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Learning from the Slums for the Development of Emerging Cities

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Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1
Slums and Precarity in Developing Countries

An Interdisciplinary Perspective Towards Innovative Forms of Urban Development

Jean-Claude Bolay, Jérôme Chenal, and Yves Pedrazzini

1.1 Of Slums and Men

Today, urbanisation is a global process that characterises the rapid development of a majority of emerging and developing countries (Cohen 2004), giving rise to important social, spatial and economic changes. In such national contexts, urban issues systematically couple with rural migration phenomena and increasing numbers of poor people living in precarious conditions, engendering informal living situations (housing conditions, employment, etc.), environmental contamination (water, soil, air and waste) and growing insecurity and vulnerability among the disadvantaged. However, informality should not be confused with poverty (Roy 2009; Gransow 2010); we may speak of growing precarity and urban impoverishment only when combined with other factors that result the deterioration of urban life.

The epitome of such trends, observed in all South countries, is the slum, an extreme urban form of social and residential precarity that has become emblematic of urban growth processes, the antithesis of sustainable, balanced urban development.

But slums should not be viewed merely as an icon of the "worst new world" (Davis 2006); they may also be a potential pool of solutions for a better urban future. Given decades of repeated failures and modest local improvements, it is time to rethink the "urban issue" by reconsidering the causes of precarity, their impact on inhabitants and, more generally, on urban form, now and in the future.

As such, slums could be the starting point for more modest but better targeted reflection on the urban future, the cornerstone of urban planning methodologies. Such rigorous analysis should incorporate the physical dimensions of urban development as well as its societal and environmental components. In this respect, the

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concept of precarity and its various social, economic, environmental and urbanistic dimensions can help us better evaluate the impact of the work of urban professionals and that of slum dwellers.

In this book we will try to redefine the nature of this multi-faceted problem, while focusing on the ways and means to qualify and quantify it. We will identify prospective tools that are capable of assessing and prioritizing issues in order to contemplate solutions to ensure acceptable living conditions for the poor of South cities and city-dwellers in general. We will also assess the role of urban actors as protectors and purveyors of public goods. Finally, we will design and propose the context for acting and implementing strategies for innovation, new policies and changes in practices.

With contributions by several authors, the book begins by recapping the various aspects of the urbanization of the world and growing insecurity for an ever-increasing number of people. Based on this, we developed a theoretical framework to show that slums are not on the margins of the contemporary urban process but rather are emblematic of it, especially in the global South. Urbanity, a prime factor of economic growth, is still closely tied to the pauperization of a large portion of the urban population and to the deterioration of their natural and built environment.

Based on a classification of different types of slums, we will then show both the diversity of each situation (through the analyses of 15 case studies that were freely explored by 19 authors and co-authors with different backgrounds) and the invariants that one finds in a cross reading. This comparison of global data, urban theory and case studies will ultimately provide an overall understanding of slums, and as such of urbanization – comprised both of demographic and economic growth *as well as* increasingly marked social disparities and territorial fragmentation – taking place on every continent. In the final analysis, this reflection will help us think differently about the urban now and address the serious issues facing many South and North city-dwellers alike.

1.2   Key Trends in Global Urbanisation

Roughly 2.6 billion people (UN 2011) currently live in urban areas of developing countries. According to United Nations forecasts (UN-Habitat 2003; UNFPA 2007, 2011), this figure could reach four billion within the next 25 years.[1] Today, it is estimated that more than one billion of these poverty-stricken urban dwellers live in slums (Watson 2009; Bolay 2006; Davis 2006; Neuwirth 2005). The world is urbanizing inexorably, and this trend, according to demographers, is essentially taking place in emerging and developing countries, namely in Asia and Africa, and in Latin America to a lesser extent. This phenomenon is coupled with a shift in poverty that,

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[1] According to the UN: *World Urbanization Prospects*: *The 2011 Revision*, the urban population could reach 4,231,404 in less developed regions by 2035.

although still mainly a feature of rural populations – who constitute 75 % of the world's poor – is now increasing in urban areas (Ravallion et al. 2007).

Additionally, a majority of the world's 3.6 billion city dwellers still live in small or medium-sized urban agglomerations. In developing countries the urban population represented 46.5 % of the whole population (52.1 % worldwide) in 2011. Of those, 16 % lived in megalopolises of more than 5 million inhabitants, 24 % in metropolises of 1–5 million inhabitants, 9.4 % in agglomerations of 500,000 to 1 million inhabitants, and 50.5 % in cities of less than 500,000 (United Nations, Population Division 2007, 2011). Even though the focus tends to be on metropolises and larger cities (Henderson 2002), the majority of urban issues will require addressing in urban contexts of all kinds, regardless of their size and complexity in terms of space, population and social organization.

The United Nations has defined five key points in the effort for slum-free urban development: access to water, sanitation, security of land tenure (Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002), sustainable housing and sufficient living space. The UN report on the occasion of the 2005 New York summit stated that the implementation of these points is as yet to be confirmed: while the percentage of people in developing countries with access to drinking water rose from 71 % in 1990 to 87 % in 2010 (WHO 2010), 39 % of the world's population still live without improved sanitation facilities. Nonetheless, the number of slums mushroomed in this same period. The number of poverty-stricken city dwellers was estimated at 662 million in 1990, and 998 million in 2007. According to the UN, this figure will reach 1.4 billion by 2020 (UN-HABITAT 2007), and possibly 2 billion by 2030 (UN-HABITAT 2003). Clearly this definition of urban precarity is unsatisfactory, as it focuses only on the more technical dimensions of the phenomenon without addressing the political, economic and social conditions underlying it. However, it allows us to determine the scale of the phenomenon and the massive investments necessary to cope with it. In short, one may say that urban precarity extends beyond slums and material living conditions. We must continually remind ourselves that slum dwellers must deal with poverty on a daily basis. Thus, urban planning strategies should be designed to act on their behalf.

This is confirmed by DFID (2007), which stressed that the challenges of sustainable and acceptable urbanization from a social and political standpoint are a priority of an unprecedented magnitude in view of what is promoted by the United Nations.

A third of the world's urban population – one billion individuals – live in precarious conditions, while 94 % of slum dwellers live in developing countries. Africa and Asia will be predominantly urban by 2030 (REF); 72 % of urban populations in Africa live in extremely poor conditions. This figure rises to 80 % in the poorest regions of the world. Cities in developing countries will absorb 95 % of the world's urban growth over the next two decades. Today, 560 million city dwellers have no access to sanitation. UN figures regarding this point (UN-HABITAT 2008) show that this demographic expansion varies greatly depending on the world region. In 2010, roughly 32.7 % of the world urban population – 61.7 % of the sub-Saharan population in Africa, 35 % in Southern Asia, 31 % in Southeast Asia, 23 % in Latin America and the Caribbean and 13.3 % in North Africa – lived in slums.

Under these conditions, cities in developing countries distinguish themselves more in their shortcomings and weaknesses than in their ability to respond to the needs of their inhabitants. Local authorities, lacking a global vision and the tools necessary to manage the city, are ill-prepared to confront these challenges. Moreover, they often only address issues relative to emergency land-use planning (e.g. natural disasters, public events, and short-term political interests) in a vote-catching, partisan aim. In such a perspective, financially and fiscally lucrative central business districts, upscale residential areas – in short, that which benefits the wealthier segments of urban society (Paquot et al. 2000, 2006) – are given precedence.

In view of this, the poor have no choice but to take their destiny into their own hands, beyond legal and regulatory contingencies and without basic amenities (water, electricity, housing, transportation, etc.) This dichotomy between public policy and social practices undermines long-term planning attempts (Pedrazzini et al. 2005) and engenders recurring problems from one continent to another:

- The responsibilities of urban players are poorly-defined and have no true and coherent impact in the field;
- Underprivileged neighbourhoods are largely isolated from the city centre and are largely excluded from public strategies aimed at the provision of infrastructure and services;
- The public authorities' inability to meet the needs of the poor results in increased informal land use, sub-standard housing and the degradation of natural resources (water, air, soil);
- The increase of informal social and economic practices is a current response to poverty, sometimes reaching as far as illegality or even violent criminality.

These contradictions result in the following patterns:

- Standard urban planning models that are ill-adapted to the situations encountered in rapidly-growing cities in developing countries,
- Shortcomings in planning processes, which in turn result in the fragmentation of the urban territory; strong disparities in terms of access to public services and a lack of transparency in the definition of priorities and the beneficiaries,
- Increasing environmental contamination and natural risks that further weaken the urban base for the poor.
- The victims of policy shortcomings held responsible for urban disorder.

1.3   Precarity and Slums: Strategies and Actions

Researchers and cooperation agencies are struggling to find common strategies and actions to upgrade slums. For author Mike Davis (2006), although slums are the most prominent feature of contemporary urbanization, he focuses instead on their consequences, including violence, insecurity, informality and poverty. In his opinion, the latter are the result of the economic power struggles of a globalised world

(Davis 2006, 2004), hence ignoring the great potential of these particular popular urban cultures (Agier 1999; Pedrazzini 2005). Conversely, Alan Gilbert denounces the stigmatizing terminology surrounding the dangerous nature of slums, their populations, crime, poverty, disease, etc. Some authors overlook the heterogeneous nature of precarious neighbourhoods – more accurately expressed with terms such as informal housing, irregular settlements, spontaneous shelter or self-help housing (Gilbert 2009, 2007) – and the many problems present in them. However, mere terminology should not distract us from the extreme living conditions of inhabitants in poor South cities. The question is, which concepts and terminology offers a better understanding of these dynamics (Roy 2011) and can the latter be addressed from both an intellectual and operational viewpoint?

Urban precarity is multi-faceted; it is social, economic and material. Perhaps the most symbolic manifestation of the latter is housing, which is generally self-built from scrap or handmade materials, and often constructed without technical expertise. These makeshift dwellings lack water, electricity and gas supply, as well as sewage systems. By sheer force of numbers, entire neighbourhoods – often in the outskirts of urban centres or areas deemed dangerous or polluted – become notorious slums. Bernard Granotier, who coined the expression "the planet of slums," already observed in 1980 the increasing urbanisation that continues today. In the urban integration process, slums, which are part of the urban context, can be evaluated from a construction and environmental standpoint that is less than desirable in sanitary and legal terms. At the same time, slums are also community-based; they are places of social recognition and identification for rural migrants.

A twofold approach is needed to address the social conditions that create slums, and to improve material, legal and infrastructural conditions for inhabitants with no other option (Pedrazzini et al. 2005).

The trans-planetary slum phenomenon merits further analysis. It is, as Jacques Véron (2008) said, one of the contemporary impacts of the "urbanization of the world," and one of the first signs of the limits of "city" as a model for a modern, more democratic human society. Much more than this, slums are also the sign of urban poverty and, more importantly, social disparities and inequalities at the territorial level. Although not all poor city-dwellers live in slums, they nonetheless embody the material and urban precarity, marginality and vulnerability of a large segment of the urban population, and have an important impact on urban organisation now and for future urbanization prospects.

The longstanding remit of UN-Habitat is to define parameters in order to analyse, assess and quantify the extent and nature of slums. Five key indicators for international benchmarking have thus been identified: access to water; access to sanitation; structural quality of housing; overcrowding and high density; and security of tenure. These indicators clearly highlight the shortcomings of such neighbourhoods relative to the objective quality standards urban planners and experts wish to implement in the fight against prevailing living conditions. We feel it would be useful to add three additional dimensions. The first concerns local amenities (schools, health centres, markets, etc.); the second relates to access to public transport (existing bus lines, trams and other state and/or privately-run transport modes);

the third has to do with the economic power of the informal sector (De Soto 1987). Roy and Alsayyad (2003) think of urban informality as an organizing urban logic that is organized in distinct sectors. During a UN workshop on the latter issue, Mboup (2004) showed the relative significance of the individual identification parameters for slums on a global level: lack of secure tenure = 70 %; lack of sustainable housing = 65 %; lack of sufficient living space = 60 %; lack of improved sanitation = 50 %; lack of clean water = 20 %. Based on the impact of climate change as regards the vulnerability of poor urban-dwellers in Latin America, researchers from the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IIED) combined these criteria with several other parameters, including locations most exposed to hazards (flooding or landslides), locations lacking infrastructure to reduce risk and lack of knowledge, capacities and opportunities to take measures to limit impacts (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009).

1.4 Urban Regeneration Policies and Projects: The Impact on Poverty?

The urban population has been increasing across developing countries for decades (Montgomery et al. 2003). The idea that increasing precarity of urban settlements results in the impoverishment of urban populations can be summed up with what Potsdam Institute researchers labelled the "favela syndrome" in the early 2000s (Kropp et al. 2001). Nevertheless, such a diagnosis, informed by numerous material, natural and socioeconomic indicators, does not allow us to identify trends over time, highlight the contradictions between residential practices, social rationales and public policies, or outline lasting solutions that focus on the well-being of urban population.

New avenues of reflection need to be explored in order to go beyond:

- exclusively sectorial, technology-based or territorial approaches in which a "bright future" consisting of standpipes and clean toilets is reinvented in all parts of all third world cities.
- millenarian or global visions that hide the profound contradictions of contemporary societies behind the fallacious political and financial intentions of governments and international organisations, which nonetheless are occasionally genuinely concerned by the plight of the poor.

In light of these worrying developments, local, national and international policies have gradually changed:

- The initial, repressive approach long aimed at eliminating slums and enforcing urban regimenting of the poor – i.e. migrants and other dangerous populations – into manufacturing and productive cohorts.
- For almost 30 years the tendency toward assimilation of the urban masses, for whom an enabling State provides services and counsel, is forcing the poor to

become small businessmen in charge of their own destinies and of present and future urban land development.

Michelon (2010) summarizes these developments, which range from the implementation of urban policies in sub-Saharan Africa targeting "simplified actions in an increasingly complex institutional reference landscape" to the awareness of the need to improve living conditions for slum-dwellers in the 1970s, to more inclusive urban renewal projects in the 1980s. All of this must be read against the backdrop of institutional reforms, the decentralisation of power and structural adjustments. Such trends, which can also be observed in Asia and Latin America, should not overshadow the ongoing process of destruction and expulsion. Between 2000 and 2002, for instance, 6.7 million people around the world were evicted from their homes (Bolay 2011).

Above all slums are the physical symbol of contemporary cities, characterized – in terms of housing and the surrounding environment – by material deficiency, which gives rise to their precarious and insalubrious nature. Slums are both a material and architectural reality, inherent to each collective dwelling, and an urban and ecological environment. Yet, beyond their structural instability, slums are also a breeding ground for social advocacy, economic innovation and urban adaptability, thus becoming an environment to be renewed for its inhabitants, a living space to be improved and an opportunity for greater urban coherency.

Regarding territorial organisation, standard urban planning principles dictate land use, the implementation of infrastructures and the creation of technical services and networks that are essential to community life in order to meet a comprehensive goal set out by the relevant authority. This is then translated physically, upon which individuals may enjoy occupancy. In slums, however, this technocratic and linear rationale is undermined by the social practices of the poor who, faced with neglect by the public authorities, attempt to solve urgent issues using their own means, on a scale relative to how they envisage the problem (i.e. the parcel, the house, the neighbourhood). They do not take into account other levels of urban intervention (i.e. agglomeration, administrative territory, urbanized area, metropolis, rural/urban region, etc.).

For users, the immediate consequences are a low-quality built environment with insufficient infrastructure, amenities and services and polymorphous pollution of the natural environment; for urban planners, they are the impossibility of applying standard models and the need to recreate new forms of land use based on pre-existing constraints. As Watson (2009) stated, "the planning in many parts of the global South has been strongly informed by planning traditions which emerged in other parts of the world in response to urban conditions very particular to an earlier time and context." Robinson (2011) more specifically analyses current urban studies, recalling that the North-American planning model provides a reference regardless of the location. She uses the work of de Boeck and Plissart on Kinshasa (2006) as a counter example to show that anthropological research can lead to wide-ranging theoretical developments on urban production and help in highlighting the role played by inhabitants.

In terms of urban management, this results in two conflicting rationales of design and intervention. This first focuses on the long-term and overall planning process at the spatial and technical level. The second is based on social urgency and site occupancy by users to meet family and specific community needs.

Countless slum upgrading projects have been implemented worldwide (Mukhija 2001), often under the aegis of external development agencies (NGOs and international organisations) or local authorities (sometimes under the pressure of grassroots associations, often with the support of foreign bilateral and/or multilateral donors). Currently, Cities Alliance (Cities without slums),[2] an international coalition of World Bank agencies, the European Union, local and national authorities, NGOs and slum associations (Cities Alliance 2011), is one of the main global initiatives in this area, with more than a hundred projects launched on various continents beginning in the 2000s through two programs: city development strategy and slum upgrading, with investments of tens to several hundred thousand dollars per project. In its 10 years of existence, some 247 projects have been initiated, with an investment of about 112 million dollars.[3] Assessing three major slum upgrading operations successfully conducted by the World Bank in the 1990s, Werlin (1999) notes that, several years after the completion of works,[4] most project goals were not met in terms of material and long-term sustainability, cost overruns, lack of maintenance, delays in land ownership regularization and conflicts among community beneficiaries. Numerous examples confirm this. For example, an MIT website reports on 30 cases ongoing over the past 20 years, analysing the goals, investments, achievements, and strengths and weaknesses of individual projects.[5] Imparato and Ruster (2003) have also assessed five programmes implemented in Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru) for the World Bank, with particular attention to slum upgrading and community participation. In the findings of their comparative analysis, they state that: "a slum upgrading program is not a collection of technical actions to be performed independently of each other. It is an integrated and comprehensive intervention aimed at improving the physical characteristics of a neighbourhood and its inhabitants' quality of life." In order to have a significant impact, the tools used must be applied to the urban agglomeration as a whole. Moreover, the destitute do not see themselves as victims of society but rather as active, dynamic, creative partners. Turkstra and Raithelhuber (2004), in their remarks on the GIS (Geographic Information Systems) monitoring of two slums in Nairobi and Addis Ababa, emphasize the need for action plans, not only on a sectoral level but also by working jointly with the various players active in underprivileged neighbourhoods.

All this brings us to a paradigm change, now taken up by the United Nations who, like all advocates of urban rehabilitation, denounce strictly technical and material operations in favour of integrated, multi-dimensional operations that

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[2] http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/

[3] http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/Anual_Reports/AR2010_FullText. pdf. In medium terms, it represents an individual investment of 450,000 US dollars per project.

[4] Calcutta, 428 million US$; Jakarta, 353; Manila, 280.

[5] http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/case-examples/index.html

respond to the housing and environmental concerns of the people, who desire a healthy, safe and stable built environment, and the global urban integration issues of economically- and socially-marginalised populations. As such, inhabitants become key players in urban transformation (UN-HABITAT 2009; Bolay 2006). In an extensive quantitative analysis based on UN data regarding approximately one million slum inhabitants worldwide, Arimah (2010) concludes that the prevalence of slums is directly linked to the macroeconomic environment, and therefore decreases with increased income. This form of urban precarity is obviously highly dependent on the migratory flows that govern South cities and the legal and regulatory framework establishing the conditions of land and property ownership.

A comprehensive overview of what is being done today to rehabilitate slums worldwide (UN-HABITAT 2010; Brockman 2009) can help us pinpoint some of the most symptomatic features that should be contemplated in the future.

To begin, the vast majority of slum upgrading operations fall outside of local and national government budgets. Acting on structural issues on an ad hoc basis is undoubtedly the most dangerous way of doing so, regardless of the seeming quality of the immediate results.

Secondly, when comparing the investments required to successfully run a city both tangibly and intangibly, the funds earmarked for slum upgrading are almost always quite modest and of limited duration. Only a few exceptions, now considered historical examples, offset this trend. Moreover, rarely are these operations then incorporated in the city's typical management practices, with maintenance and monitoring budgets.

The third finding addresses the changes observed in problem-solving. Today, almost all projects involve multiple stakeholders and contemplate multiple issues, including housing, infrastructure, amenities, economic advancement and social involvement. However, this participatory approach is not without flaws: shortcomings often include political pressure, deficient financial mechanisms, red tape and delays in upgrading works.

Finally, over the past decades, project development increasingly incorporates the demands of inhabitants voiced during consultation processes. It also takes into account basic data, such as financial capacity, achievements, costs, the poor populations' social accessibility to the city and amenities.

These changes are fundamental; they do not merely reflect the built environment, but also the various players involved, and inhabitants in particular. They may foster or hinder in-depth understanding of projects, their integration in a more comprehensive vision of urban and regional development and their adoption by city-dwellers in the short and especially long terms, as public goods for which they are responsible.

1.5   From Physical and Social Poverty to Urban Planning

A global overview of issues relative to cities – poverty, precarity, vulnerability, social disparities and territorial inequalities – that reflect major fragmentation spatially and socially speaking combine in what is known as a "slum." A slum, in short, is an urban area that is rarely considered in its own right by urban planning and yet is symptomatic of urban growth, as it mainly emerges in developing countries. Regardless of how the phenomenon is analysed or assessed, the fact remains that this reality is spread both demographically and geographically. This is why we felt it was necessary to consider the long-term perspective, and thus chose four case studies over the last 25 years. This approach reflects how we feel urban research should be done, as well as the links between the observation of reality, the analysis of factors generating social, environmental and material precarity of an ever-growing number of poor urban dwellers and the recommendations given to urban players to promote efficient land-use and urban planning to support the greatest number of people.

Synthesis is only meaningful if we incorporate two key aspects of urban development: first, the knowledge that solving urban issues requires a multi-level approach, starting from the local level, (i.e. the neighbourhood, where inhabitants use survival strategies) to the meso-level of the urban agglomeration (to understand the territorial policies established by local authorities and to analyse their application) and finally to the regional and national levels (to estimate the impact both in terms of human migrations and environmental degradation beyond city limits (Bolay and Rabinovich 2004). Secondly, we must be attentive to multi-stakeholder modes of governance, the social conflicts that prevail in such a context and existing tensions among political decision-makers, inhabitants and sectoral interest groups.

In her reflection on "refocusing urban planning on the Globe's central urban issues," Watson (2009) makes several comments that could be used to explore new avenues for planning based on the poor, inadequately-housed city-dweller majority in the global South. This reminds us that "approaches to planning which have originated in the global North are frequently based on assumptions regarding urban contexts which do not hold elsewhere in the world; secondly that the global demographic transition, whereby Southern cities and their growth dynamics are now the dominant urban reality, requires that planning turns its attention to these kinds of issues; thirdly, that the sharp divide in these cities between an increasingly informalised and marginalised population and techno-managerial and marked-oriented systems of government gives rise to a conflict of rationalities" (Watson 2009).

Regardless of its demographic or territorial characteristics, its history or socio-political specificities, urban environments can only be understood in a diachronic perspective that sheds light on the different dimensions shaping its present and future, in the long term and relative to other cities.

Many cities lack financial resources to invest in the infrastructure, facilities, networks and housing needed to solve urban integration problems (Freire 2006). However, this is by no means the only obstacle facing sustainable urban development.

According to Hasan et al. (2005), effectively promoting alternatives by mobilising stakeholders at the national and, more importantly, the local level is a key priority. Instead of being "the problem," the poor should be seen as active members in a partnership in the fight against poverty. However, their skills and potential are often not recognised, and thus can rarely be drawn on. Local authorities play a crucial role in strategies to upgrade urban living conditions and, to a greater or lesser extent, establish land use and allocation policies for the poor. Moreover, these same authorities may also choose whether to demolish or rehabilitate a slum, and may or may not participate in decisions regarding poor areas in cooperation grassroots associations. Local and international NGOs, which assist these communities and help them negotiate with urban authorities, are also important actors. Although negotiation strategies are varied and numerous, local authorities often have trouble implementing them, as the latter are short of material and human resources. Moreover, these options may interfere with the interests of influential economic stakeholders, who often lack the genuine political will to improve slum dwellers' living conditions and occasionally succumb to corruption. From this perspective, urban planning is a multidisciplinary field that uses a variety of disciplines and specializations to address urban issues in a comprehensive manner (Fischler 2011).

Urban development must be considered at once intramurally, as part of a strategy to define a framework that includes general guidelines and priority actions to facilitate urban organization (Josse and Vauquelin 2010), and in connection with the regional and national context.

Although the debate on urban planning in the global South began long ago (Balbo 1993; Choguill 1994), it should be fuelled today by current, up-to-date observations of poorly-adapted models, an increase in precarious housing, the urbanization of poverty and informality as a mode of urban socio-economic integration (Roy 2005). Everything points to the fact that planning practices in global South countries have not reaped the benefits potentially expected from the many skills and experts who were brought together to set things right. Thus, the need to rethink the issue rather than adopt misguided solutions that, in any case, will not yield the long-awaited results. It is crucial to assess actual circumstances, not only on an urban and architectural level, but also from a social, economic and institutional viewpoint. It is clearly necessary to define what we mean by urban planning, social participation, participatory approaches, poverty (Baker and Schuler 2004) and all the other terms we use without conceptual references, especially when talking about slums.

Thus should we focus on what the most pressing issues for cities in the global South – namely the poor and slums – to design comprehensive urban development plans geared both at improving living standards (employment, health and education, to name but a few) and rehabilitating the residential environment (housing, infrastructure, local amenities and other aspects of the built environment). However, the disparate rationales of the various players (public authorities, economic stakeholders, inhabitants, community associations, etc.) are at times antagonistic and often conflicting. Additionally, we must breathe new life into design, urban planning, and construction methods, developing plans that are tailored to the needs of the players

involved based on the resources available – plans that are realistic but do not lack ambition, leaving ample room for creativity when such projects are actually implemented in the field. Finally, we must bear in mind that these issues – though concentrated in global South cities whose contexts of strong demographic growth and insufficient financial resources are unique – but may also be applied to North cities, which face increasingly similar challenges (economic competition, poverty, social exclusion, territorial fragmentation and climate change) (Garau 2009). Urban development must be understood from a historical perspective, and planning must be adapted to local and regional contexts to foster greater rationality, efficiency and coherency. What we know as "slum" must change in order to become another part of the urban world from which scientists, politicians and humanity as a whole could learn a great deal.

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Part II
Spatial Typology of Slums: Confronting the Dogmatic and the Obvious

Chapter 2
Slums: Note for an Urban Theory

Yves Pedrazzini, Jérôme Chenal, and Jean-Claude Bolay

2.1 This Is Not a Slum

In the twentieth century (and since the 1970s in particular), the slum, with its many names and latitudes – from Brazilian favelas to Colombian *colonias*, Argentinian *villas*, Indian *shantytowns*, South African townships or Algerian *bidonvilles* – has become emblematic of "the big city" (Granotier 1980), with its skyscrapers, motorway interchanges, shopping mall and suburbs. So much so that one can easily imagine that, in the near future, rare will be the individual who, regardless of their origins, will not have a good idea of what a slum is and how the "problem" it poses can/should one way or another be resolved. In these times that are both urban and complex, that "good" idea is unlikely to be positive, even if many of these inhabitants must think that, though problematic, the slum is also legitimate. Hence, the solution to the problem of its nature – indeed, of its very existence – is not necessarily its elimination (*or* upgrading, *or* rehabilitation, *or* renovation, *or* any other form of modernisation). Indeed, in what we could call overwhelming public opinion – and likewise supported by certain major international bodies – there emerges slowly, surely, sustainably, the idea that a slum "solution" is possible, given the eternal "problem" of the slum, a place of deprivation and crime (Agier 1999; Rao 2012; etc.).

This idea increasingly goes hand in hand with an undoubtedly profane, but empirically "referenced" theoretical vision. The more-or-less theoretically grounded pronouncement of big-city residents regarding these neighbourhoods is far from stupid. On the contrary, given the evolution of large urban systems over the past 20 years – i.e. the 1990s, during which (neo) liberalism emerged as the sole economic principle – the idea that the slum is not the worst of all possible worlds – whatever

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Davis (2004) might think – gained substantial credibility. Given that it is based on spatial and social experience of the city, researchers must learn to combine it with scholarly approaches to the realities of the city with the utmost seriousness.

Further complications obviously arise from the fact that the "inhabitants of contemporary cities" are themselves theoretically constructed figures, and are in support of divided socially as spatially – like their perception of "their" cities and slums. Thus do we find as many "public" opinions *for* as *against* the latter. Even if taken individually the opinions of the inhabitants seem rather favourable, slums are generally "frowned upon". That said, in 2015, though a "slum theory" like the one we will briefly outline here is unlikely to change negative perceptions that dominate generally the fabrication of this idea – i.e., the fundamentally regrettable existence of slums *period* – it is essential to "theorise the slum" by treating it like any *ordinary* social and/or spatial fact. However, it is vital to also treat it as an "extra-ordinary" – but not aberrant – reality, provided there is a critical analysis of urban planning and contemporary urbanisation in general, which is the case here. Such an analysis must instead rely on the "non-ordinary" nature of the slum habitat to highlight the risk of it becoming the *ordinary* habitat of not only the very poor – as in most countries – but also of an increasing proportion of the middle class in the decades to come. For these reasons, the slum is the strategic place from which to scientifically and politically consider the destiny of major cities around the world. The presence of slums is mandatory to this global hallmark, for it is the capitalist-city-turned-liberal that has become globalised. Moreover, capitalism – even late, cognitive and spectacular capitalism (and therefore liberalism) – is built on economic (and therefore spatial) inequality, one form of which is the slum, perhaps the generic neighbourhood of the generic twenty-first-century city.

From among the many terms used at innumerable local levels to describe "informal" neighborhoods, the editors of this book have chosen "slum(s)". This choice reflects the accession of a precarious urban reality to a particular status in the urban sciences, and in which English is the globalising theoretical marker. In the history of urban planning, this reality was initially and for a long time (i.e. for most of the twentieth century) observed and identified in the favelas of Rio (Perlman 1976). Today, this Brazilian word somehow "returned to the local level", with "slum" – because of its English readability – gradually becoming universal. English, in all of the sciences, decides in favour of fact. We therefore endorse it, as every urban researcher. Nevertheless, we are not fooled by the domination that consists of "generically" using the term "slum" in the urban sciences, architecture and urbanism to (dis) qualify the self-constructed/popular habitats of big South cities, or the fact that we are contributing to validating this power relationship in the urban planning field through this book,. Move over "barrios", "favelas" and other "shantytowns"; make room for slums! That given, addressing the slum from a theoretical viewpoint does not stop the researchers from making the important distinction here in this chapter between the slum as a theoretical object and the slum as a "real" object, for which we postulate, a priori, the unacceptable condition: misery, pain,

violence, etc., that appears in both the scientific literature and political spheres as indisputable reality. Words *do* matter![1]

From there, the main challenge is analysing an environment that results from an overwhelming lack of "spatial justice" (Soja 2000); in other words, understanding the position of the slum and its inhabitants in the power system that is the city without forgetting the harshness of everyday life and while unmasking its innovative "potential." The second major challenge when it comes to theorizing the slum is not underestimating its trendy, iconic "hype" and/or romantic (in terms of social fabric of the city) character, as evidenced in recent publications (e.g. Brillembourg et al. 2013). It is important not to position oneself at either extreme – that is, its "suffering" *or* its "hype" side – at the risk of merely describing the slum rather than theorizing it.

But beyond this challenge, which might, after all, be only an issue within the academic world, theorising the painful iconic status of urbanity/contemporary urbanism is essential in the effort – that is also ours in this book – to define a slum policy. More than anything else, what must be preserved here is that which has been obtained through suffering, but that, over the years since liberation and independence from the former colonies, has succeed in becoming something very different than an expression of suffering; the "revolutionary" aspect (in the sense of the urban revolution dear to Henri Lefebvre 1970) of the slum. Thus, while this "iconic" and "trendy" aspect of the slum gave to the government power a new "intellectual" and academic grip on it – once again confirming its dominated status – it nonetheless gives slums an inverted grip on the government. Thus, against this power's will to see any "erasure resistance" (Marsault 2010) strategy annihilated, auto-construction practices – the profane praxis – of the resident can, however, benefit greatly from this iconic status to latch onto such tactics.

A sociology of slums thus helps historically situate the state of our cities and contributes to a cultural critique of urbanism as a kind of reordening "other spaces" (Foucault 1967), of which the slum is now the most common archetype at the global level. But slum theory also seeks to understand how slums "contain" this segregated city and urban dominant order, in which inhabitants have no way to resist other than by increasing their informality at the cost of their daily existences, as a result of a life that compels them to become "criminals" and reside in "illegal" housing.

So for us, the question is the following: how do we "reverse" this standpoint and go against the two classic positions of urban professionals? The first: that the slum is a problem of ownership, services, equipment, health, violence and, often, safety issues, and hence a solution (resolution) must be imposed; the second: to consider it

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[1] The authors of Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, and Jérôme Chenal et al. in Chaps. 3 and 5, recognise spatial and social "materialism". These realities are what we call "slums". However, in order to discuss this, we wish first to address urban theory. The "real" slum has – under various names and more or less "controlled" – been the subject of numerous studies. Some, such as that of Ananya Roy (2011), in denouncing the status of the "Western fantasy" in an article entitled "Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism", ironically referring to the title of the controversial Hollywood film *Slumdog Millionaire*, partly shot in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai (see also in this book, Camillo Boano's chapter on Dharavi).

as a potential urban environment, but to integrate it in a "concerted" urban rehabilitation project, often triggering an even faster and more effective demise than the threat of eradication by "evil" promoters (i.e. the Brazilian "favela-barrio" syndrome). This reversal, which perhaps naively espouses the new, poular, profane view of slums as potential habitats and neighbourhoods, has resulted in no longer considering the slum as a problem but rather a solution (in the quest for "best practices" of urban management, notably of democratic governance, etc.). We are obviously not the first to consider the slum as a solution; others have already done so (e.g. Gilbert 2007), not necessarily because they thought of themselves as progressivists but rather as left- or right-wing pragmatists, liberally believing that individual inhabitants can manage to live in the city with dignity, even when the inhabitants as an organized class cannot. The difference, it would seem, the time for technical and policy solutions to the problems of big cities (growth, breakdown, crisis, violence, etc.) is over. Now is the time for a radical reversal of perspectives – a paradigm shift -, an element of urban and critical theory through which we seek a symbolic rehabilitation of the slum and/or the re-creation of the slum in an urban sequence in which it can establish itself as a non-marginal place, or even a new paradigm of urban development.

Of course it is not enough to merely think about such a paradigm shift in order for it to happen, especially as far as DIY practices go, because it is integrated in their "project of life". Thus, without forgetting the aforementioned disgraceful conditions suffered by slum inhabitants, this symbolic rehabilitation and recognition does not necessarily involve renovation or restructuring projects, much less the evicting of inhabitants in favour of social housing projects designed for other "members of society" than those who actually *live* in these slums. It does, however, force scientists and politicians to think – differently – about the "theoretical" slum as the missing link in the history of urban planning in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. But beware: we do not wish to "passively" defend the slum by showing its *potential*, as this *potential* is seen only through a neoliberal prism, with the slum finding its place in the order of the capitalist city as a brand new icon (e.g. Brillembourg et al. 2013, re: the Tower of David in Caracas), a pool of economic forces (already in de Soto 1986), or a poor enclave to develop by inviting it to contribute to (sustainable) growth of the host city, as urban agriculture proponents do believing they see wayward peasant communities lost in the metropolis' precarious neighbourhoods. The works of Huchzermeyer (2011), invoking the right of informal sectors to formality, or those of Alan Gilbert (2007 in particular) highlighting the community dynamics and creative potential of slum players themselves obviously are headed in the right direction, i.e. siding in favour of the most vulnerable, like the writings of Frantz Fanon, for example. However, in the footsteps of groundbreaking thinkers like David Harvey (2008) and (more than anyone else) Henri Lefebvre (1974), today we seek to "theorise the slum" as a historically unprecedented agent of urban change whose position as an outsider allows for a new way of building South (but also North, East and West) cities – a social, cultural and economic fabric both urban planning-wise and materially that enables slums and their inhabitants to reaffirm their "right to the city" and thus their right to slum.

For now (in 2015), our slum theory consists of a few sequences of the same reasoning regarding the right of the poor to stay in the city. We therefore question the function of the slum in a new theory of the city and in the city itself. We also propose avenues for a theory that avoids both development theories and cultural/postcolonial studies (but nonetheless still refer to them) and offers a critical and/or innovative theory of the urban world in the making, like cities and as slums (Legg and McFarlane 2008; Roy 2009),[2] while at the same time providing an alternative narrative of the history of modern urbanisation in the world (McFarlane and Robinson 2012; Parnell and Robinson 2012).

2.2   The Invention of the SLUM: Delimiting the Battleground

Certain intolerable realities of the world remain whatever we do. Nevertheless, it is important to describe, denounce and perhaps even to continue to fight them – at least intellectually – so that they are recognised as such. That is why we propose thinking beyond the expert and profane views of the slum, which, though based on only a few "official", stereotypical depictions of the slum and its misery (Rio's favela, Jo'burg's township, Delhi's shantytown, etc.) can be found virtually everywhere. For the researcher or ordinary onlooker, in major cities, one way to fight back is through vocabulary: deconstructing the vocabulary and language of the dominators (space, class, etc.) and rebuilding them from the standpoint of the dominated. In this way – like Frantz Fanon 1961 – we may sometimes, under certain conditions, change the nervous, scornful perception non-residents may have of inhabitants of stigmatised, segregated, left-behind areas. In French, we can start with "shantytown," perhaps keeping only the "town" part, and as such deconstruct the negative image to rethink the slum from neither a "white" nor "male" nor "charitable" perspective, but from a theory of the slum as a potential solution, even one of, but also a limitless pool of projects that merits being "saved" as a place of a possible freeing of space.

From a theoretical viewpoint, as long as we continue wielding the term "slum" positively both theoretically and practically (i.e. in order to change the slum's position in the true urban hierarchy even slightly), could we not consider it as an urban lab experiment, like an eco-neighborhood in Paris, remodelled public spaces in Barcelona or urban agriculture in New York, for instance? We, the authors of this

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[2] But the theory most often directly involved, intentionally or not, to the discriminatory view of slums is perhaps, more than researchers, artists, novelists and poets such as Brecht, Pasolini, Cesar Arias and Tarun Tejpal, or filmmakers like Brillante Mendoza or Khawn (on the slums of Manila) – and again Pasolini (*Accatone*, *Mama Roma*, *Appunti per fim sull'India* and perhaps *Appunti per un'Orestiade africana*) – film-worlds that oblige us to completely revist our critical perspectives: they offer a "loving" but compassionless vision of this "worst new world" of slums. Surely even more than the sincere commitment of NGOs confronted with the bulldozers of Palestine or Beijing, Poetry will allow the soul of the poor to survive the modernisation of their poor habitats, and their footsteps to continue to mark their sequestered territories.

article, would say yes, especially since the slum promises to become *the* habitat of the 2010s. And even though no convincing sign relative to any other urban "project" (Amin and Graham 1997; Robinson 2006) is perceptible, even though by starting from a more or less personal experience of the slum and tying it in with critical thinking on the spread of urbanisation, urban planning and the "urban question" (Castells 1972), we can assess the promises of habitat forms that today are exceptional but tomorrow will be ordinary.

Finally, the real question raised by the irrevocable existence of slums is this: has what one becomes accustomed to in architecture, urban planning and, increasingly, engineering, as well as in governance and democracy, been done elsewhere other than in the slum?[3] Would not a slum theory be the theory of these "other" spaces incarnate? Of course, assuming the answer to this question is "yes," one must wonder if this is good or bad news, the hope of better "close future cities" or the desperate sign of a major planetary catastrophe? In the second case, the hope remains that we are moving towards a less frivolous society, and that the slum foreshadows both its own proliferation and an even greater environmental catastrophe that only the slum itself allows us to consider…and perhaps prevent?

Thus the period of the catastrophic urban planning that is apparently the slum masks the catastrophes to come (and those already occurring) as a result of urban planning. Yet, as a "legitimate" catastrophe of urban planning, as in physics, it happens that the slum destroys the "original state" in the arrangement of things, not in the field of "urban research" but from the reality of a city. However, this "orginal" state is in fact naturally – "originally" – unfair. Therefore, by destroying this state, which is an order (and *it is* an order), the slum sometimes succeeds in destroying a bit of the unjust order of the urban world by imposing itself urbanistically, architecturally and politically.

The slum, like the post-industrial wastelands, refugee camps and ruins, produced by what we call "natural" disasters or by wars (often civil) is now a major urban icon. However, like the ruin, wasteland or camp, it is a negative icon whose appeal and repulsiveness result from the troubled state of our relationship to the city and urbanization itself, which is both 'violence' and 'civilisation' – the 'violence of civilisation'. This violence we call urbanisation,[4] i.e. the capitalist city in the age of globalisation of neoliberal policies, is the most radical strength for elevating the (urban) status of working-class neighbourhoods, foremost amongst which are slums (given that industrialisation is relative in South cities), to constructive places of knowledge capable of transforming from handicraft to high tech within a few months, as seen in Lagos (Bélanger et al. 2000; Gandy 2005).

But this trap, this rehabilitation disaster, clearly hides another probable catastrophe. Just as false as the idea that the "urbanisation of slums" (commercial or charitable) could save the city from "crisis" is the idea that the crisis was caused by the "slumifying" of the city. However, because it is sold as such by the media, this idea

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[3] If one considers the medina of Fez or the casbah of Algiers, to cite only two historical examples, are we not in exactly the same situation, from the perspective of urban and perhaps social forms?

[4] See more on this subject: Pedrazzini (2005) and: Pedrazzini et al. (2014).

naturally enters into the thinking of inhabitants of these so-called cities in crisis, while, in truth, it is the capitalist system that *is* the crisis. The poor are merely a scapegoat so that the enemy is not capitalism but, once again, its victims.

2.3   Towards a Slum Theory

Faced with the seemingly endless growth of the city, the slum continues to impose its cobbled form and the poverty of its people as one of the elements destined to mark big cities today, and to survive the future states of growth and decline that will determine of what the city is the name. "DIY" housing, the micro-world of recycling geniuses who scrape by using "pitiful" materials to build their miraculous world, is now the irrefutable space of an urban civilisation that no longer seeks to correct itself in order to offer greater spatial and social justice to its most impoverished inhabitants. Our civilization chooses and holds steadfastly to seeing the injustice that, each day, strengthens it more firmly as an inegalitarian society, *not* as a grave problem whose solution all its forces should be urgently mobilized to find, but as a *solution in itself* that alone can ensure the long-term survival of the system. That solution? That justice explodes and the city disappears, at least as a planned space, which is how we consider the built environment in the "North". But then, maybe only the slum, clothed as a beautiful beggar, would remain, and thus become "the city".

Urban planning as practiced by many professionals, i.e. a profession rather than a practice in which they play an active role, is a bourgeois job, developed starting in the mid-nineteenth century, along with the bourgeoisie as the dominant urban class (Fainstein 2010; Harvey 2001). This word – for we are not fools – comes from another time. Yet, one cannot deny that the main problem of modern Western urbanism (whose pretense to institute itself as a model has been common knowledge for more than a century; the cities of Berlin, London, Paris, New York and Los Angeles, etc. pass the baton to assure distribution and after-sales service to Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Cape Town and Shanghai) is that it is still that of the *grands bourgeois* – Hausmann, Cerda, Costa in Brasilia, Le Corbusier in Chandigarh, and the princes of the Emirates in Doha, Dubai, etc. Since the late nineteenth century, the question remains the same for professionals who, over the ages, were desirous to respect, or at least reflect, popular knowledge with regard to urban construction techniques. How to do popular urban planning in these conditions and, more importantly, how to plan while promoting small, local business and worksites projects without abandoning the professional goal being the developer, if not the designer? The conflicting desires of urban planners have been expressed through a dialectic of destruction and construction of popular neighbourhoods both envied and detested for their urbanity (Roy 2009) since the "invention" of the big modern city itself.

Back in so-called developing or emerging countries where cities are emerging as the ultimate horizon of civilisation, these ideological principles are rarely called into question. So, when certain researchers/practitioners engage in promoting

self-building strategies and other slum-making techniques with "dangerous pity", all the while maintaining authority and control over the experiment, one has the right to wonder about the origins of the real threat to the slums. Does the threat come from its explicit enemies who, in one way or another, might benefit from their razing – or from its (self-proclaimed) friends who, in the end, are only formally using the slum to improve their public image by evacuating real inhabitants and replacing them with figurines. In any case, all help ensure the functioning of this architectural system wherein architects do the thinking and inhabitants, who live where they are told, live under domination.

Thus it is a question of safeguarding the slum from eviction and disappearance, but above all of protecting its inhabitants from bourgeois recognition (Harvey 2008) gentrification and the conformist ordering of their spaces. In this way, safeguarding the "infamy" of the slum (like Pasolini devoted his life to doing – or at least tried – for the *borgate* and bandits, or Foucault did for history's infamous) and preventing it from reconciling with the system that gave birth to it and that now, by recognising it as an ordinary neighbourhood, would deprive it of its struggles as it deprived it of everything else – roads, services, electricity, water, security – for more than a century.

The slum is that which radically opposes the bourgeois idea of space. In doing so, it has been reintegrated in urbanism and dominant urban planning, but has also been dissolved *because of its differences* and anti-establishment/resistance culture. Evidently, one sometimes continues – alongside designers of urban space – to dream of a more just, more liveable, more modern city. In this city, residents and policy-makers would no longer engage in a thankless struggle of spaces where the most powerful win in the end every time, but having made forms – subscribing to a few consultative democratic rituals, finally, in this city, urban order would be neither unjust, nor the fruit of the furious fighting of certain actors who are more resistant than others, but rather would simply *be*. It is the dream of a city. Of course, this faction of romantic (or revolutionary) designers of space almost always limit themselves to thinking the "thinkable", visible spaces of the city and those who live there, not the spaces that disturb this dream city – the unthinkable, invisible, "infamous" spaces, the stuff of which the Vietnamese, Malaysian, Nigerian and Pakistani cities are *really* made, cannon fodder for the urbanisation of the world.

2.4   Conclusion

To complete this theory, we return to the "praxis" and propose a reversal of the "how to make the city" so typical of architecture and urban planning firms worldwide – an approach that, if one were to recognise some humanistic virtue in it, nonetheless encourages a "productive" view of urban planning and the eternal recycling of the sole motive of capitalist as a guideline for the urban fabric.

To counter such habits and potentially propose a new – joint (?) – motive, we must to go into the slum and see what makes it a fundamentally unthinkable,

invisible and therefore "infamous" space/place/territory/terrain. It is important at this historic moment of global doubt concerning the civilising values of Urbanity and Western values, Modernity and Democracy, that the slum does not lose its radical strangeness. It must also continue to resist the "bourgeois" – or more simply "elitist" – way of the making of the city while aiming for its inclusion in it, and take the risk of losing its political alternativeness. For, while 10 or 15 years ago professionals and politicians still generally agreed that it was necessary to restore dignity to self-built popular housing, even if that meant destroying them to rebuild them decently, today the slum is held hostage by all kinds of players and decisionmakers. And here do we find a slew of tributes – from the most sincere to the most opportunistic – to the constructive and creative power of the poor, the slums as a collective work, etc. One, somewhat radical slum theory aims to circumvent sentimental approaches to slum reality in order to reaffirm the political challenge of an urban slum theory. From this point of view, it is not provocative to say that slum renovation projects are the new curse of poor neighbourhoods – even their misery and infamy no longer belong to them! Having become the new urban icon, the slum as a case study and locus of urban struggle has strayed to the side of applied arts, and perhaps even contemporary (postcolonial?) art.[5]

But the iconic status of the slum, while paradoxically confirming the opinion held for some years now by both its advocates and its opponents, does not in any way diminish the urgency of saving it from its "saviours". The risks are numerous. The most worrisome, however, is that of aestheticisation – the desire of its thinkers and "practitioners" to see and praise its beauty, thus joining up with the slum's desire to be attractive, to please and to stop being the bane of urbanity, at the risk of selling its soul to any developer.

This is why, to follow Walter Benjamin, one can see the slum as representative of the "destructive nature" of urban planning.[6] But this negativity, this creative destruction will be positivised due to its reverse negativity – overthrown like a coup d'état of a corrupt regime. In any case, today we must reverse, if nothing else, at least the paradigm: we must solve, at least partially, the urban riddle ("What is a city? What is urbanisation of the world?") based on several, more or less off centre (towards the margins rather than marginal) assumptions on the place of the slum in urban planning. Ultimately, what are the origins of the informal? In a series of decisions taken by the "formal" (economic) power, poor city dwellers respond by developing more or less improvised and "powerful" strategies that are impossible to formalise, and thus disqualified as "informal", thereby legitimising their "marginalisation", which is quite useful to the power.

Socially and spatially, the slum is part of the city, but in a different form than that defined by Western modernity. A slum theory is merely one aspect of urban theory whose proclamation has continued unceasingly for at least a hundred years. Only

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[5] One needs to think of the actions of street artist JR that, with each new work, veered further away from the radical political ambitions of its beginnings.

[6] "The Destructive Character" ("Der Zerstörerische Charakter") is an article by Walter Benjamin (1931).

one thing is certain: it is only by confronting the most concrete aspects of the reality of the slum as popular, poor and dominated housing that a slum theory can hope to be of some use. This is what we will try to do in the chapters that follow.

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Chapter 3
Tentative Classification of Various Slum Types

Jérôme Chenal, Yves Pedrazzini, and Jean-Claude Bolay

3.1 Introduction

The third chapter presents a typology of slums based on spatial indicators at two levels: the urban level and the neighbourhood level. We can classify and thus understand neighbourhoods according to their location in the urban area (central, periphery, etc.) and the built environment generated by the urban form. The typology we propose is not in keeping with classic slum representations (i.e. lack of access to urban services, poor habitat quality, etc.). Rather, it seeks to understand the major issues in slums based on their urban form, which will then help us propose appropriate solutions for the future development of precarious neighbourhoods.

The chapter presents the urban typologies of several common slum representations. We will look at them according to four spatial criteria: (1) their location in the city centre or periphery; (2) residential zoning in the slum settlement area (wetland area/risk area vs. land suitable for urbanisation. Some slums are centrally located on valuable land, and are consequently under great pressure, while others take root in the interstices of the city); (3) the structure of road networks (was the slum previously organised on a grid or not?); and (4) the habitat-"strengthening" process, in which the degree of *durcification* often reflects the neighbourhood's level of land insecurity. These visual and spatial criteria are easily determined and, combined, produce 16 easily identifiable slum types.

This spatial classification based on urban form gives us a systematic framework upon which to juxtapose social, economic, environmental and institutional concerns. Social practices have a spatial impact, though sometimes barely perceptible to the untrained eye. Urban form helps us see the city in all its depth and detail, in its economic relations as well as its social ones. It is in this way that the authors

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sought to expand this initial vision based on forms in the various case studies in Part III, addressing various aspects of social dynamics.

3.2   Back to Urban Planning

Before developing our slum classification in the manner of naturalists who, in centuries past, classified species for the pleasure of doing so, but also in order to understand the differences between them, we will briefly revisit urban planning, its failures and paths of future development.

One of the fundamental errors urban planning makes is not taking into account the settlement strategies of poor populations and, hence, the development of precarious neighbourhoods and slums (Chenal 2014). Without an understanding of the dynamics involved, any planning seems difficult. Yet, today, this is what planning consists of; based solely on urban extensions and population curves, a permanent gap exists between reality and planning visions.

In Global South cities, urban planning histories are often identical, though the periods may differ. Informality is problematic in all cities because this is what "makes" the city, over and beyond planning. Urban plans fail to predict the urban development of cities, serving only to ratify decisions a posteriori. The city creates itself, driven by its own dynamics; the plan that secures these outcomes follows months or years later. Urban dynamics make the city, not urban planning.

Furthermore, the informal city, which inevitably develops outside of planning, reinforces this situation. On one hand, plans for the city are late in coming; on the other hand, even when they succeed in anticipating urban development, there remains the essential problem of the informal city. The gap between planning and the reality of the city is seen as a lack of anticipation of urban growth on the part of the authorities. Spreadsheets and population curves always miss the target with regard to both decline and explosion of the population. Trying to anticipate such phenomena, if indeed possible, changes nothing if one does not seriously consider the fact that (1) plans reinforce a given situation and (2) the informal city always grows "outside the walls." The urban problem lies not in the accuracy of forecasted statistics but in urban dynamics.

Planning history has documented the shift from urban form as a result of "technical" aspects and its current symbolic drift. Urbanism is used as a means of expression by the State, which tries to showcase its success. In this "showcase," however, the poor do not exist. And although international donors have made reducing urban poverty their personal crusade, politicians have not incorporated urban poverty in their planning. Planning documents generally hide the city's poor, or act as though their poverty is marginal enough to have no visible consequences on urban space and the production of the city. However, our previous analysis (Chenal 2009, 2014) shows that cities are largely produced by their informal settlements. In this sense, poverty should have a central place in thinking on the city.

The urban diagnoses on which planning assumptions are based do not take the poor into account and, thus, do not take slums into account. Rather, they tend to be based on an undefined population of "average" citizens who are wealthy enough to fully experience the city, travels by car or public transportation, choose where they live, and so on. Yet, while these people do exist in all cities, they are often unrepresentative in those where slums are the norm.

Moreover, planning documents are based on the same ideals of the city and planning process. As such, they have similar limitations, i.e. the reduction of urban complexity and creation of the "average" citizen. The oversimplification of urban complexity is most obvious in its lack of consideration of urban dynamics. Monographs behind the planning in this sense show a series of issues without specific consideration of the dynamics. Simplifying the tool should make it more efficient, at least that is what we read between the lines in the planning documents. However, our work, on the contrary, shows that it is by taking into account dynamic complexity that planning is possible. In addition to development based on the idea of an "average" citizen, the planning done by urban planners is based on an ideal Modernist city and not the city itself. Overall, city planning is "above ground". One does not plan the city, but rather the *idea* we have of the city. The climate and seasons play no part whatsoever; the city becomes an abstract decontextualized object – a global city in a globalised world, where air conditioning produces the same spaces the world over (Koolhaas 2011). This is reinforced by the fact that the makers of cities are the same everywhere: a handful of consultants, a few World Bank officials, an African elite mainly educated in France, an Asian elite trained in the UK and, increasingly, the United States, and Latin American elite trained in Spain or California.

By not dealing with poverty, planning does not take into account the majority of urban inhabitants, which then reinforces segregation. Hence, planning takes place without any understanding of how the city is actually made. In short, planning's failure stems from a lack of integration of social dynamics – the paradox of planning – where the poorest people settle outside of areas defined by urban plans, which do not take into account urban trajectories or prioritize key issues (Chenal 2014).

The failure of successive plans should be a catalyst for a new approach to planning not solely based on the inhabitant-job duo. Such self-organized, people-centred planning would no longer be done merely by expansion, but rather would explore the individual dynamics of urban stakeholders. In other words, urban planning would rely on the dynamics of stakeholders to plan the city.

This mainly consists in understanding social dynamics prior to taking any action, in order to highlight the possible levers of change. Planning does not propose solutions for fighting poverty; on the contrary, the violence with which planners and elites seek to turn slums into cities "like any other" makes finding innovative solutions impossible.

Climate factors should also be reintroduced in planning. Without any particular nostalgia for colonial towns in Asia, Latin America and Africa, they did nonetheless take into account concepts like heat, rain, runoff and ventilation. Contemporary

cities have long forgotten this essential data. The current model is that of a global and/or generic, decontextualized city, without a direct link to the soil upon which its buildings are built – a city completely disconnected from the physical reality, made of businesspeople, airplanes and international conferences. Far from challenging Friedmann's (1986), Friedmann and Wolff (1982) or Sassen's (1991, 2002a, b) work on global cities, or Koolhaas's more forward-thinking work on the generic city (Koolhaas 2000), the reality described in current research does not take into account the hundreds of millions of poor people living in the margins of elite trends. Yet, it is for them – the non-mobile inhabitants of cities condemned to living on restricted territories under house arrest that cities should be conceived.

This is why planning must be reinvented based on urban form, which, before becoming symbolic, was connected to its environment – the same form that, when not produced by globalised urban planners, provides the key to underlying social structures.

3.3   About the Form of Slums

Google Earth influences research work in a much more profound and lasting way than we imagine. We still cannot estimate the impact this will have on our vision of cities and, hence, on the way we understand them in years to come. Today, from their workstations, people can see the world's slums and, in a single day, travel from the Kibera slum in Nairobi to a favela in Rio to the outskirts of Caracas to Darhavi to downtown Mumbai. It has become easy to measure, date and compare urban situations almost anywhere in the world, as satellite coverage is not universally equal. This vision – as an image and in planning – is revolutionising research, allowing us to see reality in the manner of a forensic image, providing the (seemingly) irrefutable evidence of what is seen.

We could, as such, evaluate the current state of slums based Google Earth's updated satellite imagery, as the criterion is relevant. In addition to urban form, deforestation, destruction, construction and flood zones should be closely monitored, and areas of crisis (war, famine, drought, etc.) updated almost daily. For other areas – urban or otherwise – updating is slow, and very slow in equatorial cities where cloudy days are frequent. In 2014, Google Street View was effective almost everywhere in the US and most of Europe, but in few African cities.[1] As such, those working on slums are not informed in the same manner or as comprehensively, depending on the location of their research subject. South African cities and Gaborone in Botswana therefore play a pioneering role, the quality of the Internet undoubtedly being a contributing factor.

Based on satellite images, it is possible to produce types of slums and, hence, classify urban forms. Initially, we classify slums into categories to show the

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[1] Google benefitted from football's 2010 World Cup in South Africa to test the system on the African continent.

differences between them, like a biologist objectively classifying plants and animals. Traditionally, architects did the same thing, showing major types and typologies in order to describe a reality, without necessarily analysing it. This is the main objective of this chapter: proposing a classification. For this, we will look at, observe and analyse the images available via Internet, classifying urban forms and testing the differences between them. Although the classification can be a goal in itself, here we use it to analyse and understand the subtle mechanisms underlying urban production. Classification first and foremost allows for understanding but, more importantly, shows that slums are more complex than the word "slums" itself – which refers to numerous realities – indicates.

For this, we will use Google Earth and visit the slums of different cities around the world. We supplement our research with Google images, which provides thousands of photographs of each slum, especially the oldest and most mediatized (i.e. referenced) ones. Dharavi gets 530,000 hits on Google, Kibera 412,000 and the less-known El Mina *kebbe* in Nouakchott "only" 207,000.[2]

Each urban form is the result of spatial and social practices, which are influenced by this form. Balzac demonstrated this in 1835, in Père Goriot's Paris, where the Vauquer boarding house – a space – influences Vautrin and the other characters. Likewise, their presence there and use of it influences the space. Even nineteenth-century European literature shows us that such phenomena are not new. What is new, however, in urban research today is the ease of access to images that allow us to immediately understand them.[3]

From there, our job is to understand social practices through the prism of urban form. Each social practice can be seen and interpreted in the urban form (Shatkin 2011; Chenal 2014). This requires the ability to interpret the latter. Urban form allows shows us practices in the broader sense, as political choices, physical constructions, the structuring of a society, and the relationship with the State and land itself, but also as a technical device that reflects the era of development. At the urban level, the will of the segregationist apartheid societies can be seen in the urban form in these countries. Form thus shows the organisation of a given society. The sanitation syndrome of colonial African cities can still be seen in the layout of their windswept streets.

The remainder of the chapter will look at slums based on four main spatial criteria, as described at the beginning of the chapter. These easily identifiable, uniquely visual and spatial criteria, combined, produce the 16 slum types summarised in the table at the end of the chapter.

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[2] Research done on 2 November 2014.

[3] See: Chenal (2014).

3.4   Centre or Periphery

Slums in urban centres are, for the most part, long-established settlements that were formerly located in periphery areas, and that encroaching urbanisation has gradually swallowed up. Some residential areas end up being entirely "swallowed" by urbanisation, and continue to exist as urban pockets. These tend to be the oldest slums, which often have a high media profile, like such as Kibera (Nairobi), Soweto (Johannesburg), La Rocinha (Rio de Janeiro) and Dharavi (India). Kowloon (Hong Kong), before its destruction in the mid-1990s, was a kind of ideal-type of the central slum. Other examples can been found in the rundown areas of Havana.

There are two types of settlement strategies. The first is to be in close proximity to active areas in the centre. Inhabitants of these slums seek to remain there at all costs. Though the sanitary conditions are often poor, the importance of remaining in the city centre makes them worth putting up with. "No eviction" movements are emblematic of these struggles; slums residents organise in order to test their power against the State (or the city/region government). In most cases they are successful, as such NGOs are typically supported by an international community of activists who fight for the rights of the poor. The construction of a highway in Karachi (Cabannes et al. 2010) is a recent and well-known example.[4]

In contrast, the second strategy is for people to settle on less valuable land on the outskirts far, from the centre. Such land is not included in urban plans or in the development programmes of planning agencies and their Priority Investment Projects. Speculators and planners do not immediately target remote areas. Hence, there is little risk of being driven away in the first years.

While the periphery settlement strategy appropriates virgin land, another strategy is based on employment. In this case, neighbourhoods tend to be created on virgin land, but close to major infrastructure traditionally located on the periphery, such as airports, ports, mines, other industrial zones or even on open waste dumps, like Stung Meanchey in Phnom Penh and Mbeubeuss in Dakar. The strategy here is not avoiding eviction, but rather being close to employment areas, even if they are located on insalubrious land.

A reading of the satellite image quickly provides this information; central areas are subject to strong real estate pressure, while periphery settlements crop up under the noses of the authorities, who are powerless when the numbers are great.

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[4] In order to avoid displacement, an overpass that passes over the neighbourhood rather than through it was created for the Lyari Expressway.

3.5 Constructability

The second indicator of our classification is the physical nature of the land, which can be of two types: land that is urbanised and zoned for residential use and land that is unbuildable and thus – theoretically – not zoned for residential use. The oldest slums are often located on land that has already been zoned for residential use, which is why they have been mediatized: when the liberal economy, with its free urban land campaign to transform these so-called lawless, impoverished, health-risk neighbourhoods, or try to reclaim them, they become beacons.

One can wander through any large Asian cities and see that, gradually, poor and working class neighbourhoods give way to new or entirely renovated districts, with luxury hotels, recreation areas and offices. In some cases there is also housing, but that has been built specifically for the elite and wealthy – those with access to "global cooling".

Major urban struggles naturally take place in these older, historic neighbourhoods that modernity wants to do away with. In China, one can no longer keep track of the number of little-publicised or unpublicised cases, though the process was large-scale. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games were a good example of this,[5] raising the question: 'What was there before Herzog & De Meuron's – stars of global and globalised architecture – Bird Nest?' The answer is: very little.

Brazil is also an excellent example. Its 2014 "pacify the favelas" World Cup policy, which is expected to continue through the 2016 Olympic Games scheduled in Rio, has considerably changed the urban landscape. Pacification, in this case, means making them formal and usable by public and private companies, their inhabitants – mostly unemployed – having essentially become unusable.

Beyond slums that have sprung up on buildable land, the overwhelming majority of informal settlements are located on land unfit for construction, due to steep gradients prone to landslides, ravines, lowlands, flood plains, dumps or pollution.

As such land has little or no market value, there is less pressure on residents to leave, offering the poor some guarantee of long-term stability. One might guess that the strategy here is to only to settle on land with no market value. However, the primary motivation is the fact that it is free. Yet, this is only the case until the interested parties agree on how to exploit this land. Such circumstances create vulnerability to natural risks.

3.6 Structuring of Road Networks

Several scenarios and much literature, providing information on the history and layout of slums. However, we must also consider the form of the road networks, whose layout allows us to determine whether a formal settlement project existed

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[5] See *Bird Nest*, a documentary by Schaud and Schindhelm (2008).

previously or not. Given human nature, in no case do people settle on orthogonally or checkerboard-shaped roadways. Such a layout indicates a preliminary plan, and thus a space "planned" by "planners" – official or otherwise.[6]

In other cases, the image of a hive comes to mind, where settlements add on one by depending on the vacant lots available, and densification or filling in what exists. This produces a non-orthogonal, potentially organic shape, but mostly complies strictly with settlement in subdivisions on a case-by-case basis.

Between these two extremes lies a multitude of "in-betweens", especially when the structuring of certain roads or major arteries occurs early on. In theory, the site's topography that gives the illusion of structuring. Human settlements do not respond to predetermined plans, but rather spring up naturally along main roads (which, in this case, are synonymous with ridgelines or valley floors).

3.7   Securing Habitat

The last indicator of our classification is that of housing *durcification*. The *favelas* of Rio and *barrios* of Caracas are mainly comprised concrete buildings, slabs and bricks, while other slums are made of recycled materials, recalling the etymology of the French word *bidonville*.

In general, regardless of the context, we do not find different types of constructions but rather a process wherein the built object goes, in the first stage, from a shelter made of flimsy recycled materials, crates, oil drums or even tarpaulins, etc., to more "durable" structures made of "strong materials" (Turner 1976). The quotation marks are significant here, as these materials are neither durable nor strong. This transformation occurs when slum dwellers are certain they will not evicted. When doubt or insecurity exist, the phenomenon is virtually impossible to observe.

For example, Mauritania's largest slum, the El Mina *kebbe* in Nouakchott, struggled for 30 years, as evidenced by the sheet metal shacks and old wooden crates from the nearest port. Then a governmental restructuring programme with international funding gave land rights to inhabitants. From that day forward, building was done with cement blocks and concrete slabs. However, the poorest still live in wooden shacks. Though many households had the means to invest, they did not do so due to insecurity of land tenure. Once security was created (Bolay and Chenal 2008), important investments were made. The image of the slum today is that of a solidly- built neighbourhood. However, the land on which they were built belongs to private owners who could potentially reclaim their property at any time, leaving the squatters in double peril, especially with regard to land. In contrast, other former slums were solidly reconstructed years ago, as the land built on was State owned and hence more secure.

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[6] Surveyors in particular play an important role in the structuring of urban peripheries, both formal and informal.

This example shows that a population's economic strength alone is not enough to explain the *durcification* process; it must be understood relative to the relationship the State – or city – has with vulnerable populations.

3.8   The 16 Types of Slums

The four indicators provide not only a spatial reading; through urban form, we can begin to examine the history of settlements, people's relationship to their government and the internal organisation of residents within slums.

We choose our classification based on the most visible factors, those that can be seen via satellite imagery and Google images (to see the form of the actual habitat). There are undoubtedly more specific indicators. However, they require greater knowledge of image reading. This is not our purpose here. The method chosen here is simple and easily used; it makes it possible to classify and typologise neighbourhoods in order to understand their histories and offer a reading of them that is not that of a slum, but rather takes as a starting point their distinctions. This way of seeing slums – not as THE slum – will allow us to reflect on the possibilities for acting there, highlighting multiple solutions for the many types of slums rather than a single response.

Thus, a recent settlement is not analysed in the same manner as a long-established one, as time offers the legitimacy of not being displaced. Similarly, settlement on private land are not dealt with the same way as those on public land. Our classification requires understanding these differences and taking them into account, which we propose doing in Chap. 21.

We have summarised, in tabular form, the 16 types of slums that our classification produces (Table 3.1). The table is a valuable aid in reading the following case studies. In each case, the slum can be classified as centre/periphery, constructible/non-constructible, structured/unstructured and strengthened/precarious.

3.9   Conclusions

Planning must be informed by social practices if it is to serve urban inhabitants and, by extension, slum dwellers. This is our starting point based on our previous studies (Chenal 2014). For this there are few diagnostic tools. Analysing urban form allows us to understand the real issues of the societies that live in cities. It also makes it clear that slum communities do not live on the fringes of cities, but right at the heart. Because the analysis of slum forms is a classic urban analysis, it helps us consider slums as a fully-fledged part of the city, not as a "sick" form of healthy urbanisation.

By starting from form, we describe the practices that brought about these forms and the stories of individual settlements, showing that each site has its own trajectory

Table 3.1 Classification of slums

Centre	Constructible	Structured	Strengthened
			Precarious
		Non structured	Strengthened
			Precarious
	Non-constructible	Structured	Strengthened
			Precarious
		Non structured	Strengthened
			Precarious
Periphery	Constructible	Structured	Strengthened
			Precarious
		Non structured	Strengthened
			Precarious
	Non-constructible	Structured	Strengthened
			Precarious
		Non structured	Strengthened
			Precarious

woven of those of its many inhabitants. Taking action in fragile areas above all requires awareness of how people live, their aspirations and their relationship to land and construction. All of these things are visible in urban form, for those who know how to read it. The sine qua non of all knowledge is first understanding how things develop and are created, and then thinking how to improve them. It would have been possible to do typologies of social practices – and why not! Urban form, however, is the veritable application of these practices, and analysing form, which is visible, is undoubtedly simpler than analysing practices. Moreover, urban form tells us about social practices, as well as the morphology of a given site. It is important to understand neighbourhoods in their context in order to act appropriately.

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Part III
Case Studies

Chapter 4
Reading Case Studies

Marija Cvetinovic

Today, with half of the Earth's population living in cities, urbanisation has become a kind of common ground for the social, spatial and environmental changes taking place worldwide. In this, the slum stands out as a symbol of extensive and rapid urban growth – the antithesis of balanced urban development. Moreover, roughly one third of the total urban population is living in precarious conditions in a variety of urban contexts. In this book we will present 15 slums with population ranging from approximately 10,000 to more than half a million inhabitants.

Due to its extensive scope, we could describe the slum as a global phenomenon, a socially and spatially extreme urban form. Our aim here is to offer a broadminded reading of slums – wherein the entire range of urban environments are considered in their contextual particularity – as a starting point for new reflection on urbanity, now and in the future. As such, we propose a contextualization of slums with regard to the social practices and spatial morphology discussed in the 15 case studies. Based on this we created a typology of urban forms to provide not only a spatial reading of slums, but also to explore their position in the urban fabric, the land tenure there, the structure of road networks and habitat security, and in this way speak to the local history, formal and informal relationships and internal workings within each settlement.

Going further, we would like to suggest that a possible solution for the growing precarity of urban living could be in the well-known maxim "Think globally, act locally." With these 15 case studies from different corners of the world – Latin America and Caribbean (6), Africa (4) Asia (3) Europe (2) and North America (1) – the idea was to present each settlement/city/country as unique but commensurable in the context of its geographical location and social conditions. Therefore, in the graphic section of the case studies, each settlement is interpreted based on a common set of data: continent, country, city, neighbourhood history, number of

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inhabitants (in the city and neighbourhood respectively), average income, basic sanitary conditions (water and electricity infrastructure), and visually located on the Google Earth map and represented with two typical pictures of the local setting.

This standardized data is supported by an expert analysis of the specificities of each settlement. Underpinned by the proposed slum typology (Chap. 3), we have organized the case studies regionally, starting from the most represented global region (Latin America and Caribbean) to the least represented one (North America). The second criterion was the number of inhabitants in the given settlements, the population directly affected by the precarity of the conditions they are living in.

However, the common threads for all 15 cases are undoubtedly the use of a multilevel approach (local, city, regional, national and international) and a multistakeholder mode of governance (decision-makers, inhabitants, sectoral and international actors), which facilitate conceptualizing prospective tools for assessing, prioritizing and contemplating the many solutions. To do so, we propose a linear cross-reading of case studies relative to: existing theoretical frameworks, local policies and social dynamics, spatial tensions in urban, peri-urban and suburban areas (centre vs. periphery), the condition and deficiency of urban infrastructure, land competition and sources of economic pressure on land distribution, multilevel decision making (national-citywide-local) and modes of participation (private developers, international donors, public authorities and local populations).

Chapter 5
Ciudad Bolivar, Bogota: Scorned Territories

Yafiza Zorro

5.1 Illegal Territories

The context in which we propose to territorialize the general concerns of this book, and thus to be in a position to discuss from a South American perspective, is that of the greater urban district of Ciudad Bolivar. This area is 1 of 20 communities[1] that administratively divide the city of Bogota, capital of Colombia. It is the largest one, not only in territorial extension, but also in terms of interregional and cultural diversity. Ciudad Bolivar welcomes 8.6 % of Bogota's urban population, some 639,768 inhabitants. Its total area is 13,000 ha, of which 3,329 ha are considered urban, 152.1 ha are urban expansion and 9,608 ha are rural (Secretaría Distrital of Planeación 2011). Ciudad Bolivar is located in the southwest of the urban area of Bogota and is generally characterized by a gently rolling topography, with sometimes a strong inclination extending to the "Cerros[2] de Ciudad Bolivar". This area consists of eight Zonal Planning Units (UPZ).[3] The majority of these neighbourhoods have their origins in illegal subdivisions. Five of the eight UPZ were defined as "unbound peripheral sectors," with land use reserved primarily for housing, but with a deficit in terms of infrastructure, accessibility, and public facilities and spaces.

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[1] The locations are administrative units into which Bogotá is divided; there are 20.

[2] Hills. This term is also generally accepted geopolitically and is used to name the poor self-constructed neighbourhoods.

[3] The UPZ (zonal planning units) are administrative divisions that control land use within the communities in Bogota. Via groups of neighbourhoods, they operate at an intermediate level between the district and the city. In general, the territory of the city is administratively divided into: Location > UPZ > Neighbourhoods.

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The Territorial Development Plan (POT)[4] gives this definition, which is currently the urban planning tool in Bogotá. It offers a differentiated treatment of these issues. Depending on the nature of land use, there may be conservation, consolidation, renovation, development, or the overall improvement of the urban area. The latter approach is specifically designed for unconsolidated outlying areas. The overall improvement seeks the inclusion of neighbourhoods that were built "unlawfully" or in defiance of urban standards. These "unbound" neighbourhoods have problems with economic segregation, as well as social, cultural, political and spatial issues.

The definition of "slums" in Colombia varies according to the different regions. For example, in Medellín, they are known as "comunas" and in Bogotá as "*barrios de invasión*".[5] In the latter, the POT has identified 1,437 of these areas, occupying 23 % of urban land, for a population of 1,400,000 inhabitants living in conditions of generalized scarcity (Carrasco 2004). The main problem of illegal settlements, although not indicated by its connotation, is not unlawfulness, but inequality. Indeed, their inhabitants are victims of a lack of governmental recognition based on the illegality of their original installations. This initial inequality gives rise to conditional informality that is determined by an economic variable that a priori prevents all subsequent potential formalization processes.

The intention of legalizing informal settlements began with the agreement 1 of 1961 of Bogotá City Council[6]; the idea was to firstly identify and recognize them, then to include them in urban development plans, thus legalizing them. The legalization process was long, not only because of the continuous appearance of new constructions of this type, but also due to the lack of interest from public administration to accelerate the process.

5.2   Informal Territories

Various factors have caused the emergence of informal settlements that constitute Ciudad Bolivar. First of all, strong migration dynamics have led to rapid territorial expansion of the city. During this process, the administration did not use the necessary tools to identify areas in the process of unlawful urbanization and to remedy it in time. In fact, the spread of informal settlements and inequality soon became uncontrollable. Another factor that reinforces these dynamics is the colombian's weak housing policy, which in general, were a support funding for upper and

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[4] The 1997 urban development Act 388 requires all Colombian municipalities to formulate a "Territorial Ordinance Plan" (POT). POT Bogotá was adopted by Decree 619 of 28 July 2000. Subsequently revised by the administration in 2003, it is currently the subject of controversy from the public and politicians in connection with land use changes that the current administration is trying to implement.

[5] Squatters Districts.

[6] The agreement 1 of 1961 of Bogotá City Council Agreement recognizes the expansion areas by including them in the proposed new segmentation of the city.

middle classes. Conversely, the system which funded social housing was not strong enough to meet all demands, as the poorest social classes were not in a condition to access financial credit. In summary, the various administrative entities in charge of this sector favoured the free housing market, to the detriment of the poorer classes.

Therefore, self-construction was a reasonable choice for this population, continually muscled out of all access to any modern planning benefits. Consequently, 20 % of existing units of this type were built between 1973 and 1993 (Cuervo and Jaramillo 2009). In this context, it is important to note that land acquisition was culturally and traditionally very significant for these new inhabitants arriving from the countryside at that time. Martinez comments on this attitude in his study on illegal settlements, affirming: "*Having a home does not represent wealth*, *but not having one represents the greatest poverty*"[7] (Torres 1993). Unfortunately, the supply of quality housing, built on territories with adequate infrastructure, was accessible only to those who could pay the price. The majority of urban population, when they obtained an estate with no facilities, had to settle for the mere promise that the government would eventually install the necessary infrastructure in order for them to live a better life (Martinez 2007).

5.3 Excluded Territories

Social polarization of a city depends on several factors, among others the distribution of public facilities and spaces is the most essential. Our analysis will therefore focus on the possible variables which generally lead to the social and spatial exclusion of territories, by examining in depth the case of Ciudad Bolivar.

Looking at the socio-economic situation of the population, the urban area of Ciudad Bolivar is classified as a social stratum of type 1 and 2,[8] corresponding to the least favoured of the city's socio-economic classes. According to the statistics of Ciudad Bolivar (DANE 2011), 57 % of households can barely cover basic home expenses, and the income of 29 % of households is hardly sufficient. As concerns basic services, 230 households do not have access to water services (aqueduct), 381 households do not have access to sewage systems, and 1,791 households have no access to electricity. The "access to new technologies" variable also reveals these differences: approximately 134,000 households (80 % of the population of the village) have no internet connection at home.

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[7] Our translation.

[8] At the national level, urban territories are ranked according to their socioeconomic status. This classification is organized by strata of 6, in which "estrato 1" corresponds to areas in poverty conditions and "estrato 6" to the most privileged areas. Stratification is an administrative tool that is based on the quality of life in households and the conditions of their habitats (type of construction, building materials, state of the immediate environment, access, basic services, etc.).

Table 5.1 Households without access to facilities

	Chapinero[a]	[b]	C. Bolivar[a]	[b]	Bogota[a]	[b]
Drinking water	0	0.00 %	230	0.01 %	3,823	0.17 %
Sewage	0	0.00 %	381	0.02 %	3,357	0.15 %
Electricity	321	0.01 %	1719	0.08 %	16,276	0.74 %

Data source DANE (2011)
[a]Absolute number of households in the local entries
[b]% relative to the total number of households in the city

Even though at city level this precarious housing stock accounts for a minimal percentage, the absolute number is still important, as shown in the table (see Table 5.1). This table compares three local entries: Ciudad Bolivar, Chapinero (a community with very favourable socio-economic conditions), and Bogotá as a whole. We thus note that in Ciudad Bolivar, 381 households are not connected to sewage systems as compared to 0 households in Chapinero.

The percentages listed in this comparative chart do not reveal significant differences between the localities, thus dismissing as practically inexistent the issue of unequal access to public services. yet the absolute numbers (1) bring to light that an important number of households are affected by this phenomenon. Then again, if we use percentages to explain that 0.02 % of all households in Ciudad Bolivar do not have this facility, the problem tends to be made invisible.

Regarding public spaces, it should be noted that they have developed in Bogotá in both legal and illegal sectors, but according to very different dynamics. To ensure the legality of their public spaces, formal areas must meet certain urban standards, notably by relinquishing part of their land for the construction of "urban public space". However, basing themselves on issues of security and protection against urban violence, many of these areas end up surrounded by barriers that limit or even prohibit free access. On the contrary, in informal areas, this form of land transfer is non-existent. It is, therefore, residual spaces that function as public spaces. However, it is clear that in everyday life, it is quite difficult to develop them for this purpose and to maintain them in good condition (Departamento Administrativo the Defensoría del Espacio Público 2013). This explains the low amount of "public space[9] per capita" in Ciudad Bolivar, representing the lowest rate of any city (11.8 m²) (see Fig. 5.1). However, as Ciudad Bolivar represents nearly 10 % of the population of metropolitan area, this "local" deficit has implications for the entire capital city.

Access to different forms and degrees of mobility is the factor that best reflects the problems of exclusion, because it is always strongly related to the context (Kaufmann 2008).

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[9]The total public space index corresponds to the entire network of parks, green areas, squares and spaces for mobility (including paths for pedestrians, cycles, and individual and public transportation).

Fig. 5.1 Public space per capita indicators (Graphic source: Departamento Administrativo de la Defensoría del Espacio Público 2013)

This is the case for Ciudad Bolivar. Its peripheral location and its physical and urban geography tend to impede the fostering of fairer access on this land.

Indeed, in the latest survey conducted on mobility in Ciudad Bolivar, the city had an average of only 1.85 trips per capita/day in comparison to 2.2 for the entire city and 2.65 for the "estrato 6" social layers (the highest on a scale of 1–6).

In response to this difference that highlights an obvious disparity in mobility options, people seek individual solutions/to match their travel needs. We can therefore point out that Ciudad Bolivar is one of the communities that uses the bicycle the most as a means of transport, in spite of the absence of an appropriate infrastructure for this type of conveyance – the index of cycle paths is very low (0.02 m^2 per capita).

5.4 Host Territories

Beyond the statistics, it is important to take into account the political history of the country to recognize the nature of the demographic and spatial growth of this part of the city.

More than 50 years of civil war have caused a phenomenon of very strong and precipitated rural to urban migrations. Two periods marked this phenomenon: first, the rural migration of the 1950s and 1960s caused by the period called

"*la violencia*"[10] and especially the migratory flow that started in the late 1980s and continued until the late 2000s, caused by forced displacement of victims of the war between the Colombian military, paramilitary and guerrillas. Thus thousands of families accustomed to a certain level of comfort in the countryside were forced to move, fleeing violence and war, to appropriate new locations, and create a new home that could accommodate them in this large " *urbe capitalina*." For a significant number of these families, the host territory was Ciudad Bolivar, despite the difficulty in settling in.

5.5   Conclusions

The urbanization process in Latin America has traditionally been marked by a conflict between the formal and the informal. However, this duality – or rather the boundary between these two categories – has become blurred, faced with the reality of mandatory interactions within such a hybrid society whose disparate social elements coexist in the same territory. Furthermore, these territorial resources are unequally shared out among the various populations that occupy them. Despite years of experience with this urban issue, there is a widening social gap in Colombian urban society. Nevertheless, they still remain largely invisible to the representatives of the upper echelons of society.

Finally, we note two important factors that indicate the magnitude of the exclusion of Ciudad Bolivar, a territory "beyond Bogota": public space and access to services. Although this is based solely on quantitative data, we can confirm that great inequalities exist on a macro scale between the different social strata in Bogota, identified first and foremost by its streets and neighbourhoods.

Currently, a revision of POT aims to create a less segregated city starting with an urban growth paradigm shift. The challenge is to densify the city in order to obtain a mixed population who can enjoy all the facilities already consolidated. This densification must be accompanied by the creation of public spaces, equipment, and quality housing. It remains to be seen whether the peripheral settlements will be included in this proposal, despite the preference given to the central districts of Bogota. Certainly, intervention measures to activate these peripheries are in the course of implementation, such as the recent approval of the draft "aerial tramway" designed for Ciudad Bolivar. This was inspired by Medellín's famous "metrocable" that successfully integrated the *comunas* (the most marginalized areas of this city)

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[10]Colombia's internal armed conflict called "La Violencia", corresponded to the political death struggle between Liberal and Conservative parties. The conflict developed in the countryside and in villages, but the outbreak of the conflict took place in Bogotá, with the event called "Bogotazo." On 9 April 1948, following the death of liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, protests, fires and killings were deployed first in the city of Bogotá and later in other cities. These actions have significantly contributed to the shape of the Colombian capital.

into the overall urban dynamics. The aim of this proposal is to link a ridge of Ciudad Bolivar's remote hills to the public transportation system that serves its lower section and connects it to the city center.

To date, the legalization of illegal settlements, their inclusion in the Zonal Planning Units, and their classification as overall improvement areas were not sufficient to reduce the effects of spatial segregation in Bogotá. The Territorial Development Plan was not clear regarding interventions in the improvement areas. Indeed, even if these territories have been genuinely recognised, their legalization remains largely rhetorical. There has not yet been any clearly defined concrete proposal for their inclusion in activity areas, or the creation of public spaces, or any new access to the entire city.

Spatially, these social differences correspond to segregated and fragmented territories. In Colombian cities, the most segregated areas are mainly found in urban peripheries, except for some areas in the city centre where they are situated in the old neighbourhoods, thus resulting in shanty towns described as "islands in the heart of the city". The peripheries, however, are geographically strategic locations. Although remote from any possible compassionate gaze and out of the imagination of urban planners, peripheries are typical of the contemporary Latin American city. Both city professionals and its inhabitants must take this into account.

As noted by architect Carlos Tovar with reference to Colombian cities: "…*the Colombian city today is an expression of individualism, competition imposed by the dynamics of the market, internationalization of the economy and globalization of companies. These processes are increasingly marked by differentiation at the social, economic and political level, reflected by urban disorder, and physical and spatial segregation, while opposing the concepts of equality, harmony, unity, integration, solidarity, and conviviality among others*" (Tovar 2002).

Case Study: Ciudad Bolivar, Bogota, Colombia

CIUDAD BOLIVAR
Bogota
Colombia

Emergence of the first informal settlements

First wave of migrants. «La violencia«

High population growth and increase in informal settlements. Population reached 50'000 inhabitants.

The Plan for Ciudad Bolivar. Town Hall of Ciudad Bolivar

Second wave of migrants. «Internal armed conflict»

Ciudad Bolivar becomes part of Bogota D.C.

Ciudad Bolivar stretches over 140 ha

Number of inhabitants reached 567'861

1950 1960   1970   1983   1990 1992   2000   2005

◇ 3'329 ha (urban area)

👥 8'743'000 inhabitants

👤 639'768 inhabitants

🏠 30% (Bogota D. C.)

1950s

🏘 The production of brick and agricultural goods on the site of Ciudad Bolivar

$ The majority of inhabitants own their accomodation, while 37% are tenants (most often the newcomers)

🚰 99.9%

⚡ 99.0%

View of the city of Bogota from Ciudad Bolivar.
Photo: Ruben Dario Escobar Sanchez (2014)

Recently built housing areas of Ciudad Bolivar without adequately adjusted traffic lanes.
Photo: Ruben Dario Escobar Sanchez (2014)

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Chapter 6
Villa El Salvador: From a Self-Management Project to Territorial Marketing

Diana Burgos-Vigna

6.1 Introduction

A few kilometres south of Lima, a "pueblo joven", the term used in Peru to refer to informal settlements, has made a name for itself. This peripheral city, more than a neighbourhood or a shanty town, with more than 445,000 inhabitants, Villa El Salvador has become a benchmark of self-governance by the people from its inception in the 1970s. Several national and international awards were subsequently to enhance the image of the peoples' victory over impoverishment. However, years of economic crisis and urban violence of the 1980s and 1990s left their mark on the social fabric and the internal cohesion of the city. The first experiments of self-management were followed by participatory mechanisms in vogue in recent years, assisted in particular by territorial marketing tools aiming to promote a certain image of the city to increase its attractiveness.

6.2 Origins of the Self-Management Project

Villa El Salvador was born from the dream of a reformist Head of State, General Velasco Alvarado, who ruled Peru from 1968 to 1975. The aim of the military government at the time was to integrate all Peruvians in a "social revolution of full participation" (Dietz 1986). It is in this context that Villa El Salvador emerged in 1971. On 27 April, a land invasion, organized by about 200 families, took place near the Southern Pan-American Highway. A few days later, the government announced the relocation of migrants in an area about 30 km south of Lima, and, especially, the

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plan to make this new *pueblo joven*[1] a "model city". Under these conditions, its originality is based on three fundamental factors: a unique urban design, a particular type of community management, and supervision of these two dynamics by the government via the national program SINAMOS.[2]

Villa El Salvador was designed from the outset as a real city and not just a relocation project. To this end, the land use plan provided for, in addition to the dwelling area, the establishment of an industrial park (*Parque Industrial*), as well as an area intended for agriculture (*zona agropecuaria*), the goal being to create hubs of internal economic development.

But the originality of Villa El Salvador also lies primarily on a basic urban core that replicates itself across the territory: the *grupo residencial*, urban group consists of 16 blocks (*manzanas*) organized around a collectively owned open space. It is on this basis that the organization of the entire community will be built.

The pyramid structure of community representation follows a very specific pattern at different levels, called CUAVES (*Comunidad Urbana Autogestionada de Villa El Salvador*). At the base is the *grupo residencial* whose inhabitants elect thematic secretaries (education, health, production, trade), as well as a steering committee. General assembly meetings are held regularly at all levels. Since the creation of Villa El Salvador and until the mid-1980s, CUAVES functioned as a true local government body, acting as an intermediary between the people and the State. This situation lasted until 1984 when Villa El Salvador became a district with, consequently, an elected municipal council.

6.3   New Participatory Practices

However, the social fabric deteriorated gradually beginning in the second half of the eighties due to multiple factors (Burgos-Vigna 2003): the actions of Shining Path guerrillas seeking to encircle the centres of political power by infiltrating the peripheral areas of the capital, the discredit of unions and political parties, and the economic crisis which affected the whole of Latin America.

In addition, in 1984 Villa El Salvador became one of the districts of metropolitan Lima. This new factor, added to the accusations of infiltration by Shining Path, dealt a severe blow to the legitimacy of CUAVES. The extreme personalization of power under Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru between 1990 and 2000, and the development of clientelism, weakened community organization and threatened the living conditions of the inhabitants.

It is therefore not surprising that as soon as Fujimori was removed from power, municipal authorities sought new urban management systems. In 2001, a

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[1] Expression meaning "young village", which replaced the traditional name of "barriada" under the leadership of General Velasco Alvarado with the aim of enhancing these suburbs.

[2] *Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social*, created in June 1971 by the "velasquist" government to promote and support the popular mobilization, and particularly to develop literacy.

"participatory budget" emerged, inspired largely by the experience of Porto Alegre in Brazil. Indeed, the district territory was divided into eight sectors based on this model. The new *Management Board of the Development Plan and Participatory Budgeting* became the institution to oversee the entire participatory process in Villa El Salvador, investment priorities being discussed at the base of the system by territorial development committees that brought together associations but also the people as individuals. Moreover, as in Porto Alegre, the participatory system associated thematic tables (health, education, gender, SMEs, trade, youth) to territorial committees that brought together key players in civil society. Villa El Salvador has been helped through this process by national and international organizations. Locally, NGOs such as DESCO and FOVIDA[3] play a major role in advising the inhabitants, providing technical expertise and establishing official relations with the authorities. Internationally, various players, not only those in the field of Spanish international development aid but also those involved in the UN's urban programs, facilitate the exchange of best practice and spread awareness of participatory processes.

As the pioneer city in Peru for the implementation of this system in 2000, Villa El Salvador saw, however, an evolution of this system after the generalization of the participatory budget to all Peruvian municipalities in 2003. New structures were then created: the Local Coordination Councils (LCC), characterized by the joint presence of municipal and civil society representatives.

6.4 Territorial Marketing

Villa El Salvador was designed as a marketing strategy by municipal teams anxious to export a positive image of their city, and even expertise in specific areas, and for several years developed international openness.

The conveyed image was based on a participatory and community identity. Michel Azcueta, first mayor of Villa in the 1980s, was the initiator of this policy. Committed to the development of popular cultural schools and institutions, he rapidly made the *pueblo joven* serve as an example with respect to education, allowing Villa to obtain a UNESCO prize that rewards achievements in this field in 1973. After the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1985, the city was proposed as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, and was elected "1986 Personality of the Year" by the national daily *La República*. In 1987, Villa El Salvador won two major international recognitions: the "Prince of Asturias" prize, awarded by Spain, and the title of "City of Peace Messenger", granted by the United Nations. From the beginning the image promoted outside was based on collaborative and inclusive participation.

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[3] DESCO (*Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo*) and FOVIDA (*Fomento de la Vida*) are Peruvian development aid NGOs:
   http://www.desco.org.pe; http://fovida.org.pe

In the 1990s and 2000s, although the image changed little, its dissemination differed significantly. It was notably in the context of a policy to promote the Porto Alegre model conducted by the urban management programme of UN-HABITAT that Villa El Salvador became the venue of the first "International Meeting on Participatory Budgets". As a consequence, district participation in networks or international meetings fell within the thematic of participatory governance. There was a gradual shift towards the idea of a form of effective local management based on two principles: urban participation and planning. Thus Villa El Salvador incorporated transnational networks such as the Forum of Local Authorities Periphery (FALP)[4] and the URB -AL[5] networks, in which, by leveraging its expertise in community organization, it managed to maintain its "image" and to attract precious resources (Burgos-Vigna 2010) to its territory.

The vision of the last Development Plan further illustrates this dynamic: Villa El Salvador was presented as "a city of culture and solidarity, modern, competitive and wealth-generating." The concept of competition was then well integrated into urban projects.

6.5 Limitations of Devices and New Perspectives

6.5.1 A Participatory Process Still Present But Faltering

In 2001, a new state reform reinforced decentralization and generalized the proposed participatory budgeting in all regions and communes in the country.

If the creation of CCL opened a new space for public debate in the Peruvian cities, the main problem centred, at Villa El Salvador, on the adequacy of this new structure with the existing political spaces. For example, one of the most active and effective organizations, the Federación Popular de Mujeres de Villa El Salvador or FEPOMUVES (Popular Federation of Women of Villa El Salvador), lost its influence. Within the framework of the participatory budget, then the CCL, it melted into a system of generalized representation to other civil society associations. The new system also made it possible for the municipality to exclude certain projects through a technical municipal assessment. The effective participation by the inhabitants of the working-class areas was assured. Although this could be interpreted as developing the citizen's duty – a necessary corollary to the right to participate, it is more realistic to observe that in this way town councils have access to very useful free labor.

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[4] FALP is a network of cities created in 2004 to make the voices of local periphery authorities heard, which appeared in line with the FAL (Local Authorities Forum) held annually in the World Social Forum.

[5] Cooperation networks between European and Latin American cities funded by the European Community.

6.5.2   Progressive Management

The recent institutionalization of participatory schemes did not happen without the loss of the decision-making power of existing local authorities. The CCL was no longer a mere advisory body. But the greatest threat to these participatory practices remained the persistence of old demons such as patronage or control of power by a minority. If the new process in theory allowed equal access to political spaces, it did not remain less tainted by political manipulation. The election of the first CCL Villa El Salvador in 2005 was particularly significant in this regard: the existing Citizen's Forum then exposed a widespread fraud. However, the same denunciation of these strategies demonstrated the response capacity of people who have access to the management of local budgets.

In a country that for several years had known the highest rates of dissatisfaction vis-à-vis democracy, the risk of disillusionment with these participatory experiences was particularly strong if these initiatives did not result in an improvement in the quality of life. Although Peru had one of the best growth rates in Latin America between 2005 and 2010 (7 % on average), the social impacts are recent: although in 2007, 42.4 % of the total population was still poor, this rate dropped to 25.8 % in 2012 (INEI 2013). The future of participatory practices will depend largely on the responses to social demands in Villa El Salvador, as in the rest of the country.

6.5.3   A Model Despite the Existence of Unsolved Problems

Although Villa El Salvador was able to promote an international image, the social problems are far from being resolved. Of the 49 districts in Lima, the human development index of 0.6688 in 2007 placed Villa El Salvador in the 39th position while the wealthiest district of the capital, San Isidro, had an HDI of 0.7590 (Inei-Redatam 2007).

The city still suffers from its peripheral location despite the arrival in 2012 of electric trains that connect it to the centre of Lima. Nearly 60 % of the active population of Villa El Salvador work outside the district according to the last census. Problems such as delinquency, alcoholism or the absence of waste disposal facilities remain areas of concern.

Finally, part of the territory still has no access to basic infrastructure. These are the most recent neighbourhoods, called *asentamientos humanos*, which bring together 25,000 housing units, deprived of drinking water, sewage systems and electricity. If Villa El Salvador's course illustrates the successful passage from a shanty town to an ordinary town, it is now obvious that areas of urban deprivation remain in the territory. By consolidating, the originally precarious city produced its own shanty towns, the other side of the coin that attested to the attractiveness of the area.

Despite all the challenges that still need to be met, one cannot but acknowledge the progress made by this community, both economically and politically. The city

was able to consolidate an industrial park of some 1,000 entrepreneurs, thus becoming the first industrial centre in the south of the metropolis. It also hosts the National Technological University of the South Cone of Lima, as well as three private universities, and is today the fifth most populous district of the city. Moreover, despite its unfavourable geographical environment, Villa El Salvador remains the symbol of a community that has been able to overcome severe poverty through the collective action and solidarity of its inhabitants. A pioneer in Peru in the field of self-governance in the 1970s, Villa El Salvador succeeded in reinventing itself at the beginning of the twenty-first century, becoming the first town to implement participatory budgeting in the whole of Peru.

Case Study: Villa El Salvador, Lima, Peru

VILLA EL SALVADOR
Lima
Peru

Arrival of 200 families who establish
Villa El Salvador

Economic crisis in Peru

Terrorist offensive by Sentier
Lumineux terrorist group destabilizes
the neighbourhood

Villa El Salvador is separated from the
municipality of Lima and elects its own mayor

Community received international awards: «United
Nations Peace Messenger» & «Prince of Asturias»

Creation of Comprehensive Development
Plan by the inhabitants in opposition to the
liberal policies of president Fujimori

Participative planning project for the
city's new development plan

1971   1975   1980   1983   1987 1990   1999

34'500 ha

9'540'996 inhabitants

445'189 inhabitants

31%

1971

Territory was occupied by 200 poor families, then general Velasco gave them the authorisation to settle

Most of the inhabitants own the land that they occupy

78,6%

92,2 %

Trujillo

LIMA

Villa El Salvador

Cuzco

Arequipa

Photo: Diana Burgos-Vigna
Very poor condition of recently built areas (called «asentamientos humanos» in spanish)

Photo: Laurens den Dulk & Leonie van Leeuwen
http://www.flickr.com/photos/23398614@N03/2533138486/sizes/z/in/set-72157606722702695/

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Chapter 7
Rocinha, Favela Beyond a Shelter Issue

Fernanda Lonardoni

7.1 Decreasing Poverty, Growing Favelas

Brazil experienced an early urban transition compared to other developing countries in Asia and Africa. Most of the country's population and economic activity have long been concentrated in cities like Rio de Janeiro. Not coincidently, most of Brazil's favelas are also concentrated there.

Favelas were born from a housing problem and have developed for more than a century, entwined with critical socioeconomic inequalities found in Brazilian cities, where wealth and poverty share a paradoxical ambivalence of territorial proximity and social distancing (Valladares 2005; Queiroz and Lago 2001). While varying in size, density, or risk exposure, these settings commonly have an informal pattern of land occupation, limited access to services, and social gaps in development. The absence of state is also reflected in the lack of public security and the frequent presence of organised crime.

In recent decades, in spite of Brazil's declining urbanisation, favelas continued to grow faster than the 'formal' city. During the 2000s, the population in favelas increased eight times more than the average urbanisation, reaching 11.4 million people in 2010, 6 % of the country's population (IBGE 2010). Rio de Janeiro is in the front rank of favela population: 1.4 million people, more than 20 % of the total city population living in some 1,000 communities, among which is Rocinha, the largest favela in the country.

Brazil has recently assumed an important voice in the international development scene with an agenda of economic growth and a more redistributive approach to social policies. However, the size and continuous growth of favelas contrast with

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recent achievements in economy and social development, suggesting that some critical challenges remain in the realm of its cities.

7.2 From Favela Removals to Slum Upgrading

Rocinha is the largest and perhaps the most iconic favela in Brazil. As opposed to many favelas, Rocinha has the advantage of being located at the core of Rio's most disputed and affluent '*zona sul*'. The value of this location should be considered for the opportunities it offers in terms of accessibility, facilities, employment prospects and livelihood. But it should also be considered within a context where socio-spatial segregation is the urban rule, where it is accepted that the poor occupy environmentally protected areas, and that they remain in hazardous areas – but it is not accepted that they occupy areas valued by the market (Maricato 2012).

Rocinha's locational attributes have certainly compensated for its precarious living conditions and have had a bearing in boosting its intensive and continuous growth. In the space of 60 years, since the first census was carried out in 1950, Rocinha saw its population increase by at least 15 times. In 2010, around 73,000 people lived in the favela, according to the Municipality of Rio, while community surveys indicated a population of over 100,000 people.[1]

The most intensive growth was observed during the 1950s and 1960s, entwined with structural rural-urban migration and the local expansion of Rio's urban frontier. During the 1964–1986 military dictatorship, Rocinha surmounted one of the most violent chapters in the history of urban repression, when more than 100,000 people were displaced and some 60 favelas vanished from Rio de Janeiro urban landscape (Burgos 2006 p.38).

A changing perspective of urban planning emerged under the light of a democratic, decentralized and more socially oriented urban policy agenda following the end of military repression in the 1980s. The challenge of integrating favelas into the city gained momentum and the policy of removals increasingly gave way to tenure security and service provision programmes (Fernandes 2007). In 1986, Rocinha was officially acknowledged as one of Rio's neighbourhoods (Leitão 2007 p. 137), opening a precedent for changing relationships between state, society and the favela.

In 1992, the Municipal Master Plan ratified favelas as neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro, a measure whose institutional lever echoed and enabled slum-upgrading initiatives to reach larger scale, for instance, through Rio's renowned *Favela-Bairro* programme (Acioly 2011; Burgos 2006). The accumulated knowhow acquired in

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[1] According to the IBGE National Demographic Census (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) the population of Rocinha in 2010 was 69,161 people and 25,352 households. In the same year, a household census carried out by the State Secretariat of Rio de Janeiro (Secretaria de Estado da Casa Civil do Rio de Janeiro) surveyed 73,410 people and reported a potential population of 98,319, including absent and refused surveys. For community leaderships Rocinha has between 180,000 and 220,000 people. http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2011/12/maior-favela-do-pais-rocinha-discorda-de-dados-de-populacao-do-ibge.html

initiatives such as *Favela-Bairro* and its spinoffs throughout the country contributed to build capacity of local governments and offered a grounded basis for the subsequent upgrading interventions implemented in the country.

7.3   A Decade of Progress and Regress

The turn of the millennium opened a decade of social and economic changes in Brazil. A combination of economic growth and stable inflation, coupled with the expansion of the labour market and antipoverty spending contributed to a process of income class ascension in Brazil.

Favelas like Rocinha interacted with this socioeconomic backdrop, redefining contemporary forms of wealth production and circulation ever more intertwined with the formal economy and the private sector. Favela dwellers gained a share in the consumer market and favelas have prospered as a booming environment for business and entrepreneurship. There appears to also be a new polarisation within the informal entrepreneurs, becoming more sensitive to the status of their assets as exchange goods, moving into sectors abandoned by the public and formal private sectors, but many also surpassing the ranks of 'survivalist' activities.

The 2000s also started with some important achievements for the urban agenda in Brazil as reflected in the enactment of the Statute of the City in 2001 and in the creation of the Ministry of Cities in 2003. Reinforced institutional foundations, coupled with a favourable economy, enabled increased public spending in urban infrastructure, and the consolidation of slum upgrading as a state policy in Brazil.

Since 2007, a number of Brazilian favelas, including Rocinha, have been the scene of large-scale public interventions, notably by investments mobilised through the national Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). One of its streams, the PAC Slum Upgrading, has channelled significant federal resources along with those prompted by states and municipalities to improve infrastructure, housing, and accessibility in favelas. The pro-poor housing strategy of the government also gained lever with the launch of the 'My House, My Life' (MCMV) programme in 2009, complementing slum-upgrading initiatives with the provision of new affordable housing.

In spite of significant progress in the access to services, infrastructure, and housing, slum-upgrading programmes have grappled with the scale of informality and still face important challenges in combining the benefits in the built environment with social development and environmental sustainability. In addition, the public-led housing provision through the MCMV programme, despite scaled-up investments and a preventive approach, has been criticised for reproducing strategies poorly tied to livelihood perspectives, namely by settling families in peripheral areas with poor accessibility to services and employment opportunities (UN-Habitat 2013). To some extent, the socio-spatial impacts attached to this programme have been pointed as a step back of the Brazilian urban agenda (Cardoso 2013).

In the specific context of Rio de Janeiro, chosen to host mega-sport events such as the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, the housing strategy has also

reckoned on a retake of removals and the enforcement of policing and security law by state authorities through the Slum Pacification Program (UPP). Since 2009, the UPPs have aimed, among other ends, to reclaim to the state the urban territories occupied by gangs of drug dealers and restore 'social order' in favelas. While supposedly contributing to repress criminality, the pacification programmes have not come without negative impacts on the cost of living, notably through inflating housing prices (Neri 2011), and the serious violation of human rights (Silva and Silva 2012; Fleury 2012).

7.4 Favelas Beyond a Shelter Issue

For over half a century, favelas like Rocinha enthused and challenged scholars, policy makers, and politics. As an academic subject, it inspired studies on the agency of the poor and studies revealing that the marginalised were in fact a product of social capitalist structures (Perlman 2010). As a political object, favelas like Rocinha have equipped an urban agenda in pursuit of social rights and city rights whose plea for equality and inclusion remains more relevant than ever, also amid recent critical urban theory (Brenner et al. 2011).

Important dimensions of the remaining vulnerability of the poor in Brazilian cities are related to the exclusionary nature of urban development, which recent institutional and economic achievements have done little to change. An underlying structure of inequality, socioeconomic and spatial, persists in urban areas along with the lack of affordable housing in locations where people can have access to enhanced livelihood opportunities.

Favelas like Rocinha are a result of this unequal urban development engendered by poverty and lack of shelter, but also by the material reality of territorial exclusions and the spatial ties of livelihoods that bind the poor to the most competitive terrains of the city. What makes Rocinha a place of solutions and opportunities should serve as an pledge for planning practice to assume the political costs of steering land markets and promote development towards meeting the needs of the poor beyond that of shelter.

As the country moves forward towards economic stability and the diminishment of poverty, the growth of informal urbanization and the housing deficit becomes an ever more pressing challenge that must be tackled. Issues that will define the future of favelas and cities include how policy interventions will leverage over urban land markets; how it will encompass the role of housing as an entry-point for other human rights and livelihood opportunities; and how it will respond to the claims for more inclusive urban development in Brazil.

Case Study: Rocinha, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

ROCINHA
Rio de Janeiro
Brazil

The beginnings of occupation in Rocinha

Fast growth of informal settlements (favelas)

Rocinha has approximately 5000 inhabitants

Military coup. Intensification of removals and evictions of informal settle-ments in Rio de Janeiro.

Inauguration of tunal Dois Irmãos improves access to Rocinha

«Favelas» are officially recognized as administrative units in Rio de Janeiro

Adoption of the master plan, willingness to transform and integrate favelas within the city

Rocinha in mass media, tourism and popular culture

Policy and Military operation. Control of Rocinha

1930   1940   1950   1964   1980   1986   1992   2000s   2011

78,5 ha

11'960'000 inhabitants (2010)

69'000 inhabitants (2010)

1'393'000 inhabitants (in 763 favelas) (2010)

1930

Originally it was an agricultural domain, which was then divided to individual plots for traders and workers who settled there

In the 1980s, the situation of illegal occupants was regulated by a governmental initiative

97,3% of the population, served by the general supply system

Regular supply

Manaus

Recife

Salvador de Bahia

BRASILIA

Belo Horizonte

Sao Paulo

RIO DE JANEIRO

Porto Alegre

Photo: Leonardo Martins

Photo: Leonardo Martins

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Chapter 8
Poor Neighbourhood and Natural Disaster

The Environmental Situation of the Cité l'Eternel in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Anie Bras, Abigaïl-Laure Kern, Georges Eddy Lucien, and Evens Emmanuel

8.1   Introduction

During the second half of the 1970s, the Haitian government engaged in a process of liberalisation of the economy, an economic development strategy that aimed to attract foreign capital and to promote the establishment of supply industries (Etienne 1999). Largely centralised in the Metropolitan Region of Port-au-Prince (PFMT), economic activities resulting from this policy caused, among other consequences, a significant shift of the Haitian rural population to the urban area of Port-au-Prince.

The literature on the development of urban areas shows that the economic development of large cities is always accompanied by strong urbanisation (Polese 1994; Veron 2007). Indeed, urbanisation is somehow a result of ongoing economic processes, those that are part of a development approach, as well as those that belong to a disintegration of rural societies (Polese 1994). However, in areas where economic activities are not able to significantly reduce the unemployment rate and generate wealth, this urbanisation can cause enormous pressure on the weak urban services available (Emmanuel et al. 2000). This is what happened in the Haitian capital where, given the population explosion, urban services could no longer meet the population's demands.

The most notable urban images of this spatial organisation, highlighted by Malebranche (1998), and the most striking symptoms of deficiencies in the quality of life in Port-au-Prince are situated around the transformation of public spaces, streets, and sidewalks into informal markets, the deterioration of the built environment, and the poor quality of urban public transport.

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Blary (1997) identified five levels or dimensions of precariousness in the slums. These levels characterise the urban organisation of precarious neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince:

1. physical deprivation, which highlights environmental hazards due to the location of the neighbourhoods (presence of ravines, swamps, waste, etc.),
2. environmental insecurity, which results from the lack of basic infrastructure and services (drinking water, sanitation, disposal of excreta), and the resulting health risks,
3. Precarious land tenure, highlighting the invasion of land by people who are not legal owners
4. economic insecurity, as the poverty level is generally very high,
5. social hardship, to the extent that extreme poverty of the residents is rarely recognised by governments, who do not implement adequate public policies.

Of these various dimensions, identifying the environmental situation of disadvantaged habitats must be correlated with the geophysical specificities of Haiti. Indeed, Haiti's environmental heritage is located in an area that is prone to cyclones and seismic risks.

As with most urban areas of the country, the city of Port-au-Prince finds itself in a dual ecosystem, that of the mountains and of the coast. A great number of the open spaces of these two complex ecosystems are squatted and house the largest slums in Port-au-Prince.

In addition, the geophysical environment of the Port-au-Prince conurbation has been marked in recent years by several devastating phenomena that systematically modified the relationship between the population and their living space. The manifestation of these phenomena, notably the flooding of lower areas of the city during the rainy periods, cyclones, and the earthquake of January 12, 2010, and their impact on the population, raise the question: Why are the noncompliant homes of the city of Port-au-Prince today the most exposed to the consequences of natural disasters?

Three main axes provide an explanation system:

- The history of the shantytowns of Port-au-Prince
- The type of habitat areas of Port-au-Prince
- The study of the environmental situation of the Cité l'Eternel.

8.2   Historical Analysis of the Shantytowns of Port-au-Prince

During the first half of the twentieth century, the Haitian State initiated a fight against the proliferation of shantytowns in Port-au-Prince. In the 1930s and 1940s, the St. Vincent and E. Lescot respective governments even proceeded to destroy some informal settlements.

After the Second World War, according to the Rousseau et al. (1998) report, the D. Estimaté government adopted a similar policy, razing the slum neighbourhoods

of Fort St. Clair and Palmistes to allow the opening of sites for the Cité de l'Exposition Internationale of the Bicentenary of Port-au-Prince, organised in 1949. However, no policy for the construction of new housing units to relocate displaced populations was implemented. Those concerned occupied the first available spaces they could find, creating new shantytowns.

The expansion and the number of slums throughout Port-au-Prince increased even further under the government of F. Duvalier (1957–1971), with the influx of peasants called to the capital on the occasion of demonstrations in support of the regime. Many of these poor people rushed to seize large suburban properties, where they erected their huts. Rousseau et al. (1998) reported that the population explosion which appeared at the same time increased the rush to the capital by an indigent population in search of work, highlighting the structural problems of planning, in particular from a health point of view, despite some efforts to build workers' housing estates.

The lack of a genuine spatial planning policy and an urban planning strategy culminated in the various social strata of the Haitian people meeting their housing needs by their own means throughout the twentieth century. In 1997, this social practice resulted in an average density of 200 inhabitants per hectare (inhab/ha) in the city of Port-au-Prince, considered very high by international standards. Before the earthquake of January 12, 2010 the average density of neighbourhoods ranged around 360 inhab/ha: 230 in regular residential neighbourhoods, and 905 in irregular housing neighbourhoods!

8.3   Typology of Habitat Areas of Port-au-Prince

In 1749, the surface area of Port-au-Prince was 78 ha. Today the city covers about 12,000 ha, crisscrossed by numerous ravines descending from the hills to the sea, referred to as the 'Mornes' in the Caribbean. These gullies create sharp divisions in the urban fabric and prevent transversal exchanges. If originally the city of Port-au-Prince was confined to the seacoast, at the bottom of the bay that bears its name, urban sprawls have gradually invaded the coastal strip. Today, the city extends to an altitude of about 800 m, which marks the current limit of its development to the south along the road up to Kenscoff.

The preliminary study on urban development in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince (UNDP 1986) recalls the option adopted by the government for the development of Port-au-Prince: linear extension along an East-West axis, along the Mornes, alternating employment and residential areas. However, the expansion has occurred mainly in the East, generally in a relatively small "urban sprawl" of agricultural areas, along existing roads and paths (Tractebel Development 1998).

Lavalin (1988) provides a very detailed typology of the habitat areas of Port-au-Prince:

- Precarious housing areas, where the density reaches 1,800 inhabitants per hectare (inhab/ha) mainly located in the lowlands, are classified as very low standard. Most often, the housing consists of a single room, in which an entire family can live. These areas account for the first deciles of the population, those with the lowest income.
- The dense or very dense informal settlements (density: 550–700 inhab/ha), of low standards but often fairly well constructed, are normally located on the higher grounds. The accommodations are made of hard materials, but have little or no equipment, and the population has a relatively low income.
- Areas with tight subdivisions (density: 300 inhab/ha), of medium standard, are very widespread within the urban conglomerate, and are served by all the urban service networks. These areas include a good part of the middle-income population.
- Areas with loose subdivisions (density: 50–100 inhab/ha), of high standard, are well served by networks and inhabited by a high-income population. These areas are generally located on the periphery and/or in the heights.
- The fabricated urban centres (low end of the City and Pétion-Ville), with administrative and commercial blocks, sparsely populated, and densely populated residential blocks at the bottom of the city and with low standards.

The available data on the precarious neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince characterise a population living in unsanitary conditions. Indeed, informal settlements represent an organisation, a density, and a topography (steep slopes, land subject to flooding, to landslides, etc.) that make them inaccessible to mechanised material waste collection. Therefore, there are few disadvantaged neighbourhoods, if any, that are served by the garbage collection service, when it works. Thus, the waste accumulates along corridors, at intersections of certain streets, and in dead ends. An expression of the encounter between an urban lifestyle and rural practices, free breeding domestic animals proliferate and feed at the will of the persistence of garbage heaps (Bras 2010). Promiscuity attached to these living conditions can hinder the application of certain public health policies.[1] In the context of uncontrolled urbanization of the city of Port-au-Prince, biological and chemical hazards faced by occupants of substandard housing will need to be considered in the future.

Of the various districts that constitute the ensemble of the shantytowns of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, the Cité l'Eternel, by its location relative to the Bay of Port-au-Prince, calls planners, scientists and policy makers to question the risk of flooding, particularly in the rainy season.

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[1] WHO (1989) defines decent and healthy housing as one that promotes the physical and mental health of its occupants by providing a sense of psychological security. This ideal accommodation should be able to serve, for its occupants, as a physical connection to their community and culture, and should allow them to express their identity (OMS 1989).

8.4   The Environmental Situation of the Cité l'Éternel

The Cité l'Éternel shantytown was built up in the late 1980s in favour of a socio-political movement at work in the country that contributed to oust the unelected President Jean-Claude Duvalier (Hurbon 1987). The shantytown comprises a set of three sub-districts: Village de Dieu, Cité Plus and Cité L'Eternel. Situated on the shoreline of the capital, before 1987 the site was a landfill for municipal and other types of waste from Port-au-Prince. This site has had a direct impact on the environmental situation in the shantytown.

On the one hand, built in the heart of the outlet, the proximity of the sea exposed the site to floods during heavy rains and the control of ravines. Indeed, with the growth of shantytowns, rainwater flows over the concrete and sheet metal roofs of houses without the possibility to seep into the ground sustainably.

There is ongoing work to enhance the soil in the city, but due to the lack of natural drainage, upwellings are seen everywhere, even inside houses, and low bearing capacity of the soil leads to a permanent differential settlement (Léger and Désinor 1998).

On the other hand, the location of the site did not allow the vast majority of homes to have latrines, and for various reasons: the lack of available space due to geotechnical instability of the zone not allowing the digging of ditches, or because of upwellings through capillaries (or by upward flows), as the ground level is below sea level in certain areas. The implementation site of the Cité L'Eternel is thus contaminated by chemical and biological pollutants contained in household waste and other types of industrial waste from the city of Port-au-Prince that are deposited therein. It is also exposed to organic and inorganic flows and loadings of sewage from open urban drainage canals (Emmanuel 2004).

Landfill is a method that is widely used to treat household waste. However, this waste burial has many harmful environmental effects. During storage and under the combined action of rainwater and natural fermentation, wastes produce a liquid fraction called "leachates" or "percolates". Rich in organic matter, these liquids cannot be discharged directly into the environment and should be carefully collected and treated. Indeed, the main source of pollution linked to waste is made up of the leachates from dumpsites or mismanaged waste sites that are at the origin of the contamination of soil, surface water and groundwater (Ragle et al. 1995).[2]

There are no studies yet on the use of polluted soil for human habitat purposes, nor on the transfer of pollutants contained in household waste leachates through a soil matrix by a vertical dynamic upward flow, occuring as upswelling in houses, and in general on the site of the Cité l'Eternel. In the case of flooding of homes by capillary rise, there is a release of pollutants contained in the soil, initially polluted

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[2] Studies relating to the impact of leachates from household garbage dumps on aquatic ecosystems and soil are rare (Khattabi et al. 2001). They are usually limited to the assessment of the toxicity of these organic acids present in large amounts in the leachates that can lead to the formation of toxic complexes with metallic elements (Fraser et al. 2000).

by household waste and their process of physical, chemical and biological evolution. The contact of these pollutants with households highlights a hazard linked to the existence of substances, which have a negative impact on the habitat and living species (Rivière 1998). In the case where the environmental conditions for the degradation of these substances are not met, the pollutants that come from household waste and are released by contaminated soil become entrenched in the environment, posing a risk in the short, medium and long term for the health of the residents of the Cité l'Éternel (Emmanuel et al. 2009).

8.5   Conclusion

The unbridled urbanisation process of the Cité l'Éternel, a precarious community of Port-au-Prince, is illustrative of the situation in many developing countries, particularly in other parts of Haitian cities. Thus, as with the Cité l'Éternel, major urban problems already jeopardised the capital before the earthquake of 2010. In addition to the environmental situation detailed in this article, the urban planning of Port-au-Prince faces two major challenges: infrastructure that is insufficient, extremely overcrowded, even saturated, and neighbourhoods built in areas that are prone to floods or susceptible to landslides.

But the earthquake of 12 January 2010 further altered this situation: the emergency problem became preponderant and predominated over the medium and long term vision that should prevail in urban planning. One of the major risks facing the extreme urgency of relocating hundreds of thousands of homeless, is to sacrifice the future of the city and its planning for the long term. Indeed, homes and temporary shelters built immediately after the earthquake appear to remain in some areas and may produce new slums.

This question becomes even more acute given that the risk of another major earthquake remains important. The epicenter of the catastrophic, magnitude 7.0 earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010 was near the town of Léogâne (Ouest Department), approximately 25 km west of the capital, Port-au-Prince. An estimated three million people were affected by the quake. Death toll estimates range from 100,000 to about 160,000 to Haitian government figures of 220,000–316,000. This high impact was mainly due to the extreme vulnerability of the precarious settlements in the capital, essentially composed of slums such as the Cité de l'Eternel. In fact, the government of Haiti evaluated that 250,000 residences and 30,000 commercial buildings had collapsed or were severely damaged.

The major international aid mobilised following the disaster could be a way to bridge the gap in regional planning, promoting the establishment of training in urban engineering with a specific attention to building requirements for earthquake zones. The latter would allow not only addressing the future seismic risk, but also thinking about how to improve emergency buildings and rethinking more broadly the planning of precarious neighbourhoods such as the Cité l'Éternel, in order to resolve the problems they have faced for many decades.

Case Study: Cité l'Eternel, Port-au-Prince, Haiti

CITÉ L'ETERNEL
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

The surface area of Port-au-Prince was 78 ha

Razing the slum neighbourhoods to allow the construction for the Cité de l'Exposition Internationale of the Bicentenary of Port-au-Prince

The Haitian government engaged in a process of liberalisation of the economy

The Cité l'Éternel shantytown was built up in the late 1980s

François Duvalier chased from power.

An average density of 200 inhab/ha in the city of Port-au-Prince

UN MINUTSAH intervention in order to re-establish the authority of the State

The density of irregular housing neighbourhoods reached 905!

The earthquake of January 12, 2010

1749   1949   1970   1980   1986   1997   2005   2010

111 ha

2'207'000 inhabitants

50'000 inhabitants

84%

1980s

built in favour of a socio-political movement that contributed to oust the unelected President Jean-Claude Duvalier

Ambiguous property rights

No domestic connection

No dommestic connection

A boy takes a shower outside his tent in Cité L'Eternel. 16/11/2010. Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
Photo: ID 465222. UN Photo/UNICEF/Marco Dormino.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/5547196070/in/set-72157626262476225

Slums being buit in the mountains to avoid floods.
Photo: Abigail Kern

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Chapter 9
(Re)Urbanization of Villa 31 Carlos Mugica

Empowerment of a Slum in Buenos Aires

Javier Fernández Castro

9.1 Preconceptions and Background

Villa 31 is the most emblematic of all the "informal" settlements or shantytowns in the City of Buenos Aires. Although it is by no means the largest low-income housing settlement in the Metropolitan Region in terms of area (35 Ha) and population (30,000 inhabitants according to the 2010 census), a series of factors coincide to make it an area of exceptional significance. It is the oldest of the city's such settlements, having existed for more than eight decades.[1] The neighbourhood lies in the extreme north of the central area and is situated between the port and an important transportation hub, where long-distance buses, three railway terminals and a number of underground lines all converge. The area stands out in contrast to the more upmarket neighbouring areas, offering the typical patchwork of urban duality where rudimentary dwellings are silhouetted by corporate towers. The inhabitants named the area "the Carlos Mugica Neighbourhood" to honour the memory of the main leader who contributed to the organisation of the Villero movement in the neighbourhood.[2]

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[1] We can trace the origins of the villa back to 1929, when the National State built a series of makeshift dwellings for a group of Italian immigrants who had been camping in front of the port, one of the few active sources of work during the economic crisis of that period. Since then, it has been a place of settlement for several waves of migrants (currently represented in equal parts by people from the interior of the country and neighbouring countries) who come to the city in search of work.

[2] Father Carlos Mugica (1930–1974) was a priest and member of the revolutionary Peronist movement in the early 1970s. He played a key role in the organisation of the Villero movement and in highlighting the fight of the popular classes to gain access to the city. He became a symbol of reference for the popular classes in Argentina, following his assassination by an extreme right-wing vigilante group.

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Several arguments have contributed over time to the generalisation of a discourse in both professional spheres and the media that favours its eradication. The possibility of replacing Villa 31 with highly profitable real estate developments, together with the logistics of the port area and the need to improve the traffic flow between the centre and the northern periphery, are all arguments which, when combined, have obscured the existence of the neighbourhood or the socio-political consequences of relocating its inhabitants, most of whom have roots in the area dating back several generations.

The research that gave rise to this work[3] presented a project hypothesis of a complete in situ establishment, but it simultaneously included the joint resolution of the remaining demands from "beyond the neighbourhood" that were present in the macro area. This resulted in the projection of a new scenario, which presented the urban project as a negotiation tool involving several actors, where it was possible to bring together positions that had been in conflict with each other up to then. The project was mainly used to move from an excluding scenario (the neighbourhood versus the development of the centre-north area) to a more inclusive (re)urbanised neighbourhood as a possibility for the development of the centre-north area. The visualisation of this development potential by the neighbourhood organisation[4] proved decisive before the State decision makers in terms of mobilisation and pushed to have it put into practice, triggering a political process that has continued with certain advances and setbacks right up to the present day.[5]

The urban project then took on a meaning that is not at all usual in our contexts. It was no longer presented in its traditional format of charting supposed "gaps" and lineally reconverting these into areas of prestige ex novo, but rather one of recognising pre-existing "filled areas" on which to operate, bringing together demands and actors in a complex and inclusive manner.

The initiation of the work consisted in surveying and reading the pre-existing urban structure as essential project material to begin with. Leaving aside all

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[3] The origins of the work lie in a University of Buenos Aires research project, based at the Institute for Human Spatiality/Inclusive Habitat Programme. The first version dates from 2002. The Legislature of the City of Buenos Aires declared it to be of interest in 2005. Law 3343, which was passed in 2009, defines the re-urbanisation of the villa in its current location, and places its execution in the hands of the local government. In 2010 it received the Biannual Prize for Project Research awarded by the Professional Council of Architecture and Town Planning, CPAU.

[4] In 2003, well-known members of the historical community made up the Board for the Urbanization of the Carlos Mugica neighbourhood, a base organisation which participated actively in the surveying debate and final definition stages of the draft bill in conjunction with the researchers. With a methodology of weekly workshops held by turn in the different sectors of the neighbourhood as well as regular general assemblies, the demands were collected and the definitive proposals were agreed upon. This organisation resulted in a process to legitimise the representation of the neighbourhood residents through a general election of neighbourhood representatives decided by the City Judiciary.

[5] The Participative Management Board, which was created by law and consists of the national and local states, elected representatives of the neighbourhood residents and the University as the technical team, agreed upon the definitive executive project in 2011. The Board still needs to approve its regulatory tools, its executive body, and the budget.

preconceptions allowed the recognition of an organisation that displayed the same elements as any other urban organisation, with the difference lying in its level of development and formalisation, which is the result of a lack of resources in this particular case. It was a matter of considering the villa as a *needy space that has to be provided with something* rather than as an *anomaly that needs to be removed*.

The recognised structure can be summarised as a well-consolidated historical head point adjacent to the bus terminal, its extension in two parallel axes of growth (known as 31 and 31 bis) on both sides of the central motorway, an open barycentre as the main space of reference, and an unfinished interchange at the opposite end, marked by the presence of Fr. Mugica's original chapel and the Villero Movement Building, a paradigmatic example of modern 1950s State architecture in Argentina.

9.2   Proposals and Projections

The proposal resulted from a collective construction, where researchers act by listening to and interpreting the demands of neighbourhood residents and then project the know-how of the urban discipline and the necessary integral vision of the problems in play into these. The traditional project notion usually ends up with the prefiguring of an all-embracing, perfect and finished object, which is supposedly unchangeable and, if possible, timeless. However, in these contexts, the action breaks with any canonical illusions. Quite to the contrary, the solution offered must adopt the sufficient flexibility imposed by its own management times: different scenarios are contemplated, heterogeneous elements and stages of execution are recognised, external resources are added to compensate for internal weaknesses, various answers are offered to the different interests in the place, discontinuities in State financing and management are envisaged, and in short, very diverse tensions and logics are weighed up.

The structure resulting from the project recognises marked continuities in relation to the current one, offering subtle correction strategies in the general ensemble, together with others of a more transformative nature in the nodal areas. This allows actions throughout the entire territory (installation of infrastructure, improving, completing, and renewing the pre-existing network), which should be differentiated from other, more paradigmatic and distinctive actions in specific strategic locations (hierarchy of public facilities and spaces both for improvements and new locations). The systematisation of the methodology used can be explained in terms of two complementary categories: scales and thematic areas of intervention.

In terms of specification levels the project operates on three scales:

- **The macro scale**/resolution of the relationship between the neighbourhood and its immediate and wider environment, (continuity of stretches of road, dissolution of boundaries, generation of shared public spaces, etc.) incorporating its structure into the wider order of the centre-north corridor. The total establishment becomes sustainable by associating rather than competing with the

extra-neighbourhood demands (resolving the continuity of the motorway and its unfinished interchange, recovering the railway's access to the port area, definitive delimitation of the horizontal expansion of the neighbourhood, etc.).

- **The medium scale/**resolution of the neighbourhood as a significant whole, with its own identity combined with a series of neighbourhood identities that make up the city. It is not a matter of replacing or dissolving the ways of the neighbourhood, assimilating them mimetically into the environment, but rather of strengthening and dignifying their own features and characteristics (spaces of reference, densities, atmospheres, lifestyles, etc.). (Re)urbanization means recognising the pre-existence of already urban characteristics, with socio-spatial relations that must be maintained, improved, and strengthened.[6]

- **The micro scale/**resolution of the various components of the internal structure of the neighbourhood, with the detailed specification of each and every one of its elements. Each street, each dwelling, each square or facility requires a specific project, and there can be a qualitative and quantitative appreciation of the whole, once these have been determined.

Depending on the urban conditions, the project covers five thematic areas:

- **Reference/**spaces of identity, focal points and containers

Configuration of a *central square* on the empty barycentre, flanked by a *hybrid building*, which houses administrative and cultural spaces, as well as places that generate employment and income. The latter contribute to the description and sustainability of economic activities in the neighbourhood. A *system of small squares* distributed in the continuity of the zone strengthens the secondary central areas in each sector, offering new and improved *facilities* (education centres, primary healthcare centres, libraries, community rooms, places of worship, etc.).

- **Flow/**spaces allowing mobility and access, lines and links

Organisation of a *differentiated stretch of road* in the hierarchical structuring of the main *avenues* for road transport, mixed secondary or residential *streets*, and *pedestrianized zones*. The efforts required by this system range from well-conceived actions aimed at opening up the "soft" zones of the area to the classification of already existing sections. These three hierarchies are complemented by the extension of the *public transport system*, mainly in the outer borders of the

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[6]We may trace the origins of the term "(re)urbanization" in documents issued by the "Pastoral Villera" of Buenos Aires, the current heir of Fr. Mugica's works. It attempts to point out the real meaning of inclusion, stating that enhancement task of the habitat in these popular sectors is based on a preexistent urban condition which must be recognized. For these priests the slum is the City, it is a consequence of its modes of production, a cultural identity with its own values which should be respected. The term (re)urbanization is associated to the generation of spaces for coexistence, mixture and articulation among different people who recognize themselves in their particular identities.

neighbourhood, and the main internal streets, with a special emphasis on the development of two new underground railway stations.[7]

- **Habitability**/spaces of domesticity, areas and combinations

  General installation of a new *network of services infrastructure* (water, sewage, electricity, gas, communications, etc.) takes advantage of the work on the stretch of road. The housing stock includes 70 % of *dwellings that need to be improved* through generalised actions involving the incorporation of new wet areas, as well as interventions of a varying extent that are classified according to the degree of intervention that corresponds to their initial state of consolidation The remaining 30 % require *actions* for their *relocation* with new dwellings in bordering government-owned lands.[8] These help to sustain the shifts caused by opening or transferring sectors that cannot be consolidated in their original location (areas under the motorway and under working railways).

- **Interchange**/spaces for interrelations, intersections and interchanges

  The extreme west of the project offers the final resolution of the interchange hub, allowing the motorway to be extended in the port area without affecting the population and allowing the freight railway to access the port once again; combined with a *topographical park* it represents an additional reference. Fr. Mugica's church and memorial and the Movimiento building are reclassified within this park, thereby enhancing the centre of pilgrimage and homage. In the easternmost end, the redesign of the *Plaza de la Feria* highlights the local shops and stores and joins a new façade to the bus terminal with a public access ramp.

- **Demarcation**/spaces for differentiation and intersections, borders and limits

  A new *park on the northern perimeter* looks towards the city and serves as an intersection to provide relief to the port infrastructure and the new thoroughfares. To the south, a new *avenue on the perimeter* limits the advance of the neighbourhood over the railway areas; and it follows its route with a series of viewpoints towards the urban front of the formal neighbourhoods. In its stretch it includes the continuation of a light regional tramway, which is currently out of use. A *pedestrian walkway and bicycle lane* link the neighbourhood to the south, crossing the railway yard.

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[7] As part of the participative management process, the City Legislature approved the redesign of the stretch of Line H of the underground railway in 2013, adding two new stations at both ends of the neighbourhood, with the aim of complementing the re-urbanisation project.

[8] In the current northern border of the neighbourhood there is an underused state-owned plot of land, which has been incorporated into the proposal.

9.3 Specificities and Replicas

The determination of the project can admit other morphologies and specific actions different to those that are presented here. Above all else, we are concerned here with a *project strategy* whose essential value is the demonstration of a potential scenario of socio-spatial articulation, where hitherto there were only insuperable contradictions. The systematisation of noteworthy scales and thematic areas represents a first principle of replicability of the experience in contrast to other contexts and areas of action.

Perhaps the only important thing here is the role played by the project as a tool of *empowerment*. Given the absence or withdrawal of the actors who should naturally have taken charge of public management, prefiguring a scenario to overcome the status quo, the irruption of the neighbours' organisation in conjunction with a research group converted an academic exercise into a political tool of urban transformation.

The combination of residents and the public university revisits the traditional association between the production and transfer of knowledge. In one direction, the project has given the locals an "excuse" or offered them a necessary condition to present, qualify and quantify their claim. In the other direction, the experience has allowed researchers to establish the bases of the new strategies to approach the project and even to review the very notion of the urban project that existed, as we have already seen.

Today, thanks to the dissemination and relative success of this experience, new community collectives in the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires now request their own specific project from the team at the university. The development of new cases on different scales and in different environments is contributing to a review of theoretical models that are being constantly reformulated, and this is helping to establish constants and allowing variables to be extracted. Perhaps this situation will allow the incorporation of new tasks into the role of the universities in the region. This is a possible way of renewing the commitment with its area of action, and ultimately of contributing to the construction of new project know-how to meet the challenges presented by the policies of inclusion; translating the general order of social justice into specific projects of spatial justice.

Case Study: Villa 31, Buenos Aires, Argentina

VILLA 31
Buenos Aires
Argentina

◇ 52,3 ha

👥 13'528'000 inhabitants

👤 26'000 inhabitants

🏠 44%

      1930
🏠🏠 Neighbourhood is created by immigrants
      and unemployed port workers after the
      crisis of 1929

$ Argentinian government

🥛 No domestic connection, the city dis-
     patchesdrinking water in trucks

⚡ Illegal connection

San Miguel de
Tucuman

Cordoba
Mendoza   Rosario

BUENOS AIRES

Bahia Blanca

Villa 31 Carlos Mugica, aerial view.
Photo: Javier Fernández Castro and IEHu FADU UBA.

Villa 31 Carlos Mugica, street life.
Photo: Javier Fernández Castro and IEHu FADU UBA.

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Chapter 10
Social Housing in Nova Luz Project

Exclusion and Popular Resistance

Simone Gatti

10.1 Introduction: Housing Conditions in the City Centre of São Paulo

The city centre of São Paulo is presented as an emblematic example of a dynamic process of public and private investments, where the development of new centres in the southwest quadrant of the city has driven away public investment and interest in the real estate market from the city centre. Responsible for 16.61 % of formal employment in the metropolitan area, and for much of the employment in the informal sector, the city centre remained accessible to the working classes. Reduced prices, proximity to employment and access to public transportation and facilities meant that a portion of the urban population would normally choose to live in the city centre, even if submitted to poor housing conditions.

According to the Municipal Housing Plan drawn up in 2009, there are 11,086 slum tenement households[1] in the central area of São Paulo. Health conditions in this type of housing are extremely precarious, being characterised by the shared use of lavatories, no lighting or ventilation, the use of gas cylinders in unventilated areas, and an excessive number of people cohabitating in the same room. These precarious conditions are further amplified by the high prices paid for living in the slum tenements, which have the highest rent per square metre in the capital city (Kohara 1999), making it an easy profit market due to its informality and lack of tax control. However, living in slum tenements located in the city centre ensures access

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[1] Law N°10.928 OF 8 JANUARY 1991, known as the Moura Law, defines tenement households as housing units for multiple families presenting some or all of the following characteristics: consists of one or more buildings constructed in an urban lot; subdivided into various rented, sublet or transferred rooms; rooms have various functions performed in them; access and shared use of open spaces and toilet facilities; generally poor circulation and infrastructure and overcrowding.

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to housing for those who have difficulty entering the formal housing market due to the lack of necessary documentation for lease agreements, and the absence of a guarantor or the money for surety. Moreover, informal contracts, common for slum tenements, provide residential mobility necessary for temporary workers, as there is no stipulated minimum renting period, unlike formal housing rental agreements.

Over the past few years, due to a shortage of constructive stock in other areas of the city, there has been a renewed economic interest in the city centre, reversing the depopulation process identified in the area in recent decades. According to the IBGE 2010 census, the population of São Paulo city centre increased 15.4 % between 2000 and 2010, also becoming the focus of major urban projects. This density was also reflected in the occupation of slum tenements, which had a growth of 13 % in a given area of the city centre from 1992 to 2011, increasing the number of residents by 39 % (Kohara 2013). However, the production of social housing for lower income groups is still concentrated in the city's peripheral areas, and slum tenement dwellers in the city centre remain in precarious housing situations.

10.2   Social Housing in the Nova Luz Project

The traditional district of Santa Iphigenia is found in this context, located west of the historic city centre of São Paulo, where, as of the 1950s, elegant businesses and luxury residences were replaced by low-budget shopping areas and residents with less purchasing power. After going through a series of urban renewal attempts over the past decades, 45 blocks of the district were listed to be part of the Nova Luz Project. The Project was launched in 2005 during the mandate of Mayor Geraldo Serra, and its continuity was assigned to his successor, then deputy Mayor, Gilberto Kassab, who was in office until the end of 2012. The Nova Luz Project proposed a major transformation, with the demolition of 55 % of the constructed surface area, which corresponded to 546 properties. The demolition was justified by the need to improve the degraded territory, as it was underutilised and not reaching the full constructive potential granted by urban legislation. The changes would be made possible through the Urban Concession, an instrument that allows the government's executive branch to concede to private developers the right to expropriate and exploit properties located in the project area. In return they must invest in transportation, road systems, new public spaces and green areas, infrastructure and social housing, provided for in the specific urban project. However, the legislation gives no guarantee of permanence to slum tenement dwellers of expropriated buildings. According to a 2011 survey (Gatti 2011), within the perimeter of the Nova Luz Project there were 38 tenement slums, as well as intermediaries and numerous shops that made up the electronic commercial hub in Rua Santa Iphigenia. In other words, a project was designed in which the expulsion of low-income workers was inevitable.

According to the guidelines of the City Statute (Federal Law 10.257/2001), the 2002 Strategic Master Plan of São Paulo introduced an important urban instrument

for areas such as Nova Luz – the ZEIS[2] (*Zona Especial de Interesse Social*), Special Zone of Social Interest. Its main purpose is to reserve areas for social housing on sections of underutilised urban land in regions that have existing infrastructure, urban services and job offers, or which are receiving investments of this nature. The demarcation of ZEIS in central areas with infrastructure – such as is the case of ZEIS 3 – represents a novelty in terms of legislation, of great relevance for considering the regulation of housing rights of low-income people. This is the case not only in remote areas where there are slums and squatter settlements, but also in the expanded city centre, in areas coveted by the housing market. This can be seen as model of the principal stimulus for the production of well-located social housing and for re-population of the central city areas. In these areas, land tenure is not the main challenge to public policy, as in the case of ZEIS in outlying areas of informal settlements, but challenges include the regeneration of substandard housing, mostly occupied by informal tenants, and the production of new housing units to supply the demand of local neighbourhoods and city residents. According to the Master Plan 2002[3] (in force at the time of drafting Nova Luz Project), In ZEIS 3, at least 40 % of the area should be allocated to the construction of Affordable Social Housing, HIS (*Habitação de Interesse Social*), for families with incomes up to six minimum wages, in other words, income corresponding to 4728 Brazilian Reais or 1576 Euros.[4] Another 40 % of the area is allocated for Popular Market Housing, HMP (*Habitação de Mercado Popular*), for families with income ranging between 6 and 16 salaries, which range between 1567 and 4202 Euros. The remaining 20 % of the area is allocated for other purposes. Another key factor regarding ZEIS are the mandatory Steering Councils, composed of public authorities and the resident population, whose functions are to prepare and approve the Urbanisation Plan as well as monitor and supervise the implementation of projects. Only through the participation of the resident population on the Steering Councils is there any social control over interventions, control which aims to ensure that dwellings are designed to appropriate income levels and that current residents are awarded priority.

In the perimeter of the Nova Luz Project, underutilised areas with infrastructure are demarcated by the 2002 Master Plan as ZEIS 3, representing an important weapon against gentrification and eviction of low-income residents, a common occurrence in urban intervention projects. Within this perimeter, 85.27 % of the

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[2] The 2002 São Paulo's Master Plan regulated four types of ZEIS in different areas of the city. ZEIS 1 corresponds to areas of slums and squatter settlements that are particularly precarious; ZEIS 2 are empty areas, ZEIS 3 are underutilized portions of the territory with infrastructure; and ZEIS 4 are watershed areas occupied by informal settlements. In 2014, the revision of the master plan demarcated another type of ZEIS, the ZEIS 5, focusing on middle-income developments.

[3] In 2014, after the cancellation of Nova Luz Project, the revision of São Paulo Master Plan changed the minimum allowance for housing production in ZEIS, favoring the low income population. In ZEIS 1, 2, 3 and 4, at least 60 % of the area should be designed for residents with incomes up to three minimal wages, allowing 20 % for HMP residents or other uses. Rents for HMP are also changed, with a limit of up to 10 minimum wages, and not 16.

[4] The values are based on the price of the minimal wage in 2015, which was amounted to 788 Brazilian Reais. In 2012, during the period in question, the minimal wage was 622 Brazilian Reais. The value in Euros was based on the January 2015 rate of EUR 1 = BRL 3.

local population has income below three minimum wages (680 Euros), meaning that the area presents high vulnerability to the processes of economic transformation. This is an inevitable occurrence in areas of urban restructuring, either because of increasing rents due to higher condominium fees caused by higher service prices offered in the neighbourhood, or because residents are unable to continue with the informal jobs that they currently have in the region. These numbers were released only after the elaboration of the initial Urbanisation Plan, at the request of civil society representatives to the Steering Council of ZEIS. The Steering Council was consolidated much later than it should have been, and only through public pressure. The initial Plan had been drawn up without registration, based on a sample survey where the results found were very different from the data subsequently submitted by an official register.[5] In the original research, the percentage of the population with incomes between zero and three minimum wages within the perimeter of the project was 44.39%, almost half the number identified by the official register (Gatti 2013).

10.3   Transformation Proposals and Popular Resistance

The Urban Plan of ZEIS was prepared by the consortium that won the tender for the execution of projects, under the coordination of City Hall, and later was taken to the Steering Council staff for approval, disregarding the legal procedure which requires that the Council participate in developing the Plan, and not only in its approval. In the Plan, 137 properties in the perimeter of the ZEIS would be demolished, and only 85 would remain intact. This decision for preservation complied with the criteria of the project, which took into account the preservation of property declared as urban heritage, properties with a constructed area of more than 2000 m² or a utilisation coefficient greater than four and residential buildings with more than 20 residential units. On the contrary, properties with utilisation coefficient of less than four and properties affecting the urban design were to be removed. The definition of which properties were to be demolished and which ones would stay intact did not take into consideration existing uses and productive activities. Small apartment houses, slum tenement houses, kindergartens, social institutions, and numerous local shops were marked for demolition, many of them representing the history of the neighbourhood, as they had been operating for over 50 years.

The Nova Luz Project ZEIS Urban Plan (PMSP 2011) presented an estimated 2152 housing units to be built, with 1160 units destined for HIS and 992 for HMP. However, there was no minimum percentage estimated for the low-income population (up to three minimum wages); neither was property acquisition by the beneficiaries considered. Taking into account the Nova Luz Project guidelines, which were made possible by the Urban Concession, in which the private developer was to negotiate directly with current owners, without government intervention, it

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[5] Article 18 of the Decree No. 44.4667 2004 stipulates that the ZEIS Manager Council is the first to take action on the development plan, since its function is to develop the plan and approve it. However, by April 2011, a few months after the deadline for delivery of the Plan of ZEIS 3 C 016 (Se), the ZEIS Maneger Council had not yet been formed (Gatti 2015).

would be impossible to guarantee the permanence of low-income residents in the area. In reaction to this, civil society representatives on the Steering Council sought to establish new guidelines that would minimise the impact on the existing population and to tie any ZEIS intervention to the compulsory responsibility to existing households, as well as to ensure that there would be no demolition of neighbourhood history or properties that represented its memory. The Plan was approved without the consent of the local population, resulting in the feeling that they were not included in the full debate and decision-making process,[6] which culminated in a public civil action taken by the Board of Representatives of civil society in partnership with the Public Legal Aid of the State of São Paulo. This action was successful, and it was determined that the plan should be revised. However, in the following city administration, with the election of Mayor Fernando Haddad, the project was cancelled and the area remained in a degraded state, made worse by evictions and demolitions, which took place since the Nova Luz Project launch.

This case study, when examined from the point of view of habitation planning, shows the importance of restrictive zoning such as ZEIS in social vulnerability areas, but also makes it clear that zoning demarcation alone is not enough for the planning tool to act as an effective means of urban land democratisation. Safeguards must be established to allow the resident population to purchase the new housing units and to control financial speculation in these areas. Social control must be guaranteed through civil society participation in the preparatory phase of the Plan, through the creation of Steering Councils, and also through offering various forms of property acquisition for different family profiles, such as including Social Lease models, as opposed to only offering property transfers to the beneficiary. The 'home ownership' model is virtually the only model used in Brazilian cities and this does not efficiently meet the needs of the population earning zero-three minimum wages. They cannot afford financing costs, and do not meet the necessary conditions to enter the formal housing market, and could be subjected to reselling their property, due to housing market pressure in the central city areas, areas with high potential for economic appreciation, and therefore allocating public subsidies to high-income households.

Until the logic of housing commodification is broken, the low-income population will not have access to housing policies. This debate, although present in certain academic and government circles, has not yet been effectively developed to become public policy in Brazil. There are, however, regulations and housing policies effective on ZEIS and on the rest of the Social Interest Housing in the municipality: existing land policies for the acquisition of public housing, a housing transfer system for residents, incentives given to the private sector for housing production and control, and the management of private intermediary action in social housing production. In practice, they can directly influence the effective fulfilment of Special Zones of Social Interest's (ZEIS) principles and the achievement of its objectives, which are to ensure urbanised and well-located land for the low-income population.

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[6] Representatives of the civil society in the Management Board refused to vote on the plan on April 4, 2012, as their proposals had not been included in ZEIS Urbanization Plan presented by the municipal government. Still, the plan is deemed approved without the consent of the affected population (Gatti 2015).

Case Study: Luz, Sao Paulo, Brazil

LUZ
Sao Paulo
Brazil

The first railway line connecting Sao Paulo and the port of Santos — 1867
Sao Paulo has 65'000 inhabitants — 1890
Construction of Luz train station — 1895
Creation of Luz neighbourhood, influx of European immigrants — 1900
Decrease in importance of railway transport system — 1930
Pauperized neighbourhood which keeps growing — 1970
Creation of the underground spur neighbourhood redevelopment — 1980
Political willingness to sanitize and renovate the Luz neighbourhood — 1991
Moura law, recognition of rights for inhabitants of the cortiços — 2005
Nova Luz project is launched

◇   52,3 ha

♦♦♦♦   19'924'000 inabitants

♦   23'374 hinabitants

🏠   600'000 inabitants (in all cortiços)

   End of 19th century

⌂⌂   Neighbourhood grew following the
   construction of railway lines and of a train
   station in 1895

$ The land plots are legally owned and most
   of the inhabitants are tenants

   Domestic connection provided

⚡   Domestic connection provided

'Apartment building located in Luz neighborhood (Santa Efigênia district).
Photo: Simone Gatti

Manifestations against the Nova Luz Project.
Photo: Paula Ribas

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Chapter 11
Slum Improvement Lessons in Africa: Kibera

Christoph Lüthi

11.1 Introduction

Kibera, Kenya's largest slum settlement is also one of the world's most notorious informal settlements. It is one of the most dense and unsanitary slums in all of Africa and is situated on just 2.5 km^2 (256 ha) of public land. Located only 5 km from downtown Nairobi, it houses a large part of Nairobi's informally employed working class, just a few hundred metres from neighbouring high income areas (Pamoja Trust 2008). Kibera plays an important role in Nairobi's booming economy, which contributes 60 % of GDP to the Kenyan economy. Today, two out of three Nairobians live in slums that occupy just 6 % of the city's land surface (Gulyani et al. 2006). The living conditions in Kibera have evolved over decades of indifference by national and local governments and have remained unchanged for half a century. In Nairobi there is a clear spatial segregation between high-income areas with low densities located primarily to the west, north and south of the city centre, and low-income areas with high densities in the east.

Nobody knows for sure how many people live in Kibera. Previous official reports estimated a total population of 700,000 to 1 million people with a population density of approximately 3000 inhabitants/ha (UN-Habitat 2003). However, the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census reports Kibera's population as only 170,070 with a population density of 665 persons/ha, dramatically scaling down all previous figures. A recent study conducted by the Map Kibera Project in Kianda (one of Kibera's 13 villages), counted a population of 15,000 people and a density of 950 inhabitants/ha. If this number were extrapolated to all of Kibera, the population would total 235,000–270,000, with a population density of roughly 1000 p/ha (MKP 2010). The latest 'Map Kibera' estimate is probably the most realistic, as it

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combines house-to-house surveys with new geo-referenced mapping tools and allows more flexibility than a one-off national population census.

In the 1920s, the British colonial government gave small plots of land on the edge of Nairobi to Nubian soldiers – an ethnic group from neighbouring Sudan – serving in the King's African Rifles. They built mud huts on the land but did not receive any formal land title deeds. The land was later renamed government land, but the Nubians remained there and rented parts of it to newcomers. They called the area Kibera, which means forest or jungle in Nubian.

11.2   The Political Economy of Kibera

Socio-economic divisions and bias in public spending favouring the affluent elite has existed in Kenya since independence. Today, 10 % of the richest households in Kenya control more than 42 % of the income.

Almost three quarters of Kibera's households earn less than KES 10,000/month. With an average of five people per household, this translates to approximately one dollar per person per day (Mulcahy and Ming-Ru 2008). Kibera's residents are disadvantaged and excluded from formal services in three domains; they lack formal access to land, housing and basic urban services. The unequal access to these three resources is constitutive of the emergence and persistence of slums and a major feature of inequality in Nairobi to date. It also illustrates the nation's distorted allocation of public resources (Dafe 2009).

Political patronage and rent-seeking[1] in Kibera is evident in four social domains: the land market, the housing sector, the provision of basic urban services, and in on-going slum upgrading projects. Furthermore, corruption is a driving force in Kenya's land allocation system where political considerations determine access to and ownership of land. In his ground-breaking study of Kibera's political economy, Phil Amis argued that being politically well-connected, rather than ethnicity, was the main precondition in Kibera to receive access to land (Amis 1983, 162). The beneficiaries of the politically distorted allocation of land (in Kenya referred to as *land grabbing*) are members of the Kenyan elite: ministers, senior civil servants, politicians and well-connected businessmen. A recent University of Nairobi study found that out of 120 Kibera slum landlords interviewed, 57 % were either government officers or politicians (UN-Habitat 2009). Slum landlords pay no taxes on the

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[1] Rent-seeking is the attempt to obtain economic gain by manipulating the social or political environment in which economic activities occur, e.g., by capturing privileges to illegally obtain government land.

rent they collect and some slum landlords own as many as 1000 units. The distorted land allocation system results in Kibera's rent-paying tenants (93 % of the population) paying absentee landlords. Thus, the informal settlement of Kibera, despite being located on public land, operates like a formal real estate market (UN-Habitat 2005).

11.3   Infrastructure Access and Services

Kibera's notoriety stems from its lack of a basic functional infrastructure. Given that the settlements are illegal, landlords are not obliged to provide any services – there are no latrines or water, no electricity, and no waste collection. The government is also largely absent and does not provide Kibera's residents with health, educational, or recreational facilities.

Housing – Most structures are let out on a room-by-room basis, and the average size of a single mud wall room is 3.5 m^2. The rooms are screened with concrete, have a corrugated tin roof and a dirt or concrete floor. Rental costs range from about KES 800–1200 per month (<US$15), which is equal to about a quarter of the monthly wages. The single rooms often house up to eight or more residents.

Water Supply – Access to drinking water in Kibera is rare and much worse than for other informal settlements in Africa. In a detailed survey carried out by the Map Kibera Project in Kianda (the eastern part of Kibera), communal water points or water kiosks were the most widely used source of water, with one water point serving 132 people. Prices per jerry can of water (20 l) vary from 3 to 6 KES (3–7 US cents), depending on the location and reliability of distribution; and there are also frequent temporary water shortages (Gulyani et al. 2006).

Sanitation – Access to sanitation is worse than to water. Almost 70 % of the population rely on shared toilet facilities. On average, a single toilet seat is shared by 20 households or 70 people (Gulyani et al. 2006). Kibera is also famous for its flying toilets (i.e., plastic bags that are tied up and then flung away).

Electricity – Less than half of Kibera's structures are connected to the electrical grid. Many residents pirate electricity from an existing power line that passes through the lower half of the settlement.

11.4 Slum Upgrading Policy in Kenya

There have been numerous projects and interventions undertaken to try to improve the living conditions in post-independence Kenya, albeit without much success. A history of decades of failed slum upgrading projects and forced evictions has left a feeling of distrust among Kenyans towards the government and donors (UN-Habitat 2007). The largest initiatives to date have been two World Bank funded projects – World Bank Second (1978–1986) and Third (1983–1991) Urban Projects, which implemented settlement upgrading projects in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru, Nyeri, and several smaller Kenyan towns. A failed upgrading project funded by the German Development Bank in Mathare Valley from 1992 to 1999 is also worth mentioning because it was met with fierce resistance by absentee landlords and residents. The former were not properly compensated, while participation rates among the latter were very low.

In the 1990s, several Kenyan NGOs became active in slum upgrading projects and since then have implemented a number of smaller, low-cost projects, most of them based in Nairobi (e.g., Undugu Society, Maji na Ufanisi). Since the new post-KANU government came to power in 2002, landmark legislation, policies, and financing instruments have been established to facilitate future slum upgrading policies. In 2004 the National Housing Policy was approved by Parliament. It established the right to decent housing, the provision of legal security of tenure for poor segments of society, and the right to participation on the part of residents in housing and slum upgrading that affects them. The government initiated the Kenya Slum Upgrading, Low Cost Housing and Infrastructure Trust Fund (KENSUF), which allocates an annual funding vehicle dedicated to slum upgrading. In addition, the Slum Upgrading Department (SUD) was created within the Ministry of Housing to address the issue of slums.

The still on-going Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP) was launched by the Kenyan Ministry of Housing in 2002 with the support of UN-Habitat and several donor organisations. Its main objectives were to: (i) secure tenure, (ii) improve housing standards, and (iii) improve the physical and social infrastructure (UN-Habitat 2008). The project's overall costs are expected to reach several billion US\$, and it will take at least 15 years to complete. Similar to the Mathare experience in the 1990s, the KENSUP pilot upgrading project in Kibera (Soweto) has since run into delays. A court case instigated by absentee landlords to stop demolitions in Soweto East was thrown out in late 2011. Construction of several high-rise buildings in the Soweto East pilot area commenced in 2012, and the first occupants have since moved in.

The upgrading sub-component, 'Kibera Integrated Water, Sanitation and Waste Management Project' (K-WATSAN), was implemented from 2007 to 2010 and is

considered as the first successful infrastructure and services upgrade in Kibera (UN-Habitat 2014). It improved basic urban services, i.e., road access, sanitation blocks, and a safe water supply. The new sanitation facilities are managed by seven facility management groups (FMGs). The seven groups were formed through public consensus; they are registered community-based organisations with clear constitutions and bank accounts. The groups run the facilities on a user-pay principle.

The main implementation challenges faced by upgrading interventions over the past decades have been: (i) lack of involvement of affected residents at the initial planning stages, leading to grass-roots opposition by the communities; (ii) political interference by rent-seeking absentee landlords regarding questions of compensation, eventually derailing many well-intended projects; and (iii) lack of project coordination, high staff turn-over and inadequate experience on the part of the authorities at the municipal level, leading to long delays in project implementation.

11.5 Learning from the Past: Better Approaches

Moving forward in disabling and highly politicised environments like Kibera is a huge challenge for all partners involved. There are, however, some key lessons that can be learned from the past Kenyan experience:

- Slum improvements can only be achieved by fully involving communities during the planning, implementation, monitoring and long-term management process. This necessitates regular community consultation, free and fair representation (e.g., through street committees), and negotiating cost-sharing arrangements at an early stage.
- Capacity building: officials and municipal staff often lack the knowledge and skills to implement participatory upgrading approaches. This requires a structured training approach for different levels of staff with on-the-job training efforts.
- From a poverty-reduction perspective, the welfare of slum dwellers is most enhanced when resources go towards upgrading public services, such as water, sanitation and transport, before tackling complex and overtly political issues like security of tenure or resettlement.

Dedicating sufficient resources to ensure pro-active communication of information on a regular basis and to assist in the sensitisation of all stakeholders is essential to a smooth process and to avoid rumours and disruptive hijacking by special interest groups.

Case Study: Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya

KIBERA
Nairobi
Kenya

◇ 256 ha

👤👤👤👤 3'363'000 inhabitants

👤 Approximately 240'000 inhabitants

⌂ 60%

1912

⌂⌂ British government gave the land to
Nubian soldiers for their contributions
in combat

$ Land ownership disputed between GoK
and the Nubian community

🚰 No domestic connection, communal
water taps with charge per use

⚡ Less than 50% have access

Photo: UN-Habitat
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?img_id=330&catid=277&typeid=53&image_catid=277

Photo: Wikipedia (Creative Commons)
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Nairobi_Kibera_04.JPG

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Chapter 12
Urbanisation Prospects for a Traditional Lakeside Habitat

Raphaël Chatelet

12.1 Introduction

With the urban sprawl of the cities on this continent, many villages previously situated miles from the agglomeration have become part of the contemporary African city. This phenomenon of continued displacement of urbanisation limits raises the question of the future of the traditional habitat in urban areas. The example presented here is therefore far from being an isolated case. It also proposes reflection on the future of the traditional community in the African city.

12.2 Changing Territory

On 12 July 2012, the authorities of the city of Lagos in Nigeria warned the 150,000 inhabitants (Gaedtke 2013) of Makoko lake district that they had 72 h to leave their homes and that the neighbourhood would then be destroyed (Al Jazeera and Agencies 2012). The letter from the authorities stated that the illegal constructions were an environmental nuisance and a security risk for the people and for the entire population of Lagos, estimated at 12 million inhabitants (United Nations 2011). With the proximity of the modern economic centre of the city, this traditional habitat pocket occupied by the poor no longer corresponded to the image that the city

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wanted to give. In addition, the district was situated in a high land value zone. It thus criticised Makoko of undermining the potential economic gain from the waterfront, at the expense of the international megacity status that Lagos sought to develop.

The result of this "eviction" policy is that about 20,000 people lost their homes. However, the neighbourhood was not completely demolished. This is not the first attempt of dismantling by the Nigerian government. Already in 2005, it practiced the same strategy towards this neighbourhood, thus causing the displacement of more than 3,000 inhabitants (Okoye 2012).

These actions have been widely condemned by the population, especially via social networks (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) and relayed by national and international media, as well as by various associations and NGOs. These events, combined with the very specific situation of this district, contributed to establish Makoko as a prime example of urban struggle.

These events are related to the heritage value of this type of habitat. Policy makers aim for the beautification of the city of Lagos and its position as a national and international economic hub. In their eyes, the traditional dwelling does not have enough value to warrant upholding it. Central neighbourhoods are places of political and economic power, where rapid modernisation is mainly based on foreign urban and architectural standards. This trend of imported modernity leads to scant consideration of traditional African dwelling typologies, lake villages in particular. As Makoko is now included in the central urban area, we could be justified in considering the possible developments of this specific heritage. Does it deserve to be preserved or does it represent excessive constraints for its inhabitants, or is it even detrimental to the image of the modern city? Is there a middle way, a compromise that would enable residents and authorities to benefit?

12.3   Acceleration of Urban Insecurity

The Makoko area, whose peculiarity is its location on the water, was originally a fishing village on the Lagos lagoon. According to legend, the magical union of a Yoruba carpenter and an Egun fisherwoman created it. Its foundation dates back to the eighteenth century, but its integration with the Lagos agglomeration was made more recently, around 1960 (Howden 2010).

This village was swallowed up by the city, with many social, economic and environmental impacts. The district is now situated in a relatively central area of the city, whereas it used to be far removed. The main reasons for this are firstly the rapid population growth of the city that generated considerable urban growth, but also the uncontrolled development undergone by the city in the period following the inde-

pendence of Nigeria. Its organisation and planning have long escaped from the hands of public authorities that unsuccessfully tried to regain control (Gandy 2006).

Several factors highlight the precariousness of this neighbourhood. The primary indication is the very low living standards of its population. The insecurity defined by their socioeconomic integration is joined by a new type of insecurity, linked more directly to the natural environment and constructed as it prevails in the neighbourhood. The increase in population results in a degradation of the lagoon, weakened by contamination of human origin; it can no longer regenerate naturally. Furthermore, the houses are overcrowded, with an average of 6–10 persons per room. Infrastructure is greatly lacking; one can note the complete absence of water distribution networks and wastewater treatment, as well as the lack of a domestic waste collection system, which are released into the lagoon. Residents have access to safe drinking water at municipal distribution points, but the service is for a fee. For the poorest population, this represents a major obstacle to access this essential resource (IRIN News 2006).

12.4   An Amendment of the Usage Value

This village is not the only one with the distinction of being placed on the water. Indeed, other inhabited sites in the Lagos lagoon, such as Lekki or Akodo-Waya, are also lakeside villages (FAO 1986). At a West African regional level, one can observe the same habitat type in Benin, with the villages of Aguégués, of Ganvié, and of So Tchanoué, but also in Ghana with the village of Nzulezo. Makoko is not unique locally, but a traditional regional dwelling whose characteristics are relevant in this tropical climate. The primary reason for this spatial and urban organisation is likely due to the desire to have privileged access to the main food resource of fish, but also a desire for protection from attacks, looting, proslavery raids, and other misfortunes that might have occurred historically on the mainland.

The original population, consisting of fishing communities, continues to practice its principal activity, but the quantity of fish has decreased, as the water is increasingly polluted. As a consequence, fish producers and consumers of local fish are affected. The degradation of the environment is a major challenge for the future of this lakeside village that can now be called a slum. Despite the conditions described, it is interesting to observe that Makoko remains a place of importance in trade, an exchange of goods coming mainly from outside the area. This demonstrates that the territory is not closed, as many exchanges develop between it and the entire city (Kazeem 2012). Compared to the lakeside villages of the region, Makoko is the one that has been most transformed, notably with a change in its economic activity and its social structure, thus its usage value.

12.5 Persistence of Traditional Governance

Over a number of years migrants from neighbouring countries (Benin, Togo, Niger) or other regions of Nigeria arrived in Makoko. Some fled inter-ethnic and interreligious violence of which Nigeria is a victim, while others arrived in Lagos attracted by the many opportunities offered by the megalopolis. These newcomers sometimes arrived from other regions and generally did not fish. A high proportion of migrants in this precarious area come mostly from rural areas, posing a question of social integration in the slum. While some do not practice fishing, the main activity in the area, others have not experienced African urban life, its meanderings and its daily survival techniques.

As described above, the authorities are attempting to dislodge the inhabitants from their neighbourhood, not wishing in any way to encourage newcomers to establish themselves. Following this logic, the authorities are absent from this area and do not supply it with equipment, infrastructure, or services. In order to mitigate this programmed marginalisation, people seek to informally organise themselves to meet basic needs, such as security, education, water and food (Kazeem 2012).

This potentially conflictual reality has the effect of strengthening local traditional power. Thus every newcomer must request authorisation to a local chief to be able to build a house on stilts. The slum is divided into six zones, each governed by a traditional chief (ibid.).

12.6 Development Prospects

As a result of the consultations that were initiated, two scenarios prove plausible in the future development of this neighbourhood. The challenge here is to provide development opportunities in terms of its urban integration in the city of Lagos. These scenarios are between two antagonistic poles, either the dismantling of the neighbourhood, or making the traditional dwelling part of heritage.

12.6.1 Dismantling: Makoko Does Not Have Development Prospects Sustainable in Urban Areas

The attractiveness of Makoko, due to its centralised position and its uncontrollable population growth, implies reflection on the sanitation conditions of the area and the relocation to other sites of the current population. In this scenario, the constructed heritage that Makoko represents is not of sufficient interest to justify its conservation. UNESCO states that traditional dwellings justify their protection only

if the activity exerted is related to its form.[1] As the fishing activity is associated with stilt houses, how can one ensure that it continues in an urban situation, where the water quality is disastrous and no longer allows this activity? How can one allow an installation on the water, while the main economic benefits are no longer exploitable?

The Nigerian government proposes a "beautification" of Lagos through the dismantling of the traditional dwelling. Why not give it credit for its initiative? Investing in the image of the city is not a useless act. In this case, the treatment of the victims of "evictions" becomes the key issue to solve.

12.6.2   Heritage: Makoko Perpetuates Its Future in an Urban Environment

In this perspective, the revaluation and preservation of the traditional dwelling would lead to a profitable economic development for local populations. Makoko has a strong heritage, the village thus becoming the witness of a regional tradition and a contemporary urban planning model with an African identity, preserving and enhancing a "bubble" of traditional housing. Devoted to tourism, for example, the area would be a new facade for the megalopolis.

UNESCO could guide site development features. This would encourage specific local conditions such as fishing, as long as the quality of the lagoon water permits. Lagoon transport and tourism also represent an opportunity to contribute to this process. To ensure the success of this dynamic, the population would be active participants.

In this second scenario, recognition plays an essential role. This could be achieved by an inscription in the World Heritage List, as is already the stilt village of Ganvié, Benin, located a hundred kilometres from Makoko. The government would take care of sanitation and basic infrastructure, thus enacting the reinvestment by the public authorities of the territory. Moreover, it would formalise the property rights of the inhabitants, legitimising their presence. The collective consciousness would encourage people to improve their homes. This would fit in an innovative process of the "embellishment" of Lagos and of the sustainability of the lakeside village, which would no longer be considered a shantytown.

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[1] Criteria V: "to be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use."

12.7   Towards a Negotiated Space

Due to the unpopularity and remonstrance of international donors (World Bank, IMF, UN, etc.), partial or total evictions seem increasingly unpopular. It is therefore likely that the State is not interested in its initial plans for the destruction of buildings and the eviction of residents. Thus Makoko will continue to exist; the question is how? The scenario of dismantling is therefore unlikely to occur. At the other end, heritage faces many obstacles before it can be achieved. The main stumbling block is the sharp deterioration of the natural environment of the lagoon. These findings suggest that the most likely development lies between these two scenarios. It is likely that the neighbourhood will defend its existence and will have the opportunity to evolve, to follow a distinct path compared to other parts of the city. For example, Makoko hosts many NGOs providing rehabilitation projects that gradually integrated into the neighbourhood and transformed it (Mark 2012). This type of solution, ad hoc and meeting a specific need, should be encouraged and reproduced. If these trends continue, Makoko will be able to restructure itself as an integral part of the city, becoming a recognised neighbourhood and an official holder of political legitimacy with political representation in the Municipality of Lagos. However, the continuity of a sustainable development of this territory implies a rapid resolution of current environmental and social problems.

Because of its extreme precariousness and its own specific situation, Makoko is a very special place compared to the rest of the city. There exist, however, many economic interactions with other neighbourhoods of the agglomeration. The privileged position of the neighbourhood, being very central, enhances its attractiveness. Added to this, the integration of newcomers proves that Makoko is not a fixed entity, folded upon itself, but a changing neighbourhood whose development follows its own course and meets its own rules. We can therefore speak of this territory as a space negotiated between different stakeholders.[2] Highlighting its specificities and solving its economic, environmental and social difficulties, Makoko has the ability to play a leading role in the district. Thus it can define a new centrality in Lagos, acting locally with a complementary role in the political and economic centre of the megalopolis.

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[2] For example, the "Floating School", proposed by Kunle Adeyemi, a Nigerian architect working in Amsterdam takes into account local architecture and climatic conditions (Fourchard 2006).

Case Study: Makoko, Lagos, Nigeria

MAKOKO
Lagos
Nigeria

Foundation of lakeside habitat

The city swallowed up the fishing village

Economic crisis

Strong demographic growth

Neighbourhood partly demolished
20'000 homeless people

1700   1800   1900   1960   1980   1990   2000   2012

◇ 70 ha

♟♟♟♟ 11'220'000 inhabitants

♟ 150'000 inhabitants

⌂ 70%

18th century

⌂⌂ Fishing village

$ 80% tenants
10% home owners
10% illegal occupants

🚰 No domestic connection

⚡ No domestic connection

●ABUJA

● Ibadan

LAGOS ● Benin City

Port Harcourt

Photo: Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Creative Commons)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/boellstiftung/5342610737/sizes/o/in/photostream/

Photo: Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Creative Commons)
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Chapter 13
The Experience of Private Investments and Funding: The Relocation of the Karyan Thomas and Douar Skouila Households

The Essalam Operation in Casablanca

Olivier Toutain

13.1 Introduction

Strategies that address inadequate housing in Morocco are part of historical, political and economic contexts that have shaped perceptions of the phenomenon as well as the priorities and responses by the State. Urban riots of early 1980s, derived in part from the slums of Casablanca, will mark a turning point in the first government action through the implementation of a comprehensive program of shanty town relocation to collective housing[1] The 2003 attacks in Casablanca and the rise of Islamism would again involve the return of strong state regulation and the establishment of unprecedented means. The speech of the King of Morocco in October 2003 was an opportunity to bring "decent housing at a national priority level" and to reaffirm the ambition "to permanently eliminate this form of housing in urban areas". The "National Cities without Slums Programme" (VSB) resulting from these guidelines was launched in 2004 in the wake of the declaration of United Nations'[2] Millennium Development Goals. Its aim is to reduce all urban slums by 2010,[3] i.e., nearly 360,000 households (1.8 million inhabitants) in more than 1000 slums and 85 cities.

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[1] Attacharouk, Nassim, Anassi Operations.

[2] Target 11 under MDG 7 of the Millennium Development Goals: "Achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers"

[3] The rate of advancement of the programme reached 70 % in 2012 (UN Habitat 2012).

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13.2 Priorities for Sidi Moumen Slums

Although VSB is a national programme, the biggest challenge is in Casablanca. In fact, the history of slums merges with that of the metropolis, where the first urban camps were settled long before Independence.[4] In 2005, on the national urban scale, the city was home to almost one third of the shacks (111,500 households, or about 500,000 people and the equivalent of 13 % of its population[5]) in over 500 slums. A restructuring scenario of neighbourhoods and maintaining households in their living space was initially preferred. In 2007,[6] however, the option to relocate to host sites on the urban periphery quickly replaced the initial choice.

In the approved programme "Casablanca without slums", priority was given to slum clearance of the Sidi Moumen area, a symbol of the 2003 attacks. For the city officials, it was necessary to address the security problem, while at the same time also meet the objectives to "upgrade" the image and standing of the economic capital. The Essalam Loghlam project partly met this objective. Foreseen in an old quarry which had become a dumping ground on the East side of the city, the operation was to relocate 2405 KaryanThomas[7] households but also nearly 6000 households from neighbouring Douar Skouila, i.e., nearly 8400 families from two of the largest and oldest slums of Casablanca. The project, located respectively at 7 km and less than 1 km from these two slums (see Fig. 13.1) was designed as an "integrated urban centre", mixing resettlement lots[8] and promotional packages for equalization on a surface of 71 ha and for about 80,000 expected inhabitants.

13.3 Originality of Access Method and Relocation Financing

Although Essalam Loghlam is a conventional type operation, its originality lies in its access and funding characteristics. Faced with difficulties in mobilizing the land necessary for slum clearance at bearable costs by future beneficiaries on the Casablanca market, a specific form of intervention was adopted by the local authorities and the public operator Al Omrane. This consisted of relocating two beneficiary families to the same housing lot (on an area of 84 m^2) on which they could construct four-storey multifamily buildings (R + 3). These two binomial households had the possibility of a "third-party partner" (promoter, investors, access to property, etc.)

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[4] The first slums appeared in Casablanca in the 1920s.

[5] Greater Casablanca.

[6] In 2007, another attack targeted a cybercafé in the area of Sidi Moumen.

[7] Labour used in the construction of the port of Casablanca was often housed in makeshift housing near the quarries used for this purpose. The name would be "Morrocanized" to use the word Karyan (distortion of "quarry") that gradually designated slums in a Moroccan dialect.

[8] In Morocco "resettlement" designates the interventions that yielded to slums the habitat lots they valued or built themselves.

Fig. 13.1 Location of the Essalam project and targeted slums (Source: CNES Spot image 2011)

committed by contract to finance and implement the construction of housing[9] of the two families[10] through the recovery of the remaining two floors.

13.4   Success of the "Third-party Partner" Mechanism

Several years after the launch of the project, the Skouila slum, as well as a large part of the Douar Thomas, disappeared completely. The Essalam operation was completed and "fully valued". On the ground, families gradually appropriated their new homes; despite the late arrival of facilities and services (schools, health centres, mosques, transportation, etc.), life was gradually organized after the strain of moving and the necessary adjustment period.[11] An economic and social impact assessment

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[9] With a surface of approximately 75 m².

[10] Device inspired from identical experiences initiated in the 1990s in Morocco on R+2 habitation lots but also informal practices.

[11] In spite of these delays, the Essalam project nevertheless benefited from an agreement worth 440 million euros to upgrade the area of Sidi Moumen. A dozen institutional and elected actors were involved (Habitat, Finances, National Education, Health, Department of the Interior, Professional Training, Youth and Sports, City, Prefectoral Council, Region). This agreement could be thanks to close coordination between the stakeholders under the aegis of the Wali and the Area Governor and to appropriate technical management.

made by Al Omranea on this point allowed the appreciation – beyond the physical results of the operation – of the dynamics of change experienced by the people and the contribution of action in the improvement of their living conditions (AFD 2014).

Among the conclusions of the study, at the forefront is the contribution of the operation to access decent housing and basic services, given the previous situation of uncertainty and insecurity. This observation, however, is clearly put in relation with the success of using a third-party partner, which was adopted by a little over two third of slum households concerned. This mechanism thus enabled the vast majority of displaced families to become owners of their new home, without going into debt. Thanks to funding leverage generated by the equalization on the residential lot, resorting to bank loans was extremely limited in the affected population. The resale by beneficiaries of their housing only affected, according to the study, 13 % of the recipients, which is well below the average for resettlement operations in Morocco. This result confirms the relevance of the response, while financing housing appears as one of the greatest difficulties of the poorest families targeted by VSB. According to the survey of affected heads of households, 20 % of them had no financial resources, 36 % were unemployed, in addition to which there were a large number of homemakers, of disabled persons, and of retirees.

Looking back at the current experiment also allows one to appreciate the momentum generated by the mechanism through the continued evolution of partnerships between the third-party investors and the slum families. In the field, households have become aware of the involvement of economic relations by expressing more demands and negotiating capacity vis-à-vis third party investors. Since the first contracts, summaries, the families gradually obtained additional benefits for their housing. A new generation of more elaborate and binding contracts for third-party partners is applied today (see Box 13.1). The investment

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Box 13.1: Progressive Evaluation of Contracts Between Beneficiaries and Third-Party Partners

In the first association contracts, the third-party partner was only required to build a home of 80 m^2 for each beneficiary, without any further precision. Their content quickly improved: zellij (tiles) in the kitchen and bathroom, as well as woodwork were added to the standard contract. The terrace was also shared with half returning to the third partner, and a quarter to each beneficiary. A third generation of contracts was eventually introduced: white ceramic tiles on the kitchen floor, in the bathroom up to 2 m, and on the building stairs; a plaster rosette on the living room and in other rooms, marble on the kitchen counter, bedroom closets, sliding aluminium windows, rubber paint for the exterior, a wrought iron gate at the entrance and an intercom. The terrace, of which the third-party partner now owns only one third of the surface[12] also has tiled floors and is equipped with water and electricity.

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[12] He was previously entitled to half of the surface.

Fig. 13.2   Building blocks for relocation within the Essalam operation (Source: Olivier Toutain)

made by developers[13] also to enhance the overall quality of construction and housing compared to traditional self-construction (see Fig. 13.2).

13.5   Success Factors That Distinguish the Essalam Operation

The private investment funding mechanism of the relocation that was adopted in the Essalam Al Loghlam "cities without slums" operation in Casablanca allowed several thousand shantytown households to benefit from a new home at a very low cost and, in most cases, without going into debt.

In the end, this experience appears to be an innovative and particularly suitable solution despite the difficulties of its management and its regulation encountered in the field (See Box 13.2).

The operation is now on a positive trajectory with the arrival of public facilities thus contributing to better urban integration of families. One can also expect to eventually see some form of social diversity in buildings and related third party housing. Through investments made, the neighbourhood, eccentric in comparison to the city, took shape and is gradually integrating into the urban fabric.

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[13] Average investment in the construction is between 60,000 and 70,000 Euros.

In this review, Essalam Al Loghlam differs from other operations by the specificity of its intervention method and with award-winning economic factors (equalization, land rent in Casablanca). Finally, the experience of the third-party partner opens opportunities for other cities in developing countries, particularly in Africa, and to local authorities that do not have sufficient resources to implement innovative fusion policies. Its replicability would depend on the conditions of public/private partnerships, particularly public incentives, the dynamism of the local real estate markets and the support of the people involved in the proposed housing solutions.

Box 13.2: Management and Regulation Difficulties of the Private Investment Funding Mechanism

Several difficulties arose to counteract the success of the mechanism even if they affect only a small part of the households concerned.[14] They are mainly due to disputes between the slum family beneficiaries and third-party partners at the level of contracts association (non-compliance with specifications of realization of housing, building deadlines not respected, claims by beneficiaries' households for money not foreseen initially, etc.) and stakeholder commitments.[15] These conflicts have led to blockages in the establishment of condominiums and individual land titles back raising discontent and a sense of insecurity among the legal beneficiaries and third party partners. In this situation emerged the poor coaching contracts of association and the lack of household remedies and mediation before the problems.

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[14] One third of households, according to an investigation carried out on this occasion.

[15] Notably regarding signing the discharge of the apartment delivery by the slum families for the benefit of the third-party partners.

13.6   Case Study: Douar Sekouila, Casablanca, Morocco

DOUAR SEKOUILA
Casablanca
Marocco

Timeline:

- Settlers' departure leaves empty plots of land — 1960
- Spatial and urban planning attempts — 1970
- Rural exodus amplified due to drought — 1980
- Urban development plan for Casablanca Metropolitan Region — 1984
- Strong demographic growth in Sidi Moumen district — 1990
- Terrorist attacks in Casablanca — 2003
- "Cities without Slums" programme launched — 2004
- The Essalam project for slum family relocation — 2007
- The operation was completed and «fully valued» — 2013

◆ 40 ha

🧍🧍🧍🧍 3'046'000 inhabitants

🧍 30'480 inhabitants

🏠 13%

1960s

🏠🏠 Development of industrial areas, rural exodus and departure of settlers

$ Private developers and the Moroccan State (public domain)

🚰 Free access to water through public fountains

⚡ 91,7%

Photo: EPFL («Urban habitat and developement» course material)

Photo: EPFL («Urban habitat and developement» course material)

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Chapter 14
Village Model of Urban Housing

Slums in Ouagadougou

Aude Nikiema

14.1 Introduction

The geographer Yves Lacoste emphasized that, regarding countries of the South, "*the poverty of terminology persists in referring to the very diverse forms of spontaneous urban growth around cities as 'slums' although they are specific of underdeveloped countries*" (Lacoste 1967). The word slum is used by default to designate forms of urban habitat that are very different from one country to another. It hides many economic political issues, but also issues related to construction practices, to history, and to local and cultural knowledge addressed by the term spontaneous.

In Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso, the term slum is not used. In the framework of the Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme (UN-Habitat 2011), the definition retains the terms of the UN-Habitat (2010) and the absence of the following elements:

- sustainable housing,[1]
- an adequate living environment (no more than three people sharing a room),
- a right to drinking water (sufficient, accessible, obtained without extreme effort),
- access to improved sanitation facilities,
- security of tenure.

Literature uses the terms "under-integrated" (Jaglin 1995; Prat 1996; UN-Habitat 2011), "spontaneous" (UN-Habitat 2007) or "irregular" (Fournet et al. 2008). The popular Burkinabe language favours the term "not subdivided".[2] In all cases, the

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[1] UN-Habitat associates the word sustainable to many terms in relation to the city, but "sustainable housing" should be understood as a place to live that is decent, built with so-called permanent materials, that is to say, in cement or clay coated with cement.

[2] "non loti" in french

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uncertainty of improved living conditions remains permanent. The underlying fundamental element is the hope that the insecurity of land tenure is only temporary. From a spatial point of view, these spaces are characteristic of urban peripheries. They have long encircled the city on unoccupied spaces or by the absorption of existing villages with the advancing front of urbanization. If the urban development policy has led to the regularization of many of them, others have been left out and are now virtually surrounded.

14.2 A Village in the City?

The term slum literally refers to the quality of construction materials. Precarious housing is a distinctive sign, which, however, cannot be accepted as such in Ouagadougou. The architectural difference between legal "subdivided" construction and "not subdivided" housing is often very small. Precarious housing and fragile building materials are not specific to one type of space, but are a reflection of practices modelled on village lifestyles. The historical and territorial footprint of Moaga power (Fournet et al. 2008) partly explains the consistency of the village model of organizing housing, still present, and the difficulties of the population to accept the principle of collective housing (Deverin 1985). The rustic appearance of the city is distinguished by the size of occupied parcels. Population densities reach nearly 102 inhabitants per hectare in areas "not subdivided", compared to 40–65 in the "subdivided" neighbourhoods (Boyer and Delaunay 2009). However, the tightly knit image of not subdivided neighbourhoods, offering a mosaic of houses dotted with small shops, without open space for vegetation and winding roads is not always obvious. Population densities observed in 2004, clearly indicated: Yamtenga, 104 inhabitants per hectare, Zongo, 36 habitants per hectare (Kombasséré 2007).

The lack of land tenure security is undoubtedly the fundamental characteristic of the areas that one would qualify as "slums" in Ouagadougou. Indeed, the "undeveloped" areas develop outside the subdivision procedures that are imposed by the general Management of Urban Planning and Land Works (DGUTF). However, their extension follows the traditional land code that imposes a merchant act for the benefit of authorities that traditionally hold the village land diverted by the city. These practices are carried on outside the legal framework imposed by the Agrarian Land Reorganization (RAF). It stipulates that the national land area is lawfully the property of the State. But in the absence of a land register that covers the entire urban area, these practices remain. They materialize by the partition of the city into a subdivided city where a majority of residents declare themselves as tenants, particularly in the centre, and a not subdivided periphery where households essentially declare themselves as owners. These land status reflect a dual city. Traditional power still exerts access to land in unallotted outskirts where modern law is not yet concretely present by subdivisions (Fournet et al. 2008). In addition, urban development practices in the Burkinabe capital became known to tenants of downtown spaces, who discovered a means of becoming landowners through the acquisition of

a "not subdivided" plot (Boyer and Delaunay 2009). Having been left for some time in a kind of torpor, "bancoville" a nickname that arose from the precariousness of construction materials, benefitted from delayed development policies. They consisted of land regularization of vast peripheral areas (Ouattara 2006). Thus, these territories have become areas of land speculation, materialized by constructions labelled "alibi houses"[3] (Cussac 2004).

The dynamics of subdivision supported in the capital did not allow the authorities to anticipate or to plan. Undeveloped spaces remain and represent 30 % of the urban municipality, of which 13 % are inhabited by 33.5 % of the census population (UN-Habitat 2011). This consists essentially of young families of rural or urban origin, who are not able to either own or lease in the subdivided area (Rossier et al. 2011).

Despite the proximity of the city and its amenities, "undeveloped" areas are not eligible for urban insertion in the absence of a legal land title. They remain "under-integrated" areas.

14.3   "Right to the city" of Under-Integrated Neighbourhoods

In Ouagadougou, living in "subdivided" neighbourhoods does not guarantee better living conditions, even if the network of facilities present improves them. One only needs to look at demographic and housing statistics that show poor access to facilities in the capital: 42.9 % of Ouagalais have grid-supplied electricity at home, 37.4 % have running water, and 39.3 % have private waste collection (INSD 2009). However, the existence of a network gives hope for improved financial capacity to purchase a subscription. It is not the case for people living in "undeveloped" neighbourhoods.

The arrangements, in which facilities are not granted to "undeveloped" areas, prevent the integration of residents in the city. They break the process of land appropriation. A phenomenon linked to urban timeframes (Royoux 2007) that place these areas outside of urban policies. This is especially visible through the access to water and electricity or the health provided. Indeed, these under-integrated areas have very few water distribution points.

The Yamtenga neighbourhood provides insights into the methods of gradual integration of undeveloped suburbs adopted by political powers. The water supply scheme applied to Ouagadougou perfectly illustrates these key geographic choices. Between the weak financial capacity to expand the network of private connections and the scarcity of resources, collective facilities, fountains and independent water supply points were prioritised. Their implementation spatially demonstrates the border with the regular city. Under-integrated spaces benefit, at best, from hand-operated pumps, reflecting the image of the village. However, in these areas, drilling accounted for only 21 % of the water supply (found to be unfit for consump-

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[3] Uninhabited, their presence was only a mark of land appropriation while waiting for a future allotment.

tion), in comparison to 73 % for fountains, giving an idea of the long distances travelled (Kombasséré 2007). As a form of legal recognition of these spaces or the desire to integrate the poorest into town, since 2010, the National Office for Water and Sanitation (ONEA), in partnership with the French Development Agency (AFD) and municipal officials have intervened in several under-integrated neighbourhoods. Drinking water is provided in homes through connections from fountains, whose management is entrusted to a private operator. In the "under-integrated" neighbourhoods that are being subdivided, the creation of a grid road network provides the opportunity to equip areas still marked by traditional dwellings.[4]

Deficiencies are also found in sanitary facilities as the central areas of the city and the frontage roads that might improve their accessibility are polarized by a propensity to private status. The shape of the road network[5] of "under-integrated" neighbourhoods and the poverty of residents cannot facilitate the implementation of this type of structure. But sometimes this model can be disrupted. Although an unallotted area, Yamtenga is originally a village, which entitles it to benefit from a basic public health infrastructure. Gradually absorbed by the city, these places become part of the unallotted urban periphery and exceptionally possess services that would usually be inexistent in these spaces. Moreover, other privately funded infrastructures – primary schools – are built in these peripheral territories. In 2015, there were 17 private, secular, or religious private schools in Yamtenga.

Nevertheless, the quality of life in this unallotted area remains unsatisfactory. The health of the communities often receives attention. Reference is often made to the double burden of diseases (communicable and chronic) when citing the health conditions of urban neighbourhoods. In the work done on the health status of the Ouagalais in eight districts including Yamtenga (Fournet 2006), two pathologies, hypertension (HTN) and malaria, were specified. The areas at risk of these diseases are differentiated. Malaria is predominantly present in non-parcelled peripheries (prevalence more than 30 %), while being in recession in subdivided neighbourhoods, where HTN is present (averaging more than 42 %). However, these studies have shown no determinism – without explaining the reasons – that some "not subdivided" neighbourhoods, such as Yamtenga, showed identical prevalence to those observed in the subdivided neighbourhoods : high prevalence of HTN (43 %) and lower prevalence of malaria (18,8 %) than urban mean (?). Therefore, the health impact of environmental and structural inequalities has yet to be explored, as illustrated by the prevalence of diarrhoea among children, which is high in the non-parcelled peripheries such as Yamtenga (15.2 %) and lower in subdivided neighbourhoods (8,8 %).

Finally, the geographical remoteness of health care service and its spatial concentration in favour of the city centre, undoubtedly justifies the behaviour of populations of "under-integrated" neighbourhoods in terms of seeking health care (Nikiema et al. 2011). Only "under-integrated" neighbourhoods with a village history benefit from the presence of a dispensary. Communities have shown a greater

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[4] 27 new fountains in the Yamtenga neighbourhood in 2005.

[5] In the neighbourhoods not subdivided, the road network is dense and disorderly unlike those in a subdivided city where certain frontage roads serve to improve traffic flow in certain places.

propensity to consult those public structures established by administrative and non-financial standards that are physically closer.

In the Burkinabe capital, measuring access to basic social amenities for the areas not subdivided according to the distance criterion is more noticeable, in contrast to subdivided areas where access is measured by time. The lack of legal recognition leads to insecurity of facilities and justifies the classification of "under-integrated" spaces. Although housing development allows communities from these neighbourhoods to access legal ownership, allocation that is based on a random draw method[6] entails the displacement of some households.

Particularities related to history, cultural background, and methods of urban management provide distinct profiles to these spaces. They should not overshadow the many points common to slums and present in the "under-integrated" neighbourhoods of Ouagadougou: precarious living conditions, demographic pressures, absence of roads for travel, and poverty.

Case Study: Yamtenga, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso 2011

Non subdivided street in Ouagadougou (Source: A. Nikiema, INSS)

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[6] During subdivision operations, municipal authorities conduct a census of residents and a demarcation of the area that does not take into account unsubdivided building. The award is made by a draw, ranked according to arrival in the neighbourhood (Boyer and Delaunay 2009).

257,5 ha

1'911'000 inhabitants

27'350 inhabitants

300'000

Very high urban growth and rural exodus

75% home owners
10% tenants
15% "hosted free of charge"

20% (for the city)

No domestic connection

Kaya

Dédougou

OUAGADOUGOU

Bobo Dioulasso

Photo: EPFL («Urban habitat and developement» course material)

Photo: EPFL («Urban habitat and developement» course material)

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Chapter 15
Dharavi: Where the Urban Design Episteme Is Falling Apart

Camillo Boano

15.1 Introduction

The central question of how informal urban territories are constituted and imagined is a long-lasting one. Informality, or that which exists outside of formal legal-juridical frameworks, has been viewed in myriad ways since its emergence in the early 1970s in the published works of Keith Hart and, previously the domain of political economists and social scientists, has recently seen a revival in importance bestowed upon it, both in mainstream architecture, as well as geography, urban studies, critical literature, and even tourism studies.[1] Too many to be summarized here, however, *informal urbanism* can commonly be understood as "a state of exception and ambiguity" (Roy 2005) or as "a dynamic that releases energies" (Balmond 2003: 343) within the urban landscape – slums, pavement-dwellers, self-organising urban services – often articulating respectively both suspicious and negative attributes and more positive and creative potential. Informality may also be defined as "a mode of production of space defined by the territorial logic of deregulation" (Roy 2009), a symptom of neoliberal economies or "a survival strategy, and, as such…a way of evading or manipulating power" (Fabricius 2008). While these definitions span a wide territory, the latter two demonstrate a linkage between an end state, a contingent spatial situation, and power apparatuses that create the conditions for such inevitable appearance in cities.

Such dichotomy is well represented by Dharavi as the iconic symbol of "slum", understood as an inevitable spatial product of global predatory capitalism. Unlike

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[1] See for example: recent exhibitions such as Design with the Other 90 %: Cities exhibit at the UN and MoMA's Small Scale, Big Change or Stefano Boeri, Sao Paulo Calling; or the Lotus International 143 (2010) and 145 (2011), Harvard Design Magazine, Architectural Design May 2011, Magazine dell'Architettura, n. 53, 2012 just to mention a few.

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the majority of low-income settlements in the cities of the global south, Dharavi is well known throughout the world. The crowded colourful buildings, open sewers, recycling workshops, and alleyways teaming with smiling industrious people have become iconic repertoire representing poor communities. It has also captured the popular imagination through its prize-winning novel, then movie, '*Slumdog Millionaire*' that offers insights into individual drama without engaging with complex everyday life, nor with the extremely difficult "David and Goliath contest" it is experiencing.

What's interesting to me is that Dharavi does not simply represent well the spatialities of historical processes exemplified by contemporary megacities (McGrath and Graham-Shane 2012) and thus a new form of urban theory – a "slum theory" (Rao 2006) – or a terrain, where insurgent and alternative narratives of resistance become symbols of the new urban struggle with the "slum" as its icon (Roy 2009), but also a theory-place where urban design episteme is falling apart.

The particular understanding of "slum as a theory" (Rao 2012), rather than merely as an empirical object of research, is central for locating the debate over megacity and the south. Whether they are seen in the declination popularized by Davis (2006) as a territorial and demographic form at the epicentre of the global appetite for urban renewal, or depicted as a paradigm of dysfunctional consumed modernity and incubators of the future, where only the vertical view allows for an innovative design strategy as the heavily criticised vision of Koolhaas (Gandi 2005), urban informality is bound to cover a range of situations in which building stock, design, layout occupations, and aesthetics contravene some sort of normative and regulatory frame. Such contraventions, however, are both enabling and generative, especially in economic terms, as they often constitute the fertile territory of central and competitive locations with access to income-generating opportunities, favourable capitals, and networks. Such privileged and historically consolidated trajectories of development have often been recognised and labelled by governments as territories, occupied and developed in productive and generative contravention of the dominant norms, forms and regulations. The reclamation of such territories in the efforts to maximise profit and rent to attract international capital investments and reposition the modern project of the city supremacy on track is the current praxis in the global south. Contemporary Mumbai – and specifically Dharavi – serve as an extreme example of such a process, putting in place new urban imaginations, as well as practices of displacement and resettlement, against multiple forms of existing urbanism and heterogeneous modes of urban occupation, whether fabricated or politico-economical.

What follows is a succinct attempt to reflect on how slums and informality – and specifically Dharavi – in their "power" to reconfigure design[2] from the pessimism

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[2] Design is a term here adopted very broadly, aiming to encompass both architecture and urban design, and any design actions and design practice going beyond the urban scale and the expert knowledge. Design is conceived as holistic practice loosely refereed to imagining, making, strategising, building and inhabiting urban spaces. (For more see Boano 2014).

that has been attributed to it, challenge their epistemologies with its contingent and immanent condition, where architectural and urban design must take different forms, from a conscious act of not intervening physically in the built environment, to the production of spaces that explicitly challenge dominant ideological perspectives, engaging with issues at a level beyond the merely technical, aesthetic, and physical. When contemplating informality, the practice of the urban designer requires further deconstruction and recalibration (Boano 2013; Boano et al. 2013) in order to gain a better understanding of how to deal with the urban project, and more specifically, in order to deal with the not-designed and the un-designable. Experiencing Dharavi, as often is the case when experiencing low-income settlements, is being exposed to complex microcosms of practices, a multiplicity of urbanisms at play, where the conventional, methodological, and design artillery – and even the philosophical one, grounded in a specific aesthetic regime – became somewhat ineffective and sterile. Investigating and working in informalities should allow us to develop trans-design research that, despite its inherent forward-looking nature, does not fixate on elements, images or forms, but on their processes and their potentialities.

15.2   Dharavi: Slum Par Excellence

Dharavi and its inhabitants have long played an integral role in the development of Mumbai's urban history. The legacy of the traditional fishing community living there for centuries was ultimately lost to a budding settlement of hutments, slowly constructed by its citizens through an increasing collection of waste and debris, effectively operating as infill on top of the swamp in the district that came to be known as Dharavi (Boano et al. 2013). Today Dharavi is made up of roughly 85 *nagars*, each of which manifests a distinct and unique character, with diverse ethnic mixtures and religious narratives and peculiar and developed income-generating industries (Patel and Arputham 2007). As such, Dharavi fits well in Solomon Benjamin's (2008) definition of "urban occupancy" as a practice of settlement in which the intersection of diverse income groups, built environments, traditions, and local economies allow such territories to constitute a production system in and of itself. Dharavi's strategic location in central Mumbai, just south of the newly developed Bandra Kurla Business Complex, found itself smack in the middle of the debate surrounding Mumbai's development future. The Dharavi Redevelopment Project (DRP), was a scheme proposed by the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) and spatialised by the architect Mukesh Mehta, coming off the back of a report produced by McKinsey in 2003. Its purpose was to establish a foundation for transforming Mumbai into a "world-class city", thus eradicating slums and illegal settlements, and suggesting in essence a tabula rasa megaproject redevelopment strategy for the entire territory of Dharavi. Mehta proposed several physical alterations for Dharavi that form the base of the DRP: an artificial

and instrumental division of the area into five sectors to be allocated to five private developers; a maximum increase of Floor Space Index, which contributes to higher urban densities, and the adoption of a spatial transformation from horizontal, low-rise "slums" to a high-rise podium style typology (G+12 and higher). Informal settlements were to be replaced with high-rise developments irrespective of the existing vibrant economy and the diverse needs within, both informal and complex that have evolved through stratifications, adaptations, and historical modifications. Ameliorating and upgrading hypothetically would be a great thing.[3] But the scheme had suspect ways in which that would be carried out. Amongst the some 3800 m^2 of planned private residential and commercial space, each slum family would only receive around 25.08 m^2 of resettled land or housing and this only to those families that could prove that they had lived there before the year 2000. Figures that anticipate foreseeable threats to everyday spaces of living, livelihoods and informal business are already central to the development of its territory. The underlying narrow for-profit, capital-driven mindset pitted residents in an invariable struggle (Wade 2013).

For over half a century, Dharavi's residents have in essence claimed their right to Mumbai in their 239 ha of urban space, a process that has grown out of struggle, adaptation, and resilience, inventing new and innovative modes of living and of inhabiting. An "occupancy urbanism" has been developed filling the gap between traditional urbanity, considered as backward, and the newly planned one, unable to achieve a satisfactory urban reality, reinventing itself over time through "a new, informal, and transformative building practice that allows them (slum dwellers) to inhabit a city that, officially, does not account for them in its master planning" (Heynen and Loeckx 1984). Indeed, no master plan, urban design, zoning ordinance, or construction law can claim any stake in Dharavi's prosperity, because it was built over many decades entirely by successive waves of small, incremental and progressive developments directly engaging Dharavi's poor in the production of space in Dharavi, claiming their right to housing in the city. These activities demonstrate, through previously unrealised solutions in spaces they control, the urban poor's potential to challenge and change formalised rules and regulations that tend to function in the interests of dominate powers. Several Mumbai-based, but globally linked, urban activist movements and organisations of slum dwellers and their supporters were there working both in a precedent setting and in continuous negotiation building on "legitimate" models of praxis (Appadurai 2001).

In recent years, however, facing "Dubaification" in the top-down, technocratic DRP process, Dharavi's designation as a special planning area in 2004 – a status that enables secretive modification of development regulations – has thrust the reigns of development completely into the hands of the government and private sector. After subsequent years of bottom-up pressure tactics and struggles, including

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[3] The practice of informal upgrade is critical and has been the subject of different critical reflections, especially in relation to density, typologies and design processes. See Boano et al. 2011.

open letters to the government and media and peaceful protests from residents of Dharavi, leaders of prominent grassroots groups and NGOs, and the Concerned Citizens of Dharavi (CCD), a space was made for institutional participation when the CCD was sanctioned as a Committee of Experts (CoE) in 2008.

This 11-member panel of activists, professionals, academics, and retired civil servants, including members of the Alliance, chaired by the retired chief secretary of Maharashtra (Patel et al. 2009), continues its pressure for the urban poor's representation and meaningful engagement within the DRP.

Alongside deeply conflicting visions among actors and questioning the true rights to the city for Dharavi's residents and the effective representation of this demand, the top-down government vision is clearly and profoundly embedded in a neoliberal trickle-down approach, where the DRP authority sees the project's objective as "their [Dharavi residents] mass economic uplift by providing better alternatives of living and business opportunities" in the belief that "upgradation can maybe take them (slum dwellers) into a world-class city" (Boano et al. 2011). Though the bottom-up vision – as manifested by members of the Alliance and the CoE – is critical of the DRP, these actors maintain a close and highly strategic relationship with government bodies in order to function as facilitators between different institutional levels. While the CoE has successfully lobbied for the adoption of urban design guidelines in the DRP and a socioeconomic baseline survey to be conducted in Dharavi, their vision and desire for an inclusive development process has been relegated to making the DRP more "humane" and guiding developers towards a more sensitive development.

Such a confrontational situation made the imaginary Dharavi/slum theory and its empirical reality clash in a perfect case of what we call "Contested Urbanism" (Boano et al. 2013).

Viewing Dharavi as a privileged gateway to Mumbai's total transformation, and driven by the idea of large profits, investment companies and real estate developers began drawing and plotting proposals in major disregard to the current physical landscape and without the involvement or recognition of local constructs, or the knowledge and interests of the residents. Thus it inevitably becomes an architectural playground where global design firms, as well as counter-activism practice, emerge, and confront. The different activist and social institutions developed counter hegemonic moves and imaginary actions that reflect the phenomenological character of the everyday practice of places from the notions of home-based enterprise to the scale of the commons, battling a superimposed exogenous plan and contesting the monotony and dominance of the DRP.

The DRP seems momentarily thwarted by grassroots opposition, the work of the Indian Alliance (SPARC, NSDF, and Mahila Milan, a community savings collective led by women), and the Special Advisory Committee of Experts appointed to "humanise" the DRP. This can be considered a milestone achievement, depending on how long it holds up. The global crisis has put the DRP on hold briefly, but the struggle continues, especially around the central point of its recognition. This has

always been an obstacle in Dharavi and throughout Indian cities. Governments simply do not know how many people are actually living in slums. Surveys have become outdated with the increase in urbanisation and the migration of people to cities for work (Wade 2013).

15.3   The Three Challenges

As many important scholars argue, the problem with contemporary urban theory lies in the problem of framing it from the point of view of normative planning. Megacity planning, with its massive scale of infrastructure development, is in contrast with occupancy urbanism, which imagines the city as an interlocking set of scalar economic and territorial form rather than a singular mega entity (Rao 2012). Exploring these strands of contested urbanism in Dharavi has made evident what Watson defines as a "clash of rationalities" (Watson 2009) between techno-managerial and marketised systems of government administration, service provision and planning, and increasingly marginalised urban populations, surviving largely under conditions of informality. This has manifested through a complete disconnect between the proposed Dharavi Redevelopment Project (DRP) and the current situation of the stakeholders most affected by the process: the citizens of Dharavi. However, seeing Dharavi through the neologism of "contested urbanism" allows us to unpack the multiplicity of slum urbanism. In our minds the particular scene transcended itself, and so we were consciously thinking how similar conflicts played out globally and how the neologism could serve as a way to better understand how to enter into various conflicting situations, practically and theoretically. Contested urbanism, therefore, highlights the nuances in the battles between the production of space for appropriation to serve human needs and aspirations, the latter expressed through the spatial adaptation of residents of Dharavi and their struggles to develop their imagination of city. Our idea of "contested urbanism" speaks to this type of perception that recognises the need for a recalibrated, multiple, and critical approach to the urban problematic – at least from a professional point of view. If design for example wants to re-engage, it must do so with an open frame of mind. Otherwise it's simply acupuncture and intervention. As for people, they will continue to push against obstacles and outperform expectations. This will always happen in Dharavi, and across India and informal settlements throughout the world. People do not wait to be assisted. They do what they must to sustain. In this respect Dharavi serves as a window into a possible future for cities beyond the slum problem, which is not by default, neoliberal. It proves that cities need to move from the paradigm of "the planet of slum" where design is "a universal solvent in the modernist sense to reproduce the problem of modernist urban planning" (Rao 2012).

This means we pay attention to the diagnostic of the potentials, accepting the following three challenges we identified.

Firstly, there is the need to play against the non-critical engagement with the materiality of urban environments that could (re)interrogate design practice, design thinking, and design education. Thus, the intellectual and methodological dimensions of each design action/intervention aims to expand rather than reduce their viewpoint to question urban space in relation to social and political issues in a continuous path of discovering the dialectical nature of the material and the immaterial.

Secondly, we must move away from a certain narrow vision of architectural and urban design, characterised by the mere provision of solutions, instead seeking to adopt a more nuanced and critical becoming of what Richard Buckminster Fuller famously called the new kind of designer, a "synthesis of artist, inventor, mechanic, objective economist, and evolutionary strategist" (1963). Therefore such praxis becomes an open immersion into both object and social constructs in order to avoid any disciplinary construction of territorial fortresses while suggesting a tactical hybrid process of design and spatial interventions, both mutable and contextual in nature and indefinable by any particular scale.

The third challenge is to deal with precariousness, scarcity, and informality as constituent materials of the everyday urban planetary condition. Recent urbanisation has been characterised by poverty and insufficient infrastructures for organising housing, employment, and basic living and social needs. In many cities today, these services are being self-organised both individually and collectively. Politics here requires one to not romanticise "the encroachment of the ordinary" (Bayat 2009), nor conceptualise informality as an aesthetic of slums, but instead to approach the issue as "possibility space", where space is both a source of oppression and of liberation.

Investigating and working in informalities has allowed us to develop trans-design research that, despite its inherent forward-looking nature, does not fixate on elements, images and forms, but on their processes, their potentialities. Aesthetics do not simply refer to types and spatial references, focused on the formal and scenographic, on its recombinant nature, on an eco-aesthetic nature, but also have a political referent and purpose (Boano 2014). Engagement with the urban global south and uncanny and informal spaces of marginality draws attention to the tension between what is visible and what is invisible in an urban condition, problematising existing social barriers and their relevant politics, disrupting a normative and a priori images, visions, and narratives, and by extension allowing for the emergence of a new right to be imagined, claimed, and enacted.

Case study: Dharavi, Mumbai, India

DHARAVI
Mumbai
India

Swamp Village of fishermen	Swamp drainage Formation of slum	First wave of immigration	Textile industry develops	Crisis in the textile industry	Official recognition as a slum	Reduction in immigration	Visite of the Prime Minister	Inter-community conflicts	Rehabilitation plan for the neighbourhood
1800	1900	1920	1960	1976		1985	1990	1995	

◇   176 ha

♟♟♟♟   19'740'000 inhabitants

♟   600'000 inhabitants

⌂   54%

The end of the 19th century

⌂⌂   Neighbourhood formation caused by
urban growth and drainage of the swamp

$ The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation 60%
Private owners 25%
Central government 15%

⛲   No domestic connection
Access to a water point 2h/day

⚡   approximately 90%

NEW DELHI

Calcutta

MUMBAI

Madras

Dharavi, aerial view
Photo: Camillo Boano, 2009.

The mutiple facets of inhabiting the slum
Photo: Camillo Boano, 2009.

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Chapter 16
A Competition for Land

Policies Towards Informal Urban Settlements in Cambodia, from Regularization to Eviction

Valérie Clerc

16.1 Informal Cambodian Settlements Challenged by Competition for Land, Forced Evictions and Resistance to Boeung Kak

In the context of trade globalization and of financialization of the city, the rapid increase in urban land prices has changed the policy concerning informal settlements. Since the 2000s, competition for land has appeared between major urban real estate investment projects and low-income housing areas located in central urban areas. This competition is hampering access to housing for low-income households and creating strong contradictions in urban policy addressing these areas. In several cities aiming to be competitive, public action is caught between the desire to attract international investors and the need to continue or implement social urban policies. Land and real estate are more than ever at the heart of the issues and strategies of urban public action.

The issue of informal settlements is reconsidered in the light of new funding opportunities that the land value and the influx of investors are supposed to help, and land rivalries emerge with hotspots of resistance or social conflict. This competition occurs on land that is well placed, often central, held by precarious land titles and offered to investors for urban renewal. New forms of public mediation emerged towards agreements between investors and the public. Governments most often favour urban renewal by investors (destruction of existing spaces and reconstruction of new districts), at the expense of the preservation of the existing habitat and its inhabitants. We are witnessing an important increase in the number of evictions.

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Phnom Penh reflects this process. With the liberalization of the economy and the internationalization of real estate investments, the arrival of investors and the emergence of large projects revealed rivalry for urban land and conflicting urban public policies. At the heart of the city, the Boeung Kak Lake is a case in point: the choice to undertake a large project led to the transfer of public domain, the lake embankment and the eviction of residents from informal settlements.

16.2   Land Competition That Leads to Antagonistic Public Policy

Cambodian urban policies are marked in the 2000s by the arrival of international flows of real estate investment. The globalization of trade and the liberalization of the economy, especially since the Paris Agreements (1991), have generated economic growth, the most dynamic in South East Asia (average annual growth rate of 8 % between 2000 and 2007), which tripled the gross national income and more than doubled the per capita income since the late 1990s (from USD 820 in 1999 to USD 2040 in 2010).

This dynamic, mainly located in the cities, together with the securisation of property then underway, the partial opening of the access to property for foreign investors, a protective legal framework for investors (Investment Act of 2003), low taxes and a liberal regulation framework, has attracted major regional real estate conglomerates in search of new markets, especially after the Asian crisis of 1997. Since the mid-1990s, numerous local and foreign private investments are geared toward urban real estate, mainly in Phnom Penh, with 1.7 million people in 2013 (Kingdom of Cambodia 2013), representing more than half of the urban population of Cambodia (14.3 million inhabitants in 2012, of which 20 % is urban population) (Nis.gov.kh 2015).

Dozens of real estate projects have been built since the 1990s, more than 600 buildings of more than 5 storeys, and almost 100 residential cities (*boreys*) (Fauveaud 2015), as well as three towers (OCIC Tower, Vattanac Tower, Gold Tower 42), the first of which was completed in 2008. Five major projects or satellite towns are under construction (Garden City, Grand Phnom Penh International City, Camko City, Diamond Island and Boeung Kak Project); and three are in preparation (Chruy Changvar City, Mekong Renaissance and AZ City). A new Master Plan of Phnom Penh had been realized by the Urban Affairs Office of the Municipality of Phnom Penh in 2005 with the assistance of the French cooperation (Bureau des affaires urbaines 2007) and since then, this strategic document, not yet adopted, has been used by the Municipality to guide investments, give a framework to sectoral and local master plans, or book space for large city equipments (Huybrechts 2011). But with no adopted urban planning or urban regulation, urban projects are mainly regulated by the market in a plot by plot negotiation of building permits. These real

estate projects structure a new modern vision of the future of the city and transform the urban space through the privatization of production methods and development opportunities offered by investors (Fauveaud 2013). Moreover, in return, these large investment projects support growth, integrating Phnom Penh as a secondary metropolis in regional economic dynamics, serving as an interface of the major regional cities, within the inter-urban competition (Goldblum and Franck 2007).

Finally, the acceleration of land speculation promotes rising land and property prices. Social housing demands are not met by these new constructions, access to housing is more difficult and central or pericentral land is coveted for investment, especially if they are occupied by precarious settlements. Numerous projects and quick building sites led to evictions by the market (Clerc and Rachmuhl 2004; Durand-Lasserve 2006). Also called market-driven eviction, these particular forms of displacement occur under the pressure of market forces, often with some forms of compensation to the displaced household (regardless how fair and equitable this compensation may be) and many without requiring the use of the force. It generally leads to the gentrification of the area. These projects also evoked protests of the inhabitants and the – at times – forceful government involvement in the destruction of informal settlements. Whatever the processes of eviction, the poorest people move further in the suburbs, exacerbating inequities in the access to urban resources.

The 2000s is also the end of the transitional period of land reconstruction. During the Khmer Rouge period (1975–1979), ownership was abolished and the city of Phnom Penh emptied of its population. During the socialist period of Vietnamese occupation (1979–1989), inhabitants have resettled in the city in empty houses or former public facilities, between buildings, or on public land. The land belonged to the State. The people only had the right of use and succession and had to obtain a residence permit. Private ownership was gradually reintroduced in 1989 with a new constitution and the distribution of ownership of dwellings to their occupants. The 1992 Land Law confirmed the principle of acquisitive possession (the possibility of ultimately transforming temporary possession to ownership after 5 years of peaceful, honest, public and unambiguous occupation); and the 1993 constitution enshrined the return to the market economy. Non-appropriated land remained the property of the State.

Squatters without rights emerged, especially those occupying space that, by law, could not be appropriated. They developed informal settlements on public spaces, roadsides, riverbanks and lakesides, following practices that interacted with formal practices (Clerc 2010). The 2001 Land Law marked the end of the transitional period that allowed access to ownership by occupation. The vast majority of properties, however, remained precarious, and a country-wide land registration project was set up in 2002 by the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC), supported by the World Bank and Finnish and German cooperations (LMAP – Land Management and Administration Project). The project includes land policies and the registration of all land in Cambodia over a period of 15 years. Provisions have been introduced for poor communities in informal settlements. An implementation decree (2003) introduced social concessions, which allow,

under certain conditions, to provide plots free of charge for families who cannot afford to buy one on the market, in subdivisions made on the private property of the State.

In parallel, a policy of improving informal settlements was gradually implemented in the 1990s and early 2000s. Many neighbourhoods were upgraded with the help of international cooperation (UNDP, UN-Habitat) and the support of international networks of poor communities (ACHR – Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, SDI-Shack/Slum Dwellers International) (Clerc 2006). In 2003, the eviction and relocation of informal settlements inhabitants was officially abandoned; and the Prime Minister announced a 5-year regularization and upgrading policy of about 500 inventoried districts. This policy, however, realized without proper coordination, was hardly notified: investors wishing to invest on occupied land sometimes only discovered the government's promise once they were on the ground. In addition, land regularization of upgraded neighbourhoods was slow and the rare initiators of regularization were linked to the process of land registration.

In fact, to summarise, land and social urban policies were conflicting. By the mid-2000s, while the government displayed its resolve to act for the poorest to keep their land rights, this regularization and upgrading policy was thwarted by the land policy to attract investors that was developed in parallel. Indeed, the securisation of the values through a land registration process and the resulting rising property values actually accelerated speculation as well as the sale by the State of its domain to investors, who were often linked to the authorities or government officials. The government thus relinquished public buildings located downtown in exchange for the construction of new facilities in the suburbs; and public land which should have been attributed to informal settlements were allocated to investors to implement large urban projects.

The government's undertaking in these incompatible land policies has given rise to some fundamental contradictions. These were managed plot by plot, by negotiation and in power relations. Any regularization underway were not fulfilled, even when the neighbourhood was already upgraded, and keeping the inhabitants on site was questioned. The arbitration was generally in favour of investors, freeing land and evicting communities. The unique land sharing project (between investors and occupiers) established in 2003 was not completed and resulted in the forced eviction of 300 families in 2012, even though the investor had already built eight of ten buildings for the relocation of 1775 families to a 2-ha site of 14 ha that had been allocated to him in the city centre. Since the 1990s, approximately 17,000 families were thus displaced in 36 relocation sites, usually flooded and unequipped, situated within a 20 km radius of the capital (Blot 2010). Cut off from their social networks and sources of income, the families (all or part) often returned to live in the city. Other than two districts (Kok Klieng 3 and Apiwath Meanchey) where relocation was negotiated and planned with the public authorities, investors and international institutions, the municipality encouraged the eviction of residents in order to realize projects. This is the case in Boenk Kak.

16.3   The Boeung Kak, an Emblematic Area of Land Competition

Located in the city centre, next to the colonial centre and the train station, the Boeung Kak is originally a lake area of recuperated rainwater and wastewater (Boeung means lake in Khmer). It was, however, gradually removed from the hydraulic system of urban drainage until it played only a minor role as an outlet during floods in the 1990s. Its central location and the flooding risks of its banks have often led planners to reserve this space for recreational or environmental projects: the urban planner Hébrard had foreseen a public garden in 1920, the authorities had plans for a garden in 1988 (Carrier 2007), the Cergy international workshops proposed in 2003 to make the area a large park of 10 ha next to a 25 ha lake, with the relocation on site of the 20,000 inhabitants together with a business centre, high end housing, large facilities and touristic area (Les Ateliers Internationaux de Cergy Pontoise 2003). The banks, once inalienable, were nevertheless used by the population, who had firewood collecting, grazing, fishing, and cultural rights; and they are traditionally inhabited: 177 constructions were thus identified to the west of the lake in the late nineteenth century (Pierdet 2008). In the 1930s, the area was left for houses of straw or wood, and during the construction of railways, the land was made available to railway workers (Jambert 2000). A map made from a 1971 survey shows hundreds of homes around Boeung Kak (Allaire 1971).

The land situation there remained complex. New houses were built upon the return of the inhabitants to the capital in 1979, as elsewhere on other public spaces in vacant gaps of the city, especially when the inhabitants were provisionally maintained at the gates of the city pending the entry permits. Some residents hold documents. During the strong housing crisis of the 1980s, the Council of Ministers had regularized these occupations regarded as irregular (provisional authorization) and exempted from taxes on rental housing made of plants (straw huts). These units were therefore both regular and provisional, the administration freely determining the authorized duration. But harvested land (vegetable crops and livestock) was administered in the productive agricultural sector ("family economy" sector), and dwellings built by farmers on the same plots were not associated with the regular residential sector (Carrier 2007). In 1985, about 70 families were relocated around the lake, their previous houses, behind Hospital Calmette, being turn in a recreational garden place (Suyheang 2014).

The occupation and densification of the banks accelerated in the early 1990s, with the rapid population growth of the city beginning with the restoration of the monarchy and the return of refugees from the camps in 1993. The 1992 Act prompted many persons to settle in the hope of obtaining property by acquisitive possession and encouraged those who had the possibility of getting their hands on land (military, police) to subdivide and sell, even if it was the public domain (e.g., south of Boeung Kak) (Khemro 2000). The election period of 1993 also contributed to

the accelerated development of the area with promises of political recognition of informal settlements and with "sales" and allocations of public land to squatters, as was the official distribution by public authorities of public garden plots located east of the lake. Starting in 1996, the halt of evictions and the public announcement by the second Prime Minister Hun Sen that the squatters should not be evicted without receiving substantial compensation triggered the arrival of a new wave of inhabitants. In the mid-2000s, the Boeung Kak was one of the largest areas of informal settlements in the city: more than 4,000 families and 20,000 people lived on the lake or on its banks.

The planning and development projects that have emerged around Boeung Kak are representative of the swaying and contradictions of public urban action faced with the informal settlements in Phnom Penh until the early 2000s. The area has seen small-scale upgrading of these neighbourhoods since 1996, for example behind the French Embassy, in the framework of programs conducted by the Municipality with the assistance of UN-Habitat. At the same time, since 1998, a private developer has signed a lease for 70 years with the Department of Transport and Finance to develop one of the biggest projects of the city (shopping centre, financial centre and condominiums) on 10 ha of land belonging to the Railways authority, south of the lake, close to the rails. In response, residents of informal settlements located on this area (Santipheap or Railways A and Roteh Pleung B or Railways B) have proposed a social land concession and sharing, in which 25 % of the land should be retained for the relocation of 325 families. The city council approved the project in 2003, an election year. But the developer finally obtained the possibility to indemnify or relocate the inhabitants (Rabe 2005). In parallel, several new upgrading projects were conducted with UN-Habitat, in the framework of the rehabilitation of 100 poor neighbourhoods per year in the city, from 2004. But the only project application rejected came from a community located near the rails of Boeung Kak (Clerc and Rachmühl 2008). Indeed, the negotiations for the major project now underway in the area had already begun on this date.

The Boeung Kak project is emblematic of the current attitude of the Cambodian public authorities vis-à-vis the informal settlements, which favours the production of large luxury real estate projects at the cost of their eviction. The central location of the lake, rising land prices and increased investments in land led to designing on Boeung Kak one of the five major projects currently under construction in the capital. Originally located on 133 ha (the 90 ha of the lake plus its surroundings), since reduced to about 120 ha, it includes a new business centre, residences of high standing, two towers, a shopping mall, service companies, new ministerial buildings and recreational spaces. Only 10 ha of the lake were remaining in the Shukaku initial project, in contradiction with the orientation proposed by the Master Plan, and no lake is now left in the final project, pushed by the government, and flooding have been increasing in the neighbourhoods. The project was developed in a context of multiple bypasses of the Land Law, with the support of public authorities. Since the

election year 2003, the government signed an agreement for the concession of the land with the private Cambodian company Shukaku Inc, a private company strongly linked to some public actors: its owner, a Senator advisor to the Prime Minister, and his wife, who directs the large Pheapimex group, ensure ample funding to the Cambodian People's Party. Chinese companies are the majority shareholders of the company since 2010 (Fauveaud 2013). In 2005, the Council of Ministers gave the Governor of Phnom Penh the principle of developing the Boeung Kak area (Cohre 2009).

The project was not yet public, but in 2006, when the country's land registration project (LMAP) initiated the systematic registration of property in the district of Sras Chok, where the lake is situated, inhabitants were denied their investigation and social concession request (Blot 2010) on the grounds that they lived on public property or in a "development zone"; and their claims were not taken into account. At the time, the World Bank temporarily suspended its credit due to corruption in several projects, including precisely the LMAP cadastral registration project in the country. While the public display took place in January 2007, the Municipality almost simultaneously granted a 99-year lease to Shukaku Inc (although leases cannot legally exceed 15 years for public domain lands). The area was demarcated during the summer of 2008, transferred from the public domain of the State to the private domain of the State (despite the legal public character of lakes), and backfilling work began.

The lease provided that the fate of the inhabitants was to be processed by the company. As soon as the lease was announced, several local and foreign NGOs involved in the fight against forced evictions mobilized to defend their rights. Although the municipality began by ensuring that there would be no eviction, most families installed on the lakeside were forced to leave. A show of strength took place between associations representing families on one side and the private investor on the other, supported by the State. The first families left in August 2009, compensated or displaced to unequipped land 20 km from the capital (Cohre 2009), during which time there was an acceleration of evictions in the capital (World Bank 2011).

After much bargaining, threats, destructions and various compensation offers by the company, most of the 20,000 inhabitants were evicted between 2009 and 2011. The World Bank suspended its loans to Cambodia, waiting for a favourable outcome to be found for people with no more land after their eviction from the Boeung Kak (World Bank 2011; Fauveaud 2013). Around 800 families who refused compensation considered insufficient were then allocated a 12.5 ha relocation plot onsite by a governmental decree in August 2011, but many of them were still awaiting the land titles in 2014. Since then, other families have agreed to leave, but families and local activists continue to protest against the illegal privatization of the lake, against forced evictions and for the right to stay and to be compensated properly (Saveboeungkak.wordpress.com 2015).

16.4   Conclusion

Competition for land is now a new dimension of vulnerability in informal settlements. Central urban land occupied precariously is increasingly coveted both by investors for prestigious projects, and by the people who occupy them, for upgrading with staying living on site. If the State at times acts as mediator, more often public authority implements ambiguous or even antagonistic policies, giving the preference to investors. Going in the same direction, until some regulations are adopted (it may be soon: property tax was introduced in 2012, a decree on planning regulations was adopted in 2015, the Master Plan should be approved at the end of 2015), the lack of planning regulation has given place to a market regulation. As a result, there have been more and more forced evictions of residents. These residents are sometimes resettled with titles next to employment areas, but often, they are relocated in distant suburbs on poorly or non-equipped sites, giving rise to the organisation of resistance and power relations and conflicts that are sometimes violent. The Boeung Kak is emblematic of this trend. Demonstrations of inhabitants and NGOs have led to violence and the imprisonment of activists. Carrying a modernist vision of the city and economic interests closely related to real estate investments, public authorities is giving preference to the national and international global city actors to the detriment of the poorest urban dwellers.

Cambodia is a textbook case for the land issue. Whereas in 1989 a general redistribution of land ownership took place, in just a few years we saw informal settlements reappear, as well as a concentration of ownership in the hands of a small number of owners. At that time the State held all urban and rural land except residential plots or those for family farming. It has now surrendered a large part of its private and public domains, and the city have been divested of its common good, the public domain, to the benefit of executives and investors. Phnom Penh is now an emblematic case of the impact of liberalisation and globalisation of real estate investment on informal settlements and policies that handle them. While a social land policy was initiated in the 1990s, and the Prime Minister had promised to regularise all informal settlements in 2003, evictions resumed. Approximately 133,000 people were evicted from their homes since 1990 in Phnom Penh (Cohre 2009; Licadho 2009); and there are many more who still live under the threat of eviction in Cambodia (Fauveaud 2013). Whether for building infrastructure or for the realisation of private urban projects, the inhabitants of informal areas, who often have rights, are displaced with low compensation or resettlement in distant suburbs, and excluded from the heart of the city. Next to the Right to the City, competition for land of central and pericentral urban zones today brings to light the idea of the Right to a Place and to the Urban Centre.

Case Study: Boeung Kak Lake, Phnom Penh, Cambodia

BOEUNG KAK LAKE
Phnom Penh
Cambodia

◇   150ha

👤👤👤👤   1'550'000 inhabitants

👤   10'000 inhabitants

🏠   25%

      1979
⌂⌂   Strong rural exodus after the fall of the
      Khmers Rouges dictatorship

$ The ownership of the lake and adjacent
      land was transferred to a foreign
      company in 2007

⊔   No accurate data available

⚡   No accurate data available

Siem Reap

Batambang

PHNOM PENH

Sihanoukville

Photo: Scott Weatherson
http://www.flickr.com/photos/scottweatherson/1329726870/sizes/o/in/photostream/


Photo: Angel Garcia (CreativeCommon)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/angelgarciaphoto/5632973924/sizes/l/in/photostream/

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Chapter 17
Informal Settlements and Public Policies in Bulgaria During the Post-Socialist Period

Aleksandar D. Slaev and Sonia A. Hirt

17.1 Introduction

Informal settlements have been a long-standing feature of cities in Southeast Europe. Ancient history notwithstanding, such settlements were commonly found at the rim of urban nodes in the region throughout the twentieth century. Fast urbanisation rates and the rocky political history of Southeast Europe during the early 1900s, especially during the Balkan wars (1912–1914), sent scores of people from impoverished rural areas and small settlements, as well as victims of the "population exchange" programs (i.e., the campaigns to expel ethnic minorities from their homelands and solidify national borders in the wars' aftermath), to settle around large cities in areas lacking basic infrastructure and hygienic conditions. As most countries in the region embraced state socialism after World War II, the extent to which informal settlements could be found around cities arguably decreased. Living conditions generally improved for the majority of the national populations. In line with the egalitarian aspects of Communist ideology, governments invested substantial resources in solving the housing problem (e.g., by building vast mass-housing districts in large cities). This is not to say that informal development disappeared. Faced with massive population flux to large cities, some of the communist regimes turned a blind eye toward informal settlements, no matter how politically unseemly their presence might have been. This was, for example, the case of Belgrade and some other Yugoslav cities during socialism (Zegarac 1999).

Yet a true eruption in the construction of informal settlements occurred in the region after the collapse of the state socialist economic and political system. The

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causes of the phenomenon were multi-faceted: the near bankruptcy of public institutions, especially in areas ravaged by ethnic conflict and affected by international sanctions during the Yugoslav wars (1990s); the ideological shift toward the right which manifested itself in government withdrawal from the production and distribution of housing; the severe economic crisis; the increased poverty rates and the high share of the "grey economy"; and the widespread radical disregard of laws and regulations, including those in the area of urban development. The latter were commonly regarded as a vestige of the old communist system (Hirt and Stanilov 2009). In some cities, "illegal" housing developments became common enough to the point of becoming the new norm. According to Tsenkova (2009, 2012), in Albania informal housing settlements today contain up to a quarter of the population of major cities and 40 % of their built-up areas. In Macedonia, such settlements house 11 % of the population of large cities. In the Serbian capital of Belgrade, they occupy nearly 40 % of residential areas. A peculiar characteristic of informal post-socialist housing growth and one that may distinguish it from this type of development in Global-South countries is that it has not been necessarily driven predominantly by low-income households. On the contrary, entire middle-class neighbourhoods have sprung in post-socialist cities that have not been legally approved (for example, Belgrade's Padina). In fact, many members of the higher class of post-socialist societies took advantage of the weakness of law enforcement by erecting mansions in highly desirable parts of cities, without going through the formal planning and permitting process (for instance, in Sofia's Vitosha district and in Belgrade's Dedinje) (Hirt and Kovachev 2006; Hirt 2009).

In this paper, however, we cannot address the complexity of informal housing development across the region. Rather, our aim is to sketch a portrait of informal housing occupied by the most disenfranchised group in Southeast Europe, the Roma, in one Southeast European country: Bulgaria. We will also briefly discuss public policy towards the issue in this country.

17.2   The Roma in Bulgaria

The Roma (also known as the Gypsies or *tsigani*) have been part of Bulgarian society for hundreds of years. Common historic interpretation is that they entered Bulgarian lands in the thirteen century, right about the time of the Ottoman invasion (Tomova 1998). It may well be that the Roma were always perceived as an undesirable and problematic group – not just by the Bulgarians, but by all other nationalities who ruled the region, dating back to the Ottoman Turks (Celik 2004). Common negative perceptions have been that the Roma resent education and work, are criminally minded, and like to move from place to place. Such stereotypes certainly fall under the umbrella of racism but, unfortunately, have persisted even as Bulgaria has made strides towards democracy and tolerance in the last couple of decades. The popular media certainly seems to cherish every opportunity to disseminate stories of the latest deplorable act performed by a member of this minority group (Tomova

2011). Hard evidence, however, suggests that some of the negative stereotypes have long lost their basis. For instance, the idea of the Roma as a nomadic, rootless group has long reached its expiration date: most Roma today live in their communities on a permanent basis (Slaev 2007). However, education and employment levels lag far behind those of the ethnic Bulgarian population. Research conducted for the *Regional Report on Human Rights* (UNDP-Bulgaria 2003) found that 46 % of the Roma interviewed were jobless, 37 % last worked in 1990 or earlier, and 21 % had never worked. A survey conducted by Tomova (1995) estimated that in 1994, 76 % of Roma people of working age were unemployed, while most women had never been in a paid occupation. Other sources estimate that in certain regions of Bulgaria, the Roma jobless rate exceeds 90 % (Project on Ethnic Relations 1998). The rate of illiteracy is the highest in Bulgarian society and current trends are especially disturbing. *The Roma in Bulgaria* report (Project on Ethnic Relations 1998) estimated that about 60 % of Roma children have either never attended or have dropped out of school. As a whole, the illiteracy rate among the Roma population is estimated at between 16 % (Tomova 1995) and 25 % (Project on Ethnic Relations 1998), whereas among ethnic Bulgarians it is only 0.2 %. Such alarming numbers feed the negative stereotypes. Ordinary Bulgarians often explain the issue by blaming it all on the Roma without recognising the broader structural issues that prohibit them from climbing up the social ladder. This unfortunate attitude is not unique to Bulgaria. In fact, it is commonly held (and in fact may be worsening!) in many other European countries that have presented themselves as democratic for much longer than has Bulgaria, as a recent volume discusses (Stewart 2011).

Yet in Bulgaria, the issue is especially acute for a simple reason: the sheer size of the Roma minority. We are talking here about a substantial proportion of the national population. Estimates are notoriously unreliable because the Roma routinely self-identify in the censuses as ethnic Bulgarians or ethnic Turks (perhaps to avoid the pervasive negative stereotyping). Thus, census data shows that in 2011, the Roma comprise about 5 % of the Bulgarian population. However, scholars claim that 9 % is a more accurate number (Tomova 2011). In the Bulgarian capital of Sofia, the corresponding statistic is 10 % (Municipality of Sofia 2007). Since Roma's birth rates far exceed those of other ethnic groups in the country, their proportion of the national population will undoubtedly grow. How can a country prosper then, if such a significant portion of its people has strikingly low education levels and only bleak prospects for integration into mainstream society?

17.3   Informal Roma Housing

There are two main types of Roma housing in Bulgaria. The first category is Roma housing in rural areas. There, the Roma homes are not too dissimilar from those of non-Roma Bulgarians; and the level of ethnic integration is relatively high (Tomova 1995). The second largest and most problematic category includes squatter settlements consisting of hundreds of homes in the periphery of large cities.

About 90 of these settlements exist, with some 300,000–400,000 residents in total – that is, the vast majority of the Roma population in the country. In these districts, mix with other Bulgarian groups is very low and almost all occupants are Roma. In the largest Bulgarian cities, individual settlements of this type may include 20,000–40,000 people each; for instance, Fakulteta in Sofia or Stolipinovo and Shekher Mahala in Plovdiv (Municipality of Sofia 2007). Many of the settlements are historic, dating back to the 1930s. They have, however, expanded dramatically in recent decades, parallel to the growth of the Roma population. Living conditions in these neighbourhoods are deplorable, and public infrastructure is limited (UNDP-Bulgaria 2005); municipal water and sewer serve just about half of the houses in these settlements, whereas for the rest of the Bulgarian population, this number is over 90 %. Tomova (1995) described typical homes as "looking like cattle sheds, roofs made of thatch, several iron sheets, or nylon folio."

According to Slaev (2007), a recent positive trend in Roma housing is that there has been a "considerable increase in the rates of solid construction (reinforced concrete columns and slabs, and brick walls) in Roma settlements." Slaev's research estimated that "the situation has changed dramatically over the last 10–15 years; and, at present, about two-thirds of the houses in the Roma neighbourhoods in the big cities in Bulgaria are solid houses". In the course of the implementation of an EU PHARE project, Slaev studied Roma housing developments in the City of Plovdiv, Shekher and Arman, and concluded that "during the last ten years, over 70 % of the Roma households have undertaken new construction – either an extension, or new two- to three-storied houses." These houses were developed without any architectural and structural plans. And although they lacked amenities considered standard in other parts of the country and could not meet the requirements of Bulgarian building and sanitation codes, they provided much better living conditions for their inhabitants than the "cattle sheds" mentioned by Tomova (1995). What is more, these houses may fit the needs of their inhabitants better than developments undertaken by the state or the local authorities (described in the section below) (see Fig. 17.1).

Slaev's research also highlighted several serious threats to the living conditions of the local population, especially the fact that the mass construction of individual homes without overall neighbourhood plans threatened the potential development of street and utility networks and thus contributed to the residents' low quality of life. Indeed, unless a limited number of new houses are demolished, in many cases it is impossible to lay down streets and utilities and provide adequate services to these neighbourhoods. For instance, street spaces framed by self-built individual homes are often less than 2 m wide, which makes it impossible for emergency vehicles to navigate the area. In another example, as communities are served by just one or two sewerage main lines (if at all) and as these lines often become clogged, sewer service trucks cannot reach the affected areas, thus leaving them in a terribly unsanitary condition.

Fig. 17.1 Massive housing in the largest informal settlement in Bulgaria – Stolipinivo neighbourhood

17.4   Housing Policies

Two main paradigms may historically be distinguished in Bulgarian policy toward Roma housing, both dating back to the socialist years. The first is direct housing provision combined with the improvement of existing housing areas. During the 1960s, for example, the socialist state built neighbourhoods with small single-family houses for poor Roma households in many Bulgarian towns and villages (Tomova 1995). These areas were supplied with water, sewer and electrical infrastructure. In other cases, instead of building housing, state authorities made land and infrastructure available to Roma households free of charge. This approach could be classified as *site-and-services* and was commonly used in developing countries during approximately the same period (Keivani and Werna 2001). The second approach, first implemented in Bulgaria in the 1970s, can be described as *slum eradication*. This method was also popular in developing countries (Keivani and Werna 2001), although a bit earlier, in the 1950s and 1960s. Under this policy, some of the Roma neighbourhoods in Bulgarian cities and towns were bulldozed and their residents moved to "modern" mass-housing projects comprising prefabricated structures. Although this approach had the positive intention of integrating the Roma with other Bulgarians (for whom housing was provided in the very same

projects), overall it suffered from all the drawbacks associated with top-down state policies that the international literature has been exposing for decades (e.g., see Drakakis-Smith 1981). Yet, despite the vast international experience, the current Bulgarian position appears to build predominantly on the traditions of these two approaches, this time using EU funds. The largest recent project to date was the demolition of informal housing in Shekher Mahala, Plovdiv, and the erection of 80 houses funded by €8 million from a European Union programme. However, the project created all sorts of problems regarding who would get the houses and for how much. Currently, only about a third of the houses are occupied.

Lately, the Bulgarian authorities have begun to tentatively utilise a third approach, which may be classified as *squatter upgrade*, using the international terminology. Projects under this approach involved infrastructure improvement in existing Roma settlements in the cities of Plovdiv and Pazardjik. However, these projects have been generally underfunded with investment only in hundreds of thousands rather than millions of Euros. Very few, if any, obvious examples can be found in Bulgaria of what appears to be the most internationally accepted approach to informal housing today: the so-called *policy of enablement* – a method which focuses less on housing provision and more on providing the conditions, facilities, and the organisational and financial instruments for the poor to be able to solve their housing problems on their own.

Overall, the housing situation of the Bulgarian Roma minority continues to be alarming. Government strategies generally do not recognise the potential of the Roma population to solve their own problems with the necessary government help in order to avoid the major pitfalls of substandard self-built construction. For example, a Plovdiv neighbourhood studied by Slaev (2007) which has existed for decades, is shown on official maps for entirely differently land uses (industrial facility, administrative building, and a school), as if the Roma neighbourhood is simply not there. The presumption must be that slum eradication (instead of upgrade or enablement) is surely to follow, when resources permit. It is thus of little surprise that housing policies are yet to touch the lives of most Roma.

Case Study: Fakulteta, Sofia, Bulgaria

FAKULTETA
Sofia
Bulgaria

Foundation of the neighbourhood

Period of communist domination starts

The first development plan for Fakulteta neighbourhood

Local authorities build a school for Roma community

Decree that forces the Roma population to settle

Construction of water supply network

Minority rights have been restored, but the economic and social situation of the Roma people is deteriorating

60% of Roma population is officially unemployed against 30,2% in 1990

78% of Roma live in segregated districts of other communities

1930   1944   1947   1948   1958   1975   1990   2004   2009

◇ 508 ha

♦♦♦♦ 1'174'000 inhabitants

♦ Around 40'000 inhabitants

🏠 60-70% of Roma population may be considered as poor

🏠🏠 1930s

Creation of the neighbourhood is part of the Roma settlement process as well as of the rural to urban exodus that happened at that time

The neighbourhood is developed with no land titles or any construction permits
$ From 1996 to 2002, there were 1'797 applications for land regularisation

🚰 Water is distributed everywhere but the flow is weak (10 liter/hour)

⚡ Electricity connection provided legally

Photo: EPFL («Urban habitat and developement» course material)

Photo: EPFL («Urban habitat and developement» course material)

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Chapter 18
Participative Urban Planning and Civil Society

Project for a Slum Area in Madrid, Spain

Todo Por la Praxis (TxP)

18.1 Background and Context

In 1974, a government decree issued by the pro-Franco Council of Ministers autho-rised the use of sections of the traditional cattle routes as vegetable gardens, and it permitted their use for the natural enjoyment of any persons who might be inter-ested. This was the first moment that La Cañada was segregated for fundamentally agricultural purposes. The initial occupants came from adjoining towns and villages such as Vallecas, Getafe Rivas Vacía Madrid, and Coslada. The territory consoli-dated itself over the course of 40 years, and it was not long before farm equipment sheds were transformed into dwellings, while the plots were further divided over time and the number of constructions increased. Today, Cañada Real Galiana has more than 2,000 dwellings and almost 30,000 inhabitants divided among its 15 km of land.

To establish a background, we can describe La Cañada Real Galiana as a green track that was traditionally used for the transportation of livestock and which extends from Tierra de Cameros (La Rioja) to the valley of Alcudia (between Córdoba and Ciudad Real). It crosses four Autonomous Communities and six prov-inces and covers a distance of just over 400 km; within the Community of Madrid, it passes through several municipalities including Pinto, Madrid, Rivas Vacia-Madrid, and Coslada. Livestock trails were communication routes used to transport livestock from one area of the Peninsula to another in search of seasonal pastures (transhumance).

Todo Por la Praxis (TxP) (✉)
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This phenomenon no longer exists as modern transport systems have put an end to this peculiar form of livestock farming, which had been in use since the eleventh century. However, its peculiar environmental value meant that for many years there were regulations to protect and conserve it. For this reason, there were laws that granted the livestock tracks the status of assets of the public domain – in other words, assets whose ownership corresponds to the Autonomous Communities and which are protected from private ownership according to the specific general interest, and which enjoy certain particular characteristics in that they serve a public purpose. In specific terms, it is said that such assets are inalienable, imprescriptible, and protected against seizure.

However, this specific overprotection has always existed. In this respect, the previous Livestock Routes Law 22/1974 of 27 June effectively recognised that these assets belonged to the public domain, declaring that they were not susceptible to expiry or expropriation, although it did regard all those routes, or the parts of them that are not considered useful from the strict perspective of livestock traffic or agricultural communication, as unnecessary or surplus and therefore transferrable. This was so much the case that the previous Regulation of 3 November 1978 developed this notion even further, going as far as to include the very "intruders" themselves as persons with rights over that public domain. However, the regulations were amended in 1995 in an attempt to curb this situation, and the amended regulation has been in force since then.

Nevertheless, the settlements in Cañada Real Galiana have followed their own evolution according to the rhythm marked by circumstances. The 1970s saw colonisation and division in favour of farmers, especially in the zone of Coslada, allowing them to erect constructions and mark out small plots for the purpose of cultivation on small farms. These settlements subsequently grew, no longer for reasons of agricultural colonisation, but rather because of the momentum of the growing waves of immigrants in the region, initially those of Spanish citizens during the 1980s, and subsequently, those of foreign citizens during the mid-1990s, with most of these coming from the Maghreb, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.

Until a few years ago, all these dwellings had gone unnoticed or ignored by the various administrations. However, pressure started with the passing of the Urban Development Plans for the zone. There is a plan to build five major urban development projects close to La Cañada (Los Berrocales, Valdecarros, Cañaveral, Los Ahijones, and Los Cerros). The proximity of these developments created various problems as the projects are planned for an area adjacent to the boundaries of La Cañada.

This proximity seemed to irritate the developers, as it could affect the sales of the buildings; and they were also concerned about the loss of value of these developments, due to the proximity of an illegal settlement. On the other hand, there is a suspicion that these urban development projects could unlawfully include that zone in order to have it declared as a green area in the developments and thus obtain more building land in their favour. This would help generate further capital gains, thereby

increasing the development potential of the building projects. It is easy to appreciate that these actions do not correspond to either the need or the obligation of the Administrations to protect the public domain, but rather they satisfy certain interests that have little to do with the public and everything to do with capitalist speculation.

The legal excuse put forward is that of the exercise of what the Administration refer to as "power of restitution of the urban planning legality". This measure is totally unjustified insofar as the use of livestock transhumance disappeared many years ago. In other cases, such as those where the livestock route has been absorbed by a municipality, the path has been diverted, thereby allowing the continuity of the routes. However, until now the urban planning pressures and interests of the zone have been given precedence over the rights of the inhabitants of La Cañada, and their fundamental right to a decent dwelling has been ignored.

18.2 Map of the Urban Development Conflict

On 15 March 2011, the Assembly of the Community of Madrid passed a Law removing Cañada Real from the public domain, and this Law aimed to become the "final solution" to the legal and social problem of Cañada Real, an informal settlement almost 15 km long, with a population of about 8,000 residents – some of whom had lived there in an "irregular" situation for more than 40 years.

This Law came about within the framework of a confrontation between two positions that are antagonistic by definition: one involving the disappearance of the entire informal settlement that currently exists and restoring La Cañada as a natural space (this is the position defended by the town/city councils of Madrid, Colada and Rivas Vacia-Madrid), and one which recognises the settlements (neighbourhood associations sectors 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5).

Following 2 years of work, the collective *Todo por la Praxis* (TXP) has come out in defence of an intermediate and alternative solution to the two opposing positions presented above: the disappearance of the settlement, the restoration of La Cañada as a livestock route, and the recognition of existing settlements. This is known as "El Plan Cañada, a neighbourhood proposal for urban regeneration articulated through a process of civic participation". The Plan has the support of the residents (the neighbourhood association of the sectors involved 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), which offers an alternative to the proposals of the various town councils concerned. It includes specific town planning proposals, a network of green spaces and public amenities, as well as a project for the wholesale renovation of all the dwellings. Faced with the demolition of the houses and the forced relocation of their inhabitants, an alternative "neighbourhood" proposal was put forward; this proposal is more economically viable and more sustainable from an environmental, social, and economic perspective.

18.3   Proposal

The Plan Cañada proposal is spelled out as a neighbourhood proposal for urban regeneration involving sectors 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. This Plan aims to provide an answer that can regulate the situation of the residents of Cañada. In basic terms, the Plan Cañada seeks to recognise the urban reality that Cañada Real Galiana has finally become, rather than its supposedly rural origins: this urban development is real and alive, one in which a large number of people carry on their daily lives in constant interaction with the territory and the urban environment that surrounds them, that of the Spanish capital. In this way, it is also a question of providing access to formal services and recognising the fact that a section of the people continue to consider it as an informal neighbourhood and "slum".

To achieve these objectives, the Plan Cañada, starts off with a series of necessary axioms that provide support and allow it to develop: the city remains and the residents stay on and participate.

1. The restoration of the dwellings: the town planning proposal of the plan Cañada establishes a road map, which first and foremost gives priority consideration to the existing real estate in Cañada.
2. A network of facilities and public spaces: Consideration is also given to the so-called "*esponjamiento*" or urban renewal of Cañada in such a way that open or empty spaces are obtained, and these become potential spaces for the implantation of a network of public spaces, green areas, facilities and amenities.
3. Roads and infrastructures: a strategy to reconcile, to the greatest possible extent, the new urban development with the traditional use of Cañada as a green route, envisages the creation of a bicycle lane in the eastern margin along the length of the track or path of Cañada, following the profile of the road adjacent to the same.

18.4   Interventions

At the same time as the negotiation process with the Administration, which includes negotiations with the various actors, there have been several interventions within the territory to try and find a solution to some of the residents' needs and demands. In the majority of cases, the initiative for these actions has come from the self-organised civil society (residents' associations, collectives, NGOs, etc.) These interventions have included implementing processes for participative urban transformation and promoting civic empowerment; and in the majority of cases, these have been made through self-constructed and self-managed processes within the various civil initiatives.

Legal Advice Bureau: This office provides legal advice, and its objective is to provide an answer to the situation of the defenceless in which the inhabitants of Cañada Real Galiana find themselves. The Legal Advice Bureau consists of a mobile unit, a portable structure of a temporary nature. The intention here is to provide legal support in a direct and immediate way to the persons in Cañada Real who have been affected by this situation.

"**Cañada Real**" **Sign** (**based on the letters that make up the name of the place**): The aim of this intervention was to give the territory some visibility in an attempt to provide it with an identity. To achieve this, a physical sign was constructed consisting of the letters "Cañada Real". The type font used is the same as that used in the famous "Hollywood" sign, located in the Hollywood Hills area of Los Angeles (USA).

Stands: these stands represent one of the few sports facilities that exist in Cañada. This football pitch is linked to the "El fanal" association, which carried out work providing educational support to young and old alike.

Food Bank: The initial proposal was to create an educational facility and provide support to volunteers and social workers. At the present time, it is a multi-purpose space, which is used as a logistics centre, as well as the base for the food bank.

Plaza Cañada: This is a public space for meetings and gatherings of residents, and it is linked to a play area for children. As is quite normal in such cases, this project has few resources, and all the material has been either recycled from construction work or donated by the residents. A small intervention was planned, which would serve as a base for any future implementations.

18.5   Evaluation of the Result, Fulfilling the Objectives

The Plan Cañada works along two lines. The first line was designed with a more technical component and includes the drafting of a participative plan with 5 associations involved and 5,000 inhabitants participating in the process. The aim of this plan was to open a door to dialogue with the administration, which had opposed the permanence of the inhabitants of Cañada Real until now. Being an instrument that goes beyond having a technical and formal value, it contemplates a working framework in which the residents of Cañada can show their desire for proactive and purposeful participation in the process of regularising this settlement. The other line of work has been the micro-interventions that have been undertaken in different points of La Cañada in collaboration with different actors. One of the several concepts that are used in all five interventions is the methodology of self-construction as a political and pedagogical tool.

In the self-construction process, collaborative learning is what we at *Todo por la Praxis* really appreciate, insofar as it generates multiple interactions between the

different team members. In the process of collaborative construction, it is necessary to share experiences and knowledge, because this is the way to build a community that can assume joint responsibility for decisions, create a consensus, and take control of the projects. At the same time, there is a strengthening of civic empowerment where the constituent part of these processes increases its political strength, allowing it to gain confidence in its own capacities, design its environment, and build alternatives.

Another of the tools has been to consider a strategy of visibility or diffusion, working with the question of the identity of the territory. For a long time, the settlement of Cañada has been stigmatised as a marginal and shambolic habitat; and one of the key aims for both the neighbours and public opinion has been to dismantle certain clichés in this regard. The Hollywood-style letters of Cañada possibly represent the initiative that best explains this concept, being an element that has built a new manner of collective thinking and a different public image. Moreover, working at this symbolic level has served as a tool to build an identity and a reference in public spaces, which had not existed in Cañada hitherto, as if "the city" felt that its least formal neighbourhoods could not benefit from the most basic facilities.

Finally, another key aspect has been to work with micro-interventions, as they are considered as a very important pedagogical component that allow citizens to transfer questions from a micro level to a macro level for themselves, in other words to move from their neighbourhood to a plan of urban development. In general terms, these technical documents are complex and not very accessible to the average citizen, and this prior work allows the introduction of key notions that can make it possible to work in the drafting of an ambitious and realistic plan. At TXP, working with these questions at a theoretical and a practical level allows us to develop a plan in which citizens can participate; and it allows them to move ahead both technically and politically, as they progress from practice towards real empowerment.

Today, the Plan Cañada has been decided upon; and even though in this case we are concerned with a plan of the Community of Madrid (the Regional Government), the Community government has understood that the participation of the neighbours is important, although it should be said that it is advancing thanks to the process started during the negotiations in which technicians and neighbour associations participated. Our understanding is that it is possible to come up with an appropriate solution for Cañada Real thanks to the mobilisation of the neighbours, together with political will. However, it is essential for this process to continue in the same spirit that has allowed a self-organised civil society that can put forward alternatives and articulate a process of participative urban transformation.

Case Study: Canada Real, Madrid, Spain

CANADA REAL
Madrid
Spain

Foundation of the neighbourhood

Franco died, return to democracy

Arrival of Moroccan immigrants

The municipality of Madrid takes a census of illegal housing in order to relocate its inhabitants

Arrival of gipsy immigrants

Municipality undertakes the violent demolition of illegal housing

1960   1975   1980   1986   1990   2004   2009

137 ha

6'574'000 inhabitants

Environ 30'000 inhabitants

14'000 families live in poor housing conditions

End of 1960s

Migrants from the poor regions of the country settle in Canada Real in order to work in Madrid

Most of the houses have been built illegally, though several occupants obtained land titles that legalize their situation

There is no public network of drinking water in the neighbourhood

There is no public electricity network in the neighbourhood

Salamanca

Barcelone

● MADRID

Valencia

Séville

Participatory activity resulted in the neighbourhood's name being built in letters imitating the famous Hollywood sign
Photo: TxP

The process of building a square in Cañada Real
Photo: TxP

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Chapter 19
Precarious Housing in Detroit

A City After the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis

Margaret Dewar

19.1   Introduction

Detroit was a crowded city in 1950 with a population of 1.85 million and dense industrial and commercial districts. Slums—concentrations of overcrowded, dense, rundown housing—characterized areas to the east and west of downtown. African Americans were segregated in the slums to the east. From the 1950s through the early 1970s urban renewal and highway construction destroyed the African-American area and part of the white-occupied slums to the west and replaced these with better housing to the east, usually not accessible to displaced residents, and with an industrial park to the west (U. S. Bureau of the Census 1952; Thomas 1997; Sugrue 1996).

Urban renewal got rid of large areas of slums but did not solve the problems of disinvestment and substandard housing. As the population declined overall with suburbanization of whites, African Americans spread into other, less crowded neighbourhoods to the north, northwest, and east of downtown. The antagonism of whites and the refusal of banks to lend in neighbourhoods with African Americans prevented the wider dispersion of black households. Corruption intensified this process. As the areas where African Americans lived expanded, real estate agents used scare tactics to persuade whites to sell homes at low prices with the threat of neighbourhood decline; they then sold the houses at much higher prices to blacks. In the late 1960s the federal government began to insure mortgages in neighbourhoods where African Americans lived. Widespread fraud in appraisal, underwriting, and sale of homes meant that new homeowners faced major repairs they had not expected and could not afford. The process led to large numbers of mortgage foreclosures and to property abandonment (Dewar and Thomas 2013; Schwartz 2006). As a result,

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disinvestment and abandonment spread out from downtown in all directions but especially to the east. These areas were no longer technically "slums" as they became sparsely settled, but the housing was often in very poor condition.

Disinvestment affected many more areas than the former slums and the neighbourhoods that whites fled during the 1960s and 1970s. Households with resources left over the next decades as school quality declined, crime increased, jobs increased in the suburbs, city services deteriorated, and racial antagonism continued. By the early 1980s changing technology and international competition undercut the region's principal industry, auto manufacturing, and led to loss of many jobs in the southeast Michigan region as well as continued plant closings of related suppliers in the city.

The result is that since 1950, the city has emptied, losing more than 60 % of its population by 2010 and more than 90 % of manufacturing jobs by 2007. The remaining households have less income. The fall in demand for buildings and land led to disinvestment in structures, eventual demolition of derelict buildings, and a huge increase in vacant land. As of 2009, more than one-fourth of Detroit's residential properties were vacant lots. Somewhat over 20 mile^2 were vacant, including residential, industrial, and commercial properties (U. S. Bureau of the Census 1949, 1952, 2007, 2010; Data Driven Detroit et al. 2009; City of Detroit Assessor 2001). Many more structures would need demolition to bring the building stock to the size the remaining population and businesses could fill.

What do these conditions mean for residents' housing? Visitors usually focus on vacancy and ruins, but the city has varied neighbourhoods, and conditions differ among them. Nevertheless, disinvestment and blight threaten both middle-income and low-income neighbourhoods. A survey in 2012 showed that 51 % of residents wanted to move to another city; 40 % expected to leave within 5 years (MacDonald 2012). Long-time Detroiters wondered for perhaps the first time whether they would need to move as their neighbourhoods deteriorated or as city services, especially police and fire protection, declined. The departure of more residents would continue to undermine housing demand and contribute to further disinvestment.

19.2 Threats to Middle- and Working-Class Neighbourhoods

Middle-class and working-class neighbourhoods, principally around the outer edges of the city, remained intact with few vacant lots as the recession began in 2008. Mortgage foreclosures hit these neighbourhoods especially hard—a "huge tsunami," one resident told the author. From 2008 to 2011, rates of mortgage foreclosure ranged from 18 to 37 % of residential structures in these neighbourhoods with the highest housing values and strongest demand for housing (Wayne County Register of Deeds 2008–2011; Data Driven Detroit et al. 2009). By 2010 more than one in ten houses stood vacant in one especially strong neighbourhood (Detroit Vacant Property Campaign 2010). In numerous previously intact areas, the impact of mortgage foreclosures was enormous. Within a few years, large numbers of

houses, stripped of materials of value by vandals, sat empty with little future except demolition. The loss of housing equity and the introduction of blight into strong areas threatened residents' commitment to staying.

What caused this huge impact on middle-class and working-class neighbourhoods? Mortgage brokers had pushed refinancing of mortgages from the mid-1990s on as federal regulation of mortgage lending relaxed. The loans the brokers hawked were subprime mortgages charging higher interest than conventional ones as well as mortgages with exotic terms such as balloon payments and interest rates that adjusted sharply upwards. In the 1990s when housing values increased, homeowners refinanced with such mortgages to extract the equity from their homes, expecting that continued increases in housing values would enable them to refinance again to meet the terms of their unfavorable mortgages. By the late 1990s, however, foreclosures rose as homeowners could not repay the loans. The economy weakened in the state of Michigan by 2002, and housing values faltered in the city. The defaults on subprime mortgages and those with exotic terms rose sharply. With the deep recession that began in 2008, many homeowners lost their jobs and could no longer make payments even on conventional mortgages; defaults on these mortgages then rose considerably. As home values fell substantially after 2007, a majority of homes with mortgages had debt that exceeded the value of the home. Some homeowners who had the income to continue to pay their mortgages instead decided to stop payments and accept foreclosure to reduce their debt. Many Detroit residents who wanted to leave the city found they could now afford to move to the suburbs; the decline in suburban housing values brought more homes within their financial reach (Detroit Office of Foreclosure Prevention and Response 2012; Immergluck 2009).

Throughout this period, many residents in middle- and working-class neighbourhoods worked to prevent the destruction of vacant housing and to save their neighbourhoods from the threat of blight and falling property values. By 2013, as the economy strengthened, these community-based actions appeared to have helped a few neighbourhoods retain enough value through the recession to remain places where middle and working class households would want to live.

19.3   Precarious Conditions in Low-Income Areas

The situation was different in neighbourhoods at the other extreme of disinvestment. In such areas, usually nearer downtown and the Detroit River, vacant lots often constituted more than 50% of residential properties. A neighbourhood in northwest Detroit, Brightmoor, illustrates the housing conditions in such areas. In a central area of Brightmoor, 53% of all properties were vacant lots in 2011, and 17% of the remaining housing required demolition. Nevertheless, 56% of housing structures were in good condition, and an additional 17% were in fair condition. Furthermore, people living in next-door houses had taken over 15% of the vacant lots to form "blots" (a combined property larger than a lot but smaller than a block) (Dewar and Nassauer 2011; Armborst et al. 2008; Dewar and Linn 2015). The

neighbours had claimed these properties with fences or hedges at the boundaries and with clear indications of use whether with the construction of a driveway and garage; the presence of barbecue equipment or play structures; or plantings. Fourteen percent of houses were associated with claims to such vacant lots. Residents were remaking the disinvested environment to improve their quality of life. One homeowner who had acquired about four lots told a National Public Radio reporter, "If I want to go to the park, I just go out here to the back yard" (Davidson 2011). Others showed with high fences and threatening signs that they were taking over lots to protect their homes from crime, dumping, and other undesirable activities.

Such uses of vacant lots were vulnerable, however. Of owners who had taken over adjacent vacant lots, only 62 % occupied the house. The landlords who owned the other 38 % of those properties may have acquired the houses after previous owner-occupants had fenced the adjacent property, and they could be expected to have less interest in maintaining the house or the adjacent lot.

Furthermore, many of those using vacant lots did not own them. Adjacent owner occupants had legal possession of only about 52 % of the lots they were using. Investors owned only about 30 % of the vacant lots they occupied. Homeowners reported trying to purchase lots from the city government without success. Indeed the city or state government owned about 53 % of the properties that adjacent owners occupied but did not own. The property owners could continue to try to purchase the property from public officials. A local non-profit developer owned another 6 % and was also likely to support owner occupants who wanted to purchase a lot. A large number of private entities owned the remaining 41 % of the properties. These private owners presumably could reclaim their property and disrupt residents' investment in using the land. In areas of high disinvestment, however, ownership was often murky; the absentee owners might have abandoned their properties years before, but city assessor records did not yet record that fact.

Communal use of vacant property could also help to improve the quality of life for remaining residents. Resident-created gardens, parks, or playlots absorbed very little land, however—less than 2 % of the vacant lots. The amount of vacant land was so extensive that the small numbers of remaining residents could not control it. Illegal dumping, houses awaiting demolition, and lots overgrown with trees and shrubs characterized the landscape.

Numerous residents of Brightmoor were quick to say that they would be happy to leave if they could. One wrote in a letter to the editor, "I live in the … Brightmoor neighbourhood…. We would like to move…. I cannot sell my home for what I owe on it, so what do families like mine do?"(Dowell 2011).

19.4   Conclusion

The weak demand for housing as a result of population loss and mortgage foreclosures thus threatens housing in both middle-class and low-income neighbourhoods. The result is a volatile environment. In middle-class and working-class neighbourhoods, additional properties become vacant or lack maintenance even as new owners take responsibility for others. The conditions require continued vigilance from the neighbours and the community-based organizations dedicated to preserving the neighbourhood's character. In areas with extensive disinvestment, residents often show with their property investments that they are creating a private haven buffered from the disinvestment on their block, but new threats to safety or land control could lead them to leave, too.

The challenge for residents, city officials, and other policymakers and urban planners is to improve the quality of life in the city in order to stanch the departure of more residents. In Detroit and other cities like it, approaches in middle-class areas should focus on reinforcing confidence in the future of the neighbourhood, thus stabilizing or strengthening housing values. Efforts can include more rapid demolition of derelict structures; stronger code enforcement for irresponsible landlords; improvements in the delivery of city services, especially police and fire protection; and reinforcement of community-based institutions that help people know their neighbours and feel part of a good neighbourhood. In low-income areas, the improvement of police and fire protection and other city services is vital. In addition, important approaches include providing long-term security for residents using nearby vacant lots whether through long-term leases or sale at very low prices; reusing other vacant lots for storm water management, vegetable gardens, and woodlots; encouraging institutions such as land trusts that can control larger areas of vacant land for communal uses; improving connections to jobs; and bringing neighbours together to reinforce commitment to the place and to each other (Morrison and Dewar 2012). Improving quality of life is especially difficult to achieve in Detroit and other cities like it, however, because of the lack of tax base which declined as population and jobs left the city and property values declined. The city has little revenue to use to address problems. The solution to the financial problem is to develop ways to share tax revenues with the rest of the metropolitan area and the rest of the state, but this has proved politically impossible thus far.

Case Study: Detroit Centre, Detroit, USA

DETROIT CENTRE
Detroit
USA

Foundation of Detroit city — 1806
The first skyscraper is built — 1869
Launch of the Ford company — 1903
Economic crisis — 1930
1'850'000 inhabitants, but urban decline begins — 1950
Riots between police and black population — 1967
Election of the city's first black mayor — 1973
1'203'000 inhabitants — 1980
Creation of the «Downtown Development Authority» — 2003
Period of economic recession — 2008
713'000 inhabitants — 2010

◇ 36'366 ha

👪 4'430'000 inhabitants

👤 713'000 inhabitants

🏠 36.2 %

1815

⌂⌂ City begins to grow after the opening of
the Erie Canal and the development of
steam boats

$ ~50% own their accomodation
15% are tenants

💧 Many inhabitants had their water
connection cut, because they could no
longer pay the bills

⚡ Problems in accessing electricity have not
become a public issue

Chicago   DETROIT   New York

San Francisco   WASHINGTON DC

Los Angeles

Houston

Miami

Variation in housing condition in Detroit.
Photos: Margaret Dewar

The investor who owns this house has secured it to prevent vandals from stripping out its plumbing and fixtures.
Photo: Margaret Dewar

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Chapter 20
Lessons Learned from Case Studies

Jean-Claude Bolay, Jérôme Chenal, and Yves Pedrazzini

20.1 Introduction

Nineteen experts considered an equal number of cities in Latin America, North America, the Caribbean, Europe, Asia and Africa. Each city is unique, rooted in its history, culture and policies and social practices that shaped it. In each case, the reader was given information regarding the physical location, major settlement and development trends and other indicators about the area in question. To this basic information we have added a short bibliography for readers interested in learning more.

We called upon 19 experts and invited them to express their view on the slum issue at various analytical levels, in an attempt to give form and meaning to raw statistics and graphs. In some cases the focus is on the existing reality, with an acknowledgement of the territorial and human dynamics at play. In others, the analysis is more theoretical, based on the specific cases but also going beyond them for more fundamental reflection on slums, their characteristics and their place in the urbanisation process. As such, the authors were able to draw broader conclusions and offer comparisons between cities, countries and regions, as well as to highlight key issues for the urban future.

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20.2 City Centres and Outskirts: Slum Locations

A slum's geographic location is a basic given that directly impacts the application or absence of policies, as well as the social and spatial dynamics surrounding the slum.

Two situations can be distinguished: slums in more or less distant city outskirts and those in extremely dilapidated central areas. This distinction must be further qualified as outlying villages that were gradually absorbed by the city, but without all the benefits that urban proximity has to offer (i.e. infrastructure), were also among the case studies.

Regardless of the location, the same two observations were made: a deteriorated built environment and a lack of infrastructure and services. This was the case from downtown Detroit to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to Bulgaria's Roma settlements found in the outskirts of many major cities. The problems are the same: substandard, over-crowded homes and neighbourhoods, insufficient or inexistent water, electricity and public transport supply and lack of sewage systems disposal.

The nature and extent of problems depends on the type of neighbourhood. In the cases studied, in inner-city slum neighbourhoods experienced pressure from private developers as well as public authorities because of their potential real estate value. Although Rocinha, the famous favela in the heart of Rio de Janeiro, has become a tourist destination, it is nonetheless under pressure by the city, which would like for it to serve as a model for safety and renewal initiatives. Due to its exceptional location in the hills above the bay of Rio de Janeiro, this pressure will only increase as developers' interest grows. This same pressure also underpins the decades-long struggle by the residents of Dharavi in Mumbai, to defend not only their homes but their livelihoods in the face of the mega-development projects of the government and their private allies. This ambiguity can likewise be seen in the Boeung Kak district in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, where the government has enacted regulations to redevelop the area while, at the same time, encouraging international developers, to invest in it. A similar thing is happening with the inhabitants of Villa 31 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where academics are working with slum associations to prevent this central area from being destroyed in order to build a business centre strategically located between the port and railway station. In our "catalogue," Detroit is a special case. Entire parts of centrally-located neighbourhoods in this US city are slowly deteriorating due to the economic collapse of the auto industry, causing its poor residents to flee the city in order to find better living conditions elsewhere.

Land competition is a key challenge for centrally-located slums, which are torn between strong pressure from public and private urban policymakers and the struggle to preserve and rehabilitate their homes and workplaces.

Peri-urban slums are characterised by other ailments. Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, is emblematic of the problem of unbridled urban sprawl. Here the land is barely divided into plots and is devoid of infrastructure. The countless shacks and small houses randomly built as plots are acquired falls outside development principles. Living conditions (i.e. lack of electricity and water) are almost rural. As

in Yamtenga, Burkina Faso, insufficient resources in such poor areas do not allow for more than the digging of wells to provide residents with access to water. Cañada Real (near Madrid in Spain) is a 15 km strip on which have been built some 2000 "houses", sheltering nearly 10,000 people connected to the surrounding agricultural areas. When the economic crisis struck, the public authorities refused to invest in the hopes that the occupants would move away, for fear the region's image might suffer and the slum's negative impact on land value.

The territorial expansion of cities is emblematic of a phenomenon we find in most big cities. Small settlements are gradually absorbed by the city over time, to in turn become peri-urban districts that merge with the urban fabric. The problem is that, although they benefit somewhat from this proximity, they still suffer from a lack of services and infrastructure. Makoko, on the outskirts of Lagos, Nigeria, is emblematic of this trend. It was originally a fishing village on the lagoon that was absorbed by the city in the 1960s. No improvements were made, so that in 2012, before it was destroyed, its 150,000 inhabitants lived in extremely precarious conditions in a highly polluted environment. However, being located in a central area of greater Lagos, the authorities, driven by urban improvement, did not hesitate to raze it.

20.3 Urban Actions: Who Acts for Which Projects?

Urban action, be it plans for an entire area or more localized development work, impacts both the existence and the transformation of slums. In this respect, the case studies shed light on two facets of this fluctuating reality: firstly, who acts? Which players are involved? In what interest and for which projects? Secondly, what is being done or projected in the short, medium and long terms? The answer to these questions must take into account that, while these dynamic changes are mainly physical and material – they are also and above all social and institutional – given that multiple players intervene occasionally in a concerted (though more often authoritarian and conflicting) way. So the key question is: Who are the players reading the case studies? Thus do we discern the critical role played by public authorities in awareness of the slum problem in the cities studied.

In the case of Casablanca in Morocco, the drastic measures to reduce the number of slums in the city over the past 10 years are the direct result of a national programme, "National Cities Without Slums", decreed by the King and inherited from the UN's "Millennium Development Goals" of 2000. This policy was applied in the case of Essalam Al Logham, through a partnership with the private sector as the contracting authority. In Bogota, Colombia, it was the city government that chose the urban planning tool – the "Territorial Development Plan" – which aims to preserve, strengthen and renovate substandard housing, with the idea of better integrating them into the larger urban context and reducing social and territorial segregation. In this particular case, the partnership aims to integrate neighbourhood associations,

so as not to impose standards that do not coincide with the wishes and capacities of the dwellers.

Another excellent example in Latin America is Villa El Salvador, near Lima, Peru. Now a real city from the standpoint of political territorial organisation, it emerged in the 1970s upon the initiative of its first inhabitants, new rural arrivals seeking to get closer to the capital. Over the years, participatory processes formalised operations, leading to the creation of a municipality that began institutionalising the urban development process in the 1980s, though sometimes apprehensive of neighbourhood associations afraid of losing control of the former slum to newly elected politicians.

Public authorities' involvement in the management of slums is often real. Such was the case in Nova Luz, in Sao Paulo, Brazil, where action took within the Strategic Master Plan, enacted by the municipality in 2002, thus creating "special areas of social interest" and renovating the informal dwellings occupied by residents. And it should not be forgotten, going from one public proceeding to another. The key role played by international cooperation agencies, the World Bank, other regional development banks and national cooperation agencies should not be forgotten. Of the international organizations, the World Bank is the largest investor, as the case of Kibera, Nairobi, clearly demonstrates. Since the 1970s, the most significant slum upgrading initiatives have been designed and funded by the World Bank and the German Cooperation Agency. This case is far from unique, as it is extremely rare for slum renovation programmes of any kind to materialise without the participation of international donors. This means that, with the exception of inter-city initiatives, financing is negotiated at the national level according to rules and conditions that local public, private and non-governmental partners are not always involved with. Hence may a population reject a project about which they were not consulted from the outset. Nonetheless, various interventions are not able to address all of the problems that plague slum neighbourhoods. Insecurity remains, and inhabitants often find themselves caught between rehabilitation operations on the one hand, and private developers' desire to eradicate such areas for real estate profit.

Public authorities are not simply do-gooders and promoters slum rehabilitation and shantytown upgrading projects. Lest we forget, they also have the power to destroy such neighbourhoods in order – in keeping with the popular, twentieth century European mantra – to "beautify the city". Needless to say, such strategies directly affect poor, socially- and economically-marginalised inhabitants.

Bulgarian Roma neighbourhoods have suffered from such governmental policies of ethnic segregation by their geographic marginalisation from urban centres, as well as a lack of provision of basic urban infrastructure. Until recently, a clear attempt has been made to destroy these neighbourhoods in favour of more sanitary homes, without consultation with the resident populations. Although some slum upgrading has taken place in recent years, such initiatives have been an exception, given the poor funding in spite of the desperate needs.

The "need" for modernisation, eliminating neighbourhoods that do not meet the standards of the city government was the pretext of the Lagos authorities to evict the 150,000 residents of Makoko in just 72 h, before destroying the entire village,

which, as a result, became a slum. Other cases, however, demonstrate the key role played by neighbourhood associations (and more occasionally, external partners, NGOs and universities) at the local level, in developing alternative strategies to the financial ambitions of governments.

In the urban struggle, the importance of community participation is recognised and often sought to increase the chances of operational success in slum areas. Behind this recognition via associations and the organisations that support them, one finds a wide variety of dynamics, ranging from the acceptance of funding for operational costs, to residents' physical involvement in development works, and, in highly politicized contexts, slum residents' participation in the urban project. This broad spectrum can be analysed in two ways: varying from the participation of local labour in the work to a more political and institutional integration of neighbourhood organisations in the process of transformation, ranging from consultation with users to their integration in real decision-making. The second is spatial, and impact the territory in which such social participation develops – from the micro-local (the individual slum communities) to the macro-urban (coordinated projects targeting the entire urban territory). In general, as clearly illustrated by certain studies, local action is more conducive to immediate participation by the communities concerned.

This was the case for Villa 31, in Buenos Aires, where the university supports neighbourhood organisations in proposing alternative rehabilitation plans to those of the city government. It was also the case in Dharavi, Mumbai, where decades of resident participation has helped draw attention to the slum's economic strength and has been used as a political weapon against the development projects targeting its destruction. Another excellent example is Boeung Kak, in Phnom Penh, where NGOs have supported local residents in the fight against a project to privatise land to a foreign company by defending their rights and acting as an advisor in negotiations with the investor and the State. Similar support and dialoguing dynamics can be observed in La Cañada, in Madrid, an experiment conducted by the NGO "Todo por la Praxis" to support residents in their efforts to preserve their living environment against outside pressure and offer alternative plans to those of the public authorities. In this case, practitioners and associations have taken advantage of Spain's economic crisis to act on the micro-local level.

The last, but ever-present player in the transformation of global South cities – and one that directly affects the future of slum neighbourhoods – is the private developer. Be they national or foreign-based, developers often work in cooperation with local and/or State governments and frequently interact with international donors. These foreign players are usually involved at the overall city planning level; most master plans are developed by specialised foreign technical agencies in the countries concerned, sometimes with the help of local partners. They also increasingly act as investors and operators in large urban projects, including infrastructure, public transport, water, waste and electricity supply, sanitation, shopping malls and luxury real estate. In the vast majority of cases their rationale is strictly material, financial or commercial; social dialogue and the preservation of the existing built and social fabric is ignored as what counts is the land's development and profitability

potential. This rationale has exploded with the globalisation of markets. All the cities of the global South are facing the same issue; public authorities have trouble resisting the pressure, when they themselves are not the root of the problem.

This is particularly the case in Asia, where economic growth is strong. It can be observed in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, with the rise in tourism. The State has allowed investors to redevelop the shores of Lake Kak, leading to the destruction of the Boeung Kak area… and at the same time has implemented a social housing policy! Dharavi is also under pressure from such urban transformations. Because of its central location, and despite the thriving economy of the toolhouses, new projects aimed at "modernising" Mumbai's centre and, in the words of the developers, turn Mumbai into a "world-class city" continue to crop up as a result of the Bandra Kurla Business Complex.

20.4   Synthesis: Beyond Diversity, Key Slum Markers

This synthesis of the revealing elements offered by the case studies shows the diversity of the realities of each slum in each city studied, each with its local and historical distinctiveness. We also saw that these areas are a key to understanding how to distinguish a number of markers that can be found in most cities, and define its central place among urban issues, and its territorial, social, economic and institutional dynamics. It is also why we can uphold with certainty that it is not enough to work on a case-by-case basis at any scale of intervention in the city. We must think globally and act locally in order to get out of a falsely- chaotic vision of the city, in favour of a true vision of real cities, not one imagined on paper, from a distance or from above. From this raised awareness, this recognition of the slum as a cornerstone of contemporary urban development will emerge action and urban sustainable development that is not sectoral and fragmented, but instead based on an understanding of spatial, environmental, social and economic dimensions in interaction with one another.

Part IV
Theory, Practice and Interventions: How Slums Challenge the City

Chapter 21
From the Field to the Theory

Jérôme Chenal, Yves Pedrazzini, and Jean-Claude Bolay

21.1 Introduction

"From theory to the field" explores different implementation techniques based on the typology described in Chap. 3. Beyond urban theory, classifications and prospective research results, we will show what *can* and *cannot* be done in different slums, thus casting doubt on the unifying policy of key international bodies that leave little room for the specific contexts of states and cities, let alone neighbourhood trajectories.

Plainly put, so-called renovation policies that, in reality, translate into the eradication of precarious neighbourhoods cannot be the same for all continents or countries, within a country (i.e. Morocco, with its "Cities without Slums" programme) or within the same city. A real transformation slum policy can only work on a case-by-case basis, using identical means of understanding the issues but, in each case, arriving at unique conclusions.

In this chapter, we will propose ways of making our theoretical approach to the slum operational, namely by attempting to think beyond pat solutions for the restructuring of precarious neighbourhoods. We will make recommendations by ranking objectives based on our readings of the case studies presented in this book and on our neighbourhood *typology*.

However, prior to this, we will as a reminder show that shantytowns "are interpreted as places of tenacious poverty, because they are considered part of the informal sector. If we adopt the view that the informal sector is a limiting factor for economic efficiency, then the shantytowns must be assimilated" (Bartoli 2011). This is how the fight against poverty – the crux of governments' and major international bodies' struggle to eradicate impoverished areas – begins with urban slums.

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According to the World Bank (Craig and Porter 2003), poor households must be allowed to consume more by (1) increasing the average household income, (2) promoting access to this consumption and (3) securing the accumulation of goods that this consumption should generate. For this we must act not only on the labour market, housing supply and urban services, but also – and most importantly – on land. Land issues are thus a key determinant of urban poverty (Bartoli 2011).

The poverty phenomenon is thus measured in part by material living conditions, i.e. slums. UN-Habitat reminds us that, in 2003 (UN-Habitat 2003), 40–80 % of the urban population (depending on the country/city) lived in precarious conditions, without access to basic urban services.

21.2   Why Restructure Precarious Neighbourhoods?

Urban poverty is undoubtedly the main reason for the restructuring of precarious neighbourhoods. Decent housing in neighbourhoods with services is a minimum condition in the fight against poverty. However, as we shall see further on, such examples are rare, and that despite the many government programmes and the unceasing work of NGOs, historic slums such as Dharavi and Kibera are still in the same condition decades after their creation.

However, reasons other than the fight against poverty incite authorities to engage in the more or less radical restructuring of shantytowns (for instance reducing violence, land recovery for real estate projects, the implementation of major infrastructure and, more pragmatically, political clientelism).

In Brazil, the recent football World Cup (2014) and impending 2016 Olympic Games in Rio have brought attention to the existence of favelas throughout the country. Here the authorities' goal is to spare future visitors to Rio this vision of poverty and media coverage of violence. To prevent the latter, the federal government has reinforced police presence favelas with elite troops whose tactics remain controversial. Officially, slums are not an issue because they are the habitat of the poor, but because they are the source of urban violence and not compatible with Rio's aspiration to be a global capital. One might expect the authorities to recognize that the root causes of this violence are linked to the economic output of the city, not the illegal activities of a few hundred individuals or even gangs (Pedrazzini 2005). So far, however, the signs of such a comprehensive approach by the authorities are few.

Elections are also an occasion for political bosses to periodically show what role they want slums to play in the "democratic" process. Precarious neighbourhoods are typically home to relatively homogenous populations in terms of geographical origin, ethnicity and family relationships, which in some cases may serve the interests of a particular political party in a given election. It is therefore not uncommon for large programmes, under the veil of the fight against poverty, to strictly adhere to the ruling elite's political agenda and offer themselves as a "counterpart" in return for

the votes of favela residents. Of course, such political tactics do not only occur in Brazil.

Another reason for the restructuring of precarious neighbourhoods' presence on the political agenda is incumbents' desire to appropriate land for property and real-estate development, be it by local governments, the State or private investors. The value of urban land is key in restructuring programmes. In such cases residents are relocated to outlying areas, leaving developers free to increase land value.

Finally, the development of large-scale infrastructure – an airport in Istanbul, a highway in Dakar, etc. – gives rise to restructuring programmes. The term is misleading because it is not so much a question of restructuring slum areas as eradicating them. This invariably results in the relocation of residents, often far from the original residential location, and hence the loss of the meagre income they were able to earn in their neighbourhood. Thus, restructuring and relocation tend to destroy a very fragile but very real economic fabric – ironic, given that the main goal of these programmes is to enable individuals to pursue work activity.

The motives for restructuring are many. However, those stemming from the so-called fight against poverty raise three important urban issues, like three basic axioms that alone justify intervention in slums.

21.3   Slums Question the City

The first urban issue raised by slums is that of its marginality. "The marginalisation and its peripheral metaphor often constitute an individualisation criterion for the slums, pigeonholing them as a type that accumulates the most negative attributes" (Louiset 2011). In the Western model of urbanisation commonly implemented in modern/contemporary societies, slums, even those in inner cities, are marginalised, much like a beggar. They exist, of course, but are not really part of the system – at least not the collective representation that currently serves as the model for what is "urban" (Chenal 2014).

The second issue slums raise is that of urban standards, or in this case the difference between the standards this model would wish to see applied in urban areas and those actually applied in precarious neighbourhoods by their inhabitants. "*The difference is not only due to corruption or mismanagement of the administrative framework*, *as some like to point out. It is linked with other differences encountered in the world*, *including in Europe*: *between the idealised city of the architect and the urban planner*, *relayed by the politician or the Administrative Agent*, *and the city that is experienced*, *practiced*, *or dreamed by the citizen*, *the inhabitant* (*in the full sense of the term*)" (Louiset 2011). The constant, however, is that whatever the standard - in each country, state, city – a gap exists between it and the reality of its applicability in neighbourhoods.

Finally, the third urban issue raised by inner-city slums is that of informality. Informality, according to Modernist orthodoxy, is the stigma of poverty because it prevents a "real" economy from developing (Farrell 2004). Thus, the fight against

informality becomes a struggle against its most egregious physical form: the slum. Such neo-liberal economic considerations have been central to international urban policy since 1970, as Jones (Jones 2012) reminds, marking the debut of international organisations' fight against informality. This inevitably meant strengthening private ownership. As such, it is no coincidence that land issues are a central element of restructuring programmes.

These three issues echo an ideal or idealised vision of the city, in which the poor and needy have no place.

21.4 The Necessity of Returning to Typology

Urban form allows us to highlight differences in trajectories between neighbourhoods from an economic, social and environmental viewpoint. The pertinence of the case studies presented here will help address the slum issue in an in-depth way, across all its themes.

Moreover, as we have seen, the negative effects of strictly applying a single global policy obliges us to revisit the standards and models generally accepted and used. It is only based on a clear understanding of the modes of production of the city and social practices that we can identify levers for action and effect change. Individuals and their practices, lives and survival strategies must be the focus of discussions on the restructuring of slums, as well as in urban planning and management (Chenal 2013). It is only by taking into account population dynamics that we can establish a common understanding of slums and lay the foundations for the future development of cities (Roy 2011).

To understand slums and apply courses of action, we must start from the urban form as the spatial manifestation of social relations. For this, we shall return to our discussion of Chap. 3 and case studies from the previous chapters (Chaps. 5–19).

21.5 Centre or Periphery

For slums, as for other urban constructions, central sites are typically older, while those on the periphery are more recent; whereas the former are located in proximity to businesses, the latter are far removed from everything. This, as it turns out, proves to be a shrewd strategy: settling on land that does not yet have value allows for long-term settlement.

We now come to the crux of the issue: the restructuring of peripheral slums legitimises settlements in the long term and creates urban sprawl. The compact city and attempts at sustainable urban management and planning clash with the development work of NGOs in remote peripheral areas (which often brings with it the first urban services), making them "prematurely" legitimate.

There are likewise restructuring programs under the auspices of major international bodies approved by States and/or cities that are finalising the settlement and often tend to legitimise it a posteriori. Urban sprawl thus develops on a large scale due to the desire to improve living conditions in precarious neighbourhoods, regardless of their location in the city.

Our own research and the case studies in the previous chapter show that, while there is the need to restructure and intervene in neighbourhoods, it is necessary to take action in central areas before intervening in periphery areas. Legitimising settlements far removed from city life and employment areas might be seen as relevant from the standpoint of individuals trapped in such precarious situations. However, collectively speaking, this tends to generate more issues than it solves.

21.6 Constructability

Housing settlements on land that is unsuitable for construction should gradually be freed up. To date, no inexpensive, large-scale technical solutions have been developed. However, relocating neighbourhoods is a possible and even desirable alternative, often for environmental reasons or potentially dangerous topographical conditions. In reality, unhealthy living areas are only rarely evacuated – sometimes due to natural disaster – as the costs of eviction and reconstruction are high. Inhabitants are typically opposed to such interventions, as they see "risk" factor more as a pretext for eviction and overture to land speculation.

Our typology gives two very different modes of intervention depending on the state of the terrain. On one hand, areas suitable for development are threatened by gentrification; on the other hand, floods, earthquakes, and other natural disasters threaten areas not suited for construction.

Renovation work shows zero tolerance to environmental risks, floods and other natural phenomena. However, areas not suitable for construction should not be improved more than other, developable areas of the city, as major and expensive drainage of slum areas ultimately provides better land for construction than surrounding "non-risk" areas. The added value on such land is even greater, creating strong urban pressure and often the eviction of residents whose protection is the pretext for intervention. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule.

21.7 Structuring Road Networks

Physical intervention in a space that has already developed is obviously less complicated, as land holdings for the creation of basic infrastructure like water and sanitation systems, or the paving of certain main streets, are clear, do not require the displacement of residents and can begin quickly. In this case, the priority must be ensuring the area is above water level, in order to prevent flooding. A slight slope on

a flat terrain – a somewhat exceptional phenomenon in nature – is not easily drainable. The existing structure of the settlements provides significant potential for the realisation of roadway drainage.

In cases where there is no hierarchical road network, intervention is more complicated. However, ensuring that an area remains above water level is a top priority for informal settlements. One must, in this case, work on a step-by-step basis, based on watersheds and the water's course. The lowest areas should be evacuated, if no natural water outlet exists. Technical pumping solutions largely ineffective as they are not sustainable, as demonstrated annually in Tondo (Manila),[1] in Guédiawaye (Dakar)[2] and many shantytowns around the world.

Based on our cases studies, we argue that creating road networks should not be the priority; rather, sewerage (clear water and wastewater), especially for public health, should take precedence. Yet, the types of slums found in Rio and Caracas point to the fact that accessibility is also important. However, roads are not the only means, given that vehicle ownership among these populations is low, and that, generally speaking, these areas favour foot, bike, cart, donkey and horse traffic – not SUVs.

Working with what already exists based on the gradient and the residents' modes of travel is fundamental in unstructured neighbourhoods. Hence, the next priority should be pedestrian traffic, so that populations can be mobile both within and outside of the neighbourhood (Witter 2012). Of course, traditionally, street, roads, pathways and facilities are superposed, but our typology allows us to debate the uses and roles of networks and prioritization of the two. As we saw in most of the examples from the previous chapters, the relative isolation of these neighbourhoods is a strategy for controlling the urban space, but also protects these areas and the communities living in them from urban gentrification of the city, which in most cases leads to their expulsion from the city.

21.8 Strengthening Habitat

The process of strengthening the habitat gives us information regarding land ownership and tenants. Putting aside residents' low income and the fact that they do not have the means to become homeowners, the poor *do* have investment capacity, though small. They can invest in their housing by creating conditions that are more secure and sustainable. This is, of course, only possible if the land is not privately owned, as landowners could potentially assert their rights and reclaim their property.

By contrast, instances where the strengthening process has already taken place is proof that resident populations did not wait for restructuring programs before "appropriating" and "privatising" the land. In such cases, the land question is not

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[1] GMA News: Floods hit parts of Metro Manila, September 19, 2014.

[2] Senenews.com: "Inondations à Dakar", May 24, 2014.

really an issue, and there is no need for intervention. Intervention undoubtedly must take place at the environmental level first and foremost.

In cases of extreme precariousness, relation with the original owner must be improved in order to render the population settlements sustainable without going through the individual plot, which is not necessary and even counter-productive, given that parcels have market value and can therefore be sold.

21.9   A partial Synthesis

In formulating an initial synthesis from the elements outlined above, we must focus on:

1. Land rights, the issue of land/property ownership and official credentials that secure this urban base;
2. the physical planning of networks in terms of spatial form and urban management;
3. prioritization of the population's needs;
4. the basic rules of urban planning (drainage, street division, sun protection, etc.), particularly given the possible effects of climate change and the specific context of each city.

As we have just seen, the habitat strengthening process does not require well-defined parcels or rights in the form of land titles in order to occur. This offers an important clue as to how to approach land. Private ownership is not an obligation (Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002; Payne et al. 2007); on the contrary, it promotes gentrification – albeit relative economic speaking, given that in the best possible scenario, residents go from very poor to poor – which naturally follows strengthening.

Networks can be redesigned in more organic forms. Although drainage pipelines are straight, water, electricity and roads networks may be flexible. It is possible to entirely rethink urban restructuring patterns, even going so far as to reverse our way of thinking about spaces and ways of living in them.

Some basic rules regarding drainage and street layout do exist, however, but may be easily applied without greatly changing a neighbourhood. It is therefore possible to significantly improve living conditions for residents by making a few small changes that serve to bridge two situations, without substantial effort.

Hence, we conclude that it is necessary to change the point of view of the neighbourhood in order to escape land issues, albeit without neglecting them. We must therefore completely revisit our own "models for making the city", that is to say, our way of representing both the social and physical space of the slum. Slums should no longer be seen as marginal, but as the living environment of a large proportion of urban dwellers, and while it calls into question other neighbourhoods, its way of functioning can also be a source of knowledge.

Despite the work of NGOs and the many programmes carried out within these areas, the oldest slums still exist, and in a form that has changed very little, thus illustrating the reality of effecting change and, ultimately, inertia as a form of resistance used by the poor to change the urban form. Is this not because these historic slums long ago reached their social and spatial optimum?

As Louiset (Bartoli 2011) reminds us, eliminating slum is not equivalent to eradicating poverty. Neighbourhoods have their way of functioning; if one renounces the use of bulldozers, only minor interventions to improve living conditions prove possible. Poverty is eliminated by redistributing wealth, not by urban master plans, regardless of their role in land planning once the wealth has been redistributed.

From the standpoint of the needs expressed by residents, their resistance to change shows that the residential location takes precedence over the quality of housing, and that a modern home in a remote outskirt will never be equivalent to a shack in the city centre. This, of course, varies according to socio-cultural preferences (i.e. the desire to remain in the city center or, on the contrary, move to a distant suburb to ensure the possibility of land ownership).

The many diverse approaches to urban form show that typologies foster specific responses according to a given situation. Thus, it is not possible to deal with land in city centres or peripheries the same everywhere. Likewise, the strengthening process is also specific to land tenure and ownership. The room for manoeuver is not the same for private land versus public land. This defeats international policies in the fight against poverty when they think of themselves as global a priori. An area on the outskirts cannot apply the same planning tools as a downtown area, further highlighting the importance of choosing a methodology that takes into account the individual context. The population's needs are not necessarily those of urban housing-plot-services, as designers of restructuring programmes seem to think. Access to employment is paramount, as are healthy habitats. In a sense, starting over based on the real needs and demands of slum inhabitants would open new radical, potentially revolutionary perspectives.

Finally, addressing slums in the fight against poverty is like treating the consequence rather than the cause, and inherently leads to an impasse that can only overcome by addressing it head on. Intervention must take this into account, while provide services at minimal cost – the only possible way for neighbourhood residents to have a better life.

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Chapter 22
Learning from the Slums, Learning for the Slums…

Conclusions

Jean-Claude Bolay, Yves Pedrazzini, and Jérôme Chenal

22.1   Introduction

Today the city is internationally magnified as the engine of the world, of its economy, and of its culture, as the ideal place for communication and exchanges. Although slums may clash with this vision of a modern, international and urban world, it is unlikely that the eradication of slums – actually impossible – or even their physical and constructive renovation, is sufficient to explain the genesis and especially its place and role, both concrete and symbolic, in contemporary urban issues. These conclusions are designed to recall the causes and effects of this global phenomenon, in its human and material salience, as in its theoretical perceptions. This will result in concrete proposals to provide guidance to students, the future professionals of the city, as well as to urban operators, whether public, private or voluntary, and to representatives of the communities concerned. Some authors stress the negative aspects of slums, violence, insecurity, marginality. But others among us, without denying these aspects, underline the fact that slums, as central dimension of the process of urbanisation, reveal also the capacity of poor to invent appropriate forms of urban integration, out of formal rules and laws, which are not adapted to their situation.

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22.2 Between Statistical Universality and Local Differentiation, a Reality at Various Levels

3.9 billion of urban population in 2015; probably 6 billion around 2045 (UN 2014). But what matters most to us, beyond these aggregate statistics is to know that in countries in the South, the number of people living in slums does not stop increasing. Launched in 2000 by UN-Habitat, the Millennium Development Goals had, amongst other objectives, to improve the lives of 100 million people living in slums. According to the organisation, this goal was achieved. This does not prevent the increase of the actual number of people living in slums. From 820 million people in 2010, this number is expected, according to UN-HABITAT (2012) to reach 889 million in 2020, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

As such the slums are the most obvious sign of what we will call a dual growth, economic growth and growing poverty, especially urban poverty, which over the decades has seen the actual number of victims increase. And disparities widen, both socially and spatially.

As we said in the introduction, the reality of the slums is not made only of physical and infrastructural dimensions. The 15 case studies show the diversity of each situation, but at the same time address a number of recurrent issues. Addressing the issue by material improvements, more or less punctual can hardly be criticised, but it does not solve the continuous trend of funding problems. On the one hand, it is necessary to understand the causes of this phenomenon; and on the other, to perceive the social, economic and cultural dimensions. Informality is a key concept, as highlighted by Roy (2009), and this informality is ever-present, outside of the law, outside of the regulations (Boano 2013). And it is not just about the poor and does not touch just the slums. The population growth of cities in Southern countries is so strong that the authorities are not armed, either with texts, or with money, or with the staff to cope. This is the art of "getting by" prevailing among the urban poor. But they are also the lenient practice, or even corruption, prevalent in many countries of the world, and that offer to these residents compromises that are insecure but real.

Some authors have animated the debate over the past decade, stressing, as does Mike Davis (2006), the most alarming dimensions of this phenomenon: violence, insecurity, crime, traffic, etc. But this omits the fact that most inhabitants of the slums are primarily individuals and families who seek first to integrate into the city and get the most from it. These facts are real; however, they are only symptomatic of a portion of reality. As stated by Gilbert (2007), stressing aspects of insecurity and poverty prevailing in the slums, we tend to forget that the focus on the prevalence of physical and material informality of that urban life disregards the integration efforts that these individuals are making to survive, live and progress in their individual and collective projects, self-built houses, installation of water systems by communities, organising neighbourhoods, and small-scale businesses.

As stated by Watson (2009), the city of the South is growing, and very quickly. And with this demographic transfer, there is inevitably a concentration of poverty and social, economic but also spatial fragmentation. Urban planning is not able to

anticipate them, nor even to solve a multitude of intertwined problems between the local needs of each family, of each neighbourhood, and the projection for the entire emerging urban area. The result is slums, on the fringes of the models used by policy makers and planners, but at the centre of urban problems – in the number of them, that varies according to the city but always impressive by the number of concerned individuals, in the essential problems to be addressed, but also in the contribution of these populations to urban dynamics, job creation, income generation, community organisation, and social and political participation. New forms of urban planning must be invented and adapted to the real context, as sketched by Jérôme Chenal et al. in this book. Integrated throughout the city, this planning has the extremely complex task of thinking both globally and locally, weighing and setting priorities in a constantly changing socio-spatial context, in order to get out of a dichotomy in which the planning outline and the major areas of intervention are fixed, while leaving local communities and informal providers to urgently settle problems in the discriminated neighbourhoods.

22.3 Causes and Effects: The Contribution of "Slum Theories"

Obviously, the slum is not a problem that can be solved in isolation, separate from its spatial and social context. And as the many works done in this regard do not allow a precise definition accepted by all, especially by its own inhabitants, it is necessary that we assume both our "vision" and definition of the slum, as well as our practical intentions regarding its contextualised transformation. What the Madrid architects involved in Cañada Real claim, choosing to be called "Todo por la Praxis (everything through praxis)".

Understanding this requires a theoretical analysis to demonstrate that the slum is not the worst of all possible worlds, even if one insists on the deficiencies, but that it is also a place to live, resulting from the spatial and social practices of the city. Accordingly, and as we have suggested in Chap. 2, theorising the slums implies that it is treated as part of the global urban reality. This will better assess, in the face of the massive expansion of this phenomenon, its chances of being recognised as such, as a basic part of the urban system.

The issue is not only scientific, it is also political, since it is primarily about capturing its historicity and its complex reality, both in the suffering of those who built and animated it, and in its potential to rethink the city as a whole through its marginalised centrality status, to the resistance of its negation by a standardised urban world that would like its physical eradication or its unreality, only for its "photogenic" validation.

A sociology of slums allows one to historically situate the state of our cities and to understand how the slums "contain" this segregated city and this dominant urban order, from which the inhabitants can only escape by strengthening the informality

of their urban integration, with accumulated threats against their daily existence, housing, health, work, and money. The central question then is to define the best way to override two professional positions: eradicate or renovate, but to aim at its rehabilitation and, to this end, take into account its existence in the district, the establishment of human beings in a city, so as to rethink urbanity in its entirety, of which the slums is an integral part.

To restructure progressive logic that is rendered by all purely formal urban plans, on any scale whatsoever, it is best to visit the slum and embrace what makes it, in its otherness, an urban space, often overlooked, almost always misunderstood, invisible and omitted from urban thought, an object of disgrace; an area in which even the best-intentioned humanistic and renovating projects deny the identity when faced with the dominant model of manufacturing the city. It is for this reason that our theory of the slums seeks to reaffirm the real political issue which is the serious analysis of slums, poor districts for which one tends to ignore the fundamental dignity of its builders and inhabitants, admittedly built in miserable conditions, but through actions drowned in good intentions, with the huge temptation to reduce it to an aesthetic and ignorant projection.

The paradigm reversal requires a vision of slums as representative of the destructive nature of urban planning, in the sense explained above. With, as a consequence, the reaffirmation of the original urban enigma that transcends the issue of slums "in itself" and those questions that one continues to ask without being able to answer: what is the urbanisation of the world? And what is, in this perspective, the place of slums in urban planning?

22.4   From Action to Planning: Insecurity, Poverty and Urban Integration

In every city of the world, and in massive and compelling ways in the so-called emerging and developing countries, urban policies affect the slums, whether it be their original intention or the consequences there of urban projects meeting other goals, but shattering the organisation of the city and the lives of all its inhabitants, including those in slums.

These policies translate into programmes, or projects, or public and/or private actions. From case to case, we have been able to see that this can range from the outright eradication of slums and the eviction of its inhabitants, with the suffering they are subjected to and the changes that are imposed on their future, to the restructuring of these neighbourhoods in extremely diverse forms and amplitudes, with more or less long term consequences, which we only rarely take into account.

The proposed typology helps us to better perceive urban issues that guide these dynamics, to the conflicts they generate.

The slums are almost invariably interpreted as places of mounting poverty, and reducing poverty is too often overlooked through ignorance or through strategies that win over the powers that be, by the disappearance of slums.

But what matters to us above all and definitely, is to know how the slum questions the city.

The first issue is that of its marginality. Not only do the slums live in insecurity, despite their economic dynamism and their intense social organisation, but they live it in double measure since it excludes the system, a system of collective representation of the city, a system of transformation of the city.

The second question is directed to all stakeholders in the city, it is that of urban standards, those that are designed in specialty cabinets, like those that we teach to future professionals and that administrative officers and private operators highlight to direct their actions. However, these standards become totally abstract when addressing the slums; arrogant and obsolete, they represent the destruction of that which exists, as much on social as on the material planes.

The third issue that we cannot escape from is that of informality. So what should be done with slums, where people work without being declared, where one is housed without being properly identified as the owner or tenant, where one occupies land without a land title? The globalisation of the economy and the neo-liberal policies that support the modernisation of the city aim to privatise them, by individualising persons and sacrificing communities, and by distorting the democratic dimension of service to the community. Facing the State individually, facing taxation alone, and facing its future without any support. It is therefore no coincidence that land regularisation is central to the concerns of slums restructuring projects.

All this is an ideal vision of the city, which does not corresponded to the social reality that edifies the city, according to history and in its contemporary transformation. It segregates more than it includes, it fragments the territory rather than uniting it. And from this perspective, the slums and their inhabitants no longer have rights, even though we have arrived at this key moment in the urbanisation of the world where they are established as a popular "generic" urban habitat form, an ordinary habitat, because usually inhabitants of cities are poor.

In short, it is important to rethink the slum and the actions taking place there by using a few fundamental and perhaps founding questions for a new way of thinking about urban development: what is the vision of the city we want to produce, to benefit whom, and how? How to prioritise the needs of people facing which demands? What is the quality of life that is to be preserved and promoted in neighbourhoods inhabited by people apparently located at the bottom of this hierarchy? And on this basis, taking into account the context of existing expertise and resources, think in terms of inclusive and non-discriminatory urban management. To this end, it is imperative to apply some basic rules of urban planning defending normal conditions of habitability and the social and economic integration of all, taking into account the nature of the neighbourhood, but for the benefit of all, and not to the exclusion of some.

22.5   Between Marginality and Centrality, the Issue of the Slums and of the City

The first thing to remember, whether one is interested in the slums "in general" or specifically to one of the neighbourhoods cited in this book, is that in addressing its specific concrete, ordinary, everyday characteristics, both human and spatial, environmental and constructive, the slums and their inhabitants, indirectly speak to us about two different things that we must differentiate: on the one hand, the story of their lives, of their conquest of the city, of their multiple attempts at integration, and what that represents to them in terms of neighbourhood, and social, cultural, and community allegiance; on the other hand, the fact that, whatever their difficulties in being admitted, they live in the city, are citizens of a "world" beyond the borders more or less marked by the neighbourhood, their practices necessarily overflowing their assignment to a residence to greatly irradiate their city, their country. Their environment is plural, individual and familial, preoccupied with education, health, housing, and income issues. Their world is likewise made of a thousand ramifications within the slum, because it is there that the links are forged, that the neighbourhood becomes a form of mutual assistance, that common origins are shared hopes. But it is also there where there are constraints, where threats are formulated, where issues must be met in a communal way, but that often cause divisions, new disputes and social divides.

The problems caused to the city by the slum, but also the problems posed to the slums by the city, cannot be addressed separately from their wider environment – this city, by "nature" dual and unequal – an environment perfectly understandable when it comes to technical networks, to its road alignments or to its collective amenities, but which should also be when it comes to social and legal demands on the full and complete integration of these slum citizens at the political and democratic level, and that yet almost always remain incomprehensible to policy makers.

22.6   Tackling the Slums Issue

Intervention in a slum, whether as a political activist, an NGO professional, the representative of a group in defence of community interests, technical service agents, or even delegates from a cooperation agency, involves positioning oneself, politically and spatially, i.e., to be clear about the role that one plays, the function that one occupies, and the intentions that one's projects about future activities. But also, aware of the land where one takes a position, of the territory in which one operates and of the space within which these activities will be located.

For this, the expert/professional/activist should take some precautions. The first is not to put on blinders and not to limit oneself to the impressions gathered in a few dozen square metres travelled, to quick organised visits, any more than the official voice that will explain that all problems have long been identified and recorded, and

it is only necessary to act accordingly to solve them, if possible according to the expectations of funders and potential sponsors. One must open one's eyes as much to what is real as to oneself, the world as it is and our place in it and for it. Adopting an "ethnological" look at this reality is indispensable; view, navigate, listen closely, to disparate voices, to many voices. In order to understand the flesh and the thickness of the neighbourhood that welcomes us, understand the unique way it has to exist, but also as its own builders perceive it, in its history, its present, and its future. And on this basis, the second facet of this apprehension strategy is to immerse oneself in the reality of the city, to know the ins and outs, the modes of operation, of regulation, the local stakeholders, the tensions, the power struggles, the challenges as perceived by the city fathers, by the authorities, by opposition groups, the resources available and actions taken in terms of development and planning.

22.7   The Slum in a Global Vision of the City

Once this immersion in urban reality is done, the next step is in relation to the vision that professionals have of the city, eager from far and near to "collaborate" with every inhabitant of this city, and of what the city could be in 10, 20 or 50 years, without much regard for the moment to the technical and budgetary constraints that will in any case no longer be the same in 3 months, but especially to expand on the values that one wants to promote, the guidelines that these values could engender in terms of standards, rules, and future practices.

This is not prophecy, or in the sense of Orwell, in 1984 or in "The brave New World" describing their era and what is at stake in the present, as a warning, hoping the worse will not come. It is about thinking of the current situation, taking into account what might happen to the city within a few years. Thus, the slum in its brutality, in its institutional violence, and in the harshness of the lives of its inhabitants, but in broad day light, the fact that the poor, that poverty, not only truly exists today, but that it is a cog in a vast urban cogwheel.

By focusing on the slum, its inequalities and its shortfalls, the alternative is less, at first, to rush to solutions that would only be provisional, in addition to being more than being premature, but from a realistic point of view, to rest the foundation for an inclusive city. The inclusive city is certainly not an ideal, imaginary, simple and happy city on planet earth. More pragmatically, therefore politically, this is a city which, by the will of its decision-making actors, notably by its local authorities, decided to act in favour of the majority, therefore individuals and families who have no class, racial or political affiliation privileges, and for which public action, targeted to "growth" sectors, will have a leverage effect in favour of their living conditions and their urban integration. Again this will require choices weighted by the available resources, but preference will be given to equipment and valuable services for the entire urban community. Following the example of basic water and electricity networks, school buildings, hospitals, and feeder roads that open up neighbourhoods and are brought into the road network, etc.

This does not mean that other actions should not be conducted within slums, responding to requests from the community, to the intrinsic needs of the neighbourhood. Neither is this to say that these actions should not be hard won by the "beneficiaries", the institutional actors generally having a hard time to truly engage in a concerted transformation of the slums, which would not serve capital interests. It has been said, it is not about an ideal city, but a real city, and its making, both social and spatial, involves many struggles and acts of resistance, to "major urban projects" in particular. But this does not mean that we shouldn't aim for a global perception of the problems, at the city and the precarious neighbourhood levels, and that urban planning, led by an inclusive vision, can't be careful about giving preferential treatment to interventions that simply assure that actions are coherent.

22.8   What Should Be Done About the Slum? An Urban Thought for a Multidimensional Action

The typology developed in this work is an undeniable support in decision-making. Its format is simple and pragmatic, based on knowledge that is recognised as useful and data that is easily accessible. We used it to introduce each one of the 15 cases presented in the book. But we also offered to each author the liberty to analyse personally the issues met in this context, offering through the diversity of cases, an opportunity to demonstrate that there are many ways to question the reality. We have data in real time and immersed in time on the characteristics of neighbourhoods, this at the spatial, urban, and – depending on available sources – the environmental levels, when it comes to anything regarding the social, cultural, and economic aspects. However, this is not enough. It is indispensable to obtain, to analyse, and to implement these elements, taking into account a number of criteria that will serve as milestones for renewed urban planning and adapted to the socio-spatial context. And it is still necessary to theoretically extend them, in order to draft a reasonable list of crucial proposals that are urgently needed:

Any intervention will be considered as an interaction between intended local action and its integration into an urban perception at the citywide scale, or even the city and its region.

The diagnosis will be established on the basis of typological features to frame the problems and make them coherent, in order to prioritise interventions in their investment and time.

Highlighting the problems and resulting actions will be done by working with the urban players, including representatives of the slum population and the various urban stakeholders, in order to identify the needs from a technical analysis of the situation, as well as the social demands that meet the requirements of the inhabitants of the concerned slums.

The measures to be implemented for urban rehabilitation will be guided by a desire to strengthen urban equity, better socio-economic and territorial integration of the poorest, and the fight against poverty, because it is that of the entire city.

The implementation schedule of the work to be undertaken in time will be defined taking into account the budget available specifically to the city, as well as external grants that might be contributed (region, nation State, foreign backers), and last, but not least, the professional and social agenda of the "self-builders" of slums, for which we will respect their availability and skills.

The actions envisaged will integrate urban and territorial dimensions, while imperatively including environmental, social and economic, aspects, but also, very concretely, political, ideological, and cultural conditions in each context.

The city of the South is in the process of changing, without interruption: internal population growth, immigration, determining new polarities and new economic activities. It combines both formal and informal activities. And this is not about to change. Despite this, working for the "development" of the slum remains a very concrete way to question the logic that prevails in contemporary urban evolution and this is never easy. The city, in the eyes of some, is primarily a market in which it is possible to still make a lot of money, if one is willing to leave on the economic roadside an important part of those who live differently, but who are also producers of the present city. For others, which we believe to be, it is above all a human macrocosm, about which choices must be made to restore the place and honour to the poorest inhabitants, discredited and yet major actors, irreplaceable players in this growing city.

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