

# Immigrants and National Identity in Europe

Anna Triandafyllidou



London and New York

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# Immigrants and National Identity in Europe

National identity and nationalism are social phenomena of increasing importance in contemporary society and politics. Over the past few decades, European identities in particular have been called into question by peripheral nationalisms, the revival of ethnic allegiances, religious communities and the creation of social movements preaching universal values. National identity may be surviving the upheaval, but it is not surviving unchanged.

This work explores the role of Others, nations, ethnic groups and immigrant communities, in the formation and evolution of national identity.

The book contains three core elements:

- An overview of literature on nationalism.
- A new and original theoretical perspective.
- A rich set of original data.

The author reviews the main theories of nationalism and criticises their dismissal of the role of Others in nation formation. Drawing upon anthropological, sociological and social psychological perspectives, she develops a dynamic, relational approach for the study of national identity.

Her study also provides an empirical analysis through case studies concentrating on the press and political discourse on immigration in Greece, Italy and Spain. The results of these case studies are compared with earlier research on 'old' immigration countries, Britain, France and Germany.

Scholars and students of Sociology and Social Psychology, particularly those working in the fields of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Ethnic and Race Relations, Immigration Studies, Comparative Sociology, Southern European Politics and International Relations, will find this work pivotal in ascribing importance to the Other in national identity.

**Anna Triandafyllidou** received her PhD in social sciences from the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. She has held teaching and research positions in Brussels, London (London School of Economics), Rome (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) and Florence (European University Institute), where she currently co-ordinates a research project on immigration policy funded by the European Commission. She is the author of four books and numerous articles on nationalism, immigration and communication.

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First published 2001  
by Routledge  
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada  
by Routledge  
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group*

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003.

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*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*

A catalogue record for this book is available  
from the British Library

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data*

Triandafyllidou, Anna

Immigrants and national identity in Europe / Anna Triandafyllidou

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Europe—ethnic relations. 2. Nationalism—Europe. 3. Xenophobia—Europe. 4. Immigrants—Europe. 5. Europe, Southern—Emigration and immigration. I. Title. II.

DD1056.T75 2001

32054'094—dc21

2001019307

ISBN 0-203-16749-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-26239-5 (Adobe eReader Format)

ISBN 0-415-25728-x (Print Edition)

στον Ευγένιο  
for having come into my life



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# Preface

My interest in nationalism and xenophobia arose mainly as a matter of personal concern as I noticed a swift change in attitudes and a rapid spread of xenophobic behaviour in my home country, Greece, in the early 1990s.

This personal concern was soon transformed into an article, the fruit of a joint venture with my friend and colleague Andonis Mikrakis, which we called 'Greece: the "others" within'. Looking back at our conclusions from that study and comparing them with the findings presented in this book, I am still bitterly surprised by the short time it took for Greece and other southern European countries to engage in heated nationalist and racist rhetoric against immigrants. I am even more surprised that few people in any of the three countries I study herein – Greece, Italy and Spain – reflect on their own experiences as emigrants, or those of their relatives and friends, in a past that is still too near to the present to be forgotten.

New developments in southern Europe, as well as the stirring of 'old' problems in 'old' immigration countries, have fortunately attracted the attention of a number of scholars. Social, political and economic issues have been analysed and criticised, solutions have been proposed and theoretical principles to which Western societies – or indeed any society – should adhere have been elaborated. It is the aim of this book to make a tiny contribution to this larger debate by pointing to the dynamics that develop between national identity and the immigrants' presence in contemporary Europe.

My contentions are twofold. On the one hand, I have tried to show that Othering the immigrant is by no means the 'natural' order of things. It is triggered by a specific sociopolitical order, that of national states. Furthermore, it serves specific purposes that are linked not only to politics or economic interests but also (and mainly) to national identity. Othering the immigrant provides a source of security for the ingroup, while also legitimising several forms of direct or indirect exploitation of non-natives. On the other hand, this book points to the interactive nature of national identity and highlights the dynamics of its development and transformation. This does not mean to deny the historical embeddedness of nations and nationalism. I am rather propagating a more sophisticated approach to the study of national identity; this is an approach that takes into account interaction – both real and imagined – with Others.

The analysis of such interaction will also help us to understand better phenomena such as xenophobia and racism because it will highlight their relative–reflexive character. In reality, it is neither the intrinsic features of Others nor those of the ingroup that triggers hostility or discrimination. It is the interaction between the two that might generate prejudice and conflict. It takes two to make a fight, as the Greek saying goes. And it takes two to build an identity. This relativisation of national identity implies that it should be treated as contextual, not as less respectable, by members of the nation and by outsiders. I hope and believe that such a perspective will contribute to an understanding of identity dynamics, and will perhaps also help to resolve ethnic or national conflicts.

It usually takes a long time to write a book and this one took nearly 5 years to reach its present form. I started the research presented here at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), where I was offered the T. H. Marshall Post-Doctoral Fellowship in Sociology for the period between 1995 and 1997. This fellowship not only gave me the material means – with a generous financial contribution from the *British Journal of Sociology* – for conducting extensive fieldwork in Greece, Italy and Spain but also a unique opportunity to become involved in a valuable circle of colleagues: ‘the ASEN crowd’. Among them, I would particularly like to thank Anthony D. Smith, the president and founder of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (‘ASEN’), who was my mentor, both officially and intellectually, during my stay at the LSE. His advice and criticism have guided my exploration of theories of nationalism. I have benefited enormously from the discussions held in his Ph.D. workshop on nationalism and ethnicity during the academic years 1995–6 and 1996–7. I would also like to express my friendship and gratitude to Gordana Uzelac, Atsuko Ichijo, Jessica Jacobson, Anna Paraskevopoulou, Beatriz Zepeda and Joanna Michlic for their affection and support during my London years and after.

In writing up the research, which took the form of several conference papers, journal articles and eventually this book, I have benefited from the financial support of the European Commission Research Directorate-General: serving as a Marie Curie Fellow at the Institute of Psychology of the Italian National Research Council in Rome in the period 1997–9 was a valuable opportunity for my professional development. During my stay in Rome, the personal and academic support of Laura Benigni, my ‘scientist in charge’ as the European Commission jargon puts it, was overwhelmingly important. In addition, the opportunity to spend 2 years in a genuinely Italian environment allowed me to broaden and deepen my research, and also to gain a fuller understanding of the Italian reality and its complexities. I hope that I have been able to do justice to it in the pages of this book.

I would also like to thank the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Florence, my current academic home, for their institutional and financial support in the last stage of preparing this manuscript.

There are a few people who, although not related to sociology nor to this particular area of study, have provided me with support and encouragement during these years, and have listened and shared with me my doubts, disappointments or anxieties concerning this work. To Ντίνα, Δημήτρη, Αλέξανδρε, Francesco, Simona: thank you for being there.

Last but not least, I would like to thank Jackie Gauntlett for her excellent administrative skills and sunny mood that were precious during my stay at the LSE. The Institute of Psychology administration team went out of their (Italian) way to resolve bureaucratic stalemates for me, and I would like to thank them for that (despite my Greek origins, returning to Mediterranean ‘chaos’ from the Anglo-Saxon sense of ‘order’ did give me a hard time). A warm thanks goes to Alexandra George for carefully editing the typescript, and to the Routledge staff, Joe Whiting, Annabel Watson and Yeliz Ali in particular, for replying promptly to all my questions and accommodating most of my demands.

A special thanks goes to my informants and interviewees, trade union leaders, public administration employees and NGO (non-governmental organisation) activists, who have generously shared with me their time and experience. It is impossible to list them individually as this would breach their anonymity, but without them this book would not have been possible.

I would like to thank *Social Identities*, the *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* and *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (Taylor & Francis group, <http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals>) for allowing me to reproduce here parts of my articles published initially in their pages: ‘Nation and immigration: a study of the Italian press discourse’, *Social Identities* (1999) 5: 65–88; ‘National identity and the Other’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (1998) 21 (4): 593–612; ‘The political discourse on immigration in southern Europe: a critical analysis’, *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* (2000) 10: 5.

Naturally, I am solely responsible for viewpoints, errors and omissions.

Anna Triandafyllidou  
May 2001



# 1 Introduction

## Moral and political considerations

National identity and nationalism (the movement that develops either to generate or to protect and revitalise national identity) are social phenomena of primary importance in contemporary society and politics. Wars are fought, ethnic cleansing is practised, objects of art are created, families are divided and lives are wrought or flourish, all in connection to this fervently debated community, 'the nation'. During the 1980s, a number of scholars and politicians hurried to predict the demise of the nation and the nation-state, and to forecast their replacement by subnational and supranational forms of identification and political organisation. However, during the past decade we have witnessed a revitalisation of national loyalties, albeit through complex processes that also involve subnational and supranational groups.

In Europe, in particular, nation(al) states<sup>1</sup> have indeed been put to the test by peripheral nationalisms, the revival of ethnic allegiances, religious communities and the creation of other types of social movements preaching universal values, such as the environmental or women's movements. Moreover, the trend towards economic globalisation, the prevalence of a neoliberal market model, increasing population movements – in particular, immigration from eastern and central Europe and the Third World towards countries of the European Union – as well as the emergence of the European Union as a transnational polity have put the nation-state's legitimacy under further strain in Europe.

These pressures from above and from below do not seem to have extinguished the national flame, and allegiance to the nation has sometimes been strengthened in the process. However, it would be as misleading to argue that national identity is surviving this global upheaval quite unchanged as it would be to claim that it has withered away. In my view, national identity undergoes a process of change that is twofold. The nature of allegiance to 'the nation' as a primary, overarching and exclusive identification is put into question. At the same time, each nation undergoes a process of redefinition of its own identity, so that national identity is reinforced and the nation asserts its distinctiveness and is reciprocally differentiated from Others, groups or individuals, who do not belong to the ingroup. Today we are witnessing a fermentation of national identities

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and the redrawing of their boundaries in relation to internal or external Others that threaten, or are perceived to threaten (which is nearly the same thing), their autonomy or presumed 'authenticity'.

In this book, I am concerned with this second aspect<sup>2</sup> of national identity change. There are a number of reasons why I consider the study of national identity and of the role and impacts of interactions between the nation and Significant Others<sup>3</sup> as important and necessary. These are of a moral–normative nature, with significant political and policy implications.

Ethnic and national conflicts are among the main concerns in international relations: our daily life is overwhelmed by news about the conflict in Chechnya, the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, the difficult cohabitation of different nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Taliban assault in Afghanistan and the evolution of northern Irish politics. Moreover, the accommodation of ethnic minorities and immigrant communities within the social, cultural and political order of the national state has become an issue of concern for almost all European countries. Greece has recently been faced with the recognition of its immigrant and historical minorities, Italy strives to deal with the *Lega Nord* challenge and integrating its growing foreign population, Britain concedes autonomy to Scotland and turns away asylum seekers from eastern Europe, France struggles to incorporate its Muslim population, and Germany is in the course of revising its citizenship law to allow the naturalisation of its large foreign population.

Studying the relationship between the nation and the Other becomes a necessary tool for designing national and international policies and strategies that might help to avoid conflict and to accommodate the cultural or political demands of different communities. This point brings me to the moral concerns related to this study. Casting light on the identity dynamics underlying the debate on immigration, and analysing the rhetorical strategies through which the ingroup/nation is constituted in public discourse in opposition to the outgroup/immigrant Other are important tools for combating xenophobia and racism. Showing that prejudice against immigrants is mainly conditioned by ingroup–outgroup dynamics that become instrumental to the reinforcement and security of national identity but have little to do with the actual features of the immigrant population (be they cultural, social or religious) provides a powerful answer to those who fear that their lifestyles and sense of community will be 'contaminated' by the aliens.

### **Some introductory remarks**

The double-edged character of national identity – namely its capacity to define who is a member of the community and, perhaps more importantly, who is a foreigner – raises a number of questions for the student of nationalism. First, it compels one to ask to what extent national identity is a form of inward-looking self-consciousness of a group, or the extent to which the self-conception of the nation in its unity, autonomy and uniqueness is conditioned from the outside, that is to say by means of its differentiation by Others.

The notion of the Other is inherent in the nationalist doctrine itself: the very existence of a nation presupposes the existence of other nations as well. Most national communities that are politically independent today have also had to strive for their survival and autonomy; so every nation had and has other nations and/or states from which it has tried/tries to liberate and/or distinguish itself. The question that I want to investigate in this book is the role that such Others play in the definition of national identity.

As a theory of political organisation, nationalism requires that ethnic and cultural boundaries coincide with political ones. Boundaries between political units are supposed to define the boundaries between different ethnocultural communities. Nonetheless, the term nation-state is generally a misnomer. It usually denotes a multinational or multiethnic state in which a given national group is politically, culturally and numerically dominant and, therefore, tends to think of the state as its own political agent. However, this situation involves a high risk of conflict between the dominant nation and minority groups.

Moreover, contemporary reality is characterised by a growing movement of people – asylum seekers and economic immigrants – who legally or illegally cross national borders. Ethnic and cultural diversity is often a result of such migratory movements that challenge the legal restrictions and police measures intended to keep them out of the national territory. Host countries are thus faced with the necessity of dealing with these ‘Others within’ whose presence defies the national order.

The coexistence of different nations or ethnic groups on the same territory requires the identity of each group to be constantly negotiated and reaffirmed if the sense of belonging to the group is to survive. It requires a constant redefinition of the ingroup that must be distinguished from Others who might be geographically, and also culturally, close.

The scope of this book is twofold. First, from a theoretical viewpoint, it aims to investigate the role of the Other in the process of the (re)definition of national identity. I shall discuss some of the most influential theories of nationalism in order to show that, although the existence of the Other as part and parcel of the definition of the Nation has been widely accepted in scholarship, the relationship between the Other and the Nation has not been investigated in depth. The notion of a Significant Other will be introduced as an analytical tool for the study of the double-edged – inward and outward looking – character of national identity. A Significant Other need not be a stronger or larger nation, nor a community with more resources than the ingroup. The feature that makes some Other group a Significant Other is the fact that its presence is salient, either because it threatens (or is perceived to threaten) or inspires the ingroup. The Significant Other defies the nation’s sense of identity and uniqueness. The theoretical inquiry will be complemented by examples taken from contemporary European history and, more specifically, from south-eastern and western Europe.

The second aspect of the book concentrates on immigrants as a particular type of Others. Immigrants are characterised by their peculiar condition of



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being others within the national territory. Moreover, there are a number of features that are distinctive about immigrants, such as their social visibility (dependent on their modes of dress and behaviour, as well as their complexions), their very condition of being economic immigrants seeking work opportunities and their supposedly temporary stay. An overview of the situation in the 'old' immigration countries of Britain, France and Germany is provided to illustrate the identity dynamics involved in the Othering of the immigrant population, and to highlight how such processes might serve functional needs of the dominant national group.

Three case studies from southern Europe – Greece, Italy and Spain – as well as a comparative analysis of their situations will be used to show that a nation typically engages in a process of redefinition of its own identity so as to keep immigrants 'outside' the national community. It is hypothesised that this process of re-elaborating ingroup identity in contrast to a new Significant Other is more pronounced in nations with a predominantly ethnogenealogical conception of nationhood than in communities of a civic–territorial character.

Greece, Italy and Spain offer a set of interesting case studies because their conceptions of the national community differ widely. Along the ethnic–civic dimension, Greece displays the closest to an ethnocultural conception of the nation. Spain, in contrast, is characterised by a predominantly civic identity, whereas Italian nationhood is based on a blend of ethnic and territorial elements. It is therefore possible to use these different characteristics to examine my hypothesis about the redefinition of national identity in different types of nations.

Moreover, these three countries have recently become magnets for immigrants from eastern Europe and the Third World. Their governments have been caught ill prepared to cope with either the economic or the sociopolitical implications of such influxes of population. Nonetheless, various programmes regularising the status of illegal immigrants have taken place in Italy and Spain, while non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the churches and local or regional administrations have, to a certain extent, compensated for defective state services. In Greece, NGOs and trade unions have increasingly been concerned with the issue of immigration, and a first programme for the legalisation of undocumented immigrants who are already in Greek territory was commenced in 1998.

This book introduces a new theoretical perspective from which to study national identity. It incorporates the notion of the Other in its definition and examines the role of the Other in the formation and change of national identity. The findings of the research cast new light on the study of nationalism by showing that national identity is double-edged, based not only on the specific features that make each nation unique but also (and perhaps primarily) on the presence of Significant Others within and outside the national territory that condition the ingroup's conception of its nationhood.

I also examine the identity mechanisms underlying xenophobia and prejudice against immigrants. It is my hypothesis that such phenomena are related more to the ingroup's own identity than to actual features of the immigrant population.

Last but not least, the study provides information about attitudes towards immigration in the three countries under examination. It thus contributes to a better understanding of the problems related to the acceptance of immigrants in these countries. It also identifies the identity dimensions by which domestic populations feel the most threatened by immigrants. These findings are useful not only for students of nationalism but also for scholars of international relations, politicians and policy-makers for the development of policies combating xenophobia.

### **Xenophobia, racism and nationalism: some conceptual clarifications**

This study concentrates on the relationship between the nation and the Other, and particularly the immigrant Other. It is therefore important to clarify some of the concepts to be used in the theoretical discussion. Definitions of national identity, nationalism and the nationalist doctrine are provided in the following chapter. Here I am concerned with clarifying the concept of Othering, as well as related concepts such as xenophobia, racism and ethnic prejudice and the distinctions among them.

I use the term Othering to describe a twofold process that involves, on the one hand, the social and political exclusion of a group or individual (seen as a member of that specific group) from a given society and, on the other hand, the construction of an image of that group as a community that is alien to the ingroup; the Other is cast as different from and incompatible with – socially, culturally and politically – the ingroup. While using the term Othering, I shall also speak of Others to signify those groups that are, or have been, subjected to a process of Othering. The concept of a Significant Other will also be introduced to analyse the relationship between the nation and prominent groups excluded from the national identity.

The process of Othering is intertwined with xenophobic attitudes and behaviour, racist beliefs and ethnic prejudice. These terms – xenophobia and racism in particular – are often used interchangeably in everyday discourse. However, they in fact refer to quite distinct phenomena. Xenophobia involves a hostile reaction towards foreigners by members of a nation or ethnic group, and is linked to specific preconditions that foster its development (Mikrakis and Triandafyllidou 1994: 789–92). It is generally related to economic factors and its main objective is the expulsion of the new groups. By contrast, racism is linked to established ‘social, political and economic practices that preclude certain groups from material and symbolic resources’ (Hall 1989: 913). In other words, racism is not simply a negative attitude towards outsiders but rather aims at subordinating the Other(s).

Discussing the large number of theories and empirical studies that have analysed the concept and phenomenon of racism is beyond the scope of this book. It might be useful, however, to sketch the origins of the phenomenon, so as to explore its links with nationalism and national identity. Bodily appearance,

and skin colour specifically, have been important characteristics used to categorise and evaluate people. These phenotypic differences were developed into folk taxonomies and defined as 'races' in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Evans 1996: 37–42). 'Scientific' arguments were provided to sustain a presumed relationship between such characteristics and moral or sociocultural features of the people classified into these categories. The underlying argument of such categorisations was that the white, European race was morally and intellectually superior to all others. Different versions of racist ideologies have found their political expression in Western colonialism and imperialism, slavery and Nazism (see, among others, Miles 1989; Todorov 1989).

'Scientific' arguments about the existence of biological 'races' that could be identified by specific sociocultural features have now been discredited. Racism nevertheless persists as ideology and practice in Western societies, although perhaps in more subtle and covert forms than in the past. As a matter of fact, immigrants and ethnic minorities are usually categorised on the basis of their physical appearance and associated cultural or ethnic features. As van Dijk (1991: 26) argues:

Throughout western history [such categorisations] have been used to distinguish in- and out-groups according to a variable mixture of perceived differences of language, religion, dress or customs, until today often associated with different origin or bodily appearance.

The racial dimension is thus intertwined with an ethnic one. Most importantly, now that overt biological racism is morally condemned by liberal Western societies, racism is transformed into ethnicism (Mullard 1986): cultural differences are used to justify and legitimise practices of marginalisation and the exclusion of minority groups as well as the sociocognitive representations that underpin them (van Dijk 1991: 26–7).

Racism is not only about ideology but also about structural inequality and advantages of the dominant group over the dominated people. Overt forms of racial discrimination have largely been replaced by more indirect and subtle views of ethnic differentiation that can be defined as 'new', 'subtle' or 'symbolic' racism (Dovidio and Gaertner 1986). We can, in fact, distinguish between different *racisms* that are historically embedded, often internally contradictory and in a state of constant flux (Miles 1993: 41).

Racism might be conceptually related to nationalism in the sense that the process of nationalisation in Europe – the construction of a national identity and a national culture within each nation-state – involved, among others, a process of *racialisation* (see Miles 1989: 73–7). The bourgeois ruling classes of the European nation-states in the nineteenth century racialised the underclass as inferior and backward, while simultaneously portraying themselves as having a 'racial history and character' that was typical of the nation as a whole. In such discourses of ethnic descent and membership, the notions of 'race' and 'nation' often became indistinguishable (Miles 1993: 46–8). Put bluntly, nationalism

and national identity involve by definition an element of racism; in the effort to impose cultural homogeneity, they create internal racialised Others. Ethnic minorities or immigrant communities often play the part of the subordinated, racialised Other in a national state, although nationalism does not necessarily involve a racist view of other nations or ethnic groups.

Finally, it is important to distinguish between racism and 'ethnic prejudice'. The latter can be defined as:

... an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group. The net effect of prejudice, thus defined, is to place the object of prejudice at some disadvantage not merited by his own misconduct.

(Allport 1954: 9)

Allport is careful to clarify the point that prejudice is not simply a prejudgement or an erroneous misconception due to some overblown generalisation or wrong information. This is because prejudice is characterised by the fact that it is resistant to change, even when exposed to new, more accurate information that would threaten to unseat a prior erroneous belief. Moreover, Allport (*ibid.*) argues that people tend to grow emotional when a prejudiced view they hold is threatened with contradiction. So, while one might discuss and change a simple prejudgement without emotional resistance, the same is not true of a prejudice. It is worth noting that, from an analytical point of view, this need not be linked to a value judgement. The extent to which a society condemns prejudice and sees it as morally unacceptable, or condones it, is a separate issue altogether (*ibid.*: 10–11).

Even though prejudice refers to groups (or to individuals as members of these groups), and leads to the disadvantage of the victim without him or her being responsible for it, it must not be conflated with racism. This is because prejudice is not necessarily linked to structural inequality. Prejudice does not necessarily imply that the object of prejudice is subordinate to the perpetrator, although the two phenomena often do coincide.

### Contents of the book

This book is organised into two parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) deals with theoretical aspects of the relationship between national identity and Significant Others, whereas the second part (Chapters 4–7) concentrates on empirical research with a view to analysing the relationship between 'nation' and 'immigration' in a particular historical context and from a comparative perspective. Case studies include both western and southern European countries.

More specifically, *Chapter 2* offers a critical review of earlier works about national identity, including the theories put forward by Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, Elie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Tom Nairn, Edward Shils, Hans

Kohn and Anthony Smith. My analysis of these works shows that, even though the role of the Other in the formation and emergence of nations is widely recognised, this role is not explicitly theorised. Nor is the Other related to the processes of identity redefinition that nations experience. A new theoretical perspective from which to analyse national identity is proposed in this chapter, drawing on the work of Walker Connor and Karl Deutsch. Attention is also paid to the analysis of boundary creation and maintenance between ethnic groups provided by anthropologist Fredrik Barth. The ingroup–Other(s) dynamics and their impact on the constitution of national identity are discussed.

*Chapter 3* concentrates on the notion of the Significant Other, internal and external, threatening or inspiring. A typology of Significant Others is constructed to study the complex dynamics that condition the relationship between the nation and its Significant Other(s). Examples of nations whose self-consciousness have been conditioned, defined and/or transformed through real or imaginary interaction with other groups are provided. The ways in which the presence of the Other affects the definition, and indeed the self-conception, of the nation are highlighted, and attention is paid to the real or perceived threat posed by the Other to the ingroup. Two cases are examined in detail: first, the relationship between Greeks and Turks, and the ways in which the Turkish Other has contributed to the crystallisation of Greek identity; and second, the interaction between Croats and Serbs, and the impact of the Serbian Other on the formation of a Croat national identity. These cases might be considered, in some aspects, to exemplify the ingroup–Other relationship.

The notion of the immigrant as a particular type of Other in the national context is introduced in *Chapter 4*. The specific character of immigrants as Others who challenge the political and cultural order of the nation is highlighted. The fact that immigrants transgress national boundaries challenges both the ingroup identification and the prevailing social categorisation. Thus, the ingroup identity has to be redefined to face this challenge and to reinforce its ‘authenticity’ and distinctiveness. Attention is paid here to the functions that the Othering of the immigrant fulfils for the ingroup and the host society, and the cases of Britain, France and Germany are examined to illustrate the argument. The role of the immigrant in the definition of the ingroup’s identity in these countries is analysed, and the politics of representation involved in this process are discussed (namely the introduction of an Us versus Them categorical structure in public and political discourse). This chapter concludes with a reflection on the role of immigrants as a particular type of Internal Other in the post-Cold War period in which old ideological struggles and West-and-the-rest dichotomies have lost their meaning.

The increasing influx of immigrants from central and eastern Europe, and from the Third World, towards Greece, Italy and Spain during the last decade has transformed these countries from emigration to immigration magnets. *Chapter 5* discusses the size of the immigration flows towards southern Europe, as well as the policy responses of national governments to this issue. Recent survey data on attitudes towards foreigners are presented and discussed, and

the historical process of nation formation and the main features that characterise national identity in Greece, Italy and Spain are investigated. The commonalities and differences between these three countries and the reasons that make them a unique set of case studies (and therefore particularly useful for the study of the role of the immigrant as a threatening Other) are also examined.

An analysis of press material is presented in *Chapter 6*, in which the themes and dimensions of national identity reproduced and re-elaborated in media discourse are investigated. The representation of Them/immigrants/aliens in contrast to Us/nationals and the relevant transformation of the idea of the nation so as to differentiate Us from Them and render the national boundary (the symbolic boundary because the geographical one has been crossed) impermeable are analysed. Attention is paid to the redefinition of national characteristics and also the discovery/invention of new features of national identity so as to distinguish the nation from the immigrant Other. The study of the press discourse has two objectives. First, it provides an opportunity for testing my hypothesis with regard to the greater or lesser closure of ethnic versus civic nations and, second, it offers a map of the discursive universe within which opinions about immigration are formed and the relevant political debate takes place.

*Chapter 7* concentrates on the political discourse about immigration in Greece, Italy and Spain. Interviews with representatives of NGOs, national administration employees and trade unionists are analysed using a qualitative discourse analysis method. The analysis examines how the ingroup/the nation and the outgroup/the immigrant Other are constituted in discourse. The strategies of positive self-representation and negative Other-representation are highlighted, and competing normative discourses are analysed. The study also shows how the concept of the nation is redefined in 'interview-speak' so as to exclude immigrants from the ingroup and instead construct them as 'alien'.

*Chapter 8* discusses the findings from the study of southern Europe in light of the research results concerning western Europe (Britain, France and Germany, in particular). The lessons to be learned from both southern and western Europe and, more specifically, the instrumental role of the immigrant as the Other to which the nation is contrasted are emphasised; so too are the rhetorical strategies used to create boundaries between Us and Them.

## 2 National identity and the Other

### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Despite its long-prophesied demise, the nation remains the most pertinent form of collective identity. Nationalist movements have shown increasing strength and fervour in defending the right of each nation to self-determination. Even though many Western thinkers and politicians have tended to believe that civil war is a relic of a bygone era and that ethnic conflict is now confined to the developing world (Asia and Africa), the bloodshed in the ex-Yugoslavian Republics has proved them wrong. National sentiments remain very strong within Europe as well.

The basic propositions of the nationalist doctrine, namely that the world is naturally divided into nations and that the nation is the only legitimate source of political power, are accepted as uncontested principles that guide the development of social and political life. Not only does the organisation of the world into nation-states seem 'natural' but also each individual's perception of the world that surrounds her/him is based on the distinction between the ingroup (the nation) and the foreigners (those belonging to other communities; the Others).<sup>2</sup>

The double-edged character of national identity – its capacity of defining who is a member of the community but also, and perhaps more importantly, who is a foreigner – compels one to ask to what extent national identity is a form of inward-looking self-consciousness of a given community? Or, to what extent is the self-conception of the unified, autonomous and unique nation conditioned from the outside by defining who is *not* a national and by differentiating the ingroup from Others? This double-edged nature does not only characterise national identity; any kind of social identity is constituted in social interaction. The outside (the Other) is constitutive of the inside (the ingroup). The former contrasts with and limits the identity of the latter, but it is also a prerequisite for the latter's development into a group.<sup>3</sup> The influence of the Other on the formation and/or transformation of the identity of the ingroup – i.e. of the national identity – has nevertheless been largely neglected in nationalism theories and research.

The notion of the Other is inherent in the doctrine of nationalism. For the nationalist (or simply for every individual who recognises her/himself as member

of a national community), the existence of her/his own nation presupposes the existence of other nations too. Moreover, as history can teach us, the course of nationalism has never been smooth. Most of the nations in existence today had to fight for their survival and in order to achieve independence. Most national communities have had, and probably still have, Significant Others, i.e. other nations and/or states from which the community has tried to liberate and/or differentiate itself. The question that I want to investigate in this study is the role that such Others play in the (re)definition of national identity.

As a theory of political organisation, nationalism requires that ethnic and cultural boundaries coincide with political ones (Gellner 1983: 1). Boundaries between political units are supposed to define the borders between different ethnic communities. Nonetheless, the term 'nation-state' is, in most cases, a misnomer. It usually denotes a multiethnic (or multinational) state in which a given national group is politically, culturally and numerically dominant and thus tends to think of the state as a political extension of itself. This situation involves great potential for conflict involving minority groups within the state.

Moreover, contemporary reality is characterised by an increasing movement of political refugees and economic immigrants who cross national borders legally or illegally. Nation-states are therefore confronted with an increasingly complex situation. Ethnic and cultural diversity is often a result of migratory movements that challenge legal restrictions and police measures intended to keep potential immigrants out of the national territory. Host countries are faced with the necessity of dealing with these 'Others within', whose presence challenges the political and cultural order of the nation. According to the nationalist doctrine, 'nations must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail in the world' (Smith 1991: 74). But reality requires a great deal of compromise and accommodation.

The coexistence of different nations or ethnic groups within the same territory requires the identity of each group to be constantly reproduced and reaffirmed if the sense of belonging to the group is to survive. It requires the constant redefinition of the 'We' that must be distinguished from a 'They' that is geographically, and perhaps also culturally, close.

This chapter aims to investigate the role of the Other in the process of (re)defining a national identity from a theoretical viewpoint. The work of some of the most prominent scholars of nationalism will be reviewed in an effort to show that, although the existence of the Other as part and parcel of the definition of the nation is widely accepted, the relationship between the Other and the nation has not yet been investigated in depth. A new perspective from which to consider the nation will be proposed in order to take into account its double-edged – inclusive–exclusive – nature. In effect, the concept of national identity implies the presence of the Other. For the nation to exist, it is presupposed that there is some Other community, some Other nation, from which it needs to distinguish itself. The nation must thus be understood as a part of a two-way relationship, rather than as an autonomous, self-contained unit.



## Definitions

Nationalism and, indeed, the nation itself appear in an ever greater diversity of forms and configurations, changing and constantly reinventing a phenomenon that scholars have meticulously tried to fit into analytical categories. A working definition is indeed necessary for constructing a theoretical framework, even though no definition appears completely satisfactory given the complexity and multidimensionality of national identity.

For the purposes of this research, I will use the definition of the nation elaborated by Smith (1991: 14), according to whom a nation is 'a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members'. To this arguably elaborate and useful definition, I will add the feature emphasised by Connor (1978, 1993), namely the essentially irrational, psychological bond that binds fellow nationals together and that is supposed to constitute the essence of national identity. This psychological bond is usually termed 'a sense of belonging' (Connor 1978) or 'a fellow feeling' (Geertz 1963). Such expressions point to the close link established between the individual and the nation.

In order to analyse national identity as a concept and/or as a social phenomenon, it is often necessary to study the movement that is linked to the 'birth' or 'reawakening' (the term one prefers depends on a choice between a modernist or perennialist point of view) of nations. That is 'nationalism', and is defined as the 'ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation' (Smith 1991: 73).<sup>4</sup>

Finally, before proceeding to the main argument of this work, it is important to provide a definition of the nationalist doctrine (Smith 1991: 74; Kedourie 1992: 67). This contains three fundamental propositions. First, that the world is divided into nations, each of which has its own culture, history and destiny that make it unique among other national communities. Second, each individual belongs to a nation. Allegiance to the nation overrides all other loyalties. An individual who is nationless cannot fully realise her/himself and, in a world of nations, s/he is a social and political outcast. Third, nations must be united, autonomous and free to pursue their goals. The doctrine actually implies that the nation is the only legitimate source of social and political power.

The nationalist doctrine celebrates the universalism of the particular. Not only does each nation deem itself to be unique but the doctrine also asserts that the world is made up of nations, all of equal worth and value because they are all unique. Moreover, all nations have the inalienable right to self-determination. Of course, it often happens that the autonomy of one nation is called into question or indeed denied by another nation(-state). Hence, conflict may arise between two national communities with regard to the 'ownership' of territory, cultural traditions, myths or heroes. However, the basic doctrine is clear: the world is divided into nations and each of them enjoys the same rights.

This feature of the doctrine is important for the discussion that will follow because it highlights the fact that the existence of Others is an inherent component of national identity and, indeed, of nationalism itself. Nationalism does not only assert the existence of the specific national community, it also assigns it a position in a world of other separate and unique nations from which the ingroup must be distinguished.

### **An inquiry into the foundations of national identity**

In this section, I shall briefly review the dominant theories of nationalism in order to show that, although many scholars have highlighted the role of national identity in distinguishing the nation from Others, the role of the Other in (re)defining national identity has remained largely unexplored. When one asserts one's nationality, one distinguishes oneself from Others, but this fact is often downplayed or taken as an assumption that needs to be neither explained nor investigated. Furthermore, if considered at all, the relationship between national Self and Other is seen as inherently conflicting and hostile. The dynamics of the interaction between the two, be they real or imaginary, aggressive or collaborative, are largely neglected.

Benedict Anderson's work provides an example. In his definition of the nation, Anderson (1991) completely ignores the role of the Other. He sees the nation as 'an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign' (ibid.: 6). For the community to exist and become aware of itself, Others might be necessary, but they are certainly not sufficient. The idea that the nation is 'inherently limited' nonetheless implies an awareness of the existence of Others. In his analysis of the emergence of nationality and nationalism – which he views as cultural artefacts of a particular kind (ibid.: 4) – Anderson points to the roles, and the intertwining between them, of print capitalism, language, the novel and the changing 'imagination' of time and place, imperialism and colonialism; in short, a variety of cultural, social and economic processes and developments. Their impact on the emergence of national consciousness and the idea of the nation as the basis of modern sociopolitical life is analysed, albeit without looking at the impact of such processes on the unavoidable relationships among (emerging) nations or nationalist movements.

Anderson points to the widening of cultural and geographical horizons through European exploration and the conquest of non-European countries. Analysing explorers' accounts of their journeys, Anderson notes the switch from the unselfconscious use of 'our' to the territorialisation of faiths that eventually led to nationalist language that is inherently comparative and competitive (ibid.: 16–17). Despite his obvious reference to Others and their impact on the self-awareness of European nations-to-be, this author gives us little information about the part played by the generalised Other or specific outgroups in raising or consolidating the national self-awareness of given ingroups. Even though he recognises that the introduction of comparative and

territorialised views were ‘utterly self-conscious and political in intent’ (ibid.), he neglects the relationship between the self-conscious ingroup and the outgroups encountered in the New World.

This is not to say that Anderson does not recognise the role of external definition – categorisation of the collectivity by others – in creating national identities. Rather he takes it for granted and, hence, unworthy of detailed analysis. This is obvious in his discussion of the role of censuses imposed by colonial authorities on indigenous colonial populations in the late nineteenth century (ibid.: 164–9). He points to the creation of census categories that ignored religious affiliation even though religion had hitherto been important as a form of collective identification in those societies. These labels made up new, foreign-imposed identity categories that later influenced – among other factors – the development of nationalist movements in the colonial territories. The censuses involved a complex Self–Other definition process whose dynamic is not fully explored by Anderson.

In contrast to elaborating on the role of ingroup–outgroup construction and differentiation, Anderson (1991: 141) argues that the role of the Other in nationalism, and in particular of hatred towards Others, is grossly exaggerated. He points to the fact that nationalism most importantly inspires love ‘and often profoundly self-sacrificing love’. Through a well-documented and meticulous analysis, he highlights the varied and frequent expressions of love of nation and the lack of importance given to hatred towards the Other in the cultural products of nationalism (ibid.: 141–54). Even though Anderson’s arguments might be valid and true, neglecting the importance of the role of the Other in defining, shaping or clarifying national identity risks obscuring an important part of the dynamics of identity formation.

The double (Self-oriented and Other-oriented) nature of national consciousness is noted by Edward Shils (1995). He writes:

National self-consciousness is the shared image of the nation and the mutual awareness of its members who participate in that image. It entails at least a minimal perception of other collectivities ... although in itself national collective self-consciousness is no more than the perception of the existence of the collectivity in question, as constituted by residence within the bounded territory or descent from persons resident in that territory.

(Shils 1995: 107)

Shils does not see the Other as *the* central factor in the development of national self-consciousness. However, he does observe that the very fact of the awareness of a community and the division of people into insiders and outsiders entails ‘at least a minimal awareness that there are other human beings whom the national collective self-consciousness does not comprise’ (ibid.). He thus points to the fundamental psychological and social fact that identity is relational: for similarity to make sense, difference is also necessary. For a collective

consciousness to be shared among the members of a nation, awareness of the existence of outsiders – of those who do not belong – is indispensable.

Unfortunately, Shils does not pursue his argument on the Self–Other relationship any further. He limits himself to observing that conflicts of interest can arise when different nations compete for scarce material resources or for prestige, status and dignity (Shils 1995: 108). Shils fails to see the interactive nature of national identity in its full depth. Although he notes that aggressiveness towards the Other might be based as much in reality as in fictitious conflict or competition, he does not explain why this is so. What purposes, if any, does this Self–Other dynamic serve? Why are national communities often, as he notes, in latent or overt competition with one another? And why does the object of contention, perceived and fictitious though it might be, manage to stir outgroup aversion or hostility?

Most importantly, Shils (like Anderson) ignores the role of inspiring Others. Both authors consider the Self–Other relationship as an intrinsically hostile one. However, as I shall argue in the following sections, the role of the Other in the (trans)formation of national identity is not necessarily confined to that of the aggressor, oppressor, inferior subject or threat.

In his influential book entitled *Nationalism*, Elie Kedourie (1992: 44–55) highlights how ‘the excellence of diversity’ becomes one of the main features of the nationalist doctrine. He also shows how the emphasis on diversity as a fundamental characteristic of the universe and as ‘willed by God’ has led to the argument ‘not only that every culture, every individuality, has a unique incomparable value, but also that there is a duty laid upon us to cultivate our own peculiar qualities and *not mix or merge them with others*’ (ibid.: 51, emphasis added). The application of this idea to politics, argues Kedourie, has transformed the conception of the nation into a ‘natural division of [the] human race’, in which each group should maintain its purity and further cultivate its own character separately from other nations. Kedourie’s inquiry into the foundations of nationalism thus shows that the doctrine not only defines the We (the nation) to which the individual owes her/his loyalty, but also asserts that there is a They (an outgroup) – other nations – from which the ingroup must remain separate. The quest for authenticity of the national self is thus inseparable from the conception of Others.

One of the main problems deriving from the application of the national principle in politics, Kedourie argues, is that ‘even if the existence of nations can be deduced from the principle of diversity, it still cannot be deduced what particular nations exist and what their precise limits are’ (ibid.: 75). The whole argument of nationalists thus seems to be reduced to the fundamental question about who composes the We and who composes the They.

In the course of developing his own theory regarding the emergence of nations, Ernest Gellner (1964, 1983) also subscribes to Kedourie’s argument that nations are a modern ‘invention’. Gellner suggests that nationalism is an historical phenomenon, logically contingent (as Kedourie argues) but not sociologically contingent (Gellner 1964: 151). He argues that the erosion of

traditional societal structures – in which membership of the group depended on prior membership of a subgroup which was an organic part of the whole – made it necessary for a new form of identity to be created to link the individual to society. This new sense of belonging has been provided by culture.

Culture has become a new form of ‘portable’ identity. An individual carries with her/himself a style of conduct, language, dress habits etc., and can thus be classified by her/his culture. Classification by culture is, in effect, classification by nationality.

Moreover, contends Gellner, the complexity of the modern community requires that its members are literate in order to enjoy full membership. Such an educational enterprise can only be sustained by a nationwide educational system. This explains why the nation – rather than smaller units, such as the tribe or city state – is the focus of modern loyalties, and also why political loyalty is inextricably related to culture.

Nonetheless, Gellner argues that cultural differences *per se* are not divisive. The deep cause of divisive nationalism is to be found in the uneven spread of industrialisation and modernisation. Summarising Gellner’s argument in a schematic form: when the discontent of disadvantaged sections of the population of a less developed region can find expression in terms of nationality because the more privileged members of the society are culturally different, the shared nationality of the underprivileged group offers a way in which to set themselves apart from the ‘nation’ of the privileged. In this context, differences in culture, language or physical appearance become important because they provide a suitable explanation for exclusion for the benefit of the privileged and also a means of identification through a set of common features, shared by the underprivileged (Gellner 1964: 168).

Gellner further pursues this argument in order to show why and how nationalism becomes a vehicle for growth (*ibid.*: 167–71). However, my concern is to highlight a conclusion that can be derived from his theory. That is, the awareness of a shared nationality on the part of underprivileged members of a population is initially based on a negative trait: their *exclusion* from the ‘nation’ of the privileged. Even though he states that nationalism ‘does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on’ (*ibid.*: 168), these might be purely negative. Thus, according to Gellner, national identity arises in order to differentiate the ingroup from the Significant Other with which the nation competes for the distribution of resources. The essence of ‘We’ lies not in the cultural specificity and/or intrinsic uniqueness of the nation, but rather in its provision of an identity that can be *contrasted* to a specific Other. Indeed, ‘the Ruritanian nation was born of this contrast’ (Gellner 1983: 62). In his book *Nations and Nationalism*, Gellner (1983) pushes the argument further by suggesting that ‘if an industrial economy is established in a culturally heterogeneous society (or if it even casts its advanced shadow on it), *then* tensions result which *will* engender nationalism’ (Gellner 1983: 108–9, emphasis in the original).

The purpose of this brief overview of Gellner’s theory is to show that,

although he considers differentiation from the Other as the main incentive for the creation of national identity, he fails to elaborate the implications of this argument further. If the aim of the Ruritians is to differentiate themselves from the inhabitants of Megalomania, this *must* have some impact on the development of their identity. In Gellner's argument, common habits or traditions of the Ruritians become significant because they provide a basis for the identification of Ruritians *in contrast* to the privileged Megalomanians. Even the similarity of the dialects that the impoverished Ruritians spoke was recognised to the extent that it separated them from those who 'spoke something quite alien' (Gellner 1983: 62). If one agrees with Gellner's theory, then one is inclined to think that Ruritanian identity was created in mere contrast to Megalomanian traditions, cultural traits and language. Furthermore, one might argue that if the features that characterised Megalomania changed so too would the characteristics of the Ruritanian nation.

Gellner's theory of nations and nationalism is adopted to a large extent by Tom Nairn (1977). Nairn views the emergence of nations as a result of the uneven spread of capitalism. The uneven spread of progress and growth and the ensuing exploitation of some regions by others leads to the 'nationalism-producing' dilemma: the middle classes realise that, if they want to partake of the advantages of growth, they need to take things into their own hands (ibid.: 99). According to Nairn, nationalism in this sense is not a 'natural' phenomenon (by contrast with nationality or ethnic variety). However, he agrees with Gellner that, under specific historical circumstances, nationalism does become a natural phenomenon; one flowing fairly inescapably from the general situation (ibid.)

Nairn's analysis of the spread of nationalism is based on an historical materialist perspective, according to which the middle classes seek to mobilise the masses in order to achieve power and hence manage growth and development themselves. Given that progress has not yet reached these 'masses' who still live in a prehistoric condition characterised by folk customs and a diversity of language, ethnic characteristics and social habits, these features are embraced and 'elevated' to national symbols by the nationalist intelligentsia. Nairn argues that his materialist account of nationalism and nation formation is better than an 'idealist' explanation. In his view, the political and ideological voluntarism of nationalism is not due to its idealistic nature but rather to the fact that 'because it is forced mass-mobilization in a position of relative helplessness (or "under-development"), certain subjective factors play a prominent part in it' (ibid.: 102). However, if one were to resort only to this idealism, which Nairn concedes is inseparable from nationalism, one would lose sight of the true structural, historical factors that led to its development.

Nairn's theory resembles Gellner's approach, not least in the sense that it requires the presence of the Other – an exploitative, powerful and perhaps threatening Other – for the nation to emerge but without making this relationship explicit. In his theoretical account, Nairn concentrates on the uneven development of capitalism in different societies and the power dynamics resulting from it. The ethnocultural content of nationalism is seen as a necessary,

albeit instrumental, factor. It is not ethnocultural difference *per se* that engenders nationalism; it is material inequality that vests ethnicity and culture with a particular nationalist meaning. This theoretical framework guides Nairn's empirical work on nationalism in the British Isles (*ibid.*). For instance, in accounting for the national dualism in Ireland between the south and the northeast, he argues that there might be two ethnic-cultural communities in Ireland but that there are not two nations corresponding to these communities. This argument is based on his materialist analysis of Ulster nationalism. Having had a share of the socioeconomic development of Britain, Ulster did not dispose of the class basis in the way that would have been necessary if it were to develop into a nation of its own.

Nevertheless, even a convinced materialist such as Nairn cannot avoid occasionally pointing to the role of the Other in the (re)definition of national identity. Thus, in an analysis of the 'Enoch Powell phenomenon', which sought to revive an Anglo-British national self-consciousness, Nairn argues that Powell – having found no strength in romanticism, imperialism or conservatism – turned to 'coloured' immigration of the 1950s and 1960s. '[T]his internal "enemy", this "foreign body" in our own streets' (*ibid.*: 274) thus became the means for restoring national identity. The immigrant Other '[stirred] the English "corporate imagination" into life once more, by providing a concrete way of focussing its vague but powerful sense of superiority' (*ibid.*) Here Nairn clearly acknowledges the role of the Other, an internal Other in particular, in the formation and/or strengthening of national identity. In analysing the role of immigration for Anglo-British nationalism, Nairn (*ibid.*: 276ff.) returns to his materialist perspective. He explores the effect of the working-class composition of the immigrant population on this new Anglo-British nationalism, as well as the impact of delegating immigrants to the bottom layer of the class structure. However, my analysis of this author's work identifies a national Self-Other relationship embodied within (as is the case with most theories of nationalism), although it is rarely acknowledged explicitly and it is studied even less.

Another classic of nationalism studies and a modernist too, Eric Hobsbawm (1990) regards the nation as a social entity only insofar as it is related to a certain kind of modern territorial state, namely the nation-state (Hobsbawm 1990: 9–11). In studying the 'national question', Hobsbawm points to the need to look at the nation as a phenomenon constructed from both above and below, and at 'the intersection of politics, technology and social transformation' (*ibid.*: 10). His analysis is historical in character and is mainly informed by historical materialism: the origins of the nation as a sociopolitical entity, he argues, are to be found in its economic usefulness and material viability. A world organised into medium-sized nation-states (rather than extensive empires) was conducive to the development of capitalism and trade (*ibid.*: 14–46). Starting from this historical materialist perspective, Hobsbawm engages in an excellent analysis of the sociocultural factors that led élites and masses alike to identify with nations.

In other words, Hobsbawm sees the nation as the outcome of social, political

and economic transformations. He explores 'popular proto-nationalism' (ibid.: 46–80), so as to highlight the cultural, political and religious roots of fully fledged nationalism that not only made it plausible as a form of 'imagined' collective identification but also made it attractive as an important resource for mass mobilisation. According to Hobsbawm, the nation became a suitable basis of mobilisation for both the modern élites and the traditional masses. Furthermore, national consciousness was fostered by the widespread migrations that characterised the first half of the twentieth century. Hobsbawm agrees with Gellner when he argues that:

All that was required for the entry of nationalism into politics was that groups of men and women who saw themselves, in whatever manner, as Ruritanians, or were so seen *by others*, should become ready to listen to the argument that their discontents were in some way caused by the inferior treatment (often undeniable) of Ruritanians by, or *compared with, other nationalities*, or by a non-Ruritanian state or ruling class.

(Hobsbawm 1990: 109, emphasis added)

In brief, Hobsbawm analyses the various social, political and economic forces that led to the emergence of nations in general, and in different countries in particular. He recognises that these nations often lived in conflict or in competition with one another without analysing the part that such conflict or competition played in the development and/or evolution of the nations involved. The ingroup–Other relationship is thus taken for granted, and is seemingly of little interest as a subject of study in itself. The focus of his analysis is, in contrast, on the role of nationalism as a lever of power for a rising middle strata and petty bourgeoisie, and also as a 'fall-back position' for the middle and lower middle strata after the failure of social revolutions in the 1910s.

Hobsbawm similarly discusses the 'apogee of nationalism' in the interwar period in Europe, highlighting nationalism's role as an antidote to the spread of Bolshevik ideology. He also points to the impossibility of creating ethnoculturally homogeneous nation-states and the related development of belligerent, nationalist movements driven by both minorities and majorities across Europe. Complete and detailed though Hobsbawm's analysis might be, he tells us little about the role that interaction and conflict with other nations or minorities played in the development of national identity. His perspective is dynamic in that it integrates different levels of social reality, namely economics, culture, religion, politics and the overall context within which a national community developed. Nonetheless, he concentrates on the national identity constituted within one society, and he fails to address the interactive nature of national identity (its double, externally and internally driven definition and development).

The theories examined thus far consider the nation as a purely modern phenomenon. They view nationality as an invention or a necessity of the modern era. Contrary to this perspective, Hans Kohn (1961) and Anthony Smith (1981,



1986, 1991) have developed approaches that take into account the ethnic origins of nations. These two authors do recognise that modern nations are an historical phenomenon, but they also highlight the roots of the nation in the 'natural' tendencies of human beings (Kohn) and in past forms of collective identification (Smith).

In his pioneering book entitled *The Idea of Nationalism*, Kohn (1961, first published 1944) defines 'nation' or 'nationality' as a group of people who are held together by a common consciousness and who also seek to find their expression as a group in a sovereign state (*ibid.*: 19). The same author defines 'nationalism' as the group consciousness – the sociological and psychological reality – of belonging to a nation. His theoretical inquiry that is pertinent to this study is mainly concerned with nationalism rather than nationality.

According to Kohn, nationalism is, first and foremost, 'a state of mind, an act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has become more and more common to mankind' (Kohn 1961: 11). However, it is also inseparable from its psychological reality, a sociological and historical (hence politics and economy related) fact. Kohn sees nationalism as the product of the growth of social and intellectual factors at a certain stage of human history. This historical fact is based on '*natural elements*' (*ibid.*: 6, emphasis added). Love of the familiar, of one's habits, home, locality, customs and the related aversion or distrust of everything foreign, the belief in the superiority of one's ingroup and native land and customs, and a related aversion or hostility towards strange customs and mores are natural tendencies in humans. Kohn emphasises that these feelings correspond to facts such as territory, language and common descent. They are, however, transformed and charged with new and extended meanings by nationalism. He also clarifies that 'natural tendency' means 'a tendency, which having been produced by social circumstances from time practically immemorial, appears to us as natural' (*ibid.*: 4). One might agree with Kohn's argument that these tendencies are 'natural' in the sense that they are so old that we tend to consider them as 'given by nature' (as opposed to a sense of being transcendental or externally defined). However, the unfortunate consequence of this argument is that, by accepting that ingroup–outgroup differentiation is a natural phenomenon, it automatically follows that one does not need to study or analyse it from a sociological or social–psychological perspective. In fact, the rest of Kohn's extremely valuable and pioneering research is concerned with the varied historical factors that conditioned the emergence and development of nationalism and nations in Europe and North America; it takes the Self–Other relationship for granted.

Despite treating this relationship as a given, Kohn cannot avoid referring to it. He thus argues that 'we arrive at [group consciousness] through experiences of differentiation and opposition of ... the we-group and those outside the group' (*ibid.*: 11). Furthermore, he recognises that an individual can identify with multiple groups. The psychological and sociological importance of the nation in the modern period lies in the fact that it is the group affiliation that commands supreme loyalty from individuals. Having said this, Kohn neglects

to explore the dynamics of differentiation and opposition between nations and outsiders.

In his analysis of nation formation in North America, Kohn hints at the part played by interaction with the mother-country, namely Britain. He points to the influence of the English constitutional tradition and English national consciousness on the formation of the American nation. Moreover, he asserts:

Among the realities of national life, the image which a nation forms of itself, and in which it mirrors itself is one of the most important. Perhaps only slightly less important is the reflection produced by foreign observers and the image thus formed by other nations, for the original image and its reflection shape and influence each other. Though the reality, in many ways, does not correspond to the image, ... this image, woven of elements of reality, tradition, imagination, and aspiration ... moulds national life.

(Kohn 1961: 289–90)

Despite neglecting the importance of interaction and mutual perception between nations in his theoretical approach, Kohn raises the matter in his discussion of American nationalism. He explores the role played by European élite<sup>5</sup> representations of the USA on American nationalism, and the American élites' representations of their own nation. He asserts that national consciousness developed in the New World with the conviction that the American nation was different from all others and unique. Its uniqueness lay in its relationship with Europe: American élites saw their nation as Europe's offspring which had surpassed its mother-nation(s) in realising ideals of equity and democracy (ibid.: 291–3). Even though Kohn's analysis concentrates on political ideas rather than examining the Us–Them dynamics in detail, he clearly points to the influence of (real or perceived) interaction between the American national Self and various real or 'imagined' European – often specifically French or English – Others. Notably, these last were often seen as inspiring or at least positive Others, and certainly not as fully alien to the ingroup. Thus, apparently without realising it, Kohn planted the seeds for further research on the role of Others in shaping national identity.

Nonetheless, the topic of ingroup–Other relations has long remained at the margins of nationalism theorists' work. Despite the considerable breadth and depth of his work, Anthony D. Smith (a renowned theorist of classic nationalism) has also treated this subject as a given, failing to grasp its importance for the development and transformation of national identity. Smith's work has concentrated on the particular character of the nation as a form of collective identity. He specifies (Smith 1991: 14) a number of fundamental features that characterise national identity. These include an historic territory/homeland, common myths and traditions, a mass public culture, a common set of legal rights and duties for all members of the nation and, finally, a single economy with territorial mobility for people and goods. The first two elements (namely the homeland and the common historical memories) are ethnic in nature in

that they characterise ethnic groups as well as national communities, the last three features are peculiar to modern nations. In other words, Smith sees in the nation the combined effect of tradition and modernity.

Smith defines the nation as a community of people that must satisfy a number of criteria (the five elements enumerated earlier) in order to qualify for nationhood. He thus emphasises the commonalties that bind the members of the nation together. Having defined national identity as an analytical concept, he then investigates the ethnic roots of modern nations as well as the different paths to nation formation followed by different communities, and the different types of nationalism developed throughout the world (Smith 1986, 1991).

At first glance, it might seem that Smith ignores the role of Others in the emergence of modern nations. Indeed, he seems to argue that nations are held together from within because of the common characteristics that link their members with one another. The presence of Others can thus be considered irrelevant to the creation of the nation. However, Smith does often refer to the importance of symbolic or real Others for the shaping of national identity.

First, he draws attention to the impact of protracted warfare on the crystallisation of ethnic identities (Smith 1991: 27). He points to the all-too-well-known pairs of antagonistic ethnicities encountered throughout history, such as Greeks and Persians, French and English, and Arabs and Israelis. Nonetheless, he cautiously warns that 'it would be an exaggeration to deduce the sense of common ethnicity from the fear of the "outsider"' (ibid.). The question of the Other re-emerges in his analysis of continuity and change in premodern ethnic communities. In his discussion of the presumed demographic and cultural continuity of the Greeks, Smith concludes that, although the former is highly debatable, the latter seems to have been preserved 'in terms of script and language, certain values, a particular environment and its nostalgia, continuous social interactions, and a sense of religious and cultural *difference*, even exclusion' (Smith 1991: 30, emphasis added). In other words, continuity and a sense of ethnic identity are, at least in part, the outcome of a sense of difference from Others, particularly difference from surrounding peoples and their civilisations. Even though Smith accepts that surviving ethnic groups (such as the Greeks) have undergone profound changes, not least because of the cultural influences of their neighbours, he does not elaborate on the role of such influences for the redefinition and/or adaptation of their identity throughout the centuries.

Second, Smith directly addresses the role of the Other in relation to the philosophical and historical discourses developed in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He argues that identity is conceptualised as 'sameness' in the context of such discourses (Smith 1991: 75). In other words, the members of one community have a number of features in common, such as language or a dress code, that are actually the markers of their identity. Others differ from the members of the community precisely in these features; they might, for example, speak a different language or have a different dress style. Even though Smith agrees that 'this pattern of similarity-cum-dissimilarity is

one meaning of national identity' (ibid.), he does not consider that there might be an interaction between the two. Do the members of the community merge because of their common language, tradition or cultural codes, or do they (like the Ruritarians) become aware of their common features only as a way in which to differentiate themselves from a Significant – perhaps a privileged – Other (such as the Megalomanians)? It remains somewhat unclear whether the boundaries are defined with reference to the specific features of the national community or whether they are constantly redefined through interaction between the nation and the Other(s).

Moreover, the relationship between the national identity and the Other underlies the typology of nationalist movements proposed by Smith (1991: 82). This typology is based on a distinction between ethnic and territorial nationalisms, and their pre- or post-independence contexts. Four types of nationalist movements are thus defined in Table 2.1.

The pre- or post-independence criterion indicates the political condition of the specific community (its autonomy or subordination to some other nation) as well as the simple fact that each nation has to assert itself in contrast to, and often in opposition to, another national community. One latent aspect of this typology is the relationship between the nation and a Significant Other. The pre- or post-independence condition mainly indicates whether the Other is within or outside the territory of the state. It is not clear in this typology whether the goals of the movement are derived from the ethnic or territorial character of the nation, or whether the nation is conceptualised as an ethnic or a civic community because of the specific context and situation in which the nationalist movement develops. The argument seems circular: is it the need to integrate disparate ethnic populations into the political community of a post-colonial state that leads to a territorial conception of the nation? Or is it the

Table 2.1 Smith's typology of nationalist movements

<i>Type of movement</i>	<i>Concept of the nation</i>	<i>Aims</i>
Territorial preindependence (anticolonial nationalisms)	Civic, territorial	Eject foreign rulers, substitute a nation-state for the old colonial territory
Territorial post-independence (integration nationalisms)	Civic, territorial	Integrate diverse ethnic populations into a new political community
Ethnic preindependence (secession and diaspora nationalisms)	Ethnic, genealogical	Secede from a larger political unit, and set up a new political ethnonation
Ethnic post-independence (irredentist and 'pan' nationalisms)	Ethnic, genealogical	Expand by including fellow 'kinsmen' who are currently outside the national boundaries, and form a larger ethnonational state

Source: Smith (1991: 82–3).

civic and territorial features of the national community that dictate its goals? (See also Geertz 1963.)

These arguments might not put into question the validity of the typology; but they do demonstrate that the notion of the Other is inextricably linked with the concept of national identity. Moreover, they show how much the opposition to the Other is taken as an intrinsic feature of nationalism without investigating the influence that it has in the definition of national identity. Overall, although addressed within case studies, the issue remains unexplored at a theoretical level.

In conclusion, in this section I have shown that, both in modernist and ethnicist accounts of nationhood, the presence of the Other as a factor that shapes national sentiments is taken for granted. I have argued that this presence remains implicit in the analysis and is thus not adequately explained. In the following section I will seek to explain why, in my opinion, national identity should not be considered as an inward-looking self-consciousness based on a set of common characteristics shared by a people. I shall argue that any theory of nationality should account for the role played by Others, not only in activating feelings of belonging to a specific group but also in shaping them in a particular direction given that each nation seeks to differentiate itself from specific – real or imaginary – Others. I will also argue that Others should be seen as part of the nation because they represent its negative. The Other is what the nation is *not*, and it thus helps in the task of clarifying who or what the nation actually is.

### **The nation and the Other**

In developing my argument with regard to the role of Others in the definition of national identity, I will draw upon the concept of national identity proposed by Walker Connor (1978, 1993) and the theory of nationalism and social communication developed by Karl Deutsch (1966).

In Connor's view, objective criteria such as culture or religion are insufficient to define which group constitutes a nation. The concept of nationality can therefore not be operationalised in terms of specific characteristics that a group should possess in order to qualify as a nation. Concrete elements such as geographic location, religious composition or linguistic homogeneity are important only to the degree to which they reinforce national identity (Connor 1978: 389). Such features can be subject to changes without a group losing the sense of autonomy and uniqueness that make it a nation.

Connor introduces one feature that, according to him, characterises all nations and that constitutes the intangible essence of nationality: the belief in common descent. He stresses that the psychological bond bringing co-nationals together is based on their common conviction that they are ethnically related. This, of course, is not an objective criterion; members of a nation need not be ancestrally related, but it is important that they believe that they are (Connor 1993: 376–7). The belief itself is of cardinal significance because it leads to a dichotomous

conception of the world. The national bond divides humanity into Us (fellow nationals) and Others (non-members of Our community) (ibid.: 386).

Connor's definition of nationality can be criticised because it focuses on ethnicity and therefore fails to account for the territorial or civic elements involved in national consciousness. However, his contribution to the study of national identity is of great significance because he stresses *the* fundamental feature that characterises both ethnic and territorial nationalisms, namely the fact that national identity – irrational and subjective though it might be – induces a dichotomous view of the world. Belonging to a nation does not only imply a knowledge of who We are but also a recognition of who the Others are. Connor suggests that, in the process of nation formation, a group of people first become aware of who they ethnically *are not*, before they realise who they actually *are* (Connor 1978: 388, emphasis in the original).

Contrary to Connor's argument, I believe that concrete elements such as culture, religion or language are important because they reinforce the nation's identity and also because they differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup(s), and thus justify and make *real* this divided view of the world. Cultural traits, myths, traditions and historical territories form an integral part of the distinction between Us and Them. They give a concrete form to the contrast between the nation and the Others, and at the same time they are shaped by this contrast so that they further reinforce it. Linguistic differences thus justify claims of belonging to separate nations, and dialects that originate from the same language are developed in opposite directions so that their differences are accentuated. The case of the Serbian-Croat dialects offers an eloquent example of such processes (Irvine 1993). Moreover, collective memories of a historical event, such as a battle, are reinterpreted in ways that emphasise the contrast between the ingroup and the outgroup. For Greeks, for instance, the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453 symbolises the age-long struggle between Greeks and Turks, and the intrinsically evil nature of the Turkish nation.

Furthermore, cultural elements might be revived in order to accentuate the distinction between Us and Them. Thus the Irish language, although replaced by English for everyday communication in Ireland, has been made a symbol of the uniqueness and authenticity of the Irish nation that emphasises its distinctiveness from Britain.

Arguing that national identity leads to a generalised divided perception of the world is not sufficient to demonstrate fully the role that the Other plays in its (trans)formation. In order to show that the conception of the Other is a functional element intrinsic to the notion of nationality, I shall use the definition of national identity developed by Karl Deutsch (1966).

Deutsch argues that the nation can be defined in functional terms. Membership of a national community consists of the ability to communicate more effectively with fellow nationals than with outsiders (Deutsch 1966: 97). This is actually the fundamental quality of a nation: 'peoples are held together "from within" by this communicative efficiency' (ibid.: 98). The more effective

a system of social communication is, the more separate does it become from those groups that it cannot incorporate: 'unable to bear promiscuity, it must choose marriage or divorce' (ibid.: 175).

Leaving aside Deutsch's definition of the nation as the most effective community for communication (ibid.: 98), the element of his work that is important to retain is his functional view of the nation. According to Deutsch, members of the national community are characterised by their ability to communicate with one another *better than* they do with outsiders. From this functional perspective, nationality is not an absolute concept. It means that members share more with one another than they share with foreigners.

This definition of the nation involves necessarily the concept of Otherness. The nation is not simply a group that is bound together by beliefs in a common descent or by a common language and shared cultural traditions. Neither is it merely a territorial community. It is a group of people that share more things in common with each other than they share with outsiders. Thus, for the nation to exist there must be some outgroup against which the unity and homogeneity of the ingroup is tested.

Nationalist activists and scholars of nationalism tend to consider national identity as an absolute relationship. Either it exists or it does not. Either a group of people share some specific features that makes them a nation (whether these features are civic or ethnic in character) or they do not. My analysis demonstrates that this argument is misleading. National identity expresses a feeling of belonging that has a *relative* value. It makes sense only to the extent that it is contrasted with the feelings that members of the nation have towards foreigners. Fellow nationals are not necessarily very close or close enough to one another, they are simply *closer* to one another than they are to outsiders.

National identity may thus be conceived of as a double-edged relationship. On the one hand, it is inward looking; it involves a certain degree of commonality within the group and is based on a set of common features that bind the members of the nation together. Contrary to Walker Connor's argument, these features cannot be summarised in the belief of a common descent. Nor is the national bond equivalent to effective communication as suggested by Deutsch. In fact, it includes a set of elements that range from (presumed) ethnic ties to a shared public culture, common historical memories and links to a homeland, and also a common legal and economic system (Smith 1991: 14).

On the other hand, national identity implies difference. Its existence presupposes the existence of Others – other nations or other individuals – who do not belong to the ingroup and from which the ingroup must be distinguished. National consciousness renders both commonality and difference meaningful. It involves self-awareness of the group but also awareness of Others from which the nation seeks to differentiate itself. This means that national identity has no meaning *per se*. It becomes meaningful through contrast with other nations. This argument is implicit in the nationalist doctrine, which asserts that there is a plurality of nations.

### Insights from an anthropological perspective

Fredrik Barth (1969, 1981) has made a significant contribution to the debate on the role that interaction with Others plays in the formation of identity. He has been predominantly concerned with ethnicity, however his approach can be applied to national identity too. He defines ethnic groups as 'categories of ascription and identification of the actors themselves [that] thus have the characteristic of organising interaction between people' (Barth 1981: 199). It is possible to broaden the field to which Barth's theory applies and to include any type of collective identity that involves both internal identification and external social categorisation of the individual. Barth himself emphasises the organisational functions of the ethnic group derived from the feature of self-ascription and ascription by others of a specific ethnic identity.

Barth's (1969) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* is innovative in that it views ethnicity as an organisational form realised through a process of interaction between different groups rather than as an assumed, static cultural content. Instead of defining ethnic identity as a set of features that the members of the ethnic group share, Barth looks at the dynamics of formation and maintenance of ethnicity. According to him, ethnic identity is developed through contact with the Other, a contact that happens at the boundary between ethnic communities. Therefore the focus of the research should not be on its content (on the features, traditions, rituals or history that characterise an ethnic group and support its identity from within), but on the interaction processes through which ethnic identity is maintained and reconfirmed despite the flow of personnel across the boundaries (Barth 1981: 198):

... the nature of continuity of ethnic units is clear: it depends on the maintenance of a boundary. The cultural features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members may likewise be transformed, indeed, even the organizational form of the group may change – yet the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of continuity, and investigate the changing cultural form and content.

(Barth 1981: 203)

Thus Barth points to the fact that ethnic identity leads to a dichotomous view of social reality in which individuals are sorted into members of the ingroup/Us and outsiders/Them. It is thus argued by Barth that ethnic identity is a way of going about in the world, structuring one's perceptions of oneself and others as members of different ethnic groups. In a world organised into nations and national or multinational states, ethnicity or nationality are crucial aspects of identification and the social categorisation of an individual, and they have important influences on an individual's opportunities in life.

This argument can be extended to cover any type of collective identity. The individual's internal and external identification with a particular group (whether it is with the supporters of football team A, the voters of party B, the inhabitants



of locality C or some other type of collectivity) involves the division of the social field into members of the ingroup and Others. The consequences of such identifications and social categorisations might have a lesser impact on an individual's life than national identity does. Still, what is of interest here is that their existence implies the perception of an Other, and it inevitably involves real or imaginary interaction with that Other.

Moreover, Barth argues, the cultural features used to differentiate and distinguish between two ethnic groups are not their 'objective' differences but those elements that are socially important because the groups see them as such:

The features that are taken into account are not the sum of 'objective' differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as *significant* ... some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and *emblems of differences*, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied.

(Barth 1969: 14, cit. in Jenkins 1996: 93, emphasis added)

By the same token, cultural difference *per se* does not entail the organisation of ethnic groups. Particular meanings have to be attributed to cultural differences so that these lead to the organisation of contrastive ethnic identities. The covariation of cultural features and ethnic boundaries does not necessarily mean that the two are interdependent. Difference can exist without playing the role of the marker between Us and Them. In fact, the path followed is usually the opposite: differences reflect the features of social organisation into distinct and separate groups and are therefore codified as idioms of identification/differentiation between groups (Blom 1969). This perspective is particularly important in order to understand the role of the Other in the formation of national identity. Differences between nations are not objectively defined by the simple facts that a group of people residing in a territory have different customs or speak a different language and abide by a different set of laws to their neighbours. The two communities do not constitute two separate nations because of these 'objective' differences; rather, the differences between their lifestyles, culture, religion, language or civic mores are rendered meaningful through the contrast between the two groups. In other words, cultural or political divergence is not the *raison d'être* for the division between members of the nation and outsiders. It is the process of constituting the national community that requires that some – not necessarily all – traditions or cultural features are used as 'emblems of difference' that distinguish them from one or more outgroups.

In fact, as Barth (1969) argues, dichotomisation between members and non-members persists and ensures the continuity of the group as a form of social organisation, even though the features that characterise it might change. Socially relevant factors determine which differences are important, rather than the 'objective' character of such differences. This view of ethnic identity is

particularly important for my analysis of the role of the Other in the formation of the nation because it shows that (a) collective identity, and for that matter ethnicity or national identity, is an organisational process that structures social interaction between members and outsiders, and (b) it provides a vessel into which various types of contents can fit.

This argument brings about a number of related points. First, if difference is defined by social factors, so is similarity. The specific features considered to characterise each group (the cultural contents of ethnic or national identity) are shaped through interaction between different groups. If, as Barth argues, some differences are emphasised and others underscored, this implies that some features will be taken to symbolise the identity of the specific group and the essence of membership to it, and others will be downplayed. In this sense, ethnic and national identity are formed, and constantly redefined and developed, through interaction with other groups.

Second, different elements may be socially relevant in distinguishing between different pairs of groups. The 'emblems of difference' between group A and group B need not coincide with those between group A and group C. With regard to ethnic groups, Barth does not give a clear answer as to which factors determine which differences are considered socially important in a given context. He only hints at the relevance of the overall sociocultural system in this matter (Barth 1981: 203). In my view, just as identity is defined both from within and from outside, so too is difference between two nations constructed both internally and externally. From within, difference will depend on the specific features that characterise the ingroup and make it distinctive and/or unique. A number of elements related to the history and collective memories of the nation can play an important part. From outside, difference is defined in relation to the specific outgroup, its own features and history, as well as with reference to the values prevailing in the wider sociocultural system in which the two groups operate. Thus both groups will try to show that they score better on a dimension that is valued in their society. If the groups in question belong to different societies (two nations, for example), reference will be made to the values and/or cultural codes that characterise the wider sociopolitical system of which they are both members (such as 'the West', 'the Arab world', 'the international community' and so on). The existence of such a common social space is postulated because it would be impossible to talk about difference or commonality between the two groups in its absence.

Interaction with different groups will therefore lead to the emphasis of one difference instead of another and attention will concentrate on particular cultural forms or contents as being distinctive of each group. Interaction with the Other will consequently affect the definition of 'We'. This conclusion holds with reference to the ethnic groups that were Barth's point of departure, and also with regard to nations. National identity is formed and consolidated through interaction, co-operation or conflict with Significant Others;<sup>6</sup> these processes influence the shape that national identity will take and the importance that will be assigned to one or other feature that characterises the ingroup.

Another relevant aspect of Barth's theory (1981: 204–5) is the fact that boundaries between ethnic groups are not necessarily territorial. A social boundary exists whenever social interaction is structured by mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion whereby members are recognised and distinguished by non-members (members of other groups). This argument supports and complements Barth's view that ethnic identity is formed through interaction with the Other rather than within the group, and it is actually valid for any type of social group. Indeed, most social groups exist in the same social and territorial space. However, this does not prevent them from putting mechanisms of mutual inclusion and exclusion into motion. Such processes characterise the interaction between members of the nation and members of minorities or immigrant communities. This constant recreation of boundaries is a strategy of identity formation and negotiation. By signifying Otherness, members of the ingroup also define who they are and the specific features that, in their view, render their community particular and unique.

The boundary is the point of realisation of both identity and difference. As Cohen suggests (1985: 13), the consciousness of a community is directly related to the perception of its boundaries. Boundaries are themselves constituted by interactions between people. According to Cohen, what is important is not whether the physical or structural boundaries of the community remain intact, but the perception of its members of the vitality of their culture and the meaning they attach to their community. This argument can also be turned on its head: if the ingroup's culture or identity is insecure, or if its members perceive it to be threatened, they will try to secure and clarify its boundaries by means of contrasting themselves with specific outgroups. However, such processes of constituting the collective Self and the Other(s) are activated towards Significant Others,<sup>7</sup> namely salient outgroups that are symbolically or geographically close to the ingroup, and whose presence is (perceived as) threatening or inspiring.

## Conclusions

The aim of this chapter has been to discuss the nature of national identity as a 'feeling of belonging' developed within a group of people. It has sought to clarify the extent to which national identity can be defined as the self-awareness of a community that shares a number of features in common, or the extent to which nationhood is externally defined through a process of differentiation from, and in contrast to, Others.

Dominant theories and definitions regarding the nature of national identity and the processes that have led to the emergence of modern nations have been discussed. Scholars have identified a variety of elements as the main features of national identity that distinguish it from other types of collective identities and these have been reviewed. Walker Connor, for instance, points to the belief in common ancestry as the main feature that gives national identity its peculiar, irrational character. Anthony Smith, on the other hand, draws attention to the ethnic origins of nations, and Hans Kohn points to the combination of natural

tendencies of human beings with a certain level of growth of social and intellectual factors. Karl Deutsch develops a functional definition of the nation as a community of efficient communication. Elie Kedourie sees it as an invention of the nineteenth century, whereas Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Tom Nairn view nation formation as a consequence of the uneven spread of industrialisation and modernisation. Benedict Anderson points to the social, cultural and economic processes that make 'imagining' the nation possible.

Even though these theories adopt different perspectives from which to examine the phenomenon of nationalism, they converge at one point: they all take for granted the existence of Others (other nations) from which the ingroup seeks to distinguish and differentiate itself. The existence of other nations is inherent in the nationalist doctrine itself. However, as Kedourie (1991: 75) points out, it cannot be deduced from the doctrine which particular nations exist and what their precise limits are. Therefore, each nationality has to assert its existence, its autonomy and uniqueness in contrast, and often in opposition, to other nations.

The identity dynamics involved in this opposition between the collective Self and Other(s) are analysed by Fredrik Barth in his famous work on *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Barth points to the role of boundaries in the formation and maintenance of ethnic groups. He observes that ethnicity is an organisational form that structures interaction between different groups. The cultural content of ethnicity can vary, yet the continuing dichotomization of the world into members and outsiders persists. Most importantly, this perspective highlights the role of boundaries and interactions in the shaping of the cultural contents of identity. This anthropological theory of ethnicity is pertinent for the analysis of national identity formation from a sociological and social–psychological point of view. Real or symbolic interaction between the nation and Others, and other nations or ethnic groups, conditions the development of national identity and determines which of its cultural or other features will be accentuated as 'emblems of difference' and which will be downplayed. In other words, interaction with the Other shapes the content of national identity.

In the following chapter, I shall explore further the processes involved in this double-edged, internal–external process of national identity formation. More specifically, I shall study the role that Significant Others – other nations or ethnic groups that, by means of their inspiring or threatening presence, influence or have influenced the development of the ingroup's identity – play in the history of a nation.

### 3 The Significant Other

#### Significant Others<sup>1</sup>

The conceptualisation of national identity as a double-edged relationship implies that it is defined both internally and externally. From within, the national bond might refer to a belief in common descent and/or to a common culture, namely a system of traditions, ideas, symbols and patterns of behaviour and communication that are shared by the members of the community. National identity might also be related to a specific territory which is the homeland of the nation and the natural setting in which it can exercise its sovereign powers. Each nation is usually based on a combination of these elements. Civic and territorial ties are stronger in some communities, while common ethnicity and cultural affinities prevail in others.

These elements define the nation from within and constitute a pool of potential identity features. However, identity is always constituted in interaction and some of these features become conspicuous because they distinguish the ingroup from Others, whereas other features remain latent. In this sense the nation is defined from outside, namely in contrast to other communities. The emphasis assigned to one or other feature of the national identity depends on the characteristics and/or the claims of other groups from which the nation seeks to differentiate itself.

The history of each nation is marked by the presence of 'Significant Others', which I define as other groups that have influenced the development of a nation's identity through their 'inspiring' or 'threatening' presence. The notion of a Significant Other refers to another nation or ethnic group that is usually territorially close to, or indeed within, the national community. Significant Others are characterised by their peculiar relationship to the ingroup's identity: *they represent what the ingroup is not*. They condition the ingroup, either because they are a source of inspiration for it – an example to follow in the quest for national grandeur – or because they threaten (or rather are perceived to threaten) its presumed ethnic or cultural purity and/or its independence. In some cases, the Significant Other's features are judged negatively and the nation might modify its own identity so as to differentiate itself from the Significant Other(s). At other times, the features of the Significant Other are highly valued by the ingroup, which might seek to incorporate some of these into its own traditions and identity.

Throughout the history of a nation, more than one nation or ethnic group can become salient outgroups, i.e. Significant Others. At any point in time, there might be more than one group against which a nation seeks to assert itself and which, in turn, influences its identity. The relationship between the nation and the Significant Other should nevertheless be understood as an interaction between two opposite poles, the ingroup and the outgroup. Each nation can be involved in more than one such coupling. In order to examine the influence that each salient outgroup has had on the development of the ingroup's national identity, we should look at them in their one-to-one relationship as Us and Them.

A Significant Other need not be a stronger or larger nation, or a community with more resources than the ingroup. The feature that makes a group a Significant Other is its *close* relationship with the other nation's sense of identity and uniqueness. Social psychological research has shown that a given group will not engage in comparisons with just any outgroup, but only with relevant ones. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979: 41), factors such as similarity, proximity and situational importance can influence the comparability between two groups; the higher the comparability, the greater the pressure will be to confirm ingroup superiority through comparison with a particular outgroup. Dissimilar outgroups are already distinctive from the ingroup, and there is hence little need for a nation to differentiate itself from them. In contrast, those that share a set of common features with the ingroup pose a threat to its distinctiveness and uniqueness (Johnston and Hewstone 1990: 188–9). Significant Others are, by definition, groups that share some common cultural, ethnic or territorial features with the nation.

Because of their close relationships with the nation, Significant Others *pose a challenge* to it. This challenge might be of a positive and peaceful character; when the outgroup is perceived to be an object of admiration and esteem, an exemplary case to be imitated, a group with a set of features to be incorporated into the national identity, a higher ground to be reached by the nation, it is an *inspiring*<sup>2</sup> Significant Other. However, at times this challenge might take the character of a threat, it might be seen as a danger to be avoided, an enemy to fight against, an outgroup to be destroyed if necessary, an Other that represents all that the nation rejects and despises: a *threatening* Significant Other.

More specifically, the Significant Other might pose a challenge to the ingroup's culture and/or territory. The threatening outgroup can challenge a nation's independence and self-determination where it is a nation that is in conflict with the ingroup because of a territorial or ethnic dispute. It could also be a group that threatens to blur the distinctiveness of the ingroup. According to social psychological research on group behaviour, the strongest competition between two groups can be expected to occur when, in reality, there is little reason to distinguish one group from another (Turner 1975: 22). Identity implies both uniqueness and the recognition of similarities between the members of the group that make their collective uniqueness meaningful. Thus, argue Lemaine *et al.* (1978: 287), 'a threatened identity can ... be restored by means

of a search for difference and otherness, the creation of, and then the emphasis upon, heterogeneity'. It might therefore happen that a neighbouring group is perceived as a Significant Other because it threatens the sense of distinctiveness and uniqueness of a nation with which it shares a set of cultural traditions and/or historical experiences. An inspiring Significant Other, on the other hand, is a model nation, admired not particularly for its features but for the way in which it has developed and/or preserved its nationhood (such as its struggle for political independence, or for emancipating the national culture and purifying it of foreign influence). The inspiring Other is not seen as part of the ingroup but as a model to be imitated.

Significant Others are also classified into *internal* (those who belong to the same political entity as the ingroup) and *external* ones (those who form a separate political unit) (see Table 3.1). In line with this distinction, a nation which is in possession of its own state or which forms the dominant national majority within a national state<sup>3</sup> might perceive an internal Significant Other to be an ethnic minority or an immigrant community. Similarly, a nation that forms part of a larger multinational political unit might perceive the internal Significant Other to be the national majority, some other small nation within the state or an immigrant community. With regard to external Significant Others, a nation which is organised in a nation-state or which forms part of a multinational state might perceive another nation to be a Significant Other. The latter could be in possession of a state or form part of a multinational polity. Also, an ethnic community which is part of a larger political unit could be an external Significant Other for another nation.

These various types of Significant Others might, of course, be perceived as either inspiring for or threatening to a nation. Moreover, their positive or negative image might change in different periods, so they might initially be an inspiring Significant Other, and later be perceived as a threat to the ingroup. This is what happened between Croats and Serbs at the beginning of the twentieth century, as I explain later (see p. 47ff.).

It is worth examining this typology in some more detail.

### *Internal Others*

Ethnic minorities that have participated in the constitution of a state within which an ingroup forms the national majority might become threatening Significant Others. Such minorities usually have a culture and language, as well as traditions and myths of origin, that are distinct from the dominant nation. They might therefore be perceived by the ingroup to pose a threat either to the territorial integrity of the state if they raise secessionist claims, or a threat to its cultural unity when they assert their right to difference and thus disrupt the cultural and political order of the national state. The indigenous population in Mexico, for instance, can be nominated as a threatening Significant Other for Mexican nationalism, even though an effort has recently been made to incorporate it into the national tradition (Carbó 1997).

Table 3.1 Internal and external Significant Others

	<i>Ingroup</i>	<i>Nation in national state</i>	<i>Nation in multinational state</i>	<i>Nation in national state</i>	<i>Nation in multinational state</i>
<i>Significant Other</i>	<i>Internal</i>	<i>Internal</i>	<i>Internal</i>	<i>External</i>	<i>External</i>
<i>Element challenged by the Significant Other</i>					
Threatening	Culture	Ethnic minority Immigrant community	Ethnic minority Immigrant community		Dominant ethnic group
Threatening or inspiring			Small nation Dominant nation	Other nation	Dominant nation Other nation
Threatening	Territory	Ethnic minority	Ethnic minority		Dominant ethnic group
Threatening or inspiring			Small nation Dominant nation	Other nation	Dominant nation Other nation

Source: adapted from Triandafyllidou (1998b: 601).



It is not rare that one nation has its own state but part of this nation lives as an ethnic minority within the boundaries of another national or multinational state. Examples include the Serbian minority in Croatia, the Albanian minority in Macedonia and Serbia, the Turkish minority in Greece or the German minority in the Czech Republic. The Serbian ethnic minority, for instance, might constitute an internal Significant Other for the Croat national majority within Croatia, while Serbia might become an external Significant Other for the Croats. Within such a context, the relationship between the nation and the Significant Others that surround it can be particularly complex.

An ethnic minority is rarely an inspiring Significant Other for some nation, for the mere fact that ethnicity is a lesser type of identity in the eyes of the nationalist. It is, in a sense, a '*nation manquée*'. Such a community has not achieved political independence or created a high culture, as a nation would do, so it cannot inspire the expectations of national grandeur nurtured by the ingroup. This is true regardless of whether the ingroup and the ethnic community form part of the same political unit (a national or multinational state) or not.

The second type of internal Significant Other refers to immigrant communities. These become *internal* Significant Others when their different language, religion or mores are perceived to threaten the cultural and/or ethnic purity of the nation. The nation is likely then to engage in a process of reaffirmation of its identity. It is also likely to seek to redefine its identity, so as to differentiate the ingroup from the newcomers. There is virtually no record of an immigrant population that is perceived as an inspiring Significant Other by the host nation. The negative and threatening representation of the immigrant seems to be an intrinsic feature of the host–immigrant relationship, and this derives, in part,<sup>4</sup> from the fact that the immigrant's presence defies the social and political order of the nation.

A small nation existing within a larger multinational state might perceive the dominant nation as an internal, threatening Significant Other; the Quebec–Canada and Scotland–UK cases are examples. The dynamics of the relationship between a small nation and the dominant national community often involve a quest for political autonomy on the part of the former and its search for distinctiveness. The latter has a desire to dominate the state institutions, as if these were the political expression of its own culture alone. This contrast often serves to demarcate the territorial or cultural–symbolic boundaries of both groups because it accentuates the features that distinguish them from one another. Rarely, if ever, does a small nation perceive the dominant one as a positive Significant Other.

A small nation might perceive another small nation or an immigrant community to be an internal Significant Other. With regard to another small nation, the rivalry and contrast between the two might involve competition for resources available from the centralised state, or it might concern competing territorial or cultural claims (examples are the Francophone and Flemish communities in Belgium). However, the relationship between two small nations in a multinational state might also be positive if another small nation is an

inspiring Significant Other for the ingroup (such as is represented by Catalan and Basque nationalism for the Galician movement in Spain). A small nation might also define its identity in contrast to an immigrant community that is perceived to be a threat to the purity and authenticity of the nation because of its alien language, mores or religion (such as Moroccan immigrants in Catalonia).

### *External Others*

Three types of *external* Significant Other can be distinguished. The first, which is particularly relevant for the initial stages of nation formation, is the dominant nation or ethnic group of a multinational state from which the ingroup seeks to liberate and/or distinguish itself (such as Eritrea and the Ethiopian Significant Other). The identity of the new nation is shaped in contrast to the dominant nation or ethnic group (Gellner 1964, 1983) and its main features are those that distinguish it from the ingroup. The struggle for liberation further accentuates the contrast between the two groups and the new nation is what the dominant nation or ethnic group is not. Rarely, if ever, is the dominant nation an inspiring Significant Other for the emerging group in this scenario.

The second type of external Significant Other concerns neighbouring nations (or national states) that might threaten the ingroup or be a source of inspiration to it. Threatening external others can be rival nations that contest some part of the ingroup's homeland or that are in possession of lands that the ingroup claims to be part of its own territory (the nation's *irredenta*). This type of external Significant Other might lead to the redefinition of the territorial boundaries of the nation or it might accentuate its irredentist tendencies and emphasise a specific ethnic or cultural conception of the ingroup which supports such tendencies (for example Pakistan and the threatening Indian Other).

The third category of external Significant Other that needs to be distinguished consists of nations, nation-states or ethnic groups that are territorially close to the ingroup but do not contest its territorial boundaries. They instead raise claims to the ingroup's cultural heritage by means of asserting that specific myths, symbols and/or ancestors are part of their national past. They threaten the ingroup's sense of uniqueness and authenticity and the ingroup might therefore redefine its identity in order to assert that the contested symbols or myths are its own cultural property. Eloquent examples of the tensions between neighbouring nations are encountered in the Balkan region: Greece's relationships with the Bulgarian and Turkish Significant Others at the beginning of this century (Triandafyllidou 1998a) cast light on the identity dynamics developed between the ingroup and a rival nation that contests its territoriality and political independence. The more recent controversy over the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (Triandafyllidou *et al.* 1997) illustrates the cultural challenge dynamics.

Other nations might also be a source of inspiration for their successful nationalist struggles and/or their vitality in asserting their identity and culture. Overall, western European nations such as England or France were inspiring

Significant Others for the emerging nations of south-eastern Europe, such as Greece or Italy, in the nineteenth century.

### *Illustrating complex dynamics*

In distinguishing between external and internal Significant Others, and further subtypes within them, my aim is to highlight the different dynamics that are developed between the nation and the Significant Other and the ways in which these condition the development of national identity. It is worth noting that internal Significant Others (are perceived to) erode the unity and/or authenticity of the nation from within, whereas external Significant Others (are deemed to) challenge the territorial and/or cultural integrity of the nation from outside. Thus, the external Significant Other is easily recognisable as the Other. It is identifiable in another state, and its contrast to the nation must be seen in the context of international relations. The external Significant Other is perceived to threaten the very position of the nation in the world of nations (and nation-states) because it challenges its distinctiveness and its right to self-determination. The relationship between the nation and an internal Significant Other, in contrast, concerns identity politics within a state. The internal Significant Other disrupts the cultural and political order of the nation, and thus challenges its sense of unity and authenticity. Even though an internal Significant Other might threaten to secede and take a part of the national territory, or it might contest the national culture, it usually does not put the existence of the ingroup into question. In other words, the external Significant Other is perceived as posing a threat to 'wipe out' the nation, while the internal Significant Other is viewed as posing a threat to 'contaminate' it.

Even though politicians and researchers tend to concentrate on threatening Significant Others, inspiring ones are no less important for the development and/or transformation of national identity. Inspiring others are usually found outside the nation, in a separate political entity from the one that the ingroup belongs to, although a positive other might also be an internal one. Inspiring others are usually other nations that have managed to achieve independence or to preserve their cultural autonomy and that provide thus a model for the development, consolidation and/or revitalisation of the ingroup identity.

The nations or ethnic communities that fall under one of the types of Significant Others defined above should be seen as *potential* Significant Others. These are groups that are related to the ingroup by two apparently contradictory features. They are different from it (they represent what the ingroup is not) and they pose a challenge to it by contesting or inspiring its existence and sense of identity. But they only become Significant Others when their threatening or inspiring presence becomes *salient*. This happens during periods of instability and crisis when the territorial and symbolic boundaries of the ingroup are unstable and/or unclear. Significant Others are identified during the phase of nation formation when national identity is still in the making. They thus strengthen the sense of belonging of the ingroup and demarcate its

territorial, ethnic or cultural boundaries because they (are perceived to) either threaten its existence or provide a model for it.

Significant Others also become salient during periods of social, political or economic crisis. The positive Significant Other might, in that case, be seen as a model to follow for resolving the crisis. The threatening Other might help overcome the crisis because it unites the people in front of a common enemy; it reminds them 'who we are' and emphasises that 'we are different and unique'. In circumstances of crisis, the outgroup might also serve as a scapegoat (Doob 1964: 253). If it is the national identity that is contested, the Threatening Other helps to clarify the boundaries of the ingroup and reinforce members' sense of belonging. By contrast, if the nation undergoes a period of general economic or sociopolitical crisis, the Other provides for 'distraction' from the real causes of the crisis and it is a means for reasserting the positive identity<sup>5</sup> of the nation 'against the odds'. In both cases, the Significant Other becomes the lever for the transition towards a new identity. Through the confrontation with the Significant Other, the identity of the ingroup is transformed in ways that make it relevant in a new set of circumstances and/or respond better to the emotive and/or material needs of the members of the nation.

### **Discourses of nationhood in the Balkans<sup>6</sup>**

In the following sections, my aim is to illustrate some of the mechanisms involved in the ingroup–Significant Other relationship, and the impact of the latter on the development or transformation of the ingroup's identity. For this purpose I have chosen two well-known pairs of neighbouring nations as case studies: Greeks and Turks, on the one hand, and Croats and Serbs, on the other. By analysing the discourses of nationhood developed in Greece and Croatia at the beginning of the twentieth century, I shall highlight the role played by the Turks<sup>7</sup> as an external Threatening Other for Greece, and also the role of the Serbs as an initially external inspiring Significant Other, which later became a threatening internal one for the Croats.

These two case studies share a number of commonalities and differences which make them a highly interesting pair for comparison. They are both situated in the Balkans, living alongside one another in a region in which ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic groups have been inextricably intermingled for centuries. It is no coincidence that nationalist wars continue to be waged in the Balkan peninsula in an effort to create ethnically homogeneous nation-states. The region has also experienced foreign intervention, which has often ignored popular needs or demands and has imposed forceful 'national solutions'. Furthermore, the development of both nations has been influenced by international dynamics in the region and by the conflict between western European countries (such as France, Britain and Austria–Hungary) and the two major eastern forces (the Russian and the Ottoman Empires).

However, despite being geographically close, the histories of Greece and Croatia differ widely. The territory of contemporary Greece was subjugated to

the Ottomans for almost four centuries (1453–1821); the regions that have recently formed the independent Croat state were part of Austria–Hungary until the creation of the first Yugoslav state at the beginning of the twentieth century (1918). Greece acquired its independence in 1829, while Croatia became a nation-state only in 1991 after the break-up of the Yugoslav federation.

Nation formation in Greece and Croatia also followed different paths. National identity in Greece is predominantly ‘ethnic’,<sup>8</sup> based on the belief in a common genealogical descent. According to the Greeks, the ethnocultural unity and uniqueness of the nation was preserved, through the Greek language and mores and the Christian Orthodox religion, despite their loss of political independence. By contrast but in conformity with the Croat State Right tradition, the Croat nation has been conceived as more a political and territorial unit. It is thus defined as a civic community rather than as a group of people that are ancestrally related.<sup>9</sup>

The relationships between Croats and Serbs and between Greeks and Turks exemplify the functioning of the Us-and-Them dynamics between two neighbouring countries/peoples that share much culturally, linguistically and historically. The two cases are not identical as Croats and Serbs shared a common religious faith (although of different dogmas), and also a common cultural identity as South Slavs. The conflict between Greeks and Turks included, among other elements, religion and genealogical descent.

In conclusion, these two case studies offer the opportunity to study the role of Significant Others in the development of the discourse of nationhood and the formation of national identities of different types, despite being situated in the same geographical and historical context.

### Greeks and Turks

If Turkey has no place in the European history, Greece does not have one either.

(T. Pangalos, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
March 1997, cit. in Lenkova 1997)

There is little doubt that the Greek government and the majority of the Greek people view Turkey as *the* major threat to the country’s independence and well-being. However the aim of this section is to examine the relationship between Greece and Turkey from a different angle that concentrates on Turkey’s role in the development of a Greek national identity. Even though such an influence might still exist (and is perhaps worth exploring), this study will concentrate on the first two decades of the twentieth century. During that period, Greece was eventually consolidated both as a nation and as a nation-state; it acquired the northern part of its current territory (Macedonia and Thrace) and the Aegean islands,<sup>10</sup> and abandoned its irredentist projects. It is therefore important to explore the role that Turkey played as an external, mainly threatening Significant Other during that period.

### *Creating the ethnos*

Before examining the dynamics of the Greek–Turkish relationship, it is worth outlining the main features of Greek national identity that developed during the nineteenth century. Greek identity encompassed both ethnic and civic characteristics. Even though early Greek nationalism in the late eighteenth century was marked by the influence of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment (Veremis 1983: 59–60; Kitromilides 1990: 25–33), the Greek nation was eventually defined with reference to common ancestry (Kitromilides 1983; Veremis 1983, 1990), culture and language (Diamandouros 1983: 55; Kitromilides 1990: 30). Greek national consciousness was built throughout the nineteenth century with reference to the Great Idea of liberating the nation's *irredenta*,<sup>11</sup> namely the regions inhabited by Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox populations that had not been included in the independent Greek state when it was created (1829). Moreover, the independent Greek kingdom accepted *eterochthones* (ethnic Greeks who were born outside the territory that later became the independent Greek kingdom), on an equal footing as *autochthones*, namely those born within the national territory (Clogg 1992: 48). In other words, Greece became the national centre: the political and cultural basis for Greek populations living in the Near and Middle East, as well as in the Balkans (Kitromilides 1983).

Modern institutions were transplanted into the newborn Greek state, as well as the Greek Enlightenment movement, even though they were alien to the traditional, rural and deeply religious Greek society of the early nineteenth century. They marked a continuity between classical and modern Greece. The ancient glorious past was thus incorporated into the conception of the nation as its genealogical and cultural cradle. However, the construction of the national identity was completed only by integrating the Byzantine period into the historic trajectory of the Greeks. The 'invention' of such a united and unique community started with the work of the Greek historian Constantine Paparrigopoulos (Veremis 1983: 60–1, 1990: 12) and continued throughout the nineteenth century by means of the national educational and cultural policies.

Despite the contradiction between the particularistic claims of Greek nationalism and the universalistic tendencies of the Christian Orthodox religion, the integration of the Byzantine past into the national consciousness led to the population's gradual identification with the *ethnos*.<sup>12</sup> Even though this identification was problematic (Kitromilides 1990: 51–59), the separation of the Greek church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1833 confirmed the close link between Hellenism and Orthodoxy.

### *A nation in crisis*

The main characteristic elements of Greek national identity that were outlined in the previous section make the Janus nature of Greek nationalism explicit. The narrative of the Greek nation is divided between the East and the West.

The East (the Ottoman Empire) represents the major enemy and threat, but it also includes the Byzantine tradition and the Christian Orthodox heritage. The West is a major source of nationalist inspiration and support but, at the same time, is regarded with suspicion as a culture alien to traditional Greek society. Even though the nationalist narrative managed to incorporate classical Greece with the Byzantine tradition and to construct a national past without ruptures, the ambivalence between East and West remains an important feature of the Greek identity, and also of Greek nationalism in general. The national narrative is characterised by a confusion between Western political principles based on rationality and irredentist projects, and these inextricably link Hellenism with Christianity (Tsoukalas 1994).

My analysis of the role of the Turks as a Significant Other for Greece has to be seen in the context of the multiple and complex Us-and-Them dynamics that developed towards both the East and the West. My aim in this section will be to show how Turkey helped to appease this internal conflict between the Enlightenment and irredentism by playing the role of the Significant Other, 'the enemy', against which the nation united. I will also show that the conclusion of the conflict with Turkey, which led to the abandonment of the Greek irredentist projects, contributed to the consolidation of the national identity.

The path towards national integration during the nineteenth century proved particularly difficult because the limited economic and military forces of the Greek state could not meet the disproportionate ambitions of its governments. Moreover, the regime of conditional sovereignty that had been imposed on Greece by the foreign powers further undermined the prestige and legitimacy of the kingdom as the political agent of the nation (Diamandouros 1983). The situation deteriorated towards the end of the century because the development policy adopted by the Trikoupis government in the 1880s led to the effective bankruptcy of the state in 1893. The military defeat by the Turks in Thessaly in 1897, and the country's submission to the financial control of the International Monetary Fund, complemented the national humiliation. It became obvious that the Greek nation-state was not able to fulfil the task it had set for itself, namely the liberation of ethnic Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, Greece reached the nadir of its existence, relapsing into an economic, political and identity crisis (Augustinos 1977: 24; Veremis 1983: 66–7). The state had lost its credibility as the main representative of the nation. Moreover, it was no longer trusted as a reliable administrator of its own affairs (Veremis 1990: 15). Its double – financial and military – failure put its role as the national centre into question (Kitromilides 1983). The situation deteriorated further with uprisings in Crete<sup>13</sup> which increased the strain in the relationships between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Another important source of worry for Greeks was the claims raised by Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania on territories north of the Greek borders that had been long coveted by Greek nationalists.

The early twentieth century – in particular the period between 1904 and 1908 – was marked by armed conflict between Greek and Bulgarian bands for

supremacy in Ottoman Macedonia.<sup>14</sup> Local men, Cretans and, more often than not, undercover Greek army officers supplied by the government of Athens joined into competing bands of guerrilla fighters. The Greek bands gradually got the upper hand in the conflict, thus preparing the annexation of the region to Greece through the Balkan wars (1912–13) (Clogg 1992: 75).

The 'Macedonian struggle' played an important part in revitalising Greek national identity by introducing a new Other, the Slavs (and, more particularly, the Bulgarians), against which the nation felt united. The Macedonian issue was seen as a test of the nation and many Greeks felt it their duty to respond (Augustinos 1977: 123). The 'Macedonian struggle' emphasised the unity of the nation, if one considers that many '*Makedonomachoi*' (Macedonian fighters) came not only from mainland Greece but also from Crete. It also provided an opportunity for new heroes such as Pavlos Melas, a Greek army officer and son of an influential family that had long been committed to the Great Idea and its realisation, who was appointed commander-in-chief of the Greek bands in the areas of Kastoria and Monastir in August 1904. He was killed there by Turkish troops in September of the same year. Pavlos Melas and his fellow fighters struck a chord with most members of the Athenian bourgeoisie, who organised social gatherings in support of the Macedonian cause (Gounaris 1997).

The following passage, written by nationalist intellectual and diplomat Ion Dragoumis during his service as a consular officer in Macedonia, eloquently expresses (albeit perhaps too passionately) the influence that the 'Macedonian struggle' had on Greek national consciousness:

You have to know that if we hurry to save Macedonia, Macedonia will save us. She will save us from the dirt in which we roll, from the mediocrity and the dead spirit, from the shameful sleep, she will free us. If we hurry to save Macedonia, we will be saved!<sup>15</sup>

(Dragoumis 1992: 10–11)

According to Dragoumis (*ibid.*), the struggle against the Bulgarian and Ottoman Others was the means of 'awakening' the national consciousness and saving the nation from the Eastern military and political threat, and the Western corrupted mores.

Under the pressure of the Bulgarian threat in Macedonia, Greece had to revise its foreign policy priorities and opted for a strategy of co-operation with the Ottoman Empire (Veremis 1990: 17). The contradiction between the compromising attitude and weakness of the independent Greek kingdom and the nationalist fervour inspired by the Macedonian question and the struggle of Cretans for '*enosis*' led some intellectuals to propose the idea of the 'stateless nation' as an alternative to the nation-state (Veremis 1990: 16). They thus emphasised the ethnic and cultural component of the nation and downplayed its territorial unity. Ion Dragoumis and Athanasios Souliotes were the two main advocates of this idea (Augustinos 1977: 117–34).

Even though Dragoumis' writings represent neither the nation nor the whole



political class, they eloquently express the contradiction between the nation and the state:

Concerning the government, I feel disgusted, I despise it. When I think of the government I feel down, retreat and fade. I get up, rise and blossom when I feel the Hellenes.

(Dragoumis 1992: 36)

In the context of the demoticist movement,<sup>16</sup> a number of intellectuals expressed their concern about the decline of the nation and the ways in which to revitalise it. Kostas Palamas stands out among other poets for his sensibility and insight. Two of Palamas' works, the 'Dodecalogue of the Gypsy' (1907) and the 'King's Flute' (1910), testify to the poet's concern with the nation's present and future, and the need for national rebirth (Augustinos 1977: 40–65). Even though a detailed analysis of Palamas' view of the nation goes beyond the scope of this book, it is worth noting that he foresaw regeneration through pain and suffering that would be inflicted on the Greeks by the Turks:

But before we are born into a new life we must wear the martyr's crown; and this will not happen until we see Turkish hordes encamped under the shadow of the Acropolis. It is only through this ultimate ordeal that the inconceivable vision of rebirth would take on flesh and bones and that the light of day would emerge out of the darkness of national despair.

(K. Palamas, *Tourkoi is tas Athinas* (Turks in Athens), *Akropolis*, June 25, 1897, cit. in Augustinos 1977: 42)

Perikles Giannopoulos, another important intellectual of this period (Augustinos 1977: 66–83), similarly blamed the Turks for all the evils that had befallen the Greeks in their history, and suggested that the era of Ottoman rule led to the breakdown of cohesiveness and solidarity among the Greeks. Giannopoulos was critical of the Orthodox church and the West too, accusing the church of betraying the national cause and the West of corrupting the Greek culture. In this hierarchy of Significant Others, the Turks nevertheless had a higher rank.

In conclusion, the Greek national identity underwent a deep crisis during the first decade of the twentieth century: the nation-state had lost its credibility and the idea of the nation had lost its clarity and vitality. Greeks were surrounded by hostile Others and were (or felt) unable to deal with them. A provisional solution to this identity impasse was provided through the accentuation of ethnic, religious and cultural elements of the national identity at the expense of its political and territorial aspects.

### *Nationalist revival*

The national crisis was concluded in 1909 with the military coup of Goudi.

The coup was enacted by the Military League and involved a sizeable proportion of the Athens garrison. Even though it originated in professional grievances among army officers, it eventually imposed a number of non-military reforms on the government (Clogg 1992: 75–6). In effect, the army rose against the corrupt and inefficient political class under the pressure of the specific domestic and foreign policy circumstances of the time (Dertilis 1985: 213–14).<sup>17</sup> The coup might be seen as the turning point from national crisis to revival. It marked the beginning of a new period for Greece under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos,<sup>18</sup> during which Greece managed to achieve many of its nationalist aspirations by means of both military campaigns and diplomatic manoeuvres. Venizelos and his liberal party won almost 300 out of 364 seats in parliament in the election of August 1912. The new government's agenda included both domestic socioeconomic reform and the aggressive pursuit of the Great Idea.

During this period, the view of the nation-without-state was abandoned. This was because the Greek state acquired new strength and prepared to fight for the liberation of the *irredenta*, and also because of the forced Ottomanisation policy inaugurated by the Young Turks despite their initial promise for equality for all ethnic or religious groups living in the empire. Thus the territorial and political dimensions of the Greek nation were reinforced by the Turkish threat to suppress ethnic Greeks living in the Empire (Veremis 1983: 66). The optimism and dynamism injected into Greek public life by the new government (Clogg 1992: 79) strengthened the identification of the nation with the state and reintroduced its role as the national centre.

The first Balkan war (1912) was waged between the allied forces of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro against the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman army was heavily outnumbered by the allied forces of the Balkan states and was soon obliged to retreat. Greek troops captured Salonica in November 1912 and the city of Ioannina, the capital of Epirus, in February 1913. The Greek navy soon established its superiority in the Aegean by gaining control over the islands of Chios, Samos and Mytilini. The gains of the allies over the Ottoman Empire were recognised by the Turks at the Treaty of London in May 1913.

The second Balkan war took place between Serbia and Greece, on the one hand, and Bulgaria, on the other hand. Serbs and Greeks agreed to divide the spoils of Macedonia and forced the Bulgarians to agree to a highly unfavourable territorial settlement (Treaty of Bucharest, August 1913). During the same period, Greece saw its sovereignty over Crete recognised, but failed to annexe the northern part of Epirus which was given to the independent state of Albania.

By the end of the Balkan wars, Greece had managed to fulfil a large part of its irredentist dreams at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (and partly of the Bulgarians). During the years 1909–13, the nation had been united and had wholeheartedly supported the government in its nationalist enterprises. Greek national sentiment had been strengthened in front of the Turkish enemy.<sup>19</sup> The role of the Turks as the Significant Other remained highly important given that Greek national identity during that period was inextricably linked with the Great Idea project that included the liberation of Minor Asia Greeks.

At the outbreak of the First World War, the Greek government decided to side with the Entente forces, despite the contrary wishes of the King and part of the political class. Despite the country's foreign successes, discord started emerging in domestic politics. The prevalence of the Great Idea as the national state ideology was attacked by part of the political world – mainly the King and his supporters – which opted for a 'small but honourable Greece' (Mavrogordatos 1983: 90–1). The emerging 'national schism'<sup>20</sup> between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists did not prevent Greek troops from landing in Smyrna (now Izmir) in 1919 with the support of the Allied forces. In August 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed with the aim of installing peace between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. According to this treaty, the region of Smyrna was to remain under Greek administration for 5 years, after which it would be formally annexed to Greece if the local parliament (to be created in the meantime) so requested. The Greek government had good reasons to believe that this would happen (Clogg 1992: 95) even though the Turks never ratified the treaty. Furthermore, Venizelos lost the election of November 1920 and the 'small but honourable Greece' supporters came to power.

The gradual erosion of national unity in the period between 1914 and 1920, expressed by the term of 'national schism', was related to a conflict between the Prime Minister and the King regarding the country's alliance with the Entente or the Central powers. Internal divisions became wider as people grew weary of the constant state of war, and also because of the vindictive behaviour of some of Venizelos' supporters during his second term in office (1917–20). The continuous interference of the Great Powers into the country's affairs also contributed to a sense of loss of national pride (Clogg 1992: 87–95). Thus, the Great Idea lost its impetus and the people started reconsidering their national identity, seeking to balance the irredentist overtone with the territorial and civic concept of the small but honourable Greece.

The royalist government elected in November 1920 nevertheless pursued the Minor Asia campaign. Despite the fact that the allies declared their neutrality in the Greek–Turkish conflict in April 1921, the Greek army's offensive of March 1921 led the Greek troops to the Sakarya river near Ankara. The major offensive launched in August 1922 soon turned into a rout. The Greek forces had to withdraw from Asia Minor, and large numbers of ethnic Greeks inhabiting the region fled towards mainland Greece as refugees.

The defeat of the Greek army at Asia Minor and its consequences – loss of the territorial gains of the Treaty of Sèvres and exchange of the Greek populations living in the Empire with the Turkish populations living in Greece<sup>21</sup> – irrevocably marked Greek history, and it also had an important effect on the Greek national identity. The Great Idea was definitively abandoned and the territory of the state was incorporated into the dominant nationalist discourse as one of the features of the nation (together with ethnic origin, culture, language and religious faith). The fact that the birth of the modern Turkish nation from the remains of the Ottoman Empire was intertwined with the destruction of the Greek irredentist project confirmed the role of the Turks as the threatening

Other *par excellence* for Greeks. At the same time, the conflict with the Turks contributed to the consolidation of Greek national identity because it strengthened the identification of the nation with the state and enhanced its modern, civic and territorial features.

### **Croat nationalism and the Serbian Other**

Inimicality between Serbs and Croats is not centuries old but dates from the early Croat experience in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia.

(Bennett 1995: 35)

This section will explore how interaction with the Serbs influenced the development of Croat nationalism and, in particular, how the Serbs as a Significant Other initially inspired Croat national identity, later becoming its major threat and the enemy against whom Croats defined their nationhood. The study will cover the first two decades of the twentieth century, analysing how the initially pro-Yugoslav, and to a certain extent Serbophile, Croat nationalism was abandoned and how the idea of a separate Croat nation-state became dominant among the Croat leadership and population.

### *The origins of Croat nationalism*

Croatia's medieval statehood was the cornerstone of the Croats'<sup>22</sup> conception of their nation in the early stages of nationalist mobilisation in the mid-nineteenth century. The Croat state-right tradition referred to the presumed legal continuity of the Croat state after the formation of the medieval Croat kingdom in the tenth century. More specifically, the claim of continuity was based on the fact that Croatia had signed the *Pacta Conventa* with Hungary in 1102. In this, Croats recognised the Hungarian ruler as King in exchange for the King's commitment to respect Croat rights and privileges such as retaining their own Sabor, a partly independent military, and a separate tax system and currency (Irvine 1993: 22). The emphasis on the State Right tradition was meant to counteract regional diversity within Croatia. The people inhabiting Dalmatia, Slavonia and Inner Croatia spoke different dialects, had had different historical and political experiences<sup>23</sup> and also had different customs and traditions.

The State Right tradition was taken up by Ante Starcevic and his Party of Right (i.e. State Right) in the 1850s. Starcevic and his followers supported the idea of an independent greater Croatia and asserted that all the inhabitants of Croat lands were political Croats. They thus refused to recognise the existence of the Serbian or the Slovene nation (Banac 1984: 86–8; Jelavich 1990: 18–19; Irvine 1993: 23–6). The Party of Right broke with the idea of Slavic reciprocity<sup>24</sup> and South Slav unity, and instead raised a claim for an independent and sovereign Croat nation.<sup>25</sup>

The Illyrianist movement, which flourished in the 1830s and 1840s (Banac

1984: 76–8; Irvine 1993: 23–4), represented another important strand of Croat nationalism. The Illyrianists and their leader Ljudevit Gaj promoted the idea of a common language and a shared culture that united the South Slavs. They aimed eventually to establish within the Hapsburg Empire an Illyrian community of all South Slavs united under a common language, the Stokavian dialect. Bishop Strossmayer and his National Party took up the Illyrian movement's legacy in the 1840s. Strossmayer aimed to bring Slovenes, Croats and Serbs together in an autonomous unit in the Hapsburg Monarchy. Moreover, he ultimately contemplated a separate federal state including Serbia and Montenegro (Banac 1984: 89–90).

### *Early twentieth-century Yugoslavism in Croatia*

On the eve of the twentieth century, Croat national identity included contradictory tendencies: on the one hand, the Illyrian legacy and, on the other hand, the Party of Right nationalist ideology. Moreover, Croat lands were characterised by a high degree of regional diversity, while nationalism was an ideology of the élites rather than a mass movement.

The removal of the Magyar ban of Croatia Khuen-Hedervary in 1903 marked the end of two decades of hostilities between Croats and Serbs and paved the way for co-operation between the two peoples. The influence of Tomas Masaryk, the father of Czechoslovak independence, on young Croats studying in Prague and their acquaintance with the idea of national self-determination promoted enthusiasm for South Slav unification. This tendency was confirmed by the Croat–Serb coalition established in 1905 which adopted a political programme aimed at South Slav unity in the Hapsburg Empire, and later the union of all South Slavs in an independent state. The term 'national oneness' (*narodno jedinstvo*) was coined to express the idea that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were three 'tribes' belonging to one Yugoslav nation. Thus, Croat national identity crystallised around the idea of Yugoslavism.

At least in principle, Unitarist Yugoslavism did not entail the abandonment of the conception of Croat political nationhood (Banac 1984: 98). However, during the 1910s, the enthusiasm for South Slav unification among the Croat political élites led to the progressive abandonment of a federal arrangement and the surrender of the Croat State Right tradition in favour of a unitary South Slav state which would be created by means of Serbian expansion (Banac 1984: 100–5; Irvine 1993: 27). As Banac argues, Serbia became the example to follow for many young Croat artists and intellectuals,<sup>26</sup> and Croat nationalism was subordinated to Serbophile unitarism.

This Serbophile section of Croat nationalism was counterbalanced by those, such as the Progressive Youth, who remained faithful to Croat political nationhood (Banac 1984: 97). Stjepan Radic and his Croat People's Peasant Party also supported these views. Radic insisted on the federalist structure of the future state within which Croats, and also Serbs and Slovenes, should be independent in organising their own affairs on the basis of the 'national oneness' project.

In conclusion, the Serbs had a positive influence on the development of Croat nationalism from 1900 until the mid-1910s. Their achievement of national independence provided the example to be followed by Croats and other South Slavs. Even though one part of the Croat political class remained sceptical with regard to the project of South Slav unification under Serbian hegemony, there was a growing tendency, particularly among the progressive Croat youth, favouring Yugoslav unitarism and conceiving of the Croats and the Serbs as one nation. Thus, Croat nationalism was generally Yugoslav oriented (*ibid.*: 106).

### *The Serbian Other and the transformation of Croat national identity*

My aim in this section will be to show how the process of Yugoslav unification in the period 1915–21 led to the consolidation of Croat nationhood and strengthened the quest for a separate state. In this process, the Serbs became the Other from which the Croats sought to differentiate and ‘liberate’ themselves.

#### *Before the unification (1915–18)*

Even though pro-Yugoslavism became a dominant trend in Serbia (as it had in Croatia during the 1900s and 1910s), the Serbian version of ‘national oneness’ was significantly different from that of the Croats. The Serbs’ views of a unitary Yugoslav state were conditioned by their own national ideology that was based on ethnic and religious homogeneity and carried with it a long history of expansionism and assimilationism. The Serbs, unlike the Croats and the Slovenes, were in possession of an independent national state at the time and thus viewed Yugoslavism as Great Serbianism.

Serbian expansionism became explicit during the negotiations for South Slav unification (1915–18). The Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic perceived the creation of the new state as the expansion of Serbian military and political institutions into the new territories. The Yugoslav Committee (YC), formed by Croat and Slovene politicians who had sought refuge in Allied or neutral countries after the outbreak of the First World War, rejected the notion of ‘concessions’ to be made by Serbia to Croatia and insisted on the leading role that the latter had in Yugoslav unification with regard to the South Slav lands within the Hapsburg Monarchy. It was thus obvious that the YC conceived of the Croats and the Serbs as two separate, though equal, parties in the unification. This did not entail the fusion of the Croat identity and/or territory into the Serbian nation-state.

The position of the YC in the negotiations with Serbia was weakened after the Entente countries promised Italy large sections of the Croat and Slovene territories on the precondition that it would declare war on Austria–Hungary. During the same period, the Allies offered Serbia control over parts of Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Slavonia, Dalmatia and northern Albania as a compensation for their previous concession of parts of Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria. The fact that Pasic kept his negotiations with the Allies secret made the YC leadership more suspicious than ever with regard to Serbs' views about Yugoslav unification. Croat unitarists grew disenchanted with the project as it became obvious that Serbia did not envisage Croatia as a partner in the new state but rather as a subordinate. A large proportion of the Croat politicians favoured a trialist solution that would grant autonomy to Croatia within the Hapsburg Monarchy rather than unification with Serbia.<sup>27</sup> Instead of feeling threatened by the Monarchy, the Croat leadership perceived unification with Serbia as the biggest threat to the nation's independence and self-determination.

As the military situation rapidly led to the debacle of Austria–Hungary, the delegates of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes proceeded to a hasty unification in October 1918. They were euphoric about their sudden rise to power and their achievement of independence, but they were also concerned about the social upheaval that was rapidly spreading throughout northern Croatia after the collapse of the Hapsburg state. For the Croats, the act of unification meant abandoning their State Right tradition in favour of Yugoslav unity. Under the circumstances (i.e. the dismantling of Austria–Hungary, the unitarist pressures of the Serbs and the overall chaotic situation at the end of the war), a Yugoslav state was seen by the Croats as the most effective means by which to achieve their national goals. However,

Their [the Croats'] national ideology and political experiences left them with conflicting approaches toward the new state, ranging from unitarism to secessionism. Divided by these different views, they were ill equipped to respond to Serbian unitarist pressures.

(Irvine 1993: 33)

In conclusion, the period preceding the Yugoslav unification led to the deterioration of relations between Croats and Serbs. Even though the Croat leadership eventually endorsed the solution of a unitary state, the belief in the 'national oneness' had largely receded. The start of the Yugoslav era was indeed quite confusing for the Croats because, although they had abandoned their national independence project for the sake of Yugoslav unity, they were already disenchanted with the idea, and were suspicious of their 'fellow nationals'.

#### *The interim parliament (1918–20) and the Croat national identity*

Paradoxically, Croat national identity was to be consolidated through the process of Yugoslav unification. By the time the Vidvodan Constitution was voted for in June 1921, the hitherto ambivalent nature of Croat nationalism – which had tried in vain to reconcile a pro-Yugoslav orientation with the State Right tradition – had been replaced by a widespread nationalist-peasant movement that claimed the right to an independent Croat republic.

The interim parliament was formed in December 1918 and ruled until November 1920, when the first elections were held in the new kingdom. However, during this period a unitary and centralised polity was installed through the expansion of Serbian rule to the new territories, rather than by the creation of a new state. The centralised unification compromised national equality from the very beginning. The Serbian army, which in November 1918 was invited to enter the territory of Croatia and Slavonia in order to restore public order, often behaved as an occupation force, and the rural population was increasingly alienated from the new political arrangement. The new government required the regional administrations to resign and, later, arbitrarily confirmed some of the previous heads of the regional bodies and rejected others (Banac 1984: 217).

The widespread social unrest expressed in northern Croatia and Slavonia during the first months after the unification showed that the Croat peasantry was reluctant to accept the new rule. People knew little about what was going on and social problems often took on political–national connotations as the blame was placed on the National Council and/or the Serbs. The discontent of the Croat peasants and their aspirations for the establishment of a Croat republic were raised by Stjepan Radic and his Croat People’s Peasant Party (Banac 1984: 226–60; Irvine 1993: 40–6). Of the twenty-eight notables elected to participate at the National Council’s delegation to Belgrade, Radic was the only one who refused to ratify the unification act and participate in the interim parliament. Thus Radic reaffirmed Croat nationhood by demanding a Croat constituent assembly that would create a Croat republic within a broader South Slav federation.

For Radic and his followers, the Serbs became the threatening Other which prevented the Croats from achieving independence and self-determination. Contrary to the Croat leadership’s earlier views of the Serbs as a brother nation and the ‘vehicle’ for Croat independence, they were now represented as the main obstacle in the way of the Croats gaining a state on their own. The idea of ‘national oneness’ was also put into question. Radic emphasised the political uniqueness of each South Slav nation: the cultural and linguistic elements uniting the Yugoslavs were not a sufficient basis for state building. The Croats were a separate nation, not least because of their distinct political tradition and State Right.

Moreover, Croat nationhood was redefined as a moral community. Radic and his party were not against national unity with the Serbs in itself; they were rather against the ‘domestic force and injustice’ that the Serbian rule had brought about:

That which you, Milica [Radic’s daughter], think that I should write ... about the Serbs etc. – that is superfluous. Before the dissolution of the [Austro-Hungarian] Monarchy and the military collapse of Germany it was necessary to swallow all of that ... today NEW facts are here, not only the beatings, but the old Serbian military, bureaucratically corrupt and



conspiratorial system, which was shameful before the war, and is now catastrophic. It is not a question of whether we, Croats want to go with *Serbia*, or rather under Serbia, but whether we want to go with the new spirit of pacifism, that is, with *practical humanism*, with the new order of PRACTICAL democracy ('socialism') and practical, scientific, trade union administration (not bureaucratic *clichés*).

(*Korespondencija*, p. 271, cit. in Banac 1984: 233, emphasis in the original)

Thus, the Croats sought to differentiate themselves from the Serbs despite their common linguistic and cultural traditions. Croat national identity was based on the State Right principle, which was 'rediscovered' (or 'reinvented') by Radic in order to confront Serbian expansionism. A set of new values – those of 'practical humanism' – were also incorporated into Croat identity to emphasise its cultural distinctiveness from the Serbs.

According to official estimates, Radic's republican ideas were widespread in the Croat countryside as early as 1919 (Banac 1984: 242–3). This view seems to be confirmed by the overall rural unrest in 1919 and the events of the Croat peasant revolt against draft-animal registration in 1920. It can thus be argued that the process of Yugoslav unification and, more particularly, the confrontation between the Croats and the Serbs within it made the former increasingly aware of their nationhood. It shaped Croat identity so as to ensure their distinctiveness from their Serbian partners.

## Conclusions

The aim of this chapter has been to introduce the notion of a Significant Other as a conceptual tool for analysing the influence of Others in the consolidation and/or transformation of national identity. A typology (see Table 3.1) of Significant Others has been developed to account for the dynamics created between the ingroup and internal (those who belong to the same political entity with the ingroup) or external (those who form part of another state) Others. The distinction between inspiring and threatening outgroups has been introduced to highlight the fact that other nations or ethnic groups are neither always nor necessarily perceived in negative terms.

It is worth noting that other nations or ethnic groups that (are perceived to) challenge a nation's culture, territory or identity constitute *potential* Significant Others. They only become Significant Others during periods of instability and crisis when the territorial and symbolic boundaries of the ingroup are unstable and/or unclear. Then their presence becomes salient. During such periods, the Significant Other helps to clarify the boundaries between the nation and the Others, and it reinforces the sense of belonging of its members. The contrast with the Significant Other provides an effective means by which to reassert the identity of an ingroup that is in crisis. In other words, through confrontation with the Significant Other, the national identity is redefined in ways that make

it relevant under a new set of circumstances and which respond better to the material, symbolic or affective needs of the nation's members.

Two cases of Significant Others have been examined in this chapter so as to highlight the dynamics of the relationship between the nation and important outgroups. First, the influence of the Turks on the development of Greek national identity has been analysed, and, particularly, the crisis, revival and eventual transformation of Greek identity during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The findings show a period of crisis during the first years of the century, when the ethnic, cultural and religious features of the nation were overemphasised and its territorial dimension was downplayed. This was followed by the re-establishment of unity between the nation and its state in the 1920s, and national identity was reinforced through confrontation with the Turks. Internal divisions nevertheless emerged in the second half of the 1920s, as a result of domestic political conflicts and the weariness of constant fighting, and the territorial and political features of the nation acquired new importance. The national identity was eventually consolidated through the tragic experience of defeat of Greek troops by the Turkish army in Minor Asia in 1922; this led to the fusion of ethnic and territorial elements within the Greek identity as the irredentist project was abandoned. The Turks thus functioned as a catalyst to the internal contradictions of Greek nationalism and contributed to the consolidation of Greek nationhood as part and parcel of the independent Greek nation-state.

The second case study dealt with the development of a Croat national identity through interaction, co-operation and conflict with the Serbs. The analysis shows that early Croat nationalism was linked to Yugoslavism and the idea of national 'oneness' among Slav tribes. During the first 15 years of the century, Croat identity remained ill defined and politically weak. It was mainly through the process of Yugoslav unification between 1915 and 1918 that Croat nationhood re-emerged. Croats gradually became disenchanted with the idea of national oneness and started viewing the Serbs as a threat to their independence and self-determination. Eventually, Croat nationhood was consolidated, and the quest for a separate state became imperative as Serbs were identified as the Other from which the Croats had to 'liberate' themselves.

Even though the Greek and the Croat nations differ in their historical experience (the Greeks under the Ottoman Empire, and the Croats under Austria–Hungary and also partly Italy and the Ottomans) and national identity (Greek identity is predominantly ethnic whereas Croat nationhood has been based on the State Right tradition), the impact of their interaction with threatening Significant Others led to similar outcomes. The conflict with the Serbs reinforced Croats' sense of nationhood and crystallised into the quest for a separate, independent state. The territorial and political dimension of Greekness was strengthened through the conflict with the Turks (and the Ottoman Empire), leading to the clear definition of the boundaries of both the state and the nation. Apart from consolidating national consciousness overall, the presence of a threatening Other reinforced the link between national identity and statehood in both cases.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that there usually are multiple Us and Them pairs that influence the formation and transformation of a nation. It would be interesting, for instance, to analyse the impact of Bulgaria and Albania on Greek national identity, or the influence of Austria–Hungary and Slovenia on the formation of the Croat nation.

## 4 The immigrant as Other

### The nation and the immigrant Other

Among the various types of Significant Others discussed in Chapter 3, immigrant communities are seen to play an important role as threatening internal Others. The host–immigrant relationship is characterised by a negative and threatening representation of immigrant groups, mainly because the latter’s presence defies the social and political order of the nation. As Abdelmalek Sayad (1991: 292–9) puts it:

Immigration and its double, emigration, offer the occasion to confront in practice, through experience, the national order, namely the distinction between ‘national’ and ‘non-national’ .... The immigrant ‘endangers’ the national order by forcing to think the unthinkable, to think that which should not exist or which should not be thought for it to exist.<sup>1</sup>

My aim in this chapter is to study the relationship between the nation and the immigrant(s) as a Significant Other(s) and examine the extent to which Othering the immigrant is functional to the development of national identity, and to achieving or enhancing national cohesion. The immigrant is a potential Threatening Other because s/he crosses the national boundaries, thus challenging the ingroup’s identification with a specific culture, territory or ethnic origin, as well as the overall categorisation of people into nationals and Others. The immigrant poses a challenge by threatening to ‘contaminate’ the ingroup’s presumed unity and authenticity.

By definition, ‘immigration’ involves members of one nation or nation-state emigrating to a host country of which they are not nationals. As Sayad (*ibid.*) argues, the phenomenon of emigration–immigration involves an absence–presence that is against the national order: the immigrant is absent from the country of which s/he is a national, while s/he is present in a different country in which s/he does not belong. In a world organised in nations and nation-states, this absence from the country of origin and presence in a foreign one leads to the exclusion of the immigrant from both societies. It is worth noting that immigration/emigration becomes a problem only in a world of nation- or

national states where ethnic and cultural boundaries have to coincide with political ones.

The relationship between the immigrant and the host nation and, more particularly, the immigrant's transformation from a potential to an actual Threatening Other are linked to the preservation of the host nation's identity and/or to its overcoming a period of crisis. A thorough understanding of the immigrant's role as a Significant Other involves the study of this double dynamic: the immigrant as a contradiction within the national order *and* the functions that the Othering of the immigrant has for the ingroup and the host society. Now that the geopolitical alliances between 'East' and 'West' and between 'Capitalism' and 'Socialism' have been reshuffled and traditional ideological distinctions are tending to lose their meanings, it becomes necessary to identify a new Other by contrast to which the identity and cohesion of the ingroup is reinforced.

In order to gain a better understanding of the role of the immigrant as a threatening Significant Other, I shall examine the dynamics between host nation and immigrants in three 'old' immigration countries, namely Britain, France and Germany. The analysis will concentrate on the recent debates on national identity and the definition of the nation in these countries, as well as the role that immigrants have played in that process. I shall therefore explore the functionality of the immigrant's Otherness for the redefinition of national identity.

### **Citizenship, nationality and immigration: the contradiction**

Immigration policy and, more particularly, the issue of acceptance and integration of immigrants into the host society are legally and conceptually related to citizenship. The immigrant is an Other, a foreigner. S/he is not a citizen of the host country. The legal entitlement to citizenship rights is neither the only nor the main reason for differentiating between nationals and foreigners and for discriminating against the latter. The condition of legal alien confirms and epitomises the factual, social, cultural and economic marginalisation of immigrants.

The notion of citizenship regards the rights conferred by a state to the individuals who live in the territory over which the state exerts its sovereign control (*Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions* 1987: 95). Citizenship is therefore closely linked to nationality. Of course, the republican ideal of freedom in the sense of rights that the individual citizen enjoys within a country is different from the nationalist notion of freedom as national independence and self-determination (Habermas 1994: 23). Nonetheless, national identity has provided for this sense of community that greatly facilitated – perhaps it was indispensable to – the implementation of citizenship in the modern state.

Since the times of the French Revolution, *ethnos* has been identified, at least in nationalist ideology, with *demos*. The two concepts have become overlapping so that people tend to use them interchangeably. As Léca (1991: 482) argues:

Nationality is conferred to the individual by the laws of the State and thus, consequently, brings with it the status of the citizen. This phrase may be repeated by replacing one word with the other without its meaning being changed.

Even though citizenship has found its modern expression in the democratic nation-state, it is not conceptually<sup>2</sup> tied to national identity. The role of national identity in the constitution of citizenship has been primarily functional. It has helped to define the political identity of the citizen. The latter, at least according to the republican school of thought, is based on the active expression of citizenship (the exercise of civil and political rights in the everyday life of the community). It is not related to common ethnic origins or to the sharing of a common cultural tradition. In this context, nationalism functioned only as a catalyst for republicanism; it is not conceptually or normatively tied to citizenship rights.

The distinction of citizenship from nationality is, nonetheless, problematic. The attribution or acquisition of citizenship rights (and duties) is still inextricably related to national identity. Nationality continues to be the main condition for the attribution – through birth or descent – of citizenship in the legal system of most European states. However, contemporary reality calls for alternative courses of action. The increasing migration influx and the construction of a European Union show the necessity of finding new perspectives for the future.

An attempt has been made to accommodate immigration while preserving the link between citizenship and nationality by means of organising societal membership in two concentric circles (Brubaker 1989a). The inner circle is to be composed by the members of the national political community while the outer circle, which involves membership to the national social and economic community, includes citizens and permanent resident aliens (nationals of third countries). This view introduces an intermediary status between full membership and total aliens: in political science jargon, this has been called ‘denizenship’ (Hammar 1989). Long-term resident foreigners, who are *de facto* members of the host country because they participate in its social and economic life, are, thus, recognised by law, too. However, their legal status poses several constraints with regard to their political membership. Denizens often enjoy secondary political rights, the right to vote in local elections, freedom of expression, association and assembly, the right of membership to political parties, for instance, but they are deprived of the right to vote and stand as candidates at national elections.

Denizenship might be accepted as a transitional condition for first-generation immigrants who reside permanently and legally in a member-state, and who wish to acquire its citizenship. Or, it might be accepted as a provisional status for those immigrants who have been residing in the host country for a relatively short period of time (less than 10 years, for example), and who aim to return to their country of origin and do not wish to acquire political rights in the host community. However, denizenship is illegitimate (Brubaker 1989b) from a

liberal, democratic point of view, unless it is a transitional situation in the passage towards full membership. According to Walzer (1983: 60, emphasis added),

[T]he process of self-determination through which a democratic state shapes its internal life must be open, and equally open, to all those men and women who live within its territory, work in the local economy, and are subject to local law. Hence, second admissions (naturalisation) depend on first admissions (immigration) and are subject only to certain constraints of time and qualification never to the ultimate constraint of *closure*.

The acceptance of denizenship as a permanent status for non-national legal residents is against traditional theories of constitutional government and democracy. In line with the ideal of equality, 'formal equality of status' as Brubaker (1989b: 16) more precisely defines it, democratic theories presume not only that there is a rough congruence between citizenry and the resident population in a country but also that this congruence is preserved over time (Hammar 1989: 87–8). Thus, a constant, large discrepancy between the people (the sum of the citizens) and the population residing in the territory of the state is incompatible with the principles of constitutional democracy.

According to Collinson (1993: 5), the number 'foreigners' residing in western Europe<sup>3</sup> is estimated to be 13 million. Of those, roughly 8 million live in Germany, France and Britain. According to Papademetriou and Hamilton (1996: 8; see also Table 4.1), 'foreigners' number nearly 13 million in just the three countries mentioned above. Nonetheless, as Collinson (1993: 146) herself notes, immigrant populations in Europe are difficult to quantify because (in part) of the different citizenship and nationality laws applied in the different countries. In any case, assigning the status of 'permanent resident' to this population means to deny admittance as equal and free members of these societies to a significant part of their active, economically and demographically, population. Their exclusion from citizenship makes immigrants powerless: they have no say in the making of laws, even though they have to abide by them. Nor do they have the possibility of protecting their interests or raising claims towards the host country. Despite the normative problems that the extension of citizenship to non-nationals can create, the importance of citizenship in the theory and practice of the nation-states (Brubaker 1989b: 17) means that the acceptance of two categories of citizenship for the members of the same society is against the self-understanding of democratic countries.

### **The functional role of the immigrant Other**

The problem of immigrant integration goes beyond citizenship. It is also related to the identity and self-understanding of the host country. Most European countries conceive of themselves as national states, where the state is the political expression of the dominant nation. This idea implies a static view of culture

Table 4.1 Foreign population in selected European countries

Country	Year			
	1980	1985	1990	1994
France	3,714,000	n.a.	3,597,000	n.a.
Percentage of total population	6.8		6.3	
Percentage of foreign originating from EU	47.7		36.5	
Germany	4,453,000	4,379,000	5,343,000	6,991,000
Percentage of total population	7.2	7.2	8.4	8.6
Percentage of foreign originating from EU	33.7	31.0	26.9	22.3
UK	n.a.	1,731,000	1,723,000	1,946,000
Percentage of total population		3.1	3.2	3.4
Percentage of foreign originating from EU		46.0	42.4	40.7

Source: adapted from Papademetriou and Hamilton (1996: 8).

#### Note

The table presents the total number of foreign-born, the percentage of total population and the percentage of foreign population originating in EU12 (Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of the EU in 1995) in France, Germany and the UK. Data on France are taken from the population censuses of 1982 and 1990. In this table, data for 1980 reflect those gathered in the 1982 census. Data on Germany refer to West Germany up to 1990 and to both East and West Germany in 1994. Data for the UK are estimates provided from the annual Labour Force Survey prepared by the UK Department of Employment.

and ethnic descent that are seen as homogeneous and unique. Their presumed purity and authenticity has to be protected from the intrusions of foreigners. Thus, pluralism is accepted only (and not always) to the extent that a nation or ethnic minority is a constitutive element of the country. It must therefore be made part of the state from the time of its creation, and it is in some way integrated into the national narrative. Even in those cases, the potential of conflict between the dominant nation and minorities is high. A plurality of identities and cultures is not easily accommodated within national states.

In some countries, immigrant communities are integrated into the national history, and the cultural, territorial, civic and genealogical links between these populations and the nation are officially recognised. As happens in France and the UK, the links between the 'mother-country' and its former colonies are deemed to justify, under certain conditions, the conferral of citizenship to people of immigrant origin.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, the status of citizenship often does not suffice to guarantee the social integration of these people. It is not unusual that individuals of immigrant origin continue to be discriminated against,<sup>5</sup> even though they have acquired the citizenship of the 'host'<sup>6</sup> country by birth or residence. Discriminatory behaviour or practices are predominantly related to race (skin complexion and phenotypic characteristics), culture or a combination of both. Having access to the status of permanent resident or, indeed, the



citizenship of a host country constitutes a major step towards immigrant integration. However, a study of the process of Othering the immigrant must pay particular attention to more subtle mechanisms of discrimination and ingroup–outgroup construction.

It is worth noting that not all immigrants are perceived as Significant Others and, in particular, as threatening Significant Others. With regard to the European Union, for instance, citizens of fellow member-states are endowed with the same rights and duties as the host country nationals. This is because they are citizens of the Union. And these people do not generally suffer from discrimination in the social sphere. Similarly, North Americans and citizens from other industrialised countries might be foreigners in Europe, but they do not contribute to the negative stereotype usually associated with immigration. The process of Othering the immigrant is thus activated towards specific groups.

The common feature that characterises such outgroups is their *subordinate* position in society<sup>7</sup> and the existence of ethnic, cultural, religious or racial *markers* that distinguish them from the dominant group. Such markers are not the reason why these groups are perceived as threatening outgroups. On the contrary, difference is context-bound: religious markers might prevail in one case (anti-Muslim racism in Britain, for example), whereas ethnic categorisation might be emphasised in another situation (such as prejudice against Albanians in Greece). The Othering of specific immigrant groups serves the interests and identity of the dominant nation. Immigrants become the negative Other against whom a positive ingroup identity is constructed and/or reinforced. They provide flexible, dispensable and disenfranchised labour in an increasingly globalised post-industrial economy, and are the new underclass that sustains the socioeconomic order of developed countries. Their construction as significant Threatening Others legitimises their social and political exclusion from the host society.

There are two types of discourse that pervade the process of constructing the threatening immigrant Other. On the one hand, there is an overtly biologising, racist language, which, although condemned by the social and political norms of Western societies, is often involved in the process of socially and politically excluding immigrant communities from the host country. On the other hand, discriminatory practices are supported by a cultural differentialist discourse, according to which there are irreducible differences between certain cultures that prevent the integration of specific immigrant populations into the host society (van Dijk 1997).

The relationship between power or privilege and racism or cultural prejudice has been explored from different perspectives – economic, sociological, linguistic and ideological – by a large number of researchers. It has been shown that racial prejudice and discriminatory discourse or behaviour are related to the power structure of society and serve to maintain the privilege of one group over another (Essed 1991; van Dijk 1993a; Wellman 1993; Riggins 1997). Exploring this line of inquiry further is beyond the scope of this chapter. My interest here is to explore the features of race or culture that make them suitable as markers for differentiating and subordinating the outgroup.

The notion of race includes a variety of features such as parental lineage, phenotype (skin colour, stature and genetic traits) as well as the combination of physical attributes with cultural characteristics. Racism is not necessarily linked to ethnicity or nationalism. As Silverman (1991: 74) observes, the concept of race referred to social difference in nineteenth-century England and France: the poor were distinguished from the aristocratic 'race'. What is common to the various definitions of the concept is that it is associated with *natural* difference. It implies shared characteristics – phenotypic, cultural or other – that cannot be chosen or shed (Manzo 1996: 19). This does not mean that racial difference is indeed natural, but rather that it has been socially constructed as such. It is perceived as irreducible and, hence, threatening for the nation and/or the nation-state.

One should not equate a sociopolitical situation that allows for the perpetuation of latent racism with one in which the perpetration of racist behaviour, the organisation of racist movements and the acceptance of institutionalised racism are integrated into the system. However, this does not mean that 'subtle' or 'symbolic' racism (Dovidio and Gaertner 1986) is harmless. It still treats difference as natural and therefore permanent; it treats difference as inherently negative, threatening and a problem to be solved.

The discourse of cultural difference is similar to biological racism because it links culture to nature. Cultural difference is seen as irreducible because it is dependent upon ethnic descent, a presumed psychological predisposition, environmental factors or a specific genetic make-up. Others are thus constructed as alien, unfamiliar and less developed. Nationalism brings with it the seed of racialisation of minorities. The notion of 'purity' and 'authenticity' of the national culture, language or traditions, intrinsic to civic and not only ethnic nationalism, implies that cultural difference is undesirable. In other words, the underlying idea is that 'someone else's roots are growing in the national/ethnic soil, distorting the particular form of human nature that ought to be sprouting there' (Manzo 1996: 23). Hence, the national order has to be restored by means of excluding the Other, both physically and symbolically, from Our society.

In reality, culturalist or differentialist discourses differ little from biological racism: their effects are racist, even if their arguments are not explicitly racial (Anthias and Yuval Davis 1992: 12–13). Cultural difference provides scope for fluidity and change in social patterns and allegiances: members of minority groups might make conscious decisions to abandon some, but hold on to other, attributes of the perceived minority culture. Or, minority groups might themselves strive to maintain cultural distinctiveness alongside full social and political integration. Race, in contrast, cuts across a population without the possibility of changing one's skin colour. Yet, as Silverman (1991: 79–80) points out, the two types of discourses are conceptually and historically interrelated:

Racism in the form of cultural differentiation comes from the post-colonial period, from a period of international circulation of labour and, to a certain extent, from the crisis of the nation-state. It relates to our national and

cultural identity crises in the same way that the biological hierarchy of races related to that long period in history in which European nation-states were carving up the rest of the world and instituting first slavery and then colonisation. This is not the only determinant but it is a concrete and absolutely essential one.

The key to understanding the importance of race and culture and their role in the relationship between the nation and the immigrant is the fact that they can both be defined as transcendental notions, linked to *nature* rather than *nurture* and, hence, irreducible. They justify the Othering of the immigrant in moral and identity terms and allow for the process of creating a threatening Significant Other in contrast to which the nation asserts and delineates its identity. These naturalising and moralising arguments thus legitimise the *status quo* and the distribution of power within the nation-state.

In order to illustrate the role played by race and culture in Othering the immigrant, as well as the latter's functional role in (re)defining national identity, the cases of three host countries – Britain, France and Germany – will be studied. Germany and France are often identified as typical cases of ethnic versus civic nationalism, while Britain is considered as a case in-between because it includes both civic and ethnic influences. In the next section, I shall discuss the national identity redefinition that has been under way in Britain since the late 1960s. Then I will deal with the recent debate on French identity and immigrant acceptance and integration. Last, a brief review of the German case will be provided. Germany will serve as a contrast case to the other two, given that it refuses to define itself as a country of immigration, despite it being the host of a large number of foreigners (see Table 4.1).

## Britain

Britain has had to deal with two different, though interrelated, phenomena during the post-war period. It has experienced a large-scale inward migration – which, although not actively recruited through governmental<sup>8</sup> channels, responded to the country's labour shortage – from both European countries and newly independent Commonwealth territories.<sup>9</sup> The completion of the decolonisation process also marked the end of the British Empire. Britain had to come to terms with its transformation from an imperial power to a (multi)national state. The former accentuated the identity crisis that was produced by the latter phenomenon. In other words, the gradually increasing immigration flows of former colonial subjects led to debates about who is British and what it means to be British. This question was already at the core of a self-confidence crisis (Jacobovits 1968) that the country was going through.

In this section, I will briefly sketch the main changes in immigration legislation and in the notion of British citizenship incurred in the post-1945 period. My aim here is not to assess the pros and cons of the British immigration policy but rather to provide for the contextual knowledge necessary to

understand the discourse on immigrants and the nation. I will thus highlight how and why the debate on immigration became the locus of the redefinition of the country's identity and, more particularly, how creating the immigrant Other contributed to the delineation of the national self. The case of Britain is particularly interesting in this respect because the components of the national identity are highly contested. First and foremost, the use of the term 'national identity' for Britain<sup>10</sup> might be deemed improper because the UK comprises four distinct 'nations', the English, the Irish, the Scottish and the Welsh. Kearney (1991: 4) argues that the 'British national community' is better conceptualised as 'four nations and one'. In common parlance, as well as in the press discourse (Jacobson 1997a: 7), the distinction between Englishness and Britishness<sup>11</sup> is often blurred and there is a slippage between the two levels of identity. Given the strong link that existed between British identity and the Empire, the post-war era is characterised by a vacuum of identification for the British, a loss of sense of purpose (Marquand 1995) which has to be reinvented or rediscovered.

The 1948 British Nationality Act came to replace that of 1914 so as to adapt the notion of British citizenship and identity to the new national and international circumstances. The new act created two main categories of British subjects: citizens of the UK and the colonies, and citizens of Commonwealth countries. Both carried the status of British subject and were entitled to settlement in Britain. This act was inspired by the Commonwealth ideal that saw all Commonwealth citizens as British subjects who could enter the mother-country without restrictions. No distinctions of race, ethnic or religious characteristic were accepted within this doctrine. Moreover, the free movement of labour was congruent with the liberal economic principles predominant in Britain.

The Commonwealth ideal, as affirmed in the 1948 Nationality Act, offered an alternative identity dimension to repair the sense of loss that followed the granting of independence to the last parts of the Empire. At the same time, this act opened the door for British subjects from the former colonies to come to Britain. And while European immigrants who had settled in Britain in the late 1940s were successfully integrated, the new 'coloured' workers were perceived as problematic: their Otherness was seen as threatening (Carter and Joshi 1984; Lunn 1990). Racial difference was perceived as irreducible and hostility towards them soon led to riots in Notting Hill in 1958. Successive governments defended the Commonwealth ideal and resisted pressure to change the immigration and citizenship law and risk alienating the new Commonwealth countries from Britain. However, a series of changes were gradually introduced from 1962 onwards, in order to restrict the influx of 'coloured' immigrants.

More specifically, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act reduced the rights of British subjects to enter the mother-country. However, people born in the UK or of British descent – and, hence, white – were exempted from immigration controls. In 1965, the number of work permits available to immigrants from the new Commonwealth countries was reduced, while the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act<sup>12</sup> established that the status of British

subjects was obtained by descent from parents or grandparents born in Britain, excluding thus both whites and non-whites from the former Empire. This restriction was further formalised by the 1971 Immigration Act that introduced the notion of 'patriality': a patriot was someone with a British-born or naturalised parent or grandparent. Patriots could settle in the UK and had the right to entry and indefinite stay as well as social and political rights as UK citizens (Bevan 1986: 77–9). The act was more complex than it might seem in this brief presentation, and it revealed the underlying tension between the Commonwealth ideal and the racial–ethnic connotations of a new Britishness (Dummet and Nicol 1990: 216–23).

Immigration laws grew more restrictive in the 1970s and 1980s. The 1981 Nationality Act abrogated the principle of *jus soli* that had been the cornerstone of British nationality. Three categories of citizenship were created by this act: British citizenship, British Dependent Territories citizenship and British Overseas citizenship. People belonging to the last two categories had no automatic right of settlement in the UK. Moreover, this act stipulated that, from 1 January 1983, British citizenship would be granted only to British-born children with at least one parent who was either a British citizen or an ordinary resident in the UK without a time limit on their stay (Dummet and Nicol 1990: 244).<sup>13</sup> Finally, the 1988 Immigration Act removed the right of certain British citizens, notably the more recent settlers (Cesarani 1996: 67), to be joined by their spouse in the UK.

As a number of studies have pointed out, the immigration debate became the primary locus where British identity was (re)constructed. Two main discourses were confronted in the effort to create a sense of national identity out of the dismantling of the Empire: on the one hand, a Commonwealth inclusion discourse, and, on the other hand, a nationalist anti-immigrant exclusion discourse (Doty 1996: 247–55). Quite interestingly, both the Labour and Conservative parties participated in either discourse.

'New' British racism was based on racial distinctions that existed already under imperial rule and served to legitimise it (Miles 1982: 289). The mutations of the Empire required more rigid definitions of identity and the drawing of tighter borders between the 'mother-country' and the dominions (Rich 1986). The '*civis Britannicus sum*' ideal collapsed under the need for redefining the national identity of the 'mother-country'. The Empire had disappeared and Britishness was reduced to white Britishness, which was linked to common descent. As Enoch Powell argued in 1968, 'the West Indian does not by being born in England, become an Englishman. In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact he is a West Indian or Asian still' (speech at Eastbourne, 16 November 1968, cit. in Gilroy 1987: 46).

The restriction of the entitlement to the status of British subject not only limited people's possibility to settle in the UK but also stigmatised them as Others, non-British, not part of the ingroup. Racial difference was put under a cultural guise. Both culture and race were seen as indelible markers that divided the ingroup from the aliens. Non-white immigrants were thus considered

unassimilable to the 'mother-country' (Gilroy 1987: 60; Cesarani 1996: 68–9). Culture cum race offered the markers for defining national identity: they offered a 'natural' dimension that allowed a distinction between British and non-British. In this respect, immigrants served as the mirroring Other through which the Self could define who s/he is.

Apparently, this racialised conception of Britain was against the Commonwealth ideal, which itself constituted an important part of Britishness. However, as Doty argues, the Commonwealth conception was characterised by an internal contradiction:

One of the major themes in this [Commonwealth] discourse was that of *national* greatness, which coexisted uneasily with the theme of international brotherhood. ... The universalism of the Commonwealth ideal was itself constituted by the particularism that was evident in the presumptions made regarding the essence of the British national character, the British people, the British nation. At the same time, these presumptions prevented universalism, in the form of the Commonwealth ideal, from fully constituting itself, because it depended upon a 'we/them' opposition.

(Doty 1996: 248–9)

Essentially, the outside (the dominions) and the inside (namely the British Isles) were mutually constitutive and mutually undermining one another.<sup>14</sup> Even though the Commonwealth discourse preached equality and brotherhood, it reflected the singularity and indeed the supremacy of the British people (Layton-Henry 1984: 14).

Effectively, a British identity was reconstructed through the redefinition of the inside and the outside. While imperial Britishness was one that reached out and gathered in other peoples and cultures under the particularist universalism of the Commonwealth ideology, national Britishness was one that needed protection from 'contamination' from alien cultures and 'races'. The identity dynamics involved in the redefinition of British identity were complex and contradictory. Ethnic minorities residing in Britain were to be incorporated into British society, but the new 'national' discourse involved the essentialisation of culture and the racialisation of the nation. Non-white immigrant residents played the role of the Threatening Other in this historical context for a variety of reasons. First, because relations between Britain and the New Commonwealth countries were marked by the colonial legacy, and, second, because the boundary between Us and Them was easier to identify because visible and 'natural'. It also allowed for the disguising of racist discourse behind cultural essentialism.<sup>15</sup>

Even though the Othering of non-white immigrants has characterised the past decades and has indeed led to important changes in the self-conception of Britain, national identity remains largely contested and insecure. It seems that the 'nation keeps struggling to define itself in terms of a past that can never be matched by the present' (Jacobson 1997a: 24). The difficulty of coming to terms with the existence of a British nation instead of a British Empire is reflected

in the competitive view of the relationship between Britain and its European partners expressed by the national press (*ibid.*). In the 1990s, the focus of the identity crisis and redefinition seems to have moved from non-white immigrants to 'the Continent', namely Europe and the European Union member-states in particular. These are the new Significant Others that threaten the already fragile sense of identity achieved through the contrast with the immigrant Other.

## France

France tends to be considered as the prototype of civic nationalism in Europe and is often contrasted with Germany, which represents the ethnic model of nationhood. Indeed, the French Revolution of 1789 introduced a new concept of nation: that based on the voluntary association between free individuals (Renan 1882). The Constitution of 1791 marked the beginning of a new type of citizenship based on culture and place of birth rather than genealogical ties. The *jus soli* principle was formally established only in 1889, but French citizenship had been open to foreigners throughout the nineteenth century (Brubaker 1992: 86–110). Even though the second half of the nineteenth century had been marked by a tendency to ethnicise the nation, the preference for a *jus sanguinis*-based citizenship was mainly developed as a reaction to the unconditional application of the birthright principle. The option that eventually prevailed, one that confirmed the political class's confidence to the assimilationist power of France, was that a person born in France and who at majority resides in France should be considered a Frenchman.

However, it is the assimilationist presumption of the French civic nationhood that puts to the test the openness of the model. As Bryant (1997: 163, emphasis in the original) argues,

In the French case the priority of the state and territory facilitated conceptions of France not as a community of descent but as a *territorial community*. Of course the French predominated within this territory but, given, so republicans thought, the obvious attraction of so advanced a culture [*sic*] as the French, assimilation of foreigners and immigrants ought not to be a problem in principle, even if in practice it often was. But now, of course, assimilation is sometimes a problem even in principle.

Indeed, the inclusive response to the challenge of immigration in the 1880s reflected the power and legitimacy of the republican assimilationist model, which, however, was based on the particularist assumption that French culture was 'better' and, hence, would appeal to foreigners who had settled in France. However, this view presumed that there could be no nation within the nation: '*la nation une et indivisible*' (the nation one and indivisible) had no room for cultural difference. Foreigners had to become 'Frenchmen' and adopt the French culture and lifestyle. The assimilationist view also implied that there was a homogeneous nation and society in which foreigners would be integrated. In

other words, republicanism functioned not only as a doctrine for immigration policy but also 'as a false idea serving to reformulate the preceding history of migration' (Galissot 1986: 12).

The uncontested precedence of *jus soli* in French citizenship law persisted until the 1970s. The French parliament debate concerning the reform of citizenship law in 1973 confirmed the view that France is 'a country of immigration', that 'immigration is a necessity' and that 'those immigrants who do not intend to return [to their country of origin] will have to integrate themselves into our national community. Our revised law of nationality will enable them to do this' (*Assemblée Nationale, première session ordinaire de 1972–73*, no. 2545, p. 18, cit. in Brubaker 1992: 228). Nonetheless, this view of French nationhood was drawn into question in the mid-1980s from both a nationalist and a voluntarist point of view. The *jus soli* principle came under attack by the far right, which linked citizenship to nationality and demanded full assimilation, but also from that part of the left-wing forces (Brubaker 1992: 231–2) that were against automatic naturalisation procedures for second-generation immigrants.

There are a number of factors which account for the crisis of French national identity in the 1980s. The decline of the assimilationist model started to become visible in this period: the reified view of the French culture and nation as a static, homogeneous and compact framework which newcomers would 'melt into' – '*se fondre*' was the term used in French – could no longer hold. The traditional assimilationist institutions of the school, army, church and political parties had lost their efficacy (Léca 1985; Commission de la Nationalité 1988). Moreover, economic globalisation trends and the prevalence of the market model further undermined the role of the nation-state as the outmost political expression of French society. In other words,

The reduced capacity of the nation-state to control and protect society engender[ed] a crisis of national identity as society bec[ame] exposed to diverse cultures, commodities, lifestyles and values which, in turn, threaten[ed] to overwhelm and dissipate indigenous cultural reproduction. (Jenkins and Copsey 1996: 119)

The habits and traditions introduced by the immigrant populations created a multicultural environment that was in contradiction to the republican model. This became all the more visible in connection to the marginalisation of immigrants and the development of suburban ghettos.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, two types of phenomena made the crisis more acute. First, the fact that in the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of Algerian families realised that their children possessed French nationality<sup>17</sup> – in function of Article 23 of the French Code of Nationality – because they had been born in France to parents born in Algeria before 1962 (when that country was still considered to be an integral part of France). This somewhat awkward application of the French code of nationality caused discontent to many Algerian families, tension



in the relations between France and the young Algerian state and opened the debate concerning the nature of French citizenship. However, the national election of 1986 offered a suitable opportunity for the exploitation of the immigration issue by right-wing parties. The National Front in particular increased its share of votes from 0.2 per cent in the 1981 parliamentary election to 9.7 per cent in the parliamentary election of 1986 (Hargreaves 1995: 177–209).

Thus, North African immigrants were identified as the outgroup in contrast to which French identity could be redefined. They became a suitable internal Threatening Other that helped to demarcate the boundaries of the ingroup at a time when multiculturalism was putting too much strain on the superficially civic but substantially cultural model of French nationalism. Anti-Arab racism resonated also with France's colonial past and the traumatic experience of the Algerian war of independence in the 1960s. It thus became obvious that the republican model did not allow for the public expression of cultural difference and that the 'one and indivisible nation' was internally fragmented: some French citizens were (perceived to be) 'less French' than others.

The lack of confidence in the national culture and its assimilationist power was witnessed in the very response to the issue provided by the state. In contrast to the 1880s, when an expansionist and inclusive policy had been adopted, the 1980s were characterised by an exclusionist tendency. The differentialist discourse<sup>18</sup> of the early 1980s (Charlot 1981; Giordan 1982; Taguieff and Weil 1990) was soon replaced by a return to the assimilationist tradition. The fact that the republican model was no longer able to integrate the newcomers was attributed to the unassimilability of the last rather than to the model's intrinsic weakness and/or the non-existence of a homogeneous French culture and nation, as that postulated by the republican tradition. The blame was thus attributed to the new immigrant populations which were perceived as more culturally distant than earlier Catholic and Jewish immigrant communities. Their Islamic culture and mores were seen as incompatible with secular France and its Catholic tradition. Othering the North African immigrants allowed revival of the assimilationist model, ignoring the impossibility of applying it in contemporary France, and thus redefining the national identity by rejecting its multicultural components. The civic-cultural homogeneity of the ingroup was thus restored and the immigrant Other was stigmatised and excluded from it.

However, as Silverman rightly observes, the question of immigration in France is not

... simply the point of intersection of two cultural communities but rather the point of intersection of fundamental aspects of the national/social complex of France today ... In the 1970s, the politicisation of immigration ... highlighted major aspects of (and contradictions in) French society.

(Silverman 1992: 14, 93)

The focus of the analysis should shift from the compatibility between different

cultural models – namely between a French secular republican model and the ethnic, cultural and religious specificities of North African immigrant communities – to the essence of French identity. It is the very conception of the French nation that makes the mutual recognition of the different cultures coexisting in French territory today difficult. The civic model *à la française* reifies culture, defining an ‘open’ nation that is however ‘closed’ within the boundaries of ‘the predetermined nature of the community’ (Silverman 1992: 25). Thus, ethnic exclusion is replaced by cultural differentialism. This last bears within it the seeds of an assimilationist universalism derived from particularist and ethnocentric distinctions between ‘superior’ and ‘less-developed’ cultures. One can identify in the French model the same internal tension that characterised the Commonwealth discourse in the UK.<sup>19</sup> More recently, French governments have made efforts to promote a ‘French Islam’<sup>20</sup> compatible with the notion of *laïcité*. Of course, such a policy reveals the contrasting tendencies within French national identity: it introduces a notion of multiculturalism in the traditionally monocultural French society but it seeks to minimise the diverse ethnic and cultural origins of the French population.

The criticism made here is not meant to neglect the openness of the French model and the persistence of the *jus soli* principle in French citizenship law, despite the crisis,<sup>21</sup> in contrast to the German ethnic approach to citizenship and immigration. My aim has been to point to the role played by the immigrant Other in redrawing the boundaries of the French nation in the 1980s and, at the same time, highlight the limits of a civic but not pluralist model of nationhood.

## Germany

The German case is different from those of France and Britain in one crucial aspect. Whereas the latter countries have recognised immigration as part of the national history – related to colonialism and imperialism – immigration in Germany is treated as a new phenomenon, alien to the history of the nation. Whereas historical links between sending countries and the host ‘mother-country’ led, at least partly, to the granting of citizenship rights to immigrants in France and Britain, until very recently German citizenship has remained extraordinarily closed to individuals of non-German origin. The official stand of the German government, and which reflects the view of many Germans, is that their country is an ethnically defined nation-state (Münz and Ulrich 1998) and certainly not an immigration country. However, this view is in stark contrast to the demographic reality: Germany is one of the countries receiving the highest number of immigrants in the world. Aliens residing legally in Germany account for 8.6 per cent of the country’s population, and, of these, nearly 80 per cent are of non-EU origin (see Table 4.1). Under these circumstances, the unsustainability of the view that Germany ‘*ist kein Einwanderungsland*’ is blatant.

In this section, I shall review briefly the factors that reinforced the ethnic conception of German nationhood in the post-war era. Furthermore, I will

examine the extent to which the definition of the immigrant population as alien to Germany and its continuous exclusion from the ingroup, despite effective integration into the host country, have contributed to the strengthening of the national identity.

German nationalism is usually identified with the romantic ethnic nationalism of writers such as Herder and Fichte. There is no doubt that, throughout the twentieth century, German nationhood (and citizenship) has been defined in ethnic terms following a narrowly understood *jus sanguinis* principle. The 1913 citizenship law confirmed that the German nation was a community of descent by reinforcing the right to citizenship of kith and kin residing abroad and excluding the immigrant population residing in Germany. The decision to opt for an ethnocultural definition of the nation was supported by both a statist and an ethnic perspective. It aimed at keeping the ties of *Auslandsdeutsche* to the Reich and also at preserving the German presence abroad. In other words, this citizenship policy strengthened the ties between state and nation, between the Reich and Germandom (*Deutschtum*) (Brubaker 1992: 114–37).

One should be cautious about assuming the existence of a homogeneous *Kulturnation*. As Rätzl (1990: 41) argues, the German *Volk* initially consisted of Germans and non-Germans together: under the Weimar Republic, minorities of non-German origin enjoyed German citizenship and were guaranteed special minority rights. In fact, the 1913 citizenship law included both ethnonational and territorial views on nationality and citizenship (Brubaker 1992).

The Nazis promoted an ethnic conception of German nationality with explicit racial connotations in the 1930s. The national self-understanding was subjugated to an ethnoracial ideology: the nation was thus defined as an organic *Volksgemeinschaft* and individuals of non-German origin (*fremdvölkisch*) were excluded. Despite the common ethnic background of the Wilhelmine conception of citizenship and the Nazi ideology, it is important to see either view within its specific historical context. The 1913 citizenship law sought to protect the ethnic ‘purity’ of the nation but did not aim at exterminating the Polish-speaking or Jewish populations, as was later done by the Nazis.

The defeat of the Third Reich and of its racial view of the German nation did not lead, however, to the abandonment of an ethnic conception of German nationhood. The expulsion of ethnic Germans from eastern European countries and the Soviet Union after the end of the war (Münz and Ulrich 1998), the division of Germany into two states as well as the total collapse of the state apparatus led to the reinforcement of the ethnic features of German identity. The integration of the expellees in conditions of social and economic chaos could only be based on an ethnocultural understanding of nationhood. People from different countries, who spoke different languages and had different traditions were tacitly integrated, as Fulbrook notes (1996: 92–4), and without major frictions.<sup>22</sup> This view of the nation justified the conviction that East and West Germany would be united again in one country: the founders of the

Federal Republic sought to emphasise that there was only one German nation and one German citizenship (Schwartz 1975).

In the disastrous situation that followed the defeat of the Third Reich, it was difficult to imagine that Germany would be in need of a foreign labour force and that it would welcome large-scale immigration from southern and eastern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Nonetheless, the German economic boom brought a large number of guestworkers (*Gastarbeiter*) to the country. These were seen as sojourners, temporary labour migrants, who would follow the business cycles of high and low employment needs (Brubaker 1992: 171–2). Immigrants themselves saw their stays as temporary. Nonetheless, in the early 1970s, immigration towards Germany had already acquired the character of long-term, if not permanent, settlement. The average length of stay had increased and the sex balance had become more ‘normal’, approximating that of the native population. The number of second-generation immigrants – children born in Germany to foreign parents – increased dramatically. The increase in size of the immigrant population and its tendency to settle down led to growing concerns about its integration and its ethnic and cultural impacts on German society.

The economic growth that the country experienced in the 1960s and 1970s gave new impetus to a (West) German national identity based on economic prosperity and social welfare, which rejected any connection with the aggressive nationalism that had led to the Nazi crimes. During this period, relations with the ‘other Germany’, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which also claimed to be the sole bearer of the German national tradition, were strained, characterised by the overall Cold War climate. The defence of the existence of a single German nation that comprised both peoples became increasingly difficult, and Germans from both the east and west sides of the country grew alienated from their brethren on the other side of the boundary (Fulbrook 1999: 203–32).

German social and political reality in the 1980s was characterised by a growing debate concerning the nature and future of German identity. This debate reflected a series of changes taking place in German society, including the development of New Left post-materialist social movements, which put into question established political and cultural norms, and the growth of a multicultural social reality, which challenged the presumed homogeneity of the *Kulturnation* (Kurthen and Minkenberg 1995: 182–4). The questioning of the national identity and the quest for normalisation and forgetting of the Holocaust was expressed in the heated debate – the *Historikerstreit* – developed among intellectuals in the mid-1980s (Diner 1987; Serie Piper Aktuell 1987). Giesen (1998: 148–64) identifies two main currents of Germanness during this period: the ‘Holocaust nation’, whose identity was based on self-criticism and collective guilt over the Nazi crimes and which was geared towards a civic conception of nationality based on constitutional patriotism; the second current, the ‘*Wirtschaftswunder* nation’, was more concerned with breaking with the past, thus allowing German national identity to regain its ‘normality’. This current

valued greatly the economic 'miracle' of the 1960s and 1970s and redimensioned the Nazi legacy by comparing it with other crimes against humanity such as those inflicted by Stalinism and other totalitarian regimes. It is worth noting that in neither of these currents was there any room or concern for Eastern Germans as part of the nation.

The need to clarify and redefine the national identity became closely related to the immigration issue. The effort to re-emphasise the myth of national homogeneity and boost national pride, expressed also in the conservative government's *Wende* of 1982 (Rossteutscher 1997: 608), was suitably complemented by the Othering of non-German immigrants. The economic recession of the late 1970s had already fuelled concerns with regard to immigration, which were soon transformed into outright hostility. In 1982 opinion polls, more than 62 per cent of the domestic population agreed that there were too many foreigners in the country and, of the people asked, more than half thought that they should be sent back to their countries of origin (Rätzl 1990: 38).

The debate on the 'foreigner problem' was framed in terms of 'purity' of the German nation and culture, and 'continuity' of the German history and civic traditions, which required that non-central European immigrants be sent back to their home countries (*ibid.*). Distancing and differentiation from the outgroup, namely non-German residents, became a suitable means to revitalise the *Völkisch* ideology and cultivate the myth of the homogeneity and uniqueness of the German nation. In fact, economic reality, namely the continuing need for a cheap labour force despite increases in the unemployment rate, and more recent political developments, i.e. the welcoming of German citizens from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and of ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, have confirmed that the refusal to accept non-German immigrants as full members of the host society was, and still is, linked to the conception of German nationhood rather than to economic concerns.

Even though a more liberal naturalisation law was introduced in 1990, the *jus sanguinis* principle concerning German citizenship remained in place intact. According to Brubaker (1992: 177–8), the impossibility of a civic and political integration of immigrants into Germany is related to the lack of a viable assimilationist tradition, which in contrast existed in France. The territorial unity of France, which existed long before the formation of a French nationhood, offered a stable base on which to develop a civic–territorial identity. Such a base was lacking in Germany. Even though the issues related to immigration have not been solved in either of the three countries examined here, the granting of citizenship to immigrants in France and the UK has formally recognised and guaranteed their permanence and membership into the host society.

Until very recently, the statement 'We are not a country of immigration' was used to define the specificity and uniqueness of German nationhood. The message implicit in this statement was: despite hosting one of the largest immigrant populations in Europe, 'We', the Germans, have managed to preserve 'Our' ethnic and cultural 'purity' and are determined to keep doing so. The

Othering of the immigrant in the 1980s has thus served to reinforce German identity by means of emphasising the boundary between Us and Them, where They are 'inside' the national territory. Thus, after the unsuccessful policy attempts<sup>23</sup> to repatriate large numbers of non-EU immigrants and re-establish the 'purity' of the nation, this last was achieved symbolically and socially through the construction of the unassimilable, alien, immigrant Other, who threatened the nation's 'authenticity'.

The ethnic character of German nationhood was further emphasised by the differentiation between ethnic German and non-German immigrants. Even though Article 116 of the German Constitution, which conferred the legal status of German to refugees or expellees of German *Volkszugehörigkeit*,<sup>24</sup> referred to the immediate post-war situation, its provisions were applied in the late 1980s too, with regard to resettlers of German origin from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus, these people were granted citizenship rights on the basis of their *Volkszugehörigkeit*, despite the fact that they did not speak German nor had they lived in Germany before.

However, unification has put the very concept of one homogeneous *Kulturnation* under strain. The racialised picture of the Other as being non-German, dark-haired, Muslim and not speaking the language properly was put under question when East Germans were found not to conform with the mythology of the 'real German'. Their supposed industriousness was proved non-existent, their mores were not those of 'real Germans'; they lacked motivation, they did not identify with their work and they found the pace of an efficient production system unbearable (Rätzl 1990: 46–7). These negative features were, of course, seen to be related to their being socialised into a communist regime not to their ethnogenealogical origin. But their social and cultural difference has been difficult to assimilate despite their common ethnic background. East Germans, too, soon realised that they were effectively 'absorbed' into a polity that had nothing in common with their experiences or needs and to which authentic East German contributions were rejected (Krisch 1999: 37). In fact, a sectional East German consciousness has been rising since 1990.

Confronted with the high economic costs and political disillusionment that followed the unification process, the 'united' nation has had to clarify its boundaries and revitalise its identity. The immigrant Other has provided once again an ideal outgroup in contrast to which national identity can be reaffirmed and the boundary between Us and Them reorganised. The revival of a xenophobic and aggressive (Fijalkowski 1996) nationalism is related more to social disintegration and frustration, especially in the Eastern *Länder*,<sup>25</sup> than to the ethnocultural foundations of German nationhood.

German identity, like any other identity, includes opposing elements and is the outcome of a constant process of renegotiation of its fundamental features. Asserting 'the right of the Germans not to be made a minority in their own country' (Klein 1994) might have become a means for reconstructing German nationhood, liberating it from the taboos and feelings of guilt of the post-Nazi

era (Schönwälder 1996: 170). At the same time, however, a process of converting German citizenship from ethnic to civic has also developed. The questioning of the legitimacy of the existing citizenship regime and the need to integrate young foreigners born and raised in the country have recently led to a substantial reform of the German nationality and citizenship law. The new law (*Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht*), which came into effect on 1 January 2000, has introduced new and more liberal conditions for naturalisation, based partly on the *jus soli* principle. The requirements for length of stay have been reduced to 8 years and the only cultural requirement is knowledge of the German language. Linguistic fluency is no longer required, nor is profound knowledge of German culture and customs. Furthermore, although double citizenship is not generally accepted, there are numerous exceptions, of which the German authorities encourage immigrants to take advantage (see, for instance, [www.lzz-nrw.de/Aktuell/english.html](http://www.lzz-nrw.de/Aktuell/english.html)) in case they wish to keep the citizenship of their country of origin. The law is particularly liberal concerning children born on German soil. Provided one of their parents has resided in Germany for the past 8 years, or has had an Unlimited Residence Permit<sup>26</sup> (*Unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*) for at least 3 years or has a Right of Unlimited Residence (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*), children automatically acquire a German passport. They only have to decide whether to keep their nationality of origin or German nationality when they come of age. However, naturalisation is not automatic for children who were born before the new law came into effect and who are less than 10 years old. Parents had to apply by the end of year 2000 in order to provide their children with a German passport and give them the opportunity to choose later which nationality they wish to retain.<sup>27</sup>

## Conclusions

This chapter has concentrated on the role of the immigrant as a particular type of Other, who contests the legal, political and cultural order of the nation. I have argued that the immigrant is an alien within the national community, first because s/he is not a citizen of the host country. Even though citizenship does not have to be tied to nationality, it has historically been linked to it in most European countries. The problem of immigrant integration, however, goes beyond citizenship in itself. It is also related to the identity and self-understanding of the host country. Some countries, such as France or Britain, have recognised formally the fact that immigrant communities are part of the national history of expansionism and colonialism. The historical ties between the 'mother-country' and its former colonies are deemed to justify, under certain conditions, the granting of citizenship rights to immigrant populations from these countries.

While the civic boundary of citizenship is an important and clear-cut one, the status of citizen is not always sufficient to guarantee inclusion and integration in the host country. Discriminatory behaviour or practices are predominantly related to 'race', culture or a combination of both. A study of the process of

Othering of the immigrant must examine the subtle mechanisms of racial or cultural discrimination of minorities and ingroup–outgroup construction.

It has been argued that not all immigrants are perceived as Threatening Others. The process of Othering the immigrant is activated towards specific groups. The common feature that characterises such outgroups is their cultural and/or racial difference from the ingroup. Race – understood as a set of phenotypic characteristics that are linked to social, cultural and psychological traits supposedly characterising the members of a community – and culture – including a variety of social phenomena such as language, religion, social and political norms and the overall environment in which one is born and has grown up – are suitable markers of inclusion and exclusion because they are associated with *natural* difference; they are attributed to nature rather than nurture, related to ethnic descent, climate or genetic make-up. Racial origin or cultural traditions cannot be chosen or shed. This does not mean that racial or cultural difference is natural but rather that it has been *socially constructed* as such. It is perceived as irreducible, unassimilable and, therefore, threatening for the nation.

In this chapter I have also sought to highlight the instrumental role played by the immigrant Other in times of crisis, when national identity needs to be renegotiated and reaffirmed. For this purpose, I have briefly examined three empirical cases: Britain, France and Germany. The length of this chapter does not allow me to explore fully the complex issues involved in all three cases nor to do justice to the dynamic nature of national identity and the contradictory discourses it often encompasses. Here, rather, my intention has been to highlight some identity processes in which the immigrants/ethnic minorities/foreigners become instrumental in the redefinition of national identity.

In Britain, non-white immigrants have fulfilled the role of an internal Threatening Other in contrast to which British identity could be redefined in the post-war era. The ‘unity’ and ‘authenticity’ of the British was ‘rediscovered’ through the racialisation of the boundaries of the ingroup and the construction of immigrants as threatening aliens. Similarly, North African immigrants have helped to restore the appeal and vitality of the republican assimilationist model in France in the 1980s despite the emergence of a multicultural social reality and the crisis of traditional institutions such as political parties, the church and the education system. In Germany, the Othering of non-German immigrants has helped to reassert the ethnic homogeneity and uniqueness of the *Kulturnation* and overcoming the post-unification crisis.

There are a number of striking commonalities between the three cases examined, despite their specific histories and different conceptualisations of nationhood. First, the Othering of the immigrant was based on boundaries that are ‘visible’ and could be defined as ‘natural’. In all three cases, the ingroup was distinguished from the outgroup with reference to phenotypic features or cultural traits, which were seen as ‘natural’ and therefore not subject to change. With the exception of Germany, where ethnic descent is in any case the primary criterion for inclusion/exclusion, in Britain and France cultural essentialism has been used to disguise biological racism against immigrants of non-white origin.



Not surprisingly, in all three countries the process of Othering the immigrant gained impetus in the post-war era and, more particularly, in the last decades. Of course, the situation in each country was conditioned by specific historical circumstances, namely the loss of military and political power for Britain, the Nazi legacy and the post-unification crisis for Germany and the decline of the republican assimilationist institutions for France. In Britain and France, immigration was linked to their colonial past because a large part of the non-European immigrants came from former colonies. In Germany, in contrast, a large part of the immigrant population had no historical connection with the country, also because those who had historical or ethnic ties were integrated as ethnic Germans.

The overall question of constructing an immigrant Other might also be related to more recent developments in the international community: the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 'Eastern bloc' has left Western democracies without an enemy, without an external Threatening Other. Thus, the enemy is now to be found in our midst (Mehan 1997).

According to Suarez-Orozco (1995: 16),

[T]he construction ... of powerful landscapes of 'Otherness' – discourses portraying immigrants as parasites and criminals taking our limited and diminishing resources – is largely a projective mechanism serving primitive psychological needs in times of great upheaval and social anxiety.

The non-European immigrant Other becomes thus particularly functional today to the extent that s/he replaces the 'communist threat'. The political debate finds a new division between Us and Them, organised along cultural and racial lines, which might replace old ideological struggles and West-and-the-rest dichotomies that have now lost their meaning.

## 5 Southern Europe

### A challenge for theory and policy

#### Introduction

Having analysed the identity dynamics involved in the relationship between the nation and the Immigrant Other in Britain, France and Germany, I will now turn to the 'new' migration destinations, namely Greece, Italy and Spain. These countries are sometimes defined as the 'soft underbelly' of the European Union, a tag that emphasises the permeability of their borders with non-EU countries. Until recently, Greece, Italy and Spain were migration senders rather than hosts. The consequence of the tightening of migration regimes in northern Europe in the 1970s was that emigration from southern European countries towards the more industrialised North gradually declined and almost ended. In contrast, from the mid-1980s, and especially after 1989, Greece, Italy and Spain were converted into host countries of mainly undocumented immigrants from eastern and central Europe, as well as the Third World. The dramatic and rather sudden increase of immigration towards these countries was a new and unexpected phenomenon for both their governments and their populations. The new situation has been characterised by administrative and political confusion with regard to migration policy, and also by a shift in popular attitudes towards foreigners. An increase in xenophobic behaviour and racism has been registered in all three countries.<sup>1</sup>

The scope of the remaining chapters of this book is to analyse how the immigrant is represented as a threatening Significant Other in the political and press discourse in the three southern countries under examination. I examine the extent to which the immigrant plays a functional role as the Other against which the nation is united, and/or the ways in which the presence of the immigrant as an 'Other within' brings internal divisions to the fore. I also seek to show that the construction of an image of immigrants as threatening outgroups is ultimately more related to ingroup identity than to the actual sociocultural characteristics of the immigrants themselves. The situation in the 'new' immigration countries will also be compared with the findings obtained from research on the 'old' immigration destinations (see Chapter 4).

Greece, Italy and Spain constitute a challenging set of case studies for a variety of reasons. First, from a theoretical point of view, the different conceptions of the nation and of national identity prevailing in each country pose a challenge

to my general argument regarding the role of the Significant Other in the development and transformation of national identity. The identity dynamics between the ingroup and the Immigrant Other might vary widely between the predominantly ethnic Greek identity, the civic definition of the Spanish nation and the civic-cum-ethnic conception of Italianness.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it is worth noting that these three countries have experienced internal tensions related to their national unity and their identity during the last decade. Since its transition to democracy, Spain has been characterised by strong centrifugal tendencies activated by the peripheral nationalisms of Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia, which had long been suppressed by the Franco regime. These dividing tensions were partly accommodated by the granting of autonomy to all Spanish regions (Siguan 1993; Corkill 1996). Nonetheless, a civic sense of Spanish identity and national unity are still threatened by Basque terrorism and by Catalan, Galician and other regions' demands for further political autonomy.

Italy, on the other hand, has long been tormented by the so-called 'southern question' and by its North–South divide, and the *Tangentopoli* scandals and the *Mani Pulite* investigations in the 1980s initiated a general sociopolitical crisis. The situation was further complicated by the emergence of the *Lega Nord*, which has challenged explicitly the unity of the Italian nation and state. The proclamation of the Padanian Republic in the spring of 1996 and the mobilisation of the *Lega* supporters against the national government have led to the reopening of both public and academic debate as to what it means to be Italian and whether an Italian nation exists (Rusconi 1993).

Of the three countries under examination, Greece is the only one that has experienced more of a nationalistic revival than an identity crisis during the last decade. The geographical position, and the historical and cultural links of modern Greece with the East, make it a marginal country in the European context. During the 1990s, the feeling of alienation that Greeks at times express towards 'the West' (Tsoukalas 1993, 1995) was accentuated by the outbreak of the so-called 'Macedonian question', namely Greece's reluctance to accept that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is 'Macedonia'. The controversy between Greece and FYROM, and the inability of other EU countries to appreciate Greece's sensitivity on the issue, has contributed to the development of a new Greek nationalism that has accentuated the ethnic character of Greek identity (Triandafyllidou *et al.* 1997; Triandafyllidou 1998b).

Greece, Italy and Spain pose a challenge to both theoretical and empirical research on nationalism and migration because of their sudden transformation from senders to hosts. The social, political and economic issues raised by such a dramatic change, the intertwining of immigration policy with European integration processes and the rising xenophobia registered in all three countries render study of the situation both interesting and necessary. The continuous quest for 'solutions' in immigration control and in integration policy and the European dimension of the phenomenon require a comparative analysis of the 'new' immigration countries. A comparison with the 'traditional' migration destinations of northern Europe is also needed. Understanding the identity

mechanisms underlying nationalism and understanding xenophobia and racism towards immigrants are important steps towards the development of more effective and just immigration policies.

### Nation formation

In order to appreciate the role of the immigrant as a Significant Other in Spain, Italy and Greece, it is necessary to outline the main features of Spanish, Italian and Greek national identity and the main phases of the nation formation process that these countries underwent. Analytically speaking, nations are distinguished with reference to their primarily ethnic or civic character (Smith 1986, 1991). The main elements constitutive of an ethnic nation are the belief that its members are ancestrally related, a common set of cultural traditions and collective memories and a link to a specific historical territory, the nation's homeland. Civic nations in contrast are based on a common political culture and a legal system that assigns equal rights and duties to all members, a common economy with a single division of labour and a territory that is the geopolitical basis of the community.

Each national identity includes both ethnic and civic features (Smith 1991: 13). In other words, the distinction should rather be understood as a continuum. Thus, I shall define ethnic nations as those in which ethnic features are prevalent, whereas civic ones are those in which civic and territorial elements play the most important part in defining who belongs to the community and who is a foreigner. In the following sections, I shall try to place Greece, Italy and Spain along the continuum and highlight the features that determine the nature of their identity.

#### *Greek identity: ethnic traditions and civic consciousness*

Not surprisingly, Greek national identity encompasses both ethnic and civic characteristics. Even though early Greek nationalism in the late eighteenth century was marked by the influence of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment (Veremis 1983: 59–60; Kitromilides 1990: 25–33), ever since the first decades of the existence of the independent Greek state, the nation has been defined with reference to common ancestry (Kitromilides 1983; Veremis 1983, 1990), culture and language (Kitromilides 1990: 30). Greek national consciousness was 'constructed' throughout the nineteenth century with reference to the nation's *irredenta*, namely the regions inhabited by Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox populations that had not been included in the Greek state at the moment of its creation.

The Great Idea (*Megali Idea*), i.e. the cultural, political and ultimately military project of claiming the *irredenta*<sup>3</sup> and integrating them into the Greek state, represented the political expression of the ethnically, religiously and culturally linguistically defined Greek nation.<sup>4</sup> It also played a significant part in unifying a traditional and internally divided society and transforming it into a nation-

state. Greece thus became the national centre, the political and cultural basis for the Greek populations living in the Near and Middle East as well as in the Balkans (Kitromilides 1983).

The ethnic character of the Greek nation was confirmed through the resolution of the question of the *eterochthonos*, who were accepted by the then National Assembly as full members of the nation: 'Greek is whoever lives ... in a country that is linked to the Greek history or the Greek race' (Kolettis 1844 cit. in Clogg 1992: 48). Thus, *eterochthonos*, i.e. ethnic Greeks who were born outside the territory which later became the independent Greek kingdom, were accepted on an equal footing as *autochthonos*, namely those born within the national territory.

The Western institutions transplanted into the newborn Greek state as well as the Greek Enlightenment movement, although alien to the traditional, rural and deeply religious Greek society of the early nineteenth century, could be said to mark a continuity between classical and modern Greece. The ancient glorious past was thus incorporated into the conception of the nation as its genealogical and cultural cradle.

However, the construction of Greek identity was completed only through the integration of the Byzantine period into the historic trajectory of the nation. The 'invention' of such a united and unique community started with the work of the Greek historian Constantine Paparrigopoulos (Veremis 1983: 60–1; 1990: 12) and was continued throughout the nineteenth century through educational and cultural policies. The unity of the nation was thus extended both in time and in space.

Despite the contradiction between the particularistic claims of Greek nationalism and the universalist tendencies of the Christian Orthodox religion, the integration of the Byzantine past into national consciousness led to the gradual identification of the flock with the *ethnos*.<sup>5</sup> Even though this identification was problematic (Kitromilides 1990: 51–9), the separation of the Greek church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1833 ultimately established the close link between members of the nation and the faithful. Thus, Greekness became inextricably related to common ancestry, cultural traditions and religion. It is worth noting that this triple boundary distinguished Greeks from the non-Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, from the South Slavs living in the Balkan peninsula, who however could not raise a claim to classical Greek culture.

In spite of the ethnic origins of Greek nationalism, the construction of a common legal and political system within the new state, the existence of a national economy and, most importantly, of a national army, the improvement of mobility within the national territory and also the creation of a common public education system influenced significantly the nature of Greek national identity, adding to it a set of territorial and civic features. Nonetheless, the path towards national integration proved particularly difficult because the limited economic and military forces of the Greek state could not meet the disproportionate ambitions of its governments. Moreover, the regime of

conditional sovereignty<sup>6</sup> that had been imposed on Greece by the foreign powers further undermined the prestige and legitimacy of the state as the political agent of the nation (Diamandouros 1983). The military defeat in 1897 and the bankruptcy of the Greek state not only shattered the dreams of national grandeur but also led to the substitution for the nation-state with the nation-without-state, which symbolised the unity and uniqueness of the Greek nation (Dragoumis 1927; Veremis 1990).

The link between the modern institutions of the Greek state and the traditional Greek society remains even nowadays puzzling (Diamandouros 1983: 47–50). The late industrial development of Greece in conjunction with the early introduction of parliamentarism resulted in the distorted functioning of the political system through the preservation of traditional power structures under the cover of western institutions (Diamandouros 1983; Mouzelis 1986, 1995). This weird combination has led to the development of a particularistic political culture (Diamandouros 1983) with mainly populist and clientelistic features and free-rider patterns of economic behaviour (Tsoukalas 1995) that further contributed to the delayed and distorted socioeconomic development of the country.

I have argued in the beginning of this book that national identity is inextricably related to the existence of Others, namely other groups, other nations who are different from Us. Difference however implies also comparison: We are better than They are.<sup>7</sup> Besides, international relations nowadays are characterised by continuous comparisons between nations at the social, economic, political and cultural level (Tsoukalas 1993). Unfortunately, such comparisons yield a negative result for Greece in terms of socioeconomic development and growth rates.

According to social psychologists (Sherif *et al.* 1961; Lemaine 1966), when a social group performs poorly in comparison with another group in the completion of a task, the disadvantaged group tends to introduce alternative comparison dimensions which highlight its difference and at the same time its superiority over the other group. The same may happen with peripheral countries which seek to introduce alternative dimensions on which to compare with industrialised nations and thus to demonstrate their superiority. The constantly renovated emphasis on the ethnogenealogical character of the Greek nation seems to make up part of such a process. The fetishisation of Greekness (Tsoukalas 1993) as a transcendental notion is an important element of contemporary Greek identity. Nationhood is conceptualised as an amalgamate of genealogical and environmental elements in which only people *born* Greeks can participate.

In conclusion, the analysis highlights the predominantly ethnic character of Greek identity from the creation of the independent Greek state until now. The markers of the 'We' are genealogical, linguistic, religious and cultural. The exclusionary character of this perspective shows that foreigners cannot be accepted as members of the Greek nation.

*Some critical reflections on 'Italianness'*

Italian identity may also be seen as a blend of civic and ethnic elements. As a matter of fact, Italianness was initially developed in the Renaissance period as a cultural concept. Only in the nineteenth century was it transformed into a political project, which became reality with the unification of Italy in 1860. Of course, in Italy just as elsewhere, there are competing discourses and conceptions of the nation. My aim here is to discuss the main elements involved in the formation of the Italian identity and highlight the predominant conception of the Italian nation.

Ever since the creation of the independent Italian state, the nation has been conceptualised as a community of people living in a territory and sharing a common set of political and cultural traditions. Thus, the national community has been primarily defined with reference to a specific territory and a particular political culture (Rusconi 1993). The idea of its historical continuity has been formulated through the integration of the Roman tradition, the *Risorgimento* and the fascist legacy into a common national past. The blending of these traditions and historical memories has, however, been characterised by internal contradictions that played an important role in impeding the consolidation of a national identity (Brierley and Giacometti 1996: 172–6).

The formation of the Italian nation was compromised not only by the cosmopolitan heritage of the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church but also by the failure of the emerging Italian bourgeoisie to incorporate within it the intellectual and literary élites (Gramsci 1985). These last remained idealist and cosmopolitan in their attitudes and promoted the *Risorgimento* movement as a counter-reform – rediscovering tradition through change, linking revolution with restoration and avoiding radical ruptures with the past (Veneziani 1994: 8–10) – preventing, thus, the development of a strong national bourgeois class and the spreading of a secular and scientific ideology, as happened in the rest of western Europe.

Moreover, this division between the producing class and the intellectuals perpetuated the existence of two cultures, a *high* culture of the literary strata and a variety of *low*, popular cultures and their respective dialects among the peasants. This duality impeded the spreading of a common Italian vernacular, which would allow for the linguistic and cultural homogenisation of the rural population. Gramsci (1979: 16) points to the gap between the literary and the popular strata and the absence of a romantic nationalist movement in Italy in the nineteenth century. Eventually, Italianness remained pretty much a legal, idealist concept that failed to penetrate the popular culture and identity.

The intellectual movement of the *Risorgimento* sought to integrate 'from above', as part of the nation, the artisan and peasant populations. The high, humanist culture created through the exaltation of the rural ethic in the works of Alessandro Manzoni, the reconstruction of the history of the Italian Republics and the denial of the imperial tradition were thus seen as the core element of Italianness. In reality, the idealisation of life in the countryside – the myth of the Italian peasant developed by Vincenzo Cuoco and his praise of the system

of 'patriarchal cultivation' – was a strategy for opposing the advent of industrialism (Bollati 1983: 101; Duggan 1994). Thus, instead of promoting the socioeconomic development of the country, the Italian nationalist movement fostered a different way of being modern: '*Italia non facit saltus*' (Bollati 1983: 97). Furthermore, the myth of a presumed Italian 'national character', i.e. a specific constellation of personality features that characterises people belonging to the same nation, was built on the basis of this rural ethic. This myth, which is still evoked today, depicts Italians as inherently 'kind people' (*brava gente*) and emphasises the cult of virtue and beauty and the Catholic tradition of solidarity as the essential elements of Italian culture and identity.

It is obvious from the above observations that religion and language, although usually identified as two fundamental elements intertwined with national identity, in the case of Italy play a contradictory role. The universalistic dogma of the Catholic Church, which is by definition in contrast with any nationalist ideology, and the standard Italian language, which has never been able to override completely local dialects, tend to weaken rather than reinforce Italian identity.

Another important element that characterises Italy is regionalism both as a political–administrative reality and as a civic tradition including cultural and linguistic traits. As a matter of fact, Italy is constituted by a plurality of territorial units with their own separate histories. The division between North and South is not a mere matter of geography that can be attributed to environmental differences or to supposed ethnobiological features, which distinguish northern from southern Italians. The origins of this division lie in the past, in the different economic, social and political experiences that each region has had (Putnam 1993).

The significance of regionalism for the concept of Italianness is obvious if one considers that, more than a century after the unification of the country, regional identities and socioeconomic realities continue to threaten the national unity, as the success of *Lega Nord* has demonstrated. The key to understanding this problem lies, first, in the relatively late formation of the Italian nation-state, and, second, in the fact that the unification was imposed by a small élite rather than the masses (Bollati 1983; Duggan 1994). The unification process was experienced by a large part of the population, mainly the southern peasants, as a civil war, or as a war for the conquest of the central and southern parts of Italy by the Piedmont region. It was certainly not a fight for national liberation (Duggan 1994: 133). Besides, the policies of the new state were not successful in inculcating a feeling of belonging to the nation to the rural populations of either the North or the South. The opposite interests of the northern bourgeoisie and the southern landowners prevented the new state from tackling effectively its main social problems – such as the low level of literacy, poor transport and communications and land reform – and creating a national consciousness among the masses (Brierley and Giacometti 1996: 174). As a matter of fact, such a nationalist sentiment was generated only during the fascist era, although again for a short time.



The failure of integrating regional diversity into the nation-state may also be attributed to the fact that territorial identities have been neglected for a long time. The creation of a centralised state left little room for local or regional politics. The state administration and institutions introduced after the unification succumbed to the pre-existing traditions and socioeconomic realities instead of fostering the homogenisation of the regional politics (Putnam 1993: 145). Thus, *campanilismo*<sup>8</sup> and clientelistic politics prevailed instead of a modern bureaucracy that would have supported national integration.

The conception of the Italian nation has also been influenced by the fascist legacy. Fascism still plays an important part in the definition of the national identity. Its influence is not direct however. It does not derive from its political and cultural legacy, even though some scholars suggest that such a legacy persists in many sectors of the public life (Veneziani 1994: 259–60), but rather from its opposite movement, namely anti-Fascism. The reconstruction of the national identity after the collapse of Mussolini's regime was based on the common sorrow and the desire to forget the Fascist experience.

The foundation myth of the new Italian Republic has been based on the movement of Resistance against the Fascists and the German occupation (1943–5). Nonetheless, the symbolic value of the Resistance as a national liberation struggle has been contested by many. As a matter of fact, the movement was divided into minority groupings which fought not only for liberation but also, and perhaps mainly, with the scope of imposing their own socioeconomic model for the reconstruction of the new Italian state (Rusconi 1993). Thus, the Resistance was from its very beginning intertwined with party politics and failed to provide for the symbol of national unity.

Post-war Italy bears with it the signs of its national past. On the one hand, national identity has been consolidated through democratic politics, the granting of autonomy to the regions and the integration through national politics, the media and consumerism of local or regional identities as subcultures within a common national culture (Brierley and Giacometti 1996). On the other hand, however, it still has not come to terms with regional diversity and autonomy nor has it succeeded in creating a common national myth.<sup>9</sup>

In conclusion, this brief analysis has shown that civic and territorial elements are prevalent in the conception of the Italian nation. Moreover, the plurality of cultural/linguistic traditions and political practices that exist within the Italian state and the internal contradictions of the national identity not only make people aware of diversity but also are a proof of the possibility for different peoples to live together. However, the Italian identity draws also upon the idea of a community of people shaped by its unique historical experiences and closed to outsiders. Faced with an increasing influx of migrants, Italians' feature of 'closure' towards Others is likely to be accentuated.

### *The development of a national consciousness in Spain*

Spanish national identity and the existence of a Spanish nation have been,

more often than not, discussed in terms of a 'problem', an 'anomaly', an 'unhealthy' situation that distinguishes Spain from other 'healthy' European countries (Marías 1990: ix; de Riquer i Permanyer 1996: 4). Even though the existence of a Spanish nation was taken for granted by the nationalist liberal Spanish historiographers, who only disagreed on the historical period in which it first appeared, the issue is far from being resolved, even nowadays. Rather, as Juan Linz suggests (1993), the history of Hispanic nationalisms should be seen as one of partial failures for all sides because neither has succeeded in achieving its ultimate goals: Spanish nationalism has had to constrain its aspirations with regard to a unitary Spanish nation-state while peripheral nationalisms (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) have had to give up their claims for sovereignty or independence.

My aim in this section is to provide for a complete though concise view of the main issues involved in the emergence and development of Spanish nationalism. For this purpose, the main elements promoting the idea of a unitary Spain will be analysed, paying particular attention to the divergent versions of Spanish nationalism developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The role of peripheral nationalisms and regionalisms in the development and transformation of a Spanish identity will be examined. The section will conclude with some remarks on the transition to democracy and the currently dominant view of the Spanish nation.

Spanish history is characterised by a long tradition of statehood: the Spanish monarchy has maintained almost identical borders since the early sixteenth century (Junco Alvarez 1996: 89). Marías (1990) suggests that the Spanish nation was born during the reign of the Catholic Kings through the conversion of Castille into Spain. Nonetheless, he also acknowledges that this was not a nation proper in the contemporary sense of the term. The dynastic union included a set of different kingdoms, autonomous between them, at least to a certain degree, while ethnopatriotic writings (Junco Alvarez 1996) were confined to a small élite with very little diffusion among the population. Spanish society at the time lacked the network of communication and cultural traditions which characterise a national community (Smith 1986). Although people living under the Spanish crown were united by a set of common enemies, their political identity was to a large extent fused with their religious, Catholic, beliefs.

A Spanish nationalism can be said to emerge gradually from the early nineteenth century onwards. The Spanish state and a notion of collective identity were reinforced from the Napoleonic invasion (1808–14), which was eventually transformed into a national myth. By the mid-nineteenth century, both Spaniards and non-Spaniards agreed that there was such a thing as a Spanish identity and way of life (Junco Alvarez 1996: 95). Besides, the unity of the Spanish state went unquestioned throughout the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, during the same period, internal divisions between liberalism and absolutism and later among liberals, Carlists and republicans became more pronounced. The Bourbon restoration in 1875 seemed to restore some political stability to the Spanish state, at least temporarily. However, the last decade of

the century was marked by a major 'national' disaster: the loss of the colonies in Cuba and the Philippines, which brought to the fore, for the first time, a concern for the nation, its fate and its interests.

As a matter of fact, the imperial crisis and the domestic conflicts were expressions of a more general identity crisis that Spain was going through in that period. Even though the tragedy of the war and the related nationalist rhetoric helped in creating a Spanish identity in contrast to the Cuban and American Other (Balfour 1996), the nationalisation of the population remained incomplete.

A number of elements impeded the successful integration of the masses into what could be called a 'Spanish nation'. Among these, most important were the lack of political will on the part of the élites in transforming the monarchy into a nation-state and the fact that Spain did not participate in any major European wars (after the Napoleonic invasion) during the nineteenth century, which would have helped to forge a feeling of national unity among the population (Junco Alvarez 1996). Military service was avoided by the lower classes while the élites were granted privileged exemptions. Moreover, the educational system remained rudimentary and ineffective and there were no overarching national symbols (such as an anthem or a flag). In other words, a number of nation-building mechanisms that have been crucial in the emergence of nations in other European countries were absent in the Spanish case.

The identity crisis of the late nineteenth century was also a crisis of legitimacy of the political arrangements in the country. The loss of the last colonies made more obvious the widening gap between the centre and the periphery. The rapid modernisation of Catalonia and the Basque country put more strain on their relationship with the central government. During this period, different currents of Spanish nationalism started emerging alongside peripheral national identities. Before examining these ideologies, it is worth noting that the idea of Spanishness prevailing in the late nineteenth century was one based on innate features, which included race, religion and a presumed national character,<sup>10</sup> 'the Spaniards were a pure, warrior race, valiant, chivalresque and Christian' (Balfour 1996: 110).

Two main currents of Spanish nationalism characterise the nineteenth century: the liberal version and the conservative–authoritarian one. The former was based on the work of the liberal nationalist historiographers (Fox 1997) who promoted romantic views of the past, nationalising certain historical feats (such as the 'War of Independence' against Napoleon) and asserting an essentialist view of Spanishness in which the nation was defined as a group of people who shared a common national character, fought through the centuries against foreign invaders and created a society based on participation and tolerance (Junco Alvarez 1996: 96–7). The features emphasised by liberal nationalist historiographers were those that would provide for the foundations of a liberal state: the nation, with its distinct essence and identity, was described as emerging and imposing itself on the territory by means of a unitary state. History served to legitimise the project of creating a liberal nation-state.<sup>11</sup>

The centralist liberal vision<sup>12</sup> of Spain was challenged from the Right by conservative thinkers who supported traditional privileges such as the local *fueros* and a decentralised system of administration. These views found stronger support in the Basque Country and Catalonia but also in Galicia, Valencia and Aragón (Solé Tura 1974: 55–94). However, the conservative vision included a strong unitary current, which saw Catholicism and the monarchy as the cornerstones of the Spanish nation (Menéndez y Pelayo 1882). The origins of the nation were found at the union between crown and cross and its identity was shaped through the ‘divine punishment’ of the Muslim invasion (Belmar 1861). According to Junco Alvarez<sup>13</sup> (1996: 103), however, Spanish nationalism remained weak: it led to no concrete programme of national development, aside from national independence, which, in any case, was already secure. Thus, it developed mainly as a reaction to social change and in contrast to the Catalan and Basque quest for autonomy.

The period between 1890 and 1936 is characterised by the development of three nationalist movements: the Catalan, the Basque and the Galician ones.<sup>14</sup> These three regions had their own language, distinct from Castilian, and had developed a sense of identity in the course of history. Peripheral nationalist movements were based on such cultural specificities but owed their strength and dynamism to perceived grievances and the unequal power distribution between the centre and the periphery of the Spanish state.<sup>15</sup> In other words, these regions considered themselves to be victims of the central government policies. Moreover, Catalonia and the Basque country in particular went through a rapid process of industrialisation that led to the development of middle-class strata in these regions. These new groupings were excluded from the centres of power that were dominated by the land-owning élites and their links with local patrons (*caciques*) (Smith and Mar-Molinero 1996: 12–14).

The unexpected, though uneven, economic growth during the First World War brought about the collapse of the liberal Spanish state structure.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie and the labour movement gained influence whereas the land-owning ruling class and the centralist state started losing power. The inefficiency of the liberal regime, growing internal tensions due to the discontent of the working class and corporate grievance of army officers encouraged the involvement of the military into politics. The proletariat managed neither to come to power nor to block the army’s involvement in politics while the bourgeoisie, although favourable to social reforms in the beginning, towards the end of the 1920s turned to the army in order to protect its economic interests. Thus, eventually, in September 1923, the Captain General of Barcelona, Miguel Primo de Rivera, imposed a dictatorship on the country (Romero Salvadó 1996: 128–30).

The development of peripheral societies and identities, the collapse of the liberal nation-state project and the military intervention contributed to the discrediting of a liberal unitary nationalism. This last was substituted for a conservative, authoritarian view of the nation in which the army became the national saviour: it saved Spain from separatism and national disorder and it

would bring economic modernisation. Within this view, however, there was little room left for alternative nationalisms.

The de Rivera dictatorship was short-lived (1923–30) but, even afterwards, the Republicans' project (1931–8) of building a democratic nation-state was led to failure. An important factor contributing to this failure was their inability to create the nation out of distinct local identities and realities (de Riquer i Permanyer 1990: 119–22; Graham 1996: 136).

The Spanish nationalist project was eventually realised, albeit in an authoritarian version, by the Franco regime. The notion of Spanishness (*Hispanidad*) promoted by the Franco dictatorship may be summarised in the following elements. First, the nation was identified with the *Patria*, i.e. the country and, hence, the state. Moreover, the *Patria* was linked to Catholic Spain, the legacy of *los Reyes Catolicos* and their struggle against foreign powers serving as a central national myth. 'Spiritual unity, social unity, historic unity' (Franco's speech on June 24, 1938, cit. in Richards 1996: 150) played a fundamental role in constructing the regime's version of Spanishness.

This organicist conception of the nation as a 'natural' entity had two implications. On the one hand, there was no room for alternative cultural identities, or for peripheral nationalism (Reig Tapia 1984; Solé i Sabaté 1993). All regional cultural difference was denied and brutally suppressed. On the other hand, unity involved also social and economic autarky. Economic self-sufficiency<sup>17</sup> meant extreme exploitation of the lower classes, which was perpetuated after the War: industrialisation was achieved through intensification of labour while even the most basic nutritional needs of the population were neglected. As Richards argues (1996: 151) 'autarky [wa]s about nationalism'. As a matter of fact, it was clear that the people were divided into two sections: 'Spain' and 'anti-Spain', victors and defeated. The latter had to be 'purified' through isolation and punishment. The notion of purification, both national and individual, was borrowed from the authoritarian currents of regenerationist thought<sup>18</sup> and related to the idea of redemption and expiation of sin associated with the Catholic tradition. Besides, regenerationism was a common feature of all the fascist regimes (Griffin 1991).

Despite the fierce repression of the Franco regime (1939–75), Catalan and Basque nationalism survived, albeit their discourse was transformed. The notion of race, which was prevalent in the pre-Second World War period, was abandoned because its use had been discredited by the Nazi regime. Language and culture became the new markers of national identity in Catalonia and the Basque country (Smith and Mar-Molinero 1996: 21). Moreover, a number of left-wing nationalist projects started emerging from the 1960s onwards. In the 1970s, anti-state voices, which called for a federation of Iberian nationalities and a different conception of the Spanish nation, grew stronger (Gillespie 1989: 303).

Eventually, the democratic transition and the Constitution of 1978 introduced, indeed, a different view of Spain in which administrative and political autonomy was granted to all regions – by 1984, Spain had been divided into

seventeen autonomous regions<sup>19</sup> – even though financial power and linguistic hegemony remained with the central state. King Juan Carlos' commitment to democracy made the monarchy a symbol of the new Spanish nationalism and gave it widespread public esteem. In the redefinition of Spanish nationalism, the Socialist Party (PSOE) played an important role. Since its coming to power in 1982, the PSOE developed a nationalist discourse concentrating on the people rather than the state, which, however, respected the country's cultural and linguistic pluralism. The granting of autonomies allowed for dual identities and loyalties: Catalan or Basque or Galician and Spanish (López Guerra 1989; Giner and Moreno 1990). Contemporary Spain is conceptualised as a 'nation of nationalities' (Mercadé *et al.* 1983: 141), namely as a social and political reality constituted of the historical synthesis of a multitude of national communities, as is in fact stated in the second article of the 1978 Constitution.

In conclusion, Spanish nationalism and national identity has been rather weak and internally fragmented until the 1930s despite the long statehood tradition of Spain. Rather unfortunately, Spanishness acquired dynamism and imposed itself on competing regional and peripheral identities only under the Franco regime. However, this happened through brutal oppression of dissidents and economic sacrifices of the lower classes. Spanish nationalism has, however, been regenerated and reformulated in the past 25 years, acquiring a democratic and pluralist character which has allowed for a peaceful cohabitation of competing national identities within one country. Of course, tensions are not absent, as the persistence of ETA terrorism shows, but there seems to be the necessary political will from all parties involved to deal with the issues of further decentralisation and cultural pluralism peacefully. This openness towards internal diversity and the regime of regional autonomy would lead one to expect that Spaniards would be relatively open towards the cultural and ethnic diversity brought in by immigrants.

### The new hosts

Throughout the post-war period, Greece, Italy and Spain have been pools of labour power for northern European countries such as France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and others (see Table 5.1). Emigration flows from southern Europe were gradually reduced and in some cases came to a halt so that in the mid-1970s the net migration rate in Greece, Italy<sup>20</sup> and Spain became positive for the first time in the post-war era. Numbers of foreigners residing in Italy started rising already in the late 1970s (Veugelers 1994: 34–5) (see Table 5.2) after north-western European countries tightened their immigration regimes. Greece and Spain experienced immigration as hosts<sup>21</sup> only in the late 1980s (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). Numbers increased in all three countries, however, in the 1990s, after the debacle of the Communist regimes in eastern and central Europe (Cornelius 1994; Izquierdo Escribano 1996; Baldwin Edwards and Arrango 1998; King *et al.* 1999). As a matter of fact, Greece, Italy and Spain may be characterised as the new European hosts (Vasta 1993: 83) (see Table 5.5).

Table 5.1 Stocks of foreign population in selected European countries

Sending country	Receiving country							
	France		Germany		The Netherlands		Switzerland	
	1976	1985	1978	1989	1978	1989	1978	1989
Greece	–	–	306	294	4	5	9	8
Italy	466	277	572	520	21	17	443	379
Spain	507	268	189	127	25	17	96	115

Source: adapted from King (1995, cit. in Escrivà 1997: 44).

Note

Data are expressed in thousands.

The immigrant population in Greece originates in its large majority from Albania, while other numerically large groups include Poles, Russians and Ukrainians, Filipinos and to a lesser extent Pakistanis, Kurds and Bulgarians. Spain has a large community of Moroccans but also Germans and Britons. Finally, Italy is characterised by a wide diversity of nationalities represented in its immigrant population. Moroccans are the largest community numerically, followed by Albanians, Filipinos, Tunisians and also Romanians, Chinese, Senegalese and also citizens from the former Yugoslavia.<sup>22</sup>

The sudden transformation of Greece, Italy and Spain from emigration to immigration countries has raised social, economic and legal issues, which their administrations were not ready to tackle. The increase of the number of immigrants hosted legally or illegally in the three countries was dramatic. Moreover, from the late 1980s onwards, reactions among the domestic population towards immigrants from non-EU countries have grown increasingly hostile. Anxiety about the possibly negative consequences of immigration on unemployment has been expressed frequently, while immigrants are often viewed as a threat to 'our' way of life. The development of xenophobic and even racist attitudes has soon led to violent incidents against immigrants, in particular Albanians in Greece, '*extracomunitari*'<sup>23</sup> in Italy and Moroccans in Spain.

### *Immigration policy*

In Italy and Spain, the problem has mainly been confronted through temporary administrative measures and special legal provisions aiming at regularising vast numbers of illegal immigrants who had already settled in the two countries. Greece, in contrast, was until very recently reluctant to recognise immigration as a long-term phenomenon and regularise any of the undocumented immigrants residing in its territory.

Despite the fact that immigration has become a matter of concern for the Greek authorities since almost a decade, it is still impossible to know the exact numbers, places of origin and other characteristics of immigrants residing in

Table 5.2 Foreigners residing in Italy

	1980*	1985*	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Variation 1996/7 (%)
EU			148,611	145,426	146,918	152,954	141,577	164,003	152,092	168,125	10.54
Non-EU			632,527	717,551	778,254	834,451	781,129	827,416	943,092	1,072,596	13.68
Industrialised countries			117,961	116,516	120,395	122,567	107,696	101,594	90,972	100,134	10.07
Developing countries			514,556	601,035	657,859	711,844	673,433	725,822	852,558	972,462	14.06
Percentage of total population	0.5	0.7	1.4*	1.6*							
Total	298,700	423,000	781,138	862,977	925,172	987,405	922,706	991,419	1,095,622	1,240,721	13.24

Source: Caritas di Roma (1998: 80), statistical elaboration by Caritas Rome of data provided by the Ministry of Interior. Data marked with an asterisk are taken from SOPEMI (1992: 131, Table 1), Italy, Ministry of Interior (1987-92).



Table 5.3 Foreign population residing in Spain in 1970, 1980 and 1994

	1970	1980	1994
Foreign population in Spain	147,700	181,000	484,342

Source: adapted from Escrivà (1997: 45).

Table 5.4 Foreign citizens resident in Greece in 1974, 1986 and 1990

	1974	1986	1990
Total foreign population	16,955	92,440	173,436
Of which:			
EU12 and North America	9,557	52,774	72,457
Other European countries	3,285	8,526	16,643
Africa	1,863	9,738	32,711
Asia	2,834	19,217	24,692

Source: adapted from Fakiolas and King (1996: 176).

#### Note

It is worth noting that although the number of EU and North American citizens increased sevenfold between 1974 and 1990, their proportion of the total foreign population fell from 56 per cent to 42 per cent. Moreover, these data do not include the main influx of Albanians, which only started after 1990 (see Fakiolas and King 1996).

the country. Their illegal condition prevents the collection of official data on the matter. Nonetheless, estimates tend to converge at a total of approximately 500,000–600,000 immigrants (about 150,000–250,000<sup>24</sup> of whom are deemed to come from Albania). An overview of the estimates/data published in a variety of sources in recent years (Petrinioti 1993; Greek Observatory for Human Rights 1995; Linardos-Rylmond 1995; Triandafyllidou and Mikrakis 1995; Katsoridas 1996; Lianos *et al.* 1996; Triandafyllidou 1996; Fakiolas 1997) suggests that after a sudden increase in the immigrant influx in the early 1990s, as a result mainly of the collapse of the 'Eastern bloc', the flows have been stabilised at around half a million immigrants, at their overwhelming majority illegal, residing in Greek territory (see also Table 5.5).

Although the Greek government was an early starter in immigration control policy, it has been particularly reluctant in recognising that immigrants 'are here to stay'. The first piece of legislation concerning immigration (Bill 1975/1991)<sup>25</sup> was eloquently entitled 'Entry–exit, sojourn, work, expulsion of aliens, recognition procedure of foreign refugees and other provisions'. The bill has concentrated on the development of stricter police controls throughout the country and the border regions in particular. Its main objectives have been to prevent the entrance of illegal immigrants and to facilitate the expulsion of those already present in Greek territory by means of simplifying the expulsion procedures, giving a certain degree of autonomy to local police and judiciary authorities<sup>26</sup> and also penalising illegal alien stay in the country. The law aimed

Table 5.5 Stocks of foreign population residing in Greece, Italy and Spain (000s)

	<i>Legal immigrants</i>	<i>Undocumented immigrants (estimates)</i>	<i>Total (including maximum estimates)</i>	<i>Total resident population in 1995</i>	<i>Percentage of total population</i>
Greece	78 (September 1997)	500–600 (1998)	678	10,443	6.49
Italy	1,240 (end 1997)	176–295 (April 1998)	1,535	57,269	2.68
Spain	461 (end 1994)	200–300 (1994)	761	39,170	1.94

Sources: data and estimates on Italy, Caritas di Roma (1998: 41 and 135); data on Greece, Ministry of Public Order, internal documents 16.10.1996 and 7.10.1997 and National Statistics Service Yearbooks 1989–97; estimates on Greece, Baldwin Edwards and Fakiolas (1998); data on Spain, Izquierdo Escribano (1996: 108–9); estimates on Spain, Cornelius (1994: 335); data on resident population for all three countries, Caritas di Roma (1998: 41).

Note

Fakiolas (1997: 1) observes that the undocumented immigrants in Greece amount to 8–11 per cent of the registered labour force in the country.

thus to bring Greece into line with its European partners, co-signatories of the 1990 Dublin convention<sup>27</sup> (ratified by Greece by Law 1996/1991) and members of the 1990 Schengen Treaty, to which Greece was accorded observer status at the time.<sup>28</sup>

Two presidential decrees (no. 358/1997 and no. 359/1997) issued in November 1997, however, inaugurated the first regularisation programme for illegal immigrants in Greece which had a 5-month duration (1 January to 30 May 1998) and which has been managed mainly by the National Employment Institute (OAED). The rationale behind the programme is a more efficient protection of the national interest and the public order rather than the protection of immigrant rights. According to the data available, 373,700 undocumented immigrants had applied for a Temporary Residence Permit (White Card) by the end of May 1998. These applications regard the so-called White Card, valid until 31 December 1998 and meant to be replaced by the Temporary Residence Card (Green Card), valid for a period of 1–5 years. By 31 January 1999 nearly 180,000 people had applied for the Green Card. The relevant deadline had been moved forward four times and eventually expired on 30 April 1999 (Baldwin Edwards and Fakiolas 1998; Fakiolas 1998; Efstratoglou 1999).<sup>29</sup>

The Italian government sought to deal with the issue through two programmes of regularisation of illegal immigrants. The first was enacted in 1986 (Law 943/1986) and regulated the conditions for admission and residence of foreigners into the country as well as guaranteed their equal rights with Italian citizens. Moreover, it defined the conditions for regularisation of

clandestine immigrant workers. This law was flawed in two fundamental aspects: first, it ignored refugees and, second, the conditions required for illegal immigrants to be eligible for regularisation were ambivalent and carried out at the authorities' discretion. Thus, the turn-out of the programme was relatively low; only 105,312 immigrants managed to pass the test (SOPEMI 1991: 22, Table 5.8), in comparison with the number of illegal immigrants estimated to be present in the Italian territory at the time.

A new law was prepared in 1989 (Law 39/1990, commonly known as the Martelli Law), which confirmed the equality of rights between foreigners and Italians, tightened the conditions for entry into the country but, most importantly, enlarged the margins for the regularisation of those already present in the national territory. According to SOPEMI (1991: 22, Table 5.8), 216,037 immigrants were legalised through the Martelli Law. Another major regularisation programme took place in 1995 during which 256,000 applications were filed of which 93 per cent were approved, bringing thus a large number of immigrants into legality (Reyneri 1998).

The efforts of the Italian governments to tame the influx of immigrants were only partly successful in achieving their objectives. First, they perpetuated a situation of 'permanent social emergency' (Campani 1993) by failing either to control the migratory flows or to integrate those already established in the country. Second, they failed to prevent violence and xenophobia against foreigners. Indeed the Italian public that was reported to show an attitude of 'social tolerance' towards immigrants (Ferrarroti 1984) soon became explicitly hostile and xenophobic. Racist incidents were registered already in 1990–1 (Bonifazi 1992; Woods 1992: 189). Moreover, Italians seemed to perceive that the state was doing too much for immigrants (Campani 1993: 525).

Only very recently, in March 1998, a new immigration law, which complements and updates existing provisions, was voted in the Italian Parliament (Law 40/06.03.1998). Eventually, in August 1998, the Parliament issued the '*Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell'immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero*' (Comprehensive text of legal dispositions concerning immigration and norms regarding the condition of foreigners) which brought together laws no. 773/1931, no. 943/1986 and no. 335/1995 (*Guida al Diritto*, 12 September 1998: III) and thus created a unitary corpus of norms that regulate the rights and obligations of foreigners in Italy, their stay and work conditions, and other matters such as family reunion, social integration and cultural and political life in the host country.<sup>30</sup> In recent years, the Italian government has allowed a limited number (a few thousand) of legal entries per year as a means of controlling and regulating immigration. In 1998, it created a new regularisation programme, which attracted more than 300,000 applications (*Corriere della Sera*, 9 February 1999). The large majority have been approved.<sup>31</sup>

The Spanish government issued a comprehensive immigration law in 1985 (*Ley organica sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España*), followed by the first regularisation programme (1985–6) for 'not sufficiently documented'

immigrants residing in Spanish territory. However, the outcome of this programme was rather poor (approximately 40,000 applications) (Izquierdo Escribano 1996: 213; Sainz de la Peña 1997: 133). Thus, a new bill was passed by the Spanish parliament in March 1991. This proposal requested, among other things, a new regularisation initiative. Approximately 110,000 undocumented immigrants managed to legalise their stays in Spain through this second programme.

After 1991, regularisation of illegal immigrants took place indirectly, through the policy of '*contingentes*', under which a number of residence and work permits was issued each year to allow immigrant workers to be employed in specific sectors of the labour market. Since 1993, 20,000 permits have been being issued annually allowing for immigrant workers to work in sectors of the economy such as agriculture, tourism and domestic service. Immigrants were originally meant to be invited to come to Spain but, eventually, the measure was used to regularise the status of those who were already in the country. It is worth noting, however, that out of 461,364<sup>32</sup> legal immigrants present in the country at the end of 1994 210,221 were EU nationals (British and German citizens representing the second and third largest immigrant groups, after the Moroccan community; Izquierdo Escribano 1996). In December 1999 a new immigration law was approved by the Spanish parliament and senate. However, the extremely liberal character of this new piece of legislation, assigning equal rights to documented and undocumented immigrants alike, led to its redrafting in December 2000 (see [www.reicaz.es/extranjeria](http://www.reicaz.es/extranjeria)).

### Xenophobia rising

Recent survey data (Eurobarometre 1997a) confirm that Italians and Greeks are prone to racism, while Spain is still one of the least xenophobic countries in Europe. However, it is clear that Italians are ambivalent in their views concerning immigration whereas Greeks are quite overtly hostile towards the presence of foreigners in their country. Thirty per cent of the Italian population consider themselves 'very' or 'quite' racist and 35 per cent 'a little' racist (see Table 5.6), 69 per cent of the population (see Table 5.7) want immigrants to neither integrate nor assimilate in order to be fully accepted in their society, and only 33 per cent of Italians (see Table 5.8) believe that people from minority groups are too different to be accepted as members of the Italian society (compared with 39 per cent and 38 per cent of EU15 average). Nonetheless, 62 per cent of the population (see Table 5.9) asserts that 'their country has reached its limits; if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems.'

Greeks, on the other hand, do not consider themselves to be racist (only 27 per cent of the population – the EU15 average is 33 per cent – would call themselves 'very' or 'quite' racist; see Table 5.6), but 34 per cent are in favour of assimilation and 24 per cent favour the integration of immigrants into the host society. This percentage is close to the EU15 average (25 per cent and 36

Table 5.6 Self-perception of respondents (per cent)

	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>EU15</i>
Very racist	6	9	4	9
Quite racist	21	21	16	24
A little racist	31	35	31	33
Not at all racist	43	35	49	34

Source: Eurobarometre (1997a: Graph 1).

Table 5.7 Opinions on integration and assimilation (per cent)

	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>EU15</i>
Disagree with integration and assimilation	42	69	67	39
Agree with assimilation	34	10	17	25
Agree with integration	24	21	16	36

Source: Eurobarometre (1997a: Graph 20).

Note

The question was phrased as follows: 'For each of the following opinions, please state whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?: Integration: In order to be fully accepted members of society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up such parts of their religion or culture which may be in conflict with the law; Assimilation: In order to be fully accepted members of society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up their own culture' (Eurobarometre 1997a: Graph 20).

Table 5.8 Opinions on minorities and immigrants (per cent)

	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>EU15</i>
Tend to agree: People belonging to these minority groups are so different that they can never be fully accepted members of our country's society	41	33	23	38

Source: Eurobarometre (1997a: Graph 21).

Table 5.9 Opinions on foreigners' presence in the country (per cent)

	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>EU15</i>
Tend to agree: Our country has reached its limits; if there were more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems	85	62	29	65

Source: Eurobarometre (1997a: Graph 23).

per cent respectively; see Table 5.7), but well above the Italian and Spanish scores. Moreover, 41 per cent of the Greek population, slightly above the EU15 average, agree that immigrants are 'too different' from Us to become members of Our society and, quite strikingly, a vast majority (85 per cent) believes that their country has reached its limits with regard to the number of immigrants that it can take. It is worth noting that Greece has the highest score on this issue, well beyond the EU15 average (65 per cent).

Spaniards, by contrast, are overwhelmingly (67 per cent) against both integration and assimilation (Table 5.7), and only 23 per cent of the population think that immigrants are so different they could never be fully assimilated (lowest score, together with Finland, among EU countries) (Table 5.8). Half of the population (49 per cent) perceive themselves as 'not at all racist' and only 20 per cent as 'very' or 'quite racist' (Table 5.6), and less than one-third of the population (29 per cent) agree that their country has reached its limits in terms of foreign population. This score is again the second lowest in Europe (only Finland has a lower score in this question), and is much lower than the EU15 average (65 per cent) (Table 5.9). Clearly, the results of this survey show that, on the whole, Spaniards remain open to people from different countries and cultures.

In summary, the results of this survey show that Italians consider themselves to be racist to a certain extent, but are relatively in favour of immigrant acceptance and integration. These findings are corroborated by ethnographic studies (Cole 1996, 1997) that suggest that working-class Sicilians have ambivalent attitudes towards immigrants. On the one hand, they tend to empathise with them, drawing from their own or their relatives' experiences as immigrants abroad; and they also affirm that foreigners do jobs that Sicilians find demeaning. On the other hand, they accuse immigrants of stealing Sicilians' jobs and resent the immigrant presence because 'it infects the city' (Cole 1996: 209–11).

Greeks, in contrast, refuse to identify themselves as racist, however they show an attitude of national and cultural 'closure' towards outsiders. These data accord with the findings of sociological research regarding the working and living spaces of Albanians in Athens (Psimmenos 1995, 1999). This research has shown that undocumented Albanian immigrants are excluded and confined to a spatial and symbolic ghetto in the Athenian society. Their exclusion, and the denial of their fundamental rights, is manifested in their relations with their employers and/or the people who rent accommodation to them, even though the latter might not define their behaviour as 'racist'.

The seemingly 'xenophile', or at least non-xenophobic, attitudes of Spanish people towards immigrants should be interpreted with caution. National survey data (CIS 1992, 1994; CIRES 1994) show that, although they blame immigrants for unemployment, depressed wages and increase of criminality, Spaniards are in favour of immigrant regularisation and of giving to the latter access to social services, especially those who are employed. However, some researchers argue that these beliefs might be a 'politically correct' answer to interviewers, rather

than an expression of the true feelings of the interviewees. Promoting tolerance and social justice ideals is a way by which to distance oneself from the Franco legacy and to show that Spain is a 'modern, European democracy' (Cornelius 1994: 360–1). But the extent to which these ideals are effectively followed in practice is debatable.

Moreover, in arguments of 'national preference', immigrants are classified according to their countries of origin: attitudes concerning immigrant acceptance are more favourable towards Latin Americans and East Europeans than towards black and North Africans, whose integration is regarded as 'problematic' or 'very problematic' by the majority of Spaniards (58 per cent) (CIRES 1994). Nonetheless, 41 per cent declared that 'they would not be worried if their son or daughter married a citizen from a Black African country', and nearly 42 per cent believed that immigrants should be able to vote in general elections (CIS 1994). Overall, it can be safely argued that Spain remains a country with a record of few racist and xenophobic incidents, where public attitudes towards foreigners remain at least ambivalent if not positive. Suspicion and negative feelings towards Moroccans, in particular, might be based on Spain's history and conflictual relationship with '*los moros*'.

The transformation of Greece, Italy and Spain from emigration to immigration countries has been sudden and unexpected. The percentage of immigrants within the whole population in the three countries is still below the levels of other western European countries (such as Germany, France, The Netherlands or Sweden). Thus, the feeling of threat often expressed by the media and the public does not seem justified. However, the attitudes of the domestic population differ significantly in the three countries. Italians seem still to be puzzled about the issue, afraid of being 'invaded' and of losing their cultural or ethnic 'purity' but nevertheless showing compassion towards immigrants and denying being racist. Greeks, on the contrary, are quite clear: there are too many immigrants in their country, and their cultural or ethnic difference is a problem. Immigrants could be accepted as members of the Greek society only if they abandoned (at least in part) their own cultures and habits and adopted the Greek lifestyle. However, Greeks do not conceptualise their attitudes as racist. Spaniards, although not immune to prejudice and ethnic preference arguments, are on the whole more open to immigrants' integration in Spanish society, even though the openness in their attitudes should be treated with caution.

### **Dimensions for comparison**

Concluding this brief overview of the situation in Greece, Italy and Spain, I would like to highlight the features that make these three countries an interesting set for examination for the Us–Immigrant Other relationship.

First and foremost, because they are characterised by different types of identities, the three countries present a challenge to the researcher who is interested in assessing the role that the Immigrant Other plays in the

development and/or transformation of national identity. Ethnic features predominate in Greek identity and nationhood is tied to common genealogical origins. Greekness is often seen as a transcendental essence that can be shared only by those born Greek. Contemporary Spanish nationalism, in contrast, is plural in character and politically decentralised, at least to a certain extent. Different national origins are accommodated as part and parcel of the Spanish state. Italian identity, finally, lies somewhere in the middle of the ethnic–civic continuum because, although originally based on common civic traditions and territory, it also displays some ethnic features such as the belief in a common national character.

Studying these three countries is interesting for an additional reason: each has seen its national identity and unity being challenged during the past decade. Greece has had to come to terms with the so-called ‘Macedonian question’ (Triandafyllidou *et al.* 1997), and is under pressure to meet the economic parameters for the European unification. These two elements have revitalised a defensive version of Greekness that emphasises the transcendental essence of the nation (Tsoukalas 1993) and the difficulty that its European partners have in understanding it. Italy, on the other hand, has gone through a series of major political scandals that have led to an institutional and political crisis. The country has nonetheless managed to meet the criteria for participating in the launch of a common European currency and has thus confirmed its position within Europe. Thus, the internal crisis of national identity has been somehow compensated by an enthusiastic pro-Europeanism, which served also to mitigate regional divergence. Finally, during the past 15 years, Spain has asserted its democratic and European vocation and has distanced itself from its Francoist past. However, the plural character of Spanish nationhood has been put to the test by Basque separatist terrorism and the increasing demands for autonomy of Catalonia, Galicia and other regional nations. The granting of autonomy to the regions has not been sufficient to eliminate such tensions within modern, democratic Spain.

The findings of survey research concerning xenophobia and racism towards immigrants conform with my expectations derived from the specific nature of each country’s national identity. The ethnic conception of Greek nationhood is confirmed by the high degree of intolerance towards immigrants. The openness of Spain is also reflected in the survey results, and the ambiguity of Italianness is expressed in Italians’ attitudes towards immigrants: discriminatory tendencies are paradoxically combined with an attitude of acceptance.

One should, of course, not neglect the objective parameters of the immigrant presence in the three countries. The percentage of immigrant population (including both documented and undocumented immigrants) is higher in Greece, where, according to estimates, it exceeds 5 per cent. In Italy, it is lower than 3 per cent, and in Spain it is below 2 per cent. Migration is overwhelmingly economically motivated in Italy and Greece but part of Spain’s immigrant population is not active economically (pensioners from EU countries, Britain and Germany in particular). Thus, one might argue that the different degrees



of xenophobia and racism registered in the three countries are simply the results of a larger or smaller presence of immigrants.

However, my interest in this book concentrates on the identity mechanisms that the presence of immigrants triggers in the domestic population of the host country. Rather than searching for causal relations between different phenomena (immigrant presence and xenophobic behaviour of the host population), my aim here is to reveal the more subtle identity mechanisms activated by an immigrant presence. In the following chapters I will therefore seek to show how national identity is redefined through the discourse on immigrants, and the functional role that the immigrant plays as a Significant Other to which the nation is contrasted.

## 6 Setting the stage, the press discourse

### Introduction

This chapter<sup>1</sup> concentrates on the press discourse concerning immigration in Greece, Italy and Spain in the period between 1990 and 1995. The press is seen here as an important public arena in which social issues are defined. By analysing press discourse, I shall seek to map the discursive universe within which the immigration debate takes place. The main topics, symbols, interpretative frames and values related to immigration are identified, and attention is paid to the definitions of the ingroup—the nation and the outgroup—immigrants.

The analysis concentrates on the themes and dimensions of national identity reproduced and elaborated in the media discourse on immigration. I examine the representation of Them/immigrants/aliens in contrast to Us/nationals, and the redefinition of the nation so as to differentiate Us from Them and make the national boundary impermeable. Emphasis is placed on the re-elaboration of national features by the press, and also the discovery/invention of new elements that serve to define the ingroup identity in opposition to the immigrant Other.

### The press discourse on immigration

The study concentrates on the articles referring to immigration that were published in the mainstream weekly press in the three countries under examination in the period between 1990 and 1995. The weekly rather than daily press has been chosen because its articles are more likely to include commentaries or extensive interviews that provide room for the expression of opinions, rather than brief news reports.

With regard to Greece, the articles included in the database were collected from four large, national, weekly newspapers (*Κυριακάτικη Ελευθεροτυπία*, *Το Βήμα της Κυριακής*, *Καθημερινή της Κυριακής* and *Απογευματινή της Κυριακής*). Of those, *Κυριακάτικη Ελευθεροτυπία* and *Το Βήμα της Κυριακής* are of progressive, left-of-centre political orientation but are not attached to a particular party. They are two of the three largest Sunday newspapers in Greece. *Απογευματινή της Κυριακής* and *Καθημερινή της Κυριακής* are traditional right-

wing newspapers, each with a relatively large circulation. These four newspapers account for the largest part of the coverage in the period under examination and are mainstream in their political orientations. They are therefore likely to reflect the main issues and interpretative frames used in the Greek press discourse on immigration.

The Italian articles analysed have been taken from two major weekly magazines, *L'Espresso* and *Panorama*. *L'Espresso* is published in Rome and has a centre–progressive tendency while *Panorama* is a centre–right-wing magazine based in Milan. Each has a large national circulation and can be considered mainstream. I chose to use two weekly magazines instead of two weekly newspapers in the Italian case study because of their strong presence in the Italian news market. In Greece, by contrast, there are virtually no such magazines and the weekly press is dominated by Sunday newspapers (such as those selected) which are of a hybrid newspaper–magazine character.

The Spanish press discourse on immigration is studied through an analysis of articles published in two mainstream weekly magazines, *Cambio 16* and *Tribuna de Actualidad*, and the Sunday edition of the largest Spanish daily, *El País*. Not only is *El País* the newspaper with the largest circulation in Spain, but it is also widely recognised as a prestigious one; it is mainstream, with loose links to the Socialist party and a strong commitment to democracy. *Cambio 16* is also seen as a centre–progressive magazine, mainstream and prestigious, while *Tribuna de Actualidad* is of right-wing political orientation and might be deemed to support implicitly a Spanish nationalist view. The combination of Spain's two major weekly magazines and its largest Sunday newspaper has been considered the best strategy for capturing a comprehensive picture of the mainstream public discourse on immigration in that country.

Three months of each year (February, June and October) were selected as sampling periods for the period 1990–5. The final database is composed of seventeen articles from the Greek newspapers, forty-four from the Italian magazines and forty-three from the Spanish press.

The articles have been coded using a database management system. The coding scheme includes four identifying categories (record number, name of the newspaper/magazine, date of publication and title of the article) and seven national identity dimensions (ethnic origins, cultural traditions, territory, language, religion, civic traditions and national character, i.e. idiosyncratic features that supposedly characterise the members of a nation and are derived from their common origins). These dimensions include the features set out by Smith (1991) in his definition of the nation, with the addition of two features that are also often deemed to be part and parcel of national identity: religion and national character. In choosing these seven dimensions, I have tried to include the main features that could be related to the idea of the nation rather than trying to suggest a specific theoretical framework for conceptualising national identity. Each newspaper or magazine article has been selected as the unit of coding and analysis, regardless of the length of the text. The procedure followed was that of multiple coding: namely more than one identity dimension could be coded for a single article unit.

The coding of the articles has allowed for a basic quantitative analysis of the sample, allowing a count of how many times each feature is mentioned in the press discourse (see Table 6.1). The percentage of coverage of each identity dimension is calculated on the total number of times it is mentioned. This simple statistical operation aims to provide a quantitative indication of the importance of each national identity feature. In other words, my aim has been to check whether there are identity characteristics in each country that are linked to the issue of immigration. This basic quantitative analysis is meant to complement the in-depth qualitative analysis of the discourse presented in the sections below.

### The Greek case study

A preliminary comment regarding the size of the database on Greece is appropriate before presenting the findings. Even though four newspapers were included in the Greek database (compared with two in Italy and three in Spain), a total of seventeen articles were collected, less than half the size of the Italian or the Spanish databases. Earlier research, by way of contrast, shows a consistent coverage of immigration issues by the Greek press with a clearly rising tendency in the period between 1990 and 1994 (Mikrakis and Triandafyllidou 1994: 798; Triandafyllidou and Mikrakis 1995: 175). Moreover, a large share of that coverage was attributed to the Sunday newspapers; *To Βήμα της Κυριακής* and *Ελευθεροτυπία της Κυριακής*: *To Βήμα* alone had published seventeen articles in the period between January 1989 and February 1993 (Mikrakis and Triandafyllidou 1994: 796). The small number of articles on immigration published in the period examined might therefore be attributed to the decreasing news value of events related to immigration or to an unexpected bias of the sample; perhaps there were fewer than usual articles on this issue during the months selected. Whatever the reason for the scarcity, the small size of the database invites caution in assuming that the results of the analysis provide a valid snapshot of the general Greek press discourse.

Three features of national identity dominate the press discourse on immigration in Greece (see Table 6.1): (1) ethnic descent, (2) culture and (3) national character. The issue of immigration is also related, although to a lesser extent, to the civic dimensions such as the national territory or the legal and political system of the country. Finally, language and religion play a marginal role in the definition of the boundary between the domestic population and newcomers.

*Genealogical descent* is a prevalent dimension of the press discourse. Ethnic origins are emphasised in order to differentiate between immigrants of Greek descent and Others. According to this distinction, Pontian Greeks<sup>2</sup> – often called *Ρωσσοπόντιοι* (Rossopontii) in colloquial Greek – are welcomed by the government (Triandafyllidou 1996) and are represented by the press as ‘our Greek brothers’. Similar comments are made with regard to *Βορειοηπειρώτες*<sup>3</sup> (Vorioepirotas), even though the Greek authorities have not conceded to give

them Greek citizenship on the basis of their ethnicity, as they did with Pontian Greeks. There is a tendency in the press to categorise immigrants in relation to their nationality; instead of being referred to as individuals or with regard to their biological or social characteristics (such as their sex, age or occupation), immigrants are tagged as 'foreigners', 'Albanians', 'Poles', and so on.

The nationality of each immigrant is linked to personality features – indications of a presumed *national character* – which are deemed to condition her/his ability to survive in, and integrate into, Greek society. A supposed inclination to criminality, for instance, is viewed as a typical characteristic of a specific national group. For example:

Albanian fugitives are deemed to be the most dangerous and cruel. Since they can easily commit murder. Romanians, Poles and Yugoslavs are deemed to be experts in break-ins and thefts. The other foreigners who live in our country have had little to do with the police since they strive for a better future through their daily work.

(KK 14)<sup>4</sup>

Social problems arising from immigration are thus attributed to ethnicity, and immigrants are consequently deindividualised as their main feature becomes their national origin.<sup>5</sup>

Attention is also drawn to *cultural difference*. According to the articles analysed, immigrants' cultures are often obstacles to their adaptation to Greek reality:

They came to Greece hungry and deprived of everything. They felt what freedom means ... Now they have found freedom and this has harmed them.

(KE 8)

The differentiation between Greeks and immigrants at the cultural level is based on a distinction between democratic, capitalist West and ex-communist, authoritarian East. Even though Greek national identity generally emphasises the difference between spontaneous, Mediterranean Greeks in contrast to the rational western Europeans of the north, Greece suddenly becomes 'the West' so that its superiority is accentuated when the outgroup comprises immigrants. The boundaries between the ingroup and the Others are clearly shifting, depending upon who is the Significant Other currently being contrasted to the nation.

Cultural differences are also attributed to the immigrants' lack of education (KK 16); they are considered ill prepared to deal with the Greek lifestyle and job market. This argument implies, on the one hand, that Greeks are better educated than Them and, on the other hand, that immigrants' problems do not derive from discriminatory behaviour of the host society (rather, 'it is their fault'). It is a common media strategy to offer a simplistic account of a complex social issue, thus attributing the blame to a specific individual or group, and

such a strategy can be particularly effective if it provides a flattering image of the ingroup.

Even though political culture is not a core element of Greek identity, *civic traditions* are taken up in the press discourse as a feature that differentiates Greeks from immigrants (see also Table 6.1). Differences between the Greek political system and those of immigrants' countries of origin are pointed out. With regard to Pontian Greeks in particular, such differences are emphasised:

Because they have learnt to receive all sorts of welfare provisions from the state, in Greece they have great difficulty taking care of themselves.

(KK 17)

However, references to the Greek legal and political systems are related to claims for the protection of immigrants' human rights, and the principle of solidarity towards the weakest members of society as a feature of Greek civic culture is emphasised (KK 16; *Vema* 12).

The *territorial dimension* of the nation is not a common feature in the press discourse, although the fact that immigrants illegally cross the national borders (AK 13) – literally, they 'invade' Greece and 'attack' border regions (KE 25) – is pointed out. The entrance of illegal immigrants into the national territory challenges the sovereignty of the nation and its actual control of its borders. Attention thus is drawn by the press to immigration as a 'threat' for the ingroup.

Religion and language are rarely used as features that differentiate between the domestic population and immigrants. The issue of language is considered from a practical viewpoint: learning Greek is an important and necessary step for the immigrant if s/he wants to survive in Greek society. Such a view implies that immigrants should assimilate culturally and linguistically, and it is worth noting that such a possibility is not excluded on ethnic grounds.

Despite the close link between Orthodoxy and Greekness, immigrants are not distinguished in terms of their religious faith. This is probably due to the fact that most of the immigrants are Christians, even if they are not Orthodox. In any event, undocumented immigrants are not able to practise their religions publicly and, therefore, their different faiths are not socially visible.

An assimilationist viewpoint with regard to religion and language conforms with the importance assigned to these two features of Greekness: the Greek nation was formed of the Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox populations inhabiting the regions of the Ottoman Empire (Kitromilides 1990: 30). The populations satisfying these two criteria were recognised as Greeks by ethnic origin and culture. The fact that these two dimensions are downplayed in the immigration discourse indicates that they are so deeply rooted in the national consciousness that they are not perceived to be threatened by the 'invasion' of foreigners and that, through religious and linguistic assimilation, immigrants can be culturally 'Hellenised'.

In conclusion, two sets of elements have been identified as important dimensions of differentiation between Greeks and immigrants in the press

discourse. First, ethnic origin and the supposedly related national character: immigrants are primarily Albanians, Poles, Romanians, Filipinos and so on, and as such they are different from the Greek ingroup. Their ethnicity is related to a set of personality features that supposedly condition their behaviour. Thus, ethnic descent is considered to be an insurmountable barrier that separates Us from Them; They are different, by definition, and should therefore remain 'outside'. Second, the cultural differences between Greeks and immigrants (where culture is understood in a wider sense) encompassing popular customs and cultural traditions, and also civic culture and the legal-political system of the host country, are emphasised. Cultural and civic elements are here intertwined. Discrimination against foreigners is explicit and quite pronounced at this level: cultural difference is judged negatively. However, it is not excluded that the newcomers could be accepted by the host society if they assimilate.

The general conclusion drawn from the analysis of this small sample of Greek press coverage is that, confronted with immigrants as the Others within the national territory, the ethnic character of Greek national identity is reinforced. Immigrant acceptance and integration is not desirable because it would endanger the idealised 'authenticity' and 'purity' of the nation. However, the possibility of immigrants assimilating is not a priori excluded, although cultural and linguistic diversity are pointed out as problems.

### **The Italian case study**

Civic values, ethnicity, territory and culture are the dimensions most frequently used in the Italian press discourse to distinguish and differentiate between Italians and immigrants (see Table 6.1). Civic values and ethnic origin appear to be equally important in terms of frequency of references, each accounting for over a quarter of the press coverage. In other words, despite the fact that a belief in a common genealogical origin is not part of Italian identity, the press commonly uses ethnicity to distinguish between Us and Them. In line with my analysis of the main features of Italian identity (see Chapter 5), territory and culture account for a large share of the coverage. National character, in contrast (which, according to my analysis of Italian identity, plays an important part in defining Italianness), is almost completely ignored by the press.

A closer look shows that references to Italian *civic traditions* relate to contrasting opinions about immigration. On the one hand, liberal and democratic ideas are put forward to support the country's closure towards immigrants. It is asserted that racism is an inevitable feature of the Italian political culture because 'the ideal of freedom prevails over the principle of equality' in Italy (*ESP* 1). On the other hand, and in conformity with the civic conception of the Italian nation, the press sustains that Italians and immigrants are only distinguished by their relationship to the law. Immigrants can therefore be accepted as members of the political community if they conform to the law and respect the social order.

The issue of immigration brings to the fore the inherent tension that

Table 6.1 National identity dimensions in the press discourse

	References (%)					
	Greece		Italy		Spain	
Ethnicity	13	(38.2)	28	(26.2)	27*	(29.3)
Civic values	4	(11.8)	27	(25.2)	27	(29.3)
National character	5	(14.7)	6	(5.6)	1	(1.1)
Religion	1	(2.9)	4	(3.7)	11	(12.0)
Language	2	(5.9)	1	(0.9)	0	(0.0)
Culture	6	(17.7)	19	(17.8)	7	(7.6)
Territory	3	(8.8)	22	(20.6)	19	(20.7)
Total	34	(100.0)	107	(100.0)	92	(100.0)
Total of articles	17		44		43	

Source: author's elaboration of raw data.

Note

\*Of these, in twenty-two articles (23.9 per cent) ethnic or national origin was linked to race using the term '*raza*' in relation to being black, Arab or Gypsy. Only once was the term related to South Americans.

characterises Italian identity: the tension between the principle of solidarity (inspired by the humanist and Catholic traditions) and the concepts of law and order (related to the idea of national sovereignty). Italy is portrayed to be striving for a national civic culture that provides a legal and political framework guaranteeing respect for the individual and freedom within diversity. This is linked to the issue of immigration, and also to the question of regional diversity and the recent major crisis of the country's legal and political system known as *Tangentopoli* and the related *Mani Pulite* judicial investigations.

Even though Italian identity is not based on a belief in a common genealogical descent, references to the national cultural heritage sometimes assume an ethnic overtone. The press tends to emphasise the different *ethnic origins* of immigrants, who are identified as 'foreigners', 'North Africans' or 'Albanians', and hence distinguished from 'Us', 'Italians', 'Europeans'. There is also a tendency to create ethnic stereotypes for immigrants of different origin. Thus, an immigrant from Albania is by definition 'a criminal' and, for a woman, being Nigerian is synonymous with being a prostitute. As the then Minister of Immigration Margherita Boniver argued:

After the incidents at Bari ... people have discovered that Albanians are violent, incorrigible, corrupted by their former authoritarian regime, unsuitable for labour. In effect, it was just xenophobia: the ethnic stereotype was therefore activated. Often, racial intolerance is not manifested explicitly; racism is inhibited because it is morally wrong. It thus has to be justified on different grounds and this is often called 'additional racism'. Albanians have therefore been rejected as criminals.

(ESP 6)



Paradoxically, the ethnic conception of the Italian nation also has a positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants. Cultural traditions such as humanism and solidarity are conceived to be part and parcel of Italianness: they constitute a *genealogical* feature of the nation. Italians are *different*, different from the immigrants because their cultures are alien but also different from northern Europeans or Americans because Italians are ‘good people’.

Ethnic stereotypes often take the form of a *national character* that comprises a set of personality features that supposedly characterise the members of a national group and influence their behaviour (Duijker and Frijda 1960). Even though national identity in Italy is based mainly on civic and territorial elements rather than myths about a common descent, there is a national mythology about the typical Italian and her/his behaviour. According to the press discourse, Italians are clever, good and sweet, but also cunning, inconsiderate and slovenly (*ESP* 1, 7; *PAN* 18). The reproduction of this national character in the press is important because it provides a sociocognitive model that is a specific way of thinking about Us and Others. If Italians think of and speak about themselves with reference to a national stereotype, they are clearly likely to classify immigrants with regard to specific sets of personality features that supposedly characterise Their nations of origin.

Such an ethnobiological view suggests that national character conditions the behaviour of people. Immigrants are thus deindividualised and differences between Them and the ingroup are exaggerated. Patterns of behaviour stemming from different cultural backgrounds and lifestyles are attributed to ethnobiological factors. Because the national character is supposedly inherent in an individual’s genetic code, an immigrant’s features are not subject to change. This view provides the necessary background for ethnic prejudice and racism to emerge.

The particular conception of the Italian national character confirms the uniqueness of the nation and its superiority with reference to other peoples and, at the same time, it emphasises tolerance. The positive self-representation of Italians is nonetheless challenged by the continuing migration influx:

... we Italians, we are good, we are ‘humane’. Not like the others: we have the mandolin within ourselves, the good pasta that functions as a pillow, we are gracious, we are clever, we are cunning but we do not suffer from the evil of the beasts. Racists? Us? Are we joking? We are not like Americans in Alabama, nor like Germans and certainly not like the South Africans of Pretoria. *We are different, we are Italians*. And then the surprise: ‘Disgusting nigger, we will kill you’. The beatings, the attempts to lynch people, the aggressions ... And then, another surprise, the lay people, our brave people all tortellini and mandolins, what do they do? They applaud. ... So, where have the ‘Italian good people’ gone? Where is this genetic difference? Weren’t we always different from everybody else?

(*PAN* 18, emphasis added)

The transformation of Italy into a host country clearly requires a redefinition of the national identity. The humanist tradition, which used to dominate the collective self-representation, is currently put into question. Italianness is reconsidered under the light of new social and economic conditions. Italians used to be emigrants themselves; they suffered from nostalgia in foreign countries where they were often ill-treated and discriminated against. Today Italy suddenly finds itself on the other side of the equation: it is one of the most industrialised countries in the world and, since the late 1980s, a country of immigration. The previous experience of Italians abroad, even though still recent (emigration from Italy continued until the 1950s), does not seem to favour an attitude of openness towards immigrants. On the contrary, there is a defensive reaction towards Them, which often translates into active discrimination. This type of behaviour is supported by an ethnic-cultural conception of the nation that raises an insurmountable boundary between the native population and immigrants.

Identification with the national *territory*, which is an important element of Italian identity, is reproduced by the press discourse at two levels.

First, attention is drawn to the permeability of the national borders (*PAN* 19, 21, 25); immigrants are represented as 'invaders' (*PAN* 16). Even though it is recognised that an increasing flow of migration is a major social phenomenon that is not confined to Italy (*ESP* 7, 8), it is emphasised that 'Italy will not be the door to Europe' for the immigrants (*ESP* 39). Thus, Us-Italians-Europeans are distinguished from Them-*extracomunitari*, who should remain 'in their countries' (*PAN* 13).

Second, Italians' identification with their territory is expressed in the idea that immigration 'has put us in a defensive situation within our own homes' (*PAN* 24). This feeling is particularly emphasised in urban areas, where immigrants tend to concentrate and where their poverty and difference is more visible than ever. The perception of immigrants as 'invaders of our own territory' is eloquently expressed in the statement of the Mayor of a small town in the south-eastern region of Apulia, near the city of Brindisi:

Either Albanians will be transferred to other regions before the twentieth of June or we will organise a public rally. After that date no one will be able to guarantee the safety of the Albanians established in my city.  
(*ESP* 9)

Fears are also expressed in the press that immigrants will change the 'character of Italian cities' if they become established in central areas (*PAN* 15, 28; *ESP* 43). Territory is thereby linked with culture, and Italianness is seen as intrinsically related to space. The presence of Others within the national territory upsets the relationship between the nation and its homeland.

One of the issues often raised by the press is the extent to which immigrants can be integrated into Italian society. It is asserted that such integration is impossible because the *cultural gap* between Us and Them is too large. It is

feared that acceptance of immigrants might threaten the authenticity of Italy, rather than leading to Their assimilation into the Italian culture and lifestyle. In other words, it is argued that an assimilationist policy would require the transformation of the Italian society into an American-style melting pot. Such a model is seen by the press as alien to the Italian tradition and the wish is expressed that different peoples and different cultures remain separate:

... [different] cultures should preserve their relative impermeability and learn to live separately with respect for one another and willingness for dialogue.

(ESP 2)

The internal diversity that characterises Italian culture does not seem to provide a model for the acceptance of differences that come from outside the nation. On the contrary, keeping the Other outside the national community is deemed to serve best the interests of pluralism because it helps to maintain diversity. The Italian tradition of hospitality does not allow for 'closing the door' to immigrants in need. But:

... solidarity with neither limits nor rules is not solidarity.

(ESP 36)

Some articles argue that it is necessary to reconsider the humanist tradition and to put a limit on it. Respect for cultural diversity is a 'good thing' but it might lead to racial discrimination 'if pushed beyond the limits'. There are frequent references to the cultures of immigrants as a means by which to emphasise potential conflict between Their traditions and Ours. For instance, it is suggested that immorality is an intrinsic feature of some foreign cultures. Thus, prostitution is linked with the Albanian or Nigerian culture as a whole, rather than being attributed to specific individuals. The conception of the Italian nation as a cultural community has an exclusionary character; it is not open to foreigners because contact with foreign cultures might endanger the authenticity of national traditions.

In conclusion, the Italian press discourse appears ambivalent. Suspicion and aversion towards cultural difference contrast with solidarity towards immigrants and their possible acceptance as part of the host society, provided they abide by the national laws and culture. Although Italians are viewed as a good-natured people, 'all tortellini and mandolins', who favour hospitality and openness towards foreigners, this ethnobiological conception of national difference provides fertile ground for xenophobic and racist views. In reality, the belief that Italians are 'good people' is as much a stereotype as the derogative generalisations about immigrants. The fear of 'being invaded' territorially and culturally is quite pronounced, and neither internal diversity nor Italy's emigrant traditions seem to help foster an attitude of tolerance and openness.

## The Spanish case study

The quantitative analysis of the Spanish data shows that the discourse is characterised by a strong prevalence of the ethnic and civic dimensions which are equally frequently mentioned by the press (see Table 6.1). Attention is also paid to the territorial aspects of the nation and, to a lesser extent, to religion.

Four features characterise the Spanish press discourse on immigration: first, a dialogical structure of the articles that contrasts racially tainted descriptions with civic values arguments; second, a strong concern about the territorial boundaries of the nation and their permeability; third, the different religion (Islam) of a large number of immigrants; and, fourth, the almost total absence of any reference to language, culture or national character.

*Language* is totally neglected by the press while *culture* and *national character* are very rarely mentioned (see Table 6.1). These elements conform with Spanish national identity and its acceptance of peripheral nationalisms – with different national languages and cultures – within a unitary state. Indeed, this finding confirms the democratic and pluralist conception of Spain that prevails in the post-Franco period. The linguistic and cultural differences of immigrants are not issues because there is no unitary language or culture to be contrasted with or whose ‘purity’ and ‘unity’ can be threatened. The almost absolute absence of comment about the national character of either Spaniards or immigrants shows that the idea has been abandoned that a set of personality features characterises all Spaniards<sup>6</sup> and is part of Spanish identity. Such a view no longer provides an interpretative lens through which to understand foreigners and classify them in relation to the ingroup.

The religious affiliation of immigrants residing in Spain is often noted in the press. This might be seen as a natural consequence of the fact that many immigrants do follow a different religion to the majority of Spaniards; many immigrants are Muslim, whereas Spaniards are traditionally Catholic. This distinction also reflects the historical relationship between Spaniards and ‘*los moros*’, the ‘*moros*’ being identified as not contemporary Moroccans but, more generally, the Muslims who threatened Spain’s territorial and cultural integrity in the past. The view that Spain is a nation forged by its struggle against the Arabs was an ideological cornerstone of the Franco regime (Richards 1996: 152–3). Nonetheless, even though the religion of Moroccan immigrants is emphasised in the press (*EP* 20), and religion is a dimension by which to distinguish immigrants from Spaniards (*EP* 23), religious faith accounts for only 12 per cent of the immigration-related coverage.

With regard to the *territorial dimension*, the press is concerned with the issue of the illegal entry of immigrants into the country: ‘the Maghreb’s exodus versus Spain has just started’ (*EP* 31). More particularly, the main themes debated are the role of Ceuta<sup>7</sup> as the ‘*paso*’ for entry to the Iberian peninsula, and the role of Spain as a ‘door’ to Europe. A number of issues are intertwined here.

There is increasing pressure from the European Union impelling Spain to improve controls of its southern coast and Ceuta–Moroccan border:

... the particular responsibility that Spain has assumed as guardian of one of the largest sections of Europe's external frontiers.

(EP 21)

and

Today it is not Spain that prohibits the entry of the immigrant. It is Europe that says 'no' before they pass through the door.

(C16 9)

Effective control of the national borders is thus thought to confirm Spain's position in the modern united Europe, although the Eurocentrism of Spanish identity dates back to the nineteenth century (Junco Alvarez 1996: 90–1).

The issue of Ceuta is particularly sensitive. The monitoring and control of the Spanish–Moroccan border is highly problematic and, eventually, rests completely on police measures. Ceuta's marginal geographical and sociopolitical position within Spain gives rise to complaints on the part of its inhabitants, who feel that their government treats them unfavourably (C16 13). Thus, the mayor of Ceuta argues:

If these immigrants can wander around Ceuta freely, then they should equally have the possibility to do so in the rest of the national territory.

(C16 14)

In this sense, territoriality is clearly related to identity. The inhabitants of Ceuta seek to clarify the boundaries of the ingroup in both symbolic and geographical terms: Ceuta belongs to Spain and they are Spanish citizens, while immigrants are not and have no right to be in the territory of Ceuta. If they do enter Ceuta, then they should be accepted anywhere in Spain.

The link between territory and identity is also manifest in statements such as the following:

... the thousands of African immigrants who are in Spain and who 'have *occupied* the centre of the big cities.

(TRI 18, emphasis in the original)

However, this concern, often expressed by skinhead racist groups, is judged negatively as 'an exaggerated feeling of territoriality' (EP 25, 26).

Generally speaking, the territorial dimension of the Spanish nation is related mainly to Spain's definition as a European country and, to a lesser extent, to the local or urban environment and its possible alteration by the immigrants. This finding confirms the strong Eurocentric tendency of contemporary democratic Spain.

The most important characteristic of the Spanish press discourse is the intertwining of a *civic values* discourse (based on solidarity and human rights) with a descriptive discourse (illustrating the ‘problems’ faced by the domestic population and describing the racist or xenophobic behaviour of Spaniards). Many articles follow this structure (C16 3, 9; EP, 32, 37, 40, 42). A descriptive account of the situation introduces hard facts – such as events related to immigration, including the 200,000 illegal immigrants residing in Spain, Spanish police being bribed to issue false passports and xenophobic incidents – that are tinted by *ethnic-racial distinctions*. In these accounts, attention is not paid to the specific national origin of the immigrant, but instead to her/his ‘*raza*’ (race). Race here has a double meaning: it might refer to skin complexion, namely black<sup>8</sup> Africans contrasted to ‘white’ Spaniards (C16 2, 13), or it might be defined as an ethnocultural category. The latter includes Arabs (C16 3, 4), ‘*los mohameds*’ (EP 19) and ‘Gypsies’; both a phenotypic element (dark skin and hair, for instance) and a specific culture and religion are alluded to. The term ‘*raza*’ is used in both ways to signify the difference between these communities and the ingroup (C16 10). An Algerian immigrant’s comment, reported in *El País* (20), is eloquent: ‘We are the other Gypsies’.

The intertwining of race with ethnic or national origin in the Spanish press discourse on immigration suggests that prejudice against immigrants is hidden behind an apparently egalitarian discourse. Attention should be paid to the fact that references to race are predominantly related to three specific communities: black people, Arabs and the Roma population. The prejudiced attitudes related to these three outgroups might differ because of each group’s historical relations with Spain.<sup>9</sup> However, in all three cases, there is a common conception of race as a phenotypic feature, inextricably linked with biological and cultural characteristics.

These descriptive, implicitly discriminatory, accounts are complemented by an overtly humanitarian discourse based on human rights and solidarity with the poor (EP 19; C16 7, 15, 16). Particular attention is paid to the desperate situation in which immigrants sometimes find themselves (EP 21; C16 9, 10):

... the right to travel through our homeland the earth to seek for resources, when there is war or hunger in our mini-territory. The Europeans and the Spaniards have known how to do this very well in all their history, by means of conquering, colonising and emigrating outside their [country’s] borders.

(C16 12)

The dialogical structure of a number of articles, which includes both a civic value normative discourse and a descriptive account of the situation, reveals the ambivalence that characterises the Spanish press discourse. The inherent contradictions involved in it are particularly obvious in cases such as that cited below, which refers to the possible stay and integration of a number of black immigrants in a small town near Madrid:

The former [local authorities] because they fear changes in their life 'we are not racists, it is because the village does not satisfy the necessary conditions to host eighty niggers', says [name of the person], mayor of Manjirón, and the latter [immigrants] because they prefer to stay close to Madrid: 'This is a way to create a ghetto and prevent the social integration of these people who, additionally, would be guarded by policemen' assures [name of the person, founder and president of AMPAE, an association assisting African immigrants in Spain] who went to visit the installations in Manjirón.

(TRI 18)

Another important feature of the Spanish press discourse, which differentiates it from the Italian and Greek ones, is the perception of a link between the country's emigration past and its current experience as an immigration host<sup>10</sup> (EP 22, 33; C16 8, 9, 11). The emigration history of Spain is part of its identity, and it reflects the cultural and national diversity that characterises this identity. The following abstract from a letter to the editor published in *El País* on 17 June 1990 is enlightening because it summarises some crucial aspects of Spanish identity:

*I, as a Spaniard and especially as a Canarian, feel that our history is closely linked to the phenomenon of emigration ... Spain, land of emigrants, does not understand today the hopes and illusions of those thousands of workers coming in their majority from the Maghreb and South America, who arrive in our lands with the same anxieties for a better future that have made us move ... A foreigners' law that denies the right of the man to earn his life with his work and that, on the other hand, forgets the sociocultural links that unites us with these peoples, who have contributed in one way or another to the mosaic of races and cultures that configures the history of Spain.*

(EP 22, emphasis added)

In other words, immigrants make a double contribution to the Spanish nation. The emigrant past and the consequent cultural and ethnic exchange between Spain and the 'then host'/'now sending' countries (often ex-colonies of the Spanish empire) are seen as part and parcel of contemporary Spanish identity. Spanish citizens share a historical past and common cultural traditions with a large proportion of the newcomers. This plurality of cultural and historical links strengthens the multinational character of Spain, as emphasised in the first sentence of the letter reproduced above. The internal diversity of Spain and the official recognition of a plurality of nations coexisting in the same country clearly facilitate the acceptance of other cultures and the recognition of their contribution to Spanish identity.

### A comparative view

The quantitative analysis of the data concerning the press discourse in Greece, Italy and Spain suggests some patterns for comparison between them (see Table 6.1). The Spanish and Italian discourses share some common features: the civic and the ethnic dimension are almost equally represented in the articles in both cases, and account for over half of all items coded. Moreover, the territorial dimension of nationality is equally important in these two countries and accounts for approximately one-fifth of the overall coverage. In quantitative terms, Greece shares only one common characteristic with Italy, namely the attention paid to cultural difference or similarity; this dimension is neglected in the Spanish discourse.

A number of national specificities should be noted, in particular the attention paid to religion in the Spanish discourse (12 per cent of all instances coded) and the role of the national character in the Greek press discourse (14.7 per cent). Another particularity of Greece is the predominance of ethnic descent as a feature for distinguishing between Us and immigrants: this dimension accounts for approximately 40 per cent of all references to immigration in the Greek press discourse. There is only one common feature shared by all three countries: the marginal attention paid to language (which in the cases of Italy and Spain are hardly ever mentioned, and in Greece accounts for just over 5 per cent of the coverage).

The exact nature and content of these similarities and differences becomes clearer through a qualitative analysis of the data. It is worth noting that the findings confirm the main hypothesis of this book, namely that the presence of immigrants leads to a more exclusionary definition of the nation and tends to raise a symbolic boundary between the domestic population and immigrants.

The results show that language is rarely used as a dimension for the exclusion of immigrants from any of the three countries. Religion, by contrast, plays a relatively important part in the Spanish discourse but is almost completely ignored by the Italian and Greek press. This finding conforms with Spanish identity and the country's historical experience of conflict with the Arabs.

Ethnic origin plays an important part in all three countries, with the highest rate of reference being registered in Greece (38.2 per cent). It is the main dimension by which to categorise immigrants and differentiate them from the ingroup. This is not surprising in Greece, given the dominant role of ethnicity in the definition of Greekness. In the case of Italy, however, where ethnicity plays only a minor role in defining the concept of Italianness, the massive presence of immigrants seems to activate a process of *ethnisation* of the national identity. The nationality of the immigrant becomes his/her main social characteristic and the barrier of 'blood and belonging' is raised to distinguish between Us and Them.

A similar mechanism is activated in Spain, but the distinction between Spaniards and immigrants is racially tainted. The important element is not which country they come from, as in Greece and Italy, but their '*raza*' (their



Arab or Gypsy origin, or their black skin). This finding is in stark contrast to the civic and plural character of contemporary Spanish identity but offers a suitable line for distinguishing between the peoples of Spain (including Catalans, Basques, Galicians and the other peripheral nations) and Others (immigrants). Quite interestingly, South Americans are the only non-European immigrants who are spared racial connotations, probably because they share a common ethnic origin and culture with Spaniards.

In Greece, attention is drawn to the idiosyncratic features that supposedly characterise immigrants according to their nationalities. This finding accords with the importance attached to ethnicity in Greece, and the transcendental nature attributed to Greekness. The national character plays an important part in the Italian discourse too, even though its appearance in the data is rather scant (just over 5 per cent). The presumed Italian national character is used to support an argument that immigrants are intrinsically different from Italians and therefore cannot be accepted as members of Italian society. Nonetheless, the representation of Italians as 'good people', 'humane' and 'brave' leads to a critical debate that reveals the development of racist and intolerant attitudes among Italians, contrary to the positive self-stereotype. The national character dimension holds a marginal position in the discourse in Spain, thus confirming the rejection of the ethnobiological view of Spanishness imposed by the Franco regime in the past.

In Italy and Spain, the ethnic dimension is counterbalanced by an equally large share of coverage dedicated to national civic traditions. This quantitative result is confirmed by a qualitative analysis of the text of both countries. The Italian press discourse reveals a tension between ethnic discrimination and a strong tradition of solidarity. The latter, it is argued in the press, needs to be redefined in the light of the current situation. In Spain, the humanistic discourse is even more pronounced and press reports are often organised in a dialogical structure in which the everyday reality of xenophobic or racist reactions towards immigrants is contrasted with human rights and solidarity. These findings accord with the civic nature of the Spanish and Italian national identities, in which regional – and even peripheral – national diversity is recognised as intrinsic to the national heritage.

Greece provides a contrast, with the civic values dimension accounting for a much smaller share of the coverage and being superseded by the ethnic origin factor and references to culture and the national character.

Overall, it is worth noting that civic values provide a marker for distinguishing between insiders and outsiders: immigrants are excluded because they are 'illegal', i.e. undocumented. They violate the law of the host country and threaten the sociopolitical order of the nation. Nonetheless, the press appeals to the civic consciousness of the domestic population and places emphasis on the values of solidarity and tolerance. The Italian press, in particular, suggests that immigrants might be accepted in Our society if they abide by the law: the boundary is thus permeable.

In line with the civic–territorial character of the Italian and Spanish nations,

the findings show that the territorial dimension is particularly pronounced in the press discourse of both countries. The idea that the homeland is 'invaded' by foreigners is highly emphasised in all three countries, although less often in Greece than in Spain and Italy (it accounts for 8.8 per cent of the Greek data, and over 20 per cent in Italy and Spain). References to the territory and the national borders stem in part from the role that the three countries play as 'guardians' of the southern frontier in the European context. Contrary to the findings, Greece should logically be the country most concerned with its porous borders because its geographical position between the Middle East and the EU, and its ground morphology (lengthy coasts, numerous islands and mountainous northern areas bordering Albania), makes these borders virtually impossible to control. Italy and Spain also share this type of problem because of their lengthy coasts and their vicinity to northern African countries. Nevertheless, the idea of an 'invasion' and the feeling of 'responsibility' towards the European partners is more pronounced in the Italian and Spanish discourses than in the Greek press. This shows that perceptions of the threat are conditioned by the national identity of the host country rather than by an actual 'threat'. Since Greekness is based on a belief in common descent, the illegal crossing of the national borders by undocumented immigrants is not perceived as an important threat to its 'integrity' or 'purity'. But in Spain and Italy, where the national territory is considered to be an important feature that binds together communities that differ in culture, language and ethnicity, the 'intruders' are perceived to threaten the nation's well-being.

Cultural differences are emphasised in both the Italian and the Greek press. It is suggested that these elements prevent immigrants from integrating into the host society in both countries. The incompatibility between the culture of the host society and the different cultures of the various immigrant communities are particularly emphasised in the Italian press. In Spain, culture plays only a marginal role as a means of distinguishing between Us and Them. This finding might be related to the internal cultural diversity that characterises Spain; contemporary Spain is multicultural and multinational. The cultural diversity of immigrants is less visible in such a plural context.

In conclusion, I would like to underline the results obtained in this study that are of special interest. First, attention should be paid to the tendency to ethnicise the idea of the nation in Italy (by accentuating the importance of cultural difference and the national character) and to racialise<sup>11</sup> ethnic origin in Spain (through the emphasis on racial attributes common among blacks or Arabs) as strategies of social exclusion of immigrants. This finding reveals how new features or dimensions can be introduced to national identity, so as to reinforce the boundary between the host society and the Other. A similar tendency is identified in the case of Greece too, where emphasis is placed on the civic culture of immigrants; it is portrayed as being so different from that of Greece that it supposedly prevents immigrants from adapting to their new environment. Civic traditions in fact play a marginal role in the conception of the Greek nation and their importance is therefore overemphasised in the press discourse on immigration.

Second, the particular role of the national character as a stereotype, not only for the Other but also for the Self, shows that national identity is constructed in interaction and is constantly reproduced. In this way it is like any other type of social identity (Jenkins 1996). The analysis has shown that both civic and ethnic features can be used to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup; the civic or ethnic character of the nation does not condition the exclusionary reaction to the presence of foreigners within the host society. The immigrant is seen as an Other who must remain outside the national community. Nonetheless, a prevalence of civic values in the conception of the nation leaves more room for acceptance and integration of the immigrant than does an ethnic view of nationality.

It is finally worth noting that, contrary to the fact that religion and language are generally considered to be fundamental characteristics of a people, they are not used by the press to distinguish between the Us and the immigrant Other (the attention of the Spanish press to the religious factor provides an exception, as discussed earlier). Further empirical research is required to explain this finding, and more light will be cast on it by the analysis of the political discourse on immigration undertaken in the following chapter.

## Appendix 6.1 Articles included in the database

### *Greece*

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Record number</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Title</i>
<i>KE</i>	6	13/06/93	Εγκληματικότητα μεταναστών: Οι vonοί της Αλβανικής μαφίας (Immigrant criminality: the godfathers of the Albanian mafia)
	7	13/06/93	Αλβανοί μετανάστες: Ο νέος εσωτερικός εχθρός (Albanian immigrants: the new internal enemy)
	8	13/06/93	Γκούλαγκ (Goulag)
	9	13/06/93	Βοήθεια οι Έλληνες (Help! The Greeks)
	10	13/06/93	Αλβανοί και Αρβανίτες (Albanians and <i>Arvanites</i> )
	22	13/06/93	Δημοκρατικόν (Democratic)
	23	13/06/93	Λεπτομέρεια (A detail)
	24	13/06/93	Ντελόρ ΙΙ (Delors II)
	25	13/06/93	Πλειοδοσία (The highest bid)
	26	13/06/93	Φιλοξενία (Hospitality)
	27	13/06/93	Χοτζάδες ( <i>Hotzades</i> )
<i>Vema</i>	12	20/02/94	Ανθείη «μαύρη αγορά» εργασίας και η παραοικονομία με αλλοδαπούς (The 'black market' of labour and the informal economy flourish with immigrants)
<i>AK</i>	13	27/10/91	Δεξαμενή αίματος οι λαθρομετανάστες (Clandestine immigrants: a pool of blood)
<i>KK</i>	14	25/10/92	Όνειρο ή εφιάλτης η «γή της επαγγελίας» (The 'promised land' a dream or a nightmare)

15	25/10/92	Θα φύγουμε οπωσδήποτε (We shall certainly leave)
16	25/10/92	Δουλεύουν παράνομα με μισό μεροκάματο (They work illegally for half the pay)
17	25/10/92	Εξελληνίζονται οι Πόντιοι (Pontians are hellenised)

Total: 17 articles\*

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Note

\*Reference numbers of the Greek data are not always sequential because the initial database included more newspapers than the four ultimately selected.

*Italy*

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<i>Journal</i>	<i>Record number</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Title</i>	
<i>ESP</i>	1	07/10/90	Il razzista mascherato (The undercover racist)	
	2	07/10/90	L'integrazione impossibile (The impossible integration)	
	3	07/10/90	Nero per sempre (Black for ever)	
	4	18/02/90	Il nero in una stanza (The black in a room)	
	5	18/02/90	La Malfa: 'Dietro l'angolo c'è LePen' (LaMalfa: 'Behind the corner is LePen')	
	6	13/10/91	L'immigrato che ci meritiamo (The immigrant that we deserve)	
	7	13/10/91	Dico che è difesa dell'identità (I say this is defence of our identity)	
	8	23/06/91	A ciascuno il suo profugo (To each his refugee)	
	9	23/06/91	Albanese non ti amo (Albanian, I do not love you)	
	30	29/10/95	Un inferno da trentamila lire (A hell for 30,000 Italian lire)	
	31	29/10/95	Razzista no, giustiziere si (Not racist, just doing justice)	
	32	29/10/95	Bianchi, neri e Manconi (Whites, blacks and Manconi)	
	33	29/10/95	Clandestini a casa (Clandestines go home)	
	34	22/10/95	Lasciate fare a SOS razzismo (Let SOS racism deal with it)	
	35	22/10/95	Clandestino a palazzo Chigi (Clandestine [immigrant] at Palazzo Chigi)	
	36	15/10/95	Solidarietà una parola ('Solidarity' is just a word)	
	37	15/10/95	Quei dieci luoghi comuni (These ten stereotypes)	
	38	15/10/95	L'africano ci da una mano (The African lends us a hand)	
	39	15/10/95	Non facciamo regali alla destra (Let's not give presents to the right-wing)	
	40	15/10/95	Circolate, in nome di La Pira (Be on the move, in the name of La Pira)	
	41	15/10/95	Costanzo, la gaffe di giovedì sera (Costanzo, the mistake of Thursday night)	
	42	15/10/95	Odiatissimi Rom (The much hated Roma)	
	43	01/10/95	San Salvario, Africa	
	44	01/10/95	Due terzi dicono alt (Two-thirds say 'Stop')	
	<i>PAN</i>	10	30/06/91	Oggi albanesi, poi... (Today Albanians, then...)
		11	16/02/92	E' debole, sia incatenato (He is weak, put him in chains)
		12	09/02/92	Razza violenta (Violent race)
		13	09/02/92	Allarme, siamo europei (In arms, we are Europeans)
		14	18/10/92	Danubio rosa (Pink Danube)
		15	13/06/93	Far West Milano (Far West Milan)

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16	13/06/93	Razze dannate (Damned races)
17	14/10/94	Da Tirana per l'amore (From Tirana for love)
18	18/06/94	Da dove viene lo skin? (Where do skinheads come from?)
19	19/10/95	Se passa il clandestino... (If the clandestine [immigrant] gets through...)
20	19/10/95	Il calvario del legalitario (The torture of those who abide by the law)
21	19/10/95	Agenzia piazza Duomo (Cathedral Square agency)
22	19/10/95	Sebben che siam straniere paura non abbiamo (Even if we are foreigners, we are not afraid)
23	19/10/95	Con unghie e cacca (With nails and shit)
24	19/10/95	Fuori legge e contro la legge (Outside the law and against the law)
25	12/10/95	Immigrati. Quanti sono davvero e come fanno a entrare (Immigrants. How many are they really and how they get in)
26	12/10/95	Uomini delle grotte (Men of the caves)
27	12/10/95	Per favore, non fate come in Francia (Please, do not do as in France)
28	26/10/95	Noi, ragazzi dello zoo di Torino (We, young boys of the zoo of Turin)
29	26/10/95	Caporale eritreo (Eritrean commander)

Total: 44 articles

*Spain*

<i>Journal</i>	<i>Record number</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Title</i>
C16	1	21/02/94	Rapados contra el racismo (Skinheads against racism)
	2	01/10/90	Violento odio racial de los cabezas rapadas (The violent racial hate of skinheads)
	3	18/02/91	España también es racista (Spain is racist too)
	4	18/02/91	La guerra crispera a los árabes y dispara el racismo en Europa (The war upsets the Arabs and fires racism in Europe)
	5	24/06/91	A Fátima no le dejaron cruzar el Estrecho (They did not let Fatima cross the strait)
	6	28/10/91	'Vamos a acabar con la escoria social' ('We shall finish with social decay')
	7	20/06/94	Agazapados (Caught)
	8	20/06/91	Leña al Mono (Beat the monkey)
	9	30/10/95	Prohibido el paso (The passage is prohibited)
	10	30/10/95	Ayudar para que no vengan (To help so that they do not come)
	11	30/10/95	Extranjeros residentes en España (Foreigners living in Spain)
	12	30/10/95	Crece el racismo (Racism is rising)
	13	30/10/95	La batalla de Ceuta (The battle of Ceuta)
	14	30/10/95	'Belloch es irresponsable' ('Belloch is irresponsible')
	15	30/10/95	Paraíso entre rejas (Paradise behind bars)
	16	30/10/95	'Vienen de un país llamado hambre' ('They come from a country called hunger')
	17	27/02/95	Violencia rapada (Skinhead violence)

<i>TRI</i>	18	08/10/90	La llegada masiva de africanos provoca brotes de racismo (The massive arrival of Africans provokes racist explosions)
<i>EP</i>	19	03/06/90	El repliegue de 'mohamed' (The retreat of 'Mohamed')
	20	03/06/90	Tres hombres sin destino (Three men without destiny)
	21	17/06/90	Asilo común europeo (Common European asylum)
	22	17/06/90	El emigrante (The emigrant)
	23	14/10/90	Ceuta, zotal en los tiempos del cólera (Ceuta, alert in times of cholera)
	24	14/10/90	Un paso menos (A passage less)
	25	10/02/91	Tribú de combate (Tribe of combat)
	26	10/02/91	Orgulloso y blanco (Proud and white)
	27	10/02/91	Tan cerca de Alà y tan lejos de Europa (So close to Allah and so far from Europe)
	28	17/02/91	Las lágrimas de Alà (The tears of Allah)
	29	02/06/91	Siete expulsiones (Seven expulsions)
	30	16/02/92	Subir al moro (To get on the Arab)
	31	23/02/92	La policía advierte a Corcuera que el éxodo magrebí acaba de empezar (Police warn Corcuera [Spanish Minister of the Interior] that the exodus of Maghrebins has just begun)
	32	21/06/92	Grupos 'ultras' amenazan por carta a una asociación de trabajadores marroquíes (Extremist groups send threatening letter to an association of Maghrebin workers)
	33	25/10/92	Color de piel (Skin colour)
	34	21/02/93	Hacer 'las Españas' (Make it to Spain)
	35	03/10/92	Los niños polizónes regresan a Marruecos (The clandestine kids return to Morocco)
	36	12/06/94	Una encuesta del CIS demuestra que los españoles más jóvenes son los menos xenófobos (A survey by CIS shows that the youngest Spaniards are the least xenophobic)
	37	12/06/94	Un colegio de 'mala fama' (A school with a bad reputation)
	38	18/06/95	Rencillas entre vecinos (Quarrels between neighbours)
	39	29/10/95	Sòlo 200 personas secundan en Ceuta una concentración contra el racismo (Only 200 people attend a public rally against racism in Ceuta)
	40	15/10/95	El alcalde amenaza con una batalla legal contra el Gobierno para sacar de Ceuta a los inmigrantes (The mayor threatens to undertake legal action against the government so as to get immigrants out of Ceuta)
	41	15/10/95	'La Guardia Civil se quedará el tiempo que haga falta' ('The Civil Guard will stay as long as is necessary')
	42	15/10/95	La puerta del odio (The door of hate)
	43	15/10/95	Las cartas de Mamà Africa (The letters of Mother Africa)

Total: 43 articles

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# 7 The political discourse

## Redefining the nation

### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

This chapter concentrates on the political discourse on immigration developed in Greece, Italy and Spain in recent years. I shall analyse the transcripts of interviews conducted with public administration employees, NGO representatives and trade unionists in Athens, Madrid and Rome between May and July 1996. The aim of the chapter is to assess the extent to which the presence of the immigrant leads to a redefinition of the identity of the host country. The interviewees were selected as a suitable target population because they offer 'privileged testimonies' of the immigration issue. Moreover, they are likely to have dealt personally with immigrants and related policy questions in their everyday work.

Having outlined in the previous chapter the identity dimensions that characterise the press discourse in each country, my aim here is to achieve a better understanding of the We–Them relationship and the emerging definitions of the ingroup and the outgroup. The findings will be analysed comparatively so as to identify common features and differences between the three countries.

### Data and methodology

The texts analysed in this study are the transcripts of twenty-six interviews conducted with public officials, NGO representatives and trade unionists in Athens, Madrid and Rome during 1996. The analysis of these interviews aims to highlight the political discourse on immigration in the three countries. It examines the opinions and attitudes of the people who have to deal with the issue on a daily basis. Their views are not representative of the nation as a whole. However, they have been selected as a suitable target population because they are often involved in public discourse on immigration and might therefore influence not only the policy agenda but also the media discourse.

My concern here is with the relational positioning realised in interviews when interviewees talk about immigrants and fellow nationals. In other words, the study examines the activities that are performed in 'interview talk' (Silverman 1993: 120–1), particularly the ways in which the interviewees seek to exclude immigrants from the host society and, at the same time, formulate a new

definition of their own national identity. The study also concentrates on the issues, values and symbols used by the interviewees when they refer to Us, Them or a combination of the two, so as to define 'nationals' and 'immigrants' as discourse categories that delineate two collectivities incompatible with one another. My ultimate objective is to analyse how ingroup superiority over the outgroup is constructed, and how images of the Other interact with definitions of the We.

The data set analysed includes nine interviews from Greece, nine from Italy and eight from Spain. In each country there were three interviews (two in the case of Spain) with administration employees, three with trade union representatives and three with representatives from NGOs in each country. The methodology used for the analysis of interview texts can be described as a qualitative discourse analysis assisted by a standard DBMS package (FOXPRO2), offering simple code-and-retrieve operations. The relatively small volume of data to be processed, and the qualitative orientation of the analysis, have been the main reasons for opting for these tools.

The coding scheme includes three identifying categories (record number, name of interviewee and organisation that s/he represents), ten issue categories<sup>2</sup> (criminality, employment, contact with immigrants, living and working conditions of immigrants, control policy, integration policy, education of immigrants, racist organisations, anti-racist associations, and immigration in general), and one text variable entitled 'Us and Them'. The interview transcripts were coded and passages referring to Us–nationals, Them–immigrants or both were identified and inserted into the text variable. These segments of text, ranging from a single sentence to a whole paragraph, were printed out and analysed qualitatively.

In this study, discourse analysis is seen as 'a general analytic approach whose precise implementation depends upon the particular theoretical issues at hand' (Reicher and Hopkins 1996: 359), rather than as a set of rules for processing data. The analysis undertaken thus concentrates on the specific issues of concern in the study. Definitions of Us and Them and evaluation of the respective groups have been pointed out. Particular attention has been paid to the use of rhetorical strategies for positive self-representation and negative Other-representation. Different types of argumentation that interfere with the relationship between the ingroup and outsiders are also identified. Finally, attention has been paid to contested issues such as the relationship between criminality and immigration, and the impact of immigrant labour on unemployment rates.

## **Findings**

The analysis of interview texts has been organised around four broad themes. Three of these correspond to the initial concerns of the study. They are respectively: (1) the definition of the Other, (2) direct or implicit attempts to put forward a specific representation of the ingroup and the Other, and also to



affirm the ingroup's superiority (Tajfel and Turner 1979), and (3) the analysis of the normative discourses inherent in interview talk. A fourth topic emerged from the data as a separate theme, namely the discussion of contested issues such as the relationship between immigration and criminality and/or unemployment.

### *Relational aspects of discourse: who is the Other?*

Defining the Other is not such a straightforward issue in any of the three countries under examination. Constructing the immigrant Other involves, first of all, demarcating the ingroup. And the nation might not always be the compact and homogeneous unit defined by theorists.

Internal diversity indeed poses a problem for Italy. The issue of immigration indicates a main cultural and administrative difference between northern and southern regions: local administrations in the north are more efficient (IT2-ADM),<sup>3</sup> but southern Italian culture is more open towards outsiders and tends to integrate them better (IT4-TU). The debate is therefore more complex than a simple confrontation between Us and Them. It involves the recognition of diversity within the ingroup and its interference with the issue of immigration.

This problem was identified in the Greek interviews. We '*i dopii*' (the people from around here) are an ethnically and culturally homogeneous category. This finding shows that socialisation into a national culture and identity has been successful in Greece, whereas regional differences remain salient in Italy. The distinction between southern and northern regions was not encountered in Spanish interviews, despite the importance of regional nationalisms within the country and the conspicuousness of regional identities. This might be related to the fact that interviews were conducted in Madrid.

In Italy, internal diversity is expressed in the form of a triangle: We (Italian people) are contrasted to Them (immigrants–foreigners) and the Italian state. The Italian state is portrayed as a second Other that fails to meet the needs of Our society and in dealing with the matter (IT6&7-NGO, IT8-NGO). This type of discourse conforms with the findings of the seminal work by Almond and Verba (1963) on civic culture in Italy. However, although such a relationship is typical of the Greek society too (Mouzelis 1995; Tsoukalas 1995), Greek citizens and their state appear to present a united front against the immigrant Other. The same unitary reaction is typical of the Spanish discourse. However, in one case, the interviewee defined her NGO and the immigrants as the ingroup and intolerant, and fellow Spanish neighbours as the outgroup (ESP1-NGO). Humanism and solidarity become the main identity dimension that distinguishes insiders from outsiders; nationality is downplayed.

Furthermore, the definition of the immigrant Other is intertwined with historical links and cultural or linguistic ties that can exist between the ingroup and specific immigrant communities. This issue is addressed in relation to colonial traditions in Italy and Spain. In Italy, the communities concerned are immigrants from Ethiopia or Eritrea, which used to be Italian colonies, and

also immigrants from Albania, a country that was under fascist occupation during the inter-war period (IT4-TU, IT8-NGO). However, there is no preferential treatment for any community and these links are not seen as claims to Italian citizenship.

In the case of Spain, the historic ties with specific countries which share the Spanish linguistic and cultural tradition is emphasised. The cultural affinity between Spaniards and Latin Americans makes the integration of the latter into the host society easier, and – according to the Spanish law – also gives them priority in residence and employment over other non-Spanish citizens (ESP3-NGO, ESP4-TU, ESP-ADM, ESP6-NGO). Some interviewees also pointed out that the Spanish people living in southern and central America still outnumber the Latin American immigrants residing in Spain (ESP1-NGO).

Another country that has historical and cultural ties with Spain is Morocco. Unlike Latin Americans, Moroccans are perceived as the Other *par excellence* for Spanish people. Prejudice against them is attributed to collective memories of past military conflict between the two countries; however, it is suggested that the reluctance of Spanish people to accept immigrants from Morocco depends more on social and cultural differences (poor, ill educated) than on nationality or history (ESP6-NGO, ESP7-TU).

The reflection on who is the Other in Spain brings about an interesting issue concerning the notion of Otherness. As many interviewees observe, Others are often found among the Spanish population: '*gitanos*' (the Roma community) and poor Spaniards ('*Españoles de realojo*') suffer more than immigrants from discrimination and isolation (ESP3-NGO, ESP4-TU). Otherness, in Spanish society, seems to be related to class and culture rather than nationality or citizenship.

In Greece, too, the issue of historic and ethnic ties with certain immigrant populations is important. The question includes, on the one hand, the *Rossopontii* or so-called 'Pontian' Greeks who form a separate category and are treated as Greeks 'returning to their homeland' and, thus, are given citizenship rights. On the other hand, there is the issue of *Vorioepiotes*, whose Greekness is contested (Triandafyllidou 1996).

Pontian Greeks come mainly from the ex-Soviet Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan. They are ethnic Greeks who either emigrated from areas of the Ottoman Empire to the ex-Soviet Union in the beginning of the twentieth century, or who left Greece in the 1930s and 1940s for political reasons. Pontian Greeks<sup>4</sup> are defined by the Greek state as members of the diaspora community who return to their homeland and are, therefore, given full citizen status and benefits aimed at facilitating their (re)integration into Greek society. *Vorioepiotes* are Albanian citizens, mainly from southern Albania, of Greek ethnic origin and Christian Orthodox religion. Only since the presidential decree no. 395/1998 have *Vorioepiotes* been officially recognised as a separate category of immigrants that should be given preferential treatment, although there were previously a number of administrative circulars distinguishing *Vorioepiotes* from other illegal immigrants, on some occasions

exempting them from the need to obtain a 'stay' permit and advising the police not to arrest them for remaining illegally on Greek territory (Triandafyllidou 1996, 1998c).

The Greekness of either group is based on a (presumed) common descent and historical ties with Greek culture and language.<sup>5</sup> However, for matters of foreign policy of the Greek state – or, as it was eloquently stated by the interviewees, for matters of 'national interest' (GR1-NGO, GR2-NGO, GR7-ADM, GR8-ADM, GR9-ADM) – Pontian Greeks are given full rights and Greek passports, while Vorioepirotos are treated as guestworkers (GR9-ADM). In other words, Vorioepirotos are 'also a bit like Greeks' (GR4-TU) but their Greekness is not recognised because it is in 'Greece's interests' (i.e. the interests of the state, which represents Greek citizens) that they remain in Albania to sustain the Greek minority there. Not one of my interviewees challenged the legitimacy of this view.

Even though the Greek state defines Rossopontii as Greek citizens, their Greekness was contested by some of the interviewees. In some cases it was acknowledged that Pontian Greeks 'are not Pontians, they are Greeks' (GR4-TU), and they are overall distinguished from aliens; in other instances they were differentiated from 'normal Greeks' (GR8-ADM) or '*dopii*', and the cultural difference between Us and Them was emphasised (GR7-ADM).

A hierarchy of Greekness is thus constructed in the political discourse, whereby priority is given to 'real Greeks', i.e. to citizens of the Greek state who are of Greek ethnicity and Orthodox religion. Pontian Greeks are, so to speak, second-class citizens. The third-class Greeks are the Vorioepirotos, whose Greekness is contested. At the bottom of the scale lie the Others, the aliens (the immigrants who cannot claim Greek origins). Constructing the Other therefore involves shifting the boundaries of the ingroup and, more importantly, creating multiple levels of inclusion–exclusion.

It is worth noting that Spanish interviewees identify immigrants as non-Europeans and conceive of Spain as the southern border of Europe. 'Africa now starts at Gibraltar and not at the Pyrenees', commented one interviewee (ESP6-NGO). This element is noticeable in the case of Italy too, where immigrants are called '*extracomunitari*' (non-EU nationals). In Greece, however, more attention is paid to the Greek or non-Greek origin of immigrants rather than to whether or not they are Europeans (GR4-TU, GR5-TU, GR6-TU). These findings accord with survey results concerning the European or national identification of member-state nationals. According to a Eurobarometre (1997b) survey conducted in October–November 1996, 52 per cent of Italians and 44 per cent of Spaniards conceive of themselves as both 'Italian'/'Spanish' and 'European', while 35 per cent and 43 per cent, respectively, identify only with their nation. In Greece, by contrast, 61 per cent of the population see themselves as Greek only, and 34 per cent consider themselves to be both 'Greek' and 'European' (the EU15 average is 46 per cent and 40 per cent respectively). It is thus obvious that the definition of Otherness depends more on ingroup identity than on the specific features of the outgroup.

Overall, ‘members of the nation’ and ‘immigrants’ are demarcated as two separate and often contrasted communities. In all countries, interviewees usually refer to fellow nationals as ‘We’, and to immigrants as ‘They’. Different communities of immigrants are referred to as ‘their group’ or ‘among themselves’ (IT2-ADM, GR5-TU). It is a common opinion that Our society can only take a limited number of Them (immigrants) (IT9-NGO, ESP4-TU, ESP5-ADM). Interviewees from all three countries reflect on the changes that their societies have undergone in the course of the past 10–20 years as a result of migratory flows. It is notable that such accounts, although accentuating the distinction between Us and Them – ‘Our society’, ‘They came’, ‘We have changed’ – concentrate more on the necessity of the host society to adapt to the new situation rather than on arguments that immigrants should leave (IT4-TU, IT8-NGO, GR6-TU). Spaniards, in particular, seem to have come to terms with the new experience of being an immigration country (ESP7-TU), although the interviewees pointed to the need to provide more information on the matter to the citizens (ESP2-TU).

*Evaluation aspects: We are better than They are*

Relational aspects of the political discourse on immigration are complemented by the evaluation of the two groups. As it will be shown in this section, there is an implicit ethical hierarchy in the discourse.

Us and Them as identity categories are constructed first through disclaimers: people deny that they or their co-nationals have xenophobic attitudes or act in discriminatory ways. Racist violence and discriminatory behaviour is attributed to particular individuals, marginal within the host society, with specific psychobiological features: ‘they are weird people’, ‘mad’, ‘old’, ‘intransigent’ (ESP2-TU, ESP3-NGO).

As a matter of fact, interviewees from all three countries explicitly and emphatically denied being racist:

Turin is not – I would not like to say ‘racist’ – particularly intolerant.  
(IT2-ADM)

We are not as racist as they are in other European countries.  
(GR5-TU, ESP1-NGO, ESP6-NGO, ESP7-TU, ESP2-TU)

We do not have a LePen.  
(ESP1-NGO)

Racism has appeared only in isolated cases like Boardilla.  
(ESP6-NGO, ESP7-TU)

[Our country] has shown great availability, a great culture of acceptance.  
(IT6&7-NGO)

Spanish people are tolerant.  
(ESP4-TU, ESP6-NGO)

There are virtually no racist organisations, but there are many pro-immigrant associations in the area of Madrid.  
(ESP6-NGO)

Racist incidents are isolated.  
(GR6-TU)

[Racist incidents] are marginal cases [by] small and marginal organisations.  
(ESP4-TU, ESP5-ADM, ESP6-NGO)

The effort to provide a positive self-conception is also manifested through the redefinition of the We and They categories. People who display discriminatory behaviour are excluded from the We—the nation (IT4-TU, ESP2-TU, ESP3-NGO). Similarly, employers who exploit illegal immigrants are distinguished from Us—Italians:

Businessmen are not encouraged to employ illegal immigrants, also because in Italy the trade unions are present ... just as they were for Italian workers ... this is the exploiter who makes business by 'selling women', life is like that, *we are not all honest. However, this is not the Italian people*, the Italian people tends to regularise the immigrant citizen, the proof is the large number of people who have been legalised.  
(IT5-TU, emphasis added)

Thus, the ingroup is credited with impartiality and is defined as 'good'. Xenophobic behaviour is justified by the lack of information or the misinformation provided by the media (ESP2-TU).

In Greece and Spain (ESP1-NGO, ESP2-TU), interviewees expressed pride at not having had a fascist or racist political past:

... the fact is that *some people* have tried to *take advantage of nationalism*, that nationalism of LePen style, some groups ... *some fascistoids* who would like to come out with the slogan 'Foreign workers go home'. Yes *we had* some phenomena of this kind ... and some small incidents however without great tension. The good thing is that *we historically* ... the evolution of the Greek trade union movement comes from a different history, a different culture than that of many European states. That is why *we* do not have such outbursts, such serious problems like in Germany or Sweden and other countries.

(GR5-TU, emphasis added)

The ingroup political and ethical superiority is thus confirmed, not only in relation to immigrants themselves (as we shall see in the following paragraphs) but also with reference to traditional immigration destinations such as Sweden or Germany where anti-immigrant political movements have developed.

In Italy, on the other hand, where fascism was a dominant political force in the past and continues to exert some influence (Veneziani 1994: 259–60), a complex rhetoric of denying racism and asserting a positive ingroup representation is adopted. The following passage is eloquent:

Italy is a country that has shown a great availability, a great culture of acceptance ... the tragedy of Italy is that it has always lived in this view that Italians are good people, so, even if *we* have been colonisers, *we* have left a good impression in Greece, in Albania, in Abyssinia. ... In all these years, the Italian lay person has lived with the idea that *we* are good, while, on the contrary, nowadays it is accepted that Italy has had its colonial experiences too, the racist contradictions, populism and, even if there have not been outbreaks of violence such as with Germans ... The word 'racism' seemed a term that did not *suit us*. Even the racist laws of 1938 in Italy were seen as something imposed by the Germans but never applied. The difficulty has been *to make Italians accept that Italy runs the risk of becoming racist*. ... *However*, when you move from big town to smaller cities, you discover *a drive for integration that cannot be compared with any other country in Europe...*

(IT6&7-NGO, emphasis added)

The positioning of the ingroup as non-discriminatory and non-racist is complemented by prejudiced views against specific nationalities. In Italy and Greece, in particular, immigrants of different nationalities are 'classified' as better or worse on the basis of qualities deemed desirable for the ingroup (but often absent there as well). In Italy, for example, the Senegalese community is praised for its honesty (IT4-TU), while immigrants of Balkan origins are seen as troublemakers. Such classifications are made also in terms of the immigrants' culture and the convergence of their values with those of the Italian culture<sup>6</sup> (IT1-ADM). Similarly, in Greece: Polish are 'different', 'they are Europeans' (GR6-TU), Albanians are 'dangerous' (GR1-NGO, GR9-ADM), Pontian Greeks are linked to the '*kosmo tis nybtas*' (underground world), and Russians are associated with prostitution networks. Moreover, it is argued that the links between certain immigrant communities and specific illegal or criminal activities derive from the immigrants' culture and lifestyle (GR5-TU). Thus, the supposedly immoral characters of the Others further accentuate the ethical superiority of Greeks.

Immigrants are also implicitly accused of refusing to integrate because their main objective is to save some money and return to their home countries (ESP6-NGO, ESP7-TU). Interestingly enough, according to the interviewees, Spanish people do not mind if immigrants do not speak Spanish, and they are willing

to accept those who wish to become part of the Spanish society (ESP6-NGO). It is thus implied that immigrants themselves are often responsible for their poor living and working conditions, and for the discrimination they suffer. Moreover, those immigrants '*que no tienen culpa*' (who are not guilty) of their undocumented status are mentioned separately (ESP5-ADM), implying that there are others who *are guilty* of being undocumented. Their reluctance to integrate and/or regularise is therefore to blame rather than Spanish people's behaviour or the state's policy.

Overall, the evaluation of Us versus Them in all three countries is mainly based on an elevation of the ingroup and a demonstration of its ethical superiority and intrinsic goodness. The positive ingroup representation and the belief that it acts humanistically and tolerantly are, in fact, typical features of political discourse about minorities (van Dijk 1993a, 1997). Moreover, ter Wal (1996) and Peñamarín (1998) highlight how the representation of the ingroup's high moral standards and tolerant, humanist attitudes are intertwined with a negative image of the Other, which is accused of being corrupt and dishonest. The findings of this study confirm that positive ingroup identity is further boosted by the representation of immigrants as immoral and unwilling to integrate into the host society.

Only one dissident to the 'we are not racist' rhetoric was found. A Spanish trade union representative casts some doubt on the immaculate representation of her fellow nationals:

The last images [from Ceuta and Melilla] ... if you only look at the images, you know who are the victims. Images that were absolutely unknown and humiliating to me as a Spaniard. Let us be careful into what we are being converted.

(ESP2-TU)

### *Contested issues: criminality and unemployment*

Despite the impression that the newspapers might give, immigrants are not blamed for increasing criminality and unemployment rates. Interviewees from all countries were critical of overgeneralisations concerning the criminal offences committed by immigrants (both regular and undocumented) (IT5-TU, GR4-TU, ESP2-TU, ESP6-NGO). The press was accused of presenting a distorted image of reality (ESP3-NGO). Not surprisingly, however, certain immigrant communities were seen as troublemakers and were perceived to be linked to organised crime (GR1-NGO, GR5-TU, GR9-ADM, ESP5-ADM). Prejudice against them was thus justified (IT2-ADM). Moreover, a tendency to criminalise illegal immigration was also found (ESP5-ADM). However this was not a prevalent view among the interviewees.

Regarding employment and the extent to which 'They take Our jobs', opinions were divided, depending on the sector. Overall, emphasis was given

to the fact that unemployment is related to the economic crisis that Our country is going through (IT4-TU, IT6&7-NGO, GR4-TU, GR5-TU, ESP7-TU) rather than to immigration. In Spain, in particular, the idea that immigrants are responsible for domestic unemployment was dismissed (ESP1-NGO, ESP2-TU, ESP4-TU).

Nonetheless, in Greece, immigrants were *blamed* for receiving lower pay and working longer hours. As representatives of both the administration and the trade unions pointed out (GR9-ADM, GR4-TU, GR5-TU):

... they almost ask for it ... they are ready to accept the unequal treatment in order to gain some money. It is in other words a vicious circle. You do not know: is it the hen that lay[s] the egg or the other way round.

(GR9-ADM)

Immigrants are therefore held responsible because employers (members of the ingroup) are prepared to exploit them. It is also emphasised by Greek interviewees that employers 'do not prefer foreigners', but hire Them because They cost less (GR4-TU, GR5-TU, GR9-ADM). Somewhat paradoxically, this argument is used in favour of regularisation: it is in the interests of the Greek population if immigrants are legalised because then they would no longer 'steal' Greeks' jobs (*ibid.*). Thus it is emphasised that it is Our interests that should be protected through regularisation, rather than Their rights. This argument delegitimises the immigrants' position in Greek society: Greeks come first, immigrants do not count.

Even though this blaming strategy is peculiar to Greece, economic explanations are similarly provided to account for racist incidents in Italy. Xenophobia and racism are linked to people's fear of losing their jobs, as well as to the poor living and working conditions of immigrants and their low socioeconomic status (GR2-NGO, IT4-TU). This actually functions as an implicit justification: We are not inherently racist, it is job insecurity that leads to racism. This is what is called 'additional' (Balbo and Manconi 1992: 64) or 'subtle' (Dovidio and Gaertner 1986) racism, namely the rational organisation of socioeconomic motivations that make people intolerant.

This type of argument is not present in the Spanish data. Conflict between immigrants and the domestic population is attributed to the circumstances under which contact takes place. More specifically, the massive arrival of immigrants to a small town or village, their concentration in decaying inner city neighbourhoods, their poverty and the fact that they tend to live in overcrowded apartments are identified as the main factors that lead to xenophobia and racism (ESP1-NGO, ESP3-NGO, ESP6-NGO, ESP7-TU). Otherwise,

... people know how to live together.

(ESP2-TU)



... such problems [of neighbouring] exist also between Spaniards.  
(ESP3-NGO)

Contact with the domestic population thus emerges as a crucial issue that accounts for much of the prejudice towards immigrants in Spain. However, the interviewees suggest that the problem is not based upon differences in nationality or culture *per se*, but rather on the social visibility of immigrants because they are poor and tend to concentrate in specific areas. Mikrakis and Triandafyllidou (1994) have also pointed to social visibility as a factor that contributes to the rise of xenophobic attitudes and behaviour. In Spain, one interviewee suggested rational planning of immigration and distribution of foreigners across the national territory as a possible solution (ESP4-TU).

### *Normative discourses: integration versus racism*

The socioeconomic explanation for xenophobia provides a 'neutralising' account of the overall issue of immigration. The focus shifts from the immigrant as a victim of racist or xenophobic behaviour to external factors that are seen as causes of social tension and facilitators of hostile behaviour towards immigrants. This type of economic argument bypasses the underlying conflict between two types of discourse concerning the relationship between the nation(-state) and immigrants. On the one hand, there is a normative discourse linked to notions of human rights, solidarity and integration (which tends to acknowledge immigrants as legitimate social and political agents) and, on the other, there is a discourse that justifies discrimination and delegitimises immigrants' positions in the host society through ethnic, cultural and psychological arguments (namely the fact that they do not belong to this country).

The rights and integration discourse is more pronounced in Italy and Spain than in Greece. In Greece, claims to human rights, the principle of equality and working-class solidarity are generally weak (GR4-TU, GR5-TU, GR6-TU) and tend to be subsumed in the prevalent nationalist discourse of 'Greeks first' (GR1-NGO, GR2-NGO, GR4-TU, GR5-TU, GR9-ADM). Employment is seen as an important means of integration into the host society, but equal treatment of immigrant workers is demanded as a way of protecting Greeks rather than as a way of protecting foreign workers. On only one occasion was the contribution of the immigrants to the national economy recognised, and a moral duty of the Greek state to reciprocate was mentioned (GR5-TU).

In Italy, the political discourse on immigration is closely intertwined with notions of human rights, solidarity and multiculturalism. Ethical principles of justice and respect for cultural difference (IT1-ADM), social values (particularly solidarity with the poor; IT8-NGO, IT9-NGO) and political notions (such as equality and fairness; IT9-NGO) are used to defend the social rights of immigrants and the need to regularise those who are already established in Italian territory (IT5-TU). Multiculturalism is promoted as a sociopolitical paradigm (IT1-ADM, IT4-TU, IT9-NGO) and concrete examples of coexistence

and integration between Italians and immigrants are provided to support this view (IT4-TU). It is nonetheless recognised that a lot of work needs to be done (IT6&7-NGO) so that 'We' (Italians) become more sensitive with regard to these matters, and it is 'Our' moral duty (IT9-NGO) to do so.

In Spain, the discourse is geared towards integration and normalisation of immigration, rather than towards multiculturalism. The need to integrate immigrants into the legitimate sector of the host society (ESP2-TU) – thus empowering immigrants to act as cultural mediators (ESP6-NGO) – and also the necessity for a public response to immigrants' needs for health services, schooling and accommodation (ESP1-NGO, ESP2-TU, ESP3-NGO, ESP7-TU) are the prevalent arguments in the Spanish discourse. Immigrant rights with regard to employment are also promoted: foreign workers should not be bound to their employer (ESP4-TU), and they should be given the opportunity to develop their training and skills' potential (ESP7-TU). Moreover, an appeal is made to the Spaniards' experience as emigrants so as to become more sensitive to immigrants' needs (ESP4-TU).

This normalisation and integration discourse in Spain is, however, moderated by the principle that:

A country should not accept more immigrants than those it can accept, so that there are no people living in the streets.

(ESP5-ADM)

This notion of 'limited capacity for absorption' refers, in particular, to the massive concentration of immigrants in small towns or in specific neighbourhoods, where the influx radically changes the composition of the population in the area.

The humanitarian viewpoint is complemented by a law-and-order approach that calls for more effective state intervention in immigration policy. Legality becomes a dimension for distinguishing between Us and Them. Immigrants are stigmatised by the mere fact of their undocumented presence in the national territory (IT2-ADM, ESP5-ADM). In Greece, the employment of immigrants in informal economic activities, often under blatantly illegal conditions (long working hours and extremely low wages), is an element that further delegitimises their presence because 'They thus steal Our jobs' (GR9-ADM) and 'They undermine Our rights' (GR4-TU, GR5-TU). The controversial character of the relationship between immigrant employment and regularisation also divides the Spanish social actors. Trade unions argue that employment legitimises the immigrant's presence in the country and her/his right to regularise (ESP4-TU, ESP7-TU), whereas public officials argue that regularisation might have negative effects on unemployment rates (ESP5-ADM, ESP8-ADM).

Law-and-order concerns are obvious in Italy and Spain, where attention is drawn to the lack of an effective immigration policy (IT5-TU, IT6&7-NGO, IT9-NGO, ESP5-ADM, ESP6-NGO, ESP7-TU, ESP8-ADM). Interviewees in all three countries (ESP4-TU, ESP5-ADM, IT5-TU, GR1-NGO, GR5-TU)

point to the need for more efficient control measures and rational planning of immigrant integration. It is worth noting, however, that the emphasis on legality as a prerequisite for being integrated into Italian, Greek or Spanish society is incongruent with their respective civic and political cultures. Indeed, citizen–state relations in these countries are characterised by mistrust and discontent, while clientelistic relations have long dominated the national administration system (Almond and Verba 1963; La Palombara 1965; Romero Maura 1973; Moràn and Benedicto 1995; Mouzelis 1995; Tsoukalas 1995).

Unlike Spain, where a discourse of prejudice and closure towards immigrants is virtually non-existent – with the exception of concerns about the effect of immigrant labour on national unemployment – xenophobic and racist attitudes are expressed overtly in Italy and Greece. Thus, psychological or ideological explanations for people's racist attitudes are offered. Xenophobia is characterised as a 'natural' tendency of all peoples and is mainly attributed to the demise of ideology rather than to discriminatory attitudes (IT6&7-NGO). Moreover, cultural differences and immigrants' difficulties in assimilating into the host society are explained through psychologising arguments: 'they are really very weird in their psychology' (GR7-ADM). The racist reactions of the domestic population and the problems of communication between Us and Them are thus linked to collective psychological phenomena. The implication is that psychological reactions cannot be judged because they are, by definition, irrational; nor can these difficulties be overcome because they do not depend upon societal mechanisms. Thus immigrants cannot be accepted as members of the host society, not because the latter discriminates against them but because of circumstances outside Our control.

In conclusion, the recognition of immigrants' human and social rights implies their legitimisation as members-to-be of the host society. This type of discourse transcends the nationalistic division between the ingroup and the Others, introducing alternative dimensions that cut across national or cultural identities. However, this discourse is opposed by a nationalistic approach which views Us–nationals and Them–foreigners as different 'by nature' and opposed to one another. Coexistence and integration is thus deemed possible only to the extent that it subscribes to a control-and-command approach, whereby the host society controls immigrants so as to fit its own interests. The conflict between these two viewpoints is more pronounced in Italy; Greek interviewees tend to reflect the nationalistic perspective. It is worth noting that most interviewees shift from a humanistic to a discriminatory discourse, and alternate between universalistic visions of solidarity and nationalistic notions of Italians/Greeks versus Others, rather than simply adopting one or other approach.

The situation is different in Spain. The integration and legitimisation discourse is prevalent (although integrated in a law-and-order perspective) and prejudice or discrimination based on nationality is very rarely taken up as an argument. This finding suggests that the experience of a multinational society organised into a single state, and the awareness of the plural and internally divided nature of the Spanish nation (Fox 1998), supports a more tolerant attitude towards foreigners.

## Conclusions

This chapter has critically analysed the political discourse on immigration in Greece, Italy and Spain, three southern European countries that have recently been transformed from emigration to host countries. My aim has been to examine the organisation of the political discourse in relation to two opposite identity categories, namely Us–nationals and Them–immigrants, and also to highlight the construction of positive ingroup images and negative outgroup representations that serve to delegitimise and exclude immigrants from the host society.

It is worth noting that, in each of the three countries under examination, the refusal to recognise immigrants as members of Our society ignores the *de facto* presence of immigrants in the host society, their employment in the informal economy and their inevitable integration through non-public channels (Triandafyllidou 1999a), despite legal restrictions. The immigration policies of Greece, Italy and Spain during the past decade have been characterised by such contradiction. The governments of all three countries have been unwilling to regularise illegal immigrants who had settled in their territories, and they placed more emphasis on improving immigration control. Nonetheless, first Italy and Spain and then, recently, Greece have had to come to terms with this new situation through regularisation programmes, regular entry provisions and accompanying administrative measures aimed at integrating the newcomers.

The reaction of the domestic population towards immigrants in the three countries under examination varies. The xenophobic and racist tendencies registered in Greece and Italy at the beginning of the 1990s (Mura 1995; Triandafyllidou and Mikrakis 1995) have become more pronounced. Approximately 30 per cent of the population of both countries define themselves as 'very' or 'quite racist' (EU15 average, 33 per cent); 41 per cent of Greeks and 33 per cent of Italians (EU15 average, 38 per cent) believe that people belonging to minority groups could never be fully accepted as members of the host society. Moreover, 62 per cent of Italians and 85 per cent of Greeks (EU15, 65 per cent) think that their country has reached its limits: if there were more people belonging to these minority groups, there would be trouble (Eurobarometre 1997a). These survey data show that Italians, and Greeks to a lesser extent, are still uncertain about how they should treat immigrants and whether immigration is a good or a bad thing.

Spaniards, in contrast, show a relatively open and positive attitude towards immigrants. Only 20 per cent of the population consider themselves to be 'very' or 'quite' racist, and only 23 per cent believe that minority groups can never be fully assimilated to the host society. Twenty-nine per cent of Spaniards affirm that their country has reached its limits in terms of immigration (*ibid.*). In answer to all three questions, Spain scores well below the EU15 average.

The findings of this study show that there are competing interpretations and discourses concerning immigration. My first concern here has been to highlight the multiple definitions of the ingroup and the Other elaborated in political discourse. Indeed, the distinction between the two is not always

straightforward. The answer is complicated by the fact that some immigrant communities have ethnic or cultural links with the host society. In Greece, for instance, there is a tendency to create multiple layers of identity whereby the first layer includes only the 'real Greeks' (Greek citizens of Greek ethnic origins and Christian Orthodox religion) and the last includes immigrants. Similarly, in Spain the cultural affinity between Latin Americans and Spaniards is pointed out. The ingroup might not always be as homogeneous as one might assume. In Italy, for example, regional differences are intertwined with issues of immigrant integration.

Along with the definition of the ingroup and the Other comes an evaluation of the two groups. Positive self-presentation, which includes denials of racism, and negative Other-presentation (van Dijk 1993a, 1997: 36–7; ter Wal 1996) are typical features of discourse on minorities or immigrants. The findings of this study are in line with earlier research. Charges of racism are denied and the ingroup is represented as impartial and non-discriminatory. However, negative features are attributed to immigrants who are accused of being corrupt and dishonest, and their will to integrate is called into question.

Not only is the ingroup represented as ethically superior to immigrants, but immigrants also become a Contrasting Other (Penuel and Wertsch 1995: 349): their negative representation serves to emphasise the desired qualities of the ingroup. This type of discourse is a strategic form of identity formation. Significant threatening Others can also be found within the ingroup, as in the case of Spain, where most interviewees point out that internal Others (such as the Roma community or poor people) tend to be the victims of more discrimination than foreigners.

In Italy and Greece, cultural difference and/or the (presumed) inability to assimilate with the host society is psychologised. Immigrants are described as 'weird' people and emphasis is put on their supposedly intrinsic personality traits. The argument cannot be falsified and the blame for Their lack of integration (as well as the justification for Their exclusion) is put on Them. In Spain too, immigrants are said to be reluctant to integrate (at least during the beginning of their stays), but overall the image of immigrants there is less negative than in Italy or Greece.

Psychologisation also serves as a strategy for maintaining a positive ingroup identity. In all three countries, racist people are defined as 'not-Us' and in some cases they are seen as psychotic or unbalanced personalities. Overt racism is thus delegitimised and treated as a pathology, while subtle racism prevails.

Despite the generally pejorative image of the immigrant as a cultural and ethnic Other, views on contested issues such as the relationship between immigration and domestic unemployment or criminality vary. Others are not blamed for domestic unemployment and most interviewees are critical of the criminalisation of immigration. Nonetheless, in Greece in particular, immigrants are blamed for 'taking Our jobs' by means of 'offering' to work for lower pay. The Us–Them dynamic remains implicit, to the extent that employers are members of the ingroup while immigrants are not. In Italy, by contrast,

employers who exploit immigrants are excluded from the ingroup. In Spain, immigrants and nationals are put on the same level with regard to illegal employment, acknowledging the fact that the spread of the informal sector is a structural feature of the Spanish economy.

Two contrasting normative discourses have been identified in this study. In one discourse, a humanistic and solidarity approach prevails. Emphasis is given to the contribution of immigrants to the host society and their position is legitimised. This discourse supports equal treatment for immigrants, and multiculturalism is proposed as a model for social integration. Immigrants thus tend to be seen as (potential) members of the ingroup. The nationalistic discourse, on the contrary, legitimises discrimination and unequal treatment on the basis of nationality/citizenship: foreigners do not belong to Our society. Furthermore, immigrant cultures are linked to social pathologies such as criminality or prostitution, and their difference is psychologised. This type of denigrating Other discourse has been encountered elsewhere (Mehan 1997), even though the use of psychologisation has not been registered.

A moderate line of argument that seems to link the two discourses is expressed by the law-and-order approach. There is agreement among interviewees from all three countries that a more effective immigration policy is needed for both control and integration. Intervention of the state at the national, regional and local levels is proposed, and the lack of a tradition in immigration policy planning is acknowledged.

In conclusion, the issues underlying the different discourses demarcate the ingroup, the nation and the definition of who constitutes 'the Other'. Contrary to expectations, nationality is sometimes replaced by more inclusive principles such as fairness, solidarity or legality. Despite the negative representation of immigrants, their position in the host society seems negotiable.

One important feature that is common to the Greek and Italian political discourses is the fact that interviewees tend to shift from one normative discourse to the other. One might start a phrase with a critical comment towards fellow nationals, then continue by reviewing the country's history and, eventually, shift the argument by claiming that 'immigrants take our jobs' or that 'this country has shown a great availability towards foreigners'. This shows that a racist viewpoint is not yet rooted in Greece and Italy, perhaps simply because massive immigration is still a recent phenomenon. It also testifies to the weakness of universalistic appeals to human rights and the general good. However, this ambivalence might be a point of departure for an anti-racist and anti-xenophobic education in which the Other is normalised, emphasis is put on the daily aspects of immigrants' lives, and notions of cultural or ethnic 'purity' are replaced by notions of difference and pluralism.

In Spain, however, the integration and normalisation discourse is clearly prevalent. It seems that Spaniards have been able to take advantage of their 'national' experience of being a multinational state characterised by linguistic and cultural difference. The cultural diversity of immigrants is therefore not seen as an insurmountable obstacle to integration. Moreover, the legacy of the

Franco regime makes Spaniards particularly sensitive to issues of rights and democracy (even though representatives of the public administration did express the odd nationalist voice among Spanish interviewees, as if they still subscribed to the conservative tradition in Spanish politics).

## 8 Conclusions

In this book I have sought to explore the relationship between the nation and the Other from theoretical and empirical points of view.

In Chapters 2 and 3 I demonstrated that nationalism theories have either neglected or failed to grasp the impact of the Other on national identity formation and change. Most theorists have tended to take the existence of the Other for granted. Indeed, we are told that all identities are constituted in interaction, and most theorists concentrate on the internal features that characterise each nation or ethnic group and which (according to members of the nation, at least) render it unique and distinct from all others. On the other hand, studies that concentrate on boundary construction and maintenance tend to discuss the actual constitution of the boundary rather than its impact on the identity of the ingroup. My aim has been to challenge the assumption of the Other's existence and to provide an analytical tool – the concept of the Significant Other – that may be helpful in investigating the relationship between the nation and salient outgroups.

Chapter 3 concentrated on creating a typology of Significant Others and highlighting the different identity dynamics that characterise the ingroup's relationship with internal or external, threatening or inspiring, Others. It is worth noting that Significant Others can be found inside or outside the boundaries of the nation. They might be perceived as threatening to the nation's existence and (presumed) unity or authenticity, or they might actually be inspiring Others that provide an example to follow on the path to achieving national grandeur.

Attention has also been paid to the feature that links the Other with the nation: territorial claims, for instance, are of a wholly different nature from cultural demands. Hence, an ethnic group or small nation that demands cultural autonomy within a multinational state might place the dominant nation's cultural hegemony in question, but it does not threaten its territorial unity. On the contrary, a minority that seeks to secede from a national or multinational state undermines the very political existence of that state. The same happens when a rival nation threatens the territorial integrity of the ingroup by claiming part of the latter's homeland.

From a theoretical viewpoint, the concept of the Significant Other aims to



focus the identity processes that condition the formation and development of the national community. It provides a tool for the study of immigration and its relation to national identity. As pointed out in Chapter 4, the immigrant is a particular type of Significant Other because s/he is to be found within the nation. S/he defies the social and political order of the national state because of her/his absence from her/his home country and presence in the host society. However, research shows that immigrant communities often become instrumental for the redefinition and revitalisation of a host nation's identity. Indeed, my review of relevant research on 'old' migration destinations – namely Britain, France and Germany – shows how Othering the immigrant has provided a means by which to overcome crisis situations. The comparative analysis of the three countries shows that identity processes activated in Britain and France in the 1970s and 1980s, in particular, and in Germany from the 1970s until nowadays, converge with regard to the ethnicisation and/or racialisation of immigration. This occurs even though their outlooks are different and they depart from different historical experiences and situations. The national Self is (re)constituted through the contrast with the immigrant Other.

Identities are dynamic by definition and are constantly renegotiated. Such processes of nation and immigration opposition are thus multifaceted and include contradictory perspectives. To say that ethnic minorities of immigrant origin have been instrumentalised as Others against which a new concept of white Britishness could be defined, or that the Muslim population in France has been used to revitalise the republican, monocultural view of the nation, is only part of the story. In both countries, debates about openness and multiculturalism were already taking place, as demonstrated by their naturalisation and minority integration policies. The same happened in Germany, where a dominant discourse of ethnic descent and closure to immigrants, who were initially seen as sojourners not settlers and who were later demonised as a threat to the existence of the *Kulturnation*, has been counteracted by a civic view of German society and by public demonstrations against xenophobia and racism towards foreigners.

The lessons to be learned from the British, French and German experiences can be useful for the study of southern Europe. Chapters 5–7 dealt with the question of inward migration to Greece, Italy and Spain, with a view to exploring how these three countries have coped with the issue. The focus of the study has been on the analysis of the identity mechanisms activated by the presence of the immigrants and on the process of national identity redefinition that took place in each of them. My aim has been to compare Greece, Italy and Spain in order to show how different types of national identity can be shaped in similar or different ways when faced with common problems.

Indeed, these three southern European countries have been faced with a relatively similar set of phenomena. From the late 1980s, and especially from the early 1990s, they were suddenly transformed from emigration to immigration zones. Incoming flows of mainly undocumented migrants increased dramatically during the last decade and caught the governments of Greece,

Italy and Spain unprepared. Immigration policy was initially constituted of emergency measures as if the 'flood' of newcomers would soon dissipate. Gradually, however, under the pressure of crude facts and European integration politics, national authorities have had to reconsider their views and create a policy framework to deal with both immigration control and immigrant regularisation and integration.

Survey research has shown a dramatic change in people's attitudes towards foreigners in these countries during the same period. In Spain results show a relative openness towards immigrants. But the Greek and Italian public expressed a strong concern for their countries' 'invasion' by aliens, and ethnic prejudice and racist behaviour very quickly became visible and led to violence against immigrants.

The empirical part of the research started with the study of the historical foundations of national identity in each country. The process of nation formation has been studied and the predominantly civic or ethnic character of national identity has been assessed. This was done because of the widely held opinion in nationalism scholarship that civic nations are open to foreigners and less prone to xenophobia and prejudice than ethnic ones. Greece, Italy and Spain cover the whole ethnic–civic continuum, with Greece situated at the extreme of the ethnic pole, Spain at the extreme of the civic one and Italy somewhere in the middle (because of the combination of ethnic and territorial features in the Italian identity). This study has therefore offered an opportunity to test whether the view that civic nations are more tolerant than ethnically oriented ones is true.

The process of creating a threatening Other perception of immigrants and excluding Them from the nation has been studied at two levels. First, the press discourse was analysed to provide a general knowledge of the discursive universe in which opinions about immigration are formed and relevant issues are debated. Second, I have conducted and analysed a series of interviews with 'privileged testimonies' – representatives of NGOs, trade unions or public administration employees in services that deal with immigration – in order to explore both private and political discourse. These privileged testimonies are not deemed to represent the public opinion of the given country, but they are given by people who are directly involved with the issue and who might also have an impact on the policy agenda. They were therefore considered an important target population.

The findings of the analysis of the press discourse have shown that ethnicity and civic values are two of the most important national identity dimensions discussed in relation to immigration in all three countries. In each country, ethnic origin plays an important part, providing the main dimension by which immigrants are categorised and differentiated from the ingroup. With regard to Greece, this is not surprising, given the dominant role of genealogical descent in the definition of Greekness. With regard to Italy and Spain, however, we are witnessing an ethnicisation of Italianness and a racialisation of Spanish identity. In Italy, the nationality of the immigrant becomes her/his main social

characteristic while, in Spain, the distinction between Spaniards and immigrants is racially tainted. The important element in Spain is not which country immigrants come from (as is the case in Greece and Italy), but rather their '*raza*', their Arab or Gypsy origins or their black skin.

In Italy and Spain, a large share of the press coverage refers to the civic traditions of immigrants. The Italian press discourse expresses a tension between ethnic prejudice and a strong tradition of solidarity, although this needs to be redefined in the light of the current situation. In Spain, the solidarity discourse is even more pronounced. These findings conform with the civic nature of Italian and Spanish nationhood, in which regional and peripheral national diversity is recognised as part and parcel of their heritage. In contrast, the civic values dimension in Greece accounts for a much smaller share of the coverage, and is superseded by the ethnic origin factor and also by references to culture and the national character.

In line with the civic–territorial character of the Italian and Spanish nation, the results show that the territorial dimension is particularly pronounced in the press discourse of both countries. The idea of an immigrant 'invasion' is emphasised in all three countries, although less often in Greece than in Spain and Italy. The issue of border control is also related to the three countries' role as the 'soft underbelly' of the European Union. As a matter of fact – and contrary to the findings – Greece should have been the country most concerned with its porous borders because its geographical position and ground morphology render efficient border control almost impossible. Italy and Spain share this type of problem too. The idea of an 'invasion' and the feeling of 'responsibility' towards their EU partners is more pronounced in the Italian and Spanish discourse than in the Greek press. This suggests that the perception of a 'threat' is conditioned by the national identity of the host country rather than the actual 'threat'. Since Greekness is based on a belief in a common descent, the illegal crossing of the national borders by undocumented immigrants is not perceived as an important threat to its 'integrity' or 'purity'. In Spain and Italy, by contrast, where the territory is one of the main features that bind fellow nationals together, permeability of the borders equates to a threat to the nation's well-being.

The analysis of the press discourse has brought to the fore some features of special interest. A general tendency to ethnicise the idea of the nation in Italy, and to racialise ethnic origin in Spain, has been registered as a strategy of immigrant exclusion. This finding shows how new identity dimensions can be introduced to reinforce the boundary between Us and the Other. A similar tendency is identified in the Greek case too, where civic culture is overemphasised so as to sustain an impression that immigrants cannot integrate into the host society. But civic traditions have never been an important element in the conception of Greekness. Similar tendencies are found in the British debate with regard to white skin colour, or in the French case with reference to republican, secular traditions that were overemphasised so as to marginalise the immigrant population and exclude it from the host society. In Germany too, the ethnic definition of difference was later complemented by a cultural

and civic dimension, and this became salient with regard to East Germans in the post-unification period.

The findings have shown that both civic and ethnic features can be used to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup. The civic or ethnic character of the nation does *not* condition the exclusionary reaction to the presence of foreigners within the host society. In either case, the immigrant is seen as a threatening Other who must remain outside the national community. The prevalence of civic values in the conception of the nation nonetheless leaves more room for acceptance and integration of the immigrant than an ethnic view of nationality does. This is the conclusion drawn from the British, French and German cases. The Othering of the immigrant takes place in all three countries. However, France and Britain differ from Germany in a crucial way: their immigrant populations are granted citizenship rights on the basis of the *jus soli* principle, while a strict *jus sanguinis* rule was until very recently applied in Germany, excluding all foreigners from membership of the ingroup. All three countries under examination in southern Europe similarly tend to exclude immigrants. However, the discourse of prejudice and closure is more pronounced in Greece, where an ethnic view of nationhood prevails, and least pronounced in Spain, whose nation conception is primarily territorial and civic. Italy is characterised by a combination of exclusionary views with a solidarity discourse, reflecting its combined ethnic and territorial foundations.

The findings concerning the press discourse conform with the results obtained from the study of the political debate. The qualitative analysis of interview discussions has shown that there are competing interpretations and discourses concerning immigration. Multiple definitions of the nation and the Other have been identified; the distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup is not always straightforward. This is complicated by the fact that some immigrant communities are ethnically or culturally related to the host society. In Greece, for instance, there is a tendency to create concentric circles of identity, whereby the central and smaller circle includes only the 'real' Greeks, i.e. Greek citizens of Greek ethnic origins and Christian Orthodox religion, whereas outer circles include different categories of 'lesser' Greeks. In Spain, the cultural affinity between Latin Americans and Spaniards is also emphasised. In Italy, by contrast, the immigration debate brings regional differences between the country's North and South to the fore.

The political discourse is characterised by strategies of positive self-presentation, which include denials of racism or negative Other-presentation. These are typical features of discourse about minorities. In line with earlier research, the ingroup is represented as open and democratic while immigrants are blamed for being the victims of discrimination or persecution because they are corrupt, dishonest and unwilling to integrate into the host society. In Italy and Greece, cultural difference and/or the (presumed) inability to assimilate are psychologised; emphasis is placed on the supposedly intrinsic personality traits of immigrants. In Spain, too, immigrants are seen as reluctant to integrate but, overall, their collective image is less negative than in Italy or Greece.

Psychologisation also serves as a strategy for maintaining a positive ingroup identity: in all three countries, racists are defined as 'not-Us' and are often characterised as psychotic or unbalanced personalities. Overt racism is therefore delegitimised and treated as pathological, while subtle racism leads the way.

Two contrasting normative discourses have been identified in all three southern countries. On the one hand, a humanism and solidarity approach places emphasis on the contribution of immigrants to the host society and supports immigrant social, political and cultural rights; immigrants tend to be seen as potential members of the ingroup. On the other hand, a nationalistic discourse legitimises discrimination and unequal treatment on the basis of nationality/citizenship; foreigners do not belong. A moderate line of argumentation that seems to bridge the two discourses is expressed by the law-and-order approach.

There is agreement among interviewees from all three countries that a more effective immigration policy is needed for both control and integration. The intervention of the state at the national, regional and local levels is required, and the lack of a tradition in immigration policy planning is acknowledged. It is worth noting that, with the exception of some public administration officials, the integration and normalisation discourse is prevalent in Spain. Overall, and contrary to expectations, nationality is sometimes replaced by more inclusive principles such as fairness, solidarity or legality. Despite the negative representation attributed to immigrants, their position in the host society is thus negotiable.

One important feature that characterises the Greek and Italian political discourse, in particular, is the fact that interviewees tend to shift with relative ease from one normative discourse to the other. They might start with a critical comment towards fellow nationals, then continue by reviewing the country's past experiences of emigration or colonisation and, eventually, switch to an 'immigrants take our jobs' approach. This finding suggests the fluidity of identity – national identity in particular – as well as the delegitimation of explicit racism. People hesitate among their liberal and human rights principles, their prejudiced views towards certain groups or phenomena and their need for a positive representation of themselves and their ingroup. This ambivalence might be a point of departure for anti-racist and anti-xenophobic campaigns. At the same time, it might prove effective in the marginalisation of immigrants.

Overall, the study of the political discourse has shown that the immigration debate is not merely about immigrants and their control, expulsion or acceptance. It is also, and perhaps mostly, about defining who is included in the ingroup and who is relegated to the outgroup. Quite to their surprise, my interviewees realised that there were multiple layers of the We, and that it was not always clear who belonged and who did not. This finding is in line with the debate in 'old' immigration destinations where the immigrant population has settled and become part of the ingroup and is therefore difficult to distinguish from the 'nation'. Blurred and multiple boundaries are in fact the norm rather than the exception, especially in immigration countries (Jacobson 1997b). This

study confirms the dynamic nature of identity processes and the constant renegotiation of multiple layers of inclusion defined with reference to Significant Others.

Moreover, the political discourse reveals the need for a positive ingroup identity. Talking about immigrants involves the projection of a positive national image and this is achieved through asserting our moral or cultural superiority towards the Other (Tajfel and Turner 1979). At the same time, immigration tests the civic principles of liberal democratic societies. A humanitarian discourse is contrasted with prejudice and xenophobia. This situation of uncertainty with regard to the guiding principles of society prepares the ground for a law-and-order discourse: the national state thus regains its lost sovereignty and legitimacy as the main political agent of the nation and the caterer of the goods (Jenkins and Copsey 1996). This line of argument can be compared with similar debates in Britain and France, where the issue of immigration was also framed in terms of law and order. In France, in particular, the immigration discourse was related to the crisis of the republican model and the loss of credibility of traditional national institutions such as the school or the church.

In conclusion, the analysis of the press discourse confirms my main hypothesis: the presence of the immigrant Other activates a process of redefinition of national identity, which aims to raise a boundary (cultural and symbolic, if not necessarily geographic) between the ingroup and the foreigners. New dimensions have been introduced in all three countries to differentiate nationals from immigrants and to exclude the latter from the host society. Moreover, the findings with regard to the territorial dimension of the nation confirm my view that xenophobia is linked more to the identity features of the ingroup than to the social, cultural or ethnic characteristics of immigrants. The qualitative analysis of the political discourse, on the other hand, has cast light on the ways in which definitions of the We and the They take place, and also on the ways in which the contrast between the ingroup and the Other is used to construct a positive image of the national Self and a pejorative, prejudiced, deindividualised view of immigrants.

Last but not least, the contradictory discourses that structure interview responses and their relationship to civic values or humanitarian principles show that the debate on immigration touches upon the social and political foundations of host societies. Indeed, the issue of immigrant acceptance or exclusion and the related phenomena of xenophobia and racism towards foreigners are linked to a more general crisis of post-industrial societies that occurs when globalisation trends and intensive modernisation phases destabilise the existing national societal model.<sup>1</sup> It is particularly important that prejudices are unmasked and dialogue is promoted so that peaceful, democratic solutions are found to cater for the needs of different communities, be they nationals of the host societies or foreigners.

# Notes

## 1 Introduction

- 1 The term national state is preferred to that of nation-state to denote the fact that most, if not all, nation-states include a national majority and one or more ethnic or national minorities.
- 2 The first aspect, namely the change in the *nature* of national identity, is the object of a separate study that the author has conducted while employed as a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute. This study will be published in Triandafyllidou, A. (2002) *National Identity Reconsidered: Images of Self and Other in a United Europe*, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press.
- 3 The concept of Significant Others is discussed in Chapter 3.

## 2 National identity and the Other

- 1 Parts of this chapter have appeared in Triandafyllidou, A. (1998b) 'National identity and the other', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21 (4): 593–612, and are reproduced here by kind permission of the publisher.
- 2 This is not to say that other allegiances, such as religion or kinship, are less important. However, nationality is a sense of belonging that by definition overrides other group identities and is pertinent to all aspects of life, including the social or cultural sphere and also economics and politics. Part of the individual's sense of her/his national identity might be determined by religion, as in Pakistan or Israel, for instance.
- 3 Here the group is understood in the social–psychological sense (Turner 1982: 15) as 'two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or, which is nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be members of the same social category'.
- 4 With regard to definitions of nationalism, see also Connor (1978), Deutsch (1966) and Smith (1971).
- 5 Kohn does not specify that he is referring to élites. He talks about 'Europe' and 'America', but I think he is actually referring to intellectuals and/or political élites of European countries or North America. He does not provide any systematic evidence concerning mass attitudes or representations, but he extensively quotes and analyses opinions expressed by thinkers, writers and politicians.
- 6 The notion and role of the Significant Other is elaborated in Chapter 3.
- 7 See previous note.

### 3 The Significant Other

- 1 The notion of the Significant Other was originally introduced in Triandafyllidou (1998b) where the Significant Other was seen as a threatening outgroup. This argument is re-elaborated and further developed here so as to include Others that are a source of inspiration for the nation. This section must thus be seen as complementary to the arguments developed in Triandafyllidou (1998a,b).
- 2 It should be noted here that the inspiring Significant Other is clearly distinguished from the ingroup: it does not constitute part of the national 'we'. However, it is valued highly and provides an example to follow for realising to the full the national potential for self-determination and cultural expression.
- 3 I use the term 'national state' here to denote states which include a national majority that claims that the state is its own nation-state, and one or more ethnic minorities whose collective identities can be more or less recognised. Many of the states that are considered – by themselves and others – to be nation-states are such national states (Connor 1978).
- 4 Other factors accounting for xenophobia and racism towards immigrants include race, as well as lack of communication between the two groups, the poverty of immigrants and their marginal position within the host society. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapters 4, 6 and 7.
- 5 Social-psychological research (Tajfel 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel and Forgas 1981) has shown that social comparison processes (comparison between social groups) serve to achieve and/or maintain a positive group identity.
- 6 An earlier version of this section and the following two sections of this chapter is included in Triandafyllidou (1998a).
- 7 The terms 'Turks', 'Turkey' and 'Ottoman Empire' are used interchangeably because the period under examination is that of the 'birth' or 'revival' of Turkish nationalism and, hence, of the transition from the collapsing Ottoman Empire to the modern Turkish nation-state. Discussing the specific phases and factors influencing this transition goes beyond the scope of this book.
- 8 Analytically speaking, nations are distinguished with reference to their primarily ethnic or civic character (Smith 1986, 1991). The main elements constitutive of an ethnic nation are the belief that its members are ancestrally related, a common set of cultural traditions, collective memories and a link to a specific historical territory, the nation's homeland. Civic nations in contrast are based on a common political culture and a legal system that assigns equal rights and duties to all members, a common economy with a single division of labour and a territory that is the geopolitical basis of the community. Each national identity includes both ethnic and civic features (Smith 1991: 13). Therefore, the distinction is better understood as a continuum. Thus, I shall define ethnic nations as those in which ethnic features are prevalent and civic ones as those in which civic and territorial elements play the most important part in defining who belongs to the community and who is a foreigner.
- 9 The nature and development of Greek and Croat national identity will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.
- 10 With the exception of the Dodecanese Islands that were incorporated in the independent Greek state in 1947.
- 11 The *irredenta* included all territories inhabited by ethnic Greeks, ethnicity (which for Greeks is co-terminous with nationality) being defined in terms of language, culture, historical memories or religion. The *irredenta* extended to the north and included Macedonia, Thrace and even farther northern Balkan regions south from the Donau. To the east, irredentist claims referred to territories of the Ottoman Empire, notably



- the Aegean Islands, Cyprus, Crete, Asia Minor and also parts of Anatolia (Kitromilides 1990: 43–5).
- 12 *Ethnos* is the Greek word for nation. However, it denotes indistinguishably both an ethnic group and a nation, thus showing the extent to which the two concepts are interrelated in Greek language and culture.
  - 13 Cretans periodically organised revolts against the Ottoman Empire (1841, 1858, 1866–9, 1877–8, 1888–9, 1896–7), demanding the '*enosis*' (union) of the island with the Greek kingdom (Clogg 1992: 69). Eventually, Crete was granted autonomous status in 1897 without however being united to mainland Greece.
  - 14 The 'Macedonian struggle', as it is usually called in Greece, was initially waged through cultural and religious propaganda (1870–1903). It eventually led to widespread armed conflict between Greeks and Bulgarians in the region.
  - 15 All quotations originally written in Greek cited in this book have been translated into English by the author.
  - 16 Demoticism was a cultural movement, which emerged in the early twentieth century and promoted the use of the vernacular Greek in education. This movement was also concerned with unifying and renovating the national literary production (Augustinos 1977: 29–39).
  - 17 Clogg (1992: 73) emphasises the role of external factors by seeing the coup partly as a response to the Young Turk revolution of 1908.
  - 18 Venizelos had already started his successful political career in his native Crete after the island was granted autonomous status in 1897. Aside from being a charismatic personality and a politician with great diplomatic capacities and intuition, Venizelos had the advantage of not having any links with the 'old' political class of mainland Greece.
  - 19 See also Doob (1964) with regard to the role of the common enemy in uniting the nation.
  - 20 The 'national schism' between supporters of Venizelos and his government committed to pursuing the Great Idea project, on the one hand, and royalists who preferred a 'small but honourable Greece', on the other hand, profoundly marked the Greek interwar social and political life.
  - 21 See Clogg (1992: 100–5) for a brief review on the matter; for more extensive accounts, see Hypourgeion ton Exoterikon (1921), Toynbee (1922), Mears (1929), Morgenthau (1930) and Ladas (1932).
  - 22 The term 'Croats' here refers to the Croat nobility and intelligentsia who were the pioneers of Croat nationalism.
  - 23 Dalmatia had been under the Venetian influence for centuries until 1797, when it was annexed to the Hapsburg administration. Slavonia and Inner Croatia had been subject to Hungary initially, and later to Austria while parts of their territories had been under Ottoman rule. With regard to linguistic differences, the stokavian dialect was spoken throughout the country, except for the Zagreb region, where kajkavian was prevalent, and Dalmatia and the Croat Littoral, where the cajkavian dialect was spoken (Irvine 1993: 18).
  - 24 According to the idea of 'Slavic reciprocity', the Slavs should rely on one another because they, in essence, constituted one people and spoke a single language (Banac 1984: 72).
  - 25 With regard to the anti-Serb ideology adopted by Starcevic and his party and the role of the Magyar ban of Croatia Khuen-Hedervary in fostering inimicality between Serbs and Croats in the Hapsburg Empire, see Banac (1984: 91) and Jelavich (1990: 17–18).

- 26 With regard to the shift in Young Croats' views from Croat political nationhood to Yugoslav unitarism, see, in particular, Banac (1984: 100–1).
- 27 See also Irvine (1993: 32) with regard to the views of other Croat leaders.

#### 4 The immigrant as Other

- 1 'L'immigration et son double, l'émigration, sont l'occasion l'une comme l'autre de réaliser pratiquement, sur le mode de l'expérience, la confrontation avec l'ordre national, c'est-à-dire avec la distinction entre "national" et "non-national" .... L'immigré met en "péril" l'ordre national en forçant à penser ce qui est impensable, à penser ce qui n'a pas à l'être ou ce qui ne doit pas être pensé pour pouvoir être.' The quotation in the main text was translated by the author.
- 2 The concept of citizenship is theoretically complex and politically contested. There are a number of academic traditions, which attribute to it different meanings. Among these traditions, there seems to be general agreement, however, that citizenship refers to the norms that specify the relationship between the state, i.e. the politically organised community, and the individual. Therefore, it involves rights and obligations, which characterise the individual as a member of the community. Since Marshall's (1950) most influential work, rights and obligations related to citizenship have been clustered into three categories. First, citizenship is understood in civil terms, i.e. as the right for individual freedom, more specifically liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith and the fundamental rights to property and justice. Second, citizenship has a political meaning, which has been developed in the course of the nineteenth century. It regards the right to participate in the exercise of political power either as an elector or as a governor. Third, during the course of the twentieth century, citizenship has involved a set of social rights. These include the rights of economic and social security but also 'the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society' (ibid.: 11). Social citizenship has found its material expression in the modern welfare state, as the latter has been developed in western Europe and the USA in particular. The three 'types' of citizenship defined by Marshall are viewed as interdependent although fundamentally different in their conception. Habermas (1994: 24–5) argues that the primary meaning of citizenship regards political membership. Citizenship initially served for the social delimitation of the state; the individual was assigned membership to a state and, thus, also membership to a particular national community 'whose existence was recognised in terms of international law' (ibid.). According to the same scholar, the political rights determined by citizenship are those that matter because these endow the individual with the power for self-government. These constitute the democratic rights to which the individual can lay claim in order to change his/her material legal status. Later, the meaning of citizenship has been expanded to include civil rights. It has been organised into one common set of civil and political rights which referred to the problem of societal self-organisation. Citizenship provided the legal status which guaranteed and regulated the rights of political participation and communication. These first two groups of rights (those clustered under the notions of civil and political citizenship) have been derived from the democratic, liberal tradition. They aim to delineate the freedoms of the individual and the right for democratic self-government of society. Civil rights, in particular, define the freedom of the citizen from state intervention. The most recent section of citizen rights, namely those included under the heading social citizenship, involve an active state which often intervenes in the lives of the citizens. These rights are meant to give a material foundation to the formal, political status of citizenship (van Steenbergen 1994: 3); their scope is to

- guarantee ever wider sections of the population to be included, to be full members of the sociopolitical system. More specifically, they guarantee a minimal level of well-being which allows the citizen to exercise her/his civil and political rights. Social citizenship is based not only on equality and freedom but also on solidarity.
- 3 The term 'foreigners' here includes EU nationals living in another member-state, and in Britain those who hold British citizenship.
  - 4 The expression 'people of immigrant origin' is used to cover the variety of cases of individuals or groups that find themselves in the grey zone between the nation/ingroup and the aliens/outgroup. Besides, the different types of groups that may be classified under this category vary between countries depending on their particular history and citizenship and immigration law. Thus, for instance, in Britain, where formerly immigrant groups have become settled and are regarded as such by the majority of the population, the term 'ethnic minorities' has prevailed – which also signifies the fact that they are seen as part of the 'national' community – in public and political discourse. In France, too, a large part of the population of immigrant origin is French by birth. Thus, a variety of terms is used to talk about minority groups, including '*les étrangers*' (the foreigners) or '*population d'origine étrangère*' (population of foreign origin). In Germany, in contrast, the terminology used is dominated by terms such as '*Gastarbeiter*' (guestworkers) or '*Ausländer*' (foreigners). Only recently, the term 'our foreign co-citizens' has been coined to account for the fact that often the so-called *Ausländer* was born in Germany of parents born in Germany or established in the country for most of their lives.
  - 5 See sections on France and Britain.
  - 6 The term 'host country' is used here in a euphemistic sense to distinguish the country of residence from the country of ethnic origin of these people. Of course, their so-called host country is often 'their country' because they were born and/or have lived there most of their lives.
  - 7 My analysis here is informed by a broader discussion of the concept of race, racism and the racialisation of boundaries in Anthias and Yuval Davis (1992: Chapter 1 in particular).
  - 8 Large companies such as London Transport, however, did execute several recruitment drives in the West Indies.
  - 9 Former colonies other than Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
  - 10 McCrone (1997) argues that Britain has been losing its identification basis and appeal because, while it was created as nation-state, it is a 'state-nation', namely a political identity related to the state rather than to a distinct nation of which the state is the political expression. For Colley (1992), a sense of British identity was developed among the Scottish, the English and the Welsh in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This identity was, however, based on a sense of unity created in contrast to the Other, and more particularly the French Other.
  - 11 According to Cohen (1994), the confusion between Englishness and Britishness may be conceptualised as a 'fuzzy internal frontier'. For a theoretically informed discussion of the relationship between Englishness and Britishness, see also Langlands (1999).
  - 12 It is worth noting that the 1968 Immigration Act was passed by a Labour government. The Labour party had opposed vehemently the racial content of the restrictions introduced in 1962 by the Conservative government, promising that it would change them as soon as it came to power. Nonetheless, by 1965 Labour had aligned with the Conservatives in supporting stricter immigration controls for people from the New Commonwealth countries.
  - 13 The 1981 Nationality Act was followed by contradictory measures which showed the confused though racialised character of British nationality. Thus, under the 1981 Act, people from Hong Kong and the Falklands were categorised as British Dependent

- Territories Citizens and thus had no right to settle in the UK. However, in 1983, British citizenship was extended to the inhabitants of the Falklands and in 1990 to part, the wealthiest strata indeed, of the Hong Kong population (Layton-Henry 1992: 208–9).
- 14 Doty (1996: 248) is inspired by the notion of antagonism introduced by Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 125). An antagonistic relationship involves a constitutive outside, which limits the identity of the inside, while being simultaneously a prerequisite for its constitution.
  - 15 Quite interestingly, Jacobson (1997b), in her research on perceptions of Britishness by young British Pakistanis, identifies three types of social boundaries which define, for her interviewees, what it means to be British. The first and less ambiguous boundary is the civic one, namely the possession of British citizenship and a British passport. A second boundary, less clear than the first but still quite visible, is the 'racial' one, which is related to the presence or lack of white British ancestry. Third, the interviewees refer to a cultural boundary, which is invariably intertwined with the 'racial' one. This refers to notions of British culture, which encompass a wide range of social phenomena including language competence, religious affiliation, cultural heritage, behavioural patterns, familiarity with the British lifestyle and/or social and political institutions of the country.
  - 16 See Lloyd and Waters (1991: 58–61) concerning the issue of large working-class housing estates inhabited by immigrants.
  - 17 See Brubaker (1992: 140–1) for more details on this matter.
  - 18 It is worth noting that the '*droit à la différence*' (the right to be different) discourse was developed mainly by left-wing forces, including some ministers of the Socialist government, as a rejection of the republican assimilationist model (Brubaker 1992: 148 and 231–2).
  - 19 See the section on Britain (p. 62ff.).
  - 20 As French Interior minister at the time, Charles Pasqua argued:
 

We need to treat Islam in France as a French question instead of continuing to see it as a foreign question or as an extension into France of foreign problems... It is no longer enough to talk of Islam in France. There has to be a French Islam. The French Republic is ready for this.

(Pasqua speech in Lyon, published in *Le Monde*, 2 September 1994, cit. in Hargreaves 1995: 208)
- As a matter of fact, there is evidence (Hargreaves 1995: 118–31) that republican principles have indeed been internalised by the Muslim population of France.
- 21 See Brubaker (1992: 150–65) for an assessment of the reasons that led the attack against the *jus soli* principle to fail.
  - 22 A certain degree of cultural and socioeconomic conflict was of course inevitable, but the integration of the nearly 12 million ethnic German expellees took place relatively smoothly given the difficult social and economic circumstances (Kleßman 1982; Bark and Gress 1989: 305–6; Schulze 1989).
  - 23 Kurthen and Minkenberg (1995: 192) are particularly critical of the lack of policy measures for the integration and acceptance of non-German immigrants and point to the need for developing a controlled immigration policy that takes into account domestic interests as well as humanitarian concerns.
  - 24 The term *Volkszugehörigkeit*, which literally means 'membership of the Volk', is, according to Brubaker (1992, fn. 15), a legal concept that refers to both objective (common language, culture or traditions) and subjective (attitudes) markers of belonging to a community.

- 25 See also Ireland (1997) for an interesting, although excessively critical, discussion of the rise of xenophobia and racism in Eastern Germany.
- 26 Further information on the full range of statuses available to foreigners residing in Germany may be found in Cyrus (2000).
- 27 Information on the new citizenship and nationality law can be found in English on the following websites: [www.lzz-nrw.de/Aktuell/englisch.html](http://www.lzz-nrw.de/Aktuell/englisch.html) or [www.hamburg.de/Behoerden/Auslaenderbeauftragter/themen/einbuerg/english.pdf](http://www.hamburg.de/Behoerden/Auslaenderbeauftragter/themen/einbuerg/english.pdf) and information on naturalisation applications presented to date at [www.bundesauslaenderbeauftragte.de](http://www.bundesauslaenderbeauftragte.de).

## 5 Southern Europe: a challenge for theory and policy

- 1 The issue is dealt with in more detail in the following section.
- 2 With regard to dominant views of Greek, Italian and Spanish national identities, see section on Xenophobia rising (p. 95).
- 3 See note 11, Chapter 3.
- 4 This conclusion does not aim to overlook class and social factors which divided the Greek nationalist movement (Mavrogordatos 1983). It rather highlights the role of the Great Idea within the conception of the Greek nation.
- 5 *Ethnos* is the Greek word for nation. It indistinguishably denotes both an ethnic group and a nation, thus showing the extent to which the two concepts are interrelated in modern Greek language and culture.
- 6 With regard to the concept of conditional sovereignty in relation to the independent Greek state, see Kaltsas (1965).
- 7 Social psychologists (Tajfel 1978, 1982) sustain that there is a social–psychological mechanism of social comparison which characterises intergroup relations in general and which aims to confirm the superiority of the ingroup.
- 8 The term comes from the word *campanile* (the church’s tower bell) that symbolises the strong affiliation with one’s family, friends, village and local patron who are one’s group of reference and allegiance, and through which one pursues and protects one’s interests.
- 9 Scholars and politicians tend to disagree on this matter. Opinions vary between those who view Italian identity as a feeling of belonging to a civic–territorial community (Rusconi 1993) and those who, like Bocca (1990) or Umberto Bossi, are quite sceptical as to whether an Italian identity exists at all. Nonetheless, debate is fervent over the meaning of ‘Italianness’, the historical roots of the nation and, most importantly, its future. It is worth noting that one of the major Italian publishing houses, Il Mulino, recently launched a new book series entitled ‘*L’identità italiana*’ (the Italian Identity), whose purpose is ‘to re-discover the Italian national identity’ (*Panorama*, 28.5.98: 150–4).
- 10 The belief in the existence of a Spanish national character is an issue debated in contemporary Spain too. Paul Ilie rightly points to the importance of this belief, given that ‘Whether that identity is real or imagined, true or false, Spaniards speak of it and write about it. The Spanish character is a reality in public discourse’ (Ilie 1989: 176).
- 11 It is worth noting that some liberals supported federalism and thought that the old provinces should retain a degree of autonomy (Smith and Mar-Molinero 1996: 5).
- 12 A concise summary of the differences between the centralist liberal vision and the national-Catholic current is provided in Junco Alvarez (1996: 102).
- 13 Junco Alvarez sustains that some sort of syncretic version of Spanish nationalism eventually developed that emphasised the century-long struggle against the Muslims,

- the specific geological and climatic features of the peninsula and the Spanish national character.
- 14 More information on smaller peripheral nationalist movements, such as those in Andalucía or in Valencia, can be found in Smith and Mar-Molinero (1996).
  - 15 Analysing the specific nature of these regional nationalist movements goes beyond the scope of this chapter. However, I will seek to highlight the ways in which peripheral nationalisms influenced the development of a Spanish national identity.
  - 16 The Liberal party had already been irreparably divided because of the contrasting views of different fractions concerning the country's involvement in the war.
  - 17 With regard to the notion and policy of autarky under the Franco regime, see Richards (1995).
  - 18 In particular, Ganivet (1946), Unamuno (1895) and others.
  - 19 There have been many criticisms concerning the logic of these arrangements, the confusion of the division into regions and the effective degree of autonomy granted to them (López Guerra 1989; Corkill 1996: 159–62).
  - 20 The balance between immigration and emigration in Italy acquired positive values for the first time in 1973 (Mura 1995). For more details concerning emigration, return and immigration in Greece, see Fakiolas and King (1996).
  - 21 Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 refer to immigrants with residence permits allowing them to live in the host countries.
  - 22 An up-to-date overview of the immigrant presence in Italy and Greece and the related policy measures adopted in the past decade can be found in Triandafyllidou (2001). See in particular the chapters by Psimmenos and Georgoulas and by Veikou and Triandafyllidou.
  - 23 The term *extracomunitari* means literally people of non-EU origin and is commonly used in Italy to denote immigrants originating from third countries.
  - 24 Estimates vary, although the second number seems the more plausible (see also press releases circulated by e-mail by the Greek Helsinki Monitor and Minority Rights Group ([helsinki@compulink.gr](mailto:helsinki@compulink.gr)) during the summer 1997, in relation to the new presidential decrees on the regularisation of illegal immigrants already present in the Greek territory).
  - 25 Bill 1975/1991 has been modified by Law 2452/1996 concerning refugees and the detention of immigrants, while the decision for their deportation is pending (Kalatzis 1998, personal communication).
  - 26 See Triandafyllidou (1998c) for a detailed critique of Law 1975/1991.
  - 27 The Dublin Convention, which was signed on 15 June 1990 in Dublin by all the then EU Member States, with the exception of Denmark, regulates the issue of refugees/asylum-seekers defining a common visa policy, co-ordinating asylum-seeker policy and promoting collaboration among national public order services (Katsoridas 1996: 13).
  - 28 Convention applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 among the governments of Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and France on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. The Schengen partners decided on 25 June 1991 to grant Greece an observer status following the latter's request on 13 June 1991. The Schengen group was later enlarged through the inclusion of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. However, Greece has become part of the no-internal-border zone inaugurated in March 1995 only in 2000.
  - 29 On 4 April 2001 a new immigration law was passed in the Greek parliament which regulates the entry and stay of foreigners in Greece and includes a new 'amnesty' for undocumented immigrants.
  - 30 Even though it is too early to assess the effect of the new law on immigration control

and immigrant integration into the Italian society, it is worth noting a number of positive features. First, the will of the Italian authorities to deal with immigration as a long-term phenomenon providing for ordinary, rather than extraordinary or temporary, measures and provisions on the matter. Second, the law reiterates and reinforces the equality of treatment and rights between Italians and immigrants. Third, it plans long-term migratory flows with the co-operation of the governments of the immigrants' countries of origin, acknowledging that there is room in the Italian labour market for foreign workers, provided flows and stays are regulated (*Guida al Diritto, Inserito speciale*, 12.09.1998).

- 31 The government expressed its favourable opinion (*RAI1*, evening news, 9.2.1999) towards legalising all applicants who satisfy the necessary conditions, namely having arrived in Italy before 27 March 1998, having a house, a job and no record of criminal offences.
- 32 There is a slight discrepancy between Izquierdo Escribano (1996) (the figure reported here) and Escrivà (1997: 45) concerning the total number of legal immigrants present in Spain at the end of 1994. The author is aware of this discrepancy and has decided to accept both numbers, given the small difference between them.

## 6 Setting the stage, the press discourse

- 1 A slightly different version of the section on Italy was published in Triandafyllidou (1999b). An earlier version of the study of the Greek press discourse can be found in Triandafyllidou A. (1998) 'Οι "άλλοι" ανάμεσα μας – Ελληνική εθνική ταυτότητα και στάσεις προς τους μετανάστες' (The 'others' among us – national identity and attitudes towards immigrants in Greece), in *Κοινωνικές Ανισότητες και Κοινωνικός Αποκλεισμός* (Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Saki Karagiorga Foundation), Athens: Saki Karagiorga Foundation & Exantas, pp. 488–99 (in Greek).
- 2 The term 'Pontian' (or 'Pontic') Greeks refers to people of Greek descent coming from the region of Pontos in north-eastern Turkey. For political or economic reasons, they emigrated mainly during the 1930s and after the Second World War to the ex-Soviet Republics of Georgia, Kazakhstan and Armenia. Pontian Greeks started returning to Greece, which they consider to be their 'homeland', after the collapse of the communist regime and the dismantling of the Soviet Union. An extensive study of the Pontian Greeks and their coming/return to Greece as refugees, repatriates or immigrants is provided in the *Journal of Refugee Studies* (1991).
- 3 'Vorioepiotes' are Albanian citizens of Greek ethnic origin and Christian Orthodox faith who live in southern Albania.
- 4 The following abbreviations are used to refer to the various newspapers and magazines: *KE*, Κυριακάτικη Ελευθεροτυπία; *Vema*, Το Βήμα της Κυριακής; *KK*, Καθημερινή της Κυριακής; *AK*, Απογευματινή της Κυριακής; *PAN*, Panorama; *ESP*, L'Espresso; *EP*, El País; *C16*, Cambio 16; *TRI*, Tribuna de Actualidad. For sources, please see Appendix 6.1. Quotations in this and the following chapters have been translated into English by the author.
- 5 Earlier research (Kuper 1989) suggests that the tendency of one ethnic group to deindividualise another is an indication of imminent ethnic conflict, violence and even of genocidal threat.
- 6 With regard to the existence of such a view, see Junco Alvarez (1996).
- 7 Ceuta and Melilla are the two remaining Spanish colonies on the southern coast of the Mediterranean, neighbouring Morocco on all sides.
- 8 The term 'black' is used here to denote dark skin complexion and not a biological or

cultural category. To indicate this, the term is used throughout this book with a small 'b'.

- 9 The conflictual relationship between '*los moros*' and Spain and the role that the former have played in the formation of a Spanish national identity have already been discussed in the previous chapter. The Roma community, on the other hand, is a marginalised group that suffers from social exclusion even though its members are Spanish citizens with full rights and obligations. Prejudice and discrimination against this community go beyond the immigration phenomenon. Prejudice against black people is more likely to stem from generalised racial prejudice rather than from any past historical experience of contact or conflict between Spain and sub-Saharan African countries.
- 10 'Those who have forgotten the reality of the suitcases and the goodbyes at the departure of the train should start to give credit to those who, each time with more insistence, suggest that Spain is a racist country' (C16 9).
- 11 The term 'ethnicisation' is used here to denote references to the ethnic or genealogical origin of one or more people, and also to the presumed relationship between this origin and some social, cultural or transcendental essence that characterises the members of this ethnic group. The notion of 'racialisation' implies a reference to phenotypic features and to a link that supposedly exists between these and a set of psychological and cultural characteristics typical of a particular 'race'. Both notions therefore contain an allusion to 'natural' difference or commonality. However, ethnicisation is linked to culture, deriving presumably from descent, while racialisation is related to phenotype.

## 7 The political discourse: redefining the nation

- 1 This chapter appeared in a slightly different version in Triandafyllidou (2000). It is reproduced here in accordance with the copyright policy of the *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*.
- 2 The issue categories were mainly aimed at monitoring the issues mentioned by the interviewees, but eventually were not used as indicators of the importance of each issue. Given the small number of interviews analysed, I chose to concentrate on a qualitative type of analysis.
- 3 Names of the interviewees are withheld for confidentiality reasons. For the same reason I do not specify which organisation, ministry, etc. the interviewee represents. I acknowledge that this poses some difficulties for interpretation: for instance a right-wing official from the Ministry of Public Order will not have the same views as a 'leftist' from the Ministry of Education. The following abbreviations are used: GR, Greece; IT, Italy; ESP, Spain; ADM, employees of the national administration; NGO, non-governmental organisations; TU, trade unions.
- 4 With regard to Pontian Greeks and their return to Greece, see the *Journal of Refugee Studies* (1991) Special issue, 4: 4.
- 5 Even though the majority of Pontian Greeks and Vorioepiotes do not speak Greek.
- 6 ... or with the interviewee's view of what the Italian culture ought to be.

## 8 Conclusions

- 1 See Wimmer (1997) for a fuller discussion of this issue.



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