that they consider the mark of creative, global cities would rise accordingly.

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