

D. Fairchild Ruggles *Editor*

# On Location

Heritage Cities and Sites

 Springer

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D. Fairchild Ruggles  
Department of Landscape Architecture  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  
Champaign, IL 61820, USA  
dfr1@illinois.edu

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# Contributors

**James R. Barrett** Department of History, University of Illinois  
at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA  
jrbarret@illinois.edu

**Sharon Haar** School of Architecture, University of Illinois at Chicago,  
Chicago, IL, USA  
haar@uic.edu

**Zeynep Kezer** School of Architecture Planning and Landscape,  
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK  
zeynep.kezer@ncl.ac.uk

**Chuo Li** Department of Landscape Architecture, Mississippi State University,  
Starkville, MS, USA  
cl1004@msstate.edu

**Emily Gunzburger Makaš** College of Arts + Architecture,  
The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA  
emakas@uncc.edu

**Robert Ousterhout** Department of the History of Art,  
The University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA  
ousterob@sas.upenn.edu

**D. Fairchild Ruggles** Department of Landscape Architecture,  
University of Illinois at Champaign, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA  
dfr1@illinois.edu

**Clare A. Sammells** Department of Sociology/Anthropology, Bucknell University,  
Lewisburg, PA, USA  
c.sammells@bucknell.edu

**Joseph L. Scarpaci** Department of Geography, West College of Business,  
West Liberty University, West Liberty, WV, USA  
joseph.scarpaci@westliberty.edu

**Helaine Silverman** Department of Anthropology, University of Illinois  
at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA  
helaine@illinois.edu

**Ian Straughn** Brown University, Providence, RI, USA  
Ian\_Straughn@brown.edu

# Introduction: The Social and Urban Scale of Heritage

D. Fairchild Ruggles

## The Heritage of Cities

A recent exhibition at the New Museum sharply rebukes preservation movements for transforming lively and inhabited, albeit gritty, urban environments into bland precincts for touristic observation and consumption. “Cronocaos” (2010 at the Venice Biennale, and restaged at the New Museum in New York in 2011) makes this point through its contrast between visibly “preserved” clean spaces and intact fabric, starting with the exhibition’s awning, where the name “Cronocaos” is splashed across an existing and still legible sign for the former restaurant supply store where the show is installed (Ouroussoff 2011). Designed by Rem Koolhaas and Shohei Shigematsu, the exhibition does not take issue with transformation per se so much as how the contemporary “obsession with heritage is creating an artificial re-engineered version of our memory” (New Museum 2011) in which unsightly and insalubrious heritage together with historically important but no longer valued architectural works from the 1960s and 1970s are all expunged by preservation’s merciless sanitation process.

The museum proclaims that “preservation is an under-examined topic, but increasingly relevant as we enter an age of ‘Cronocaos,’ in which the boundaries between preservation, construction, and demolition collapse, forever changing the course of linear evolution of time” (New Museum 2011). The critique is justified, but facile. It is not only the way that heritage policy distorts historic time that merits recognition, but also the way that it distorts space and thus the built environment in its entirety. This volume of essays takes on that question, especially of lived places and the way that human communities – ranging from expert professionals to ordinary residents – experience and determine the interpretation and preservation of large swathes of inhabited but historically significant space.

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D.F. Ruggles (✉)

Department of Landscape Architecture, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,  
Champaign, IL, USA

e-mail: dfr1@illinois.edu

Past volumes in the Cultural Heritage and Museum Practices (CHAMP) series have considered the themes of human rights, intangible heritage, and contested heritage. These have had a particular urgency at the time that the topics were selected. *Cultural Heritage and Human Rights* (Silverman and Ruggles 2007) was a collection of essays that responded to revelations concerning the torture of international prisoners held by the US Government in the name of protecting civil liberties that, ironically, the Bush administration had drastically curtailed with the Patriot Act of October 2001. Two years after that volume appeared, *Intangible Heritage Embodied* (Ruggles and Silverman 2009) addressed a remarkable development in UNESCO policy: the ratification of the *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* in 2003. The 2003 Convention challenged disciplinary categories because it shifted the focus of heritage from the material object to the intangible acts of performance, ritual, voice, and movement. Thus, preservation was transformed from a primarily technical procedure enacted on stone, wood, and paper to a form of social management in which the medium – the human body – was living and capable of autonomous agency. The third volume, *Contested Cultural Heritage: Religion, Nationalism, Erasure, and Exclusion in a Global World* (Silverman 2010), looked at the ways that heritage can be a site for conflict, either between majority and minority populations or between competing national bodies. If the human rights and contestation themes were a political choice, and the intangible heritage was a disciplinary choice, the present volume's theme of heritage cities and sites encourages an investigation of scale, both spatial and sociopolitical, particularly as it affects the primary stakeholders. Thus, it merges both the material and the social perspectives of heritage management and interpretation.

In this sense of opening the field to consider human beings and communities – which is the signal characteristic of heritage, as opposed to preservation studies – this volume follows naturally in the path of the previous ones. The stakeholder who lays claim to a city space can be a resident with a clear need for the amenities that the city and neighborhood is supposed to offer – clean water, sewage and waste removal, adequate and affordable housing, employment opportunities, safety, good schools, access to medical care, public transportation and parking, and so on. But the stakeholder can also be a nonresident landowner whose capital is invested in a building – a hotel, shopping center, or planned community – and who wants that fortune to rise in value, without necessarily having a sense of responsibility for the impact on the actual residents. Or, the stakeholders can be the *former* residents of a city or neighborhood, such as the generation of Chinese Americans who, having been born on American soil, left the Chinatown where their parents had settled, to move to the suburbs and realize the dream of upward social mobility that suburbia represents. Such dispersed, dislocated stakeholders can include the living descendants of dispersed or destroyed Jewish communities in Germany, Poland, Austria, and Russia or the descendents of the Irish migration to North America. They may no longer be physically present in their former neighborhood yet retain a deep attachment to the place through memory and a constructed sense of shared historic identity (Orser 2007). For some of these groups, forced exile has deepened their place attachment, and the memory of place is linked to the memory of a lost social community.

For others, the pain of leaving has been forgotten with the passing of generations, replaced by a simple and largely symbolic notion of having roots elsewhere.

Although persons whose own identity is tied to the heritage of a site are its primary stakeholders, the city administrators, urban planners, architects, sociologists, geographers, historians, and other experts cannot be excluded, and indeed the latter can have the most profound effect on planning and community survival, as Scarpaci's discussion of the office of the City Historian of Havana (chapter "Urban Heritage, Representation and Planning: Comparative Approaches in Habana Vieja and Trinidad, Cuba") elucidates. Such interested persons and agencies can range from local neighborhood associations to city councils and local preservation alliances; state and national institutions, such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the USA or INTACH in India; and finally, at the international level, UNESCO, the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), the World Monuments Fund, and groups formed around specific missions, such as Dumbarton Oaks in Washington DC and the Geneva-based Aga Khan Trust for Culture. Clearly, because the professionals in these organizations can step in and out of these roles, their presence as stakeholders is temporary.

Finally, a site may resonate with meaning not because of the attachment of specific stakeholders, but because it speaks to disparate communities and interest groups on account of what it represents. At the site of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis in 1968, there is now a National Civil Rights Museum. The site is marked so that visitors can mourn the loss of a national hero whose clear voice and courageous example galvanized the civil rights movement in the USA in the late 1950s and 1960s, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964. Many people visit the site, but the numbers of black Americans are particularly high relative to the population as a whole (58% in 2008, for example, according to personal communication from the Museum Director, Tracy Wright). If they visit the Martin Luther King, Jr. memorial more than sites such as Concord's historic bridge where the first battle of the Revolutionary War took place on April 19, 1775, it is because the Civil Rights Museum is a memorial that directly addresses the black American experience of recent and current generations. Heritage can speak to and about racial and ethnic groups and class, as demonstrated by James Barrett's study of Chicago's working-class South Side (chapter "The Heritage of Social Class and Class Conflict on Chicago's South Side"), Emily Makaš' study of ethnic divisionism in Mostar (chapter "Rebuilding Mostar: International and Local Visions of a Contested City and its Heritage"), and Zeynep Kezer's study of modern Ankara (chapter "Of Forgotten People and Forgotten Places: Nation Building and the Dismantling of Ankara's Non-Muslim Landscapes").

Among experts, descendent communities, and local residents, what constitutes a stakeholder may change as the sense of investment changes. Their attachment to place is not a firm attribute that exists in the sense of cultural deposits; it changes as groups compete for resources, reassess the past's relevance, and redefine their sense of heritage.

Tourists pay attention to heritage sites, but they are not stakeholders because as individuals they lack long-term investment in the sites they visit. Yet tourism as a



whole is an economic force that has a powerful impact on all categories of stakeholder. For historic cities, tourism can be a mixed blessing. It may bring jobs – preferably not low-paying service jobs but more empowering jobs in education and management. It may create revenues – hopefully for the residents themselves and their city so that profits are plowed back into the community and not siphoned off to distant corporate headquarters. Tourism may confirm and celebrate historic identities, or it can suppress them. It may create a bizarre disconnect between the precincts where the monuments, markets, and rituals are displayed for the consumption of outsiders, and the backstreet areas where daily activities include not Mardi Gras or the presidential inauguration but the more frequently activated rituals of Halloween trick-or-treats, happy hour at the local bar, and walking the dog – all of which are staged almost entirely for the participants themselves (MacCannell 1976; Scarpaci 2005).

A defining characteristic of cities is their spatial complexity. Whereas a monument can be cordoned off as an adventure for which one buys a ticket and passes through a turnstile or crosses a threshold, the thresholds of cities are inlaid in the very fabric of the city itself. One is usually conscious of passing from one zone to another – signaled by gates, bridges, walls, street boundaries or changes in architectural style – yet these transitional elements are not separate from the neighborhood that they announce. The borders that may encircle historic fabric in living cities do not encircle the people themselves; nor do they enclose the meanings that the historic fabric contains. Indeed, the word “contain” is symptomatic of the concept of heritage as a deposit that is laid into material culture. According to such a perspective, objects and monuments have a kind of meaning that can be possessed and even circulated in a capitalist economy (Yúdice 2003). When monuments and touristic areas are artificially marked off by walls that are exterior to them, as for example at the Alhambra or Ostia, they are set aside from the living city and designated as belonging to history, not the present. Such insistent spatial demarcations reveal an anxiety about authenticity, a fear made palpable by the fact that while historic sites may represent and even emblemize the past, they exist in the present. In the words of Françoise Choay, since the nineteenth century, historic monuments have had “the intensity of a concrete *presence*” as well as “a definitive and irrevocable *past*, constructed by the double work of historiography and the recognition (historial) of the mutations imposed upon human *savoir faire* by the Industrial Revolution” (Choay 2001: 139).

A historic monument and even a city can be enclosed and the necessary services that appear to intrude on its historicity can be relegated to space outside the “circle of authenticity.” The thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Alhambra palace in Granada (Spain) is maintained within multiple circles, the outer (gardens, gates, plaza) regulated yet easily accessible, an inner circle (the palatine halls and courtyards) that requires a ticket with a fixed time of entrance, and an innermost circle that consists of spaces that are rarely open to the public (the towers, harem quarters, baths). Inside these circles, the conservators have carefully replaced missing tile, supplied water (some of it is now pumped mechanically through hoses rather than flowing gravitationally as previously), planted gardens, and – quite recently – temporarily taken away the famous lions from the central fountain of one of the courtyards in order to remove centuries of lime accretion. Meanwhile, the huge parking lot, ticket booths

with long queues, gift shops, and restaurants are located on the exterior. The palace is of course uninhabited, although there are hotels and residences just outside the precinct walls and one of them occupies the former Monastery of San Francisco, which itself replaced a former Islamic palace. The border between historic interior and supposedly less-historic exterior is marked by a guarded entrance, where a uniformed attendant takes the visitor's ticket before ushering him or her through the door into the first of the palace's many halls. The strategy of fencing off these zones works well, preserving the site, despite the 5,000 visitors that walk through the halls on an average day, their feet scraping the stone floors, and their shoulders rubbing against glazed tile ([http://www.turgranada.es/sala-prensa/sala-prensa-detalle.php?id\\_seccion=635](http://www.turgranada.es/sala-prensa/sala-prensa-detalle.php?id_seccion=635), consulted 26 July 2010). This physical boundary between historic interior and an exterior characterized by parking and hygiene services, although inscribed spatially, actually marks an imaginary temporal line between the historic past – the Islamic era of six and a half centuries ago – and the present.

A living city cannot use such strategies because the borders of a living city are not external to the historic fabric but an integral part of it. With no inscribed inner circle and no exterior, where are the parking spaces for cars and buses to be placed? The toilets, cafes, post offices, and pharmacies cannot be relegated elsewhere; they are needed for the comfort of the residents and must be incorporated into the urban fabric, modern but necessary impositions of the present on the otherwise well-preserved vision of the past. The pressures of growth on urban planning in a rapidly developing city in China are examined in this volume by Sharon Haar. An example of growth – in the form of a new park – that self-consciously reflects the past is presented in Straughn's chapter.

This is not to suggest that the city has no zones at all. It often has a defined historic quarter (e.g., New Orleans' French Quarter) or cultural area (e.g., New York's Little Italy), and it is full of people who regularly pass back and forth between zones, living in one area but working, going to school, shopping, or simply visiting in another. It is also determined by financial and other kinds of capital that contribute to the production of these same marked areas and likewise pass in and out of them. People and capital are not separate from the zones that they inhabit. One can usually recognize the crossing from one area to another, such as from the corporate business district to the designated historic area, "red light" zone, street market, or university campus, but it may be less obvious how those seemingly disparate spaces produce each other.

This past and present interconnectedness of sites and urban spaces eludes preservation because such relationships cannot be artificially maintained. The existing preservation technique of selecting and conserving the physical artifact or the more recent framework of encouraging the continuity of intangible cultural practices both rely on the pressure of a heritage agency that is external to the artifact or practice being protected. Preservation is, by definition, something that is brought to bear on material or social culture in order to prevent its disappearance. It is an oxymoron: in the act of stabilizing a historic quarter that is disintegrating, or keeping alive disappearing vocal or craft traditions, it intervenes in the cultural fabric or practice and thereby changes it. Most tourists, themselves an external presence, do not notice the change. But stakeholders do.

Studying and managing heritage cities is difficult both because cities are porous and because they are inhabited. The borders are part of the city itself and demarcate zones without necessarily blocking access (although clearly some residents have freer movement than others). The meaning of a monument or urban space occurs in the space between the observer and the object of attention. But if the observer (like the stakeholder) is a shifting category, then meaning is likewise unstable. This is problematic for the interpretation of heritage, which seeks to reveal and explain the most important meanings that resonate from a monument or site. Because these meanings are contingent on people, they are affected by the same political ideologies, economic pressures, religious faith, and social identities that characterize the people. Ultimately, heritage has to be not only “present centered” but flexible and humanistic. The results may sometimes look strange, as explained in Ousterhout’s examination of the various preservation and demolition phases of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (chapter “Is Nothing Sacred? A Modernist Encounter with the Holy Sepulchre”), and the lack of unity may reflect a lack of concord regarding what the monument means.

In this way of framing the space of the heritage city as permeable and alive, the difference between the objectives of preservation and the objectives of heritage study is revealed. Both are focused on a historic entity. But whereas *preservation* is specifically action oriented and focuses on a historic object, usually defined as a monument or place, *heritage study* is less concerned with the act of preservation than its outcome, specifically the outcome with respect to issues of social justice, the triad of race/class/gender, the economics of preservation management and tourism, and issues of identity and difference. In the words of G. J. Ashworth, Brian Graham, and J.E. Tunbridge, “heritage is present-centered and is created, shaped, and managed by, and in response to, the demands of the present. As such it is open to constant revision and change and is also both a source and a repercussion of social conflict” (2007: 3). For this reason, the essays in this volume focus hardly at all on how to preserve historic sites but turn instead to the social life of cities, towns, and large-scale sites in places as diverse as Chicago, San Francisco, Habana, Cuzco, Tiwanaku, Jerusalem, Mostar, Ankara, Shunde, and Cairo. Rather than stasis and unity, the essays focus on change, pluralism, and fragmentation. Rather than assuming that the city and its population are one and the same, they examine the ways in which cities are dynamically changing as they are made and then remade by the people who inhabit or simply visit them.

## Heritage Organizations and Preservation Instruments

UNESCO is today the world’s most powerful heritage organization with the most extensive international scope. Planned in the aftermath of the First World War and responding to the devastating destruction of that war and World War II, UNESCO was formalized in 1946 and had 36 member states by the following year (for a history of UNESCO, see Valderrama 1995). With respect to the preservation of cultural heri-

tage, it followed upon earlier international efforts, specifically the Madrid Conference of 1904 and the Athens *Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments* of 1932. But because UNESCO was under the aegis of the newly formed United Nations, its powers rested on international law and a structure of international cooperation that far exceeded the specific heritage mission. In the formation of UNESCO, cultural heritage was tied to larger political agendas. It was also predicated on the recognition that international cooperation was sometimes needed to intervene in the protection of sites that were deemed of such outstanding universal significance that their preservation or destruction should not be left solely in the hands of the nation-state where they were located. This was the motivation for the 1972 *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, now known simply as the World Heritage Convention. The convention was adopted as a specific outcome of the UNESCO campaign to preserve the Abu Simbel and Philae temples in Egypt prior to the Aswan Dam's flooding of the valley where the ancient monuments had stood for more than two millennia.

Not all world nations have signed on to UNESCO's World Heritage Convention, but those that have done so are identified in UNESCO's various instruments (consisting of declarations, recommendations, and conventions) as states parties and they have agreed to evaluate and select sites in their own nations for nomination to the UNESCO World Heritage List.

One of world's most powerful preservation instruments – the Venice Charter – was written not by UNESCO but ICOMOS. When the First Congress of Architects and Specialists of Historic Buildings met in Paris in 1957, it recommended that the world's nations should establish a government agency to oversee the protection of historic buildings and that the member states of UNESCO should join the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) in Rome. The emergence of a new organization, whose charge extended beyond museum walls (and different from the purview of the International Council of Museums, ICOM), was key. The charter was the first in a series that expanded the definition of the object of preservation from a precious thing in a glass vitrine to larger areas of material fabric, such as walls, buildings, and archaeological and historic precincts.

When the Second Congress of Architects and Specialists of Historic Buildings met in Venice in 1964, the group took two actions that would have a long-lasting impact. The first was the adoption of the *International Restoration Charter*, now known as the Venice Charter, and the second was the establishment of ICOMOS. With the Venice Charter, the frame of preservation had grown in scale from museum object to architectural monument; yet these early attempts still focused on the monument as a self-contained and permanent object, advocating for better technical methods and a consistent and scientific approach to preservation. As a set of preservation codes, it was visionary, but the justification and social values underlying preservation were not examined. The concept that the object of preservation was static and purely formal and material reflected a Western set of assumptions about material culture. Although one of the salutary aspects of the council was its international collaboration, of the 23 experts convened to draft the charter, only two came from outside of Europe.

The role of ICOMOS was advisory to UNESCO. Its member experts met regularly to review urgent preservation problems, such as the list of at-risk sites, and to draft policies reflecting “best practices” for heritage preservation and management. Both ICOMOS and the Venice Charter reflected a perception of heritage that focused on “the preservation and restoration of ancient buildings” (Venice Charter) and “preservation and the appreciation of the world heritage of historic monuments” (ICOMOS, Historic Background, Document 2). In both, the monument was designated as the primary object of preservation, permanence was emphasized, and reconstruction was sharply limited.

The Venice Charter did not view monuments in isolation: it addressed “not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting.” However, the words “but also” implied a hierarchy between monument and setting, in which the landscape or urban environment was valued as the ground (“setting”) from which the monument itself emerged. Neither landscape nor cityscape was regarded as a monument or primary object for preservation.

The charter also expressed anxiety about authenticity, as represented in the assertions of articles 12 and 13:

Article 12. Replacements of missing parts must integrate harmoniously with the whole, but at the same time must be distinguishable from the original so that restoration does not falsify the artistic or historic evidence.

Article 13. Additions cannot be allowed except in so far as they do not detract from the interesting parts of the building, its traditional setting, the balance of its composition and its relation with its surroundings.

Article 9 is the most problematic. It states that out of “respect for original material” restoration “must stop at the point where conjecture begins, and in this case moreover any extra work which is indispensable must be distinct from the architectural composition and must bear a contemporary stamp.” In the insistence on a clear distinction between old and new, it was understood that the new fabric should reflect modernist values and that additions and restoration work should *contrast* with the historic fabric rather than blend in or complement it. In conducting preservation, architects and conservators have struggled ever since with the implied stylistic preference for cold modernism. On a conceptual level, the differentiation between original object and later work reflected a broader notion of the object as distinct from its surroundings, an isolated object standing clearly apart from later additions and surrounding context. But in the last decades of the twentieth century, poststructuralism insisted that object and context were mutually constituted, that neither could be said to produce the other, and thus that there was no sequential order of being or importance. Influenced by this radically different philosophical reimagining of what the object is (which denies the possibility of determining originality), the Venice Charter’s distinction between original object and later accretions came under scrutiny. Growing dissatisfaction on both a practical and philosophical level led to a reevaluation of the charter in 2006, and the subsequent publication of a large volume of collected studies evaluating the impact, utility, and limits of the 1964 Venice Charter (Hardy 2008, see especially the chapter by Samir Younes).

While the Venice Charter continued to insist on the integrity and authenticity of the original monument as a distinct object, other UNESCO conventions and ICOMOS charters began to expand the scale of the “monument” to include urban fabric, gardens, and landscape. The 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention broadened the field considerably when it identified heritage as encompassing both the natural and the cultural, defining the latter not only as monuments (architecture, sculpture, painting), but also as groups of buildings and sites in which both natural and cultural factors contributed to the value. In its accommodation of the natural alongside the cultural, the convention shifted emphasis from “cultural property” (a mid-century legacy emphasizing particular ownership) to one of a commonly shared heritage that was envisioned as serving the existing stakeholders as well as future generations (Yusuf 2008: 27). The convention did not set out specifically to address landscape, but was amended at various subsequent moments to do so (Whitby-Last 2008).

With specific import for cities, UNESCO made the *Recommendation Concerning the Safeguarding and Contemporary Role of Historic Areas* in 1976. This followed after related recommendations for the safeguarding of archaeological excavations (1956), landscapes (1962), cultural sites endangered by development (1968), and the 1972 *World Heritage Convention*. And it followed after the ICOMOS *Resolutions on the Conservation of Smaller Historic Towns* (1975) which defined the object of preservation as small towns that have not expanded beyond historic core and that lack economic vitality. The 1976 *Historic Areas* recommendation begins with the statement that “historic areas are part of the daily environment of human beings everywhere,” and it specifically targeted “historic towns, old urban quarters, villages and hamlets” in its language (section 1a). It recommends that preservation occur in conjunction with planning at the urban, local, and regional levels and that it extend beyond merely stabilizing the physical fabric to include maintenance and revitalization of the entire area. It mentions modern ills, such as pollution, increasing danger of demolition with consequences for both social coherence and economic vitality, loss of viewsheds due to encroaching urban development, and need for rehabilitation of slums. Section 3 addresses the question of scale:

Section 3. Every historic area and its surroundings should be considered in their totality as a coherent whole whose balance and specific nature depend on the fusion of the parts of which it is composed and which include human activities as much as the buildings, the spatial organization and the surroundings. All valid elements, including human activities, however modest, thus have a significance in relation to the whole which must not be disregarded.

Just as the complex scale of historic urban fabric was recognized as a source of concern for preservationists, so too the scale of landscape entered into the debates. In 1982, ICOMOS adopted the *International Charter for Historic Gardens*, called the Florence Charter. Its emphasis on historic gardens was new, and in the spirit of the Venice Charter it provided general guidelines for the maintenance, conservation, and restoration (although see Birnbaum 1994 for more specific practical guidelines) and acknowledged that landscapes cannot be understood separately from the activities that take place in them. However, it was an awkward document that was uncomfortably romantic in its emphasis on the beauty of historic gardens and landscapes as sites of

enjoyment and even “paradise”: it ignored sites of pain and sorrow, such as graveyards and battlefields, and sites of shame and endurance, such as concentration camp gardens. The most popular form of designed landscape – the public park – was ignored until ICOMOS published a statement on Historic Parks and Cultural Landscapes between 2001 and 2002. Perhaps for this reason, the Florence Charter, unlike many other ICOMOS charters, was not adopted as a UNESCO instrument.

In 1979, the Australian National Committee of ICOMOS adopted its own ICOMOS charter, known as the Burra Charter.<sup>1</sup> National committees frequently issue charters for their own national audience, and these can sometimes provide the seeds for discourse on an international field. Although produced to address specific issues pertaining to Australian heritage, the Burra Charter gained international importance for its broad emphasis on *all* sites of cultural significance. It made clear distinctions between maintenance, preservation, restoration, reconstruction, and adaption. With specific respect to heritage of cities and sites, it introduced new terminology to compensate for the Venice Charter’s loose (and generally useless) definitions of “the architectural work” and the “urban or rural setting.” The new terms were:

1.1 Place: “site, area, building or other work, group of buildings or other works together with pertinent contents and surroundings.”

1.2 Cultural significance: “aesthetic, historic, scientific, or social value for past, present, or future generations.”

1.5 Fabric: “all the physical material of the place.”

For the heritage of cities and large sites, the most important charter may be the ICOMOS *Charter on the Conservation of Historic Towns and Areas*, called the Washington Charter (1987). Designed to complement and expand upon the Venice Charter, the charter cautioned that historic cities, “large and small,” are vulnerable to urban encroachment and industrialization. To preserve historic cities, it said that attention must be paid not only to the state of preservation of the individual buildings (as decreed by the Venice Charter), but also to formal spatial relationships and to the economic, commercial, and cultural functioning of the city. It recognizes the complexity of urban character, described as:

1. Urban patterns as defined by lots and streets;
2. Relationships between buildings and green and open spaces;
3. The formal appearance, interior and exterior, of buildings as defined by scale, size, style, construction, materials, color, and decoration;
4. The relationship between the town or urban area and its surrounding setting, both natural and man-made; and
5. The various functions that the town or urban area has acquired over time.

The charter addressed the fact that cities are not merely material artifacts but inhabited, complex communities on which heritage conservation and planning have an immediate impact that can be either positive or damaging to both public and private life. It urged a broadly conceived and flexible approach that would integrate the diverse physical, social, and economic dimensions of the city and be sensitive to the desires of local inhabitants to maintain their identity and retain control of their



environment. The stress on relationships (between built form and built spaces and between town and surroundings) and function seemed to emerge more from the mindset of cultural geographers and anthropologists than preservationists, and indeed, the Washington Charter signaled a new direction in ICOMOS and UNESCO instruments that has since led to a new concern for human and intangible forms of heritage (Ruggles and Silverman 2009).

The first of these was the *Nara Document on Authenticity* (ICOMOS 1994), in which preservation values – although purporting to build on the Venice Charter – were radically redefined to admit a more diverse set of expectations and possibilities. Instead of privileging stasis and material form, the spectrum of things to be “preserved” was greatly expanded to include material impermanence, renewal, and human performativity. More importantly, the Nara Document insisted that preservation values are not universal, but “may differ from culture to culture, and even within the same culture.” Not only was the object of preservation thus changed dramatically, but preservation practice itself. And with this change, the dominance of the West in the articulation of heritage values heretofore was likewise unseated. The trend toward greater relativism, impermanence, and the social and human aspects of cultural practice culminated in the 2003 *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Heritage* and the 2005 *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* which aimed “to promote respect for the diversity of cultural expressions and raise awareness of its value at the local, national and international levels” (Article 1e) (Ruggles and Silverman 2009: 1–14).

In 2005, UNESCO published the *Vienna Memorandum on World Heritage and Contemporary Architecture – Managing the Historic Urban Landscape*, which culminated in 2011 in the draft of an official UNESCO *Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape* that as of this writing was still under review by the member states. ICOMOS – which is not a states party and thus technically not required to comment – nonetheless in its advisory role annotated the draft. It observed that the Vienna Memorandum, although emphasizing the conjunction of architecture, urban fabric, and landscape, seemed to revert to the Venice Charter’s earlier language that divided historic fabric from modern restoration. ICOMOS pointed specifically to the problematic Article 21 in the Vienna Memorandum:

... urban planning, contemporary architecture and preservation of the historic urban landscape should avoid all forms of pseudo-historical design, as they constitute a denial of both the historical and the contemporary alike. One historical view should not supplant others, as history must remain readable, while continuity of culture through quality interventions is the ultimate goal.

ICOMOS cautioned that Article 21’s disparagement of “pseudo-historical design” seemed “an encouragement for, if not insistence upon, conflictual interventions that do not respect ‘continuum’,” and demanded that the wording be revised in the recommendation under review (see link to ICOMOS comments at <http://www.whc.unesco.org/en/activities/638>).

In whatever form the 2011 recommendation takes, it will be a fundamental document for the management of historic cities. In its present draft form, it treats cities as historically layered – “to be revealed and celebrated” – comprising both natural



and cultural features and existing at a geographical scale well beyond that of the historic center. Instead of setting fixed policies to guide the preservation of material fabric – which too often sterilizes it in the very manner lambasted by the Cronacaos exhibition – it calls for a new “management of change,” a dynamic process that is as historically authentic as the material fabric itself. The change is envisioned as sustainable so that historic fabric can serve not only the present but also future generations. Thus, rather than regarding the city as a new version of preservation’s artifact, larger and more complex than preservation objects as typically defined, it instead advocates for a new approach to the care and management of historic cities.

The new UNESCO recommendation appears flexible, in which case it may allow historic cities to flourish and promote a shared understanding of heritage even while their residents and visitors enjoy them as useful modern spaces. Cities and sites are not always understood in the same way by their various stakeholders – think of Mostar or San Francisco’s Chinatown (chapters “The Politics and Heritage of Race and Space in San Francisco’s Chinatown” and “Rebuilding Mostar: International and Local Visions of a Contested City and Its Heritage”) – but they have the potential for providing common ground – think of the scarred site of the World Trade Center in New York City. Cities are often home to considerable human diversity, which is one of the pleasures and challenges of urban life. Culturally, this diversity is a resource that enriches the social life of both inhabitants and visitors: some of the most energetic St. Patrick’s Day parades occur in New York and Boston, which have large populations of descendent Irish, and yet one does not have to be Irish to enjoy a St. Patrick’s Day parade. But diversity can sometimes lead to conflict and even eruptions of violence when the presence of an alternative identity is asserted or even trumpeted, as in the disagreements regarding the rights of gay people to march in the New York St. Patrick’s Day parade.<sup>2</sup> From the perspective of preservation, how does one preserve both the tangible and intangible heritage of a place and interpret it fairly when the primary stakeholders strongly disagree about which identity should be celebrated, or when the celebration of such identity highlights painful inequalities? Is preservation policy a matter of enjoining or policing? How reliable is official heritage interpretation when the nations entrusted with the duty to represent the past have a clear interest in its marginalization or suppression (see Silverman’s chapter “The Space of Heroism in the Historic Center of Cuzco” and Kezer’s chapter “Of Forgotten People and Forgotten Places: Nation Building and the Dismantling of Ankara’s Non-Muslim Landscapes”). What are reasonable limits to the defined space of a heritage precinct (on which see Sammells’ chapter “The City of the Present in the City of the Past: Solstice Celebrations at Tiwanaku, Bolivia”), and how much can an organization like UNESCO or the nation which actually regulates heritage circumscribe the living conditions and social behaviors of modern citizens in such areas? Where does heritage end, or does it saturate all aspects of life, like memory itself? These are unanswerable questions that continue to plague preservationists, which may be the reason why UNESCO and ICOMOS continue to churn out new declarations, recommendations, charters, and conventions in which both the object and practice of preservation are repeatedly redefined.

Ultimately, UNESCO designations, while attempting to preserve the object/site/city and its context, actually serve to decontextualize it. The very practice of listing

deracinates sites, placing them artificially in groups (according to nation), removed from the human communities where their value is most profoundly sensed and understood. The result is a reconstitution of relationships so that sites that originally gained their meaning locally now become universally recognized not for their local meaning, but for their ability to represent a larger category, which is invariably one that UNESCO has defined and to which the site is assigned in the course of its nomination by the nation. Hence, from the specific and personal, the site enters the UNESCO inventory (Hafstein 2009; Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 2004).

The essays in the present volume examine sites in terms of their meaning to human communities, considering them not as items on a list, historic fossils, or examples of applied preservation practice, but as broad swathes of historically important yet currently inhabited space. It is important to recognize that cultural traditions do not float free from the communities and specific regions from which they emerge – the three are woven together. Culture is *located*: hence the title of this volume, *On Location*.

## Notes

1. The Burra Charter, as written in 1979, has been revised several times and continues to be examined and revised in the present day (<http://australia.icomos.org/publications/charters/>).
2. The New York St. Patrick's Day parade is organized by the Ancient Order of Hibernians, not the city, which is presumably why the courts have not prohibited the discrimination.

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# The Heritage of Social Class and Class Conflict on Chicago's South Side

James R. Barrett

On September 14, 2004, hundreds of labor activists, amateur and professional historians, and other Chicagoans assembled at Haymarket to dedicate a new sculpture intended to commemorate a central event in the history of the city and the nation. The group gathered on the city's West Side, near an obscure corner that was unremarkable and – until that moment – unmarked. It had taken more than 100 years to decide on a suitable way to mark this spot for posterity. What was behind this commemoration, and why had it taken so long to acknowledge the significance of this place?

On May 4, 1886, a large group of working people had gathered in this place, in the midst of the great eight-hour strikes sweeping the country, to protest the police killing of several workers at the nearby McCormick Harvester plant. When police arrived, an unknown assailant threw a bomb from the edge of the crowd. In the *melee* that followed, eight policemen and an unknown number of workers were killed. Eight radical working-class leaders were arrested for conspiracy. Convicted on the basis of extremely flimsy evidence, four of these men were hanged, one committed suicide, and the remaining three were imprisoned. In the wake of the conflict, a Red Scare set in, as labor activists were arrested, immigrant working-class organizations were raided, and printing presses were shut down. For millions of Americans on both sides of the class divide, the Haymarket Affair symbolized the deep social divisions in Gilded-Age America, the threat – or promise – of working-class radicalism, and the frightening potential for violence in the relations between social classes (of the substantial scholarship on the subject, the best studies are Avrich 1984; Green 2006).

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
J.R. Barrett (✉)

Department of History, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,  
Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA  
e-mail: jrbarret@illinois.edu

Internationally, Haymarket became a *cause célèbre* as labor activists throughout the world commemorated the events in Chicago and their meaning for workers. In 1889, the new Socialist International declared May First to be “May Day,” an international labor holiday. Novelists, playwrights, and poets invoked Haymarket in numerous languages, as did artists throughout the world. William Morris argued that the executions demonstrated “that cold cruelty, heartless and careless at once, which is one of the most noticeable characteristics of American commercialism” (Thompson 1976: 507, quoting *Commonweal* Sept. 24, 1887). The great British graphic artist Walter Crane created his famous engraving “A Garland for May Day” in honor of the executed anarchists. The Cuban revolutionary Jose Marti, no friend of anarchism, took the executions as a sign that “this Republic has fallen into monarchical inequality, injustice, and violence” (Foner 1986a: 216). Marchers carried images of the Chicago labor radicals in parades and demonstrations in Europe, South America, and in Mexico, where May Day is often known as “The Day of the Chicago Martyrs” (Hobsbawn 1983, 1990; Foner 1986b).<sup>1</sup> More than a century after the Haymarket events, delegations of foreign visitors could be seen visiting the obscure spot on the edge of Chicago’s Loop or the elaborate cemetery monument erected to honor the slain anarchists. Even in the USA, radicals hosted large May Day parades and celebrations in many cities between the end of the nineteenth century and the McCarthy era of the early 1950s (Haverty-Stacke 2009). Haymarket marks an important moment in American labor history and is one of the few labor history events to make it into the nation’s history textbooks.

In Chicago itself, however, the Haymarket site remained unmarked and the event largely ignored for most of the twentieth century, as various constituencies – politicians, political radicals, the city’s labor movement, and its police union – fought over the meaning of what had happened in this place, what it meant for the people of the city and others around the world, and how these events should be recalled and conveyed to later generations. The controversy raises the broader issue of how Americans have chosen to remember – or forget – the history of social class and class conflict as we encounter it in our cities. Today, most Americans continue to ignore the reality of class distinctions and their implications, even as social inequality increases, but in fact we have always had trouble acknowledging and understanding class (Burke 1995). It is little surprise, then, that our commemoration of this part of our heritage has a rather ambiguous history.

The complex problem of class is an element of the broader issue of historical memory (Lowenthal 1985). This essay considers tensions over the heritage of social class and class conflict in Chicago, a city particularly rich in its labor history. It focuses on three important heritage sites: Haymarket; Pullman, today a showcase of nineteenth-century architecture, but originally a carefully planned company town and the site in 1894 of one of the most famous labor conflicts in the US history; and the “Back of the Yards” neighborhood, the site of Upton Sinclair’s muckraking novel, *The Jungle* (1906) (Fig. 1). Heritage work is often closely associated with the built environment, its emphasis usually on the architecture and material culture of a site and the preservation of these tangible reminders of, in this case, our industrial past. My emphasis here is on the intangible aspects of our industrial heritage, specifically



**Fig. 1** Map of Chicago showing location of Haymarket, Pullman, and the “Back of the Yards” neighborhood (Map by Zheng Li)

the social relations that characterized these places and the meaning they continue to have today. My central questions are: Who is remembering these heritage sites, and what do they remember?

## Haymarket

Chicago, it seems, has always been a labor town. The great eight-hour campaign at the heart of Haymarket began in Chicago not in the 1880s, but back in the 1860s when the labor reformer Andrew Cameron established his Eight Hour Leagues and pushed successfully for a state law mandating the shorter work day (Roediger and

Foner 1989; Jentz and Schneirov 2011, Chap. 3; Montgomery 1967). That effort was lost amidst the depression of the 1870s. When the movement resurfaced, Chicago was once again at its heart. A strike wave was building in the city in the early 1880s, long before the general strike of 1886. The middle-class fear of this surging labor movement had at least as much to do with this storm of strikes as with working-class anarchism, though the two were clearly related. A broad range of groups were represented in Chicago's labor movement, ranging from conservative craft unions populated largely by native-born skilled workers, through the reformist Knights of Labor, the province of the city's Irish laborers, to the revolutionary socialist and anarchist unions which had their strongest base among the city's Germans and other recent immigrants (Nelson 1988; Schneirov 1998; Hirsch 1990). It is striking, especially now, when class seems to be receding as a category of historical analysis, and how much the awareness of social class and its inherent inequities shaped the lives of people in a city like Chicago.

Behind the Haymarket events and the eight-hour strike of 1886 lay a vibrant working-class culture rooted in Chicago's immigrant communities and particularly among German workers and their families. This was a more cerebral world than most people might envision for a nineteenth-century laboring community – a world of worker intellectuals who might quote Goethe or Shakespeare as readily as Marx. Remarkable characters, like Haymarket martyrs August Spies, Michael Fischer, and others who will never make it onto the pages of history books, were self-taught free thinkers “exceedingly well read in philosophy, history, literature, and political economy” (Green 2006: 139; Keil and Jentz 1988, 1983). After working all day at manual labor, they then spent their evenings reading poetry, classic fiction, and political philosophy and debating the issues of the day.

Often forgotten today, such radicalism – in its various incarnations from the Knights of Labor's capacious labor reformism through the Marxist socialists' electoral campaigning to the anarchists' violent rhetoric of class war – was a way of life for thousands of working people in cities like Chicago. The obsession of the city's businessmen with the danger posed by such radicals becomes more understandable (if no less pernicious) as one reconstructs their movements and cultures. They were formidable enemies of Chicago's business class.

The immediate reaction to the trial and executions of the Haymarket radicals tells us a great deal about their symbolic importance to the city's workers – and to its elites. Newspaper editors who had called for the men's blood now went about the city with armed guards in the days after their executions while the city's workers turned out in huge numbers to eulogize them. The Haymarket defendants were George Engel, Samuel Fielden, Adolph Fischer, Louis Lingg, Oscar Neebe, Albert Parsons, Michael Schwab, and August Spies. Their families had planned simple wakes at their own houses or in ethnic fraternal halls, but long lines had formed by 8 a.m. in front of Lucy Parsons' modest apartment on Milwaukee Avenue. Ten thousand people had filed through her little parlor by the time her doors were closed at 11:30 p.m. The other wakes drew similar crowds (Green 2006: 274).

Yet it is perhaps the long-term legacy of Haymarket and efforts to commemorate the events that represent the most intriguing part of the story. On June 25, 1893,





**Fig. 2** Monument to the Haymarket Martyrs, Waldheim Cemetery, Forest Park, Illinois (with thanks to <http://www.buckydome.com/TWW/index.htm>)

during Chicago's World Columbian Exposition, more than a thousand workers and their families joined a long procession in Chicago and then boarded special trains. They traveled to a nonsectarian portion of Waldheim Cemetery on the city's outskirts, where a beautiful monument was dedicated to the slain anarchists. Eight thousand more visited the monument in the course of the day, listening to speeches and songs in English and German, Bohemian, and Polish – languages that reflected the rich diversity of the city's working-class communities. The monument consists of a defiant-looking hooded female figure of Justice reaching down to place a laurel wreath on the head of a fallen worker (Fig. 2). The last words of the executed anarchist August Spies are inscribed across the base of the statue: "The day will come when our silence will be more powerful than the voices you are throttling today" (Adelman 1976: 105–106; Green 2006: 290–291; Roediger and Rosemont 1986: 171).

The dedication of the monument took on greater importance the following day when Governor John Peter Altgeld pardoned the remaining three Haymarket defendants, who had been imprisoned for eight years, observing that they had been convicted



not for any particular action but rather on the basis of their political beliefs (Altgeld 1893; Ginger 1958: 81–88; Smith 1995: 170–171). Radical and labor presses printed Altgeld's decree in the thousands and sold them in cheap editions along with other labor classics, but the bold decision ended both his political future and his legal career.

The continuing symbolic importance of Haymarket to the more radical wing of the labor movement becomes clear as we walk through Waldheim. For the 100-year period from the Haymarket events through the end of the twentieth century, it was the only place that the working-class perspective on those events was preserved and commemorated. Generations of radicals chose to be buried in the shadow of the Haymarket monument – everyone from the anarchist Emma Goldman to the communist Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. The ashes of “Big Bill” Haywood, the one-eyed leader of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), are here, as are those of the IWW's troubadour Joe Hill. The place continues to attract radical visitors over the years, much as Marx's grave does in London's Highgate Cemetery in north London (Adelman 1976: 105–130). Labor historian James Green writes that the Haymarket monument became “a ritual site for preserving a sacred memory that, without constant vigilance, would soon be erased ... a kind of shrine for socialists and other pilgrims who came to visit from all over the world” (Green 2006: 291, 317).<sup>2</sup>

The first sculpture to grace the Haymarket site itself, installed in 1889, commemorated not the great strike or the radical labor movement behind it, but rather the policemen killed by the bomber or in the chaotic fusillade that followed the explosion. The *Chicago Tribune* and business groups raised the necessary funds and dedicated the statue in the name of the city “to her defenders in the riot.” The statue was widely resented and attacked at several points in its history. In the 1920s, a union transit worker drove his street car into the statue, knocking it off its stand. On October 6, 1969, in the midst of the campaign of protest against the war in Vietnam, a bomb exploded, wrecking the policeman statue. Rebuilt and reinstalled, the statue was destroyed again a year later and after repair, moved to the lobby of Chicago Police Headquarters and finally to a quiet spot at the police academy. Its departure left Haymarket Square with no marker of any sort to commemorate the events there (Adelman 1976: 38–40; quote in Smith 1995: 170).

By 1986, Haymarket had remained unmarked for a century due to the city's deeply conflicted memory of what happened there. Centennial events included rallies, special exhibits at the Chicago Historical Society and Public Library, plays, concerts, conferences, and film showings (Chicago Public Library 1986; Chicago Historical Society 1986). But we still had no official designation or even an acknowledgement at the site itself. When I conducted tours of Chicago labor history for students, academics, labor activists, and others throughout the late twentieth century, I always had to ask my listeners to use their imagination when we reached the site of Haymarket. (With few working-class history sites marked and a great deal of the industrial sites decaying or gone, such tours required quite a bit of imagination on the part of participants.)

Contention over the meaning and value of this history complicated the process of establishing it as part of the city's heritage. Local businessmen and real estate developers failed to see the attraction of a site marking a violent confrontation between

police and radicals. The respectable business union leaders of the Chicago Federation of Labor hesitated to embrace the more radical pioneers of their movement. The Fraternal Order of Police clung tightly to its own narrative in which the policemen were both heroes and victims, and deeply resented the attacks on the police statue. When the place was considered at all, much of the public at large tended to lump contemporary radical groups with the memory of the Haymarket anarchists and to dismiss both as irrelevant.

In this situation, the Illinois Labor History Society (ILHS), a small group run on a shoestring by veterans of the city's more progressive unions, pursued the issue. The great oral historian and journalist Studs Terkel, who had a long association with the city's Left, and Les Orear, a veteran of labor organizing in the stockyards and president of the ILHS, led others in lobbying the city government for almost 20 years, but succeeded only in attaching a small plaque to the side of a neighboring building. Mayor Richard J. Daley and subsequent administrations firmly opposed the idea. On the centennial of Haymarket, Harold Washington, the city's first Black mayor who had roots in the progressive community, issued a proclamation honoring the birth of May Day in Chicago. He supported the idea of a permanent memorial park, but he died before it could be built (Green 2006: 312–316).

Finally, on September 14, 2004, Terkel, together with the presidents of the Chicago Federation of Labor and the Fraternal Order of Police, and Mayor Richard M. Daley (the son of former Mayor Richard J. Daley) dedicated a beautiful, if rather ambiguous, sculpture and plaque marking the spot, where Sam Fielden, the wagon driver-revolutionary had urged the city's workers to action (Fig. 3).

As James Green points out, however, the ambiguity of the abstract sculpture and the accompanying inscription continues to reflect Chicago's divergent perspectives on the Haymarket legacy. The inscription notes that over the years, the Haymarket site has "become a powerful symbol for a diverse cross-section of people, ideals and movements. Its significance touches on the issues of free speech, the right of public assembly, organized labor, the fight for the eight hour work day, law enforcement, justice, anarchy and the right of every human being to pursue an equitable and prosperous life. For all, it is a poignant lesson in the rewards and consequences inherent in such human pursuits" (Green 2006: 317, fn 359, and quote 318). The words are eloquent, but they seem to sidestep the social reality of social class and endemic class conflict which had brought both policemen and workers to this place in 1886. Conflicts continue over the place and what its history means. For unionists, it is a symbol of the struggle for decent working conditions and the eight-hour day; for civil libertarians, the sacred right to self-expression; for anarchists and other revolutionaries, the struggle for a total transformation of American society; for conservatives, an early confrontation with terrorism; for the police, the memory of their fallen comrades. One hundred and twenty-five years after the event, Chicagoans still seem to have trouble coming to terms with the meaning of Haymarket, a difficulty which surely reflects our broader problem facing the issue of social class in American society.

Sometimes, contention over the appropriate commemoration of events involving class conflict is so heated that important sites go largely unmarked for decades, as was the case at Haymarket Square. The event became a major cause in the international labor and socialist movement and the origin of an international workers' celebration,



**Fig. 3** Chicago artist Mary Brogger's sculpture (2004) marking the spot near the northeast corner of Randolph Street and DesPlaines, where the Haymarket events occurred in Chicago on May 4, 1886 (Photo by Jenny Barrett)

but the site itself remained unmarked, as a variety of groups fought over what happened in that place and what it means for the city and its people.

### **Pullman: A Businessman's Dreams and the Working-Class Realities**


Far from Haymarket, on Chicago's distant South Side lies one of America's most carefully designed company towns, a place where two distinct visions of industrial society clashed at the end of the nineteenth century, one a vision of entrepreneurial paternalism and the other of a democratic commonwealth. George Pullman developed and built a luxurious passenger car at precisely the moment when the nation's railroads were expanding explosively between the end of the Civil War and the end of the nineteenth century. In the process, he amassed a great fortune.

Today, the scope of Pullman's vision is apparently less in his crumbling Palace Car works than in the model town he designed and built adjacent to those works (the best study on this is Hirsch 2003). In the face of the growing labor organization and class conflict in the city of Chicago, he acquired 4,000 acres 12 miles south of the city's Loop, sufficiently distant, he hoped, to create a kind of *cordon sanitaire* around his new creation. He hired the famous architect Solon Spencer Beman and began construction in 1880. Pullman envisioned a community with quality housing, paved streets, scrupulous attention to sanitation, and superior educational, cultural, and recreational facilities, as well as a whole range of what he deemed wholesome activities intended to win and hold the loyalty of his workers. The town had parks, gardens and ponds, shops, a theater, and a well-stocked library. Indeed, part of the town's attraction came from its contrast with Chicago's dirty and overcrowded immigrant slums. On the eve of the depression of 1893, the town had a population of 12,600 (on design and construction, Buder 1967; Smith 1995: 181–184; for a critical and analytical assessment, Reiff 2000: 7–32).

It is impossible to grasp what the Pullman experiment meant at the time to people from different social backgrounds without recalling the wave of class conflict that seemed to be overwhelming American society in the late nineteenth century. In the midst of a great depression that threw millions out of work, an army of unemployed converged on the nation's capital to demand a program of public works. Between 1880 and 1900, workers engaged in over 23,000 strikes affecting 117,000 firms. Thirty major strikes broke out in 1894 alone. Particularly worrying were the increasing size and the sophistication with which workers used the strike weapon. The sympathy strike, in which workers from various industries supported one another regardless of whether they were directly involved, was becoming more and more common (Montgomery 1980, 1999). Finally, the increasing size of labor organizations in the period and the rising influence of radical ideologies, like anarchism and Marxist socialism, were daily reminders of the society's deep divisions.

All of this signaled a growing class consciousness among the nation's workers and nowhere was this development more apparent than in Chicago. As cultural historian Carl Smith notes, Pullman's model town attracted so much attention in part because of what it symbolized for the urban middle class and business leaders – a possible solution to what contemporaries called the “Labor Problem,” the increasingly shrill conflict that seemed to be tearing the society apart (Smith 1995: 186–187). Perhaps, Pullman's paternalism and efficiency could repair the social fabric.

But this was also a community tightly controlled from top to bottom by George Pullman. For example, saloons – those bastions of working-class culture – were suppressed and indeed the sale of alcohol was explicitly prohibited, except in the hotel bar intended for the use of the management and visiting clients. All the property, including retail stores and entertainment venues, was owned and carefully controlled by the corporation. Pullman even owned the town's only church. And because of all this, the town became an important symbol to workers in the town and throughout the country, a symbol of industrial despotism and manipulation. “They secretly rebel,” the *New York Sun* wrote of Pullman's workers on October 11, 1885, because “[t]hey declare they are bound hand and foot by a philanthropic monopoly” (quoted in Lindsey 1942: 65; a similar critique was made by the radical Christian economist



**Fig. 4** Map and engraving of Pullman, George Pullman’s planned industrial community, with the car works in the background and the Florence Hotel in the foreground, from Richard Ely, *Harper’s Magazine*, Feb. 1885

Richard Ely 1885; see also Smith 1995: 204–208). In December 1884, shortly after construction of the town was completed, the same Albert Parsons who would be executed 2 years later for his role in the Haymarket events addressed a meeting of the International Working Peoples’ Association just outside the boundaries of Pullman. “What is Pullman,” Parsons asked, “but a plantation, a penitentiary, a slave-pen where 4,000 men come and go at the beck and call of one man” (quoted in Smith 1995: 204).

Even as we stroll through the streets of Pullman today, its design and architecture reflect the hierarchical social structure its creator had in mind (Fig. 4). The most opulent structure is certainly the Hotel Florence, named for Pullman’s daughter, and strictly reserved for the town’s business class. Here, Pullman himself kept an apartment for those days he could not get back to his family mansion on Prairie near downtown Chicago. Homes range from substantial Victorian single detached structures that were designed for the top management and large elegant row houses for mid-level management, through much smaller, closely packed row houses for the firms’ skilled and semiskilled workers, to large structures, where single unskilled males rented rooms (see the walking tour in Adelman 1972).

In insulating his workers and creating a more efficient and pliant labor force through his benevolence, Pullman thought he had engineered the ideal industrial environment, a model for other manufacturers to follow. But he also saw the town



as well as the car works as a commercial investment, and he intended to make a profit from both. In the midst of the depression that began in 1893, Pullman reduced his work force from 5,500 to 3,300 and slashed wages by an average of 25 to 40% while holding his unusually high rents steady. In the midst of the worst depression the society had seen, Pullman substantially increased dividends by these means, and the company closed out the year with a \$2.3 billion surplus (Ginger 1958: 150; d'Eramo 2002: 201).

By the summer of 1894, Pullman's workers were at the breaking point and they turned to the American Railway Union (ARU) for support. Pullman refused even to meet with the group, however, and the ARU called a boycott on all Pullman cars. When the General Managers Association supported Pullman by attaching his cars to trains across the country, railroad traffic ground to halt. On July 4, 1894, against the advice of the Secretary of War and the Army Chief of Staff and over the protests of John Peter Altgeld and other governors around the Midwest, President Grover Cleveland ordered a large contingent of federal troops to break the strike. He also invoked the Sherman Act and jailed the entire leadership of the union and the strike. Violence spread in the stockyards neighborhoods and in other industrial communities on Chicago's South Side. Crowds attacked trains around the South Side and some \$80 million in property was lost. By the end of the conflict, more than 25 people had been killed and scores injured. Both the strike and the ARU were crushed (Schneirov 1998: 335–343).

Whatever his accomplishments during his life, Pullman's dreams crumbled in the wake of the strike and he died in 1897. Reviled by the city's working poor, he left careful instructions that his grave be placed in an obscure location in Graceland Cemetery and his coffin covered by layers of steel railroad rails and tons of concrete, this to discourage desecration of the body by any of his many detractors. Carl Sandburg's poem "Graceland" contrasted the opulence of Pullman's tomb with the poverty of the city's working-class neighborhoods (Sandburg 1992: 23). In 1898, his perfectly planned town (which had been annexed by the city in 1889) was ruled by the Illinois Supreme Court to be "incompatible with the theory and spirit of our constitution" (quoted in Ginger 1958: 164). The corporation was forced to divest itself of the town which was then incorporated into the city of Chicago, the source for the contagion of labor organization and radicalism from which Pullman had originally sought to insulate his enterprise and its workers.

Throughout the twentieth century, Pullman remained a focal point for labor organization and conflict. While Pullman's largely African-American porters built the nation's first major Black union, the workers in the Pullman shops successfully organized as a large local of the Congress of Industrial Organization's Steel Workers' Organizing Committee, later the United Steelworkers of America (Hirsch 1999, 2003).

In the wake of the second Great Migration of African Americans from the South and the collapse of the region's manufacturing in the postwar era, Pullman and the adjacent Roseland community declined. By 1960, Pullman was designated a blighted area and local businessmen recommended the destruction of the historic community and its replacement with an industrial park.

The approaches of two very different groups to preserving the neighborhood and celebrating the history embodied in it convey the contingent quality of heritage work and the constructed quality of the historical memory on which it is based. The Pullman Civic Organization was founded that year and began a fight to preserve the neighborhood. Whatever its socioeconomic problems, Pullman was full of architecturally significant buildings, and urban professionals could easily reach the Loop and other business locations on a commuter train which passed through at regular intervals. In 1973, residents, developers, and architects formed the Historic Pullman Foundation (HPF) which bought up and restored the historic buildings and brought their beauty and historical significance to a wider audience. They campaigned for designation of the neighborhood as a city, state, and national historic site, leading walking tours of the houses and other buildings, erecting historical displays in a new visitors' center, and cooperating with other groups on historic festivals and celebrations. In 1975, the Pullman Historic District was designated a national historic site.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time, the ILHS, the group that championed the commemoration of the Haymarket site, published labor historian William Adelman's *Touring Pullman*, which accentuated not the architecture and esthetics of the community, but rather its significance as a site of working-class life and culture, industrial work, and class conflict. The ILHS and labor educators started their own tours for labor and urban historians and students and labor activists. The society patiently drew the labor movement itself into the effort to commemorate the place. In 1994, to commemorate the centennial of the great Pullman Strike, the Chicago Federation of Labor and other groups organized the city's annual Labor Day parade in Pullman rather than downtown in the Loop (Adelman 1972).

The two groups cooperated on a variety of projects. Each had a vested interest in preserving and promoting the place, but their goals were rather different, with the HPF emphasizing development, promotion, and the continuing livability of the community while ILHS focused its activities on the massive struggle that occurred there at the end of the nineteenth century and the continuing relevance of that struggle for the contemporary labor movement.

## **A Jungle “Back of the Yards”**

For all their importance to the city and its history, for all the human drama that has unfolded there, the former location of the Union Yards and certainly the adjacent Back of the Yards neighborhood is the least commemorated of the three sites of working-class experience and struggle considered here (Fig. 5). The only tangible vestige of the yards is the great limestone gate that was erected at their entrance after they were opened in 1865. Designed by the famous architects Daniel Burnham (1846–1912) and John Wellborn Root (1850–1891) who later designed the city's 1893 World's Columbian Exposition, the gate provided access to one of the largest



**Fig. 5** The great stone gate of the Union Stock Yards, circa 1875, designed by the architect John Wellborn Root of the firm Burnham and Root. The gate, all that remains of the original stock yards, was placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1972 and designated a National Historic Site in 1981. Behind the gate is the monument to Chicago firefighters killed in the line of duty (Photo by Jenny Barrett)

industrial facilities in the world. It is a testament to the destructive power of the system they symbolized that the Union Stock Yards and their related industrial plants are now gone without a trace, replaced by a new generation of plants in a relatively successful industrial park.<sup>4</sup>

Today, a visitor to the old stone gate also finds an impressive memorial to the city's firefighters killed in the line of duty, the growing ethnic diversity of the names carved in chronological order on the stone reflecting the ethnic succession in the city's neighborhoods. But the visitor finds little to mark the work lives of the industry's laborers or the titanic labor struggles fought in this place from the late nineteenth century through the postwar years. The scene of giant strikes in 1886, 1894, 1904, 1921–1922, and 1947, a focal point for the city's great race riot in 1919, the context for the successful union organizing of the 1930s and 1940s, and one of the nation's classic industrial communities, has little to indicate or explain the vital history that has taken place here. A visitor is struck by enormous disparity between the beauty of the monument to the firefighters, which commemorates one human drama, and the empty space where one might expect to find a commemoration of those many other dramas played out by city's stockyards workers over the years. The stories of the poor remain unmarked. The city seems incapable of finding a way to make all of that history tangible to subsequent generations.



In *The Jungle* (1906), Upton Sinclair immortalized Chicago's stockyards and the working-class neighborhoods surrounding them, and the site has remained a subject for both scholarly and fiction writers. In his evocation of Chicago's slaughterhouses, those great symbols of monopoly capital and the nation's exploding mass-production system, and in his depiction of the social implications of such work beyond the walls of the factory, in those densely populated ethnic enclaves of US cities and industrial towns, Sinclair was more accurate than some might think. He captured the reality of industrial work, social class, and ethical issues regarding poverty, discrimination, and abuse of power that remain relevant today. He brilliantly conveyed the essence of the stockyards and slaughterhouses and the work that went on there not only in terms of the enormous size, lightening speed, and unrelenting efficiency, but also in terms of the sights and smells: "down a side street there were two rows of brick houses, and between them a vista: half a dozen chimneys ... touching the very sky – and leaping from them half a dozen columns of smoke, thick, oily, and black as night" (Sinclair 1988: 25).

At its height at the end of World War One, the site consisted of 46 separate plants employing nearly 146,000 workers collectively earning almost \$70 million per year – a tangle of rail yards, ramps, pens, sheds, packing and rendering facilities, huge slaughterhouses, and allied factories, dominating the southwest side of the city and the neighborhoods surrounding them. The yards and adjacent plants were but one part of a solid industrial belt running north and south along the branches of the Chicago River, including the huge McCormick works, vast expanses of railroad yards, warehouses, car shops, lumber yards, foundries, machine shops, breweries, mountains of coal and garbage, and electrical generating stations. Further south lay the blast furnaces and rolling mills of the South Chicago steel complex (Jablonsky 1993: 10–11; Barrett 1987).

Some of *The Jungle*'s most dramatic scenes are the detailed and accurate descriptions of work on Swift's (Sinclair calls the place Durham's) killing floors, where the old "all-round butcher's" skilled trade was fragmented into 78 routine tasks carried out by a killing gang of 157 men. "It would be difficult to imagine another industry where division of labor has been so ingeniously and microscopically worked out," the economist John R. Commons observed. "The animal has been surveyed and laid off like a map" (1905: 224; for full discussion of the transformation of slaughtering and meat packing work, Barrett 1987: 20–31). Once slaughtered, each head of cattle slid along an overhead rail and was "disassembled" by a small army of unskilled men. In the process, control over the work passed from the skilled butchers to the bosses, and continuous flow production commenced. "If you need to turn out a little more," a superintendent confided, "you speed up the conveyors a little and the men speed up to keep pace" (*National Provisioner* 1900: 17). Chicago's "disassembly lines" were closely studied by young Henry Ford, who made them the model for his own auto assembly line – with all its implications for how work would be done in the USA for most of the twentieth century (Ford 1923: 81). In an age when labor itself is getting less and less attention from scholars, Sinclair conveys his wonder at this epochal transformation of work to his readers.

Staffing these production lines were unskilled workers drawn from throughout the world. When the US Immigration Commission studied the industry from 1908 to 1909, it found more than 40 nationalities represented in the workforce, consisting of an older generation of Irish, Germans, and Bohemians and increasing numbers of Polish, Lithuanian, Slovak, and other newcomers. By the World War I years, Black and Mexican migrants began arriving in ever larger numbers (Barrett 1987: 36–63).

It was a marvelously rational production system, but its effects meant chaos for the families and communities who depended upon it for their livelihoods. The worker community, which was poor and survived on its own toil, lived very near to a more privileged one, where work was defined very differently. The juxtaposition of two Chicago communities wonderfully captures the social distances between the immigrant poor and the respectable middle class in the early twentieth century. Hyde Park, the middle class home of the University of Chicago, nurtured scholars who were pioneering the systematic study of industrial society in the same era that Sinclair probed in his novel (Bulmer 1984; Diner 1980). “Back of the Yards,” the community that grew up in the shadow of the slaughterhouses and cattle pens, provided the giant industry with its labor force and was fundamentally shaped by the realities of early twentieth-century capitalism as embodied in the meat packing industry. As geographer Thomas Jablonsky notes, the yards “conditioned the nature of everyday life for nearby residents” (1993: 11).

Back of the Yards residents suffered from two and a half to five times Hyde Park’s rate of contagious disease. With one of the highest rates of tuberculosis in the country, the Stockyards neighborhood also had among the highest rates of infant mortality. By 1909, about one out of every three infants died, a rate more than seven times that for Hyde Park. One need not go far to find the explanation for all this carnage: overcrowding, pollution of air and groundwater, open garbage dumps, and occupational diseases picked up on the killing floor and cutting lines (Barrett 1987: 66–73). Sinclair might be faulted for his literary style or even for rolling the experiences of many different real families into the lives of a single fictional one, but his picture of everyday life in “Packingtown” was firmly grounded in conversations with physicians, settlement house workers, and Socialist Party intellectuals and activists who knew the neighborhood well. By 1918, the packers’ own attorney concluded that the only solution to the neighborhood’s desperate physical condition was “absolute destruction of the district. You should tear down the district, burn all the houses” (*Chicago Tribune*, March 6, 1918).

Part of the novel’s achievement, then, is in conveying the *experience* of working-class life and the social implications of the business system Sinclair attacks in his novel. Many a stockyards child raised, like Sinclair’s little Antanas, in the teeming neighborhood Back of the Yards simply stood far less a chance of surviving, let alone thriving, than one born into the more rarified atmosphere of Hyde Park. Sociology students, settlement house reformers, and public health physicians generated reams of statistics documenting the industry’s effects on public health here and in comparable communities. In *The Jungle*, we confront this reality of social class on a human scale and with a drama missing in contemporary studies and in most social histories

of this era. And yet in *The Jungle* and in many other evocations of the place, the people themselves recede, overwhelmed, it seems, by the giant machinery and plants.

When I read the book at the age of 19, I was just beginning to realize that working people had their own history and that neighborhoods not unlike mine had a story worth telling. Sinclair's relentless narrative of the destruction of these immigrant workers and their families at the hands of the great "meat trust" gripped and inspired me (an effect I am always hoping the book will have on my own students). *The Jungle's* animation of this experience remains an important reason we continue to read the book. Even as a teenager, however, I recognized that the novel, like much of the labor movement in that era, was racist. The only descriptions of African Americans in the book are of strikebreakers, and they employ the crudest sort of contemporary language, suggesting the level of Socialist understanding of race in this era. Their roles as tools of the great packers strip them of any humanity.

This lapse reflected life in the real community, for Back of the Yards was long defined in racial and ethnic terms as much by those who were absent as by who were present. Like many others in the city, the neighborhood had well-defined borders and the thousands of Black workers who labored every day in the yards were often not welcome in the community. As late as 1970, more than 95% of the community's inhabitants were white (Jablonsky 1993: 149–150).

The women characters, too, are all victims who seem almost to be waiting for the next tragedy to befall them. As Kevin Mattson has noted recently of the character Jurgis, "practically every woman in his life becomes a prostitute" (2006: 30). We find little in *The Jungle* to foreshadow the vital roles that Black migrants and second-generation-immigrant men and women played in the creation of powerful industrial unions that would transform their lives in the next generation, little to suggest that these wretches would one day subdue the great "meat trust" and fundamentally change the history of Chicago and the nation.

Had Sinclair assumed the vantage point of the workers themselves rather than that of a Socialist intellectual, the clues lay all around. Encountering the novel for the first time, it seemed to me that something was wrong in Sinclair's story, something I found difficult to explain at the time. In the squalor he described, I did not recognize my own neighborhood, one not unlike Back of the Yards, nor my friends and neighbors in Sinclair's degraded and defeated characters. The real Back of the Yards, far from being morally degraded, was dominated by more than a dozen vibrant parishes that formed the nuclei of the various ethnic communities. Where Sinclair and the Chicago sociologists found only poverty and social pathology, many workers and their families found a vital community and rich cultural lives. These people, like my own neighbors, had love and beauty in their lives as well as poverty and dangerous work. They were exploited indeed, but they were not broken.

Beginning in the late 1960s, the "new labor historians" responded to this awareness of the complexity of class and human conditions by focusing on the everyday lives of workers. In the process, they transformed our understanding of the history of industrial capitalism and the agency of common people in shaping the society in which they lived and worked. Driving this reinterpretation was the notion of human agency: the idea that workers themselves made this history through the creation of

their own institutions and movements, their own cultures and ideas (Brody 1979; Buhle & Buhle 1988; the inspiration for this approach derives largely from Thompson 1963). From this perspective, what makes the Back of the Yards historically significant is less its status as a classic industrial slum and more its residents' own self-organization and their struggles to transform this place into a livable environment.

What I found most compelling in the human drama at the stockyards, when I turned to it as my dissertation topic in the 1970s, was not what riveted Sinclair – the destruction of these people by the “meat trust” – but, rather, their creation of cohesive family lives, rich religious cultures, and powerful social movements. I was drawn by this confirmation of the human spirit against such steep odds. It is impossible to understand the later upsurge of labor and community organizations, such as the United Packinghouse Workers of America – the strongest, progressive, interracial union of the CIO era – or the Back of the Yards Council – the prototype for Saul Alinsky's community organizing – without documenting the basis for this human spirit and the cultures it spawned (Horowitz 1997; Slayton 1986).

## Making Class Visible

The marking and interpretation of sites commemorating the heritage of working-class experience and class conflict remains an underdeveloped enterprise in American cities, but it is certainly an ongoing project of historians, archivists and curators, artists, labor and community activists, and, to a lesser extent, professional preservationists. They have harnessed a variety of approaches to mark these places for us and to consider their meanings – documentary films, plays, novels, Web sites, books, articles, maps, and walking tours. A notable example of such a tour is “The Labor Trail Map: Chicago's History of Working-Class Life and Struggle” produced by Leon Fink and his colleagues under the auspices of the city's Center for Working-Class Studies, which, along with the ILHS, hosts a variety of heritage activities.<sup>5</sup> Local and regional labor history groups have been particularly active, creating similar projects in the form of printed or online, interactive maps for St. Louis, Kansas City, New York City and Rochester, St. Paul, Boston, Pittsburgh, and other cities. Within the past few years, the Labor and Working-Class History Association has provided some coordination of this work (Green 2000).<sup>6</sup>

Like many aging industrial neighborhoods, some in Chicago are experiencing gentrification with the return of urban professionals to the central city. Haymarket is perhaps the best example in part because of its proximity to the Loop. Still a symbol of working-class culture and politics for many in the local and international labor movements, it has now become one of the city's trendiest culinary venues and a haven for the hip elite.

Pullman's gentrification efforts have been more fitful. The more architecturally significant portion of the community is largely well-maintained and remains one of the few racially integrated communities on the city's South Side. The planned Transportation and Labor Museum hit a snag when a huge fire destroyed sections

of the central works building and state funds dried up. North Pullman, once the province of the most recent and least skilled immigrant workers in the Pullman firm, consists largely of much smaller homes, many of them in disrepair. This part of the community is largely African American and has its own perspective on the Pullman heritage which stresses the importance of the Pullman Porters. Bordering areas of Chicago with considerable gang activity and decaying housing and retail districts, it remains marginal.

Of these three communities, Back of the Yards remains closest to its roots – for all the changes the decline of the stockyards and meat packing industry have wrought there. An immigrant working-class neighborhood characterized by extreme poverty and attendant problems at the turn of the last century when Sinclair wrote *The Jungle*, Back of the Yards remains such a neighborhood today, though its racial complexion has changed, as it is now populated largely by Latino immigrants and their children. The community's churches, built with such sacrifice by these earlier generations of immigrants, remain the focal points of the community. Social problems, such as gang violence, for example, that seem contemporary were not unknown in Back of the Yards a century ago, where the city's original street gangs sprang from the old Irish enclaves and spread to Poles, Italians, Eastern European Jews, and other racial and ethnic groups (Thrasher 1927; Diamond 2009).

Despite its reputation as a “labor town,” Chicago has been slow to publicly mark its rich history of working-class struggle and the contributions working people have made to the city's history. If the purpose of monuments is to give physical, visible form to human memory, including memories of deprivation, conflict, and social justice, then this element of heritage work is perhaps the contemporary installment of a very old fight. Physical deterioration, as in the case of Back of the Yards and parts of Pullman, and the erasure of the working-class past through gentrification, as in the case of Haymarket, provide all the more reason for finding the means to mark, preserve, and interpret aspects of working-class heritage and the historical significance of places like these. If some semblance of this urban heritage is to survive the “rebirth” of inner city communities, it will require a great deal of effort on the part of historians, preservationists, and others concerned with their significance.

## Notes

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1. For a best-selling contemporary novel, see Frank Harris, *The Bomb, A Novel* (John Long, London, 1908) and for a recent novel based on the events, Martin Duberman, *Haymarket: A Novel* (Seven Stories Press, New York, 2003). The *Haymarket Scrapbook* reproduces a wide range of contemporary and modern textual and graphic documents and interpretations of the event and the radical working-class culture that produced it.

2. In 1998, social historians associated with Newberry Library succeeded in convincing the National Park Service to designate the cemetery monument (not Haymarket Square) a national landmark.
3. "Third Annual Historic Pullman House Tour – October 10, 1976"; "Historic Pullman 33d Annual House Tour," October 7 and 8, 2006, flyer; "Historic Pullman Visitor Center" and "Be a Part of History, Join the Historic Pullman Foundation"; flyers in the author's possession.
4. The Chicago industry's decline in the course of the 1960s was part of a more general deterioration of the city's manufacturing base in this era.
5. "The Labor Trail Map: Chicago's History of Working-Class Life and Struggle," Center for Working- Class Studies, available from the University of Illinois Chicago Labor Education Program, 815 W. Van Buren St. #110, Chicago. IL 60607. See also the group's Web site at <http://www.workingclassstudies.org/> accessed June 10, 2010.
6. For an excellent compilation of walking tours, maps, and other commemorative works for labor and working-class history sites, see the wonderful Web site constructed by Rosemary Feurer of Northern Illinois University for the Labor and Working-Class History Association: [http://www.niu.edu/~rfeurer/labor/place\\_space.html](http://www.niu.edu/~rfeurer/labor/place_space.html), accessed June 8, 2010. For examples of local and regional efforts to mark and preserve working-class history sites, see also the Web sites for the Illinois (<http://www.kentlaw.edu/ilhs/> accessed June 10, 2010), Pennsylvania (<http://www.palaborhistory.org/markers.php>, accessed June 10, 2010) groups, and the California Labor History Map (<http://www.calpedia.sfsu.edu/calabor/>, accessed June 10, 2010). For the civic engagement efforts of the Labor and Working Class History Association, see their Web site: <http://www.lawcha.org/>, accessed June 10, 2010. On the relationship between working-class social movements and the popular celebration of working-class history, see Green 2000.

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# The Politics and Heritage of Race and Space in San Francisco's Chinatown

Chuo Li

San Francisco's Chinatown has existed since the City of San Francisco was established in 1848 and is presumed to be the first Chinatown in North America. Located at the central business district of the City of San Francisco, the Chinatown is bounded by the financial district and Jackson Square on the east, downtown shopping center on the south, and Nob Hill and Russian Hill residential areas on the west and the north. It is perceived as "a City within a City," and has multiple roles not only as a residential neighborhood but also as a business and commercial district, light manufacturing area, and social and cultural center for the Chinese ethnic group (*Report of the San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens' Survey 1969*: 35). With a history of racial hostility and anxiety towards difference, San Francisco's Chinatown has experienced several crises of removal, relocation, and demolition. In 1906, an earthquake followed by a devastating fire in the City of San Francisco destroyed the Chinatown and almost succeeded in driving the Chinese to the deserted margins of the city. The subsequent urban renewal movements, revival of historic preservation, and booming tourism industry have continuously shaped the landscape of Chinatown as a contested and unstable territory. Despite historic traumas and ruptures, San Francisco's Chinatown has survived until today and become an important tourism attraction and economic contributor to the city. The unique and rich history of the Chinatown makes it a useful case that provides insights for understanding the dynamicity and complex politics of ethnic urban landscape and the contested meanings of heritage and space.

Chinatown is a socially constructed space and place that has endured landscape transformations and context-specific struggles over space. Changing ideology and unequally empowered discourses of the society and the community have often confounded the ways in which the past has been interpreted and represented.

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C. Li (✉)

Department of Landscape Architecture, Mississippi State University, Starkville, MS, USA  
e-mail: cl1004@msstate.edu

The encounter of divergent landscape attitudes and practices pertaining to the use of heritage and space in the Chinatown raises the fundamental questions about the very narrative that defines the cultural identity of Chinatown as fixed, homogeneous, and discrete. For this reason, this paper focuses on the ambiguity and discontinuity surrounding the heritage discourse and its associated collective memory and unsettles the official rhetoric that imagines the Chinatown as an emblem fixed in the essentialized past.

Rather than being simply a passive historic victim of racism and spatial reorganization of capitalism, the Chinatown has internal dynamics that are the result of the interaction of power, culture, and political traditions. By examining the idea of space as a mechanism of ethnic empowerment and identity formation, the paper explores how the official discourses of race and space are challenged through the actions of community groups or individual agents who negotiate and contest the urban forms according priority to the logics of capital accumulation and the dominant discourse of a “Chinese” heritage. More specifically, it investigates how the idea of the “ethnic enclave” that was used in modern western society to exclude undesirable Others, can also act as a mechanism for the ethnic minorities to negotiate power relations. From its origins as a strategy of exclusion, spatial isolation could thus become an essential element in the constitution of power (Massey 1994: 22). Historic preservation plays an important role in the shifting political and economic imperatives from both “inside” and “outside” of the Chinatown community. The ways that historic preservation was feared, resisted, or celebrated in San Francisco’s Chinatown shows that the hegemonic discourse of tradition and place that define or subordinate the minority culture as Other could equally generate a “counter-discourse” (Caftanzoglou 2001) that was solidly grounded on the ethnic empowerment and “insurgent citizenship” of the minority, defined by James Holston (1999) as a form of claiming new notions of membership, democracy, and moral solidarity as a way of expanding the scope and understanding of entitlement. But under any conditions, historic preservation can be a real challenge. At stake is the choice of preserving a city neighborhood as a heritage site and an inscription of memory, or maintaining it as a vital place that incorporates the everyday processes by which multilevel and intermingled power discourses have been implicated in the politics of place-making and the production of space.

## **Rebuilding Chinatown as an “Oriental City”**

When the City of San Francisco was established in 1848, the Chinese had already arrived as mining workers and fortune seekers. They settled in an area around Portsmouth Plaza, the hub of the city at that time. With their increasing presence, Chinatown gradually came into shape at the beginning of the 1850s and was soon recognized as a distinct neighborhood in the city. Its form was not the result of deliberate planning but rather a series of voluntary decisions and involuntary impositions. By 1877, the core of Chinatown was set within the 15 blocks, from north



**Fig. 1** The core area of San Francisco's Chinatown, which had more than 90% Chinese population according to the 1970 census account. (Graphic by author, based on the GIS data provided by the San Francisco city government at <http://www.gispub02.sfgov.org/website/sfshare/index2.asp>)

Pacific Avenue to south California Street, and west Stockton to east Kearny Street (Fig. 1). Even though Chinatown became the home of nearly two-thirds of the Chinese in San Francisco and a prosperous commercial district, the Chinese owned very few of the properties in the Chinatown because the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act denied Chinese immigrants the right to own land. Thus the Chinese residents were obliged to take long-term leases lasting from 3 to 12 years from White landlords. Their willingness to pay high rents made it possible for them to settle in the area of Chinatown, even though the place was overcrowded and lacked the necessary amenities that other neighborhoods offered. The *San Francisco Municipal Report 1884–1885* indicated that “The general aspect of the streets and habitations” of the Chinatown was “filthy in the extreme,” and it attributed the unpleasant physical conditions to the “peculiar habits of this people (the Chinese).”

Before the 1906 earthquake, Chinatown residents made little attempt to express their cultural identity through architectural design. The majority of Chinatown buildings were Italianate Victorian buildings that could not be distinguished from buildings in the surrounding downtown areas. A contemporary observer at that time,

described Chinatown as "...neither picturesque nor Oriental... the pagoda as a building is wholly absent... the majority of the buildings are of brick, two or three stories high and with the cellars or basements... the architecture is thoroughly American..." (Bancroft 1890). Of the four district association headquarters that had been built, only the Yeong Wo District Association Building was ostensibly Chinese, because it had carved wooden lions standing by the entryway and a distinctive courtyard and portico (Borthwick 1948). Additionally, a Chinese theater, the Hook Took Tong that was built in 1852, had a pagoda-like façade. These were among the very few buildings in San Francisco's Chinatown that evinced a Chinese architectural style by the end of nineteenth century.

With the deterioration of San Francisco's Chinatown in the 1906 earthquake and fire, the city had intended to move the Chinatown from its downtown location. But in fact, long before the earthquake occurred, the city government had already made several attempts to relocate the Chinatown. In 1853, the local newspaper had identified Chinatown's downtown central Dupont Street (later renamed Grant Avenue) as the "most desirable in the city for retail stores and family residences" and suggested the Chinese should be removed from the area (Daily Alta California 1853). In 1882, the City Board of Supervisors recommended that the Chinese be moved to governmental reservations, or settled in a tent city near the city cemetery under police surveillance. The Chinatown quarantine in 1900 and the accusation that Chinatown posed a health hazard further confirmed the government's determination to take "the shame of the city" off the city map (Pan 1995: 26). The crisis was terminated with the appeal of the Chinese to the federal government and the federal district court, which decided that the forced removal was unconstitutional (Pan 1995).

However, when the 1906 earthquake and fire occurred, many San Franciscans applauded the destruction as an opportunity to eradicate the vice and filth of the Chinese community. The *Overland Monthly* proclaimed, "Fire has reclaimed to civilization and cleanliness the Chinese ghetto, and no Chinatown will be permitted in the borders of the city. It seems as though a divine wisdom directed the range of the seismic horror and the range of the fire god. Wisely, the worst was cleared away with the best" (Ngai 2006). The city authorities soon decided that Hunter's Point on the southeast corner of the city, a sparsely populated area at that time, would be an ideal site for the relocated Chinatown. They envisioned the new Chinatown would be an "oriental city, properly sewered, with paved streets, schools, and all the essentials of modern life, but also with features outwardly characteristic of a Chinese city, with its pagodas, its temples and its lantern-hung porticoes" (Dyer 1906: 554; Pan 1995: 92; Lee 2001: 150). Although the relocation plan ultimately failed because of the resistance of the residents, the exotic imagery created for the Chinatown perpetuated the essential ideas of the "Orient" and revealed the city's desire to rebuild Chinatown as a stereotypical Oriental place fulfilling Western fantasies. As Edward Said (1979: 1) has argued, this kind of creation was "almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences." It was also a material result of a system of knowledge and a cultural history that had given the Orient a cognitive reality in and for the West (Anderson 1995; Said 1979).

With the certainty that the Chinese would be allowed to rebuild Chinatown in its original location, many temporary wooden structures were erected there to house Chinese business, family, and district associations. By June of 1906, there were 12 Chinese stores open in Chinatown (Pan 1995). When city permits were eventually granted to 43 Chinese businesses, Chinese merchants began to seek ways to reverse Chinatown's reputation as an immoral and degraded slum. Recognizing the importance of tourism in securing the area's survival, Look Tin Eli, a wealthy Chinese merchant and founder of the Bank of Canton, proposed to construct the new Chinatown as a city of "veritable fairy palaces" (Ngai 2006). The "Oriental" style that had been used to great effect at the 1893 Chicago World's Fair inspired the architectural design of the new actual Chinatown, for which pagoda rooflines and other Chinese motifs accessorized standard western structures. The efforts were supported by the San Francisco Real Estate Board, which passed a resolution recommending that "all property owners... of Chinatown to have their buildings rebuilt with fronts of Oriental and artistic appearance..." (Yip 1985: 26). The new Chinatown started at the corner of California and Dupont Street, where two of the great bazaars, the Sing Fat and the Sing Chong designed by architect T. Patterson Ross and engineer A.W. Burgren, constituted the gateway to the Chinatown (Fig. 2). Five other great bazaars including the Shanghai Bazaar, the Canton Bazaar, the Wah Sing Lung, the Wing Sing, and the Yan Wo, also congregated on the corner. The deliberate effort made by the Chinese merchants to make the neighborhood fancifully Oriental was a strategy to hinder the city's plans to remove Chinatown from its central location. The idea was to "create a neighborhood so appealing and idiosyncratic that no one would want to dismantle it" (Bruni 1998). In light of the vices and crimes associated with the old Chinatown, the city also insisted that the new Chinatown should present different physical and social appearance to eliminate the notorious filthy alleys, brothels, opium dens, and gambling halls. They decided to widen the narrow streets by adding 30 feet to Grant Avenue and connecting it to Dupont Street with a newly constructed 100-foot wide avenue. Thus in 1908, Dupont Street became part of Grant Avenue; but in Chinatown the Chinese translation of Dupont (Duban) is still in use even today. With the broader streets well connected to the major streets of the city, Chinatown became more physically integrated into the city rather than an isolated enclave as it was before the earthquake.

While the built environment of the new Chinatown was experiencing a sort of "Orientalization," the post-earthquake social transformation of the community was involved in the process of "Americanization." Influenced by the American reform movement at Hull House, Tuskegee and elsewhere, the Chinatown elites promoted American virtues such as public hygiene, nuclear family values, and American middle-class respectability. The social institutions such as Chinese hospitals with western medical treatment, Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A, Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and Chinese American Citizens Alliance were gradually established in the community (Ngai 2006). The journalist and photographer Louis Stellman (1913–1914) had observed that the 1906 fire that destroyed Chinatown was "(p)erhaps the most powerful westernizing agency ever applied to the Chinese." Although the comment might seem exaggerated, the 1906 earthquake and fire were an important turning



**Fig. 2** The Sing Fat and the Sing Chong Buildings at Grant Avenue, ca. 2007 (Photo by the author)

point for the future development of the Chinatown, since thereafter it experienced continuous changes under the contradictory forces of capitalism, race relations, and different streams of power. Most significantly, the earthquake had opened up the door of the Chinatown and transformed its relation to mainstream society through interaction, negotiation, contestation, and compromise (Lee 2001).

Art historian Anthony W. Lee (2001) has acknowledged two major transformations of Chinatown after the earthquake: One was the development of the quarter into a “full-blown tourist destination” where “otherness” and exotica had been marketed as a major attraction; the other change was the anxiety caused by the replacement of existing social and cultural orders with revolutionary republican values, which also reflected profound changes in China itself. Lee (2001: 149) believes that the two forces of transformation were fundamentally at odds since the power of the tourism industry always tended to “freeze or preserve cultural and social practices,”



especially when difference was being commodified, whereas the revolutionary force of the republic, on the other hand, sought to advance society by abandoning its old values and traditions. Lee's argument is convincing with regard to the different assumptions associated with the two forces of changes, but it is also important to point out that the transformations were actually both mobilized by the dominant discourse of a "new Chinatown" through reproducing and reconstituting the place identity under present political and socioeconomic imperatives.

The production of "ethnic" tourism in Chinatown was grounded on the construction or invention of ethnicity, for which a particular way of seeing alleged power over the material world through the device of perspective (Berger 1972). Dean MacCannell (1999: 91) suggests that modernity is literally turning the "real life" of others into "a production and a fetish," and the "emergence of a fascination for the 'real life' of others" becomes "the outward signs of an important social redefinition of the categories 'truth' and 'reality' now taking place." To sustain a firm sense of authenticity and reality, as argued by MacCannell (1999: 93), requires the trope of mystification. And the social structure itself is automatically involved into the process of constructing the mode of mystification that supports social reality. Thus, instead of "freezing or preserving" the old values and traditions, tourism development in the Chinatown mobilized architectural arrangements, social and cultural resources to stage a mystified scene accommodating the desire of the sightseers (MacCannell 1999: 93). Lee (2001: 152) correctly suggests that it would be difficult to "measure a process of 'Westernizing' defined against 'East' whose meaning was itself in flux." But the transformation of the post-earthquake Chinatown revealed a power relation based on superiority, exclusion, and marginalization. For Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants, ethnicity and exoticism had been adopted as tactics essential for the survival of the community. Although difference was superficially stressed in the built environment, the processes of assimilation and domination were more powerful and permeated everyday life in the post-earthquake Chinatown.

After the earthquake, design approaches that deliberately sinicized architecture shaped the landscape of Chinatown for the following decades. In 1925, during the Diamond Jubilee, Oriental-style lights were installed on Grant Avenue between Bush and Broadway Streets, consisting of Chinese lanterns resting atop dragon-entwined lamp posts. The Chinatown press regarded the lantern project as the "most distinctive landmarks in the area [that] pin point our Chinatown in the four corners of the earth," and referred to Grant Avenue as the "Street of Dragon Lantern" (Wong 1961: 59). In 1932, the architect Julia Morgan contributed a new way of interpreting Chineseness in her design of the YWCA building on Clay Street. Inspired by the Chinese things displayed in the 1900 Paris Exposition, Morgan had designed a few buildings adopting Chinese-style motifs and decorations, which included the Ming Kwong Chinese Girls' School in 1924 and the former Methodist Chinese Mission School at 940 Washington Street in 1910 (Wilson 2007). The Chinatown YWCA was a community-based recreation and education center serving Chinese women (Fig. 3). The building is clad by red brick, and two octagonal towers project above the central entrance. One square tower rises above the west wing of the building. The roof is covered by handmade clay tiles imported from China (Wilson 2007).



**Fig. 3** Former Chinatown YWCA building, now the Chinese Historical Society of America Museum. ca. 2007 (Photo by author)

The arched entryway – flanked by a lantern – is decorated with glazed geometric patterns above which is a circular window with Chinese lattice work in stone. Within the building, a narrow rectangular courtyard decorated in Chinese garden style clearly reflects Morgan’s intention of incorporating Chinese traditional architecture elements into the building. The original interior of the building had Chinese-style furniture designed by Morgan herself, and the early layout included a gymnasium, library, and other educational and recreational facilities. Although in the 1990s, the Chinese American architect Philip Choy remodeled the building’s interior to accommodate a space for the Chinese Historical Society of America Museum and Learning Center, the original aesthetic quality and Chinese characteristics have been carefully retained (Wilson 2007).

H.A Crosby Forbes (1974) has argued that the export of Chinese decorative arts greatly influenced the early American visual image towards China. As well, the creation of Chinese-style garden pavilions, architectures, landscape, and what were known in the nineteenth century as “Museums of Chinese Curiosities,” such as returning China trader Nathan Dunn’s Chinese Museum in Philadelphia, had also played an instrumental role in the formation of the visual image of China (Forbes 1974; Forbes et al. 1975; Goldstein 1979). Motifs such as pagodas had been adopted in American architectures when, as Jonathan Goldstein (1979: 4) has suggested, Americans were attempting to “create a romantic vision of Cathay by erecting villas, gardens, amusement parks, and other public displays that were at least partially Chinese in their appearance or contents.” John Kuo Wei Tchen (1999) has identified



three forms of Orientalism that took their shapes from the socioeconomic, political, and cultural conditions of American society in different historical moments. The first formation is referred to as “patrician Orientalism” that was driven by the passionate taste for Chinese luxuries to establish a culture of distinction among the American elites in the early nineteenth century. With the expansion of the commercial marketplace in New York and the decline of the Chinese empire by the end of nineteenth century, “commercial Orientalism” emerged as a form in which Chinese things, ideas, and people were commodified to gratify the American desire for exoticism. Both “patrician Orientalism” and “commercial Orientalism” facilitated a stereotypic representation of the Chinese and reinforced a construction of the culture of “otherness.” As Tchen (1999: 163) has argued, “Neither the elite culture of distinction nor the market culture of commercial stereotypes allowed enough breathing room for real, cross-cultural Chinese individuals to thrive.” The racialized perception and representation of the Chinese immigrants as barbaric, alien, and unassimilated “others” created a solid ideological ground in which the anti-Chinese sentiment was cultivated in the 1870s. Tchen defined this as “political Orientalism,” situated in the national political debates about Chinese contracted laborers – the fear of job competition with cheap labor from China and the degrading working conditions that drove White labor leaders and politicians to exclude the Chinese from the national polity by categorizing them as inferior and different. Thus Tchen (1999: 295) concludes, Chinatown “was shaped not so much by the actual presence of Chinese in the metropolis as by their systemic erasure and omnipresent ‘otherness’ in New York before Chinatown.” More generally, the conception or the idea of Chinatown is a social construction produced and reproduced within the rigid confines of Oriental “otherness” and the racial hierarchy of the dominant society.

I believe that the post-earthquake effort to rebuild Chinatown as an “Oriental City” was driven by the combination effects of the three forms of Orientalism. The “patrician Orientalism” and “commercial Orientalism” had prompted the popular interest in searching for an essentialized and romantic visual image for the Chinatown. To overturn the long-held perception of Chinatown as a filthy and immoral slum, the Chinese American elites and the city officials viewed the rebuilding of Chinatown as a rupture that would lead Chinatown to a brighter future. Exoticism was thus used as a convenient tool for enhancing the public image and viability of the Chinese community. The aestheticized or romanticized image consolidated the ways that Orientalism had worked to produce Chinese and Chinese American culture as discrete, fixed, and homogeneous others. The mysterious and pleasurable vision also effectively obscured the actual being and more precise representation of the architecture, sociocultural composition of the Chinatown. For instance, the official rhetoric of a “new Chinatown” has masked the real historic conditions of poverty, racial segregation, and disenfranchisement built on the “political Orientalism” constituted by the historical exclusion, racialized oppression, and exploitation. Thus the post-earthquake construction of ethnicity was the product of a set of contesting dynamics that sought to legitimate the institutions of inequality and marginalization through rearticulating the place identity of the Chinatown in relation to the dominant culture’s stereotype.

## Urban Renewal and the Kong Chow Temple

During the 1960s and 1970s, many American cities experienced rapid growth, and San Francisco was no exception. By the mid-1970s, San Francisco had become the second largest center of international commerce and finance in the U.S. and its ratio of office space to population ranked among the highest in the nation. About 30 million square feet of office buildings were erected in the city, mostly in the downtown area. The “Manhattanization” of San Francisco was accelerated by the city’s desire to maintain its central position in the cross-Pacific trade and to adjust its evolving function in the nation’s corporate economy (Hartman and Carnochan 2002). While the urban renewal movement upgraded the city’s infrastructures to accommodate the growing corporate needs, it unfortunately also led to the massive demolition of low-income housing and the displacement of poor populations. For instance, Manilatown, located at the Kearny Street, was dismantled when the cheap hotels in the vicinity of the enclave were demolished as part of urban renewal. The encroachment of high-rise office buildings of the Financial District also threatened Chinatown that was proximate to Manilatown. The sale of Kong Chow Temple (located at the edge of Chinatown) to one of the city’s major developers in the early 1970s intensified worries concerning the very existence of the Chinatown and provoked fierce debates within the Chinese community.

Kong Chow Temple is probably the first Chinese joss house built in the North America. Historically, the temple was an integral part of the Kong Chow Benevolent Association, a district association established by the immigrants from the Sihui and Heshan areas of Guangdong province. The temple, which served as the headquarters of the Kong Chow Association, was erected around 1857. Located at the intersection of Pine and Kearny Street, it was a two-story structure facing the Pacific Ocean in the days before the filling in of the bay removed Pine and Kearny Streets from the shore. During the 1906 earthquake and fire, the temple was dynamited by fire fighters to clear out blocks in order to contain the spreading fire, and in 1909 it was rebuilt on the same plot of land with donations from members. The new structure, a three-story building in which the top floor housed the temple, inherited the popular layout of Chinatown association buildings with combined features of Chinese tiled roof and decorations, and typical American downtown structural frameworks (Yip 1995).

In 1969 the association decided to sell the property for \$630,000 to the Title Insurance and Trust Company. The new owner of the temple was Ralph K. Davies, chairman of the board of American President Lines, who had been assembling all properties wedged in between the Pine and Kearney Streets entrances to the St. Mary Catholic Church’s Garage for a number of years with the intention of building skyscrapers. The city issued a permit to wreck the temple but immediately thereafter some community members voiced heartfelt concerns claiming that the temple was a symbolic historic landmark of the San Francisco Chinatown. A battle to save the temple was initiated by Charlotte Chang, whose father, Yee Ah-tye, had originally donated the land for the temple in 1854. The 93-year-old Chang, who proclaimed herself to be the only living witness to the words and intentions of her father, insisted

that her father had stipulated that the land could never be used for any other purpose than as a temple. Unfortunately, Chang couldn't provide paper records to support her claim because the 1906 earthquake and fire had destroyed all the documents (Sala 1968a; b).

Chang declared the place of the temple to be sacred ground because "a temple has been on that land ever since there were people living in San Francisco" (Sala 1968a). She believed the proposed office building would violate its sacredness. In addition to the historical significance of the temple for the community, Chang also acknowledged the temple's importance in sustaining her personal and family memory, for "the temple is not important to her as a physical object but as a living symbol of the goals and principles for which her father fought" (Sala 1968b). With respect to the future of the Chinatown community, Chang indicated her concerns over the possibility of losing Chinatown to the big corporations. She suggested that if the temple were demolished, the entire 500-block of Pine Street would be lost forever and the financial district on Chinatown would move one block closer. She worried that if Chinese owners continued to sell their properties to the developers, there would be nothing left of Chinatown except the commercial street along Grant Avenue. Thus a viable Chinese community would eventually disappear if the Chinese did not start making efforts to retain their properties by exchanging them only between themselves (Sala 1968b).

Although Chang was supported by some community members, for the Kong Chow Association the temple had already become a financial burden. In poor condition, it would cost approximately \$50,000 to restore it to conform to the present building code. Thus rather than "wasting" money to repair the dilapidated temple, the association purchased a new building on Stockton Street and planned to move the temple there. To recognize the legacy of the first Chinese temple, they stipulated that the purchasers of the old site erect a plaque commemorating its brief history. At this point, Chang and her followers decided to pursue legal means to halt the sale and subsequent demolition of the Kong Chow Temple. In April of 1968, in a suit filed by Attorney Gordon Lau representing Charlotte Chang, the court upheld the Association. After the trial, Chang and her supporters protested in front of Kong Chow Temple and submitted a plea to the Landmarks Preservation Advisory Board, requesting the designation of the Kong Chow Temple as a historical landmark. Although the City Landmarks Board did pass a resolution urging preservation of the temple, it still lacked legal protection, and so the temple was finally dismantled to make way for a high-rise office building in the 1970s.

The controversy over Kong Chow Temple occurred in a particular historical moment of San Francisco, when the "Manhattanization" of the city was causing a massive displacement of the urban poor. The urban renewal movement intensified the conflicts between the interests of the marginal groups and the expansion of corporate capitalism. It also created a long-term dilemma regarding the availability of low-income housing in the city. The Kong Chow Temple controversy revealed the financial forces that imposed gentrification from outside as Chinatown and Manilatown began to disappear due to the uncontrolled expansion of the financial district. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, some 1,700 housing units in Chinatown were converted to office use, while an influx of overseas Asian capital

boosted the commercial and residential rents to a new height and drove small businesses and low-income residents out of the neighborhood (Hartman and Carnochan 2002: 365). Historically as a viable living community, Chinatown was home to many Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans, most of who had modest income and relied on Chinatown businesses to make a living. In Chinatown's core area, nearly 97% of the residents were renters; even in the noncore area, renters comprised more than half of the population (*Report of the San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens' Survey and Fact Finding Committee* 1969: 5; Loo 1991: 76). The transformation of Chinatown under these economic shifts threatened to turn the community into a commercial tourist area, at the cost of displacing low-income Chinese immigrants and elderly. However, these same forces were empowering because the prevalent feelings of insecurity about territory, status and power brought the consciousness of the enclave's boundaries into focus. Thus Kong Chow Temple not only signified the historical legacy and cultural heritage of the Chinatown community but also, more importantly, stood for the symbolic boundaries of the community. The dispute regarding the demolition of the temple was grounded on the competing spatial discourses of history, ethnicity, power, and changing socioeconomic imperatives.

In addition, the contradictory ways in which Kong Chow Temple had been interpreted as cultural heritage revealed internal diversity and heterogeneity within the Chinese community. Rather than a fixed, homogeneous ethnic community, Chinatown is itself a site of difference and of different relations among Chinese immigrants – that is, there are unequal relations of class, gender, social learning, and cultural affiliations. The unsuccessful efforts of Chang and her followers marked a history of survival in which social relations were determined by asymmetrical and uneven distribution of power. Historically excluded from the normal national space and perceived as inassimilable aliens, Chinese immigrants had established a relatively independent economic and political structure in the ghettoized Chinatown. The traditional social organizations, such as clan and district associations, possessed arbitrary authority that determined the political, cultural, and economic characters of the community through various means of control. In particular, the male-dominated traditional organizations and the informal political structure of Chinatown had put women in a noticeably subordinate position. Women had been excluded from the boards of the family and district associations when the gender relations in the homeland villages were transplanted to the transnational life. As Chang complained to a local newspaper, it was the fact that she was a woman that deprived her of the respect of the Kong Chow Association board members. The association didn't take her advice seriously and simply refused to negotiate with her (Sala 1968a; b).

Although Chang, as a second-generation Chinese American woman, didn't succeed in challenging the long-standing patriarchal hierarchies entrenched in the social structures of the Chinatown, her efforts to protect the Kong Chow Temple gives us insight into the evolving gender roles and gender relations within the community. The gender relations practiced in the traditional Chinese society that had legitimated men's superiority and women's subaltern position were rearticulated in the immigrant society as a means to consolidate the coherence of the notion of masculinity

through the imposition of patriarchal orders (Smith 2006). However, contradictions in gender ideology between the new generations of Chinese-American women and the dominant configuration of male privilege revealed a dynamicity that could disrupt partially gender relations in the new context. The collision of diverse interests and the evolution of social relations derived from disruptive changes in culture, power, and economy continue to shape Chinatown as a contested space of competing identity discourses.

## Chinatown as a Historic District

The San Francisco Planning Department proposed a Downtown Plan (1985), which highlighted the importance of historic preservation in the downtown area and intended to shift new development to the South-of-Market districts. With growing opposition to the uncontrolled growth of high-rise office buildings, local voters approved a "Proposition M" to limit the construction of new office buildings to an annual total of 950,000 square feet (Godfrey 1988: 10). The renewed appreciation of the cultural and architectural diversity of the urban neighborhoods led the city to recognize officially the historical significance of San Francisco's Chinatown. Shortly after the Downtown Plan was published, the San Francisco Landmarks Preservation Advisory Board submitted a proposal to designate Chinatown as a historic district. According to the proposed codes, any alterations to the exterior of structures within the historic district would require city permits as well as review by the Landmarks Board. New constructions on vacant sites would also need review and approval of the Landmarks Board and City Planning Commission.

The San Francisco Planning Commission proposed interim controls on Chinatown development, seeking to preserve the historic character of Chinatown by restraining new urban development and preventing high-rise building projects from spreading into the neighborhood. These controls not only set height restrictions on new non-residential and residential buildings but also reduced the floor area ratio in core Chinatown from the original 10:1 to 6:1 and noncore area from 6:1 to 4.8:1 (Loo 1991: 75). Some Chinatown groups, mostly new generation grassroots community organizations, supported the city's interim controls in hopes that they would overturn "overly liberal zoning rules that encourage owners to develop properties at the expense of housing" (Loo 1991: 75). However, those owners of the property in Chinatown protested the ordinances and legislations that were designed to demarcate the area as a protected historic district because they feared that the restrictions of building heights and area ratio would reduce the future developmental opportunities of their properties. The designation of a historic district provides tax incentives for rehabilitation costs, and the enactment of State Historic Building Code in 1985 also allows a range of alternatives for evaluating the structures in historic districts in meeting the building codes. Nonetheless the Chinatown property owners, headed by the Chinese Six Company, opposed the proposed regulations and declared their desire for the rights "to build to what the property here is worth" (Bishop 1990).

In addition to this opposition, the particular forms of land ownership in Chinatown also made it extremely difficult to process the historic district legislations. After WWII, the clan associations and district associations bought many of the properties in Chinatown from White owners. The funds were mostly assembled from association members, and in some cases there were hundreds of people contributing to a single purchase. The system is called *hui* in Chinese, which uses collective financial powers to acquire properties or business, and then shares the profits among the members. In this way, Chinatown associations exerted considerable property control and economic influence in the community, owning about 35% of the properties in Chinatown (Bishop 1990). Driven by the feeling of insecurity about the future of their political economic territory, the associations and property owners allied to resist the historic designation and interim controls. The political pressures from Chinatown organizations and their unwillingness to cooperate eventually obliged the Landmarks Boards and the Planning Commission to delay the designation plan and shortened the effective period of the interim controls.

Without protection as a historic district, San Francisco's Chinatown was experiencing a slow erosion of its historical flavors, which was accelerated by the fast economic development and new Asian capital from overseas. Some Chinatown activists and preservationists expressed their concerns over the ever-changing façade of Chinatown storefronts. According to Enid Lim, a previous Landmark Board member, San Francisco's Chinatown was suffering the Hong Kong "mall-ization," which destroyed the historical characters of the old Chinatown, especially on Grant Avenue, the commercial street of the neighborhood, where the glossy appearance of aluminum and plate glass was replacing the wood frame window and doors that had fronted Chinatown stores since 1906. The so-called modernization homogenized the façade of the commercial units, erasing the historic character that had made Chinatown a distinctive neighborhood (Adam 2002). With the development of tourism, stores selling Chinese ethnic products such as fine jade and cheap curios gave way to camera and video equipment shops, all-purpose tourists' bazaars, hamburger outlets, cookie chain shops, and shops selling Wild West gear, all intended for non-resident consumers. Harry W. Low, former national president of the Chinese American Citizens Alliance, complained about the transformations asking "Is Chinatown going to remain a unique area with a special history, food and other attractions or just another place full of camera and T-shirt shops?" (Bishop 1990).

The debates over the ever-changing façade of Chinatown street fronts and the struggles pertaining to historic preservation had lasted for several decades. In the 1940s, the idea of preserving Chinatown as a historic district was inspired by a letter written by the New Orleans mayor to an architectural magazine, explaining how the Louisiana City's Vieux Carre Commission planned to preserve the French Quarter. San Francisco quickly decided to do something similar. Concerning the "westernization" of Chinatown, William T. Hogan, a realtor, and others formed a committee aiming to save the historic look of the community. They asserted that Chinatown was "slowly, but surely, disappear[ing] from our midst as a result of remodeling store fronts and buildings that will do away with the charm that is its greatest attraction" (San Francisco Chronicle 1947, Nov. 28). They observed that shops on Grant Avenue



looked the same as stores found in any small downtown area: full glass front, black marble, and cream brick façade. With regard to the process of modernizing Chinatown's main commercial street, the committee advocated adopting the preservation laws exercised in New Orleans and redefined the local ordinances. The proposed legislations would not mandate remodeling, but would encourage new designs seeking "to preserve the Oriental flavor" (San Francisco Chronicle 1947, Nov. 28). Hogan's proposal received support from a group of Chinatown businessmen, who themselves also formed a Committee for the Preservation of Architecture in Chinatown in order to preserve the historic façade of Grant Avenue. They believed that the modern buildings were stripping the Chinese character from the commercial street, with "disastrous" results for the business of the community (San Francisco Chronicle 1947, Nov. 28). Francis Lai Chinn, a Chinatown businessman, believed the Chinese themselves would wholeheartedly endorse the committee plan if they realized it would help business, saying candidly, "Let's admit we're putting on a Hollywood façade to attract tourists, and admit we're trying to preserve atmosphere because we think it will pay off" (San Francisco Chronicle 1947, Nov. 28). The Chinese merchants clearly knew what they were selling and to whom. The Chinese things, buildings, and images were thus commodified to gratify Western fascination with exoticism, which in consequence perpetuated and reinforced the solid ideological ground of "otherness" constructed in the Western society.

In 1947, the Board of Supervisors proposed a city statute prohibiting any architectural changes in the modernization plans for San Francisco's Chinatown. About a month later, the Committee for Preservation of Architecture in Chinatown initiated a voluntary program to seek legal means of controlling construction and alterations in Chinatown. The program suggested that a local commission, similar to the Vieux Carre Commission of New Orleans, would ensure the retention of the Chinatown's character by passing on building and alteration plans and rejecting those practices that do not conform to "traditional" design. Although the proposal met with support from some business owners in Chinatown, the two most powerful Chinese organizations, Chinese Six Company and Chinatown Chamber of Commerce, withheld support, and so, despite the clear goals and agendas demonstrated by the Committee for Preservation of Architecture in Chinatown, its efforts didn't succeed at the end. They failed to penetrate the political autonomy of the Chinatown community and then failed to secure the support of the dominant Chinatown organizations. In addition, the endeavors to maintain the spatial order of Chinatown in the 1940s was also opposed by local architects and Chinese businessmen who saw "progress" as essential for the community's future development. For instance, P.C. Quock, former president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, said "Like everything else, Chinatown must keep up with the times. It is past time that many of our stores were modernized" (San Francisco Chronicle 1947, Sept. 22). An architect said, "New Orleans' French Quarter is an architectural gem. There are no architectural gems in Chinatown. Most of the buildings are so rotten they should be torn down instead of being preserved" (San Francisco Chronicle 1947, Nov. 28). Two other architects, Worley Wong and John Campbell, who designed some of the modern buildings in Chinatown, were also among the first to rally to oppose the

preservation statements. They commented that the “fake sheet metal pagodas aren’t going to help anybody... If Chinatown citizens want modern store fronts on their buildings, that’s their business” (San Francisco Chronicle 1947, Nov. 28). Unlike the preservation proponents who perceived the exotic architectures in Chinatown as something valuable representing the unique Oriental character of the community and a tourist attraction, the arguments made by the pro-development group were fundamentally grounded on the ideology that saw Chinatown as an impoverished slum requiring “progress” and “modernization.”

The struggles and debates over whether the old structures in Chinatown should be preserved or modernized have lasted for several decades. Though the conundrum might be universal, in San Francisco, the issues are complicated by the community’s particular history of immigration and racial discrimination, and the politics of ethnic identity. The exotica of Chinatown have been appreciated in the rest of society not only because it was an important attraction for the tourists and consumers, but also because it signifies the ideology of multiculturalism that has been celebrated by Western liberal society. The city has used the strategy of ethnic iconization in an attempt to construct itself a tolerant, international, and diverse cosmopolitan city (Irazabal 2004: 145). However, as some scholars have pointed out, multiculturalism is subject to the inherent structure of racism that defines the Other from a distanced point of European supremacy (Mitchell 2004; Zizek 1997). For instance, Slavoj Zizek (1997: 44) has argued, “multiculturalism is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a ‘racism with a distance’ – it ‘respects’ the Other’s identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position.” Paraphrasing Zizek’s criticism, I argue that the drive to preserve the Oriental and exotic architectural environment of the Chinatown is a ramification of the mass cultural consumption of ethnicity and difference in the modern society. The emphasis on the essential or essentialized elements of ethnic identity indicates the superficial attempts of the policies and rhetoric of multiculturalism to interpret and control cultural difference (Mitchell 2004: 122). The success of the tourism industry and the advancement of mass media technology further encouraged the enduring official discourse that defined the ethnic minorities as fixed, marginalized Others, in which a true engagement with the real life of the people inhabiting in the community was unfortunately ignored.

In addition to the tensions between preservationist and commercial concerns in the Chinatown development, the substandard living environment and severe scarcity of affordable housings and outdoor recreational spaces in the Chinatown also stimulated a debate about the role of historic preservation vis-à-vis local interests. The majority of Chinatown buildings were old structures, whose devastated conditions and outdated layouts that were originally designed for bachelor laborers, later became an obstacle for renovation and development. According to a 1976 national survey, Chinatown residents were far less satisfied with their neighborhood than the overall U.S. citizens. Only 2% of Chinatown residents indicated “very satisfied” with their neighborhood (compared to 46% nationally). Most expressed neutral feelings towards their living environments, but qualities such as “filth,” “crowding,” “noise,”



“traffic jams,” and “parking problems” were considered undesirable attributes of the neighborhood (Campbell et al. 1976; Loo 1991: 79–80). These perceptions show that resistance to historic preservation in Chinatown is linked to the backward living standards. For instance, Thomas Ng, a member of the Chinese Six Company, complained that the old buildings in Chinatown were always overcrowded and lacked necessary sanitary facilities, and thus he worried that the historic district designation and the consequent acts of preservation “would block progress” (Adam 2002). Gordon Chin, a prominent leader in Chinatown’s low-income housing movements, also stated that “it would be a mistake to consider the losses to historical design without also seeing projects intended to make Chinatown a more pleasant place.” To Chin, priority should be placed on improving substandard living conditions, including the construction of desperately needed outdoor recreational spaces and low-income housings (Adam 2002). In some cities and towns, the adaptive use of the historic structures has sometimes ignored public access and interpretation, and therefore has been criticized for its role in gentrification and the displacement for low-income residents (Hayden 1995: 53). As a living community with a large population of poor immigrants and vulnerable tenants, Chinatown faces a special challenge when it tries to incorporate preservation into the everyday life of its residents. Though heritage advocates have emphasized that historic preservation does not have to prevent development and that the tax credits and subsidies rewarded to historic designation would provide financial support for rehabilitating historic buildings, community members are still concerned that preserving old architectural fabric will not address the pragmatic needs of the residents and will pose a barrier to future progress.

The ideological construction of Chinatown as an impoverished slum that has been historically associated with poverty, crime, prostitution, and the opium trade, has been profoundly transferred into spatial languages and affected the Chinese residents’ perceptions towards the historic remnants of the community. It shows that space is far more than a neutral physical container, but is encoded with rich social connotations and intertwining social relations. The socially constructed knowledge produced by the dominant society (and in which the subaltern community participates in its own way) serves to justify the link between place and race, morality, social behavior, and cultural difference. Within such a system of knowledge, the space of Chinatown was naturalized as a living repository of uncivilized and inassimilable Oriental Others through the various ways of materializing the racial ideologies (Anderson 1995; Shah 2001).

For instance, in 1885 the city created a map for San Francisco’s Chinatown, specifically indicating the locations of brothels, opium dens, and gambling halls in the Chinatown area (Fig. 4). The map not only was the material *result* of the constant effort to monopolize and define minority space as deviant, imperfect, and marginal but also *produced* the hegemonic narrative that defined the place of Chinatown as Other. The bachelor society of Chinatown was considered immoral, dangerous, and threatening to the respectable domesticity of the White society, which further justified the racial hierarchy and discriminatory practices towards the Chinese immigrants. In accepting the racial discourses that privileged a system of meanings and values rooted in hegemonic White culture, the Chinatown community members



**Fig. 4a and b** An official map indicating the locations of brothels, gambling halls, and opium dens in San Francisco's Chinatown. ca. 1885 (compiled by a Special Committee of the Board of Supervisor, San Francisco Municipal Report, 1884-1885. Collection of The Society of California Pioneers. C003860)

perceived their buildings as carriers of a shameful history that ought to be condemned. Defined thus, the past became something to escape, and the prospect of “upgrading” and “modernizing” the physical environment of the community was eagerly embraced. The depreciation of the past thus was entrenched on the racial hierarchy and the ideological ground of “otherness” in the dominant society.

The disparity between the ideology of the Chinese community members and the city institutions over the interpretation and management of Chinatown's heritage reveals the continuing need for negotiation and compromise with respect to the contours of ethnicity in the Chinatown. The social cleavages between the enthusiastic guardians of mainstream values and the excluded Others are accentuated by the difficulties of connecting social memories with place memories. As Dolores Hayden (1995: 46) observed “place trigger memories for insiders, who have shared a common past, and at the same time places often can represent shared pasts to outsiders who might be interested in knowing about them in the present.” The disparity between insiders' social memories and outsiders' present needs often leads to conflicted views towards history and preservation. To the larger society, Chinatown is significant not only for its unique history of immigration but also for the exotic environment that stimulates the Western fantasy of the Oriental Other. For the community members, however, the disgraceful past and the awkward present complicate their feelings toward the place. Chinatown, to them, is not simply a historical repository but the community where they live daily. The argument over the future of the historic community is ultimately a contest over social identity: whose Chinatown is it, who should be the beneficiaries, and who is entitled the right to interpret and control heritage? David Lowenthal (1985) has pointed out that we have domesticated the past and treat it a “foreign country” and a “marketable commodity” that is nearly irrelevant to modern concerns and our own presence. Thus the real challenge of preservation might lie in how to develop an appropriate means of embracing the historic and inhabited landscape as an evolving social process.

## Conclusion

Instead of being a fixed and homogeneous ethnic community, Chinatown is a complex social space containing diverse groups of people and dynamic interactions and social relations. It is a historical emblem undergoing constant transformation in terms of its sociocultural composition, demographics, and cultural landscape. Not only the early bachelor society evolved to embrace new waves of Chinese immigrants varied in class, gender, and national origin, but also the macro-urban context endured shifting relations of power, culture, and economy. The historical processes of staging the Chinatown as a fixed, homogenous, and essentialized symbol of an exotic ethnic enclave indicate some of the ways in which the dominant discourse that has subordinated Chinese immigrants and their culture as Other has also reproduced and reconfigured the space of Chinatown. The creation of ethnic structures

and spaces at the beginning of the twentieth century was fundamentally driven by an aggressive market force to commodify the ethnic traditions that were reinvented as an expression of pure and consistent culture in a new spatio-temporal context.

The packaging of ethnic themes reveals the logic of the dominant culture that fixes Chinese American identity and denies the social complexities of Chinatown as an actual living community. The awareness of social time – “a time defined by both formal relationships and daily interaction” – combined with historic preservation efforts focusing on the monumentalization of history were entangled in the multi-faceted discourse of heritage and identity (Herzfeld 1991: 6). Michael Herzfeld (1991) has argued that social and monumental time separate the popular from the official understanding of history. While social time addresses the everyday experiences of ordinary people, monumental time tends to focus on the categorized and stereotyped past (Herzfeld 1991: 10). Far from being a stable cultural identity with one shared identity, Chinatown is a terrain of contested meanings, subject to pressures from both inside and outside of the community. In the course of fighting against the relocation of the Chinatown, the demise of the historic building of Kong Chow Temple, and the historic designation of Chinatown, the Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants indicated their courage and ability to reclaim their lives, insisting on their own terms for doing so.

The prosperity of tourism as an industry in the modern era has propelled the cultural consumption of enclaves of ethnicity, encouraging a superficial interpretation of the neighborhood without truly engaging with the people living there (Caftanzoglou 2001: 27). Yet Chinatown residents have successfully resisted or at least disrupted the official attempts to impose a dominant and structured order on their spatial activities. They have challenged the established meanings and official discourse that structures and manages them as an essentialized Other, and have instead managed to convert their marginalization into positive values (Caftanzoglou 2001: 32). Roxane Caftanzoglou (2001: 24) has suggested that the internally oriented and symbolically produced spaces that are assigned distinct values, meanings and functions, and the creation of internal boundaries that demarcate and uphold the differences do not necessarily comply with hegemonic construction of space and the meanings that assigned them. She believes that it is essential to recognize the dynamic whereby immigrant settlements were seen as “a disorderly and polluting irruption of social time in the midst of the isolated and well guarded ‘buffer zone’ designed to surround and isolate” the immigrants from the dominant society. There is a disparity between the dominant discourses about what Chinatown should be, on the one hand, and on the other a collective self-identification of the community. In response to the imposition of a top-down spatial order, Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans have constructed a counter-discourse of heritage, space, and race grounded on their distinct political economic system and collective memories that gave the community its sense of social and cultural identity. The history of racial exclusion and various forms of dispossession have generated strong feelings of belonging and self-identification for the Chinese immigrants, in which space was a key resource for identity construction (Sibley 1995; Gillis 1994).

Boundary consciousness is a mutual process that could be internalized by the minority community, whose insecurity of their political economic territories accentuates their own boundary perception, where autonomy and independence were at stake. For Chinese Americans, the series of massacres that took place on the west coast in the 1870s, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Acts, and other ongoing threats of dispossession and displacement made their attachment to the place of Chinatown particularly intense. They worked hard to maintain the livelihood of their community. In this, the symbolic construction of boundaries protected them from racial oppression and job discrimination in the larger spaces of the modern metropolis (Zhou 1992). More importantly, it then became a mechanism of political empowerment for the enclave. The enduring sense of inequality and unevenly distributed spatial powers encourage boundary erection and readapt existing spatial boundaries to the present politics of heritage. The particular political system and socioeconomic pattern of San Francisco's Chinatown also reinforce social construction of spatial boundaries, for which space can be a device with which to challenge dominant values and capitalist forces. In San Francisco, Chinatown residents were able to successfully reject the intrusion of the official powers into the everyday spatial orders of the community by deploying long-established traditional Chinatown social organizations to express the voices of the community, and in consequence sustain their hegemony over the space. The case of San Francisco shows that "minoritized space" (Laguerre 1999) is not simply a mechanism of the hegemonic power of the dominant group, but can simultaneously empower the subaltern minority to produce an infrastructure of support. The development of city capitalist systems, the transformation of local political and social structures, and the on-going racial politics in society suggest that the role of Chinatown as an ethnic heritage will continue to be contested in various ways. It is a space inflected with the instability, fluidity and hybridity of cultural identities that has been embedded with constantly contested power relations.

## Note

This paper is drawn from research from the author's Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2011: "Chinatown and Urban Redevelopment: A Spatial Narrative of Race, Identity, and Urban Politics, 1950–2000."

1. *Report of the San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens' Survey and Fact Finding Committee* defined three arbitrary areas of San Francisco's Chinatown: Hard Core, Residential, and Potential. Based on the census count of 1960, the Committee referred "Hard Core" to census tracts A-13, 14, 15, an area bounded by California Street on the South, Pacific Avenue on the North, Mason Street on the West, and Kearny Street on the East, which had over 90% Chinese populations. "Residential" was referred to A-5,6,7,9,16 where Chinese constituted more than 50% of the population. "Potential" area including A-3,4,8,10,22 had about 25.6% Chinese in the 1960 census count and was predicted to have greater than 50% Chinese in the 1970 census.

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# Urban Heritage, Representation and Planning: Comparative Approaches in Habana Vieja and Trinidad, Cuba

Joseph L. Scarpaci

Cultural patrimony is a resilient feature in portraying “cubanness” (*cubanidad*) in contemporary Cuba. The government enlists socialist slogans, domestic and foreign personalities, and selected built environments in its arsenal for defining *cubanidad*. This paper examines the architectural and planning features of two Cuban World Heritage Sites: Habana Vieja (1982) and Trinidad (1988). I begin with a review of how *cubanidad* has been expressed through travel writings and landscape architects of the nineteenth century. I then briefly turn to key semiotic features associated with the colonial (1511–1898), Republican (1902–1958) and Socialist (1959–present) periods as a backdrop to the workings of urban heritage planning in these two cities. Each city has developed unique strategies to balance the need for tourist revenues, on the one hand, with residential housing needs, on the other. I conclude that there is no clear association between a centrally planned economy and the diversity of approaches to urban heritage, representation and planning in contemporary Cuba. Rather, elements of scale, personal leadership, and relative location better explain the differences in these planning strategies and the representation of *cubanidad*.

## On Defining *Cubanidad*

Capturing the essence of material and non-material cultures is a daunting task that requires a multidisciplinary approach because no single lens can adequately capture the meaning and representation that such an endeavor mandates. Cultural geography has long employed “landscape,” which refers to an assemblage of objects in the natural and human-altered (i.e. built) environments, as a window onto local, regional,

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J.L. Scarpaci (✉)  
Department of Geography, West College of Business, West Liberty University,  
West Liberty, WV, USA  
e-mail: joseph.scarpaci@westliberty.edu

and national identity. Following Mikesell (1968), I employ the term as the portion of land that the eye can understand in a single glance, particularly the objects in that territory that lend to its pictorial aspect. Landscape analysis entered U.S. cultural geography after Carl Sauer's "Morphology of Landscape" (1925). He enlisted the idea of *landschaft* elaborated by geographers in Germany to counter the then popular geographic explanation of "environmental determinism." But Sauerian landscape analysis turned environmental determinism on its end: instead of looking at the restrictions that environment imposed on human activity, Sauer preferred to assess how humans had modified the landscape over time and space. In his framework, landscape became a loose association of natural and cultural elements understood by using cultural history and artifactual analysis (terraces, pottery, seed stock, stream beds, abandoned settlements).

Two major criticisms challenged this approach to landscape analysis. The first was the inability to reconstruct fully the natural landscapes of the past. Sauer recognized the problem caused by the lack of written and visual records and the limitations of reconstructing climatic and biogeographic regimes using phenology (which looks at how plants and animals respond to climatic change such as periods of pollination, freezing of lakes, the onset of seasons, and related events). A second critique developed in the early 1980s and bore the label of the "new cultural geography." Imbued with social and cultural theory, this new line took on the same historical approach but departed sharply from the older landscape tradition in its conceptual framework. In many ways, the sociocultural and political perspective took over the task of natural history and artefactual analysis. In part, this divergence in landscape perspectives stems from Carl Sauer and the tradition of cultural geography that developed at The University of California at Berkeley's Department of Geography, which focuses on the historic landscapes of Latin America. The "new cultural geography" tends to examine more contemporary and urban landscapes, which lend themselves more readily to sociocultural and political interpretations.

This new way of examining landscape has adopted a range of topics: from dramaturgical approaches that address marginality (Cresswell 1996), to the application of iconography derived from art history to interpret landscape (Cosgrove and Daniels 1988), the study of the sides of buildings in U.S. Central Business Districts as a window to political regimes and neighborhood change (Ford 2000), and the study of the Latin American historic district as center for contesting the uses of public space (Jones and Varley 1994; Bromley and Jones 1996a, b).

There is a range of sources that can contribute to a study of *cubanidad* (Scarpaci and Portela 2009). Early travel writing provides a rich descriptive source. Henry Dana (1815–1882) wrote in 1859 while sailing offshore Cuba that the "fertile, undulating land comes to the sea, and rises into high hills as it recedes" (Dana 1996: ix). Cuba, like the Greater Antilles (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Cayman Islands), gives land observers a glimpse of its mountains and hills from the many plains and flatlands sprinkled across the island (Richardson 1992: 15). The question remains, however, of how to study the Cuban landscape as a "thing" when "Cuban landscape" carries many meanings. Christopher Columbus – Cuba's first European discoverer – allegedly said that it was the "most beautiful land [his] eyes

have ever seen,” although many other Caribbean residents have claimed that the Italian sailor made the same remark about their islands. The German naturalist Baron Alexander von Humboldt (called Cuba’s “second discoverer”) described the island as one of sugar and slaves in 1801–1802 (Humboldt 2001). Twentieth-century Cuban anthropologist and ethnomusicologist Fernando Ortíz, sometimes referred to as the “third discover of Cuba” for having reconstructed indigenous and African contributions to the island’s rich tapestry, argued passionately that Cuba was enriched by the contributions of Afro-Cuban culture. Cuba did not need to be rescued by outsiders. Its Africanization (Ortiz coined the term “Afro-Cuban”) meant understanding material culture (plant names, toponyms, farming practices) and non-material contributions (syncretism, language, music, street humor [*choteo*], folklore, botany) to the island’s heritage (Mañach 1969).

### *Cuba as Landscape*

Early non-cartographic representations of Cuba appear in landscape paintings. European landscape painters who visited Cuba were awed by the island’s beauty. Baron von Humboldt remarked upon his arrival in Havana’s harbor in 1800 that it was “one of the most picturesque and pleasing on the northern equinoctial shores of America” (Humboldt 2001).

In the nineteenth century the colony forged a strong sense of nationalism that centered, in addition to the struggle for independence, on human–environment relationships. Louis A. Pérez, Jr. (2001) has cogently documented the rise of nationalism based on how Cubans supported each other before, during, and after hurricanes. Specifically, his aim was “to insert the phenomenon of mid-nineteenth-century hurricanes into the larger circumstances of the Cuban condition as one more variable in the formation of nation.” His environmental history studied how the catastrophic storms of the 1840s molded socioeconomic developments in nineteenth-century Cuba. He shows how the powerless (peasants, slaves, common folks) and powerful (the Spanish colonial authorities) reached compromise in preparing for tropical storms, surviving them, and rebuilding in the wake of the storms. In this way, then, Cuban respect and admiration for the forces of nature take firm hold well before Independence (1898) and the socialist government (1959–present), while also cutting across class lines. This also contributed to *cubanidad*.

This occurred while the United States developed the Hudson River School of landscape painting in the nineteenth century in response to modernity and industrialization, as well as a romantic clinging to the nation’s older established eastern seaboard. While America’s frontier moved increasingly westward, the Hudson River painters’ found an enthusiastic American public that increasingly appreciated the older settlements, often depicted as moral or literary themes. In both the United States and Europe, this new venue of painting was partly a response to the rise of industrialization and surely recognition that mechanization was capable of transforming the look of the land in unprecedented ways. Industrial production, driven

by smoky steam engines in factories, mills, and railroads, left sooty plumes across cityscapes and countryside alike (Howat 1987). Cuba was also responsive to this new genre of painting, which altered its initial influences that were decidedly European.

A few remarkable landscape painters in nineteenth-century Cuba merit review here. Esteban Chartrand's 1877 work, marine landscapes (*paisaje marino*), and Valentín Sanz Carta's *Las Malangas* capture Cuba's pristine countryside. Chartrand (1824–1825 to 1884–1889), a son of French immigrants who lived in the Cuban port of Matanzas, brought a subtlety and accuracy to his landscape portraits of a nation that was not yet dominated by sugar cane planting and urbanization. He constructed nostalgic, romanticized, and idealized landscapes that were washed in twilight. Unlike European painters gazing at the island, he included the common peasant (*guajiro*) as opposed to the trappings of the economic elite. Elements in his paintings emphasized *lo cubano*, and highlighted such cultural elements as *bohíos* (small and simple farmhouses), *ingenios* (simple sugar mills) and palms (the *palma real* in Spanish, or royal palm (*Roystonea regia*) is the national tree) (MNBA 2001).

Chartrand and Sanz Carta flourished at a time when there was a growing appreciation for local aesthetic and beauty, and a turn away from elitist and Spanish-based views of local life. This current of painting rose in tandem with the independence wars and helped to cement certain iconic elements of *cubanidad*, ranging from depictions of huts, wild-growing fruit, palm trees, castles and fortresses, and other natural and cultural elements that might at one time have been considered too plebian to paint.

### *Architectural Heritage as Commodity*

Government approaches to the identification, safeguarding, and maintenance of national heritage sites and monuments defy a simple division into whether a nation is a market or a centrally planned economy (Bromley and Jones 1995). For example, in Celebration, Florida, the present construction boom by the Walt Disney Corporation takes its stylistic inspiration from the designs of historical small-town America. The market-driven approach to planning is evident by this planned community that embraces the pre-automobile period, much like Disney's Main Street pedestrian boulevard at the entrance to Disney World in Orlando, Florida. Neo-traditional design structures such as Seaside, Florida and related projects of Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk of DBZ Associates (Duany et al. 2000) have also influenced the U.S. housing market. In Blacksburg, Virginia (where I have lived), a developer has built a neo-traditional community, modeled on principles of New Urbanism, called the Village at Tom's Creek. It is touted in terms of heritage values:

The Village is a planned "traditional neighborhood development," built according to the principles that shaped traditional Virginia villages...It is designed to create an intimate

neighborhood surrounded by and connected to its open meadows and woodlands. Traditional close-knit Virginia communities evolved around distinctive civic spaces. The Village's informal parks, tree-lined boulevards, and small central shops are designed with respect to this tradition. The streets and alleys will provide both intimate lanes of small yards and friendly porches and formal boulevards with flowered medians and small shops. The variety of house styles and sizes will echo the finest traditional Virginia architecture (TVTC 2006).

This view of heritage draws on both cultural (traditional neighborhood development, close-knit Virginia communities, civic spaces) and natural elements (beautiful rolling landscapes, meadows and woodlands, flowered medians). Heritage, therefore, has been carefully packaged by the developer to conjure up history, lifestyle, and landscape in the U.S. housing market (which was booming until very recently). Its marketing conveys history, prestige, respectability, and a sensibility towards the fine (middle-class) aesthetics of life.

Are such descriptions of heritage in the United States any different from promotions of heritage landscapes in socialist Cuba? Historic Trinidad is promoted on the government's national press (*Prensa Latina*) website as follows:

The cultural treasurer that distinguishes Trinidad gives it a unique distinction in the Greater Antilles. Between mountains and sea, the city called the 'Museum of the Caribbean' expresses a proud and unique natural beauty to whoever visits it... Passing through its narrow cobble-stoned streets allows the walker to discover artistic balconies, curved balustrades of precious wood, complex iron grillwork, surprisingly decorated walls, and romantic patios (Primeras Villas 2006).

Like the small-town image promulgated in Blacksburg, natural and cultural attributes pepper the discourse about the charms of this colonial Caribbean town. Yet, heritage representations are not always so simple in their intentions (Barthell 1996). In the case of Trinidad, some Cubans would argue that it was neglected intentionally in the first decades of the revolution because the government wanted to punish Trinidadians for support lent to the anti-communist guerillas during the insurgency of the 1960s. When old towns became "fashionable" and when the government discovered that European backpackers were enthralled with Trinidad, the government finally decided to capitalize on its assets.<sup>1</sup>

In an era of global travel in a deregulated market for the middle classes, heritage is becoming an important niche market in international tourism. Hewison argues that heritage is produced just like any other commodity, "which nobody seems able to define, but which everyone is eager to sell" (Hewison 1987: 9). If heritage tourism is indeed commodified, then the pressure in developing nations like Cuba is especially great because of the need for hard currency. But the economic need may conflict with what locals want. Cheryl Shanks (2002: 17) describes this paradox as one of the many dilemmas of "artificial authenticity": "commodifying culture simultaneously preserves, transforms, and destroys it."

This is a sensitive issue for politicians and local officials in developing countries like Cuba because economic development creates pressure to attract dollars or Euros, which, in turn, may corrupt the authenticity of local culture (Barberia 2002).

As examples, we might think of Ernest Hemingway's favorite bars in Habana Vieja, or dancing the tango in Buenos Aires' San Telmo neighborhood. These places garner a disproportionate amount of publicity in promoting heritage, even though they are only marginally related to the history of the neighborhoods in which they are promoted. The unwitting tourist may know little about the historic veracity of these representations and may not even care to know (Urry 2002). Nevertheless, as David Lowenthal has shown (1985), rebuilding historic places and landscapes offers familiarity and guidance to both residents and tourists even though their historical veracity may be suspect. Latin America has no shortage of heritage tourism venues; *favela* (slums) tourism in Brazil, immigrants' heritage tourism in South America (Schlüter 2000), human-rights tourism (Burtner 2002; Haddock 2002), and historic district venues (Scarpaci 2005), to name just a few.

Debates internal to Cuba about heritage have thus far been exempted from the neoliberal economic waves rocking other Latin American nations. Breglia (2006) examines heritage in Mexico as an arena in which multiple public and private actors compete for the right to control cultural patrimony. Starting in the early 1990s, she demonstrates how farmers, ethnic minorities, politicians, heritage site managers, and local developers aim to control cultural patrimony as a form of legitimizing how archaeological sites should be managed. Her discussion examines the relationship between local peoples and privatization policies that prevail in Latin America. Although Cuba has thus far been spared these debates, it is unclear how in a post-Fidel Cuba heritage projects will be financed and controlled, and what the role of for-profit management portends for the island.

Cuba signed The World Heritage Convention in 1981, one year before Habana Vieja earned a spot on UNESCO's list as a World Heritage Site. The World Heritage Convention promotes the preservation of cultural properties as well as the conservation of diverse and unique natural elements. The UNESCO list gives priority to how particular peoples interact with their cultural and natural environments and attempts to preserve the delicate balance between the two. Inscription on the World Heritage List requires that a particular place exhibit "outstanding universal value." Specifically, ten criteria guide the assessment of heritage sites (Table 1) and we refer to these criteria (using lower-case Roman numerals) in our discussion of each site. Cuba has eight entries in UNESCO's list: six cultural and two natural. Given the size of its territory and the absence of a large indigenous population, Cuba places respectably well on the list when compared to its Caribbean and Latin American neighbors, as well as selected European, African and Asian nations.

By mid-211, UNESCO's list included 911 properties, of which 704 (77.3%) were cultural, 188 (19.5%) were natural, and 27 (3%) were mixed properties; and the list keeps growing (UNESCO 2011a).

**Table 1** Selection criteria for world heritage status and Cuban site qualification (<http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/>)

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<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.</li> <li>2.</li> <li>3.</li> <li>4.</li> <li>5.</li> <li>6.</li> <li>7.</li> <li>8.</li> <li>9.</li> <li>10.</li> </ol>	<p>To represent a masterpiece of human creative genius; <i>Desembarco del Granma National Park</i></p> <p>To exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design; <i>Urban Historic Center of Cienfuegos, Alejandro de Humboldt Park</i></p> <p>To bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared; <i>Archaeological Landscapes of First Coffee Plantations in Southeast; Desembarco del Granma National Park</i></p> <p>To be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history; <i>Old Havana and its Fortifications, San Pedro de Roca Castle, Santiago de Cuba; Trinidad and Valley of the Ingenios; Viñales Valley, Alejandro de Humboldt Park; Viñales Valley</i></p> <p>To be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the environment especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change; <i>Old Havana and its Fortifications, San Pedro de Roca Castle, Santiago de Cuba; Trinidad and Valley of the Ingenios; Urban Historic Center of Cienfuegos</i></p> <p>To be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance. (The Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria.)</p> <p>To contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance</p> <p>To be outstanding examples representing major stages of earth's history, including the record of life, significant on-going geological processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic features</p> <p>To be outstanding examples representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals</p> <p>To contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation</p>
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
## Cuba's World Heritage Sites

Cuba markets eight World Heritage Sites of which six are cultural environments (the Archeological Landscapes of first Coffee Plantations in South East, Urban Historic Center of Cienfuegos, Habana Vieja and its fortifications, San Pedro de Roca Castle in Santiago de Cuba, Trinidad, and Viñales Valley) and two are natural settings (Alejandro de Humboldt National Park, Desembarco del Granma National Park) (Table 2). These landscapes are evenly distributed throughout the island (Fig. 1). Since 1992, UNESCO has used the term “cultural landscape” to refer to the interaction that exists between the cultural and natural environments. UNESCO inscribed Tongariro National Park (New Zealand) as its first cultural landscape on the World Heritage List because it displayed spiritual links of the indigenous Maori people with their land (Rössler 2004a). Cuba's Viñales Valley and the Archeological



**Table 2** Cuba's UNESCO world heritage sites

Site	Location	Cultural or natural site (year established)	Attributes
Alejandro de Humboldt National Park	Holguín and Guantánamo Provinces N20° 27' W75° 0'	Natural (2001)	Large concentration and high diversity of endemic fauna and flora. Landform variety, altitudinal diversity and rich lithologies. Freshwater biological diversity stems from one of the largest watersheds in Caribbean. Named after Alexander von Humboldt and his research in Cuba in early 1800s.
Archeological Landscapes of first Coffee Plantations in South East	Santiago and Guantánamo Provinces N20° 01' 48" W75° 23' 29"	Cultural (2000); Also a designated "cultural landscape"	Remnants of nineteenth-century coffee plantations in Sierra Maestra foothills stand as testimony to enterprising agricultural system carved out of steep topography. Construction highlights the technological, social, and economic condition, of the Caribbean at that time.
Cienfuegos: Urban Historic Center	South central port city of 150,000 residents. N 22° 08' 50" W80° 27' 10"	Cultural (2005)	Settled by French settlers rather late in Cuba's history (1819), Cienfuegos became an important agricultural trading center and port. Its historic core displays an eclectic architectural ensemble that embraces the ideas of modernity and hygiene in nineteenth century Latin America.
Desembarco del Granma National Park	National Park, south-east corner of the of Cuba N19° 53' W77° 38'	Natural (1999)	Established in 1986 as a national park, its 26,180 ha. area represents some of the best examples of elevated marine terraces and karst topography. Considered one of the finest natural landscapes in the Atlantic Ocean.
Old Havana (Habana Vieja)	City of Havana Province N23° 8' W82° 21'	Cultural (1982)	Settled in 1519 by Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar as one of the island's seven initial settlements ( <i>villas</i> ). Includes the core of the historic settlement of San Cristóbal de La Habana and its fortifications from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Encompasses most of the municipality of Habana Vieja, 1 of 15 in Havana City Province.
San Pedro de Roca Castle, Santiago de Cuba	Santiago de Cuba city N19° 58' 0" W75° 52' 15"	Cultural (1997)	Citadel located at the entrance to the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. Considered a prime example of Spanish colonial military architecture derived from Renaissance and Italian designs.
Trinidad and Valle de los Ingenios	South central Cuba, Sancti Spiritus province N21° 48' 11" W79 59' 4"	Cultural (1988)	The town of Trinidad and valley adjacent to it where sugar production in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reigned supreme, and sugar mills ( <i>ingenios</i> ) dominated the landscape, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Vinales Valley	Pinar del Río province N22° 37' W83° 43'	Cultural (1999); also a designated "cultural landscape"	A visually striking valley because of hill-sized unusual limestone erosive remnants called haystacks or <i>mogotes</i> (in Spanish). The island's prime tobacco production system is largely unchanged over the centuries. It possesses unique vernacular architecture and a multiethnic population that mirrors that of the broader Antilles region.



**Fig. 1** Location of UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Cuba, 2011a (map: Scarpaci and Portela)

Landscapes of the First Coffee Plantations in Southeastern Cuba are two “cultural landscapes” out of 37 recognized by UNESCO (UNESCO, World Heritage 2011b).

The first colonial capital was in Santiago de Cuba, but it was relocated by the Spanish to Havana in 1572. Unlike Lima or Mexico City, Havana was never endowed with ornate religious architecture; however, Havana boasts the largest collection of Spanish colonial military architecture in the western hemisphere, which was clearly stated in the awarding of heritage status by UNESCO in 1982. A fine collection of historical “palaces” still stands within the confines of the walled city as well as extramuros (Weiss 1972). When the walls were torn down in 1862, a two-block swath surrounding the western flank of the old city became available for construction. However, the Cuban independence wars with Spain deterred investment and construction in the site of the old walls until after the war ended in 1898.

In 1898 U.S. troops occupied the island, which had suffered neglect after the periodic wars since 1868. Ripe for modernization, foreign capital (mostly U.S. but some British) poured into island to upgrade the telegraph, telephone, rail lines, public sewage, port facilities, public lighting, and roads. An interesting array of architectural designs from Barcelona, New York and Chicago enhanced the banks, office buildings, and train stations of major cities. Purdy and Henderson out of Chicago built the building that is currently the Lonja de Comercio building (1909) while Skidmore, Owings, and Morrill constructed the majestic Hotel Nacional overlooking the Florida Straits in 1930. By 1952, new laws raised the limits on buildings heights. Ley de Propiedad Horizontal in 1952 allowed for a sort of Caribbean Manhattan to poke through the sleepy six-story skyline, especially west of the old city (Habana Vieja) and into Centro Habana and the Vedado district of the city (Fig. 2). Although modern structures cropped up in Santiago de Cuba, Camagüey, and Matanzas, the capital siphoned off most investment. By the time of the 1959 revolution Havana sprawled like suburban Los Angeles, rather than following the model of Buenos Aires or New York, densely packed with high-rise development. The modernization project was topped off with competition of a new Civic Square that President



**Fig. 2** An eastern view of the modern skyline of the El Vedado section of Havana (photo: Scarpaci)

Fulgencio Batista built between 1952 and 1958. Located a few kilometers south and west of the old city on a site known as the Catalan Hills, the Civic Square espoused modernity and discipline, in contrast to the colonial period. The relocation of the government center complemented the 1926 plan created by Jean Claude Nicolás Forestier at the request of the Cuban government (Scarpaci et al. 2002).

If Fidel Castro's origins in the eastern city of Santiago de Cuba did not prejudice him with an anti-Havana sentiment – a long-standing regional rivalry in Cuba – then his disdain for sumptuous projects in the capital city deepened that feeling. More precisely, the revolution became decidedly “anti-macrocephalic”; it aimed not to lessen Havana's prominence as the educational, scientific, medical, and government headquarters for the nation. Accordingly, considerable investment went into building schools, universities, vocational tech centers, primary-care clinics, maternity homes, hospitals, libraries, and elementary schools throughout the island. Susan Eckstein (1977) referred to this as a “maximum of ruralization and a minimum of urbanization.” At the same time, Havana had a huge squatter settlement population: about 5% of the metropolitan area lived in shanties. In the early months of the revolution, rents were frozen, and later, the government set income caps to protect those earning less than a certain amount from having to pay rent. When private property was completely eliminated, the Ministry of Housing built public housing projects. The U.S. trade embargo forced the government to experiment with low-cost, high-rise, public housing buildings. Cuban housing authorities adopted models from Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, and pre-fabrication of concrete panels became the norm in new construction (Fig. 3). Émigré's who left the island without giving it to a family member lost the housing stock which was divided and distributed. Throughout much of the island, urban homes built in the republican and colonial



**Fig. 3** Prefabricated public housing left (left) next to Hotel Riviera (1957, designed by Philip Johnson) with balconies. Image taken from Melfa Cohíba Hotel (photo: Scarpaci)

eras were subdivided to accommodate migrants such as students, volunteers, teachers, and new workers who moved there to work in the new economy.

### *Habana Vieja: Old Havana and Its Fortifications*

The 142 ha that constitute Old Havana (Habana Vieja) are part of a legally protected area containing a unique layering of historic buildings and public spaces that span nearly half a millennium. Lewis Mumford's (1938) legendary statement that "in the city, time becomes visible" is exemplified by Havana. Founded in 1519 as one of the original *villas*, the city changed its location twice before it was settled on a cape at the western edge of bay, originally called Puerto Carena (today called Havana Bay or *Bahía de la Habana*). The first site in 1516 was on the southern (Caribbean) shore of the island, near the present port of Batabanó. Adjacent swamplands and an unprotected bay led the military expedition that followed Diego de Velázquez's party to relocate to the northern (Florida Straits-Atlantic Ocean) site, near the Almendares River (the present-day divide between Vedado and Miramar municipalities). Soon thereafter, the current site of Habana Vieja was selected because of its deep, bag-shaped harbor and defensible port, which today accounts for the largest collection of Spanish military architecture in the western Hemisphere.

Perhaps no other heritage site in Latin America and the Caribbean has received as much attention as Habana Vieja, 1 of 15 municipalities in Havana City province. Among UNESCO designations, it is relatively large in scale and is home to about 85,000 residents. UNESCO admitted the property to its heritage list in 1982, but the





**Fig. 4** A view of San Francisco Plaza and church and bell tower of same name, as seen from the top of Lonja de Comercio Building, Habana Vieja (photo: Scarpaci)

systematic restoration of Habana Vieja did not begin in the mid-1990s, concurrent with the creation of Habaguanex and a spate of related construction and real-estate firms tied to the City Historian's Office. It houses some of the largest collections of Spanish colonial architecture in the Americas (Fig. 4). Four key plazas

(San Francisco, Cathedral, Armas, and Vieja), as well as several pedestrian boulevards (Prado and Obispo), anchor the historic preservation projects (see Scarpaci 2000; Scarpaci et al. 2002; Colantonio and Potter 2006a, b; Edge et al. 2006).

The City Historian's Office has been an engine of economic development, not just for Habana Vieja, but for Cuba as a whole. This is reflected in its annual budget, which rocketed from \$3 million USD in 1993 to over \$60 million USD in the new millennium. It employs about 6,000 workers spread out among construction (Puerto de Carena and Fénix), real estate (Aurea), historic preservation (Habaguanex), travel (San Cristóbal), monuments restoration, and other agencies (Scarpaci et al. 2002: 340–343). The City Historian's Office handles a long list of redevelopment projects. However, although the Office receives generous public funds, it is not clear what the economic benefits of this investment are. The public does not know the actual revenues generated by heritage tourism in the old city, how much goes to the national treasury, and what percentage of revitalized buildings actually reach local residents (Colantonio 2004). For instance, the southern tip of Habana Vieja contains the poor neighborhood of San Isidro, which has been targeted by the office for residential rehabilitation. However, no one knows what percentage of funds is directed to residential improvement, and the proportion that is earmarked for hard currency-generating tourism projects. Unlike Trinidad, though, the Havana office labors in multiple areas and its efforts are a powerhouse in a city and national economy that has faced setbacks in tourism and sugar production.

Another contentious issue is the extent to which residents of Habana Vieja are displaced, especially across the bay to the sprawling public housing complexes in Habana del Este. Foreign tourist investment and public–private partnerships with foreign capital are a top-priority policy objective in Cuba, where the office contracts with (mostly European) investors in revitalizing Habana Vieja. Historic preservation enhances social stability while supporting the country's environmental and socioeconomic resources. Colantonio (2005) argues that the revitalization of Habana Vieja is drawing key personnel from other “badges of honor” touted by the revolution: health care and sports. This transfer of labor occurs because the heritage and tourism industry offers higher paying jobs in hard currency in the form of gratuities. Focus groups that I convened (Scarpaci 2005: 141–145) showed that residents of Habana Vieja are generally pessimistic about the benefits of heritage tourism that will accrue to them, but their cynicism is not much different from residents in the UNESCO historic sites of Cartagena, Colombia or Cuenca, Ecuador (Scarpaci 2005: 138–145). Nevertheless, restoration efforts cannot take place fast enough to rescue the historic shell of the old quarters that have been debilitated by humidity, storms, high temperatures, and a lack of maintenance.

UNESCO also included military fortifications in its designation. The fortresses of El Moro (Fig. 5), Real Fuerza, La Punta, and La Cabaña represent the largest collection of colonial architecture concentrated in one district in the western hemisphere. Inspired by renaissance and Italian military designs from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, these garrisons complement the ramparts that surrounded Habana Vieja until 1861, when the colonial government tore them down. The colonial network of forts protected commodities coming from Mexico and South America.



**Fig. 5** El Morro Castle (1589) on the western side of the narrow entrance to Havana Bay, as seen from the city's seaside boulevard, El Malecón (photo: Scarpaci)

These former fortresses now serve largely as museums and mixed heritage venues. For example, La Punta (built between 1589 and 1600 to guard the “point” or western entrance to the bay) houses a naval museum. The impressive polygonal fort known as El Morro (Castillo de los Tres Santos Reyes del Morro) at the eastern mouth of the bay has museum holdings that focus on military and naval themes. Many visitors are drawn to its lighthouse, which dates to the 1840s.

La Cabaña (Fortaleza de San Carlos de la Cabaña) was completed in 1774 in response to the British taking of the city in 1762. It sits on a high ridge overlooking Habana Vieja and was designed to thwart repeat land attacks from the east. Each evening there is a reenactment of the canon-firing ceremony that in the colonial era announced the closing of the city gates (Fig. 6). La Cabaña has a complex history and offers myriad interpretations of the meaning of heritage landscapes in contemporary Cuba. It houses a museum dedicated to Che Guevara. However, there is little curatorial attention given to Guevara's controversial role as head of the military tribunals (Comisión Depuradora) held immediately after the Triumph of the Revolution in 1959 where suspects were tried and executed. Some allege that these puppet courts ignored well-established judicial review and instead opted for military-court procedures that are enacted during states of siege and national emergencies (Valladares 1986; Brown and Lagos 1991; Vargas Llosa 2005). La Cabaña is also where political prisoners were kept, including the Reinaldo Arenas (1943–1990), a persecuted political dissident, author, and homosexual who was arrested in 1973 for “ideological deviation.” He was tortured in La Cabaña where the harsh living conditions included floodwaters and excrement. His story was told in his book, *Antes de que Anochezca* (Arenas 1993), which was the basis for Julian Schnabel's film *Before Night Falls*.





**Fig. 6** Re-enactment of the closing of Havana's city gates held every evening at La Cabaña Fort, across the bay from the old walled city. One of the few venues where locals and tourists share a common space, although tourists pay in hard currency and locals pay about one-fifth of the price in local currency (photo: Scarpaci)

Visits to La Cabaña fortress and museum make mention of the history of neither political prisoner holdings nor summary executions. Estimates of the number of executions over which Che Guevara presided there range from 179 to several thousand (Brown and Lagos 1991). Julio Vargas Llosa (2005) describes Che's actions as comparable to those of Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria (1899–1953), who was Joseph Stalin's head of Soviet security and police apparatus during the Great Purge of the 1930s. Not surprisingly, La Cabaña's themes of English naval attacks, corsairs, and pirates are carefully orchestrated to avoid mention of Arenas and other political activists imprisoned in the fortress. While it is understandable that a nation might not wish to celebrate its role in political oppression, in other nations such "dark tourism" (as it is often called) provides the opportunity for acknowledgement, reflection, and perhaps healing (Lowenthal 1985). In South Africa, political imprisonment, torture, and

extermination serve as niche-type heritage industry as evidenced by the development for tourism of Robben Island – where Nelson Mandela was imprisoned 12 km offshore of Cape Town (see Mandela 1994). One can now tour detention centers that have come to light in post-Pinochet Chile (Scarpaci and Frazier 1993), the extermination camps of the Nazi Holocaust, and other sites of atrocity tourism (Ashworth 2002; Turnbridge et al. 1996). As this chapter has shown, heritage interpretation and curatorial displays are an evolving process in Cuba, and such recognition of the darker side of La Cabaña’s Spanish-colonial façade may some day be revealed.

## Heritage Management in Habana

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and CAME (the former Soviet-Eastern Europe trade bloc), Cuba has embarked on a strong movement to rescue historical places, promote museums, and celebrate nationally and internationally acclaimed sites and monuments (Scarpaci 2000, 2005). One of the catalysts of this movement has been the City Historian of Havana, Dr. Eusebio Leal Spengler (b. 1942). He became known to millions of Cubans through a television show he hosted called *Andar La Habana* (Walking through Havana) in which he highlighted the city’s historical and cultural assets. An elegant speaker and an elected member to the National Assembly, he describes the nation’s pursuit of heritage this way:

We have brought life back to every neighborhood in all aspects, as a worthy place to live where schools, cultural institutions, and health facilities proliferate. Resurrecting what once seemed to be lifeless provokes confused looks at such a romantic crusade. And even if it were that way, we would not feign ignorance nor feel ashamed of being romantics in an age defined by apocalyptic events. Our work projects other forms of hope: that which is born from recovering memory, from dreams shared by many to create a new order (OHCH 2006, my translation).

But whose memory will be restored? Whose view of Cuba will the state prioritize? (Bustamante n.d.) As the Cuban most affiliated with heritage preservation, Dr. Leal is well positioned to answer these questions. In 1993, he convinced the authorities to create a unique state-owned company, Habaguanex that allowed him to operate a series of hotels, bed-and-breakfast facilities, shops, supermarkets, and other retail activities. All are run in hard currencies (then dollars, now Convertible Cuban Pesos, or CUC) and, except for hotel lodging, can be accessed by both foreigners and Cubans. With the surplus (or profit) derived from this retailing, various agencies of the City Historian’s Office restore buildings, public spaces, streets, and upgrade the infrastructure of Habana Vieja. Thus, with but a small start-up budget approved by the national State Council, the firm has gone on to generate hundreds of millions of dollars each year.

There is no way of knowing the firm’s income statement or balance sheets since data are not published. Nevertheless, Dr. Leal’s City Historian’s office has gone on to expand into real estate (Aurea), transportation (Fénix), tourism (San Cristóbal), and related endeavors. Habaguanex does not focus just on residential enhancement,



**Fig. 7** Temporary pre-fab housing, one block from Plaza Vieja in Habana Vieja. These Canadian-built modular units are small but offer solid housing while locals await housing reassignment outside the neighborhood or else return to their remodeled home, done by the City Historian Office (photo: Scarpaci)

but there are no firm data on what percentage of the building stock is devoted to residential, institutional, or commercial endeavors. One of its controversial aspects is the displacement of some of the residents of Habana Vieja; however, there are no public meetings on this issue. According to officials, the state relocates a small number of residents to public housing, across the bay, in Habana del Este. Prefabricated modular housing from Canada, located one block west of Plaza Vieja, is often shown to foreigners to indicate where residents are temporarily lodged while their buildings are upgraded (Fig. 7); there are no official or cross-validated data on residential displacement. Except for the neighborhood of San Isidro (discussed below), every restored building that I have visited on Habana Vieja that has undergone revitalization, the ground floor (and, at times, the second floor and the mezzanine) is always devoted to commercial (e.g., hard currency functions) or institutional (museum, archive) land uses, with only a few apartments allocated to locals. While some displacement is temporary in order to permit building improvements, this introduction of new activities and the gentrification it generates, has caused permanent displacement.

Soon after its creation, Habaguanex pursued an active advertising campaign in print and electronic media that promoted its chain of hotels and services in the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Old Havana. Normally, state retailing companies

such as Rumbos or CIMEX would operate these shops, and hotels operated by Cubanacán, Gran Caribe, or Gaviota would manage hotels. This was an unprecedented gift of an important market share to the City Historian's Office. It came about in the worst of the Special Period (1993 and 1994) and perhaps signaled the central government's concern over generating hard currency and tapping into heritage tourism as a new comparative advantage. Although in the early years of the revolution Fidel Castro promised a different kind of "America" for his island – one that did not rest on the low-paid and servile toil of chambermaids, bartenders, and porters (Chaffee and Prevost 1992) – tourism had become an important engine of economic development.


Most of Habaguanex's revitalization efforts center upon a few axes in the historic district: (1) The major plazas of San Francisco, Vieja, Catedral, and Armas; (2) the pedestrian boulevard of Obispo, which connects Central Park with Catedral and Armas squares; and (3) the pedestrian boulevard, Prado, leading from the Malecón through Central Park anchored by the Capitolio and Fraternity Park. Residential development has concentrated largely in the southern tip of the oval-shaped district, in San Isidro neighborhood.

San Isidro was traditionally a working-class neighborhood, devoid of posh architectural structures. Two key heritage landmarks still stand in the neighborhood: the southern gate to the city together with the largest remnant of the walls (that stood until 1861), and the birth home of Cuban statesman, orator, fighter, and renowned patriot, José Martí. The housing stock of the neighborhood consists mainly of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century three-story buildings. It abuts the neighborhood of Jesús María, the train station, and the Tallapiedra energy plant. Located away from the architecturally rich districts of the plazas to the north, it was a neighborhood comprised of seamen, merchant marines, and stevedores. It was peppered with low-end retailing, bars, and brothels until the revolution. Since then, only the bars and a few shops prevail.

## Heritage Management in Trinidad and Valle del los Ingenios

Trinidad was also one of the island's original villas founded by Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar. It was settled in 1514 and named after the Holy Trinity (*Santísima Trinidad*). Situated on the flanks of a hillside with a good strategic view of the Caribbean side, the town was platted in such a way as to depart significantly from the orthogonal mandates of the Law of the Indies. The town was a key transshipment and refurbishment point for maritime traffic between key eastern (Santiago de Cuba) and western (Havana) ports. Its relative isolation fostered a regional economy based on illegal trade with Dutch, English, and French merchants, while also leaving it vulnerable to attacks by corsairs, buccaneers, and pirates. The Haitian slave revolt of 1791 sent French colonial sugarcane growers in search of new lands and their settlement in eastern Cuba (as well as elsewhere in the Caribbean and North America) introduced distinctive vernacular architectural details (Fig. 8). Trinidad's elite benefited greatly from this sugar investment and built opulent urban palaces such as the Palacio Cantero, mansions in the adjacent valley, and religious architecture (Fig. 9).





**Fig. 8** Trinidad distinctive vernacular architectural details: wooden bracing for cantilever called tornapunta, traditional and unique in Trinidad (photo courtesy of Marissa Masangkay)



**Fig. 9** School children playing in the Plaza Mayor in the heart of Trinidad's historic district, flanked by aristocratic houses built by the sugar barons from the first half of the nineteenth century (photo: Scarpaci)



**Fig. 10** Trinidad streets paved with local rounded stones from nearby streams (called *chinas pelonas*) as well as ship ballast carried in ships from Europe in the nineteenth century. Sugar was carried back on return voyage (photo: Scarpaci)

This slave-based production peaked in the 1850s and then declined as the local cane growers failed to update their *ingenios* with more modern mills (*centrales*) that used steam-powered processing and grinding mills.

Railroad expansion in western Cuba gave sugarcane growers greater proximity and lower transportation costs to the United States market so that the center of sugar shifted. The changing economy left a museum-like cluster of colonial homes, palaces, and streets in Trinidad, many of the latter adorned with ship ballast from Hamburg, Germany as well as a unique braiding of stream rock called *chinas pelonas* (Fig. 10). Relative isolation from the larger port of Cienfuegos (a paved road did not connect the two places until the 1950s) indirectly led to a rich collection of nineteenth-century artifacts; Cubans call the town the “museum city” (Scarpaci 2005: Chap. 7).

A talented and expanding team of professionals headed up originally by Trinidad native and architect, the late Roberto “Macholo” López Bastida (1958–2003), and later by architect Nancy Benítez, maintains the properties in much of the historic district. A 2% tax imposed on hard-currency operations (hotels, restaurants, taxis, bars, art galleries, etc.) and a 1% tax on peso-run establishments produced an annual budget of more than US\$400,000 in the early years of the millennium. The restoration office is less ambitious than its capital-city counterpart, but does manage to employ nearly 600 employees (Fig. 11). Significantly, the Trinidad restoration team




Fig. 11 Trinidad Restoration Office Organizational Chart (Scarpaci)

does not prioritize restaurants, art galleries, museums, or other entities devoted strictly to tourism. After an early phase (1988–1992) of restoring key elite structures from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they have focused largely on improving run-down residential structures in the Three Crosses Neighborhoods with the assistance of the Barcelona-based NGO, Architects without Borders. Efforts are underway to develop a network of bed-and-breakfast facilities and an agricultural museum in the Valley of the Ingenios, as well as curtailing impending beachfront hotel development along Ancón Peninsula, some 11 km from Trinidad proper (Scarpaci 2005: Chap. 7).

Only one hotel site will be permitted within the historic district, a small, 12-room, high-end bed-and-breakfast, and just one block from the main town square. The land-use zoning is designed not to tax the water and sewage infrastructure further. Nonetheless, dozens of illegal B&Bs exist to house tourists wishing to pay as little as one-fifth of what hotels are charging.

Although the notion that “small may be beautiful” is a paradigm for the city conservation office of Trinidad, it also means it is restricted by administrative power and relatively small revenues (when compared to Habana Vieja). Since the new millennium began, the Ministry of Tourism has been trying to get investors to build 4,000 rooms on Ancón peninsula, just 11 km from Trinidad and the closest beach. The Trinidad restoration office was not consulted about this solicitation, and they are strongly opposed to it, pointing out that tourists will visit the historic districts in



air-conditioned buses that, although prohibited from entering the historic district will park with motors running on the outskirts of the historic district. The congestion, noise and diesel pollution will be significant. In addition, the conservationists argue that the restaurants and bars will not be able to handle the influx of tourists using washrooms and bathrooms.

Trinidad will be able to market a smaller walkable version of Habana Vieja with key differences. The town's heritage marks the rise and bust of sugar – roughly from 1800 until 1860 – after which time modern boilers (*centrales*) replaced the slave-based axe-grinding stone (*trapiche*). The main highway connecting Trinidad to Cienfuegos was not paved until the early 1950s, adding to Trinidad's relative isolation. Like Habana Vieja, heritage preservation was more the result of happenstance than any well forged planning conservation polices like those found in Brazil, Peru, or Mexico (Hardoy and Gutman 1992) (Jones and Varley 1999). The city preservationists must continue to disentangle their disagreements with the Ministry of Tourism and are forced to spend resources on legal fees when they bring local companies into litigation for not paying their 2 or 1% tourism tax.

## Representations of *Cubanidad*

Heritage planning practices in Habana Vieja and Trinidad have evolved unevenly. In both cities, official policy and action ranged from ambiguity (pre-1980s), to official UNESCO recognition (Havana in 1982; Trinidad in 1988), and to active promotion and commodification of heritage. Cuba's downward economic spiral in the 1990s increased competition for scarce public resources, and not surprisingly, food provision, health care, and energy tended to receive priority over matters of cultural patrimony. But the island's post-Soviet tourism marketing altered that approach after 1993, and it prevails into the second decade of the new millennium.

For a relatively small nation – not much larger than the state of Pennsylvania – Cuba has a remarkable array of cultural and natural sites, national landmarks, and cultural landscapes. However, not all of the heritage sites have been developed under carefully designed management plans. Trinidad and other sites evolved their museological identities as much by default as by design. The preservation of such sites may be due to Cuba's relatively low population density, despite being the largest island in the Caribbean. The destruction of historic sites has occurred because of idiosyncratic and technological factors, as, for example, when Havana's walls were demolished because they were militarily obsolete and exacerbated crowding. Although heritage preservation was not particularly well supported or encouraged in the decades following the Revolution, recently it has received considerable attention. To be sure, heritage sells and the Cuban government unabashedly seeks – in the parlance of free-market economics and neoliberalism – new comparative advantages to sustain the economy. Time will tell whether the revolution is successful in defining its own version of socialist heritage. As Graham et al. (2000: 25) note, "It follows that once a subversive heritage succeeds to power, it quickly loses its revolutionary intent and becomes a conservative force in itself."



**Fig. 12** Dancers from Trinidad, Cuba. Afro-Cuban traditions have become a mainstay in cultural tourism venues across the islands (photo: Scarpaci)

There is a trend in heritage preservation to acknowledge the spiritual values tied to historical monuments, natural features, and cultural landscapes. Anthony Tung poses the question somewhat differently:

If the historic cores of major cities are vigorously protected and their architectural forms are fixed in time, as if they were living museums, can such metropolises prosper in the unforgiving world of global economic competition? Have we arrived at a moment when...conservation assumes an unprecedented urgency because of the historically unparalleled power of modern humans to alter whole cityscapes overnight? (Tung 2001: 1).

In this age when technological gains capture the public's imagination about what is new, as opposed to old, the urgency in conservation also entails documenting rituals, belief systems, and oral traditions (see Ruggles and Silverman 2009). Given Cuba's low-level of formal, religious participation, we might expect to see some movement whereby the spiritual and belief systems could, over time, incorporate many more political values embraced by the Revolution, or by Cuba's African heritage, which has only since the twentieth century been celebrated and recognized (Ortiz 1916; Tannenbaum 1946; de la Fuente et al. 1996). Behind many heritage sites in Cuba is the anonymous blood and sweat of slave labor that is still not fully acknowledged, although this appears to be changing. Indeed, there is a huge resurgence of Afro-Cuban heritage tourism throughout the island (Fig. 12) that functions variously as legal and illegal microenterprises. Such cultural portrayals

thrive in Trinidad and Habana Vieja and are multiplier effects of the broader heritage industry. Because the transmission of national values to young people is a celebrated form of national cultural identity that UNESCO supports (Rössler 2004b), such a trend toward celebrating the vernacular is quite likely, particularly as the Revolution has reached its 50-year anniversary. We might even envision a new kind of heritage landscape emerging at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo, Cuba, when it ultimately returns to Cuban control. Fidel Castro claims that he will turn the facility into a free education center for the people of Latin America, but at present, tourists can only observe the base through a single observation tower several kilometers north of the base. The international uproar over the use of Camp X-ray within the “Gitmo” naval base for detaining alleged terrorists has cast unprecedented scrutiny upon what was once a sleepy coaling station negotiated on dubious terms from the Cuban nation based on the Platt Amendment of 1902. In fact, Cuban maps since 1959 make no reference of the U.S. naval base. Nevertheless, new venues of dark tourism lurk on the horizon, whether to explore and bear witness to political oppression (e.g., La Cabaña) or the international violations of human rights (Camp X-ray). The possibilities for new heritage landscapes are unlimited: Camp X-ray could some day be a sort of international Islamic heritage or anti-war site in a post-Iraq war, post-embargo, and post-Fidel era.

Perhaps the greatest challenge may be marshalling the necessary resources to manage these landmarks as the economy struggles to regain levels from the 1989 Soviet era. *The New York Times* architecture critic Paul Goldberger identifies the Cuban risk in leaning towards too much free-market activity and too much state control:

It is a striking paradox that right now in Cuba, the Communist regimes seem quite eager to sell anything it can to bring in short-term income – whereas it is here, in the United States, this citadel of capitalism, that so many people are looking at Cuba with more of a long view, and urging it to move slowly, to make rules, to enforce a certain amount of governmental authority to limit and guide development...the answer for [Cuba] – this “third way” – is not merely a matter of preserving what is there and preventing new construction, which is absurd and impractical. And it is emphatically not the theme park...

## Conclusions

Heritage planning in Havana, because of its scale, has gained national prominence. Revenues generated from heritage tourism contribute to the national treasury. Perhaps because of this, residential refurbishing appears to be relatively small, while the commercial focus of Habaguanex prevails. In fact, I have often heard Havana residents say that “Where’s there is a crane, there is a hotel being built,” underlying the tension between the goals of the government and the wishes of residents. Trinidad heritage planners have largely avoided the tourism business, thanks in part to the native son and pioneering leadership of Roberto González. Instead, it has focused on improving the housing stock. Moreover, Trinidad’s financing is more transparent, specifically tied to the volume of peso and hard-currency generating firms. Perhaps

because the Trinidad restoration office is an appendage to the Ministry of Culture, it has been less concerned with profit. Whereas Havana has a huge housing stock that has yet to be refurbished, Trinidad has commenced with the worst housing stock and has refurbished nearly one-quarter of the buildings in the historic zone.

Future heritage and marketing projects in Cuba will be ambitious but necessary, and they will not be confined to land projects. They might include underwater cultural heritage, which is fast becoming a focus of international agencies and may be a useful means of exploring shipwrecks and at the same time preserving the fragile coral reefs that surround Cuba (Grenier et al. 2006). Alternatively, they may include political monuments monumental such as the centenarian Brazilian architect Oscar Niemeyer's sculpture interpreting U.S. imperialism towards Cuba; a man holding a Cuban flag stands below a looming tiger. In the meantime, Cuba's heritage landscapes offer constructive lenses through which we can interpret the history, culture, nature, and politics of the island.

Both historic districts reflect the broad waves of political and economic forces that have left a mark on their built environments. It is also clear that the post-Soviet era forced the government to draw on traditional comparative advantages, a prospect that did figure in the first three decades of the revolution. However, centralized socialist planning has been no panacea. There is no reason to believe that community input to historic preservation is any more sensitive to the planning process in market economies. Nor does centralized planning ease cross-ministerial negotiations, as evidenced in the debate between the cultural and tourism ministries over Trinidad's oceanfront development. "Small may be beautiful" in the case of Trinidad, with its laudable focus on residential enhancement as a priority, but it also entails ensuring that local firms pay tourism taxes. These behind-the-scene pressures, although subject to criticism, are safeguarding rich elements of Cuba's patrimony. Representations of *cubanidad* reflect myriad forces that change according to organization, leadership values, and geography. It is easy to envision different paths of change when and if a post-Raul and post-socialist government take power.

## Note

1. I am grateful to Orestes del Castillo, Jr. for making this point.

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# The Space of Heroism in the Historic Center of Cuzco

Helaine Silverman

It is often difficult for governments to accomplish the construction of a memorial to a political figure. One need only think of the length of time between the death of Abraham Lincoln in 1865 and the 1922 dedication of the Lincoln Memorial on the National Mall in Washington D.C. (Thomas 2002). This paper examines the even longer delay between the 1781 martyrdom in the Plaza de Armas of Cuzco of a transcendental political figure in Peru, José Gabriel Condorcanqui Tupac Amaru II (henceforth, Tupac Amaru), and his perpetual commemoration, which did not occur until 1980 when a memorial was built in a large plaza in the neighboring district of Wanchaq, rather than on the actual site of the event. Debates about physical memorialization of this *prócer* (precursor of Peruvian independence) were complicated by the fact that the agonistic drama to be commemorated had played out in the heart of what was to become a UNESCO World Heritage Site and member of the Organization of World Heritage Cities.

The delay in achieving a monument to Tupac Amaru was caused by deep partisanship of two kinds. First, racial and cultural animosity of the dominant white and mestizo class toward the Indian population over centuries has always been the backdrop to whatever nostalgia for the Incas has existed in Peru. These irresolvable tensions in part explain why it took almost 200 years for Peruvians to recover Tupac Amaru's memory and rehabilitate him historically. But the larger and more recent issue affecting the monumental commemoration of Tupac Amaru was spatial and it played out in vociferous debates between 1969 and 1980 in Cuzco, where Tupac Amaru had been executed: a dispute between the Cuzco populace at large and Cuzco's developmental bureaucracy and architectural elite about *where* the materialization of national reverence was to be placed and the *form* it would take. These decisions became the fault line along which this aspect of the cultural heritage of Cuzco was

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H. Silverman (✉)

Department of Anthropology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,  
Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA  
e-mail: helaine@illinois.edu

contested and prioritized, in accordance with sometimes self-contradictory aesthetic, intellectual, political, and social ideas and identities held by individuals, municipal officials and local professionals, and the national government at the time.

## **Background: The Great Rebellion**

José Gabriel Condorcanqui was a mestizo entrepreneur from the district of Tinta, about 50 miles southeast of Cuzco. He owned a large mule train, land, mining interests, and coca fields. He claimed to be a descendant of the last Inca, Tupac Amaru, who had been executed by Viceroy Toledo in 1572. Thus, Condorcanqui had a royal Inca lineage and was a member of the colonial middle class. But he had to fight prolonged battles in Lima's courts to have his claims and related demands recognized (such as exoneration of his Indians from the onerous mit'a labor tax in the silver mines of Potosí) and, as a result, he became exasperated with the colonial system. At the same time, the Church and State in Cuzco were embroiled in a virtual civil war that spilled into the countryside and resulted in riots and revolts throughout the 1770s. When the State imposed more burdensome taxes on merchants (thereby affecting Condorcanqui's livelihood as well), violent protests broke out. This unsettled situation came to a head on November 4, 1780 when Condorcanqui, now with the *nom de guerre* of his royal ancestor, Tupac Amaru, began a widespread, organized, armed rebellion in which many thousands participated.

Tupac Amaru said his fight was with the Spanish, not the Peruvian Creoles, and he attempted to unite all of the non-Europeans in his struggle against Bourbon colonialism. Tupac Amaru presented himself both as an Inca king rooted in Andean/Indian society and as an educated mestizo trying to work within the colonial system for his own social and economic benefit and to negotiate political rights and end the more exploitative practices afflicting Indian peoples (Walker 1999:16).

Tupac Amaru attacked Cuzco on December 28, 1780, but his siege of the city failed. Battles continued across the south highland region, but increasingly the Spanish were defeating the insurrectionists. On April 6, 1781, Tupac Amaru was captured and, 6 weeks later, he, his wife Micaela Bastidas (a brilliant commander in her own right), and other family members were brutally executed in the Plaza de Armas.

Although Tupac Amaru's rebellion was unsuccessful in its moment, 40 years later Peru threw off Spanish rule and established a republic. But by then Tupac Amaru was virtually forgotten and the Creole elite were timid about resurrecting or appropriating the Incas as the new nation's ancient or classical past because the Indian-based movement led by Tupac Amaru had terrified non-Indians (Walker 1999:20). This phobia was manifested in the physical fact that prior to the 1920s there were almost no monuments to the Incas (see Majluf 1994:32) – notwithstanding vivid travelogues written by foreigners who marveled at the ruins of precolumbian Peru – and none to their Andean descendants. In Cuzco, former capital of the Inca Empire, there was only one simple statue to Pachacutec (the greatest of the Inca emperors)

that had been erected in 1878 in the Plaza Regocijo. Rather than the Incas, the new Peru was focused on the Creole actors of its Independence, such as Simón Bolívar, and other nineteenth-century heroes. This preference became particularly notable after the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) provided a rich crop of new heroes.


## The First Attempt to Monumentalize Tupac Amaru

In early 1923 the Municipality of Cuzco unanimously agreed to erect a monument to Tupac Amaru in Cuzco (location not specified) (Tamayo Herrera 1989:157). The initiator of this movement was an alderman, Rómulo Acurio de Olarte. But the initiative seems to have been thwarted by an important local journalist, Angel Vega Enríquez, who claimed Inca descent and whose ancestors had fought with Tupac Amaru in the Lima courts. This ended the Cuzco initiative for several decades. However, in August 1924 the distinguished Lima poet José Santos Chocano called for a monument to Tupac Amaru to be located in Lima (Tamayo Herrera 1980:12), and a debate over how to represent Tupac Amaru played out in the Lima newspapers. The news spread to Cuzco where the undertaking became the hot topic of the day, including whether a different Inca, Manco II (he assumed the Inca kingship as a puppet ruler under Pizarro and then led a belated revolt against the Spanish) ought to be the first one commemorated (Tamayo Herrera 1980:14–16). Remarkably, the Cuzqueños were not trying to get the proposed monument to Tupac Amaru erected in Cuzco; they accepted the idea that it ought to be located in Lima, ironically where Tupac Amaru had been so mistreated by the courts (Tamayo Herrera 1980:16–17). President Leguía, aware of the disputes and the passions they aroused, withheld his support for a monument.

I attribute the revival of interest in Tupac Amaru at this time to the flourishing *indigenismo* movement in the intellectual circles of Lima and Cuzco (see, e.g., Mariátegui 1928; de la Cadena 2000). *Indigenismo* was a discourse about the terrible social, political, and economic condition of Peru's Indian population. It brought attention to the Indian plight and propounded the worth of indigenous culture and the need to redress its abuse through progressive policies. Visually, *indigenismo* was manifested in painting, sculpture, and the art accompanying print media (see Majluf 1994).

## Interlude

Although it did not come to fruition in 1923, the idea of a Tupac Amaru memorial in Cuzco eventually caught on – albeit not yet in monumental form. Tupac Amaru was commemorated at the site of his martyrdom in January 1950 when the city of Cuzco, the national university, and the Rotary Club joined forces and placed a large bronze plaque outside the chapel where Tupac Amaru and the other insurrectionists had been imprisoned prior to their executions (Fig. 1). Reading the tablet carefully,



**Fig. 1** (a) The chapel in which Tupac Amaru and the co-conspirators were held prisoners. (b) 1950 plaque on wall of chapel alongside the Iglesia de la Compañía, commemorating Tupac Amaru and the other co-conspirators executed with him in the Plaza de Armas. The plaque can be seen to the right of the chapel (Photos: Silverman, 2003)

one sees that it was intended as a stop-gap measure, until the deserved monument to Tupac Amaru would be built. It says, “While Peru and the nations of America erect in this plaza the merited monument to his heroic sacrifice, this column is raised by the Municipality, University and Rotary Club.”

The cause for erecting a monument to Tupac Amaru was greatly advanced when *Ley 15962* was passed on December 29, 1965: *Authorizing the creation of a monument in the Plaza de Armas of Cuzco to the memory of the martyr José Gabriel Condorcanqui Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastides Pfyucacahua and their families who were sacrificed for the cause of independence* (“La Legislación y los Héroes Nacionales”: <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/museo/Heroes.pdf>, p. 30). This law, passed during the first presidency of Fernando Belaunde Terry (1963–1968), was undertaken by act of Congress rather than through the initiative of President Belaunde. Although Belaunde had promised agrarian reform to the millions of Peru’s disenfranchised Indians, this was achieved only in an extremely limited form, thereby frustrating expectations and leading to peasant mobilizations, including in Cuzco. A guerilla movement arose. Belaunde’s development programs were underfunded. Perhaps *Ley 15962* – recognizing an Andean hero at a time of great political difficulty with the highlands – was passed as a palliative to the government’s incapacity to deliver significant change. Tamayo Herrera (1980:20) speculates that Belaunde’s reticence with the law was due to his being an architect and that he was “surely aware that executing the law would be a grave attack on the untouchable monumentality of the Plaza de Armas.” Tamayo Herrera also says that the law was conceived by a congressman from Cuzco with support from his minority party’s congressional delegation (1980:20).

The monument did not get built because the political party in control was disinterested and the money was not transferred (Tamayo Herrera 1980:21). But as soon as the law was passed, there was debate in Cuzco. Tamayo Herrera notes the opposition of the Colegio de Ingenieros (College of Engineers) and the Colegio de Arquitectos (College of Architects) in Cuzco, which opined that a monument to Tupac Amaru in the Plaza de Armas would be “an architectonic aberration” (1980:21). But popular groups from provinces around Cuzco supported the idea and began a dedicated struggle to see the project realized.

A forum of architects, engineers, provincial advocates, journalists, and assorted monument supporters was held in the spring of 1967, but this political and politicized faction yielded to the will of those architects and engineers who were against the monument (Tamayo Herrera 1980:22). The Tupac Amaristas, however, were soon to have a second chance because a military coup on October 3, 1968 replaced Belaunde with a new, revolutionary government that had an intense interest in Tupac Amaru.

## The Resuscitation of Tupac Amaru Under Velasco

General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s regime was leftist and progressive. It sought to curb foreign imperialism, correct gross inequities of land tenure through a sweeping agrarian reform for millions of Andean peasants, and restrain traditional oligarchical





**Fig. 2** The “Piel Roja” statue that formerly stood atop the fountain in the center of the Plaza de Armas, Cuzco (Photo from an undated, uncopyrighted calendar in possession of the author)

power in Peruvian society. Part of Velasco’s ideology was the resuscitation of Tupac Amaru as “the initiator of Peru’s unfinished revolution” and he, Velasco, as the figure who would bring it to a successful conclusion (Walker 1999:19). Under Velasco, Tupac Amaru became a transcendental hero, arguably Peru’s most mythic figure – the Andean cacique fighting to bring justice to his people and to overthrow the misery-causing Spanish colonial state. Tupac Amaru imagery appeared everywhere, for instance on new currency.<sup>1</sup> In the presidential palace Velasco replaced the painting of the Spanish conqueror Francisco Pizarro with a portrait of Tupac Amaru, and the government declared 1970 the “Year of the Precursors of Peruvian Independence” (*Ley 18211*), clearly referring to Tupac Amaru.

The Revolutionary Government’s Tupac Amaru enthusiasm spread to Cuzco. The incongruous statue of a bow-and-arrow toting “Piel Roja” (Native American “Red Skin”) atop the European-style fountain in the center of the Plaza de Armas was lassoed to the ground by a citizen in the thrall of Velasco’s Tupac Amaru rhetoric (Fig. 2). Following the destruction of that statue there arose “a current of Tupac Amaru fervor, patriotic and worthy sentiment that believed the moment had come for erecting in this place the glorious and incommensurable symbol of the precursor of independence, our illustrious José Gabriel Túpac Amaru” (editorial, *El Comercio*, September 5, 1969). An anonymous authority from the Cuzco province of Chumbivilcas was quoted as saying that “The ‘Piel Roja’ that existed in the Plaza de Armas until recently

was an upstart, but, happily, destiny made it fall from its own weight, giving way to the monument to Tupac Amaru” (*El Comercio*, September 16, 1969).

The push for a Tupac Amaru monument in the Plaza de Armas received a major injection of support when, coincidentally, one day before an already scheduled trip to Cuzco and before learning of the destruction of the “Piel Roja,” Velasco stated that he was committed to the erection of a monument to Tupac Amaru in Cuzco’s Plaza de Armas – one that would be worthy of the “tough personality” of the cacique – and that the government would provide the funds (*El Comercio*, September 6, 1969). Indeed, Velasco may have been prompted to act by Venezuela’s announcement on August 22 that it would give \$2,000 dollars for the construction of a monument to Tupac Amaru in the Plaza de Armas of Cuzco: “The Venezuelan representative said in effusive phrases that the Latin American countries must erect a granite [monument] in memory of one of the leaders of liberty, who immolated his life in the Plaza de Armas of Cuzco” (*El Comercio*, August 22, 1969).

On September 16, 1969 the Revolutionary Government passed *Ley 17815*, which stipulated that celebration of the sesquicentennial of Peru’s independence would include “the erection of monuments to the precursors and transcendental events in the National Independence that the government believes it necessary to enshrine” (Article 4, Section b). The law clearly reinforced the message Velasco had espoused days before in Cuzco.

## Intervening in the Plaza de Armas

The reasons given in Cuzco for erecting a monument can be readily extracted from the many newspaper articles that appeared: (1) Tupac Amaru was a historic figure of pan-American significance in the liberation movements; (2) He played a direct role in the eventual liberation of Peru from Spanish rule; (3) Cuzco and specifically the Plaza de Armas was the scene of his execution; and (4) He is a shining example to all freedom-loving people, showing the road to justice and social vindication. But amid the Velasquista clamor in Cuzco for a Tupac Amaru monument, *El Comercio* cautioned in its editorial of September 5, 1969 that the matter would have to be considered calmly and dispassionately by technical specialists (“architects, historians, urbanists, archaeologists, etc.”) qualified to undertake an intervention in historic Cuzco and that any hurried decision would find its partisan supporters and opponents. The newspaper was reacting to the discussions in the street about the characteristics and location the monument would have (*El Comercio*, August 22, 1969).

*El Comercio* proposed an urgent convocation of an institutional forum with authorized members acting on behalf of all Cuzco. This was necessary because “Cuzco, our Cuzco, is a relic and as such requires an especially delicate treatment... Let’s be careful that a new ‘Cuzcocide’ not be committed!” (*El Comercio*, 5 September 1969). These words turned out to be prescient. They defined all subsequent debates about any proposed intervention in the historic center of Cuzco, most especially the Plaza de Armas (see Calvo 2003; Silverman 2008), for the Plaza de Armas is and always has been Cuzco’s most important public space (Fig. 3).





**Fig. 3** The contested space of the Plaza de Armas, Cuzco, which was vigorously debated in the local newspapers. Two churches dominate the horizontality of the plaza: the Cathedral (a) and Compañía (b); (c) Portal de Comercio (Photos: Silverman, 2003)

Therefore, the introduction of a new element in the plaza – let alone one of major historical significance – aroused discussion and passion.

The issue has consistently been whether such an intervention would or would not be “an attack against the architectonic unity of the Plaza de Armas” (e.g., *El Comercio*, 16 September 1969). The argument against an intervention, summarized below by Tamayo Herrera, has never varied:

... locating [the monument to] Tupac Amaru in the Plaza de Armas was opposed [for] solid and profound reasons of an aesthetic, architectonic, stylistic and historic character. In the first place, the Plaza de Armas of Cuzco – which is surrounded by the Cathedral, the Compañía, the Triunfo, the Lourdes chapel, the Society of Artisans, the University, and the Portals ... constitutes in and of itself an architectonic unity and undoubtable monument that is complete and practically closed on itself. Said Plaza moreover has a stylistic peculiarity, Indo-Spanish (more the latter than the former), that demands its inalterability, its intangibility, and aesthetically the Plaza is one of the plazas with the most originality, flavor, and conjunction of unity in its variety, which gives it its own special charm, which practically makes it unique in Peru and possibly in America (1980:23–24).

It was happenstance that in August 1969 the Primer Forum sobre Conservación de Monumentos y Desarrollo Urbano, organized by the Colegio de Arquitectos del Perú, was held in Cuzco. Certainly this forum would have served for the exchange of many ideas about Peru’s historic cities and most especially Cuzco, which has the greatest concentration of prehispanic and colonial monuments and an urban expansion that already was putting these buildings at risk.

On December 1, 1969 Cuzco’s Forum of Architects and CRYF (Corporación de Reconstrucción y Fomento del Cuzco/Corporation for the Reconstruction and Promotion of Cuzco) determined – notwithstanding the constant invocation of Tupac Amaru by the Revolutionary Government and Velasco’s special interest in the project – that “the monument to Tupac Amaru should not be located in the Plaza de Armas because it does not concord with the architectonic patterns of our old plaza. The fountain will continue, but with modifications. A large part of the tiled area will be restricted so as to enlarge capacity and convey greater authenticity. Thus, one of the most significant tourist attractions will not suffer dissonant variations” (*El Comercio*).

Nevertheless, on May 18, 1970 Velasco made good on the promise he had given in Cuzco. *Ley 18280* was passed, which stated that construction of a Tupac Amaru monument was in the national interest and should be located in the Plaza de Armas of Cuzco.

## The First National Design Competition, 1970

For 4 months the monument to Tupac Amaru was debated on the street, in the newspapers, and in official meetings, for (with regard to the latter) *Ley 18280* called for the creation of a formal, national design competition whose jury would be integrated by diverse officials from Cuzco (prefect, mayor, general commandant, archbishop, rector of the national university) and representatives of other interested

parties (notably the “Peruvian peasantry” as well as the obviously necessary body of architects and Consejo Nacional de Conservación y Restauración de Monumentos Históricos/National Council of Conservation and Restoration of Historic Monuments). The guidelines for the competition stated that the monument had to be original, sculptural, figurative rather abstract symbolism; the sculpture would have to represent Tupac Amaru with the expression of a fighter and in a combative pose; the figure could either be standing or mounted on horseback; and it could not exceed 8 m in height (Tamayo Herrera 1980:34–35).

In a personal interview I conducted on July 7, 2004 with Ronald Peralta Tamayo, one of Cuzco’s most distinguished architects, he told me that he and his colleague, Roberto Samanez Argumedo, another very distinguished Cuzco architect, entered the competition together. He said that their purpose in doing so was, in a sense, subversive: “We participated in the competition to demonstrate that the plaza is, in and of itself, a monument; it didn’t need a new element.” His statement reiterates the position he took in a 1969 newspaper article in which he had argued that the plaza could not withstand a massive monument and proposed that the latter be located elsewhere and that in the plaza there be placed a small, low, horizontal monument with an eternal flame on a plaque (*El Comercio*, November 7, 1969).

Mr. Peralta and Mr. Samanez (whom I also interviewed) described their design submission (of which no copy now exists) for the national competition:

Our proposal was to develop planes in the plaza surface towards inside. It was like a sanctuary below the Plaza de Armas, which one accessed through the different planes. Along one side of it, as if emerging from the depths of the earth, we put an emerging statue of a strong Tupac Amaru, as if he was emerging from the depths. Accompanied by a phrase, a stanza from a great Peruvian poem [“Canto coral a Tupac Amaru II,” by Alejandro Romualdo Valle, which won Peru’s National Poetry Prize in 1949], which has a very beautiful part: “They can quarter him, they can dismember him, but they can’t kill him.” Kill him in the sense that they [the Spaniards] would never be able to remove him from the memory of the Peruvians.

Mr. Peralta described their motivation as conforming to the poem: restoring Tupac Amaru to his rightful place in history.

That first national design competition was declared null; no design won. A second national competition was subsequently convened on whose jury Mr. Peralta served. Although he recalls seeing some interesting proposals, the jury could not reach a majority opinion and for a second time the competition was declared null. A third and a fourth design competition were held, ending in May 1972 with the winning entry by Joaquín Ugarte y Ugarte (Tamayo Herrera 1980:34) (Fig. 4).

Meanwhile, in Cuzco, the populace was proposing its own ideas for a monument. An architect, Cabrera, argued that as a commemorative work the monument did not necessarily have to be of such colossal proportions as to make its installation in the Plaza de Armas impossible (*El Comercio*, November 17, 1969). Professor Fuentes Lira, Director of the Escuela de Bellas Artes in Cuzco, attempted to solve the size versus inalterability problem in the Plaza de Armas with his proposal of a symbolic monument of rocks brought from the many Latin American countries to which marble and bronze would be applied and that presumably would be quite low although large (*El Comercio*, November 11, 1969). A man named Dante Maron proposed an immense bronze statue of Tupac Amaru, accompanied by his wife and



**Fig. 4** Joaquín Ugarte y Ugarte's winning entry for a monument to Tupac Amaru (Photo: Silverman, 2003)

children, looking down at Cuzco from the heights of Sacsayhuaman, the great Inca site above the city (*El Comercio*, November 18, 1969). It was to be illuminated at night and complemented with a subterranean Liberty Museum. His idea did not prosper, presumably because his monument would have infringed on the Inca archaeological zone.

### **The Outcome of *Ley 18280***

In addition to the national design jury, *Ley 18280* also called for the formation of a Comisión Nacional del Sequicentenario de la Independencia del Perú. Although led by Juan Mendoza Rodríguez, a general loyal to Velasco, and guided by the vision of *Ley 18280*, the members of the Comisión opposed the construction of the monument in the Plaza de Armas. A new forum was held on January 15, 1971, with



**Fig. 5** Small plaque commemorating the deaths of Tupac Amaru, his family and other co-conspirators, on the occasion of the sesquicentennial of Peru's independence. The plaque can just be seen on the end of the portal in Fig. 1a (Photo: Silverman, 2003)

the participation of delegates from diverse institutions and occupations of Cuzco (prefect, mayor, members of the National Commission, architects, the general commandant, archbishop, university professors, historians, journalists, peasant farmers) (Tamayo Herrera 1980:24–25). Tamayo Herrera states that there was pressure on the delegates, resulting in a 27:5 vote in favor of erecting a monument to Tupac Amaru in the Plaza de Armas. But still the monument was not erected because in 1972 and 1973 there was a vigorous national campaign against the idea, led by the weekly national magazine, *Oiga*. The magnificent winning design by Joaquín Ugarte y Ugarte had been sculpted in Lima, but it was not sent to Cuzco because of the ongoing dispute about its location.

Throughout 1974 General Mendoza defended *Ley 18280*, arguing that “in no way does the monument distort the architecture of the Plaza, to the contrary it fortifies it from the historical point of view and it integrates it from the aesthetic point of view... it reifies the plasticity of the colonial framework of the plaza in which [Tupac Amaru] was sacrificed... Cuzco must not bargain with Tupac Amaru because he earned the best of its plazas with his sacrifice” (Tamayo Herrera 1980:25–26). But the local and national discord over the monument literally warehoused it for 6 years, until 1980, when it was placed outside the historic center in a new plaza constructed expressly for it (see below).

As the debate over the monument's location dragged on, a lesser measure was taken in Cuzco. Alongside the 1950 plaque discussed above (see Fig. 1), on the wall next to it at the end of the portal on Calle Mantas, a smaller plaque was placed in 1971, honoring Tupac Amaru and the co-conspirators on the occasion of the sesquicentennial of Peru's independence, and indicating that this is the place where they met their deaths (Fig. 5).



## The Next Attempt

Velasco was ousted from office in August 1975 by General Francisco Morales Bermudez (see details in Klarén 2000:359–360), but Tupac Amaru fervor did not diminish with Velasco's removal, for the bicentennial of his martyrdom was fast approaching. The Morales Bermudez government launched an extraordinary celebration of the rebellion, forming a National Commission of the Bicentennial of the Emancipatory Rebellion of Tupac Amaru through promulgation of *Ley 21705* on November 30, 1976: *Declaring the historical importance of celebrating the Bicentennial of the rebellion of Tupac Amaru II and naming the respective National Commission of the Bicentennial of the Emancipatory Rebellion of Tupac Amaru* ("La Legislación y los Héroes Nacionales": <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/museo/Heroes.pdf>, p. 42). This Commission was quickly enlarged through *Ley 21910: Amplifying the Commission charged with celebrating the emancipatory effort of Tupac Amaru II* (<http://www.congreso.gob.pe/museo/Heroes.pdf>, p. 42).

In 1976 the statue created by Joaquín Ugarte y Ugarte was at last taken to Cuzco where it was exhibited in the suburb of Huancaro, which has a large fair ground, but afterwards it was stored. Just as the monument conceptually (before its actual creation) had been a problem for the government of Juan Velasco Alvarado, the Tupac Amaru sculpture's physical presence in Cuzco was now a problem for Velasco's successor, General Morales Bermudez and the Bicentennial Commission. *Ley 18280* demanded the installation of the monument to Tupac Amaru in the Plaza de Armas, but no one, not even Velasco, had been willing to actually place the monument there because of the controversy swirling around the issue. A group of Bicentennial Commission members realized that the only solution was to relocate the statue. But where?

They found an adequate space less than a mile from the Plaza de Armas, to its southeast in the Wanchaq district. At the time the space was a large abandoned field opposite Wanchaq's municipality building. The space was large enough for a huge plaza in which Ugarte y Ugarte's dramatic statue could be centered without any other visual competition, leaving room as well to immortalize the other martyrs who died with him that day. However, to achieve this goal there was a legal impediment: *Ley 18280* would have to be rescinded or superseded. The emotional opportunity to do so existed. By now, almost 10 years after the maelstrom of 1969, the dispute had largely atrophied into apathy among the general populace, and the most ardent supporters of a Plaza de Armas location for the monument realized they would never win and so conceded (Tamayo Herrera 1980:39–40). As a team of talented architects worked out the development of the new Plaza Tupac Amaru in Wanchaq, Cuzco came together in support of the project, and President Morales Bermudez felt secure in asking for the abrogation of *Ley 18280* through *Ley 22735*. The law passed on October 23, 1979: *Let Article 1 of Ley 18280 be modified in the sense that the monument to José Gabriel Condorcanqui Túpac Amaru II be erected in the Civic Plaza ... to be constructed in the city of Cuzco and that, in commemoration of the bicentennial of the historic rebellion initiated on 4 November 1780 it carry the name of the precursor.*

## The Irony of Accomplishment

Morales Bermudez's military government permitted a general election to take place and on July 28, 1980 Belaunde, who had been removed from his elected position by Velasco's military coup, was returned to the presidency. There had been an unsuccessful attempt to create a monument to Tupac Amaru in Cuzco during his first mandate (*Ley 15962*) and then ongoing controversy about it. Now, during his second presidency, Belaunde was to be the beneficiary of Velasco's and Morales Bermudez's efforts concerning Tupac Amaru. On November 4, 1980 Belaunde presided over the inauguration of the monument to Tupac Amaru in its new, immense plaza, and on that occasion a new law, *Ley 23225*, was easily passed, mandating the commemoration and celebration of the Tupac Amaru bicentennial (Fig. 6). According to *El Sol* (November 5, 1980), the various articles of *Ley 23225* were received "with ovations" in Cuzco. These articles included:

Article 1. The Nation recognizes that José Gabriel Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas Puyucahua are precursors and martyrs of the Peruvian emancipation and renders grateful tribute to them on the Bicentennial of the Emancipatory Rebellion of 1780 that culminated in their glorious sacrifice.

Article 8. The names and images of José Gabriel Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastidas and the other martyrs of the Emancipatory Rebellion of 1780, along with whatever other precursors and national heroes are recognized as such by the law, will have the hierarchy of national symbols.

Article 9. The year 1981 is declared "Bicentennial Year of the Emancipatory Rebellion of Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas."



**Fig. 6** The new Plaza Tupac Amaru in Wanchaq with the epic-proportioned monument in its center (Photo: Silverman, 2003)





**Fig. 7** The colonnade honoring the other martyrs of the Great Rebellion, executed with Tupac Amaru. They are memorialized in this colonnade of standing monoliths bearing their names. Plaza Tupac Amaru, Wanchaq (Photo: Silverman, 2003)

The other precursors and national heroes of the Great Rebellion were commemoratively installed in a colonnade in the new Plaza Tupac Amaru, each column bearing the name of one of the insurrectionists executed along with Tupac Amaru (Fig. 7).

### **Back to the Plaza de Armas: A Monument at Last**

Another article in *Ley 23225* of 1980, however, reopened the issue of Tupac Amaru in the Plaza de Armas even though his towering statue had been installed in the permanent new plaza honoring him. Article 2 stated: “Let there be erected an Altar to the Fatherland/Homeland [*patria*], with a perpetual votive flame in a subterranean area of the Plaza de Armas in the city of Cuzco as a permanent homage of the Nation to the memory of José Gabriel Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas and the other martyrs of the Emancipatory Rebellion of 1780.” This article insists that a permanent physical marker honoring the actors in the Great Rebellion must be present in the Plaza de Armas. By suggesting a perpetual flame and subterranean form, the law clearly acknowledged the long-standing debate about the appearance of the Plaza de Armas. Although probably without memory of the earlier design proposal, the article also



**Fig. 8** Altar a la Patria, fulfilling *Ley* 23225 (Photo: Silverman, 2003)

seemed to favor the concept of Peralta and Samanez's commemorative monument that had been proposed 10 years earlier, accepting that an elevated monument in the Plaza de Armas would disrupt the architectural harmony and visual sightlines of the plaza. The article drew the discourse of heroic precursors firmly into a new discourse of the nation worshipping itself.

Article 2 of *Ley* 23225 was more or less fulfilled. In 1981 an *altar a la patria* consisting of a ground-flush three-part stone cross and commemorative plaque was created in the garden of the Plaza de Armas, opposite where the insurrectionists had been imprisoned (Fig. 8). It was installed by the Comisión Nacional del Bicentenario de la Rebelión Emancipadora de Tupac Amaru in conformance with the *Ley*. However, there is no eternal flame, as the law required, and the condition of "subterranean" is met by the horizontal position of the cross. The stones themselves evoke Inca workmanship in the manner in which they have been hewn, and their configuration as a cross must refer to the chapel in which Tupac Amaru was kept prisoner. The cross may also evoke Tupac Amaru as a Christ-like figure who will arise again, for as he was being tortured he is reported to have said, "They want to kill us and they can't kill us: one day I will return." These words have become immortal in struggles of resistance throughout Latin America.

Daniel Estrada took office for his first term as mayor of Cuzco in 1984, soon after the Altar a la Patria had been created. He ideologically embraced Tupac Amaru as a resistance fighter, and in 1992 in the counter-celebration of the Columbian Quincentenary, he had erected next to the Altar a la Patria a commemorative stone bearing the famous words, “Y no podrán matarnos” (“They can’t kill us”) (Fig. 9); he also had the cross slightly elevated from its earlier prone position. Not only was Estrada acting from conviction but also his beliefs intersected continuing national mandates about Tupac Amaru. Also in 1984, *Ley 23904* created the Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos Tupac Amaru whose mission was to continue investigating the history of the Great Rebellion, to honor and exalt Tupac Amaru and the other actors in that insurgency, and to produce cultural works inspired by the rebellion.


Despite the existence of the huge Plaza Tupac Amaru in Wanchaq as well as the small Altar a la Patria in the Plaza de Armas itself, in 1997 one more attempt was made to insert a major Tupac Amaru monument into the Plaza de Armas, this time by a lone individual. The July 10, 1997 issue of *El Sol* reports that Edmundo Rado (about whom I was unable to ascertain further information) proposed a major sculptural work presenting a grouping of the principal men, women, and children of the Great Rebellion.<sup>2</sup> Nothing came of his proposal.

## The Discourse of Preservation

As it was being debated, the eventual Tupac Amaru monument was assumed by almost everyone – ordinary citizens, architects, officials – to require an exceptionally large size because of the personality and actions of the man himself: “colossal, gigantic” (*El Comercio*, September 6, 1969), “a GRANDIOSE monument that is in proportion to his extraordinary figure” (*El Comercio*, November 7, 1969, identical emphasis in original). When *Ley 18280* was promulgated, the scale of the monument was confirmed: it could be up to 8 m in height.

For the vast majority of architecture preservationists, the widely sought after Tupac Amaru monument posed a challenge to the architectural ensemble of the Plaza de Armas. The preservationist/anti-monument position was most clearly articulated in the declaration by CRYF (October 13, 1969), the interview with Ronald Peralta Tamayo (November 7, 1969), and the decision of the Forum de Arquitectos (December 1, 1969), all quoted above. The objections of the preservationists can be distilled from the newspaper reports into the following:

- The plaza is “*intangibile*” – untouchable. It must remain as it is.
- A large monument will overwhelm the scale and proportion of the colonial architecture, which is the most important architecture of the plaza.
- The monument will not harmonize with the unity of architecture of the plaza; the “*antigua plaza*” is the colonial plaza.
- Tupac Amaru, if one could ask him, wouldn’t want the unity of the plaza to be destroyed in the name of his memory.



**Fig. 9** (a) Mayor Daniel Estrada erected this stone marker in honor of 500 years of Andean resistance in the commemoration of the counter-Columbian Quincentenary remembrance. The marker says “Y no podrán matarnos”; (b) Next to the marker Estrada slightly elevated the stone cross from its ground-flush position (Photos: Silverman, 2004)



- A monument will be “anti-aesthetic.” For instance, its materials of construction will be modern, thereby destroying the architectural and “plastic” unity of the plaza.
- A monument will not be in agreement with the archaeological characteristics of the plaza.
- The plaza is ours (*nuestra plaza*), and it is one of the most beautiful in the world.
- The plaza is one of Cuzco’s greatest tourist attractions and must not be permitted to suffer any dissonant features (*variaciones disonantes*).
- The plaza represents an entire moment of Peruvian and American history and for this reason it is the world’s cultural heritage.

As I have argued previously (Silverman 2002), the positions taken by local architects and related technocrats concerning Cuzco’s Plaza de Armas have contradictions. The dramatic Spanish reworking of the great Inca plaza, Haukaypata, into the Plaza de Armas is only minimally acknowledged. Rather than Inca remains, it is the colonial architecture that is forcefully defended. Furthermore, the preservationist premise is that the Plaza de Armas is a dead environment, an architectural museum or “a relic” whose form and meaning cannot be changed. This viewpoint is invalid because as a colonial-era plaza it had taken on a new propagandistic role in its own time as an architecture of conquest, proclaiming Spanish power, Church power, elite power, and the smallness of the ordinary person – particularly the Andean.

... architectural projects were a powerful tool in the subjugation of the native people of South America by the Spaniards... the deliberate display of architectural motifs, the organization of building practice and labour ... serve the ends of political, religious, and economic conquest (Fraser 1990: front matter)

... [speaking of the arcades running around the Plaza de Armas:] The use of the arch here has the effect of extending the jurisdiction of the church into the secular domain; it is as if the main square were really the atrium, and indeed on religious festivals the church always appropriates the town square for processions and rituals... The church spawns arches out into the public sphere... extending the civilizing influence of the church façade into the town itself.... The visual impact is most impressive... [people were] accustomed to recognizing – instantly and automatically – the arch as associated with the sphere of religion. (Fraser 1990:144–145)

Whereas architectural historian Valerie Fraser (1990) conceived of power emanating only from the architecture per se, architect Ronald Peralta spoke in terms that resonate with, indeed anticipate, important phenomenological spatial theorists, such as Norberg-Schulz (1971), Rapoport (1982), Relph (1976), and Tuan (1974, 1977). Peralta said:

I consider that the importance of a plaza is based essentially in the space enclosed by it ... the buildings that are situated around the plaza limit the space of this plaza... The space of which I speak generates or motivates diverse sensations in the person such as: euphoria, tranquility, placidity, anxiety. It can make a person feel large or little... this architectonic art [is used] to achieve a psychological impact... the buildings that are around a plaza enclose a space that according to its proportions and location give it urbanistic value – architectonic and also plastic... (*El Comercio*, November 7, 1969)

Mr. Peralta's architectural preservationism and keen aesthetic sense led him to defend the sightlines to the colonial architectural frame of the plaza against the potential Tupac Amaru monument.

Velasco's regime also understood the power of the plaza's colonial architecture, which is why that government and its sympathizers in Cuzco were so intent on intervening with a monument to Tupac Amaru: they wanted to disrupt the still evident colonial narrative of manifold power that at that time was the reflection of the ongoing disenfranchisement of Peru's millions of Andean peasant farmers. They could not (and surely would not) physically damage the architecture itself, but they could disrupt the built environment overall with a monument to challenge the colonial script. They regarded the open space enclosed by the arcades and churches as fair game.

When the preservationists speak of "*nuestra plaza*," it is *their* plaza – the architecture textbook-validated worth – that is meant. They proclaim its *intangibilidad*. This does not mean "intangible" as in English. Rather, *intangible* in Peru means "untouchable, that which cannot be altered." Yet to declare the plaza *intangible* is to ignore its very tangible changes over time and to contemplate the building fabric but not its embodied use and the use of space within and without – the activities inside the buildings and those taking place in the open area of the plaza. Notwithstanding the supposed *intangibilidad* of the plaza, the architects did propose to increase the plaza's "authenticity" by paving large areas (*El Comercio*, December 1, 1969, quoted above).<sup>3</sup> They also decided that the fountain should remain, although with some modifications.

The irony is that, in making their argument, the preservationists have ignored the fact that the European-style late-nineteenth-century fountain in the center of the plaza has nothing to do with the colonial architecture that surrounds it. Yet this fountain is defended whereas the culturally relevant monument that could have been put in its place is decried. As I have argued previously (Silverman 2008), if one wants to be a purist it is the fountain and tourist services that are the dissonant elements in Cuzco's colonial Plaza de Armas. Surely a representational Tupac Amaru monument in the plaza would have been a great tourist attraction as well as a source of education about the dramatic history of the plaza.

The colonial Plaza de Armas is magnificent – even with its glaring, ugly signage, excessive tourist services, and vehicular traffic. Yet the travel advertisements that beckon tourists to Cuzco lure them with the Incas and their "timeless" descendants, not with images of colonial architecture. Mr. Peralta says that Tupac Amaru, if he could speak to us, would be opposed to a grand monument in his honor in the plaza. To the contrary, I think that the ambitious, prideful, Inca-descended cacique who hated the Spanish colonial administration might well have been delighted to tear down all of the colonial architecture (including, perhaps, the churches) representing the oppressive regime, and to rebuild the plaza's Inca palaces that the colonial buildings had destroyed or covered.

Most interesting in the discussion of the preservationists' point of view is the discourse about the Plaza de Armas as *patrimonio universal* (world heritage) that



Mr. Peralta invoked in 1969 (*El Comercio*, November 7, 1969). Although Cuzco would not become a UNESCO World Heritage Site until 1983, Mr. Peralta was engaging the various supranational declarations that already had been signed by many countries in previous years, as well as Peru's own series of cultural heritage laws (for a discussion of the latter see Higuera 2008; Silverman 2006). His international knowledge and global perspective on cultural heritage management shaped his ideas about the plaza. The 1931 Athens Charter adopted by the First International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments stated that "in the construction of buildings, the character and external aspect of the cities in which they are to be erected should be respected, especially in the neighborhood of ancient monuments, where the surroundings should be given special consideration. Even certain groupings and certain particularly picturesque perspective treatment should be preserved." One can readily see how this suggestion influenced the appreciation of the viewshed of the Plaza de Armas' architectural frame. Furthermore, in 1954 UNESCO adopted the Hague Convention, which expressed the concept that there is a "cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world" (<http://portal.unesco.org>). In 1964 ICOMOS's International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (the all-important Venice Charter) "set forth principles for conservation based on authenticity and the importance of maintaining the historical and physical context of a site or building... monuments are to be conserved not only as works of art but also as historical evidence... an historic monument embraces not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting in which is found the evidence of a particular civilization, a significant development or an historic event." Because the colonial plaza existed (including the chapel on the plaza in which Tupac Amaru was held prisoner awaiting execution), the argument could readily be made that in compliance with the Venice Charter the plaza needed to be maintained in its current form as historical evidence of the colonial period. The coup-de-grace in support of the preservationists' position was Article 6 of the Venice Charter: "The conservation of a monument implies preserving a setting which is not out of scale... No new construction, demolition or modification which would alter the relations of mass and color must be allowed." Considering the size of the desired mega-monument to Tupac Amaru that so many were advocating, the preservationists legitimately defended their position on the unstated basis of the prestigious Venice Charter. Importantly, too, not only did Peru sign the Venice Charter, one its own architects, Victor Pimentel, was a member of the committee that drafted the original charter.

Yet I believe that the historical recovery and cultural reconciliation implied by a significant Tupac Amaru monument in the Plaza de Armas would have been well justified. Moreover, the brilliant subterranean design of architects Peralta and Samanez would have accomplished that affirmation without disrupting the space through a monumental vertical display. A comparison with the interpretive controversy surrounding Maya Lin's eloquent gash in the earth for the Vietnam Memorial in Washington D.C. immediately comes to mind (Howe 2002; Lin 2000; Menand 2002).

## Conclusion

At the time of Tupac Amaru's execution, Cuzco's elite lived around the Plaza de Armas, as they had continuously since Inca times, but with a change in occupants. The Plaza de Armas had become a magnificent colonial architectural ensemble, dominated on one side by the Cathedral (Fig. 3a), on another side by the Iglesia de la Compañía (Fig. 3b), and by an arcade enclosing the open center of the plaza itself (Fig. 3c). Only by carefully looking through the arches would one see the remaining corners and wall fragments of important Inca buildings that had survived the Spanish conquest and redesign of ancient *Haukaypata*, the former Inca plaza (see, e.g., Bauer 2004:112–130). Although invisible to the untutored eye, that great Inca space still determines the configuration of the Plaza de Armas with the most notable change having been the installation of a European-style triton fountain in the late nineteenth century and the development of gardens around it over the course of the twentieth century.

In the decades of debate about creation of monument to Tupac Amaru, his heroic character was never questioned. Indeed, CRYF, which so vigorously opposed construction of the monument in the plaza in 1969, published an excellent paperback the following year with a comprehensive history and archival documentation of Tupac Amaru's life. Rather, the issue consistently revolved around the location that the physical commemoration of Tupac Amaru would occupy because, with the exception of the Peralta and Samanez design, there was apparent unanimity that Tupac Amaru had to be portrayed in direct representational form at larger-than-life scale.

A monument supports and perpetuates a historical narrative, and for a large segment of the Cuzco population, Tupac Amaru came to be understood in the twentieth century as validating their mestizo identity and Andean experience. For Juan Velasco Alvarado's revolutionary government Tupac Amaru was interpreted and promoted as exemplifying the goals of the regime. But monuments occupy and create space. Thus, they are not ideologically neutral, physically unobtrusive, or socially inert. Herein lies the basis of the lengthy debate that took place concerning where to put the monument to Tupac Amaru. Ultimately, the Plaza de Armas was forsaken or protected – depending on one's perspective – in favor of a new location essentially devoid of meaning until such was inscribed by the architects who created the Plaza Tupac Amaru, by the government that installed the dramatic monumental ensemble, and by residents who use the Plaza Tupac Amaru.

The Plaza de Armas remains the principal monument in the historic center of Cuzco, architecturally and socially. Because of the peripheral location of the Altar a la Patria in terms of the use of space in the plaza today (which focuses on the central fountain) – and notwithstanding the altar's placement facing Tupac Amaru's site of imprisonment – Tupac Amaru is visually and cognitively almost invisible in the exact spot of his greatest historical moment.

Save for official ceremonies, the Plaza Tupac Amaru in Wanchaq is simply a nice open space for children to play in (Fig. 10), and it hosts a popular Saturday market.



**Fig. 10** Children play in the Plaza Tupac Amaru, oblivious to the historically transcendent drama commemorated there (Photo: Silverman, 2004)

Without site-specific rootedness in the event being commemorated, without the visual support of the surrounding colonial period architecture that constitutes the materialization of the causes of Tupac Amaru's martyrdom, the Plaza Tupac Amaru – although successful as a new social space in the city – is ultimately unsuccessful as a memorial.

## Notes

1. Peruvian currency emitted during Velasco's regime featured on the 50 soles bill Tupac Amaru on the front and the town of Tinta on the reverse. The 100 soles bill depicts Tupac Amaru on the front and the great Inca site of Machu Picchu on the reverse. The linking of Tupac Amaru with Machu Picchu on the 100 soles bill is particularly interesting because of Tupac Amaru's claim to be descended from Tupac Amaru I, who was crowned Inca in 1571 (Hemming 1970, see especially pp. 506–507). The new currency was significant, for previously the paper bills typically had shown Creole national heroes, among other iconography.

2. Similar suggestions for a group representation had been made in 1969 by J. Tarquino Guevara (*El Comercio*, October 10, 1969) and by Dante Maron (*El Comercio*, November 18, 1969).
3. Perhaps the paving was to be understood as a substitute for the thick layer of sand that covered the plaza in Inca times when it functioned as Haukaypata. Unfortunately, because this is a debate that happened 40 years ago, I was unable to obtain more information than what appeared in the newspapers.

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# The City of the Present in the City of the Past: Solstice Celebrations at Tiwanaku, Bolivia

Clare A. Sammells

Tiwanaku<sup>1</sup> is a pre-Inca urban archaeological site, built in 200 A.D. and abandoned around 1150 A.D., and now a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Visitors from Bolivia, South America, Europe, the USA, and other parts of the globe come to this place to stand, breathless at 13,000 ft. above sea level, and marvel at the splendor of its stone masonry and architecture. Tiwanaku is the “capital of the Aymara world” not only because it is part of the pre-Columbian past, but because any attempt to define the Aymara as a contemporary indigenous political body must reference this place. It is integral to ongoing attempts in Andean Bolivia to redefine the state in terms of its indigenous, and especially its Andean indigenous history. Tiwanaku is a place where the past becomes manifest, and manifestly important, in the present. This was particularly evident during the annual Solstice celebration on June 21, which I witnessed in 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2010. (Figs. 1, 2, and 3).

The ritual of the Solstice highlights the increasing divisions between rural and urban indigenous Aymara while ritually uniting them into a single group. In early twenty-first-century Bolivia, most who self-identified as Aymara lived in urban areas, yet the “ideal type” for Aymara culture remained rural. Solstice rituals invoked an Aymara “culture” grounded in agricultural lifestyles and pre-Columbian rituals. These rituals at first maintained distinctions – and physical boundaries – between Aymara rural leaders and the urban Aymara who came to see them. Then, with the rising sun, these boundaries were erased in spontaneous celebration. This ritual was a performance of a rural ideal enacted in a nonurban, yet urban, space: a pre-Columbian city recast as an archaeological site, a rural village linked simultaneously to one city of the past and another of the present.

In Bolivian politics of the early 2000s, rural/urban divisions were real yet porous. The divisions between groups identifying as Aymara were overcome not only dur-

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C.A. Sammells (✉)

Department of Sociology/Anthropology, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, USA  
e-mail: c.sammells@bucknell.edu





**Fig. 1** Solstice pilgrims “receive the Sun” on the dawn of June 21, 2003. Kalasasaya area of the archaeological site of Tiwanaku (photo: Sammells)

ing public rituals, such as the Solstice, but also at important political moments, such as during the *Guerra de Gas* (the “Gas Wars,” also called “Black October”) in 2003, and the 2006 election of President Evo Morales, Bolivia’s first Aymara president. The Solstice served as a nexus that both divided and linked rural and urban Aymara communities in ways that reflected larger political processes.

All cities are temporal as well as spatial phenomena, and here I discuss the links created across both types of distances between two urban centers. One comprises the contemporary cities of La Paz and El Alto. Although these two cities are now politically distinct, they were originally one and continue to function largely as a single urban space; they are certainly seen that way from the point of view of rural Bolivians. The second urban center I discuss here is the pre-Columbian city of Tiwanaku. Built in approximately 200 A.D. as a pilgrimage center, Tiwanaku gradually became a metropolis influencing large sections of the highland Andes in Bolivia, Peru, and Chile. Around 1200 A.D., long before the rise of Inca Empire or the Spanish Conquest, an extended drought led to the abandonment of Tiwanaku as urban space. Nevertheless, people continued to live and farm in the valley, and Tiwanaku remained a powerful sacred site as the region became rural once again (Couture 2002; Janusek 2004; Kolata 1996, 2003). By the early twenty-first century, the village of Tiahuanacu officially had only 2,000 residents (and in reality fewer due to urban migration). People in the municipality see themselves, and are seen by others, as both Tiwanakeños and as part of the larger highland indigenous group of the Aymara, who identify Tiwanaku as having been built by their ancestors. Tiahuanacu’s Catholic church was built in the seventeenth century from stones



**Fig. 2** Solstice pilgrims “receive the Sun” (photo: Sammells)



**Fig. 3** Aymara musicians play indigenous music while pilgrims dance just after dawn on June 21, 2003. Kalasasaya area of the archaeological site of Tiwanaku (photo: Sammells)

quarried from the archaeological site, the only source of stone in the area. Archaeological objects are found throughout the area in the course of tilling and making adobe bricks. The contemporary village and the ancient city are interconnected in time and space, their histories and materialities intertwined, and their centers separated by a short walk.

Tiwanaku/Tiahuanacu is also spatially connected to contemporary La Paz/El Alto. The village lies just off the Pan-American highway that links the capital of La Paz to the Peruvian border at the town of Desaguadero. There is regular public transportation and a great deal of temporary and permanent migration out of the village. Some Tiwanakeños are return migrants who came back to “retire” in Tiahuanacu; having worked for wages in the city, they used their savings to open small stores or restaurants in the village, sometimes living in homes inherited from their parents. Almost all Tiwanakeños have been to the city at some point, just as most city people have visited the archaeological site, even if only once as schoolchildren.

At the Solstice, these linkages are brought to the fore. Since the late 1980s, the Winter Solstice has been Tiwanaku’s the most public and visited event of the year; it is also called the “Aymara New Year,” “Machaq Mara” (meaning “New Year” in Aymara), Wilka Kuti (“the return of the sun”), “el Solsticio” (the Solstice), or, as it is commonly called within Tiahuanacu, “el venti-uno” (the twenty-first). Newspaper archives, published accounts, and oral histories suggest that the emergence (or, as some argue, reemergence) of this event as a public ritual began in the 1930s with the September Equinox celebrations of *indigenista* archaeologists and was an uneven process involving Aymara political activists, archaeologists, tourists, local and national political authorities, and local residents. Rather than having a single meaning, the Solstice is a nexus that combines multiple historicities into a powerful event that can accommodate contradictory meanings (Sammells 2009). The Solstice is a moment when Tiwanaku is transformed back into a city, reflecting its original purpose as a regional pilgrimage site and a locale for public religious ritual.

## A Solstice Celebration

Every year on June 21, Tiahuanacu is transformed for a night and a day from a quiet rural village into a place of national importance. The Winter Solstice, performed at dawn in the archaeological site of Tiwanaku, draws Aymara activists, indigenous pilgrims, foreign backpackers, urban university students, New Age seekers, Bolivian politicians, and archaeologists to watch the sun rise over the ancient stone walls. By the 2000s, the event was announced in La Paz newspapers, on television, and over radio. Far from being only a religious celebration, pilgrims often brought to the event political concerns connected to Aymara peoples of the region.

The 2003 Solstice was spectacular. The event was covered in all major newspapers in La Paz (e.g., 2003b). Parallel (but clearly secondary) Solstice celebrations were performed in El Alto at a replica of the iconic *Puerta del Sol* (Gateway of the Sun) and in La Paz (2003a, c). The 2003 Solstice occurred on a weekend (Friday

night to Saturday morning), and so many who otherwise might have been constrained by work or school attended. Over 5,000 people arrived, with some estimates of the attendance ranging as high as 15,000. In any case, it was the largest Solstice crowd anyone could remember. There were a few Latin American and European backpackers, but the vast majority was Bolivians from the nearby cities of La Paz and El Alto. Many were university students and young adults. Some were from rural villages. Some spoke Aymara, and others did not. Some (or their parents) might not have identified themselves as Aymara 20 years before.

The connections between the contemporary city of La Paz and the pre-Columbian city of Tiwanaku forged through the Solstice are not new. When the Solstice emerged in the late 1970s in its current form as a public Aymara event, the celebration was conceived as a pilgrimage beginning in La Paz and ending in Tiwanaku. According to Tiwanakeños who took part and contemporary newspaper accounts, participants gathered in the Miraflores plaza outside the soccer stadium in La Paz, where the Bennett Monolith stood. This large stone representation of a person was moved to the city in 1932 by naturalized Bolivian archaeologist Arthur Posnansky, after being excavated from Tiwanaku's Semi-subterranean Temple by the US archaeologist Wendell Bennett. The Solstice pilgrims then walked or took vehicles to *La Ceja* (the "Eyebrow") of El Alto and traveled over the mountain of *Lloco Lloco* (the highest point on the road between El Alto and Tiahuanacu, and the site of a shrine for professional drivers) to the Natural Medicine Hospital in the community of Wankollo outside Tiahuanacu. There, pilgrims rested and chewed coca until a few hours before dawn, and then walked to the archaeological site to greet the sunrise. By 2003, the Natural Medicine Hospital was closed and few walked from La Paz, but the buses, minivans, and private cars that began in the city and finished at Tiahuanacu replicated this route, if only by necessity; this is the only paved road linking Tiahuanacu to the capital.

Tiahuanacu's location – both as a rural village easily accessible to the capital of the nation and the location of a pre-Columbian city – is salient to its position as a contemporary pilgrimage site. As a tourist attraction and an economic and political unit, Tiahuanacu is marginal to the cities of La Paz and El Alto, but the Solstice inverts this situation by repositioning it, temporarily, as the place where the nation is celebrated. While La Paz is economically and politically central to the Bolivian nation, Tiwanaku is often called the "spiritual capital" of the Aymara people. Insofar as the Aymara people are conceptualized as the rural root of the Bolivian nation (an idea that archaeologists, such as Posnansky and other *indigenistas*, promoted in the 1920s and 1930s), Tiwanaku – conceptualized as a specifically Aymara pre-Columbian city – also became central to Bolivia's national project. Pilgrims who attend the Solstice are participating in a project of becoming part of "the Aymara" or laying claim to the abstracted Aymara as the root of the nation. In this way, Tiwanaku is a classic example of a sacred pilgrimage space on the margins (Cohen 1992; Turner 1973).

Few pilgrims to the Solstice stated this directly, however. The diverse group of visitors that I interviewed the night of the 2003 Solstice expressed a variety of overlapping reasons for attending the event: religious revelation, Aymara cultural roots,

national pride, a fun excursion. But all the Bolivians that I spoke to agreed that making the pilgrimage to see the Solstice was part of their affirmation of being Aymara, of being Bolivian, or both. They showed pride at participating; some said that they felt that the event would be impossible to miss. A few expressed embarrassment at not having attended before. As Victor Turner has pointed out in regards to pilgrimage, the line between voluntary participation and obligation is often thin (1973: 198–200).

Urban Bolivians arrived at Tiahuanacu in buses throughout the night of June 20, 2003. The usually near-empty village streets were filled with visitors. All the village stores were open and Tiwanakeños set up temporary stands on corners and sidewalks to sell food and drink. In both the plaza and near the entrance to the archaeological site, Tiwanakeña artisans who usually sold to tourists offered knit scarves, hats, and mittens to those underprepared for the frigid temperatures. Visitors snacked on food purchased from locals or brought their own bundles of cooked potatoes and other tubers. Although the sale of alcohol was prohibited by the municipality, many visitors brought their own and some locals were willing to bend the rules, justifying this by saying that the night was bitterly cold.

In the main plaza, people danced throughout the evening to live and recorded folkloric music. Some drank and smoked cigarettes to keep warm. Few slept. There were far too many pilgrims to accommodate in the village's two small hotels or in local homes, anyway. Instead, visitors stayed out all night, wandering between the main plaza and the archaeological site on the village's only paved and lit road. Many locals also stayed up all night to sell to them.

Throughout the evening, the *mallkus* (indigenous leaders of the rural communities surrounding Tiahuanacu) were busy preparing for the dawn ritual. In their headquarters, they and their wives privately gathered with their chosen *amautas*, religious specialists who supervised the ceremonies and the preparations of the *misas* (offerings). Hidden from the eyes of pilgrims, the *amautas* led the *mallkus* in preparing offerings to the Andean deities of Pachamama (the Earth Mother), Tata Inti (the Father Sun), and the *achachillas* (animate mountain spirits). These offerings were later taken into the archaeological site and burned on an adobe pyramidal pyre in front of the cordoned-off crowds just before dawn.

During the night, the *mallkus* also patrolled the village, walking authoritatively in small groups. They were easily recognized by their distinctive red- and black-striped ponchos, knit *luch'u* hats sporting the rainbow-checked *wiphala* (the square, rainbow-checked Aymara flag), and whips worn slung across the shoulder and tied across the back. This distinguished them from the uniformed military police who also marched in groups around the village during the night.

By 5 a.m., visitors had lined up in the museum to purchase tickets, and then stood in another long line snaking around the fence to enter the archaeological site. In the meantime, they tried desperately to stay warm. Wrapped in blankets, they breathed into their hands, stomped their feet, and lit nearby clumps of *ichu* grass on fire to provide some heat. The *ichu* was smoky when burned, and soon the air was thick with a dark haze. Those in line coughed and suffered, eyes watering, but were unwilling to give up their places. The fact that this land was largely privately owned, and that *ichu* grass was a resource used for making adobe bricks, did not seem to

concern the visitors. They treated these areas as “open” rural space, in contrast to walled houses with locked doors and clearly defined interior courtyards common to both rural and urban Aymara homes.

Once the large doors of the fence opened, the waiting crowds burst past, barely showing their tickets to the *mallkus* guarding the entrance. The visitors were happy to be able to move their frozen muscles once again and escape the smoke of the burning vegetation. The paths to the Kalasasaya, the part of the archaeological site where the main celebration took place, were lit with candles. *Mallkus* directed visitors to this area, keeping them from wandering elsewhere in the site or performing non-approved ceremonies outside of the central event. Most visitors climbed the steep, narrow stone stairs into the Kalasasaya, a large elevated plaza in the middle of the archaeological site. Directly on their left was the famous Gateway of the Sun. Others did not enter the Kalasasaya at all, but rather gathered on a small hill directly behind the Gateway of the Sun. The first rays of light to enter this monument are considered especially powerful, providing energy to those struck by them.

Those who entered the Kalasasaya were separated from the Ponce Monolith and the main eastern entrance (through which the sun rises on equinoxes, but not on solstices) by a rope cordon guarded by military police. Beyond this were permitted only *mallkus*, the *amautas*, and archaeologists from the Bolivian national office of archaeology (many of whom had excavated in Tiahuanacu and some of whom were also from the municipality). Also present were local and national government representatives, including Tiahuanacu’s mayor, city council members, and a few Bolivian national officials. Like most other visitors to the Solstice, I stood outside this central area, on the other side of the cordon. The central ceremony was performed by the *amautas* who had privately prepared offerings (*misas*) with the *mallkus* earlier in the evening, but most visitors could not see or hear this ritual. One of these *amautas*, Lucas Choque, had been performing such ceremonies for several years and was also present at the 2006 inauguration ceremony of President Evo Morales in Tiwanaku.

The rope barrier dividing the Kalasasaya during the predawn ritual visibly separated local from urban as well as the politically powerful from the masses. Local *mallkus* and officials stood with national leaders from La Paz, making visible the political links connecting them to centers of power in the capital, as well reciprocally linking the state to its indigenous roots. These associations were forged long before this event, but were far from egalitarian. While *mallkus* and national officials had shared management of the archaeological site since 2000, this relationship was fraught with preexisting hierarchies.

Despite the symbolism of tying rural and urban spaces together and the claims of many Solstice visitors that they came to celebrate “with local people,” most urban visitors to the Solstice socialized with each other, not with residents of the municipality. The majority of Tiwanakeños did not attend the dawn rituals of the Solstice, even though they would not have paid admission. They dressed in ordinary clothes: men in “western” dress, and women either *de vestido* – in western-style clothes – or *de pollera* – in the large skirts associated with indigenous Andeans – depending on how they normally attired. They sold food, drink, and other goods to visitors. Only



the *mallkus* and *amautas* wore special clothing for the event which marked them specifically as Aymara, as well as indicating their political authority.

When the first light emerged over the north-east corner of the Kalasasaya at dawn, all visitors extended their hands up and palms out toward the light to “receive the sun” (*recibir el sol*) (Figs. 1 and 2). After a bitterly cold night spent outdoors, they anticipated the dawn and keenly experienced the transformation from dark to light, cold to warm. Many visitors described this as a chance to receive the sun’s energy and to spiritually cleanse themselves in order to have good fortune in the coming year.

After dawn, the cordon came down, and indigenous leaders crossed the previous barrier to gather at the “altar” – a large, horizontal stone in the center of the Kalasasaya, now elevated as a result of past archaeological excavations – to chew coca. Coca is a common ending to most community events and meals, but in this context it was also a public display, as chewing coca was seen as unambiguously indigenous. Meanwhile, visitors danced in circles to the music of visiting musicians, many of whom were dressed in ponchos and *luch’us* and played drums and panpipes (Fig. 3) Others waved the Aymara flag (*wiphala*) and climbed to the top of the Akapana pyramid. In 2003, police intervened to stop revelers climbing the main eastern entrance and reverently touching the Gateway of the Sun. These celebrations were spontaneous and unregulated. Despite claims that the dawning sun was a personal spiritual experience, the Solstice celebration was in reality a crowded, public display of Aymara solidarity and deeply felt interactions with the materiality of the site itself. It was so crowded in 2003 that it took several hours for all the visitors, filing out in long lines, to leave the central Kalasasaya.

Later in the morning, a planned parade of dance groups – performing “autochthonous” dances associated with the rural Aymara, rather than the “folkloric” dances performed by urban groups – paraded from the archaeological site to the village plaza, passing by municipal authorities sitting on elevated benches while visitors lined the streets to watch and take photographs. By the afternoon of June 21, the crowds were gone, having boarded buses and minivans to take them back to El Alto and La Paz. As the sun set, the village once again seemed empty.

## Sacred and Secular

Although they represented a very small number of participants, foreign tourists were also important actors at Tiwanaku’s Solstice; touristic networks are central to heritage in general (see Di Giovine 2009). The relatively small numbers of foreign visitors attending the Solstice should not be interpreted to mean that the event was divorced from tourism networks. Others have drawn the opposite conclusion; for example, Van den Berghe and Flores Ochoa suggest that because the majority of visitors to Cuzco’s Inti Raymi were Peruvians, this and similar events were “clearly not events of ‘staged authenticity’ held for the benefit of tourists” (2000: 16). This implies a division between the secular and the sacred, an assumption that foreign tourists and domestic pilgrims engage in fundamentally different and separate net-

works of cultural travel and pilgrimage. Furthermore, it suggests that events, such as Inti Raymi or the Solstice, have only one true audience, rather than weaving together multiple narratives with overlapping audiences. A more nuanced analysis is needed to understand the interactions among local, national, and international participants in these types of ceremonies.

The act of performing creates meaning for those who perform, not just for those who witness the performance (Turner 1986). This is no less true for performances aimed at tourists. Not only can participants find meaning in performing an abstract or stylized version of their own “culture” to outsiders, but tourists generally recognize that these are exactly that – performances that are aimed, in part, at them (Bruner 2005). The Solstice was a performance with multiple audiences, and all participants were aware of this. In this context, the presence of foreign tourists (even in small numbers) was meaningful to many Bolivians even though they were not the sole or even primary audience for the event. The presence of tourists underscored the event’s economic importance and potential. Attracting foreign tourists with economic resources was a major concern for Tiwanakeños and national officials. All hoped that these visitors would bring proportionately more wealth than their Bolivian counterparts.

While money was a concern, the Solstice was not merely a commodified ritual performed solely to enrich Tiwanakeño authorities and enterprising local vendors who sold tickets, food, and clothing at the event. Rather, the Solstice was an abstract and external form of “culture” that could be defined, bounded in space and time, and transmitted to outsiders. The value of “culture” was not solely financial, but the money it attracted served as one type of yardstick for measuring its value. “Rich in culture” was a phrase that I heard often from Bolivians explaining why their nation was unique, and why foreigners might want to visit. This “richness” was not measured solely by money; this phrase also implied Bolivia’s generally accepted position as the “most indigenous” nation in South America and the self-proclaimed “folkloric capital” of the continent (according to tourist brochures, postcards, and interviews with tourists). To be indigenous in Bolivia – however ambiguously defined – was to be rich in culture. “Culture,” in Bolivia and elsewhere, has often been defined against some other dominant, unmarked set of cultural practices. Culture is something that rural indigenous Bolivians “have” that nonindigenous urban Bolivians might have lost and that foreign tourists generally are not believed (by many Bolivians) to possess. But part of what made Aymara culture real and powerful was precisely that it could be abstracted and sold – it had the potential to be commodified. Markers of Aymara culture appeared at political rallies, blockades, and marches as well as on postcards and tourist-oriented Web sites. This was not because tourism created politics or vice versa. Rather, symbols, such as the *wiphala* flag, red ponchos worn by *mallkus*, and iconic images of the equinoctial dawn rising through the eastern gate of the Kalasasaya, can be abstracted as powerful signs for both endeavors, albeit to different ends. These interactions suggest that the commodification of culture is not inherently a move toward inauthenticity or hyperreality (as per Baudrillard 1996; Ritzer and Liska 1997). Instead, the act of cultural abstraction can lead to new types of cultural markers with both political and touristic ramifications.

## Religion and Politics, Indigeneity and Nationalism

The Solstice was a religious event, but also fundamentally a political one. It created new sets of relationships by emphasizing “the Aymara” as both descendents of pre-Columbian Tiwanakotas and contemporary political actors, and reinforced the category of “the Aymara” as a coherent political body. “The Aymara” was not defined by a singular cultural tradition or even unified linguistic practice. There was a distinction between Aymara people and “the Aymara,” similar to the distinction drawn by Carneiro da Cunha between culture as anthropological concept and “culture” as a category that can be usefully invoked in political ways. The latter category was forged in part through rituals, such as the Solstice. If “Political speech (and other political acts ...) are what constitutes society, groups, collectivities” (Carneiro da Cunha 2006), then it follows that the Solstice was not only part of Aymara religious practice, but itself constitutive of the very category of people who participated in it. Participation in the Solstice was for many an act of declaring oneself to be part of “the Aymara” even when not participating in the daily lifeways that were seen to mark that group in ideal terms.

Rather than thinking of Aymara “identity” as a stable and fixed sense of community, we can here (following the critique of Kelly and Kaplan 2001) analyze it as something that is actively constructed, maintained, and reinforced. The Solstice was a new religious practice that emerged in the late 1970s, with antecedents reaching back into the archaeology of the 1930s. But the fact that it fit into “a framework of old and continuing ‘principles’” (Obeyesekere 1986: 197) meant it was also seen as part of an ongoing Aymara religious tradition that extended into the pre-Columbian past. This ritual was not only about reenacting the past, but also part of active attempts to reformulate the relationship among rural authority, urban politics, and Aymara political identification. The Solstice emphasized the coherence of “the Aymara” as a political body, both in opposition to and as an essential component of the Bolivian state.

The Solstice as an Aymara event has long been in tension with the Solstice (and previously the September Equinox) as a Bolivian event. Posnansky’s Equinox celebrations in the 1930s and 1940s were framed as explicitly nationalist in nature, grounding the Bolivian nation in its glorious pre-Columbian past (Sammells 2009). By the 1992 Solstice, the ritual had become a protest by explicitly subaltern citizens against the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Columbus; it was framed explicitly as a statement to the Bolivian state that indigenous citizens could not be ignored (1992a, b, c, d, e). But these themes of indigeneity and nationalism remain in tension. Since 1992, the Solstice has been celebrated not only as an act of resistance to a dominant national culture, but also as a reclaiming of national Bolivian culture. The Solstice proclaims Bolivia to be an Aymara nation.

The Solstice of 2003 was attended largely by urban Bolivians who wished to assert their Aymara subjectivities despite not fitting into a Weberian “ideal type” of how to be Aymara in early twenty-first-century Bolivia. That ideal is a rural one, where Aymara agriculturalists grow potatoes and other crops, herd sheep, cattle, or

llamas, wear “indigenous” clothing, and practice Andean religious beliefs. The Solstice permits urban residents to perform nostalgia for this rural lifestyle even if they do not engage in the quotidian labor that produces it.

Due to urban migration trends over the previous 20 years, by the early twenty-first century, most Bolivian Aymara lived in cities or towns. Nearly 60% of self-identified Aymara in the Department of La Paz (which included La Paz, El Alto, and Tiahuanacu) lived in urban areas (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Bolivia 2008). Aymara populations in rural and urban areas and multiple ecological zones have long been linked to each other through kinship, temporary migration, seasonal labor, and trade (Buechler and Buechler 1971; Murra 1968, 1975; Romero Pittari 1982; Stearman 1985). Rural Aymara are attracted to cities by better educational opportunities, more lucrative employment, and the “bright lights” – or are forced to migrate because of lost access to land, an occasional outcome of inheritance disputes. While continuity is often emphasized by anthropologists, many individuals experienced personal ruptures between rural and urban spaces caused by family arguments, disagreements about land inheritance, and other conflicts (Kohn 2010).

Once in the city, migrants often changed aspects of their clothing, labor patterns, food habits, and language. This resulted not in the loss of indigenous markers, but rather a new set of specifically urban indigenous markers that showed some continuity with rural ones, but were easily distinguished from each other. Individuals would often “code-switch” between cultural markers as they moved between different social situations. Nevertheless, urban indigenous people often looked to rural practices to define and legitimate what was truly indigenous. A contestant for Miss Cholita Paceña 2007 learned this when she lost her title, moments after winning, for having fake braids (Rueters 2007). Many indigenous women in La Paz had, in the move to the city, shifted from double braids to a shorter hair length, and young urban women often changed styles of clothing during their lifetimes or even over the course of a week. So did rural women who migrated to the city (temporarily or permanently) in search of work. It was common to see urban women with long hair loose, tied back, or in a single braid – all styles that were not marked as indigenous, but permitted women to return to the indigenously marked double braids at will. Likewise, it was common for women with short hair to use fake braids for public folkloric performances, where stylized indigenous dress was used. The judges of the Miss Cholita Paceña pageant decided that long hair was a sign of a lifestyle more similar to that of rural indigenous women. The fetishization of women’s hair length as a marker of “true” indigeneity demonstrates how markers of rural life can be deployed to identify “real” indigenous people in the city.

But while “ideal” Aymara people might be rural, these cultural markers were also associated with poverty. Thus, Tiwanakeños often dressed up to go shopping in La Paz markets. By adopting the clothing of urban indigeneity, they avoided some of the more blatant discrimination against the rural poor. There was, therefore, a tension between the perceived wealth of city living, and the poor yet unequivocally Aymara rural lifestyle. In fact, the very category of “indigenous” in Bolivia has long had class implications, equating poverty to indigenosity (Ari 2005; Barstow

1979; Orlove 1998). Although these associations are less rigid now than in the past, they have not completely disappeared.

In this context, the rural lifestyle – with Tiwanaku as its spatial representation – became “a symbol as well as a place” (Johnson 2007: 20). In order for the Solstice to be felicitous (following the definition of Trouillot 2000), “the Aymara” must be reaffirmed as a fundamentally rural people while at the same time acknowledging their growing urban numbers. The past needed to be present at the Solstice for urban visitors to lay claim to a nostalgic rural history. It was present at the ritual in the form of clearly identifiable indigenous leaders and religious practices. Many urban visitors to the 2003 Solstice told me that they had attended to celebrate “with” local *mallkus*, *amautas*, and officials who dressed in “traditional” Aymara clothes (red ponchos, *luch'us*) and conducted “traditional” Aymara ceremonies (burned offerings to *Pachamama* and *Tata Inti*) – even though their actual interactions with those individuals were limited.

This perception of the traditional fits into larger narratives surrounding Tiwanaku/Tiahuanacu. In addition to being associated with poverty, ruralness was also associated with the past. This temporalization of progress has certainly been noted elsewhere (Errington 1998). But in this case, many urban Aymara, many of whom are rural migrants themselves or the children of such migrants, see rural lifestyles as literally belonging to their own past. The fact that Tiahuanacu is a rural village near a pre-Columbian archaeological site only further emphasized its connections to pasts, both recent and distant. The depth of that history was a legitimating force for the importance of the Solstice, and event participants claimed a temporal connection between themselves and ancient Tiwanakotas based on biological and cultural descent. These claims were legitimated by both archaeological literatures and national discourses about patrimony.

Tiwanakeños understood that Tiwanaku had great symbolic value and that national leaders were required to acknowledge its importance (and, by extension, the importance of the people who saw it as their spiritual capital). Politicians visited during election campaigns and other important events. At the same time, Tiwanakeños recognized that on the national level, their local concerns as rural residents and farmers were often secondary to those of urban populations. Even though rural life was a legitimating force at the Solstice, most Tiwanakeños were marginal even to the Solstice ritual. *Mallkus* and *amautas* conducted the ceremony, but Tiwanakeños who were not local political leaders rarely entered the archaeological site to watch the ritual. Nor did they celebrate the day as one important to their own religious calendar. Most Tiwanakeños told me that before the rise of the Equinox and Solstice as public rituals, these events were not celebrated in local households.

Thus, the Solstice was a fundamentally urban event transpiring in rural space that symbolically incorporated the growing – and politically powerful – urban Aymara populations of La Paz and El Alto, and created a sense of belonging to a larger group of the Aymara with Tiwanaku at its center. The ritual structure of the Solstice recreated the divide between rural and urban in order to erase it symbolically. Tiwanakeño *mallkus* and municipal officials physically marked off ritual space to exclude urban crowds. Most visitors who attended the ceremony in the Kalasasaya

could not hear what was said by the ceremony's enactors, although they could see the flames consuming the offerings and hear the horns. This physical division between rural and urban participants was essential to maintaining the very legitimacy of the event as a pan-Aymara celebration. The legitimacy of ideal rural Aymara life was affirmed through its literal centrality to the ritual, and its demarcation from the majority of urban pilgrims. At dawn, the rising Sun – itself an active participant in this event, one that brought energy and well-being to those who waited for it in the cold – symbolically erased these divisions. After dawn, all participants broke into spontaneous music and dance, rupturing the cordon separating ritual specialists from pilgrims, rural from urban, and the politically connected from the masses.

Reversing decades of rural migration to the city, the Solstice was a pilgrimage of urban Aymara back to a rural landscape – one that for some was their literal roots, but for many more was an abstraction of a rural Aymara lifestyle. While some of these pilgrims did have connections to specific rural locations from where they, their parents, or grandparents had emigrated, for others that rural space was no longer one with personal connections. Tiahuanacu stood, during the Solstice, for the abstracted rural past to which all Aymara should be connected.

## Ritualized Reporting to a National Audience

The Solstice is more than just an Aymara event, however. Public events in Tiwanaku have long had national significance, from the first Equinoxes celebrated by *indigenista* archaeologists in the 1930s to multiple visits from Bolivian Presidents and presidential hopefuls to the Solstice itself. By following the newspaper coverage of this event in La Paz, one can see a change in the role of the Solstice in this national imaginary. Even as local leaders gained control over the archaeological site and the income it generated (especially in 2000), the Solstice itself is increasingly presented as an event of national, and nationalistic, significance.

As the Solstice rose to prominence in the 1980s, annual coverage on June 21 reported on actual events at the Solstice. Before Solstice and Equinox events, the press published advance articles with details about the events planned. The same sources also reported on the actual celebrations afterward, detailing the predictions of *amautas* such as Valentin Mejillones for the following agricultural year, showing photos of the celebrations, and occasionally criticizing the organization of the event itself.

After 1992, the 500-year anniversary of Columbus' first voyage to the Americas and the year when the Solstice was consolidated as Tiwanaku's major annual event, the Solstice slowly transformed into an institutionalized media ritual. Press coverage of the event changed significantly. Major articles about the Solstice were increasingly published as the event itself was happening, rather than reporting on events after the fact. Media coverage in the 1990s and 2000s increasingly relied on file photos and stock descriptions from previous years, allowing articles to be published in the June 21 edition of the newspaper even though actual coverage of the event could not possibly have made it to the press room in time. In the articles of La



Paz newspapers, it is clear that the same photos, and even the same text, were often recycled from one year to the next (and in a few cases, eerily similar articles even appeared in different newspapers). File photos were not only of events from different years, but sometimes were of different astronomical phenomena. Iconic equinox photos clearly taken in September or March were often published in June with articles on the Solstice.

By the 2000s, newspapers with photos of the Solstice went on sale in La Paz at dawn on June 21 as the celebrants in Tiwanaku were raising their hands to receive the sun. The articles could not be eyewitness accounts, although some were implied to be. But these articles were not meant to report on the event, but announce it. The Solstice had become a ritual, and the newspapers had become an important part of that ritual. Their role was to declare the beginning of the Aymara New Year to the nation so that everyone – including those who were not in Tiwanaku itself – could feel that they were, in some way, participating.

Such participation was not limited to Aymara Bolivians or residents of La Paz. The Solstice media coverage in 1997 demonstrated how newspapers created links between nationalism and Solstice celebrations (1997a). On June 21 of that year, *Presencia* ran a front-page photo of *mallkus* with a bonfire in front of the Ponce Monolith (1997b) and included several articles inside with a photo of the sun rising through the Gateway of the Sun. Surrounding the main *Presencia* article were smaller articles for each of the other provinces of Bolivia, noting how they celebrated (or did not celebrate) the Solstice. The Quechuas and Kallawayas celebrated “Inti Watana” in the Inca ruins of Inca Racquay in Sipe Sipe, Cochabamba (1997f). The Aymara New Year was celebrated for the first time in Rumi Rumi and Sucre in the Department of Chuquisaca, where radio and television jingles were employed to convince the people to celebrate the “real” New Year (1997g). Meanwhile, in Potosí, people were said to have “lost their cultural memory” and preferred to watch the Aymara celebrate on television, despite the efforts of one man to revitalize the Solstice (1997e). In the lowland province of Beni, it was noted with surprise that even migrants from the Andes celebrated only the festival of San Juan (St. John) on June 24 (1997c). The Catholic church, on the other hand, wanted to recover and incorporate elements of indigenous religion (1997d). Implicit in this press coverage was the idea that the Solstice should be celebrated throughout Bolivia, regardless of geography, ethnicity, or declared religion. Those who did not celebrate it were seen as having lost their traditions, rather than as not having acquired a new cultural practice. Rather than exclusively Aymara, the Solstice had become a national ceremony.

I see this as part of a larger and older project to connect the Aymara to a nation-state with roots in pre-Columbian indigenous culture. In Tiwanaku, these tensions between nationalism and indigenous identity came out even in quotidian practices. For example, local officials were uncomfortable with local women selling souvenirs that had been made in Peru. Tiwanaku was closer to the Peruvian border than it was to La Paz, Aymara people lived on both sides of the border, and touristic goods from both nations were largely indistinguishable to most foreigners. Nevertheless, Tiwanakeño authorities did not want visitors to think that Tiwanaku was a Peruvian site. This was not a literal fear that visitors would not know what nation-state they

were in, but a concern for distinguishing Tiwanaku not only as a unique place, but as a specifically Bolivian archaeological site.

The participation of La Paz-based newspapers in announcing the Solstice to the national body (rather than just reporting on it) is part of the ritualized reporting that is now integral to the Solstice. Regardless of whether they personally self-identify as Aymara, Bolivian citizens are expected to take note of the Solstice. The politics that occur there have resonances on the national level. The city of the present performed its rural roots in the city of the past, but the reasons for doing so were very much grounded in the present.

## Notes

1. For clarity, I use “Tiahuanacu” (adj. “Tiwanakeño”) to refer to today’s existing village and municipality, and “Tiwanaku” (adj. “Tiwanakota”) for the pre-Columbian, pre-Incan urban site and location of archaeological research and tourism. This distinction is artificial. In reality, the ambiguity and interchangeability of spellings reflect the linkages forged between the past and present through daily life near a site that evoked powerful sentiments, as well as constituted an important part of the daily economy.

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# Is Nothing Sacred? A Modernist Encounter with the Holy Sepulchre

Robert Ousterhout

The church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem stands today as one of the most bizarre and contradictory buildings to come down to us from the Middle Ages – so much so that it appears as an illustration in Robert Venturi’s book *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (Venturi 1966, Fig. 101). Its architectural structure is so awkward that one wonders if we would give it a second look if it were not for the inherent sanctity of the building – for the church marks the events on which Christianity is based: the Crucifixion, Entombment, and Resurrection of Christ. Because of this, the site was monumentalized, glorified, and celebrated throughout the Middle Ages and beyond, beginning in the early fourth century when the Emperor Constantine the Great (reg. 306–337) undertook the first monumental construction at the site.

The present condition of the church raises challenging questions for those interested in issues of heritage management, for we are dealing with both tangible and intangible aspects of cultural heritage that are not immediately evident to the outsider. Why, indeed, does such a building as this merit preservation? While the architecture may strike us as mediocre, the Holy Sepulchre is preserved today not for its esthetic qualities or its importance to the history of architecture but as a material sign of its religious history, as a witness to Christianity’s most important events – that is, what it represents is more important than what it is. And because of this, we are obliged to pay close attention to the built form, raising questions of authenticity and meaning. And yet it is not the form itself that we value so much as the memory it allows us to retain, for memory is preserved not only in texts but also in places and things. Thus, the preservation of architecture is about more than buildings themselves; it allows us to preserve aspects of history as well. That said, in the case of the Holy Sepulchre, what the building means and thus how it should be preserved continue to be hotly contested issues over which the stakeholders find little agreement.

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R. Ousterhout (✉)


Department of the History of Art, The University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA  
e-mail: ousterob@sas.upenn.edu

The curious history of the building may help us to understand both its odd appearance and continued contestation. Eusebius of Caesarea described the building in his biography of Constantine, calling the church of the Holy Sepulchre “the new Jerusalem, facing the far-famed Jerusalem of olden time” (Wilkinson 2002, 144). He, thus, contrasted the glorious new imperial building at the site of the Tomb of Christ with the ruins of the Jewish Temple on the opposite side of the city (where the Dome of the Rock was built in 695) (Fig. 1). Facing each other across the Tyropoean Valley, the monumental juxtaposition of tomb and temple represented the failure of the old dispensation and the success of the new. Because of later damage and reconstructions, the exact nature of Constantine’s “New Jerusalem” is far from clear, although its basic components are known. The fourth-century complex isolated the most significant holy sites – Calvary and the Tomb – and established the basic architectural features to glorify them (Fig. 2). The vast complex of buildings consisted of an atrium, a five-aisled basilica with its apse oriented to the west, a porticoed courtyard with the rock of Calvary in the southeast corner, and, finally, the great Rotunda of the Anastasis (Resurrection) housing the Tomb of Christ.<sup>1</sup> Because of site limitations, the last is D-shaped rather than fully rounded. Within the early complex, the basilica functioned as the major setting for the liturgical services while the courtyard and rotunda were commemorative, housing the venerated relics.

Following damage and repair in the seventh and tenth centuries, the church complex was destroyed in 1009 by the fanatic Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim, who was reportedly outraged by the alleged fraud practiced by the monks of the Holy Sepulchre in the “miraculous” descent of the Holy Fire, celebrated annually during the Easter Vigil. The building was subsequently rebuilt with the financial support of the Byzantine emperors and was apparently completed ca. 1048 by Constantine IX Monomachos (reg. 1042–1055) (Ousterhout 1989). However, according to some scholars (Biddle 1999: 77–81), the reconstruction may have been begun several decades earlier, perhaps under Constantine’s predecessor Michael IV (reg. 1034–1041). Although the Rotunda and the porticoed courtyard remained much the same, neither the basilica nor the atrium was reconstructed. The Anastasis Rotunda was provided with an open, conical vault and an apse on its eastern façade, and the courtyard became the focal point of the complex, enveloped by numerous annexed chapels organized on several levels.


After the conquest of Jerusalem at the completion of the First Crusade in 1099, the complex was given a more unified appearance, in accordance with Western European standards, incorporating elements associated with Western European pilgrimage architecture (Ousterhout 2003) (Figs. 3–4). The Cloister of the Canons was built to the east of the Byzantine complex, on the site of the Constantinian basilica, with the subterranean chapel of St. Helena being an expansion of the Byzantine crypt of the Invention of the Cross – built into the foundations (Folda 1995: 57–60, 517 n. 3, and Fig. 5 for plan of the cloister). The Tomb Aedicula was remodeled, but the Anastasis Rotunda was left in its eleventh-century form. A domed transept and a Romanesque pilgrimage choir replaced the courtyard and its subsidiary chapels. The chapel of Calvary was expanded, but contained within the eastern portions of the south transept. The choir was dedicated (but not completed) in 1149 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the conquest of Jerusalem (Folda 1995: 178). The monu-





**Fig. 1** Jerusalem. Aerial view, with the church of the Holy Sepulchre in the foreground and the Dome of the Rock in the background (courtesy of Albatross Aerial Perspective, Jerusalem)






**Fig. 2** Jerusalem, Holy Sepulchre, reconstructed plan of the fourth-century complex. Elements surviving at ground level are in black; reconstructed elements are hatched: 1. Patriarchate; 2. Anastasis Rotunda; 3. Tomb Aedicula; 4. Courtyard; 5. Calvary; 6. Basilica; 7. Atrium (author, redrawn after Corbo, with assistance from A. Papalexandrou)

mental entry on the south façade is flanked by a belfry and the so-called Chapel of the Franks, which provided access to Calvary. Despite subsequent damage and repair, this is more or less the form in which the building is preserved today.

After the seventh century, however, the glory of the church was outshone by the Dome of the Rock, which was visually more prominent and esthetically more pleasing than the complex and contradictory building into which the Holy Sepulchre had evolved. Certainly, the basic planning concepts evident in the three different phases of the Holy Sepulchre stand in stark opposition to each other. Yet, as each phase incorporated large elements of its predecessor, the inherent contradictions in planning principles became permanent elements of design. The final form is a directionally ambivalent pilgrimage church, with a rotunda in the place of the nave, enveloped by an asymmetrical array of subsidiary spaces and outbuildings. There is an old joke that a camel is a horse designed by a committee; in architectural terms, the Holy Sepulchre is a camel. Moreover, while the Dome of the Rock was visually prominent, splendid in its isolation on the former Temple platform, the Holy Sepulchre was hemmed in on all sides by the dense urban fabric of the medieval city.

The centuries of Ottoman control in Jerusalem were marked by repeated misfortunes, compounded by squabbles and turf wars among the Christian communities that inhabited the Holy Sepulchre, with the major stakeholders – the Greek Orthodox, the Roman Catholics (represented by the Franciscans), and the Armenians – further compartmentalizing the interior by adding new walls and barriers while remaining in disagreement about how to maintain the building as a whole or even how it should function on a daily basis. The discord was bad enough that the Ottoman authorities entrusted their keys to the building to a Muslim family. Pilgrims conducting their vigils complained of fleas, merchants operating within the church, strange noisy rituals of the eastern rites, and other pilgrims, who spent the night drinking and quarreling.

At the same time, the holy sites of Palestine had become inextricably linked with the so-called Eastern Question, as the European nations sought expansion while



**Fig. 3** Jerusalem, Holy Sepulchre, plan of the present complex. Crusader additions of the twelfth century are shown in black: 1. Patriarchate; 2. Anastasis Rotunda; 3. Tomb Aedicula; 4. Crusader Choir; 5. Chapel of St. Mary; 6. Chapels; 7. Holy Prison; 8. Ambulatory with radiating chapels; 9. Chapel of St. Helena; 10. Crypt of the Invention of the Cross; 11. Calvary; 12. Entrance (author, redrawn after Corbo, with assistance from A. Papalexandrou)



**Fig. 4** Jerusalem, Holy Sepulchre. General view from the south, showing the base of the crusader belfry rising above a Byzantine chapel, the monumental façade, and the Chapel of the Franks (author)

Ottoman power declined (Baldi 1919). By the nineteenth century, the Holy Sepulchre was in a perilous state: the belfry had been damaged and partially demolished in the eighteenth century; a fire ravaged the building in 1808, after which it had been poorly restored. The Greek community, with the support of the Russians and Ottomans, took charge of the work to the consternation of the Latins, rebuilding the medieval Tomb Aedicula in a nineteenth-century style and at the same time removing all traces of the royal tombs of the Latin Crusaders. The dome of the Anastasis required a second intervention later in the century. Moreover, the disagreements between the Christian communities ultimately led to the enforcement of the so-called Status Quo, first instituted in 1757 (and one of the underlying causes of the Crimean War), reinforced by a firman of 1852 and subsequent firmans by the Ottoman authorities. The Status Quo confirmed possession to the various communities of the properties they occupied at the time of the firman while severely limiting any future interventions in the building (Rock 1989; Freeman-Grenville 1994). The most famous relic of the Status Quo is the ladder in the upper window of the south façade, which can be restored but cannot be removed (see Fig. 4). In addition, there continue to be contested areas within the building that cannot be cleaned because cleaning implies ownership. In short, the Holy Sepulchre had become an ugly and difficult building, and it was legally obliged to remain that way.

More significantly, modern Christian tastes did not respond to the historic building as their medieval predecessors had done. What seems to have occurred is a growing disparity between the inherent sanctity of the site and what its architecture represented. During the Middle Ages, the Tomb of Christ had been glorified and authorized by the church building that enshrined it. The architectural features were regarded as part and parcel of the ritual experience at the holy site. The building was understood as a combination of reliquary containing the holy sites, a contact relic whose sanctity came by proximity and association, and an authentic relic in its own right, associated with Constantine and the Crusaders. In the minds of the faithful, the building and the site merged (Ousterhout 2003).

By the nineteenth century, however, all that had changed. Europeans had become attuned to the stylistic developments of historical architecture by means of new scientific studies and through various revival movements, and they were familiar with ideas of stylistic purity and esthetic unity promulgated by restoration architects like Viollet-le-Duc. Visitors consequently complained about the appearance of the Holy Sepulchre, which had become a pastiche of poorly restored historical components replete with jarring disjunctions and representing an odd mixture of styles. “Both the architecture and the internal decorations are much inferior to those of the original edifice,” wrote Michael Russell in 1831. “The meanness of everything about the architecture of the central dome, and of the whole rotunda which surrounds the Sepulchre itself, can only be exceeded by the wretched taste of its painted decorations” (Russell 1831: 92). Later in the century, Pierre Loti described the Tomb Aedicula as “a great marble kiosk, of a luxury that is half-barbaric and overcharged with silver lamps” (Loti 1903: 29–39, 33). Loti lamented the state of the building, noting “the decay of the walls and the pillars, worn, corroded, shapeless and greasy” (Loti 1903, 34).

Even worse, visitors, particularly the anti-Catholic British, questioned the authenticity of the site. “The place seemed to me like a shabby theatre,” wrote William Makepeace Thackeray in 1844 (Thackeray 1846: Chap. 13). In a painting of the Miracle of the Holy Fire of 1892–1899, the Pre-Raphaelite artist William Holman Hunt lambasted the pious fraud of the Greek rite while describing the building as “crammed full of trumpery pictures of old Saints, and decorated throughout in that bad taste which Roman Catholics have to themselves in Europe but which here the modern Greeks share with them” (Landow 1979: Chap. 1). In 1886, General Gordon popularized an alternative site for Christ’s Resurrection, the so-called Garden Tomb which subsequently became the focus of Protestant devotion, set in a landscaped glade outside the city wall. Although its authenticity has been consistently discounted by historians, in the words of Father Jerome Murphy-O’Connor (1980: 146–48), it “conforms to the expectations of simple piety.” Perhaps for this reason, the theme park “The Holy Land Experience” in Orlando, Florida, chose to represent the Tomb of Christ with a replica of the Garden Tomb (Wharton 2006: 193; Branham 2008: 18–31).

Not only had the Holy Sepulchre degenerated unto an ugly and unappreciated building, it was coming apart at the seams. The earthquake of 1927 brought matters to a climax, exacerbated by another fire in 1934, until the government of the British Mandate found it necessary to intervene (Murphy-O’Connor 1999: 69–84). William Harvey was brought in as a consultant to prepare a structural report. He emphasized that the weight of the vaulting was causing the outward rotation of the exterior walls, exacerbated by the thin-walled construction, poor mortar, repeated earthquakes, and the deterioration of the masonry from the fire of 1808 (Harvey 1935: 12). The British authorities subsequently installed a metal buttress to brace the south entrance façade. Surprisingly, the unilateral actions by the British found almost no response within the Christian communities occupying the church, and no further interventions occurred for the next 20 years. The Roman Catholics seem to have been the only group to take the matter seriously. Under their auspices, Luigi Marangoni, the *proto* of San Marco in Venice, prepared a second structural report, following on that of Harvey, which emphasized the fractures that pervaded the historic masonry (Marangoni 1937). Already in 1934, the Latin Patriarch had proposed the demolition of the old complex and its complete reconstruction.

What happened after Marangoni’s report was published in 1937 remains unclear. In 1940, Gustavo Testa, Titular Archbishop of Amasea (and later Cardinal), Apostolic Delegate in Palestine, and Regent of the Latin Patriarchate, invited the architect Antonio Barluzzi to investigate the possibility of constructing a grand new Christian monument to replace the gloomy, decaying old church. Barluzzi was a logical choice for the task because he had considerable experience with holy sites: he had already built new churches on Mount Tabor, Ein Kerem, Gethsemane, the Mount of the Beatitudes, and the monastery of the Flagellation (Madden 1964). In 1937, he had remodeled the chapel of Calvary within the church of the Holy Sepulchre using Aswan granite and introducing new mosaics, following what he saw as the “severe style” of the Crusaders. For the new design of the Holy Sepulchre complex, he asked to collaborate with Marangoni. Their project was delayed by the

outbreak of World War II, however, and it was published only in 1949 to coincide with the 800th anniversary of the dedication of the crusader church (Vincent et al. 1949: 113–45). Their project had four major aims:

1. To give the site of the church complex greater prominence so that it could compete visually with the Dome of the Rock by opening up a great plaza around it and making the “new Temple” more visually prominent, recalling the Constantinian building
2. To respect the sentiments and rights of the competing Christian communities (Latin, Greek, and Armenian) by providing them spacious churches of their own, grouped around a central sanctuary
3. To provide additional worship spaces for the other “dissident communities” (the Coptic, Abyssinian, Anglican, and Syrian churches)
4. To respect the Holy Sites by isolating and monumentalizing them

To regularize the complex, the new program would have destroyed most of the surviving, historic construction and leveled a huge area around it (Fig. 5). A large section of the Old City was to be bulldozed, creating an open plaza of some 7 ha, connected by a broad boulevard to the Jaffa Gate. Of the Holy Sepulchre complex, only the underground chapel of St. Helena was to be left in place – although I have no idea why – and all other construction was to be entirely replaced, with the “relics” of the old building displayed in a lapidarium-like manner within the porticoes of the new, central courtyard. Calvary, the Anastasis Rotunda, and the Tomb Aedicula were to be built anew. The three major congregations – Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox, and Armenians – were to be housed in grand Romano-Romanesque basilicas converging on the central courtyard, with smaller facilities for the other Christian congregations. The proposed complex measured approximately 155 by 200 m overall, framed by belfries rising close to 100-m tall (Figs. 6–10).

The project appears to the contemporary scholar as a bizarre Orientalist/Antiquarian fantasy, detailed with Fascist-like façade arcading, minaret-like belfries, and mosque-like domes. The design was prepared with great sincerity, however: Barluzzi and Marangoni published their proposal together with a history of the Holy Sepulchre by the distinguished scholar Father H.M. Vincent and a description of the state of the present building by the similarly distinguished Father Donato Baldi. It seems to have been taken very seriously, at least within certain circles of the Roman Catholic Church. It goes without saying that the audacious character of the buildings proposed, combined with the suggestion of wide-scale bulldozing in the historic center of old Jerusalem, effectively guaranteed that it would never be constructed.

Or, perhaps if World War II had ended differently, it might have. Although the project was begun as a study, the nationalist fervor in Italy at the dawn of the war placed the project within the scope of Italy’s imperial ambitions – particularly after the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Both Barluzzi and Marangoni were members of the Fascist Party, and Barluzzi served as secretary of the Jerusalem branch of the party for the decade 1927–1937 (Cohen 2008: 68). Moreover, Benito Mussolini was personally interested in the project. He had funded the construction of Barluzzi’s Church of the Beatitudes on the Sea of






Fig. 5 Plan of Jerusalem showing area to be cleared for construction of the new Holy Sepulchre complex proposed by Barluzzi and Marangoni (from Vincent et al., pl. 2)


Galilee, and Mussolini was a knight of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre (Cohen, 2008: 64–80). That is to say, the major players in this venture shared an almost mystical sense of Italy’s destiny. Viewed in this context, as Raymond Cohen recently commented, the proposed edifice “looks uncannily like the blueprint for a triumphalist monument to Italian victory in World War II” (Cohen 2008: 80).






**Fig. 6** Plan of the new Holy Sepulchre complex proposed by Barluzzi and Marangoni (from Vincent et al., pl. 3)

At the Holy Sepulchre and elsewhere, Barluzzi's architectural work was based on what he interpreted as the religious concept of site, and the necessity to "shape the art so that it expresses the feeling called for by that Mystery" that occurred at the site. This approach contrasts with what he saw in the historical buildings of Palestine. As his mentor, Father Diotallevi, who became Custos in 1914, expressed it, "Neither



**Fig. 7** View of new Holy Sepulchre complex proposed by Barluzzi and Marangoni (from Vincent et al., pl. 4)



**Fig. 8** Interior view of proposed basilica at the Holy Sepulchre complex proposed by Barluzzi and Marangoni (from Vincent et al., pl. 8)




**Fig. 9** View of the interior courtyard with Chapel of Calvary in the Holy Sepulchre complex proposed by Barluzzi and Marangoni (from Vincent et al., pl. 11)

the Byzantines of the fourth century, nor the Crusaders who came after them, seemed to concern themselves too much with the architectural forms of the shrines they put up. They more or less followed what was in fashion at the time and let it go at that” (Madden 1964: 81–83). For example, commenting on how his design for the rebuilding of the Church of the Flagellation deviated from archeological accuracy, Barluzzi commented, “Don’t we owe God also the tribute of beauty as well as that of goodness?” (Madden 1964: 130–31) Incidentally, toward the end of his life, Barluzzi became a mentor for the young archeologist Virgilio Corbo, who was primarily responsible of the excavation of the Holy Sepulchre. One wonders how much he influenced Corbo’s subsequent understanding of the building.

How should we situate Barluzzi and Marangoni’s strange “New Jerusalem” within its historical context? Clearly, the attitudes toward sacred history it represents contrast dramatically to those reflected in the medieval reconstructions of the Holy Sepulchre and to those that ultimately guided the restoration of the complex from the 1960s to 1970s (as summarized in Corbo 1981). First, we might attempt to place it in






**Fig. 10** View of the interior courtyard showing the arcades used as a lapidarium in the Holy Sepulchre complex proposed by Barluzzi and Marangoni (from Vincent et al., pl. 12)

the context of the medieval tradition of copies of the Holy Sepulchre. At the twelfth-century S. Stefano in Bologna, for example, the church was interpreted in the regional idiom – North Italian Romanesque, with both dedications and relics replicated from the prototype in order to transfer its spiritual validity to a new location (Ousterhout 1981: 311–21, 1998: 393–404). Although somewhat later, the monastery of the New Jerusalem at Istra, near Moscow, begun in 1656 by Patriarch’s Nikon, falls into this tradition as well (Fig. 11). Translated into a picturesque Russian vernacular, it appears considerably more spectacular than its prototype. At the same time, the monastery is painstakingly accurate in following the plan of the Jerusalem building. By the seventeenth century, knowledge of the Jerusalem monuments had been disseminated by means of souvenir models and published plans. Not only was Nikon’s New Jerusalem built to the same scale *in plan* as the original, but it rose considerably taller, with a great conical dome over 60m high. Nikon was criticized in his day for his presumption (Ousterhout 1997: 143–154). The vaulting collapsed in the early eighteenth century and the building was ravaged by fire shortly thereafter. More to the point, Nikon’s contemporaries seem to have viewed his building more as hijacking of the sacred than a conceptualization of it.

We might view the New Jerusalem at Istra as a transition to a more “modern” approach based on detailed analysis of texts and remains. For example, in the nineteenth century, Gustav Schinkel proposed a monumental rebuilding of the actual Holy Sepulchre church, which would have included leveling large areas around the site and leaving the tomb exposed and in the open (Schütz 1988: 76–100). We might even see



**Fig. 11** View of the New Jerusalem at Istra, from east (author)

the tradition of fanciful, idealized, reconstruction drawings – like Schinkel’s proposal, which was based largely on textual descriptions – as representative of the new approach to the old site. New attitudes toward architecture and monumentality had become as important as the respect for the history and historic fabric of the monument and its site.

The Italian-Catholic background of the architects, Barluzzi and Marangoni, might also explain several peculiar features of the proposal, as they were both firmly grounded in the tradition of the Italian Renaissance. The isolation and monumentality of their complex might be compared to ideal city views of the Renaissance, which were often representations of Jerusalem, centered on the Temple (Ousterhout 1998). These views, of course, had much to do with the Dome of the Rock in its monumental isolation on the Temple Mount. Moreover, the audacity of the proposal – to raze a sacred edifice and to rebuild it in the new style – finds a precedent in the papal rebuilding of the basilica of St. Peter’s in the sixteenth century. The Renaissance architectural ideal, in fact, informs many of Barluzzi’s Holy Land church designs, such as his unrealized project for Nazareth.

Marangoni and Barluzzi seem to have been in Venice when they prepared their proposal – at least they were there working on it when the war broke out in 1940. The theatricality of the Venetian scene may have influenced them as well, as may have Venetian artists Carpaccio and Gentile Bellini, who had created exoticized images of Jerusalem and Alexandria (their works are reproduced in Howard 2000). The spiral minaret of a prominent mosque in Cairo (or possibly Samarra) finds its way into these views, and this may be the basis for the bizarre form of the belfries

in the proposal. It is noteworthy that in his work at the Flagellation church, Barluzzi had experienced difficulties – both bureaucratic and otherwise – in constructing a belfry that could compete with the minarets of the city. In the Holy Sepulchre project, the towers rise over twice as tall as any existing tower in the city.

There was also a tradition of exotic views of Jerusalem from the late Middle Ages. In several manuscripts illuminations, such as the fifteenth-century Book of Hours of René of Anjou (British Museum, MS Egerton 1070, f. 5), Jerusalem appears as a city of attenuated towers and exotic domes (Boase 1971: pl. 75). In these, the dome of the Holy Sepulchre occasionally is distinguished by an external staircase – a feature that finds its way into the proposal. One might also note reconstructions of the Tower of Babel, such as that by Athanasius Kircher, however symbolically inappropriate it might be (Kircher 1679: 41). But looking into history for precedents only provides part of the story, for the project of Barluzzi and Marangoni was inherently Modernist in both its attitudes and much of its appearance. The arcading of the exterior follows the standard of Italian Fascist Classicism, as appeared in buildings, such as EUR 42 of 1938 (Kostof 1995: 718 and Fig. 27.33). When the style was exported to the Italian colonies, as in North Africa and or the Greek islands, we often find a sort of stripped-down Classicism mixed with local or oriental elements, as for example at the church of St. Nicholas on the island of Kos, built by the Italian architect R. Petracco between 1937 and 1939 (Colonas 2005). It is also worth noting in comparison Le Corbusier's unrealized plan for Paris in 1925, in which he proposed to bulldoze and regularize a huge area of the Right Bank (Le Corbusier 1929). For the Modernists, the historical city was no longer adequate for contemporary needs – and this seems to have been Barluzzi's and Marangoni's attitude toward the historical Jerusalem as well.

Needless to say, the proposal of Barluzzi and Marangoni was never accepted. When the competing Christian communities finally came together in 1955 to develop a plan for the Holy Sepulchre, it was prompted by “the sheer terror of being in the building when it collapsed” (Murphy-O'Connor 1980: 71). Indeed, we might also credit the audacity of the Barluzzi–Marangoni plan for shaking the respective parties into an awareness of the problem at hand. After four intense years of negotiation, they decided to maintain the existing building as it had evolved through its complex history, conserving and stabilizing as much as possible of the historic fabric while introducing no new construction. Stones that were no longer load bearing were to be replaced with replicas for the sake of visual continuity with the past. All other masonry was to be left in place, even if broken and discolored. Thus, the present Holy Sepulchre appears as an odd mixture of pristine but bland replication and the unsightly original elements (Ousterhout 2000).

The concern for the visual replication of the original forms is no doubt important here because for the contemporary visitor seeing is believing. But the fate of the original masonry is also noteworthy in terms of what it represents about changing attitudes. Barluzzi and Marangoni had proposed to preserve elements of the original in a sort of lapidarium (Vincent et al. 1949) (see Fig. 10). The stones were to be presented as antiquities or museum artifacts, not as relics per se – that is, they were to be taken out of their original context of devotion. In fact, that is exactly the fate of the old stones today. Those removed in the process of repairs during the 1960s and 1970s have been virtually forgotten. Fragments of carved capitals and column





**Fig. 12** Jerusalem, Church of All Nations, garden with stones removed from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre during restoration (author)

shafts now lie inconspicuously at the entrance to the Greek Patriarchate, in the courtyard of the Museum of the Flagellation, and in the landscaped terraces of the Church of All Nations (Fig. 12). They have been demoted to garden ornaments.

During the Middle Ages, both the fabric of the building and the sacred topography it enclosed were regarded as relics. It calls to mind how, at the twelfth-century reconstruction of the Abbey Church at St.-Denis, the patron Abbot Suger stated explicitly that his intention was to “respect the very stones, sacred as they are, as if they were relics” (Panofsky 1946: 100–101). The medieval Holy Sepulchre was treated similarly. Accordingly, I suspect that the “relics of the Holy Sepulchre” noted in many medieval European inventories could have been fragments of *either* the Tomb of Christ or the church building itself (Bautier 1971; Folda 1995: 83). For example, at Neuvy-St.-Sépulcre, relic of fragments of Christ’s Tomb and drops of his blood is mentioned as a 1,257 gift by Cardinal Eudes de Châteauroux to Neuvy (Viollet-le-Duc 1859: VIII, 288; Hubert 1931–1932: 98). And at Borgo Sansepolcro, relics of stones from the Holy Sepulchre led to the founding of the town (Lavin 1981: 23–24).

Changing attitudes appear within the church as well. Rather than expose the masonry that testifies to the historicity of the site, several of the communities insist upon covering original surfaces with new mural decoration. Following along the lines of the “status quo,” the discourse is more about control and possession than about history or sacred topography (and thus the recent skirmishes between the rival Christian groups within the building, reported in *The Guardian*, November 11, 2008). Constantine, after all, had come from Rome to claim the site and to mark it with his imperial presence. In fact, all interventions must have had symbolic impli-

cations, relating them to the ideological concerns of the founders or possessors. The Byzantine reconstruction, for example, with its annexed chapels, distinctive brick and stone masonry, and mosaic decoration, added a stamp of Byzantine imperial authority, as Constantine IX saw himself as the ecumenical patron of the Church and the successor to Constantine the Great (Ousterhout 1989: 78). Similarly, the crusaders' project placed the building into the context of Romanesque European pilgrimage architecture (Folda 1995: 535, no. 30).

In a similar manner, the audacious proposal of Barluzzi and Marangoni proclaimed dramatically the Roman Catholic possession of the site in a style and with a bravura associated with the twentieth-century Italian revival of the Roman Empire. History allows us some perspective on similar follies of the past. The Modernist movement of the twentieth century is replete with grand gestures – as diverse as the Communist system of government or the Pruitt–Igoe Housing Project. Many of these have collapsed as spectacularly as they appeared.

By way of conclusion, I would like to compare Barluzzi's and Marangoni's project to another unbuilt Modernist project for Jerusalem. Between 1974 and 1988, the noted Israeli architect Moshe Safdie developed a master plan for the Western Wall area (Safdie 1989). Accessible following the Israeli taking of the Old City in 1967, a makeshift arrangement allowed access to the exposed Herodian masonry of the Temple platform, which had become a focal point for Jewish worship. In many ways, the terraced plaza Safdie proposed was an elegant and practical solution to the movement of people through a difficult space, separating religious and secular visitors. After years of excruciating deliberations and redesigns, however, the proposal was rejected by the religious authorities. Ultimately, their decision rested not on practical or esthetic grounds but on eschatology. They maintained the principle that worship at the Western Wall was to be temporary, in expectation of the rebuilding of the Temple that would herald the End of Days (Safdie 1989: Chap. 17). To give the Western Wall the appearance of permanence was to reject prophecy, and thus the project was unacceptable. As Safdie lamented, "Tradition has it when the Messiah comes, the Third Temple will be built. Luckily it is supposed to come down from Heaven already designed. No doubt the Lord has been observing the difficulty of getting architectural plans approved in Jerusalem" (Safdie 1989: 222).

The same sort of criticism had been leveled against the Russian Patriarch Nikon in his project at Istra. When he was deposed, one of the charges leveled against him was his presumption in founding a New Jerusalem, one that was not just a "mere copy as from a pattern, but the very prototypal Jerusalem itself" (Ousterhout 1997: 152). For from a theological perspective, the New Jerusalem was not to be built by man – not Constantine nor the Crusaders, not Patriarch Nikon nor developers in Florida; not Barluzzi and Marangoni nor Moshe Safdie; it was not to be constructed on this earth. In the final analysis, grand Modernist gestures may speak volumes about utopian ideals in a transformed society, but their concerns are more with this world than the next. The spiritual concerns of the faithful seem to demand different solutions. For the faithful – and for the architectural historian – the remnants of the old Jerusalem speak more eloquently about the promise of the coming of the New Jerusalem than any "New Jerusalem" ever could.

## Notes

1. The standard monograph remains L. H. Vincent and F.-M. Abel, *Jérusalem nouvelle* (1914), vol. 2. The history of the building is summarized in R. Ousterhout, "Rebuilding the Temple: Constantine Monomachus and the Holy Sepulchre," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 48 (1989). V.C. Corbo, *Il Santo Sepolcro di Gerusalemme* (1981), 3 vols., is indispensable and has superseded all previous publications on the subject, but without providing a full analysis of its architectural remains. A less satisfactory account with imaginative reconstruction drawings is provided by C. Couasnon, *The Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem* (1974). More recently, see J. Taylor and S. Gibson, *Beneath the Church of the Holy Sepulchre* (1994), for important observations on the site of the Constantinian building, although their essays at reconstruction are less useful. M. Biddle, *The Tomb of Christ* (1999), offers important observations on the building's history while focusing on the present condition of the Tomb Aedicula. In general, more attention has been given to the perplexing early history of the site than to the standing remains. For the last restoration, see most recently: R. Cohen, *Saving the Holy Sepulchre: How Rival Christians Came Together to Rescue their Holiest Shrine* (2008).

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# Rebuilding Mostar: International and Local Visions of a Contested City and Its Heritage

Emily Gunzburger Makaš

In July 2005, the historic center of Mostar, including its sixteenth-century market, mosques, and famous Old Bridge, was inscribed on UNESCO's World Heritage List (Fig. 1). The world's attention had initially focused on Mostar when its iconic sixteenth-century stone Old Bridge was deliberately destroyed during the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia–Hercegovina. At that same time, the city was forcibly divided into politically and culturally distinct Croat and Muslim sides. For many, Mostar's destroyed bridge and its division quickly came to symbolize the war's threat to Bosnian multiculturalism, which was the image of Bosnia–Hercegovina advocated by the international community. As a result, the reconstruction of the Old Bridge in 2004 and simultaneous political reunification of Mostar and subsequent designation as a World Heritage City by international organizations have all been regarded internationally as symbols of reconciliation and the rebuilding of metaphoric bridges between Bosnia's divided people.

However, this interpretation of Bosnia–Hercegovina, Mostar, and the bridge is not universally shared by the local community. Locally sponsored reconstruction projects, local media, and the general political situation in the city suggest separate communities, each with its own identity and multiple, layered ideas of what Mostar means. These varied interpretations have influenced the rebuilding of the city's architectural heritage as well as the local reception of its international recognition as a World Heritage City. In Mostar, the two most important effects of the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia–Hercegovina and its varied interpretations have included the city's physical destruction and its political reorganization. The first necessitated a massive postwar reconstruction effort, and the second provided the polarized context in which this effort took place.

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E.G. Makaš (✉)

College of Arts + Architecture, The University of North Carolina  
at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA  
e-mail: emakas@uncc.edu





**Fig. 1** View of Mostar's sixteenth-century Old Bridge and the surrounding Old Town (image: author, 2006)

## Wartime Destruction of the City

Subject to two separate sieges, Mostar was the most heavily damaged city in Bosnia–Hercegovina. Ninety percent of the city center was damaged, and a third of the buildings in the historic core were completely destroyed. Thousands were killed and tens of thousands were displaced from their homes and from the city. The first siege of Mostar took place in the spring of 1992, when the city was surrounded and shelled by Bosnian Serb paramilitaries with support from the Yugoslav National Army (Yarwood 1999: 3; Bose 2002: 95–96). During that 2-month attack, most of the city's religious, cultural, historical, and architectural monuments were deliberately targeted and severely damaged or completely destroyed. The Catholic Cathedral was one of the first buildings shelled. Other religious buildings attacked at that time included the Bishop's Palace, the Franciscan Church and Monastery, and 12 of the city's 14 mosques (Architectural Association 1993: 13; Zvoko 1999: 57–92). In retaliation for attack on Mostar's religious and cultural buildings by the Bosnian Serbs and mostly Serb Yugoslav Army, both of the city's Serb Orthodox Churches were attacked and burnt by a small, unidentified group in the besieged city (Behram and Minirana 1992: 3; Yarwood 1999: 6; Zvoko 1999: 104). In addition, most of the city's schools were damaged during the initial battle, as were its


historical museum, archives, and other cultural buildings. Five of Mostar's six bridges were destroyed, leaving the historic stone pedestrian Old Bridge as the only remaining river crossing.

The second siege of Mostar began in May 1993, almost a year after the first intensive attack and blockade ended. This time, Mostar was attacked by the Bosnian Croat militia, known by the acronym HVO, with military and financial support from the Croatian Army (Bose 2002: 96, 105; Kulenović 2001: 367). Mostar's mosques were targeted again, but this second siege took an even greater toll on the more anonymous buildings of Mostar's historic core, which were obliterated by the prolonged shelling. The few architectural monuments in the center that had survived the initial siege were destroyed in the subsequent months. Even the Old Bridge did not survive this second siege, but rather became a deliberate target and was shelled point blank for days by the Bosnian Croat HVO militia. Despite futile attempts to protect it with corrugated metal and tires, it succumbed to the bombing and collapsed on November 9, 1993.

To worldwide and some local observers, since its brutal destruction, the Old Bridge has come to represent the painful divisiveness of the war in Bosnia–Hercegovina, as well as the destruction of cultural heritage in that war and in war in general. However, the most frequently argued new meaning of the Old Bridge in recent decades is that it represents Bosnia–Hercegovina's supposed pluralistic tradition. Foreigners and locals alike describe it as a symbol of Bosnia–Hercegovina not simply because of its beauty and widespread reputation – the prevalent perception of it before the war – but now because of this one specific characteristic of Bosnian identity.

These new associations actually first appear shortly before the bridge's destruction, as it came under threat and as other significant pieces of Bosnian cultural heritage were lost. Escalating rhetoric about the Old Bridge's significance and pleas from Mostar residents and the Bosnian Government to the United Nations and UNESCO to intervene and save it paralleled its vulnerability as an increasingly deliberate target. Local newspapers began to call specific attention to the bridge's plight in a series of articles (Grad bez 1993: 48; HVO Razara 1993: 1; Opet Pakoa 1993: 1; Protest Generala 1993: 35; Salom 1993: 4; Dr. Siljadzic 1993: 8; Stari Most 1993: 8). These did not go unnoticed by the rest of the world, and soon publications and e-mail list serves began to take up the cause. The rhetoric and the destruction may have been mutually reinforcing: not only did its defenders plead for the bridge because it was at risk, but it was probably increasingly at risk as its public profile grew.

When Mostar's Old Bridge was eventually destroyed in 1993, the Bosnian Government assigned partial blame to the western-led international organizations and governments for their failure to act on the bridge's behalf. In a public letter, the Bosnian foreign minister argued that along with the bridge, Bosnia–Hercegovina had also lost hope that the United Nations, UNESCO, the Council of Europe, or other Western institutions would, or could, save Bosnia–Hercegovina's cultural heritage (Pismo Vlade 1993: 8). This sentiment was epitomized in a political cartoon printed a few days after the Old Bridge's destruction in *Oslobođenje*, the only daily newspaper published in Sarajevo at that point during the war. The cartoon depicted UNESCO as falling along with the bridge's arch (Fig. 2) (Stefanović 1993: 2).




**Fig. 2** Political cartoon depicting UNESCO falling along with the stones of the Old Bridge, representing the international institution's failure to save this example of world cultural heritage, 1993. Božo Stefanović, "UNESKO" [UNESCO], *Oslobođenje*, November 15, 1993, p. 2 (image: Božo Stefanović, 1993)

## Wartime Division of the City

In addition to finishing the destruction of the city, the second siege of Mostar in 1993 involved the Bosnian Croat HVO militia's cleansing of the western part of the city of non-Croats, expelling Muslims and the few remaining Serbs from their homes, detaining some in camps, and busing others out of the region (Council of Europe 1994; Goldstein 2000: 246; Mahmutćehajić 2000: 84; Pusić 1998). Most fled to the already severely damaged eastern part of Mostar, which the HVO then began shelling from previously secured positions in the hills around the city. The HVO was unable to fully conquer the blockaded enclave in east Mostar despite its tactical and supply advantages. The standoff lasted almost a year and ended not because of any military advances or changes on the ground, but rather because a ceasefire was negotiated at the highest political levels. The March 1994 Washington Agreement ended hostilities between the Bosnian Croat militia and the Bosnian Army throughout the country (Framework Agreement 1994). It marked the official end of the second siege of Mostar and of the war in that city, as little organized fighting took place there afterward. Though an approximate peace came to Mostar with the Washington Agreement, the Dayton Peace Agreement completely ending the war in Bosnia–Hercegovina was not signed until November 1995, nearly two years later.

However, immediately after the March 1994 Washington Agreement, members of the international community who had participated in its arbitration recognized that the governing of Mostar – still polarized and contentious – was a highly sensitive



**Fig. 3** Diagrammatic map of Mostar showing locations of religious buildings, sites' mentions in the text, political divisions of the city between 1994 and 2004, and the area of the World Heritage District of Mostar Old Town (image: author, 2011)

and important issue. The European Union took responsibility for this project and established a commission with a two-year mandate to govern the city. In March of 1996, as that commission's role in Mostar neared its end, the European Union hosted a meeting in Rome involving the Presidents of Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina at which an Interim Statute of the City was devised as a temporary solution for the self-governance of Mostar (Interim Statute 1996). With this Statute, the de facto division of Mostar into Croat and Muslim sides that had occurred during the war became institutionalized in the city's postwar government.

The Interim Statute established seven largely autonomous municipal districts within the city, three in the west with Croat majorities, three in the east with Muslim majorities, and a Central Zone to be controlled by the joint (and weak) city council (Fig. 3). Though each of the two "sides" was composed of three separate municipal units, these often acted as blocks, and in fact the three Croat majority municipalities actually signed a formal agreement of intercooperation. The result was that in practice the city continued its wartime division between a west Mostar that was Bosnian Croat

controlled and inhabited and an east Mostar that was Bosnian Muslim controlled and inhabited. It was a city rendered in two, like Cold War Berlin, with as clearly demarcated “sides.”

## Interpretations of the War in Bosnia–Hercegovina

The war in Mostar has been interpreted differently by some within the western international community and by various local constituencies, and these interpretations often contradict. The West has tended to understand the war in Bosnia–Hercegovina as one between pluralists and particularists, between those wanting to carve the country into separate nationally based territories and those wanting a shared political and cultural space (Banac 1993; Cigar et al. 2002; Coward 2003; Donia et al. 1994; Sells 1996). Both battles for Mostar are understood by international organizations and western governments as unprovoked aggressive attacks on a pluralistic city. These opinions and approaches dominated the international community’s wartime interventions as well as its postwar reconstruction efforts in Bosnia–Hercegovina.

However, within Bosnia–Hercegovina and specifically within Mostar, the perspectives on the war vary considerably. As with almost all aspects of Bosnian culture and politics today, these multiple interpretations are inextricably related to identity debates: how one interprets the causes and agenda of the war is largely dependent on how one identifies oneself. Thus, Serb, Croat, Muslim, and Bosnian patriots remember recent history differently, and many of these conflicting perceptions are relevant to Mostar’s postwar context.

Nationalist Croats in Bosnia–Hercegovina and Mostar, including many of those that led the HVO during the war and West Mostar in the years immediately afterward, tended to interpret the war as a three-way civil conflict in which they fought to defend their right to live and promote their own cultural and religious identity in their “homeland.” Many Bosnian Croats, chauvinists, and nonnationalists alike believed themselves to be fighting to preserve their existence against enemies who wished to either expel them physically or subsume them culturally into a supranational Yugoslav or Bosnian culture (Augustinović 1999; Friedman 1996; Goldstein 2000: 245; Herceg 1999: 32; Mišković 1997: 8; Praljak 1997; Papić 1996: 9). Croats in Mostar nearly universally interpret the first siege of the city as an aggressive attempt of Serbia to control part of Bosnia–Hercegovina. Local Croat understandings of the second siege, when the Bosnian Croat militia attacked the city, are more varied. Some see it as admittedly a preemptive strike, but a necessary one for self-preservation. On the other hand, others see it as a provoked attack because the Bosnian Army had allegedly attacked Croat civilians in nearby villages.

Interpretations of the war by Bosnian Muslim nationalists and supporters of a shared Bosnian identity overlap in large part because of the blurriness between these two identity categories today. Like the international community, most Muslims in Mostar interpret the war as an aggressive attack by those seeking to carve out

ethnically pure territories in Bosnia–Hercegovina (Behram 1993: 6; Mahmutćehajić 2000; Mahmutćeahijić 2001; Zulfikarpasić et al. 1995). Unlike the Bosnian Croats, most Bosnian Muslims in Mostar did not believe themselves to be fighting for increased rights to express and celebrate their identity, but rather to preserve what they believed to be the status quo: a shared Bosnia–Hercegovina. As the war progressed, however, many Muslims began to feel more and more isolated and some began to see themselves as a threatened minority within the broader region, fighting for their existence. On the other hand, those who considered themselves Bosnian nationals first and foremost, regardless of their religious affiliation, definitely subscribed to the position that their multicultural country was threatened by separatists throughout the war.

## Reconstruction of the Old Bridge

Mostar's most famous site, the Old Bridge, was also its most widely publicized reconstruction project. For international organizations and governments, rebuilding the Old Bridge became synonymous with the greater process of rebuilding a peaceful, pluralistic Bosnia–Hercegovina. The bridge's new symbolic associations and neutrality as infrastructure led to the international community's overwhelming financial and political support for its reconstruction while ignoring many other major sites in Bosnia–Hercegovina (Barry 1999: 112). International organizations and foreign governments scrambled to contribute to the Old Bridge's reconstruction and proudly announced their involvement in any public forum possible, including large signs throughout the city. Locals also celebrated this attention, even producing postcards that listed the donor countries and organizations.

The efforts of the World Monuments Fund and the Aga Khan Trust for Culture contributed to the initial impetus and organization for the Old Bridge's reconstruction, but it was the World Bank that took the lead in establishing the financing structure to support the project (The World Bank 2003). Cultural heritage had not been an area historically funded by the World Bank, but beginning with Mostar and a few other initial projects in 1998 and 1999, it ventured into the heritage field because of anticipated economic development through tourism. The World Bank gave a low-interest loan of 4 million US dollars to the City of Mostar and set up a fund to which others could contribute. Donations came in from half a dozen foreign governments. In addition, the companies involved in the actual rebuilding represented a similarly international force. During the reconstruction process, UNESCO organized an Expert Team of international scholars and practitioners to advise the local team and donors on the technical aspects of the reconstruction. Each of these organizations, firms, and foreign governments explicitly described the bridge's symbolism of Bosnian multiculturalism and its reconciliatory role as motivating their funding or participation in the project. For example, the World Bank identified its primary goal as improving "the climate for reconciliation among the peoples in the country through recognition and rehabilitation of their common cultural heritage" (The World Bank 1999).




The World Bank and UNESCO took special care to ensure that representatives of the city's Muslims, Croats, and even Serbs were involved in every step of the reconstruction process; however, Mostar's residents did not actually come together as smoothly and altruistically as the project's promoters initially claimed they did (UNESCO 2002a; The World Bank 1998; UN 2001). Most of the Croat population of the city subtly obstructed or simply ignored the whole reconstruction process (ICG 2003). For some Mostar Croats, the Old Bridge has since the war been understood as belonging to the specifically Muslim community. The city's Catholic Bishop, for example, clearly saw the bridge as *their* project, not a shared one and he refused to attend the New Old Bridge's opening ceremony partly because Mostar's Muslims had not approved of a recent project he had sponsored (Lovrenović 2004; Marusić 2004: 2).

The most common view expressed locally at the time of its reconstruction, however, was that the Old Bridge had been appropriated by the international community. For some Mostar Croats, the glorification of the Old Bridge in the postwar period and the lavishing of international attention on it, as well as the specific discourse on pluralism and multiculturalism which permeated that attention, were something from which they wished to distance themselves, even though they may have previously acknowledged the bridge as their own. It is not only Mostar's Croats who have begun to see the bridge as overtaken by foreigners: this view is shared by some Muslims and Bosnian patriots as well, as a 2003 political cartoon from the Sarajevo daily *Dnevni Avaz* reveals. Published six months before the opening ceremony, this cartoon illustrates clearly the local sentiment that the New Old Bridge had become the international community's project rather than that of Mostar's inhabitants (Fig. 4) (Ninković 2003: 2). In the cartoon, the bridge is labeled OHR for the Office of the High Representative, the foreign-run, civilian, oversight government in Bosnia–Hercegovina established by the November 1995 Dayton Agreement that had ended the war in Bosnia–Hercegovina. The two river banks are labeled SDA and HDZ for the Muslim nationalist and Croat nationalist political parties in power in Mostar and throughout Bosnia–Hercegovina at that time. According to the cartoon, the bridge represented neither of the individual communities in Mostar nor them collectively, but rather the international community and its attempts to bridge the two communities. The cartoon calls into question whether there are genuine local sentiments of cooperation behind the reconstruction of the bridge and the reunion of the city it was meant to symbolize, complicating the simple rhetoric of the World Bank and other international sponsors touting Mostar as a success story.

The New Old Bridge's opening ceremony in July 2004 also reinforced the pervasive local opinion that the project and its symbolism belonged to the international community and its vision of Bosnia–Hercegovina. Speakers at the event included a World Bank official, the High Representative, and the Chairman of the Bosnian Presidency, but no one from Mostar. Mostar was also underrepresented in the performances which took place during the ceremony: international dance troops and musicians as well as the Sarajevo Philharmonic Orchestra performed, but only in the background of the large-scale finale did locals anonymously participate in a children's chorus and as divers from the Old Bridge. In an additional bizarre twist, for security reasons, nearly all citizens of the city were forbidden to come within a few

**Fig. 4** Political cartoon depicting the New Old Bridge as the OHR, representing the international community. Đoko Ninković, “To je To: Novi Most u Mostaru” [That’s That: The New Bridge in Mostar], *Dnevni Avaz*, October 6, 2003, p. 2 (image: Đoko Ninković, 2003)



blocks of the Old Bridge the night of the opening even though the speeches repeated continuously that it was *their* night to be proud and celebrate *their* progress (Ashdown 2004; Tihic 2004). While delegations of princes, presidents, ambassadors, and foreign experts filled up the seats in the viewing area, Mostar’s residents watched the opening ceremony on televisions at home and on screens set up in cafes – at a safe distance from the dignitaries near the New Old Bridge itself.

## Rebuilding and Reunion of the City

Around the Old Bridge in Mostar’s Old Town, where most buildings had been significantly destroyed, only fragments of the most architecturally and historically significant structures remained after the war. These were stabilized and the surrounding

piles of rubble were cleared. As rebuilding took place, the overall prewar organization of Mostar was retained, including the placement of streets, blocks, open spaces, and neighborhoods. In addition, like the Old Bridge, almost all the structures in the Old Town, as well as the destroyed public buildings located elsewhere in the city, were rebuilt in close imitation of their prewar appearances, with few exceptions. For example, Kujundžiluk Street, a sixteenth-century market that was extensively restored in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and nearly totally destroyed during the war, was rebuilt recently as a more perfect version of its former self by the local preservation institute with help from the Swedish NGO Cultural Heritage without Borders.

Looking beyond the Old Bridge to some of these other recent architectural projects in Mostar reveals that the unifying and pluralistic symbolism attached to the city's iconic centerpiece by the international community is indeed not the only idea being represented through Mostar's rebuilding. Because the various parties disagree on the causes and meanings of the conflict in which the monuments and urban fabric were destroyed, they also do not concur in their understanding of the reconstruction of these same sites. Mostar's Bosnian patriots, Muslims, and the international community believe that the war was fought to keep the city the shared place that they perceived it to have been previously, and consequently they have supported reconstruction projects they think will recreate the unified character that they associate with the former city. Thus, they have attempted to use architecture and urban planning to promote shared spaces and an inclusive Bosnian identity. The Old Bridge is the quintessential example of such a project.

Mostar's Croats, on the other hand, have viewed these symbols of a shared Bosnia–Hercegovina and allegedly multicultural spaces as attempts to assimilate their minority culture into the dominant Muslim culture under the umbrella term Bosnian. They have, therefore, been resistant to participate in these shared projects, including the Old Bridge's reconstruction. Since the war ended, nationalist Croats in Mostar have rebuilt war-damaged buildings in such a way as to demonstrate and express their cultural and religious uniqueness. They have used architecture to mark their spaces and strengthen their distinctive Croat identity. From the perspective of the city's Muslims, Bosnian patriots, and the international community, this conspicuous display of Croat symbols has been interpreted as an ongoing attempt to claim and delimit territory, and any construction that further changes the city is seen as a continuation of the wartime attacks on its former shared character. But this opposition to the construction of Croat symbols and cultural institutions has been understood by Mostar's Croats as a continuation of attacks on their rights to celebrate their identity; it has reinforced their fears of being a threatened minority whose existence is at risk.

One of the most contested recent architectural projects in Mostar was the reconstruction of the church and bell tower of the nineteenth-century Franciscan Church of Saints Peter and Paul (Fig. 5). The church was almost completely destroyed during the first siege of the city, and then torn down and replaced with an oversized concrete new church after the war. What was especially controversial about the reconstruction of the Franciscan Church was the size and proportions of the new bell



**Fig. 5** Franciscan church, bell tower, and monastery complex after reconstruction (image: author, 2011)

tower and the different ways that height has been understood. Both its supporters and its critics agree that the primary effect of this tower is to clearly mark a Catholic presence on Mostar's skyline. There is nowhere in the city from which the tower is not visible, making it more present than even the Old Bridge, whose image is reproduced everywhere, but which can actually be seen from only a few very specific vantage points in the city. For the Franciscans and most of the city's Catholic Croats, the bell tower's height represents their clear and visible presence in a city historically dominated by more numerous, albeit much smaller, minarets (Brkić 1998: 17; Milić 2002: 5; Pavković 2001; Šimunović 2001: 49). For Mostar's non-Catholics and the international community, the tower's specific location by the boulevard that divides the city means that the tower reinforces and marks the line of separation. Because of this location, its critics see its height not only as changing the status quo for the worse, but also as aggressive and confrontational (Smajilhodžić 2002: 52).

Religious nationalist symbols have been less obvious in the eastern, Muslim-controlled part of Mostar, but the building and rebuilding of mosques has also been interpreted as an attempt to distinguish one side of the city from the other. The accumulation of separate, low-profile projects has had a collective impact on the city. Before the war, there were less than 20 mosques in Mostar, but today there are nearly 40 (Stranden 2003). The result is that there are now more mosques than necessary for the number of practicing believers, more minarets on the skyline, and therefore an east Mostar that has a more emphatically Islamic character. Many of

Mostar's non-Muslim residents have noticed the trend to cover east Mostar with mosques, and have even argued that today the bulbs illuminating the tops of the minarets are stronger and the speakers issuing the call to prayer five times a day are louder than before the war (Juka 2001: 6; Martin 2000: 18; Pločkinić 2001: 6; Strandenes 2003). Although these allegations may or may not be based on truth, in general, these sorts of statements reflect the perception of the city's Catholic Croats that they are surrounded by minarets, mosques, and Muslims.

Despite the mixed messages conveyed by the different heritage-rebuilding projects in Mostar, the reconstruction of the Old Bridge did in fact clearly accelerate Mostar's political reunification. Without a doubt, the drafting and implementing of the new city Statute reunifying the city just months before the New Old Bridge's opening was inspired by the glaring discrepancy between the unifying rhetoric associated with the Old Bridge's reconstruction and Mostar's divided reality. However, like the bridge project itself, rather than demonstrating locally initiated cooperation, the reunification was imposed by the international community. A series of OHR-appointed commissions drafted a new city statute whose publication sparked a heated public debate and general discontent in Mostar (Commission 2003: 9–10). Despite the lack of public support, the OHR decided that the Statute was good enough and ordered its implementation in March 2004. The OHR and the various international organizations working in Mostar were clearly aware that this represented an important structural change for the city's government but that it did nothing to change Mostar's ongoing physical and psychological division. Nevertheless, they publicized Mostar worldwide as an exemplary case of postwar reconciliation and congratulated themselves and Bosnians on the beautiful new bridge and reunited city.

## World Heritage Designation

The exemplary status of Mostar as a reunited and multicultural city has also been recognized at a global level, especially through the marketing campaigns of UNESCO, which in the past decade has repeatedly pointed to this city as proof of the potential for heritage reconstruction to contribute to community reconciliation (UNESCO 2002a, b; UN 2001; The World Bank 1998). UNESCO's addition of Mostar's Old Bridge and Old City to the World Heritage List in 2005 made official its status as a model city. Ostensibly, designation as a World Heritage Site is a recognition of the universal value of Mostar's historic architecture, but because its architecture is no longer historic, but rather quite new, and as its facsimile reconstruction is in violation of most conservation principles outlined in the Athens and Venice Charters, Mostar's international importance is therefore based on other values: the intangible qualities it reflects, including multiculturalism and postwar reconciliation.

During the war and specifically during 1993 when Mostar's Old Bridge was being increasingly damaged by general and targeted shelling, the fact that it was not already a site recognized by UNESCO became a source of local and international confusion. Numerous media reports referred to it as or implied that it was a World


Heritage Site while publicly calling attention to its threatened status (Između Most 1993: 9; Novi Prilog 1995: 7; Opet Pakao 1993: 1; Protest Generala 1993: 35; Spasite Stari 1993: 8; Stari Most 1993: 8). Mostar's clear importance as part of the universally appreciated heritage of the world was ambiguously conflated with the idea of it being an officially designated World Heritage Site and of being "under UNESCO's protection." Those advocating this position were surely aware of the attack on the nearby World Heritage City of Dubrovnik two years earlier and were aware that a successful media campaign had been launched to mobilize the international community to protect that Croatian city. The parallel rhetoric was aimed at achieving a similar effect for Mostar.

This "mistake" about Mostar's World Heritage status was made at the highest Bosnian and international levels: by officials, organizations, and media venues (Spasite Stari 1993: 8). One might think that the reference was to the more general Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in times of war, which applies to all "neutral" sites regardless of official, local, or international designation. However, even the international expert sent by UNESCO to observe and evaluate the situation in Mostar in 1993 erroneously stated that the city should be placed on the World Heritage List in Danger (Council of Europe 1993). Of course, this UNESCO list is reserved only for already designated World Heritage Sites, so Mostar could not be placed under this form of protection. This misrepresentation served the needs of both locals and internationals trying to bring attention to Mostar by sensationalizing and simplifying the situation for global consumption, as if being a remarkably, well-preserved, sixteenth-century architectural ensemble with a well-known and well-loved iconic central site was not reason enough to want to save the city from its impending destruction.

The Old Town of Mostar was not officially nominated to the World Heritage List until July 1998. The city's administration made the nomination, but it was not completed according to official procedures, which require initiation at the state level, and so UNESCO suspended the city's application in 2003. However, Bosnia-Herzegovina's Commission to Preserve National Monuments agreed that Mostar was a worthy candidate to be the country's first World Heritage Site, and the Commission drafted a new nomination in time for consideration and approval at the 29th session of the World Heritage Committee in 2005. Mostar's image was thereupon selected for the cover of UNESCO's quarterly *World Heritage Review* announcing all the newly designated sites in October 2005, reflecting both the city's widespread international reputation as well as the well-known iconic view of the Old Bridge (Fig. 6).

According to the nomination report prepared by ICOMOS and included as the key criterion for inclusion by UNESCO, Mostar was deemed deserving of World Heritage listing because it was "an outstanding example of a multicultural urban settlement; and because with the 'renaissance' of the Old Bridge and its surroundings, the symbolic power and meaning of the City of Mostar as an exceptional and universal symbol of coexistence of communities from diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds has been reinforced and strengthened" (BiH Commission 2005). The same sentiment was echoed in UNESCO's own one-paragraph summary on its Web site as





**Fig. 6** The Old Bridge on the cover of the issue of UNESCO's *World Heritage Review* in which the sites most recently inscribed on the World Heritage List were described, October 2005. *World Heritage Review* no. 41, October 2005 (image: UNESCO, 2005)

well as in the *World Heritage Review*'s one paragraph on Mostar, which is repeated verbatim on the World Bank's Web site. The city's essence and value for the global heritage community were outlined in these brief texts, and Mostar and its bridge were again evoked as symbols of multiculturalism and reconciliation. UNESCO claimed: "The Old Bridge area, with its pre-Ottoman, eastern Ottoman, Mediterranean and western European architectural features, is an outstanding example of a multicultural

urban settlement. The reconstructed Old Bridge and Old City of Mostar is a symbol of reconciliation, international co-operation, and of the coexistence of diverse cultural, ethnic and religious communities” (UNESCO 2005: 12).

This inclusive description belies the fact that the area actually nominated comprises almost exclusively Ottoman-era and reconstructed Ottoman-era heritage, with the exception of one major institutional building from the Austro-Hungarian period (the Girl’s High School, a ruin that has not yet been rebuilt). In addition, this district is inhabited almost exclusively by Bosnian Muslims, and its shops and cafes are overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, owned and staffed by Bosnian Muslims. Although the heritage and people of the city of Mostar as a whole may be accurately described as multicultural, the same term cannot be applied to the World Heritage Site of Mostar. Even the slightly larger historic district designated by the Bosnia–Hercegovina Commission to Preserve National Monuments and the UNESCO buffer zone still do not venture beyond the “Muslim side” of Mostar or incorporate many buildings from periods other than the Ottoman era. This fact has not gone unnoticed by the city’s Croat community, which largely ignored the Old Bridge and Old Town since the war, but has given indications of feeling slighted and excluded now that the area has become profitable and popular among foreign tourists.

Neither the nomination report nor UNESCO’s publicity addresses the nonmulticultural character or lack of historic layers in the specific area designated within the city; but the question of the Old Town’s worthiness for the World Heritage listing despite its relative newness was given significant attention. The ICOMOS nomination report included a short theoretical note on the site’s integrity, which acknowledged that the Old Bridge is a reproduction and that a high percentage of buildings in the surrounding Old Town have also been completely reconstructed. Instead, Mostar’s inclusion was justified on the basis of the historical and scientific accuracy of its reconstruction and the authenticity of materials, techniques, and forms. The report argued that Mostar “has a kind of truthfulness,” that “there is no doubt of a special kind of ‘overall’ authenticity,” and that the “intangible dimensions of the property” have been restored, meaning the city’s prewar, multicultural, urban identity has been revived by the rebuilding of its lost architecture (ICOMOS 2005).

This kind of language, and the liberal interpretation of the Venice Charter, reinforces the significance of Mostar to the international community and the idea that this city is somehow special. The ICOMOS report also explicitly made reference to another special case, the Historic Centre of Warsaw, which was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1980 as “principally a place of memory” rather than as an authentic historic site. Warsaw’s Old Town was also a recent construction because, like Mostar, it was almost totally rebuilt following deliberate and targeted destruction during wartime.

## Conclusion

Mostar’s meaning and recent history have been grossly oversimplified in the rhetoric of the World Bank, ICOMOS, UNESCO, the OHR and most of the other international organizations and foreign governments as well as by state-level politicians

and some enterprising locals from the city. Mostar has been reduced to a sound byte repeated so frequently that even those familiar with the reality of the city and its continuing tensions and divisions have come to advocate this idea that the city and the bridge represent multiculturalism and reconciliation. However, just as is true for the Old Bridge, the city of Mostar could potentially be recognized as reflecting these attributes if instead of forcing a single interpretation, the multiple perspectives and meanings were acknowledged, and this form of pluralism was celebrated instead.

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# Of Forgotten People and Forgotten Places: Nation-Building and the Dismantling of Ankara's Non-Muslim Landscapes

Zeynep Kezer

On March 25, 2007 in a column penned for Turkey's largest circulation daily *Hürriyet*, Soner Yalçın, a journalist known for his sensationalistic pieces, wrote that the original owner of the Presidential Residence in Ankara was Armenian (Yalçın 2007). This 80-year-old bit of news generated much controversy: many simply could not believe it while others claimed it must be false. The issue has continued to reverberate in the public consciousness along with other related – and often explosive – questions about the making of the modern Turkish state, the place of its non-Turkish citizens in it, as well as the historiographic manifestations of these concerns in a climate of continued debates as the country contemplates a serious bid for European Union membership.<sup>1</sup>

The Presidential Residence in Çankaya, known as Çankaya Köşkü, has long had resonance as the seat of power in Turkish popular imagination akin to that of its internationally renowned American counterpart, the White House (Fig. 1). Çankaya Köşkü was the setting for crucial strategy sessions during the Turkish War of Independence, which was fought to liberate the country from post-WWI occupation after the Ottoman Empire collapsed. Many of the reforms that would change Turkey's face, including the proclamation of the republic and the relocation of the capital from Istanbul to Ankara, were formulated here. In the early years of the republic, the estate's inclusion in the path of official celebrations and its extensive coverage ranging from textbooks to commemorative stamps, further reinforced its mythical place in the public mind. Consequently, Çankaya Köşkü has come to stand indisputably at the center of the foundational narratives of the modern Turkish nation-state (Fig. 2).

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Z. Kezer (✉)

School of Architecture Planning and Landscape, Newcastle University,  
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK  
e-mail: zeynep.kezer@ncl.ac.uk






**Fig. 1** Çankaya Köşkü shortly after the construction of the new larger residence and office building by Austrian architect Clemens Holzmeister (ca 1930). The two smaller buildings to the right of the new structure and the middle building at the center comprised the original structures of the Kasabian family vineyard estate (Source: *La Turquie Kamaliste*, June 1935)



**Fig. 2** A 1969 Turkish stamp commemorating the 50th anniversary of Atatürk's arrival in Ankara at the start of the War of Independence. One of the three buildings in the Kasabian vineyard estate can be seen in the background (Source: Kezer collection)

Soner Yalçın's column publicly punctured this established popular narrative with intimations of another life, of a past that was kept under wraps and a heritage the erasure of which does not get much mention in contemporary Turkey. The original ownership of Çankaya Köşkü is known to many historians, but its public disclosure



**Fig. 3** (a) The fountain located in the museum portion of the Presidential Residence in Çankaya; (b) The inscription under the eagle identifies 1873 as the construction date, and Kasabian family name is chiselled underneath (photos: Kezer)

proved to be an unsettling surprise for the broader national audience. Considering, however, that the first owners' name is chiseled in Armenian letters on the fountain in the museum portion of the Çankaya complex that is open to the public, how the story of its origins ever went unnoticed is puzzling (Fig. 3). In this chapter, using the incongruous lineages of Çankaya Köşkü as a starting point, I examine not only the demise of the actors who once animated this rival narrative, but also the processes by which even the most conspicuous vestiges of their existence were rendered invisible to those who remained behind.

## An Unraveling Empire

In late December 1919, Turkey's national hero and eventual first president Atatürk arrived in Ankara accompanied by a large military-bureaucratic cadre of nationalists, to lay the groundwork for a resistance movement to liberate the country from extensive post-WWI occupation by the Allies.<sup>2</sup> Atatürk and his close entourage initially stayed at the premises of the school of agriculture and later moved to the manager's apartment at the train station. Both of these were makeshift arrangements that became more stressful the longer they stayed in Ankara. Soon after securing the eastern borders and winning their first battles against Ally-backed Greek armies on the Western front, in March 1921, Atatürk's close friend Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydın) convinced him to scout for more permanent accommodations from among the many available vacant vineyards on the hills just outside the city.<sup>3</sup> Shortly thereafter, during an afternoon outing on horseback, Atatürk spotted a prominently appointed two-story vineyard house atop Çankaya Hill, with commanding views of the town and the Anatolian

plains. The estate belonged to Bulgurzade Tevfik Efendi, patriarch of one of Ankara's most prominent families. With the prodding of other local notables, the city of Ankara purchased the house for 4,500 Liras, and presented it to Atatürk, who took it on the condition that the house would be deemed Army property and that he would move in only as a tenant.

Different variations of this account, which displays some of official history's central tropes, have long been in circulation. In the first place, the story clearly underlines the close alliance between the nationalists and Ankara's notables. In the annals of official history, stories about the gift of Çankaya Köşkü and other generous contributions, constitute points of local pride (Atay 1958; Şimşir 1988; Kansu 1968; Müderrisoğlu 1993). They show Ankara's local notables in a favorable light for their support of the fledgling nationalist movement and their defiance of the Istanbul government, which had embarked on this disastrous war campaign in the first place, dreadfully mismanaged it, and surrendered in disgrace, delivering the most complete defeat in the empire's history. Such narratives of grassroots support were also instrumental in justifying the choice of Ankara first as the staging point for the War of Independence and, later, as the nation's capital. No less important are the lessons of honesty and humility conveyed by this story, which portrays the sale as a transparent transaction and reinforces the image of Atatürk as a modest leader, who would not assume ownership of the property, instead playing himself down as a temporary occupant, a mere tenant.

Soner Yalçın's new account, however, introduced a rather unsettling element into this otherwise mythical story: that of a previous Armenian owner. In this version, Ohannes Kasapian, a wealthy local businessman had sold the estate with all of its interior furnishings to Bulgurzade Tevfik when he was leaving town during WWI. But Yalçın gave no further explanation as to why Kasapian really left or how, leaving open the question of whether Kasapian's departure was an escape to safety during the war, as he appears to, and if so why Kasapian's Turkish counterpart, Bulgurzade Tevfik Efendi, would not only stay behind but also buy more property. To put it bluntly, the Armenian Kasapian and his family faced very different odds than the Muslim Bulgurzade Tevfik during WWI.

The divergences between the fortunes of these two families are inextricably linked to broader socioeconomic and political transformations that characterized the last century of the Ottoman Empire, and these in turn have ramifications for the way that heritage is conceived in modern Turkey. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the empire had found itself, with increasing frequency, fighting to preserve its sovereignty and territories against European expansionism and the separatist nationalist claims of its various constituents. By the turn of the century, the situation had deteriorated significantly: the state was on the brink of economic bankruptcy and there was widespread unrest throughout the empire. Emboldened by the weakness of the Ottoman state, in late 1912, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro joined forces to declare war, forcing the Ottoman army to cede Edirne (Adrianopolis), the former capital, and retreat to the outskirts of Istanbul. This last defeat was a watershed moment not only because it led to immense loss of life and land, but also

because it revealed, in no uncertain terms, that the threat of disintegration was very close to home. As the first Ottoman foothold in Europe, the Balkan peninsula was as integral to the empire as its Anatolian half and shared the same governmental, institutional, and social structures: its loss was unlike any other previous territorial losses. Alarmed by this realization, Ottoman politicians and intellectuals began to seek explanations as well as scapegoats for the empire's misfortunes. It was at this juncture that the Young Turks, who espoused a particularly zealous brand of nationalism, staged a coup to take over the government and effectively established the Congress of Union and Progress (CUP) dictatorship. Thanks to the organizational skills of its leadership, the CUP was able to secure the support of various civilian administrators and military personnel and maintain a secret paramilitary organization, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (special organization) to implement its most oppressive policies.

The CUP leaders considered the empire's non-Muslim elements a threat to Ottoman interests, and were especially suspicious of Armenians, regarded as potential traitors (Üngör 2005: 13–20; Akçam 2008: 38–43, 82–84). Their bitterness was rooted in the gradual erosion Muslims experienced in their fortunes starting from the latter half of the eighteenth century onward. Ethno-religious segmentation, which afforded differential access to economic and social resources to different social groups, was inherent in the constitution of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>4</sup> But with the empire's increasing integration into expanding networks of global capitalism, a disproportionate amount of the wealth generated by international trade and banking had accumulated in the hands of non-Muslim families. (There were structural reasons for this. With the demise of the recruitment through conversion system [*devşirme*], military and bureaucratic careers had been closed off for non-Muslims in the late eighteenth century, leaving commerce and manufacture as the primary urban occupations open to them [Kasaba et al. 1986; Çağlar Keyder 1993; Göçek 1993]). European entrepreneurs tended to work with non-Muslim merchants who were, in turn, more open to such prospects and better disposed to acquire the relevant language and trade skills than their Muslim counterparts, thus enjoying an advantage for making contacts and establishing partnerships. Overtime, their broadening spheres of interaction facilitated the parallel diffusion of post-enlightenment political ideas, such as nationalism, which increasingly threatened to destabilize the Ottoman state from within. Gradually adopting the view that “Turkey is for Turks,” the CUP espoused Turkification policies in the cultural and the economic arena. It started a campaign to change toponyms, pushed for the use of Turkish in business and official transactions, and began to harass non-Muslim merchants and tradesmen, making it difficult for them to stay in business (Üngör 2005; Özcan 2006; Aktar 2000: 26–32; Akçam 2008: 79–104).

WWI gave CUP leaders an opening to implement some of their most radical ideas regarding population policy. Already before the war, claiming their presence to be a security concern, CUP operatives had forced thousands of Aegean Greeks to emigrate to Greece (Aktar 2000: 26–32). In 1915, using the war and the activities of Armenian nationalists as a pretext, the CUP government ordered the mass deportation of

Anatolian Armenians. All Armenians – with the exception of those residing in Istanbul – were sent to the desert areas of what is modern day Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. To this end, in addition to mobilizing the Teşkilat-i Mahsusa and a network of loyal governors, the CUP also made it a criminal act to provide shelter to escaping Armenians. Anatolia's Armenian population was decimated in the process: thousands died at the hands of CUP officials and marauding bandits as well as from exposure, disease, and starvation.

In Ankara, Ohannes Kasapian and his family felt secure initially, for the deportation orders did not include Catholic Armenians. But in October 1915, orders were issued for Catholic Armenians as well. Luckier than most, the Kasapians managed to escape this fate, thanks to Ohannes' connections in the German-run Rail Company, which helped secure their passage to Istanbul, where they eventually settled. But, as with many of Ankara's wealthy Armenian families, the Kasabians lost their homes. In a rebuttal to Yalçın's article, published in Istanbul's Armenian language newspaper, Kasabian's grandson Edward J Cuhaci wrote that contrary to Yalçın's claims, Ohannes Kasabian had not sold the estate in Çankaya, but that it was confiscated from him together with the family's other assets for which they never received any compensation. (Despite the controversy Yalçın's article generated, *Hürriyet* refused to publish Cuhaci's response.)

Mr. Cuhaci's story echoes similar accounts of lost wealth. The Young Turk government had long been keeping detailed tabs on the assets of the Empire's non-Muslim subjects. In preparation for the mass deportation, the government established special commissions that comprise local notables and government officials to keep an inventory of "abandoned goods" and oversee their administration. (For a detailed examination of CUP internal correspondence regarding the Armenian deportation and the handling of their property and moveables, see Akçam 2008.) Prior to departure, the Armenians were required to register their assets at these commissions, which were to sell them and transfer the money to the deportees at their final destination. Needless to say, this convoluted arrangement was unlikely to work under the best of circumstances, given the obvious difficulty of coordinating such transactions with a proto-modern bureaucracy and an underdeveloped infrastructure. Correspondence between the central government and local commissions reveals that corruption was rampant: the government continually admonished the commissions against unlawful takeovers, sales, and despoiling of property – but the sheer repetition of these warnings indicates that abuses were unstoppable.

In any case, as entire families were wiped out during this death march, few were left behind to claim compensation. When lone survivors, mostly children, took refuge in (and eventually became citizens of) other countries, they were not allowed back into Turkey – even as tourists – until the 1950s. When the ban was formally lifted, for several years they were required to sign a waiver relinquishing their claims on any family property.<sup>5</sup> But even those who, like the Kasabians, survived and stayed in Turkey, did not receive anything in exchange for the plundering of property and belongings.



## Another Ankara

In the decades prior to these disastrous events, Ankara had experienced a revitalization of its economy after more than a century of serious setbacks. Throughout the 1800s, Ankara's once world-renowned mohair industry had nearly collapsed as mass-produced cheap European fabrics flooded the Ottoman market and British entrepreneurs succeeded in breeding the rare angora goat in South Africa. By the end of the century, however, Ankara's prospects had improved somewhat. As part of Ottoman administrative reforms, it had become a provincial capital. The ensuing construction of government offices, the opening of modern institutions, including new schools, and the improvement of intercity transportation and communications gave the town a regional advantage. Most importantly, the inauguration of rail service in 1893 converted Ankara into an important break-of-bulk point for Central Anatolia. These developments spurred the emergence of a new commercial-administrative area to the west of the citadel, toward the station, thus breaking open Ankara's self-contained and rather insular form (Fig. 4). While artisanal trades, purveyors of agricultural goods and traditional consumer items (foodstuffs, fabrics, household items) remained in the old commercial center on the southern foothills of the Citadel, newer types of business engaged in import-export brokerage, warehousing, and sales of foreign goods began to define the new center to the west. The placement of the modernizing institutions of the Ottoman government in this area further cemented this trend.

Parallel developments in the city's residential fabric accompanied these changes. Elegant townhouses were built along the Citadel's western foothills in the district known as Hisarönü, which in turn drove the emergence of a shopping district featuring Ankara's smartest stores specializing in imported high-end consumer goods. As with the new types of commercial enterprise, the owners of homes in Hisarönü (and the customers of the smart shops) consisted almost exclusively of Greeks and Armenians, who had long been the preferred partners of European merchants conducting business in the Empire (Fig. 5). And yet, despite the incipient push for expansion, Ankara in the early 1900s remained very much a walking city. Its urban fabric was dense, with the bulk of its building stock huddled around the Citadel, its streets were narrow, and the outdoor spaces of most of its homes – including the posh ones – were quite cramped (Karay 1939: 42–44).

What the townhouses at the center lacked in spaciousness was compensated by the vineyard estates in the periphery. Like the Kasabians, most middle and upper class families in Ankara owned a vineyard estate or could visit one in the summers to escape Ankara's dry summer heat and congestion. The farthest of these could usually be reached by horse carriage within an hour. While the relatively wealthy Armenians had a predilection for the Çankaya-Kavaklıdere to the southeast of town and the Keçiören-Etlik district in the North, the Greeks concentrated in the south in vineyards dotting the Dikmen hills. A typical vineyard house was a two-story stone or brick masonry building offering relatively modest comforts. For instance, although the Kasabians had a sizeable estate, none of its three residential buildings





**Fig. 4** Ankara in 1924, at the outset of the Republic. Buildings with relatively larger footprints and in darker shade indicate the incipient growth toward the train station inaugurated in 1893. The districts that suffered from the 1917 fire are in the vacant area immediately to the West of the Citadel (map: courtesy of Vehbi Koç Ankara Araştırmaları Merkezi)





Fig. 5 Townhouses in Ankara's Hisarönü neighborhood in the first decade of the twentieth century (Source: Ankara Municipality, Ankara in Postcards)



**Fig. 6** The Tevonian family sitting by the poolside in front of their estate. ca 1910 (Photograph Courtesy of Project SAVE)

had indoor plumbing. Yet many homes had their own artesian wells, and by the early 1900s, it had become quite fashionable to build a marble pool and a formal garden for outdoor living (Fig. 6).

The primary purpose of the vineyard estates was production rather than leisure. In addition to growing the more than 20 varietals of grapes for which Ankara's vineyards were renowned, a typical property comprised vegetable gardens and a variety of fruit and nut trees. Owners of larger estates also grew mulberries and kept silkworms, others had apiaries, and Ankara's honey was quite well-known. People enjoyed their produce at the height of its season, but most importantly they prepared their pantry for Ankara's bitter winters. The vineyard season started as soon as the schools were let out in early summer. Families would move out to their estates accompanied by relatives and an entourage of servants. The Kasabian estate accommodated 14 members of the extended family and their servants (Cuhaci Feb. 2008). Family patriarchs commuted more regularly to the city for business while the rest of the family – grandparents, wives, and children – stayed at the estate until after the first fall harvest in September. The passage of time in the summer was marked as much by the ripening of fruits as by annual festivities, among them the Blessing of the Grapes in mid-August for which Armenians would bring baskets of

grapes to the Garmir Vank Monastery and camp for three days in the fields by the Çubuk River. Shared by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, such festivities appear to have predated Christianity, and popular belief places the monastery on the grounds of an earlier temple dedicated to an ancient Anatolian fertility goddess – most likely Cybele (Kasparian 1968: 24). The cycles of ritual and harvest and the imperatives of economy bound together this belt of summer estates surrounding the city, integrating them into the geography of Ankara as a whole.

The deportation orders of 1915 violently disrupted these cycles. The exact chronology of events vary, but prior to their departure, the contents of homes, businesses, and religious buildings that belonged to Ankara's Armenian community were moved to the warehouses by the train station under the supervision of specially designated officials and gendarmes, in a process that lasted months (Karay 1939: 55). Decrying the lawlessness of the looting that ensued, Alice Odian Kasparian recalled "Many officers expropriated anything they wanted." In addition to the goods stored in shops owned by the deportees, she lamented the confiscation of common household goods, family heirlooms and jewelry – in short, she wrote, "everything that was removable was removed from the city as well as the summer homes" (Kasparian 1968: 36).

In the course of these removals, a mysterious fire erupted in Hisarönü and environs. All consuming fires in Ottoman cities were not uncommon, since most residential buildings were made of wood, but this one spread with ferocity, simultaneously and in multiple directions, devouring Ankara's most elegant houses within a few hours (Karay 1939: 48). Refik Halid (Karay), a young Ottoman bureaucrat, witnessed the disaster: mothers crying over lost children, distressed pregnant women going into labor, young girls running and screaming with their hair ablaze, and unattended casualties stranded in stretchers in narrow streets. What is striking about Karay's account is not only the human cost of the tragedy, but also the degree of detail he offers about the material wealth and the widely Westernized tastes of the city's non-Muslim merchant class:

Shifting from one dangerous spot to another watching the calamity unfold, I arrived at a square where a temporary shrine to the wealth of Ankara's Armenians had been erected: The choicest and most expensive carpets strewn over maybe a hundred salvaged pianos all lined up... In just the quarter of an hour, these luxuriously lacquered tinder boxes went up in flames as if they had been doused with gas. How eerie their moans, as if they were human beings, with thousands of melodies sounding off their glowing chords, and their white teeth popping with the heat. Homes in this neighborhood were free for all, the doors wide open and the contents intact; anybody could walk in and take anything they wanted. (Karay 1939: 50–51)

The Ankara fire lasted two nights and two days, burning out when there was nothing left to burn. By the end "Ankara's most elegant neighborhood, its largest shopping district, its wealth and prosperity had all been reduced to ashes" (Karay 1939: 51). The fire and deportations were twin disasters that ruptured Ankara's social, economic, and physical fabric. They uncoupled the previously interdependent urban and agricultural landscapes of the townhouses and vineyard estates, opening them up to fragmentation and reappropriation, both physically and





**Fig. 7** The burned Hisarönü district in the early 1920s, with some new construction after Ankara became the capital. However, the scars of the fire are quite visible (Source Ankara Municipality, Ankara in Postcards)

symbolically. This decoupling would have a lasting impact on the trajectory of Ankara's subsequent growth under the republic, and the discourses that surrounded it (Fig. 7).

## Overlays and Erasures

When the nationalists began to arrive in Ankara in 1919, the charred remains of the once prominent Hisarönü district met them on their way into town from the train station. Among them, journalist-author Vala Nureddin's impressions of his first morning in town were especially dire:

We woke up to Ankara's sunshine in the morning and took a brief walk in town. I felt like I was walking through the cinders of a giant fireplace. No sign of civilization, no greenery, just the smell of ashes in dark and crooked labyrinthine passages. Because it had suffered two consecutive devastating fires, Ankara's lack of charm was beyond description (Vala Nureddin quoted in Şenyapılı 1970: 29).

The fire had further diminished Ankara's already insufficient housing stock, making it difficult to find adequate shelter: hence, the newcomers converted a few school buildings into dormitories; some rented rooms in the homes of local families;

many doubled up just to have a roof over their heads. Meanwhile, for those who could afford it, the now vacant vineyard estates proved an attractive alternative.

When Ankara became Turkey's capital in 1923, the newcomers quickly assumed important positions of power and their actions not only determined the directions of physical growth, but began to inscribe new spatial hierarchies and patterns of movement onto the landscape. Many of the nation's founding fathers chose to settle in abandoned vineyards they acquired from the National Real Estate Office on very agreeable terms.<sup>6</sup> Atatürk's residence in Çankaya became an especially powerful new magnet for future development. The district's prestige and rent augmented in proportion to his political success. Prominent members of his entourage preferred to acquire homes in neighboring estates, hoping to benefit from their close proximity to the sole source of authority (Cantek 2003: 142). Despite their initial reluctance to leave the comforts and amenities of Istanbul for the distinctly harsher living standards of Ankara, embassies also followed suit. They took up the Turkish government's offer for free land and, like the ruling elite, they settled in the former vineyards, further reinforcing the position of Çankaya-Kavaklıdere as Ankara's prime neighborhood for members of the official protocol. These developments intensified the traffic along a new North-South corridor connecting Çankaya to the city's late nineteenth-century core, which was now home to various offices of the republican government.

The new settlements in Çankaya were fundamentally different from the vineyards they replaced. In the first place, they were suburban residences, which, despite accessibility problems during winter storms, were meant to be inhabited all year round. Built in the latest fashionable styles, these homes also had the symbolic function of showcasing the modern way of life the republican leadership sought to instill in Turkish society. Also, unlike the departed owners of the former vineyards, none of the new residents engaged in agricultural production. This led to lucrative subdivisions of large vineyards for residential development and the gradual transformation of the size and pattern of property plots in the area. As a result, there arose a new elite, whose power stemmed from political connections and whose wealth derived from profitable land deals. The ability of Çankaya residents to expedite the provision of public utilities – such as water, electricity, telephone – cemented the district's ascendancy over other districts. In contrast, members of the republican elite who had chosen to settle in the northern vineyards of Keçiören and Etlük before the outcome of the war was known and Atatürk established himself as the sole authority, found themselves gradually outnumbered and marginalized (Yiğit 2004: 228–230).

The situation in the burned out district of Hisarönü, which remained in a state of disrepair for several years, was far worse. Although some prominent new institutional and commercial structures, including the City Hall and the Courthouse, were built in this area, attention and investment had already shifted away from the citadel and its immediate vicinity. Over the next few decades, these once-elegant homes deteriorated, and, as with most of the city's older neighborhoods, became shoddily subdivided slums housing Ankara's newest unskilled migrants.




## Constructing a Selective National Heritage

It is important to situate the changes in Ankara's residential fabric within the context of the political and demographic transformations brought about by the city's new role as Turkey's capital. The relocation of the administrative apparatus of an expanding state necessitated the construction of ministries, government offices, courthouses, and a wide range of ancillary official structures, which introduced land uses that were unprecedented in Ankara. They also generated new landmarks and, concomitantly, new toponyms that overrode older ones. The national assembly, the government quarter, the university – to name a few – came to represent Turkey's new social and political order and served as the new references for physical orientation within this rapidly changing cityscape.


These new developments also changed the relationships among the constituent parts of the city, reconfiguring how Ankara was experienced, visualized, and mapped as a whole. Already by the 1930s, visual and verbal depictions of the city had shifted from describing it as a concentric entity with a dense core surrounded by a belt of agricultural estates to a linear development along a dominant North-South axis leading up to Çankaya. This pattern was reified not only in tourist guides and street maps, but also in infrastructure and transportation maps. Consequently, Keçiören, Etlük, and even Dikmen (which was not that far from Çankaya) were omitted from Ankara's most commonly used maps (Figs. 8 and 9).

Lastly, the departure of a significant percentage of Ankara's original inhabitants coupled with the influx of new migrant populations who had no memory of the city prior to these changes facilitated the superimposition of new cognitive maps and narratives over the existing landscape. Ankara's population increased from approximately 20,000 in 1920 to 74,000 in 1927 and 120,000 in 1935 (Keleş 1971: 5). The incoming population was a mix of bureaucrats from Istanbul relocating to Ankara to work for the new government, mostly unskilled labor from nearby provinces working in the construction sector or in menial jobs that facilitated the new capital's growth and operations, and students who came from across the country to study in the newly founded institutions of higher education. These were outsiders with no historic ties to the city, thus providing a particularly suitable opportunity for the republican leaders to project their ideologically charged narrative onto the city as if were a blank canvas to the exclusion of others. Official depictions of Ankara as a city built from scratch under the auspices of a progressive new government had wide circulation in the early years of the republic. Such a suggestion that all but denied Ankara's pre-republican past could gain reasonable credibility because of the wretched condition of the fire district which continued bear some of its scars well into the 1940s, and because the fabric of the vineyards surrounding the city was changing beyond recognition. That Ankara had no distinctive Ottoman urban landmark that could stand out from the new republican building stock similarly helped perpetuate this view, especially among the vast majority whose only experience of the city was limited to the years after the foundation of the republic.



**Fig. 8** Ankara's transformation under the republic, republican urban development overtaking the agricultural belt surrounding the city's historic core. In the first few decades of the Republic, most tourist maps of the city comprise the section in rectangle. (Map reworked by the author on a 1953 Turkish State Highways Map)

The republican leadership defined the new capital in diametric opposition to its Ottoman predecessor: if Istanbul was backward, stagnant, cosmopolitan, and contaminated by heterogeneity, Ankara was progressive, dynamic, ethnically pure and honest. An editorial entitled "The Center of the State," published in the semi-official daily, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, just a few days after Ankara was proclaimed capital, declared that Istanbul "looked like a map of the Tower of Babel, spoke a thousand and one languages, had a thousand and one different types of blood in its veins, and



**Fig. 9** Driver's guide to Ankara 1942. The map comprises the linear axis of development between Ulus and Çankaya (Source: Author's collection)

harbored a thousand and one allegiances” (Anon. 1923). In Ankara, unlike Istanbul, the new republic’s leaders would look out for the nation’s interests rather than those of expansionist European powers, brokered by a local “comprador bourgeoisie” that comprise mainly non-Muslims with compromised loyalties (Anon. 1923).

The repetition of this polarizing trope was essential to maintaining a fiction of ethnic purity in Ankara and Anatolia. In reality, however, neither Ankara nor any other part of the country had ever been homogeneous. Although the majority was Muslim, the Ottoman population was historically a mix of various ethnic and religious groups. The nineteenth-century official provincial yearbooks (*salname*) and commercial almanacs can attest that multilingual communities of Christians, Muslims, and Jews were to be found everywhere throughout Anatolia and the Balkans. Non-Muslims had a significant presence in the cities, as they often plied urban trades, but there were also many who lived in the countryside and worked the land. Ottoman towns, in particular, were sites of vigorous cultural crosspollination resulting from centuries of coexistence – as exemplified by Ankara’s Armenians, who spoke Turkish among themselves, but wrote it with Armenian characters (Cuhaci Feb. 2008).

At the same time, especially from the latter half of the nineteenth century onward, there also were significant tensions between the empire’s constituent communities, often spurred by rising nationalist sentiments. Large-scale population shifts resulting from wars and crises further fanned these frictions. Also, in Ankara, as in other towns, the mounting fortunes of non-Muslims who did business with European merchants and the conspicuity of the emerging wealth gap, as embodied in distinctive patterns of settlement and consumption, elicited widespread resentment among Muslims (Koç 1973). Not all non-Muslims were rich – but the most conspicuously wealthy and well-connected, especially in provincial towns like Ankara, were non-Muslim. The stereotypical perception that non-Muslims had an unfair advantage in the changing economic order of nineteenth-century gained traction based on their fortunes and privileges, and it contributed to the postrationalization of the disasters that ensued.

During the early decades of the republic, both official and unofficial discourse relentlessly polarized Istanbul and Ankara in terms of ethnic purity, legitimizing the continued ostracization of non-Muslims throughout the country. Meanwhile, Istanbul, which remained under nominal international oversight, in part due to the terms of the Lausanne Peace Treaty (Oran 2004), gradually turned into the primary – and perhaps only – Turkish city with an institutional infrastructure that allowed non-Muslim citizens to reproduce their culture and transmit their traditions. Elsewhere Turkey’s minority communities were vulnerable. In the most extreme cases, this took the form of violent outbursts, such as the 1934 Pogrom, which terrified the sizeable Jewish population of Edirne and Kırklareli who then sought refuge in Istanbul (Bayraktar 2006). But there were also everyday aggressions that made it difficult to conduct weddings, baptisms, and burials in the Anatolian countryside; the challenges of constituting and sustaining a parish or finding a priest with a population so depleted; or the impossibility of finding a parochial school for the young ones, which compelled many families to move to Istanbul, which still had active churches, synagogues, and communal schools.<sup>7</sup> Gradually, the rhetorical polarization became an experienced reality.



Republican leaders saw their policies as achieving the cultural, economic, and, ultimately, demographic “re-conquest” of Turkey from extraneous elements. In this regard, parallels between republican and CUP (Young Turk) policies were hardly surprising. Despite personal rifts with the CUP leadership and significant disagreements over policy – including over the disastrous deportation of Armenians – republican cadres included many Young Turks, whose ethnocentric views found new resonance, especially in the 1930s with the rise of similar ideologies elsewhere in Europe. Although not all members of the leading cadre espoused the same zeal for homogenizing the population, there were enough of them in strategic positions to have a profound effect (Aktar 2006: 105). Hence, for instance, government sanctioned efforts, such as the “Citizen Speak Turkish Campaign” of the early 1930s, were driven by a vision of cultural homogeneity. They made non-Turkish speakers feel unwelcome in public places, and, by implication, in the new national public sphere (Aslan 2007). In the same vein, discriminatory practices, such as the notorious wealth tax of 1942, devised purportedly to cope with Turkey’s financial distress during WWII, served as an instrument of economic conquest (Ökte 1951; Aktar 2000; Pur 2007; Çetinoğlu and Turkey 2008). Imposed almost exclusively on non-Muslim citizens, this arbitrary and exorbitant levy compelled many to sell their assets at a loss to well-connected opportunistic buyers in order to avoid deportation to labor camps. Newspapers of the day proudly described this transfer of wealth in the form of properties and businesses as the “nationalization” or “Turkicization” of the landscape of commerce (Aktar 2000: 206, 232–233).

Turkey’s non-Muslim citizens were also learning that the state would not protect them from attacks on their person or property. The 1955 riots, which destroyed countless businesses owned mostly by Greeks and Armenians in the Beyoğlu district, proved that even in Istanbul, their safety was compromised. The involvement of local officials and the tacit approval of their actions at the highest levels of the central government both in the 1934 Thrace Pogroms and the 1955 Istanbul riots have since been amply documented (Bayraktar 2006; Haker 2002; Güven 2005; Karaca 2005). The continued erosion of non-Muslims’ rights as citizens, whether in the form of large newsworthy events that affected whole communities or petty injustices that disrupted the lives of a few at a time, obliged many non-Muslim citizens to emigrate, further reducing each minority group’s numbers within Turkey’s population mosaic.

The effort to “re-conquer” the terrain within Turkey’s boundaries extended to place names as well. Toponyms are compact vessels of collective memory with their remarkable capacity to conjure up, in just a word or two, the heritage of a people through the memory of events, practices, and narratives. Insofar as they invoked webs of meaning and ethno-religious patterns of the inherently variegated mosaic of Turkey’s Ottoman past, non-Turkish place names posed a challenge to homogenization policies that were at the center of nation-building efforts in Turkey. Hence, after naming the expanding capital’s new streets and neighborhoods after their ideological principles and the key battles and prominent heroes of the War of Independence, the republican leadership turned its attention to existing places, which did not sound Turkish enough. Thus, for instance, Ankara’s Jewish Quarter (Yahudi Mahallesi) was renamed İstiklal Mahallesi (Independence Quarter). The neighborhoods claimed by the great fire were treated as if they had no previous history. The western slope

between the two walls of the citadel, which had been the site of much of Ankara's most handsome townhouses, was turned into a park and named after Atatürk's closest collaborator, İnönü. The new commercial street cutting through the heart of the Hisarönü district was named after the Anafartalar Battle in which Atatürk had escaped death. Ankara's reconfigured and renamed sites were then incorporated into the paths of commemorative parades and highly publicized sports events, inscribing them as new reference points on an existing topography, and thereby weaving them into new webs of meaning that were closely identified with the foundational myths of Turkey's new political order.

## Conclusion

Turkey's passage from empire to nation-state was traumatic. The atrocities of WWI, the mass deportations and massacres of non-Muslims, and the 1924 compulsory population exchange with Greece profoundly transformed the country's demographic makeup.<sup>8</sup> Between the last Ottoman census of 1906 and the first republican census of 1927 Turkey's total population fell from 15 million to 13.6 million, and the percentage of non-Muslims fell precipitously from 20 to 2.5% (Çağlar Keyder 2005: 6; Aktar 2000: 17). The decline continued in peace time so that by 1945 the percentage of non-Muslims was down to 1.5%, and to a mere 0.2% in 2005 (İçduygu et al. 2007: 363). In the formative years of the new state, Turkey's leaders considered achieving population homogeneity to be key to political stability. Consequently, they pursued a range of national integration policies that further suppressed or marginalized the expression and cultural reproduction of non-Turkish identities. This took the form of forced – and often violent – attempts at cultural assimilation for non-Turkish Muslim populations who were expected renounce their diverse ethnic identities (Yıldız 2001; Yeğen 1999; Çağaptay 2003, 2007). For non-Muslims, whose integration was tacitly deemed impossible, it entailed various discriminatory practices that reified their exclusion. Measures that included bans on the use of other languages in public, restrictions on their ability to practice certain professions, and extralegal attempts to confiscate their assets or limit their rights as citizens ultimately compelled many non-Muslim to leave Turkey (Aktar 2000: 241–243; Bali 2003; İçduygu et al. 2007).

Transformations in the physical environment that were directly or indirectly linked to these policies were instrumental in establishing a popular conception of Turkey as a uniform terrain with a homogeneous population and a shared unified heritage. Changes in the physical world had long-lasting consequences insofar as they undercut long-standing notions of land tenure and ownership, reconfigured cognitive maps, and disrupted established cycles of life. They shook the lives those who, as targets of such discriminatory policies, lost their homes, livelihoods, and communal institutions, while propelling the fortunes of those who, with the implicit approval of the established powers, stood to gain from that loss. But more broadly, even for those who had little to lose or gain materially, these changes redrew the maps of neighborhoods and towns and generated new economic and social hierarchies. Such changes operated in less discernable, more diffuse ways, making



their impact harder to grasp because, for the most part, the physical environment continued to project an appearance of permanence, masking the disruptions in cultural practices, transfers of ownership, and concomitant shifts in meaning. And, when actual physical changes – in the form of demolitions or new construction – were made to built environments formerly occupied by non-Muslims, they were gradual and uncoordinated, making them blend easily into other changes in the land.

In Turkey's newly minted capital, the demise of non-Muslims, emerging residential trends, ideological convictions, political ambitions, and personal designs dovetailed quite conveniently with an official meta-narrative which continually pitted the legacy of the empire against the promise of the republic, always positing the moral superiority of the latter over the former. This polarization linked otherwise discrete thoughts and disparate actions within an overarching binary construction, validating them by virtue of their association with the republic or condemning them because they pertained to the empire. Despite its apparent rigidity that knew no gradations between good and evil, in practice, this official meta-narrative was flexible enough to accommodate morally ambiguous or even conflicting positions. Thus, republican officials could simultaneously distance themselves from the atrocities of WWI as the responsibility of their misguided predecessors, while implementing policies that ostracized non-Muslims as extraneous remnants of the Ottoman social order who bankrupted the Empire. They could recast the formerly complementary landscapes of the vineyards and the devastated downtown against one another, as if they were representatives of republican progress and Ottoman blight, while personally reaping the benefits of a real estate boom.

As the story of the dismantling of Ankara's pluralistic landscape poignantly illustrates, these processes involved multiple actors simultaneously transforming the city's landscape and blurring the legibility of parts of its pre-republican past that contravened official narratives whether they explicitly sought to erase them or not. It is, I argue, this eclectic, partially overlapping, and always selective amalgam of gradual erasures that has led to a generalized amnesia without specific culprits, which ultimately is tantamount to a more effective historical exclusion. In the end, the rhetorical constructions that conflated the project of modernization with the project of homogenization produced a landscape so bereft of its original referents that today, the obvious meaning of surviving place names in Ankara, such as Papazın Bağı (the priest's vineyard) and the adjacent Çankaya (bell hill, as in, church bell hill), which should invoke the existence of a culturally diverse landscape and heritage, no longer can.

## Notes

1. Turkey's bid for European Union membership and the strengthening of civic organizations have engendered a more robust and critical debate about Turkey's transition from Empire to nation-statehood. Nevertheless, as the prosecutions of authors Orhan Pamuk and Elif Şafak and the assassination of journalist Hrant Dink, clearly indicate, the subject of minorities in Turkey remains very contentious.

2. In this chapter, to avoid confusion, I refer to the founder of modern Turkey as Atatürk, his more widely recognized name. In actuality, it was not until 1934 that Mustafa Kemal was granted this name, meaning Father Turk, by the National Assembly, with the passage of the Surnames Act, requiring all Turkish citizens to obtain a surname.
3. The last names in parentheses were acquired after the passage of the 1934 Surnames act. At the time of the events, the individuals in question did not have last names.
4. The largely heterogeneous subject population was demarcated into millets, communities defined largely along religious lines and represented at the imperial level by their respectively chosen leaders (Braude and Lewis 1982). Nonetheless, millets were fluid entities the definition and porosity of which changed over time in relation to the broader historical context (Goffman 1994).
5. In the early years of the republic, there is abundant correspondence between the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Foreign Office, which often served as an intermediary on behalf of displaced Armenians and other non-Muslim communities about property and the right to return, which the Turkish government steadfastly refused. I was unable to find official documentation about when exactly this ban is lifted. It appears that things began to change in the early 1950s. Shortly after Turkey became a US ally and joined NATO, Armenian-Americans serving in the US Military began to visit their homelands Military officers with a special permit and recorded their experiences about finding long-lost family members, abandoned homes, and other property. They also report that duration of their stay and their itinerary are under strict checks in these early years (Vasilian 1952; Kushikian 1953).
6. Information about these transactions is relatively fragmentary. There are, however, witness accounts (whose names cannot be disclosed here) detailing suspiciously quick transactions. A particularly interesting development are the various newspaper classifieds announcing the title registration of plots “without prior owners” or “full documentation” to higher level republican functionaries.
7. There is a range of evidence in the form of memoirs, correspondences, travel writing, and newspapers that paints a picture of gradual atrophy of non-Muslim communities outside Istanbul, due to harassment, lack of resources, and various limitations imposed by the central government in spite of the protections accorded at the Lausanne Peace Treaty. See for instance, (Vasilian 1952; Kushikian 1953; Haker 2002; Arslanyan 2005; Bali 2001; Levi 1996) British Diplomats reporting to the Foreign Office also include detailed descriptions of harassment experienced by non-Muslims in various parts of the country. In many of these, the assessment of British observers was that non-Muslims were being encouraged to emigrate or move to Istanbul.
8. Although the Armenian case is the most notorious, other non-Muslim groups in different parts of the country were subjected to similar treatment depending on the discretion of the local governors. Diyarbakır’s governor ordered the deportation and killing of Syriacs, Nestorians, and Yezidis (Üngör 2005). In Western Turkey CUP’s locals carried out similar atrocities on non-Muslims (Akçam 2008: 79–131).

Additionally, long before the implementation of the official population exchange stipulated in the Lausanne treaty, orthodox Christians had begun to be purged from across the country (Aktar 2006: 99–156; Loizos 1999; Lekka 2007).

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# The Contemplation of Ruins: Heritage Cosmopolitanism and the Parsing of Cairo's Islamic Fabric

Ian Straughn

## Mourning in Cairo

Pollution, overcrowding, lack of access to basic services, sprawl, and the phenomenal disparities between rich and poor have become the standard narrative depicting urban survival in modern Cairo. Hardly audible within this physically, emotionally, and conceptually cacophonous environment are discussions about the ways in which the cultural production of a “sense of place” (Feld and Basso 1996) can emanate from that deeply historical urban fabric. Without detracting from the constant struggles faced by Cairo's diverse inhabitants this essay examines how their dealings with the city's traditions, its multiple pasts, can operate as both as a constraint that conditions the practices of dwelling often through the establishment of certain boundaries and also as a resource for enriching and transforming those practices. Where Cairene's may find respite from survival mode and locate space in which to thrive comes from a relationship of antagonism with the city that pushes against those boundaries and asserts independence from the patterns of dwelling entrenched in the urban fabric.

An important facet of the discursive production of that relationship are lamentations for the city that once was. Yahya Haqqi, prominent Egyptian literary and cultural figure, offers a glimpse of this affective response to the city as it developed in the period before the formalized policy of *infitah* or “opening to the West” under President Anwar Sadat in the 1970s. In his classic 1944 novella, “The Saint's Lamp” (*Qindil Umm Hashim*), he holds on to the possibility that the nightmare of the urban transformations may not fully overtake the traditional city. He introduces his story with the image of the narrator's grandfather moving to Cairo in search of work. This one-time farmer takes up residence in the traditional quarter near the mosque of

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I. Straughn (✉)  
Brown University, Providence, RI, USA  
e-mail: Ian\_Straughn@brown.edu

al-Sayyida Zaynab in an old house on what used to be called Ablutions Lane. The narrator clarifies: "I say 'used to' since the destructive axe of the town-planning department demolished it together with other old landmarks of Cairo. However, the spirit of the old Square escaped unscathed, for the axe could destroy only things made of bricks and stone" (Haqqi 1973: 1). Haqqi's optimism rests with his contention that the "spirit" of the place is not contingent on its materiality. Traditional practices of dwelling are not undone with the changes to the physical environment. A sense of place, he might contend, rests in the mind not in the transience of material things.

The present essay questions how effective such an effort to decouple the spirit of the city from its materiality is in creating space for people to resist, to control, and even to accommodate the forces of modernity and globalization. It examines the relationship of a long-standing discourse about the Muslim Middle East in which certain physical traces constitute the "traditional city" as an analytical object, as a social fact. While Haqqi has sought to break that association so deeply ingrained in orientalist scholarship, I argue here that more recent discourses of cosmopolitanism coupled with the logics of heritage practice have, in fact, reinscribed this linkage in new ways. The force of this reinscription of the Islamic city has led to a set of contingencies for how the loss of tradition is to be mourned, and, alternatively, how it is to be consumed, differentially across the city. Through a close examination of two heritage projects in different parts of the historic landscape of Cairo, this essay analyzes how a multiplicity of preservationist strategies cultivate the past as a resource for contemporary dwelling through the material fabric of this dynamic city. The result is not simply the rehearsal of the traditional city as an object to be entombed and passed off as the representation of the real. Yet, at the same time the practices of heritage examined here still find legitimacy and locate their necessity in classic terms of nostalgia, memorialization, and conceptions of the past as a resource that requires control and standards.

In comparing the efforts to engage with Cairo's historical landscape through the production of the new al-Azhar Park funded by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC) and the Fustat archaeological zone, the location of the first Islamic period settlement in the metropolis, this article draws attention to the location of the traditional city concept within broader discourses of order. At stake in both these projects is an effort to recover the traditional while putting forward mechanisms through which it might find order. On offer in the relationship between cosmopolitanism and heritage practice is an attempt to demonstrate how good planning and the desire for the traditional city can coexist, a rebuke to Cairo's modernization efforts that began with Mehmet Ali Pasha in the early nineteenth century. Timothy Mitchell (1988), in his analysis of colonial practice in Egypt, introduces us to the figure of Ali Mubarak, an Egyptian administrator and engineer who, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, was given the authority to transform Cairo into a modern city. A student of Haussmann's modernization of Paris with its boulevards and sewage tunnels, Mubarak, we are told, set out to "do what now had to be done" in order to bring order and sanitation to the city. One particularly radical project ploughed the 2 km long Boulevard Muhammad Ali through the heart of the city. Similar to the description



offered by Haqqi, all along the path that it blazed observers witnessed how it ripped through houses, shops, and even mosques (ibid: 65). Drastic and unremorseful, Mubarak was charged with bringing legibility to the urban landscape, creating a vantage point from which to assert state control over space. That search for legibility continues to orient the creation of Cairo as a heritage city.

In Mitchell's analysis the key to understanding this dramatic act was the need to impose order. He writes (ibid: 68):

The 'disorder' of Cairo and other cities had suddenly become visible. The urban space in which Egyptians moved had become a political matter, material to be 'organised' by the construction of great thoroughfares radiating out from the geographical and political centre. At the same moment Egyptians themselves, as they moved through this space, became similarly material, their minds and bodies thought to need discipline and training. The space, the minds, and the bodies all materialized at the same moment, in a common economy of order and discipline.

This production of order through the planning and organization of state agencies and agents is for Mitchell, as it was for Foucault, at the core of modernity and processes of colonization and state control. Mitchell labels this process "enframing," namely the ways in which a modern bureaucracy asserts itself as the sole generator of the very conception of what constitutes order.

He describes this as "a method of dividing up and containing... which operates by conjuring up a neutral surface or volume called 'space'" (ibid: 44). This statement carefully articulates how the cities of the Muslim world (particularly the Muslim Middle East) became discursively produced in opposition to modern forms of spatiality.<sup>1</sup> In Mitchell's account, the modern city is not only linked with notions of order and legibility, but also grounded in the absolute ontology of abstract space. It is this very geometricality and neutrality of space that became a vector for the organization of social life in accordance with specifically designed plans. This was the space of Levi Strauss' engineer, not his *bricoleur*. It served as an empty signifier to be filled with meaning, especially the representations produced by the state to legitimate its control and rule. Thus, what characterized the premodern in Mitchell's analysis was its resolve and refusal to be enframed.

In this account, traditional spatiality with its structured openness of meaning resists the growing rectilinearization of the modern world whose result is the increased institutionalization of social life into discrete spaces. Anthropologist Brinkley Messick (1993), in his ethnography of Islamic legal practice in Yemen, demonstrates this process by highlighting the distinction between what he labels the "spiral texts" of traditional Islamic scholars and the "straight texts" of the emerging state bureaucratization of legal and administrative affairs. With the former, he argues that it is content which determines form, whereas with the latter it is form that determines content. This distinction between form and content emerges in Messick's account as a generalizable metaphor for the difference between a traditional and modern spatiality. Here again, Levi Strauss' binary of the engineer and the *bricoleur* orients the spatial conceptualization of those who are connected with the traditional and those who have broken from it (ibid: 237). The city, in Messick's analysis, is but another example of this spatial dichotomy between the straight and the spiral.

Unlike with Haqqi, we are left nostalgic for the traditional. We mourn the loss of its spontaneity and what he describes as the “strong indexicality of the old texts, in which writing was a non-arbitrary mark of the person” (ibid: 249). With the modern “straight” forms of the city we lose that sense of personality, that sense of an authoring genius, which, for Foucault, was the intermediary figure to connect the sign and the signified together in the production of knowledge.

Messick’s position, despite its tendency for nostalgia, differs from the efforts of certain groups of contemporary elites to retrospectively label the urban forms of the premodern *medina* as Islamic so as to appear to preserve, and hence control, a fixed set of values associated with the past.<sup>2</sup> Instead, his argument suggests that the operation of open structures of authority within the Islamic tradition allows for a spatiality in which content is not predetermined by form. Only under the forces of modernity does an Islamic tradition become fixed and codified so as to be essentialized, represented as unchanged and orthodox. For both Mitchell and Messick, the *bricolage* which permeates their analysis offers a mode of dwelling marked by resistance to the “enframing” accomplished by modern, capitalist attachments to an abstract and absolute space. For Haqqi that refusal allows for the sense of space to continue even when the material forms of the premodern city have been obliterated. Orhan Pamuk (2005), in his memoir of Istanbul, offers a somewhat different perspective. In his lament about the loss of the city to modernity he captures the resulting mode of dwelling in the concept of *hüzün*, a sadness, a melancholy that he likens the *tristesse* that Levi-Strauss imagined as the affective response of a Westerner in the midst of the slums of the “tropics.” *Hüzün* differs from this classic anthropological concept for Pamuk in that it is not the result of an urban paralysis. Instead, it gives the residents of Istanbul the poetic license to be paralyzed. The issue that predominates in these varied looks at the city is whether modernity and its forms of spatiality are anathema to the production of a sense of place. What follows is an examination of heritage cosmopolitanism in Cairo that analyzes its role within the culture of globalization, and its relationship to the enframing, the straightening, and the melancholy of the modern city. The crucial intervention comes with identifying the limitations to its workings as a recuperative mode of heritage discourse that says one can be cosmopolitan and still have desire for the traditional city. Heritage cosmopolitanism does not act upon all parts of the city equally. Some parts of that urban fabric are given preferential treatment. It is here that alternatives to the heritage city might be found, where the potential for senses of place, in the plural, offer varied claims over the old stones and forgotten spaces.

## Preserving the Real Cairo: Between Fustat and Al-Qahira

The urban fabric of Cairo has had multiple starting points. It is a palimpsest formed as each new urban foundation eventually becomes woven together as part of an overall conglomerate. This pattern has persisted into the twentieth century with the attachment of areas initially envisioned as suburbs, such as Mohandiseen, Ma’adi, Misr

Gadida (New Cairo), or Six of October City. This process began with the foundation of the settlement of Fustat, one of the first *amsar* (often glossed as “garrison towns”) which was established by the caliph ‘Umar I in order to house the military contingents that accomplished the Muslim conquest of Egypt in the mid-seventh century. The town, which sources indicate was originally not intended to be a permanent settlement, was located adjacent to the Byzantine fortress which housed the Coptic Christian community of Qasr al-Shama’ (known today as Misr al-‘Adima [“old Cairo”). The evolution of Fustat from a military camp of tribal quarters (*khittat*) into an integrated city is well documented in several sources though a handful of early Arab and Persian historians and geographers.<sup>3</sup> In terms of architectural, the Mosque of ‘Amr is the only standing monument from this foundational period that remains today.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, all that remains of the original mosque is little more than its location and the barest outlines of its plan. It has been enlarged and rebuilt several times since its foundation having fallen victim to several earthquakes and the needs and tastes of those who continue to worship there.

In laying out a brief history of the city’s urban development what I intend to track are the moments and locales in its formation that become synecdoche for the urban landscape as a whole. This becomes important in understanding the ways in which heritage practice can operate differentially within a multifaceted material past. This does not necessarily mean the privileging one location or one time period over another, rather it may suggest different modes of cultivating and engaging that past within a cosmopolitan vision. In 969 CE, Egypt was removed from the political control of the *sunni* Muslim world nominally under the authority of the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad, and drawn into the Isma’ili *shi’i* sphere of the Fatimid dynasty that controlled most of North Africa. At the time of the Fatimid conquest, Fustat (also known as Misr – thus identified with its foundation as one of the early *amsar*) was in fact an urban collage of three cities: the original *misr* of Fustat, al-Askar (literally “The Cantonment”) which was the Abbasid administrative and governmental “suburb” (Abu Lughod 1971: 14) to the north, and al-Qatai (literally “The Wards”) which was the “pleasure city” (ibid.) of the semi-autonomous Abbasid governor Ahmad ibn Tulun (of Turkish origin) and his four successors. The medieval geographers indicate that these three areas of Fustat/Misr were well integrated as a single urban landscape.<sup>5</sup> The following historical description provides a good representation of the scholarly consensus concerning the city’s early urban evolution:

In AD 750 another satellite town, al-‘Askar ... was founded by the ‘Abbasid army which took over the country from the Umayyads. The greater part of al-Fustat must have been at that time in ruins since it had been burnt by the retreating Umayyads. The vitality of the old city was so strong, however, that it was immediately resurrected and the new administrative and military capital, rather than dominating, was soon absorbed by it. A little later al-‘Askar was nothing but the name of a quarter within the urban agglomeration.

Roughly the same happened to another satellite town founded in AD 870 by Ahmad ibn Tulun... Apparently well planned with the famous mosque in the middle and a vast palatial complex extending almost to the slopes of the Citadel hill on the eastern side, it was divided into lots or fiefs; hence its name al-Qatai. As the administrative capital of the Tulunids and a garrison for their troops, it did not survive the dynasty as a separate urban settlement, and what was not destroyed by the Caliph’s army in AD 905 merged with al-Fustat. (Kubiak 1987: 11–12)

The author of this passage further argues that this pattern of Fustat/Misr's incorporation of "rival princely cities," as Abu Lughod (1971) terms them, comes to an end with the Fatimid foundation of al-Qahira, literally "the victorious one," which would have, in his words, an "unexpected career" (Kubiak 1987: 12).

A full account of the development of Fatimid al-Qahira is beyond the scope of this essay and has been well documented in a large volume of scholarly literature (see for example Raymond 2000; Sanders 1994; Bierman 1998). Indeed, a comparison of the ink devoted to the history of the Isma'ili contribution to the broader urban landscape to those pages that document the metropolis prior to the Fatimid conquest, indicates a tension in just where to mark the real beginning of what would become the modern city of Cairo. The very title of Abu Lughod's volume, *Cairo: 1001 years of the City Victorious*, appears to make the argument that the urban landscape that existed prior to the appearance of the Isma'ili princely compound intended to house only the Fatimid caliph and his supporters, falls outside of the historical scope of the contemporary city. The exclusivity of the city (in which only those who were part of the ruling elite and their retainers could live; others could only enter with passes) and its clear separation from Fustat, marked by both walls and distance, demonstrates the clear distinction of this new regime from all that had come before. The city as a whole was a spatial symbol of the uniqueness of the Fatimid Imam/Caliph, marked by both his divinity as the spiritual leader of the Isma'ili community and his political authority among all Muslims as the Caliph, or *amir al-mu'mineen*, "Commander of the Faithful." The decision to put the palace at the center of the city was by no means arbitrary, or merely functional. It was symbolically instrumental, such that people's experience of the space of al-Qahira would constantly orient them toward the centrality of that unique individual who occupied those palaces. The physical plan of this city was undoubtedly aimed toward the formation of a political subjectivity through an individual's experience with this addition to the urban landscape. For Isma'ili faithful, Arab and Berber alike, it was an enclave that was their own, one that set them apart: a retreat which they had fought to carve out for themselves in lands of North Africa for nearly three quarters of a century. Al-Qahira was a monument to their success after years of oppression and near extinction in the periphery of Ifriqiyya. It was also a place to indulge in the luxuries of a newly formed empire.

For the predominantly Sunni Muslim citizens of Fustat (though there were also large Coptic and Jewish minorities) their early experience of al-Qahira was one of exclusion as well as political and economic domination (Sanders 1994). However, it was also a symbol of possibility: that Egypt would no longer be the periphery of a crumbling Abassid regime, and become, instead, the center of a new imperial challenger. Indeed, exclusion and separation of Fustat residents from the new royal city may have had a bright side. It suggested that the new Fatimid regime, by setting up their capital and early building endeavors some 2 km away, had little interest in imposing itself upon the physical structure of Fustat/Misr. Indeed, the Fatimid regime, unlike modern colonial regimes, did not initiate anything as drastic as the Hausmannization of Cairo that took place in the nineteenth century or Marshal Lyautey's urban planning of French colonial Rabat (Brown 1976; Wright 1991).

This is not to say that drastic physical changes did not occur to both Fustat/Misr and al-Qahira during the nearly 200 years of Fatimid suzerainty (969 CE to 1169 CE). Nor did the Fatimid regime fail at times to impose its will upon the spatial practice of the subject population (Bierman 1998). The Fatimids brought to Egypt new arguments to the discursive tradition of Islam, packaged with new hegemonic political and economic agendas that profoundly altered spatial practice and the production of Cairo-Fustat as a composite urban landscape.

It is tempting to understand the relationship between these two components of the city as a story of competition. In such a reading, the end result would be a victory for al-Qahira which became the core of the future city of Cairo. However, it may be more useful in understanding the current discrepancies in the articulation of heritage practice associated with these elements of the city's historic fabric by recasting the narrative as part of a long-standing dialectic of spatial practice with roots in Fatimid era political, economic, and doctrinal discourses. This dialectic encompassed: (1) the physical changes that took place in these two cities during this period, (2) the royal ritual processions (Sanders 1994), and (3) the state sponsored public writing on architectural and other spaces (Bierman 1998).

Within a couple of decades following the foundation of the new royal enclosure of al-Qahira, it began to expand in all directions outside of its original brick enceinte. Indeed, this wall seems to have lost any defensive character within 65 years of its building when the Persian geographer Nasr-i Khusraw describes al-Qahira as an unfortified city. During the first century of Fatimid rule, both cities appear to have increased in luxury and wealth, though al-Qahira considerably more so. Excavations at Fustat indicate that there was considerable rebuilding of domestic residences during this period prior to the reign of al-Mustansir (1058–1074) (Scanlon and Kubiak 1964–1978). These excavations have also provided evidence of a particularly Fatimid period architectural style of courtyard house which has allowed the redating of some of the “*maisons*” reported in earlier excavations (Bahgat and Gabriel 1921). This suggests, therefore, that in the large area that now comprises much of the current Fustat archaeological preserve (see discussion below in section “The Ruins of Fustat”) the early Fatimid period was one of significant high-quality rebuilding. Nevertheless, much of the area of what was al-Qatai still lay in ruins following the 905 CE assault on the Tulunid dynasty by the Abbasid army. In the areas of Fustat properly excavated by ARCE, there is evidence of ruined and abandoned structures during this economically successful period (Scanlon 1994). Such ruins, or *kharaba*, are mentioned in several letters preserved from the Fatimid period as part of the archive known as the *geniza* documents (Goitein 1983: 22). The presence of such *kharaba* was not uncommon in all periods and that in fact most of them were still functioning structures, often as animal pens or for domestic industries (ibid.). The ruins of al-Qatai itself were likely used for building material for much of the reconstructions in other parts of Fustat/Misr and even al-Qahira.

Physically, Fustat/Misr does appear to decline following the famines and ethnic rivalries within the army during al-Mustansir's reign. This period of unrest seems to have affected the commoner city more severely than the royal enclave. The north of

Fustat/Misr, the areas that were once al-Askar and al-Qatai, apparently fell into greater ruin. The most significant changes to the shape of the urban landscape, however, are the result of specific acts of the powerful *wizir* Badr al-Jamali – who, after having calmed the tense situation with the army, all but replaced the Imam/Caliph as the legitimate political authority. He ordered that new stone walls be built for al-Qahira, walls which expanded it in size accommodating the mosque of al-Hakim built outside the original wall of the royal enclosure. Following this, he opened the doors of al-Qahira for the first time to anyone from Fustat/Misr who chose to move there. Moreover, he built a wall to hide the ruins of northern Fustat/Misr and declared that those who did not rebuild their properties in that region would *de facto* have forfeited them to the state. Despite immigration into al-Qahira, both the Geniza documents and archaeological excavations indicate that Fustat/Misr continued as a viable city, though evidence for new construction in the twelfth century is minimal. Nevertheless, Fustat/Misr was later dealt a major physical blow with its burning in 1168 lest it serve as a base for the approaching Crusaders (Kubiak 1976). Several authors report that the city burned for some 54 days. The area around the Mosque of ‘Amr and the Byzantine fortress of Qasr ash-Shama’a apparently survived largely unaffected. Yet Fustat never seems to have recovered its former stature despite its later enclosure within the defensive wall of Salah al-Din ibn Ayyub (Saladin) whose dynasty marked the end to Fatimid rule.

There are several points to highlight from this review of the physical history of the Fatimid urban landscape. First, it is important to note the centrality of political and economic discourses within this account. Physically, both elements of this particular urban landscape were significantly altered by economic and political events. The *wizirates* of Badr al-Jamali and later his son al-Afdal became turning points in the debate over political authority within the Fatimid regime. Spatially, this was made most clear in al-Afdal’s decision to move his residence to Fustat, breaking with the long held tradition that all of the Imam/Caliph’s retainers live within al-Qahira. These two *wizirs* used the physical experience of the urban landscape as a vehicle for confusing the populace as to what had been clear spatial lines of political authority marked by the separate functions of the two cities. These distinct roles, physically inscribed onto the urban landscape, now became blurred. Fustat became associated with the seat of political authority by housing the palace of the *wizir*. Meanwhile, al-Qahira was no longer the closed royal city of its foundation; it was to have a civilian population for the first time. Sanders (1994: 68) argues, however that the al-Afdal’s attempt to establish Fustat/Misr as a rival to al-Qahira even for purposes of temporal administration failed because the latter remained closely identified with the ritual authority of the Imam/Caliph. It still retained the memory of its origin as a ritual royal center. She writes: “Cairo was still the seat of the Fatimid caliphate, and her symbolic value was too important to ignore or transform. The only solution for al-Afdal may have been to suppress one of the caliph’s most powerful expressions of his political authority, urban processions” (ibid.).

The lines of confusion that Badr al-Jamali and his son tried to draw in the physicality of the urban landscape did not engender a competition between al-Qahira and Fustat/Misr. Rather, they are emblematic of the dialectical movement toward urban



synthesis. Neither city emerged from the physical history of this urban landscape as an unaltered victor. Al-Qahira was fused with a new socio-spatial program drawn from the new migrants of Fustat/Misr which transformed it into both a commercial and administrative center and not just a ritual city. The decision to let Fustat/Misr burn in advance of the approaching Crusaders has greater significance than its mere utility as a military tactic of a scorched earth defense. It indicates that much of what was Fustat/Misr had already become assimilated physically as part of, a now very different, al-Qahira. That the core of Fustat, centered on the Mosque of 'Amr, survived, and was later enclosed within the new city wall of Salah al-Din (Saladin in the West), testifies to its continued position within the memory of the urban populace. Even burned and defeated, it persevered as something of a shadow, a negative space both real yet intangible. Perhaps the most appropriate way to characterize the emerging sense of place embodied in this dialectic comes in the form of the *sabbakhin*, inhabitants who have mined the ruined areas of Fustat/Misr for its nitrogenous rich soil of decaying mud brick (*sibakh* in Arabic) to transfer to local agricultural fields supplying Cairo's markets (Bacharach 2002: 2–3). Fustat became digested and dispersed across the urban landscape, yet never seemed to disappear. At the same time, as its ruined buildings would become recycled, its antiquities, its coins, potsherds, and various other artifacts sifted out in the processing of the *sibakh*, made their way into museums, private collections and even as payment for medical services (ibid: 4). Al-Qahira, meanwhile would, expand, become introduced to new possibilities with concrete, rebar, and the “axe of the town planning commission” whose transformative force Haqqi rejected. It was in that space that the real opportunity for the making of the modern heritage city emerged most forcefully.<sup>6</sup>

## Heritage Cosmopolitanism

Heritage and its development has profoundly shaped Egypt's encounter with modernity, imperialism, and now the processes of globalization. The Napoleonic invasion of the country in the late eighteenth century was a turning point in opening Egyptian heritage to an ever increasing array of stakeholders. The question of who sets the agenda for how the state and various interest groups within Egypt itself cultivate that heritage, has become a matter deeply entangled with the influence of foreign powers and their cultural and political institutions. The very fact that the study of ancient Egypt would become an academic discipline in its own right as part of the modern Western university testifies to the level of interest generated by the practice of heritage within its borders (Reid 2002: Chap. 5). One prominent theme in discussions of heritage in Egypt is its inherent roots in the discourses of Western modernity (Colla 2007). Its adoption within the emerging institutions of the nation-state has largely accepted a presumed disinterested objectivity of scientific and humanist academic scholarship brought to Egypt. However, there has also been a consciousness of the colonial logics of Orientalist discourses of representation and control through the production of knowledge about a place, its people, and their past.

In large part, these poststructuralist critiques have been subsumed into forms of nationalism as a means of asserting control both physically and discursively over the cultural patrimony of the nation-state (Silberman 1997).

In response to the rise of nationalist claims in the twentieth century, a variety of overlapping and competing narratives have emerged in order to maintain the standing of foreign interests as stakeholders in Egypt's heritage. Most persistent is the colonialist argument about the necessity of foreign (usually Western) intervention in order to protect the Egyptian past from the predations of its present custodians, who either lack the skills, the resources or the proper disposition to do so effectively and in accord with international standards. Such an argument intersects with a narrative of abdication in which Egyptians and the nation-state have largely disowned or disavowed much of the region's ancient past for either religious, ethnic or political rationales. Similarly prominent are economic discourses that equivocate between the inclusion and separation of heritage from the very market forces simultaneously pushed by imperial powers that have introduced the structures of global capitalism and neo-liberal economics. In other words, does heritage represent a resource like any other? Can it be nationalized? Whose property is it? These questions reveal the recurrent universalist assertion that Egyptian heritage forms part of world culture. The more elitist version contends that it is therefore open to study, interpretation, and ultimately control by authorized scholars regardless of their national origin. The fact that such authorization is largely in the hands of foreign academic institutions has been a source of tension and critique (Reid 2002: 2). A more reactionary version of this universalist claim to global patrimony rejects the assertion of such authority, arguing instead that Egypt's heritage is open to all who wish to lay claim to it as part of their past.

Into this discursive space enters cosmopolitanism. What does it mean to be citizens of the world and lay claim to as many pasts, to as much heritage as you want? In its classic Kantian formulation, it references a belonging to a world community, a notion of global citizenship that would encourage those universalist humanist ideals that would ensure peace (Robbins 1998: 2). One version of this has been the rhetoric of multiculturalism that has accompanied global capitalism. Its effect, however, has all too often been the pursuit of spatial homogenization at the expense of difference – a rootlessness that moves with the flows of capital and labor. For Paul Gilroy (2005), such forms of “borderless thinking” are at the root of a postcolonial melancholia that may well reinforce the colonial legacies of othering whose power relations escape without interrogation. A city like Dubai might be the ultimate expression of that kind of cosmopolitan vision and how it amalgamates heritages in the manner of Disney's Epcot center. Anthony Appiah (2006: xx) highlights a key problem when he states: “Cosmopolitanism is an adventure and an ideal: but you can't have any respect for human diversity and expect everyone to become cosmopolitan.” At issue then is whether cosmopolitanism can be a force for the critique of globalization or simply its representative culture, a culture whose adoption in Egypt, at least, “has long since been a marker of elite status” (De Koning 2006: 224). The recent work of the newly formed Cairo School of Urban Studies has centered its analysis of the city on this tension between an elite and a progressive

cosmopolitanism (Singerman and Amar 2006). The heritage case studies offered in this essay similarly seek to expose this tension, while at the same time blurring the lines of the political commitments of those engaged in a vernacular cosmopolitanism in which locality becomes the very basis for the reinscription of global relations (Bhabha 2001: 40).

The complicated issues posed by the development of heritage practice in Egypt as a site for colonial and imperial control, nationalist movements, diplomatic overtures, economic security, and academic fame – to mention but a few – has challenged efforts to provide a standard and coherent agenda. Negotiating what priorities should serve as the basis for hammering out such an agenda – funding, identity, ownership (private or governmental), knowledge and scholarship, international law, etc. – has been marked by tensions over discursive authority more generally. Does authority for issuing such an agenda lie with the postcolonial nation-state? Its ability to subsume heritage within the narrative of nationalism has met with only limited success even among Egyptians, let alone the many outside stakeholders (Colla 2007). What room is there for arguments about heritage and its cultivation that do not simply mirror the agendas and ethical dictums championed by the various narratives just mentioned?

One way into this question is to examine the postcolonial Egyptian elite whose interest in heritage appears less motivated by nationalist sentiment, than in cultivating nostalgia for the traditional as part of an emerging globalized cosmopolitanism. A new quarterly publication that hit Cairo bookshops in December of 2007 illustrates well this emerging trend. With a price-tag of 40 LE, roughly eight US dollars, or in other measures about a week's salary for the average Egyptian, this journal was hardly destined to find its way into most homes. *Obelisque*, the name given to this new glossy, is a thoroughly Egyptian publication despite the fact that its content is exclusively in English. This linguistic move demonstrates both an assumption about the education of the journal's particular audience and an effort to manufacture a particular exclusivity. Donald Benson in his editor's letter introducing the magazine writes: "Obelisque wants to showcase the best of design, culture and travel in Egypt. It is time for Egyptians to acknowledge what is praise-worthy in their own achievements." In an effort to be inclusive to a broader audience Mr. Benson writes: "Readers of Obelisque outside Egypt could be excused for experiencing culture shock when they see the pictures and read the stories in this issue. This is not the Egypt they have read about since childhood. Within these pages we present a version of the Egypt story that is full of contemporary art and modern design." Egypt, he tells us, "is a young country."

This new Egypt story becomes a narrative that will put Egypt on the cosmopolitan map and shed its dusty image. The irony of the magazine's title may well declare that this obelisque is no mere antiquity. Rather than a surface for carving the cartouches of dead pharaohs it inscribes the story of a particular class of postcolonial elites in a nation where the gap between rich and poor is nothing short of a chasm. They have adopted the multicultural heritage-ism in which to define their own participation in the culture of globalization. Thus, while anthropologists of Cairo, such as Farha Ghannam (2002) and Petra Kuppinger (2000) document the spatial worlds of the

city's urban lower class neighborhoods, the staff of *Obelisque* opens for readers of this inaugural issue the fine homes of ministers, artists, developers, and even a successful psychiatrist. Consumption dominates this particular story of the young Egypt. This consumption extends beyond what is available in the marketplace, or rather the exclusive boutiques of restrictive malls and five star hotel shopping centers, and embraces a the cultivation of a particular lifestyle. It is a lifestyle infused with the romance of heritage as an elite endeavor encouraging art, travel, home furnishings, and the patronage of museums. It is a careful blending of the local – pillow cushions hand-embroidered in traditional designs from the tent-makers bazaar, vernacular architecture, Arabic calligraphy, medieval Islamic period artifacts – and the global – international art collections, Parisian fashion, Swiss watches, haute cuisine.

The urban fabric of Cairo offers certain opportunities for this pursuit of cosmopolitanism. Its role is to provide a place specific identity that acknowledges and even celebrates an Egypto-Islamic cultural tradition, yet does not contradict or restrain a desire for the technological, economic, and secular offerings of global capitalism. The goal is not to approximate or renegotiate traditional forms of dwelling within the constraints of the modern city. As such it stands in contrast to Ghannam's (2002) accounts of how the inhabitants of Cairo's impoverished districts struggle to maintain something authentic, something real, in the face of demands of the modern urban landscape.<sup>7</sup> In the cosmopolitanism of *Obelisque*'s readership, the real and the authentic is not located in the self, but in the idea of the heritage city. What does that particular engagement with the city look like? Where does it intersect with, and even challenge, the heritage work conducted by state authorities and related institutions? What authorizing discourses does it adopt and which does it reject?

The negotiations between these elite cosmopolitan actors and the logics of heritage nationalism promoted by state authorities find clear expression by Galila El Kadi and Dalia ElKerdany (2006) in their analysis of the recent efforts to preserve Cairo's nineteenth-century belle-époque architecture. Initially, this period of the city's past was not part of the governmental mandate for managing heritage through the authority of the Supreme Council of Antiquities (SCA). Desire for the "heritization" of these structures – their conversion from an exchange value into a cultural value – was the result of pressure by Egyptian elites, including Egypt's former first lady Suzanne Mubarak, for whom this period marked the nation's historical commitments to cosmopolitan sensibilities (ibid.: 350). The result is the particularization of heritage in which special interest groups may demand of the state particular recognition that still conforms with a broader nationalist sentiment while claiming special privilege and access to some element of the heritage landscape. El Kadi and ElKerdany write (ibid.: 351):

The heritization process, however, has always been politicized and controversial in Egypt. Within the elite, the content and notion of 'heritage' is not agreed upon or consensually shared. Accordingly, we can talk of 'heritages' in the plural, with each faction of the elite defining heritage in one way or another. The popular classes also identify with other heritages. For some it is a sheikh's grave, for others, a relic in a church. Very few in Egypt seem to have a pluralistic commitment to embrace the totality of heritages and to draw meaning from a variety of legacies.

This analysis suggests something of the antithesis to a cosmopolitanism that is all-embracing, but one rooted in identity politics. Heritage and its importance to the nation-state becomes the language in which to pursue recognition of one's cultural group within the broader frame of citizenship.

The question then is whether the state can be effective and even-handed in how it manages the multiplicity of these heritage claims within Egypt. It has certainly not escaped criticism which has come from many sides. Minorities, such as the Nubians in Upper Egypt (Smith 2006), or marginal sectors of the society who have been displaced or whose resources have been cut in order to make way for heritage projects that benefit big players in the tourist industry (Kuppinger 2006) have fared poorly in shifting the debate. Foreign scholars and conservation experts have had more success in getting a seat at the table (Sedky 2009). However, this has not altered many large projects, such as the recent work of the Historic Cairo Restoration Project (HCRP) that has allocated roughly \$US 40 million for monuments primarily in al-Qahira proper. Issues here range from sensitivity to the needs of local communities, the quality of the materials used, to the overall commercial rather than scholarly orientation of the vision for the city (Williams 2006). The cultivation of heritage cosmopolitanism with the potential for plurality seems unlikely to come from the state alone given its preference for nationalist narratives, be they economic or ideological. Here then we return to the foreign stakeholders, in particular those that have come to redefine themselves not as alternatives to the state but as cooperative, if not sometimes paternalistic, partners. Of interest are the ways in which these new partners negotiate not only with the state authorities but also with the other special interest groups, particularly those elites for whom the consumption of certain heritages, if not the cultivation of a more all-encompassing heritage, has become a marker of their participation in global cosmopolitan culture.

## Cairo's New Lung

In 2006, the city of Cairo received a gift from His Highness the Aga Khan, the leader of the global Isma'ili community, a diasporic Muslim sect that forms one of the major branches of the Shi'i Islam. That gift, a new 30-hectare park which had been more than two decades in the making, represented one of the major projects undertaken by the AKTC as part of its Historic Cities Support Programme whose interests lie primarily in the architectural heritage of the Muslim world (Fig. 1). One account of how the project was initiated refers to a visit in 1984 by the Aga Khan to Cairo for an urban development conference during which he had the opportunity to view the city from the Darassa Hills, "a surprisingly uninhabited piece of wasteland" built up by "waste and rubble formed through a spontaneous process of rejection by an overpopulated metropolis – a process that was norm in medieval times, when the lack of organized collection of solid waste caused cities to accumulate layers of debris" (Monreal 2004: xi).<sup>8</sup> This site bordering on the vast metropolis of medieval Cairo was the vantage point from which the nineteenth-century Scottish Orientalist





**Fig. 1** Aerial view of Azhar Park, looking north (Photo: Gary Otte 2004, reproduced courtesy of the Aga Khan Trust for Culture)



painter David Roberts had sketched his famous view of Cairo's Ayyubid walls. Those walls were no longer visible but the vista was still to be had. It was here "close to the citadel, near the eastern limits of medieval Cairo," writes the Aga Khan in a preface to one of the project's major publications, "an opportunity did arise to act on all three 'themes of concern' for the Aga Khan Trust for Culture" (HH The Aga Khan 2004: v). Al-Azhar Park, named after the famous mosque and Islamic institution of learning located in the neighborhood adjacent to the site, has served as the AKTC's model for simultaneously undertaking historical preservation, encouraging the social development of impoverished Muslim populations through community buildings, and promoting quality, aesthetically pleasing and culturally sensitive contemporary architectural spaces.

From its outset, this project has sought to define the contours of heritage cosmopolitanism for the Muslim world while recognizing the necessity of balancing the interests of the various stakeholders with whom the AKTC must intersect and partner. The rhetoric used to introduce the broader stakes for the heritage city demonstrates the project's relationship to a variety of discourses within the cosmopolitan spectrum. The Aga Khan (*ibid.*) opens his remarks with the following statement:

We stand today confronted with starkly different visions of the future of historic cities. At a time when our heritage, the anchor of our identity and source of inspiration, is threatened with destruction, by war and environmental degradation, by the inexorable demographic and economic pressures of exploding urban growth, or by simple neglect, there can be no doubt that it is time to act. Will we allow the wealth that is the past to be swept away, or will we assume our responsibility to defend what remains of the irreplaceable fabric of history? My answer is clear. One of our most urgent priorities must be to value, and protect, what is greatest in our common heritage. Breathing new life into the legacy of the past demands tolerance, and understanding and creativity beyond the ordinary.

First and foremost, the Aga Khan has put forward a call to action in the face of multiple failures and attacks on the future of the heritage city. These are broadened to include not merely the catch-all of neglect, but also target specific structural problems facing not only the impoverished third world, but all societies. The use of the third person "we" throughout this statement is carefully ambiguous. It serves to critique those in the Muslim world that have ignored or denied the relationship of heritage to identity and thus contributed to its continued status as foreign (even un-Islamic) or simply a resource to be exploited for the greatest economic and political benefit. At the same time, it is a challenge to the colonial legacy of paternalism and orientalist representations, adopting the very language and arguments used in order to lay claims to others' pasts. That argument comes from a prominent Muslim voice, although one that may have difficulty establishing its authority as representative within a majority Sunni Muslim world. There is a delicate balance here between speaking to a diverse and perhaps uninterested Muslim audience while simultaneously participating in the culture of globalism by promoting a language of cosmopolitanism that invites all to be stakeholders. While this might alienate some, at its broadest level these words are targeted to counteract Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis. Heritage becomes a common bond, a basis for communication that has the potential to diffuse conflict, and hence the return to the Kantian cosmopolitan ideal.

The complexities of this balancing act operates on multiple levels as the AKTC negotiates its standing with local, national, regional, and international actors who have stakes in Egyptian cultural heritage and patrimony. These actors are not only governmental, including municipal officials, the Egyptian SCA as well as international bodies, such as UNESCO under whose auspices historic Cairo was declared a world heritage site in 1979 and thus open to additional funding streams while subject to certain regulations. They consist also of various similar NGOs, such as the World Monuments Fund which partnered with the AKTC and provided some of the funding for this project, and quasi-governmental development arms, in particular USAID which has ongoing funding for conservation in historic Cairo through numerous grants administered by the independent American Research Center in Egypt (ARCE). Additionally, the project has needed to court, and in some cases employ, a scholarly and professional community that includes archaeologists, urban planners, architectural historians, conservators, as well as local craftspeople, administrators, developers, public relations liaisons, journalists, and various other professionals.<sup>9</sup> Less obviously, the AKTC is in conversation with other funders of heritage preservation work in Cairo each with their own political motivations. USAID and its role in promoting US public diplomacy in the Middle East is one example, as are various initiatives undertaken by Kuwaiti, Saudi, and other players in the Muslim Middle East. Given the visibility of this project both in terms of its mark on the landscape of Cairo and as major investment on the part of the AKTC, the diplomatic and political agenda involved here is not negligible. The move toward a heritage cosmopolitanism, in part as a response to a conflict laden “clash of civilization” narrative, offers one argument among many within the Muslim world concerning the place of heritage in forming Muslim identities and shaping Islamic cultures.

In order to make sense of this alphabet soup and the various lines of argumentation followed by different actors it is necessary to examine the development of the project, its compromises, its results, and the reactions to it from the many groups with whom it has cooperated or whose concerns and interests it has attempted to address. One of the major claims of the AKTC and the various scholars and professionals engaged in the project is that it offers a model for heritage work that provides sustained development opportunities to local, generally impoverished, residents. To this extent, the development of the park site also included rehabilitation efforts in the neighboring district of al-Darb al-Ahmar in which local residents were trained to carry out many aspects of the conservation work through the revival of traditional crafts. Additionally, a community center was established, and residents have become employed in the ongoing maintenance and operation of the park. The contrast of this model to efforts elsewhere in Islamic Cairo, particularly by the SCA, is instructive. Two aspects stand out. First is the notion of economic sustainability. Stefano Bianca, one of the chief architects of the project, likens the financial organization to a familiar Islamic economic concept, the *waqf*, or pious charitable foundation (Bianca 2001: 12). The park and those employed to maintain it, are to be supported by various profit generating mechanisms related to the project. In addition to corporate sponsors, such as the Arab African International Bank that displays an advertisement at the park entrance that reads in both Arabic and English

“Preserving Egypt’s Heritage,” there are entrance fees. The prices paid by visitors are means tested to a degree. Egyptian nationals have a much reduced rate over international visitors, in addition there are parking fees for the generally middle and upper classes that prefer not to arrive via public transportation or on foot. Within the park are various restaurants and other concessions, such as the greenhouse that generate revenue. Other funds will come from a parking and commercial structure that will be built outside of the parks grounds.

This question of the economic long-term viability of the park is not unrelated to the second arena of contrast which concerns the privileging of tourism and the broader issue of who is the target audience for the development of the heritage city. Without doubt, international tourism is an important part of the national finances of Egypt. Islamic architectural heritage of Cairo, however, has largely been off the map of the vast majority of these visitors for whom the more ancient ruins are the key attractions, as are now the beaches of Sharm al-Sheikh and other Sinai destinations. Nevertheless, more recently, following the city’s listing as a UNESCO World Heritage site, there has been an effort to increase Cairo’s market share of the tourist business through efforts to make it more accessible by producing a more coherent and readable narrative for the Islamic urban landscape (Sutton and Fahmi 2002). How to do this, and for whom, has not been without tension and critique (Lewcock 1985; Rodenbeck 1983; Williams 2006). The AKTC’s Azhar Park project represents a fairly significant departure from the strategies employed up till now primarily through the SCA and its HCRP. The AKTC, for its part, has sought to highlight that difference in how it has cultivated a grassroots development strategy in which the local community was incentivized economically and socially through employment and the revival of traditional skills in construction and handicrafts. In contrast to much of the work of the HCRP which in many cases contracted major developers ill suited to the work of conservation, the Azhar Park project was committed to training locals as conservators and fostering the already existing local knowledge in various craft traditions. The down side is that such work is often slow and often cost-prohibitive given the magnitude of the conservation effort that exists in historic Cairo.

Even with this commitment to grassroots conservation, there have been compromises as well as decisions which suggest certain prioritizations in the representations of heritage at the site. From its very outset, the project was forced to accommodate municipal demands regarding the future park site. While the Darasa hills which the project now occupies may well have been an urban wasteland adjacent to what was once Fatimid Al-Qahira, it was still of interest to city officials as a locus for three large drinking water-reservoirs. These would ultimately be built and then incorporated into the park’s overall design. Such accommodations do not always sit well with heritage purists. In the case of the archaeological remains of the Ayyubid period city wall which was uncovered during the grading of the park’s slopes, a balance had to be struck between its scientific excavation and its incorporation as an aesthetic element of the overall landscape design. In places it has been significantly restored using new stone, albeit by employing local craftsmen who have revived medieval masonry practices. In this instance, many other project



**Fig. 2** Reconstruction of the Ayyubid wall at Azhar Park (photo: author)

officials have been forced to weigh the merits of documenting and preserving the archaeological record with the desire to produce a visually appealing and inviting sanctuary within the modern city (Fig. 2).

For whose tastes, then, is this park created? In thinking through this question, we can begin to reveal many of the constraints and tensions within heritage cosmopolitanism as it adopts an ethos of preservation while promoting certain aesthetics in remaking the city along heritage lines. As with the palaces and monuments built by the conquering Fatimid Isma'ili rulers when they first founded and developed al-Qahira in the tenth century, their later-day descendents, the Aga Khan and the Isma'ili diaspora, are on display through this addition to one of the Sunni Muslim world's most important cities. The AKTC certainly acknowledges the historical connection between the Aga Khan and the Fatimids of Cairo, and that this was a significant part of the inspiration and motivation behind the project. The Fatimid legacy, particularly its promotion as a rich and cosmopolitan era in Muslim history, cannot be divorced from the attention which the AKTC has given to Cairo. Even the naming of the park after the vaunted religious institution is significant since it was first built as a center of Isma'ili learning under the Fatimids and only later became the premiere academy for the development of Islamic thought within the Sunni tradition. While the park's design seeks to recreate something of the ambiance of a Fatimid palace and its gardens, we must be careful not to overstate this project as merely a homage to the ancestors of the Aga Khan and the global Isma'ili community.



**Fig. 3** The Fatimid-inspired architecture of the hilltop restaurant at Azhar Park (photo: author)

However, through their patronage of Islamic cultural heritage in the predominantly Sunni context of contemporary Cairo, one can read this gift as partly an assertion of Isma'ili legitimacy within the larger Muslim *umma* (community of believers), a status that might otherwise be denied by more conservative Salafi and Wahhabi discourses emanating from elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world.

The invocation, in the AKTC literature, of David Robert's nineteenth-century, quintessentially Orientalist view of Cairo suggests that this new park has drawn inspiration from other sources as well. In their description of the project, the lead managers have expressed an intention that the utilization of the park should serve "not only as a public green space but as a panoramic platform to view and reinterpret the built heritage of Cairo" (Rashti and Stino 2001: 20). Who is the viewer and what image of the heritage city have they been offered? Here, we might explore the prominent profile which Azhar Park received in the pages of *Obelisque*. The magazine covered both the project itself in one article and provided a feature on the Egyptian architects who designed one of the major buildings for the facility – its hilltop restaurant (Fig. 3). Readers were introduced to the park as a "new lung" for a city desperately lacking in green open spaces and to its value as a leisure destination, where one can enjoy vistas of the city's historic quarters while enjoying fine dining, a cappuccino, or as they purchase plants from the onsite greenhouse just like those used for the grounds. To a degree that view of the city has been sanitized in keeping with an elite aesthetic for how one ought to enjoy and cultivate heritage. The Ayyubid wall has been cleared of its debris and the "medieval" practices of refuse





**Fig. 4** The greening of Cairo with the plantings at Azhar Park (photo: author)

management that made this vantage point possible have been remolded into pleasing slopes, carpeted and enclosed (Fig. 4). The park becomes the contemporary citadel of the modern heritage city, a counterpoint to the medieval citadel that was to protect the post-Fatimid landscape and make it whole – bringing together the once royal city of al-Qahira and the commoner town of Fustat (Fig. 5).

This cosmopolitan vision for, and vista of, the city has not found universal favor among all those concerned about Cairo's future. Singerman and Amar (2006: 14) in their introduction to the projects of their new Cairo School for Urban Studies have been markedly less sanguine about the potential of this form of cosmopolitanism to encourage a progressive politics. They write: "the recently opened al-Azhar Park, celebrated as a vast green oasis of neo-Islamic architecture articulates Cairo's current drive to transform public patrimony into Islamicized gated enclaves. This park, like many new centers of consumption and entertainment, is filled with wealthy Gulf and Saudi tourists ... spaces designed to serve the needs of spectacular consumerism by subjects of rentier petroleum states rather than transform local urbanites into a productive bourgeoisie." This comparison of the park to other sites of consumption, however, misses the mark. The stated intention of the AKTC has been to provide a public space that is accessible to a broad swath of the city's inhabitants in which to cultivate a heritage sensibility.<sup>10</sup> Such a goal, however, cannot be practical without also courting the consumptive desires of an urbane cosmopolitan elite whose participation is key to the long-term stability and attraction of the project.





**Fig. 5** Azhar Park and its relationship to the medieval citadel of Cairo (photo: author)

The danger of such a compromise is that the heritage city becomes a mere object of representation, an externalization of “tradition” as a material expression of past cultural genius. In other words, the project runs the risk of transforming the historic city into a foreign county, a place to be appreciated and consumed during temporary visits, but not a space that is lived (Lowenthal 1985).

## The Ruins of Fustat

While Al-Azhar Park offers one model for the incorporation of formerly derelict spaces into the heritization of modern Cairo’s densely packed urban landscape, the fate of the Fustat archaeological zone represents another. In this open expanse behind Egypt’s oldest mosque and adjacent to Coptic or “old” Cairo, there are no nurseries that produce the climatologically appropriate greenery that gives the Aga Khan’s gift to the city its verdant appeal while being conservative with its water consumption (Fig. 6). For the ruins of al-Qahira’s once-thriving medieval counterpart, it is not the absence of water that is a concern but rather its presence. While the causes for the site’s rising ground water have yet to be adequately documented and determined, the threat they pose to the archaeological remains only worsens. The vast extent of medieval Fustat is now covered by the growth of residential, industrial, and municipal constructions of the twentieth century. However, roughly 100 hectares



**Fig. 6** The unmanicured green spaces of the Fustat archaeological zone with residential neighborhoods and debris piles encircling (photo: author)

have been mandated as an archaeological reserve by the SCA incorporating and extending an area of state sponsored excavations that were first undertaken in the 1920s by the Egyptian scholar ‘Aly Bahgat. Those excavations, followed by a series of others by Egyptian, American, Japanese, and currently French researchers, as well as documentation projects under the auspices of UNESCO (see Antoniou et al. 1980; UNDP 1997), have secured the site as one of the richest sources of archaeological materials for the study of early Islamic society and urban life. Despite the historical value which scholars have assigned to the archaeology of Fustat, even the area set aside by Egyptian authorities as a preserve has faced numerous threats that go well beyond the site’s hydrology.

Cairo’s population has exploded through various demographic pressures, especially the rural to urban migrants who have come seeking low wage industrial and commercial jobs due to the scarcity of agricultural land. This has led to persistent encroachment by largely unplanned and under-regulated residential neighborhoods that have moved into areas formerly part of historic Fustat, a region largely abandoned after the thirteenth century. In certain cases, the municipality has sanctioned the settlement activities although providing only limited services, such as sewage and waste removal. In the 1960s, plans for development in the area of the Abu Sa’ud Mosque, just to the northwest of the Fustat archaeological preserve, were delayed in order for ARCE to

undertake a series of rescue excavations uncovering the complexity and density of the urban fabric during the ninth to twelfth centuries. Nevertheless, much building continues under the radar of the municipality and residents have laid claim to the parts of the preserve for burning trash, grazing animals, recreation activities, and small-scale industrial activities in make-shift workshops.

Defending the archaeological remains within the preserve has had mixed results. While a project by a Kuwaiti development firm to remove the ruins in order to establish a 50 million KD housing project was ultimately rejected, other projects have moved forward. Ibrahim 'Abd al-Rahman (2002: viii), the chief SCA inspector for the site details the following:

Fustat has faced even more calamities due to aggressive local action. The Abu Qarn estate was constructed and was like a dagger in the heart of the plan formulated by the residents of the al-Raya District. The estate of the Khayr Allah agricultural area was built by devouring the Grand cemetery... In addition, local companies such as the Arab Contractors, al-Gumhuriyya, and others took over vast tracts of Fustat. But the greatest catastrophe took place when the Cairo Governate established a public garbage dump on the Salah Salem highway. The refuse spread daily, devouring what it could of the ancient city. Fustat was almost lost in the same way al-'Askar disappeared under the foundations of the Zainhum district, which developed informally.

More recently, it has been the SCA and other government ministries that have been the culprits in cultivating a neglectful and even antagonistic attitude to the urban heritage embodied by the site of Fustat (Fig. 7). Debris from two major projects, the new National Museum for Egyptian Civilization slated to open in 2009 and a sporting club for SCA employees, continues to be bulldozed from the plateau which they occupy into the Fustat archaeological zone below. SCA officials within the zone have taken to conducting dummy excavations at the base of these debris slopes in order to mark their encroachment in an attempt to police the grounds, or at least document the advance. In another example of Fustat's treatment, it became the storage depot for the original architectural fragments from the neighboring Mosque of 'Amr following its renovation. The marble columns, capitals, and other pieces from this oldest of Egypt's religious buildings now acquire a new patina under the harsh sun and choking dust (Fig. 8). Effectively, the inspectors at Fustat have been assigned a largely under-resourced role as caretakers, with little ability to mandate or engage in conservation and presentation of the archaeology and the site's history. The site is, in fact, closed to the public with no plans to make it available either to international or local visitors.

Within the discourse of preservation Fustat has become a preserve for a handful of researchers, inspectors, and visiting heritage delegations. As a heritage destination, it is best experienced through the varied archaeological reports and the occasional museum exhibition of its rich variety of artifacts. The actual ruins of Fustat are in many ways just that: ruins. They have attracted varied practices of dumping, spoliation, and rebuilding. Some, such as the back-dirt piles of scientific excavations or the plans for building traditional craft workshops, find legitimacy within the logics of heritage cosmopolitanism. The digging of *sibakh* by the local peasants was outlawed. Still other activities have received official or at least tacit sanction from



**Fig. 7** Debris slopes marked with dummy excavations that have since filled with ground water seepage (photo: author)



**Fig. 8** Open storage of architectural fragments from the Mosque of 'Amr. Note the standing ruins and debris slopes in the background (photo: author)





**Fig. 9** The Fustat ruin field, looking northwest, with unrestored traces of the Ayyubid/Mamluk city wall that extends south from the medieval citadel (photo: author)

the various authorities that control and manage the site. Nevertheless, some success in altering the vision of the site as a land-fill or as just land for development has been achieved through the construction of a stone wall around the archaeology preserve, the so-called Fustat Gardens, and adjacent lands of the Cooperative Societies. Additionally, legal authority was granted by the legislature for the removal of unapproved constructions, both residences and workshops. Still, Fustat does not seem destined to become a destination that will grace the pages of *Obelisque* any time in the near future. This kind of ruin does not conjure up the same Orientalist nostalgia of a David Robert's sketch (Fig. 9). The question is whether it must strive to do so in order to reserve, or perhaps preserve, a place in the heritage city. At the very least Fustat represents another model for how Egyptians and others with stakes in Egypt's cultural patrimony have cultivated modes of dwelling both with and in the past.

## Contemplating the Future of an Islamic Urban Past

Attention to the fate and future of Fustat offers an important contrast to the efforts to promote the kind heritage cosmopolitanism embodied in the production of Al-Azhar Park. The different trajectories of these two nodes within the heritage city

offer a revealing picture of the differential workings of the preservationist cartology. What, then, are the causes and consequences of the uneven mapping of heritage cosmopolitanism onto the urban fabric? Are some ruins best left in their state of ruination? In the case of Fustat, there are certainly political, economic, and historical reasons for why it has not received the kinds of heritage attention that the AKTC and others have orchestrated for monuments and vistas of medieval al-Qahira.

However, there may be an opportunity here, a space in which to step outside of certain kinds of heritage practices as the authorizing means by which particular places and pasts gain acceptance within its cosmopolitan discourse. Is there something to be gained from falling outside of the protective arms of the heritage industry? The Fustat ruins are a place in which to contemplate decay without the promise of their enduring future. Its aesthetic is one of ruination, a showcase for the kinds of taphonomic processes of decay that archaeologists attempt to document in order to understand how the material record was formed. In this sense, they have come to operate as a space of alterity to the forms of global cosmopolitanism whose particularly consumptive cultivation of the heritage city is not without limitations and preferences. Perhaps such places need to be scripted into the making of the heritage city as a counter-balance to a fetishization of conservation, or the materialism implicit in heritage as a development strategy. Fustat offers its own reality that draws power from a desire to lament both its abuse and neglect within the universalist claims of heritage discourse and cosmopolitan culture. There is an authenticity here that cannot be manufactured in the manicured greenery and the minareted sunsets of al-Azhar Park. The grittiness and struggle, the corruption and confusion that conditions the lives of the majority of the city's residents is far closer to the realities of a dusty Fustat than that of the Aga Khan's verdant gift.

The point, however, is not to reject the desires of heritage cosmopolitanism's pursuit of a future for the past through a particular representation of Cairo as an Islamic city. Such an escape may be welcome by many even if it does not reflect the city they know. While its efforts may border on the utopian and certainly echoes of a paternalist elitism, such critiques should not unduly burden the analysis of the place of heritage in the practices of dwelling. This analysis has sought to examine how these become drawn into questions of authenticity and modernity. Janet Abu Lughod (1987: 172) in her well-known critique of the Orientalist canon of Islamic urban studies has argued that the city is not a product but a process. The problem with such an analysis is that it leads to efforts to resuscitate and revive those processes, what she also terms "deep structures to the language of Islamic expression in space" (ibid.: 164), in the hope to recreate and return to the traditional city. This fundamentally misunderstands the relationship of heritage to the very workings of modernity as a tool in the making of what Heidegger famously described as the "world picture." By this he meant a world that has become a picture, a representable object of technoscientific rationality, or as he writes: "world picture ... does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived of and grasped as a picture" (Heidegger 1977: 130). It is left to the spaces of alterity – the Fustats of the world, not the al-Azhar Parks – to reclaim such perspective. They might reveal certain workings of a continued and vibrant tradition of argumentation about the ways in



which the past should become cultivated as part of one's sense of place. Heritage discourse should be careful not to foreclose such arguments but encourage them, see where they lead, and analyze the structures of power that serve to authorize and legitimate one mode of dwelling over another. The heritage city is a particularly modern phenomenon. As such, the scope of its efforts in producing that object, that world picture, necessitates an examination of where the past falls outside of its claims to authority and control. As diverse inhabitants cultivate their senses of place, the arguments that they articulate become the locus for observing the dynamism and continuity of something we might begin to call an Islamic urban tradition.

## Notes

1. The *medinas* of North Africa in particular demonstrate the kinds of representations that would justify French efforts to transform the city into a space fit for civilization and modernization. The general thrust of the discourse was to depict the traditional city as chaotic, contaminated and constrained by a particular cultural mentality frozen in its backwardness.
2. Michael Gilson provides an extensive commentary on this re-Islamization of the traditional city particularly by the very bourgeoisie that left the *medina* for the modern suburbs (1983: 212). He writes that "it is instanced by the idea of the setting apart of a cultural center of a particular kind in which 'Islam' can be appropriately reproduces and admired" (ibid). What we see then is the merging of the Islamic city and the traditional city discourses within a particular modernist perspective of how the meanings attributed to the spatial forms of the past can be regulated as part of the present. For Gilson, this recuperation of the Islamic in the modern nation-state is part of a larger process of positioning Islam into the discrete sphere of religion (ibid: 189).
3. The compendia of Ibn Duqmaq (1309 [1893]) and al-Maqrizi (1270 [1853]) offer the most complete descriptions (see Kubiak 1987: 18–29 for a complete description of the documentary evidence). These sources also provide much of our knowledge of the later Fatimid period.
4. This mosque, built around 640 CE by its namesake 'Amr ibn al-As, the general who led the Muslim armies to victory against the remaining Byzantine forces, became the focal point of civic and religious life within the military camp *cum* city.
5. Archaeological evidence, however, has given us virtually no basis from which to question these narrative sources concerning the agglomeration of Fustat/Misr prior to the arrival of the Fatimids.
6. The notion of a "medieval" Islamic Cairo situated in these areas of the historic city has roots that trace back well into the late nineteenth century under the work of the Comité de Conservation des Monuments de l'Art Arab. This period and the formative efforts undertaken by foreign and Egyptian figures in articulating a place for the medieval city in the modern world has been carefully examined in the edited volume *Making Cairo Medieval* (AlSayyad et al. 2005).

7. The term her informants use to describe it is *'asl*, which in Arabic literally means origin.
8. The conference was in fact sponsored by the Aga Khan Award for Architecture and resulted in a publication on the problems facing urban growth in the city.
9. Many of the professionals, particularly the conservators and architectural consultants, will find employment with numerous of these agencies and funding sources as projects come on line.
10. While a detailed ethnographic study of the park and its use and operation has yet to be undertaken, the observations of this author during several visits suggest that various classes of Egyptian society have taken advantage of the site. Young couples stroll the grounds; children enjoy an open play ground and rides, while professionals patronize the restaurants. It is possible to hear various dialects of Arabic as well as foreign languages mingling with the din of the city. While the main entrance on the eastern side of the park is largely accessible by car, a planned second entrance was opened in 2008 on the western side of the park linking it to the working class neighborhood of Darb al-Ahmar and more pedestrian traffic.

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# Heritage and Sustainability in Shunde (China)

Sharon Haar

The effects of rapid urban development can be seen throughout China in its large cities. Urbanization of major cities, such as Chongqing, and infrastructure projects, such as the Three Gorges Dam (1994-), have led to the massive reshaping of land, resources, and cultural traditions, with global consequences. However, the effects of rapid urban development and the remaking of the physical landscape also can be seen in rural regions and small yet growing cities, raising questions about the transformation of landscape and building traditions as they are tied to traditional cultures. The following case study examines several recent planning projects in the city of Shunde in the Guangdong province that illustrate the tenuous balance between urban growth and heritage, landscape, and preservation, particularly as they are manifested through the discourse of sustainability.

## Land and Water

Shunde is part of the large network of cities that together form the agricultural and industrial base of the Pearl River Delta, historically united by water and now brought together via advanced technological connections, highways, and – anticipated in the near future – light-rail (Fig. 1). Shunde itself is not a megacity; currently, it operates as a district of Foshan (pop. 3.8 million, 2004) which itself is a satellite of Guangzhou. Nor, however, is it rural in the strict sense of the word. Its population – somewhere above one million and growing (not including its floating population of semilegal migrant workers) – is comparable to the metropolitan region of Phoenix (pop. 1.3 million, 2006). As such, its urban development issues occur at a specific scale; they are not addressed by the overgeneralized analyses of megacity growth or the critique of specific projects, such as the Beijing Olympic Village or the Pudong in


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S. Haar (✉)

School of Architecture, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

e-mail: haar@uic.edu






**Fig. 1** Map showing Shunde's location in the Pearl River Delta (Haar)

Shanghai, around which many Western discussions of Asian urbanism are built. Despite its massive industrial, agricultural, and horticultural output that produces furniture, refrigerators, and flowers distributed in China and to its trade partners, Shunde is relatively “unseen” by the global economy of which it is a part (Fig. 2).

This paper raises questions regarding the ways in which metaphors of landscape preservation and ecological consciousness are utilized as economic engines. Shunde's leaders recognize that the modernization of the city is a direct outgrowth of its history, founded on water-based agriculture and manufacture. The modernization of the region's environmental ecology is essential to economic growth (Grimes 2005). Shunde's official Web site places these in relation to tourism, stating: “On the basis of social and economic progress, Shunde commits itself to creating an overall environment for tourism. [The tourism] industry has entered a new phase for brand new development.” But what kind of tourism is this? Shunde would never qualify as a world heritage site. Despite its place in the global economy, it does not fit the UNESCO definition of a World Heritage Site that belongs “to all the peoples of the world, irrespective of the territory on which they are located” (<http://www.whc.unesco.org/en/about>). However, Shunde's planners and developers recognize the



**Fig. 2** Morphology of the “Old Town” and “New Administrative District” of Shunde (base drawing by Kristy Gasparino and Sarah Weibenson)

extent to which the future of the city relies not only on its manufacturing capacity, but also on its “place-making” capacity: the way it promotes and to a certain extent preserves its cultural and landscape heritage, but also the way in which it creates “heritage” through the creation of new landscapes designed to celebrate and integrate the past into the future. In this study, my approach is from the perspective of the urban designer, not of an expert on Chinese heritage. My interest is in analyzing the place of heritage and landscape within the development of the sustainable city. Partially for practical purposes, but also for the purposes of explicating the process of rapid urban growth, I am less concerned with the representation of these spaces than what their development represents.<sup>1</sup>

## Shunde’s Urbanization

Shunde’s growth can be understood in the context of its location and its history. Its origin dates to the fifteenth century when it emerged from the water-based ecology and economy of the delta estuary formed where the Pearl River, the third longest river in China, empties into the South China Sea between Hong Kong and Macau. It is part of Guangdong province in the south of the country, where in late 1978 Deng Xiaoping initiated China’s economic reform movement, capitalizing on centuries of international trade through the region to transform it into a center for global manufacturing (Campanella 2008). Shunde’s vernacular architecture and urban patterns




**Fig. 3** Old City Center (*left*) and fish farms (*right*) (photos: Aaron Garbutt and Carl Wohl)

have two primary characteristics: a loose but dense network of fish and silk farms scattered throughout the navigable water-based landscape and dense urban development following the contours of a mountainous topography further inland.

Chosen as a “pilot” city in the 1980s by the Chinese government, Shunde has rapidly responded by developing the requisite new industrial zones, technical schools, residential areas, and administrative capacities. Further, as part of a large network of growing cities, Shunde’s government and planners perceive the city’s future to be directly tied to its ability to compete for both local and global recognition and sales of its products. One city development brochure calls this: “creating the future with urbanization.”<sup>2</sup> This future, however, still has ties to the past. City leaders describe their methodology for growth as “being flexible and dexterous like the water,” recognizing that the city’s foundations sit within “the earliest artificial ecological system in human history.”

Shunde’s urbanization has three components: (1) the westernizing old town comprising tall buildings, shopping malls, hotels, McDonalds, KFC, etc., set within the hilly landscape of the interior; (2) an extensive *desakota* region (from the Indonesian words *desa* [village] and *kota* [town]) “characterized by an intense mix of agricultural and non-agricultural activities that often stretch along corridors between large city cores” (Sui and Zeng 2001:37); and (3) the “new administrative district,” established on a flat plane of former fish ponds at the confluence of two rivers (Fig. 3). The village/town dynamic of the *desakota* seems inherent in the historic development of the region, in which land and water have been continually modified to promote agriculture, production, and trade. T.G. McGee, who with Norton Ginsburg developed this model of Asian urban development, states: “Distinctive areas of agricultural and nonagricultural activity are emerging adjacent to and between urban cores, which are a direct response to pre-existing conditions, time-space collapse, economic change, technological developments, and labor force change occurring in a different manner and mix from the operations of these factors in the Western industrialized countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (McGee 1991: 4). However, now the scale, technology, and methodology of building have shifted dramatically, layering modern building and infrastructure on top of the




**Fig. 4** Cutting and filing to create the ground plane of the New Administrative District (photos: Sarah Brady and Sharon Haar)

region's ecological attributes through a massive reshaping of water and land. In the maps, planning documents, and drawings, the original state of the land is never clear, so it is difficult to determine what has been built versus merely planned, and what plan (among many) is currently in place. Representations of the Pearl River Delta seem to rarely match experiences on the ground.

Although Ginsburg describes the growth of the desakota regions as “almost natural” and unrelated to government planning, the same cannot be said of the New Administrative District built alongside but distinct from the old city (Ginsburg 1991: xii). The strategy used in the design of the New District, of building new urban areas far outside of existing cities, is becoming common in Chinese cities as they struggle to expand beyond physically constrained historic centers to accommodate massive urban growth. In Shunde, the superimposition of an urban grid measuring  $300\text{m} \times 300\text{m}$  over fish farms to create the New City, for instance, has created a jarring clash between old and new landscape (Fig. 4). One mode of land use can still be seen under the other, like a palimpsest, and often, where one system ends, the other suddenly begins. The urban grid places the new city hall across from a large public space flanked on either side by administration buildings. New convention centers and exhibition halls highlight the relationship of administration and economy, and new high-rise residential complexes, malls, and entertainment centers are quickly being built to support the district's burgeoning population. The New City welcomes the automobile: its six- to eight-lane roadbeds anticipate a move toward the use of the private car, already evident in the region's congested highways. Although the area has bus service, the distances between places in this tropical environment discourage walking, bicycling, and simply standing at the bus stop. As one of the wealthiest regions in the country, with a per capita income of \$10,000 in the early 2000s, more than one in ten families own a car and the buildings provide ample garages or surface lots to accommodate them (Statistical Yearbook of Shunde 2004). The administration buildings sit atop large parking plinths hidden by designed landscape (Fig. 5). Despite the rapid rate of construction, environmental considerations are prioritized (according to the city's own brochures) so that an “immense artificial green landscape” is simultaneously being grown.



**Fig. 5** Panorama of the City Hall and Civic Plaza of the New Administrative District from the city's administrative building (photo: Wotjek Palmowski)



**Fig. 6** Plan showing palimpsest of the existing fishponds and new buildings (Haar)

The Hong Kong-based urbanists Laurent Gutierrez and Valerie Portefaix aptly describe the geography of the Delta as floating, reflecting the situation and characterization of its urban form. “It is very natural that these small villages developed from an agricultural production to an industrialized economy. The multiplication of rural enterprises, small towns and transport infrastructure are the main determinants of today’s organization. This transition not only involved farming activity but also the size of plots and accessibility to water. This also extends to the erasure of surrounding peaks to fill ponds and create artificial planes that accommodate a growing infrastructure and urban settlements” (Gutierrez and Portefaix 2003: 75) (Fig. 6).

The regional ecology of the Pearl River Delta may have always been a patchwork, but today’s modern urban patches are of a size and scale out of touch with the traditional agricultural organization of small fish farms and canal towns and tight-knit, pre-urban cities further inland. Similarly, the new attitude toward water does not respect traditional practices. New projects may incorporate water elements into their landscape themes, but typically to the detriment of the existing water ecology. It is here that the greatest effects of Western-style modernization can be seen in the wholesale erasure of traditional landscapes and agricultural methods in the rich delta estuary.



To create the new ground plane for industrial agriculture, industrial and technology parks, and entirely new cities, large amounts of the soggy delta must be filled. The effect of this filling is evident not only in the loss of fish farms – formerly a source of employment and income for local farmers – but also in the denuding and carving out of the area's hills and mountains which provide the material for the infill.

An overlay of new and planned projects on top of the preexisting landscape around the Gui Pan River illustrates this process. Newly built developments rarely follow the contours of the hills or former canals and dikes, but instead sit as independent elements anticipating future neighbors. The new Polytechnic, a large campus with an anticipated enrollment of 10,000–12,000 students covering over 120 hectares, is designed around its own dramatic and meandering water landscape that runs up against the existing water systems without acknowledging them, probably in anticipation of further development. Each block of the New City swallows numerous fishponds with little attention to the existing land divisions or waterways. Water here serves to augment the monumentality of the district's open spaces, roads, and buildings, but does little to relieve the excessive scale of roadbeds designed for anticipated traffic in the final buildout. As the traditional landscape is slowly erased by the inexorable pace of development, the inhabitants of old villages are relocated to new villages placed in leftover spaces between new developments. Existing hills are scoured to provide new fill. While green elements – trees, bushes, flowers, and grass – are abundant and line every new road and highway, they require constant watering by water tankers throughout the cool night and tending by manual labor throughout the hot day. The development process operates by creating a *tabula rasa* of new land to provide a flat, fresh plane for construction.

As the urban designer and academic Richard Marshall has noted with regard to Asian projects designed to allow cities to compete globally: “Among other things these projects provide two very important global advantages to their host locations. First they provide a particular type of urban environment where the work of globalization gets done and second, they provide a specific kind of global image that can be marketed in the global market place” (Marshall 2003: 4). This is true even in the relatively small city of Shunde, which promotes itself both on the basis of its industrial strengths and the image of its green environment. However, it begs the question: Is the historical ecology a recognized and valued component of the city's efforts toward sustainability or is it merely an artifact of the past that is ultimately discarded?

In Shunde, development is taking place on two tracks: the building of the pieces necessary for globalized competition and the promotion of local traditions. With globalization comes not just factories but the infrastructure to support them: roads, highways, water management, and the New City, too large to be accommodated within the old center and, therefore, necessitating the large-scale conversion of agricultural land (much of it water) to hardscape and modern buildings. Preservation is also a developmental imperative necessitating the survival of pieces of rural lifestyle and the building of new sites to celebrate history and tradition.



## Landscape and Sustainability

The New City with its axial organization, large-scale grid, and neo-historicist and neomodern architecture stands in contrast to the Shunfeng Mountain Park. The park is a 400+hectare development that is “a key project [in] the construction of green mountains, clean water and blue sky” and the main auxiliary project for urbanization in Shunde. Its mountainous landscape sits between the new and old cities while its extensive water system joins them. Shunfeng provides the entire district with a landscape and heritage site in which views to and from it suggest a history of urban and landscape development deeply tied to long-standing religious and cultural traditions, geomancy, and historic Chinese gardens (Figs. 7 and 8). Although the park contains a vast array of passive and active recreation, its core elements are the Baolin Temple on the top of Taiping Hill and two large water features, Qingyun Lake and Guipan Lake “[adopting] the method of mountain linking with water, leaning against mountain and facing water.” The park conjoins Chinese and Western characteristics, with referents to Chinese historic landscape elements, with a program designed – as described in the city’s promotional materials – to be a “leisure and body-building people’s park” affording the qualities of a “city lung.”




Fig. 7 Plan of Shunfeng Mountain Park (Haar)





Fig. 8 Design drawing and model of Shunfeng Mountain Park (Haar)



Fig. 9 Qingyun Lake and Baolin Temple under construction (photos: Andrew Dribin, Carl Wohit and Sarah Brady)

Baolin Temple, a ceremonial complex dating to A.D. 942, was moved to Taiping Hill in 1996 as part of a reconstruction project that includes a sequence of surrounding buildings that imitate architecture from the Song through the Ming dynasties (tenth through seventeenth centuries). A journey to the summit of the temple provides a view to a pagoda at an even higher elevation at the top of the hill and a view out to Qingyun Lake, an artificial body of water that is the focal point of a “large-scale Chinese Garden.” Elements of the garden include a main Entrance Square, Wuxing Bridge, Stone Memorial Arch, Nine-Crook Bridge, Belt-form Bridge, Spring Greeting Pavilion, and Dragon Form Pavilion (Shunde’s New City Web site offers images of historic gardens, pavilions, and garden elements that are precedents for the design) (Fig. 9). Here the emphasis is on reflection and acknowledgement of historic building and landscape forms. By contrast, Guipan Lake, created by widening the northern portion of the Guipan River, is designed to be an active recreational space that will ultimately sit within the New City as its residential developments expand to the East (Fig. 10). Unmentioned in the descriptions of the Shunfeng Mountain Park is the place of the Hua Gui Gardens between the foot of Taiping Hill and the GuiPan River, a meeting venue, hotel, and guest residences for visiting dignitaries modeled on Italian villas. Because of its location, it is unseen except from the river, but it commands superlative views both out to the transforming riverfront and back



**Fig. 10** Shaping the Qingyun and Guipan Lakes (Haar)

to the Pagoda on the hill. The location of this compound within the framework suggests alternative uses with a very different set of stakeholders than those who presumably enjoy the other areas of this public park.

To view Shunfeng Mountain Park solely through the lens of its historical recreations or its respiratory capacities is to misconstrue its larger program and its role in orchestrating the geographical relationship of Old City to New City, traditional landscape to contemporary recreation, and tourism and global space to traditional place. In his study of the cultural landscape of Chengde, the summer mountain resort of the Qing emperors (named a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1994), the historian Philippe Forêt noted “The survival of architectural heritage has emerged as a recent concern on the Asian continent only after the often gratuitous destruction of a large number of sites and structures. The new perception of a need to protect the rich legacy of Asian values is related to the disturbing disappearance of the physical environment of ancient Asia, which is succumbing to the deadly combination of climatic degradation, wartime devastation, public apathy, and rampant development” (Forêt 2000: 6). A comparison of the creation of the contemporary Shunfeng landscape to the historic district of Chengde is instructive, despite the fact that they were built during different periods and under differing auspices. Both of these “created landscapes” are derived from principles of southern Chinese Pleasure Gardens and “attitudes toward nature ... superimposing borrowed landscapes that together came to form the genuine Qing landscape” (Fig. 11). Of particular note is that the sites themselves had “no previous cultural imprint” (Forêt 2000: 15). Forêt suggests a way of reading the Mountain Park through the relationships among its landscapes and features but, more importantly for my study, as an intersection of “hybridity, spectacle, and colonial studies” that views “landscape as a monument” (Forêt 2000: 1).



**Fig. 11** Shaping Taiping Hill (photo: Wotjek Palmowski)

While I do not want to equate Chengde’s “imprinting of imperial authority on a natural environment” with the objectives of the project at Shunfeng Mountain Park, there are clear correlatives between the two landscapes in the way that they both use natural and naturalized landscape and play “simultaneously on several geographical scales and on several registers of meaning” to frame the reading of a larger territory (Forêt 2000: 2-3, 65).

In the case of Chengde, the remaking of the landscape served to further the authority of the imperial administration through reference to the past as it also allowed for the better administration of the land and its inhabitants. Shunfeng Mountain Park utilizes a similar methodology for authorial if not administrative purposes. Heritage, thus, authenticates the wholly modern project of the socialist market economy that has built the New City of Shunde as previously imperial forms are released for the people’s pleasure. In so doing, it both physically and metaphorically grounds and connects the shifting landscape of the New City and the larger district of Shunde providing “attachment to place and territory” (Entrikin 1991: 4).

## Heritage and Sustainability

The erasure of cultural traditions – family farming and manufacture (including fishing and silk), canal towns, family temples, and local Lingnan organization incorporating buildings and water – has been brought about through massive reorganization of the landscape, particularly water and land. Planners in Shunde are keenly aware of the real and potential future consequences as they describe the price of development in terms of the loss of local culture and extreme pollution. The sense of loss informs both the form and style of contemporary developments and stimulates increasing interest in ecological and heritage tourism directed at local and national audiences. The turn toward tourism is a way to preserve traditional culture and also to promote the city for future economic development. In this dynamic, preservation



**Fig. 12** Changjiao and Fengjian Villages: Housing, canal, and family temple (photos: Haar)

is an aftereffect – that is, a reaction to development – paradoxically made possible by the speed of growth and expansion of wealth in the city.

Since water is at the center of all development in Shunde and the central feature of its ecology, it is not surprising to find it at the center of questions of sustainability and preservation. The villages of the region were organized around canals and centered on the relationship of fish farming for sustenance and mulberry bushes for silk production. The canals were the primary method of circulation and served to connect the villages to larger towns and trading networks. Although no longer significant to the region’s industrial economy, preservation of the villages and restoration of their family temples have become an essential feature of heritage tourism. One piece of Shunde’s promotional material specifically praises village life: “Stepping into Fengjian village, you will see the setting sun turning the Mulberry fish ponds into red, the reticulated watercourses, the hit-and-miss cockleboats, the banana forest on the riverside, the blue stone plate roads leading to the back roads” (Fig. 12).

Shunde’s Web sites actively promote the city’s “Return to Nature,” “the Natural Watery Region,” and “Traditional Culture.” Along with the “New Scenic Spots,” such as the elements of Shunfeng Mountain Park, are links to “Scenic Spots and Historical Sites,” ancestral temples, bell towers, and historic peaks that can be found amidst the rapidly modernizing region. The region’s canal-focused villages are based upon a form of family based, communal living that remains extant in many new residential projects but without the integration of landscape and production. In these developments, both urban and suburban, the centerpiece is water, coursing through artificial streams, canals, ponds, fountains, and play areas. As family farming and industry have shifted to industrial-scaled agriculture and horticulture and the region’s productive capabilities have moved into industrial and technology parks, the nuanced integration of living and working around water has disappeared. The future economy of the villages is tourism, particularly as younger inhabitants move to jobs and residential projects in and around the city.

It is not clear how the tourism around the villages will work, although there are several models that could be used for comparison. The first is the nearby tourist and recreational site developed in conjunction with the actor Bruce Lee’s ancestral village,





**Fig. 13** Water features in new residential developments in the suburbs and the city of Shunde (photos: Haar)

Jun'an Eco Park, which operates – literally – as a preserve to present the historical ecology and economy of the region through reenactment. Among its recreated landscapes, the Eco Park contains silk-making demonstrations, a historic town and factory, fishponds and mulberry bushes, and preserves of the history of the agricultural/manufacturing origins of the region. Here, cultural and landscape heritage works in direct support of the tourist economy. A second model might be that of the water towns outside of Suzhou in the Taihu Lake region, several of which are preserved as historical sites and attract tourists drawn to the experience of traditional culture. (Tourists often pay a fee to visit the centers of these towns.) Whereas in the first model the heritage that is represented in the built and landscape environment is recreated, in the second model it is actually preserved, although not sustained. Renate Howe and William S. Logan argue in “Protecting Asia’s Urban Heritage: The Way Forward” (Howe and Logan 2002: 256) that “Conservation, change, and development must be based on the unique cultural values and heritage legacy of Asia, its sub-regions, and cities, for these are the essential props of community identity and cohesion, as well as a burgeoning cultural tourism industry operating at international, regional, and domestic levels.” But it remains unclear as to whether the latter (tourism) does serve to maintain the former (community identity and cohesion). What is demonstrated, however, is that the methodologies of urbanization, while often using traditional landscape and village motifs as props around which to organize large-scale building – the canals of the New Administrative District and the water features of the Polytechnic and new residential districts – do not utilize the ecological principles of the traditional landscape as a means for developing an ecologically sustainable urbanism (Fig. 13). And it is in this sense, whether one believes that urbanization, globalization, and tourism are good for heritage preservation and diversity or not, that it can be argued that Shunde’s designers, planners, and developers are missing out on an opportunity to promote regional heritage as a mechanism for urbanization (Cowen 2002).



## Conclusion

The restoration of Baolin Temple and its location within a newly built, if historically associated, building and landscape context do not appear to be “ethically fraught” in the way that reconstruction at historic sites in the West can be. In China, there is less debate about the preservation of “authentic” ruins versus the reconstruction of buildings and landscapes with little recourse to historically accurate artifacts (Gao and Treib 2006). The landscape theorist Stanislaus Fung noted that “Chinese buildings continue to be caught in a perpetual cycle of building and rebuilding,” and suggested that the physical survival of buildings in China is not an integral part of urban “identity” (Fung 1999: 148). But while this conclusion may be accurate with respect to architecture, it may not be applicable in the realm of landscape and planning because questions of preservation and recreation do come into play with regard to the large-scale remaking of agricultural land into a new administrative district, as is occurring in Shunde. Identity is clearly an issue in the creation of Shunde’s new city through the reshaping of the natural landscape into a complex associative realm directed both toward the creation of recreational opportunities and the realignment of urban relationships. Shunfeng Mountain Park creates a vast environmental panorama at the same time that it is an indicator of the city’s need for attractive, ecologically mindful open space and a landscape that provides grounding in a context that is floating, both literally and figuratively. These new landscapes provide vehicles for tourism, but also serve to distinguish the district from its larger context, not preserving, but creating a “sense of place.” The Park and the New City use the past as a way toward the future, a future that situates the city in a globalizing economy and landscape.

As Shunde struggles for its place within the intense industrial and promotional competition of the Pearl River Delta, it also struggles to create a sense of place and a community. Its upwardly spiraling population is not due to natural growth but to massive migration from the countryside and other cities; building an identity for the city is the key to its continued growth and status in the region. The Baolin Temple/Shunfeng Mountain Park complex seeks to create a cultural community by making explicit reference to an assumed, shared past. By contrast, in the canal towns the “indigenous” population attempts to preserve an affective relationship to the land and its disappearing history. The geographer Nicholas Entrikin would see this development emerging from the globalization of capitalism, industrialization, and urbanization: “Ideas of local culture emerge only as residual effects of [the] dynamics of capital, and are to be understood only in reference to them. The mechanisms of capitalism create *types* of places and regions, to which culture adds ‘local color’” (Entrikin 1991: 30). The creation of the sustainable twenty-first-century city rests on the erasure of the existing ecology and at the same time provokes the desire for historical continuity. Heritage and ecology risk becoming tropes of one another rather than meaningful ways of ensuring sustainable growth.

## Notes

1. I had the opportunity to travel to Shunde in Fall 2004 as part of a team of faculty and students in University of Illinois at Chicago's Urban Planning and Policy Program and School of Architecture hosted by the city and its local development company to work on proposals for new residential developments in Shunde's New City. The joint studio originated through the auspices of Tingwei Zhang, an associate professor in the Urban Planning and Policy Program. I would like to thank our hosts for generously touring us through the region. I am grateful to the students, practitioners, and faculty who shared their thoughts and experiences with me and in particular those who translated Chinese documents and statistics. The interpretations of these materials are my own. Thanks also to the students who provided several of the images for this essay. I would also like to thank Dianne Harris and D. Fairchild Ruggles for pointing me toward additional research on landscape and heritage in Asia.
2. Quotations from promotional materials are taken from the four-volume report: *Shunde New City: Planning, Operation, Industry, and Culture* provided by Shunde's planning department. See also: <http://newcity.shunde.gov.cn/english/> (Shunde Information Center, accessed 6 March 2009), <http://www.shunde.gov.cn/newen/> (Shunde People's Government of Foshan, accessed 6 March 2009), and <http://www.shunde.cn/en/> (Shunde Information Center, accessed 6 March 2009).

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